RAZGLABLJANJA
Marian Kcmpny
kulturni sistemi v vzhodni evropi v času tranzicije
(OPOMBE K ISKANJU GLOBALNE LOGIKE V FRAGMENTDRANEM SVETU)!
Pričujoče opomin je tre ha razumeti kot izraz nezadovoljstva - neZadov.....ljst va, ki izvira iz Sfedanjegi stanja
razprav o načinih raziskovanja in analiziranja postkomu-nistične realnosti, s katero se srečujemg danes. Vendar je treba lokalne izzive J kot .so tisti, ki so jih povzročile sedanje preobrazbe družbenega reda v srednje- in Vzhodnoevropskih državah, neizogibno motrili /. vidika globalnih fenomenov. Ti so predme! obravnave v družbeni teoriji v zvezi z refleksijo o tako imenovanem postmodernem preboju • ki velja za večdimenzionalni globalni fenomen. Zato se zastavljajo vprašanja, kot so: Kakšne so postkomunisliOne kulture? Kaj lahko imajo skupnega kulture (družbe), ki so bolj predmoderne kot moderne, daleč od fenomenov, s katerimi se srečujejo nosi moderne (lieri: najbolj razvile, poslindustrijske)? in, spei, kaj imajo lahko skupnega s tako imenovanimi Primitivnimi kulturami, ki naj bi bile prav tako pod pritiskom iste logike post modernizacije?
^ ''iKlar. kakor sam razumem vse 10. moramo, da bi odgo-V(,rili na ta in podobna vprašanja, nujno analizirati prešli,i a rte1
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»nineve. kisov podlagi sodobni: teoretske prakse v družbo-lvlu. še več, moja temeljna trditev je. tla je dejansko treba Prtnovnp premisliti sredstva za dojemanje spreminjajoče se "■^ničnosti ki so na razpolago družboslovju, saj jih je treba ; |ucti kol neke» vrsto stranskega produkta bolj fundamental-Jjl!| vzorcev, ki oblikujejo kulturno itleniilelo obravnavanih uzb, / drugimi besedami, zdi se, tla ima diskiirz o realnosti ! 1,1 zunanje oblike kot znanstveni nietadiskurz ki se danes 'javlja iz "nezaupljivosti do mctanaracij" (kol se je izrazil F. Af,iard) Posledica je neprijetna strateška dilema, v katero
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eni strani se nauk iz postmodern ižma za mnoge Z vaja v ,,uPiieaji|e. tla morajo drilžlioslovci pievzeti fiagmcntirano j" lspi'kii\{), posebej kar zadeva tako imenovane kulturne sniee Po drugi strani pa kaze, da priznanje, da vsi živimo v J ,<w t modernem, fragmenti ranem svetu, implicira, tla je naša perspektiva neizogibno omejena, kar izključuje S |Kisno možnost obrav navanja drugih realnosti, kot tla so jli(>natle brez oken". Vprašanje, ki se zarisuje v ozadju, se z. lllKimi besedami glasi: Kako »globalna" je lahko družbos-iVlla torija, ki je "neobčutljiva" za lokalne naracije in I ol"embno,sti> V praktičnem je/iku se. kol kaže, to strne v P'Jsanju, kako uskladiti težnjo po odkrivanju globalne kul-"le logike z odpravo avtoritele "velikih leorij" v prid mik-"skopskih analiz procesa spreminjanja.
Kol sta se izrazila Marcus in Fischer, "je potreben juvelii jev pogled na svet" < 1986: 25), kar pomeni, tla naj bi si antropologi lx>lj prizadevali najti razlago pričakovanj in indetcrmi na nt kot pa regularnosti in globalnih posledic opazovanih pojavov Kar nameravam dokazovati sam, gre v isto smer. Menim, da mota tisti, ki hoče kpnceptualizirati dinamiko družbe (njeno logiko), najprej premisliti teoretsko logiko družboslovnega raziskovanja Po mojem mnenju je zlahka mogoče opazili močno težnjo, ki se vrli okoli knltnrizacije družboslovne teorije in spremembe statusa ter značaja analiz široko pojmovanih kulturnih vidikov družbenega življenja. Ta težnja je usmerjena v prepoznavanje njihove določujoče vloge* tako na teoretski kol na meta teoretski ravni.
Potemtakem mora prizadevanje po konceptualiziranju "kul turnih sistemov" Vzhodne Evrope spodbujati poskuse po karakterizaciji sprememb, do katerih prihaja v tem delu sveta v smislu preobrazb simboličnih/kulturnih praks, m jih povezati z. reileksijo o kulturnih temeljili družbenega življenja ter tudi s skrbnim premislekom t> kulturnih dejavnikih, ki determinirajo svojsko simbolično prakso - sodobno družboslovje
V mislih imam predvsem Vprašanje, do kolikšne mere imamo lahko transformacije, ki smo jim priča in ki so pogosto zelo spektakularne, za kulturne spremembe? Ali lahko, na primer, govorimo i) regularnosti ali sočasnosti političnih in gospodarskih transformacij na eni Strani in kulturnih spre memb na drugi? Do kolikšne mere so vzhodnoevropske revolucije produkt kulturne spremembe in do kolikšne mere so njen vzrok? Do kolikšne mere so kulturne spremembe vzrok, gonilna sila transformacij, in do kolikšne mere so njihov korelat? lld. Seveda, v sami koncepciji revolucije kol radikalne spremembe, ki zadeva vse vit like družbenega živi jeni a mora biti zajel tudi kulturni dejavnik. Zastavlja pa se vprašanje kakšna je njegova vloga in kako se manifestira njegova funkcija. Če je socialni in politični kaos značilni element revolucije (kol so nekateri raziskovalci eksplicitno izpostavili), mar moremo potem govoriti tudi i> kulturnem kaosu? Ce revolucijo spremljajo velika pričakovanja {kol se običajno poudarja), visoke ambicije in erupcija družbene energije, ali vse to učinkuje ludi na kulturo? Kako se to kaže na področju simbolne prakse?
Dovolj paradoksalnp je, da so bila takšna vprašanja zastavlja na v jeziku, ki je bil bolj abstrakten, ij. v jeziku teorije posredovanja (M. Archer, A. Gidtlens. A, Touraine) ali v historični sociologiji meti njenimi promineninimi predhodniki so bili N. Flias, P. Abrams, C, Tilly in še posebej T. Skocpol (prim, njeno tlelo States and Social Revolutions).
S sklicevanjem na razvoj antropološke teorije bomo dobili dragocen namig, kako implementirati takšno usmeritev.
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GLASNIK 
SED 37/1997, št. 1-2
17
RAZGLABLJANJA
Navsezadnje se v antropologiji kaže, da kategorija kulture ji epe lira pojmovanje, ki nam dopušča obravnavati ¡o kot "niela kategorijo", ki deluje kot posrednik med makre »proces i družbenega nastajanja ali njegove preobrazile in Človekovo aktivnost jo i vključno s simbolnimi praksami) Do tega pride, ker za sodobno antropologijo kultura ni več mehanizem, ki zagotavlja stabilnost socialnega sistema, ampak je posula delavnik. kigenerira spremembo s pomočjo svoje zmožnosti, da poti določenimi pogoji artikulira kompetitivne vizije kulturnih svetov (glej npr. < )rtner 1984).
