TEORIJA IN PRAKSA Družboslovna revija Let. LX, št. 4, str. 587–910 Ljubljana, oktober–december 2023 UDK 4, ISSN (tiskana izdaja): 0040-3598 ISSN (spletna izdaja): 2820-591X USTANOVITELJ IN IZDAJATELJ Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani GLAVNI UREDNIK PIKALO, Jernej, Univerza v Ljubljani PODROCNI UREDNIK KRPIC, Tomaž, Univerza v Ljubljani SEKRETARKA REVIJE CERNCIC TOmAžEVIC, Tina mEDNARODNI UREDNIŠKI ODBOR BOJINOVIc FENKO, Ana, Univerza v Ljubljani BURGER, Anže, Univerza v Ljubljani CABADA, Ladislav, metropolitan University Prague CALABRESE, Andrew, University of Colorado Boulder ÇELIK, Burçe, Loughborough University London CIPEK, Tihomir, University of Zagreb CLARKE, Alissa, De montfort University COENDERS GALLART, Germŕ, University of Girona COhEN, Sara, University of Liverpool CZADA, Roland, University of Osnabrück DAhLGREN, Peter, Lund University DE BEULE, Filip, KU Leuven DOBROTIc, Ivana, University of Zagreb, University of Oxford DžANANOVIc mIRAŠCIJA, Nedžma, University of Sarajevo FILIPOVIC hRAST, maša, Univerza v Ljubljani GEmINI, Laura, University of Urbino Carlo Bo JANSSEN, Susanne, Erasmus University RotterdamKOGOVŠEK, Tina, Univerza v LjubljaniKOS-STANIŠIc, Lidija, Zagreb University KOTNIK, Vlado, Univerza na Primorskem BANJAC, marinko, Univerza v Ljubljani LUThAR, Breda, Univerza v Ljubljani mANIGART, Philippe, Royal military Academy mITREVSKA, marina, Ss. Cyril and methodius University in Skopje PAJTINKA, Erik, University matej Bel, Banska Bystrica ROmANENKO, Sergei, Russian Academy of Sciences KOmEL, mirt, Univerza v LjubljaniŠADL, Zdenka, Univerza v Ljubljani WANIS-ST. JOhN, Anthony, American University Washington DC WILLKE, helmut, Zeppelin University WINTER, Rainer, The University of Klagenfurt ZImmERmANN, Katharina, University of hamburg OBLIKOVALEC mUJEZINOVIc, Ismar PRELOm BETON, Leon TISK Tiskarna CICERO, Begunje, d. o. o. 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TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 60, 4/2023 TEORIJA IN PRAKSA Interdisciplinary journal of social science Vol. LX, No. 4, pp. 587–910 Ljubljana, October–December 2023 UDK 4, Print ISSN: 0040-3598 Online ISSN: 2820-591X FOUNDER AND PUBLIShER Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana EDITOR-IN-ChIEF PIKALO, Jernej, University of Ljubljana ASSOCIATE EDITOR KRPIC, Tomaž, University of Ljubljana ISSUE mANAGER CERNCIC TOmAžEVIC, Tina INTERNATIONAL EDITORIAL BOARD BOJINOVIc FENKO, Ana, University of Ljubljana BURGER, Anže, University of Ljubljana CABADA, Ladislav, metropolitan University Prague CALABRESE, Andrew, University of Colorado Boulder ÇELIK, Burçe, Loughborough University London CIPEK, Tihomir, University of Zagreb CLARKE, Alissa, De montfort University COENDERS GALLART, Germŕ, University of Girona COhEN, Sara, University of Liverpool CZADA, Roland, University of Osnabrück DAhLGREN, Peter, Lund University DE BEULE, Filip, KU Leuven DOBROTIc, Ivana, University of Zagreb, University of Oxford DžANANOVIc mIRAŠCIJA, Nedžma, University of Sarajevo FILIPOVIC hRAST, maša, University of Ljubljana GEmINI, Laura, University of Urbino Carlo Bo JANSSEN, Susanne, Erasmus University RotterdamKOGOVŠEK, Tina, University of LjubljanaKOS-STANIŠIc, Lidija, Zagreb University KOTNIK, Vlado, University of Primorska BANJAC, marinko, University of Ljubljana LUThAR, Breda, University of Ljubljana mANIGART, Philippe, Royal military Academy mITREVSKA, marina, Ss. Cyril and methodius University in Skopje PAJTINKA, Erik, University matej Bel, Banska Bystrica ROmANENKO, Sergei, Russian Academy of Sciences KOmEL, mirt, University of LjubljanaŠADL, Zdenka, University of Ljubljana WANIS-ST. JOhN, Anthony, American University Washington DC WILLKE, helmut, Zeppelin University WINTER, Rainer, University of Klagenfurt ZImmERmANN, Katharina, University of hamburg GRAPhIC DESIGN mUJEZINOVIc, Ismar PAGE LAYOUT BETON, Leon PRINT Printing house CICERO, Begunje, d. o. o. 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The price of an individual issue is EUR 20.00. The journal is subsidised by the Slovenian Research Agency. TEORIJA IN PRAKSA Vol. 60, 4/2023 VSEBINA CLANKI Igor LUKŠIC: HEGLOVSTVO V POLITOLOGIJI ADOLFA BIBICA 593–616 Jure SMOLE, Boštjan UDOVIC: GOSPODARSKA DIPLOMACIJA MAJHNIH DRŽAV V PRIMERJALNI PERSPEKTIVI: PRIMER SLOVENIJE, SRBIJE IN AVSTRIJE 617–640 Žiga SELAN, Janja VUGA BERŠNAK: PRISOTNOST DEPRESIJE V IZBRANIH KRITICNIH POKLICIH V OBDOBJU PANDEMIJE V SLOVENIJI: PRIMER ZDRAVSTVENEGA OSEBJA, PRIPADNIKOV IN PRIPADNIC SLOVENSKE VOJSKE TER POLICISTOV IN POLICISTK 641–659 DRUŽBENI IN JAVNOPOLITICNI VIDIKI OKOLJSKIH TVEGANJ SKOZI PRIZMO JAVNEGA MNENJA (TEMATSKI SKLOP) Brina MALNAR: ISKANJE POTI OD OKOLJSKE OZAVEŠCENOSTI DO PODPORE OKOLJSKIM POLITIKAM. KAJ NAM POVEDO PODATKI DRUŽBOSLOVNIH ANKET? (Uvodnik) 660–663 Brina MALNAR: PODPORA POLITIKAM BLAŽITVE PODNEBNIH SPREMEMB: ŠTUDIJA 64 CLANKOV S PODATKI IZ MODULA EVROPSKE DRUŽBOSLOVNE RAZISKAVE 2016 (ANG) 664–690 Slavko KURDIJA, Tadej BEVK: PODNEBNE SPREMEMBE IN ODNOS JAVNOSTI DO RABE OBNOVLJIVIH VIROV ENERGIJE 691–716 Marko POLIC, Matija SVETINA: POMEN OKOLJSKIH VPRAŠANJ PRI ZADOVOLJSTVU Z ŽIVLJENJEM 717–728 Marjan MALEŠIC: JAVNOMNENJSKA ZAZNAVA OKOLJSKE VARNOSTI V SLOVENIJI 729–752 Sonja BEZJAK, Janez ŠTEBE: INTERDISCIPLINARNE TEMATSKE ZBIRKE PODATKOV KOT PLATFORMA POVEZOVANJA RAZISKOVALCEV: PRIMER RAZISKAV O OKOLJU V SLOVENIJI 753–774 ARTICLES Anton BEBLER: VOJNA V UKRAJINI V PRIMERJALNI PERSPEKTIVI 775–786 Ajda HEDŽET: DRŽAVOCENTRICNOST V MEDNARODNIH ODNOSIH: ANALIZA KONSTRUKCIJE NEDRŽAVNIH KOLEKTIVNIH AKTERJEV V ŠTUDIJAH CLOVEKOVIH PRAVIC 787–813 Jernej PIKALO, Petra PODOBNIKAR: METAFORA KOT POLITICNA TEHNOLOGIJA 814–832 Simona KUKOVIC, Jelena JOKSIMOVIC: PROTOKOLARNA DARILA – LEPA GESTA ALI POTENCIALNO TVEGANJE? NESKLADNOSTI PRI POROCANJU DARIL V SLOVENIJI 833–855 Mimoza BUDECI: KAKO RAZNOLIKOST SKUPIN TER VIDIK SPOLA VPLIVATA NA VOJAŠKO PROFESIONALNOST IN KAKO RAZLICNE SKUPINE DOJEMAJO KONCEPT PROFESIONALNOSTI? 856–874 TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 60, 4/2023 PRIKAZI, RECENZIJE Christopher Blattman: Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Piece (Tomáš ŽIPAJ) 875–879 Mike Hulme: Climate Change Isn’t Everything: Liberating Climate Politics from Alarmism (Maja Turnšek) 879–883 AVTORSKI POVZETKI 884–890 SEZNAM RECENZENTOV LETNIKA LX 891–891 KAZALO LETNIKA LX 892–895 590 TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 60, 4/2023 CONTENTS CLANKI Igor LUKŠIC: HEGELIANISM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE OF ADOLF BIBIC 593–616 Jure SMOLE, Boštjan UDOVIC: THE COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY OF SMALL COUNTRIES: A COMPARISON OF SLOVENIA, SERBIA AND AUSTRIA 617–640 Žiga SELAN, Janja VUGA BERŠNAK: DEPRESSION AMONG FIRST RESPONDERS DURING THE PANDEMIC COMPLEX CRISIS: CASE STUDY AMONG SLOVENIAN HEALTHCARE WORKERS, MILITARY AND POLICE 641–659 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS THROUGH THE LENS OF PUBLIC OPINION: SOCIAL AND PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS (THEMATIC SECTION) Brina MALNAR: NAVIGATING THE PATH FROM ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS TO SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES: INSIGHTS FROM SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY DATA (Editorial) 660–663 Brina MALNAR: INFORMING CLIMATE MITIGATION POLICIES: A SCOPING STUDY BASED ON 64 ARTICLES USING THE 2016 EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY ROTATING MODULE (ENG) 664–690 Slavko KURDIJA, Tadej BEVK: CLIMATE CHANGE AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES 691–716 Marko POLIC, Matija SVETINA: THE IMPORTANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS FOR LIFE SATISFACTION 717–728 Marjan MALEŠIC: PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN SLOVENIA 729–752 Sonja BEZJAK, Janez ŠTEBE: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEMATIC DATA COLLECTIONS AS A PLATFORM FOR BRINGING RESEARCHERS TOGETHER: THE CASE OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH IN SLOVENIA 753–774 ARTICLES Anton BEBLER: THE WAR IN UKRAINE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 775–786 Ajda HEDŽET: STATE-CENTRISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: EXAMINING THE CONSTRUCTION OF NONSTATE COLLECTIVE ACTORS IN HUMAN RIGHTS SCHOLARSHIP 787–813 Jernej PIKALO, Petra PODOBNIKAR: METAPHOR AS A POLITICAL TECHNOLOGY 814–832 Simona KUKOVIC, Jelena JOKSIMOVIC: CEREMONIAL GIFTS – NICE GESTURE OR POTENTIAL RISK? GIFT REPORTING DISCREPANCIES IN SLOVENIA 833–855 Mimoza BUDECI: THE WAYS DIVERSITY AND GENDER AFFECT MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND HOW DIVERSE GROUPS PERCEIVE THIS CONCEPT 856–874 BOOK REVIEWS Christopher Blattman: Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Piece (Tomáš ŽIPAJ) 875–879 Mike Hulme: Climate Change Isn’t Everything: Liberating Climate Politics from Alarmism (Maja Turnšek) 879–883 AUTHORS’ SYNOPSES 884–890 LIST OF PEER REVIEWERS VOL. LX 891–891 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. LX 892–895 CLANKI UDK 32BIBIC:130.32HEGEL Igor LUKŠIC* HEGLOVSTVO V POLITOLOGIJI ADOLFA BIBICA**1 Povzetek. Bibic se je s Heglom srecal na vec ravneh. Neposredno se je lotil Hegla v svojem doktoratu, v katerem je preuceval razmerje med civilno družbo in državo pri Heglu in Marxu. Tu se ni ustavil samo pri Filozofiji prava, temvec se je lotil tudi Fenomenologije duha, ki je kljucno Heglovo delo za vstop v heglovski nacin mišljenja. Za globino teoretskega izraza se je v dvajsetem stoletju izkristalizirala navezava na Helga. Misel, ki zapušcino Hegla obide, je plitka, tista, ki se od Hegla vsaj poskuša uciti, se nameri posegati v globino. Hegel državo kot najvišjo formo v razvoju cloveštva postavlja najvišje v hierarhiji oblik bivanja svobode clo­veštva. Politicno pri njem ne biva samo v državi, tem­vec zacenja že v naravni in civilnodružbeni formi, v državi kot svetovnemu procesu pa se samo domojstri. 593 Slovenska politologija je imela to sreco, da se je njen glavni utemeljevalec Adolf Bibic namenil politiko ute­meljiti prav ob opori na Hegla. Kljucni pojmi: Hegel, heglovstvo, civilna družba, država Uvod Clanek se ukvarja s teoretskim utemeljevanjem in umešcanjem politolo­gije pri Bibicu. Ker je Bibic deloval v casu doktrinarne prevlade marksizma in samoupravnega socializma in ker je bila tudi Visoka šola za politicne vede (1961) ustanovljena v kontekstu prizadevanj Zveze komunistov Jugoslavije, da se poglobi in razširi vedenje marksizma in socializma,2 bi pricakovali, da se bo njegova politologija uklonila vladajoci ideologiji. V nasprotju s tem pricakovanjem podrobna analiza njegove zapušcine kaže, da je veliko bolj kot nereflektirani del družboslovja v Sloveniji in Jugoslaviji, ki je paktiral s * Dr. Igor Lukšic, redni profesor, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija. ** Izvirni znanstveni clanek. DOI: 10.51936/tip.60.4.593 1 To raziskavo je financno podprla Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost RS (www.arrs.gov.si) v okviru raziskovalnega programa P5–0441. Financerji niso imeli nobene vloge pri nacrtovanju študije, zbiranju in analizi podatkov, odlocitvi o objavi ali pripravi teksta. 2 O tem podrobneje pišem v razpravi Politologija v Republiki Sloveniji (Lukšic, 2022). Igor LUKŠIC površinsko kritiko socializma in marksizma, prispeval k poglabljanju razu­mevanja prakticne politike in k razvoju koncepta politike. Bibic (1962) si je najprej obetal, da naveza na sociologijo v podobi kake politicne sociolo­gije odpira tudi za fenomen politike dovoljšen mentalni okvir, ko pa se je poglobil v študij Hegla, je ugotovil, da sociologija ne zmore konceptualnega okvira za razvoj nove znanstvene discipline in prevec zamejuje razumeva­nje polja politike (Bibic, 1964 in zlasti 1972). Najprej se clanek ukvarja s pomenom heglovstva v družboslovju, še zlasti v okviru miselnega toka, ki se mu rece marksizem ali, še ožje, heglo­marksizem. Nato se posveca percepciji Hegla na Slovenskem. Da bi odprli nove dimenzije socializmu in ga odlepili od stalinisticne ali vulgarnomate­rialisticne navlake, je bilo namrec nujno revitalizirati marksizem prav skozi Heglovo misel. Od tu pa sledimo heglovstvu v delih Adolfa Bibica, utemeljitelja sloven­ske in jugoslovanske politologije, ki je prav v navezovanju na Heglovo zapu­šcino utrdil posebno pozicijo novi znanstveni disciplini. Heglovstvo kot teoretska globina Za merjenje globine teoretskega izraza se je konec devetnajstega stoletja, še bolj eksplicitno pa v dvajsetem stoletju izkristalizirala navezava na Hegla.3 Misel, ki zapušcino Hegla obide, je plitka, tista, ki se od Hegla vsaj poskuša uciti, se nameri posegati v globino. Tako se je tudi uveljavilo spoznanje, da je marksizem lahko samo heglomarksizem ali pa je vulgarni in sholasticni poizkus opletanja s kakšno od Marxovih misli oziroma citatom iz njegove zapušcine. »Tudi racionalna refleksija zgodovine marksizma nam razkriva, da se v vseh obdobjih, ko govorimo o renesansi marksizma, ponovno aktu­alizira ravno heglovska dedišcina.« (Debenjak, 1985: 34) Hegel je bil rojen v srednjeveški svet. V njegovem casu so se politicna raz­merja tako zelo zasukala, da je s francosko revolucijo prišel na oblast novi red, kapitalizem, miselni svet pa so znotraj tega preobrata pripravili razsve­tljenstvo in prvi možje nemške klasicne filozofije. Hegel je sistematiziral vse te družbene, politicne in miselne dosežke boja za odpravo fevdalizma in celokupnega francoskega starega reda (ancient regime). Hkrati pa je razši­ril svobodo v filozofijo, ki predstavlja vrh, ker je sinteza vse dotedajšnosti. Karl Popper, veliki apologet pozitivizma, je v delu Odprta družba in njeni sovražniki Hegla postavil na castitljivo mesto zagovornika zaprte družbe in posebej izpostavil, da je njegova dialektika, ki ubija pravo pot do resnice, nemogoca. Heglov historicizem je razglasil za »zastrupljevalsko intelektualno bole-zen«, ki ji je nadel ime »orakeljska filozofija« (Popper 1945/1986: 9). Prav tako je njegovo idejo države razglasil za totalitarno in povsem neprimerno za case odprte družbe, kar pomeni v obdobju vladavine liberalizma, ki gradi na absolutni svobodi posameznika in njegove privatne lastnine. Trdi, da je Hegel »manjkajoci clen« »med Platonom in moderno obliko totalitarizma« (Popper 1945/86: 31). Igor LUKŠIC Hegel je »mislil vpricni stik med srednjeveškim in modernim«, in ce nje­govo filozofijo postavimo v historicni kontekst, potem je jasno, da imamo opravka »z ostro kritiko vpricnih razmer in ne samo z misticizmom, ki je iz razmer izhajal, kot je rekel Marx« (Cole, 2014: XV). Hegel je doživel, izkusil, predelal in zapisal izkušnjo tega prehoda, je mislec te velike revolucije,4 pre­obrata, nastavka za novo, obeta novega sveta in hkrati ohranjanja, je dejanski mislec dialektike5; aufhebung ancient regime, aufhebung sta izraza, ki idejo njegove dialektike najbolje instantno povzemata.6 In v tem je tudi mislec pojma, misel je sistematicno razvil do pojma, ki, obogaten z izkustvom in posredovanjem, nosi resnico in je odrivna tocka novega mišljenja, novih generacij, ki kaj historicno relevantnega izkušajo. In s tem se je Hegel izpo­stavil in vzpostavil kot merilo teoretske globine za celo zgodovino misli, vkljucno z 21. stoletjem. Cole (1915: 1) ugotavlja že takoj v prvem stavku svojega clanka o rojstvu teorije, da je treba »Heglu pripisati izum teorije, ne pa Marxu ali Nietzscheju, ki sta nadaljevala tam, kjer je Hegel koncal«. Preprican je, da je Hegel vzpo­stavil teorijo s prelomom s Kantom, s tem se je namrec »filozofija pretvorila v teorijo, kot jo poznamo danes«. Debenjak ugotavlja, da je poglavitni vir cudenja za Hegla sama zgodovina in posameznik, ki se v to zgodovino in vsakokratnost njenega dogajanja vkljucuje. Zanima ga udeležba posameznika v širši celoti – ljudstvu in zgodovinska usoda ljudstva. …: ne zgolj tako, da bi zgolj rasla cloveška pamet, … temvec tako, da je svetovni um skozi muke in navzkrižja zgodovine prihajal sam do sebe. S tem je zgodovina dobila smisel … (Debenjak, 1981: 29) Hegla so torej zanimali politika in politicno delovanje, država in svo­boda. Njegova ideja, da je filozofija cas, zajet v mislih, in da je vsaka misel otrok svojega casa, kaže na »cas«, ki ni prazna mehanska kategorija, temvec kategorija, napolnjena z razmerji politicnih sil: ideje, ki so ta cas, nosijo v sebi vpricna razmerja politicnih sil. »Šele z reflektiranjem interesa, šele ko ‘ideja’ odkrije svojo zvezo z njim, šele tedaj lahko misel postane historicna, šele tedaj lahko doloci svoj topos v 4 »Francoski filozofi 18. stoletja so revolucionarji. … V Nemciji pa so filozofi spoštovani univerzitetni profesorji, privilegirani uradniki pruske monarhije, ceprav se pri njih, v njihovi filozofiji, pogosto skriva plodno revolucionarno jedro. Toda revolucionarne misli v Nemciji služijo bolj kot nek ventil v zadušljivi atmosferi absolutizma, h kateremu se zatekajo in ga izkorišcajo izolirani posamezniki.« (Ziherl 1952: 59) 5 Najvecja zasluga nemške klasicne filozofije in zlasti Hegla je bila »obnovitev dialektike kot najvišje metode mišljenja« (Debenjak 1969: 168). 6 Fenomenologija duha je bila za Rosenkranza, urednika prve izdaje Heglovih zbranih del leta 1844, »povsem nova filozofija, ki je izhajala iz koncepta samo-zavesti«. Hegel je v tem delu razvil »koncept izkustva, ki tvori samozavest« (Rosenkranz cit. po Shannon 2021: 2). cloveški zgodovini. Pozitivni, kriticni elementi zgodnjega socializma so postali zgodovinsko relevantni šele tedaj, ko se je izvršil temeljit miselni preobrat, ko je mišljenje zajelo same zgodovinske predpostavke mišljenja in s tem postalo historicno, zgodovino reflektirajoce, alias dialekticno mišljenje …; v tem, ko je radikalna sprememba zavesti, je izraz radikalno spremenjene biti (zakaj »zavest ne more biti nic drugega kot zavedna bit«), radikalno spremenjenega social­nega življenja, torej historicne eksistence ljudi.« (Debenjak, 1969: 166–167) Heglovi ucenci so po njegovi smrti razpadli na dve struji: mladoheglovce in staroheglovce. Njegova misel je razpadla na dva dela, svet je v svojem obetu poenotenja skozi Heglovo filozofijo razpadel na dva dela. Marx si je v vrstah mladoheglovcev zastavil nalogo, da heglovsko enotnost7 ponovno obudi v novih razmerah z uporabo bisera njegove zapušcine: dialektiko in historicnim nacinom mišljenja. Marx je že kmalu na zacetku študija dognal globino Heglove misli, saj je že v pismu ocetu napovedal, da se namerava »še enkrat potopiti v morje« Heglove filozofije, da bi iz njega »prinesel na svetlo najcistejši biser« (Marx, 1969: 26). Rezultat tega potapljanja je bil dobro poznavanje Heglove filozo­fije, ocena njenega dometa in preseganje, ohranjanje in odpravljanje nje­gove misli. Marx je zlasti izpostavil pomen Heglove dialektike kot nacina mišljenja, ki je potopljeno v delovanje ljudi. Engels je v delu »Položaj delavskega razreda v Angliji« (1845) v predgo­voru zapisal, da »ta knjiga povsod izdaja sledove izvora enega od predni­kov modernega socializma – nemške klasicne filozofije« (Engels, 1969: 542). V delu »Razvoj socializma od utopije do znanosti« je v predgovoru zapisal, da so »nemški socialisti ponosni na to, da izhajamo ne le od Saint-Simona, Fouriera in Owna, ampak tudi od Kanta, Fichteja in Hegla« (Engels, 1979: 555). V drugi formulaciji pa pravi, da k »skicirani zgodovini razvoja socia­lizma« sodita tudi »klasicna nemška filozofija in Hegel« (Engels, 1979: 554– 555). Hegel ima posebno mesto. Zastavil si je veliko zgodovinsko nalogo, ki je sicer ni rešil, je pa njegova zasluga, da je prvikrat orisan ves naravni, zgodovinski in duhovni svet kot proces, tj. v nenehnem gibanju, spreminjanju, preobražanju in razvoju, in storjen poskus, dokazati notranjo povezanost v tem gibanju in razvoju. S tega stališca zgodovina cloveštva ni bila vec divja zmeda nesmiselnih nasi­lij, ki so pred sodnim stolom sedaj dozorelega filozofskega razuma vsa enako vredna obsodbe, in je najbolje, da jih cimprej pozabimo, temvec se je razodela kot razvojni proces cloveštva samega. (Engels, 1979: 607) Podobno ugotavlja Antonio Gramsci: »Nadaljevalci njegove misli so razdružili to enotnost na mate­rializem in idealizem. Marx pa je združil ta dva elementa v sintezi, v kateri ‘clovek stoji na svojih nogah’« (Gramsci 1977: 1861). Lenin je v casu prve svetovne vojne v Filozofskih zapisih zapisal, da marksisti niso razumeli Marxa, ker niso brali Helga. O Leninu pa so njegovi nasledniki vedeli povedati, da je Marxa bolj na grobo razumel zato, ker je od Hegla bral samo Logiko, ne pa tudi Fenomenologije duha.8 To »novo, filozofsko in k Heglu ter nemški klasicni filozofiji sploh usmerjeno branje Marxovega in Engelsovega opusa, kot sta ga v dvajsetih letih najbolj izrazito prikazala Korsch in Lukacs« je »dalec presegalo kapaciteto poprejšnje teoret­ske senzibilnosti« (Zgaga, 1989: 22). Gramsci pri analizi razmerja med Heglom in evropsko kulturo ugotav­lja, da je bila »tudi evropska kultura podvržena procesu poenotenja in je v zgodovinskem trenutku, ki nas zanima, dosegla vrhunec pri Heglu in kritiki heglovstva« (Gramsci, 1977: 1826). Združila sta se dva procesa: »francoski politicno-pravni in drugi, nemški, teoretsko-spekulativni«. »Iz razgradnje heglovstva pa izhaja zacetek novega kulturnega procesa, katerega znacaj se razlikuje od vseh predhodnih, v tem, da združuje prak­ticno gibanje in teoretsko mišljenje (oz. poskušata se združiti skozi tako prakticni kot teoretski boj).«9 (Gramsci, 1977: 1826) Od tu torej izhaja »nov nacin koncipiranja sveta in cloveka, ki ni vec rezerviran za velike intelek­tualce, profesionalne filozofe, temvec se usmerja k ljudstvu, množici, s kon­kretnim svetovnim znacajem, spreminjajoc ljudsko mišljenje, mumificirano ljudsko kulturo« (Gramsci, 1977: 1826). Kako zelo je povezana globina Heglove misli z marksizmom (filozofijo prakse), je Gramsci predstavil v naslednji misli: »Filozofija prakse kot rezul­tat in krona celotne predhodne zgodovine. Iz kritike heglovstva se rodi moderni idealizem in filozofija prakse. Heglovski imanentizem postane historicizem; ampak absolutni historicizem obstaja le s filozofijo prakse, absolutni historicizem ali absolutni humanizem.« (Gramsci, 1977: 1826– 1827) Na drugem mestu pa je k izvorom marksizma dodal še druge miselne tradicije in politicne prakse: Filozofija prakse predpostavlja to celotno kulturno preteklost, renesanso in reformacijo, nemško klasicno filozofijo in francosko revolucijo, kal­vinizem in klasicno angleško ekonomijo, laicni liberalizem in histori­zem, ki predstavlja temelj vseh modernih koncepcij življenja. Filozofija 8 Lenin je leta 1914 v Filozofskih zvezkih zapisal: »Ni moc do kraja doumeti Marxovega ‘Kapitala’ in zlasti njegovega I. poglavja, ce nisi preštudiral in doumel Heglove Logike. Torej nihce od marksistov ni doumel Marxa pol stoletja sem!« In še: »Ce Marx ni zapustil Logike, pa je zato zapustil logiko ‘Kapitala’ … V ‘Kapitalu’ je v eni vedi uporabljena logika, dialektika in spoznavna teorija materializma, ki je pri Heglu vzel vse, kar je pri njem dragocenega, in je to dragoceno razvil naprej.« (Lenin 1975: 47) 9 »Hegel je na konju francoske revolucije in restavracije dialektiziral dva momenta življenja misli, materializem in spiritualizem, vendar je bila sinteza »clovek, ki stoji na svoji glavi.« (Gramsci, 1977: 1861) prakse je krona vsega tega gibanja intelektualne in moralne reforme, dialektiziranega v kontrastu ljudske kulture in visoke kulture. Ustreza neksusu protestantska reforma + francoska revolucija: je filozofija, ki je tudi politika in je politika, ki je tudi filozofija. (Gramsci, 1977: 1860) Gramsci (1977: 1054) ugotavlja, da se »s Heglom zacenja cas, ko se ne misli vec v terminih ‘kast’ ali ‘stanov', ampak v terminih ‘države', katere ‘aristokracija’ so ravno intelektualci. ‘Patrimonialna’ koncepcija države (ki je nacin mišljenja na podlagi ‘kast') je neposredno tisto pojmovanje, ki ga mora Hegel uniciti«. Pri tem ugotavlja, da je »Heglovo pojmovanje lastno raz­dobju, v katerem se je razvoj buržoazije v širino lahko zdel neomejen: ves cloveški rod bo buržoazen« (Gramsci, 1987: 131). Prav tako je izpostavil, da je bila izjemnega pomena »ne samo v pojmovanju politicne znanosti, tem­vec v celotnem pojmovanju duhovnega in kulturnega življenja … pozicija, ki jo je Hegel dodelil intelektualcem« (Gramsci, 1977: 1054). Kot kaže, se je na Slovenskem pred drugo svetovno vojno s Heglom ukvarjal predvsem Evgen Spektorskij, ki je Heglovo misel predstavil v obsež­nem delu Zgodovina socijalne filozofije II. (1933) na treh straneh, kasneje pa je napisal razpravo z naslovom Comte in Hegel (1940). Tudi iz njego­vih clankov o razmerju med sociologijo in filozofijo (1943) ter o razmerju med teorijo in empirijo (1942) je cutiti nemehanicisticni, lahko bi rekli celo heglovski duh, saj opozarja na to, da sociologija brez filozofije ne more in da »vsaka empirija šele sledi tej ali oni teoriji« (Spektorskij, 1943: 212). Je pa Spektorskij ostro nasprotoval povezovanju Hegla z marksizmom.10 Heglovstvo po letu 1945 v Sloveniji Ce je heglovstvo doživelo pravo renesanso v objemu prve svetovne vojne, tj. v veliki krizi svetovnega kapitalizma, ki se konca s prvim prebo­jem v oktobrski revoluciji, je druga renesansa spet plod nove krize, druge svetovne vojne in iskanja poti v razumevanje tega, kaj se je v tej bestialnosti zgodilo s cloveštvom in kako naprej.11 10 »Pripisovati Heglu tezo, antitezo in sintezo, pomeni ga pretvarjati v levicarskega hegeljanca ali v marksista, ker so oni najvec prispevali k takemu pojmovanju njegove dialektike. Toda Hegel niti kronolo­ško niti nacelno ni bil marksist.« »Skupaj s Sombartom se moramo samo cuditi, kako se še nahajajo ljudje, ki zbližujejo materialisticno dialektiko s Heglovo dialektiko.« (Spektorskij, 1940: 248) Heglu je odkazoval svojstveno filozofijo, ceš da je to samo malo bolj sofisticiran spinozizem: »pomikajoci se spinozizem«, med­tem ko je »spinozizem ustavljeno hegeljanstvo« (Spektorskij, 1940: 249). 11 Friškovec potrebo po tej drugi renesansi umešca takole: »Izkušnja tiranije in padca cloveštva v bar­barstvo druge svetovne vojne … ni potrdila … ponovnega ubitja Hegla … Prav pod vtisom prestane vojne se je zacela Heglova renesansa. Cloveštvo je hotelo doumeti prestano preizkušnjo in vzroke, ki so do nje prive­dli … Prav zavest krize je tisto, kar nosi in oznacuje ves Heglov sodobni prerod, ki ni vec enotno gibanje in ni stvar ene same filozofske smeri.« (Friškovec 1985: 140–141) Ko si je še mlada država Jugoslavija zadala poglabljanje politicne in druž­boslovne teorije v petdesetih letih 20. stoletja, je v središce postavila tudi študij in prevajanje Marxa in Engelsa in del marksistov. Že takoj na zacetku se je izkazalo, da sta poznavanje in razumevanje nemške klasicne filozofije, zlasti pa Heglove zapušcine, prvi pogoj za razumevanje Marxa, Engelsa in marksizma. O Heglu so v družboslovju po letu 1945 pisali bolj obrobno. Najbolj vpliven avtor je bil gotovo Boris Ziherl12 z delom Dialekticni in historicni materializem (1952), ki je nastalo po stenografskih zapisih njegovih preda­vanj na Inštitutu društvenih nauka v Beogradu v letih 1949–50. Ziherl že na zacetku uvede Hegla kot »vrhunec in konec klasicne buržoazne filozofije«, marksizem pa je njen »edini možen nadaljevalec« in predstavlja hkrati »kva­litativen skok v razvoju filozofije« (Ziherl, 1952: 12). Hegla Ziherl (1952: 44) spet izpostavi pri obravnavi dialektike in še posebej v posebnem poglavju Dialektika (53–78), nato pa še v poglavju o državi. Ziherl nikjer med litera­turo ne navaja Heglovih del, tako da njegove misli vedno navaja ali povzema po Leninu, Marxu in Engelsu. Izpostaviti velja njegovo dokaj besno nastro­jenost proti Heglu – konzervativcu in mešcanskemu ideologu,13 ko gre za vprašanje države14 in svobode, ceni pa njegovo dialektiko in historizem. »Dve osnovni in nedvomni zaslugi Hegla, ki ga vzpostavljajo kot najvecjega filozofa po Aristotelu in pred Marxom, sta v tem, da je, prvic, razvil novo dia­lekticno logiko in jo sistematicno razdelal v svojem delu ‘Znanost logike’ in, drugic, s tem ko je dialektiko, seveda idealisticno, ampak dialektiko, vnesel v zgodovino cloveštva.« (Ziherl, 1952: 60) Stališca Hegla do narave Ziherl ocenjuje kot predkantovsko (Ziherl, 1952: 64). Ziherl je o Heglu govoril tudi v svojem nastopnem predavanju na Oddelku za sociologijo na Filozofski fakulteti leta 1954 z naslovom Historicni materi­alizem in sociologija. Tu ugotavlja, da je »prvi vir« historicnega materializma »nemška klasicna filozofija, predvsem Heglova filozofija zgodovine, kakor tudi neštete pripombe in primeri, s katerimi je Hegel ponazarjal posamezne postavke v svojih glavnih delih ‘Phänomenologie des Geistes’ in ‘Wissenschaft 12 Ziherl je o Heglu pisal tudi že leta 1939 v clanku Znanost in politika, kjer pripominja, da so bili »najvecji filozofi tudi najvecji znanstveniki svojega casa (Descartes, enciklopedisti, Kant, Hegel)« (Ziherl 1939/1974: 101) in v prid svoji tezi o posredovanju znanosti z družbenimi razmerji navaja Heglovo misel: »Die Philosophie ist ihre Zeit in Gedanken erfasst.« (Ziherl, 1939/1974: 96) 13 »Po njegovem pojmovanju mora država pripadati najpremožnejšemu stanu … S tem se je Hegel jasno vzpostavil kot ideolog buržoazije. Njegov ideal države je ustavna monarhija … Ta najbolj reakci­onarni del svoje teorije je Hegel razvil v ‘Filozofiji prava’ … ko je že bil priznani državni filozof Prusije.« (Ziherl 1952: 65) 14 »Znano je, da njegova teorija države in prava predstavlja najbolj reakcionarni del vse njegove filozofije. Tu Hegel opravicuje prusko monarhijo kot najvišjo, najbolj smiselno obliko vladanja.« »Njegovo razlago države in delitev narodov na državotvorne in nedržavotvorne so obilno uporabljali nemški šovi­nisti …« (Ziherl 1952: 416) der Logik’ in kjer je veliki nemški filozof idealist prišel do povsem historicno materialisticnih zakljuckov. Zlasti pomembno je bilo Heglovo pojmovanje zgodovinskih pojavov kot notranje povezanih izrazov enotnega procesa, ki se odvija po dialekticnih razvojnih zakonih« (Ziherl, 1954/1974: 152). Sociolog Jože Goricar Heglu namenja nekaj strani v delu Oris zgodovine politicnih teorij (1959). Pa še tu, kot kaže, se bolj naslanja na sekundarne vire, zlasti Bertranda Russella15 in Borisa Ziherla, kot na neposredni vir in študij Heglovih del. Razpravo o Heglu uvede s stavkom: »Najpomembnejša glava v vsej nemški klasicni filozofiji je bil Georg Wilhelm Hegel (1770– 1831).« (Goricar, 1959: 258) Goricar Heglu priznava predvsem zasluge za dialektiko in zgodovinsko mišljenje. Nato pa pripominja, da je Hegel štel za najvišji narod, ki je poklican, da vlada vsem drugim ljudstvom, Nemce »in je ta njegova ideja postala teoreticna opora za imperialisticne in germani­zatorske težnje Nemcev nasproti Slovanom in drugim narodom«. Nato še v tem kriticnem duhu do Hegla dodaja: »Najbolj reakcionaren del vse Heglove filozofije vsebuje filozofija prava …«16 (Goricar, 1959: 262) V istem letu je Goricar izdal tudi Sociologijo, kjer o Heglu govori pod poglavjem marksisticna sociologija (1959a: 52–55). V tem delu Goricar Hegla neposredno navaja, ko govori o dialektiki, s katero presega evolu­cionizem (1959a: 54). Na krajši nacin kot v predhodnem delu izpostavlja Heglovo dialektiko in zgodovinski pristop. Anton Žun je leta 1964 izdal ucbenik Sociologija, ki ga je v uvodni opombi neambiciozno oznacil za »sistematicni prirocnik, prakticen mozaik«. Hegla omenja enkrat in to zelo obrobno: »Z drugimi besedami: v prvi stopnji svo­jega obstoja je razred v družbi samo objektivno in ekonomsko, samo kot ‘razred po sebi', ne pa še tudi subjektivno in politicno ideološko, z zavestjo o zasebnih interesih, kot ‘razred za sebe’ (Marxovi heglovski izrazi).« (Žun, 1964: 111) V delu Pregled socioloških teorija iz leta 1969 Goricar nemško klasicno filozofijo omenja kot eno od predhodnic sociologije (Goricar, 1969:11), ven­dar ne Kantu ne Heglu ne namenja niti minimalne pozornosti.17 O Heglu piše le v malem pasusu, kjer povzema Proudhonovo kritiko Hegla (Goricar, 1969: 55). 15 Tako lahko mirno zapiše: »Najpomembnejša, najbolj revolucionarna stran vse Heglove filozofije pa je kritika tradicionalne formalne aristotelovske logike. Prav ob tej kritiki je Hegel utemeljil zavestno dialek­tiko.« (Goricar 1959: 262) 16 To mesto navajam zato, da bo jasno, da se je Bibic lotil povsem nove interpretacije Heglove Filozofije prava prav z afirmacijo njegove delitve civilne družbe in države. Goricar je bil v komisiji za zagovor njegovega doktorata. 17 Goricar (1969: 6) v uvodu pojasnjuje, da »ta pregled ne obravnava posebej marksisticno teorijo o družbe«, ker je »ne moremo gledati kot eno od mnogih socioloških teorij«, ker se je »od svojega nastanka pa do danes silno razvejila na nekaj struj in tokov«. Hegla pa je v verziji iz leta 1959 obravnaval prav v poglavju o marksisticni sociologiji. Z marksizmom je izpadla tudi nemška klasicna filozofija in z njo Hegel. Vse kaže, da so Hegla zaceli študirati bolj sistematicno na Inštitutu za sociologijo in filozofijo Univerze v Ljubljani. Božidar Debenjak je npr. leta 1964 objavil raziskovalno porocilo »Problemi slovenske marksisticne filo­zofske terminologije v luci odnosa Hegel-Feuerbach-Marx«. V njem med drugim ugotavlja, da »slovenski mešcanski filozofi niso zapustili niti kanto­vske terminologije, kaj šele heglovsko« (Debenjak, 1964: 9). »Nemška klasicna filozofija je ustvarila lasten jezik – jezik, ki je bil kot starogrški sposoben izraziti dialektiko. … Jezik nemške filozofske klasike se mocno loci od poprejšnje metafizicne filozofije in je ostal kasnejšim metafizikom prav tako tuj. ‘Zlovoljni, prevzetni in povprecni epigoni’ so se posmehovali tej dialektiki in njenemu nacinu izražanja, ki so ga oznacevali kot ‘besedno igro’.