

THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTHORITY - CONTENT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISCOURSE OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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1. Introduction

After the Bosnian war 1992-1995, the international community (IC) established a strong presence in the country and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was entrusted as the most powerful international body and 'final authority in theatre' regarding the implementation of Dayton and subsequent accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) into the European Union (EU). The OHR was created under the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (Dayton Peace Agreement) of 14 December 1995 to oversee implementation of civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement. The mission of the HR, also a Special Representative of the EU, is »to work with the people of BiH and the International Community to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth BiH) is a peaceful, viable state on course to the EU integration.«

If press releases' »only raison d'être is to be retold...as accurately as possible, preferably even verbatim, in news reporting« (Jacobs, 1999: xi) and if its function is to compete for the mercy of different journalistic gatekeepers, then OHR's press releases are quite a peculiar genre. Due to the position of this institution in BiH, they are guaranteed news and they immediately affect citizens or politicians. As such, they have the full power of perlocution (Searle, 1975) as they immediately impact the public and political life in BiH. Their newsworthiness is not decided by the BiH journalists as their audience-directedness is inevitable, but by the concrete power of the OHR given by the Bonn Declaration¹ and its subsequent interpretation. Their sole production and publication assure their appearing in the Bosnian print and broadcast news; they precede the news, and this

makes it difficult for to define its already hybrid generic qualities (Majstorović, 2006: 131). In terms of its urgency and newsworthiness, press releases of the High representative very much resemble royal decrees, except that today the Internet has replaced heralds. As only a small percentage of the BiH public uses the Internet², these press releases were meant to be picked up by the news media, and they because of the supreme role of the HR, they made it into the central news without much competition, particularly the HR's decisions on laws and removals.

The qualitative content analysis of the Office of the High representative (henceforth OHR) in Bosnia presents a preliminary insight in this large body of texts (Majstorović, 2006) primarily through its most frequent themes between 1996-2005. It is not however a media content analysis as the paper's objective was not to measure the actual time given to the news on something that a HR did or said, but to see how and what this organization communicated to BiH public. If two press releases like the ones below

In order to protect the Office of the President of the RS as an institution and the legitimate interest of the people of RS, the HR **has removed** Nikola Poplašen from the Office of the President of RS and **forbids** him to exercise any of the rights, privileges, and authorities of that Office. 5 March 1999

The High representative, Paddy Ashdown, today **issued** a decision removing Nikola Grabovac from his position of Minister of Finance for the Federation of BiH. Mr. Grabovac and his Ministry have been implicated in the AM Sped affair yet the Minister has refused to accept final political responsibility for the actions or inactions of his Ministry and step down from this position. "High representative **removes** Nikola Grabovac", 14 June, 2002

were published on the OHR's website or communicated at a press conference, most likely, they would make it to the central BiH news because of its domestic affairs importance. On another lever, an international official's removing a legitimately elected president of an entity would also be indicative of the two power relations: a) the role and authority of the OHR prescribed by the Dayton Peace Agreement and b) the OHR's agenda-setting capacity in Bosnian and Herzegovina's public sphere shaping and contextualizing BiH's reality.

To examine how such discourse was possible in this particular spatio-temporal dimension, I will first provide contextual arguments on how such unprecedented authority was made possible and how the OHR's agenda-setting role became visible through the dictate of prominent topics such as democratization and transition in BiH. Secondly, I will define what this agenda-setting capacity has meant and how this shaping and recontextu-

alizing was actually done through discourse. Thirdly, I will show how the High representative (HR) used language to exert power in constructing democratization and transition, two most important IC objectives in BiH, through a selection of particular discourse topics.

2. Toward an interdisciplinary research agenda: discourse, politics and communication

Although the language of democratization appears universal, its content today is a highly ideological one that qualifies liberal democracy in the states of Eastern Europe and justifies the interference of Western institutions into their domestic affairs (Chandler, 2000:7). The IC's presence in BiH was on one hand the result of the numerous wars and contention in the Balkans and one could argue that it was *needed* as such. On the other hand, the IC mandate and actions have stepped out of line defined by Dayton, by being overtly authoritarian, situating this discussion in the realm of postcolonial³ and globalist theories (Flowerdew, 1997, Todorova, 1997).

Press releases fall into the register of political communication, or political discourse, as could the entire international community's talk in BiH, and Wilson (2001: 398) warns of this danger when he says 'all *analyses* of discourse are potentially political, and, that on one level, '*all* discourse analysis is potentially political'. This study does not claim that discourse-analytical approach means reducing a social problem to its linguistic or communicative aspects; the language used by the High representative when talking about BiH or addressing the BiH citizens is the language of a dominant elite that struggles for primacy with languages of other, competing elites (the state, political parties, nongovernmental sector etc..) in the BiH public sphere.

OHR's press releases up until 2005 and later have been central in the mainstream BiH media discourse which is socially constructing BiH realities. Although professional activities are characterized by special languages, access to which is usually restricted to members of a given profession (Lakoff, R., 1990, Tannen, 1990), and political leaders use these languages 'to exert power over the general public and develop support for their policies' (Kress, 1995 in Flowerdew, 1997: 454-455), the OHR's discourse is not just 'any' institutional or professional discourse. It is relevant and worth studying because of the High Representative's enormous influence in BiH even in 2009 as this organization was supposed to lead the country

into a new era of its development, from socialism to capitalism, from post-war democratization into transition, from 'Dayton to Brussels'.