V leni kontekstu je poučno preučili preobrazbo, .skozi katero jé šla sama k< >ncepcija "kulturnega sistema". Postopni vse večji poudarek na kulturni diskontinuitet i in odprtosti kulturnih sistemov je najboljše izrazil Oeeitz v svoji teoriji kulture. Tak< > pravi: "Analiza kulture se torej ne spusti v heroičen 'holi.stični' naskok na 'temeljne konfiguracije kulture', vse-obsežen red vseh redov' .../, temveč v temeljito preučevanje značilnih simbolov - materialnih posrednikov percepcije. enrocij in razumev anja" ( iy7.V ■ iíM~í). Kljub vsemu pa metafora za kulturne sistemé, na katero se končno sklicuje Cieertz, ni ne pajki iva mreža niti grad iz peska, temveč hobotnica. Še bolj pomembno pa je, da je ta metafora izhajala iz njegove diagnoze < > stanju sodobne humanistike.
Kol je opisal,C. (ieertz t 19H0) v svojem članku lihmvtl G'en-res(Nejasne zvrsti), so hila sedemdeseta leta 20. stoletja tako neverjetna mešanica žanrov, da imamo sedaj v human isti ki opraviti s povsem novimi konfiguracijami človeške misli. Še več. spremenjena usmeritev, s katero so začeli mnogi družboslovci na podlagi odmika od družbenih analogij, izvedenih iz fizikalnih proces< >v. k analogijam s področja analiz simbolnih form (t| k metaforam "igre". 'Vírame", "teksta", sestavljenih iz različnih vrst vedenja), prinaša določen destabilizirajoči učinek ne le na metode, uporabljane v teh znanostih, temveč tudi na njihove cilje. Cieertz verjame, da naraščajoče zanimanje za analize simboličnih sistemov sili znanstvenike zastav Ijati nova vprašanja o razmerjih med preučevale! teli sistemov m tako imenovanim realnim svetom, skratka, kultura postaja manj transparenten medij, skozi katerega raziskovalec "lahko preučuje" družbo, ki postaja nekaj, česar si. recimo tako. mi ne izmislimo, temveč nekaj, v čemer živimo.
To je del težnje sodobnega družboslovja (ali. v širšem smislu, humanist i ke) po problema tiziranju Objektivne realnosti. J. ! tahermas, na primer, ki nadaljuje tradicijo frankfurtske šole, poudarja potrebo po iskanju prehoda od znanja, ki izraža tako imenovano "indirektno zavest" o preverjeni objektivni realnosti. ¡i "kritičnemu" znanju "Kritično" znanje, ki je rezultat "kritiziranega" znanja, je po svojem značaju inet a lingvistično in konstituira svojsko zavest o "indirektni zavesti" tero njenih socio-kulturnih pogojih. Povedano drugače: ta vrsta znanja raziskovalcu ne dopušča identificirati svetovnega nazora, ki mu je dan bolj posredno, z objektivno realnostjo Ta vidik interpretira kot miselno realnost, kot koncept, katerega pojav napoti raziskovalca k iskanju temeljnih določujočih dejavnikov "kritiziranega" znanja, ki je ponovitev vednosti zdravega razuma
Po drugi strani velja v različnih filozofskih usmeritvah od Husserla do posimodernizma za lažno že sama ideja zoper-stavljanja spoznavajočega subjekta in spoznavnega objekta, saj le usmeritve ne obravnavajo niti subjekta niti objekta kot trajnih konstitutivnih virov našega mišljenja ali delovanja. Še več, mnoge oblike postmodernega preobrata v luimanistiki (že samo njihovo število kaže, kako daleč od homogenosti je ta težnja), v katero sodijo, med drugim, francoski poststruk-turalizem, ameriški neopragmatizem, koncepcije, ki izvirajo
11
iz heideggerjanske tradicije ali iz Wittgensteinove filozofije -pomenijo opustitev ohranjanja opravičevanja veljavnosti znanstvenega diskurza, tj. opustitev prepričanja, tla je ta ali oni način mišljenja ali oblikovanja sodb (uporabe "idiomov" mišljenja) mogoče uporabiti samo. če je potrjen. Ne zahteva več vsaka "pripoved" prikaza potrjevalne ali u pravi če val ne "meta-pripovedi"
Zato bi si težko predstavljali koncept kulture, ki ne bi upošteval naslednjih dveh vidikov. Prvič, temeljne kategorije antropološke analize, kot sta "kultura" ali "družba", je mogoče misliti samo znotraj svojskih miselnih konstrukcij, ki odsevajo miselno realnost nekoga drugega. Drugič sama konceptuali-zacija kulturne realnosti pomeni, da mora vključiti teoretsko vprašljivo opozicijo - spozna vn jočega sul >jekta - zavedajoč se, seveda, tla kulturna analiza ni sekundarna glede na "neposredno zavest" o kulturni realnosti, ki obstaja za nekoga nekje v "zunanji" realnosti, temveč da se svet kulture ustvarja ali rekonstruira tudi znotraj znanstvenega diskurza. Še več. tak disku iz konstituira tlel kulture v smislu vsote znanja in pravil argumentiranja, s katerimi razpolagajo posamezniki samo zattv, ker pripadajo skupnosti. Tako recipročno prepletenost znanstvenega diskurza in kulturne realnosti bi ob uporabi Habermasove terminologije lahko definirali kot svojsko kolonizacijo znanosti, ki jo izvede življenjski svet, medtem ko se raziskovalci v vlogi ekspertov za kulturo sklicujejo na kategorije. prenesene v teoretski diskurz iz praktičnih diskurzoV o standardih in vrednotah, ki uporablja|cj koncepte, ki so v dani družbi očitni. Na tem mestu se ne sklicujem po naključju na jezik Habennasovega dela Theorie des kotnmu 11 ¡kult ven Handelns, da bi opozoril na pomen analize vloge znanosti (znanstvene prakse) kot foruma za razpravljanje O zadevah v teoretskem diskurzu. s katerimi naj bi racionalizirali in modernizirali življenjski svet. To, z drugimi besedami, ne pomeni samo, da se n-tič sklicujem na Habermasovo razpravo o razmerju meti teorijo in prakso, ampak nam to sklicevanje omogoča na jasen način ponazoriti pomembno tezo, tla je med znanstvenim diskurzom in zdravo pametjo le fiktivna distanca ali fiktivno razločevanje in da ni resnične avtonomije jezika znanosti
Tako je tudi kulturna analiza, osredotočena na siml">olnc kulturne prakse, sredstvo ali simbolno orodje za potrditev vizije družbenega življenja, ki vsili določeno zaznavo mehanizmov družbenega življenja ali temeljnih družbenih procesov. Sklicujoč se na Habermasovo zasnovo, je "kultura" kot ena od treh komponent, ki sestavljajo življenjski svet, področje kris-talizacije simbolnih praks (znanost je lahko ena od njih) in je tako podvržena kolonizaciji z logiko, ki vodi podsistema sistema - politiko in gospodarstvo. Ta dualistična družbena teorija, ki razločuje in združuje dve enako pomembni kategoriji "Življenjski svet" in "sistem" (gle; Habermas 19S! 171-229)-ter obsega sistematično analizo diferenciacije med tema dvema kategorijama, se nanaša tudi na splošno videnje kulturnega procesa. V tem kontekstu je ključnega pomena Ilabermasova teza o potencialni racionalizaciji (moderni* zaciji) bistvenih komponent življenjskega sveta kot procesa ki otlseva in tudi implicira določene spremembe v sistemu Izkaže se, da v skladu s to usmeritvijo pride z modernizacijo ne le do pojava dveh podsistemov, omenjenih zgoraj, temveč tudi do sprememb na kulturni in družbeni ravni življenjskega sveta s procesoma, ki pogojujeta drug drugega.