« (Debenjak, 1964: 31) Hegla se je poglobljeno študiralo v sedemdesetih in osemdesetih letih na Filozofski fakulteti zlasti pod mentorstvom Božidarja Debenjaka. V osem­desetih so izšla velika dela, ki so plod tega študija, izpod peresa Slavoja Žižka (1980, 1985), Mladena Dolarja (1985, 1990), plod študija Hegla pa so tudi dela Lea Šešerka, Tomaža Mastnaka, Leva Krefta in Pavleta Zgage ter Jelice in Rada Rihe, Tineta Hribarja, Andreja Kirna in Boruta Pihlerja ter Cvetke Toth. Ob 150. obletnici Heglove smrti je novembra 1981 Univerza v Ljubljani v sodelovanju s CKZ organizirala simpozij o Heglovi miselni zapu­šcini, na katerem so nastopili skoraj vsi imenovani, ni pa bilo Adolfa Bibica. Politološke barve je zastopal Franc Friškovec (1985), ki je govoril o državi kot hieroglifu uma v Heglovi misli. Po Bibicu se v tem obsegu s Heglom v okviru politologije ni ukvarjal vec nihce. Tudi Bibic se Heglu ni nikoli vec vrnil na polno, ga je pa ohranil kot referenco tudi v kasnejših delih. Politologija po heglovskih korakih Že od ustanovitve Visoke šole za politicne vede leta 1961 se je zdelo, da je posest politologije postavljena ravno v pomanjkanje znanj in študija in da se politologija neha tam, kjer se ta zacno, oziroma da se politologija konca tam, kjer se zacnejo prave študije resnicnega sveta. Politologijo imajo cesto za brezvsebinsko vedenje, vsak o njeni temi lahko govori, ima mnenje, ven­dar pa globlji vpogled sporoca, da naj druge vede poskušajo z rezoniranjem brez politologije, kolikor hocejo, brez nje ne zmorejo imeti v sebi življenja in resnice, saj je ta vedno plod realnih razmerij politicnih sil ali, kot bi rekel Hegel, je otrok svojega casa, je pogreznjena v duh casa. Duh casa pa vedno izreka politicno resnico. Slovenska politologija je imela to sreco, da se je njen glavni utemeljitelj Adolf Bibic namenil politiko utemeljiti prav ob opori na Hegla. Njegovo delo Zasebništvo in skupnost s podnaslovom Civilna družba pri Heglu in Marxu18 je zavezalo politologijo v Republiki Sloveniji že v izhodišcu k resni teoretizaciji19 in k ukvarjanju s konceptualizacijo in refleksijo politike kot kljucnega predmeta politologije. Bibic je Hegla vkljuceval v svoja razmišljanja in zapise že v prvem vecjem delu »Kaj je politicna znanost?« leta 1969 (v ponatisu 2021). Ko govori o zacetkih politicne misli pri Platonu in Aristotelu, nadaljuje: Kasnejši razvoj politicne misli se je gibal, lahko bi rekli, ravno v smeri razkroja te anticne ‘nravne totalnosti’ (Hegel) in k razkrivanju dua­lizma med javno in privatno sfero, državo in družbo. Zacetke tega raz­dvajanja najdemo že v rimski dobi, ko se na temelju pojavljajoce se bla­govne produkcije zacne razlikovati javna in privatna sfera, politika pa postopoma izgublja svoj kasnejši smisel – garancije mirnega uživanja privatne lastnine. (Bibic, 1969/2021: 15) Ko govori o državi kot pomembnem predmetu politicne znanosti, nika­kor pa ne edinem, znova priklice Heglovo misel: Posebno na tistih obmocjih, kjer je sprico specificnega razmerja družbe­nih sil igrala država izredno veliko vlogo, se je politicna misel ne samo osredotocila, marvec tudi reducirala na njo. Ugotovljeno je bilo, da to velja zlasti za Nemcijo, kjer je že Hegel s svojo divinizacijo države kot ‘hoje boga po zemlji’ anticipiral nekatere tipicne težnje, ko so kasneje, ne brez odlocilnega vpliva ‘pruske poti v kapitalizem', politicno znanost omejile na obco teorijo države ali celo na njen del, kot ‘uporabno in prakticno znanost o državi’ (Jellinek). Novejši razvoj države in njena cedalje vecja vloga v družbenem življenju sta le še poudarili ‘državni’ karakter politike in v nekaterih skrajnih težnjah v celoti poistovetile politiko z državo, izkljucujoc iz interpretacije politicnih pojavov zadnje ostanke dialektike v odnosih med državo in družbo, ki je bila v središcu pozornosti pozitivne klasicne tradicije. (Bibic, 1969/2021: 25) Bibic je v tem prvem delu Heglu namenil tudi nekaj krepkih iz arzenala tiste recepcije, ki se je hranila pri Ziherlu (1952) in ki jih v kasnejših delih 18 Bibic je leta 1969 obranil doktorat na Pravni fakulteti z naslovom »Civilna družba« in država pri Heglu in Marxu pod mentorstvom Gorazda Kušeja, v komisiji pa sta bila še Jože Goricar in Anton Žun. Delo je bilo objavljeno pod naslovom Zasebništvo in skupnost: »civilna družba« in država pri Heglu in Marxu pri Mladinski knjigi leta 1972, nato pa še nekoliko dopolnjen ponatis z rahlo spremenjenim naslovom Zasebništvo in skupnost: civilna družba in politicna država pri Heglu in Marxu pri Delavski enotnosti leta 1984. 19 O prispevkih k teoretizaciji v vrstah slovenske šole politologije glej obširneje v Pikalo (2022) o teore­tizaciji politicne posredovanost okoljskih razmerij pa v Lukšic A. (2022). ni vec izpostavljal. »S to svojo implikacijo teorija elit zgolj nadaljuje nekri­ticni pozitivizem Hegla, glede katerega se kaj rado pozablja, da je bil bolj kot monarhist predvsem prvi veliki moderni teoretik birokratsko-elitnega rezona, ki je pripisujoc državnemu uradništvu fantasticno sposobnost avto­produkcije ‘splošnega interesa’ in moralnih vrlin, hkrati razglašal ljudstvo za tisti del države, ki ne ve, kaj hoce; ki je za predhodnike modernega proleta­riata uporabljal zanicljiv izraz Pöbel, anticipirajoc modernejši termin ‘mno­žica'; ki je ustavil dinamiko zgodovine ravno na tej tocki realnega dualizma med vladajocimi in vladanimi, razglašujoc hkrati ta dualizem za presežnega in ‘pomirjenega'.« (Bibic, 1969/2021: 40–41) Ce recemo s Heglom (1998: 11), si je ob ustanovitvi Visoke šole za poli­ticne vede politologija zadala naslednjo nalogo: »Sodelovati pri tem, da bi se … približala obliki vede – cilju, da bi odlocila svoje ime ljubezni do vedenja in postala dejansko vedenje …« Tedaj je napocil cas za povzdigo politologije v vedo. »Tisto, za kar zatorej gre pri študiju vede, je vzeti nase napor dojema (Begrif).« (Hegel, 1998: 42). Kot ugotavlja Hegel (1998: 16) v Fenomenologiji duha, se na zacetku kaže veda, »kot da je ezotericna posest nekaterih posameznikov«, »njena nerazširjena prikaznost dela« pa »njeno bivanje za posamezno«. Kar zadeva prvo Heglovo ugotovitev, se je slovenska politologija konsti­tuirala okrog dela prof. dr. Adolfa Bibica in nekako prav po pojmu deluje kot njegova posest.20 Oblikoval je tudi heglovsko zahtevo, tu smo že pri drugi ugotovitvi Hegla, ko je zahteval posebno znanstveno disciplino. V petde­setih letih so pod pojmom politicne vede razumeli vse družboslovne vede, ki so se ukvarjale tudi s politiko. Jože Goricar, nestor povojne sociologije na Slovenskem, v delu z naslovom Oris zgodovine politicnih teorij (1959), ugotavlja, da se »šele zadnjih nekaj let nekateri znanstveniki na Zahodu tru­dijo, da bi znanost o politiki utemeljili kot samostojno znanstveno panogo z lastnim predmetom in lastno metodo ter jo tako osamosvojili od vseh druž­benih ved … Danes je položaj tak, da takšna formalno samostojna znan­stvena panoga še ne obstaja«. »Politicna znanost« po njegovem prepricanju »posega zaradi vseobsežnosti svojega predmeta na podrocje prav vseh druž­benih ved«21 (Goricar, 1959: 17). 20 Bibic je zasnoval predmeta Obca politologija in Zgodovina politicnih idej. Bil je predstojnik Katedre za politicne vede, nato še Oddelka za politicne vede in centra za politicne vede. Bil je tudi urednik Teorije in prakse, ki jo je usmerjal kot sicer fakultetno revijo, vendar je izpostavljal politološke poudarke. Bil je med ustanovitelji in prvi predsednik politološkega društva in v vodstvu jugoslovanskega politološkega združe­nja, dva mandata pa je bil tudi clan izvršnega odbora IPSA (1976–1982). Bil je med vodilnimi v odboru IPSA za pluralizem, ki se je redno sreceval na delovnih konferencah enkrat letno. Bil je tudi mentor polito­loških doktoratov na FSPN. Skratka, prvih petintrideset let se na podrocju politologije v Sloveniji ni zgodilo pravzaprav nic mimo Adolfa Bibica. 21 Goricar je leta 1959 v »politiko kot znanost« prištel »vsa tista podrocja družbenih ved, ki raziskujejo clovekovo družbeno dejavnost, s katero doseza zaželene družbene smotre, predvsem pa tisto dejavnost, Na zacetku se je politologija v Sloveniji in v Jugoslaviji srecevala prav z istimi težavami, kot jih Hegel opisuje za filozofijo: »Absolutum (to je celo­kupna politika, ko gre za politologijo, op. I. L.) naj ne bo dojeman, temvec cuten in zrt, ne njegov dojem, temvec njegovo obcutenje in zor naj imata glavno besedo in naj bosta izrekana.« (Hegel, 1998: 12) Nasproti vedovnemu mišljenju Hegel postavlja »rezoniranje semtertja«, to je »neka nakljucna zavest, ki je le potopljena v snov, kateri je zato težko, da bi iz materije hkrati cisto povzdignila svoje sebstvo in bila pri sebi« (Hegel, 1998: 42). Namrec »vedenje je dejansko in more biti prikazano le kot veda ali kot sistem« (Hegel, 1998: 22–23), kar pomeni, da še takšna obilica neurejenega materi­ala za vedo ne predstavlja na sebi prav nic. Zato je bilo treba zacetne korake usmeriti v »naporno trudenje, ki se kaže skoraj gorecno in razdraženo, da bi ljudi iztrgali iz zatopljenosti v cutno, navadno in posamezno in usmerili njihov pogled navzgor k zvezdam …« (Hegel, 1998: 13), tj. k oblikovanju sis­tema vedenja, konceptualizaciji. Ko se je izkazala potreba po novi vedi o politiki, je poprej obstajal nako­picen material, ki je klical po novih smiselnih povezavah in ujetju v nove koncepte. Obstajala je neka »prazna širina«, a tudi »prazna globina«, »neka ekstenzija substance, ki se zliva v koncno mnogovrstnost, brez sile, da bi jo držala skupaj, tako neka brezvsebinska intenzivnost, ki je, vzdržujoc se kot gola sila brez razširjenosti, isto kot površnost« (Hegel, 1998: 14). Ob vseh težavah in tegobah (vec o tem v I. Lukšic, 2022) ob utemeljeva­nju nove vede, je bilo treba odgovoriti tudi na vprašanje, v cem naj bi bil pomen in potreba politicne znanosti v jugoslovanski državi in družbi, ki je razglašala, da država ‘odmira’ in ki je povezovala socializem s samoupravlja­njem« (Bibic, 1985a: 788). Da bi politologija utrdila svojo samobitnost, je v želji, da uide objemu prava, najprej skocila v objem sociologiji. Bibic je leta 1962 napisal clanek Sociologija politicnega življenja, v katerem se pridružuje sociologizaciji posameznih sfer življenja ljudi ob sociologiji lokalnih skupnosti, sociologiji umetnosti, ruralni sociologiji, sociologiji družbe in samoupravljanja. Bibic (1962: 683) ugotavlja, da bi za dolocitev predmeta raziskovanja v okviru politicne sociologije morali najprej opredeliti, kako politiko razumeta »sodobna politicna znanost in sociologija«. Posebna politicna sociologija je utemeljena na »obci sociološki trditvi, da sta država in družba dva razlicna pojava družbenega življenja« (Bibic, 1962: 685). Tako bi se posebna socio­logija ukvarjala s problemom razmerja med državo in družbo oziroma »s ki jo narekujejo materialni in drugi interesi družbenih razredov in ki je v najvecji meri usmerjena na državo in državno oblast« (Goricar, 1959: 18). Tako razumljene politicne vede so prišle v ime nove Visoke šole za politicne vede ob ustanovitvi. Po tedanjih predstavah so politicne vede vkljucevale vse vede, ki so pomembne za razumevanje in vodenje družbe in države: filozofijo, zgodovino, psihologijo, sociologijo, politicno ekonomijo, pravo, mednarodne odnose. heterogeno strukturo družbe in v dinamiki te strukture odkrivala mobilne sile politicnega procesa« (Bibic, 1962: 685). Bibic tudi poudarja, da »socio­logija politicnega življenja nima objektivnih pogojev za obstoj v etatisticnih sistemih, v katerih država absorbira družbo« (Bibic, 1962: 690). V razmerah odmiranja politicnega (v ožjem smislu) bi sociologija politicnega življenja imela prvenstveno nalogo, da preucuje nove politicne procese, ki nastajajo na temelju tega odmiranja. Ta obsedenost z odmiranjem države in politike je gotovo v prvih letih zelo dolocala prednostno izbiro sociologije pred poli­tologijo, ki je tako že po predmetu preucevanja nosila protisamoupravno in protirežimsko noto. Slovenski politologiji je bilo na poti osamosvajanja še posebej težko zaradi vseutopitve v projektu odmiranja politike, ki je ekspertizo politolo­gije prezirljivo zanicevala, saj je »samoupravna logika« vse po naravi vedela in znala sama, in ofenzive sociologije na Visoki šoli za politicne vede. Ce so bili na zacetku skoraj vsi zaposleni profesorji bolj ali manj vkljuceni v poli­ticne vede in tako vsaj z enim udom politologi,22 so se iz te naveze zaceli pocasi odklapljati sociologi in novinarji oz. komunikologi. Bibic se ni priklo­nil temu trendu, marvec je utemeljeval svojo pot, bolj zahtevno,23 hkrati pa bolj osamljeno.24 22 Prvih petintrideset let se slovenska politologija razvija predvsem po zaslugi najbolj zagnanega ute­meljitelja Adolfa Bibica, ob tem pa imajo pomembne prispevke za njen razvoj tudi Stane Južnic, Vlado Benko, Stane Kranjc, Boštjan Markic, Anton Bebler, Janko Rupnik, Drago Zajc in Matjaž Macek ter Slavko Podmenik. Na njenem obrobju so delovali tudi Ernest Petric (mednarodno pravo), Niko Toš (sociologija javnega mnenja), France Vreg in Slavko Splichal (politicno komuniciranje in javno mnenje), Avguštin Lah (politicna geografija) in Zdenko Roter (razmerje med cerkvijo in državo). Pri Bibicu so diplomirali med drugim Stane Kranjc (1963), Matjaž Macek, Rudi Rizman, Ivan Hvala, Ljubomir Jakimovski, Ciril Baškovic, Joco Klopcic, Boris Muževic, Milan Zver, Andrej Klemenc, Jasmina Držanic, doktorirali pa Gojko Stanic, Stane Kranjc, Vlado Sruk, Miha Ribaric, Drago Zajc, Igor Lukšic (diplomiral, magistriral in dokto­riral), Radule Kneževic, Samo Kropivnik; od uveljavljenih politologov pa sta pri njem magistrirala Andrej Lukšic in Dejan Jovic (FPZ Zagreb in FPN Beograd). 23 Med drugim se je intenzivno zavzemal za dvigovanje politicne kulture prek (politološkega) izobra­ževanja za politiko in samoupravno delovanje ljudi, o cemer je med drugim obsežneje pisal Banjac (2022). 24 Najprej so se pridružili imenu Visoke šole za sociologijo, politicne vede in novinarstvo, nato pa so iz imena fakultete izrinili politologijo in pustili samo družbene vede (glej vir Mlinar, kako se sladi ob tem, da je sociologija zmagala). Politologija je bila hendikepirana tudi zato, ker kar nekaj kljucnih politologov ni doktoriralo do sredine osemdesetih let, kar je v raziskovalnem in institucionalnem pogledu krepilo bolj propulzivno in bolj zakoreninjeno (apoliticno) sociologijo. Na koncu je celo Vlado Benko, mednarodni politolog, našel svojo umestitev mednarodnih odnosov v sociologiji, in ne v politologiji, kjer se je vseskozi razvijala, in je v njen kontekst, tj. Oddelek za politologijo, tudi institucionalno postavljena. Benko je leta 1977 napisal delo Mednarodni odnosi, ki se osredini na politicne mejnike in na državo ter na ekonomske povezave. O sociologiji ni ne duha ne sluha. Leta 2000 pa je napisal delo Sociologija mednarodnih odno­sov, kjer že uvodoma opozarja, da je v mednarodnih odnosih sociologija zelo redka zlasti v primerjavi s politologijo. Vendar tu je pritisk sociologije: »V razpravah pri nas, domnevamo pa tudi drugod, je pogosto govor o potrebi 'sociologizacije’ znanosti o mednarodnih odnosih, kar izhaja pretežno iz presoje o pri­matu politicne znanosti na tem podrocju.« (Benko 2000: 8) Ni nakljucje, da je prav to delo, ne pa njegovo temeljno Mednarodni odnosi, doživelo ponatis leta 2022 pod uredniško taktirko sociologa Nika Toša. Kako obrobno vlogo je imel Hegel v dominantni ostali politološki sferi, kažejo dela Vladimirja Benka, politologa mednarodnih odnosov, ki Hegla v prvem delu Mednarodni odnosi (1977) niti v ponatisu (1987) ne omenja. Benko Hegla ni bral in poznal, zato v drugem svojem delu povzema nekaj, kar so netocno trdili drugi. V delu Sociologija mednarodnih odnosov trdi, da je »izvor stališc, da mednarodne skupnosti ni pri Hobbesu in Heglu«, ker da je »za Hegla država edina resnicnost v mednarodnem življenju, ki ob sebi ne dopušca obstoja nekega višjega, državo omejujocega reda« (Benko, 2000: 128). Hegel namrec državo razume na treh ravneh: eno je notranja ureditev in njena suverenost, druga raven so mednarodni odnosi, tretja pa prehod države na raven svetovne zgodovine – takrat postane moment ideje svetovnega duha. Benko Hegla namaka tudi v stališce, da »pravni in moralni principi, ceprav obstajajo, ne morejo omejevati držav v njihovih ravnanjih« (Benko, 2000: 129). Hegel zadev nikoli ni obravnaval na pravno-pragmaticni ravni obsodb ravnanj držav, kot se to pocne v drugi polovici 20. stoletja, temvec se je ukvarjal z moralo in državo kot pojmom. Kar Hegel eksplicitno ugotavlja, je, da država in morala delujeta na razlicnih ravneh zavesti. Edina omemba Hegla v Benkovi knjigi Sociologija in teorija mednarodnih odno­sov je obrobna: »Francoska revolucija, ki jo ima Hegel za osrednji dogodek in najvecji dosežek v cloveški zgodovini (Willms, 1972: 52), je z velikanskimi koraki …« (Benko, 2022: 70). Benko s tem pokaže vsaj dvoje: prvic, da se zaveda teže Hegla in ga navaja vsaj posredno prek drugega avtorja, in dru­gic, da Hegla ni bral, kar se seveda tudi pozna pri teoretizaciji. Zato je pot od politologije kot konteksta mednarodnih odnosov v objem sociologije tudi razumljiva. Bibic je imel obratno pot: zacel je s poskusom, da bi politiko mislil v okviru sociologije, pa se mu je ob Heglu izkazalo, da je to smrtni greh, ce postavimo zadevo v versko-moralni kontekst, sicer pa teoretsko prekratko in nemišljivo. Hegel v Bibicevih delih Samostojno vedo politologijo je Bibic utemeljeval od samega zacetka in kljucna spoznanja strnil v knjižici Kaj je politicna znanost (1969, ponatis 2021). Ker je politicno delovanje tako naraslo, da vzpostavljene znanstvene discipline ne morejo v celoti zaobseci vseh njegovih razsežnosti, je potrebna znanstvena panoga, ki ne bo obravnavala politicnega delo­vanja po obrokih, marvec ga bo zajela kot celoto, ki ima kljub svoji cedalje vsajenosti v vse bistvene družbene odnose še vedno neko speci­ficno logiko delovanja in specificno vlogo, pa tudi specificno strukturo, ki omogoca in hkrati zahteva, da se nova znanstvena panoga konstitu­ ira. 25 (Bibic, 2021/1969: 23) Bibic je preuceval celoten Heglov opus in se pri tem posebej osredoto­cil na »temeljno vprašanje«, ki je Hegla ves cas vznemirjalo, to je »clovekov položaj v politiki in njegova vloga v politicni skupnosti« (Bibic, 1972: 25). V tem kontekstu najprej izpostavi Heglovo zanimanje za razmerje med poli­tiko in religijo. Hegel se je v mladih letih še posebej ukvarjal s pomenom, dometom in vlogo kršcanstva v zahodni misli. Hegel se je najprej zelo navduševal nad antiko. Zanimalo ga je vprašanje narave anticne republike, ki je dosegla najvišjo obliko v grški polis, in še bolj vzroki, zaradi katerih je propadla. Bibic ugotavlja, da je Hegel po francoski revoluciji ujet v duh casa, ko je bilo jakobinstvo politicno poraženo, Nemcija polfevdalno nemocna za dosledni politicni pluralizem, potenciali za sociali­zem pa šele v kali. Hegel se je tako znašel v dualizmu med univerzalizmom antike in partikularizmom moderne, ki je dolocal njegovo politicno misel vse do konca (Bibic, 1972: 34). Bibic presoja Heglovo politicno misel po kriteriju demokraticnosti, »to je, koliko si je Hegel pri konstruiranju modela cloveškega sožitja predstav­ljal, da pri njegovem uresnicevanju sodeluje ljudstvo« in po kriteriju, koliko je uspel »razkriti strukturne predpostavke in mehanizme dejanskega poli­ticnega življenja, razkriti zapletenost protislovij, ki se v modernem svetu pletejo na relaciji splošni–posebni interesi in torej tudi na relaciji civilna družba–država in znotraj njih« (Bibic, 1972: 35). Bibic ugotavlja, da Hegel bolj ko briljira po drugem kriteriju, manj pušca prostora prvemu kriteriju. Bibic se posebej ukvarja s Heglovim razumevanjem lastnine, ki ga postavlja v kontekst fevdalizma in Nemcije. Po njegovi oceni je Hegel zelo kriticen do fevdalne politicne strukture, ki je »reducirala javno pravo narav­nost, brez posredovanja, na privatno pravo in tako izkljucevala um …. Hegel je jasno videl, kakšne posledice ima dominacija privatne lastnine, ki je samo po pravni obliki splošna, kot dejanski odnos pa tisto, kar ljudi med seboj izolira. Reducirati državo na privatno lastnino je po njem pomenilo uniciti državo kot oblast« (Bibic, 1972: 41). Hegel se je lotil študija politicne ekonomije in se ob tem zavezal, kot ugotavlja Bibic, »da se bo združil s casom, da bo poskušal najti odgovor na bistvena vprašanja epohe in njene ‘usode'« (Bibic, 1972: 42). To je pomenilo, da je Hegel vse bolj »priznaval moc institucij moderne buržoazne dobe« in 25 Na Hrvaškem so takšno zahtevo uspeli zastaviti šele v zacetku 21. stoletja s knjigo Mirjane Kasapovic »Izhod iz množine?« (2007), torej vstop v politologijo, ki ima svoj predmet in je samostojna znanstvena disciplina, ne pa nanos vedenj o politiki, ki se naplavijo ob robu jezerc vseh že etabliranih ved, ki se priložnostno in kurantno obrnejo tudi na polje politicnega, kot se je to kazalo tudi Goricarju leta 1959. tako »sublimiral kategorijo celote in idealiziral državo kot institucijo, ki naj bi to celoto predstavljala na politicnem podrocju in tako zagospodovala nad partikularizmom zasebnih in posebnih interesov«. Hegel v spisu Nemška ustava leta 1802 ugotavlja, da »Nemcija ni vec država«, »Nemcija ni vec politicna celota«, »Nemška državna stavba ni nic dru­gega, kot vsota pravic, ki so jih posamezni deli odtegnili celoti, in ta pravic­nost, ki skrbno bdi nad tem, da državi ne preostane nic od oblasti, je bistvo ustave«, »Politicno stanje Nemcije je ‘pravna anarhija', njeno državno pravo pa pravo proti državi« (nav. po Bibic, 1972: 47–48). Za moderno državo pa je bistveno ravno nasprotno, da se privatno in posamicno podredi splošnemu. Za Hegla je za moderno državo bistvena »skupna obramba celote … lastnine« (Bibic, 1972: 48). Hegel se zavzema za mocno državo, ki brzda anarhoidne elemente posamicnosti, hkrati pa zahteva »veliko torišce svobodnega udej­stvovanja« (Bibic, 1972: 49). Bibic analizira še druge Heglove spise, ki pa imajo predvsem priprav­ljalne razsežnosti za njegovo veliko Fenomenologijo duha in na Filozofijo prava. V njih je izmojstril dialektiko in nekatere kategorije, ki jih je kasneje sestavil v svoj sistem. Nato se je lotil tudi Fenomenologije duha, ki je kljucno Heglovo delo za vstop v heglovski nacin mišljenja. Bibic za Marxom ugotavlja, da je Fenomenologija duha »po globini misli in po poletu duha edinstveno v sve­tovni filozofski literaturi«, je »rojstni kraj Heglove filozofije« (Bibic, 1972: 69) Bibic se referira tudi na Lukacsevo interpretacijo Fenomenologije in napo­veduje, da se v svojem delu omejuje samo na tiste dele Fenomenologije, »ki so posebej zanimivi s stališca razvoja Heglovih družbeno-politicnih nazorov« (Bibic, 1972: 70) in ki »so pomembni za razvoj Heglovih pogle­dov na državo in družbo« (Bibic, 1972: 78). Bibic analizira Heglovo pojmo­vanje razmerja med gospodarjem in hlapcem. V tej relaciji izpostavi odnos hlapcevske zavesti do smrti in odvisnost razmerja od dela. Bibic ugotavlja, da je Hegel »tu prvikrat na velikanskem zgodovinskem gradivu, v katero je zaobsegel celotni zgodovinski razvoj zavesti in stvarnosti, natancno raz­vil svojo dialekticno metodo, povezujoc jo bistveno s problematiko dela« (Bibic, 1972: 78). Bibic izpostavlja, da se po Heglu »v delu združujeta subjekt in objekt, ko subjekt spozna, da je objekt produkt njegove zavesti« in ugo­tovitev, da je »delo ustvarilo clovekovo samozavedanje, s tem pa tudi clo­veka kot cloveka« (Bibic, 1972: 72). Po njegovem namrec »delovni proces usposobi clovekovo zavest skozi zavest hlapca, da se dvigne do sposobnosti misliti« (Bibic, 1972: 72). Svoja razmišljanja iz prejšnjih obdobij Hegel v Fenomenologiji postavi v sistem: grški polis kot organska skupnost, v kateri je posameznik nepo­sredno prežet s splošnim, razpade na neskoncno število atomov v rimski dobi, ki se konstituira na procesu razdvojitve splošnih in posebnih interesov, kar postane znacilnost moderne dobe, v kateri vlada mešcanstvo. Hegel pri­pelje razvoj politicne skupnosti do francoske revolucije, ki je »zadnja stopnja v razvoju sebi odtujenega duha« (Bibic, 1972: 75). Z njo pride do »zveze med posamezno in obco voljo, ki je dejanska, ne pa samo zamišljena«, vsako »deja­nje celote je hkrati neposredno in zavestno delovanje vsakega posameznika« (Hegel, cit. po Bibic, 1972: 75). Ta triumf se sprevrže v svoje nasprotje: »edino delo in dejanje absolutne svobode je smrt« (Bibic, 1972: 76). Strah pred smr­tjo atomizirane posameznike pahne v sprijaznjenost, celotna revolucija pa konca v restavraciji. Ta restavracija ni vrnitev v predrevolucionarno dobo, temvec je revolucija obogatila misel s spoznanjem, da se obca volja ne da rea­lizirati v dejanskem svetu, zato se preseli v novo deželo samozavedajocega se duha, ki ji ime posodijo Kant, Fichte in romantiki. »Heglovo zgodovinsko globino« vidi Bibic v tem, »da je ‘bogastvo’ in ‘državno oblast’ prikazoval kot dve temeljni obliki alienacije (‘sebi odtuje­nega duha') in da je tako postavil v svetovno zgodovinski razsežnosti, dasi v idealisticni perspektivi, tudi problem zopetne prilastitve odtujenega sveta ekonomije in politike« (Bibic, 1972: 79). Heglovsko zgodbo Bibic nadaljuje tudi v marxovski koncepciji, v kateri gre za »sintezo individualne svobode, svobode delovnih in drugih življenj­skih asociacij svobodne skupnosti vseh … Izhodišce tega koncepta je razre­dni boj, cilj pa preseganje razredne družbe in svobodna osebnost v svobo­dni skupnosti« (Bibic, 1983: 1642). Po tej koncepciji gre za preseganje zgolj politicne emancipacije, ki cloveka pripozna kot državljana in clana civilne družbe kot v prvi sferi svobodnega in enakega z drugimi, v drugi pa kot vezanega na vse dejanske procese neenakosti v produkciji življenja in na zahtevo po emancipaciji cloveka kot cloveka. Prvi dve sta se že zgodili, druga je hkrati vladajoca, tretja pa je povsem konceptualne narave. Bibic izpostavlja, da je politika po svojem bistvu raz­merje med dominacijo, izkorišcanjem in emancipacijo, zato je ne moremo reducirati na zgolj boj za oblast, vladanje ali nemoralno dejavnost, kar mirno pocne vladajoci common sense. V temeljnem delu slovenske politologije Zasebništvo in skupnost je Bibic kljucni problem politologije opredelil takole: »Kako ohraniti svobodo posameznika in kako zagotoviti obstoj in razvoj politicne celote, je bilo in je veliko vprašanje moderne politicne misli in sodobne politicne znanosti« (Bibic, 1972: 7). Zanj je »zasebništvo samo privid individualne svobode, kot je politicni absolutizem samo iluzija trajne skupne moci« (Bibic, 1972: 7). Bibic je poudarek iz razmerja med razredom in državo, na kar je »realno misleci socializem« reduciral pojmovanje države, dopolnil s poudarkom raz­merja med državo in civilno družbo, kar je spet izvorno Heglovo stališce. V casu nastanka te študije, konec šestdesetih let 20. stoletja, se je zdelo, da je država tako mocno prisotna v civilni družbi in zlasti v ekonomiji, da je locevanje med civilno družbo in državo izgubilo pomen. Zlasti vulgarni marksizem je stavil na to, da je vse država. S tem pa je izginil prostor za raz­liko med državno in družbeno lastnino, za razmerje med samoupravno poli­tiko in strankarsko politiko, in seveda s tem tudi velika razlika med samo­upravnim socializmom jugoslovanskega projekta in projektom državnega realsocializma sovjetskega tipa. Po letu 1990 se je ves intelektualni napor za utemeljevanje prostora emancipacije cloveka v tej smeri izgubil, saj so v vladajoci zavesti tudi znotraj družboslovja to razlikovanje žrtvovali neolibe­ralni doktrini, po kateri je tudi socializem v celoti totalitarna ideologija. Ni nakljucje, da je v tem obdobju tudi Heglova misel izgubila tla pod nogami. Splošcena praksa splošci tudi potrebo po globinah mišljenja. Razlikovanje med civilno družbo in državo pa nima pomena samo zno­traj doktrine socializma, temvec nosi klico projekta emancipacije tudi v vseh drugih doktrinah. To razlikovanje izpostavlja realna razmerja med akterji, ki delujejo po dveh nasprotujocih si paradigmah: civilna družba po nacelu zasebništva, krepitve zasebnega interesa, država pa po nacelu skupništva, skupnega interesa. Zmaga neoliberalizma je v zadnjih štiridesetih letih mocno okrepila proces koncentracije kapitala, s cimer je okrepila zasebno sfero do te mere, da lahko cedalje bolj instrumentalizira državo za potrebe hitrejše koncentracije kapitala v rokah vse manjše pešcice ljudi. Heglova misel pa se zaenkrat ni izkazala kot dobro orodje za utemeljevanje in pospe­ševanje tovrstnih procesov, zato je v dobi neoliberalizma in neokonservati­vizma še bolj porinjena na obrobje glavnih ideoloških tokov. Heglovstvo je pri Bibicu živelo tudi skozi ukvarjanje s heglovci, kot sta Roza Luxemburg in Antonio Gramsci. Leta 1977 je zbral, uredil in napisal predgovor v Izbrane spise Roze Luxemburg, leta 1987 pa v izbrane spise Antonija Gramscija. Roza se ni referirala na Hegla, ker je v svojih zapisih reflektirala predvsem svoje aktivisticno delo in analizirala dogajanje na celo­tni fronti delavskega gibanja. Je pa zastopala tisti marksizem, ki je gradil na Heglovi zapušcini, tako imenovani heglomarksizem. Zato je tudi sorazmerno kmalu in veckrat stopila v konflikt s kanto- ali spinozomarksisti tipa Kautsky. Drugace je z Gramscijem, o cemer piše tudi Bibic. Gramsci je na Hegla neposredno navezoval svoje misli in zapise. Po Heglovem vzoru je v osredje svoje analize postavil razmerje med civilno družbo in državo26 (Bibic, 1987: 14). Gramsci je bil preucevalec politike in filozof, ki sodi med mocne pred­stavnike politologije, ki iz Heglove zapušcine crpa ne le kljucne koncepte, temvec tudi nacin razmišljanja in analize politike, pri cemer je spet treba izpostaviti prav dialektiko. V to vrsto je treba dodati še Kardelja. O njegovi koncepciji politike je 26 »Gramsci sam izrecno poudarja, da razlikuje civilno družbo od politicne družbe ali države v pomenu, ‘kakor je to razumel Hegel’« (Bibic, 1987: 15). Bibic pisal, da se »navezuje na velike teme moderne politicne teorije, ki sta jih zasnovala v mešcanski epohi zlasti Rousseau in Hegel in ki so jih kri­ticno prevzemali in presegali v svojih delih Marx, Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg in Gramsci« (Bibic, 1979: 1408). Po njegovem se Kardelj »zavzema za dia­lekticno pojmovanje politike. Središce te dialektike je protislovje …« Pri tem gre Kardelju za to, da se protislovje med dominacijo in emancipacijo »razrešuje v širjenju in poglabljanju politike kot emancipacije« (Bibic, 1979: 1408). Bibic opozarja, da je »bistveni sestavni del Kardeljeve koncepcije politike … kritika ‘politicne države’ (od tod pomen poznavanja Heglove kon­cepcije politicne države in Marxove kritike te koncepcije, ce hocemo razu­meti bistvo Kardeljeve politicne misli)« (Bibic, 1979: 1407). Bibic je torej v Kardelju prepoznal heglovske dimenzije njegove politicne misli, ker se ga je lotil z izkušnjo poznavalca Hegla in ker mu je s tem izrekel najvišji možni kompliment, ki ga teoretik lahko da teoretiku.27 Bibic se je k Heglu vrnil ponovno v delu Civilno društvo i politicki plu­ralizam leta 1990, ki je izšlo samo v hrvaškem jeziku. Ugotavlja, da kljucno mesto v razpravi o nastanku ideje moderne civilne družbe pripada Heglu. Hegel je po njegovem to temo obdelal »najbolj sistematicno, najbolj precizno in najbolj vplivno« (Bibic, 1990: 28). Bibic opozarja, da Hegel ni gradil le na razdvajanju civilne družbe in države, temvec tudi na njunem povezovanju. Po Heglu je država konkretna svoboda, tako da svoboda ni pri posamez­niku v civilni družbi, ker je vezana na obce. Brez države ni svobode, civilna družba pa je prostor strukture potreb, korporacij in ekonomije, partikular­nih interesov, ki se šele v državi lahko realizirajo in pripoznajo. Bibic v tem delu opisuje, kako je tudi njegovo delo Zasebništvo in skupnost oralo ledino znotraj socialisticne recepcije civilne družbe in je bilo tako v osemdesetih letih lažje to diskusijo voditi v okviru reforme samoupravljanja kot v drugih delih države. Na Hrvaškem in v Srbiji sta se proti uporabi koncepta civilna družba postavila Stipe Šuvar in Miloš Nikolic, oba vidna ideologa jugoslo­vanske Zveze komunistov, v Sloveniji pa je proti uporabi pojma nastopil Zoran Polic, eden od prvoborcev NOB (Bibic, 1990: 67). Bibicevo ukvarja­nje s Heglom in Marxom ter s civilno družbo je tako pomagalo rekonceptu­alizirati samoupravljanje in njegov prehod v strankarsko demokracijo. »Ne glede na to, kakšne so bile vsebine, ki so jih posamezniki pripisovali civilni družbi, je bilo za ta koncept znacilno, da je bil povezan z globoko potrebo po reformi in obnovi našega javnega življenja.« (Bibic, 1990: 68) Bibic analizira vpliv koncepta civilne družbe na koncept pluralizma in na pluralizacijo javnega življenja v Sloveniji in Jugoslaviji. V tem kontekstu kot 27 Edvard Kardelj je umrl februarja 1979. V jeseni je že izšla posebna številka Teorije in prakse s clanki, ki so razporejeni po posameznih podrocjih z ustreznimi uvodnimi študijami. Bibicev tekst Dialektika politike je postavljen kot jagoda na torti na zadnje mesto, kot kronska ocena velicine Kardeljeve politicne teorije. najboljšo možnost za nadaljnji razvoj politicnega življenja razvija koncept asociacijskega pluralizma, ki ga utemeljuje na idejah iz zgodovine politicnih idej. S tem konceptom bi rad Bibic rešil heglovski problem razlikovanja med zasebništvom in skupnostjo, med civilno družbo in državo, med burgeoisom in citoyenom: »Asociacijski pluralizem izraža zakonitost moderne dobe, ki ni, kot smo že poudarili, doba atomiziranih, izoliranih posameznikov, temvec epoha, v kateri ljudje vse bolj skupaj rešujejo skupne probleme. … Ko nagla­šajo osnovno clovekovo družbenost, mu asociacije ne odvzemajo njegove individualnosti.« (Bibic, 1990: 203) Tako je »individuum v središcu stvari«. »Ceprav so asociacije zasnovane na konkretnih interesih ljudi, ostajajo aso­ciacije povezane s clovekom, njegovimi potrebami in težnjami, z njegovo družbeno naravo, ki ni samo sebicna, temvec je usmerjena tudi k skupno­sti.« (Bibic, 1990: 203) Hkrati pa se je treba zavedati, da je treba »zdraviti tudi patologije, ki jih rojeva življenje asociacij.