AdnAn Sivić, SebAStjAn vöröS / beyond eliminAtion And ConStruCtion:  
Zen, SymboliSm, And the PerenniAliSt SChool
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Adnan Sivić, Sebastjan Vörös
University of Ljubljana
Beyond Elimination and Construction: 
Zen, Symbolism, and the Perennialist School1
1 Introduction
The Bhagavan has said, 
“From the night I attained perfect enlightenment 
until the night I enter nirvana, between the two, 
I do not speak, nor have I spoken, nor will I speak a single word, 
for not speaking is how a buddha speaks [不說是佛說].” 
Laṅkāvatārasūtra, T.16.670.0498c17; Pine, 2012, 1752 
In this paper, we tackle a highly contentious issue in Zen, namely the relationship 
between enlightenment, understood as satori or “seeing one’s nature” (Bodhidharma, 
1989, 11), on the one hand, and the linguistic and socio-cultural means that consti-
tute the path that leads to enlightenment on the other. More specifically, we outline 
a novel answer to the question of whether (and, if so, in what way) enlightenment 
is transcendent in relation to the path leading to it. This question is not merely an 
exegetical one, but has important consequences for our understanding of the nature 
of Zen Buddhism, for if enlightenment is completely dependent on particular socio-
cultural conditions – for instance those that form the milieu of a typical Zen monastery 
– then there can be nothing universal about it (i.e., it becomes impossible to speak of 
a “trans-confessional core” in Zen). This latter issue itself, namely that of universal-
ism, is, of course, beyond the scope of the present discussion.3 The question is rather 
1 Co-first authorship statement: both authors contributed equally to this work. The paper is a result of the 
work within the research program “Philosophical Investigations” (P6-0252), financed by ARRS, the 
Slovenian Research Agency.
2 We will be referencing Red Pine’s translation of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra throughout; a reference to 
Guṇabhadra’s Chinese text from the Taishō Tripiṭaka will also be given, but the volume and text 
numbers will be omitted in all further occurrences. 
3 See Vörös (2013, 23–102).
DOI:10.4312/ars.16.2.165-178
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whether such an interpretation of Zen is possible given the role that is played by con-
crete (linguistic and non-linguistic) practices.
In the first two sections, we will present an (apparent) dichotomy between two 
radically different ways of approaching this question: the (phenomenologically) elimi­
nativist view, which understands enlightenment as pure experience radically inde-
pendent of social and linguistic conditioning, i.e., a radical elimination of conceptual-
ity, and the constructivist view, which takes satori – along with all other aspects of 
the Zen Path – to be “a unique and impressive cultural achievement particular to East 
Asian societies” (Wright, 1992, 117, our emphasis). Finally, in the third and fourth 
sections, we will present some of the key difficulties inherent in these two accounts 
and attempt to sketch out a different understanding of enlightenment, a via media 
between the Scylla of unconditioned experience and the Charybdis of culturally deter-
mined practice, drawing on the notion of symbolism as it was developed by thinkers in 
the perennialist school (R. Guénon, F. Schuon and A. K. Coomaraswamy). 
2 Dropping off body and (discursive) mind?
Although the eliminativist view that will be discussed here emerged in the 20th cen-
tury, it also finds support in some of the foundational texts of Zen. To illustrate this, 
let us look at two classical examples that are often cited in support of the eliminativist 
interpretation. In a famous declaration, most likely from the early Tang Dynasty, Zen 
is characterized as “a special transmission outside the scripture […], not depending 
upon the letter, but pointing directly to one’s Mind” (Suzuki, 1938, 48). Similarly, in 
Bodhidharma’s Bloodstream Sermon, we read:
Even if you explain thousands of sutras and shastras, unless you see your 
own nature yours is the teaching of a mortal, not a buddha. The true Way is 
sublime. It can’t be expressed in language. Of what use are scriptures? But 
someone who sees his own nature finds the Way, even if he can’t read a word. 
Someone who sees his nature is a buddha. And […] a buddha can’t be found 
in words or anywhere in the Twelvefold Canon. (Bodhidharma, 1989, 29)
If these and similar admonitions to avoid “the nets and snares of words” are taken seri-
ously (Dōgen, 2007a, 10), one is left with the impression that enlightenment entails 
eliminating discursivity so as to gain an immediate access to reality. Linguistic catego-
ries, as well as all other types of socio-cultural conditioning, would thus form a veil that 
must be removed if we are to see reality for what it is. This view was taken up by many 
early Western interpreters of Buddhism in general and Zen in particular, especially those 
in (psycho)therapeutical communities (see Harrington et al., 2013; Taylor, 2000). Erich 
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Fromm, for instance, sees Zen satori as a breaking away, or ultimate liberation, from 
the various forms of enculturation, which, since they are the end result of the process of 
repression, restrict our everyday reality to only “those feelings that can pass through the 
social filter of language, logic and meaning” (Fromm et al., 1971, 162).
