

DEMOCRACY ACROSS BORDERS: PARLIAMENTARIANS AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES

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Abstract

The article focuses on international parliamentary institutions (IPIs), which generally do not receive much attention in the scholarly literature. However, it can be argued that in spite of some notable difficulties, such as the lack of membership continuity and lack of funding, IPIs can contribute to the reduction of the global/regional democratic deficit. To account for, and discuss the prospects of, increased involvement of parliamentarians in international affairs, the concepts of deliberative democracy and international public spheres have been used.

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Introduction

For most of the twentieth century, many policy-makers and academics looked at the international community through the prism of inter-state relations: the world was run by states in pursuit of their egoistic interests, whereas other actors had limited influence on international affairs.¹ After the end of the Cold War, the presence of non-state actors has become much stronger in terms of both numbers and diversity. Yet, these changes seem to have a limited effect on the transformation of the nation-state – its centrality in international affairs continues to persist. Non-state actors continue to be subjected to intergovernmental decision-making that is non-transparent, reduces public participation, and has only limited parliamentary control through legislatures in nation-states. The disagreement with such practices seems ever more apparent. Non-governmental organisations, social movements, activists, and citizens, participate in actions aimed at holding governments accountable for their conduct of international affairs (Samhat and Payne 2006, 252). To this end, they can stage public protests,² or organise international conferences that are run simultaneously with world summits on issues such as human rights, women's rights, and environmental problems (Hochstetler and Clark 2000).

These developments indicate that besides states, various international public spheres, defined as “institutional sites where collaborative problem-solving, publicity and advocacy take place” (Cochran 2002, 519) are emerging. This has been noted also by the Commission on Global Governance.³ In its report titled *Our Global Neighbourhood* (1995), the Commission has defined global governance as:

a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.⁴

The Commission as well as most of the global governance literature do not include members of parliament or international parliamentary institutions (IPIs) as actors in international public spheres. So far, only a few scholars and practitioners have focused on the phenomenon of IPIs, e.g. Klebes (1990), Cutler (2001), and, in the context of transnational networks, Slaughter (2004). This is somewhat surprising, given that democracy has become the most widely accepted form of government within states,⁵ whereas global governance continues to suffer from the lack of democracy and legitimacy. Erik Stein, for instance, suggests that internationalisation by definition means a “loss of democracy” (Stein 2001, 490), which means less influence of legislative bodies over executive branches, and consequently a wider gap between international decision-making and citizens whose direct effect on such decisions is non-existent. If interests of citizens are underestimated or insufficiently addressed, the stability of the international community as a whole could be under threat. Some authors argue that “we the people” approach – a global democratic body constituted by direct elections – may not be the solution to the problem (Nye 2001, 4). This, of course, is not a revolutionary thought; in order to make mechanisms of global governance acceptable in the eyes of the public worldwide, legitimacy cannot be provided from the top. As James Rosenau has pointed out, “governance does not just suddenly happen. Circumstances have to be suitable, people have

to be amenable to collective decisions being made, tendencies toward organization have to develop, habits of cooperation have to evolve, and a readiness not to impede the processes of emergence and evolution has to persist" (Rosenau 1995, 17). International parliamentary institutions (IPIs) assume different roles in these processes, even though, with a few exceptions (to be discussed later in the article), this has rarely been recognised.

This article seeks to encourage a debate about the involvement of members of parliaments in international public spheres. It will be argued that by the very nature of their office (as directly elected representatives) members of parliaments can act in such fora. IPIs are "institutions in which parliamentarians co-operate with a view to formulating their interests, adopting decisions, strategies, or programmes, which they implement or promote, formally and informally, in interactions with other actors, by various means such as persuasion, advocacy, or institutional pressure" (Šabič 2008, 258). These institutions, based on shared interests of parliamentarians, who are committed to contribute to solving problems of regional and/or global dimensions, range from highly institutionalised bodies (e.g. the European Parliament) to informal parliamentary associations and networks (such as the Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum, and the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank). They provide a venue for parliamentarians to stimulate public debate on issues of regional/global governance, and to facilitate the development of shared norms and values in an increasingly integrated world.

