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Economic Restructuring and Democratization of the Media in Postsocialist Countries**

Introduction

When in 1989 and 1990 the old authoritarian structures began to break down with an almost inordinate speed all around Eastern Europe, it was hardly imaginable what were to be the "final" results of these dramatic changes in which civil society played a prominent role. Several attempts of counter-revolution initiated

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by the old power structures took place afterwards in Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. Nationalistic clashes dramatically appeared in a number of former socialist countries previously declaring nations (and nationalisms) as one of the products of capitalism that ought to disappear owing to "proletarian internationalism". In other countries like Albania and Bulgaria, radical changes are still impeded by the old political powers. Nevertheless, it is evident now that no historical turning back is possible any more. In a very short period of time, civil society was created in East-Central Europe; almost overnight, it succeeded to inaugurate parliamentary democracy, but at the same time, the processes of political reconstruction and economic restructuring imperilled again the existence of civil society.

Deregulation and privatization of national economy and the media – particularly the press – are considered by the new power elites in Central-Eastern Europe not only as fundamental prerequisites to solve the weaknesses of bureaucratic control and achieve a higher level of productivity, but also as necessary conditions of general democratization and, thus, the autonomy and development of the media. Arguments for such changes are similar to those prevailing in Western Europe (cf. Keane, 1991) and already *domesticated* in some developing countries. In the classical liberal model of the media, their primary democratic role is defined in terms of a *watchdog* function; accordingly, the media ought to control, and limit the power of, the state authorities. It is precisely this function which determines forms of ownership and organization of the media. Since the primary task is to safeguard the autonomy of the media from the state, and since only the private property is said to ensure such an autonomy, the fundamental condition for a democratic media system is its firm, and exclusive foundation in the free market. Any state or public regulation may essentially limit the critical role of the media. While such a regulation is believed to have been "acceptable" in broadcasting in the period of technological limitations (e.g., because of the "scarcity of frequencies"), contemporary developments in communication technologies (e.g., satellites and cable systems) now support a complete independence of the electronic media from the state, too.

The liberal model of media autonomy

The classical liberal model is based on several normative and historical (partially implicit) assumptions, which is completely neglected by the new Eastern European (de)regulation endeavours. At least four of them should be mentioned here:

(1) In accordance with the traditional conception of the relationship between the state and civil society, where the latter included citizens as the *owners of the production means*, the critical role of the media as "instruments" of civil society was understood in terms of limiting, and preventing the abuses, of state power. The task of the media was to control and limit the principle of maximization of political power.

(2) Before the rise of the mass press on the eve of the 19th century (Splichal 1981a, p. 99), the press was highly politicized and clearly related to party interests. The growth of the mass press and particularly radio and television in the 20th century generated depoliticization of the media and their commercialization based on the growing importance of their entertainment function. This trend obviously

challenged traditional liberal conceptions restricted to the political role of the media.

(3) Traditional divisions between the state and civil society were challenged by the development of new media functions – entertainment and, particularly, advertising – and the economic restructuring of advanced capitalist societies. Similar to the state, agents of “invisible power” (capital), their transnational agglomeration, and the principle of profit maximization they tend to advance, jeopardize the independence of the media and journalists, and the freedom and equality of citizens.

(4) Processes of oligopolization and monopolization in the economy and, specifically, in the media have changed the traditional relationship of independence among the state, capital, and the media. While traditionally, the state wanted to avoid public media control and penetrate the media (e.g., by legal regulation), now it cooperates with media conglomerates which, on their part, try to influence governments and to get governmental support for their projects.

The controversies related to these assumptions make the validity of classical liberal conceptions of the media dubious. As for example Barber (1992, p. 63) demonstrates, “importing free political parties, parliaments, and presses cannot establish a democratic civil society; imposing a free market may even have the opposite effect.” Uncritical imitation of democratic institutions developed in older democratic institutions may be a risky business. Instead, as Dahl (1991, p. 15) suggests, the countries in transition to the inauguration of democratic institutions should “discriminate between the aspects of the mature democratic countries that are essential to democracy and those that are not only *not* essential to it but may be harmful.”