The eliminativist approach presupposes that conceptuality, often understood in a 
rather broad and loose sense, can be separated from a non-conceptual “core” of “pure 
experience”. In Fromm’s view, for instance, enlightenment is “the direct, non-reflec-
tive [unreflektiert] understanding of reality, without affective contamination or con-
ceptual elaboration”, a kind of “repetition of the pre-intellectual, direct understanding 
of the child, but on a higher level” (ibid., 171). Clearly, the main emphasis here is on 
the removal or elimination of conceptuality, which seems to be but a restatement of 
the Zen emphasis on the famous “backward step”, or the turning of the mind inward, 
as famously expressed in Dōgen’s canonical text Fukanzazengi (Dōgen, 2007b, 363).4
Despite its seemingly uncontroversial nature, this interpretation rests on a highly 
tenuous presupposition about the relationship between experience and conceptual-
ity. As Wright points out, the eliminativist account takes for granted the so-called 
“instrumental theory of language” – “the belief that language is an avoidable and op-
tional element in human experience” (Wright, 1992, 114). In other words, for Fromm 
and other eliminativists, human cognition is conceived of as a stratified or layered 
cognition, in which the layer of pure experience – pure observation, sensation, etc. – 
is, somehow, superimposed by the socio-culturally mediated conceptual structures. 
While these can be extremely useful from a pragmatic perspective, e.g., by helping us 
manoeuvre through the innumerable complexities of our natural and social surround-
ings, they are also existentially and ontologically misleading – and principally so – as 
they necessarily introduce simplifications, delimitations, and thus distortions into the 
unified meshwork of pristine, mute experience. 
This stratified view of cognition, made popular by the empiricist tradition, has a 
certain intuitive appeal. On closer inspection, however, it proves to be philosophically 
suspect for at least three reasons. To begin with, it seems to introduce a yawning, 
perhaps even unbridgeable gap between the two cognitive layers: if perception and 
cognition, experience and conceptualization, are so disparate, it is difficult to see what 
ties them together. Secondly, and relatedly, the status of intellection – as an activity 
utilizing concepts, etc. – seems contingent and secondary, which is profoundly at odds 
with the prominence it plays in both our everyday and professional lives. Thirdly, and 
most importantly for our purposes, this conception seems to be unable to account for 
the transcendent nature of satori. That is, even if we accept, provisionally, the idea 
4 While Dōgen’s Sōtō school does differ from other Zen traditions in its concrete forms of practice (al-
though the difference is primarily one of emphasis), we can still take it as representative with regard 
to its understanding of language and enlightenment (Vörös, 2013, 446–461).
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that satori is similar to, as Fromm puts it, “the pre-intellectual, direct understanding 
of the child”, how are we to explain the last part of Fromm’s statement: “[…] but on 
a higher level” (Fromm et al., 1971, 171). What higher level? Are we to posit yet 
another – third – level beyond the level of conceptualization? But if so, why call it 
pre-reflective? Surely, something is amiss here.
3 Enlightenment constructed?
This criticism of Fromm’s presuppositions regarding the relationship between concep-
tuality and experience has played an important role in later discussions. As Wright, a 
key figure in the debate, continues: “Feelings, like thoughts, are shaped and moulded 
by the language that we have (instrumentally) taken merely to ‘express’ them […], 
‘cerebration’ and ‘affection’ are not independent domains that can be so easily juxta-
posed” (Wright, 1992, 115). From his perspective, Fromm not only “eliminates what 
is valuable and interesting in cultural studies” but also “fails to understand Zen en-
lightenment as a unique and impressive cultural achievement particular to East Asian 
societies” (ibid., 117, our emphasis).
Wright’s alternative account starts from the notion that human perception is al-
ways shaped by linguistic categories, i.e., that there is, and can be, no “pre-linguistic, 
objective ‘given’” (ibid., 118). By highlighting the interdependence of perception, lan-
guage, and thought, he thus arrives at a view diametrically opposed to that of Fromm. 