« Gre za »‘transcendiranje’ posamic­nosti v skupnostno«, kar je »politicni proces v najširšem pomenu besede«. Demokraticnost tega politicnega procesa pa se dosega na tak nacin, da »skupnostne povezave ustvarja tako, da hkrati ohranja individualnost tega, kar prehaja v skupnost. Skupnost pri tem, torej, ni sinonim zunanje oblasti, ki s silo varuje mehanske povezave med clovekom in sabo, temvec je kon­kretno artikulirana celota, ki priznava avtonomijo delovanja cloveku, svoje sile in legitimnost pa crpa iz priznavanja posameznika in asociacij« (Bibic, 1990: 203–204). V tem okviru imajo posebno mesto »politicne asociacije«, ki se od interesnih razlikujejo »po stopnji splošnosti interesov, za katere se zavzemajo« (Bibic, 1990: 205). Njihova osnovna vloga je v tem, da agregirajo, artikulirajo in selekcionirajo interese razlicnih segmentov civilne družbe. Asociacijski pluralizem »predpostavlja in zahteva širši koncept politike in demokracije. Za razliko od monoarhicnega nacela se zavzema za »poli­arhicno« konceptualizacijo politike. Za razliko od elitisticno-pluralisticne koncepcije politike … se asociacijski pluralizem poleg tekmovanja zavzema še za cim širšo udeležbo ljudi v politiki« (Bibic, 1990: 209). Bibic se torej zavzema za novo konceptualizacijo politike, ki bi »namesto bipolarne pola­rizacije« vpeljala »novo sintezo, ki zahteva pripoznavanje mnoštva protislo­vij in konfliktov, v katerih se družbeno in politicno življenje prikazuje bolj raznovrstno, njihove rešitve pa so bolj zapletene« (Bibic, 1990: 211). Bibic je preprican, da s takšno koncepcijo politike in asociacijskega pluralizma »socializem ne bi bil samo ali predvsem zahteva po vecji enakosti, temvec tudi zahteva po vecji svobodi cloveka in skupnosti« (Bibic, 1990: 212). Celotno delo prežemajo heglovska problematika in razumevanje druž­benih in politicnih procesov ter seveda uporaba kategorialnega aparata. Bibic je tako pokazal, kako heglovstvo lahko živi v politoloških delih tudi konec dvajsetega stoletja. Sklep Heglovstvo velja kot kriterij teoretske globine zlasti v najboljši tradiciji marksizma. V razmerah, ko Heglu ni bila peta slava niti v Jugoslaviji niti v svetu in ko je bilo na slabem glasu zlasti delo Temeljne crte filozofija prava, se je Bibic lotil afirmacije prav tega dela Heglove zapušcine v navezavi na interpretacijo celotne njegove zapušcine, vezane na politicne ideje in Heglov nacin razumevanja vpricne zdajšnjosti. Bibic je pav v tem Heglovem delu našel konceptualni okvir za razumevanje politike in s tem kljucnega predmeta politologije, na katerem je utemeljil to novo propulzivno znan­stveno disciplino. Pri tem se je spopadel z vladajoco ideologijo odmiranja države in zanikanja relevantnosti civilne družbe. Pokazal je, da je za širi­tev emancipatornega potenciala nove družbene in politicne ureditve prav navezava na Heglovo razlikovanje med civilno družbo in državo kljucnega pomena tako za Marxa in marksizem kot tudi najboljši okvir za razvoj polito­logije. Bibic je v politologijo uvajal tudi historicizem in dialekticno mišljenje, s cimer se je okužil pri študiju Hegla. Na tej osnovi je razvil koncept aso­ciacijskega pluralizma kot model polne politike, ki bi nadgradila liberalno demokratsko strankarski tip pluralizma. Z naslonitvijo na misleca države in politike Hegla je politologija prek Bibica pridobila utemeljitev in se z analitskim aparatom usposobila za ana­lizo, razumevanje in predvidevanje razvoja države in politike v 21. stoletju. Izpostaviti velja, da je bila teoretska poglobljenost politologije po zaslugi Adolfa Bibica utemeljena v študiju Hegla, Marxa in Gramscija, s cimer je politologija lahko izplavala iz sociologizmov v pristan neodvisne samo­stojne znanstvene discipline. LITERATURA Banjac, Marinko (2022): Izobraževanje o politiki v casu permanentne negotovo­sti: politološka refleksija. Teorija in praksa 59 (posebna številka: Humanizacija politike): 330–351. Benko, Vladimir (1987/1977): Mednarodni odnosi. 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Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga. UDK 341.7:339.9(436+497.11+497.4) Jure SMOLE, Boštjan UDOVIC* GOSPODARSKA DIPLOMACIJA MAJHNIH DRŽAV V PRIMERJALNI PERSPEKTIVI: PRIMER SLOVENIJE, SRBIJE IN AVSTRIJE**1 Povzetek. Namen pricujocega clanka je analizirati gospodarsko diplomacijo treh majhnih držav – Avstrije, Slovenije in Srbije, v primerjalni perspektivi. Raziskati želimo, ce in kako drugacna gospodarsko-politicna struktura držav (Avstrija kot država s tržnim gospodar­stvom, Slovenija kot potranzicijska država, Srbija kot država v tranziciji) vpliva na delovanje gospodarske diplomacije. S pomocjo primerjalne analize, ki je uteme­ljena na velikem številu intervjujev z akterji gospodarske diplomacije, ugotavljamo, da: (1) je ne glede na model, na podlagi katerega omenjene države oblikujejo svojo gospodarsko diplomacijo, pomen države vedno priso­ten, še posebej v primerih težav ali zapletov na izbra-617 nem trgu (ex-post pristop); (2) se vse analizirane države soocajo z enakimi izzivi v gospodarski diplomaciji, ti pa niso pogojeni z njihovim gospodarsko-politicnim siste­mom, ampak z mednarodnim okoljem in delovanjem izvoznih ali investicijskih aktivnosti podjetij; (3) ostaja v primeru konceptualizacije in operacionalizacije gospo­darske diplomacije znotraj diplomatskih študij še veliko neraziskanega, kar onemogoca njeno obco sprejetost, saj gospodarska diplomacija in sorodni koncepti tudi 20 let po zacetku njenega aktivnega preucevanja še niso enovito konceptualizirani, hierarhizirani in umešceni v kanon diplomatskih študij. Kljucni pojmi: gospodarska diplomacija, Avstrija, Slovenija, Srbija, diplomatske študije * Dr. Jure Smole, Vodja strateških trgov, Eti elektroelement d.o.o., Izlake, Slovenija; dr. Boštjan Udovic, redni profesor, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija. ** Izvirni znanstveni clanek. DOI: 10.51936/tip.60.4.617 1 Clanek je rezultat študija na doktorskem programu Humanistika in družboslovje (smer: Diplomacija), raziskovalnega programa P5-0117 (Slovenija in njeni akterji v mednarodnih odnosih in evropskih integracijah) ter Ciljnega raziskovalnega projekta V5-2259 (Globalna prisotnost in domet Slovenije v OZN). Uvod Gospodarska diplomacija kot dejavnost države, ki pomaga pri internaci­onalizaciji podjetij,2 je kot koncept v diplomatskih študijah postala »popu­larna« predvsem po letu 2000, zagon njenega preucevanja pa se je razvil šele v drugi polovici novega tisocletja. Razloge za to gre iskati v treh smereh: prvic, gospodarska diplomacija je koncept v okviru diplomatskih študij. Ker so se te zacele pospešeno razvijati šele po koncu hladne vojne (takrat so izstopile iz »sence« teorije mednarodnih odnosov in analize zunanje politike), se je takrat zacela oblikovati tudi konceptualizacija gospodarske diplomacije. Drugic, gospodarska diplomacija je bila vseskozi razumljena kot presecišce dveh njej sorodnih konceptov – ekonomskega državništva (economic sta­tecraft) in ekonomske zunanje politike (economic foreign policy) –, zato je (bila) njena konceptualizacija veliko zahtevnejša, kot bi bila, ce bi bila samo­nikel koncept znotraj diplomatskih študij (Okano-Heijmans, 2011). Dolocene nerazmejenosti med omenjenimi koncepti še vedno obstajajo, to pa one­mogoca dokoncno konceptualizacijo in hierarhizacijo gospodarske diplo­macije znotraj diplomatskih študij (prim. Naray, 2012; Ruel in Visser, 2012). Tretjic, novost in nedorecenost konceptov ter hierarhizacije gospodarske diplomacije v odnosu do sorodnih konceptov je vodila do osredotocenja raziskovalcev v izhodišcno konceptualizacijo pojava samega po sebi. To je povzrocilo, da je zaradi pomanjkanja izhodišc v definiranju, kaj gospodar­ska diplomacija sploh je, umanjkal sistemski pristop k analizi gospodarske diplomacije na »specificnih primerih«, kot so npr. gospodarska diplomacija v velikih državah, majhnih državah, državah v tranziciji, gospodarska diplo­macija potranzicijskih držav, gospodarska diplomacija nedržavnih enot itd. Na tem raziskovalnem podrocju imamo le posamicne študije (npr. Aleidan, 2019; Fry-McKibbin in Nguyenm, 2019; Teixeira et al., 2015; Kesteleyn, 2014; Gruden, 2005; Justinek, 2011; Arbeiter et al., 2019), to pa onemogoca struk­turirano konceptualiziranje gospodarske diplomacije kot samostojnega kon­cepta znotraj kanona diplomatskih študij. Gospodarska diplomacija kot koncept spada v okvir institucionalne teorije, in sicer v steber analize delovanja institucij, dilem in vprašanj transakcijskih stroškov; odnosa med politiko v najširšem pomenu (politics) in ekonomijo kot filozofijo (economics) ter konkretno politiko (policy) ter gospodarstvom (eco­nomy) kot konkretno aktivnostjo; v vprašanja institucionalne razlicnosti in uvedbe najboljših modelov za stroškovno ucinkovitost (od kljucnih nacel javnih financ) ter v strateški okvir institucionalne teorije, v katerem se vzpostavlja odnos med državo (kot vseobsegujoco skupnostjo), ki obcasno deluje kot agent (sredstvo) v rokah konkretnih podjetij. Seveda se gospodarska diplomacija umešca tudi v historicni institu­cionalizem prek vprašanja javnih politik, sposobnosti države za zagotavljanje družbene in državne blagi­nje, nacionalne varnosti, odnosa do moci države v mednarodnih odnosih ter kompenzacije pomanjkanja slednje in še bi lahko naštevali. Za natancen pregled razvoja institucionalne teorije napotujemo na dela Aguilere in Grgaarda (2019), Ramana Sharme et al. (2021), Raškovica in Takacs (2021) ter Raškovica (2015). Namen našega clanka je prispevati k dopolnitvi tega manka, in sicer z analizo delovanja gospodarske diplomacije majhnih držav3 z razlicno gospo­darsko-politicno strukturo. Tako bomo preverjali znacilnosti gospodarske diplomacije kot koncepta na primeru Avstrije, države z dolgo delujocim tržnim gospodarstvom; Slovenije, države, ki je gospodarsko v potranzicij­skem obdobju; in Srbije, države, ki svojo politicno in gospodarsko tranzi­cijo živi vsakodnevno. Pri analizi bomo preverjali, ce se znacilnosti in izzivi gospodarske diplomacije, ki so bili do sedaj analizirani, prikazani in koncep­tualizirani znotraj teorije gospodarske diplomacije (in širše v diplomatskih študijah), pojavljajo tudi v analiziranih primerih. Pri tem se bomo osredinili predvsem na vprašanja, povezana s strukturnim delovanjem gospodarske diplomacije (modeli delovanja), z njim pogojene spremenljivke (financni in cloveški viri, okolje delovanja, prožnost oz. togost ipd.), ter na nikoli razre­šeno vprašanje merjenja njene (ne)uspešnosti oz. (ne)ucinkovitosti (Ruel in Zuidema, 2012). Vse našteto bomo preverjali v primerjalni perspektivi, pri cemer se zavedamo omejitev, ki jih takšna študija ima zaradi redke dostop­nosti ali nedostopnosti podatkov, pa tudi zaradi dolocenih izhodišcnih raz­lik primerjanih držav.4 Na podlagi povedanega smo si postavili raziskovalno vprašanje, na katero želimo odgovoriti, in sicer nas zanima, kakšne so znacil­nosti modelov gospodarske diplomacije znotraj teorije diplomatskih študij ter kako se konceptualizirane znacilnosti gospodarske diplomacije kažejo na analiziranih primerih. Na raziskovalno vprašanje bomo odgovorili s kombinacijo razlicnih raziskovalnih metod. V teoretskem delu, ki bo osnova za empiricni del, bomo spoznanja o gospodarski diplomaciji prikazali, konceptualizirali in operacionalizirali s pomocjo opisne in primerjalno-kriticne metode, s katerima bomo najprej razgradili (decoupling) obstojeca spoznanja in ugo­tovitve, nato pa s pomocjo metode sinteze spoznanj oblikovali modelsko razmišljanje o gospodarski diplomaciji, primerno za analizo izbranih pri­merov. Empiricni del clanka bo temeljil na podatkih, dobljenih s pomocjo 3 O tem, kako definirati »majhnost« države, je bilo v ekonomski teoriji ter teoriji mednarodnih odno­sov izdelanih že veliko predlogov, a se nobeden ni zares prijel. Zgošcen pogled, kateri kriteriji bi lahko državo definirali kot »majhno«, lahko bralec najde v Udovic in Svetlicic (2007: 32–37). Ne glede na vse mogoce kriterije, nekatere tudi tehtane ali izracunane po posebni formuli, se je na tihem za definiranje »majhnosti« države uveljavil populacijski kriterij, ki »majhne« države definira kot tiste države, ki imajo do približno 10 milijonov prebivalcev. Na Slovenskem se je med nekaterimi razpravljalci v mednarodnih odnosih uveljavilo še razlikovanje med mala in majhna država. Termin mala država naj bi oznaceval kategorijo držav ((samo)perceptivna kategorizacija), majhna država pa lastnosti države (npr. majhno ozemlje in majhno število virov, prebivalstva itd. – objektivne danosti torej) (prim. Bojinovic, 2004: op. 5). 4 Avstrija in Slovenija sta clanici Evropske unije, Srbija ni; Srbija je država v gospodarski in politicni tranziciji, Slovenija je to še delno, Avstrija ni; Avstrija je gospodarsko najbolj razvita in ima najbolj razvit sistem gospodarske diplomacije, Slovenija se tu umešca v sredino, Srbija je od vseh treh držav gospodarsko najmanj razvita, njena gospodarska diplomacija je šele v vzpostavljanju. poglobljenih polstrukturiranih intervjujev (in-depth semi-structured inter­views) s 14 sogovorniki, ki so delovali ali delujejo na podrocju gospodarske diplomacije Avstrije, Slovenije in Srbije oz. se le-te poslužujejo (t.i. metoda intervjujev strokovnjakov; prim. Bogner et al., 2018; Döringer, 2020; Bogner in Menz, 2009). Pridobljene podatke bomo križno preverjali tudi s podatki, pridobljenimi z metodo opazovanja z udeležbo. Tak pristop nam ne bo omogocil samo testiranja empiricnih podatkov, ampak s povratno zanko tudi obogatitev teoretske zakladnice spoznanj o gospodarski diplomaciji. Clanek je sestavljen iz treh delov. Uvodu sledi teoretsko-konceptualni del, ki predstavlja okvir za konceptualizacijo gospodarske diplomacije kot aktivnosti med strukturo (structure), agentom (agency) in akterjem (actor­ness) ter uokvirja tudi predstavitev empiricnih ugotovitev, ki sledijo v tret­jem delu clanka. Clanek zakljucujemo s sklepom, v katerem bomo pred­stavili odgovor na raziskovalno vprašanje, izpostavili odprta vprašanja in podali nekaj napotil za raziskovanje v prihodnje. Teoretski okvir: gospodarska diplomacija med strukturo, agentom in akterjem Milan Brglez (2021) pojasnjuje, da je izhodišce za preucevanje diploma­cije znotraj diplomatskih študij »diplomatska praksa, iz katere je mogoce diplomacijo teoretizirati prek dveh pristopov – agentskega in strukturnega«.5 Po njegovem mnenju diplomatska praksa postane del strukture prek proce­sov reprodukcije in transformacije prakse same; na drugi strani pa sta prva pogoja za agentizacijo diplomatske prakse identifikacija in socializacija s slednjo. Ne glede na to, v katero smer se razvoj diplomatske prakse oblikuje, se ta znova dinamizira v »nadgrajeno diplomatsko prakso«, ki se oblikuje na podlagi dolocene oblike moci – strukturna se oblikuje prek strukturne moci, agentska pa prek relacijske moci. Udovic (2022) je nadgradil Brglezovo razumevanje diplomacije v diplo­matskih študijah še z enim konceptom, akterjem. Kot poudarja sam, je razu­mevanje diplomacije v diplomatskih študijah le skozi prizmo dihotomije med strukturo in agentom zastarelo, saj izhaja iz pozitivisticne metodologije. Moderni pristopi v diplomatskih študijah pozitivisticne pristope opušcajo (zares jih niso nikoli sprejeli) in jih nadomešcajo z interpretativisticnimi. Njegovo razmišljanje tako sledi smeri, da poznamo v diplomatskih študijah 5 Vprašanje odnosa med agentom in strukturo ima v družboslovnih znanostih dolgo brado. Njegove zacetke beležimo pri socioloških ocetih (Durkheimu in Webru), prelom pa je to podrocje preucevanja doži­velo z Giddensovo (1979) konceptualizacijo, ki jo štejemo za prelomno v tem okviru razmišljanja odnosa med strukturo in agentom. Z vidika teorije mednarodnih odnosov lahko zametke razmišljanja in dilem okoli tega odnosa najdemo že pri Singerju (1961), odprta vprašanja v odnosu med strukturo in agentom v teoriji mednarodnih odnosov pa obravnava Alexander Wendt v svojem clanku iz leta 1987. tri ravni oz. akterje, ki so pomembni za razumevanje diplomatske aktivno­sti državnih in nedržavnih akterjev: (1) strukturo, ki diplomatsko prakso uokvirja in reproducira; (2) agenta, ki diplomatsko prakso sooblikuje skupaj s strukturo ali samostojno ter jo izvaja; (3) akterja, ki diplomatsko prakso samo izvaja oz. je zgolj kanal za komuniciranje. Za slednjega je znacilno, da ne deluje brez navodil, ce navodila ima, jim sledi in jih ne skuša preobli­kovati. Kljucno je, da instrukcije (navodila nadrejenih oz. centrale) razume in obravnava brezpogojno in se do njih ne opredeljuje (prim. Udovic in Arbeiter, 2021: 12). V sistemu gospodarske diplomacije skozi zgodovino in še danes naj­demo vse tri oblike izvajanja gospodarske diplomacije. Ta je bila v prazgo­dovini in v predantiki prepušcena predvsem ad hoc odlocitvam in je kot taka predvsem temeljila na agentskem in akterskem pristopu. Z oblikova­njem instituta proksena v anticnih Atenah, ki so ga imenovale domace obla­sti v polisu in je bil »v službi« tujih trgovcev, je postala gospodarska diplo­macija vse bolj strukturno pogojena. Seveda si lahko predstavljamo, da je bila njegova naloga veliko vec kot le pomoc tujim trgovcem ob prihodu v mesto, a že nacelo njegovega porocanja domacim oblastem ter tudi delova­nja skladno z zahtevami polisa kaže, da je bilo njegovo delovanje del uvelja­vljene strukture mestne državice. Še bolj umešcena v strukturo državnega delovanja postane gospodarska diplomacija v starem Rimu, kjer so naloge v zvezi z gospodarsko diplomacijo opravljali praetorji peregrinusi. Ti so imeli s strani države poverjena pooblastila za promocijo trgovine, hkrati pa tudi sodna pooblastila (Udovic, 2013: 35–49). Gospodarska diplomacija se je v naslednjih stoletjih vse bolj strukturirala, višek svoje strukturnosti (ki obstaja še danes) je dosegla z institucionalizacijo diplomatskega aparata v casu mestnih državic, v 14. stoletju. S tem premikom je struktura privzela vse pomembnejšo aktivnost in gospodarski diplomaciji okrepila tudi sim­bolicno moc, ki je agenti – ki so delovali predvsem po nacelu pragmatizma – niso nikoli imeli v takšnem obilju. Od tega preloma naprej je gospodar­ska diplomacija postajala vse bolj del strukture in vse manj agentska. Hkrati pa se je krepila tudi njena akterska vloga. S spremembami v »strukturi« in »akterjih« se je spremenila tudi raven izvajanja gospodarske diplomacije. Ce je bila v izhodišcu namenjena ali podrejena interesom posamicnega trgovca, se je s strukturalizacijo održavila. Njeno oblikovanje ni bilo vec pre­pušceno agentom, ampak so tematiziranje in prioritete gospodarske diplo­macije bile dolocene državno oz. vsaj na državni ravni (Lee in Ruel, 2012: XIX). Gospodarska diplomacija je tako predstavljala vec kot le instrument za pospeševanje gospodarske menjave, postala je sredstvo vpliva tudi na dru­gih podrocjih (Svetlicic, 2011b; Saner in Yiu, 2003; Mercier, 2007; Reuvers in Ruel, 2012). Spremembe v diplomaciji nasploh in v izvajanju gospodarske diplo­macije so postale še bolj radikalne v 20. stoletju, s fragmentacijo medna­rodne skupnosti, ko so v diplomaciji in v gospodarski diplomaciji zaceli vse pomembnejše mesto zavzemati novi akterji, mdr. nevladni akterji (Naray, 2015: 173), pa tudi akterji, ki bi bili v klasicnem diplomatskem svetu uporabniki gospodarske diplomacije – podjetja (Jaklic in Šešum, 2019; Hajdukiewicz, 2019). Vstop podjetij v strukturo delovanja gospodarske diplomacije je odprl dilemo odnosa med ponudbo in povpraševanjem pri oblikovanju gospodarske diplomacije, v kateri država ni bila vec edini odlo­cevalec, ki je dolocal oblikovanje gospodarske diplomacije, ampak je to vse bolj prehajalo tudi v roke podjetij (Jaklic, 2011). To pa je seveda pomenilo, da delovanje gospodarske diplomacije po nacelu »enotno za vse« (one size fits all) ne odgovarja vec zahtevam casa (van Bergeijk, 2009: 180; prim. tudi Justinek, 2018). Prav slednje je v razumevanju in oblikovanju gospodarske diplomacije ustvarilo neke vrste revolucijo, saj klasicni/državni modeli gospodarske diplomacije v mnogih primerih niso vec ustrezali realnosti oz. potrebam podjetij in drugih akterjev v gospodarski diplomaciji. Da bi države odgo­vorile na spremenjene trende v mednarodnih (ekonomskih) odnosih, so zacele spreminjati klasicno ureditev gospodarske diplomacije, ki je bila državocentricna, z velikim poudarkom na povezovanju z drugimi aktiv­nostmi diplomacije, v smeri potreb in želja njenih uporabnikov (Seringhaus in Botschen, 1991: 116). V tem okviru so se oblikovali trije6 kljucni modeli razvijanja in delovanja gospodarske diplomacije: (1) državocentricni (npr. Slovenija, Srbija, Francija), (2) interesni (npr. Ceška, delno Hrvaška) ter (3) mešani (Avstrija, Italija). Znotraj državocentricnega modela se gospodarska diplomacija razvija obicajno v okviru ministrstev za zunanje zadeve in ministrstev za gospodar­stvo, morda tudi v okviru agencij, ki so pod neposrednim nadzorom države. Gospodarska diplomacija je v teh okvirih predvsem aktivnost, ki sledi stra­teškim interesom države oz. panogam, ki so v strateškem interesu držav (de la Carriere, 1998). V splošnem bi lahko ta model poimenovali kot strukturni model, saj pomen državno ustvarjenih odlocitev (tj. državna struktura) pre­vladuje nad interesi posamicnih podjetij ali panog. Drugi model razvoja gospodarske diplomacije temelji predvsem na pod­jetniški pobudi. Gospodarska diplomacija prima facie ne zastopa interesov države, ampak interese podjetij. Ta, zbornicni model je zasnovan na preseku pricakovanj potreb podjetij, ki so clani zbornic. V dolocenih državah sicer zbornice delujejo v imenu vseh podjetij, drugje le za svoje clane oz. za tiste, Rana (2016: 70) obstojece modele razvršca v pet kategorij, Naray (2011: 142–143) pa navaja šest modelov organizacije gospodarske diplomacije. ki storitve placajo. Ta model gospodarske diplomacije bi lahko poimenovali kot agentski model, saj znotraj tega modela agenti (tj. podjetja in odposlanci zbornic) dolocajo aktivnosti, da zadovoljijo potrebe njihovih narocnikov. Tretji model se nahaja nekje vmes – vcasih je bolj podoben interesnemu, drugic bolj državocentricnemu, odvisno od potreb in strukture države ter podjetij. Ta model tako lahko prehaja od strukturnega k agentskemu, lahko pa je samo akterski, kar pomeni, da so struktura in agenti v drugih institu­cijah, dolocena pooblašcena institucija – ki je lahko tudi zunaj državnega sistema (npr. agencija s pooblastili za zastopanje na tujih trgih) pa le izvaja to, kar ji je naroceno. Seveda ima vsak od naštetih modelov tudi svoje slabosti. Centraliziran, državocentricen model, ki je obicajno umešcen v klasicno strukturo držav­nega (birokratskega) aparata, lahko – kljub znanju in velikemu številu kon­taktov in poznanstev – postane ovira, ce zapade v klasicne birokratske postopke; socasno je ta aktivnost vedno omejena z mednarodno- (npr. 42. clen Dunajske konvencije o diplomatskih odnosih) in notranjepravnimi akti (npr. Ustava, zakoni ter podzakonski akti). Na drugi strani interesni sis­tem, ce ni podprt z državnim ozadjem, v državah, kjer je politika še vedno pomemben odlocevalec v gospodarstvu, nima prave veljave, saj nima ne dejanske ne simbolne moci. Agenti tako redko dostopajo do najvišjih (poli­ticnih) odlocevalcev v državi, kar znižuje njihovo uspešnost pri izvajanju gospodarske diplomacije, pa tudi ucinkovitost. Niso redki primeri, ko se lahko tudi zgodi, da mora – ker zbornicni sistem ne uspe doseci ciljev – v postopek vstopiti država s svojim aparatom. To se dogaja predvsem v pri­merih ex-post7 gospodarske diplomacije. Z vidika slabosti so mešani primeri organizacije gospodarske diploma­cije lahko najboljši, saj se minimizirajo slabosti državocentricnega in intere­snega koncepta, socasno se pa lahko krepijo njihove prednosti. Slabost tega koncepta je lahko nevarnost razpršenosti odgovornosti ter neusklajenost politik in aktivnosti, kar posledicno vodi do neucinkovitosti. Pa tudi to, da lahko, ce prihaja do težav v komuniciranju med razlicni akterji, posamezniki privzamejo vlogo akterja in »cakajo na navodila«, sami pa ne storijo nice­sar, kar lahko vodi do številnih izgubljenih priložnosti ter tudi nevarnosti za dolocen gospodarski ali politicni ugled države. Udovic (2009) konceptualizira gospodarsko diplomacijo tudi glede na njeno casovno komponento. Po njegovem mnenju se gospodarska diplomacija oblikuje casovno po dveh nacelih: ex-ante in ex-post. Ex-ante gospodarska diplomacija se ukvarja predvsem z vprašanji vstopa podjetij na trg (lahko bi jo zato imenovali strategija odpiranja vrat), ex-post gospodarska diplomacija pa se zacne odvijati takrat, ko pod­jetje že deluje na tujem trgu in potrebuje »pomoc države pošiljateljice« ob nastalih problemih (to strategijo bi lahko oznacili kot kurativno delovanje). Tabela 1: PREDNOSTI IN SLABOSTI MODELOV GOSPODARSKE DIPLOMACIJE Model Prednosti Slabosti Državocentricni (strukturni) 1. Visoka simbolna moc 2. Dostop do najvišjih odlocevalskih vrhov 3. Jasna linija odlocanja in dolocanja prioritet 4. Nacionalni interes kot vodilo 5. Sposobnost ex-ante in ex-post delovanja 6. Jasnost financiranja 1. Nevarnost birokratizacije in razpršenost odgovornosti 2. Togost v odzivanju na krize in pobude 3. Težave z definicijo nacionalnih interesov in selekcijo projektov, ki zaslužijo pomoc 4. Notranje- in mednarodnopravne ovire 5. Nizka stopnja ucinkovitosti 6. Omejeni financni viri, kriteriji javnih financ Interesni (agentski) 1. Fleksibilnost, hitrost, odsotnost birokracije 2. Jasna linija odgovornosti ter usmerjenost k uporabniku 3. Vecja zmožnost ustvarjanja odnosov na ravneh business­to-business (B2B) in business-to-consumer (B2C) 4. Višja stopnja ucinkovitosti od državocentricnega modela 5. Ciljnost financiranja 1. Nizka simbolna moc, omejen domet, zavzemanje le za clane 2. Nepoznavanje okolja, podcenjevanje znacilnosti države vstopa 3. Omejeno znanje, odsotnost stikov s državo sprejemnico 4. Odsotnost strateškega in celovitega delovanja 5. Omejena sredstva, nestanovitnost v dotoku sredstev Mešani* 1. Visoka simbolna legitimacija in socasno vecja ucinkovitost 2. Hiter angažma veleposlaništva, ce je potrebno, sicer predvsem vodenje poslov po nacelu podjetniških pobud 3. Primerno uravnoteževanje med interesi »države« in »podjetij« 4. Sposobnost delovanja ex-ante in ex-post 1. Nevarnost pretiranega približevanja ali državocentricnemu ali interesnemu modelu in privzemanje njegovih slabosti 2. Prevelika razpršenost odgovornosti in s tem nevarnost neucinkovitosti in nedelovanja sistema 3. Problem pristojnosti in odgovornosti * Mešani model lahko prehaja med vsemi tremi stopnjami – državocentricnim, interesnim in akterskim, zato ga je treba, ko ga analiziramo, casovno in krajevno zamejiti, da bi vedeli, za katero obliko gre. Vir: Lasten prikaz. Vse naštete prednosti in pomanjkljivosti opisanih treh modelov izhajajo iz logike delovanja teh modelov. A kot vedno v odnosih, v diplomatskih pa je to še toliko bolj pomembno, pridemo do vprašanja izvajalcev in udele­žencev v modelih; to lepše napiše Svetlicic (2011a: 124ff), ko pravi, da so kadri tisti, ki odlocajo o uspešnosti ali neuspešnosti dolocene aktivnosti znotraj gospodarske diplomacije (prim. tudi Jazbec, 2022). Zato je treba tudi te kadre primerno izbrati glede na njihove znacilnosti in sposobnosti, soca­sno pa upoštevati tudi njihov status. Ce imajo v državocentricnem modelu obicajno že vnaprej dolocen (diplomatski) status, kar jim daje in doloca prednosti in slabosti, pa je v interesnem modelu njihov status odvisen predvsem od moci interesne skupine ali organizacije, ki jih je predlagala. Najbolj fleksibilen pri njihovem uveljavljanju je mešani model, ki omogoca na eni strani, da dobijo vse prednosti iz državocentricnega modela, socasno pa jim ni treba biti del tega modela (in s tem slabosti zmanjšujejo); na drugi strani pa lahko koristijo predvsem fleksibilnost iz interesnega modela, ne da bi jim bilo treba sprejeti slabosti iz tega modela. Prikazane znacilnosti navedenih modelov gospodarske diplomacije bomo v nadaljevanju preverjali na primeru treh analiziranih držav. Pri tem bomo skušali predvsem analizirati modele gospodarske diplomacije, ki jih obravnavane države imajo oz. jih vzpostavljajo, ter slednje oceniti glede na njihove prednosti in slabosti, kot so prikazani v Tabeli 1. Gospodarska diplomacija Avstrije, Slovenije in Srbije v primerjalni perspektivi Avstrija, Slovenija in Srbija so majhna in odprta gospodarstva, v katerih ima izvoz, pa tudi višje oblike izhodne internacionalizacije, velik vpliv na rast bruto domacega proizvoda. Za takšno obliko gospodarstva je še pose­bej pomembno, da država naredi vse potrebno, da se mednarodna trgovina odvija brez težav oz. da jo državna politika celo aktivno podpira. Pri tem se je treba zavedati, da je pomoc gospodarske diplomacije najbolj potrebna majhnim in srednjim podjetjem, ki se pri svojem vstopu na tuje trge in delo­vanju na njih pogosto soocajo s pomanjkanjem znanja, cloveških in financ­nih virov pa tudi z nepoznavanjem tujih trgov.8 Kljub temu da v primeru treh analiziranih držav dalec najvecji del izvoza ustvarijo velika podjetja, postajajo majhna in srednje velika podjetja – tudi v obliki t. i. born global – vse pomembnejša za uspešno izhodno internacionalizacijo.9 To gre pripi­sati predvsem dejstvu, da so majhna in srednje velika podjetja v primerjavi z velikimi podjetji fleksibilnejša in bolj odzivna (Cavusgil in Knight, 2015). Že skladno z nordijsko šolo internacionalizacije se majhna odprta gospo­darstva najprej internacionalizirajo na trge sosednjih držav oz. držav v regiji. Tej tezi pritrjujejo tudi naši podatki. Avstrija ima v Srednji in Jugovzhodni Evropi 35 % vseh svojih izhodnih tujih neposrednih investicij (ITNI) (Österreichische Nationalbank, 2023), Slovenija pa vec kot 75 % (Banka Slovenije, 2022). Vse tri države tudi najvec izvozijo na trge Evropske unije. 8 Tako Jaklic in Šešum (2019: 105) kot intervjuvanci v naši raziskavi ugotavljajo, da mala in srednje velika podjetja potrebujejo najvec pomoci pri internacionalizaciji svojega poslovanja, in sicer predvsem v njeni zacetni fazi, ki je pogojena z omejenimi financnimi in cloveškimi viri, pomanjkanjem znanja ter nasploh višjimi fiksnimi stroški vstopa na tuje trge. 9 Tega se zavedajo tudi na pristojnih ministrstvih, saj so majhna in srednje velika podjetja še osrednji fokus gospodarske diplomacije vseh treh obravnavanih držav (BMEIA, 2019: 180; Golubovic, 2020: 239; Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve Republike Slovenije, 2021: 3). Povedano pokaže, da so si obravnavane države po izvoznih in investicijskih vzorcih podobne, zato bi bilo logicno, da bi bili tudi vzorci vzpostavljanja, razvijanja in delovanja gospodarske diplomacije podobni. Slika 1: RAST BDP-JA V AVSTRIJI, SLOVENIJI IN SRBIJI MED LETOMA 2010 IN 2021 Vir: Pripravljeno na podlagi podatkov Svetovne banke (2023). Slika 2: DELEŽ IZVOZA V BDP-JU V AVSTRIJI, SLOVENIJI IN SRBIJI MED LETOMA 2010 IN 2021 Vir: Pripravljeno na podlagi podatkov Svetovne banke (2023). Struktura delovanja gospodarske diplomacije oz. njen ponudbeni vidik Osrednji organ, okoli katerega se razvija gospodarska diplomacija Avstrije, je Avstrijska gospodarska zbornica (Wirtschaftskammer Österreich – WKÖ), kar pomeni, da bi lahko avstrijski model umestili na prvi pogled v interesnega, a le ce ne poznamo povezovanja WKÖ z državnimi deležni­ki.10 Tocneje bi bilo avstrijski model umestiti v mešani model, v katerem ima WKÖ res primat, a je njeno delovanje usklajeno z drugimi struktu­rami v državi. WKÖ ima poleg urada na Dunaju tudi deželne gospodarske zbornice v vsaki izmed devetih11 zveznih dežel, ki pokrivajo svoje lokalno obmocje (kar kaže tudi spletna stran WKÖ) in interese podjetij iz posa­micnih dežel. Zunanji obraz WKÖ predstavlja Advantage Austria. Njena glavna naloga je, da skrbi za promocijo zunanje trgovine v vec kot 70 državah sveta (Advantage Austria, 2022). Cetudi je Advantage Austria kot del WKÖ (uradno) locen del avstrijskega ministrstva za zunanje zadeve, podatki kažejo, da ima Advantage Austria, kjer je le mogoce, sedež kar na veleposlaništvu;12 to po mnenju sogovornikov »prinaša financne, vsebinske in organizacijske sinergije« (Smole, 2022AT-a).13 Slovenska gospodarska diplomacija je v svojem razvoju prešla številne faze in tudi oblike delovanja (prim. Udovic, 2013: 255–304; Jekovec, 2012; Ramšak, 2014; 2015; Udovic, 2017; Udovic in Vojinovic Jacimovic, 2019; Udovic, 2022). Od leta 2009 je nosilec gospodarske diplomacije Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve (MZZ), ki pri izvajanju gospodarske diplomacije sodeluje s podpornimi institucijami, kot so npr. Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo, turizem in šport, Gospodarska zbornica Slovenije, SID banka, SPIRIT Slovenija in Slovenska turisticna organizacija. Predstavništva gospodarske diplomacije so v slovenskem sistemu integrirana v strukturo MZZ, kar pomeni, da imajo nekatera veleposlaništva rezidencne, druga pa nerezidencne ekonomske svetovalce. Trenutno je teh svetovalcev 19, vecina jih je lociranih v evrop­skih državah, in še to v glavnih mestih (na veleposlaništvu), z izjemo Milana in Šanghaja. V nekaterih primerih se gospodarska diplomacija poslužuje tudi lokalnega osebja, ki je lahko v izrazito pomoc pri oblikovanju smernic, iskanju partnerjev in pridobivanju poslov za slovenska podjetja. Slovenski model je tako klasicen državocentricen model. 10 V Avstriji je clanstvo v gospodarski zbornici obvezno in ne prostovoljno, kot je v Sloveniji. 11 Avstrijske zvezne dežele so Predarlska, Tirolska, Štajerska, Solnograška, Zgornja Avstrija, Spodnja Avstrija, Koroška, Gradišcanska in mesto Dunaj. 12 V Sloveniji imamo takšen primer, ko je sedež Advantage Austria na sedežu avstrijskega veleposlani­štva, na Prešernovi 23 v Ljubljani. 