There is no doubt that a centralized socialist economy based on state ownership was both *economically inefficient* and *inimical to democracy*. But it would also be mistaken to believe that “free markets” and private property are the only (or, at least, the best) alternative in both respects. Although an advocacy of any form of socialized markets and social ownership is regarded with considerable suspicion in the period of the proclaimed *laissez-faire* doctrine in East-Central Europe, it should be acknowledged, as Blackburn (1991, p. 234) claims, that “the imposition of narrow commercial criteria menaces the integrity of civil society and hands the initiative to rapacious commercial interests.” The question of an alternative to *laissez-faire* is particularly important for such vital activities in civil society, as are education, science, culture, and communication. Such a critical view is particularly needed, as Becker (1992, p. 13) argues, not only because the extent and forms of privatization of the mass media in Eastern Europe exceed what has been practised in Western capitalism until now, but also, or even primarily because Eastern Europe is becoming a kind of experimental zone for those strategies of privatization activated by Western media capital, which are still held back by the social responsibility doctrine in the West. A policy not willing to restrict the operation of the free market in the media is clearly in favour of *corporate speech* rather than *free speech*; it is far from being a continuation of the ideas of the former democratic opposition in Eastern Europe. Jakubowicz (1992b, p. 72) even maintains that “the results of the Solidarity revolution and the rule of post-Solidarity forces are almost the reverse of what was originally intended.”

The (re)construction of multi-party parliamentary democracy and market economy in Central-Eastern European countries points to the radical changes from socialist statism (sovietism) toward capitalism. The Communist Parties in Central

and Eastern Europe failed to reform their systems which denied "any deference between political and social power, public and private law, and state-sanctioned (dis)information and propaganda and freely circulated public opinion" (Keane 1988, p. 2). The merger of economic and political power in the hands of the state produced a totalitarian, self-obstructing "command" system which was not even able to generate valid information about what is going on in society and, particularly, economy. In short, the autonomy of civil society had been "replaced" by an all-in state. At the same time, the ineffectiveness of socialist economies led to the decay of these countries as typical *peripheral* entities unable to collaborate (let alone to compete) with the core of the developed countries.

New political elites in Central-Eastern Europe generally rejected state socialism and tried to introduce capitalism; consequently, we may expect a total reorganization of society around the logic of capital and market place. A few years ago, the entry of private capital in the arena was politically and ideologically unviable. When discussing "informatization and restructuring of Soviet society", Chereskin and Tsalenko (1989) still pointed to "possibilities and specific features of socialist economy" and rejected capitalist market economy. Now, however, it is believed that these tasks may be assumed only by private companies which may be prepared to supply telecommunications services and to satisfy the demand which far exceeds the supply.

"Privatization IS Democracy" vs. "Privatization OR Democracy"

Leaving aside the question of the feasibility of the new economic policies, contemporary processes of denationalization and privatization in former socialist countries can be challenged from four main perspectives:

(1) The nature of privatization with the dominant role of the state ("centralized privatization") contradicts the proclaimed quest for democratization of society and the state; although the public interest is the key word for governments to justify their efforts toward privatization, it is not a guarantee for an extension of citizens' rights and freedoms. The new key right to private property and private ownership of economic enterprises may support political liberty, but certainly not political equality. It may be that free enterprise is a prerequisite for a free press, but it is also clear that market mechanisms cannot guarantee the diversity and quality of information needed by citizens in a democratic society. As Barber (1992, p. 59) put it, a free market does not equal to an open and democratic society.

(2) Privatization is often considered as an almost universal solution to improve the efficiency of former socialist economies. However, it is in fact more motivated by the need to fill the state treasury than by the economic efficiency, which could be improved also without privatizing, e.g., by introducing competition among public enterprises (Przeworski 1991a, p. 45).

