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GENEALOGY OF MORALITY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

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Nietzsche published *On the Genealogy of Morality* in 1887. After that, philosophical works of genealogy started to increase gradually. Even Husserl, a thinker who seemed to never have any direct contact with Nietzsche in his whole life¹, published his last book *Experience and Judgment* with the subtitle “Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic” in 1933 though it was not known if the choice of the subtitle was intentional, not to mention the contemporary most outstanding genealogy philosopher Foucault and others. Although, before and in Nietzsche’s time, there were various philosophical works emphasizing historical consciousness, such as Vico’s *New Science*, Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science of*

¹ In the very detailed *Husserl Chronicle* edited by K. Shuman (*Husserl-Chronik – Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls*, hrsg. von K. Schuhmann, Den Haag 1977), the name of Nietzsche has not appeared even once.

Logic, Dilthey's *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*,² most philosophers would claim as Plato: we are not telling a story.³

Adding strong historical consciousness into contemporary thoughts so that it becomes the main indicator of modern ideas—this is the most outstanding, if not the most important influence of Nietzsche. As he said, “Alles aber ist geworden; es giebt keine ewigen Thatsachen: sowie es keine absoluten Wahrheiten giebt. — Demnach ist das historische Philosophiren von jetzt ab nöthig und mit ihm die Tugend der Bescheidung.”⁴

Ideas of the genealogy of morality belong to this kind of “historical philosophizing”. Genealogy first of all is a term referring to the research on family history. The genealogy of morality, in Nietzsche's own terms, indicates the study of the “development history of moral concepts (Entwicklungsgeschichte der moralischen Begriffe)”.⁵ But what is exactly the goal of studying the development history of moral concept? Nietzsche had a very straightforward description of

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2 Here Dilthey must be mentioned particularly as a contemporary of Nietzsche. This philosopher of history, who focused much on historical consciousness and historical rationality, is one of the representatives who have marked historical consciousness on contemporary thoughts. He and Nietzsche were concerned with not only the philosophy of history, but also the philosophy of life. Maybe just because of this, the attitude of Dilthey towards Nietzsche was not so much the same as that of Husserl towards Nietzsche. He mentioned Nietzsche in his works with a critical attitude though very few times. It seemed that he did not regard Nietzsche as a serious spiritual opponent. For example, in his representative work *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*, he mentioned Nietzsche critically only once: “Nicht durch Introspektion erfassen wir die menschliche Natur. Dies war Nietzsches ungeheure Täuschung. Daher konnte er auch die Bedeutung der Geschichte nicht erfassen.” (W. Dilthey, *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*, GS Bd. VII, Göttingen 1992, S. 250)

3 Heidegger cited Plato's claim “keine Geschichte erzählen” in *Sophist* (242c) in the second paragraph of *Sein und Zeit*, “d.h., Seiendes als Seiendes nicht durch Rückführung auf ein anders Seiendes in seiner Herkunft zu bestimmen”. (*Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen 1979, S. 6) Given this point of view, Heidegger at that time stood right on the opposite side to Nietzsche.

4 F. Nietzsche, *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, Erstes Hauptstück, 2. In: *Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, hrsg. G. Colli u. M. Montinari, München/Berlin/New York 1980, Bd. 2, S. 25.

5 Nietzsche, *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, in: *Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, a.a.O., Bd. 5, S. 289.

his conception of history: “Nur soweit die Historie dem Leben dient, wollen wir ihr dienen.”⁶ From this point of view, the aim of Nietzsche’s genealogy study is no more than: clarifying the present on the basis of the past.

Most of Nietzsche’s books, in the author’s point of view, should be read like literary writings such as essays, proses, dictums, and fables, and they are quite readable as well as thought-provoking. Nietzsche’s mastery of language is beyond suspicion, even though he himself disliked German, at least its sounds.⁷ Only a few of Nietzsche’s books could be regarded as academic works. *On the Genealogy of Morality* should be one of them. It is so academic that Nietzsche warned in advance in the preface that we should not read this book as “modern people”, but “ruminant it” like cows.⁸

What should be noted here is that at the end of the first chapter of this book, Nietzsche made a special annotation (Anmerkung), and it stands for the key idea of Nietzsche’s moral study:

“Ich nehme die Gelegenheit wahr, welche diese Abhandlung mir giebt, um einen Wunsch öffentlich und förmlich auszudrücken, der von mir bisher nur in gelegentlichem Gespräche mit Gelehrten geäußert worden ist: dass nämlich irgend eine philosophische Fakultät sich durch eine Reihe

6 Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen*, in: *Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, a.a.O., Bd. 6, S. 103-110.

7 See: Nietzsche: “Was den Deutschen abgeht”, in: *Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, a.a.O., Bd. 1, S. 245.