Potemtakem ima Habermas dobro podlago za mnenje, da kulturna modernizacija, torej diferenciacija kulturne sfere v skupine institucij, zbranih okrog treh aksioloških sferi Habermas navaja, po Webru, kognitivno-instru mentalne vrednote).
GLASNIK SED 37/1997, št. 1 -2
RAZGLABLJANJA
"mogoča razvoj institucij civilne družite - post-t ra dicional n ih, post-konvenctonalnih, komunikativno koordiniranih in refleksivnih oblik združevanja, izražanja javnega mnenja, vzpostavljanja solidarnostnih vezi in načinov oblikovanja ^entitete. Na podlagi I iabermasove usmeritve J. L Colien in ^ Aru to (1992: ¡21 ff.) obravnavata rekonstrukcijo teorije Clvilne družbe bolj izčrpno. ,Se več, potencialna vez med kulturno racionalizacijo in družbelio racionalizacijo po Haber-ma.sn ni utopični horizont kulturnega modernizma; deloma bila ž.e udejanjena kot rezultat razvoja tržnega gospodarstva 'rt sodobne države (glej Habermas 1992: 5171 It',).
\ endar pa oh tem 1 labermas ponovno ugotavlja, da kulturni ltu>dernizem nikjer ni hil v celoti uresničen, In poudarja, da t1' bila modernizacija zahodnih družb izvedena na tak način.
i sta kulturno osiromašen je in kolonizacija (rcilikacija) življenjskega sveta spodkopala potencialno posodobljeni živ-'ieiijskj svet. Na ta način i labermasova teorija potrjuje tezo o ostajanju vrzeli med kulturami ekspertov in kulturo občestva. ' 1 vrzel v splošnem vodi v obubožanje kulturne razsežnosti Zlvljenjskega sveta, s čimer zaradi omejenega števila verovanj, 11,1 katere se sklicujejo udeleženci interakcij v želji, da hi usk lat]ili svoje interpretacije realnosti, zavira gladko implemen-'■ll'i|<i komunikacijskih praks. Hkrati pa teorija kaže privlačno l,ln' praktičnih diskurzov (splošne komunikacijske prakse.
se izraža I labermas), kadar pride do oblikovanja kulturne 1:1 vni življenjskega sveta tako v kontekstu družbene inte-«'■'cije. predajanju novim generacijam in obnavljanju kul-'"'nega znanja kot v kontekstu oblikovanja posameznih 'dentitet (glej Habermas l<;8ft).
s to teorijo. navedeno za primer, lahko dešifriramo dve temeljni značilnosti, ki se kažeta kot neločljiva dela vsakega 'kretskega poskusa po izčrpnem dojemanju družbene res-tlk tiosli in njene dinamike. Na eni strani torej takšno početje ^sakit temelji na predpostavkah, ki se nanašajo na i neha ni?. Itle in smeri zgodovinskega kulturnega (civilizacijskega) pro-1 '•'sa, predpostavkah, ki se lahko utrdijo samb kot del kulture ^kspenov. Zato je treba objektivno znanje ves čas verificirati ^Iftlc na predpostavke s poznava jočega subjekta, ki se nana* I« na dani objekt Na dmgi strani pa je razlikovanje, podob-1 tazlikt iv aniti med kulturo (življenjskim svetom, če se zave-_ Jmo Mahu-ruiasovih pridržkov do kulti mili.stičnega ožanja /l' 'idrijskega sveta) in .sistemom ki >i dvema vidikoma di užhe, ^' 'dtujljivi atribut tiste usmeritve, ki noče skrčiti svojega po-obravnave le na miselno resničnost ali na reprezen-'ie drnžhenih akleriev.
^ imen zgoraj navedenih razmišljanj je bil prikazati vlogo ^"'inrne kategorije (kulturnega procesa) pri razvijanju 1 '"žhoslovne teorije, ki naj bi pojasniki realnost, v kateri pod Jožico nepovezanih dejstev deluje notranja logika proce-llv modernizacije. Tako rekoč v drugo skrajnost pa lahko 11K'stiuip drugo usmeritev, v kateri "kult uro" obravnavajo kot [' 'seben kontekst, ki omogoča v resničnosti živečemu l1(»Mtnit;zniku dojeti tok takšnih nepovezanih dogodkov kot ! tUmi,h reprezentacij teh dejstev.
P11 se izkaže, da je Oreertzova koncepcija dobra ilustracija "ied " l,sl,,t"', 'lt'v- kL'r združuje prepričanje, da kultura ni ki i' '11 kot so mreže pomenov (semantične strukture), JL|stvai-ja posameznik in v katere je zapleten (prim. C .cerlz 1 ">), in inierpretacijo knlinre kot "fikcije" (v izvornem |	latinske besedp jhno), kot nečesa kar so ustvarili
ls «>v-jlci. Z drugimi besedami, svet. do katerega so prišli
raziskovalci, se nt* nanaša neposredno na neko zunanjo realnost. Mreža simbolov sestavlja avtonomno sfero, na katero ne-kulturni dejavniki nim:l|n vpliva Za razliko od zgoraj omenjenega Habermasovega koncepta, po Katerem postavljanje kulturne ravni življenjskega sveta nasproti sistemu vodi v prepričanje, da obstajajo procesi kolonizacije in dekoloni-zacije življenjskega sveta, ki jih generira skupna logika, pa so koncepti, kakršnega je na primer podal Geeitz, zaradi načela integracije enotni v izločanju "kulture" od "socialnega siste ma". Razločevalna poteza kulture je v tem primeru "logično pomenska" integracija elementov, ta pa je v nasprotju s "kavzalno-funkcionalnim" načelom integracije družbenega sistema.