13 To mešanje med interesnim in državocentricnim modelom je zanimivo ne samo z vidika ureja­nja gospodarske diplomacije Avstrije, ampak tudi z vidika privilegijev in imunitet, ki pripadajo clanom Advantage Austria po Dunajski konvenciji o diplomatskih odnosih (31. in 34. clen ter 42. clen DKDO). Podobno kot v Sloveniji je tudi v Srbiji, kjer se je po desetletju posta­vljanja gospodarske diplomacije (Udovic et al., 2014) ta dokoncno ustalila na Ministrstvu za zunanje zadeve. A ker se ta še ni dovolj razvila, dejansko gospodarsko diplomacijo Srbije vodita Ministarstvo trgovine, turizma i telekomunikacija in Privredna komora Srbije,14 ki ima svoje predstavnike v sosednjih državah in državah najpomembnejših trgovinskih partnericah (Nemcija in Italija) (Smole, 2022XS-f).15 Povedano nakazuje na trotirno gospodarsko diplomacijo Srbije, pri cemer je ta uradno del MZZ, de facto pa jo izvaja predvsem Privredna komora Srbije. Deklarativno je torej srbski primer tipicni primer državocentricne gospodarske diplomacije, dejansko pa gre za mešani model, ki je bližje interesnemu kot državocentricnemu. Kako poteka vsakodnevno delovanje gospodarske diplomacije v analizi­ranih državah? V Avstriji je WKÖ skupaj z Advantage Austria glavni odlocevalec in izva­jalec gospodarske diplomacije. Operativni sestanki med razlicnimi dele­žniki v avstrijskem sistemu potekajo tedensko, strateški na najvišji ravni vsaj dvakrat letno, na nižjih pa pogosteje, odvisno od tematike, njenega pomena za gospodarstvo Avstrije in tudi od strateških odlocitev države (Smole, 2022AT-c). Slovenski sistem je v primerjavi z avstrijskim veliko bolj tog, komunika­cija med akterji, ki se v doloceni meri še vedno razumejo kot konkurenti, poteka obcasno, ob potrebah. Pri tem obstajata dve ravni pogovorov in dogovorov: formalna in neformalna. Formaliziran okvir dogovarjanja deležnikov znotraj sistema gospodar­ske diplomacije predstavlja Svet za internacionalizacijo, ki ga skupaj vodita Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve in Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo, turizem in šport. Gre za letna ali polletna srecanja, na katerih se deležniki slovenske gospodarske diplomacije srecujejo in razpravljajo o zadevah in izzivih, povezanih s programom internacionalizacije. Drugo raven predstavlja ope­rativna koordinacija. Ta je v veliki meri prepušcena posameznikom (Smole, 2022SI-a, f) ter se odvija tako vertikalno (MZZ v odnosu do podpornih insti­tucij) kot horizontalno (podporne institucije usklajujejo svoje programe in aktivnosti). Odvija se na podlagi osebnega zaupanja, poprejšnjega sode­lovanja, pozitivnih izkušenj in tudi prijateljskih stikov, ki so jih uradniki in drugi vzpostavili skozi leta delovanja slovenske gospodarske diplomacije (Udovic, 2023). V Srbiji je zaradi nerazvite gospodarske diplomacije še vse prepušceno sprotnim aktivnostim razlicnih deležnikov. Formalno vlogo za pobude ima 14 Clanstvo v Privredni komori Srbije je obvezno. 15 V Srbiji je treba na podrocju gospodarske diplomacije omeniti še en organ, in sicer Razvojno agen­cijo Srbije, ki skrbi predvsem za privabljanje investicij. njihovo zunanje ministrstvo, a dejansko se institucije po nacelu »ko rabiš, poklici«, same usklajujejo med sabo. Je pa Srbija malce posebna v tem oziru, saj si – za razliko od Avstrije in Slovenije – bolj prizadeva za vhodne inve­sticije, sama pa veliko manj casa namenja podrocju spodbujanja izhodne internacionalizacije in diverzifikacije svojega gospodarstva (prim. Bellina, 2019; Smole, 2022XS-a, b, d; Golubovic, 2020: 243). Pricakovanja do gospodarske diplomacije oz. vidik povpraševanja Kot ugotavlja že Jakliceva (2011: 751–775), je za uspešno delovanje gospodarske diplomacije samo njen dober ustroj premalo. Pri ustroju in sto­ritvah, ki jih gospodarska diplomacija ponuja, mora priti do preseka s potre­bami podjetij, še posebej majhnih in srednje velikih, ki pri svoji internacio­nalizaciji najbolj potrebujejo delovanje gospodarske diplomacije države. Da pa bi do preseka med ponudbo in povpraševanjem prišlo, morajo uporab­niki uslug gospodarske diplomacije najprej poznati strukturo gospodarske diplomacije, nato pa tudi instrumente, ki jih slednja lahko uporablja. Po raziskavi, ki jo je opravil Smole (2022AT-a, c, e), vecina avstrijskih pod­jetij pozna ustroj avstrijske gospodarske diplomacije in tudi ve, kaj lahko od tega ustroja pricakujejo. Zadeva je malce drugacna v Sloveniji in Srbiji. V Sloveniji je v zadnjih letih16 zaznati napredek pri prepoznavnosti gospodar­ske diplomacije, še posebej med gospodarstveniki. Ti so namrec ozavestili, da gospodarska diplomacija kot struktura v MZZ obstaja, seznanjeni so tudi s tem, kakšne usluge jim gospodarska diplomacija ponuja. Ni najbolj jasno, kdo konkretno znotraj sistema (bodisi MZZ bodisi podporne organizacije) so tisti akterji, ki lahko dolocenemu podjetju pomagajo ali ex-ante ali ex­-post. Pri tem nejasnost pooblastil v javni službi in pretekle izkušnje (npr. v preteklosti je GZS delala za vsa podjetja, imela celo svojo mrežo pred­stavništev; dandanes dela samo za narocnike ali placnike) ustvarjajo nekak obcutek obcasne zmedenosti majhnih in srednje velikih podjetij, na koga naj se v primeru svojih potreb obrnejo. Glede na to, da v Srbiji gospodarsko diplomacijo šele vzpostavljajo, je ta slabo razumljena in prepoznana (Smole, 2022XS-a, b, c, d, f), predvsem pa mora najprej dobiti vecjo vlogo znotraj diplomacije. Ob tem ne gre prezreti pomena promocije gospodarske diplo­macije kot aktivnosti per se, ki jo morajo nosilci gospodarske diplomacije opraviti, da bi gospodarska diplomacija lahko sploh delovala, kot bi morala. 16 Zanimiva je Smoletova (ibid.) ugotovitev, da so podjetja, ki so usluge gospodarske diplomacije v slovenskem ministrstvu za zunanje zadeve uporabljala (v Sloveniji so to bila predvsem velika podjetja, ki so te storitve uporabljala predvsem ex-post), zaznala napredek v kakovosti storitev gospodarske diplo­macije; podjetja, ki uslug gospodarske diplomacije niso uporabljala, pa so menila, da slednja ni koristna. Preseneca tudi, da je bilo nekaj nekdanjih ekonomskih svetovalcev, ki niso vec v ustroju državne uprave, zelo kriticnih do organizacije in delovanja slovenske gospodarske diplomacije. V Avstriji je promocija dela gospodarske diplomacije (in njenih uspehov) integralni del aktivnosti gospodarske diplomacije; v Sloveniji je tovrstna promocija relativno šibka, kar pomeni, da je nepoznavanje glavni razlog, da se podjetja gospodarske diplomacije sploh ne poslužujejo. Podobno je v Srbiji, kjer je gospodarska diplomacija še v povojih, izjemo predstavlja Razvojna agencija Srbije (RAS).17 Seveda je z vidika povpraševanja po storitvah gospodarske diplomacije nujno vedeti, kaj boš vprašal oz. kako boš pristopil k ponudniku in izvajalcu gospodarske diplomacije. Ce v Avstriji velja, da se podjetja naceloma bolje pripravijo na izhodno internacionalizacijo, so povpraševanja po storitvah gospodarske diplomacije v Sloveniji izhodišcno bolj problematicna, saj so slovenska podjetja, predvsem majhna in srednje velika, za gospodarsko diplomacijo nezainteresirana in slabo pripravljena. Posledicno so vprašanja in prošnje, ki jih napotujejo na ekonomske svetovalce doma ali na tujem, presplošne, pogosto se nanašajo na pridobivanje informacij, dostopnih v javno dostopnih virih in mnogokrat poslanih na razlicne naslove (Smole, 2022GDS-i, k, t, ž, ac). Kadrovska politika snovanja gospodarske diplomacije Omenili smo že, da so za uspešno gospodarsko diplomacijo kljucni predvsem ljudje, ki delujejo tako doma ali v tujini (prim. Naray, 2015: 161; Svetlicic, 2011a). V Sloveniji, kjer je hrbtenica gospodarske diploma­cije Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve, je vecina ljudi, ki deluje v gospodarski diplomaciji, s tega ministrstva, nekateri so v sistem gospodarske diploma­cije prišli z Ministrstva za gospodarstvo, turizem in šport. Prehajanja med javno upravo in gospodarstvom v slovenskem sistemu skorajda ni. Poleg tega je v slovenskem sistemu tudi težava, da se v gospodarski diplomaciji znotraj ministrstva za zunanje zadeve od diplomatov, ki to nalogo oprav­ljajo, nasploh »pricakuje vec aktivnosti in delovanja, kar povzroci, da se jih mnogo odloci, da gredo delat drugam, v druge sektorje ali direktorate« (Udovic, 2014). V Srbiji klasicnih gospodarskih diplomatov sicer še nimajo, se pa zave­dajo, da bodo morali na tem podrocju narediti smele korake, ce bodo želeli 17 Zanimiv clanek z naslovom “Ekonomska diplomatija pogrešna ideja” je bil leta 2009 objavljen v srbski reviji Blic. V clanku avtor pojasnjuje, da je delovanje gospodarske diplomacije metanje denarja proc, saj tuje naložbe privlacijo dobri zakoni in manj korupcije, ne pa vec gospodarskih svetovalcev. Poleg tega so po njegovem mnenju informacije danes prosto dostopne in jih tuji vlagatelji dobijo prej, kot ce bi vprašali gospodarskega svetovalca, ki deluje na veleposlaništvu ali predstavništvu države pošiljateljice. Avtor clanek sklene z mislijo, da Srbija zato ne potrebuje gospodarske diplomacije, ampak evropsko, saj se v Bruslju gradi javna podoba in prihodnost, ter dodaja »to, z gospodarskimi diplomati je zastarelo razume­vanje diplomacije in nerazumevanje interesov Srbije«. biti uspešni. Eden takih korakov je, da bodoce kadre, ki bi lahko delovali v gospodarski diplomaciji, išcejo tudi med izstopajocimi študenti srbskih uni­verz (Smole, 2022SI-a). Poleg številcne okrepitve gospodarske diplomacije namenjajo pozornost tudi neprestanemu izobraževanju, ki naj bi pripomo­glo k širini in dvigu kompetenc posameznika (Golubovic, 2020: 250; Smole, 2022XS-a). V Avstriji so na podlagi svojih dolgoletnih izkušenj oblikovali stalno in stabilno politiko upravljanja s cloveškimi viri v gospodarski diplomaciji. Pri tem ima kljucno vlogo izbor kadrov, njihovo usposabljanje in motivira­nje. Vse tri faze delovanja gospodarske diplomacije zagotavljajo tudi diplo­matski status, ki ga ekonomski svetovalci dobijo, cetudi so del WKÖ in ne ministrstva za zunanje zadeve. Ta jim namrec »daje težo in lajša mreženje« (Smole, 2022AT-c). Napredovanje v sistemu Advantage Austria je postopno, in sicer lahko posameznik šele po šestih letih neprekinjenega delovanja v sistemu Advantage Austria v tujini prevzame mesto direktorja tega pred­stavništva (Smole, 2022AT-a). Situacija je v Sloveniji drugacna. Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve je izobra­ževanja v gospodarski diplomaciji zasnovalo predvsem znotraj t. i. diplo­matskega in višjega diplomatskega izpita, pri cemer je eden od modulov v zelo skromnem obsegu pokrival tudi delovanje gospodarske diplomacije. Podobna struktura se je vzpostavila tudi spomladi 2023, ko so bili priprav­ljeni ucni nacrti prenovljenega predmetnika Diplomatske akademije, ki so predvidevali prav tako predavanje o gospodarski diplomaciji na osnovni in višji ravni. Ostala izobraževanja niso strukturno organizirana, ampak so spo­radicna in prepušcena zanimanju posameznika, ki na tem podrocju deluje. Druge znacilnosti delovanja gospodarske diplomacije Avstrije, Slovenije in Srbije Ceprav so si obravnavane države v mnogocem razlicne, pa vse tri države gospodarsko diplomacijo postavljajo visoko na listi prioritet. Razlika, ki se opazi, je v udejanjanju deklarativnih zavez v praksi, ki peša predvsem v Srbiji, v Sloveniji pa na žalost še vedno zaostaja. Ali gre tu predvsem za vpra­šanje organizacije ali pa le delovanja deležnikov, je dilema, ki jo bo še treba osvetliti, a za naš primer je pomembno poudariti, da se je avstrijski model, ki je mešan, izhodišcno resda interesen, a z mocnimi državocentricnimi kontu­rami, izkazal za najboljšega. Tam, kjer je potrebno, vstopi »formalna« država. V tej tocki se model približa bolj državocentricnemu, tam, kjer te potrebe ni, pa se gospodarska diplomacija odvija naceloma po klasicnih poslovnih obicajih. Ce avstrijski model izhaja predvsem iz potreb avstrijskih podjetij, sloven-ski in srbski gospodarsko diplomacijo razumeta veliko bolj državocentricno, kar pomeni, da se »država« odloca, kje, kako in zakaj. To se kaže tudi npr. v odlocitvah, da se v izvajanje gospodarske diplomacije vse bolj vkljucuje izseljence in zdomce, hkrati pa tudi, da se v zadnjih mesecih odlocamo za odprtje novih veleposlaništev na podlagi interesa podjetij oz. širše – gospo­darskega interesa države.18 Slovenija si pri izvajanju svoje gospodarske diplomacije pomaga formalno tudi z mrežo slovenskih castnih konzulov, premalo pa po mnenju nekaterih izkorišca mrežo tujih castnih konzulov (Esih, 2023), ki bi lahko pomagali predvsem v državah, kjer nimamo stal­nega rezidencnega predstavništva. Pomembna razlika med obravnavanimi oblikami gospodarske diploma­cije je tudi podjetniška kultura oz. delovanje podjetij. Ce pogledamo npr. pomen povratnih informacij za uspešno delovanje gospodarske diplo­macije, lahko ugotovimo, da avstrijska podjetja svojim institucijam pogo­sto pošiljajo povratne informacije o (ne)uspelih poslih, izzivih in težavah. Drugacna je situacija v Sloveniji, kjer velja pregovorna omertŕ, ko se podje­tja oglasijo obicajno takrat, ko so z delom državnih organov nezadovoljna, na drugi strani pa se gospodarski svetovalci pogosto pritožujejo, da od pod­jetij ne dobijo informacij o tem, kaj se je zgodilo z dolocenim poslom, ki so ga pomagali pripravljati, saj se podjetja na povpraševanje o tem ne odzo­vejo ali pa se celo izgovorijo na poslovno skrivnost.19 Podobno je tudi v Srbiji, kjer zaradi zacetkov ne ena ne druga stran ne pricakuje informacij in posredovanja le-teh. A to ni pomembno samo z vidika poslovne kulture, ampak tudi merjenja ucinkovitosti in uspešnosti gospodarske diplomacije. Vprašanje, ki ostaja nerazrešeno in se pojavlja v zvezi z gospodarsko diplomacijo, je tudi, ali gospodarska diplomacija upravicuje svoj obstoj in sredstva, ki jih za svoje delovanje porabi. Gre za nerešljivo dilemo, saj je nemogoce ugotoviti, koliko gospodarska diplomacija odnese iz proracuna in koliko vanj prinese, prav tako je nemogoce ugotoviti, koliko (ne)uspešno delovanje gospodarske diplomacije prinese ali odnese z vidika rasti bruto domacega proizvoda.20 A ker je gospodarska diplomacija tudi izpostavljena 18 Tak primer je npr. Alžirija, kjer sta novembra 2022 ministrica za zunanje in evropske zadeve Tanja Fajon in minister za infrastrukturo Bojan Kumer podpisala sporazum o dobavi plina Sloveniji. 19 Seveda poslovna skrivnost ni neki nebodigatreba, ampak je z njo potrebno ravnati zelo previdno. Nezaupanje do državnih uradnikov, da bi lahko kakšno poslovno skrivnost »predali« konkurenci, hromi tudi komunikacijo med podjetji in ponudniki gospodarske diplomacije. 20 Na tem mestu bi rada spomnila na anekdoto, ki se je zgodila pred leti na Slovenskem, ko je eden od ministrov od svojega ministrskega kolega terjal, da mu pojasni, koliko gospodarska diplomacija doda k rasti bruto domacega proizvoda. Zahteva je bila neresna, saj je bilo vsakomur jasno, da se tega ne da realno izracunati, in je imela predvsem politicno ozadje. Da bi rešili zagonetko, so uradniki z enega od ministrstev poklicali profesorja na eni od slovenskih fakultet, ki se je delno spoznal na podrocje gospodar­ske diplomacije, ter ga vprašali, kako bi izracunali doprinos gospodarske diplomacije k rasti bruto doma­cega proizvoda. Profesor jih je najprej skušal prepricati, da je to jalovo pocetje, a ni uspel. Ko je videl stisko uradnikov, je kot iz topa ustrelil: »Gospodarska diplomacija prinese k rasti BDP 17%.« Nejeverni uradniki so ga nato vprašali, kako je to tako hitro izracunal, ce je še maloprej vztrajal, da se to ne da izracunati. javnosti in tudi vprašanjem o njeni uspešnosti, je smiselno o njej razmišljati tudi skozi oci njene promocije. In to ne samo med zainteresirano javnostjo – podjetji, ampak tudi v širši javnosti, ki obicajno kroji javno mnenje glede razreza proracuna. Hitreje kot bo usidrano v splošno zavest, da je gospo­darska diplomacija nujna in potrebna državna dejavnost, manj bo nepotreb­nih vprašanj o tem, koliko stane ter koliko doprinese k proracunu in k rasti bruto domacega proizvoda. Slika 3: FORMULAR ZA VSEBINSKO POROCANJE EKONOMSKIH SVETOVALCEV V SLOVENSKI GOSPODARSKI DIPLOMACIJI Vir: Ministrstvo za zunanje in evropske zadeve, interno gradivo (n. d.). Nasmejal se je in dejal: »Zacutil sem. Pa naj ta drugi minister dokaže, da je odstotek, ki sem ga povedal, nepravilen.« Razprava in sklep Namen clanka je bil s pomocjo primerjalne analize gospodarske diplo­macije v majhnih državah z razlicno gospodarsko-politicno strukturo ugo­toviti, ce obstajajo »naddržavne« znacilnosti gospodarske diplomacije, ter s to ugotovitvijo dodati kamencek v mozaik preucevanja diplomacije znotraj diplomatskih študij. Pri tem nas je vodilo raziskovalno vprašanje, osredi­njeno na modele gospodarske diplomacije znotraj teorije diplomatskih štu­dij, ter kako se te znacilnosti kažejo v konkretnih analiziranih primerih. Na podlagi analize smo prišli do štirih ugotovitev. Prvic, v diplomatskih študijah se vse bolj oblikuje kanonsko razumeva­nje o treh modelih gospodarske diplomacije – državocentricnemu, intere­snemu in mešanemu. Nekateri avtorji sicer druga dva modela še natancneje delijo na njihove podoblike, a to je bolj preferenca posameznih avtorjev, ki z vecjo fragmentacijo modelov morda želijo bolje prikazati le dolocene poudarke. Dodana vrednot te delitve je tudi vprašanje prednosti in slabosti vsakega od modelov. V Tabeli 1 smo to zelo natancno prikazali, a na tej tocki želimo poudariti – kar je z vidika diplomatskih študij izjemnega pomena –, da je tudi pri oblikovanju pomena gospodarske diplomacije pomembna simbolna komponenta (vec o tem prim. Arbeiter in Udovic, 2017; Arbeiter, 2019), ki se morda za gospodarsko diplomacijo prima facie ne zdi logicna. Pomen simbolike se v gospodarski diplomaciji pojavlja predvsem v dveh primerih: (1) ko podjetja vstopajo na trge, kjer ima država pomembno vlogo; tam se tudi interesni modeli bolj približujejo državocentricnim, saj tako podjetniki lažje pridejo do najvišjih funkcij in lažje sklepajo posle; (2) ko pride do težav na dolocenih trgih ali pri izvedbi dolocenih poslov (torej v primerih ex-post) in je roka interesnega modela prekratka oz. je potrebna pomoc države (morda tudi kar klic kakšnega ministra ali celo višjega funk­cionarja v prestolnico druge države). V obeh primerih se tudi interesni ali mešani modeli zelo mocno približajo državocentricnemu. Druga ugotovitev, ki smo jo prikazali v clanku, je, da je gospodarska diplo­macija nad politicno-gospodarskimi znacilnostmi države. Vse obravnavane države se namrec soocajo z enakimi vprašanji, le rešitve, ki jih oblikujejo, so morda drugacne. Tu delno izstopa Srbija, kjer so aktivnosti v gospodarski diplomaciji šele na zacetku, zato je na tej tocki težko ocenjevati, kako se bo ta razvila. Kar zadeva rešitve kljucnih vprašanj, bi lahko rekli, da so te pogojene z zgodovinskim razvojem gospodarske diplomacije v državi in njeno tradi­cijo. V Avstriji, kjer je družbeno uveljavljen in sprejet korporativen in regiona­len sistem upravljanja družbe, se odgovori na vprašanja gospodarske diplo­macije (finance, kadri, struktura, izobraževanje) tudi oblikujejo na teh ravneh. Podobna je situacija v Sloveniji, le z drugacnimi rezultati. Ker je naš družbeni sistem nagnjen k centralizaciji in državocentricnosti, so tudi aktivnosti v gospodarski diplomaciji izvedene predvsem v okviru državnega udejstvova­nja v njej. To je še posebej res po ukinitvi obveznega clanstva v Gospodarski zbornici Slovenije, ki je iz paradržavnega združenja postala interesno združe­nje (le) svojih clanov. Sedemnajst let po tej reformi lahko ocenimo, da je bilo to preoblikovanje za razvoj gospodarske diplomacije v Sloveniji škodljivo. Tretja ugotovitev izhaja iz razmišljanja Jakliceve (2011) ter Jakliceve in Šešuma (2019) o pomenu preseka med ponudbo in povpraševanjem za delo­vanje gospodarske diplomacije. Morda se ta ugotovitev nanaša še najbolj na vprašanje ocenjevanja ucinkovitosti in uspešnosti gospodarske diplomacije. Teh dveh dejavnikov namrec ne moremo meriti v odstotkih doprinosa k bruto domacemu proizvodu ali zaposlenosti na kratki rok, lahko pa ucinke gospodarske diplomacije merimo na daljši rok, in sicer prek tega, koliko poslov, ki so jim bila odprta vrata, je bilo izvedenih, kakšen je njihov izplen, koliko ljudi je dodatno zaposlenih, kakšna je dodana vrednost teh poslov itd. A za to je treba imeti povratne informacije podjetij, ki morajo jasno pove­dati, kdaj jim je gospodarska diplomacija pomagala, kdaj samo do dolocene mere, pa tudi, ce jim je kdaj škodovala. Razmere v mednarodni skupnosti so namrec vse bolj zapletene in tudi aktivnosti držav, kot je npr. gospodarska diplomacija, ni treba razumeti kot edino zvelicavne. Dejstvo je, da se tudi mnoge podjetniške ideje »sfižijo«, da se le nekatere od mnogih uspešno ures­nicijo. Povratna informacija je tako ne samo želena, ampak nujno potrebna, ce želimo, da se delo gospodarske diplomacije najbolje izkoristi. Cetrta ugotovitev se nanaša na podrocje izobraževanja. Ugotovimo lahko, da so na podrocju izobraževanja za delovanje v gospodarski diplomaciji kljucne tri tocke: (a) izobraževanje mora biti stalno in na podlagi najnovejših podatkov. Svet postaja zelo nepredvidljiv (Raškovic, 2022), gospodarstvo pa je najbolj volatilno podrocje, tako da je pomembno, da so gospodarski sve­tovalci karseda najbolje opremljeni s potrebnimi kompetencami – ne samo za mednarodno poslovanje, ampak tudi za vnaprejšnje zaznavanje morebit­nih tveganj (kombinacija ex-post in ex-ante gospodarske diplomacije); (b) izbor kadrov za gospodarsko diplomacijo je izredno pomemben, veliko bolj kot struktura. Agent in akter sta tako zlasti v oddaljenih državah tista, ki nosita odgovornost za (ne)uspešnost državne gospodarske diplomacije; (c) poleg izbora je kljucno motiviranje kadrov, ki jih pošiljamo v gospodar­sko diplomacijo. Ti so namrec pogostokrat izpostavljeni številnim dodatnim obremenitvam in preverjanjem (prim. slika 3), kar v napacnem uokvirjanju pošilja tudi napacen signal, da je treba v gospodarski diplomaciji delati vec za enako placilo. To pa je pot v pogubo. Koncno, ugotovitev clanka je tudi ta, da je kljub vec kot dvajsetletnem aktivnem preucevanju gospodarske diplomacije kot pohladnovojnega kon­cepta v diplomatskih študijah treba še veliko postoriti. Odpirajo se vpraša­nja pomena novih akterjev v gospodarski diplomaciji, njihovega dosega ter zmožnosti; postavljajo se dileme odnosa med spodbujanjem gospodar­stva z režimi, ki kršijo mednarodno pravo; vznikajo premisleki o tem, kaj je še gospodarska diplomacija in kaj je vojno dobickarstvo. In gospodarska diplomacija seveda postaja vse bolj tudi del odnosov z javnostmi. Pa še bi se našlo dilem, konceptualizacij in odprtih raziskovalnih vprašanj, na katere ta clanek ne daje odgovora. Daje pa izhodišca za raziskovanje v prihodnje. LITERATURA Aguilera, Ruth V., in Birgitte Grgaard (2019): The dubious role of institutions in international business: A road forward. Journal of International Business Studies 50 (1): 20–35. 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Udovic, Boštjan (2022): Nadgradnja ‘Brglezove osmice’. Graficni prikaz s komen­tarjem. Neobjavljeno. Udovic, Boštjan (2023): Pogovor s predstavniki ZDG. Ljubljana, 13. marec 2023. UDK 616.895.4:[351.74-051+355.11+616-051] Žiga SELAN, Janja VUGA BERŠNAK* PRISOTNOST DEPRESIJE V IZBRANIH KRITICNIH POKLICIH V OBDOBJU PANDEMIJE V SLOVENIJI: PRIMER ZDRAVSTVENEGA OSEBJA, PRIPADNIKOV IN PRIPADNIC SLOVENSKE VOJSKE TER POLICISTOV IN POLICISTK ** Povzetek. Pandemija, ki jo je povzrocil virus SARS­CoV-2, Sloveniji ni prizanesla, nasprotno, terjala je dolgotrajen in izcrpavajoc odziv zaposlenih v nekate­rih kriticnih poklicih. Ti so bili v obdobju pandemije, upoštevajoc omejitve in potrebe po povecanem obsegu dela, izpostavljeni vrsti dejavnikov, ki so zaznamovali njihovo zdravstveno pocutje in splošno dobrobit. V clan­ku predstavljamo – s pomocjo kvantitativnega merske­ga instrumenta pridobljene – samoocene zaposlenih v kriticnih poklicih (zdravstveno osebje, policisti/-ke, pripadniki/-ice Slovenske vojske) glede njihovega obcu­tenja stresa, obremenitev in depresije, in sicer v izbra­nem obdobju pandemije, t. j. med marcem 2020 in juni­jem 2022. Raziskava pokaže, da je 30 % anketirancev/-k v kriticnih poklicih obcutilo depresijo. Nadalje, rezultati kažejo povezanost med depresijo in dejavniki pandemi­je (r = .567, p = < 0.01) pri vseh preucevanih poklicih. Kljucni pojmi: kriticni poklici, pandemija, depresija, stres, dobrobit Uvod Svetovna zdravstvena organizacija (SZO) je bila 31. decembra 2019 obve­šcena o primerih pljucnice neznanega vzroka v mestu Vuhan na Kitajskem. Zelo hitro se je pojavilo nenadzorovano širjenje okužb po svetu. SZO je 31. januarja 2020 razglasila izredne razmere na podrocju javnega zdravja. 11. marca 2020 je zaradi hitrega povecanja števila primerov okužb zunaj Kitajske generalni direktor SZO napovedal, da bi lahko izbruh oznacili kot * Žiga Selan, magister obramboslovja, Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve, Služba za evropska sredstva, Slovenija; dr. Janja Vuga Beršnak, izredna profesorica, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija. ** Izvirni znanstveni clanek. DOI: 10.51936/tip.60.4.641 pandemijo (Bhargava, 2021). Virus SARS-CoV-2 se je zelo hitro razširil po razlicnih državah po vseh delih sveta, npr. v Italiji je bil prvi uradni primer odkrit 21. februarja 2020, že mesec prej (21. januarja 2020) je bil potrjen prvi primer v Združenih državah Amerike (ZDA), v Sloveniji pa smo prvi pri­mer okužbe potrdili 4. marca 2020 (Mlakar, 2020; AJMC, 2021). Kot navaja Worldometer (2023), je virus SARS-CoV-2 v mocnem obsegu prizadel našo državo, do marca 2023 je namrec zaradi covida-19 umrlo vec kot 7.074 ljudi. V takšnih izjemnih okolišcinah kompleksne krize so še posebej obreme­njeni zaposleni in zaposlene v tako imenovanih kriticnih poklicih, ko pride do izrazito povecanega obsega dela, dela v negotovih okolišcinah, hitrega sprejemanja odlocitev brez vseh vnaprej znanih podatkov, potrebni sta pri­lagodljivost in predanost. V teh poklicih je delo zahtevnejše in terja veliko odrekanja, medtem ko v kriznih razmerah delo postane še bolj naporno, stresno, urniki so neredni in zaposleni se srecujejo z življenje ogrožajocimi situacijami ter smrtjo. Vse to lahko pripelje do izcrpanosti in zdravstvenih težav. Namen clanka je raziskati prisotnost depresije in povezavo med depresijo ter izbranimi samoporocanimi znaki obremenitev v casu pande­mije (marec 2020–junij 2022) pri zaposlenih v kriticnih poklicih, in sicer pripadnikih/-cah Slovenske vojske, policistih/-kah in zdravstvenem osebju. Duševno zdravje zaposlenih v kriticnih poklicih v obdobju pandemije Duševno zdravje se predvsem nanaša na kognitivno, vedenjsko in custveno dobro pocutje, ki posamezniku/-ici omogoca uspešno soocanje z vsakdanjim življenjem. Pomembno je v vseh življenjskih obdobjih, od otro­štva do odraslosti (U. S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2022), in vpliva na vsakdanje življenje ter odnose tako v družini kot tudi na delov­nem mestu in v širši skupnosti. Ustrezno duševno zdravje je temelj zdravja na splošno in posledicno družbene, družinske in gospodarske stabilnosti, socialne blaginje in kakovosti življenja ljudi. Pomembno je, da se zavedamo, da je vsakdo izmed nas dovzeten za tveganje in razvoj motenj duševnega zdravja, ne glede na starost, spol, dohodek ali etnicno pripadnost (Felman, 2020; U. S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2022). Po podatkih IHME (International Health Management Associates) je imelo leta 2019 v EU 15,34 % prebivalstva duševne motnje, kar pomeni približno 75 milijonov ljudi. Med najpogostejšimi diagnozami pri splošnem prebivalstvu je bila tudi depresija (4,60 %).1 Nedavni podatki kažejo, da je pandemija poslabšala duševno zdravje in z delom povezana bremena – vec študij (Mental Health Vec na: http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-results-tool?params=gbd-api-2019-permalink/b6dce4dc­7359fa30ac20b63cc265f1fc. America, 2020; Tehrani, 2022; Guo in drugi, 2020) je namrec pokazalo, da je pri poklicih, ki so bili kljucnega pomena za odzivanje na pandemijo (t. i. kriticni poklici), povecano tveganje za težave z duševnim zdravjem in izgorelost. Poleg tega je z izpostavljenostjo krizam povezana tudi uporaba psihoaktivnih substanc. Nedavna študija NIJZ (Nacionalni inštitut za javno zdravje) je pokazala, da so strokovnjaki na podrocju duševnega zdravja v Sloveniji zaradi narave dela in s tem povezanih dejavnikov sami izposta­vljeni povecanemu tveganju za duševne stiske in samomorilnost, ampak praviloma ne posegajo po pomoci, s katero bi lahko blažili tovrstne stiske (Roškar et al., 2022). V nadaljevanju se bomo osredotocili na depresijo kot eno od pogostej­ših težav v duševnem zdravju, ki se pojavlja tudi med zaposlenimi v kriticnih poklicih. Depresija Depresija negativno vpliva na posameznikovo/-icino pocutje, nacin raz­mišljanja in ravnanje ter med drugim povzroca obcutke žalosti in/ali izgubo zanimanja za delo. Ta duševna stiska je pomemben dejavnik pri opravljanju dela tudi med zaposlenimi v kriticnih poklicih, saj so, po podatkih SZO, med diagnosticiranimi tudi zdravstveni delavci/-ke, policisti/-ke in pripadniki/-ce oboroženih sil. Tako kot pri drugih duševnih motnjah (anksioznost, PTSM itd.) tudi na razvoj depresije vplivajo razlicni dejavniki tveganja in zašcite, na primer sodelovanje v oboroženem boju, daljša odsotnost od družine oz. ljubljenih oseb, travmaticne in stresne situacije, stalna nevarnost in ogrože­nost, zahtevna usposabljanja itd. (Inoue in drugi, 2021). Leta 2021 so ame­riške vojaške zdravstvene ustanove porocale o povecanju depresije med ameriškimi vojaki/-njami z »obicajnih« 11,4 % na 15 % (Inoue in drugi, 2021). Tudi zdravstveno osebje se srecuje s travmaticnimi in stresnimi situacijami, nerednimi delavniki, pomanjkanjem spanja, delom v zašcitni opremi, z zah­tevnimi pacienti/-kami in obiskovalci, s trpljenjem in smrtjo pacientov/-k itd. (Fang in drugi, 2017).2 Izpostaviti je treba tudi navzocnost depresije med pripadniki/-cami policije, saj narava njihovega dela, povezana s stresnimi in travmaticnimi dogodki (price kriminalnih dejanj, smrti, oboroženih bojev, sledenje osumljencev itd.), lahko negativno vpliva na razvoj depresije. Pri tem pa je pomembno, da so nekatere raziskave (npr. Husein in drugi, 2014) pokazale vecjo prisotnost depresije med policistkami, medtem ko je med policisti v vecji meri prisotna anksioznost. Pri merjenju stresa tovrstnih raz­lik ni bilo zaznati. Kitajska raziskava (Fang in drugi, 2017) je pokazala, da je kar 57,2% anketiranih oseb porocalo o simptomih depresije. Depresija v obdobju pandemije Clanek smo osredinili na samoocenjeno navzocnost depresije in stresa med nosilci/-kami kriznega odziva v slovenski družbi (t. i. first responders), torej med zaposlenimi v kriticnih poklicih, in sicer med zdravstvenim ose­bjem, pripadniki in pripadnicami Slovenske vojske ter slovenskimi policisti in policistkami. V nadaljevanju predstavljene raziskave namrec kažejo, da se je v medna­rodnem prostoru med pandemijo pojavnost depresije v preucevanih skupi­nah povecala. SZO je v znanstvenem porocilu 2. marca 2022 (Scientific brief: Mental Health and COVID-19: Early evidence of the pandemic’s impact) pojasnila, da se je v prvem letu pandemije covida-19 globalna razširjenost anksioznosti in depresije povecala za kar 25%. SZO (2022) je na podlagi opravljene raziskave ugotovila, da je pandemija povzrocila kar 27,6-odstotni porast depresije. Neprofitna organizacija Duševno zdravje Amerika je v obdobju pan­demije beležila vec anksioznosti, depresije, osamljenosti in drugih dušev­nih težav, pri cemer ugotavlja, da je pandemija negativno vplivala zlasti na duševno zdravje tistih, ki so bili vkljuceni v krizno odzivanje med pan­demijo (Mental Health America, 2020). Med zdravstvenim osebjem so v obdobju junij–september 2020 merili prisotnost nekaterih duševnih težav (n = 1.119), pri cemer so ugotovili, da jih je 93 % doživljalo stres, 86 % jih je porocalo o anksioznosti, 77 % o frustracijah, 76 % o izcrpanosti in izgorelosti ter 75 % o preobremenjenosti. Prav tako je 76 % zdravstvenih delavcev/-k porocalo, da jih skrbi in jih je strah, da bi okužili svojega otroka, polovica jih je porocala, da jih skrbi, da bi ogrozili svojega partnerja/-ko, in 47 % jih je bilo zaskrbljenih, da bi izpostavili starejše odrasle družinske clane. Raziskava je med drugim tudi razkrila, da je custvena izcrpanost najpogostejši opis sprememb v pocutju zdravstvenih delavcev/-k (82 %), sledile so težave s spanjem (70 %), fizicna izcrpanost (68 %) in strah, povezan z delom (63 %). Vec kot polovica je porocala o spremembi apetita in utrujenosti od socu­tja ter povecani zavesti ali pozornosti do izpostavljenosti (Mental Health America, 2020). Raziskava »The psychological impact of COVID-19 on police officers« iz leta 2022, v kateri je sodelovalo 3.863 policistov/-k je pokazala, da je 13,7 % anketiranih policistov/-k porocalo o depresiji, 4,6 % pa jih je kazalo simptome duševnih motenj in so potrebovali ustrezno obravnavo (Tehrani, 2022). Omenimo lahko tudi navzocnost depresije v casu pandemije med pripadniki/-cami oboroženih sil. Na tej tocki moramo poudariti, da so razis­kave, opravljene po razlicnih delih sveta, prikazale tudi razlicne rezultate, odvisno od tega, v kolikšni meri so bile OS (oborožene sile) vkljucene v krizno odzivanje v casu pandemije. Pripadniki/-ice OS, ki so opravljali delo v bolnišnicah, so porocali o podobnih težavah kot zdravstveno osebje, in sicer o anksioznosti (29,44 %) in depresiji (36,45 %) (Guo in drugi, 2020). Na podlagi predstavljenih raziskav na podrocjih zdravstva, policije in vojske lahko na tej tocki predpostavimo, da obstaja povezanost med pan­demijo in obcutenjem depresije. Prav tako lahko predpostavimo, da se je število oseb z depresijo v casu pandemije povecalo. Zdravstvo Eno izmed kljucnih vlog pri obvladovanju epidemiološke krize v pove­zavi s covidom-19 v Sloveniji in ravno tako tudi drugod po svetu je imel zdravstveni sistem. Zdravstveno osebje se je v casu obvladovanja epide­mije (marec 2020–junij 2022) srecevalo z vrsto dodatnih nalog, pri cemer pa zdravstveni delavci/-ke praviloma niso usposobljeni za upravljanje s kompleksnimi krizami z družbenimi ucinki, kakršne povzroci pandemija. Izpostavljeni so bili povecanemu obsegu dela, delu v nevarnih okoljih, pri­soten je bil strah pred okužbo in prenosom okužbe na družinske clane in kolege/-ice, delo so opravljali na drugih delovišcih, redno so se testirali, obvezno so nosili zašcitno opremo, kot so maske, ocala, šcitniki za obraz in sredstva za zašcito rok in dezinfekcijo (Šinkovec, 2020). Med pande­mijo je do izraza prišla tudi obcutna kadrovska podhranjenost javnega zdravstvenega sistema (zasebni del se namrec ni v tolikšni meri vkljuceval v skrb za bolnike), primanjkovalo je okoli 30 odstotkov zaposlenih (Ceh, 2020). Posledicno v javnem zdravstvenem sistemu ni bilo in še vedno ni dovolj osebja, tisti, ki pa so, so zelo hitro postali preobremenjeni in utrujeni. Prihajalo je tudi do okužb s covidom-19 ter posledicno karantenskih odlocb med zdravstvenimi delavci (Ceh, 2020; Jurjevcic Tržan, 2021). Prav tako so bili zdravstveni delavci/-ke med pandemijo obcasno prica verbalnemu nasilju nad zaposlenimi (Ceh, 2020). Med zdravstvenimi delavci/-kami je bilo cutiti tudi nezaupanje vase in v svoje znanje glede obvladovanja