

STATE, NATION AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE: DEMOCRATIC STATES WITHOUT NATIONS

Heinz Gärtner

Introduction

Two debates on different levels have influenced our understanding of the role of the state in international politics: the debate about the relationship between state and nation on the one hand, and the contribution of International Relations Theory to the debate about the state on the other hand. This paper argues that these debates fail to capture fully the developments in Central and Western Europe. The solution to nationality problems lies not in the relations between nation and state rather in the separation of the state from the nation. Furthermore, it is not the anarchical character of the state system that threatens Western and Central Europe, but nationalism as a force within the state.

The new discovery of **national identity** in the East Central European States¹ is occurring simultaneously with the process of **European integration** in Western Europe.² While the search for national identity has revived the principle of nationality and ethnicity, the European integration process has forced Western European states to redefine their national identities. The meaning of "identity" is by no means clear. There can be a variety of national identities including cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and national elements. But all of these identities become exclusionist if they intensify. Their inherent danger lies in their potential to lead to cultural discrimination, ethnic conflict or separation, and nationalism. There is, for example, no definite clear-cut distinction between linguistic and racial nationalism. Ethnicity can be defined as a group of persons with "common ancestry" or sharing a "common cultural heritage" or as an alternative term for "race."³ In nationalist doctrine, as in Nazi Germany, language, race and culture

Thanks to John Bunzl for sharing his knowledge on nationalism and minorities and for his comments on this paper. Helpful suggestions have been given by Jonathan Bach, Robert Jackson, Stephan Kux, Stephen Larrabee, Hanspeter Neuhold, Daniel Nelson, Bruno Schoch, Lene Břgh Sřrenson, and Mark Zacher.

¹ In this article the term "Central Europe" is used for the old lands of the Habsburg Empire. The term "East Central Europe" mainly refers to the former smaller members of the Warsaw Pact Organisation.

² Regarding the Nordic states (Norway, Finland, Sweden) see Raimo Väyrynen, "Territory, Nation State and Nationalism," in Jyrki Iivonen, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, ed., *The Future of the Nation State in Europe* (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1993), pp. 159–178.

³ Definitions by Bernard Phillips, Ashley Montagu, and Encyclopaedia Britannica quoted in Mojmir Krizan, "Postkommunistische Wiedergeburt ethnischer Nationalismen und der Dritte Balkan-Krieg," *osteuropa* 45, no. 3 (March 1995), p. 202.

constitute different aspects of the same entity, the nation.⁴ Max Weber defines nations as ethnic communities "unified by a myth of common descent."⁵

This essay does not discuss the rights of ethnic minorities or the nature of cultural identity; rather, it is about the positioning of nationalism within the international state system. Nationalism is related to the state: it tries to get its own statehood and it opposes state interference.⁶ The paper argues that it is possible, and necessary, to separate the concept of the state from that of the nation. Without this separation unrest, conflict, instability and, in certain cases, even war will result. The literature very often confuses state and nation. Most scholars maintain that in Western Europe, nations have become synonymous with the state, whereas in Eastern Europe the transition from the nation to statehood is incomplete.⁷ This study argues that the compatibility of state and nation does not explain why nationalism is less of a problem in Western Europe. Rather Western Europe is built upon strong, developed, and democratic statehood based on the rule of law. It would be wrong, even disastrous, for Central and Eastern Europe, to assume that the relatively homogeneous states of Western Europe could serve as models. The consequence would be rearrangement of borders and the entire dissolution of Versailles settlement and cause dangerous instability.

The study further argues that the dissolution of statehood in Western Europe through integration, regionalization or globalization processes may give rise to ethnic nationalism and not to overlapping identities with individuals or social movements as the main actors. Theories which consider the anarchical character of the state system as the main source of war (neo-realism, institutionalism) miss the point because the causes of instability lie within the characteristics of states themselves.

Historical aspects of "state" and "nation" in Western and Central Europe

Until the beginning of the nineteenth century the meaning of "nation" was not defined by language, culture or ethnicity. For Montesquieu "nation" was synonymous with the nobility and aristocracy. In France and England "nation" was clearly distinguished from the "people" or population. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in France, "state" was associated with the King and his royal government. The idea of nation was then used in opposition to the Crown by resentful aristocracies and/or in encounters with external powers (anti-English in France, anti-French in England).

⁴ Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1960), p. 71.

⁵ Max Weber, "The Nation," in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright-Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948), pp. 171–179.

⁶ Compare Daniele Conversi, "Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation," *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics* 1, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 73–85.

⁷ Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 10–12, 33–39; Iván Gyurcsik, "New Legal Ramifications of the Question of National Minorities," in Ian M. Cuthbertson and Jane Leibowitz (eds.), *Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue* (New York: Institute for EastWest Studies, 1993), p. 20.

Once dissociated from the person of the King after the French revolution, the French "state" became synonymous with the French "nation."⁸

In the seventeenth century, "nations" in Central Europe consisted of those nobles or gentry who together with the King or Emperor lived off the peasants and other suppliers of labour and goods.⁹ The original nations had no unitary ethnic base.¹⁰ During the eighteenth century, no distinction was drawn between a homogenous people and the nation. In Germany, the "state" remained a separate concept until the nineteenth century. The meaning of the word nation then was shaped by German Romanticism (Fichte, Herder, Schlegel). "Nation" became synonymous with "Volk," but was also frequently used interchangeably with "state."¹¹ The rise of romantic nationalism in the nineteenth century fueled the desire of every nationality to have its own nation-state. The late nineteenth and the early twentieth century saw the birth of an aggressive and expansionist nationalism.

As a political and ethnic concept, the "nation" was established much later than the state. The nation therefore is not a primordial and natural entity.¹² It is a modern phenomenon with an archaic face.¹³ While there may be "primordial sentiments,"¹⁴ the ethnic nation is, however, a modern invention¹⁵ and a political artefact. Since the nineteenth century the nation has gradually been identified with the state.¹⁶ Nationalism has been both a source as well as a consequence of the demise of multinational state systems.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the rulers of these multinational systems regarded their

⁸ Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 27–184. Norbert Elias, *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation, Soziogenetische Untersuchungen*, vol. 2, *Wandlungen der Gesellschaft: Entwurf zu einer Theorie der Zivilisation* (Frankfurt: suhrkamp, 1988), pp. 123–311. Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

⁹ Tony Judt, "The New Old Nationalism," *The New York Review of Books* (May 26, 1994), p. 46.

¹⁰ William Pfaff, *The Wrath of Nations* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), p. 19.

¹¹ Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, pp. 286, 364.

¹² Josef Bayer, "Nationalismen in Osteuropa: Sackgasse oder notwendiges Durchgangsstadium zur Demokratie?" in *Friedensbericht 1994: Krieg und gewaltfreie Konfliktlösungen* (Zürich: Verlag Rüegger, 1994), pp. 29–42. See also Pfaff, *The Wrath of Nations*, p. 14; Peter Rutland, "State Failure and State Building in Post-Socialist Europe: Implications for Theories of Nationalism" (Paper prepared for the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1–3 September 1994), pp. 5–9.

¹³ Bruno Schoch, "Der neu aufbrechende Nationalismus in Europa als Bedrohung für Stabilität und Frieden," in Achim Güssgen and Rüdiger Schlaga (eds.), *Chancen und Probleme einer zukünftigen europäischen Friedensordnung* (Frankfurt: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 1992), pp. 66–69. See also Bruno Schoch, *Nach Strassburg oder nach Sarajevo? Zum Nationalismus in postkommunistischen Übergangsgesellschaften* HSFK-Report no. 6 (Frankfurt: HSFK, 1992).

¹⁴ Rupen Cetinyan, "The Institution of Ethnicity: The Political Economy of Ethnic Organization and Conflict" (Paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1–4 September 1994).

¹⁵ Pfaff, *The Wrath of Nations*, p. 16.

¹⁶ Otto Dann, "Begriffe und Typen des Nationalen in der frühen Neuzeit," in Bernhard Giesen (ed.), *Nationale und kulturelle Identität: Studien zur Entwicklung des kollektiven Bewußtseins in der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt: suhrkamp, 1991), pp. 56–76.

¹⁷ Concerning the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy see Manfred Rauchensteiner, *Der Tod des Doppeladlers: Österreich-Ungarn und der Erste Weltkrieg* (Graz: Styria, 1994). See also Rutland, "State Failure and State Building," pp. 19–20.

territories as states. The collapse of the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian empires in 1918 led to the creation of Poland, the Baltic states, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Austria, and very nearly, an Ukrainian state. But like the former empires which spawned them, these entities did not emerge as homogeneous nation-states. Filled with national minorities, these states were linguistically and culturally mixed.¹⁸ The Wilsonian principle of self-determination could not be applied to both ethnic nationalities and the territorial integrity of states. Self-determination of peoples and territorial integrity of states are not identical. Thus, the principle of self-determination may cause and legitimise nationalism and fragmentation.¹⁹ There is no way to distinguish between the "good self-determination" and "bad nationalism."²⁰ For example, the Romanians who support a unification of Moldova with Romania on an ethnic basis would not accept a separation of Romanian territories with substantial Hungarian minorities. Moreover, the Russian and Russian-speaking populations of Moldova justify secessionist arguments that Moldova intends to join Romania.

The aspiration that nation and state borders should coincide has been a decisive cause of European wars since the middle of the nineteenth century – including the wars in former Yugoslavia since 1991. In the nineteenth century in Central Europe, the German (Herderian) idea of the nation, defined by ethnicity, culture, language, and an emphasis on "common" history has always been predominant. The nation should be defended by a powerful state. The Hungarian and Slovakian nationalism was mainly based on language. L'udovít Stúr (1815–1856), the theorist of Slovak nationalism, developed a real "language philosophy" based on Herder's ideas of community building.²¹ A somewhat similar version of this linguistic and cultural nationalism had been developed by the Czech historian Frantisek Palacky, the Ukrainian Michael Hrushevsky, and the Romanian Nicolae Iorga.²² Nationhood in Central Europe can be defined in terms of lineage. The attributes of the ethnic nation include culture, language, and a common ancestry. Most of the time these characteristics are blurred and cannot be separated.²³

The transition from this concept to the more political definition of the nation as a community of citizens inspired by the French Revolution has never really succeeded although there were some attempts before and after 1918.²⁴ Tomáš Masaryk, for ex

¹⁸Judt, "The New Old Nationalism," pp. 46–47.

¹⁹Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 63–106.

²⁰Jonathan P.G. Bach, "The Crisis of Democratic Discourse: Nationalism and Eastern Europe" (Paper presented at the 34th Annual International Studies Association Conference, Acapulco, Mexico 23–27 March, 1993), p. 6 f.

²¹Tibor Pichler, "Die Eigenständigkeit als Idee des Slowakischen sprachbegründeten Nationalismus," in Eva Schmidt-Hartmann, *Formen des nationalen Bewußtseins im Lichte zeitgenössischer Nationalismus-theorien* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994), pp. 321–330.

²²See also John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), pp. 335–344. John Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 12–19.

²³For the definition of "ethnic nationalism" see Charles A. Kupchan (ed.), *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 4.

²⁴See Jacques Rupnik, "Central Europe or Mitteleuropa?" *Daedalus* 119, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 249–278.

ample, tried to find a solution to the nationality problem within a reformed Austrian state before he founded Czechoslovakia.