8 Nietzsche: *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, in: *Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, a.a.O., Bd. 5, S. 256. – Nietzsche’s books are popular philosophical writings in our times. But at the age of Nietzsche, there were some people who would complain Nietzsche’s works were too difficult to understand, so that Nietzsche had to defend himself like this: “Wenn diese Schrift irgend jemandem unverständlich ist und schlecht zu Ohren geht, so liegt die Schuld, wie mich dünkt, nicht notwendig an mir. Sie ist deutlich genug, vorausgesetzt, was ich voraussetze, dass man zuerst meine früheren Schriften gelesen und einige Mühe dabei nicht gespart hat: diese sind in der Tat nicht leicht zugänglich.” (a.a.O., S. 255) – Eduard von Hartmann also mentioned in his criticism on Nietzsche: “Nietzsche beklagt sich oft darüber, dass die Deutschen seine Bücher nicht verstehen, und entschuldigt dies damit, dass diese Bücher zu tief für das Verständnis der Lebenden seien.” (See: *Ethische Studien*, Leipzig 1898, pp. 34)

akademischer Preisausschreiben um die Förderung moralhistorischer Studien verdient machen möge: - vielleicht dient dies Buch dazu, einen kräftigen Anstoss gerade in solcher Richtung zu geben. In Hinsicht auf eine Möglichkeit dieser Art sei die nachstehende Frage in Vorschlag gebracht: sie verdient ebenso sehr die Aufmerksamkeit der Philologen und Historiker als die der eigentlichen Philosophie-Gelehrten von Beruf. Welche Fingerzeige giebt die Sprachwissenschaft, insbesondere die etymologische Forschung, für die Entwicklungsgeschichte der moralischen Begriffe ab?

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— Andererseits ist es freilich ebenso nöthig, die Theilnahme der Physiologen und Mediciner für diese Probleme (vom Werthe der bisherigen Werthschätzungen) zu gewinnen: wobei es den Fach-Philosophen überlassen sein mag, auch in diesem einzelnen Falle die Fürsprecher und Vermittler zu machen, nachdem es ihnen im Ganzen gelungen ist, das ursprünglich so spröde, so misstrauische Verhältniss zwischen Philosophie, Physiologie und Medicin in den freundschaftlichsten und fruchtbringendsten Austausch umzugestalten. In der That bedürfen alle Gütertafeln, all „du sollst“, von denen die Geschichte oder die ethnologische Forschung weiss, zunächst der physiologischen Beleuchtung und Ausdeutung, eher jedenfalls noch als der psychologischen; alle insgleichen warten auf eine Kritik von seiten der medicinischen Wissenschaft. Die Frage: was ist diese oder jene Gütertafel und „Moral“ werth? will unter die verschiedensten Perspektiven gestellt sein; man kann namentlich das „werth wozu?“ nicht fein genug aus einander legen. Etwas zum Beispiel, das ersichtlich Werth hätte in Hinsicht auf möglichste Dauerfähigkeit einer Rasse (oder auf Steigerung ihrer Anpassungskräfte an ein bestimmtes Klima oder auf Erhaltung der grössten Zahl), hätte durchaus nicht den gleichen Werth, wenn es sich etwa darum handelte, einen stärkeren Typus herauszubilden. Das Wohl der Meisten und das Wohl der Wenigsten sind entgegengesetzte Werth-Gesichtspunkte: an sich schon den ersteren für den höherwerthigen zu halten, wollen wir der Naivetät englischer Biologen überlassen... Alle Wissenschaften haben nunmehr der Zukunfts-Aufgabe des Philosophen vorzuarbeiten: diese Aufgabe dahin verstanden, dass der Philosoph das Problem vom Werthe zu lösen hat, dass er die Rangordnung der Werthe zu bestimmen hat.”⁹

9 Nietzsche: *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, in: *Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, a.a.O., Bd. 5, S. 288f.

In this annotation, what Nietzsche tried to present is his fundamental understanding of the moral study: on one hand, the moral study should be restored as the study of the history of the generation and development of linguistic concepts; on the other hand, the moral study should be restored as the study of issues and history of values constitution. –Of course, the values here refer to the values which must be reevaluated on the ground of physiology, medicine, and ethnography.

II

As all evidence shows, Nietzsche was serious when he proposed this requirement on the future study of moral history in the annotation. Some later philosophers seemed to treat his requirement seriously as well, including some phenomenologists. Although there was no obvious trace of Nietzsche's influence on the genealogy of Husserl's life, *Logical Investigations*, published by Husserl in 1900, the year in which Nietzsche passed away, is regarded as a response to Nietzsche: God is dead!¹⁰ Now human can only accomplish his own responsibility through self-knowledge! Self-mastery has taken the place of God-mastery, whereas human has to be a subjective ego with sufficient rational self-knowing. Moral response to Nietzsche is evident here, though quite indirect. Husserl, on the other hand, was trying to conduct "historical philosophizing". This kind of philosophizing, of course, is not a casual answer to Nietzsche's requirement, but much more a response to his contemporary philosophers, Natorp's and Dilthey's thoughts of

¹⁰ Nietzsche thought that the "huge event" of "God is dead" was still on the way, and required two hundred years to be known. Actually, this event was not declared by Nietzsche, but only cited by him. Before him, Hegel and Martin Luther both analyzed and explained the sentence "God is dead". Counting therefrom, it has been two hundred years of time. For this, see: E. Jüngel, "Friedrich Nietzsche: Atheistische Leidenschaft für die Freiheit", in: <http://debatte.welt.de/kommentare/32521/friedrich-nietzsche-atheistische-leidenschaft-fuer-die-freiheit>. It must be added here that: Nietzsche's real declaration is not "God is dead", but the sentence after that "God remains dead". ("Gott ist tot! Gott bleibt tot!" in: Nietzsche: *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, in: *Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, a.a.O., Bd. 3, S. 481) However, for the Eastern, this sentence has no meaning, for God has never been alive to them.