In a particularly telling passage, he writes: “Because he is a perfect instantiation of 
the cultural ideal, the Zen master can be understood to be ‘relatively more’ determined 
and shaped by the Zen community’s linguistically articulated image of excellence” 
(ibid., 123, our emphasis). Thus, what is at stake here is not the phenomenologico-
hermeneutical thesis on the fundamental inseparability of language and perception, 
which Wright takes from a specific reading of Heidegger – this, after all, only con-
cerns our ordinary, non-enlightened experience, and even Dōgen would be happy to 
concede that here we remain entangled in the “nets and snares of words” – but his ex-
tension of this view to both the pursuit of enlightenment and enlightenment itself. For 
Wright, then, neither is the Zen path a specific way of fulfilling a pre-existing motiva-
tion for spiritual realization (perhaps stemming from a kind of existential dismay or 
disillusionment inherent in the human condition, referred to in Sanskrit as saṃvega), 
nor is enlightenment a specific mode of its appeasement. Rather, both the pull towards 
and the very attainment of enlightenment are the result of a culturally specific fram-
ing, which functions primarily through the imitation of role models – Zen monks who 
embody specific social norms (ibid., 125). Enlightenment, then, is constructed all the 
way down.
Much could be said about the way Wright understands the concrete Zen practices 
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in light of this interpretation (e.g., the surprising view that kōans merely serve to 
prove linguistic determinism (ibid., 127)), but for our purposes, the following points 
are of utmost importance: in his view, the aspiration and path towards, as well as 
the attainment of, enlightenment is: (1) linguistically and conceptually conditioned, 
hence (2) unique to a particular milieu, and (3) attainable only through a long process 
of training, where this training is taken to consist primarily in a kind of “linguistic 
shaping” (ibid., 131).
How does this view square with the textual sources? Zen texts are, as Wright 
himself agrees (ibid., 129), replete with references to enlightenment as transcend­
ing language; however, he is quick to add that these references function merely as 
ironic statements (insofar as they involve “speaking against speaking”) aimed primar-
ily against reflection (as typified in more scholarly branches of the Buddhist tradi-
tion), rather than as explicit statements about enlightenment that should be taken at 
face value (ibid., 130). However, there is a curious paradox at work here. Namely, 
it would seem that the constructivist argument hinges on reinterpreting the textual 
sources in light of a particular (post)modern understanding of language so as to fit 
enlightenment into its own conceptual box, which is precisely the sort of hermeneutic 
transgression that Wright accuses Fromm of committing (see ibid., 115). But even 
more importantly, while this view rightly criticizes the naïve universalism of the 
eliminativist approach – the idea that individual linguistic and practical forms of any 
given tradition are just so many pragmatically useful, but ultimately arbitrary, ways 
of approaching the trans-cultural domain of pure experience – it does so only at the 
cost of permanently enclosing the Zen tradition within itself. In other words: if Zen 
is, in fact, determined by a particular language and culture, then what are we to we 
make of the flourishing of Zen in the West in recent decades (see e.g., van der Braak, 
2020; Ford, 2006; Wallace, 2003)? Perhaps even more importantly, given that cultural 
and linguistic practices also change over much smaller temporal and geographical 
distances, is it even feasible to talk of a unified Zen tradition in China and Japan – or, 
for that matter, in a rural temple and a bustling head monastery in the same region?
If these questions never seem to appear as problems to Zen practitioners them-
selves, and if a deeper mutual understanding between Zen and other traditions, both 
Buddhist and non-Buddhist, is not only possible, but even seen by notable practition-
ers as fruitful (e.g., Suzuki, 2002), then this is because the concrete historical forms 
(doctrines, language, iconography, etc.) are never understood as being exhaustive 
of the dynamic essence of the tradition. This, moreover, is not a Western romantic 
and orientalist interpretation of Zen, but rather a view repeatedly stressed in Zen’s 
foundational scriptures. Thus, in the Laṅkāvatāra even the notions of existence and 
rebirth – two central pillars of Buddhist philosophy – are portrayed as skilful means, 
i.e., pragmatic tools whose only purpose is to lead the practitioner to the other shore 
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(0494a10–23; Pine, 2012, 139–41). Once there, all teachings fall by the wayside, for 
language is of no help where subject and object no longer arise (0497b02; Pine, 2012, 
163; Dōgen, 2007b, 5–6).
