

YOUTH POLITICAL EXTREMISM: METHODS OF EARLY WARNING

Abstract. Background/Objectives: The growth of international terrorism and extremism underpins the relevance of this study. It is essential to prevent (warn of) extremism among young people. In this context, this article focuses on the search for new methods for providing early warning about extremism in the youth environment. Methods: The study offers a new approach to prevent the spread of extremism among young people. Unlike foreign approaches emphasising complicated statistical methods for analysing committed crimes of an extremist nature, the authors propose a method of early diagnosis and prevention of extremist manifestations among young people. In contrast to statistics and sociological surveys, monitoring allows the accurate tracking of real-life social processes and coordination of the work of state and social institutions in combatting extremism.

Keywords: *extremism, extremism prevention, monitoring, tolerance, youth extremism*

Introduction

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, scientific interest in the topic of combating terrorism grew around the world. The number of studies published on the subject rose dramatically (Silke, 2008). An active search for new methods of studying extremism and terrorism may be observed. Studies by American scientists mostly focus on analysing already committed crimes using sophisticated statistical analysis methods (Dugan et al., 2005) and structural modelling methods (Johnson and Braithewaite, 2009). However, the use of statistical methods attracts criticism, with doubts being expressed as to their reliability (Chermak et al., 2012). European scientists began studying extremism and terrorism even before 11 September 2001. For example, a socio-philosophical model of extremism was substantiated

* Sergey Eliseev, PhD in Political Sciences, Professor, St. Petersburg State University, Saint-Petersburg, Russia; Irina Vicentiiy, Senior Lecturer, Murmansk Arctic State University, Apatity, Russia; Vladimir Gluchich, Associate Professor, Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University "LETI", Saint-Petersburg, Russia.

within the modern liberal-democratic system of ethical and political values, according to which extremism acts as a universal antithesis of constitutional order and democracy (Backes, 2007). It stands to reason that young people are most often bearers of extremist views as it becomes increasingly difficult for them to adapt to the dynamics of the changing reality, to the requirements of the market, competition and democracy.

It is important to emphasise that young people are not only involved in perpetrating extremist activity, but with increasing frequency are becoming the victims of extremist crimes. According to American researchers, in 2000 the average age of victims of Jihad was slightly less than 33 years (Gruenewald and Pridemore, 2012). It should also be noted that long-term data of American studies show that friends and family members of criminals more often become victims of criminal offences than strangers (Puzzanchera et al., 2016).

The spread of youth extremism is one of the most acute problems of modern Russia (Zubok and Chuprova, 2008).

Extremism refers to extreme manifestations of intolerance in society. It has become part of modern politics. The growth of extremism requires a search for new methods to detect its formation at an early stage. In our opinion, political intolerance is an indicator of the emergence and development of extremism in certain social groups, particularly among young people.

In the present article, the authors want to combine sociological and criminological approaches to the study of youth extremism. To this end, the article first explains what actions by the Russian state have been successful in combating extremism and terrorism, second, finds a correlation between political intolerance and extremism and, third, justifies methods for monitoring political intolerance as a way of preventing extremism among youth. *The purpose of this article is to describe the possibility of using monitoring political intolerance as a method of providing early warning about extremism by identifying risk groups prone to intolerant behaviour.*

Legal Framework for Countering Extremism in Russia

Extremism has become a real global problem of modern society. Although the issue of extremism is widely discussed, there is still no single interpretation of what it means.

In a sociological framework, extremism refers to political ideologies that oppose a society's core values and principles. For example, exploring the cultural-extremism nexus, Elaine Pressman finds «extremism» to be a culturally relative term in that extremist beliefs depend on one's cultural perspective since a person who holds views considered to be extreme within one cultural context or time may not be considered to hold extremist beliefs in

another cultural context or time. He therefore suggests that «[n]orms and values are intricately bound up in the definition of extremism» (Pressman EDE, 2009).

In liberal democracies, extremism is applied to any ideology that advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and human rights (Neumann, 2010).

In studies of the last decade, much attention has been paid to preventive methods for combating extremism among young people. Several interesting directions can be distinguished among the perspective of ideas of prevention and combating youth extremism. An assessment of the essence of extremism, the causes and content of this phenomenon, its types and ethno-psychological, geographical and other features is provided in the works of T. Bjorgo, R. C. Meldrum, T. J. Young, C. Hay, J. L. Flexon, T. Berecz and K. Domina.