Any media text analysis can be seen as an analysis of cultural texts and Kellner (2003) proposes a useful three-pillar cultural research structure consisting of:

- Political economy and production of culture (cultural texts) through studying ownership of media conglomerates, which subsequently means ownership of messages;
- Cultural texts such as pamphlets, ads, and even OHR's press releases. Textual analyses such as content analysis and discourse and critical discourse analysis (CDA) explain these texts through concepts of ideology, discourse type, narratives, semiotics, topics, formal linguistic characteristics etc.
- Audience analysis (audiences are seen as heterogeneous and multiple): audience members are recipients of texts, which mean different things to different people, and cultural studies is interested in how audiences receive them.

This research has to do with the second pillar as a preliminary step for a thorough CDA approach whose advantages were helpful in later more detailed analyses of the OHR press releases. As a press release is a borderline genre between interpersonal and mass communication (Jacobs, 1999: 31), press release can be viewed as a genre or even media channel with a strong albeit not yet fully realized meaning potential.

3. Contextualizing the IC role in BiH- A Job without Alternative

The 'new democracies' were seen as dysfunctional for many reasons such as deep cultural barriers and Bosnian democratization as a needed 'noble experiment' (Denitch, 1996: 60). There are different opinions about international involvement in BiH, but they are mainly divided into those who think there was no other alternative and those who think although there may have not been alternatives, the actual democratization process has been catastrophic. Because of so much blood spilt in the name of nationalistic ideals, some critics say Western outsiders 'are far better representatives of the genuine interests of the Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian peoples and states than their patriotic leaders' (Denitch, 1996: 32). The pretext for this is that new democratic societies are just inept, with 'remarkably few legal, political, and

civic skills...deep-seated prejudice...and have yet little willingness to reconceptualize their prejudices or anxieties in language familiar to Westerners' (Fine, 1996: 559). Both of these opinions favor international intervention in BiH, which is seen as a course of action 'without an alternative'.

More recent and rather different opinions emerged later critiquing the 'noble experiment' as 'a mockery of any meaningful concept of democracy' and a 'grotesque parody of democratic principles' (Carpenter, 1997 in Chandler, 2000: 158, 190). Paddy Ashdown has received much criticism regarding his colonial-style politics, 'running Bosnia like Raj', and 'making much greater use of his untrammled powers as a 'benevolent despot' than his predecessors (Traynor, 2003). The critique of the 'evangelic belief' in imposing democracy from above and its similarities with the British East India Company was a theme of Knaus and Martin's article 'Travails of the European Raj' (2003).

With a great deal of caution and diffidence there has, however, been some systematic critique against the OHR policy in the realm of international relations but little in discourse and media studies. Western politicians have been blamed for their lack of accountability to BiH citizens. They have been forcing statehood upon the divided Bosnian ethnic groups at all costs and at the expense of society. Ten years after Dayton, there is no 'positive peace', as a form of cooperation and integration (Galtung, 1968 in Roach, 1993), but 'negative peace', as a mere lack of organized violence between the main ethnic groups. A more detailed insight into the inadequacies of the Western efforts in terms of society building in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their subsequent inability to guarantee the BiH stability is given by Yordan (2003), who says the initial intervention of the EU and USA were led by their personal interests and not humanitarian ideals.

American negotiators wrote the GFA with the assistance of Western Europeans and Russian diplomats. While the parties to the peace talks could debate these provisions, they were not allowed to make any substantive changes. Through diplomatic arm twisting, the U.S. forced the parties to sign the peace agreement, even though some of its provisions contradicted their self-interest. In the end, the GFA can be seen as an instrument of conflict settlement, rather than one of conflict resolution. It did not permit the leaders of ethno-national group to negotiate an ending to their war and it did not provide an incentive for Bosnia's political leaders to address the very problems that had led them to war. Instead a settlement was forced upon them, angering many of Bosnia's politicians and stripping them of their right to create a society that best represents their needs and interests (Yordan, 2003: 62).

The Dayton Peace Agreement (GFA) in newly built Bosnian state was designed to stop the war and introduce capitalism and democracy as a

new sort of modernity. But insisting on a market economy, without the social cohesion, which was shown in a World Bank's study (Yordan, 2003), is not and cannot be a guarantee of a self-sustaining peace. »As a result, the success of the present peace building operation should not be solely gauged by how much the economy grows, by how many bills are passed by the legislature, or by how many pro-GFA supporters are elected to public office (Yordan, 2003: 63). »Indeed, one of the major faults of the peace process is that international diplomats are not accountable to Bosnia's citizens and their policies often disregard the opinions of the country's political leaders« (Yordan, 2003: 71).

This lack of consideration for the BiH political subjects, while running a policy that eventually has to result in a modern state, and legitimizing ethno-nationalist leaders and their separatist politics while at the same time pursuing the idea of a strong state of BiH are probably two largest paradoxes of the OHR discourse which have subsequently created two very opposing and confusing messages to BiH citizens. To impose laws regulating civilian life without civic participation⁴, to create packets of laws aimed at strengthening 'jobs and justice' without input of BiH politicians (Knaus and Martin, 2003: 1), to ignore the country's historic commonalities, multiculturalism, memory and emancipatory potentials of the socialist Yugoslav past in a monologic imposition of liberal-democratic Bosnianhood from above without any plans of restoring the country's genuine and full sovereignty; these are acts of colonization. These acts have been justified by the lack of democracy in BiH and have also been recontextualized as necessary steps for democracy and Europeanization, which is a rather circular logic. Even the concept of democracy has been an ideologically loaded one being upheld as »a universal aspiration...difficult to obtain outside the developed and mature democracies of the West« (Chandler, 2000: 17). They behaved as if BiH was a clean slate on which liberal Western values were simply to be inscribed.