neznane okužbe; soocali so se tudi s številnimi eticnimi dile­mami glede obravnave in zdravljenja obolelih (npr. eticna dilema glede razporejanja ventilatorjev). Vladala sta bila tudi velika negotovost in strah v povezavi z morebitno okuženostjo svojih najbližjih in svojih sodelavcev/­-k. Zelo obremenjujoce je bilo tudi vzdrževanje socialne razdalje do družin­skih clanov. Delovnik zdravstvenega osebja med pandemijo je bil neurejen, neprilagodljiv, dolg in posledicno naporen. Zahteval je veliko število nadur, prilagajanja in neprekinjenega dela. Takšen delovnik je eden izmed kljucnih dejavnikov stresa in dodatno povecuje možnost za razvoj duševnih motenj (Jurjevcic Tržan, 2021). Policija Med pandemijo (marec 2020–junij 2022) so pripadniki/-ce slovenske policije (zaradi kompleksnosti le-te) nacionalni red, mir in stabilnost zago­tavljali ob rednem delu – tudi s kopico dodatnih nalog, mednje spadajo zagotavljanje varnosti na nenapovedanih protestih, nadzorovanje policijske ure, ukrepanje pri nezakonitih migracijah in nadzorovanje »starih« držav­nih meja, tudi tistih, na katerih je bil zaradi schengenskega obmocja nadzor odpravljen. Sektor za odnose z javnostmi SGDP GPU (2020) navaja, da so doloceni policisti (predvsem prometni) opravljali razlicne dodatne naloge (spremstvo konvojev, prisotnost na notranjih mejah, izvajanje ukrepov za omejitev gibanja in združevanja na javnih krajih), velikokrat na robu zmog­ljivosti in pogosto tudi sami izpostavljeni tveganju za zdravje. Policisti/-ke so skladno s sprejetimi odloki, ki so se med pandemijo spreminjali, preverjali in izvajali nadzor po vsej Sloveniji. Še vec dodatnega dela policiji pa je nalo­žil odlok, ki je prepovedoval prehajanje obcinskih meja, saj so policisti/-ke morali doloceno casovno obdobje dodatno izvajati še nadzor na mejah obcin po celotnem ozemlju Slovenije. Prav tako so bili policisti/-ke izpo­stavljeni zelo razlicnim dejavnikom tveganja (povecani obseg dela, delo v nevarnih okoljih, prisoten je bil strah pred okužbo in prenosom okužbe na družinske clane in kolege/-ice) (Sektor za odnose z javnostmi SGDP GPU, 2020). Poleg rednih zadolžitev so policisti/-ke cez ozemlje Slovenije v samo prvih dveh mesecih epidemije v letu 2020 organizirano pospremili skoraj 67.000 tovornih vozil v maticne države in samo aprila in maja 2020 izvedli približno 190.000 kontrol na krajih, kjer so se pred epidemijo obicajno zbi­rali ljudje (Sektor za odnose z javnostmi SGDP GPU, 2020). Policisti/-ke so morali pri opravljanju svojega dela obvezno in dosledno upoštevati navo­dila NIJZ (nošenje zašcitnih mask in ocal, razkuževanje, varnostna razdalja, prezracevanje itd.) (Kovacic, 2020). Srecevali so se tudi z zahtevnimi tehnic­nimi in logisticnimi nalogami, pravnimi vprašanji, kadrovskimi izzivi, saj so se s covidom-19 okužili tudi zaposleni v policiji in so tako morali ostajati v karanteni. Nekateri izmed policistov/-k so se srecevali tudi s prilagoditvami za opravljanje službene obveznosti od doma in izobraževanja na daljavo (Sektor za odnose z javnostmi SGDP GPU, 2020). Zaradi številnih klicev na tel. številko 113 v povezavi z pandemijo (RS MNZ, b.d.) je slovenska poli­cija 3. aprila 2020 vzpostavila dodatni klicni center, v katerem so odgovarjali državljanom na vprašanja o pandemiji. Klicev je bilo v povprecju 500 na dan (Sektor za odnose z javnostmi SGDP GPU, 2020). Slovenska vojska (SV) Tudi pripadniki/-ce SV so se, zaradi pandemije (marec 2020–junij 2022), sre­cevali z vrsto dodatnih nalog. Kovac (2021) navaja, da je SV leta 2020 postavila premicno bolnišnico Role 2 v Ljubljani s kapaciteto do 140 bolniških postelj, namenjenih za oskrbo obolelih prebivalcev/-k. SV je med drugim tudi poma­gala državljanom Slovenije pri vrnitvi v domovino ter pri transportu obolelih pripadnikov/-ic SV z mednarodnih operacij in misij (MOM) (Kovac, 2021). Skladno z aktiviranim nacrtom državne zašcite in reševanja ob epidemiji je SV pomagala predvsem z materialnimi sredstvi in logisticno podporo ter kadro­vskimi zmogljivostmi. Vojaške zdravstvene enote (VZE) so tako vzpostavile sistem sledenja visoko tveganih stikov, preventivnih testiranj ter pravocasnih napotitev v karanteno. Pripadniki/-ce SV so med pandemijo sodelovali tudi z zdravstvenimi delavci/-kami, in sicer pri selitvi laboratorija v UKC, premiku in vzpostavitvi delovanja vojaškega rentgena na lokaciji UKC Ljubljana, selitvi oddelka iz bolnišnice dr. Petra Držaja v UKC Ljubljana, selitvi in opremljanju novonastalega oddelka (selitev MOBSTAC v UKC) (Bjelan, 2020). Kljub pandemiji so se pripadniki/-ice SV udeleževali MOM (mednarodne operacije in misije), skrbeli so za temeljne vojaške naloge, kot je vzdrževa­nje reda, miru in stabilnosti, ter vzdrževali stopnjo pripravljenosti in uspo­sabljanja. Pomembno je omeniti tudi vojaško vajo Preskok 2020, ki je pote­kala od konca aprila do 19. junija 2020 in jo je SV izpeljala kljub pandemiji in zaprtju države (lock down) (Kovac, 2021). Vaja Preskok 2020 sodi med najvecje vojaške vaje v zgodovini SV; vkljucevala je 2.500 vojakov/-inj SV, pri cemer lahko domnevamo, da bila vaja zaradi pandemije za pripadnike/-ice stresna (npr. strah pred okužbo in prenosom v družinsko okolje). Vojaške zdravstvene enote so ves cas trajanja vaje Preskok 2020 skrbele za izvajanje zdravstvene oskrbe, redno testiranje na okužbo s covidom-19 ter dezinfek­cijo prostorov in uporabljene opreme (Kovac, 2021). Kot smo že omenili, so pripadniki/-ce SV tudi med pandemijo delovali na razlicnih MOM. 3 Metoda in opis raziskave Kljucni raziskovalni cilj je bil raziskati prisotnost depresije in povezavo med depresijo pri zaposlenih v kriticnih poklicih, in sicer pripadnikih/-cah oboroženih sil, policistih/-kah in zdravstvenem osebju ter nekaterimi zna­menji obremenitev v casu epidemije covida-19, o katerih so sami porocali (marec 2020–junij 2022). Na primer: na Kosovo so odšle veterinarske enote (VETE) z namenom temeljite dezinfekcije vozil in prostorov. Zaradi sprejetih strogih epidemioloških ukrepov vlade RS leta 2020 se je prekinil rotacij­ski krog na misiji EUTM Mali (Training Mission), sledil je tudi preklic dopusta clanov/-ic misije. Tako so pripadniki/-ce SV, ki so bili takrat nastanjeni v Maliju, nadaljevali svoje delo (Kovac, 2021). Raziskovalni vprašanji in hipoteze Iz raziskovalnega cilja je izpeljano naslednje raziskovalno vprašanje z izvedenim podvprašanjem, pri cemer se obe vprašanji nanašata na obdobje pandemije covida-19 med marcem 2020 in junijem 2022. RV1: Kako se delo v kriznih razmerah v casu pandemije odraža na zdravju/pocutju zaposlenih v kriticnih poklicih (to so pripadniki/-ce SV, policisti/-ke in zdravstveno osebje)? RV1.1: Kakšna je povezava med depresijo in obremenitvami v casu pan­demije covida-19 v kriticnih poklicih? Na raziskovalni vprašanji bomo odgovorili s pomocjo naslednjih hipo­tez: H1: Med zaposlenimi v preucevanih kriticnih poklicih se je v casu pande­mije covida-19 kazala depresija. H2: Med zaposlenimi v preucevanih kriticnih poklicih obstaja poveza­nost med depresijo in pandemijo. H3: Med zaposlenimi v preucevanih kriticnih poklicih se je pokazala povezava med samooceno stresa v casu pandemije in depresijo. Opis raziskave Kljucna raziskovalna metoda je retrospektivno kvantitativno merjenje s spletno anketo in bivariatna statisticna analiza podatkov (Lobe, 2006), pri cemer pa se zavedamo omejitev glede objektivnosti pri raziskovanju clovekovega vedenja, custev in duševnih težav. Predhodna teoreticna in empiricna spoznanja so bila operacionalizirana in oblikovali smo merski instrument za preucevanje depresije in obcutka stresa ter obremenitev med pripadniki/-icami SV, policisti/-kami in zdravstvenim osebjem v Sloveniji v casu pandemije (marec 2020–junij 2022). Anketni vprašalnik je anonimen in sestavljen iz 21 vprašanj, od tega je pet demografskih vprašanj (spol, starost, poklic, število otrok in zaposlitev partnerja/-ice). Sledita vprašanji, ki se nanašata na obcutke stresa, in sicer na stres doma in stres v službi. Nadalje je indeks pandemije sestavljen iz naslednjih vprašanj: stres na delovnem mestu, stres doma, strah pred okužbo, strah pred prenosom okužbe, povecani obseg dela, placilo in volja po dodatnih aktivnostih (neodvisne spremenljivke). 4 Depresija je bila izmerjena z lestvico CES-D (Radloff, 1977; Boisvert in drugi, 2003), pri cemer smo uporabili prevedeno in slovenskemu okolju Pri vseh vprašanjih za izracun indeksa pandemije je bila uporabljena petstopenjska Likertova lestvica. prilagojeno lestvico za izracun indeksa depresije (Vuga Beršnak in drugi, 2020; Cronbach a = 0,908).5 Indeks depresije smo izracunali po smernicah avtorjev vprašalnika CES-D (Radloff, 1977; Boisvert in drugi, 2003).6 S pomocjo statisticne metode korelacije smo torej analizirali povezanost med odvisno spremenljivko (depresija) in zgoraj opisanimi neodvisnimi spremenljivkami (dejavniki tveganja: stres in pandemija). Vprašalnik smo oblikovali s pomocjo orodja 1KA (Center za družbo­slovno informatiko, b. d.). Pridobljene podatke smo analizirali s pomocjo racunalniškega programa IBM SPSS, ki je namenjen statisticnim obdelavam. Formalni in neformalni postopek pridobivanja dovoljenj za izvedbo raziskave Da bi lahko izvedli spletno anketo, smo morali pridobiti uradno dovo­ljenje za izvajanje anketiranja policistov in policistk, pri cemer je bila pro­šnja za podatke policije v raziskovalne ali študijske namene obravnavana na Policijski akademiji v Centru za raziskovanje in socialne vešcine. Za razisko­vanje v zdravstveni stroki smo prek e-naslovov in telefonskih klicev stopili v stik s številnimi zdravstvenimi domovi, domovi za starejše obcane/-ke in urgentnimi klinicnimi centri. V vseh omenjenih ustanovah so se po preuci­tvi prošnje prostovoljno odlocili, ali bodo anketni vprašalnik posredovali svojim zaposlenim, o cemer so nas obvestili. Za izvedbo ankete v SV nam ni bilo dodeljeno posebno dovoljenje, smo pa v stik s SV in Generalštabom SV stopili prek telefona in e-pošte. Opis vzorca Anketni vprašalnik je bil namenjen zdravstvenem osebju, policistom/­-kam in pripadnikom/-cam oboroženih sil SV. Raziskava je bila anonimna in sodelovanje prostovoljno. Vzorcili smo namensko, saj smo želeli pridobiti odgovore tocno dolocenih posameznikov in posameznic v izbranih pokli­cih, ki so med epidemijo opravljali delo, povezano z upravljanjem s posle­dicami le-te. Ugotovitev raziskave ne moremo posplošiti na celotno popu­lacijo. Anketa je potekala od 28. aprila do 15. julija 2022; v tem obdobju je v raziskavi sodelovalo 1022 oseb, vendar je bilo zaradi prekinitve ali neustre­zno izpolnjenega vprašalnika na koncu ustrezno izpolnjenih 587 anket. Od 5 Uporabljena je bila pri projektu Vojaško specificni dejavniki tveganja za dobrobit in zdravje voja­ških družin. 6 Vprašalnik, namenjen izracunu indeksa depresije, je sestavljen iz desetih vprašanj, merjenih na petstopenjski lestvici (1. redko ali nikoli, 2. vcasih ali malokrat, 3. obcasno ali srednje pogosto, 4. zelo pogo­sto in 5. ves cas). tega je v raziskavi sodelovalo 60 % moških (352), 39 % žensk (228) in 1 % oseb, ki se ni želel opredeliti po spolu (7). Povprecna starost sodelujocih anketirancev/-k je bila 42,6 let. V raziskavi je sodelovalo 16 % (94) zdravstve­nih delavcev/-k, od tega 14 % (13) moških in 86 % (81) žensk, 9 % (50) je bilo pripadnikov/-ic oboroženih sil, od tega 76 % (39) moških in 22 % (11) žensk ter 47 % (278) pripadnikov/-ic policije, od tega 74 % (207) moških in 24 % (67) žensk. 19 % (112) oseb pa je v casu pandemije opravljalo drugi poklic, zato smo jih iz analize izlocili. 17 % (16) anketirancev/-k, ki so zaposleni v zdravstveni stroki, ima tudi partnerja/-ico zaposlenega/-o v enem izmed preucevanih poklicev. Prav tako ima partnerja/-ico v preucevanih poklicih zaposlenih 14 % (7) pripadnikov/-ic SV in 28 % (74) policistov/-k. Rezultati in analiza H1: Med zaposlenimi v preucevanih kriticnih poklicih se je v casu pande­mije covida-19 kazala depresija. Med vsemi anketiranimi jih 30 % (75) kaže znake depresije, od tega 42,5 % žensk in 21,6 % moških. Iz pridobljenih analiziranih podatkov (Tabela 1) lahko ugotovimo, da je indeks depresije pozitiven pri 38 % (5) zdravstvenih delavcih in 43 % (36) zdravstvenih delavkah, 10,6 % (22) policistih in 11,9 % (8) policistkah. Indeks depresije je pozitiven tudi pri 7,6 % (3) pripadnikih SV in 9 % (1) pripadnici SV. Sklenemo lahko torej, da znake depresije kaže vec žensk kot moških. Pri tem pa je treba upoštevati spolno strukturo preucevanih organiza­cij. Primerjalno med vsemi tremi vzorci in tudi znotraj vzorca zdravstve­nega osebja je najvec depresivnih žensk, a je tudi v raziskavi v tem vzorcu sodelovala absolutna vecina žensk (86 %). V SV in policiji je precej manj posameznikov/-ic kazalo znake depresije, a med njimi prevladujejo moški, pri cemer je treba upoštevati, da je v obeh organizacijah v raziskavi sode­lovalo vec kot dve tretjini moških. Razmerje med spoloma je povezano z ospoljenim karakterjem vseh treh organizacij. Tabela 1: PODATKI ZA IZRACUN INDEKSA DEPRESIJE, RAZDELJENI PO POKLICIH Poklic Redko ali nikoli Vcasih ali malokrat Obcasno ali srednje pogosto Zelo pogosto Ves cas Ne želim odgo. Skupaj 1. Motile so me stvari, ki me obicajno ne motijo. zdrav. osebje 13 (16 %) 15 (19 %) 32 (40 %) 19 (24 %) 1 (1 %) / 80 (100 %) pripadnik/-ica SV 12 (29 %) 9 (21 %) 12 (29 %) 7 (17 %) 2 (5 %) / 42 (100 %) policist/-ka 50 (23 %) 52 (24 %) 63 (29 %) 40 (19 %) 9 (4 %) 1 (0 %) 215 (100 %) 2. Stežka sem ostal/-a osredotocen/-a na to, kar sem pocel/-a. zdrav. osebje 22 (28 %) 23 (29 %) 22 (28 %) 11 (14 %) 2 (3 %) / 80 (100 %) pripadnik/-ica SV 18 (43 %) 14 (33 %) 5 (12 %) 4 (10 %) 1 (2 %) / 42 (100 %) policist/-ka 79 (37 %) 50 (23 %) 49 (23 %) 32 (15 %) 4 (2 %) 1 (0 %) 215 (100 %) 3. Pocutil/-a sem se depresivno. zdrav. osebje 30 (38 %) 17 (21 %) 21 (26 %) 11 (14 %) 1 (1 %) / 80 (100 %) pripadnik/-ica SV 22 (52 %) 12 (29 %) 2 (5 %) 4 (10 %) 2 (5 %) / 42 (100 %) policist/-ka 93 (43 %) 47 (22 %) 41 (19 %) 24 (11 %) 9 (4 %) 1 (0 %) 215 (100 %) 4. Za vse, kar sem pocel/-a, je bil potreben napor. zdrav. osebje 18 (23 %) 20 (25 %) 24 (30 %) 13 (16 %) 5 (6 %) / 80 (100 %) pripadnik/-ica SV 18 (43 %) 11 (26 %) 10 (24 %) 2 (5 %) 1 (2 %) / 42 (100 %) policist/-ka 76 (35 %) 54 (25 %) 45 (21 %) 33 (15 %) 6 (3 %) 1 215 (100 %) 5. Cutil/-a sem upanje glede prihodnosti. zdrav. osebje 5 (6 %) 10 (13 %) 15 (19 %) 30 (38 %) 19 (24 %) 1 (1 %) 80 (100 %) pripadnik/-ica SV 4 (10 %) 8 (19 %) 12 (29 %) 9 (21 %) 9 (21 %) / 42 (100 %) policist/-ka 27 (13 %) 36 (17 %) 50 (23 %) 52 (24 %) 49 (23 %) 1 (0 %) 215 (100 %) 6. Obcutil/-a sem strah. zdrav. osebje 18 (23 %) 19 (24 %) 24 (30 %) 16 (20 %) 3 (4 %) / 80 (100 %) pripadnik/-ica SV 18 (43 %) 10 (24 %) 5 (12 %) 7 (17 %) 2 (5 %) / 42 (100 %) policist/-ka 77 (36 %) 55 (26 %) 39 (18 %) 31 (14 %) 12 (6 %) 1 (0 %) 215 (100 %) 7. Spal/-a sem nemirno. zdrav. osebje 16 (20 %) 22 (28 %) 20 (25 %) 17 (21 %) 5 (6 %) / 80 (100 %) pripadnik/-ica SV 19 (45 %) 10 (24 %) 6 (14 %) 6 (14 %) 1 (2 %) / 42 (100 %) policist/-ka 67 (31 %) 54 (25 %) 40 (19 %) 41 (19 %) 12 (6 %) 1 (0 %) 215 (100 %) Poklic Redko ali nikoli Vcasih ali malokrat Obcasno ali srednje pogosto Zelo pogosto Ves cas Ne želim odgo. Skupaj 8. Bil/-a sem srecen/-na. zdrav. osebje 7 (9 %) 15 (19 %) 33 (41 %) 18 (23 %) 5 (6 %) 2 (3 %) 80 (100 %) pripadnik/-ica SV 1 (2 %) 9 (21 %) 14 (33 %) 11 (26 %) 6 (14 %) 1 (2 %) 42 (100 %) policist/-ka 21 (10 %) 48 (22 %) 75 (35 %) 51 (24 %) 18 (8 %) 2 (1 %) 215 (100 %) 9. Pocutil/-a sem se osamljeno. zdrav. osebje 34 (43 %) 17 (21 %) 18 (23 %) 10 (13 %) 1 (1 %) / 80 (100 %) pripadnik/-ica SV 18 (43 %) 11 (26 %) 9 (21 %) 3 (7 %) 1 (2 %) / 42 (100 %) policist/-ka 92 (43 %) 51 (24 %) 47 (22 %) 16 (7 %) 7 (3 %) 2 (1 %) 215 (100 %) 10. Nisem se mogel/-la »spraviti v pogon«. zdrav. osebje 18 (23 %) 28 (35 %) 17 (21 %) 13 (16 %) 3 (4 %) 1 (1 %) 80 (100 %) pripadnik/-ica SV 15 (36 %) 15 (36 %) 5 (12 %) 6 (14 %) 1 (2 %) / 42 (100 %) policist/-ka 77 (36 %) 45 (21 %) 36 (17 %) 43 (20 %) 11 (5 %) 3 (1 %) 215 (100 %) Vir: lastni prikaz. Na podlagi zgornjih podatkov lahko potrdimo hipotezo, da pripadniki/-ce SV, policisti/-ke in zdravstveno osebje nakazujejo razvoj depresije (30 %), pri cemer so se kot najbolj zaskrbljujoci pokazali podatki glede depresivno­sti med zdravstvenimi delavkami. H2: Med zaposlenimi v preucevanih kriticnih poklicih obstaja poveza­nost med depresijo in pandemijo. Treba je poudariti, da smo Pearsonov koeficient korelacije izracunali za vsak preucevani poklic posebej. Najprej smo se posvetili indeksu depresije, ki smo ga opazovali v odnosu z vsemi neodvisnimi spremenljivkami (1 – stres na delovnem mestu, 2 – stres doma, 3 – strah pred okužbo, 4 – strah pred prenosom okužbe, 5 – povecani obseg dela, 6 – placilo in 7 – volja po dodatnih aktivnostih), v nadaljevanju pa smo vse neodvisne spremen­ljivke v programu IBM SPSS povezali v eno in jo poimenovali »pandemija covida-19« ter ugotavljali njeno povezanost z depresijo. Iz izracunov korelacij med indeksom depresije z razlicnimi neodvi­snimi spremenljivkami (Tabela 2), kjer smo stres raziskovali v povezavi z drugimi dejavniki v luci širšega konteksta v povezavi z depresijo, lahko izpostavimo, da smo pri vseh preucevanih poklicih, torej pri zdravstvenem osebju, policistih/-kah in pripadnikih/-cah SV, ugotovili srednje mocno povezanost med indeksom depresije in: a) stresom na delovnem mestu, ki izhaja iz nalog povezanih z obvladovanjem pandemije; b) s stresom, ki so ga anketiranci/-ke obcutili/-e doma; c) z voljo, željo in energijo, ki so jo imeli anketiranci/-ke v casu pandemije za sodelovanje pri družinskih obveznostih ali opravljanju svojih hobijev. V vseh obravnavanih vzorcih pri vseh ome­njenih izracunih se je pokazala statisticno pomembna in znacilna povezava (p < 0.01), kar nakazuje na to, da obstaja korelacija med navedenimi neod­visnimi spremenljivkami in depresijo. V vseh obravnavanih vzorcih se je pokazala statisticno znacilna povezava (p < 0.01) med depresijo in strahom pred okužbo ter strahom pred prenosom virusa v domace okolje. Tabela 2:KORELACIJA MED DEJAVNIKI TVEGANJA V CASU EPIDEMIJE COVIDA-19 IN INDEKSOM DEPRESIJE ZDRAVSTVENEGA OSEBJA, POLICISTOV/-K IN PRIPADNIKOV/-IC SV PREUCEVANE SKUPINE Zdravstveno osebje Policisti/-ke Pripadniki/-ice SV Duševna motnja Dejavnik tveganja r P r p r p Depresija Stres na delovnem mestu .497 < 0.01 .496 < 0.01 .493 < 0.01 Stres doma .537 < 0.01 .524 < 0.01 .574 < 0.01 Strah pred okužbo .341 < 0.01 .337 < 0.01 .486 < 0.01 Strah pred prenosom okužbe .306 < 0.01 .302 < 0.01 .417 < 0.01 Povecani obseg dela 154 > 0.05 0.85 > 0.05 .178 > 0.05 Placilo 137 > 0.01 - 0.74 > 0.01 -0.63 > 0.01 Volja, želja in energija .499 < 0.01 .548 < 0.01 .620 < 0.01 Epidemija covida-19 .534 < 0.01 .548 < 0.01 .620 < 0.01 Vir: lastni prikaz. Korelacije med indeksom depresije in dodatnimi delovnimi urami v casu pandemije nismo uspeli ugotoviti. Prav tako v nobenem vzorcu nismo uspeli ugotoviti korelacije oz. povezanosti med indeksom depresije in placilom za opravljanje dodatnega dela. Kljub temu da povezava ni statisticno znacilna, pa lahko povzamemo, da je r v vzorcu pripadnikov/-cah SV in slovenskih policistov/-kah negativen (r = -.063 in -.074). Ta ugotovitev nakazuje, da bi se pri policistih/-kah in pripadnikih/-cah SV depresivnost lahko znižala, ce bi bila njihova financna situacija ugodnejša, medtem ko pri zdravstvenem osebju tega ne opazimo. Med pandemijo in depresijo pripadnikov/-ic SV, policistov/-k in zdrav­stvenim osebjem obstaja srednja povezanost, zato lahko drugo hipotezo potrdimo. H3: Med zaposlenimi v preucevanih kriticnih poklicih se je pokazala povezava med samooceno stresa v casu pandemije in depresijo. Za namen raziskovanja H3 smo se posvetili izoliranemu razmerju pove­zanosti med stresom, ki so ga anketiranci/-ke obcutili na delovnem mestu, in stresom doma v casu covida-19 ter epidemijo. Iz opravljene in predstavljene analize ter izracunov Pearsonovih koefi­cientov korelacij med depresijo in delovnim stresom in stresom, ki so ga anketiranci/-ke obcutili doma v casu pandemije, obstaja srednje mocna povezanost pri vseh preucevanih poklicih, in sicer, pri zdravstvenem osebju je r = .497 med depresijo in delovnim stresom ter r = .537 med depresijo in stresom doma, pri policistih/-kah je r = .496 med depresijo in delovnim stre­som ter r = .524 med depresijo in stresom doma, pri pripradnikih/-cah SV pa je je r = .493 med depresijo in delovnim stresom ter r = .574 med depresijo in stresom doma. V vseh obravnavanih vzorcih pri vseh omenjenih izracunih se je pokazala statisticno pomembna in znacilna povezava (p < 0.01), kar nakazuje na to, da obstaja korelacija med delovnim stresom in stresom doma ter depresijo. Razprava in sklep Kot smo ugotovili, je bil v casu pandemije (marec 2020–junij 2022) pomembno povecan obseg dela in spremenjene (poslabšane) delovne razmere, pri cemer predhodno niti ni bilo poskrbljeno za ustrezno uspo­sobljenost zaposlenih v kriticnih poklicih za primer odziva na pandemijo z vajami niti ni bil posodobljen nacrt odziva na epidemijo. Kot primer lahko navedemo veliko dodatnega in spreminjajocega se dela, naloge, ki so jih ti poklici opravljali prvic, so bile nepoznane, tudi delo v maskah je bilo za nekatere skupine (policisti in SV) novo in nepoznano, prav tako tudi vzdr­ževanje varnostne razdalje in razkuževanje opreme in rok. Dodatne obre­menitve so bile neredni in spreminjajoc urnik ter napotitve v karanteno. Zagotovo pa sta bila navzoca tudi strah pred okužbo in prenosom le-te na družinske clane. Raziskava je pokazala pozitiven indeks depresije pri 30 % anketiranih zaposlenih v preiskovanih poklicih, in sicer pri 42,5 % žensk in pri 21,6 % moških. Ugotovili smo torej, da delo v kriznih razmerah, kar je bila tudi pandemija, lahko povzroci porast depresije med zaposlenimi v kriticnih poklicih v Sloveniji. Podobno ugotavljajo tudi nekatere druge sorodne raziskave, na primer v raziskavi »Mental Health Care for Military Personnel in the COVID-19 Epidemic« je bila izmerjena povišana stopnja anksioznosti (29 %) in depresije (36 %) v casu pandemije (Guo in drugi, 2020), v obo­roženih silah ZDA so prav tako prepoznali anksioznost (17 %) in depre­sijo (17 %) med pandemijo (raziskava US soldiers and the role of leader­ship: COVID-19, mental health, and adherence to public health guidelines (2022). Pri vseh preucevanih poklicih, torej pri zdravstvenem osebju, policistih/­-kah in pripadnikih/-cah SV, smo ugotovili, da obstaja srednje mocna in zna­cilna povezanost med indeksom depresije ter pandemijo, kar nakazuje na to, da lahko dejavniki tveganja, ki spremljajo pandemijo, prispevajo k razvoju ali h krepitvi duševnih težav med zaposlenimi v preucevanih kriticnih pokli­cih. Srednje mocno povezanost smo prepoznali med indeksom depresije in: a) stresom na delovnem mestu; b) s stresom, ki so ga anketiranci/-ke obcutili/-e doma; c) z voljo, željo in energijo, ki so jo imeli anketiranci/-ke v casu pandemije za sodelovanje pri družinskih obveznostih. Pandemija in z njo povezana tveganja ter obremenitve so trajali približno dve leti, kar je povzrocilo krepitev stresa med prebivalstvom, tudi med zapo­slenimi v kriticnih poklicih. Klinika Mayo (2018) navaja, da lahko dlje casa trajajoca izpostavljenost stresnim situacijam pripelje tudi do razvoja dušev­nih stisk. Poudariti je treba, da se je predvsem zdravstveno osebje srecevalo s travmaticnimi dogodki, saj so na intenzivni negi v najbolj kriticnih epide­mioloških razmerah vsak dan skrbeli za nekaj sto ljudi, pri cemer so nekateri tudi izgubili življenje. Tudi policisti/-ke ter pripadniki/-ce SV so bili, kot smo videli, prica stresnim in travmaticnim situacijam, le da na drugih podrocjih. Za konec lahko poudarimo, da smo med pripravo clanka ugotovili, da so pripadniki/-ice SV, policisti/-ke in zdravstveni delavci/-ke med pandemijo opravili zelo veliko dodatnega dela, v neznani situaciji, ob spreminjanju delavnika, v strahu pred okužbo in prenosom virusa SARS-Cov-2. Vse to je povzrocalo nelagodje, stres, strah in je bilo povezano z razvojem duševnih motenj, kot je depresija. 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Dostopno prek https://apps.who.int/iris/rest/ bitstreams/1412184/retrieve, 17. 7. 2022. DRUŽBENI IN JAVNOPOLITICNI VIDIKI OKOLJSKIH TVEGANJ SKOZI PRIZMO JAVNEGA MNENJA (TEMATSKI SKLOP) Brina MALNAR* UVODNIK: ISKANJE POTI OD OKOLJSKE OZAVEŠCENOSTI DO PODPORE OKOLJSKIM POLITIKAM. KAJ NAM POVEDO PODATKI DRUŽBOSLOVNIH ANKET? Cas, ko se cloveštvo sooca z vse bolj oprijemljivimi negativnimi posledi­cami podnebnih sprememb, postavlja okoljske politike pred velik izziv. Za njihovo uspešno oblikovanje in izvajanje je treba razumeti zapleten odnos med dogajanjem v naravnem okolju in dejavniki, ki vplivajo na stališca in zaznave prebivalstva o njem. Odziv javnosti po eni strani doloca meje možnega javno politicnega ukrepanja, po drugi pa je tudi ucinek tega ukre­panja, pa tudi številnih drugih dejavnikov, kot so vrednote, osebna izkustva, politicna in medijska krajina in drugi. Vse te dejavnike v svoje modele zdru­žujejo družboslovni analitiki, ki s pomocjo razlicnih vrst podatkov razisku­jejo vecplastne družbene posledice okoljskih vprašanj. Vir podatkov za opazovanje dinamike stališc javnosti do okoljskih vpra­šanj so praviloma velike družboslovne ankete, kakršne se v slovenskem pro­storu že vec kot pet desetletij izvajajo v okviru programa Slovensko javno mnenje (Malnar, 2021). Pricujoci tematski sklop tako združuje pet prispev­kov avtorjev s podrocij sociologije, psihologije in obramboslovja, ki teme­ljijo na okoljskih mnenjskih kazalnikih tega programa ter njegovih domacih in tujih partnerjev. Splošna podmena petih študij so izsledki številnih razis­kav, ki kažejo, da je obstoj podnebnih sprememb, ki jih povzroca clovek, in njihovih negativnih posledic v javnostih evropskih držav postal vecinsko sprejeto dejstvo (Poortinga et al., 2019; Kácha et al., 2022). Tematski sklop se zato osredini na naslednji korak, torej na vprašanje, ali oziroma pod kakšnimi pogoji se to zavedanje prevede v okoljska ravnanja in podporo okoljskim politikam. Rdeca nit prispevkov je empiricno raziskovanje »real­nega«, torej vedenjskega in politicnega dometa okoljske ozavešcenosti, saj se na prvi pogled zdi, da je bil s prevlado teh stališc v javnosti dosežen klju­cen preboj za podporo okoljskim politikam in ravnanjem. Vendar pa je iz prispevkov razvidno, da gre pri tem le za nujen, ne pa tudi zadosten pogoj. S teoreticno razlago tega dejstva se sistematicno ukvarja prvi prispe­vek (Malnar), ki temelji na strnitvi ugotovitev 64 študij s podatki ankete European Social Survey. V njem avtorica razvije splošni teoreticni model in izriše povezave med kljucnimi individualnimi in institucionalnimi dejav­niki, ki vplivajo na okoljska stališca, ravnanja in odnos do okoljskih politik. * Gostujoca urednica: dr. Brina Malnar, znanstvena sodelavka, predstojnica Centra za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in množicnih komunikacij, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija. Model izpostavi nujnost in hkrati nezadostnost okoljske ozavešcenosti, ki sama po sebi ne privede do okolju prijaznega ravnanja prebivalstva, pac pa se to zgodi le hkrati z vecjim številom posredujocih dejavnikov. Custvena angažiranost, predvsem pa obcutek individualne odgovornosti, zaupa­nje soljudem in politicno zaupanje so nekateri kljucni elementi, ki zave­danje okoljskih problemov pretvorijo v ravnanja in podporo politikam. Ker gre za kompleksne dejavnike, na katere nosilci odlocanja ne morejo enostavno vplivati, ti predstavljajo pomembno oviro oblikovanju politik in uveljavljanju ukrepov za blažitev podnebnih sprememb. Ena od rešitev je lahko fleksibilnost na strani javnih politik, torej prilagajanje okoljskih stra­tegij konkretnemu družbenemu, ekonomskemu in politicnemu kontekstu držav. Splošne ugotovitve o razkoraku med stališci in ravnanji, s katerim se srecujejo odlocevalci, na primeru Slovenije potrdi študija javnomnenjske podpore razlicnim scenarijem rabe obnovljivih virov energije (Kurdija in Bevk). Kot ugotavljata avtorja, se slovenska javnost v vecinskem deležu zaveda obstoja antropogeno povzrocenih podnebnih sprememb in je na nacelni ravni vecinsko naklonjena obnovljivim virom energije, kot so vetrne ali soncne elektrarne. Te igrajo kljucno vlogo v zelenem prehodu in izra­ženo nasprotovanje njihovemu umešcanju v prostor je v slovenski javnosti nižje kot v tujih raziskavah. Vendar pa drugi kazalniki nakazujejo potrebo po relativizaciji teh ugotovitev, saj ob omembi konkretnejših okoljskih ukre­pov, npr. davka na fosilna goriva, naklonjenost anketirancev hitro preide v vecinsko zadržanost ali nasprotovanje. Avtorja kot bistven problem v slo­venskem prostoru vidita nizko stopnjo politicnega zaupanja ter, glede na druge države, še izrazitejši pesimizem glede smiselnosti in ucinkovitosti osebnega okoljskega ravnanja. Ob tem izpostavita, da je za uspeh okoljskih politik potrebna širša družbena preobrazba, ki bi ob energetski preobrazbi zagotovila pravicno porazdelitev koristi in tveganj za vse družbene skupine. Razpravo o tem, kako globoko dejansko seže zavedanje okoljske proble­matike na individualni ravni, nadaljujeta naslednja dva clanka. Študija Polica in Svetine se osredini na povezavo med odnosom do okoljskih vprašanj in zadovoljstvom z življenjem. Avtorja izhajata iz pricakovanja, da široko pri­sotno zavedanje problema okoljskih tveganj v javnosti postaja dejavnik, ki že vpliva na zadovoljstvo z življenjem. A temu ni tako, saj podatki kažejo, da imajo tradicionalni dejavniki, kot sta zaznana materialna blaginja in zdravje, pricakovano še vedno vodilno vlogo, medtem ko statisticno znacilne pove­zave med zadovoljstvom z življenjem in odnosom do okoljskih vprašanj ni. Pokaže se torej, da je okoljska problematika v kontekstu vsakdanjega živ­ljenja še vedno abstrakten, neoprijemljiv problem, oddaljen od »realnejših« življenjskih izzivov. Ob tem je potrebno opozoriti, da so bili podatki zbrani leta 2020, zato obstaja možnost, da so ekstremni vremenski pojavi v Sloveniji medtem okrepili zaznavo okoljskih tveganj tudi v vsakdanjem življenju, kar bodo potrdile ali ovrgle naslednje meritve. Podoben zastavek ima cetrta študija (Malešic), ki analizira ali oziroma v kolikšni meri javnost povezuje okoljska tveganja, kot so vremenske kata­strofe, okoljski terorizem ali pojav okoljskih imigracij, z vidikom osebne in širše varnosti. Študija z medcasovno analizo najprej znova razkrije vse vecjo nacelno obcutljivost javnosti v Sloveniji za okoljske probleme, kar je trend, ki ga bo zanimivo spremljati v prihodnjih letih. Obenem pa, podobno kot v prejšnjem primeru, podatki kažejo, da javnost okoljska varnostna tveganja obravnava kot oddaljena od vsakdanjega življenja in jih na individualni ravni ne zaznava kot potencialne varnostne grožnje. Tudi pri varnostnem vidiku se torej nacelna ozavešcenost glede globalnih okoljskih tveganj ne prevede v spoznanje, da okoljske grožnje lahko »vdrejo« v vsakdanjo življenjsko rutino in jo porušijo. Spet pa obstaja možnost, da je zaradi širše izkušnje s pojavi, kot so poplave, neurja, plazovi in podobno, v casu od meritve prišlo do premika stališc oziroma okrepljenega zavedanja varnostnih groženj, ki jih lahko prinašajo okoljski problemi. Peti clanek (Bezjak in Štebe), ki zaokroži tematski sklop, vrne razpravo na splošne vidike raziskovanja okoljske problematike. Tu imajo – poleg raziskovalne infrastrukture, kakršna je program Slovensko javno mnenje – kljucno vlogo tudi arhivi družboslovnih podatkov. Avtorja na primeru vzpostavljanja interdisciplinarne baze okoljskih podatkov v Sloveniji prika­žeta strateško vlogo tematskih zbirk pri spodbujanju uporabe podatkov, saj tovrstne zbirke predstavljajo odgovor na raziskovalne in družbene potrebe po informacijah, kar še zlasti velja za podrocje okolja. Vecplastna medse­bojna povezanost družbe in naravnega okolja namrec zahteva pridobivanje širokega spektra podatkov, od javnomnenjskih do baz o porabi energije v gospodinjstvih in globalnih baz podatkov o emisijah toplogrednih plinov, proizvodnji in porabi nafte, plina, elektricne energije itd. Poleg tega da omo­gocajo prost dostop do kakovostnih podatkov, arhivi in tematske zbirke predstavljajo tudi platformo za interdisciplinarno sodelovanje in povezo­vanje proizvajalcev podatkov ter ponujajo vpogled v obstojeco pokrajino podatkov, s cimer nakažejo morebitne vrzeli v raziskovanju. V luci zaostrovanja problematike podnebnih sprememb v Sloveniji v zadnjih letih bi bilo dobrodošlo, da bi pricujoci sklop analiz in nastajajoca tematska zbirka podatkov spodbudila širši val interdisciplinarnega razisko­vanja teh pojavov. To bi prispevalo dodatna spoznanja o medsebojni pove­zanosti okoljskih vprašanj z družbenimi vidiki, kot so socialne in regionalne neenakosti, vrednote, državljanska odgovornost, politicni in ekonomski interesi in drugi. Dobrodošla bi bila tudi strnitev spoznanj obstojecih izsled­kov z razlicnih znanstvenih podrocij, s cimer bi odlocevalci dobili bolj celo­vito informacijsko podlago za nacrtovanje okoljskih politik in ukrepov v okviru specificnih možnosti in omejitev slovenskega družbenega prostora. Prav tako dobrodošle bi bile študije primerov lokalnih okoljskih odlocitev (denimo umešcanja obnovljivih virov v prostor), saj se lokalna logika odlo­canja pogosto povsem razlikuje od logike odgovarjanja na nacelni ravni. V tem smislu rezultati tematskega sklopa poleg raziskovalnih vprašanj odpirajo tudi vprašanja o informacijskih in komunikacijskih strategijah, saj na primer premostitev razkoraka med okoljskimi vprašanji in gospodarsko realnostjo zahteva kulturno in lokalno prilagojene pristope, ki pritegnejo razlicne družbene skupine v izvajanje trajnostnih okoljskih praks (npr. Choi in Hart, 2021; Davidovic in Harring, 2020). Seveda pa mora za to v idealnem scenariju obstajati aktivna angažiranost vseh deležnikov, vkljucno z aka­demsko skupnostjo, politicnimi odlocevalci, gospodarstvom in lokalnimi skupnostmi, ki bodo soustvarjali in implementirali sprejemljive rešitve v luci vedno nujnejših podnebnih izzivov. Brina Malnar gostujoca urednica LITERATURA Choi, Soobin and Sol Hart (2021): The influence of different efficacy constructs on energy conservation intentions and climate change policy support. Journal of Environmental Psychology 75: 101618. Davidovic, Dragana, and Nillas Harring (2020): Exploring the cross-national vari­ation in public support for climate policies in Europe: The role of quality of government and trust. Energy Research & Social Science, 70: 101785. Kácha, Ondrej, Jáchym Vintr and Cameron Brick (2022): Four Europes: Climate change beliefs and attitudes predict behavior and policy preferences using a latent class analysis on 23 countries. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 81: 101815. Malnar, Brina (2021): Med aktualnim in konceptualnim: 50 let akademske izrabe programa Slovensko javno mnenje. Teorija in Praksa 58 (4): 1065–1088. Poortinga, Wouter, Lorraine Whitmarsh, Linda Steg, Gisela Böhm and Stephen Fisher (2019): Climate change perceptions and their individual-level determi­nants: A cross-European analysis. Global Environmental Change 55: 25–35. UDK 316.654:[502.14:551.58-043.79](4)«2016« Brina MALNAR* INFORMING CLIMATE MITIGATION POLICIES: A SCOPING STUDY BASED ON 64 ARTICLES USING THE 2016 EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY ROTATING MODULE Abstract. The article presents a meta-analysis of aca­demic articles using the European Social Survey Climate Change module. It summarises the key individ­ual and country-level factors that shape climate beliefs, behaviours, and policy support, aiming to mitigate the problem of the fragmentation of findings when inform­ing policymakers. The results, depicted in a heuristic model, underscore the significance of awareness, trust, and socio-political contexts, illustrating the intricate interplay of climate change beliefs, emotional engage­ment and policy preferences. By consolidating the scat­tered research through a meta-analytical approach, the study efficiently identifies key obstacles encountered by European decision-makers while implementing climate mitigation measures and policies. Keywords: climate change, climate action, climate poli­cy, European social survey Introduction: The distinct role of comparative surveys in informing policies Comparative social research is widely recognised as a core branch of empirical research in the social sciences, with some authors describing it as the “lifeblood” of these disciplines (Smith, 2011). One of the key data sources in comparative research are multi-purpose comparative surveys, specialized programmes that provide quantitative data for secondary analysts in various social science fields. Notable examples include the World Values Survey, the European Values Study, the International Social Survey Programme and the European Social Survey. According to Andreß et al. (2019), comparing ten­dencies between countries and following up within them would not be pos­sible without the existence of these survey programmes. * Brina Malnar, PhD, Research Associate, Head of the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, Guest Editor. DOI: 10.51936/tip.60.4.664 The epistemic advantage of comparative surveys is the added dimension of cross-national comparisons, which is important not only for academic research, but for public policy-making as well. Studies based on compara­tive surveys often employ macro-societal factors as explanatory variables, utilising multi-level modelling to explore cross-level interaction (Esser, 2017). They allow comparisons of the effects of alternative (policy) inter­ventions in various institutional and societal contexts (Norris, 2009; Bryan and Jenkins, 2015), i.e., by studying the ways in which country contexts shape and condition the relationships between individual-level variables (Kroneberg, 2019). They offer the possibility to compare the outcomes of different policy solutions, examining macro-level structural elements other­wise difficult or impossible to manipulate. Cross-national surveys provide an ideal research format to assess policy effects. Some scholars have even postulated that country-level comparisons are the closest substitute for experimental research in the social sciences (Smelser, 1976). Large quantitative surveys are usually publicly funded and costly exer­cises. As such, they face external and internal expectations to demonstrate both academic and societal relevance to funders, researchers and the public (Molas-Gallart, 2015; Benneworth, 2015; Martin, 2011). This may be inter­preted as forming part of the ongoing ‘accountability trend’ where sci­ence is expected to contribute something in return to society and its pub­lic funds for research, i.e., to generate knowledge that benefits society as a whole, stimulate new approaches to social issues or inform public debate and policy-making (Penfield et al., 2014; Bornmann, 2012, Donovan, 2011). While publicly funded multi-purpose comparative surveys remain under academic control, governments expect general ‘policy returns’ from them (Hakim, 1982) and most researchers seem to respond to this expectation. A global study of research activity in modern universities conducted among 12,379 academics in 15 countries (Bentley et al., 2015) found that analysts overwhelmingly combine basic and applied research. According to the authors, this is not only linked to funding and university strategies but also, more significantly, to individual norms concerning academics’ obligations where researchers have internalised the duty to generate returns to policy. The aim of this article is to reassert these hybrid practices and capitalise on them by extracting policy-directed content from academic articles gener­ated using the European Social Survey (ESS) 2016 Climate Change module, conducted in 23 countries (for details, see ESS ERIC 2018). The ESS, now a European Research Infrastructure Consortium, is an academically driven multi-purpose, cross-national survey that measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations across Europe. In addition to producing scientific findings and promoting higher standards of rigour in cross-national research, its third main goal is to inform policies. As noted by Kropp (2017), the biannual setup of ESS enables it to address pressing political issues more effectively and positions it closer to the policy area than other similar surveys. This orientation is reflected in ESS module selec­tion procedures where policy relevance is one of the key criteria, as well as in thousands of academic ESS publications where policy-oriented content is present in 79% of the texts, especially those addressing welfare, climate change, immigration, and work–life balance. (Malnar, 2022: 27). Research goals: Addressing the issue of the fragmentation of findings Our study is motivated by the combination of the ESS’ policy-friendly for­mat and content, along with the significant efforts made by analysts to con­sistently generate ‘policy returns’. The bibliographic database of European Social Survey academic publications is extensive, currently totalling nearly 10,000 units1. In principle, this should provide a valuable policy resource, a trend also observed with other comparative survey programmes experienc­ing similar publication growth. Paradoxically, the growing volume of academic publications has become a challenge for social science research. Many scholars are concerned that findings from the exponentially rising number of scientific articles are not adequately integrated into theory-building. Comparative research, although praised for establishing causality, is not exempt from this issue. Despite the vast number of articles being published, they often go unread as the focus is primarily on publish for the sake of publishing (Fernandez-Cano, 2020). Some point to overspecialisation due to which sociology has retreated into safe niches of fellow thinkers, with dense networks and their own jour­nals (Turner, 2016). According to Blaikie, research practice has tended to become ritualised in the testing of isolated or trivial hypotheses (Blaikie, 2010) and, while variable-based quantitative comparative research is an inexhaustible source of causal propositions, this does not mean that these propositions form a theory in the sense of a logically connected system (Kroneberg, 2019). Similarly, Lagos believes the perverse effect of having so much individual data available is the production of the partial interpretation and atomisation of analysis, which may be delaying rather than accelerating the development of theory (Lagos, 2008). According to these authors, multi-purpose comparative surveys are con­tributing to the problem of fragmented findings rather than serving as a solution for theory-building. This issue could pose legitimacy problems for research infrastructures in relation to funders and the public. In the case Accessible at https://bibliography.europeansocialsurvey.org. of the ESS, the majority of its resources are allocated to data provision and methodological issues, with only a fraction dedicated to findings-related concerns (see ESS ERIC, 2022). Although the ESS requires questionnaire design teams to publish ‘topline results,’ offering comprehensive cross-data analysis from rotating modules for various audiences, these efforts do not address the problem of fragmented findings. The compiling and digesting of results continue to rely entirely on user communities. In our perspective, the lack of systematic efforts by research programmes to summarise find­ings based on their data might be the missing link in better connecting and accumulating knowledge from scattered publications within academic and policy communities. Our study aims to explore and demonstrate the ben­efits of a meta-analytical approach for offering ‘general policy returns’ in the context of widespread academic publishing, while focusing on climate change mitigation research. Methodological approaches to summarising the outcomes of numer­ous studies can be broadly categorised into quantitative and qualitative ones. Among quantitative methods, the systematic review stands out, hav­ing gained prominence in medical research as a solution to information overload. A systematic review’s specific objectives may include assessing the effectiveness of a policy, offering the policy-making context, identify­ing risk factors, guiding primary research in understudied areas etc. Another aim can be to review the theories, typologies, data or methods in a certain field (Petticrew and Roberts, 2006; Schlosser, 2006; Thomson, 2013; Harden, 2010). It is based on the entire relevant scientific literature, allowing for a comprehensive and unbiased review. This approach empowers research users, including researchers and decision-makers, to organise and prioritise information effectively. Unlike medicine, research approaches in the social sciences lack stand­ardisation, making a narrow systematic review nearly impossible. Instead, various non-systematic review methods are often employed. These meth­ods do not yield a common final quantitative effect size estimate, such as a correlation coefficient between variables, but serve other purposes, such as summarising findings across different topic areas and acting as sources of ideas or information. One of the most commonly used non-systematic review formats is the scoping study, which investigates the scope, range and nature of findings in a given field, provides a summary, identifies gaps in primary research (Arksey and O’Malley, 2005: 21–22) and offers a synthetic narrative evaluation of the findings. The aim is to enable a new or higher level of interpretation and a deeper understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (Harden, 2010; Smit and Van Der Graaf, 2012). This article is a scoping study that utilises all available ESS English-language articles based on the Climate Change module as its framework. The focus on this topic is twofold. First, with the increasing frequency of extreme weather events, climate change mitigation has become a top pri­ority on policy agendas. Still, it poses significant challenges for policymak­ers due to the substantial costs and necessary lifestyle changes involved. Interestingly, while the environment has been widely recognised as a policy ‘grand challenge’ for at least a decade or two, the ESS did not comprehen­sively include this topic until 2016. This was largely due to its bottom-up policy of module selection and strict evaluation procedures. However, after publication of the first dataset from the new module in 2017, academic pub­lications quickly emerged, showing the steepest increase for any module to date (Malnar, 2021: 21). This suggests that the topic was highly anticipated and filled a significant gap in the ESS thematic landscape. The article aims to explore how a scoping study, focused on recent and ‘compact’ academic publications in terms of thematic focus and data source, can help overcome various policy implementation obstacles and obstacles to policy change (Šinko, 2014). The second reason is practical and pertains to the ESS’ rich and systematic bibliographic resources. The ESS collects continuous and detailed information about its academic use to evaluate its impact, inform questionnaire design, and guide outreach and communications efforts. These resources enable scholars to robustly identify and access relevant publications based on the Climate Change module. The specific research focus of our scoping study is to harvest knowledge and findings that would help address the key policy challenge faced by cli­mate change mitigation policies: how to achieve the transition from climate change awareness and concern, which now seem widespread among the general public, to climate change mitigation behaviour and policy support, which are much less so. In other words, how to explain and address the fact that the considerable of public concern is not adequately reflected in actual behaviour and policy support. After outlining our empirical sources (articles) and their analytically relevant attributes, the article proceeds to the results section, cataloguing individual-and country-level parameters associated with climate change attitudes, mitigation behaviour, and support for climate change policies, along with their essential interactions. The results section culminates in a descriptive meta-model outlining the conditions needed for climate change awareness to translate into action and policy support. The discussion sec­tion provides a narrative summary of relevant policy findings, drawing les­sons and implications for policymaking, while noting some limitations of this research format. The conclusion briefly reflects on the future role of research infrastructures in light of the findings concerning fragmentation issues, suggesting they should consider taking a more active role in summa­rising academic knowledge. Data and methods The study is based on all available English-language articles utilising the ESS Climate Change module. The selection framework is the ESS official bib­liographic database acquired through the Google Scholar search platform, covering the period 2004–2022. An ESS-based publication is defined as any academic publication in the English language with at least one ESS item used in primary analysis (Malnar, 2022). The publications were coded for various bibliographic variables, including the use of items from ESS mod­ules, as established by reviewing publication texts obtained through open-access and university subscription-access schemes. While there was a total of 112 academic publications using items from the Climate Change module, including reports, book chapters, theses etc., we narrowed our study to jour­nal articles (64) to ensure sufficient analytical quality, subject to the peer review process. The Climate Change module was fielded in 2016 in 23 countries, and its first data file was issued by the ESS in 2017. This means that all publi­cations are relatively recent, covering the period between 2018 and 2022: 2018 (2 articles), 2019 (8 articles), 2020 (20 articles), 2021 (16 articles) and 2022 (18 articles). The authorship structure follows typical publication pat­terns, with the majority of first authors coming from Western Europe (39) and Nordic Europe (22), while 8 articles were authored by researchers in Southern-Mediterranean and 8 in post-socialist Europe. This article does not address issues of regional bias in academic publishing, a well-researched phenomenon (e.g., Lundgren, 2015; Krause, 2016), albeit it should be con­sidered since it may influence the content of publications in terms of focus and interpretation. The picture is more balanced in terms of country data use where all European regions are well represented. The average number of countries included was 18.9, there were 5 single country studies. With respect to academic domain, the majority of articles (37) was published in journals in the area of environment, energy and space, 8 in sociological journals, 7 in economic journals, 6 in political journals, 3 in psychological journals and 3 in other journals, which provides a variety of theoretical per­spectives. The 64 articles underwent content analysis using the scoping study review format (Arksey and O’Malley, 2005; Harden, 2010; Smit and Van Der Graaf, 2012), a qualitative analysis method that provides a synthetic narrative evaluation of the findings. Relevant content was identified, organised and summarised through a reviewing process guided by three research aspects: 1) major determinants of climate change attitudes, behaviour, and policy support; 2) key implications and recommendations for climate change pol­icy; and 3) analytical limitations. The research results are presented through a narrative synthesis and visually with a scheme depicting the key concepts and their associations. The aim is to enable a new or higher level of interpre­tation and a deeper understanding of the phenomenon under study. Empirical results Individual-level determinants The first goal of the scoping study was to map key determinants of cli­mate change attitudes, behaviour, and policy support. Overall, 15 analyti­cal concepts or constructs were found to be influential for climate change behaviour and policy support, 12 of them on the individual-level and 3 on the country-level. Beliefs about climate change. Beliefs are essential for predicting climate actions and policy support, serving as a necessary precondition. Accepting the fact that climate change is happening, is partly caused by humans, and brings negative impacts is crucial for individuals to engage in mitigation behaviour and support policies. The findings from the 64 articles gener­ally indicate that this precondition is largely fulfilled as an overwhelming majority of the European population believes that climate change is hap­pening. Scepticism about it ranged from 2.3% in Iceland to 16.5% in the Russian Federation (Poortinga et al., 2019). The public is more divided on the issue of the causes where a significant share of people attributes climate change equally to human influences (anthropogenic) and natural processes (Lübke, 2021a). People doubtful about anthropogenic climate change are more unlikely to feel responsibility and support costly policies (Levi et al., 2020), which creates a challenge. On the other hand, the perceived impacts of climate change were seen to be negative in all participating countries (Poortinga et al., 2019). Worry and concern about climate change. Worry signals that an individ­ual is actively and emotionally engaged with the topic of climate change and more likely to engage in climate action and support climate policies. Worry was found to be positively related to feelings of personal respon­sibility to reduce climate change which, in turn, is linked to climate policy support, as well as to personal climate mitigation behaviours (Bouman et al., 2020). The scope of worry was found to be associated with attribution beliefs, i.e., the more people believe that climate change is caused by human actions, and the more they believe that it has negative impacts, the more they worry about it (Verschoor et al., 2020). On the other hand, trend and attribution denial has the opposite effect and reduces ‘eco-anxiety’, particu­larly in regions and countries with higher levels of climate change exposure (Hadarics, 2020). Worry about climate change also appears to be rooted in biospheric values, i.e., caring about nature and the environment (Bouman et al., 2020). Human values. ESS-based studies repeatedly find that individuals who prioritise self-transcendence over self-enhancing values are less likely to have trend or attribution sceptical views, to have a stronger concern with climate change and engage more in energy-reducing behaviours (Poortinga et al., 2019), being oriented to endorsing or supporting collective benefits and the provision of public goods (Nezlek, 2022; Welsch, 2021). There is also a country-level effect with larger shares of post-materialists in afflu­ent countries making these countries more climate conscious. One study found that in France, Germany and the United Kingdom self-transcendent values play a key role in driving preferences for solar energy (Pagliuca et al., 2022), albeit values are comparatively less effective in shaping support for increased fossil fuel taxes. Socioeconomic attributes. Analysts consistently find that ecological con­cerns are driven by more privileged segments of society, specifically those with a tertiary education and higher economic status. Educated individuals tend to be more aware of climate change, recognise its human-induced ori­gins, perceive it as a serious issue, exhibit more reported saving behaviour, and express greater support for relevant policies (Poortinga et al., 2019). The impact of income is less straightforward. ESS-based studies indicate that individuals with a higher income are more likely to invest in energy-efficient appliances but less likely to limit their energy use. In contrast, lower-income groups tend to limit energy use more, possibly due to the relatively higher economic benefits they derive from reduced energy consumption (Umit and Schaffer, 2020). Self-interest is one of the determining factors. Demographic attributes. Analysts find that older respondents are more likely to hold trend or attribution sceptical views and lower levels of con­cern. For example, in Spain and Lithuania the youngest respondents are found to be the most aware, blame climate change on human activity most intensely, are the most concerned and the most willing to act (Foncubierta-Rodríguez et al., 2021; Vaznoniene, 2022). Nevertheless, the situation is com­plex. ESS-based studies indicate that millennials, raised in an individualistic culture and facing frustration due to precarious employment opportuni­ties and the 2008 economic crisis, are less likely than other generations to feel responsible for reducing climate change (Gómez-Román et al., 2021; Georghiou et al., 2019). Surprisingly, the older Generation X was found to feel the most responsible. Another challenging group comprises vulnerable NEETs (not in education, employment or training) who experience social exclusion. Their unhappiness associated with the NEET condition medi­ates their willingness to adopt pro-environmental attitudes (Bonanomi and Luppi, 2020). Gender was not identified as one of the strongest predictors of climate change concepts. Nevertheless, men across the 23 countries are more likely to hold trend and attribution sceptical beliefs and generally exhibit lower levels of concern about climate change compared to women (Poortinga et al., 2019). In the USA, this trend is particularly noticeable among politi­cally conservative men, a phenomenon often referred to as the ‘white male effect’. Analysts theorise that differences in socialisation, such as the moth­erhood mentality or a stronger ethic of care, might explain this disparity (Verachtert, 2022). Social trust. A large number of ESS-based studies identified social trust as the key factor explaining the well-known concern–behaviour gap, i.e., the fact that respondents’ environmental awareness is not adequately reflected in their actual behaviour. What they find is that pro-environmental behav­iour is influenced not only by intrinsic motivation and external economic incentives, but also by how people perceive the likelihood of others’ actions (Lübke, 2021). The concern–action relationship is stronger in high-trust countries, while in low-trust countries strong concern is paired with a low level of feeling personal responsibility and climate policy support (Bodor et al., 2020). Pro-environmental behaviour seems to depend on one’s per­ception that a large number of people are willing to make an effort to help mitigate climate change and not take a ‘free ride’ while the costs are being paid by the global collective (Davidovic and Harring, 2020). People need to trust their fellow citizens and other actors to comply with policies and will only take on the costs for climate action if others do so as well. One study established that a tipping point must be reached for the social-norm effect to dominate the rational-choice, free-rider effect (Welsch, 2022). Once indi­viduals believe that a large enough percentage of the population is engag­ing in mitigation behaviour, they are subject to conformity bias and switch from free-rider to mitigation behaviour, which is perceived as a social norm. In this way, a group with a pro-environmental orientation will continuously incentivise each other to act in ways that reduce energy consumption, such as the well-known trend of imitation in purchasing solar panels (Caferra et al., 2021). However, ESS-based studies show that most people structurally underestimate the willingness of others to contribute, i.e., doubt that many other people will limit their energy use to help mitigate climate change (Bouman and Steg, 2019; Lübke, 2021). This high level of distrust in others’ pro-environmental behaviour contrasts with the generally high level of self-reported energy conservation behaviour. Perceptions of responsibility, efficacy and outcome expectancy. ESS-based studies find that a sense of personal responsibility to reduce climate change is essential for translating worry into energy-saving behaviour. Climate con­cern is a necessary, yet insufficient condition for climate responsibility, which can be a combination of factors such as personal beliefs and social pressures (Pohjolainen et al., 2021). The feeling of personal responsibility, or lack thereof, is also the most important condition for predicting both opposition to carbon taxes and attitudes to other climate policies (Levi, 2021). Nonetheless, worry and personal responsibility may not be sufficient for people to engage in energy-saving behaviours. Another factor are per­ceptions of self-efficacy (the belief that one is able to use less energy) and personal outcome expectancy (the belief that limiting one’s own energy use will help reduce climate change; Dirksmeier and Tuitjer, 2022). Efficacy beliefs have been identified as a core psychological component that influ­ences climate change engagement (Choi and Hart, 2021). Yet studies find that while people’s belief in their ability to limit their own energy use is high, their positive outcome expectancy is low, i.e., most were pessimistic about how much difference their individual actions make. The situation is the opposite for the societal level. While perceptions of collective effi­cacy are low, perceptions of collective outcome expectancy are high. That is, although respondents believe that collective action by large numbers of people would successfully reduce climate change (Žigiene et al., 2021), they do not believe this is likely to happen. People’s motivation to limit energy use is therefore diminished by the low expected effect of their personal actions and lack of belief in the collective action, an issue closely related to social trust. Efficacy beliefs thus modify the effect of worry about climate change in shaping behavioural responses. Worrying translates into energy saving behaviour more for those with high levels of personal and collective outcome expectancy (ibid.). Political position, ideology. In line with previous research, ESS-based studies find that political orientation alters the relationship between cli­mate change beliefs and worry. Believing that climate change is caused by humans and will have a negative impact across the world is a more potent source of worry for left-leaning than right-leaning individuals (Gregersen et al., 2020). Not only Populist-Right but also mainstream Conservative party-family voters are less worried about climate change and less in favour of higher fossil fuel taxation. Political ideology also modifies the effects of education. For those on the political left, education is related to pro-climate change beliefs and support for climate change policy, whereas for those on the political right, these effects are weak or negative (Czarnek et al., 2020). The exception is post-communist Europe where the left–right ideological divide is understood differently. For example, a study finds that attitudes to fossil fuel taxation are relatively independent from the left–right political orientation in many of these countries (Sivonen, 2020). In these countries, climate change attitudes did not become as entrenched within the party system as in the West (Fisher et al., 2022), with the exception of the Czech Republic (Cermák and Potancoková, 2020). The effect of left–right ideological positioning in (Western) Europe (and even more so in the USA) is due to the fact that climate change attitudes are part of a wider cluster of political orientations and affiliations. During the second half of the twentieth century, parties on the left reoriented to include environmentalism as well as other “new politics” issues (ibid.). In contrast, studies find the congruence of anti-immigrant and anti-ecological attitudes in extreme populist right voters. ESS-based studies confirm these congruencies. There is an association between attitudes to refugees and atti­tudes to the environment across 20 European countries, with pro-environ­mental party voters being more positive regarding immigrants and refugees (Puskarova and Dancakova, 2018; Ilmarinen et al., 2020; Parsons, 2021). Next, people who hold attitudes consistent with a nationalist ideology are generally more likely to be sceptical about climate change and oppose poli­cies that increase taxes on fossil fuels (Kulin et al., 2022). Nationalism priori­tises national interests over supra-national agendas and the transfer of some national competences to the supranational level may make climate action less appealing to communitarian Europeans (Weko, 2021). Analysts also find synergy between attitudes to redistribution and environmental atti­tudes. Support for reducing income differences was positively connected to supporting all three climate policy instruments (Sivonen and Koivula, 2020a). Spatial placement, urban–rural residence. Studies reveal that climate change scepticism and concern exhibit urban–rural differences. Living in a country village is associated with greater climate scepticism and lower con­cern compared to living in a big city (Weckroth and Ala-Mantila, 2022) and individuals in small towns and rural areas are also more likely to oppose cli­mate change measures (Arndt et al., 2022). Analysts maintain that for people who live in rural areas the economic cost of energy-based taxes is likely to be higher, and thus the self-interest is one of the determining factors. Poorer regions are generally more sceptical of climate change measures and more likely to be rural. Another aspect is that carbon-intensive industries, espe­cially coal mining and coal-based power generation, are often concentrated in a few regions and decarbonisation actions will affect those regions espe­cially strongly (Yazar et al., 2022). The second explanation is ideological and refers to anti-establishment attitudes in more peripheral and declin­ing regions. In the light of intergroup conflict or the core–periphery thesis, the opposition is between progressive, egalitarian, metropolitan wealthy middle classes concerned about climate change, and the ‘left behind’ low-income individuals residing in poorer regions, the ‘losers’ of globalisation (Arndt et al., 2022). The latter have no incentive to support policies that hurt them financially. This is the basis for new political alliances where populist right-wing parties increasingly align with the periphery and the countryside and green parties with the metropolitan centres. (Social) media and Internet use. Previous studies indicate that climate change perceptions interact with how climate change is portrayed in the news, which is today increasingly accessed via social media platforms. Media representations can affect both climate change perceptions and per­ceived efficacy. On the individual level, an ESS-based study found that daily Internet use as well as the amount of time spent online correlate negatively with perceived climate change efficacy particularly in Germany, Finland, the UK, the Netherlands and France (Tuitjer and Dirksmeier, 2021). On the national level, Facebook usage negatively correlates with perceived climate change efficacy. Extreme weather exposure. Analysts maintain that individuals use first­hand weather experience to form climate opinions, although this could depend or be modified by news exposure as media enable those experi­ences to be viewed in light of the climate change issue (Damsbo-Svendsen, 2020). One ESS-based study found that when objective temperatures increase, climate opinions are strengthened, comparable to the effect of a full step to the left on a 0–10 political ideology scale. Another found that a significantly bigger share of support for the tax-and-subsidy policy is pre­sent when interviews are conducted during the hottest months (seasonal effect), suggesting that consensus on decisions about climate change poli­cies is stronger in the hottest months (Becchetti and Conzo, 2022). Findings suggest that extreme weather experiences ‘automatically’ foster some level of support for pro-mitigation attitudes, but it is only an extremely