In particular, one author (Bjorgo, 2011) analysed the value orientations and extremist behaviour of young people and proposed preventive measures to work with them. The author argues that, since the nature of extremism is dynamic and diverse, it is useless to target a single prevention strategy for all types of extremist behaviour; it is much more effective to select specific tools suited to each individual type or aspect.

One report (Berecz and Domina, 2012) analyses the impact of migration on the spread of extremism in the European Union. The work tracks the influence of socio-economic and territorial factors on the growth of extremism among youth.

Parameters of the political marginalisation of unemployed and employed young people in Europe are compared in the article by Bay and Blekesaune (2002), where the authors discuss various aspects – political beliefs, political interests and political extremism.

Some works (Bouchard, 2015; Geeraerts and Sanne, 2012; Braddock and Horgan, 2016; Koehler, 2014/15) analyse the influence of the mass media and social networks on youth extremist sentiments.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the studies which emphasise the role of educational institutions and family upbringing as powerful anti-extremist social and ideological factors in the sphere of youth policy. In particular, the UK experience in developing youth's intolerance attitudes to extremism and countering the influence of extremist groups on young people is of interest. The programme is based on “cognitive discoveries” made by high school and college students while developing their own thoughts in discussions and debates about effective strategies for preventing violence and extremism (Clinch, 2011).

We now turn to analysing the practice of combating extremism in Russia.

The British Institute for Economics and Peace annually publishes the

Global Terrorism Index (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). The researchers found that the terrorist threat around the world grew significantly in 2014 when the number of terrorist attacks and number of victims rose. Since 2000, the number of people killed in terrorist attacks has increased nine-fold from 3,329 to 32,658. At the same time, the authors note that in Russia the situation has improved markedly. Russia has made significant progress in the fight against terrorism. Moreover, the number of deaths due to terrorist attacks is falling every year. Which actions by the Russian state have contributed to this success in combating extremism and terrorism?

In the period 2002–2015, a new legal model was developed in Russia along with a new regulatory framework to counter crime. Currently, extremism is one of the biggest threats to the Russian Federation's national security (Message from the President..., 2012). Countering extremism is an important task of the state and society. Over the past 15 years, a new legal framework for combatting terrorism and extremism was created. In 2002, the Federal Law "On Countering Extremist Activity" (Bjorgo, 2011) was passed, formulating general principles for combating extremism in the Russian Federation.

The federal law refers the following to the extremist activity (extremism): forcible change to the foundations of the constitutional system and violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation; public justification of terrorism and other terrorist activity; stirring up of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord; propaganda of an exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the grounds of their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion; violation of human and civil rights and freedoms and lawful interests in connection with a person's social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion; obstruction of the exercise by citizens of their electoral rights and rights to participate in a referendum or violation of voting secrecy, combined with violence or the threat of the use thereof; obstruction of the lawful activities of state authorities, local authorities, electoral commissions, public and religious associations or other organisations, combined with violence or the threat of the use thereof; committing of crimes with the motives set out in indent "f" ["e" in the original Russian] of paragraph 1 of Article 63 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation; propaganda and public display of Nazi emblems or symbols or of emblems or symbols similar to Nazi emblems or symbols to the point of confusion between the two; public calls inciting the carrying out of the aforementioned actions or mass dissemination of knowingly extremist material, and likewise the production or storage thereof with the aim of mass dissemination; the public, knowingly false accusation of an individual holding state office of the Russian Federation or state office of a Russian Federation constituent entity of having committed actions mentioned in the present Article and which constitute offences while discharging their

official duties; organisation and preparation of the aforementioned actions and also incitement of others to commit them; the funding of the aforementioned actions or any assistance for their organisation, preparation and carrying out, including by providing training, printing and material/technical support, telephony or other types of communications links or information services (RF Law FZ-114, 2002).

In 2006, the Strategy of the State Youth Policy of the Russian Federation (Berecz and Domina, 2012) was approved while in 2009 the RF National Security Strategy until 2020 (Strategy of the state, 2006) was adopted. Thus, a new legal framework was created to combat extremism and its spread in the community, especially among youth. However, legal remedies by themselves are insufficient to win the struggle against extremism. It is important to stop extremism feeding its resources. First of all, this refers to human resources, mostly represented by young people. It is today's youth that is increasingly becoming the target of extremist organisations because they not only lack life experience, but are well versed in the advanced technologies which all form part of the arsenal of extremist movements and organisations.