(3) De-nationalization and privatization forced by the state are primarily aimed at redistribution of the wealth and power (for example, the redistribution of control over systems of communications) rather than at a more effective economy; instead of a means to rationalize the economy, they are implemented as *the* (political) goal by itself.

(4) The succeeding of transplantation of Western capitalism and private ownership in postsocialist countries is limited by indigenous social structure and

super-structure of these societies. *Developmentalists* in the late 1950s and early 1960s believed that press freedom correlated with, and spurred on economic growth, but they largely ignored the cultural and historical context which often plagues political development in developing countries toward a Western-type democracy.

In contrast to capitalism, political and economic activities in former socialist countries are still largely monopolized by the state. In practice, for example, the policy of liberalization and privatization in communications applies only to the press and local (or regional) broadcasting while, at the same time, national broadcasting organizations were largely renationalized and put under the direct control concentrated in the hands of the government. The reason for such a contradiction is quite evident: "Privatization" is often used as a *metaphor* to indicate some (and to conceal other) dimensions of much more complex socio-political realities.

Nor is privatization only a question of ideological legitimation. In addition to ideological legitimation, it is even much more important that contemporary privatization policies in Eastern Europe are mainly concerned with allocative control over the economy rather than with the question of ownership itself, or with operational control aimed at an effective use of available resources. They are mainly related to the question of the *redistribution of political power and control* over the economy and aimed against the "red managers" (Mencinger 1991, p. 23). They are – once again, and similar to nationalization performed by the former socialist state – aimed at establishing a new social structure by political force in the hands of the state and the new *effective* owners. As Zeleny (1991, p.) argued, "the selling off social property in the CSFR has been misused for political purposes," which is but "a propaganda in an election campaign for a new totalitarianism."

As a matter of principle, efforts to privatize the whole economy by the state intervention are paradoxical. The historical process of transformation of ownership is namely *asymmetrical*: Although it is possible to nationalize the private sector by state intervention, it is impossible to (re)establish it by the same means. State directed privatization is as voluntaristic as it was the nationalization of the means of production by the revolutionary socialist state. Nevertheless, new East European governments want to re-nationalize former state or social property first – to achieve political control over industrial privatization and over the economy in general. This "ought to assure them, in accordance with the marxist doctrine of production relations and social superstructure, the permanence of power" (Mencinger 1991, p. 23).

The role of political parties and powerful economic actors has been significantly changed during the last century, thus making the borderline between the state and civil society less transparent, but the principal function of mass communication remains, at least theoretically, unchanged. The mass media operate simultaneously in the realms of the state (politics) and economy (within or without civil society) and mediate between them, or, according to Gouldner (1976, p. 123), they "stand *between* the public, on the one side, and, on the other, the official managers of institutions, organizations, movements, or the society's hegemonic elites", thus making the relations of the media "to political parties here and elsewhere, the relations to the business world and to the numerous groups and interests who influence and who are influenced by the public" (Weber 1976, p. 99) the real site of the problem. If the mass media, by definition, link the two opposing spheres and perform simultaneously political and economic functions, **there is no rationality for the media to be totally subsumed under either of them.**

The problem with market liberalism which insists that market competition of the media is the most important precondition of their freedom, is precisely in such an invalid subsumption. Market liberalism assumes that the basic right to private property – because *everyone* has this right – guarantees both freedom of the media (their independence from the state) and freedom of citizens (free choice between different media and contents). In fact, this is clearly an ideal type of “free market” which in practice does not exist due to the processes of capital concentration and centralization. As a consequence, the “free” media market is largely oligopolized, and the “free” choice is severely limited by constrained supply.

The *fundamental failure* of market liberalism is the inability to distinguish, and then comprehend the contradiction *between the economic sphere* (representing either a part of civil society or an autonomous subsystem as conceptualized by Gramsci) *and the political sphere* of the state, “between the economic and the political at the level of their value systems and of the social relations which those value systems require and support” (Garnham 1990, p. 110). If two incompatible – economic and political – sets or systems of values and relations exist, and the media mediate between them, why should they be subjected to the laws of economy rather than polity? The media are political institutions *par excellence*, not just commercial enterprises. By forcing *political communication* to channel itself via *commercial media*, public communication is transformed into the politics of consumerism, and citizens are made into consumers.