warm cli­mate that increases the awareness and focus on climate change and not the increase or decrease in temperature in colder months. Political trust. The last individual-level determinant is political trust, a ‘heavy weight’ predictor for explaining attitudes to carbon taxes. For econo­mists, carbon taxes are the most effective means for discouraging carbon consumption, yet they encounter strong public opposition. For example, researchers highlight instances like Australians voting out a government that had introduced a carbon tax, and in France, large protests by the ‘gilets jaunes’ led the government to cancel a proposed increase in fuel taxes (Otto and Gugushvili, 2020). ESS-based studies consistently demonstrate that atti­tudes to carbon and other environmental taxes are shaped not only by peo­ple’s beliefs and concerns about the issues these taxes address, but also by their trust in their country’s politicians and political system. Positive expec­tations lead individuals who trust their government and institutions to be more cooperative and willing to accept risks or sacrifices (Fairbrother et al., 2019). Analysts find that on aggregate nations most supportive of higher taxes on fossil fuels are not those that are more aware and concerned about climate change, but those with the highest levels of political trust. Support for carbon taxation is highest in Sweden, which is unremarkable in terms of beliefs about the dangers of anthropogenic climate change. On the other hand, climate concern is exceptionally high in Spain where support for new carbon taxes is very low. People who worry about climate change are sub­stantially more likely to support climate policies if they live in a society with high political trust, while in countries with low levels of political trust, being aware and concerned about the climate is at most weakly associated with support for taxes on fossil fuels (Kulin and Sevä, 2020). In countries with more corruption, any money people pay in as public revenues could be stolen, be spent in wasteful ways, or disappear through corruption. Studies also find that while political trust strongly predicts carbon tax opposition, it does not (so much) affect attitudes to subsidies and bans (Davidovic and Harring, 2020). Country-level determinants As noted in the introduction, manipulating country-level determinants of climate change variables is a specific advantage of comparative research. ESS-based studies identified three key country-level factors: Democratic legacy and quality of governance significantly influence climate change concerns, with lower levels observed in Eastern Europe than in the West. One explanation is the persistence of “sticky” values from the communist era (Sivonen, 2020), shaping citizens’ political perspec­tives differently from other regions. Post-materialist values, common in advanced industrial societies, are less prevalent in post-communist societies (Marquart-Pyatt et al., 2019). In addition, the political and economic uncer­tainties following the collapse of communist regimes have left citizens in former socialist states (FSS) with mixed reactions, struggling to prioritise environmental protection over personal economic security, reflecting a cul­tural lag in their attitudes (Poortinga et al., 2019). The second explanation is the increased level of policy performance risk in FSS countries, i.e., the heightened probability that a given policy initiative will underperform or fail. This relates to the concept of government qual­ity, encompassing bureaucratic effectiveness, the rule of law, and absence of corruption (Davidovic and Harring, 2020), influencing political trust. Perceptions that the state can deliver on its promises increase tolerance of taxation, while scepticism about the state’s ability to carry out policies effectively erodes the willingness for sacrifices. As policy performance risk rises, the positive relationship between concern and policy support weak­ens, potentially the case in former socialist nations. Moreover, FSS countries heavily rely on fossil fuels and the jobs the fossil fuel industry produces, potentially increasing the size and complexity of policy programmes, open­ing up further opportunities for mistakes and, potentially, corruption. In high-policy-risk contexts, concern about climate change becomes a poor predictor of policy preferences (Campbell, 2022). The quality of govern­ment nevertheless does not affect support for subsidies and bans, most likely because these two policies involve much less risk in terms of cost and regulations. ESS-based studies show that higher levels of national affluence, typically measured as gross domestic product per capita, strengthen the link between perceived climate responsibility and climate policy support (Pohjolainen et al., 2021), which makes national affluence another explana­tion for FSS specifics. Namely, economic development may itself be a condi­tion for lowering policy risk. Welfare and tax regime. Welfare regime is another institutional fac­tor closely linked to political and social trust, especially relevant for the legitimacy of high-cost policy instruments such as taxation (Sivonen and Kukkonen, 2021; Otto and Gugushvili (2020). The principle of universality and relatively impartial and objective policy instruments, such as taxation, may partly explain why people trust compre­hensive welfare states more. Attitudes in countries with social-democratic and conservative welfare regimes are the most supportive of sustainable welfare and eco-social policies, contrasting with attitudes in liberal coun­tries like the UK and Ireland, as well as Eastern European countries. ESS-based studies show that welfare regime type strongly influences taxation attitudes rather than attitudes to subsidising or banning. Support for higher fossil fuel taxes was notably high in Nordic regimes (ibid.). This supports the idea that taxation is not simply about tax payments but also about the distribution of tax revenues. People in more universal and generous welfare states may perceive they get better value for their tax revenues. Existing energy policies and energy sources. According to the policy feedback perspective, the current domestic energy context and policies shape the possibilities and preferences for future policies among citizens (Stadelmann-Steffen and Eder, 2020). Research indicates that in countries with a substantial share of renewable energy individuals accepting anthro­pogenic climate change are more inclined to support policies promoting renewable energy. On the contrary, in countries heavily reliant on fossil fuels (such as Hungary, Lithuania, Israel, Russia), there is a stronger prefer­ence for fossil energy, leading to a rejection of climate policies (Fritz and Koch, 2019). Transitioning away from fossil fuels would entail substantial costs, making it challenging to implement such policies. Policies conse­quently hold the potential to transform both structural factors and the atti­tudes and behaviours of specific groups or entire populations. Notably, individuals with strong climate change attitudes and high levels of political trust experience positive feedback effects, where the existing energy policy context reinforces their preferences for policies aligned with this context. Still, this feedback mechanism also has its downsides. In countries where the fossil energy sector remains a significant economic factor, even individ­uals sensitised to climate issues are more reluctant to accept taxes on fossil fuels compared to their counterparts in other countries (Stadelmann-Steffen and Eder, 2020). Further, a country’s dependency on fossil fuels may alter the relationship between political ideology and attitudes to fossil fuel taxa­tion (Sivonen, 2020). The awareness to action model Based on the mapping of key determinants of climate change attitudes, behaviour and policy support in the 64 academic articles, we developed a heuristic conceptual model illustrating the complex relationship between climate change awareness and climate action or policy support (Figure 1). The model comprises three main components: starting conditions, interven­ing factors, and outcomes. The focus of the left panel is on the generation of climate change atti­tudes and the factors that determine the essential starting condition: cli­mate change beliefs. Believing that climate change is occurring, is human-caused, and has negative consequences is a necessary precondition for action. According to our scoping study, awareness is influenced by a range of moral, political, socio-economic, socio-demographic and climate-related factors. The middle panel presents intervening factors that need to align for cli­mate change awareness to translate into mitigation behaviour and policy support, which are our key outcomes concerning the research question. Guided by our scoping study, the model illustrates that awareness first needs to be coupled with emotional engagement (worry) and then with the sense of personal responsibility. Once these factors are established, addi­tional conditions come into play, depending on the type of outcome. For worry to successfully translate into personal climate action, high social trust and strong efficacy and outcome expectancy beliefs are necessary. When it comes to translating worry into climate policy support, high political trust is crucial. Political trust, in turn, is influenced by various country-level con­ditions, including democratic legacy, characteristics of the welfare system, and the quality of governance. In addition, a policy feedback loop and low dependency on fossil fuels play separate roles in this process. Figure 1: HEURISTIC CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE LINK BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AWARENESS, CLIMATE ACTION AND POLICY SUPPORT Source: author’s compilation. The presented model is a condensed version, simplifying the relation­ships as awareness determinants often also directly influence worry and responsibility. Further, the policy side of the model is more strongly aligned with fossil fuel taxation measures and less so for subsidies and bans. Despite these simplifications, the aim was to depict the relationships in the clearest way possible, even if some details were lost in the process. Discussion: Lessons and implications for policymaking In our discussion, we aim to focus on the second goal of our scoping study: to chart and summarise key implications and recommendations for climate change policy. Climate change, as noted, is one of the ESS topics with the strongest policy-oriented content in its publications. We follow our heuristic model to summarise the policy advice provided by analysts based on their results. The main challenge addressed in this discussion is how to achieve the desired outcomes of climate change mitigation behaviour and policy support. First, the findings emphasise the crucial role of awareness and concern as prerequisites for action. Renewable energy policies frequently struggle to engage social groups less sensitised to climate change (Stadelmann-Steffen and Eder, 2020). Analysts recommend that governments persist in inform­ing the public about the risks linked to the ongoing global warming and its potential consequences. They should develop climate change awareness policies and programmes that are accessible to all segments of the popula­tion (Roberts, 2022). Effective communication efforts are best initiated by individuals or groups with whom many people can identify (Bouman and Steg, 2019). Increased awareness can be facilitated by promoting online media literacy, enabling individuals to better assess the credibility of media sources (Tuitjer and Dirksmeier, 2021). Analysts also highlight the seasonal effect and recommend focusing on environmental policy decisions during the hotter months. High summer temperatures are more likely to lead to extreme weather events and greater media coverage about climate change, making public opinion more sensitive to these issues (Becchetti and Conzo, 2022). In addition to informing people on climate change, it seems critical to encourage them to take personal responsibility in order to increase cli­mate policy support and action (Pohjolainen et al., 2021). A significant portion of policy analysis examines climate change meas­ures in relation to social inequalities and well-being, identifying this link as one of the key policy challenges. Many policies that are environmentally sound, such as imposing heavy taxes on fossil fuels, disproportionately impact the poor and may introduce a new ecological dimension to exist­ing social conflicts (Otto and Gugushvili, 2020; Mayer and Smith, 2019). The fear of rising costs is likely to reduce support for increasing energy taxation, especially among people who do not consider climate change a major risk, and among lower income groups (Sivonen and Koivula, 2020). The sug­gested solution is to develop welfare policies along with climate policies to facilitate a “just transition” to a sustainable energy model (Weko, 2021). Environmental policies need to be aligned with social as well as regional policies, for example, establishing progressive tax and subsidy schemes. On the European level, mechanisms like the Just Transitions Fund could help level out differences between countries given that the lower average sup­port in Eastern Europe is also linked to economic development. Analysts also suggest policy diversification because policies based on efficient measures hold greater potential to be successful among higher-income groups, while lower-income individuals are more likely to save energy (Umit et al., 2019). They also recommend framing diversification to overcome public scepticism across countries. For instance, in affluent countries, key environmental messages should emphasise the lower cost of climate change consequences if necessary measures are taken sooner, whereas in countries with a higher incidence of poverty the key message should focus on the fact that impoverished people are more likely to bear the brunt of environmental degradation (Otto and Gugushvili, 2020). Studies also suggest that resistance to climate policies is likely to be concen­trated in specific local communities, the potential ‘losers’ of these processes (Arndt et al., 2022). Highlighting the role of social and political trust is another prominent topic in informing policymakers since trust in both institutions and peers improves pro-social behaviour, in this case leading to more responsible energy consumption (Caferra et al., 2021a). Analysts suggest that in order to improve their effectiveness, environmental policies must be shaped by thinking on the group rather than the individual level, i.e., be perceived as a social dilemma situation (Lübke, 2021). Policy should promote the ‘desir­able norm’, sanction free-rider behaviour, and reward cooperation in indi­viduals and organisations. For instance, legislators should push companies toward the adoption of environmental practices, even if they are seen as economically detrimental, to bring about system-wide changes (Rintala et al., 2021). Decision makers should strive to increase trust in others’ coop­erative efforts, highlight the prevalence of virtuous behaviour among peers, and enhance individuals’ beliefs in their own capabilities and the effective­ness of their actions (Choi & Hart, 2021). In addition, policies should work on enhancing belief in the effectiveness of collective actions. Analysts point out that in low-trust contexts policies which heavily depend on trust, such as fossil fuel taxes, can pose an inextricable challenge (Kulin and Sevä, 2020). They also warn that increased efforts to raise people’s awareness about the reality and dangers of climate change are likely to have little impact on peo­ple’s support for carbon taxes, which strongly depends on political trust (Fairbrother et al., 2019). They suggest increasing political trust by reduc­ing policy performance risk through the increased transparency of public administrations, enabling people to have a clear understanding of how their money is being managed (Caferra et al., 2021). More specific suggestions include sharing critical information regarding the effectiveness of carbon taxes or earmarking revenues for green spending (Pohjolainen et al., 2021) and implementing a highly visible revenue recycling mechanism, such as direct transfer schemes (Levi, 2021). Others suggest shifting the policy focus from carbon taxation to subsidies on renewable energy given that these policies are associated less with trust in political institutions and more with trust in impartial institutions, such as the legal system and the police, which is considerably higher (Kulin and Sevä, 2020). They also do not directly affect the affordability of energy, making them less costly for individuals. Another set of recommendations concerns political and ideological divi­sions. Some suggest that climate policy could benefit from framing carbon taxes in ways that do not resonate with ideological orientations, by avoid­ing the term “tax” and instead using “carbon fee and dividend”, “pollution reduction scheme” or “climate contribution”, which could meet with less public opposition (Levi, 2021). Others suggest the opposite, proposing that policies should target various political groups in a way that appeals to them. For example, targeting individuals with a right-leaning political orientation in a manner that appeals to communitarian priorities rather than global framings, emphasising in-group benefits and focusing on the possible eco­nomic or local consequences of climate change (Gregersen et al., 2020). The final set of recommendations relates to the role existing policies play in shaping public preferences for energy sources. The good news for policymakers is that renewable energy policies have the potential to rein­force themselves (Stadelmann-Steffen and Eder, 2020) through the policy feedback loop. However, this is also true for carbon-based policies and car­bon prices, which are less frequently implemented in countries that rely on a high proportion of fossil fuels to generate electricity. Analysts therefore caution that the feedback mechanism involves a risk of greater polarisa­tion as both types of energy policies reinforce themselves. Studies focusing on energy security perceptions also caution that individuals who are more worried about energy supply interruptions may hold stronger preferences for energy sources that are programmable, such as fossil fuels and hydro­electric power, as opposed to wind and solar power, which are intermittent (Casamassima et al., 2022; Demski et al., 2018). Analysts also place their findings within an epistemic and methodologi­cal context by discussing the study’s limitations, which was the final goal of the review. While consistently acknowledging the quality of ESS data, ana­lysts warn that the module was fielded in a relatively small number of coun­tries (n = 23), and those countries tend to be relatively affluent (Poortinga et al., 2019). It would be advantageous to include a more geographically, economically and culturally diverse set of countries, ideally encompassing lower-income countries outside of Europe, since attitudes and their deter­minants there could differ from those in the ESS dataset. Several analysts also point out the module’s limited thematic scope, such as the absence of more detailed survey data about individual Internet use and online prac­tices (Tuitjer and Dirksmeier, 2021). To address the geographical and con­ceptual limitations, they recommend conducting more in-depth case studies to identify unique patterns within countries and exploring the role of other contextual factors, such as media influence, climate vulnerability and socio-political histories in greater detail (Smith and Hempel, 2022). In addition to this key epistemic criticism, which to some extent relativises the findings of the 64 articles, analysts mention specific methodological issues. These include the cross-sectional nature of the data, limiting the establishment of causal associations (Lübke, 2021; Welsch, 2020; Levi et al., 2020; Kácha et al., 2022), the use of single-item measures (Gregersen et al., 2021; Ilmarinen et al., 2020), potential social desirability bias due to self-reported items (Gómez-Román et al., 2021; Syropoulos and Markowitz, 2022) along with concerns about low construct reliability and the low percentage of explained vari­ance (Ilmarinen et al., 2020). To summarise, analysts emphasise the significant challenges and ‘obsta­cles’ faced by policymakers while implementing climate change mitigation policies and promoting desired behaviours in European countries. When providing recommendations, analysts mostly offer general strategies rather than specific solutions. A more focused policy evaluation effort is called for in the next steps to effectively implement these recommendations. Conclusion Our objective was to conduct a comprehensive summary of findings from the ESS Climate Change module to identify general policy implications that social science research can contribute and address the challenge of frag­mented findings. We aimed to illustrate how a meta-analysis of results can offer a more efficient method for communicating insights from multiple stud­ies to diverse audiences by identifying the common determinants of climate beliefs, behaviours, and policy support, along with their main associations. The heuristic meta-model derived from our scoping study highlights essential risk factors that policymakers encounter while implementing climate goals. The scoping study also offers an overview of different scenarios suggested by analysts to help decision-makers address public opposition to climate policies. Similar exercises could be conducted for ESS topics such as immigration, welfare or family work, all of which are highly policy-oriented. Considering the benefits of summarising findings, a critical point for future discus­sion is whether survey research infrastructures like ESS ERIC and similar programmes should continue to leave the task of summarisation solely to academic endeavours or gradually expand their operations to provide resources that encourage the summarising of findings. This dilemma, which might pose legitimacy issues for research infrastructures concerning funders and the public, is relevant for survey management teams, funders, and science policymakers alike. BIBLIOGRAPHY ARTICLES INCLUDED IN THE SCOPING STUDY Arndt, Christoph, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Christos Vrakopoulos (2022): The Centre-periphery Divide and Attitudes Towards Climate Change Measures among Western Europeans. Environmental Politics (32) 3: 381–406. Becchetti, Leonardo and Gianluigi Conzo (2022): Preferences for Climate Change-related Fiscal Policies in European Countries: Drivers and Seasonal Effects. 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ESS ERIC (2020): ESS Annual Activity Report 2021-22. Accessible at https:// www.europeansocialsurvey.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/ESS_Annual_ Report_2021-22.pdf, 1. 11. 2023. UDK [316.654:502.174.3]:551.58-043.79(497.4)«2019« Slavko KURDIJA, Tadej BEVK* PODNEBNE SPREMEMBE IN ODNOS JAVNOSTI DO RABE OBNOVLJIVIH VIROV ENERGIJE** Povzetek. Clanek predstavlja ugotovitve raziskave o odnosu javnosti do obnovljivih virov energije – OVE (SJM 2019/1) in jih postavlja v kontekst mednarodne primer­jave stališc o podnebnih spremembah, kot se kažejo iz podatkov Evropske družboslovne raziskave ESS 2016 (modul: Climate Change). Rezultati kažejo na splošno visoko stopnjo soglašanja javnosti s podnebno paradigmo, pri konkretnejših okoljskih ukrepih pa je (tudi evropsko) javno mnenje nekoliko bolj zadržano. Podobne ugotovi­tve najdemo v študiji OVE. Ta pokaže izrazito favorizira­nje vetrnega in soncnega scenarija, ki sta s stališca javno­sti podrobneje predstavljena s prednostmi in slabostmi. Pri obravnavi konkretne prostorske umestitve pa se kaže, kako javnomnenjski razmislek pocasi drsi iz polja okoljske v polje ekonomske, tržne miselnosti. Primerjalna analiza podatkov ESS kaže podobno sliko, še posebej, ko opazuje­mo razlike med okoljsko razvitejšimi zahodnoevropskimi in nordijskimi državami ter državami srednje in vzhodne Evrope. Avtorja v zakljucku poudarita, da okoljska trans­formacija (tudi z implementacijo OVE) ne bo uspešna brez širše družbene transformacije, ki bo zagotovila pra­vicno porazdelitev koristi in tveganj. Kljucni pojmi: podnebne spremembe, obnovljivi viri ener­gije, ESS, javno mnenje, vetrna elektrarna, soncna elek­trarna, prostorski ucinki Uvod Blaženje podnebnih sprememb je eden izmed najpomembnejših izzi­vov sodobnega casa. Te spremembe po mnenju vecine znanstvenih in stro­kovnih deležnikov predstavljajo vedno vecjo grožnjo za okolje in povecu­jejo tveganje za izgubo kakovosti življenja oziroma življenja samega. Hude * Dr. Slavko Kurdija, višji znanstveni sodelavec, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani; dr. Tadej Bevk, asistent, raziskovalec, Biotehniška fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija. ** Izvirni znanstveni clanek. DOI: 10.51936/tip.60.4.691 posledice vse pogostejših skrajnih vremenskih pojavov in njihova vse vecja intenzivnost so se dodobra pokazale tudi v Sloveniji med vec zaporednimi katastrofalnimi poplavami v kratkem casovnem obdobju. Da bi preprecili nadaljnje škodljive vplive predvsem clovekovega vpliva na ozracje, bi bilo v razmeroma kratkem casu potrebno doseci znacilna zmanjšanja emisij toplo­grednih plinov, na kar opozarja vec pomembnih mednarodnih institucij (IPCC, 2023)1. Za dosego tega cilja je potrebno narediti pomembne korake na vec podrocjih. Od razvoja in uporabe novih nizkoogljicnih tehnologij do splo­šnega preoblikovanje nacina proizvodnje in zmanjšanja njene porabe, kar vkljucuje tudi zahtevo po spremembi življenjskih navad. Vse to naj bi uokvir­jale nove okoljske politike. Eden kljucnih ukrepov za zmanjšanje ogljicnega odtisa je predvsem prehod na rabo obnovljivih virov energije (OVE), o cemer bomo podrobneje govorili v drugem delu clanka. Preden preidemo na konkretno analizo podpore javnosti pri razlicnih scenarijih rabe obnovljivih virov energije (OVE) v Sloveniji, poglejmo, kakšen je vrednotni, mnenjski okvir slovenske javnosti glede podnebnih sprememb, vkljucno s sprejemanjem tega dejstva, razumevanjem vzrokov in oceno posledic. Uvodni pregled bo zajel predvsem mednarodni kon­tekst, kar bo: prvic, omogocilo umešcanje Slovenije v evropski vrednotni prostor pri teh vprašanjih in drugic, omogocilo boljše razumevanje konkret­nih stališc, ki jih v povezavi z OVE izrekajo prebivalci Slovenije. Odnos do klimatskih sprememb Sprejetost podnebne paradigme2 v mednarodnem okolju odraža vso kompleksnost tega vprašanja, ki se kaže v razlicnih stopnjah pripoznanja podnebnih sprememb kot znanstvenega dejstva in s tem povezanih posle­dic. Z vecanjem stopnje nezaupanja v znanost, ki je izrazito porasla pred­vsem v obdobju pandemije, se v razlicnih družbeno kulturnih okoljih, poli­ticnih kontekstih, pa tudi raznih omrežij v okviru spletnih platform izkazuje razlicna stopnja zanikanja podnebne paradigme, bodisi v obliki skepticizma (znanost nima dovolj zanesljivih podatkov, gre za naravna klimatska nihanja ipd.) bodisi prek teorij zarot (podnebna znanost je politicno motivirana, za tem stojijo ekonomski lobiji, ki poskušajo prevzeti nadzor nad družbo in 1 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Medvladni odbor za podnebne spre­membe (IPCC) je organ Združenih narodov za ocenjevanje znanstvenih dognanj v zvezi s podnebnimi spremembami. Climate Change 2023 Synthesis Report. 2 S pojmom podnebna paradigma mislimo na prevladujoca stališca, prepricanja in razumevanje glede podnebnih sprememb ter njihovih vplivov na okolje in družbo. Gre za celosten okvir razumevanja, ki vkljucuje znanstvene, družbene, politicne in ekonomske vidike podnebnih vprašanj, ki se nanašajo na odgovornost in potrebo po zmanjševanju emisij toplogrednih plinov na globalni ravni. energetskimi viri). Velika vecina javnosti, še posebej pa znanstvene skup­nosti kot celote, pa jasno podpira stališce, da podnebne spremembe so in da so te v vecji ali manjši meri zanesljivo tudi posledica cloveških dejavno­sti (Powell, 2019). Podatki Evropske družboslovne raziskave (European Social Survey – ESS)3, ki jo bomo vzeli za vir merjenja stališc med Evropejci, pokriva evropske države vkljucno z Izraelom. V evropskem okviru (kjer je skepticizma generalno gledano sicer manj kot denimo v ZDA), pa vseeno obstaja nekaj znacilnih razlik. V razlicnih družbeno kulturnih okoljih z raz­licnimi ekonomskimi tradicijami in razlicnimi energetskimi zapušcinami nastajajo vrednotne klime, ki se skozi stališca razlicno odzivajo na povpra­ševanje o odnosu do podnebnih sprememb (Stern, 2000). Medtem ko neka­tere države aktivno in zavzeto ozavešcajo svoje javnosti o teh spremembah in možnih posledicah, druge izkazujejo vecjo zadržanost ali celo dvome. V okviru 8. vala Evropske družboslovne raziskave – ESS 2016-2017 (ESS Round 8, 2016; Kurdija, 2018) je bil v vec kot dvajsetih državah, poleg jedr­nega dela raziskave, vkljucen tudi posebni tematski modul o odnosu javno­sti do podnebnih sprememb in rabe energije (Public Attitudes to Climate Change, Energy Security, and Energy Preferences). Modul se osredotoca na dileme v povezavi s podnebnimi spremembami in rabo energetskih virov, ki so ga oblikovali razlicni strokovnjaki s podrocij okoljske psihologije, poli­ticne sociologije in družboslovne metodologije. Njegova relevantnost je bila poleg vsesplošne aktualnosti vezana tudi na dogajanja ob bok Pariškega sporazuma, ki se je oblikoval ravno v letih 2015 in 2016 ter je postavljal temelje globalnih smernic za obvladovanju podnebnih sprememb, trajnost­nega razvoja – s posebnim poudarkom na rabi obnovljivih virov energije. Da bi ponazorili splošni vrednostni kontekst o podnebnih spremembah, poglejmo, kakšna prepricanja imajo prebivalci evropskih držav o treh izho­dišcnih vprašanjih modula: (A) Verjetno ste že slišali za trditev, da se podne­bje na Zemlji spreminja zaradi zviševanja temperature v zadnjih 100 letih. Kakšno je vaše osebno mnenje o tem? Ali menite, da se podnebje na Zemlji spreminja? (odgovori: 1 – zagotovo se spreminja, 2 – verjetno se spreminja, 3 – verjetno se ne spreminja, 4 – zagotovo se ne spreminja); (B) Ali menite, da so vzrok za podnebne spremembe naravni procesi, clovekova dejavnost ali oboje? (odgovori: 1 – v celoti naravni procesi, 2 – predvsem naravni ESS je bil zasnovan s podporo Evropske znanstvene fundacije in je eden najbolj zanesljivih druž­boslovnih instrumentov za sistematicno spremljanje stališc in subjektivnih zaznav prebivalcev evropskih držav. Metodologija ESS je dosegla najvišjo raven standardizacije v primerjalnih družboslovnih raziska­vah. Za svoje dosežke pri zagotavljanju doslednosti in metodološke ekvivalence na mednarodni ravni je ESS prejel Descartesovo nagrado – najvišje evropsko priznanje na podrocju raziskovanja. Od zacetka, leta 2002, se raziskava ESS izvaja tudi v Sloveniji (v okviru programa Slovensko mnenje). Center za raziskova­nje javnega mnenja in množicnih komunikacij na Fakulteti za družbene vede (UL) je partner v projektu (predstavnika v mednarodni koordinaciji: dr. Brina Malnar in dr. May Doušak) ter izvajalec raziskave na nacionalni ravni (nacionalni koordinator: dr. Slavko Kurdija). procesi, 3 – približno enako naravni procesi in clovekova dejavnost, 4 – predvsem clovekova dejavnost, 5 – v celoti clovekova dejavnost, 6 – menim, da podnebnih sprememb ni); (C) Kaj menite, kako dober ali slab vpliv bodo imele podnebne spremembe na ljudi po vsem svetu? Ocenite na lestvici od 0 do 10, pri cemer 0 pomeni izredno slab vpliv, 10 pa izredno dober vpliv. Tabela 1: DELEŽ ODGOVOROV O ODNOSU DO PODNEBNIH SPREMEMB PO DRŽAVAH (%) Države (A) Podnebne spremembe so (B) Spremembe povzroca clovek (C) Posledice sprememb bodo slabe % % % Avstrija 92,5 91,8 74,0 Belgija 96,4 94,0 66,3 Ceška 88,9 89,5 68,0 Estonija 91,3 88,8 59,7 Finska 94,0 93,9 67,2 Francija 96,3 93,8 73,7 Nemcija 95,4 94,8 77,4 Madžarska 91,4 92,7 77,0 Islandija 97,7 94,6 81,6 Irska 96,1 91,1 63,2 Izrael 86,3 85,4 58,1 Italija 94,8 93,6 69,0 Litva 88,7 82,7 73,7 Nizozemska 96,2 91,8 61,6 Norveška 92,9 87,8 71,9 Poljska 92,6 89,6 70,4 Portugalska 97,0 93,6 81,1 Rusija 82,2 83,8 61,8 Slovenija 96,5 93,0 71,4 Španija 95,8 95,7 87,9 Švedska 96,8 92,4 81,2 Švica 96,4 94,4 74,0 Velika Britanija 93,6 91,0 66,0 povprecje 93,5 91,3 71,1 Vir: Evropska družboslovna raziskava – ESS 8. val (2016–2017); za analizo deležev na ravni držav so bile uporabljene poststratifikacijske uteži.4 Dostopno tudi na spletnih straneh ESS Topline Series »European Attitudes to Climate Change and Energy« https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/findings/topline-series. V tabeli 1 so prikazani deleži sprejemanja podnebne paradigme po drža­vah pri vprašanjih A, B in C. Pri vprašanju A je naveden seštevek na odgo­vorih 1 (zagotovo) in 2 (verjetno); pri vprašanju B seštevek na odgovorih 3 (narava in clovek enako) 4 (predvsem clovek) in 5 (v celoti clovek); pri vprašanju C, kjer je uporabljena 11-stopenjska lestvica, pa je prikazan sešte­vek pri odgovorih med 0 in 4 – levo od sredine lestvice, kar pomeni, da bodo posledice slabe. Že na prvi pogled vidimo, da prebivalci vecine držav pritrjujejo, da pod­nebne spremembe so (A). To se kaže v deležu pritrjevanja, ki skorajda pri vseh presega 90 %. Nekaj razlik sicer opazimo, vendar tudi v skupini tistih držav, kjer je ta delež nižji (Rusija, Litva, Ceška in Izrael), gre še vedno za izrazito vecino. V drugem stolpcu (B), kjer je prikazana stopnja soglašanja z uveljavljeno znanstveno podmeno, da so vzroki podnebnih sprememb antropogene narave, prav tako vidimo visoko stopnjo pritrjevanja. Razlike (z nižjo stopnjo soglašanja) se pojavljajo med prej omenjenimi državami, pri cemer je vec skepse zaznati tudi še med Norvežani in Estonci. Ne glede na to tudi v tem primeru lahko ugotovimo, da gre za izrazito vecinsko strinjanje z navedeno predpostavko. V