Extremism and Intolerance of Young People in Russia

As evidenced by international studies, states with an unstable political and economic situation (including Russia) are susceptible to extremist crimes in the first place. These conditions lead to the outbreak of extremism as a universal and cynical tool for solving political and economic disputes, entailing the destabilisation of national security. According to Russian statistics and most experts, over the past ten years the number of extremist crimes has been growing in Russia. Whereas 656 extremist crimes were officially registered in 2010, in 2015 the figure had risen to 1,308 (The General Office of Public..., 2016).

The spread of extremism and its manifestations indicate a lack of social adaptation of those involved, and the development of anti-social mindsets that cause aggressive behavioural patterns. Tolerance is an instrument for ensuring social cohesion, especially among individuals and groups whose values differ.

Tolerance is an individual's capacity to have mutual understanding and the ability to perceive respectfully and endure the diversity of the modern world, the presence of different points of view, opinions, values, norms of behaviour therein. Tolerance implies the construction of a tolerant attitude of society (groups) to different ideological theories, moral, religious beliefs, cultural events, and people of different nationalities. However, the phenomenon of tolerance should be better explored "through the back side of tolerance" - via "intolerance" (Soldatova, 2002).

Intolerance (from the *Latin* intolerantia – lack of tolerance, impatience, unendurableness, insufferableness, insolence) as a social and cultural phenomenon is complex and heterogeneous. It can be expressed in a wide range – from mild discomfort and irritation, not shown in behaviour, to various forms of discriminatory behaviour, up to genocide.

While tolerance is underpinned by a willingness to cooperate with people of other cultures, attitudes, beliefs, its opposite – intolerance – is characterised by the rejection of people of other cultures, attitudes and beliefs. It is often based on the idea that ‘own’ is normal, natural, and the ‘other’ is abnormal and unnatural.

This leads to public calls for aggressive, discriminatory, violent acts against others, ‘not ours’, and the approval of discriminatory measures and extremist actions against them. In this capacity, intolerance is closely intertwined with extremism and radicalism.

Paradoxical as it may sound, tolerance must have certain limits beyond which intolerance should arise to the phenomena in which the destructive potential is laid: crime, terrorism, xenophobia and extremism.

At the time, Karl Popper described it as the “‘paradox of tolerance’: Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force” (Popper, 1992).

The results of empirical studies in the Russian Federation show the continuing trend of the growth of social tension, intolerant behaviour and negative attitudes to certain national, ethnic and social groups (Vicentiiy, 2015).

According to the authors of an analytical review prepared by domestic and foreign researchers in 2010, the beginning of the 21st century was marked by increasing violence against individuals and private property in Russia, caused by racism, xenophobia and religious intolerance.

According to Human Rights First, a human rights non-governmental organisation, the number of atrocious crimes accompanied by violence continues to rise steadily in Russia. In 2007, there were 667 victims of racist crimes, including 86 murders. By August 2008, 65 people were killed during racist and other attacks. These are young people who commit the most serious crimes motivated by racism. They are often treated by law enforcement agencies to be minor offences not entailing serious punishment rather than acts of racism. According to some sources, there are around 10,000 neo-Nazi sympathisers, mostly young men united within 150 extremist organisations. A certain degree of extremist sentiments is inherent in different types of

youth movements and may manifest itself in the form of actions provided the life situation is worsening (Yael et al., 2010).

The main causes of these negative phenomena are well known: they include spiritual and moral transformation of society, the large decile coefficient of the income gap between rich and poor, deformation of the education and upbringing system, growth of distrust in the existing social and political institutions. The institutional living environment of young people is the most exposed to changes, both positive and negative (Vicenty, 2015).

The same characteristics are often cited as determinants of the growth of extremist sentiments. It is clear these negative phenomena will not be eradicated in society in the near future. Accordingly, they will still affect the development of intolerance and extremist to some extent.