There is no doubt the need for the political independence of the media is still great, and perhaps greater than in the past. As Garnham (1990, p. 110) argues, it is also possible that the “pursuit of political freedom may override the search for economic efficiency”. However, this is only one side of the contradiction between the two spheres. The other is that “the extent of possible political freedom is constrained by the level of material productivity.”.

The contradiction between the economic sphere (of civil society) and the political sphere of the state is fully developed in Western capitalist societies. As a number of studies report, the contents of privately owned television stations (still) diverge significantly from those of public corporations in terms of structure and values. However, public broadcaster do not strengthen their distinctive image of serious public affairs journalism, cultural programming and educational programming vis-a-vis commercial stations. On the contrary, they largely yield to the competitive pressures of commercial stations and include more fiction and other “de-nationalized” lightweight entertainment programs. As an NBC executive in the USA pointed out, “a network cannot bow to higher standards if its competitors all round adopt lower ones. It becomes a greyer issue when it’s all around you, and you’re the last person crying ‘Wait a minute’” (Blumler 1991, p. 9).

In the former socialist countries in East-Central Europe, this contradiction is partly “softened” by the absence of a truly developed market economy, and the continuing domination of the state over the economy. At the same time, however, the contradiction is strengthened by the low level of investment in domestic programming. Rising production costs lead to an increase in less expensive imported commercial programs transmitted by “public” television stations. Thus the contradiction between the state and civil society in the media sphere is not just a question of (formal) ownership and control; it is much more a question of values and ideologies dominating the global market.

One of the main questions we have to address is whether, and how, a “postsocialist” civil society can be constructed to “deregulate” the dependence of the

media on the state and/or the market, and to maximize freedom of communication. The situation in East-Central Europe differs from that in the West at least in one crucial dimension. While in the West democratic efforts are aimed particularly at decommodification of the media and limitation of profit-maximizing principle, East-Central Europe is facing only the first consequences of de-nationalization and privatization. Commercial motives of the media are thus often regarded as mainly limiting state penetration, without having any unfavourable consequences. Journalists see media commercialization as an important instrument to achieve their own autonomy from the state, while the question of how the media care for the interests of the citizens is beyond their "professional" interest. The basic problem is the lack of money and capital needed for a practically efficient, not only a nominal privatization, rather than the danger of an excessive power of capital. This makes very feasible a monopolistic coalition between the state and media professionals (journalists); although the latter may now play a more important role than in the former system where a similar coalition existed, the both systems would have in common the exclusion of the third part – the audiences. The domination of any of these three groups – the state, media professionals, and audiences – or coalition between two of them against the third one inevitably produces the imbalance of power and domination of interests of minority (in authoritarian systems) or majority (in paternalistic systems) against the interests of those not participating in the coalition.

In his early writings on freedom of the press, Marx criticized the liberal conception of freedom of the press, which reduced it to, or subsumed it under, freedom of entrepreneurship. At the same time, however, he admitted that "it is no transgression, when a German perceives the unknown goddess of freedom of the press as one of the goddesses he already knows, and accordingly he names her after them, freedom of entrepreneurship or freedom of ownership" (Marx 1974, p. 68). This is exactly the case with the contemporary situation in East-Central Europe after the decades of non-market economy and state controlled media and economy. It is largely believed that freedom of ownership and, particularly, private ownership is the guarantor of democracy and free press. Privatization is seen as the only instrument to reduce and, possibly, abolish state intervention in the media. Private ownership is simply the only "goddess" known and experienced by the majority of people, although to a very limited extent. While freedom of the press was declared as one of the fundamental freedoms (though not of individuals) under the previous regimes, private ownership was banished; now the goddess of private ownership resurrected as did the religion itself. On the other hand, social and economic equality which was the highest value in socialism, is devaluated by the anti-communist "movements" or even declared to be a negative value. Similarly to socialism which neglected, in contrast to Marx's ideas, the culturally progressive side of capitalist expansion (Garnham 1992, p. 3) and developed essentially as *anticapitalism*, *anticommunism* now represents "a total negation of socialist values, the suppression of the entire Marxism and not only Leninism, the rejection of contractual and cooperative relations, and forcing of egoism, competitiveness, and private ownership" (Rus 1992, p. 21).