In 1915, Friedrich Naumann developed a theory of "Mitteleuropa" in which Prussia-Germany would unite with Austria-Hungary to form a Central European "world power." All other states of the region would be satellites. In the 1930s, Hitler argued that protecting German minorities required expanding the German "Lebensraum" in the East. He found allies in Hungary because of their opposition to the Versailles system, among the Romanians because the Soviets annexation of Bessarabia, among the Slovaks because of their anti-Czech nationalism, and among the anti-Serbian Croats.²⁵ Conversely, Stalin used the German enemy as a pretence to dominate the Slavic nations. After 1945, ethnic-based nationalism became invisible to the West. Neither the genocide of World War II nor the post-war withdrawal and expulsion of the Germans created homogeneous nation-states in Central Europe.²⁶ The "Yalta system" resulted from the failure to resolve, or at least keep under control the national and ethnic problems and conflicts prior to World War II. After the lid of the Cold War was lifted, however, the national aspirations unleashed as a result of the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I and Stalin's realignment of borders after World War II have re-emerged.

"Nation-state" or "state"?

The term "nation-state" implies that national and state identity are congruent.²⁷ In order to emphasise the ethnic dimension of the state in Central Europe, scholars frequently use the term "national state." Scholars of nationalism concentrate mainly on the question of whether states create nations or nations bring about states and to what degree state and national boundaries are coeval.²⁸ As a consequence of this debate, states without nations are considered incomplete.

Benedict Anderson²⁹ describes how states transform themselves into nations, which he calls "imagined communities". For Eric Hobsbawm, the state induces nationalism primarily as an instrument to create loyalty.³⁰ Ernest Gellner's³¹ main interest is the close relationship between culture and state. He defines nationalism as a "principle

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Schoch, "Der neu aufbrechende Nationalismus," 65. Joseph Rothschild, "Nationalism and Democratization in East Central Europe: Lessons from the Past," *Nationalities Papers* 22, no. 1 (Spring 1994), p. 32.

²⁷For definitions see Rothschild, "Nationalism and Democratization," pp. 27–30.

²⁸Zarko Puhovski, "Nationalismus und Demokratie im postkommunistischen Schlüssel," in Margit Pieber/Österreichisches Studienzentrum für Frieden und Konfliktlösung (ed.), *Europa – Zukunft eines Kontinents: Friedenspolitik oder Rückfall in die Barbarei* (Münster: agenda Verlag, 1994), pp. 132–138.

²⁹Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

³⁰Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

³¹Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism and politics in Eastern Europe," *New Left Review*, no. 189 (September/October 1991), pp. 127–134.

which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent." He describes the way in which the "marriage of state and culture" works in different parts (time zones) of Europe during the last 200 years. In the most western time zone (the Atlantic shore of Europe), the states correlate with cultural zones. In the next time zone, corresponding to the erstwhile Holy Roman Empire, a homogeneous, standardized culture (bride) was there in the late eighteenth century without a suitable state (bridegroom). In the Eastern part of Europe, the third time zone, there were neither national states nor clear "staatsfähige" national cultures; both had to be created. The ethnographic map of Eastern Europe from Trieste to St. Petersburg looks like a painting by Kokoschka,³² it is a mass of multicoloured points. So neither bride nor bridegroom was ready. In the fourth zone, the Red Army imposed a culturally homogeneous ("gleichgeschaltetes") political system on a non-ethnic political system linked to an industrial society. He comes to the same conclusion as did Karl W. Deutsch twenty years ago. Deutsch observed a patchwork consisting of large spots with the same language, the same nationalities, and in large part also the same religion as in Western Europe (France, England, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy). In contrast, the Eastern European map of languages, religions, and nationalities looked like an irregular pattern of little dots.³³

Many scholars and politicians in East Central Europe draw the conclusion that nation and state should coincide, or the scholars at least complain about the incompatibility:

In Western Europe essentially homogenous nation states were created while Eastern Europe's traditional Great Empires were always multinational and attempts to homogenise them were doomed to failure, they never developed into nation states.³⁴

In many cases these complaints lead to the call for political change. Historians, for example, very soon after the breakup of the Yalta system in 1989/90 began to question the Versailles system. The scholarly debate about the injustices of the Trianon Treaty (1920),³⁵ in which Hungary lost roughly two-thirds of its territory and one-third of its population,³⁶ led Hungarian Prime Minister Antall to declare that he was the "Prime Minister of all Hungarians."³⁷

³²Gellner prefers paintings by Modigliani with clear distinguishable colours.

³³Karl W. Deutsch, *Der Nationalismus und seine Alternativen* (München: Serie Piper, 1972), pp. 41–68. (The American edition *Nationalism and Its Alternatives* was published in New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.)

³⁴András Balogh, "Conventional Wisdoms on National Minorities and International Security," *Defence Studies: Army and Security Policy in Hungary*, no. 2 (Budapest: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 35.

³⁵For example the Hungarian Historian Katalin Soós in a speech in Vienna at the Austrian Institute for Eastern and South Eastern Europe on March 6, 1990.

³⁶Hungary lost almost 1.7 million ethnic Hungarians to Romania, about one million to Czechoslovakia, and around half a million to Yugoslavia. Bennett Kovrig, "Hungarian Minorities in East-Central Europe" (The Atlantic Council of the United State: Occasional Paper, March 1995). Transylvania did not, however, belong to Hungary until 1848. In the seventeenth century it was autonomous, in the eighteenth century it belonged to Austria. From 1848 to 1918 it was Hungarian, it came to Romania after 1918, to Hungary again in 1940, and back to Romania after 1945. Pfaff, *The Wrath of Nations*, p. 201.

³⁷Reported by the Hungarian news agency, MTI, 13 August 1990. Other political leaders repeated similar statements afterwards.

However, in the eyes of the Hungarian minorities the post-Communist governments in Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia did not guarantee their rights. In December 1991 the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania (HDFR) voted against the adoption of the new constitution because it stresses the unity of the Romanian nation and the exclusive official status of the Romanian language. In 1992 the Hungarian parliamentary coalition abstained in the votes on the new constitution because its original draft affirmed the principle of the "Slovak nation" and failed to provide for official use of minority languages. In 1991 a new law declared Serbian to be the sole official language in the republic, in effect eliminating the administrative use of Hungarian. Only the Ukraine and the Croatian government guaranteed minority rights to the Hungarians' satisfaction.³⁸

With Slovenia³⁹, the Ukraine⁴⁰ and Slovakia⁴¹ Hungary agreed to treaties on minority rights; it failed to conclude a treaty with Romania. These treaties should help to guarantee the borders between Hungary and its neighbouring countries and to protect ethnic minorities.⁴²

On the one hand, Hungarian politicians have given public assurances that they will not seek to change borders. On the other hand, the government has affirmed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). In this document, the participating States "consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement."⁴³ Among the Hungarian population the feeling remains that it is not fair that the Hungarian nation is much larger than the territory of the state.

While this debate tries to define the relationship between nation and state, and while politicians try to solve the problem of ethnic minorities inside and outside the state's boundaries, others see the territorial state fading away and social and national identities emerging. Waever et al. recognise the separation of the nation from "stateness," while pointing to the simultaneous weakening of the territorial state. They

³⁸ Kovrig, "Hungarian Minorities in East-Central Europe," pp. 17–27.

³⁹ *Convention on providing special rights for the Slovenian minority living in the Republic of Hungary and for the Hungarian minority living in the Republic of Slovenia* (Ljubljana, November 6, 1992).

⁴⁰ *Declaration on the Principles of Cooperation between the Republic of Hungary and Unkrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the guaranteeing of Rights for National Minorities*, (Budapest, May 31, 1991).

⁴¹ Hungary and Slovakia signed the treaty short before the "Pact on Stability in Europe" was adopted in Paris in March 1995.

⁴² The Hungarian Parliament accepted unilaterally a law on the rights of national and ethnic minorities (Romany, Slovaks, Rumanians, Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Germans) which in July 1993. Obviously, this law also is considered to be a model for the neighbouring states with Hungarian minorities: "In its positive interpretation, the principle of reciprocity means that two countries, along the common border of which national minorities are living, try to create proper living conditions for those minorities on the basis of similar principles." Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, *The principle of reciprocity in the policy towards national minorities* (Budapest, January 1992).

⁴³ "Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe," Helsinki 1 August 1975. Document in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), *Europe Transformed: Documents on the End of the Cold War, Key Treaties, Agreements, Statements and Speeches* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 87.

The Hungarian government insisted to enshrine this principle into the bilateral treaties with the Ukraine and the Slovak Republic.

do not see the demise of the nation-state, but rather of the state alone, with the nation remaining: "Left behind we find, nations with less state, culture with less shell. ... Culture has in this sense become security policy."⁴⁴ Therefore they suggest that European integration does not necessarily demand close integration of peoples, shared culture or homogeneity.⁴⁵ On the contrary, the process of breaking down state sovereignty is leading to a stronger assertion of cultural (national) identity. They try to cover the variety of emerging overlapping and competing identities with the concept of "societal security."⁴⁶ Societal identity should, according to the authors, develop both an ethnonational and a political identity. They argue, however, that threats to ethnonational identity are replacing military concerns as the central focus of European insecurity. "The security of a society can be threatened by whatever puts its 'we' identity into jeopardy."⁴⁷

Yosef Lapid also notes the return of ethnic and national identities. He claims that "identity is an irreducible category."⁴⁸ Daniel N. Nelson⁴⁹ offers the idea of a "de-stated" security for the next century, because security lies not in the capacities of states or groups of states alone, but also derives from the strength and resources found in consensual societies, growing economies, and legitimate polities.

The above-quoted authors deal with the phenomena of nation, state, and society as dependent and independent variables. The question should be asked, however, whether states can develop without a nation. Max Weber defined the state as "an administrative and legal order" with "binding authority" over "the area of its jurisdiction." One might also add the state's monopoly of the legitimate use of force,⁵⁰ or Weber's notion of the state as a corporate group. For Weber the state is not necessarily connected to the idea of nation (though it is connected to the Hegelian conception of civil society of which the nation is part). Also his legal definition of the state – population, territory and effective government – makes no mention of culture, religion or ethnicity as defining characteristics of statehood. Neither culture, ethnicity, language, nor religion is necessary to define independent statehood. To get statehood the population must occupy an exclusive territory under a national government of its own which is constitutionally independent of all other sovereign states.⁵¹

⁴⁴Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan and Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1993), pp. 68–71.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 76–78.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁴⁸Yosef Lapid, "Nationalism, Identity and Security: Global Threats and Theoretical Challenges" (Paper presented at the 34th International Studies Association Convention, Acapulco, 23–27 March 1993), p. 4 f.

⁴⁹Daniel N. Nelson, "Great Powers and World Peace," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 22, no. 2 (1993), pp. 169–178.

⁵⁰Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Günther Roth and Claus Wittich, ed., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 54–56.

⁵¹Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, "The Character of Independent Statehood," in Robert H. Jackson and Alan James (eds.), *States in a Changing World: A contemporary Analysis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 18–19.

For Anthony Giddens, a sovereign state is a political organisation that has the capacity, within a delimited territory or territories, to make laws and effectively sanction their maintenance; exert a monopoly over the disposal of the means of violence; control basic policies relating to the internal political or administrative form of government; and depose the fruits of a national economy that are the basis of its revenue. For Giddens, linguistic or cultural identity is one of the distinctive characteristics of the classical nation-state. "They are clearly bounded administrative units, in which policies adopted by governments are binding upon whole populations."⁵²

If the state were separated from the nation, then the legitimacy of creating ethnically and culturally homogeneous nation-states would decrease. One could argue that some sort of national identity is essential to keep the state together. This is not necessarily true if the state can define its own identity based on democratic, institutional and legal concepts. In other words, it is possible to have a political identity with cultural variety. Before the question of state identity is addressed, the debate between neo-realists and institutionalists should also be included in the analysis of European developments. In contrast to the debate on the relationship between state and nation, the debate between neo-realists and institutionalists tends to overlook the phenomenon of nationalism within states.

An "anarchy of states"?