In order to conceptualise the role of IPIs in international public spheres, the article will begin by analysing the concept of domestic analogy, as it has been put forward by Hidemi Suganami (1989). This conceptual tool enables the inclusion of the parliamentary dimension to the analysis of global governance. It also makes it possible to consider alternatives to the contemporary world order, as has been demonstrated by the contributions that have emerged out of the cosmopolitan democracy project, and utopian blueprints for new global institutions (e.g. the world parliament). Interestingly enough, however, these studies and blueprints seem to overlook or at least underestimate the parliamentary dimension of the *present* international community. They do not seem to pay much attention to the unique situation of national parliamentarians addressing international problems and acting at the international level. The article will question this neglect. It will argue that one should consider an alternative way to provide a better insight as to the role and potentials of parliamentarians in general and IPIs in particular as international actors. An approach, which is based on concepts of deliberative democracy and international public spheres, will be suggested as such an alternative.

Domestic Analogy and Deliberative Democracy

Domestic analogy can be defined as a "presumptive reasoning ... based on the assumption that since domestic and international phenomena are similar in a number of respects, a given proposition which holds true domestically, but whose validity is as yet uncertain internationally, will also hold true internationally" (Suganami 1989, 24). Following this reasoning, particularly when observing the integrating force of globalisation, one may indeed imagine that a world democratic state could be its final outcome. Thomas Franck, for example, has argued that democracy is becoming a "global entitlement" (Franck 1992, 46). His view is shared by many

authors who argue in favour of democratising global institutions, but there is no consensus about how to accomplish the ideal of global democracy and make it a constituent part of the present and/or a future world order.

The cosmopolitan model of democracy has made the most elaborate contribution to the modern debate about alternatives to the present world order based on the idea of domestic analogy. Cosmopolitan democracy is a project, which promotes a global political organisation, based on the rule of law and enhanced public participation and political representation (Archibugi and Held 1995, 13; Held 1995, 106). Influenced by Kant's *Essay on Perpetual Peace* and supported by Habermas' discourse theory of morality,⁶ cosmopolitan democrats proceed from the notion that "in the interdependencies of a global economy and society, [states] forfeit their own capacities for autonomous action as well as their democratic substance" (Habermas 2003, 89). Cosmopolitan democrats do not say that states *per se* are under threat and fading away, at least not in the foreseeable future (Held and McGrew 2007, 211-14). Yet, what is needed is the transformation of the present international community to a globally integrated society, founded on dialogue, solidarity and commonly shared values, rather than on exclusion, which stems from egoistic interests and behaviour of nation-states, resulting in devastating consequences such as poverty (Habermas 1996, 116). In the long-term future, cosmopolitan democrats envisage a world community with its own constitution, political representation with a global parliament, judicial system (a global court), and even a "permanent shift of a growing proportion of a nation-state's coercive capability to regional and global institutions" (Held 1998, 111).

The parliamentary dimension has been identified as an element of a world order based on cosmopolitan democracy, but cosmopolitan democrats do not see a world parliament to be created overnight. David Held has hoped that, in the meantime, as the contemporary international community progresses towards cosmopolitan democracy, the accumulated knowledge and experience, drawn from the practice of the existing IPIs such as the European Parliament, would encourage the creation of regional parliaments – of which decisions might eventually be recognised as legitimate independent sources of law (Held 1998, 108).

Certain reservations can be raised as to whether the project of cosmopolitan democracy, and the resort to domestic analogy, respectively, can provide a viable alternative in an attempt to restructure the international community. It is true that ever more governments around the world are elected democratically, even though standards of democratic elections tend to be interpreted differently in individual states (Archibugi 2004, 442). However, in lieu of global demos, alternative paths towards global democratisation are studied outside the context of domestic analogy, in particular by looking at activities of non-state actors, such as advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998), epistemic communities (Haas 1992), knowledge networks, and think tanks (Stone 2000; Stone 2004). It has been suggested that non-state actors could contribute to global democratisation by concentrating their knowledge and experience in the so-called global political parties, which would primarily address issues that have a dramatic impact on the global society (Kreml and Kegley 1996). Lucio Levi has argued that the dynamics of reducing the democratic deficit⁷ by establishing a global democratic institutional structure depends on the development of the so-called dialectical unity between the governments and the civil society. It is