generation and philosophy of history. However, if moral study should be restored as the study of issues and history of values constitution as Nietzsche proposed, then according to Husserl, “historical philosophizing” should be centered on studying issues of “meaning-constitution and meaning-accumulation”.¹¹

The direct response to Nietzsche could be found in another phenomenologist, Scheler, who obviously took Nietzsche and Kant as two most important spiritual opponents. His symposium, *The Turn-Over of Values*, written between 1911 and 1914, can be regarded as an answer to Nietzsche’s requirement on the moral history study, as well as an answer which proceeds in “vom Edmund Husserl zuerst scharf formulierte ‘phänomenologische Einstellung’”¹². Later, in his representative writing *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, although Scheler took Kant as the direct spiritual opponent, and criticised his ethical formalism from the negative side, the confirmative side of this writing fitted Nietzsche’s requirement for the moral study proposed in *On the Genealogy of Morality* very well: solving the problem of values and stipulating the hierarchy of values.¹³

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In sum, Scheler proposed here that various values constitute an objective and hierarchical system: from sensible values (comfort—discomfort) to life values (nobility—vulgarity), and further up to mental values (good—evil, beauty—ugliness, true—false), until up to the values of the holy and the secular. The relationship of foundations presenting in the hierarchy of values is a four-level partition: values of perception and usefulness, values of life, values of mind, and values of the secular and the holy. Correspondingly, there are four kinds of different feeling-levels: feelings of perception, feelings of life, feelings of mind, and feel-

11 Here a famous definition of “history” given by Husserl in his late work can be referred to: “Geschichte ist von vornherein nichts anderes als die lebendige Bewegung des Miteinander und Ineinander von ursprünglicher Sinnbildung und Sinnsedimentierung.” (Hua VI, S. 380 f.)

12 See: M. Scheler, *Vom Umsturz der Werte – Abhandlung und Aufsätze*, 1972 Francke Verlag, Bern 1955, S. 7.

13 In Nietzsche, the hierarchy of these values is the hierarchy of goods (Rangordnung der Güter). But what discriminates him from Scheler is that he believed that “Die Rangordnung der Güter ist aber keine zu allen Zeiten feste und gleiche.” Whereas, „die einmal angenommene Rangordnung der Güter ... entscheidet jetzt über das Moralisch-sein oder unmoralisch-sein.” (See: Nietzsche, *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, a.a.O., Erstes Hauptstück, 42)

ings of spirit.¹⁴

Here, Scheler believed that values were neither purely subjective nor purely objective. More often he explored a middle ground through the use of phenomenological views, so that he avoided phenomenologism and ontologism in the field of the study of values. The former restores values completely to the individual or group subjective feelings, denying the possibility of values' being-in-itself; the latter regards values as purely objective, denying that values will vary with the change of subjective feelings. —This is similar with the approach of Husserl who opposed presupposing ideas within the human brain as well as outside of it in *Logical Investigations*.

Scheler's way of thinking has indicated that his ethical discussion responds to Nietzsche's requirement indeed, but this response does not mean the acceptance of Nietzsche's standpoint of the moral history study. On the contrary, in view of Nietzsche's annotation cited above, he did more corresponding criticism on the other side. The criticism at least includes the following two aspects:

The first is the criticism on Nietzsche's thought of the ethics of biologism. Nietzsche viewed British biology or Darwin's theory of evolution as the opponent, often disparaging it, for example, in *Twilight of the Idols*, he set forth a specific section against it in special, but unconsciously his thought became influenced by Darwinism and evolutionary ethics, and even fell under a by-product of Darwin's thought: social Darwinism. The inner-relation between Darwin's theory of evolution and Nietzsche's genealogy of morality might be understood as a relation of the claim of the struggle for survival and the claim of the struggle for power, which belongs to the inner-difference of the ethics of biologism. It's right in such an ethical evaluating system that different positions on the problem of moral passions came into being.

Specifically, different from British empiricism, also different from the conclusion of Darwin, the formation of sympathy and conscience would be taken

14 See the further discourse on this problem in the author's "Afterword to the Translation" of the Chinese translation of Scheler's *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, Beijing, Sdx-Joint Publishing Company, 2004, p. 909.

as a result of life decline by Nietzsche, for it went against the powerful trend of original life, and in this sense it was viewed as non-ethical by Nietzsche, at least reactionary in the meaning of ethics. In order to go forward following the path of keeping survival, human must preserve the original trend or primitive impulse, such as reinforcing the will to power, preserving or creating a stronger life type.