Neo-realists and their traditional realist forefathers consider states the primary unit of analysis and the sole actors in international relations. In addition according to Kenneth Waltz, states form the structure of international political systems through their mutual interaction.⁵³

Waltz has been heavily criticised not only for making states the most important units in the international system, but also for assuming that these units are not affected by the functions they perform or the variations and processes that occur within them.⁵⁴

Everything else is omitted. Concern for tradition and culture, analysis of the character and personality of political actors, consideration of the conflictive and accommodative processes of politics, description of the making and execution of policy ... they are omitted because we want to figure out the expected effects of structure on process and of processes on structure. That can be done only if structure and process are distinctly defined.⁵⁵

For Waltz, domestic systems are centralised and hierarchical; international systems are decentralised and anarchic. Domestic political structures have governmental institutions, while international politics is characterised by the absence of government. In

⁵² Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, 2 vols. of *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, vol. 2 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 270, 282, 289.

⁵³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1979).

⁵⁴ William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom, *International Relations then and now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation* (London: HarperCollinsAcademic, 1991), p. 264.

⁵⁵ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 82.

contrast to the international system, domestic systems are characterised by specialisation and integration.

For Buzan et al.⁵⁶ although the international system has been defined by the ordering principle of anarchy, functional differentiation can change the structure of the international system itself. The consequence is that an international structure that is reproduced intentionally will take form that is very different from the neorealist one that is reproduced unintentionally. Units (states) differ according to the extent to which they can claim not full sovereignty, as Waltz argues, but sovereignty only over a limited range of functions. Because the internal structure of states diverges, diffusion of domestic and international structures occurs. This diffusion makes it possible for states not only to pursue competitive strategies but also to co-operate even under the condition of anarchy. They can generate a "co-operative anarchic society." In such a society the states are reproduced by "the process of mutual recognition and common practice."

Institutionalists assert that states are not the sole significant actors in world politics and stress patterns of complex interdependence and institutionalised co-operation.⁵⁷ "Transnational actors sometimes prevail over governments."⁵⁸ They do not question the realist assumption of anarchy. They argue, however, that international institutions mitigate the dangers of the anarchic world of states.

International institutions can facilitate ... a process of co-operation by providing opportunities for negotiations, reducing uncertainty about others' policies, and by affecting leaders' expectations about the future. Thus, international institutions can affect the strategies states choose and the decisions they make.⁵⁹

Both neo-realists and institutionalists recognize the anarchic nature of international relations and view states as the principal actors in world politics, and both "seek to explain behavioural regularities." Neo-realists conclude – because the system is anarchic – that each state must provide for its own security (self-help); while for institutionalists international institutions mitigate the consequences of anarchy. For neo-realists states are constrained in a structure of anarchy, for institutionalists interna-

⁵⁶Barry Buzan and Charles Jones and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

⁵⁷Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

⁵⁸Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (London: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 386.

⁵⁹Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann, *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe: 1989–1991* (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 5.

tional institutions affect the states' behaviour⁶⁰, others stress the rules of conduct and discipline.⁶¹

Some neo-realists⁶² predicted the emergence of conflicts among states after the end of the Cold War because this meant a return to a more anarchic system of state relations. Even the "Western European states will begin viewing each other with greater fear and suspicion."⁶³ Renewed interstate conflicts are more likely to break out in Eastern Europe, as Mearsheimer points out, in part because of resurgent "hyper-nationalism,"⁶⁴ which was an important cause of the two world wars.

For institutionalists, organisations and regimes are essential in order to constrain state strategies and provide opportunities for collective action, and find support for their perspective in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War.⁶⁵ Institutions signal the future intentions of governments and legitimize their behavior; institutions can provide governments with information and third party arbitration, and governments can employ security institutions as fora to strike favorable bargains.⁶⁶

Neither neo-realists nor institutionalists take into account adequately changes in the nature of threats, however. Anarchy on the state system level is not much of a problem in Western Europe; it is not even a serious risk among the East Central European States. In Western and Central Europe the risk of inter-state wars is not very high. No immediate military threats exist on the state system level.

Conflicts have shifted from inter-state to intra-state levels. On the one hand, the main threat is ethnic nationalism which is directed against existing democratic statehood. On the other hand democratic states are best able to respect minority rights on a nonterritorial basis.

Nationalism against states

Although East Central European states remain concerned about a potential new Russian imperialism, their main security threat is not external, rather it comes from anarchy within states.⁶⁷ Ethnonationalism does not reside at the level of the state sys-

⁶⁰Rittberger pointed out that German research centered on international regimes in the East-West context in the issue area of security at a time when the crisis of "détente" was causing great anxiety in large parts of the populace in Germany and in Europe in general. In contrast, the American regime analysis concentrated on issue areas in West-West relations mostly within the economic realm. Volker Rittberger, "Research on International Regimes in Germany: The Adaptive Internalisation of an American Social Science Concept," in Volker Rittberger (ed.), *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 6–8.

⁶¹Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "Cold War Myths and the New International Realities: Reconsidering Theoretical Premises," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 22, no. 2 (1993), p. 150.

⁶²John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, 15, 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5–56.

⁶³Ibid., p. 47.

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 7, 20–21, 35.

⁶⁵Keohane and Nye and Hoffmann (eds.), *After the Cold War*, p. 383.

⁶⁶Richard Weitz, "Pursuing Military Security in Eastern Europe," in Keohane and Nye and Hoffmann (eds.), *After the Cold War*, pp. 342–380.

⁶⁷See also Peter Coulmas, "Das Problem des Selbstbestimmungsrechtes: Mikronationalismen, Anarchie und innere Schwäche der Staaten," *Europa-Archiv* 48, no. 4 (25 February, 1993), pp. 85–92.

tem as it did in the nineteenth century (for example, the unification of Germany and Italy) and before the two world wars. It is directed against the state itself or it is used by an ethnically defined state elite against its own minorities. Nationalism can emerge when state boundaries do not coincide with national boundaries. Hence, the main enemy of the principle of ethnicity and nationalism appears to be the state, which is seen as the major obstacle to achieving a homogeneous nation. As a consequence, conflicts of desire emerge over borders, territories (most of the time both sides claim historical rights), and minorities (within or outside the respective state). Throughout East Central Europe war is no longer considered a practicable means for resolving disputes between states, but conflicts emerge rather between ethnic communities and states.

Many in East-Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe⁶⁸ see the end of communism as an opportunity to reanimate the national and ethnic claims of the past to restore an order essential to their identity.⁶⁹ The wars between Serbia and Slovenia, and Serbia and Croatia started off as domestic wars about the establishment of ethnonational states before they became international wars following the international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. The war in Bosnia is a civil war over ethnically defined territories. The most endangered region which has not yet drifted into a war is the Muslim Albanian enclave of Kosovo within Serbia. Problems with nationalities exist with Hungarians in Slovakia, Romania,⁷⁰ and Serbia. There are Romanians and Russians (Dnjestr) in Moldova; Romanians, Slovaks and Poles in Ukraine; Russians in the Baltic states; Poles in Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus; and ethnic tensions in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. There are strong German communities in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania.⁷¹ Greek minorities live in Albania, Serbia and Bulgaria, and a Bulgarian minority exists in Serbia. The conflict between Greece and Macedonia ("Skopje") is ethnically-based. The future of the Albanian minority in Macedonia is uncertain. There are also Turks in Bulgaria. Altogether, if the nation-states declared ethnic homogeneity about a quarter of the population between Baltic and Black Sea⁷² would live in the wrong place. Thus establishing ethnically homogeneous nation-states in Central Europe would require not only redrawing internationally recognized borders, but also relocating various population groups currently located relatively isolated enclaves throughout the region in order to achieve territorially contiguous nation-states.

⁶⁸Not to mention the Russian Federation.

⁶⁹William Pfaff, "East Europeans Have a Basic Adjustment to make," *International Herald Tribune*, May 21-22, 1994, p. 4.

⁷⁰At the time of writing there was no agreement on a basic treaty between Hungary and Romania concerning the recognition of existing borders and the protection of the rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania.

⁷¹With all these states Germany concluded treaties on friendship and co-operation, which address minority issues.

⁷²Giles Merritt, "A Charter For Peace In Europe," *International Herald Tribune*, 5 May, 1993.

These ethnic tensions are accompanied by secondary effects such as refugee problems, migration, and demographic strains.⁷³ Furthermore, imagined homogeneous nations will perceive immigrants with different ethnic backgrounds as a threat to their desired homogeneity.

On the surface these types of conflicts seem to correspond to traditional types.⁷⁴ But the "classic" types of conflicts are between states, while the new nationalism is directed against the non-ethnic state itself. Realists and neo-realists have difficulty capturing the dynamics of this type of nationalism because it does not occur at the state level.⁷⁵ Institutionalist also focus on the impact of institutions on the behavior of states and governments in conflict. Co-operation among states in international institutions is primarily designed to prevent conflicts among and between states, not within states. Also, the internal diversity of states need not necessarily lead to the co-operative society Buzan et al. envision, especially if the domestic structure is shaped by anti-state nationalisms. The international society would not be dominated by co-operative states but the societies within states could be dominated by nationalisms.

Conflict prevention and resolution between or within states?

The Yugoslav case has proved that an international institutional network itself is not sufficient for internal peace building. International cooperation has not been able to prevent or resolve the conflict. Before the Yugoslav crisis many believed that the enunciation of norms was sufficient to prevent violence and to promote peace-building. This view stemmed from the enthusiasm of politicians and diplomats after the CSCE Charter of Paris was adopted in November 1990. The Charter is based on the assumption that states are willing to comply with the rules, procedures, and norms laid down by the CSCE institutions and "mechanisms."⁷⁶ These norms would limit the use of force and protect human rights and the rights of national minorities. Indeed, Yugoslavia was one of the most active countries in the CSCE⁷⁷ process⁷⁸ as member of the so-

⁷³One example is Germany. German law defines citizenship by ancestry. Despite Germany's financial, housing and unemployment problems due to the unification costs, it has accepted 340.000 ethnic German immigrants to resettle in Germany since 1990. In 1993 Germany changed its constitution eviscerating the respective Art. 16 but not abolishing it.

⁷⁴For example, Ole Wæver and Morten Kelstrup, "Europe and its nations: political and cultural identities," in Wæver and Buzan and Kelstrup and Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, p. 72.

⁷⁵This criticism of neo-realism is different to the argument that neo-realists would not see the different characters of states (democratic or autocratic, capitalist or communist, peace-loving or aggressive). Among others see John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 5-58.

⁷⁶Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 21 November 1990.

⁷⁷Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

⁷⁸Ljubivoje Acimovic, "The CSCE Process from a Yugoslav Viewpoint," in Hanspeter Neuhold (ed.), *CSCE: N+N Perspectives: The Process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe from the Viewpoint of the Neutral and Non-Aligned Participating States* (Wien: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1987), pp. 79-100.

called NNA⁷⁹ group. Within a very short period, this optimistic view was shattered by armed conflict that has defied all attempts at intervention.

Most of the traditional security concepts are state-based in the sense that they are designed to keep peace and security in the ca^{se} of conflicts between states.

- Alliances are seen as a device available to sovereign states⁸⁰ to aggregate and augment their individual capacities to bring about greater security.⁸¹

- A system of collective security⁸² implies that all member states would be willing to come to the assistance of individual member states when attacked or threatened by another member. The member states in the system might not consider an ethnic conflict a threat worthy of collective action. If they do, however, the mechanism would escalate ethnic wars into interstate wars.

A concert system based on co-operation among the great powers might reduce the risk of war among themselves, but there is the danger of a breakdown from within as in the nineteenth century Concert of Europe.

Recent events indicate that institutions and their member states seem to learn more quickly than scholars. After the international institutions were caught completely unprepared, lacking experience or appropriate instruments⁸³ to deal with the challenge of the abrupt re-emergence of uncontrolled inter-ethnic conflicts, they have been active to develop new approaches.