true that governments have the power, but civil society movements have the “initial capacity, which can be used during moments of crisis in order to move governments to transfer their authority to supranational institutions” (Levi 2003, 65). Jan Aart Scholte (1998, 293-94) refers to “civic activism” which, by forcing political actors to pursue their policies in a more transparent way and enhancing public participation in addressing global problems, makes a significant contribution in reducing the democratic deficit in the contemporary global governance.

Nevertheless, cosmopolitan democrats argue against steering away from the domestic analogy in discussing the institutional structure for a just world order. According to James Bohman, “the consequence of rejecting the domestic or state analogy is that the focus of democratization shifts to the informal public spheres and weak publics that depend less on a broad legal framework and more on the capacity of citizens to challenge existing rules” (Bohman 2005, 304-5). Hence, an institutional and legal framework must be developed in which active participation is made possible in decision-making on issues, such as high politics, poverty, global warming (Bohman 2005; 311-12).

Cosmopolitan democrats are not alone in thinking about a global world order, eventually based on representative democracy. Some authors believe that creating a global institution, of which legitimacy would be based on (directly) elected representatives, should be considered a pragmatic solution to address the global democratic deficit. Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss have argued that such an institution – a global assembly – would be more legitimate in overseeing state compliance with international legal norms than, say, non-state watchdogs such as Amnesty International (Falk and Strauss 2001, 216-17). They, and others, argue that by the very nature of their office, the elected members would not represent national interests. They would instead align along party lines, *ad hoc* interests (coalitions of the like-minded), or worldviews (Falk and Strauss 2001, 217, Kauppi, Leinen, Watson and Onesta 2007).

The idea that there should be a “parliamentary wing” of a global political institution is not new: it had been entertained in the context of debates about the creation of the League of Nations (Johnsson 2003, 21). After the end of the Cold War, when the relationship between the United Nations and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) was enhanced,⁸ an ambitious idea of adding a parliamentary chamber to the United Nations has often been brought up. It has been proposed that such a body should be composed of directly elected representatives from individual states, or groups of states (Schwartzberg 2003). Similar ideas have been pushed forward by the network called Campaign for a More Democratic United Nations (CAMDUN), which promotes the idea of a UN Second Assembly. In such an Assembly, “each participating country could have up to 6 delegates. One delegate would be directly elected by ‘world citizens’ who in some way ‘act as well as think globally’. The other five delegates would be indirectly representative of the peoples: one delegate for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with a formal link with the UN system, one delegate for NGOs without a formal link with the UN system, and three delegates to represent the wider civil society through their governance institutions and other bodies.”⁹

Some authors are sceptical as to whether such a project could ever materialise. The main criticism against the idea of a global parliament points to the fact that the

international community does not have its own demos (consequently, it would be unclear who should be represented in a global parliament), and that the knowledge about the democratic institutions is not universal. Further, many parts of the world are unfamiliar with the concept of parliamentary democracy. Finally, “transworld political parties like the Liberal and Socialist Internationals are not set up to conduct intercontinental election campaigns for global parliaments; nor have proposals to form a ‘global opposition party’ against prevailing global policies attracted any significant following” (Scholte 2002, 291-92).

In sum, therefore, two main perspectives on a future world order that are based on domestic analogy can be identified. On one hand, cosmopolitan democrats offer a republican idea of a global citizenship and a set of institutions with a (directly) elected forum of representatives. On the other hand, somewhat utopian planners would enhance and institutionalise the involvement of non-state actors in global decision-making processes, ideally by creating a “world parliament”. The cosmopolitan democracy project encounters scepticism, both theoretical and practical, as to its feasibility, given the reality of the state-based international community, which is not going to whither away soon. The main critique of utopian solutions is that they fail to address the “legitimacy setback” in their plans, which originates from the fact that (national) parliamentarians assume a rather limited role in these blueprints.¹⁰ In order to analyse more closely the role of parliamentarians in the international arena, the idea of deliberative democracy appears to provide a more promising research framework for such an investigation.