In this regard, it is important to create a system of measures aimed at countering extremist activity. The Federal Law "On Countering Extremist Activity" directly specifies that, in order to counter extremism, the federal authorities, state authorities of subjects of the Russian Federation, and local self-government shall take, within their competence and on a priority basis, preventive, including educational and promotional, measures aimed at preventing extremist activity.

In this context, a comprehensive system of observations, evaluations and forecasts of changes in the state of political tolerance may serve as a relevant measure for preventing and early warning about extremism among young people in order to identify risk groups with low-tolerance mindsets and potentially inclined to support extremist activity. It is about identifying the first signs of the onset of extremism and preventing its earliest forms. The monitoring of political tolerance should become part of the system for preventing the spread of extremist mindsets among young people.

In this study, youth is considered a "marginal socio-demographic group which, by virtue of age characteristics, differs by little social experience, immature value orientations, the boundary location between the group of adults and a group of children (not yet an adult, but no longer a child), and as extreme maximalism and radicalism in judgment. The age of this social group defines a priori the proneness to conflict, extremism and manifestations of intolerant behaviour" (Yael et al., 2010).

Tolerance in the sociological sense is understood as a social norm which regulates the social interaction of individuals belonging to different cultures and includes respect for the opponents, their worldviews, orientations, values, attitudes, norms and behavioural patterns.

Intolerance in the sociological sense is understood as a deviation from the social norm, which manifests itself in rejection, impatience concerning people of other cultures, attitudes, beliefs, values, norms and behavioural patterns.

Political tolerance is understood as a social norm that regulates the interaction of individuals belonging to different political cultures and includes respect for the political opponent, recognition of the possibility and need for the existence of different political forces, political and philosophical systems, orientations, values, attitudes, norms, political behaviour models etc.

Political intolerance can also be defined as a deviation from the norm. But, in this case, the deviation is more of a socio-cultural nature than a social and legal one. Unlike other areas of public life, intolerance in politics has certain features. Intolerance in politics often has fuzzy or blurred boundaries which may change due to alterations in the alignment of political forces.

Political tolerance in the system of political relations takes the form of institutionalised conflicts, that is, a form of struggle for power according to certain rules (for example, the election institute, the institute of law and judicial system, the institute of parliamentarism, the institution of political party, and others).

Political intolerance is not the same as extremism. But it can escalate into extremism in certain conditions. Therefore, monitoring of political tolerance may be considered a measure for preventing and providing early warning about the spread of extremism.

Extremism is a socio-legal and criminogenic-criminal phenomenon. According to Russian legislation, extremism is characterised by assaults aimed at altering the constitutional order, and at stirring up political, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious hatred or enmity with violence or the threat of its use, causing damage to property, as well as the incitement to commit such acts (Franz, 2013).

Extremism is a threat to the constitutional order of the Russian Federation and democratic human rights and freedoms, as expressed in the internal readiness for activity aimed at achieving the set goals by criminal means (Eliseev and Ustinova, 2010).

It is important to note that young people are increasingly becoming victims of extremist crimes. One aspect regularly observed in murders on ideological grounds: most victims were not familiar to the criminals. These were the occasional relations. It can be argued that the increase in social distance is a characteristic feature of ideologically motivated violence. The absence of a personal acquaintance with a potential victim psychologically facilitates extremists and terrorists committing crimes on ideological, ethnic or religious grounds (Parkin et al., 2015).

Other researchers have noted that extremist crimes are in some ways of a “random” nature. Random people become victims of such crimes (Jeff, 2006).

The theoretical and methodological basis of the empirical study of political tolerance arose from the concept of values as abstract ideas expressing human beliefs about behaviour types and preferred goals, as well as

the theory of social attitudes associated with the ideas of (Richard, 1934; Vladimir, 1979). According to their views, the social attitude instructs the individual to act in a certain way. In various social situations, personal attitudes must manifest themselves in different ways, i.e., situationally, depending on the nature of the social distance.

The methodology for identifying politically tolerant mindsets took into account structural components of the mindset such as an object of the social attitude; the individual's response to the object (positive or negative) which can occur at three levels – cognitive, affective and behavioural. The theory of social attitude assumes that the 'Other' must be specified. Based on the positional approach, this research investigated the attitudes of young people towards Russian political parties.