Scheler noted this point more or less, so he believed that “Den Irrtum, Leben sei an erster Stelle ‘Daseinserhaltung’, haate ja auch Nietzsche gründlich überwunden, nicht aber den anderen, daß es ausschließlich *Selbsterhaltung*, respektive – nach seiner Auffassung – *Selbstwachstum*.” Thus we can easily understand Scheler’s conclusion: “Vielmehr nahm er [Nietzsche] gerade in *diesem* Punkt die gesamten Irrungen einer falschen und einseitigen Biologie und Psychologie auf, und zwar besonders in der Formulierung, die sie durch das ‚Kampf ums Dasein‘-Prinzip durch Darwin erhalten hatten.”¹⁵

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The second is the criticism on Nietzsche’s nominalistic standpoint of values. Nietzsche advocated the discussion of the problem of values as well as the regulation of the hierarchy of values, but actually there was a presupposition of a fundamental premise in his whole moral ideas: values and their hierarchy are subjective, artificial, and changing over time. Just for this reason, Nietzsche tended to identify the study of morality with the study of moral history, as well as identify the study of phenomenology of morality with the study of genealogy of morality. And just for this reason, Nietzsche put forward such a proposition: “Es giebt gar keine moralischen Phänomene, sondern nur eine moralische Ausdeutung von Phänomenen....”¹⁶ While in the view of Scheler, this showed a basic standpoint of Nietzsche: “die sittlichen Werte würden nur ‚geschaffen‘, oder in wertindifferente Phänomene ‚hineingedeutet‘”¹⁷.

For the position of treating this problem, Scheler and Husserl were almost the same. Maybe they had different opinions on the suquence of foundations of

15 Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik: Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus*, Halle a.d.S. 1921. S. 283.

16 See: Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, Chap. IV, § 108.

17 Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, a.a.O., S. 208.

the idea intuition and the value intuition, but they both asserted that the inner construction of values and the value perception would be independent of man's will, thus they were both against Nietzsche's view about subjective values. Scheler criticised Nietzsche clearly that: " 'Wertgefühle' aber (z.B. 'Achtungsgefühl' usw.) dürfen diese nur darum heißen, weil in der primären Gegebenheit des 'vollen Lebens' die *Werte* selbst noch unmittelbar gegeben waren, derentwegen allein sie ja den Namen 'Wertgefühle' führen."¹⁸ Scheler believed that if denying the over-subjective validity of value-in-itself, moral "standards", "regulations", "judging rules" would have no way to provide a reasonable illustration of its origin, so that it would lead to moral nihilism in the very end.

As a result, the criticism on Nietzsche's moral position from Scheler can be summarized as: "Nietzsche ist vielmehr in die Richtung einer Verneinung des Wertes der Zivilisation und zur Verherrlichung dessen gekommen, was er schließlich die 'blonde Bestie' nannte."¹⁹ – What presents here is a representative basic attitude and position of the advocate of the phenomenology of moral consciousness towards the genealogist of morality.

III

However, this article is not aiming at cleaning the normal responses from phenomenology or phenomenology of moral consciousness to Nietzsche's genealogy of morality, but at discussing a more representative special case in those responses: the relationship between the phenomenology of moral consciousness of Eduard von Hartmann²⁰ and the genealogy of morality of Nietzsche.

Eduard von Hartmann (1842~1906) is contemporary with Nietzsche. He was born merely two years earlier than Nietzsche and passed away six years later

18 Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, a.a.O., S. 207f.

19 Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, a.a.O., S. 289. – In the book *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche ever praised the "noble race" of "carnivores", and called them "blond beast" (blonde Bestie). (Nietzsche: *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, in: *Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, a.a.O., Bd. 5, S. 275)

20 Different from his nephew Nicola Hartmann (1882~1950), who is also a philosopher. The following part will call Eduard von Hartmann as Hartmann for short.

than him. His youthful work *The Philosophy of the Unconscious* (1868) made him famous.²¹ Nevertheless, his later work *The Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness* (1879), which he thought more important and maturer, never obtained any deserved wide concern.

If reviewing the history of the use of term “phenomenology”, then strictly, Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* cannot be counted as a phenomenological work in the usual understanding of today, for it is overly speculative in style while lacking description in methods. Actually, the philosophy of Aristotle and that of Kant would match the title of phenomenology much better, for the former is in reference to its means of classification from the intuitive description used in any research field, while the latter is in term of the whole field of phenomenal issues pointed by his eyes. If judging and evaluating by the most characteristic standard of Husserl’s phenomenology today, we will reach a surprising fact: the contemporary first phenomenological work actually is not Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* (its second volume called “*Phenomenological and Epistemological Investigations*” only in name), but Eduard Hartmann’s *The Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness*. This further means that what the contemporary first phenomenological work in phenomenological style talks about is not the problem of cognitive phenomenology, but the problem of moral phenomenology.

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It’s right in this Hartmann’s work that the problem of phenomenology of moral consciousness is discussed systematically. The human moral system understood by himself is a trinity composed by feeling-morality, reason-morality,

21 Nietzsche called Hartmann as “Schalk” in his *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*, and devoted much space to satirize this work of Hartmann: „seine berühmte Philosophie des Unbewussten – oder um deutlicher zu reden – seine Philosophie der unbewussten Ironie geschrieben. Selten haben wir eine lustigere Erfindung und eine mehr philosophische Schelmelei gelesen als die Hartmanns” (Nietzsche: *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen*, in: *Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, a.a.O., Bd. 1, S. 314)

and taste-morality.²² That means: first of all he is a trialist in the philosophy of morality. Actually trialists in the area of morality can be already found before that, for example, Schleiermacher divided his ethics into doctrine of goods (ethics of habitus), doctrine of duties (ethics of rationality), and doctrine of virtues (ethics of nature).