The CSCE (at the Budapest CSCE Summit in December 1995 the CSCE became the OSCE⁸⁴), for example, has made conflict prevention and crisis management an integral part of the process of its functional redefinition and institutional development.⁸⁵ The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities established at the Helsinki summit in 1992 has a specific and explicit early warning function. According to his mandate, he will provide early warning at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues that have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in the judgement of the High Commissioner, have the potential to

⁷⁹Neutral and non-aligned States.

⁸⁰For the tendencies of European defence organisations towards "Renationalization" see Jan Willem Honig, "The 'Renationalization' of Western European Defence," *Security Studies* 2, no. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 122-138.

⁸¹Various definitions of alliances are given by Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 1. Brian L. Job and Don Munton, "Disentangling the Alliance: The Role of Small and Middle States in NATO," (Paper presented at the 33rd International Studies Association Convention, Atlanta, 30 March-4 April, 1991); 2. Katja Weber, "A New Era in Global Relations: A reassessment of Security Arrangements" (Paper presented at the 35th International Studies Association Convention, Washington, D.C., 28 March-1 April, 1993), p. 2.

⁸²For examples of this debate see Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," *International Security*, 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 4-43, Inis R. Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1966); Heinz Gärtner, *Wird Europa sicherer? Zwischen kollektiver und nationaler Sicherheit* (Wien: Braumüller, 1992); Joseph Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends," *Survival* (Spring 1992), pp. 36-50.

⁸³Among others compare Andreas Unterberger, "Minderheitenschutz und Selbstbestimmung: Die große historische Aufgabe zur Jahrtausendwende," *Europäische Rundschau* 22, no. 3 (1994), pp. 37-50.

⁸⁴Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

⁸⁵Among others see Hanspeter Neuhold, "Conflicts and Conflict Management in a 'New' Europe," *Austrian Journal of Public and International Law*, no. 46 (1994), pp. 109-129.

develop into conflict within the OSCE area, affecting peace, stability or relations between participating states.⁸⁶ Appointed in December 1992, he has had to deal with minority problems in Estonia, Latvia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Slovakia and Hungary.

OSCE also makes use of its official representation (missions) to counter, for example, the danger of a spill-over of the conflict in former Yugoslavia (to Macedonia, Kosovo, Sanjak and Vojvodina). The missions in Estonia and Latvia have performed a preventive function. Other missions are charged with mediation and conflict settlement (e.g. Moldova, Georgia, Chechnya, and planned is the first OSCE peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh).⁸⁷

The Budapest summit in 1994 adopted the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security that emphasises that the participating States will not use armed forces to deprive persons as individuals or as representatives of groups of their national, religious, cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity.⁸⁸

The establishment of these mechanisms as such, however, does not tell how effective they will be. At its meeting in Rome in December 1993, the CSCE Council of Ministers⁸⁹ agreed also that for the establishment of co-operative arrangements the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity is one criterion that must be observed.

Despite warnings since November 1990 about the break-up of Yugoslavia neither NATO nor the WEU became involved until much later. In the three years since NATO emergency meetings on former Yugoslavia began, NATO officials have learned something, however. They frankly acknowledge that alliance structures were, even after the changes initiated in 1990 and 1991, still largely based on the requirements for regional defense vis-à-vis an external threat and thus not ideally suited to circumstances which called for a broader range and mix of responses with greater flexibility in both structure and means of deployment and support. The idea of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) originated at Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) with the aim of providing NATO with a deployable multinational headquarters capability for peacekeeping and any other out-of-area operation.⁹⁰

Skeptics argue, however, that ethnic conflicts – except, perhaps, those that spill over existing borders or involve clear genocide – are probably beyond settlement through external institutions, particularly once fighting has begun. This would be true

⁸⁶*Helsinki Document 1992, Decisions, II(3).*

⁸⁷Office of the Secretary General, *CSCS Facts*, (Vienna: 15 November 1993). See also Wilhelm Hoynck, Secretary General of the CSCE, *CSCE Works to Develop its Conflict Prevention Potential* (Brussels: NATO Review 42, no. 2, 1994).

⁸⁸CSCE Budapest Document 1994, *Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era*.

⁸⁹Fourth Meeting of the CSCE Council, *CSCE and the New Europe – Our Security is Indivisible, Decisions II(3)* (Rome: 1993).

⁹⁰Bruce George (General Rapporteur), *After the NATO summit: Draft General Report* (Brussels: International Secretariat of NATO, May 1994), II./10.–17..

for weak institutions like the OSCE which has limited possibilities for sanction, and for peacekeeping operations on the ground as the Bosnian case illustrates. It is true also for more powerful institutions such as NATO.⁹¹ NATO also lacks the tools that are required to help prevent ethnic tensions from escalating into outright conflict.⁹² Furthermore, a military alliance can threaten or use negative sanctions but has few positive incentives at its disposal to encourage peaceful settlement.

The aspiration of the current leadership of the East Central European states is to come closer to the West European countries and take part in their integration process.⁹³ Hence, they see membership in Western institutions as essential. They are keen to get stronger political, security and economic commitments. Some give the European Union (EU) top priority, for others NATO has priority.⁹⁴ Hungary and Poland formally applied to join the EU, primarily in order to gain eventually membership in the WEU or NATO in order to provide for their security. It is no secret that the Visegrád countries (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) initially reacted to the NATO initiative "Partnership for Peace" (PfP) with considerable disillusionment. Poland had sought full membership. The PfP is open to all former Warsaw Treaty states, including the former Soviet republics of which the Visegrád four are those least in need of reassurance about their security.⁹⁵ In contrast to its policy toward its "near abroad" neighboring countries, Russia would probably not use military power against Central and East European states. Instead Moscow would probably use more political and diplomatic means of coercion.⁹⁶ Membership and security guarantees cannot adequately respond to this type of pressure. NATO is suitable to counterweight to a potential Russian military threat. Enlarging NATO could mean that its member states will be confronted with threats posed by the internal unrest in new member states, not Russian resurgence.

The question remains whether NATO is willing and capable of addressing new types of threats. Why should NATO want to get involved in ethnic conflicts and internal turmoil? It must not give security guarantees that are not credible. Therefore the US and NATO could not offer more than the PfP initiative. In this way the US and NATO retain the option of non-involvement in the event case of internal conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe.

⁹¹ Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "Co-operative Security in Europe," in Janne E. Nolan (ed.), *Global Engagement: Co-operation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 321-322.

⁹² See also Petr Lunak, "Security for Eastern Europe: The European Option," *World Policy Journal* XI, no. 3 (Fall 1994), p. 129.

⁹³ Hardi, "Small State Security in Post Cold War Europe," p. 12.

⁹⁴ Concerning Central European security issues see among others Jacob Kipp (ed.), *Central European Security Concerns* (London: Frank Cass, 1993); Regina Cowen Karp (ed.), *Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition* (Oxford: SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1993); Paul Lendvai, *Zwischen Hoffnung und Ernüchterung: Reflexionen zum Wandel in Osteuropa* (Wien: Jugend und Volk, 1994).

⁹⁵ Charles A. Kupchan, "Strategic Visions," *World Policy Journal* XI, no. 3 (Fall 1994), p. 113.

⁹⁶ Lunak, "Security for Eastern Europe," p. 129 f.

Regional organisations

The East Central European leaders see regional co-operation as a means to becoming members of the EU. The Central European Initiative (CEI, formerly "Pentagonal" group⁹⁷) is a system of regional co-operation among mainly smaller states. The Central European Initiative was initially considered by some a counterweight to Germany. But each member considers the initiative a step closer toward Western Europe. Founded in 1989, the CEI had ten full members in 1994 (Austria, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Croatia, Czech and Slovak Republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia⁹⁸). The CEI is not an international organisation and has neither the basis nor the intention to initiate a Central European integration process. Its purpose is to implement joint regional projects⁹⁹ within Central Europe in very concrete and pragmatic fields.¹⁰⁰ It has never dealt with security and defense issues. The "Policy Document on the Pentagonal Initiative" in November 1989 stated:

The Pentagonal Initiative is a contribution towards creating security and stability ... particularly through establishing and strengthening mutually beneficial partnership structures based on the shared values of parliamentary democracy and human rights ... co-operating on specific matters ...

The "Visegrád Initiative" (regional co-operation among Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) failed to establish a regional security and defense co-operation. The result of the Visegrád initiative was, however, that the participating states concluded among themselves and with West European states bilateral treaties with security clauses. Each state pursued its individual strategy to establish closer ties with NATO.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, the Visegrád states have been reluctant to pursue more ambitious regional initiatives because they are concerned that such initiatives will come at the expense of their integration into NATO.¹⁰²

Although the European Community requested the establishment of a free trade zone among the Central European countries (CEFTA) to promote association agreements

⁹⁷ Hanspeter Neuhold (ed.), *The Pentagonal/Hexagonal Experiment: New Forms of Cooperation in a Changing Europe*, The Laxenburg Papers LP 10 (Wien: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1991).

⁹⁸ So far there is no consensus on admitting Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania and the Ukraine, which have indicated their interest in membership.

⁹⁹ The joint projects are formulated and supervised by 16 working groups and a large number of sub-groups. The fields covered are among others: protection of environment; transport and traffic; co-operation between small and medium-sized businesses; culture; education and youth exchanges; technological and scientific co-operation; information; telecommunications; energy; tourism; disaster protection and relief; migratory movements; statistics, and agriculture.

¹⁰⁰ Although environment is one of the main issues of the group there are heavy conflicts about power plants among the members. Austria, for example, tried to persuade the US Congress to prevent the Export-Import Bank from issuing loan guarantees for the nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic near the Austrian border. A dispute between Hungary and Slovakia about a hydro-electric power plant is to be resolved by the European Court of justice.

¹⁰¹ In January 1994, a short time before the NATO summit the Czech Republic declared that it did not want collective arrangements.

¹⁰² Kupchan, "Strategic Visions," p. 117.

with the EU,¹⁰³ foreign trade among them remained under seven percent of total trade. Their products are not complementary; they all sell semi-manufactured goods and raw materials. All of them compete for markets in the East and the West. There is almost no mutual investment. Economic recovery and growth in the Visegrád countries in the medium and long run will not be strong enough to bring about any kind of rapid catching up with Western Europe. The real per capita GDPs in the most advanced Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic and Hungary) are now about 35-44 percent of the average EU level.¹⁰⁴ In order to accelerate the integration process the Visegrád countries do not need regional co-operation but first and foremost growth of their domestic economies.¹⁰⁵

One reason for the preoccupation with membership in Western institutions seems to be a substitute for domestic politicians who are unwilling or unable to take responsibility to bring about democratic reform and a developed economy.¹⁰⁶ Democracy does not follow automatically when communism collapses.¹⁰⁷ Security and integration into the Western system can only be secured through changes within these countries, not only through formal membership in international organizations such as NATO or the EU. The establishment of democratic statehood on the basis of the rule of law, economic development, and pluralism¹⁰⁸ is the basis for successful integration. The West European states meet these criteria, hence they have been successful with integration. There is no comparable economic and political integration outside Western Europe. All other attempts failed or did not go beyond a certain point (e.g. WTO, OAU, OAS, ODECA, ASEAN¹⁰⁹), because they usually comprised non-democratic, politically and ethnically fragmented, and in many cases economically weak¹¹⁰ states. Of course, the formation

¹⁰³ Although the EU is already Eastern European largest trading partner the EU states export more to the Visegrád states than they import from these states.

¹⁰⁴ Peter Havlik et al., *More solid recovery in Central and Eastern Europe, continuing decline elsewhere*, Research Report no 207 (Vienna: The Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies – WIIW, July 1994), p. 26 f.

¹⁰⁵ András Inotai, "Die Visegrád-Länder: Eine Zwischenbilanz," *Europäische Rundschau* 22, no. 1 (1994), pp. 51–54.