An unprecedented amount of control resting with the HR has produced discursive relations of power and inequality between the participants and has also, as a result, affected their identities and social roles particularly when it comes to the noted lack of agency for BiH citizens and 'progress from the above' (Knaus and Martin, 2003: 68). This apparent progress is »no longer measured by free elections and constitutional frameworks, but on the basis of alleged cultural distinctions or ill-defined assessments of civil society...(which) has led to an increasingly qualified acceptance of liberal democracy in states outside

the West...and the international regulatory bodies which are now overseeing the political process in the new democracies« (Chandler, 2000: 4).

The OHR's mandate was strengthened in 1997 by the Bonn Peace Implementation Council powers⁵, an ad hoc created body aiming to follow the implementation of GFA. The Bonn Declaration gave the HR the power to propose and adopt legislation when conflict among politicians stalled the legislative process, and to dismiss politicians who worked to prevent or delay the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Carlos Westendorp, the second High representative who originally campaigned for the expanded mandate, and his successors Petritsch and Ashdown, have rewritten or imposed over 100 laws, spanning economic, social, political, and judicial issues, and have removed over eighty individuals from public office⁶« (Yordan, 2003: 61). Today, that number is over 150 individuals; only in June 2004, the HR Ashdown removed and conditionally removed around 60 individuals from their public positions. In May 1999, Westendorp said to *Wall Street Journal*: »Yes, this disregards the principles of sovereignty, but so what? This is not the moment for post-colonial sensitivity...The problems of the region will only be solved when we have introduced a general respect for democracy and the rule of law« (Westendorp, 1999 in Chandler, 2000:201). In August 2009, in their rehabilitation process, some 53 were repealed by the current High Representative Valentin Inzko, as they were no longer seen to be a threat to peace implementation, institutional integrity or democracy.

4. Delineating the OHR discourse: the scope and the truth

The discourse of the international community in BiH is vast and includes texts produced by other international organizations such as OSCE or UN IPTF, Dayton Agreement, press reports and public addresses to name but a few. After Dayton, which not only established international control over military forces on the ground but also put into practice a new, post-Cold War, international agenda for long-term peace-building. This new role for international institutions is increasingly described as *democratization*...a major international experiment in political engineering in BiH. (Chandler, 2000: 1-2). Although the role of the OHR was initially established to create long term peace and democracy, the OHR's discourse was pregnant with discursive formations that were to be reenacted well before they were dialogically articulated, surpassing and exceeding the formal boundaries of the Dayton. This analysis seeks to outline elements of discursive construction of democratization and transition in the country by identifying and

discussing prevailing discourse topics. Establishment of the OHR after Dayton, with its actions and interactions, is seen as a semiotic act in which the final word and interpretation of everything related to transition and future European integrations in Bosnia rests with the HR.

Although discourses on democratization and transition have blurred boundaries, democratization or the so-called 'post-war period', conditionally speaking, began in 1996 and ended in 2000, when the transition stage began which still continues today. The OHR-style democratization and, more recently, Europeanization discourses are rarely criticized except from an extremely nationalistic point of view. In a world where 'social power is based on privileged access to socially valued resources, such as wealth, income, position, force, group membership, education or knowledge power' (Van Dijk, 1993a: 254), it seems that BiH citizens either don't have or don't have enough of such power given the little resistance to OHR's activities during the period. The reasons are plentiful: weak public opinion, corrupted and discredited politicians who are using populist rhetoric, the historical legacy of the Balkans as the Other, or mistrust and insecurity aggravated by the poverty typical for any post-war society.

This type of discourse-as-social-interaction presumes subject positions and through occupying them both the OHR and BiH citizens become what they are. In the same way, occupation of the aforementioned subject positions, i.e. the dominant (OHR) and the dominated (BiH citizens), reproduces and temporarily fixates a certain social order that, wrongly, appears to be commonsensical. In this situation, BiH politicians, although sometimes appearing hesitant to attract votes, cannot but agree to the OHR's decisions which creates a culture of dependence. Via its Internet portal, the OHR informed the public, used strategies of positive self - and negative other-presentation (Majstorović, 2006), sanctioned, brought legislation or otherwise promoted political stances. To make their dominance more efficient, the OHR also used all modern communication resources available from press officers, through press releases and press conferences where their statements appear in various frames and recontextualizations (Bernstein, 1990), such as extradition of war criminals to ICTY framed as a necessary precondition for entering the EU or frequent appeals to intellectuals to help BiH accept the changes and transition.