In the view of Hartmann, his phenomenology of moral consciousness was in substantial agreement with the study of moral concept history and physiology study as Nietzsche required in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, “Er glaubte, mit seiner Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewußtseins bereits das geleistet zu haben, was Nietzsche (in der Anmerkung am Schluß der ersten Abhandlung “Zur Genealogie der Moral”) von künftigen moralhistorischen Studien erwartete: Eine möglichst umfassende Katalogisierung unterschiedlicher moralischer Überzeugungen, deren Entstehungsgeschichte aus dem Unbewußten und deren wissenschaftliche Durchleuchtung (“physiologische Beleuchtung und Ausdeutung”, wie Nietzsche schreibt). Deshalb hat es Hartmann besonders gekränkt, daß Nietzsche seine Ethik nicht gründlich studiert hatte.”²³

Of course, Hartmann didn't think naively that his phenomenology of moral consciousness could be ranked with Nietzsche's genealogy of morality. The main rival assumed by him in this book was Schopenhauer, not Nietzsche.²⁴ This was not because he thought he was closer to Nietzsche, but more because he didn't take Nietzsche as a real philosopher of morality. In fact, in the tradition of German philosophy of morality, Hartmann acted more like Schopenhauer's companion rather than Nietzsche's, for the situation here was not the same as that in French philosophy, British philosophy, and Scottish philosophy. In German philosophy, the

22 The part “feeling-morality” of the book is edited and added the introduction by *Jean-Claude Wolf*, republished in 2006 (Ed. von Hartmann, *Die Gefühlsmoral. Mit einer Einleitung herausgegeben von Jean-Claude Wolf, Philosophische Bibliothek Bd. 587, Felix Meiner Verlag GmbH Hamburg 2006*). The author will accomplish the translation and the publication of this part in the book in the year, and plans to accomplish the translation and the publication of the whole book in recent years.

23 Jean-Claude Wolf, “Einleitung des Herausgebers”, in: Hartmann, *Die Gefühlsmoral, a.a.O.*, S. 11.

24 Hartmann, *Die Gefühlsmoral, a.a.O.*, S. 26.

mental resources of the enhancement of feeling-morality appears quite scarce compared to the overflow of reason-morality. In a broad sense, Nietzsche's thought of morality could be fitted into the category of reason-morality, while "reason-morality" said here is not the same as Kant's rationality of duties, but more like a type of rationality of tools or values. It means: the standard of "rationality" consists in whether it favors the excellence or power of race or not.

The trialism of Hartmann is trialism because he believed that human moral system would be imperfect on a theoretical basis if lacking any one of them. For example, if there was only reason-morality and taste-morality while no feeling-morality, human beings would lack ethical enthusiasm, moral passions, heroism, etc. Therefore, in his point of view, "kann weder die harmonische oberflächlichen, wo eine Abgerundetheit der Geschmacksmoral noch die zur Pedanterien neigende abstrakte Vernunftmoral mit der Gefühlsmoral siegreich konkurrieren."²⁵

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But a complete foothold on feeling-morality, just like a total appeal to sympathy by Schopenhauer, would make a moral system become one-sided and broken. Here when Hartmann criticised Nietzsche's moral claim of anti-sympathy and anti-conscience, he also presented his basic attitude towards the moral consciousness of sympathy and even towards feeling-morality-general: "Deshalb schießt Nietzsches Verwerfung des Mitleids in Bausch und Bogen weit über das Ziel hinaus und erweist sich als ein bloßes Kokettieren mit Barbarei und Bestialität. Unschätzbar als subsidiäre Triebfeder, völlig unzulänglich als allein bestimmendes Prinzip – dies muß unser Endurteil über das Mitgefühl sein."²⁶

Here it shows that, even if Hartmann had special preference to feeling-morality, he would not think that it could take the place of taste-morality and reason-morality.

IV

As discussed till now, we can roughly seize some essential difference between

25 Hartmann mentioned Nietzsche merely five times in the book, but discussed Schopenhauer about sixty times. – But Hartmann used the space of one chapter in *Ethics Study* to discuss "Nietzsches 'neu Moral'". (See: *Ethische Studien*, the same book as above, pp.34-69)

26 Hartmann, *Die Gefühlsmoral*, a.a.O., S. 96.

Nietzsche's suggestion of the study of development history of moral concept and the value-generating process and the suggestion of the study of phenomenology of moral consciousness.

In fact, if there was some similarity and comparability existing between Nietzsche's ethical requirement and certain ethical suggestion to date, then this kind of ethical suggestion should be evolutionary ethics or biological ethics. It does not indicate the evolution of morality, but the evolution as a standard for judging the morality. Here good and evil is understood as good or not good for related species' self-preservation. In Nietzsche, good and evil was understood as good or not good for related species' self-strengthening and self-variation. Ethics was not the problem of "should"(Sollen) any more, but changed to the problem of "will"(Wollen). In other words, there was no traditional ethical appeal at Nietzsche. This is firstly because the traditional ethical requirement "you should"(du sollst) has been replaced by the claim of "I will"(ich will) in the philosophy of will to power.