Deliberative democracy is a political process in which political decisions “are reached through a deliberative process where participants scrutinize heterogeneous interests and justify their positions in view of the common good of a given constituency ... Interests, preferences and aims that comprise the common good are those that ‘survive’ deliberation” (Nanz and Steffek 2004, 315, 318). In other words, deliberative democracy “relies on certain *participatory* conditions for rule-making” (Nanz and Steffek 2004, 320). The rationale behind this approach is that global democracy, as an ideal, can be accomplished if the main goal is “to save its normative core, while making it effective form of governance and problem solving in the current open field of possibilities” (Bohman 2004, 24-25).

This answers the criticism that global demos in the conventional sense of the word does not exist. As much as that may be true, it seems that “some sort of global demoi” are in existence. In other words, the global demos is decentralised, perhaps even replaced, with concerned (and informed) public (Bohman 2004, 25). To capture these “demoi,” a generic term international public sphere can also be used. Thus, the demoi are the result of globalisation, which both, integrates markets and creates global problems. Interested individuals and groups seek to address those problems, also by pushing for more institutionalised influence in the global decision-making (cf. Fraser 2005).

The idea of deliberative democracy also needs to address queries concerning legitimacy. Non-state actors are vital for the development of the international community, because they provide a much-needed feedback for intergovernmental institutions that could otherwise become lethargic and non-responsive to inputs from the external environment. Yet, as argued earlier by Falk and Strauss, they suffer from the legitimacy deficit: whom do non-governmental organisations represent

if no one has elected them?¹¹ Of course, the legitimacy deficit will not go away soon, but it is important to involve in international affairs those institutions that can reasonably claim the possession of democratic legitimacy. As directly elected representatives of peoples, parliamentarians can make such a claim; whether they can play a role in facilitating a feedback for intergovernmental decision-makers through IPIs is another matter. In the next two sections, this question will be discussed in more detail.

IPIs as International Actors

In an attempt to analyse what IPIs can or cannot do in international arena, it is important to understand the historical background of the need for a more active involvement of parliamentarians in international affairs. The idea of creating an international parliament has never been developed separately, but always in a wider context, mostly as part of peace plans. To help keep the peace and share the idea of peace among legislators around the world was the reason why the Inter-Parliamentary Union was established in 1889 (Passy 1896, 9-10). The inauguration of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1949, as the first ever pan-European parliament, was a direct result of the popular perception that political leaders had failed to spare their citizens the atrocities of war and that the public should have a greater role in making decisions about war and peace in Europe. This sentiment was particularly evident at the Hague Congress of the European Movement, held in May 1948, which was attended by more than 7,000 participants (Loth 1988, 9).

The plan to improve the transparency of policy-making processes at the inter-governmental level was further materialised in practice with the creation of new IPIs in the 1950s. In Europe, after the creation of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community in 1957, the European Parliament, which in 1951 was created as the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, began to function as the organ of all three European Communities. Further, the Western European Union (1954), the European organisation for collective defence, also introduced a parliamentary assembly as one of its main organs. The need for institutionalised parliamentary co-operation quickly spread beyond Europe and IPIs have gradually become a global phenomenon; almost 70 IPIs have been established so far.¹²

IPIs can appear in two basic forms: as international parliamentary organs (IPOs) or as international parliamentary associations (IPAs). IPOs are defined as organs of international governmental organisations, composed of parliamentarians (Lindeman, 1983). Besides well-known European IPOs such as the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Andean Parliament and the Parliament of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) can be mentioned as examples. In principle, IPAs can be described as voluntary institutions, established by parliamentarians from different countries, to address issues of common interest. From the legal point of view, IPIs are international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). The main criterion for distinguishing between international governmental and non-governmental organisations is the body of law that governs their activities. "If those activities are governed by international law, we speak of an international organization proper If those

activities are, however, governed by some domestic law, we usually say that the organization in question is a non-governmental organization” (Klabbers 2002, 8). Besides the Inter-Parliamentary Union, typical IPAs are the Commonwealth Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the Global Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment.