5. *Analyzing the data: definition of topic/theme*

Discourse topics are crucial for understanding of text and talk (Van Dijk, 1997: 10). It is »an intuitively satisfactory way of describing the unifying principle which makes one stretch of discourse ‘about’ something and the next stretch ‘about’ something else« (Brown and Yule, 1983: 70). For these reasons, the key rule in defining them was centrality of some propositions and concepts in relation to others (Tomlin, Forrest et al. in Van Dijk: 1997a). The study of semantic macrostructures of a text may show how propositions are ordered in hierarchical networks of importance, relevance or conceptual dominance (Van Dijk, 1993b: 33). Themes or topics are primarily realized in headlines or lead paragraphs and they »define the overall coherence or semantic unity of discourse, and also what information readers memorize best from a news report« (Van Dijk, 1998: 248). The semantic representation cannot be systematically ‘reduced’ to produce the discourse topic representation is provided; instead, one is required to go back to the original text and »make up a sentence which appears to summarize the main points in the piece of text, and then translate this sentence into a semantic representation« (Brown and Yule, 1983: 109).

To identify topics and not the amount of airtime, I needed to become familiar with the corpus and then use corpus linguistics methodology. The data were downloaded from the OHR’s website by means of Teleport Pro and then processed by Wordsmith Tools software whereby two wordlists were created: a wordlist of the entire corpus and a wordlist comprising of headlines. These were compared with the reference corpus wordlist, which was Charles Dickens’s *Great Expectations* and some other texts in my textual archive, which made up a reasonably big list for calculating keyness⁷. I identified recurrent topics by investigating the contents of all the texts in the corpus and came up with a list that to a great extent coincided with the topics that were discussed in the HR’s special reports to the UN General secretary⁸. Then, to corroborate these findings, I analyzed headlines of over 1400 press releases between 1996-2004 and partly 2005, as these were the most direct way of addressing the BiH public, and came up with a similar list of key words that coincided with the previously defined topic category⁹.

This reason why I combined the two calculations was because this methodology proved in many ways problematic: the keyword analyses were not clear-cut in the sense that they yielded a lot of function words. Another problems with the content analysis method was that it included a great deal of overlap between the topics as some fell into multiple catego-

ries. If there was a topic that would fit in more than one category, I included it in multiple categories¹⁰ and provided charts for every topic's annual distribution in Appendix 2. Interestingly enough, the keyword analysis showed a significant number of direct speech acts (Searle, 1975) or explicit semi-performatives (Jacobs, 1999)¹¹ and due to their prominence, I decided to establish a separate 'performatives' category. These speech acts, when it comes to the HR, are almost all directives with full power of perlocution¹².

It was also problematic to decide if the discourse of the OHR started immediately upon Dayton in late 1995, in 1996 when it technically started, or in 1998, when the first decisions on removals and laws on national insignia were passed? After the Office was formed in 1995, the OHR started with official press releases in 1996. The first releases were far fewer, less sophisticated and looked more like news reports. With the Bonn Powers and the strengthened OHR's mandate in December 1997, Petritsch's and Ashdown's press releases sounded more similar to political and viceregal speeches (Kaminsky and Etz, 1999). The discourse of the ensuing High representatives, Schwarz-Schilling, Lajčak and Inzko, were not analyzed in this paper.

6. Research findings

The results obtained by looking at keywords of the entire corpus in comparison to the reference corpus were as follows¹³:

1. WordSmith List of Keywords from the entire corpus (the first 20)

NWORDFREQ.	UKUPNA.TXT	%	FREQ.POREDBA1.TXT	%KEYNESS	P	
1 THE	44,063	9.45	37,991	5.13	8,167.2	0.000000
2 REPRESENTATIVE	3,591	0.77	28		6,543.0	0.000000
3 BIH	2,884	0.62	26		5,221.9	0.000000
4 HIGH	3,873	0.83	472	0.06	4,854.9	0.000000
5 WILL	3,575	0.77	788	0.11	3,457.6	0.000000
6 BOSNIA	1,916	0.41	33		3,344.9	0.000000
7 HERZEGOVINA	1,728	0.37	27		3,036.3	0.000000
8 BRCKO	1,247	0.27	0		2,372.7	0.000000
9 FEDERATION	1,193	0.26	9		2,172.6	0.000000
10 OHR	1,108	0.24	5		2,048.9	0.000000
11 IMPLEMENTATION	1,017	0.22	12		1,815.8	0.000000
12 RS	1,001	0.21	14		1,770.2	0.000000

13 DISTRICT	927	0.20	14		1,631.5	0.000000
14 AUTHORITIES	904	0.19	22		1,533.1	0.000000
15 AGREEMENT	892	0.19	28		1,473.5	0.000000
16 PEACE	855	0.18	27		1,411.3	0.000000
17 LAW	1,787	0.38	573	0.08	1,343.7	0.000000
18 COUNCIL	870	0.19	49		1,320.1	0.000000
19 INTERNATIONAL	1,220	0.26	289	0.04	1,129.1	0.000000
20 REPRESENTATIVE	674	0.14	22		1,108.1	0.000000