Apparently, the media in East-Central Europe are not yet dominated by commercial corporate speech – mainly because the process of de-nationalization and privatization of the former state and party owned media is far from being completed – but they continue to exist under another form of domination. The actual autonomy of the media is limited by the state which tries to exhibit and strengthen

its sovereignty. In a way, East-Central European media are in similar position as those in capitalist countries: on the one hand, they are under the persisting pressure of state censorship and control; on the other hand, they are exposed to the "self-contradictory and self-paralysing tendencies of market-based communications media" (Keane 1991, p. 116). Thus, the fundamental question of whether a genuinely democratic communication system can be worked out may be (and should be) addressed simultaneously to both capitalist (commercial) and postsocialist (paternalistic-commercial) systems.

Democratic perspectives of the media in postsocialism

The fundamental difference between the two media systems – the Western capitalist commercial system and the emerging paternal-commercial system in postsocialist countries – is in the fact that East-Central European societies have never experienced political democracy in any full sense. With the exception of Hungary and, partly, Poland which has been often split between Austria, Russia and Prussia, they represented for centuries stateless nations, although with different degrees of autonomy: Bulgarians, Romanians, Serbs and Montenegrins, until the fall of the Ottoman Empire, following the war between Russia and Turkey; Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenians and Croatians until the end of the First World War and the fall of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Both multinational empires were actually destroyed by nationalisms. Similarly to the other two great empires having dominated in Eastern Europe, Russia – though independent itself – always represented the "jail of nations". Political democratization which started in some of these countries after the First World War was blocked by the Second, and after the end of war by Soviet occupation (with the exception of Yugoslavia). As Walzer (1992, p. 164) argues, the internationalism of communists, which was aimed against imperialism of "great empires" and their dynasties, actually owes a great deal precisely to that imperialism.

The absence of any fully developed democratic tradition certainly prevents these countries from establishing an indigenous political democracy compatible with the nature of their own culture(s). The lack of other – mainly economic and technological – resources makes dependency road even more likely to be followed by East-Central European countries. Thus Sparks is right when saying that by "looking at what is entailed in the profitable operation of the press and broadcasting in a developed market economy we can perhaps gain some insight into the future development of the media in the emerging market economies" (Sparks 1991, p. 13). This does not imply that East European societies will simply follow the path traced by those in the West, due to both internal and external (global) limits to growth. However, it does mean that external patterns of growth and "progress" are so powerful that peripheral societies like those in East-Central Europe cannot compete with them successfully. At best they can react and adapt to change in a rational way, but their autonomy or rationality is limited to certain "degrees of freedom" in implementing others' experiences and plans.

The importance of differences between the two systems also applies to "market or democracy" dichotomy which has specific components in the former socialist countries, or even a different nature in comparison to the West, partly because democracy in East-Central Europe is (still) less endangered by the dominant commercial principle of profit maximization, partly because civil society seems to

dispose of more indigenous power. The question of the kind of counter-power civil society has at its disposal is one of the main problems related to its autonomy from both the state and economy. In developed market systems the autonomy of civil society from economy seems problematic because huge economic power is concentrated in economic organizations and the state, while the "alternative power" in the hands of civil society (e.g., moral power and information) is severely limited. In East-Central Europe, however, the influence of intellectuals based on their "cultural capital" and ethical – rather than political or economic – power (still) compares favourably with that held by political and economic actors. Under socialist regimes, the cultural sphere represented the only possible alternative to the institutional political sphere. Important political initiatives against the monopolized political power were taken by intellectuals, mainly writers and social scientists, under the mask of artistic freedom and cultural autonomy.