¹⁰⁶ Compare also Lawrence Freedman, *Strategic Studies and the New Europe*, Adelphi Paper no. 284 (London: IISS, January 1994), p. 20; Rosser Baldwin, "Addressing the Security Concerns of Central Europe Through NATO," *European Security* 2, no. 4 (Winter 1993), p. 548.

¹⁰⁷ See statements by President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia and "Solidarnosc" activist and Polish historian, Adam Michnik, at a conference in Vienna in February 1991, quoted by Peter Frank, "Stability and Instability in Eastern Europe," in International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *European Security after the Cold War: Part II*, Adelphi Paper no. 285 (London: IISS, February 1994), p. 7.

¹⁰⁸ This includes the freedom of press and information. Not even Hungary is ready to achieve these standards. Two months before the national elections in 1994 Hungary's right-of-centre government dismissed 200 radio and television journalists including Hungary's most popular and independent broadcasters. The election brought a victory of the Socialists, however.

¹⁰⁹ Warsaw Treaty Organisation, Organisation of African Unity, Organisation of American States, Organisation of Central American States, Association of South East Asian Nations etc..

¹¹⁰ Some members of ASEAN meet the criteria of economic development.

of democratic states in the West was gradual and took centuries; in the East it was sudden and fairly recent.¹¹¹

Democracy is a precondition

Non- and less democratic states frequently violate minority rights and suppress their minorities. It suggests a relationship between regime type and violence within states. State repression is often used to explain and justify nationalist anti-state mobilisation.¹¹² Ethnopolitical conflicts in autocratic regimes are, however, far more intense than those in democracies.¹¹³ Less than one percent of the world's population killed by violence within the state reside in democracies.¹¹⁴

Since 1989, all countries of Visegrád group have gradually introduced democracy.¹¹⁵ European institutions already have developed the instruments to support the strengthening of democracy. According to CSCE documents, three major principles define a democratic political system: the rule of law (which includes the division of power, a representative government, and guarantees against the abuse of state power), political pluralism (with a parliamentary process) and respect for individual rights and freedoms. Outside the normative framework, there are also social, economic, political, and cultural conditions, such as the existence of a "civil society," which have to be met to ensure democratic processes.¹¹⁶ The Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE¹¹⁷ contains a list of human rights and fundamental freedoms in detail, among them: the right to freedom of expression, the right of peaceful assembly and demonstration, the right of association, the right of thought, conscience and religion. The CSCE Charter of Paris affirms the strong commitment of its member states to democracy. They undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations. ... Democratic government is based on the will of the people, expressed regularly through free and fair elections. Democracy has as its foundation respect for the human person and rule of law. Democracy is the best safeguard of freedom of expression, tolerance of all

¹¹¹ Compare also Jonathan Eyal, "Liberating Europe From Nationalism Will Not Be Easy," *International Herald Tribune*, May 24, 1994.

¹¹² Conversi, "Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism," p. 76.

¹¹³ Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System" (1994 International Studies Association Presidential Address), *International Studies Quarterly* 38, no.3 (September 1994), pp. 362-363.

¹¹⁴ Rudolph J. Rummel, "Power, Genocide and Mass Murder," *Journal of Peace Research* 31, no. 1 (February 1994), pp. 1-10.

¹¹⁵ Romania, however, has many of the features that hamper a solution of the minority issues: a restive minority in dispute with state officials; leading politicians committed to anti-democratic fundamentalism; a tendency to expand the state by absorbing a neighbouring territory (Moldova); and widespread fear of the intentions of neighbouring states which have seized Romanian lands in the past. Tom Gallagher, *Romania after Ceausescu: Nationalism Defines Democracy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995).

¹¹⁶ Javier Ruperez (General Rapporteur), *Democratization in Eastern Europe: an Interim Assessment, Draft General Report* (Brussels: International Secretariat of NATO, May 1994), I. and II..

¹¹⁷ 29 June 1990.

groups of society, and equality of opportunity for each person. Democracy, with its representative and pluralist character, entails accountability to the electorate, the obligation of public authorities to comply with the law and justice administered impartially. No one will be above the law.¹¹⁸

Modern democracy cannot simply mean majority rule which can threaten minority interests. Minority rights are included explicitly in the "Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union" issued by the EC Foreign Ministers in December 1991. It stated that the recognition of these new states requires:

- respect for the provisions of the Charter of the UN and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights;
- guarantees for the rights of the ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE ...¹¹⁹

The Council of Europe has a major function in the process of developing democratic institutions and the rule of law as well as protection of minority rights. The "Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities," signed in February 1995, transformed existing political commitments into legal obligations. It also contains a special monitoring mechanism. Increasing the membership of the Council of Europe without lowering its standards is an important challenge.

So far there are no other structures which can implement and guarantee minority rights better than the democratic states. A homogenous nation-state is not a precondition for democracy¹²⁰, however. Ralf Dahrendorf demonstrated convincingly that ethnically heterogeneous states are better able to guarantee basic civil rights than are homogeneous nation-states¹²¹ because democracy is the basis for the recognition of cultural diversity. Although both nationalism and democracy may have emerged out of the same process of industrialisation,¹²² they are not inseparable.¹²³ It would be like arguing that two trains leaving the same station at roughly the same time would have to go in the same direction. Moreover, if democracy and ethnicity are not kept separate

¹¹⁸Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 21 November 1990.

¹¹⁹Compare also Colin Warbrick, "Recognition of States: Recent European Practice" (Paper presented at the 33rd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 31 March-4 April, 1992).

¹²⁰"First comes the nation state, then a liberal constitution reinforced by a liberal political culture, and only then, if at all, democracy." Lind, "In Defence of Liberal Nationalism," Micheal Lind, "In Defence of Liberal Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 3 (May/June 1994), pp. 95-97. This idea is not new and goes back to John Stuart Mill who argued that democracy would be feasible only in linguistically homogeneous states.

¹²¹Ralf Dahrendorf, "Politik-Eine Kolumne: Europa der Regionen," *Merkur*, no. 509 (August 1991), p. 704.

¹²²Francis Fukuyama, "Comments on Nationalism & Democracy," in Larry Diamond and Marc F Plattner (eds.), *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 23.

¹²³"In raising these questions, I mean to suggest that the idea of nationalism is impossible - indeed unthinkable - without the idea of democracy, and that democracy never exists without nationalism. The two are joined in a complicated marriage, unable to leave each other" Ghia Nodia, "Nationalism and Democracy," in Diamond and Plattner (eds.), *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy*, p. 4.

people would more and more vote along ethnic lines. The elected leaders would then pursue narrow ethnic interests.¹²⁴

States without nations and nations without territories

If the state disintegrates but the nation continues, if security becomes "de-stated" and ethnonational identity replaces state security, it might well happen that domestic anarchy prevails over the democratic state. Gottfried Herder's idea that a variety of nations organized along cultural lines and supported by strong states could coexist peacefully failed. The outcome was that "small nations filled with national pride and hatreds and jealousies, egged on by demagogues, (were) marching against each other."¹²⁵ A study on European minorities came to the conclusion that [t]he concept of self-determination is too destabilising to be applied broadly as a solution to ethnic grievances; and that the splintering of state entities into smaller and smaller ethnic enclaves is destroying both the political and economic cohesiveness of the European continent.¹²⁶

Among others Barry Buzan distinguishes between weak and strong states. States in which society and government are at odds are weak states. States which are coherent in socio-political terms are strong. "Reducing contradictions between the state and societal security is thus a precondition for successful 'national' security policy."¹²⁷

If a society is dominated by ethnicity and nationality, however, the gap between society and state will widen and the state will be weakened,¹²⁸ unless the state itself is ethnically homogeneous. Only with a society based on strong political identity (citizenship)¹²⁹ and not on ethnic origin,¹³⁰ can society and state be reconciled. Ethnonational identity should not be part of statehood (as the concept of "societal security"

¹²⁴Hans Binnendijk and Patrick Clawson, "New Strategic Priorities," *The Washington Quarterly* 18, no. 2 (Spring 1995), p. 117.

¹²⁵Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Nationalism: An Interview with Isaiah Berlin" by Nathan Gardels, *The New York Review of Books* (November 21, 1991), pp. 19–23.

¹²⁶Ian M. Cuthbertson and Jane Leibowitz, Introduction, in Cuthbertson and Leibowitz (eds.), *Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue*, here p. 3.

¹²⁷Barry Buzan, "Societal security, state security and internationalisation," in Waeber and Buzan and Kelstrup and Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, p. 57. For the Third World see K.J. Holsti, "Armed Conflicts in the Third World: Assessing Analytical Approaches and Anomalies," (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Acapulco, Mexico, 23–27 March, 1993).

¹²⁸Herold James observes that in German national historiography the term "nation" gradually has been replaced by "society" without changing the substance. "Society" is considered to be less problematic. Harold James, *Vom Historikerstreit zum Historikerschweigen, Die Wiedergeburt des Nationalstaates* (Berlin: Siedler-Verlag, 1993).

¹²⁹On definitions of citizenship see Rainer Bauböck, "Changing Boundaries of Citizenship: The Inclusion of Immigrants in Democratic Polities," (Paper prepared for the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1–3 September 1994).

¹³⁰Concerning the Hungarian example see Peter Hardi, "Small State Security in Post Cold War Europe: The Case of East-Central Europe," (Paper presented at the Conference on Small State Security, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Can., 24–25 March, 1994), p. 9.

suggests). Hence, to defend democratic statehood it is necessary for Central European states to "de-nationalize" and "de-ethnicize" the concept of the state. The state must be defined without reference to the nation. Nor should it matter whether the states are larger than the nations or the nations are larger than the state.¹³¹ There is no convincing reason why people who speak the same language or belong to the same race should form one state.¹³² If nations are "imagined communities" (Anderson) or an instrument to create loyalty and not an enduring characteristic of human nature, then it should be possible to remove them from the concept of the state. Nationality and ethnicity like religion should remain a private matter, as a granted right, however. For centuries religion was tied to the state. Eventually the secular state prevailed, at least in the Western societies.

Historically, state and nation developed separately. If democratic states (political and administrative units on a legal basis) are dissolved, however, ethnic nations may emerge with local or regional autocratic powers and with their own militias.¹³³ Leaders of Nation-states who consider themselves explicitly as representatives of a particular ethnic group tend to oppress or ignore the rights of other ethnic groups. The Serbian attempt to create a Serbian state is a case in point. But also the Croatian constitution of December 1990 defined the state as a "nation-state of the Croat people." The same is true for the Romanian (1991) and Slovakian (1992) constitutions.¹³⁴

This essay does not discuss the question whether secession is morally justified or whether there should be a constitutional right to secede.¹³⁵ It argues, however, that strong democracies offer the best opportunity for resolving ethnic conflict, but only if ethnic conflicts are addressed carefully.¹³⁶ Without the self-limitation that stems from a democratic state, there will be no distinction between citizenship and nationhood.¹³⁷

Nonterritorial minority rights

States respect and protect minority rights better than supranational bodies. Hannah Arendt takes a pragmatic view with respect to the League of Nations:

Or when, as in the case of minorities, an international body arrogated to itself a nongovernmental authority, its failure was apparent even before its measures were fully

¹³¹Uri Raĵanan makes this distinction. As examples for the first case he mentions among others the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia but also France; for the second case Hungary. Uri Raĵanan, "Nation und Staat: Ordnung aus dem Chaos," in Erich Fröschl and Maria Mesner and Uri Raĵanan (eds.), *Staat und Nation in multi-ethnischen Gesellschaften* (Wien: Passagen Verlag, 1991), pp. 23–65.

¹³²Kedourie, *Nationalism*, pp. 99–102.

¹³³As Hugo von Hofmannsthal said in "Jedermann": "Jeder in seinem Bereich schier einer kleinen Gottheit gleich!"