4 Practice and transcendence
It would seem, then, that our discussion has come full circle and we are ultimately 
forced to accept that, despite all its theoretical shortcomings, eliminativism is nev-
ertheless correct. However, there are at least two good reasons why this conclusion 
might be premature. First, while it is true that eliminativism doesn’t present enlight-
enment as a linguistic and cultural construct (and hence attempts to keep enlightened 
experience outside of the realm of conceptual description), it is no less true that it 
remains committed to a very particular view of what enlightenment consists in, name-
ly the elimination of conceptual elaboration of pre-reflective experience. This, how-
ever, is likewise contradicted by the foundational texts of Zen, for they are emphatic 
that nirvāṇa is “not the destruction of anything” (0504c05; Pine, 2012, 209; see also 
Dōgen, 2007b, 129).5 In this sense, Wright’s charge of imposing modern notions on 
an ancient tradition still holds true for eliminativism (although arguably less so than 
for his own brand of constructivism): when interpretative push comes to hermeneutic 
shove, theoretical commitments are given priority over faithfulness to the tradition 
itself.
Secondly, and crucially, eliminativism can’t clarify the relationship between con-
crete practices and the “end” they lead to (taking the latter term in a very provisional 
sense). In other words: if enlightenment is merely the elimination of certain habitual 
mental tendencies, then there is no reason why the same goal couldn’t be accom-
plished, say, by the administration of psychoactive drugs or even direct brain stimula-
tion (which helps explain why eliminativism has been so popular among scientists 
studying meditation). That is, the specifics of the path are, fundamentally, irrelevant. 
Thus, if constructivism ends up reducing the end to the means, eliminativism in turn 
reduces the means to a mere contingency, an inevitable nuisance.
What is needed, then, is a mental framework that would allow us to understand 
both the critical role played by socio-culturally conditioned practice, such that the 
relationship between practice and realization isn’t arbitrary, and the radically trans-
cendent nature of realization itself. In what follows, we would like to tentatively ex-
plore one such framework, which so far has been unfortunately largely neglected in 
contemporary scholarship on Zen, as well as in contemporary philosophy of religion 
5 Note that this denial applies especially to the destruction of mental faculties or “views” (見). In a 
different section of the Laṅkāvatāra, the view that nirvāṇa consists in the destruction of hindrances 
is criticized in more depth and explicitly identified with a type of nihilism (499a11–b21; Pine, 2012, 
177–179).
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in general, namely the rich tradition of perennialism, as it was laid out in the works of 
René Guénon, Frithjof Schuon, Ananda Kentish Coomaraswamy, and others. While 
reasonably well-known in some fields of research, primarily that of Islamic philoso-
phy (e.g., Nasr, 1989), perennialists remain little-known in Buddhist studies, with 
only a few notable exceptions (e.g., Suzuki, 2002, 9–10), despite the fact that some of 
the perennialists wrote extensively on Buddhism (e.g., Coomaraswamy, 1916; 2011; 
Schuon, 2018) and much more extensively on the Vedic tradition in the context of 
which Buddhism arose (e.g., Guénon, 2001a; 2001b; Schuon, 1959; Coomaraswamy, 
1933).
Briefly put, the perennialists hold that while traditions differ in their exoteric as-
pect (which is said to include everything from language to concrete practices), they 
are ultimately unified in their esoteric aspect (Smith, 1984, xii). The latter refers to the 
apprehension of the Absolute,6 a sphere that Guénon terms metaphysics. This concept 
can be misleading, however, insofar as it can be easily misunderstood for a system of 
propositions about the nature of reality, which is far from the case in this context. In 
Guénon’s words: “Knowledge belonging to the universal order of necessity lies beyond 
all the distinctions that condition the knowledge of individual things, of which that be-
tween subject and object is a general and basic type” (2001a, 75). 
Metaphysics is thus inexpressible “with” language, for language always assumes 
the subject-object distinction, which is precisely what metaphysics, in this specific 
understanding, is said to overcome. However, it can be expressed “in-and-through” 
language, whereby the dynamics of language – its perpetual unfoldment, mutation, 
and self-transcendence – engenders the birth of the said distinction, its origin and 
source. We are dealing, then, not with a system of propositional knowledge, but rather 
with what Dōgen terms practice-realization (修證, shushō) (T2580), where these two 
aspects are inextricably linked: “When one speaks of the means of attaining meta-
physical knowledge, it is evident that such means can only be one and the same thing 
as knowledge itself, in which subject and object are essentially unified; this amounts 
to saying that the means in question, if indeed it is permissible to describe it by that 
word, cannot in any way resemble the exercise of a discursive faculty such as individ-
ual human reason” (Guénon, 2001a, 75). Or, in the language of Zen, “not depending 
upon the letter, but pointing directly to one’s Mind” (Suzuki, 1938: 48).