So far as that is concerned, Nietzsche's philosophy of morality has reached the other realm of "good and evil" in the traditional sense, and has nothing to do with what is generally termed ethics. Just as what we could say to religious ethics that: the problem of the relation of God and human is not ethical in normal sense any more, we could also say to Nietzsche's philosophy of morality that: the problem of the relation between evolving or evolved superman and common man has gone beyond the range of ethical problem in usual sense. No matter whether naming his ideas as non-moral ethics or non-ethical morality, the meaning is the same: they are all superman, all too superman.

All ethics of evolution has an outstanding characteristic: all of morality and values are taken as generated, thus only effective in special historical period of time. This is the view of morality which becomes more and more popular in social life under the deepened influence of modern natural science. Nietzsche was under this influence unconsciously.

The way of taking the morality as certain moral habitus (acquired habitus) is not conflicting with the suggestion of the phenomenology of moral consciousness. On the whole, there does not exist an either-or relationship between

Nietzsche's suggestion on the philosophy of morality and the philosophical theory of phenomenological moral consciousness. That is the reason why the author adopts "and", not "or", in this article's title. The relationship between the phenomenology of moral consciousness and the genealogy of morality is a kind of including and included relation. The former regards the latter as an indispensable component of its own work.

The analysis of human ethical phenomena from the phenomenology of moral consciousness has shown that: Nietzsche's genealogy of morality belongs to the problem scope and work area of the phenomenology of moral habituality. While in the overall study field of the phenomenology of moral consciousness, besides the area of moral habitus, the other two study areas could and should be included: the phenomenological study areas of moral nature and moral rationality. The author ever made a detailed clarification of this threefold division in the article "On the Origin of Moral Consciousness"²⁷. What needs to emphasize here only is that it does not quite agree with Hartmann's triadic philosophy of morality.

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In brief, moral nature indicates some innate and non-acquired moral abilities. They are similar to the virtues in Aristotle. For example, if we say that the virtue of dog or horse lies in the virtue of loyalty, then in the sense of this, we can also view sympathy as moral nature or one of inbred virtues. Surely in Aristotle acquired virtues also exist, that is, acquired moral abilities. They involve acquired cultivated moral abilities. These abilities, on one hand correlate with acquired ethical custom, on the other hand are relevant to rational reflection and judgment. The former is what we call moral habitus or moral habits, while the latter is what we call moral rationality, or Hartmann's reason-morality. The morality of nature and the morality of habitus constitute two types of feeling-morality in the sense of Hartmann. Those three types of moral abilities may interconvert with one another. Moral nature may devolve into acquired ability, while moral habitus and moral rationality may convert into moral nature through meaning-constitution and meaning-accumulation as Husserl pointed out. Many such examples

27 Liangkang Ni, "On the Origin of Moral Consciousness", in *Wen Dao*, Kejian Huang (ed.), Fuzhou, 2007, pp. 47-64.

could be cited, and more than one have found it so.

Kant ever mentioned the following requirement in the area of epistemology: “Alle Metaphysiker sind demnach von ihren Geschäften feierlich und gesetzmäßig so lange suspendiert, bis sie die Frage: *Wie sind synthetische Erkenntnisse a priori möglich?* gnugtuend werden beantwortet haben.”²⁸ Actually this requirement also applies to the field of ethics,²⁹ as long as we use “congenital (angeboren)” instead of “a priori” and use “acquired” instead of “synthetical”. That is a transformation of epistemological concepts into physio-psychological concepts. The work of the phenomenology of moral consciousness is related therewith.

Of course, in reference to the aim of this article, our eyes should be cast mainly on such a problem: could moral study be equal to the study of “the development history of moral concept”? Conversely, can the study of genealogy of morality replace the study of phenomenology of moral consciousness? As discussed above, the answer to this problem surely is negative.

V

We can demonstrate this kind of necessity by a specific case analysis here. Nietzsche's book *Human, All Too Human* was published in 1878, while Hartmann's *The Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness* was published in 1879. There was no sign to show that Hartmann had ever been influenced by Nietzsche on the moral feelings of gratitude and revenge. But the coincidence is that they both had some discussion on the phenomenon of retribution (Vergeltung) in human feeling activities in their respective works. This retribution is divided into two

28 Kant, *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik*, in: *Kant-Werke*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt 1983, Bd. 5, S. 139) While he has said before that: “daß eine gnugtuende Beantwortung dieser einen Frage ein weit anhaltenderes, tieferes, und mühsameres Nachdenken erfordert, als jemals das weitläufigste Werk der Metaphysik, das bei der ersten Erscheinung seinem Verfasser Unsterblichkeit versprach.” (*Kant-Werke*, a.a.O., Bd. 5, S. 138).