Apart from the legal status, the difference between IPOs and IPAs lies in their mandates. It is much clearer what IPOs can or cannot do, since their mandate is determined by an international treaty. For example, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is not allowed to discuss issues related to defence.¹³ Similarly, the European Parliament, by far the most powerful and complex IPO, has only consultative role in security and defence matters of the European Union. IPAs have more flexibility in choosing and changing topics they wish to address. A good example is the IPA called Parliamentarians for Global Action. Established in 1978, this organisation had first focussed on disarmament and confidence building between the Soviet Union and the West. Since the end of the Cold War, it turned its attention to other topics, such as democratisation, sustainable development, population growth, international law, and human rights.¹⁴ The majority of IPAs generally tend to focus on human rights, but other most pressing issues that are in the centre of attention in the international public sphere at large, are also discussed by IPAs, e.g. poverty reduction, development, corruption, environmental protection, women’s rights, and arms trade.

The Prospects of IPIs as International Actors

In a globalising world, members of IPIs, who are elected representatives with their own constituencies, can significantly contribute to bringing concerns of their own constituents directly to the international arena. This is important, since such concerns are increasingly shared by individuals across different countries, faced with the same global problems and issues. In the same fashion, members of IPIs can bring national preferences into international debates. Those preferences cannot be simply ignored in any regional or global decision-making. When considering deliberative democracy, Nanz and Steffek (2004, 322) have envisioned the so-called deliberative fora, which would consist of NGOs, epistemic communities and national officials. Members of IPIs could arguably be listed among these actors.

In spite of their worldwide presence, IPIs face some notable obstacles, which affect their scope of action and influence. Membership continuity is of course crucial for accumulating knowledge and experience in an international institution which is based on individual members. In most cases, a long-term membership commitment to an IPI is an exception rather than the rule. Members of IPIs are, after all, national parliamentarians. If they are asked to assume a different role in their own country, they will do so. A good example is the former Turkish parliamentarian Abdullah Gül, who had been active in two IPIs, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. He considers those years as one of the highlights of his career.¹⁵ But in 2002, he became the Prime Minister of Turkey, in 2003 the Foreign Minister and is now the President of Turkey (since 2007). Of course, assuming a role in the executive branch is quite different from being a parliamentarian; defending national interests becomes a priority over shared interests, concerns, and ideas on which IPIs are built. This does not mean

that interpersonal bonds among former colleagues in IPIs are severed overnight.¹⁶ Nevertheless, from an IPI perspective, losing experienced members may have a negative effect on the work of these institutions.

The lack of funding could also represent an obstacle for members of IPIs to carry out their work. For various reasons, many parliamentarians dispose of rather limited budgets for foreign travel. This problem is particularly acute for parliamentarians from developing countries, although wealthier countries are not immune to it either. Members of the US Congress have to take a special care to justify foreign travels for which public funds are used. For decades, the US media have been demonstrating a considerable sensitivity to this issue; in the past, participation of American parliamentarians at meetings of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly had been particularly scrutinised (Trohan 1967, 6).¹⁷ It should also be noted that there is some degree of vulnerability of parliamentarians to pressure from corporate lobbyists, who are all too happy to offer various incentives for parliamentary support.¹⁸ Therefore, one cannot exclude the possibility that the work and activities of parliamentarians abroad are funded to pursue specific interest of third parties. Nevertheless, IPAs do not serve as a proxy for realising interest of third parties, e.g. from the corporate sector. Public financial resources dominate budgets of IPAs. A notable example of providing the financial support based on public funding is the Parliamentary Centre from Canada. The Centre has stimulated and supported a number of IPAs abroad, such as the African parliamentary network on anti-corruption, the African parliamentary network on poverty reduction, and the Inter-parliamentary Forum of the Americas. The Centre has a close relationship with the Parliament of Canada. It receives funding from the Canadian government, international institutions, such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, as well as a number of donor agencies.¹⁹ In some cases, IPAs receive funding predominantly from private sources, but mainly from donor agencies and charities. Examples of such IPAs include the European Parliamentary Forum for Population and Development and the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption.²⁰