Podobno sled razmišljanja lahko najdemo v Archerini sociološki teoriji (1988} Archerjeva v bistvu pove naslednje: problem s konceptualizacijo kulturnih kategorij leži v "milu o kulturni integraciji", ki smo ga podedovali od klasične kulturne antropologije (prim. Archer 1988: 4). Logična kohezivnost in konsistentnost kavzalnih razmerij sta za "častilce" lega mita neiazločljivi komponenti, sestavljeni iz dveh analitično ločenih razsežnosti kulturne realnosti - sveta idej (po Archerjevi je to kulturni sistem v ožjem pomenu besede) in razmerij med skupino in posameznikom (sodo-kult urna raven).
Tako pojmovano vprašanje kulturne analize presega enostavno zoperstavljanje kulture in družbene strukture bodisi z obravnavanjem prve kot pojavne oblike slednje (ali narobe) bodisi s priznavanjem njune absolutne avtonomije zato, da bi označili prav odvisnost, ki obstaja na vsaki od posameznih ravni in med njima (podrobne|e glei Archer 1988: I. del) Vendar pa se zdijo posledice sprejetja lega vidika analitičnega dualizma, če uporabim Archerin izraz, nekoliko nenavadne ({TOCitliarJ. V prvi vrsti je za Archer jevo kulturni sistem po def iniciji sistem kulturne inteligibilnosli (.nekaj podobnega |c 1'opperjev Tretji suet objektivnega znanju; yitun. Archer 1988 104 ff.). ki mora biti izražena v skupnem jeziku. Nadalje mora imeti ta sistem zanj značilne poteze (logična razmerja), ki se ne zrcalijo verno v prepričanjih posameznikov. Skratka, "svet miselnih produktov" se kaže kot nekaj popolnoma različnega od sveta človeških pomenov.
Zalo da bi artikulirali kulturni sistem, moramo po Archerjevi predpostaviti, da njegova notranja logična razmerja niso odvisna od konteksta vzročnih odvisnosti, do katerih prihaja med posamezniki, uiti od pomenov, ki |im jih pripisujejo. Se več. sodbe, nastale v zvezi s kulturnim sistemom, iiai hi bile predvidoma brez vsakršne ambivalence. 1'rav tukaj pa se srečamo s klasičnima in nerešljivima antropološkima vprašanjema - z relativnostjo in interpretacijo. Celo Archerjeva pravi (glej 1988: 278), da tako razumljenega kulturnega sistema ni mogoče v celoti opisali, medtem ko teoretsko refleksijo. ki prevladuje v družboslovju, povezuje z izidom dosti bolj negativni sklep. Ce naj hi za družboslovno teorijo post? modernizem pomenil desirukcijo ključne ali celo, kot bi se morda zdelo, konstitutivne kategorije družboslovja, to se pravi kategorije "družbe" (Z. Bauman je prepričan, da je predstavo o leificirani kategoriji družbe nadomestil koncept družbenosti, ki se sklicuje na epizodni značaj družbene realnosti), potem tudi "kultura" dobi novo obliko, kar izhaja iz takšnega drugačnega pojmovanja družbene realnosti.
Ta novi način interpretiranja kulture je že po sami svoji naravi v nasprotju s konceptom "objektivne" kulture kot nečesa, kar ima skupnega določena skupnost ljudi (to je / družbo, razumljeno na tradicionalen način) in katere pripad niki so podobno kulturno usposobljeni. Na splošno povedano je tovrstna usmeritev izražena v poštmoclern ¡stični kritiki pojmovanja kulture kot "razdeljenega znanja", kol
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"norm" ali kot "javnega vedenja" Kot alternativo "kultumenili ali retoričnemu holizmu" (glej Thornton I9SH) ta kritika ponuja vizijo notranje lieterojenih ali celo kompetitivnih oblik (kulturnih praks in spretnosti) V tej situaciji koncepti, kol so "hibridizacija", "decentralizacija", fdekonstrukcija" ali "lokalnost" kulturnega znanja, postajajo glavne kategorije, ki označujejo "kulturo". Če ju opazujemo s tega vidika, je kultura zmeraj videti kot hibrid, ki se sani ločuje od kultni ne tradicije.
Zdi se. da vse. kar je hilo povedano do seda j j razkriva nujno potrebo po ponovnem premisleku ključnega Vpraša rija teli razmišljitfij - do kolikšne mere lahko kulturne analize pomaga j( > pri našem objektnem poznavanju realnosti v post komunističnih svetovih in na kakšnih premisah (predpostavki!h) mora hiti utemeljeno? Že sama dezintegracija komunističnega sistema m kopica različnih interpretacij tega fenomena jedo določene mere razkrila, kako vzorči mišljenja, s katerimi imamo opraviti, determiniralo načine, s pomočjo katerih predstavljajo "logiko" kulturne spremembe.
Raznolikost interpretacij je rezultat razhajanj v predpostavkah - ne le v socioloških, temveč tudi v filozofskih, političnih ali etičnih - na katerih temeljijo. Z, Krasnodebski. na primer, dokazuje (1991). da mnoge interpretacije ne zmorejo doumeti pravega pomena tega pojava, čeprav so 1 ali ko korektne v detajlih. Do tega pride zaradi neustreznosti takšnih izhodišč, ki jih dejansko pogosto privzamejo povsem neosmišljeno. Če se strinjamo s tem, tla razumemo dezintegracijo realnega socializma kot krizo sedanjega časa - tako kot post modernizem naj bi bil tudi komunizem post-', bil naj bi poM-kapiializem in naj bi sklenil vso zgodovino do trenutka ko se je pojavil; tako so se izrazili Krasnodebski (1991: ) in drugi - potem ni mogoče videli komunizma (oziroma, natančneje'; tistega, kar je ostalo od njega) bodisi ekskluzivno v čisti sociološki perspektivi bodisi Zgolj v jeziku dezintegracije političnih in gospodarskih institucij realnega socializma ter v jeziku propada moralnega reda (ob razumevanju komunizma kot etičnega nihili/ma)
Samo / upoštevanjem kulturne razsežnosti in širokega zgodovinskega ozadja tega kompleksnega in večplastnega fenomena - ati zgolj s privzemom idej in viednol, ki so konstitutivne za s i sterile razmišljanja o analizirani realnosti - lahko vidimo v pojavih, ki smo jih že izkusili m v leli. ki jih še doživljamo, nekaj več kol ponovno rojstvo barbarstva, ki je izvorno prišlo z vzhoda. Na la način I ionio tudi opazili vzajemne odvisnosti med bližajočim se padcem komunistične utopije na Vzhodu in Spremembami v zahodnih družbah, ki začenjajo s post industrijsko fazo ali z obdobjem posimoderne
Vendar teza, da je post modernizem, pojmovan kot ideji o posimodernosii. deloma tudi reakcija na eksperiment z "real fiiui socializmom" in na njegove učinke (glej Krasnodebski 1991: 2M i IT ), ne ponuja zadovoljivega pojasnila o mehanizmih kulturne spremembe, ki je bistvo transformacije in pO mnenju mnogih avtorjev omogoča pojav nove kvalitete v družbene realnosti - postmodeino družbo 1'olcintakcni splošnci vprašanje ostane: je g ¡obalno-lokalna polarnost pojasnjevalna ali, bolj preprosto, diagnostična?