Perennialists concur with eliminativists that, being ineffable, metaphysics can 
only be pointed at by statements, doctrines, and other means, all of which are by defi-
nition inadequate, but nevertheless necessary as a starting point, “an aid toward under-
standing that which in itself remains inexpressible” (Guénon, 2001a, 75). However, 
6 This term is used very often in perennialist texts, but it doesn’t entail any sort of objectivization of 
metaphysical realization. What is in question here is beyond what can properly be subsumed under 
Being, let alone any narrower determination (Guénon, 2001d, 10; 2001c).
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and this is where the two strands part ways, this pointing must not be understood as an 
arbitrary reference to a wholly separate realm – say, the realm of pristine experience 
– whereby the pointing would be completely severed from that which is pointed at. 
No: linguistic, cultural, and other aspects are no less characteristic of human experi-
ence as are, say, sensations or affects. Thus, in line with constructivists, perennialists 
argue that it is in-and-through the very act of pointing – through the seeming vagaries 
of different socio-cultural practices – that the Absolute actualizes itself. Where they 
disagree with constructivists, however, is in their belief that this Absolute cannot be 
exhausted by the peculiarities of any and all networks of pointings. The Absolute is 
not, and cannot be, exhausted, because these pointings themselves are caught up in the 
process of the unfoldment, and therefore never static or ultimate, but rather always, so 
to speak, pointing beyond themselves.
Taking this approach has three main advantages. First, it allows us to avoid the 
two extreme poles of modernist thought: demonization versus fetishization of language. 
Both focus on language as a static system of established meanings, and neither pay 
enough attention to the origins and modulations of those meanings. That is, instead of 
removing structures (eliminativism) or adding structures (constructivism), the most im-
portant aspect is the process of structuration itself – the birth of wholes, the manifesta-
tion of forms, in the vibrant framework of linguistic acts. Second, it gives us a new and 
fruitful understanding of the relationship between concrete doctrines and practices on 
the one hand, and their soteriological aim on the other. In a certain sense, one may say, as 
eliminativists do, that the end (the Absolute) is always already “here”, but is “overlaid” 
by language, culture, etc. However, this can only be properly understood if the particular 
“here” – the particular socio-cultural setting in which I am situated – is recognized, by 
myself, precisely as an aspect of the Absolute – as that which, in its unique way, allows 
one of its facets to manifest itself and thus can be said to symbolize the Absolute. Third, 
it makes intelligible the unity of a particular tradition (e.g., Zen in different cultural con-
texts), as well as the unity of different religious traditions (e.g., in Suzuki, 2002).7 The 
latter two points will be elaborated in more detail in the next section.
5 Enlightenment symbolized 
We have noted that, for perennialists, doctrines and practices symbolize enlighten-
ment, i.e., the “order” of the Absolute. How are we to understand this? Since a de-
tailed account of religious symbolism is beyond the scope of this article, we will, in 
what follows, focus on merely two aspects which are particularly important for our 
7 While perennialists do hold that all traditions are merely different paths leading to the same peak, a 
view that we agree with (see Vörös, 2013), all that is said here in the context of Zen still holds even 
if one rejects this assumption.
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purposes. Both of these draw on the original meaning of the word “symbol”, namely: 
symbol as “that which throws or casts together” and symbol as a “token” or a “sign”. 
The crucial point is that what determines the symbol as a symbol is its capacity to 
bring together linguistic, practical, etc., means of a given socio-cultural context (a 
given “tradition”), but to do so in a way that allows for this context to meaningfully 
break through and reorganize itself. That is to say, a symbol is fundamentally a cast-
ing together of existing expressive means, whereby a new structure gets instantiated, 
in the light of which these expressive means acquire a completely novel orientation, 
dynamism, and significance. The birth of this new structure – the moment of its origi-
nary emergence – is a glimpse, however temporary or provisional, into one of the 
aspects of the Absolute (see e.g., Guénon, 2001d, 118ff.).