In a number of former socialist countries, particularly in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, intelligentsia entered upon new political careers after the overthrow of the former regimes. In some cases, this appeared as "selling of intellectuals". However, different parts of the former political "alternative" capitalized their former political investments to different degrees; civil society did not simply "come into power", without having restructured itself. In Slovenia, for example, "the new political order brought most disenchantment to that part of alternative which firmly stuck to the 'anti-political' aims. The core of this project was the rejection of the 'battle for power' and striving for a radical remaking, by arousing the potentials of 'civil society', the relationship between the politics and society" (Bernik 1991, p. 18). Although intellectuals actually caused the decay of civil society by establishing political parties and entering political (state) institutions after democratic elections, they may (and already do) help to reconstruct civil society either from within or from without. In different forms, the early proponents of democratic changes – dissident intellectuals and radical theorists – have been largely dismissed:

Not only the Velvet Revolution but also the "Velvet Evolution" has brought to its initiators and protagonists, or at least to some of them, "hard times". [...] The difference between both cases is that of quantity rather than that of quality: the relatively smooth transition to democracy has enabled at least some of the "theorists" to adapt to the changing circumstances, whereas the rapid changes have made the coping with new situations much more difficult (Bernik 1991, p. 19).

Media democratization might be considered a typical case. Before democratic (r)evolutions, fundamental reforms in the institutions of communication were considered by civil movements essential for any process of democratization. Yet after democratic changes, many of East-Central European broadcast organizations remained essentially unchanged or even re-regulated as typical state institutions by the newly established political elites. A part of the former "antistate" intellectual opposition came once again in the position to require public "protection" of the media against party and/or state interference.

The ruling coalitions see the media, particularly television and radio, as a corporate "democratic" organ of the new "pluralistic" party-state, i.e., in the same perspective as it was regarded by the old authorities. {10} This old authoritarian conception of the total polity practised for decades by the old socialist regimes may be found in other activities as well, for example in controlling nominations of chief personnel in educational, cultural and health institutions, or in wooing intellectuals to become party members or prophets.

As before, the idea of public service media is once again, and quite often used as a cover for paternal or authoritarian communication systems (Williams 1976, p. 134), where a high concern for people is based on the protective role of the media, in contrast to commercial systems which are characterized by a very low concern for recipients *as recipients or users*, and high concern for *consumers* whose consumption capacities can be sold to advertisers. What is now needed is to create a new kind of public service media which would be based on public funding and not controlled by the state or dominated by commercial interests, and characterized by high concerns for production *and* recipients as users who are defined and define themselves in terms of *social and collective needs*, in contrast to consumers who are defined in terms of privatized individual desires. Such a new public system certainly cannot be the *only* system; rather, it should compete with those developed by the state ("paternal systems") and the market ("commercial systems" – See Table 1). But the fact that civil society would have its "own" communication system would make it less vulnerable than it is now, due to a portion of *communication power* it will gain and generate.

Table 1: Types of media systems based on levels and forms of attention to audiences and the media

System	Concern for audiences	Concern for the media
Authoritarian	low (restrictive) ¹	low
Paternal	high (protective) ²	low
Commercial	low (consumptive) ³	high (imperative) ⁴
Democratic	high (supportive) ⁵	high (supportive) ⁶

¹ Authoritarian interest in audiences is restrictive in the sense that it limits, by means of censorship, the amount and diversity of contents available to audiences.

² Paternal interest in audiences is protective, because media controllers aim at protecting audiences against certain kinds of ideas and values which would be damaging to them.

³ Commercial interest in audiences is consumptive, because it considers them only as (potential) consumers of the advertised goods and services.

⁴ Commercial concern for the media is imperative, because technological and professional development of the media is a necessity to survive the market competition.