2. Wordsmith List of keywords from the press releases' headlines (the first 20)

N	WORD	FREQ.	KIKILIKI.TXT %	FREQ.PORED	BA1.DOC %	KEYNESS	P
1	REPRESENTATIVE	494	3.71	4		2,761.1	0.000000
2	HIGH	522	3.92	58	0.03	2,597.1	0.000000
3	BRCKO	197	1.48	0		1,115.3	0.000000
4	BIH	190	1.43	26	0.01	919.8	0.000000
5	OHR	158	1.19	5		849.9	0.000000
6	STATEMENT	94	0.71	9		471.5	0.000000
7	DISTRICT	85	0.64	1		469.8	0.000000
8	LAW	111	0.83	37	0.02	465.8	0.000000
9	SUPERVISOR	77	0.58	0		435.3	0.000000
10	FEDERATION	60	0.45	3		315.3	0.000000
11	IMPLEMENTATION	57	0.43	1		312.1	0.000000
12	COUNCIL	58	0.44	3		304.2	0.000000
13	RS	65	0.49	14		295.3	0.000000
14	MEETS	51	0.38	0		288.2	0.000000
15	COMMISSION	52	0.39	1		284.0	0.000000
16	ON3	23	2.42	1,608	0.76	280.7	0.000000
17	MOSTAR	49	0.37	0		276.9	0.000000
18	OF	704	5.28	5,570	2.64	261.1	0.000000
19	WELCOMES	46	0.35	0		259.9	0.000000
20	APPOINTS	42	0.32	0		237.3	0.000000

Few addresses to the HR were found in the corpus, or other-people quotations, which justifies this assumption. Some of the topics identified have not even made it into the 'keywords' as can be seen in the examples below. *Srebrenica* and *Hague Tribunal*, two very important topics of today, didn't even make it to the top twenty keywords. They became more pro-

minent after 2000, or in the ‘transition’ phase, whereas they had been almost completely erased from the discourse of previous years.

Chart 1






Chart 2



Because keyword list 2 showed a number of explicit semi-performatives¹⁵, I decided to establish a special chart of ‘direct speech acts’ (*Chart 3*), as in these texts the HR ‘condemned, congratulated (Dayton anniversaries, 8th of March, Easter), expressed condolences, criticized, warned, or ‘was disturbed’ regarding the situation in BiH. During Wolfgang Petritsch’s times (1999-2002), there were a lot more ‘socializing’ speech acts (commemorating, commiserating, wishing a happy holiday) and when it came to

Paddy Ashdown's discourse (2002-2005), there were more sanctions and removals.

Chart 3



Removals of BiH officials and the HR's introduction of legislation, immediately to become the law, were seen as separate topics. Chart 4a shows that removals of officials were most frequent in 1999, which is not true, as this chart is based on the number of published *press releases that dealt with removals*, and not *the number of removed individuals*. Removals were most frequent in 2004 (see *chart 4.b*), but there weren't that many press releases talking about each individual removal: the HR would remove 60 individuals just in one press release.

Chart 4a





Chart 4b


25 topics were identified in over 1400 texts and their annual distribution is provided in Appendix 2:

1. Refugees, return, collective centers;
2. Diplomacy, HR's visits abroad, EU integrations;
3. Territories, police, army, intelligence, airports;
4. BiH courts and legislation;
5. High representative and BiH politicians/politics;
6. ICTY (the Hague tribunal);
7. OHR and HR's decisions, laws, occupying premises;
8. Removals;
9. Social issues (health care, education, POW, culture);
10. Property issues and claims;
11. Events, openings;
12. Srebrenica;
13. Assaults and crime;
14. Reintegration and reconstruction, energy, resources;
15. Elections;
16. Media;
17. Human rights;
18. Brčko district;

19. Economy and inter-entity cooperation;
20. OHR bureaucracy;
21. Region;
22. Donations;
23. State symbols and insignia, citizens' documents;
24. Addresses to the OHR
25. Corruption, drugs, trafficking.

This preliminary content analysis showed that most prevalent topics are those about the OHR's communication with local and international politicians, Peace Implementation Council, UN (*Diplomacy, HR's visits abroad, EU integrations*), or topics such as *Brčko district, property claims* and *social issues*. Topics were analyzed not so much in terms of their prominence but more as trends, e.g. the property claim issues related to displaced people, for instance, entered the discourse in 1998, peaked in 2002, when the HR Petritsch brought a packet of laws related to this subject. Later, there was a decline of their topical prominence in 2004, as people mostly managed to reclaim their property or to resolve their property issues in another way.

Chart 5



Going back to 1996 and the 1st HR, Carl Bildt, there were fewer removals, laws etc., which is logical given that 1996 was the first post-war year. Some press releases also announced that local politicians did not fully understand what they were supposed to do or how to act so they would even 'forget' to show up at meetings.

For the second week in a row, Republika Srpska Prime Minister Gojko Kličković failed to turn up at the meeting of the Joint Interim Commission this afternoon. This was in spite of explicit undertakings to come and in spite of the time and place of the meeting being agreed. “Statement by the High representative Carl Bildt”, June 25, 1996

The most dominant topics were refugees, elections, then a novelty in BiH, regulation of property claims and so forth. As in 1997, there were more assaults and criminal incidents, but also more talks on the reintegration and restructuring of the country; a trend that declined in later years. As was seen earlier, topics such as ‘Srebrenica’ and ‘ICTY’ had been introduced whereas they did not exist prior to 2000 and their frequency was steadily growing towards 2004.

1998 was a year of high increase in decision making in terms of the state symbols and insignia relevant to the BiH state identity such as license plates, first passports, the flag, the coat of arms, the currency etc. After local politicians could not agree about these things, the HR of the day ‘had’ to make these decisions as well. The year 1997 marks an increase in direct speech acts, a trend that more or less continued until 2005. Speech acts of ‘congratulation’, be it New Year, 8th of March, or Dayton anniversary, were most frequent during Wolfgang Petritsch’s time. In comparison with other HRs, Petritsch seemed to have a more personal and warmer tone but he also removed people, annulled decisions and issued edicts. Judging by their verbal acts, the power to make and freedom to interpret laws, meetings with the highest international and BiH officials, and the decisions published in the RS or Federation Official Gazettes, the HRs generally behaved more like BiH presidents than international envoys.