¹³⁴László Kiss, "Nationalstaat, Integration und Subregionalismen in Mittel- und Osteuropa," *WeltTrends*, no. 2 (1994), p. 31.

¹³⁵As regards this debate compare Allen Buchanan, *Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

¹³⁶Renée de Nevers, "Democratization and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, pp. 61–78.

¹³⁷George Schöpfunglin, "Nationalism and National Minorities in East and Central Europe," *Journal of International Affairs* 45, no. 1 (Summer 1991), p. 60.

realised; not only were the governments more or less openly opposed to this encroachment on their sovereignty, but the concerned nationalities themselves did not recognise a nonnational guarantee, mistrusted everything which was not clear-cut support of their 'national' ... rights ...¹³⁸

One approach to protecting minority rights¹³⁹ on a nonterritorial basis is to guarantee personal and functional autonomy in the areas of culture, language, and religion; this was first developed by the Austrian Social Democrats Otto Bauer and Karl Renner.¹⁴⁰ Renner advocated nonterritorial national councils for minority issues (such as culture and education). The councils would be elected independently of the territory in which the minority lived.¹⁴¹ The Slovenian Social Democracy leader Etbin Kristan proposed an even more radical solution at the Party Congress in 1899: nations can only exist without borders but they consist of the totality of individuals, not of territories. Therefore, Kristan compared "nation" with the Roman Church. Because Slovenes lived dispersed throughout the crown lands of the monarchy,¹⁴² Kristan sought a policy that decoupled "nation" from "territory."

Nonterritorial solutions¹⁴³ can only be achieved if the state remains territorial and is separated from a kind of nationality which remains individual and personal. This includes, of course, the guarantees by the state of cultural identity across borders but with no regional political authority or governance.¹⁴⁴ Nonterritorial approaches also

¹³⁸Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), p. 292.

¹³⁹For a general view about institutions and means of the protection of minority rights see Andreas Unterberger, "Minderheitenschutz und Selbstbestimmung: Die große historische Aufgabe zur Jahrtausendwende," *Europäische Rundschau* 22, no. 3 (1994), pp. 37–50.

¹⁴⁰Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (Wien 1907. Second Edition, "Marx-Studien": Wien 1924); Karl Renner, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen in besonderer Anwendung auf Österreich*, vol. 1, Nation und Staat (Wien: Deuticke, 1918); Karl Renner, *Was ist die Nationale Autonomie? Was ist die Soziale Verwaltung? Einführung in die nationale Frage und Erläuterung der Grundsätze des nationalen Programms der Sozialdemokratie* (Wien: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1913); Karl Renner, *Staat und Nation: Zur österreichischen Nationalitätenfrage. Staatsrechtliche Untersuchung über die möglichen Principien einer Lösung und die juristischen Voraussetzungen eines Nationalitätengesetzes* (Wien: Josef Dietl, 1899).

¹⁴¹Renner's concept was also designed to save the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy from disintegration. Regarding the implementation of the concept see John Coakley, "Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: The Strategy of Non-territorial Autonomy," *International Political Science Review* 15, no. 2 (1994), pp. 299–301.

¹⁴²Franc Rozman, "Etbin Kristan und seine Ideen der Personalautonomie," in Helmut Konrad (ed.), *Arbeiterbewegung und nationale Frage in den Nachfolgestaaten der Habsburgmonarchie* (Wien: Europaverlag, 1993), pp. 97–110.

Ruggie's concept of "unbundling" of territoriality with various functional regimes and political communities as an institutional negation of exclusive territoriality can be seen as a modern version of this concept not on the level of the nation but on the state level. John Gerald Ruggie, "Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations," *International Organisation* 47, no.1 (Winter 1993), p. 165.

¹⁴³Of course, some aspects of functional approaches are also related to the territory; for example, the opportunity to use and learn the mother tongue. Raimo Väyrynen, *Towards a Theory of Ethnic Conflicts and their Resolution* (An Inaugural Lecture by the John M. Regan, Jr., Director of the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, delivered on March 15, 1994), p. 28. Concerning the territorial approach see John Coakley, "Introduction: The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict," in *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict* (London: Frank Cass, 1993).

¹⁴⁴Functional approaches must not be confused with "regional regimes," however, which require the "deconstruction and rearrangement" of concepts of territorial borders and state sovereignty. Gidon Gottlieb, "Nations without States," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 3 (May/June 1994), pp. 100–112.

would reduce the danger that settlements of the majority population on the territory where the minority lives would undermine minority rights. This approach can, however, also lead to a permanent discussion about ethnic "over-" and "under-" representation in every possible institution.

Karl Renner, the Austrian politician and lawyer, wrote in 1902:

Nature knows neither an equality of individuals nor an equality of nations; equality is a creation of law and its greatest benefit for those subject to it.¹⁴⁵

For Renner, equality is a matter of institutions, law, constitution and administration. These dimensions have developed within the context of statehood and have been provided only by the state.¹⁴⁶

Can integration be an adequate response to nationalism?

One idea of the founders of the European Community was to ban nationalism. All European states support further progress of European integration. Nationalism on a state level in fact has been left behind. The Union was built on French-German partnership to reduce the fear of German military resurgence. It is unclear, however, how far the integration process will go and what the "finalité politique" will be. The concept "of an ever closer union" (Treaty of Rome and Treaty of Maastricht) does not specify the end of the process. Will economic integration processes eventually lead to a European federation?¹⁴⁷

Nor is the integration theory¹⁴⁸ very specific about the finality of this process. Integration theory is based on the assumption that in some fields and at a certain point, economic integration processes would unavoidably spill over – automatically or politi-

¹⁴⁵Karl Renner, quoted and interpreted in Gerald Stourzh, "Probleme der Konfliktlösung in multi-ethnischen Staaten: Schlüsse aus der historischen Erfahrung Österreichs 1848 bis 1918," in Fröschl and Mesner and Ra'an an (eds.), *Staat und Nation*, 106. See also Cvetka Knapic-Krhen, "Karl Renner und die nationale Frage in den Nachfolgestaaten der Monarchie. Was blieb vom Personalitätsprinzip?" in Konrad, ed., *Arbeiterbewegung und nationale Frage*, pp. 11–143.

¹⁴⁶The OSCE does not exclude personal and functional solutions. The CSCE Copenhagen Document of 1990 (paragraph 32) states: "To belong to a national minority is a matter of a person's individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice." Paragraph 35 speaks of "the right of persons belonging to national minorities to effective participation in public affairs." *Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE*, 29 June 1990. This formulation spilled over to the Declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights (June 1993). Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June 1993, paragraph 10.

Of course, the reason for this formula was mainly the fact that there was no consensus about the definition of national minorities. See also Arie Bloed, "A New CSCE Human Rights 'Catalogue': The Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE," in A. Bloed and P. van Dijk (eds.), *The Human Dimension of the Helsinki Process: The Vienna Follow-up Meeting and its Aftermath* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), pp. 67–69. Koen Koch, "The International Community and Forms of Intervention in the Field of Minority Rights Protection," in Cuthbertson and Leibowitz (eds.), *Minorities*, pp. 257–262.

¹⁴⁷The Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht in 1992, speaks in Art. J.5 of "the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence."

¹⁴⁸David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966); Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organisation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Ernst B. Haas, *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975).

cally – to other areas (political and security). It is by no means certain, however, if and when integration processes become irreversible and prevail over state sovereignty. Functional theory does not predict the limits of integration.

The European integration process has raised growing concern about national identities, however.¹⁴⁹ Supporters of a deeper Europeanisation are quick to assure skeptics that national identities based on language and culture are not threatened.¹⁵⁰ But promoters of European integration have avoided addressing the complicated relations between integration, nation, and state. If national identities remain, what becomes of the state? Will it become less significant? And if states disappear, what would the new structure look like? What would be the structure of the EU? How democratic would it be?

If states remain the main actors, however, the EU can be seen as a structure¹⁵¹ of a new type that affects and constrains the behavior of member states. The units will be constrained to take the same form, pursue a similar range of governmental tasks, and they would adopt a similar internal structure as well. This seems to confirm the view that despite different geostrategic positions, different threat perceptions, and varying economic performance there is a similar debate on security issues in all West European states. The members of the EU have developed a new structure by creating new institutions, norms and rules, even a new code of communication. This is different from the realist picture of the war-prone anarchic structure.

What happens, however, if the integration process results in the dissolution of states?

If states disappear, Hedley Bull¹⁵² foresees a "neo-medieval" model with "overlapping authority and multiple loyalty" emerging. In such a system, states must share their authority with "other associations."¹⁵³ Bull regards the "neo-medieval" system as incompatible with the state-based international society. Barry Buzan,¹⁵⁴ however, supports the idea that international society is not contradictory, but symbiotic

¹⁴⁹This is already true for the Czech Republic which is having second thoughts about membership in the EU. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus said that not only the Czech Republic but also the other former Communist states need "to find their own identity and not to lose it straight away on their road to Europe." Quoted in William Pfaff, "Sifting Through the Past In Search of an Identity," *International Herald Tribune*, May 26, 1994.

¹⁵⁰The argument has been put forward that the people of Luxemburg has not been absorbed during the integration process. But this assurance has more significance for the Germans or French, of course.

¹⁵¹For Kenneth Waltz a united Europe might emerge as a third superpower, since for Waltz the only transformation which can take place within the structure is that the units move away from the anarchic structure they form to an hierarchic, highly centralised, and more powerful state. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 180, p. 202. Despite the difficulties to form a single, effective political entity that controls foreign and military policies as well as economic ones, for Waltz the uneasiness over German power and the competition with Japan and America on even terms may enable Western Europe to achieve political unity. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 69 f.

¹⁵²Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 254–255 and 264–276.

¹⁵³In the medieval period the political units include civitates, principes, regni, gentes, respublicae. *Ibid.*, p. 29. See also John Gerardo Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 155.

¹⁵⁴Barry Buzan, "From international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the English school," *International Organisation* 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 327–352.

and complementary to a world society, which is based on individuals, non-state organizations, and the population as a whole as functionally differentiated actors with shared identities.

Andrew Moravcsik¹⁵⁵ sees individuals and privately constituted groups as fundamental actors in world politics; governments constitute a subset of domestic social actors. For Mark Zacher¹⁵⁶, the decaying Westphalian system of sovereignty and state autonomy is directly related to the increasing cooperation among states: "states are becoming increasingly enmeshed in a network of collaborative arrangements or regimes." Charles Kegley argues that this process requires the active moral commitment of states to cooperative arrangements:

The voluntary sacrifice of sovereignty for collaborative problem-solving ... requires states to conceive morally of transnational co-operation as compatible with their national interests ...¹⁵⁷

James Rosenau goes one step further and sees a "multi-centric world" emerging which "is in sharp contrast to that which prevails in the state-centric world."¹⁵⁸ The number of essential actors would increase to "hundreds of thousands."¹⁵⁹ The states system would gradually be replaced by the two-fold process of "globalization" and "localisation," which Rosenau calls "fragemegration" (fragmentation+integration).¹⁶⁰

While different sources underlie the operation of fragemegrative dynamics in the political, social, and economic realms, they all contribute to the same major outcome: in each realm the close links between territoriality and the state are breaking down and thereby posing the question of what constitutes the boundaries of communities.¹⁶¹

Holm and Sørensen¹⁶² point to the process of "uneven globalization" resulting from intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders. The state plays an active role in this process, however. Michael Zürn looks at the other side of the coin and speaks of "uneven denationalization." For Zürn "denationalization"

¹⁵⁵ Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberalism and International Relations Theory" (Centre for International Affairs Working Paper, no. 6, July 1992), p. 10.

¹⁵⁶ Mark W. Zacher, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), *Governance without government: order and change in world politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 100.

¹⁵⁷ Kegley, Jr., "Cold War Myths," p. 149 f.