Po mojem mnenju želja po rekonstruiran ju realnosti v objektnem jeziku determinira rabo določenega meta jezika, ki je, v tem primeru, medkulturna deskripcija. Spel se torej zastavlja vp ra Strife o karakteristiki takega "diskurza o diskurzu" in o njegovi avtonomiji it ti. Skratka, da bi prišli do objektnega poznavanja procesov, do katerih prihaja v post komunistični resničnosti, potrebujemo kritiko posebne "neposredne zavesti".
ki omogoča refleksijo vprašanj, kot so "vrnitev v Evropo", "pojav civilne družbe" itd,, kot znanstveno deskripcijo teh procesov. To je v veliki meri iskanje kulturnih predpostavk (idej. vrednot), ki segajo - pogosto se tega raziskovalci ne zavedajo - v njihovo "neposredno zavesi", ki je blizu prevladujoči zdravi pameti. Ko gremo po tej poti, iščemo tudi argumente na filozofsko-etični ravni med predpostavkami, ki določajo temeljne predpostavke predmeta ali raziskave.
V njih se kaže prevladujoča tendenca intelektualnih procesov, ki.so značilni za sodobno družboslovje, to je, da se zapletajo v moralne trditve. Kot se je izrazil C.eertz (1980: 35): "Strokovnjak brez duha. ki trosi zdravilne zvarke usmeritev se obnese, toda tudi modri predavateljev) zapiski, ki delijo potrjene sodbe, prav tako delujejo." Medtem pa ie antropologu ostala vloga participacije ob uživanju-enakih-pravic \ procesih interpretacije in reinterpretacije dinžbenega sveta, participacije v etičnem diskurzu. ki skupaj z drugimi avtonomnimi subjekti določa alternativne, fragmentirane kulturne realnosti. Ta misel naj bi bila nekaj več kot zgolj stilistični leitmotiv-pokazala naj bi smer raziskav, ki jih je šele treba izvesti. Kot sam razumem, to pomeni hrepenenje po "lokalnem" in vodi v opuščanje ambicij po global iziran ju antropološkega znanja. Zato moramo, potrjujoč Geertzovo videnje kulture kot 'oktopoidnega sistema', upoštevati "lokalnost" antropološkega znanja, zato da to ne bi preprečilo temeljitega raziskovanja in analize kulturnih reprezentacij procesov, ki so v osnovi post komunistične realnosti. Zatorej se danes ne zdi plodno iskati globalnih civilizacijskih trendov v Vzhodni in Zahodni Evropi, temveč obravnavati partiku-larne impulze, ki bi lahko očitali "množično skupno delovanje /kulturne/ celote" skozi razdruŽevanje gibanja njenih delov.
(Iz angleščine prevedel Božidar jezerni k.) LITERATURA
•	Aiu;i ICR, M. 198«: Culture and Agency. Cambridge
•	BATESON. G. 1936: Na ven. Stratford.
•	COHEN, J. L. and A. ARATO: Civil Society and Political Theory, Cambridge, Mass.
•	GEERTZ, C 1973: The Interpretation of Cultures New York
•	GEERTZ. C. 1983: Blurred Genres, V: local Knowledge New York. ¡'p. 19-35.
•	HABERMAS, j. 1981: Theorie des kommunikativen Hatv delns. Vol, I, Erankfurt/M.
•	HABERMAS, J. 1986: I'ojecic dziafania komunikacyjncg" (uwagi wyjasniajace). V: Kultura i Spoieczeristwo 3, pp 21-44,
•	MARCUS, G. E., and M. M. J, FISCHER 1986: Anthropology as Cultural Critique. Chicago.
•	KRASNODEBSKI, Z. 1991: Waiting for Supermarkets or Downfall of Communism Seen in Postmodern Perspective V: Polish Sociological Bulletin 4, pp. 281-87,
•	LAS!!, S, 1990; Tile Sociology of Postmodernism. London
•	ORTNER, S. B. 1984: Theory in Anthropology since tin-Sixties, V: Comparative Studies in Society and 11 ¡Story 26 I ■ pp 126-166.
•	THORNTON, R.J. 1988: The Rhetoric of Ethnographic Holism. V: Cultural Anthropology 3, pp 285-303.
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M arian Kcmpny
cultural systems of eastern europe in
transition
notes on the search for gi obal logic in fragmented World1
These notes -should be treated as an expression of a dissatisfaction - a dissatisfaction rooted in ihe present state (>t debates about the ways of inquiring and analysing; the postcommunist reality that we face nowadays, ilow-t'ver. local challenges; such as those caused by the present transformations of the social order in Central and '-ist European countries, .should inevitably be observed from tile point of view of global phenomena which, in M>eial theory, are debated in conned ion with reflection "¡'(»I the so-called postmodernist breakthrough - regarded as a multidimensional global phenomenon. ' hai is why questions arise such as: What are posteom-111must cultures like-1 What can lie common to the cullies (societies) which are rather premodeni than "lodern, far from phenomena with which those postmodern (read: most advance, postindusirial) are fated? 'ri turn, what can they have in common with the so-called primitive cultures which allegedly are also under Pressure of the same logic of post modernisation?'
' see it. however, ii is indispensable to analyse tacit ascriptions underlying contemporary theoretical practice in ^ k' social sciences in order to answer these and similar cjues-K,n* furthermore, my basic claim is that the means of grasp-'lie changing realities, which are ai the disposal ot social ^lence, need in fact to be reconsidered, as they should be
,1 11 a kind of by-nroduci of more fundamental patterns
sha
pirkji the cullurai identity of the societies in question. In !| Morels, the:discourse about the reality appears to have saine features as the scientific meiadiscourse emerging 'vtroin "incredulitv towards metanarralives" (asF. Lyotard
Pui it)
^Ollsequently. we are caught in an embarrassing slrategic L "Una. ()n ihe one hand, for many people a lesson of post-^ ^'dernism boils down to a belief thai the social scientist must j ea fragmented perspective, especially as so-called cultural H 1 ls concerned. On the other hand, however, to avow ' w <■■ .il] |(\ e in a postmodern, traginenled world seems to Py that our own perspective is inevitably limited which
P'Ci ludes ;
like w
Wy possibility to deal with other realities as if they
window less monads
In other words, the problem that looms behind is. how* 'global' can social theory be while 'insensitive' to local narratives and concerns. In practical terms this seems to boil down to the question how to reconcile the pursuit of global cultural logic with suspension of the authority of grand theory' in favour of microscopic analyses of the process of change. As Marcus and Fischer put it, "a jeweller's-eye view of I he world is needed" (19H6: JS), what means that anthropologists should seek for explanation of expectations and ludelcrmi-narits rather than regularities and global consequences of phenomena observed.