Another question that comes to mind in the discussion about the role of IPIs as international actors and obstacles they face is their effectiveness. It is not quite clear how such effectiveness could be measured in the first place. The use of decision-making powers that IPIs possess would conceivably be the most concrete measure of their influence on (intergovernmental) policy-making. The problem is that IPIs are typically not part of the decision-making processes. IPAs do not of course possess any formal decision-making powers, but even among IPOs only a few can claim that they have the statutory powers to make decisions that must be respected by the governments. It is quite safe to say that the only IPO that uses those powers effectively and authoritatively is the European Parliament.

Other possible tool to measure the effectiveness of IPIs could be the outcome of their initiatives, submitted to governments. It is less known, for example, that the Assembly of the Western European Union has been the initiator of some important decisions of the Western European Union (WEU). In several recommendations, especially in Recommendation 467 (1989), the Assembly proposed the establishment of a European Institute for Advanced Security Studies (WEU Assembly,

Doc. 1195). Subsequently, at a meeting in Brussels on 13 November 1989, member states decided to set up a WEU Institute for Security Studies (WEU Information Report 1990, 26).

Further, the WEU Assembly adopted several recommendations (e.g. Recommendation 482 on observation satellites /1990/), in which it called for an urgent establishment of a WEU centre for satellite and data interpretation as a first step towards setting up a European Observation Satellite Agency. In its reply to the Recommendation 501, the Council informed the Assembly that foreign and defence ministers of WEU members decided to set up a Satellite Data Interpretation Centre (WEU Assembly, Doc. 1291).²¹

Thus, there is evidence that ideas and formal initiatives of IPIs can result in concrete intergovernmental actions, but such evidence is limited. On the other hand, as has been argued throughout the article, there is a considerable potential for IPIs to establish themselves elsewhere, e.g. as catalysts for international co-operation on pressing issues, as norm promoters and actors in reducing global democratic deficit. Anne-Marie Slaughter, while sceptical about the concrete role IPIs can play in the world, recognises this by giving a simple example: “it is highly unlikely the threat of loss of observer status at the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly will shift the attitude of U.S. and Japanese legislators on the death penalty, [but] it is quite possible that several decades of regular relations between Arab and European parliamentarians has had impact on the way many European politicians view security and economic issues in the Middle East” (Slaughter 2004, 118).

Conclusion

To consider the role *national* parliamentarians can play among *international* public spheres seems to be a contradiction in terms. There may not be a global demos and the creation of a democratic world state is not going to happen in the near future. National borders are porous and all the major problems are transboundary by nature. In this context, it is difficult to imagine that parliamentarians will keep sticking to the local agenda. To account for the growing involvement of parliamentarians in international affairs and the number of IPIs that have been created so far, the concepts of deliberative democracy and international public spheres seem helpful. It can be concluded that as part of international public spheres, IPIs can contribute to the reduction of the democratic deficit, above all because their members are the only actors that may hold governments accountable for their actions. This is especially important, as globalisation has blurred the distinction between issues of local, regional, and global relevance. Parliamentarians can use IPIs as an additional tool to address international problems and seek consensus on how to deal with them.

This article has not been intended to overrate the capacity and potential of IPIs to enhance transparency and legitimacy of global governance. Some serious limitations to parliamentarians’ activities abroad cannot be ignored. Since members of IPIs are also members of national parliaments, it is impossible to expect from them not to pursue national preferences during their international activities. The lack of membership continuity and the lack of funding should also be noted as factors that limit activities of IPIs. Their effectiveness is questioned, too. Still, as the article has indicated, such limitations do not inhibit participation of parliamentarians in

international affairs, because local problems tend to be global, and *vice versa*. It may be that many parliamentarians are not yet entirely convinced, or aware, that the ongoing globalisation processes will sooner or later change their agenda. However, globalisation practically forces parliamentarians to become international actors if they wish to defend interests of their local constituencies adequately. Seen from this perspective, therefore, it seems important that IPIs be seriously considered not only in future analyses of global democratic deficit, but also in the contexts of IPIs as catalysts of international co-operation and as promoters of norms and values that aim to foster peace and stability in the world.