¹⁵⁸ James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (New York-London-Toronto-Sidney: Harvester-Wheatshaf, 1990), p. 271.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 250.

¹⁶⁰ James N. Rosenau, "Fragegrative Dynamics: Notes on the Interaction of Globalizing and Localizing Processes" (Paper presented at the 35th International Studies Association Convention, Washington D.C., 28 March-1 April 1994); James N. Rosenau, "New Dimensions of Security: The Interaction of Globalizing and Localizing Dynamics," *Security Dialog* 25, no. 3 (September 1994), pp. 255-281.

¹⁶¹ James N. Rosenau, "Fragegrative Dynamics: Notes on the Interaction of Globalizing and Localizing Processes" (Paper presented at the 35th International Studies Association Convention, Washington D.C., 28 March-1 April 1994); James N. Rosenau, "New Dimensions of Security: The Interaction of Globalizing and Localizing Dynamics," *Security Dialog* 25, no. 3 (September 1994), pp. 255-281.

¹⁶² Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sørensen, "Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War," (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

results from the weakening of the state through globalization and the presence or emergence of "strong societies." ¹⁶³

Robert W. Cox sees opportunities for social movements:

Moreover, the changes taking place in states (diminished importance) give new opportunities for self-expression by nationalities that have no state of their own, in movements for separation or autonomy; and the same tendencies encourage ethnicities and religiously defined groups that straddle state boundaries to express their identities in global politics. ... Social movements like environmentalism, feminism, and the peace movement transcend territorial boundaries. Transnational co-operation among indigenous peoples enhances their force within particular states. ¹⁶⁴

It is far from being clear whether or when Europe will become a super-state or a "neo-medieval" system. If statehood in Central Europe is dissolved, however, it is very unlikely that a society of overlapping, more or less equal authorities and actors with shared identities will emerge. It is more likely that the most powerful authority will dominate the nation. In Central Europe, nations were the basic building blocs of the Habsburg monarchy, not the rights of the individual or the citizen. If the boundaries of the territorial state are dissolved through "fragementation" processes they will most likely be replaced by borders defined by nationalities, ethnicity, culture, and language. When state structures are weakened, nationalism based on ethnic distinctions is likely to be the consequence, rather than equal rights for individuals or groups. ¹⁶⁵

Stephen Van Evera ¹⁶⁶ predicts that nationalisms will pose little risk to peace in Western Europe because they are satisfied, having already gained states. In the East the number of stateless nationalisms is larger, increasing the risk that future conflicts will lead to wars of liberation. He basically follows Ernest Gellner's argument that in the West, in contrast to the East, states correlate with cultural zones.

The potential for the concept of the nation to degenerate into ethnonationalism is not limited to Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, the Flemings and Walloons in Belgium, the German-speaking minority in Northern Italy (South Tyrol), the Basques and Catalans in Spain, and Corsica are the best known examples. The Italian right-wing "National Alliance" partner in the governing coalition advocates revising the Treaty of Osimo (1975) that recognised the post-war borders between Italy and Yugoslavia (now Croatia and Slovenia). ¹⁶⁷ In response, the leader of the major party representing the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol (Northern Italy) said that if borders were under revision, then the border between Italy and Austria (Brenner) should be reconsidered as well.

¹⁶³In the context of the argument in this paper, Zürn means "destate-ization". Michael Zürn, "The Challenge of Globalization and Individualization: A View from Europe," in Holm and Sfransen (eds.), *Uneven Globalization and the End of Cold War*, pp. 137–165.

¹⁶⁴Robert W. Cox, "Towards a post-hegemonic conceptualisation of world order: reflections on the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), *Governance without government: order and change in world politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 144.

¹⁶⁵See also Michael E. Brown, "Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 8.

¹⁶⁶Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," pp. 10–12, 33–39.

¹⁶⁷*la Repubblica*, 23 and 24 april, 1994.

A "Europe of the regions" challenges states through decentralisation and fragmentation. Where are the borders of the regions?¹⁶⁸ Will there be a Basque region transcending the border between France and Spain? Will there be a Tyrolian region¹⁶⁹ or a Bavarian-Tyrolian region, or will there be a Northern Italian region as the "Lega Nord" (second largest party in the Italian government in 1994/95) proposes?¹⁷⁰ What would happen to Switzerland with its linguistic groups? The result of these changes might not be war, but most likely uncertainties, tensions, conflicts, unrest, and perhaps terrorism would increase.

Consider the situation of Austria if state borders were to disappear. Some Austrian politicians believe that Austrians have to get used to a Europe without borders.¹⁷¹ Some believe that the EU will emerge as a multinational state along the lines of the old empire.¹⁷² Historically, Austria has suffered from an identity crisis, and many leaders of the First Republic (1918–1938) thought that the country was not a viable entity. All political parties had the designation "deutsch-österreichisch" (German-Austrian) in their programmes or names. Most Austrians considered themselves ethnic Germans. This general sentiment prepared the ground for the "Anschluss" in 1938. After 1945, Austria developed a strong identity as an independent though small state. Austrian politicians downplayed the idea of the "nation"¹⁷³ or called the state "nation." Part of Austria's identity was shaped by its neutrality between the military blocs. Today more than two-thirds of Austrians believe that they are an independent nation.¹⁷⁴ To a large extent this is due to Austria's successful de-ethnicising of the Austrian state which the Austrians consider their "nation." If state borders in Europe were to disappear due to

¹⁶⁸ Dahrendorf, "Politik – Eine Kolumne." See also Anton Pelinka, "Europa der Regionen: Zur Unschärfe eines Begriffs," in Johann Burger and Elisabeth Morawek (eds.), *Mehr Europa? Zwischen Integration und Renationalisierung: Informationen zur politischen Bildung*, (Wien: Bundesministerium für Unterricht und Kunst, 1993), pp. 43–46.

¹⁶⁹ The chairman of the South Tyrolian Peoples Party (by far the biggest party in South Tyrol), Siegfried Brugger, complained in January 1995, that Austria's new government did not include the concept of an all-Tyrolian European region into their program. Within the party there is a debate whether the South Tyrolian members of the European parliament should vote with Austria and not with Italy.

¹⁷⁰ South Tyrolian politicians always supported the idea of a Europe of the regions hoping to strengthen their ties to the German speaking North. When in summer 1994 leaders of the two main Italian parties, the "Lega Nord" and the "Forza Italia" suggested an Italian federalism as basis for Europe of the regions, they protested heavily.

¹⁷¹ Foreign Minister Alois Mock, Interview in *Der Standard*, 7 February 1994: "Wir müssen die Frage der Beseitigung der nationalen Grenzen zur Kenntnis nehmen. Das ist ein wichtiges Bauprinzip der Gemeinschaft." Austria's President Thomas Klestil declared in a speech in Slovenia on 2 June 1994 with respect to the Slovenian – Italian border which has been questioned by the Italian neofascists, that in an integrated Europe the borders would disappear but not revised. ("In einem integrierten Europa geht es um das Verschwinden von Grenzen und nicht um deren Revision.") *Austrian Television*, 2 June 1994. The Chancellor Franz Vranitzky assumes that there would be no revisions of borders. Interview in *Kurier*, 9 June 1994.

¹⁷² For example Otto von Habsburg, member of the European parliament at a speech in Laxenburg on 2 June, 1994.

¹⁷³ Famous are former Chancellor Bruno Kreisky's words: "We have a national soccer team, a national library, a national bank – therefore we are a nation."

¹⁷⁴ The rest believes that Austria is "not yet" or "not at all" a nation. Ernst Bruckmüller, *Österreichbewusstsein im Wandel: Identität und Selbstverständnis in den 90er Jahren* (Wien: Signum Verlag Wien, 1994), pp. 15–18. See also Gabriele Holzer, *Verfreundete Nachbarn* (Wien: Kremayr & Scheriau, 1995).

integration, Austrians could once again consider themselves to belong to the German nation. Europe would be confronted again with unifying ethnic German majority.¹⁷⁵

Ethnonationality as a basis for authority relations challenges the premises of European integration: a society of democratic states with equal citizens. If statehood were dissolved, democracies developed over the last centuries might fade as well. So far there is no developed democracy outside the state, either on a supranational or on a regional or local level. The domestic structures of the member states have shaped the structure of the EU. All member states are democracies with developed economies. In other words, the internal characteristics of the states have reinforced the process of European integration. Of course, the "security dilemma" among the West European states was not apparent because security had been provided by the United States and NATO. Under this umbrella, the European states created a system that Karl W. Deutsch called a "pluralistic security community."¹⁷⁶ The members of these communities have been able to keep peace among themselves over a long period of time and resolved their disputes without resorting to force. In a pluralistic security community, states do not form an integrated government. Instead sovereign states with compatible values and high levels of communication, consultation and transaction band together. Although members do not fight each other, they do not necessarily have the same security goals (e.g., policy positions regarding the war in the former Yugoslavia).

Giving the European Parliament more power¹⁷⁷ would be a step towards a more federal Europe, but would not necessarily result in more democracy. The European Parliament does not work according to the same principles that guide national parliaments, and European federalism is not the same as federalism in states such as Germany or Austria. Federalism in these states distributes legal competencies within a state. Such a federalism on a European level would require a European state. More European federalism without a developed state would, however, favor nations over the states. Democracy is an attribute of states¹⁷⁸ and should be guaranteed to the democratic member states unless it is replaced in certain areas by a more democratic EU structure, which is not yet on the horizon. States should not give up democracy before it is clear what they get in return. As to the institutional arrangements the European Commission should not operate independently of the democratic governments of member states.

¹⁷⁵Egon Matzner sees the danger for Austria to fall apart if Europe consisted of autonomous regions. Egon Matzner, "Si disgrega anche l'Austria?" *limes* (Rome: December 1993): pp. 219–223. More general see Egon Matzner, "Alternatives and Prospective for Europe 2020: On the making of a Socio-Economic Context for a Civilized Europe" (Paper prepared for the Meeting of the Club Of Rome + BBV Foundation in Lyon 29–30 September, 1993), p. 10 f.

¹⁷⁶Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5 f. See also Richard Ned Lebow, "The long peace, the end of the cold war, and the failure of realism," *International Organisation* 48, no. 2, (Spring 1994), pp. 268–273.

¹⁷⁷At Maastricht the Parliament got the right to vote on the appointment of a new Commission and to veto on laws in certain areas (the internal market, education, culture, public health, consumer protection, transeuropean networks, and research and development framework programmes).

¹⁷⁸According to Robert Dahl, Hans Kohn and others the state is the correct size for democracy and the legitimate form of political organization. See Bach, "The Crisis of Democratic Discourse: Nationalism and Eastern Europe," p. 5.

Conclusion: states without nationalism

Many observers foresee no withering away of the states system. They suggest that sovereign states and the states system formed by them will be around at least for the time being and probably for much longer than that.¹⁷⁹

One could argue that European states are no longer sovereign because they have transferred much of their sovereignty to international bodies (e.g., the EU) in any case. The argument that states have lost sovereignty is far from new, however. Hedley Bull maintains that the European states system has always been part of a wider system of interaction in which groups other than the state (e.g., Catholics and Protestants) are related to each other, to foreign states and to international or supranational bodies, as well as to the state in which they are located.¹⁸⁰ States have always struggled to maintain sovereignty. However, if sovereignty means autonomy, a supreme coercive power, authority not hampered by others,¹⁸¹ exclusive control over a given territory,¹⁸² and equality and independence in their mutual relations, states have never been sovereign. Since the Westphalian system of "sovereign states" there have always been limitations to sovereignty, including national and international law, constraints imposed by the configuration of power (not even the decision of the states to go to war in 1914 was sovereign, because they were based on assumptions what other states would do) and economic interdependence.¹⁸³ The understanding among the members of the international community as to what constitutes sovereign authority during a particular historic period (dynastic state, national state), however, changes.¹⁸⁴ Camillieri and Falk highlight the paradox that the increasing strength of the state (administrative, legal, and military functions) may result in its declining sovereignty in the economic area.¹⁸⁵ In the future, the concept of sovereignty may also include some kind of democratic principle as a constitutive part. The state responds to international challenges such as economic and technological internationalisation processes. Accommodation to new devel-

¹⁷⁹Jackson and James (eds.), *States in a Changing World*, especially pp. 361–367. Hanspeter Neuhold, "Weltpolitik zwischen Integration und Fragmentierung," in *Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Internationale Politik* (Wien and Köln and Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 1994), pp. 99–119.