What 1 am going to argue goes in the same direction. 1 as sume that in order to conceptualise the dynamics of society (its logic) one must previously rethink the theoretical logic ol social inquiry To my mind, a strong tendency revolving around the cultlirisation ot social theory and around the change of the status and character ot the analyses ot (he broadly understood cultural aspects of social life can he easily noticed. The direction of the tendency is to recognise their detenning role both on the theoretical and metatheoretics 1 level. This is why, then, an endeavour to conceptualise cultural systems' of Eastern Europe has to incite the attempts to characterise the changes which are occurring in this part of the world in terms of the transformations of symbolic/cultural practices and to link them with the reflection over the cultural foundations of social life, and also with careful consideration of the cultural factors which determine the peculiar symbolic practice - modern social sciences What 1 especially have in mind is the question to what extent the transformations, often very spectacular, that we witness, can be regarded as cultural changes? For instance, can we lalk of the regularity or paral-lelness of political and economic transformations on the one Hand, and of cultural changes, on tile other? To what extent arc East Furopean revolutions a product of the cultural change, and lo what extent are iliey its cause? To what extent are cultural changes the cause, the driving force of the transformations, and lo what extent are they their correlate?, etc. Of course, in the very concept of revolution as a sweeping cliange which includes all aspects of social life there has to be a cultural factor The question arises, howev er what its role is and how its function manifests itself? If social arid political chaos is a characteristic element of a revolution (as some researchers have explic itly put il), can We then also talk of a cultural chaos? If a revolution is accompanied (as commonly pointed out) by great expectations, high ambitions and an eruption ot social energy, does all this also effect culture?
"t 'h'H.ft urns presi'ttti'd umi it introduction la the session t/flCu Itu red Systems of Eastern Europe in Transition: .	/ Global Cul t it ral Logfe? Iicitl dining tin1 t >th hiterilfittuiuil Coitgtvss t>/Antlirojiolagiatl and Ethnological Science*
k'yk" City. July 29 - August J /99 It
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How is this expressed in Mil* area of symbolic practice? Paradoxically enough, .such questions have been asked in a language which was even more abstract, i.e., m the language <>i the theory ofagency^iM. Archer, A. Giddens, A. Touraine), or in historical sociology (among its prbminent forerunners wete \ Elias, 1- Ah rams, C, Tilly, and especially T. Skocpol (cf. her, Stales am/Social Revolutions), particularly in the past ten years.
If wf refer to tin- development of anthropological theory, we will get a valuable hint how such an approach is to he implemented It is in anthropology after all that the category of culture appears ¡0 be generating an understanding which allows lis to treat it as a "mctacategoiy" thai acts as a mediator between the mauopiocesscs of social becoming, or of its transformation, and human activity (including symbolic practices). It happens so because for modern anthropology culture has ceased to he a mechanism that secures stability of a social system but lias instead become a factor that generates change by means of its ability to articulate, on certain conditions. competitive visions of cultural worlds (see, e.g.. Ortner 1984)s In this context it is instructive to examine the transformation which the very concept of cultural system' has undergone. A gradually growing stress on cultural discontinuity, openness of cultural systems has found the; best expression in Geertzian theory of culture In his view "the analysis of culture conies clown therefore not to an heroic 'holistic' assault upon the basic configurations of tile culture, an overarching order of orders' .../. but to a searching out of significant symbols .../ - the materia] vehicles of perception, emotion, and understanding" l 1973: 'KJH). Nevertheless, it is neither I lie spider w eb nor the pile of sand, but the octopus as a metaphor standing for cultural systems that Gecriz finally refers to. What is even more important is that it resulted from Ins diagnosis of ihe condition of contemporary human sciences.
As described byC, Geertz (19^3) in his article Blurred Genres. the 70s have seen such an incredible mixture of genres thai what we are now dealing with in the humanities are new configurations of human thought. Moreover, the change of approach that many social scientists have made by moving from social analogies* derived from physical processes, to analogies from the area of symbolic form analyses (i.e. metaphors cif "play", of "drama", of "text" made up of various kinds ot behaviour) has a certain destabilising effect not only on the methods used 111 these sciences but also on their aims. Gecriz believes that a growing interest in the analyses of symbolic systems in turn forces scientists to ask anew questions about the relationships between 1 he researcher oft hese systems ami the so-called real world. In short, culture is becoming a less transparent medium, thanks to which the researcher "can examine" society, becoming something which, say. we do not invent but which we live in
I his is ,1 pa it ot a tendency in modern social sciences (or. in broader terms, in the Immanilies) to question objective real-it)' For instance. J. Ilabeimas, who continues the Frankfurt school tradition, stresses the necessity 10 find a passage from the knowledge which expresses 1 he so called "indirect awareness" df the ascertained objective reality to the "critical" knowledge. The "critical" knowledge, which is the result of' "critjcisetl" know ledge, is metalinguistic in character and constitutes a peculiar awareness of tile "indirect awareness" and of its .socio- cultural conditions. In other words, this kind of know ledge does not allow the researcher to identify the work!-view, which he is given rather indirectly, with the ob-
jective reality; it interprets this view as the thought reality, as a concept whose emergence tells the researcher to look for the fundamental determining factors of the "criticised" knowledge which is a repetition of common sense knowledge.
On the other hand, in various philosophical approaches, from Musserl to postmodernism, the very idea of contrasting the knowing subject with the known object is considered a false one because these approaches do not treat either the subject or the object as permanent constitutive sources of our thinking or activities. Moreover, the many versions ot the postmodern turn in the humanities - their number alone shows how far from homogeneous this tendency is, the tendency that includes, among other things, French postjitniau-ralism, American neopragmatism, conceptions which stem from the Heidegger tradition or from Wittgenstein's philosophy - mean the abandonment of the preservance to legitimate the validity of scientific discourse, i.e. giving up the belief that this or that way of thinking or of formulating judgments (of using thought "idioms") can be used only if it is validated Each "narration" no longer demands the presentation of a validating and justifying "metanarralion".
Consequently, it would be hard to imagine a concept of culture without considering these two aspects Firstly, the fundamental categories of anthropological analysis, such as "culture" or "society", are possible to think of only in terms ot peculiar thought constructions which reflect someone else's thought reality. Secondly, tile conceptualisation of the cultural reality alone means having to employ the theoretically questioned opposition - the knowing subject - being aware, however, that cultural analysis is not secondary as regards the "direct awareness" ofa cultural reality that exists for someone somewhere in the "external" reality, but that the world of culture is created or reconstructed also within scientific discourse Moreover, such a discourse constitutes a part ot culture in terms of the amount of knowledge and rules of arguing available to individuals only because they belong to a community. Such a reciprocal entanglement of scientific discourse and cultural reality which, using i labermas's terminology. could be defined as a peculiarcolonisation of science by the life world, at the time when researchers, acting as culture experts, refer to the categories transferred to the theoretical discourse from the practical discourses about standards and values which use concepts that are obvious in a given community, It is no coincidence that 1 refer here to the language1 of 1 labermas's Theorie lies kommunikativen Haruleinsin order to emphasise the importance of the analyses of the role of science (scientific practice) as a forum fot discussing, Within the theoretical discourse, matters which are to rationalise and modernise the life world. In other words, the reference to 1 labermas is not meant just to refer for the n-th time to the discussion on theory - practice relationships; it allows us to exemplify, in a clear way, a significant thesis that there is in fact only a fictitious distance or a fictitious separation ot scientific discourse and common sense, and that there is no real autonomy of the language of science. Thus, cultural analysis, focussed on symbolic/cultural practices, is also a means or a symbolic tool for sanctioning a vision of social life which imposes a certain perception of the mechanisms of social life or of fundamental social processes. Referring to the I labermas' framework, "culture", as one of the three components that make up the life world, is an area of the crystallisation of symbolic practices (science could be one of them), and thus it is subject to colonisation by logic which govern the subsystems of the system - politics and economy. At the same
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time. tliis dualislic social theory w hich singles out and com bines two equally important categories - "the lift- world" and "Hit- system" (see 1.1 laberuias 1981: 171-229), which contains systematic analysis of the differentiation between these two categories. refers to a general vision of the cultural process. In this context, of vital importance is I la hernias' thesis of po-'ential rationalisation (modernisation) of the essential components of the lit e world as of a process that not only reflects 'hii also implicates certain changes in the system.