Two things are important here. On the one hand, because different traditions 
constitute different integrated wholes – with different expressive means available to 
them – symbols are, by necessity, concrete and particular (Schuon, 1984, 18). In their 
bringing together of the expressive means available in a given milieu, they need to be 
mindful of the expressive particularities of the milieu if they are to truly make sense 
(literally: constitute, or bring forth, a genuinely new domain of significance). The 
particularities of a certain symbolic expression are thus not contingent and redundant; 
they are, so to speak, the “flesh” of the symbol, its capacity to consume us and nourish 
our linguistic sensibilities. 
On the other hand, while being firmly embedded into the framework of existing 
expressive means, symbols use these means in a way that allows them to fold back on, 
and thus break away from, themselves (ibid., 67). That is, they create a “crack” or a 
“hollow” in the fabric of a context – an “axis” around which meaningful structures can 
(re)order themselves. The symbol as a “sign” of the Absolute is thus both within and 
beyond language, it is, we might say, a temporary resting place of language in the pro-
cess of its structuration. This is overlooked both by those who seek its meaning solely 
in that which is beyond it (eliminativists) and by those who seek its meaning solely 
in that which is within it (constructivists). The former overlook the “casting together” 
aspect of the symbol, the latter its function as a “sign” or a “token”.
This understanding of symbolism opens up an interesting middle way between 
eliminativism and constructivism. On the one hand, there is no question of reducing 
realization to the culturally and linguistically conditioned practices that lead to it; but, 
on the other, it is likewise impossible to speak of liberation apart from the specific 
tradition in which it is rooted. Esoterism and exoterism are inseparable: the former 
without the latter becomes a fruitless search for “end without means […], spirit with-
out letter” (Smith, 1984, xxiv), while exoteric forms without an esoteric nucleus are 
reduced to nothing but “their most external elements, namely, literalism and senti-
mentality” (Schuon, 1984, 10).
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Symbols, which constitute the exoteric part of a tradition, are thus neither causes 
nor reasons for enlightenment, or the esoteric parts of that self-same tradition. For if 
they were causes, then a mere exposure to a symbol or a mere detection of it (without 
any comprehension) would result in a specific state or reaction: if one studies this and 
does that, then enlightenment will follow (Vörös, 2019, 89). If, on the other hand, they 
were reasons, it should be possible to attain enlightenment through voluntary mental 
effort – in other words, we could simply reason ourselves into enlightenment. Instead, 
they can perhaps be best conceptualized as what in the phenomenological tradition is 
called motivation (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 301). 
Motives, unlike causes, act through their significance, i.e., they are not merely 
factual juxtapositions, but something that has to be apprehended. However, this sig-
nificance, unlike the significance associated with reasons, is not a matter of clearly 
articulated ideas (explicit actualities), but a matter of tacit significances (implicit pos-
sibilities) (ibid.). There is, then, a meaningful (not arbitrary or mechanistic) relation-
ship between the symbol and the symbolized, yet one that has to do not with explicit 
chains of reasoning, but rather with what we might call “existentially transformative 
gropings” (Vörös, 2019; 2021). In other words, symbols function as motives – as 
beckonings or solicitations – that invite us not to passively (automatically) react to 
what is given or to actively manipulate the already constituted meanings, but to trans-
form our mode of being – our ordinary manner of existence – so as to be able to realize 
what a given symbol points to. In this sense, symbols are not so much prereflective 
or prerational, but rather what Guénon calls suprarational (Guénon, 2001a, 75), for 
they point above the structures of meaning and reasoning that are deemed meaningful 
within a given context. 
It is this pre- or suprarational nature of motivation that provides us with an un-
derstanding of how Zen, with its decidedly non-scholarly and at times iconoclastic 
attitude, is no less a complete tradition and integral whole – a “spiritual organism” 
(Schuon, 1984, 108) – even if one completely eschews all study of scripture, as some 
more radical Zen teachers would doubtless recommend. Zen is not “universal mysti-
cism”, a royal road to what we imagine to be “pure experience”, bereft of traditional 
context, because “symbolic” cannot be identified with “propositional” or “textual”. 
The seemingly humble ensō, the cosmic mudrā, the lotus position, the “turning word” 
of a kōan, or even the unexpected strike of a staff: these symbols point to liberation no 
less completely than the most diligent study of the Twelvefold Canon, for they “pre-
cede knowing and seeing”, as thinking and discrimination fall by the wayside (Dōgen, 
2007b, 365). Nothing about these expedient means is arbitrary, and yet this isn’t to say 
that enlightenment is exclusive – let alone reducible – to a particular historical form: 
when the realm of discriminatory thinking, subject and object, is left behind for that 
which is wholly beyond expression, how could there be any talk of individuality?