¹⁸⁰Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 278.

¹⁸¹For definitions of sovereignty see among others Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order: Values and Power in International Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 24–29; Joseph A. Camillieri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World* (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 11–43.

¹⁸²Stephen D. Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Cornell University: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 235–238.

¹⁸³The debate on limitations of the sovereignty by law is based on the ideas of Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth century. He does not make general legal distinctions between different degrees of capacities for rights for different classes of states. In Grotius' view all sovereign states are equally bound by international law. Hidemi Suganami, "Grotius and International Equality," in Hedley Bull and Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, eds., *Hugo Grotius and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 221–240.

¹⁸⁴Regarding different conceptions of sovereign authority see Bruce Cronin, "Distinguishing Between a Domestic and an International Issue: The Changing Nature of Sovereignty and Obligation in International Relations" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC (1–4 September, 1994).

¹⁸⁵Camillieri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty?*, pp. 83–88.

opments are hardly a new feature of state sovereignty and have been going on ever since the modern sovereign state emerged.

The Westphalian system did not eliminate old entities.¹⁸⁶ The new territorial states emerged as the main actors, however.¹⁸⁷ The new order created a system of states which are at least formally equal, in contrast to the earlier dominance of emperors and popes. In this manner, the non-democratic states of 1648 contained elements on which later pluralist democracies were built, including churches, universities, cities, guilds, merchant leagues, monasteries, and the aristocracy with its sovereigns.

Democratization and economic development in the West were achieved within the framework of the European state. Hedley Bull has observed that the European state system is also the basis for the international society.

What is chiefly responsible for the degree of interaction among political systems in all continents of the world, sufficient to make it possible for us to speak of a world political system, has been the expansion of the European states system all over the globe, and its transformation into a states system of global dimension.¹⁸⁸

The European state is the basis for globalization, integration, and for democracy. There is no developed democracy outside the state. Integration should not go beyond the limit where democratic statehood is dissolved. It might well be that it is replaced by the most powerful new and old actor: the nation defined in ethnic terms. The principle of nationality and ethnicity is far from a unifying force. More likely, nationalism will split existing states. Ethnonationalism may become the major cause of domestic anarchy in European states. A Europe based on nations without states would most likely reverse the integration process. Only integration plus statehood can reduce this danger. Traditionally, international institutions and organisations, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, sought to protect existing states from external threats (as the liberation of Kuwait demonstrated). Protecting states from internal dissolution and helping them to rebuild their economic, social, and administrative structures is a new function of international organizations. In Europe, international institutions (OSCE, Council of Europe) also seek to protect minority rights; this was not only in order to improve the status of ethnic nationalities, but also to protect states from secession.¹⁸⁹ It will be interesting to see whether the EU, once supranationally organized will develop sufficient means to prevent or moderate nationalistic behavior, movements and secessionist claims.

¹⁸⁶Stephen D. Krasner denies that the Peace of Westphalia marks a turning point in history. Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," pp. 235–264.

¹⁸⁷Whether there is an analogy between feudal actors and modern states see Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800–1300: communal discourse and conflictual practices," *International Organisation* 46, no. 3 (Spring 1993), pp. 427–478; and the criticism by Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Medieval tales: neorealist 'science' and the abuse of history," *International Organisation* 46, no. 3 (Spring 1993), pp. 483–485.

¹⁸⁸Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 20 f.

¹⁸⁹Urs W. Saxer, *Die Zukunft des Nationalstaates, Staaten zwischen Souveränitätsorientierung und Integrationsoffenheit in einem sich wandelnden internationalen System*, Basler Schriften zur europäischen Integration no. 6 (Basel: EuropaInstitut an der Universität Basel, 1994), pp. 34–36.

Of course, states make war. The history of the rise of the state is linked to violent conflict and military power.¹⁹⁰ Democratic states are usually able to keep peace among themselves, however.¹⁹¹ Will this be true if they are replaced by something else?¹⁹² International institutions provide important support for democratization. The major threat in Central and Western Europe comes from within the states¹⁹³ and not from an anarchic states system. The "security dilemma" does not simply appear on the ethnic level.¹⁹⁴ Ethnic groups do not act like states as a modified neo-realist approach would see it.¹⁹⁵ Conflict arises not so much between ethnicities, but among different groups concerning the character of the state and whether it is defined ethnically or politically.

Van Evera observes that nationalist movements without states and densely intermingled nationality populations increase the risk of war. The danger of war can be reduced if nationalisms attain statehood and if national populations are compact and homogeneous.¹⁹⁶ But this goal is unrealistic for several reasons.

One response to intra-national heterogeneity is some sort of "ethnic cleansing." The history of Central Europe and the Balkans is full of examples: the Turkish killing of Armenians during the First World War; the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations in 1922; Stalin's evacuation of Poles from the Eastern territories in 1939–1941;¹⁹⁷ the Croat massacres of Serbs during the 1940s; the so-called "option" when the population of South Tyrol had to decide in 1939 whether to become Italians or leave the country; the expulsion of the German-speaking population from the Sudetenland after the Second World War, and of course the Holocaust; the most recent example is the "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia and Croatia.

Suggestions for peaceful separation¹⁹⁸ rarely work.¹⁹⁹ Success depends on the history of the territory and populations involved and on the degree of ethnic heterogeneity.

¹⁹⁰ Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1994). Ekkehart Krippendorff, *Staat und Krieg* (Frankfurt: edition suhrkamp, 1985).

¹⁹¹ Michael W. Doyle, Kant, 'Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12/ No. 3 and 4, 1983, pp. 205–235 and 323–353. Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). A good summary of the arguments of this hypothesis is given in Thomas Nielebock, "Friede zwischen Demokratien: Ein empirisches Gesetz der Internationalen Beziehungen auf der Suche nach seiner Erklärung," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 22, no. 2, (1993), pp. 179–194.

¹⁹² Heinz Gärtner, "Small States and Concepts of European Security," *European Security* 2, No. 2 (Summer 1993), p. 193.

¹⁹³ See the brilliant essay on the phenomenon of future civil wars by Hans Magnus Enzensberger, *Aussichten auf den Bürgerkrieg* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993).

¹⁹⁴ Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35, no. 1, (Spring 1993): pp. 27–47, and in Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, pp. 103–124.

¹⁹⁵ Michael C. Williams and Keith R. Krause, "The Subject of Security: Foundations of Rethinking Security" (Unpublished paper, 7 April, 1994).

¹⁹⁶ Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," pp. 10–20.

¹⁹⁷ Tony Judt, "The New Old Nationalism," p. 47.

¹⁹⁸ Norbert Ropers, "Ziele, Ebenen und Aufgaben," in Jörg Calließ (ed.), *Auf dem Wege zur Weltinnenpolitik: Vom Prinzip der nationalen Souveränität zur Notwendigkeit der Einmischung* (Rehburg-Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 1994), p. 98; Lind, "In Defence of Liberal Nationalism," p. 92.

¹⁹⁹ Alexis Heraclides sees four prerequisites as essential as accepting secessionist self-determination: 1. The existence of a distinct and sizeable self-defined community or society within a state; 2. constant and systematic discrimination, exploitation or domination against a sizeable self-defined collectively on the part of the state or

ity, and most important of all, the political leadership of both sides must want or at least accept the separation. One relatively peaceful example is the Czech-Slovak "civilised divorce" in 1992.²⁰⁰ The secession of homogeneous Slovenia involved some violence in 1991.²⁰¹ Peaceful homogenization (separation or unification) cannot be a general solution.²⁰² This would create new national problems and new minorities. If South Tyrol joined Austria again, there would be a significant Italian minority there (one-third of the population). More than two thirds of the population of Transylvania are now Romanians, and Slovakia's Magyars represent about 50 percent of the inhabitants in towns and villages near the Hungarian border.²⁰³ All these parts of the population belonging to the majority would become new minorities if borders were be changed. Homogenization as a general principle for peaceful separation would confirm and legitimize efforts to make political and ethnic borders correspond.

The remaining option is to create states without nations, or to "de-nationalize" and "de-ethnicize" the idea of the state gradually. States defined as administrative units do not necessarily have any national or ethnic affiliations. Conversely, ethnically defined states are likely to oppress minorities. Only de-nationalized and de-ethnicized democratic states are fully equipped to protect minorities. This could be done best on a nonterritorial basis. Ethnicity and nationality, like religion, should become a private matter recognized by states as a civil right. The "nation-state" should keep the "state" and drop the "nation."

the dominant ethnic group; 3. cultural domination and 4. the state's rejection of dialogue. Alexis Heraclides, "Secessionist Conflagration: What Is to Be Done?" *Security Dialogue* 25, no. 3 (September 1994), p. 289. The questions remain, however, how large "distinct and sizeable" is (minorities usually do not want to be counted) and how to measure "discrimination, exploitation or domination."

²⁰⁰ Milica Z. Bookman, "War and Peace: The Divergent Break-ups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia," *Journal of Peace Research* 31, no. 2 (1994), pp. 175-187.

²⁰¹ An example of peaceful unification is the German unity of 1991 which was only possible because of the breakdown of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

²⁰² Secession as a global concept is suggested by Christian P. Scherrer, *Ethno-Nationalismus als globales Phänomen: Zur Krise der Staaten in der Dritten Welt und der früheren UdSSR*, INEF-Report no. 6 (Universität Duisburg Gesamthochschule, 1994), pp. 56-66.

²⁰³ Kovrig, "Hungarian Minorities in East-Central Europe," pp. 18, 22.

Povzetek

Država, narod in varnost v Srednji Evropi: demokratične države brez narodov

Pričujoči članek ne obravnava pravic narodnih manjšin in kulturne identitete, temveč položaj nacionalizma v mednarodni politiki. Dve razpravi sta na različnih ravneh vplivali na pojmovanje države v kontekstu mednarodne politike; po eni strani razprava o odnosu med državo in narodom, po drugi pa prispevek teorije o mednarodnih odnosih k razpravi o državi. Naš članek dokazuje, da obe razpravi ne moreta v celoti pojasniti dogodkov v Srednji in Zahodni Evropi. Kar zadeva prvo razpravo ta članek trdi, da rešitev nacionalnih problemov ni v odnosih med narodom in državo, ampak v ločitvi države od naroda. Kar zadeva drugo razpravo, je avtorjevo stališče, da Zahodni in Srednji Evropi ne grozi anarhija državne ureditve, temveč nacionalizem kot sila znotraj države. To ne velja le za Srednjo, ampak tudi za Zahodno Evropo. Razpad državnosti v Zahodni Evropi skozi integracijske, regionalizacijske ali globalizacijske procese bi pospešil etnični nacionalizem, ne pa prekrivanja identitet z enakopravnim posameznikom v središču.

Narodnost in etničnost naj bi, podobno kot religija, ostali zasebni zadevi, toda kot zagotovljeni pravici. Zato je za srednjeevropske države potrebno, da "raz-narodijo" in "de-etnicizirajo" svoj koncept države. Potrebno bi bilo vsaj poskusiti razmišljati o državi brez naroda. Po eni strani je največja grožnja etnični nacionalizem, ki je naperjen proti obstoječi demokratični državnosti, po drugi strani pa so demokratične države najbolj sposobne spoštovati manjšinske pravice na neteritorialni osnovi.