29 Surely including the area of linguistics (see the author's article “After national mind and cultural differences—Taking the linguistic philosophical thought of William Humboldt as the starting point”, *Jiangsu Social Sciences*, vol. 3) and the area of etymology as Nietzsche said.

types: gratitude (Dankbarkeit) and revenge (Rache). Their respective descriptive analysis on it right presents that there is a fundamental difference between them.

In the book *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche discussed “gratitude and revenge” particularly in a section: “Der Grund, wesshalb der Mächtige³⁰ dankbar ist, ist dieser. Sein Wohlthäter hat sich durch seine Wohlthat an der Sphäre des Mächtigen gleichsam vergriffen und sich in sie eingedrängt: nun vergreift er sich zur Vergeltung wieder an der Sphäre des Wohlthäters durch den Act der Dankbarkeit. Es ist eine mildere Form der Rache. Ohne die Genugthuung der Dankbarkeit zu haben, würde der Mächtige sich unmächtig gezeigt haben und fürderhin dafür gelten. Desshalb stellt jede Gesellschaft der Guten, das heisst ursprünglich der Mächtigen, die Dankbarkeit unter die ersten Pflichten. – Swift hat den Satz hingeworfen, dass Menschen in dem selben Verhältniss dankbar sind, wie sie Rache hegen.”³¹

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The description of gratitude and revenge here has writers’ free and exaggerated style, but the quoted assertion of the writer Swift constitutes the exception in that paragraph on the contrary. Of course, the main point of this article is not the judgment on Nietzsche’s analysis, but the desire of pointing out the fundamental difference between the genealogy of morality and the phenomenology of moral consciousness.

Hartmann expended great length on analyzing “gratitude and revenge” in his system of the philosophy of morality. In the book *The Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness*, he handled ten types of moral feelings totally, which all belong to nature or impulse or instinct. The fourth type in them is “reverse feeling”(Gegengefühl), also called “retribution-desire” (Vergeltungstrieb). The basic manifestation of this type of instinct is constituted by “gratitude and revenge”. Hartmann described the relation of the instinctive revenge and the rational reflection as such: “das natürliche Gefühl drängt ebenso unwillkürlich zu

30 Nietzsche said here in German “der Mächtige”. If we consider the key concept of his philosophy “Will to Power (Wille zur Macht)”, then this word can be translated to “powerful man” as well.

31 Nietzsche, *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, a.a.O., Erstes Hauptstück, 44, “Dankbarkeit und Rache”.

sofortiger Revanche, wie es zur Notwehr drängt. Im modernen Kulturleben, wo die Reflexion alles überwuchert, kann man die unmittelbare Identität des reaktiven Gegengefühls, aus welchem die Notwehr und die Revanche entspringen, fast nur noch da beobachten, wo die Revanche aus dem Gefühl so schnell erfolgt, daß die Reflexion keine Zeit gehabt hat, sich dazwischenzudrängen (was hernach oft genug zur Reue führt). Sobald die Reflexion Zeit hat, dazwischenzutreten, sucht sie sich der Situation zu bemächtigen und arbeitet da dem Vergeltungstrieb entgegen, wo die Befriedigung des letzteren mit Nachteilen für das eigene Wohl verknüpft, oder auch, wo sie durch höhere sittliche Rücksichten verpönt ist.”³²

There are lots of similar characterizations in Hartmann’s description of the phenomenology of moral consciousness. Compared with the previous discourse of Nietzsche, what demonstrates here first of all is not only the difference between the philosopher and the writer, but also the distinction of their thoughts and expressive styles. The author will explain this point further later. Here attention should be firstly paid on an obvious difference in the conclusion from analysis

Nietzsche held a standpoint in the analysis of morality: the validity of morality and values depends on the context of various times and various cultures. So did the problem of revenge. He believed that, “ wenn jemand Rache der Gerechtigkeit vorzieht, so ist er nach dem Maassstabe einer früheren Cultur moralisch, nach dem der jetzigen unmoralisch.”³³ This kind of relativism of morality and relativism of values extend to the highest scope of morality “good and evil”: “zwischen guten und bösen Handlungen giebt es keinen Unterschied der Gattung, sondern höchstens des Grades.”³⁴ As a matter of fact, judging as such, there is not much room left for discussion. Readers have to either accept it or refuse it. We can even say that the type of revenge and justice is only the distinction of degrees, thus it is relative as well. We even cannot say it is moral or immoral at all, no matter in the past or at today. That means we can only keep silent eventually in moral

32 Hartmann, *Die Gefühlsmoral*, a.a.O., S. 63.

33 Nietzsche, *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, a.a.O., Erstes Hauptstück, 42.

34 Nietzsche, *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, a.a.O., Erstes Hauptstück, 107.

issues. So moral relativists have to cancel their own right of speech in the end.

While in the respect of Hartmann, we see that he pointed out some essential categories of phenomena of the nature of mind, for example, he at least found out certain instinctive issues in the revenge: that means happening involuntarily and without hesitation, and thus he assured that this type of moral feeling had essential difference from moral judgment and moral reflection. His further analysis showed that: the fundamental meaning of the term “criminal law” (Strafrecht) in German is “penalty law”, so any criminal laws are correlated with the means of revenge as certain national behaviors, and so on. In this sense, justice is a promised product of rationality, but it rests on moral nature and moral feelings more or less.