Quantitative analysis techniques were used as the empirical methods for studying the values and mindsets of political tolerance. The empirical data were collected in the form of a questionnaire. Statistical processing and analysis of the primary empirical data were carried out using the SPSS computer statistical processing program.

Extremism and Political Intolerance of Youth: Results of the Empirical Research

Russian society has entered a phase of generational change. The Millennium generation, now aged 14 to 29 years, has come to replace the older generation (30–51 years). According to sociologists, the new generation should be much less prejudicial than their parents. Globalisation and the simplification of communication of different parts of the world should lead to the development of tolerance, tolerance of each other's different cultures. The same applies to race, nationality, sexual orientation and gender. In order to verify the hypotheses, in the period 2014–2015 the questionnaire method was used in an empirical study of political tolerance of student youth in the Murmansk region.

The said study carried out in the Murmansk region found that the majority of young people were aware of the importance of political tolerance as a value of modern society, but politically tolerant mindsets are formed at a sufficiently low level. In some young people, politically tolerant values are declarative in nature, they are not made actual in terms of interaction with a certain 'political other' – at the level of mindsets, college students are mostly intolerant. Does this mean these young people are prone to extremism? The authors have no unequivocal answer. In our opinion, at present they most likely do not pose a public threat. But in a given situation and in certain circumstances, representatives of this group may take part in extremist activity in one form or another.

In the authors' opinion, the presence of certain intolerant attitudes in an individual's mind towards a particular social or political object cannot be a sign of extremist activity. However, if these separate mindsets take on a systematic character and are transformed into clear ideological views, which are based on the ideas of impatience (intolerance) concerning the fundamental values and principles of society, socio-political forms of its structure and are expressed in psychological readiness to act using violent (illegal) methods, thus implementing extremist ideology, then we have signs of extremist activity.

The available extremist attitudes can be considered a sign of extremist activity. At least, for example, the Terrorism and Extremist Crime Database created in the United States specifies two parameters as their features: first, behavioural, i.e., committing an act of violence, and second attitudinal (Popper, 1992). The absence of the second feature in a crime qualifies it as a simple criminal offence.

Table 1: LEVEL OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE AS A VALUE

	Frequency	%
Low level of political tolerance	7	2.7
Medium level of political tolerance	70	26.9
High level of political tolerance	183	70.4
Total	260	100.0

Source: Vicentiy, 2015: 143.

The study intended to measure students' tolerance mindsets concerning Russian political parties. The methodology covered empirical indicators that reflect the structure of the social attitude consisting of its structural components, such as an object of a social attitude, a social situation in which the object is placed, the individual's response to the object (positive or negative), which can occur at three levels – cognitive, affective and behavioural.

Thus, the respondents' assessments describing their views of the parties as erroneous, dangerous, and an unwillingness to understand their point of view and ideas were used as empirical indicators of political intolerance at the cognitive level. Empirical indicators of intolerance at the affective level contained concepts that describe the respondents' negative emotions relative to the ideas and activities of the political parties, such as hostility or a sense of disrespect. The lack of relevance for a respondent of party pluralism, the focus on the one-party system and the evaluation of certain parties as being unimportant refer to the same level of mindset. Empirical indicators describing the behavioural aspect of the social attitude to a party's intolerance can be expressed in the intention to abolish some political parties, in the refusal to provide quota places to minority parties in parliament, and in the readiness to deny them the right to exercise their right to vote.

The total frequency analysis of the indicators of political tolerance of Russian political parties and the statistical data given in Table 1 show a mixed response of students. Some empirical indicators demonstrated the party intolerance of the majority of students for the Russian parties. This fact then required a further in-depth analysis in terms of the identified specific subgroups of empirical indicators and the use of additional statistical methods.

The index of the students' political tolerance for the entire sample set at the mindset level was 37.6 points. Since the index value on a scale can range from 18 (min) to 72 (max) of points where the interval from 18 to 36 points characterises a low level of party tolerance, the range from 37 to 54 points corresponds to a medium level, and from 55 to 72 a high level, it emerges that one can talk of a medium level of tolerance among students regarding Russian political parties. Frequency analysis revealed the ratio of students' subgroups demonstrating low, medium and high levels of tolerance was 43.1%, 51.9% and 5%, respectively (Table 2).

As may be seen, the percentage of students demonstrating a high level of tolerance for Russian political parties (at the level of social attitude) is very small compared with other subgroups. At the same time, a relatively numerous subgroup of students was intolerant of Russian political parties.