The High representative, Carlos Westendorp, yesterday issued a Decision suspending the power of authorities in both Entities to re-allocate and dispose of certain types of socially-owned land... The High representative has taken this Decision after extensive research and consultation as to the problematic nature of the current legislation and the misapplication... His Decision is effective as of May 26, 1999, and shall be published in the Official Gazettes of the Entities. “Decision on Socially-Owned Land”, 27 May 1999


The High representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, today met with a senior delegation from the European Commission’s Directorate for External Relations, headed by the Director, Mr Reinhardt Priebe. The delegation is visiting Bosnia and Herzegovina to discuss assistance to the country within the EU’s five-year Regional and Country Strategy. “High representative meets European Commission delegation”, 20 July, 2001

Petritsch was the one who tried to deny the claims of protectorate in BiH by introducing the concept of ‘ownership’, or a sense that Bosnians should be accountable for what was happening in their country. ‘Ownership’ initially planned to ‘give people the feeling that this is their country’ by allowing Bosnian leaders more say (Kaminski and Etz, 1999), but the problem was that Petritsch was very choosy which leaders he felt should have a say (Chandler, 2000: 202).

In terms of removals and decision making for ‘obstructing Dayton’ or for ‘the lack of cooperation with ICTY’, the content analysis has shown Paddy Ashdown to be the most active HR. That trend had two peaks: in 2002 when Ashdown came to power, and especially in 2004 with more and more individuals removed without any public disclosure of the supporting evidence and with a general lack of transparency. To illustrate the much debated ‘removals’, here is a typical format of a removal decision, which later on became much more formal and ritualized and had greater reference to the powers enabling a HR to do it¹⁶. The ‘removal’ trends can be seen in Chart 6.

The High representative has written this morning to Dragan Čavić, Vice-Chairman of the SDS, notifying him of his decision to remove him from office in the newly elected Republika Srpska Assembly, using the authority vested in him by the Bonn Peace Implementation Council. Mr Čavić is also barred indefinitely from holding further official positions in BiH. “High representative removes SDS vice-Chairman Čavić from Office”, October 08, 1998

Chart 6.



7. Depths of critical discourse analysis versus breadths of content analysis

Content analysis has been very helpful for definition of topics, but even results obtained cannot sufficiently account for the subtler ideological processes in texts. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) can give more detailed explanations of such relations and therefore is a logical continuation of any content analysis; where a content analysis gives breadth and general feeling, a CDA framework provides depth of details of vaguer notions such as ideologies, beliefs, coercion but also strategies of representation, mitigation and justification encoded in the actual language use. While content analysis tells us if a removal happened it doesn't tell us how it happened, i.e. how it was constructed in the text. The text below:

You will be aware that at the request of the High representative the NATO Secretary General and the SACEUR have authorized SFOR to occupy and control a number of Broadcasting Facilities in the RS. This action took place this morning. This action was taken following the grotesque distortion of the press conference with Judge Louise Arbour, which was broadcast by SRT on Sunday, 28 September. The High representatives recommendation was made on the basis of the mandate given to him under the terms of the Sintra Declaration specifically paragraph 70 which empowers him to act against any media outlet whose output is in persistent and blatant contravention of either the spirit or letter of the Peace Agreement. The apology and rebroadcast of Judge Arbour's interview by SRT was, although welcome, frankly too little too late. In our statement last night we made it clear that further action was under consideration. "NATO Secretary-General and SACEUR at the request of the HR authorized SFOR to occupy and control a number of Broadcasting Facilities in the RS", October, 1, 1997

is about an act of SFOR's occupation of the broadcasting facilities. It can be coded as a topic 'OHR decisions, laws, occupying premises' but no content analysis would reveal that such a decision was presented as completely commonsensical at the time. SFOR, at the request of the HR Westendorp, committed the act of open coercion as a result of the Republic Srpska's main media 'distorting' Louise Arbour's press conference broadcast followed by a journalist's commentary. The year 1997 was certainly not the prime time of BiH media's objectivity and professionalism and although the SRT, perhaps reluctantly, came with an apology, this was still considered to be 'frankly too little too late'. Through the combination of an adjunct expressing the speaker's attitude followed by a metaphor with a condescending overtone, OHR made a case and justified a military seizure of SRT on the premises of bad journalism legitimizing it as a threat to Dayton and democratization. Not only did this language speak of a one-time sanction but of a contingency

plan in case similar things happened in the future enacted in a semi-performative of warning committing to 'further action...under consideration'.

In the following paragraph, it is not stated what powers or international provisions authorize the OHR and SFOR to act and occupy the premises of a bank that has been involved in illegal business operations. If BiH citizens were to construct their social identities from this text, they would be even more passivized seeing that none of the local police or authorities are mentioned, and would probably be misled to believe that the OHR has the power to do it and will do it instead. The linguistic choices used to describe this joint activity are particularly interesting as there are traces of military/secret service discourses (e.g. the operation was well-planned and well-executed, SFOR maintained a safe and secure environment, there was no outside-interference etc.).