Here we are not planning to introduce Hartmann’s philosophy of morality completely and systematically, but only want to indicate that: some fundamental phenomenological issues can be found in Hartmann.

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VI

Nietzsche’s thought of the genealogy of morality is the unusual voice in his age. Whereas today, though in a morass of internal contradictions, it has represented a kind of general orientation of moral evaluation. Contrary to the circumstances of one hundred years ago, it becomes more and more difficult to resist that attitude of mind instead.

After all, Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality is merely a lead-in in this article, the author hopes that in the very end it could bring out a characterization of the phenomenological work of moral consciousness. What remains unsolved is whether Hartmann’s analysis of moral consciousness is right the model of the analysis of phenomenology of moral consciousness or not. No matter whether Hartmann’s phenomenology of moral consciousness belongs to real descriptive analysis of phenomenology of moral consciousness or not, we can at least try to formulate a few fundamental properties of the phenomenological work of moral consciousness as follows:

- 1) Property of **intuition**: the analysis of phenomenology of moral conscious-

ness is not a contingent idea, not a temporary inspiration, not a casual imagination, neither a speculative assumption. It must be attached to the intuition, that is, a direct hold of moral consciousness in both two aspects of construction and generation. Where the intuition extends to, where the analytic work of phenomenology will proceed. The study of phenomenology of moral consciousness must face moral-consciousness-in-itself directly. At this point, the study of Hartmann is up to the standard of phenomenology, and he “vermittelt ein Bild vom Reichtum moralischer Intuitionen”³⁵.

2) Property of reflection: reflection here indicates that consciousness reflects on its own activities and ways of activity. It is reflexive, introspective, and reflective. The phenomenology of moral consciousness firstly is not the observation and judgment of social mind or national spiritual state, but needs to satisfy the self-evidence within the moral observation of oneself first of all. Specifically, if a phenomenologist of moral consciousness himself never experienced despair, he could not reflect despair in the true sense, neither can he take it as an object of analysis of the phenomenology of moral consciousness—indicating the phenomenology of despair particularly here.

3) Property of **description and interpretation**: the phenomenology of moral consciousness first of all requires a detailed description of the characteristics of conscious phenomenon step by step. This is similar to the method which Husserl used to describe the conscious phenomenon of perception in *Logic Investigations*. That kind of description is also applied to psychology, for assuring the structure of mind. Similarly, the phenomenology of consciousness assures the structure of consciousness by **the method of description**. Secondly, it also traces the generation of consciousness by **the method of interpretation**. This kind of interpretation means to interpret the motivation of consciousness. Through methods of description and interpretation, the phenomenology of consciousness unfolds in two aspects of intentionality longitudinally and transversely, that is, in an aspect of constitutive phenomenology, or in an aspect of generative phenomenology. In this sense, they on one hand are different from the normal value judgment; on

35 J.-C. Wolf, „Einleitung des Herausgebers“, in: Hartmann, *Die Gefühlsmoral*, a.a.O., S. 12.

the other hand they are different from causal explanation in natural science.

4) Property of **neutrality**: this is the work requirement of Husserl to the analysis of phenomenology of perceptual consciousness: with the attitude as a disinterested onlooker, one should try the best to face the thing-in-itself under the circumstances of eliminating all preconceptions and prejudices. The analysis of phenomenology of moral consciousness needs to focus on this requirement in particular. Nietzsche suggested that, "In jeder Philosophie giebt es einen Punkt, wo die ‚Überzeugung‘ des Philosophen auf die Bühne tritt."³⁶ The opinion is profound indeed, and it has been reinvestigated in various tones by Heidegger and almost all the other hermeneutists. But the key point at here and all the other places is: it cannot provide any excuse for the casual understanding and over-annotation of consciousness or thought, but it can be taken just as a warn, that is, asking thinkers to introspect their own standpoint or intervention of "beliefs".

102 Simultaneously it is also building an unreachable critical point ready for the approaching as far as possible.

5) Property of **essence assurance**: this is the elementary property which any analytic work of phenomenology must have, and it surely applies to the phenomenology of moral consciousness too. The study of phenomenology is the intellectual intuition characterized by the certainty of categories. The phenomenology of moral consciousness is not aiming at grasping the moral essence behind the moral phenomena, but at seizing the essence acting as the phenomenon. That means various properties of moral consciousness: nature, habitus, and rationality are all self-given in some way as well as self-appearing directly.

Finally, we may conclude that: on one hand, the relationship between the genealogy of morality and the phenomenology of moral consciousness is in content: the study of the generation history of moral consciousness and the development history of moral concept constitutes an important part in the phenomenology of moral consciousness, at least one third of the domain of problems. While on the other hand, compared to the genealogy of morality, the real merit of the phe-

36 Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, in: *Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, a.a.O., Bd. 5, S. 21.

nomenology of moral consciousness maybe is not the fitted content and topic with the genealogy of morality, but the maturity of methods which is reached due to the initiation and application of those methods by Hartmann, Husserl, Scheler, and others.

Translated by *Yu WANG*