it turns out that according to this approach, modernisation brings about not only the emergence of the two subsystems, 'Mentioned earlier 111 this work, but also changes on the cultural antisocial levels of the life world, with till* two processes njntlitioning each other,
1 lahermas has therefore a good reason to suggest that it is cultural modernisation, the differentiation of the cultural sphere into groups of institutions gathered around three ax-lOlogK .tl spheres (Mabermas quotes, after Weber, the cogni-'ive instrumental values), that enables the development of the ■nstitutions ot the civil society - the post-traditional, post-con-ventionaj. communicatively coordinaicd and reflexive forms tJf associating ot voicing public opinion, of solidarity bonds ai"id ot shaping identity. On (he basis of I laberiiias' approach l- Cohen and A. Arato ( 1992; esp. i21 If) deal with the re-"-"nsiruction of the civil society theory more exhaustively 1 urthermore. the potential link between cultural rationalisa-ll°n and social rationalisation is not. according to Habermas, ll|c Utopian hon/.on of cultural modernism; it has already u paitly implemented as a result ot the development of "'<■■ free-market economy and modern state (see Habermas 171 ft)
^ I lie same time, however, [lahermas repeatedly stated that ailliu-al modernism had never been fully realised anywhere j'ntl si ressed that the modernisation of Western societies had ^'n carried out in such a way that the potential of the mod-^■'''tiised life world was underuiiued by a cultural impoverish-and colonisation (reificalion) of the life world. In this ^'ay 1 lahermas' theoty itself becomes a confirmation of the ll"sis u| emerging gap between the experts' cultures and "'■'t ot the public in general resulting in the cultural paupen-sai'on of the cultural dimension of tiic life world, thus not l^i'iniitfnjr a smooth implementation of com nuip ¡cation prac t*s because ot ihe limited set of beliefs to which the inter-;ltl'j>n participants refer in their desire to agree on their ""«'piciations of reality. At the same lime, I he theory shows u" captivating powerof praciical discourses (oi the common 1 "'"iiunication practice, as t iaberinas puts it) when it comes '' shaping of the cultural level of the life world both in K' context ot social integration and handing down and redwing the, cultural knowledge and in .(he context of shaping '"dividual identities (see Habermas I9H6), 0L|oted as an example, the theory allows us to spell out two a menial characteristics which seem to be inseparable Parts ot everv theoretical attempt to grasp comprehensively s<H1al reality and its dynamism. Thus on the one hand, an LTt;lking like this is. each time, based on the assumptions l(ii'lllriK l() the mechanisms and directions of the historic CUj: "it h ivilisational) process, assuinplions which are consoli ^ Mt-d only by being part of the experts' culture. In conse-''k'[Ke the objective knowledge is consianlly verified gainst presuppositions which relate lo the given object and ^ h are made by ihe knowing subject. On the other hand, / ' Puliation similar l< > that between culture (the life world keep in mind I lahermas' reservations as to the cultural-
istic narrowing down of the life world) and the system as two aspects of society, is an inalienable attribute of the approach which refuses to narrow its area of deliberation down 10 ihe thought reality or to the representations of social actors.
The above-mentioned deliberations have been aimed at bringing out the role of the cultural category (the cultural process) in an effort to develop a social theory that would explain the reality in which, beneath a magnitude of unconnected facts, there is the internal logic of modernisation processes. At the other extreme, so to say, we could place another approach, according to which "culture" would be treated as a peculiar context which allows an individual who lives in a reality to perceive the stream of such unconnected events as the cultural representations of those facts.
It is again that Geertz's concept is a good illustration ot this kind of approach, as he combines the belief that culture is nothing but webs of significance (semantic structures) which the individual creates and in which he is entangled tel. GeeiTZ 1973:5) with the interpretation of'cnlture as of "fiction" (in the original sense of the Latin tetm fictio), as of something which has been created by the researcher. In other words, the world which the researcher has reached does not directly refer to some external reality, t he network of symbols makes up an
if
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autonomous sphere which is not influenced by non-cultural determining factors. I'nlike Habermas' concept mentioned above in which juxtaposing the cultural level ot the life world versus the system induces a belief that there are processes of colonisation - decolonisation of the life wOrld which are generated by common logic, concepts like the one Geertz came up with are unanimous in isolating "culture" from "the social system"; the reason for this is the principle of integration. The distinguishing feature of culture is here the "logico-meaning-ful" integration of elements which is In contrast with the "causal-functional" principle of social system integration
A similar line of thinking can be found in A. Archer's sociological theory ( 19KH). What Archer says comes down lo this: the problem witli the conceptualisation of the cultural Gate goiy lies in "the myth of cultural integration" that we have inherited from classical cultural anthropology (cf. Archer 19&8: *'i) The components w hich the "worshippers" of this myth find t indistinguishable are the logical cohesion and con sistence of the causative relations which consist of two ana lytical separate dimensions of the cultural reality - the world of ideas (according to Archer, the cultural system in the strict sense of the term) and the relationships between groups and individuals (the socio-cultural level)
So understood, the problem of cultural analysis lies in going beyond the simple contrasting of culture with the social struc-lure either by treating ihe former as the hitter's epipheno menon (or vice versa) or by recognising their absolute autonomy in order lo define precisely the dependence that exists at each of the isolated levels and between them (see in detail Archer 19SSH, pari t). The consequences, however, of adopting this perspective of the analytical dualism, to quote Archer's term, appear to be somewhat peculiar.
First of all, by definition the cultural system is foi Archer a system of cultural iiUelligihllut (.something like Popper's Third World of objective knowledge; cf. Archer l%K: KM If) which have to be expressed in a shared language. In addition, however, this system has lo have features (logical relationships) which are typical of' n and which are not faithfully re-
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fleeted in the beliefs of individuals. In short, "the world ot thought products" appears to he something totally different from the world ol human meanings
According to Archer, in order to articulate the cultural system we have to assume that the logical relationships existing within it do no! depend on the context of the causative dependencies which occur between individuals, nor on the meanings attributed to them. Moreover, the assumption is that statements made in connection with the cultural system are free of any ambivalence. That is exactly w here we face the classical and un solvable anthropological problems-relativity and translation. liven Archer says (see Archer 19H8: 278) that, si i understood, the cultural system cannot he fully described, whereas the theoretical reflection which is prevailing in the social sciences is bound to result in a much more negative c< inclusion.