Early this morning, representatives of the Office of the High representative, with the strong support of SFOR, entered the main branch of Hercegovačka Banka in Mostar, retrieving documentation required by the Provisional Administrator, Toby Robinson. The operation was well-planned and well-executed. While SFOR was maintaining a safe and secure environment, the needed bank records and vaults were secured. There was no outside-interference." High representative welcomes operation securing records of Hercegovačka Banka", April, 18, 2001

A great deal of OHR's main topics dealt with removals and bringing new legislation which were justified with the negative Other representation of BiH politicians by distinguishing between the good (European) and the bad (Balkan) principle:

"The Balkans as a pejorative term have returned to themselves, and among the Balkan nations there is a competition over which one belongs to the Balkans, which means is lost, and which one has managed to escape the dirt, corruption and hatred of the Balkans and can be counted as a part of Europe, that means of civilization." This also goes for Bosnia and Herzegovina... I believe this is the only way in which BiH can become a democratic, self-sustaining and self-confident state. This is the essence of *Europeanization*. "The HR discusses Protectorate in DANI, This is not our country", 3 March 2000

In his discussion of the Bosnian protectorate, the HR Petritsch quotes an Austrian source, Karl Markus Gauss, who happens to be a Balkans expert. This is also a hortatory report as it implicitly prescribes a norm through a set of descriptions of what the norm is. As Petritsch himself is considered to be an expert on the Balkans, Gauss's credibility and critical statements about BiH are not brought into question. After the quotation, Petritsch says 'it is the only way for BiH to become a democratic, self-sustaining and self-confident state' and that this is 'the essence of Europeanization.'

Argumentation schemes/higher level semantic relations	Rhetorical devices/linguistic means	Examples
negative other-representation	presupposition: The Balkan used to mean something bad and now it is true again	The Balkans <i>as a pejorative term have returned to themselves...</i>
negative other-representation	irony: Who would compete to become a member of something that is bad? implicature: one who belongs to the Balkans is lost	and among the Balkan nations there is <i>a competition</i> over which one belongs to the Balkans which means is <i>lost</i>
positive Europe representation	topos of comparison (those belonging to the Balkans and those who have escaped), presupposition: the Balkans is dirty, corrupted and full of hatred, negative semantic context	and which one has managed to escape <i>the dirt, corruption and hatred of the Balkans</i> and can be counted as <i>a part of Europe, that means of civilization</i>

The sentence ‘the Balkans as a pejorative term’ presupposes the long-term negative legacy of the Balkans, which ‘has again returned’, which is a rather personal and ungrounded individual authority claim. The metaphor of competition over who ‘belongs to the Balkans’ is used in an ironic sense whereby the already negative semantic context surrounding the Balkans-as-synecdoche is stressed to create an even further distance from the region and its entailments for who would compete to stay in its *dirt* and *corruption*. The elaboration of this claim in the following sentence is also interesting because a value judgment is made between the *lost* and *uncivilized* who remain in the Balkans and those who have escaped its *dirt, corruption and hatred* and can be counted as *a part of Europe, that means of civilization*. This is a hegemonic meaning-making; in the HR’s words Europeanization, under the international community’s terms and supervision, becomes *the only way* in which BiH can become democratic, self-sustaining, and self-confident. The biblical reference of salvation is also tacitly present: the verb *escape* (*escape*- succeed in getting away or breaking free from, flee) is connected with getting away from something negative or binding while the noun *escape* is synonymous with *flight* (noun) and translates into Serbian as ‘save oneself’. By this analogy ‘escaping the Balkans’ could translate as an act of salvation.

While there is little self-criticism in the OHR discourse, there is a lot of negative other-presentation. The more negatively presented BiH or its politicians are, the longer and more justifiable the mandate of the IC and

OHR. Through negative other-presentation, the OHR usually provides an alternative reflected through western, liberal-democratic values, claiming it is only done ‘in the BiH’s citizens’ best interest.’

In an unprofessional manner and with very few exceptions, local media have conducted a campaign of disinformation, if not an outright smear campaign, based on biased, incomplete or simply wrong information with the apparent goal to confuse and alarm the public...”Textbook Review in the Canton of Sarajevo”, 4 November 1998

In this example, the HR justifies its role by assigning the chronic inability and negligence to the local politicians. This is a very general statement, but there are some interesting lexical choices to discuss. Deadlines have not been met, commitments have not been fulfilled etc. so the situation is total chaos and the HR is needed to put the place in order. In the paragraph below, local politicians are not regarded as people of authority nor are they respected.

I could produce a long list of deadlines that have not been met, commitments that have not been fulfilled, minutes of important meetings during which the officials of this country have done nothing but to bicker and squabble and play babble games. “New Year’s Message to BiH Citizens”, 31 December 1999

Politicians are ascribed ‘feminine qualities’: they ‘do nothing but bicker, squabble and play babble games.’ Aside from the OHR’s discourse being chauvinistic in general, here are some collocations for *bicker*, *squabble* and *play babble games*. from the Internet and traditional dictionaries such as Merriem-Webster and Collins Cobuild.

e.g. Though the two women *bicker* and tease each other, they are obviously old friends.

The women *bicker*, prattle, and flirt like characters out of Tennessee Williams or Eugene O’Neill.

e.g. My four-year-old *squabbles* with his friends.

Here are 8 tips for keeping the child *squabbles* away this season.

In reality, today’s misguided parents even interfere in their child’s *squabbles* with other children.

e.g. Mona *babbled* on and on about her new boyfriend.