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6 Conclusion
In contemporary Western approaches to Zen, two radical views have become domi-
nant: eliminativism, which understands enlightenment as the cutting off of a particular 
mental habit, accomplished by arbitrary means, and constructivism, which imprisons 
liberation into nothing more than the exercise of certain linguistic and cultural con-
ventions. We have presented the key difficulties inherent in both views before trying 
to sketch out an alternative, drawing on the largely neglected work of perennialist 
thinkers and a phenomenologically informed notion of symbolism and motivation. 
By taking the idea of the symbol in its double meaning, namely as that which “casts 
together” the culturally conditioned particularities of Zen into a unified tradition, and 
yet points beyond them as a “sign” of something that itself transcends all description, 
we can do justice both to the crucial role played by concrete practices and to the trans-
cendent nature of their soteriological end.
In this manner, we can avoid the pitfall of either severing the end from the means 
or reducing the former to the latter – where both hermeneutical transgressions serve 
only to fit Zen neatly into our own preconceived conceptual boxes. If we wish to 
take Zen (or perennialism) seriously, then we must acknowledge that anything like an 
exhaustive explanation of enlightenment is, and must remain, out of the question. At 
best, what we can approach is an understanding of what the act of pointing at enlight-
enment involves, while cautiously avoiding any tendency to mistake the explanation 
for what is explained, the (admittedly crude) map for the ineffable landscape, the 
conditioned for the ultimate. To return to the very beginning, “not speaking is how a 
buddha speaks”, and thus “if we want to attain the matter of the ineffable, we should 
practice the matter of the ineffable at once” (Dōgen, 2007b, 363).
References
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Braak, A. van der, Reimagining Zen in a Secular Age, Leiden 2020.
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Coomaraswamy, A. K., A New Approach to the Vedas, London 1933.
Coomaraswamy, A. K., Hinduism and Buddhism, Mountain View CA 2011.
Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō, Mt. Shasta 2007a.
Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō: The True Dharma-Eye Treasury, Volume I, Berkeley 2007b.
Ford, J. I., Zen master who? A guide to the people and stories of Zen, Boston 2006.
Fromm, E. et al., Zen-Buddhismus und Psychoanalyse, Frankfurt am Main 1971.
Guénon, R., Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, Hillsdale, New York 2001a.
Guénon, R., Man and His Becoming According to the Vedanta, Hillsdale, New York 
2001b.
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Guénon, R., The Multiple States of the Being, Hillsdale, New York 2001c.
Guénon, R., The Symbolism of the Cross, Hillsdale, New York 2001d.
Harrington, A. et al., Mindfulness meditation: Frames and choices, American Psy­
chologist, 2013, pp. 1–27.
Merleau-Ponty, M., Phenomenology of Perception, London & New York 2002.
Nasr, S. H., Knowledge and the Sacred, New York 1989.
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Schuon, F., Language of the Self, Madras 1959.
Schuon, F., The Transcendent Unity of Religions, Wheaton 1984.
Schuon, F., Treasures of Buddhism, Bloomington 2018.
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ty of Religions. Wheaton 1984, pp. ix–xxxviii.
Suzuki, D. T., Zen Buddhism, Monumenta Nipponica 1 (1), 1938, pp. 48–57.
Suzuki, D. T., Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist, London & New York 2002.
Taylor, E., Shadow Culture: Psychology and Spirituality in America, Berkeley 2000.
Vörös, S., Podobe neupodobljivega: (nevro)znanost, fenomenologija, mistika, Lju-
bljana 2013.
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taza, Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (7–8), 2019, pp. 70–94.
Vörös, S., All Is Burning: Buddhist Mindfulness as Radical Reflection, Religions 12 
(12), 2021.
Wallace, B. A. (ed.), Buddhism and Science: Breaking new ground, New York 2003.
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Philosophy East and West 42 (1), 1992, pp. 113–138.