⁵ Democratic interest in audiences is supportive, because it is aimed at advancing competencies (the right to transmit) and opportunities (the right to receive) of audiences to participate in communication processes, including their access to the media.

⁶ Democratic concern for the media is supportive, because it promotes and subsidizes media diversity.

The main problem is how to limit the control and power held by commercial groups and political institutions in order to protect and increase, and not to injure, the independence of the media, or prevent coalitions between the media and the state or capital, which go to the detriment of "consumers". From a *theoretical* perspective this would imply the inauguration of an "autonomous, 'self-organized' public" (Vreg 1990, p. 317) and "radical democratization" of the public media, political and economic competition (Krueger 1991, pp. 26–28):

(1) The *public use of the media* should allow for a symmetric change between the diverging perspectives of participants and observers. If not, the potentially

public media degenerate into economic enterprises or propaganda departments of the state or political parties.

(2) Institutional autonomization of *political competition* should be counteracted by:

(a) the recognition of the public media as the fourth, "soft" or symbolic-argumentative power, so as to preclude their subordination under one of the three classic powers;

(b) an ever-renewed "federalization" of all four powers to limit their drives toward centralization;

(c) lowering the thresholds of citizen participation in democratic political competition.

(3) *Economic competition* should be socio-culturally regulated:

(a) through the political separation of powers;

(b) through the limitation of the costs of bureaucratization caused by (a);

(c) through the extension of the customary models of co-determination, e.g., by the inclusion of representatives of the public sphere.

What exactly should (or could) be the nature of such a system is certainly beyond the scope of this contribution. Mulgan, for example, believes that three types of "regulation and public control seem likely to survive in most conceivable societies": (1) traditional contents regulation of the core mass media, (2) infrastructure policies to ensure universal access to the basic communication networks and their connectivity, and (3) policies and laws regulating common standards and providing free public services (Mulgan 1991, p. 260). If there is much doubt about institutional forms of future public regulation, it is clear, however, that the market-place alone, or in combination with political (party) pluralism, does not guarantee *equality in freedom*; rather, it is only a terrain for different possible policies and coalitions based on different ideologies. Rolland and Ostbye (1986, p. 122) argue that different media systems are "established, maintained and eventually abolished by decisions made in political system, and only indirectly by actions taken in the market." And it is also clear that, as long as the new media policy in East-Central Europe is based on *anticommunism* rather than on *postsocialism*, the idea of *non-market* and *non-state* driven media will be marginalized even more than in capitalist societies.

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SANDRA BAŠIĆ*

Globalni mediji v lokalnih medijskih okoljih

Tako je vrlina utemeljena v *ljubezni do domovine*; čast v samoljubju /amour propre/; naposled strah v *ljubezni do samega sebe* /amour de soi/, ki ustreza čistemu življenjskemu nagonu po samoohranitvi. Toda strah se v tej ali oni obliki vpisuje v načelo vsake vladavine. V despotizmu gre za *strah pred smrtjo*, v monarhiji za *strah pred mnenjem* in končno v republiki za *strah pred zakonom*.

Alain Grosrichard, Struktura seraja

Medijski sistemi večine postsocialističnih držav delujejo brez urejene zakonodaje na tem področju. Ta zakonodajni prazni prostor omogoča nenehno vmešavanje državnih institucij v urejanje različnih medijskih praks.

Temeljno vprašanje, ki se pojavlja v razpravah o zakonskem urejanju medijske sfere, je povezano na eni strani z vprašanji demokracije in načinom zagotavljanja temeljnih državljskih pravic (svobode izražanja, svobode medijev, avtonomije javnosti...) in na drugi strani z zaščito državnega interesa (maksimiziranje moči države), ki to svobodo omejujejo. Pri tem država »pristaja« na skoraj popolno liberalizacijo tiskanih medijev in obratno, elektronski mediji so praviloma izpostavljeni številnim nadzornim omejitvam. Pri tem je definiranje statusa televizije kot nacionalnega medija posebej vprašljivo. Večina predlogov medijskih zakonov

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