II. tor social theory, postmodernism is supposed to mean the destruction of the key, or even, as ii might seem, constitute for [Ins discipline, category of "soeieU 1 (/.. Bauman believes that the notion of the reified category of society lias been replaced Ity the concept of sociality which refers to the episodic character of the social reality), then "culture" itself is given a new form as a result ot such different thinking about the social reality
This new wav of interpreting culture is by its very nature contrary to the concept of "objective" culture as of something that is shared by a community of people (that is by the tradi-lionally understood society), whose members have similar cultural equipment. Broadly speaking, this kind ot approach is expressed by the criticism, formulated by the followers of postmodernism, of perceiving culture as "divided knowledge as "norms" <iras "public behaviours As the alternative to "cultural (or relhoric) holism" (see Thornton 1988) this criticism proposes the vision of an internally heterogeneous or even competitive forms (cultural practices and resources). In this situation the concepts, such us "hybridisation", "decentralisation", "deconsmiction". or "localness" of the cultural knowledge become the main categories denoting "culture". Perceived in this perspective, culture always seem to be a hybrid that shuts itself off from the cultural tradition.
It seems that everything that has been said so far reveals the urgent need to rethink the problem which is the key one in these deliberations: To what extent can cultural analysis contribute to our object knowledge of the reality in the postcom munist worlds and on what premises (presuppositions) must it he based? The disintegration of the communist system alone and the bulk of different interpretations of this phenomenon Have revealed to s<>me extent how patterns i if thought at work determine the ways by means of which the 'logic' ol cultural change is represented.
Tile variety of interpretations is a result of the divergence ol assumptions - not only sociological but also philosophical, piilitical or ethical on which they are based For instance, '/.. Krasnodebski argues ( 1991) tliat many interpretations do not grasp the true meaning of this phenomenon, though they can be correct as to details, which is dire to the inadequacies of such premises, which in fact are frequently adopted quite unwittingly. If we agree to perceive the disintegration of real socialism as a crisis of the present lime - just like postmodernism, communism was to be 'post-', it was to lie postcapita I ism and, at the same time, it was to close all history up to
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the moment of lis emergence, as Krusnodejbski (1991: 2H i> and others have put it, then it is impossible to view communism (or rather what is left of it) either exclusively in a purely sociological perspective or only in terms of the disintegration of the political and economic institutions of real socialism or m tentis of the decay of a moral order (while perceiving communism as ethical nihilism).
It is only by taking into consideration cultural dimensions and the broad historical background of this complex and multi-aspect phenomenon - or just by adopting the ideas and values which are constitutive for the systems ot thinking about the analysed reality - that we can see in the phenomena that we have experienced and in those which we are still experiencing something more than the rebirth of barbarism that originally came from the East This will also allow us to see the mutual dependencies that exist between the forthcoming fall of the communist Utopia in the East and the changes in Western societies which are opening the post industrial phase or the postmodern ep<>ch.
1 iowevei. the thesis that postmodernism, understood ;is the idea of postmodernity, is partly a reaction to the "real socialism" experiment and to the effects it has produced (see Kr.is-nodCj'hski 1991: 284 ft .) does not offer a suff icient explanation ot the mechanisms of the cultural change, which is the essence of the transformation that, according to many authors, enables the emergence of a new quality of the social reality the postmodern society. Therefore the general question remains: Is the global/local polarity explanatory or rather simply diagnostic?
"to my mind, the desire to reconstruct reality in the object language determines the use of a certain metalanguage which, in this case, is a metacultural description. The question thus arises again about the characteristics of such a "discourse about discourse" and about us autonomy, etc In short, what we need in order to gain object knowledge about the proc esses that happen in the postcommunist reality is a criticism of a peculiar "direct awareness" which enables reflection such as "the return to Europe", "the emergence of civil society". etc., as a scientific description of these processes. This is largely a search for cultural presuppositions (ideas, values' which interfere, often without the researchers realising it. in their "direct awareness" which is close to the overwhelming common sense. Following this path, we are also looking for arguments that exist on the philosophical-ethical plane among assumptions which determine assumptions underly ing the object or research.
They reflect a prevailing tendency of intellectual processes typical of modern social sciences to be enmeshed in moral claims, As Geertz put it( 1983: 35), "the specialist without spiril dispensing policy nostrums goes, but the lectern sage dispensing approved judgments does as well", whereas the rolf that lias been left to the anthropologist is that of an enjoying" equal rights participant in the processes of the interpretation and re interpretation of the social world, a participant in art ethical discourse who, together with other autonomous sub* jects, determines alternative, fragmented cultural realities This thought should he something more than merely a stylistic leitmotif - it should show the direction of research yet to be1 conducted. As I see it. it means longing for local and lca<-b to suspending of ambitions to globalize anthropologic"1' knowledge. Consequently, endorsing Geertzian view on CU1' lure as an 'octopoid system one should keep in mind such localness' of anthropological knowledge, in order not to obstruct a thorough study and analysis of cultural repi'L*"
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s en rations of processes underlying the post-communist realty. I lence. lather than to look today lor global civilizational trends ¡n Eastern and Western Europe it seems more fruitful deal with particular impulses which could foreshadow 'a massive coactioii ot the -cultural whole' hy clisjointment n)o\ ements of its parts
REFERENCES
' ARCHER, M. 1988: Culfttre and Agency, Cambridge.
*	KaTESON. G. 1936: Navcn. Miallord. ' COIIKN. | I. and A AliATO: Civil Society and t'olilical •
t heory Cambridge, Mass.	•
" GEERTZ, C 1973: The Interpretation of Cultures New York.
*	GEERTZ, C 19«3: Blurred Genres InaLocal Knowledge. New York, I'p 19-35.

I1ABERMAS, J. 1981: Theorie des kommunikatlven Ham delns. Vol. I. Frarikfurt/M.
I IABERMAS, J. 1986: Poj<;de dziatania komunikacyjnego (uvvagi wyiasniaiace). V: Kultura i Spoteczerjistwo 3, pp. 21-44.
MAKC.US, Q. E.,and M. M.J. FISCHER 1986: Anthropology as Cultural Critique. Chicago,
KRASNODtjBSKI, z. 1991: Waiting for Supermarkets or: Downfall oft Communism Seen in Postmodern Perspective. V: Polish Sociological Bulletin 4, pp. 2H1-H7. LAS] 1, S. 1 y90: The Sociology of Postmodernism. London. ORTNER, S B. 1984: Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties In: Comparative Studies in Society and History 26/1, pp. 126-166.
THORNTON, R. J. 19««: The Rhetorieof Ethnographic Holism. In: Cultural Anthropology 3. pp. 285-303-
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