Beyond Elimination and Construction: 
Zen, Symbolism, and the Perennialist School
Keywords: Zen, enlightenment, perennialism, constructivism, symbolism, 
transcendence
As Zen took root in the West over the past century, there emerged a number of dif-
fering interpretations of one of its key facets, namely the question of the relationship 
between language and enlightenment. The two camps which came to garner the most 
attention in philosophical circles are eliminativism, which understands enlightenment 
as the cutting off of linguistic and socio-cultural categories, accomplished by arbitrary 
means, and constructivism, which identifies satori with the exercise of certain linguis-
tic and cultural conventions. In the present paper, we first lay out some of the most 
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important criticisms of these two positions, arguing that the two accounts fall into the 
error of either demonizing or fetishizing language, respectively, before outlining a 
different approach to the relationship between practice and realization, drawing on the 
largely neglected work of perennialist thinkers and a phenomenologically informed 
notion of symbolism. By taking the idea of the symbol in its double meaning, namely 
as that which “casts together” the culturally conditioned particularities of Zen into 
a unified tradition, and yet points beyond them as a “sign” of something that itself 
transcends all description, we propose an interpretation that can do justice both to 
the crucial role played by concrete practices and to the transcendent nature of their 
soteriological “end”.
Onkraj eliminacije in konstrukcije:  
zen, simbolizem in perenialistična šola
Ključne besede: zen, razsvetljenje, perenializem, konstruktivizem, simbolizem, 
transcendenca
Ko se je zen budizem v prejšnjem stoletju zlagoma uveljavil na Zahodu, je prišlo 
do razvoja vrste različnih interpretacij ene od njegovih temeljnih značilnosti, namreč 
svojstvenega odnosa med jezikom in razsvetljenjem. Dva pristopa, ki sta bila ob tem 
deležna največ pozornosti na filozofskem področju, sta eliminativizem, ki razsvetlje-
nje razume kot odstranitev jezikovnih in družbeno-kulturnih kategorij, in konstruk­
tivizem, ki satori istoveti z utečenimi jezikovnimi praksami in kulturnimi konvenci-
jami. V članku bova najprej predstavila najpomembnejše ugovore proti omenjenima 
stališčema, pri čemer bova trdila, da obe interpretaciji privedeta do demonizacije oz. 
fetišizacije jezika, in nato predstavila oris drugačnega razumevanja odnosa med pra-
kso in razsvetljenjem na podlagi večinoma zapostavljene perenialistične tradicije in 
fenomenološko utemeljenega pojma simbolizma. Če idejo simbola razumemo v nje-
nem dvojnem pomenu, tj. kot tisto, kar »meče skupaj« kulturno pogojene partikular-
nosti zena v enotno tradicijo, hkrati pa kaže onstran njih kot »znak« nečesa neizreklji-
vega, lahko utemeljimo tako ključno vlogo konkretnih praks kot tudi transcendentno 
naravo njihovega soteriološkega »cilja«. 
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About the authors 
Adnan Sivić is a Young Researcher at the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, 
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, where he is currently working on his Ph.D. thesis 
under the supervision of Dr. Sebastjan Vörös. His primary research interests include 
phenomenology, the philosophy of religion, Buddhist philosophy, perennialism, and 
enactivism.
Email: adnan.sivic@ff.uni-lj.si
Sebastjan Vörös, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Department of 
Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. His research interests 
span philosophy and history of science, epistemology, and Buddhist and Christian 
philosophy. He is the author of Podobe neupodobljivega (The Images of the Unimagi­
nable), in which he addresses mystical experiences from neuroscientific, phenomeno-
logical, and epistemological perspectives, and several articles on enactivism, embodi-
ment, and (neuro)phenomenology. He is currently writing a book on the life and work 
of Francisco Varela.
Email: sebastjan.voros@ff.uni-lj.si
O avtorjih
Adnan Sivić je mladi raziskovalec na Oddelku za filozofijo Filozofske fakultete Uni-
verze v Ljubljani, kjer trenutno piše doktorsko disertacijo pod mentorstvom dr. Seba-
stjana Vörösa. Njegova primarna raziskovalna področja so fenomenologija, filozofija 
religije, budistična filozofija, perenializem in enaktivizem.
E-naslov: adnan.sivic@ff.uni-lj.si
Dr. Sebastjan Vörös je docent na Oddelku za filozofijo Filozofske fakultete Univerze 
v Ljubljani. Raziskovalno se ukvarja s filozofijo in zgodovino znanosti, epistemolo-
gijo, fenomenologijo ter budistično in krščansko filozofijo. Je avtor knjige Podobe 
neupodobljivega, v kateri obravnava nevroznanstvene, fenomenološke in epistemolo-
ške vidike mističnih izkustev, ter vrste člankov o enaktivizmu, utelešenosti in (nevro)- 
fenomenologiji. Trenutno piše knjigo o življenju in delu Francisca Varele.
E-naslov: sebastjan.voros@ff.uni-lj.si
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