Baby Annabel makes realistic mouth movements and sucking sounds when drinking from her bottle, she *babbles* and giggles and when you rub her tummy.

Crystal just sits a few feet away smiling sadly as she *babbles*.

Given these verbs' collocates, they primarily seem to refer to arguing over petty things while *bicker* and *squabble* as near synonyms seem to collocate a lot with women. *Babble* refers to uttering words in an incoherent way but can also imply 'irrelevant or foolish utterance,' which, when used for men, can imply a lack of seriousness and even masculinity.

8. Conclusion

The ways in which Bosnian reality is shaped and modeled from the outside are very disputable in terms of the power relations at work, while BiH still lacks strong public opinion which is respected, measured, and on the basis of which politicians and their constituents should act. This preliminary research puts some of these problems in perspective, providing context and opening space for further discourse analytical investigations especially since 14 years after Dayton BiH society is still fragile with the OHR still present. To do a solid analysis of discourse as social interaction that would account for discourses, processes and participants, one needs to respect triangulation consisting of heavy contextualization from other disciplines, careful linguistic methodology but also a series of more detailed textual analysis. For media texts, content analysis can be used as a preliminary, but it cannot fully account for the many and complex strategies of political communication.

Notes

- [1] Bon Peace Implementation Council Declaration of 1997 further extended the Dayton powers of the HR. It is an extensive 26-page list of internationally prepared legislative measures...(which) covered policy-making powers at both state, entity and municipal level; intervening in order to regulate policy on housing, education, the legal system, citizenship, travel, the constitution, refugee return, policing, the media, electoral regulation, economic reconstruction and regional relations...extending right down to requirements for the Bosnian sports teams at the Winter Olympics in Nagano, Japan (PIC, 1997b, section II, 3)« (Chandler, 2000: 157).
- [2] Estimated internet penetration in BiH was around 20, 3 in 2007. (<http://www.internetworldstats.com/euro/ba.htm>)
- [3] Postcolonialism is used here to refer to the Third World countries and the Balkans are also considered in this category.
- [4] See press release »Textbook Review in the Canton of Sarajevo«, 4 November 1998 at www.ohr.int

- [5] See Appendix 1
- [6] See Appendix 2
- [7] Key words are obtained by comparing the words in the text with a reference set of words usually from a larger corpus. Any word which is found to be outstanding in its frequency in the text is considered 'key'.
- [8] OHR's own categorization of topics, in their rapports to other foreign organizations, can be seen, for example, in the 14th Report by the High representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The Secretary-General of the United Nations, 16 July 1999, **APRIL - JUNE 1999**, available at www.ohr.int
- [9] Their annual distribution was provided in Appendix 3.
- [10] For example, when a press release was titled 'Brčko supervisor, Henry L. Clarke, halts privatization in Brčko district', 14 August 2001, we would put it in three categories: 'Brčko', 'economics', and 'OHR decisions, laws, occupations'.
- [11] These are .e. verbs in past simple used by the HR such as removed, welcomed, imposed etc. Due to the prominence of self-quotation and 1st and 3rd person self reference typical for press release genre (Jacobs, 1999), the conclusion was these actions referred to the HR.
- [12] In speech acts theory (Searle, 1969, 1975, Austin, 1978), an illocutionary act implies the performance of an illocution such as, for example, declaring a removal of a person (directive speech act). Where illocution is an act performed *in* saying something, in contrast to a locution as an act *of* saying something, eliciting an answer is an act performed *by* saying something, which Austin calls perlocution. By saying that he removes an individual, the individual in real life is removed and that means that OHR's word is the law and that illocutions (and locutions) also have the immediate power of perlocution.
- [13] To calculate keyness, I compared the entire corpus with the reference corpus list, which yielded a lot more function words and general words and nouns from the general register. In the second list, I compared press release titles as they almost always contained a verb. This proved to be the most relevant way of testing because of the corpus size. When I cross-referenced both of these lists, I found that a number of key words were present in both, at least the first 20 or so, and modal verb *will* made it to the 'very high' fifth place (this modal did not occur as a key word in the titles' list), so I included it here.
- [14] Verschueren (1999) uses the term explicit *semi-performatives* to include performatives (illocutionary speech acts), which are not 1st person present tense.
- [15] Example of more ritualized 'removal' and other decisions can be found at www.ohr.int under the link *HR's decisions*.

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- www.ohr.int
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Appendix 1: PIC Bonn Conclusions, 10 December 1997

... The Council welcomes the High representative's intention to use his final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary, on the following issues:

- a. timing, location and chairmanship of meetings of the common institutions;
- b. interim measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach agreement, which will remain in force until the Presidency or Council of Ministers has adopted a decision consistent with the Peace Agreement on the issue concerned;
- c. other measures to ensure implementation of the Peace Agreement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities, as well as the smooth running of the common institutions¹. Such measures may include actions against persons holding public office or officials who are absent from meetings without good cause or who are found by the High representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its implementation.

1 This provision is very vague and it is up to the HR to interpret it as he sees fit.

Appendix 2- distribution of discourse topics by the years 1996-2004 (charts)

Chart 1




Chart 2




Chart 3




Chart 4




Chart 5




Chart 6




Chart 7




Chart 8




Chart 9




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


Chart 11




Chart 12




Chart 13




Chart 14




Chart 15




Chart 16




Chart 17




Chart 18




Chart 19




Chart 20




Chart 21