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Notes:

1. Authors that have defended this position are, among many others, Carr (1978), Morgenthau (1968), and Waltz (1979).
2. Perhaps the most notable among them in recent years have been the protests against trade liberalisation during the 1999 ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation in Seattle.
3. The Commission was established in 1992, in order to "explore the opportunities created by the end of the cold war to build a more effective system of world security and governance" (<http://web.archive.org/web/20020204001556/www.cgg.ch/TheCommission.htm>). It was chaired by the former Prime Minister of Sweden, Ingvar Carlsson, and the former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Shridath Ramphal. Note: all Internet links referred to in this paper have been active at the time of writing.
4. Available at <http://www-old.itcilo.org/actrav/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/globe/gove.htm>. The concept of international regimes as institutions for governing issue-areas, by state and non-state actors, is comprehensively discussed in Roter (2003, Chapter 3).
5. According to the Freedom House data, 123 out of 193 countries in the world could be counted among electoral democracies in 2007. "Freedom in the World 2007: Year Marked by Global 'Freedom Stagnation', Setbacks for Democracy in Asia", <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=457>.
6. As argued by Linklater (1998, 121-22).
7. The term "democratic deficit" can be defined as the low degree of citizens' participation in political processes, either at the national or at the international level (Läufer 1988, 682, Seidelmann 1989, 76-7).
8. In 2002, the IPU received an observer status by the General Assembly of the United Nations (resolution A/RES/57/32, 19 November 2002).
9. [Http://www.camdun-online.gn.apc.org/options.html](http://www.camdun-online.gn.apc.org/options.html).
10. Cf. Nölke (2004, 15).
11. Nye (2001, 3) has called them "self-appointed" institutions. For a concise comment on the status of non-governmental organisations see Sadoun (2007).

12. For analysis of the growth of IPIs see Šabič (2008, 259-61).
13. This limitation applies to the entire organisation, as prescribed by Article 1 of the Statute of the Council of Europe.
14. For details, see <https://www.pgaction.org/prog.asp>.
15. On his official website (<http://www.abdullahgul.gen.tr/EN/Main.asp>), Gül mentions that in 2001, he was “awarded with Pro-merito Medal of the Council of Europe and became Honorary Associate of Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly.” He has served in the Assembly for almost 10 years (between 1992 and 2001).
16. Interview with Paul E. Gallis, Specialist in European Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., 8 June 2006.
17. For general criticism of foreign travel by US Congressmen/women, see, for example, Junketing Congressmen Off to Here, There, Everywhere, Los Angeles Times, 15 November 1972, 2, Trohan (1967, 6), and Wolf (2006). Nowadays, only the costs of attending meetings of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly are appropriated in the Congressional budget. As for the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the Republican-led Congress had lost all its interest in this institution after the end of the Cold War – before that, the IPU had some relevance because it was a rare meeting place between the American Parliamentarians and their colleagues from the other side of the Iron Curtain. The Congress ceased its membership in the IPU in the 1990s.
18. See, for example, “Pharmaceutical Firms Top the List,” USA Today Magazine 133, No. 2713 (2004).
19. Based on the author’s e-mail interview with Sonja Vojnovic, Programme Co-ordinator, Canadian Parliamentary Centre, 6 July 2006.
20. For details, see http://www.iepfpd.org/index.asp?ID=374&id_sous_menu=34; and http://www.gopacnetwork.org/AboutUs/funders_en.htm.
21. The two institutions have been integrated in the institutional architecture of the European Union, and are called the European Union Institute for Security Studies and the European Union Satellite Centre. For details, see <http://www.iss.europa.eu/> and <http://www.eusc.europa.eu/>.

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