Table 2: LEVEL OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE AS A MINDSET

Tolerance level	Frequency	%
Low	163	43.1
Medium	196	51.9
High	19	5.0
Total	378	100.0

Source: Vicentiy, 2015: 144.

As a whole, an average level of political tolerance characterises youth, which is consistent with the theories on the formation and development of democratic values in general (Gibson et al., 1992; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003) and the results of empirical research into political tolerance in particular (Hasnita and Samsu, 2015).

Detailed comparative analysis of the party tolerance index at different levels of social attitude (where 6 is the min and 24 the max value) revealed no significant differences. The tolerance index at the cognitive level of the attitude was 11.6 points, amounting to 13.3 points at the affective level and 14.9 points at the behavioural level, where the range from 6 to 12 points means a low tolerance level, from 13 to 18 a medium one and 19 to 24 a high level (Tables 3-5). Thus, the study results allow the conclusion that there is a

relationship between the various aspects of tolerance. In this case, it seems that if individuals exhibit some tolerance at any of the attitude levels, they are also tolerant at the other levels. Thus, the relationship between different aspects of tolerance is proven, which is consistent with the results of existing studies (Vicentiy, 2015).

Table 3: STUDENTS' POLITICAL TOLERANCE MINDSET AT THE COGNITIVE LEVEL

Tolerance level	Frequency	%
Low	224	62.7
Medium	119	33.3
High	14	3.9
Total	357	100.0

Source: Eliseev and Vicentiy, 2015: 303.

Table 4: STUDENTS' POLITICAL TOLERANCE MINDSET AT THE AFFECTIVE LEVEL

Tolerance level	Frequency	%
Low	159	43.4
Medium	179	48.9
High	28	7.7
Total	366	100.0


Source: Eliseev and Vicentiy, 2015: 303.

Table 5: STUDENTS' POLITICAL TOLERANCE MINDSET AT THE BEHAVIOURAL LEVEL

Tolerance level	Frequency	%
Low	115	31.2
Medium	171	46.3
High	83	22.5
Total	369	100.0

Source: Eliseev and Vicentiy, 2015: 303.


Figure 1: TOLERANCE/INTOLERANCE AT THREE LEVELS OF STUDENTS' ATTITUDE, IN % BY GROUPS



Source: Eliseev and Ustinova, 2009: 14.

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Figure 2: STUDENTS' TOLERANCE IN THE SITUATION OF INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION AND IN THE SITUATION OF POLITICAL COMPETITION




Source: Eliseev and Ustinova, 2009: 16.

The study found that young people are more intolerant in politics than in the situation of simple interpersonal communication. Comparing the results of measurements in two situations, the authors observe that the number of tolerant persons prevails in situations of interpersonal communication and the number of intolerant ones in the situation of political struggle (Figures 1 and 2).

For clarity, we now compare the levels of students' tolerance/intolerance in the situation of interpersonal communication and the situation of political competition (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: MODELS OF STUDENTS' POLITICAL TOLERANCE, IN %



Source: Eliseev and Ustinova, 2010: 50.

Conclusion

The study presents a new approach to the prevention of extremism among youth. The authors propose using a method of political intolerance monitoring as a means of early diagnosis and preventing extremist manifestations among young people. In the authors' opinion, the monitoring of political tolerance/intolerance enables risk groups to be detected through the identification of politically intolerant mindsets and prevents the further spread of extremist ideology among young people in the early stages of its development.

The research results confirm the findings of previous studies on the role of socio-economic factors in developing youth extremism, emphasising the role

of institutions of family and education as effective anti-extremist social and ideological factors in youth upbringing. The research showed that in families with a high level of wealth status tolerant children are more often brought up, while in families with a low level of financial standing, on the contrary, the children are intolerant. Our findings are consistent with the opinion of American scientists on the impact of the family and especially of the mother's social status on the processes of youth socialisation and fostering tolerance of other people. They also confirm the conclusion of British scientists on the role of education in developing youth's mindsets that are intolerant of extremism and countering the influence of extremist groups on young individuals.

The research results hold practical value for the state government, administrative bodies and the police in terms of improving their work with risk groups and preventing the spread of extremism among young people.

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