zadnji koloni, v kateri so navedeni deleži stri­njanja s tem, da bodo posledice podnebnih sprememb slabe, pa vidimo, da je konsenza manj. Tudi razlike po državah so nekoliko bolj ocitne. Najvec soglašanja z negativnim posledicam najdemo v državah Islandija, Španija, Portugalska, tudi Švedska; obratno, najmanj soglašanja s tem pa je v Izraelu, Estoniji in Rusiji, tudi na Irskem, Nizozemskem, v Belgiji in Veliki Britaniji. Ce bi 23 držav razvršcali po izraženi stopnji javnomnenjske sprejetosti podnebne paradigme, bi videli, da se Slovenija pri prvem vprašanju (A) uvr­sti visoko na 4. mesto, medtem ko se pri drugem in tretjem pomakne precej navzdol, na 10. in 12. mesto od skupaj 23 držav. Glede na število držav in uvrstitve le-teh je Slovenija umešcena v polje z relativno visoko stopnjo oza­vešcenosti o obstoju in posledicah podnebnih sprememb. Še posebej, ce vzamemo v ozir prvi dve5 vprašanji, ki v cisti obliki zastavljata miselni okvir sprejetosti podnebne paradigme (Poortiga et al., 2011). Umestitev držav lahko še posebej nazorno prikažemo z dendrogramom, s pomocjo metode hierarhicnega razvršcanja v skupine, kjer se enote opazovanja (države) raz­vrstijo v skupine (grozde) na podlagi podobnosti. Združevanje je prikazano postopno, v vec korakih. Z namenom, da bi videli razmerja bolj pregledno, sta bili za kriterij združevanja izbrani spremenljivki A (pripoznanje obstoja) in B (antropogenost), ki najbolj jasno kažeta idejno izhodišce javnomnenj­skega sentimenta v odnosu do podnebnih sprememb. Vprašanje C je nekoliko bolj specificno, tako z vidika merjenja (11-stopenjska lestvica) kot še pose­bej z vidika pricakovanj do respondenta, ki mora pri odgovoru vpliv sprememb kvantificirati. Slika 1: IZID RAZVRŠCANJA V SKUPINE (WARDOVA METODA) Vir: Lastni izracun; podatkovni vir: ESS Round 8, 2016; za analizo deležev na ravni držav so bile uporabljene poststratifikacijske uteži. Dendrogram prikazuje proces združevanja med državami, pri cemer se v prvem koraku med sabo povežejo najbolj podobne (dolžina linije, ki jih povezuje je najkrajša), cemur sledi pridruževanje najbolj sorodnih v naslednjem koraku. Slika nazorno prikazuje dolocene regionalne vzorce oz. vzorce, ki izhajajo iz zgodovinskih in družbeno-ekonomskih okolišcin. V izhodišcu vidimo dva veliki grozda, enega manjšega s samo tremi državami (Rusija, Litva in Izrael) – tega lahko opredelimo kot skupino z nižjo pod­nebno ozavešcenostjo – in drugo, ki je precej bolj številcna in heterogena in v kateri so države z manj izraženega podnebnega skepticizma. Razlike drugega grozda razpadejo na dve podskupini: manjšo, v kateri so Avstrija, Madžarska in Velika Britanija ter Estonija, Poljska, Ceška in Norveška. V vecji podskupini drugega grozda, ki jo lahko opredelimo kot skupino držav z višjo stopnjo splošne podnebne ozavešcenosti, pa so vse ostale države, med drugim tudi Islandija, Švica, Belgija, Nemcija; mednje sodi tudi Slovenija. Uvrstitev Slovenije se, vsaj kar zadeva »ideološko« podlago okoljskih nazorov, zdi dobra in s stališca nadaljnjih usmeritev ustrezna. Podobno kot velika vecina evropskih držav nacelno sprejemamo opozorila okolj­ske stroke in mednarodnih okoljskih institucij. Vec vprašanj se odpira v kontekstu okoljskih smernic, kjer se pricakuje bolj konkretna podpora okoljskim politikam in kjer bi usmeritve morale najti odsev v dejanskih dejanjih, vkljucno z nekaterimi naceli samoomejevanja. Nacelno visoka podpora v vecjem delu Evrope pocasi drsi v zadržke in nepodporo doloce­nim konkretnim politikam, celo v okoljih, kjer je nacelno sprejemanje pod­nebne paradigme izrazito vecinsko. Nadaljnje analize modula ESS »Climate change«, ki jih zaradi omejitve prostora enega prispevka v obliki kvantita­tivnih prikazov ne bomo podrobneje predstavljali, omogocajo vpogled v nekatere vzorce, ki to potrjujejo. V smislu splošne ocene se posvetimo tudi podpori, ki so jo Evropejci izkazovali pri treh vrstah konkretnih ukrepov: subvencije za naložbe v obnovljive vire energije (OVE), uveljavitev zakona, ki prepoveduje prodajo energetsko manj ucinkovitih gospodinjskih naprav, ter povecanje davkov na fosilna goriva.6 Najbolj priljubljen ukrep je uporaba javnih sredstev za raz­licne modele subvencioniranja, saj jo podpira kar tri cetrtine (75 %) evrop­skega prebivalstva, medtem ko ji nasprotuje le manjšina (10 %); ta ukrep je med drugim izrazito visoke podpore deležen tudi v Sloveniji. Manjši delež, vendar še vedno znacilnih 60 % Evropejcev podpira uveljavitev zakona o prepovedi prodaje energetsko manj ucinkovitih gospodinjskih aparatov, proti cemur se izrece 17 % vprašanih. Po pricakovanju pa je izrazito najmanj priljubljen ukrep, ki predpostavlja povecanje davkov na fosilna goriva (za nafto, plin in premog). Pri tem ukrepu je vec nasprotnikov (44 %) kot pod­pornikov (30 %). Davek na fosilna goriva najvecjo podporo uživa v neka­terih zahodnoevropskih državah, zlasti nordijskih, medtem ko je najmanj priljubljen na Poljskem, v Rusiji ter v nekaterih drugih vzhodno- in tudi juž­noevropskih državah (Španija, Portugalska). Podrobna analiza razkriva, da višja obdavcitev fosilnih goriv, ki jo stroka ocenjuje kot enega izmed ucin­kovitejših ukrepov, dosega višjo podporo (vecinsko pa le na Švedskem in Finskem) v okoljih z visoko stopnjo zaupanja v sistemske institucije (Otto & Gugushvili, 2020), kar pa, glede na podatke, velja predvsem za nekatere nor­dijske države in tiste zahodnoevropske, ki zgodovinsko in politicno izkazu­jejo socialnodemokratsko tradicijo, kjer gredo progresivni okoljski ukrepi z roko v roki s skrbjo za pravicno družbo (Fritz & Koch, 2019). Pogled na mednarodne podatke modula Climate change Evropske druž­boslovne raziskave (ESS Round 8, 2016) tudi v nadaljevanju pokaže nekatere vzorce, ki jih lahko opazimo v shemi razvršcanja držav v skupine. Tudi pri opredelitvah glede energetskih preferenc in odnosu do obnovljivih virov se ti v mogocem prekrivajo. Pokažejo se nekatere tipicne regionalne in zgodo­vinsko politicne formacije, ki kažejo na to, da so obstojeci režimi energetske Povzeto po ESS Topline Series »European Attitudes to Climate Change and Energy«: https://www. europeansocialsurvey.org/findings/topline-series. preskrbe, njihova infrastrukturna zapušcina, pa tudi naravni resursi po drža­vah mocne determinante oblikovanja okoljskih pogledov ljudi (Balzekiene & Telesiene, 2016). Za nadaljevanje razprave, ki bo šla v smeri podrobnejše analize odnosa prebivalcev Slovenije do OVE, je to lahko izhodišce, ki kaže, kam se pri vprašanju energetskih preferenc v mednarodni prostor umešca Slovenija. To vprašanje je od zacetka vojne v Ukrajini, ob narašcajocih cenah energije in vztrajni odvisnosti od fosilnih goriv postalo še posebej perece. Ce pogledamo generalno sliko podpore razlicnim virom energije, vidimo, da približno dve tretjini Evropejcev na splošno misli, da mora biti velika vecina elektricne energije proizvedena v hidroelektrarnah ali vetrnih elektrarnah in celo tri cetrtine iz soncne energije (obnovljivi viri). V nadalje­vanju bomo podrobneje videli, da je tudi v Sloveniji ta podpora izrazita in da s casom še narašca. Nekoliko drugacna je bila podpora hidroelektrarnam, ta med ostalimi evropskimi državami v poprecju kaže znatno podporo (66 %), medtem ko je bilo v Sloveniji leta 2016 (Kurdija, 2018) te podpore manj (59 %); še opazneje pa je ta podpora upadla do leta 2019 (51 %) (Hafner, 2021). V nasprotju s tem je zelo ocitno, da sta premog in jedrska energija v povprecju med Evropejci izrazito nepriljubljena vira. Premog in zemelj­ski plin imata najvec zagovornikov v Izraelu ter v vec vzhodnoevropskih državah, kjer je višje podpore deležna tudi jedrska energija (Rusija, Litva, Madžarska). Skladno s tem je tudi podpora obnovljivim virom v teh državah znacilno nižje izražena, še posebej v Rusiji. Odnos do obnovljivih virov energije v Sloveniji – izhodišce Uveljavitev OVE velja za enega kljucnih javno politicnih ukrepov za blaženje podnebne krize. Kljucen del zelenega prehoda – glavne razvojne paradigme EU je vecanje deleža energije, pridobljene iz obnovljivih virov energije (OVE). Tako EU kot države clanice izvajajo in krepijo politike, ki stremijo k hitrejši implementaciji rabe OVE. EU je tako nedavno sprejela t. i. Direktivo RES (Direktiva EU/20232413), ki med drugim državam clani­cam nalaga, da opredelijo prednostna obmocja za gradnjo naprav na OVE, Slovenija pa je sprejela Zakon o uvajanju naprav na obnovljive vire energije (2023), ki to uveljavlja tudi v našem pravnem redu. Medtem ko se zakonodajna podpora vecanju rabe OVE krepi, pa se v splošni javnosti pogosto pojavlja nasprotovanje temu, zlasti ob izgradnji konkretnih projektov. Wustenhagen in sodelavci (2007) so v modelu druž­bene sprejemljivosti rabe OVE izpostavili, da je ta zgrajena iz tržne spreje­mljivosti, politicne sprejemljivosti in sprejemljivosti v lokalnih skupnostih. Raziskave kažejo, da javnost na splošno podpira rabo OVE. V EU 92% ljudi podpira vecjo rabo OVE (Evropska komisija, 2019), zato se lahko sprva zdi, da je uspešnost energetskega prehoda bolj ali manj tehnicno vprašanje iskanja pravih potencialov in tehnoloških rešitev. A izvedba konkretnih projektov kljub temu pogosto naleti na neodobravanje lokalne in širše jav­nosti. Prehod na OVE ni le tehnicni problem, temvec širši družbeni izziv (Pasqualetti, 2011; Otto & Gugushvili, 2020), ki zahteva tako usklajevanje raz­licnih strok kot tudi širše javnosti. Na to kažejo tudi navedbe v Nacionalnem energetskem in podnebnem nacrtu (NEPN, 2020: 48), ki kot eno od omeji­tev hitrejšega razvoja rabe OVE navaja nasprotovanja splošne javnosti. Kljucne razloge za odpor proti projektom OVE so raziskovalci sprva iskali predvsem v simptomu »NIMBY« (not in my backyard oz. ne na mojem dvorišcu), danes pa se kot glavni razlogi navajajo navezanost na prostor ter skrb za lokalno identiteto in kakovost življenja (Bevk & Golobic, 2020; Devine-Wright, 2009; Wolsink, 2000). Cedalje pomembnejše postaja tudi vprašanje lastništva objektov OVE ter delitve koristi in škode med dele­žniki (Goedkoop & Devine-Wright, 2016; Wustenhagen et al., 2007), saj so z razvojem rabe OVE povezani številni zunanji ucinki, kot so izguba estet­ske vrednosti krajine, hrup, padec vrednosti nepremicnin ipd., ki zadevajo tako lokalno kot tudi širšo javnost (Krekel & Zerrahn, 2017; Droes & Koster, 2016). Opisana izhodišca kažejo na kompleksnost energetske tranzicije, ki sega prek razlicnih meril – od naddržavnega in državnega z oblikovanjem politik in strategij prek lokalnega do ravni posameznika z vplivi na okolje in kako­vost življenja. Takšno razumevanje problematike zahteva celovit pristop k raziskovanju možnosti za smotrno implementacijo rabe OVE, ki upošteva cim vec opisanih dejavnikov in sledi hierarhiji meril – od oblikovanja in pri­merjave scenarijev razvoja OVE na državni ravni do pogledov posamezni­kov na umešcanje objektov za rabo OVE. V nadaljevanju clanka bodo pred­stavljeni rezultati raziskave, ki kaže to kompleksnost in sega od vprašanja splošne podpore rabe OVE, izhajajoc iz državnih scenarijev, do konkretne ravni posameznega projekta, s poudarkom na raziskovanju odnosa javno­sti do prostorskih posledic vecanja rabe OVE. Raziskava poskuša zaobjeti podporo javnosti rabe OVE na abstraktnem, nacionalnem in, konkretno, lokalnem nivoju. Cilj je bil preveriti javnomnenjske ucinke treh razlicnih scenarijev rabe OVE (vetrni, soncni in hidro scenarij) in ugotoviti njihove zaznane prednosti in slabosti ter vpliv razlicnih kompenzacijskih ukrepov na sprejemljivost rabe OVE. Metoda Kljub družboslovno zastavljenemu izhodišcu raziskave sta tema in pristop izrazito interdisciplinarni. Zato so pri izvajanju projekta Družbena sprejemlji­vost prostorskih ucinkov v scenarijih rabe OVE (Golobic, 2018) sodelovale štiri inštitucije, ki vsaka na svojem podrocju izkazujejo vrhunske reference: Biotehniška fakulteta (Oddelek za krajinsko arhitekturo), Inštitut Jožef Stefan (Center za energetsko ucinkovitost), Filozofska fakulteta (Oddelek za psihologijo) in Fakulteta za družbene vede (Center za raziskave javnega mnenja). Oblikovan je bil poseben modul o družbeni sprejemljivosti rabe OVE v obsegu približno 120 spremenljivk, ki je bil vkljucen v izvedbeni okvir raziskave Slovensko javno mnenje SJM19/1.7 Pripravo instrumenta in zbi­ranje podatkov (anketiranje) je koordiniral Center za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in množicnih komunikacij (CJMMK) na Fakulteti za družbene vede.8 Vsebino anketnega vprašalnika so spremljale graficne in foto priloge, ki so bile uporabljene pri izvedbi intervjuja. Poleg preucevanja sprejemljivosti posameznih tehnologij in scenarijev rabe OVE v Sloveniji smo v anketi pre­verjali tudi razloge za podporo dolocenemu scenariju, njegove negativne vplive na okolje, vpliv pomena kompenzacijskih dejavnikov na njegovo sprejemljivost ter poglede na razmerja med razlicnimi deležniki pri njego­vem nacrtovanju. Slika 2: ZASNOVA VPRAŠALNIKA DRUŽBENA SPREJEMLJIVOST SCENARIJEV RABE OBNOVLJIVIH VIROV ENERGIJE Vir: lastni prikaz. 7 Raziskava Slovensko javno mnenje (SJM) je izvirni slovenski empiricno raziskovalni projekt z najdaljšo podatkovno zgodovino (od 1968 dalje), kar daje raziskavi veliko medcasovno primerjalno vrednost. Njena izjemna tematska širina pokriva polje številnih družboslovnih disciplin (Malnar, 2021; Malnar & Šinko, 2012), pri cemer ima tudi raziskovanje okoljskih vsebin pomembno mesto. 8 Naloge CJMMK so zajemale koordinacijo in svetovanje pri pripravi vprašalnika, pripravo vzorc­nega nacrta, pripravo programskih in drugih orodij za zbiranje podatkov ter pripravo kvantitativne ana­lize (nosilec naloge: dr. Slavko Kurdija, nadzor kakovosti podatkov in pregled podatkov: mag. Tina Vovk). Splošno podporo smo poleg OVE merili tudi za druge vire energije (pre­mog, zemeljski plin, jedrska energije). Za ta namen smo prevzeli isti sklop vprašanj, ki je bil uporabljen v Evropski družboslovni raziskavi v okviru modula Climate Change iz leta 2016 (ESS Round 8). To je omogocilo medca­sovno primerjavo med letoma 2016 in 2019. Merili smo sprejemljivost treh razlicnih scenarijev rabe OVE, pri cemer je vsak temeljil na razlicni kombi­naciji soncne, vetrne in hidro energije. Pomembno je poudariti, da smo sce­narije oblikovali na podlagi obstojecih dokumentov, predvsem Akcijskega nacrta za obnovljive vire energije (2017). Soncni scenarij je temeljil na obsežni gradnji soncnih elektrarn, vetrni na vecjem obsegu vetrnih elektrarn ter hidro na izkorišcenju vecine potencialnih lokacij za hidro elektrarne. Za vsak scenarij smo izdelali prostorski model, ki je prikazoval, kje v Sloveniji bi se posamezen vir izkorišcal (Priloga 1). Lokacije za vetrne in hidroelek­trarne smo povzeli iz osnutka AN-OVE, medtem ko smo soncne elektrarne razporedili glede na obmocja poselitve (strešne elektrarne) in model letnega kvaziglobalnega obseva tal po Sloveniji (Rakovec et al., 2008). Modeli so bili izdelani izkljucno z namenom vkljucitve v javnomnenjsko raziskavo, zato so bili temu primerno poenostavljeni. Za vsak scenarij smo z izbirnim vpra­šanjem ugotavljali tudi njegovo kljucno prednost in pomanjkljivost, kjer je bil nabor možnih odgovorov pripravljen na podlagi pregleda najpogosteje izpostavljenih prednosti in slabosti posameznega vira v literaturi. Sprejemljivost soncnih in vetrnih elektrarn je bila izmerjena tudi na kon­kretni, lokalni ravni, v primeru, da bi se ena ali druga postavila v bližino respondentovega bivališca. Za pomoc pri odgovarjanju smo za vsako tehno­logijo pripravili fotomontažo, ki je prikazovala osnovne vizualne znacilnosti posega. Osnovo za fotomontažo smo izbrali v obliki fotografije, pri kateri smo presodili, da prikazuje relativno anonimno slovensko krajino, v katero smo nato v enem primeru vstavili vetrne turbine ter talno soncno elek­trarno v drugem (Priloga 2). Ceprav strateške usmeritve zagovarjajo izgra­dnjo soncnih elektrarn na strehah, gradnja na tleh ni izkljucena. V raziskavi smo se odlocili izpostaviti namestitev na tla, saj nas je zanimalo mnenje o izvedbi s potencialno vecjimi prostorskimi posledicami. Pri vsaki konkretni rešitvi smo anketirance spraševali o njihovi skrbi glede možnih negativnih vidikov vsake od rešitev, pa tudi o njihovem stališcu glede delitve koristi in škode med razlicnimi akterji. V zakljucnem delu vprašalnika pa smo preucili še vpliv razlicnih oblik kompenzacij ter razmerja med razlicnimi akterji pri odlocanju o postavitvi vetrne ali soncne elektrarne. Osnovni instrument raziskave je bil standardizirani vprašalnik (s pretežno 5-, 7- in 11-stopenjskimi Likertovimi lestvicami), ki je bil prilagojen za zbiranja podatkov s pomocjo racunalniško podprtega osebnega anketi­ranja (CAPI). Metodologija izvedbe raziskave je v celoti sledila principom izvedbe raziskave Slovensko javno mnenje, ki za vzorcni okvir uporablja Centralni register prebivalstva in metodo dvostopenjskega verjetnostnega vzorcenja. Na prvi stopnji smo uporabili skupine osnovnih popisnih oko­lišev (ki se uporabljajo za potrebe vzorcenja) in so bili predhodno strati­ficirani z upoštevanjem 12 statisticnih regij in 6 tipov naselij (kmecka do 2.000 prebivalcev, nekmecka do 2.000 prebivalcev, naselja z 2.000 do 10.000 prebivalcev, naselja z 10.000 do 100.000 prebivalcev ter loceni kategoriji Ljubljana in Maribor). Na drugi stopnji je bilo znotraj izbranih popisnih okolišev po postopku sistematicnega nakljucnega izbora doloceno fiksno število ciljnih oseb z osnovnimi kontaktnimi podatki. Velikost izhodišcnega vzorca je bila n = 2000. Do zakljucka raziskave je anketo izpolnilo 1079 oseb (stopnja odzivnosti: 54 %). Prikaz rezultatov Po mnenju vecine vprašanih bi iz obnovljivih virov energije (hidro, vetrne in soncne elektrarne ter biomasa) morali proizvesti veliko do zelo veliko energije, saj se je v povprecju za ta dva odgovora odlocilo skoraj 68 % vprašanih. Pri tem izstopajo predvsem soncne (86,5 %) in vetrne elektrarne (81,4 %). Vecji delež odgovorov za neobnovljive vire (jedrska energija, zemeljski plin, premog) se zvrsti med sploh nic do srednje, v zadnjem pre­vladujeta jedrska energija (24,9 %) in premog (29,2 %). Razvidni sta visoka podpora obnovljivim virom energije, predvsem soncnim in vetrnim elek­trarnam, in znacilno nižja podpora neobnovljivim virom (Slika 2). Slika 3: RAZPOREDITEV ODGOVOROV NA VPRAŠANJE: KOLIKO ELEKTRICNE ENERGIJE, PORABLJENE V SLOVENIJI BI PO VAŠEM MNENJU MORALI PROIZVESTI IZ VSAKEGA OD TEH VIROV Vir: Lastni izracun; podatkovni vir: SJM 2019/1. Primerjava z enakim vprašanjem v modulu podnebne spremembe v sklopu Evropske družboslovne raziskave 2016 (Kurdija et al. 2018) pokaže podobno razporeditev odgovorov. Z izjemo hidroelektrarn se je povprecna ocena podpore vseh obnovljivih virov energije povecala (slika 3). Hidroelektrarnam je podpora nekoliko padla (- 7,5-odstotne tocke oz. 12,6 % za odgovore zelo veliko in veliko skupaj). Prav tako je povprecna ocena padla za premog in zemeljski plin, medtem ko se je podpora rabi jedrske energije nekoliko dvignila (+ 4,9-odstotne tocke oz. 29,7 % za odgo­vore zelo veliko in veliko skupaj). Vecji je tudi delež odgovorov ne vem za vse vire energije. Statisticno znacilni sta razliki povprecij ocen za premog in soncno energijo. Slika 4: PRIMERJAVA POVPRECIJ NA ENAKO VPRAŠANJE O SPLOŠNI PODPORI RAZLICNIM VIROM ENERGIJE V LETIH 2016 IN 2019 Vir: Lastni izracun; podatkovni vir: SJM 2016/2 (ESS val 8.); SJM 2019/1. Glede na dovoljene odgovore smo za vsakega anketiranca izdelali indeks naklonjenosti OVE. Indeks je bil izdelan na nacin tockovanja, pri cemer smo posameznim odgovorom, ki kažejo podporo OVE ali zavracanje fosilnih goriv, pripisali doloceno število tock (Tabela 2) in jih sešteli. Višje število tock pomeni vecjo naklonjenost OVE. Anketirance smo glede na seštevek razdelili v tri razrede: manj naklonjeni (seštevek od 1 do 6), srednje naklo­njeni (od 7 do 9), mocno naklonjeni (od 10 do 15). Tisti, ki se v indeks niso uvrstili (49 oseb), so bili oznaceni kot neopredeljeni. Najvec anketirancev je bilo razporejenih v razred srednje naklonjenih (39,6 %), tem sledijo mocno naklonjeni (30,8 %), cetrtina pa je manj naklonjenih (25,1 %, Slika 5). Tabela 2: TOCKOVANJE ODGOVOROV ZA IZDELAVO INDEKSA NAKLONJENOSTI OVE zelo veliko veliko srednje malo sploh nic premog 1 2 zemeljski plin 1 2 jedrske energija 1 2 hidroelektrarna 2 1 soncne energija 3 2 vetrne energija 3 2 biomasa 1 1 Vir: lastni prikaz. Slika 5: RAZVRSTITEV ANKETIRANCEV V INDEKS NAKLONJENOSTI OVE Vir: podatkovni vir: SJM 2019/1. Na vprašanje o najvecjih koristi rabe OVE izstopata odgovora manj izpu­stov toplogrednih plinov (37,3 %) in ti viri so neomejeni, obnovljivi (22 %). Nadalje sta s 15,3 % in 12,2 % zastopana odgovora ti viri so bolj prijazni za rastline in živali ter boljša energetska samooskrba. Poleg odgovora ne vem je najmanj anketirancev izbralo odgovor ta energija je cenejša (8,4 %). Primerjava ocenjevanja scenarijev, ki so si jih anketiranci lahko ogledali na kartah (Priloga 1), pokaže, da se scenarija, ki temeljita na vetrni in soncni energiji, vprašanim zdita podobno dobra, s povprecno oceno 7,44 oz. 7,46 (na lestvici od 0 do 11, kjer višja ocena pomeni boljši, Slika 6). Njuno podob­nost kažeta tudi frekvencni porazdelitvi, ki se skorajda prekrivata. Scenarij, ki temelji na hidroenergiji, pa je prejel povprecno oceno 5,47 (Slika 6). Pri njem se kaže tudi opazno vec odgovorov na skrajnem negativnem polu lestvice (sploh se mi ne zdi dober), kar kaže na vecjo polariziranost stališc pri tej tehnologiji. Slika 6: PRIMERJAVA PODPORE SCENARIJEM OVE V SLOVENIJI Vir: Lastni izracun; podatkovni vir: SJM 2019/1. Podobno kot indeks naklonjenosti OVE smo izdelali tudi indeks prefe­rencnih scenarijev, ki je nastal z razvršcanjem ocen scenarijev. Razporeditev kaže, kateri scenarij je bil za posameznega anketiranca najboljši (slika 7). Zaradi pogostih podobnih odgovorov za vetrni in soncni scenarij en razred opisuje tudi tiste anketirance, ki sta se jim zdela vetrni in soncni podobno dobra in obenem boljša od hidro scenarija. Anketirancev, ki ne izkazujejo jasne preference in jih zato ni bilo možno zanesljivo razporediti v posame­zen opisan razred (ostali), je 18,4 %. Slika 7: RAZPOREDITEV ANKETIRANCEV V INDEKS PREFERENCNIH SCENARIJEV Vir: SJM 2019/1. In kje anketiranci vidijo kljucne prednosti in slabosti navedenih scenari­jev? Med glavnimi prednostmi hidro scenarija so vprašani izpostavili zane­sljivost vira (27,1 %) in višanje ravni energetske samooskrbe države (23,9 %). Glavna slabost hidro scenarija je bilo najveckrat mnenje, da so hidroelek­trarne škodljive za okolje (31,3%). Naslednji najbolj pogost vsebinski odgo­vor je, da hidroelektrarne niso na ustreznih lokacijah (17,6 %). V kategoriji drugo (6,1 %) so bili izpostavljeni predvsem okoljski vidiki, kot so vplivi na ekosisteme, poplavljanje ter preobremenjenost dolocenih rek. Tako za vetrni kot soncni scenarij prevladuje mnenje, da je glavna prednost prijaznost do okolja (vetrni 34,1 %, soncni 32,7 %). Temu sledi odgovor, da je ta energija poceni (vetrni 25,1 %, soncni 20,7 %). Med slabostmi pa je v obeh primerih naj­vec odgovorov prejela izjava da vetrne/soncne elektrarne niso zanesljiv vir energije (vetrni 29,2 %, soncni 23,7 %). 13,4 % vprašanih je menilo, da vetrne elektrarne niso na ustreznih lokacijah. 15,2 % vprašanih pa je za soncni sce­narij ocenilo, da je ta energija draga. Delež odgovorov drugo je znašal 8,4 % pri vetrnem in 10,7 % pri soncnem scenariju. V tej kategoriji so se pojavili predvsem odgovori, da v scenariju ne vidijo slabosti, pri vetrnem scenariju pa so navedli še vpliv na ptice, hrup in vizualni vpliv na okolje, medtem ko so pri soncnem scenariju izpostavili odpadke in nevarnost požara. Visoka podpora vetrnim in soncnim elektrarnam je izkazana tudi na lokalni ravni. Anketiranci so ob vizualnem prikazu soncne in vetrne elek­trarne (Priloga 2) ocenjevali, kako mocno bi jih poseg motil v bližini njiho­vega bivališca. Izkaže se, da vecine vprašanih ne bi pretirano motil ne en ne drugi objekt. 59,8 % respondentov je svoj odgovor pri vetrni elektrarni umestilo v levo polje lestvice sploh me ne bi motila, kjer je celo najvecji delež dobil skrajni pol lestvice (27,5 %). Odziv v primeru soncne elektrarne je bil podoben, 62,8 % anketiranih se nagiba v smer odgovora sploh me ne bi motila, skrajni pol je dobil 29,7 % odgovorov. Povprecni oceni (na lestvici od 0 do 10) sta 3,28 za vetrno elektrarno in 3,09 za soncno elektrarno (Slika 8). Tudi v teh dveh rezultatih se odraža visoka podpora vetrnim in soncnim elektrarnam, kar je konsistentno s prejšnjimi vprašanji. Med razlogi za skrbi ob bivanju v bližini vetrne ali soncne elektrarne nobeden od vidikov ni pretirano izstopal. Pri vetrnih elektrarnah bi bili vprašani najmanj zaskrbljeni o tem, da gre za nepotrebno porabo denarja in prostora (povprecje: 1,74) ter z migetanjem senc (povprecje: 1,78, na lestvici od 1-sploh me ne bi skrbelo do 5-zelo bi me skrbelo). Najbolj zaskrbljeni bi bili zaradi hrupa (povprecje: 2,44) in vrednosti nepremicnin (povpre­cje: 2,25). Nasprotno pa bi bili pri soncnih elektrarnah najmanj zaskrbljeni zaradi hrupa (povprecje: 1,34), vpliva na zdravje ljudi (povprecje: 1,84) in z nepotrebno porabo denarja in prostora (povprecje: 1,87). Najbolj zaskr­bljeni bi bili pri soncnih elektrarnah zaradi blešcanja (povprecje: 2,50) in izgleda krajine (povprecje: 2,42). Slika 8: KAKO MOCNO BI VAS MOTILA PRISOTNOST VETRNE ALI SONCNE ELEKTRARNE V BLIŽINI VAŠEGA BIVALIŠCA? Vir: SJM 2019/1. Slika 9: POVPRECJA ODGOVOROV O ŠKODI IN KORISTI ZA RAZLICNE AKTERJE PRI IZGRADNJI VETRNE ELEKTRARNE (VE) Vir: SJM 2019/1. Tudi strukturi odgovorov glede koristi posameznih akterjev sta si pri vetrni (VE) in soncni elektrarni (SE) zelo podobni (Slika 9). Prevladuje mnenje, da ima investitor elektrarne zelo veliko korist (povprecje 2,22 za VE oz. 2,33 za SE; na sedemstopenjski lestvici od -3 do 3). Prebivalci v bli­žini objekta pa nimajo niti koristi niti škode (povprecje 0,39 za VE oz. 0,53 za SE), medtem ko se za prebivalstvo Slovenije na splošno mnenje nagiba proti koristi (povprecje: 1,41 za VE oz. 1,47 za SE). Tako mnenje o koristi in škodi za naravo v okolici (povprecje 0,31 za VE oz. 0,29 za SE) kot globalno naravno okolje (povprecje: 0,27 za VE oz. 0,25 za SE) se giblje okoli sredine lestvice – nima niti koristi niti škode. Koristi so torej pripisane predvsem investitorjem in delno tudi prebivalstvu Slovenije. Med ponujenimi kompenzacijami za podporo gradnje soncne ali vetrne elektrarne je najvecji delež (dobra polovica vprašanih) izbrala vlaganje lastnika elektrarne v lokalni razvoj (53,8 %). Temu sledi z 20,8 % odgovor: neposredna financna izplacila (v obliki enkratnega zneska ali mesecne rente). Soudeležbo pri delitvi dobicka pa je izbralo 15 % vprašanih. Razprava in sklep Skozi celotno serijo indikacij, ki jih je pokrivala študija, se konsistentno odraža visoka podpora obnovljivim virom energije, predvsem vetrnim in soncnim elektrarnam, kar nakazuje na sklep, da je družbena sprejemljivost rabe OVE v Sloveniji visoka. Prepoznane prednosti obnovljivih virov energije se nanašajo predvsem na njihove okoljske vplive – najpogosteje gre za manjše izpuste toplogre­dnih plinov, cemur sledita obnovljivost vira in prijaznost do rastlin in živali. Energetski vidiki (samooskrba in cena) so, zanimivo, na dnu te lestvice. Pri tem velja dodati, da bi ponovitev študije v casu po nastopu energetske krize (ki sovpada z zacetkom vojne v Ukrajini) najbrž pokazala drugacna raz­merja. To kaže na to, da sta samooskrba in cena hitro pozabljeni, ko ljudje živijo v casu družbene in ekonomske stabilnosti. Prednosti in slabosti soncnega in vetrnega scenarija kažeta podobno sliko, hidro scenarij pa nekoliko drugacno. Konkretno za soncni in vetrni scenarij je najpogosteje izbrana prednost prijaznost do okolja, cemur sledi trditev, da je ta energija poceni. Slabosti pa vecina vprašanih vidi v nezane­sljivosti vira. Na vprašanje o slabostih scenarija je dobršen delež vprašanih odgovoril tudi z ne vem. Ob prevladujocem mnenju, da kljucne prednosti soncnih in vetrnih elektrarn izhajajo iz okoljskih vidikov, je presenetljivo, da se odgovori o koristih in škodah, ki jih ta dva objekta sicer prineseta globalnemu naravnemu okolju, koncentrirajo okoli odgovora nimajo niti koristi niti škode. To bi lahko razumeli, da gre pravzaprav za »še najmanj slabe rešitve«, kjer se soncne in vetrne elektrarne kažejo kot edina objek­tivno dostopna alternativa za pridobivanja energije, pri cemer pa to okolju vseeno ne koristi prav posebej, zgolj zada najmanj škode. Podobno lahko izpeljemo iz ugotovitve, da ima ocitno najvecjo korist od elektrarne investitor, da respondenti v elektrarnah na osnovi OVE pre­poznajo predvsem podjetniški vidik. Vidiki družbene koristi pa so nekoliko manj prepoznani. Ocitno gre pri razumevanju koristi predvsem za ekonom­ske vidike, kjer vecina anketirancev ni toliko razmišljala o okoljskih dejav­nikih. Nekoliko drugacen vtis dajejo odgovori pri hidroelektrarnah, kjer vprašani menijo, da so sicer zanesljiv vir, ki omogoca boljšo samooskrbo Slovenije, a so obenem bolj škodljive za okolje. To je povezano tudi z jasno izraženim mnenjem, da (v prikazanem scenariju) niso na ustreznih lokaci­jah. Predpostavimo lahko, da je na tovrstna stališca vplivala razprava v medi­jih, ki je prikazala nasprotovanje nekaterim projektom HE (Mura, Mokrice), pri katerih so nasprotniki v ospredje izrazito postavljali njihove negativne vplive na okolje. Visoka podpora soncnim in vetrnim elektrarnam se kaže tudi na lokalni ravni. Življenje v bližini vetrne ali soncne elektrarne se vecini vprašanih ne zdi problematicno. Najvec skrbi zaradi bližine vetrne elektrarne vzbuja hrup, pri soncni elektrarni pa blešcanje, v primeru obeh pa je naveden še padec vrednosti nepremicnin v njuni okolici. Ti vidiki so pogosto izpo­stavljeni tudi v literaturi. Zanimivo je tudi, da bi bilo vec ljudi zaskrbljenih glede videza krajine pri soncnih kot pri vetrnih elektrarnah. To je lahko tudi posledica uporabe fotomontaže talne soncne elektrarne (glej prilogo), ki je bila uporabljena pri vprašalniku, saj ta zavzame vec prostora kot vetrne elektrarne (na drugem prikazu). Medtem ko je visoka podpora na splošni in nacionalni ravni skladna z rezultati vecine drugih podobnih študij, je visoka podpora na lokalni ravni po svoje presenetljiva, saj pogosto zasledimo porocanje o lokalnem naspro­tovanju izgradnji tovrstnih objektov. Možnih razlag za to je vec. Prvic, gre lahko za vpliv konteksta zaradi strukture vprašalnika, ki sega od splošne do lokalne ravni, kar (zaradi družbeno zaželenega nacina odgovarjanja, ki ga prej beležimo na splošni ravni) lahko vpliva na nacin presojanja projektov v lokalnem okolju, saj so ti postavljeni v kontekst splošnih, nacionalnih ciljev. Poleg tega anketiranci znotraj istega vprašalnika tendirajo k temu, da nace­loma odgovarjajo konsistentno (ne v nasprotju z lastnimi odgovori). Drugic, lokalni kontekst je bil še vedno relativno abstrakten in se anketiranci niso povsem identificirali s predstavljeno lokacijo kot njihovo, ampak je ta »nekje drugje«. To bi bil lahko eden od vzrokov, da so mu manj nasprotovali. Tretjic pa, v nasprotju s tem kar vsekakor tudi velja, da nasprotovanje lokal­nim projektom, ki se odraža v literaturi (Segreto et al., 2020), izhaja pogosto iz t. i. »glasne manjšine«, medtem ko vecina tovrstne projekte morda vseeno podpira oz. jim vsaj ne nasprotuje. V zagovor zadnjemu argumentu gre vse­kakor dejstvo, da je bila raziskava s katero smo podatke zbirali (Slovensko javno mnenje 2019/1) zasnovana na reprezentativnem vzorcu. Ce se ozremo še na nekatere ugotovite iz širšega konteksta – odnosa javnosti do podnebnih sprememb in umestitev Slovenije v evropski okolj­ski vrednotni okvir, lahko potegnemo nekaj sklepov, ki so podobni tistim iz raziskave o obnovljivih virih energije iz leta 2019. Velika vecina prebi­valcev Evrope sicer priznava obstoj podnebnih sprememb in razloge za njihov nastanek. Vecinsko mnenje o tem najdemo tudi v nekaterih bolj skepticnih državah. A opazen je vzorec šibkejše sprejetosti podnebne para­digme in nekaterih konkretnejših ukrepov za razogljicenje v vzhodni in srednji Evropi. Slovenija se v tem oziru najde nekje na razpotju. Pri nacel­nem soglašanju se tendencno pomikamo proti skupini zahodnoevropskih držav, v nekaterih konkretnejših ozirih in prepricanjih pa ostajamo v polju skepticizma. Pri podpori obnovljivim virom energije in politiki subvencij (v smislu: odgovornost naj prevzame država) prednjacimo, pri vprašanju obcutka okoljske opolnomocenosti pa se znajdemo na repu. Tu mislimo na nivo posameznikovega obcutka, da bo z osebnim prizadevanjem tudi sam lahko prispeval k reševanju podnebne krize. Najbolj resignirano stališce se v tem smislu pokaže predvsem v državah, ki imajo tudi sicer vec zadržkov do soglašanja s podnebnimi spremembami, kamor pa sicer po podatkih Slovenija ne sodi. Da bi se znašli ob boku bolj razvitih držav, bi torej morali izkazati nekaj vec družbenega zaupanja, ki se kaže (kot bo v svojem clanku v tej ediciji pokazala B. Malnar) kot eden pomembnejših vzvodov do lažjega uveljavljanja ukrepov. Posameznika namrec ne sme prevevati dilema, da je v svoji skrbi za okolje osamljen, medtem ko drugim za to ni mar. Ekonomski vidik se (tako kot vecini Evropejcem) tudi Slovencem zdi naj­pomembnejši. Po podatkih iz modula Climate Change (ESS 2016) je skrb za cenovno dostopnost energije pri Slovencih trikrat višje izražena kot denimo skrb za zanesljivo dobavo vira in skrb zaradi podnebnih sprememb. To kaže na mocno materialno pogojenost oblikovanja stališc javnosti v povezavi z energetsko politiko. Podobno kot se kaže tudi v raziskavi o družbeni spre­jemljivosti OVE. Pri tem velja opozoriti, da sta bili obe meritvi izvedeni pred nastopom energetske krize v letu 2022. Ne glede na to pa je prej kot ne jasno, da – ce bomo kot družba izkazovali predvsem nacelno podporo, rav­nanjem, ki predstavljajo tudi doloceno materialno samoomejevanje, pa ne bomo izkazovali podpore – bomo (ceprav v krogu razvitih držav) pristali v zgodbi Norveške, kot tipicne države, ki izrazito pritrjuje okoljskim vredno­tam, na ravni prakse pa še vedno ustvarja visok ogljicni odtis (Fritz & Koch, 2019). Po drugi strani pa moramo nujno upoštevati tudi, da ukrepi za ucinko­vito razogljicenja nikakor niso enoznacni. Gre za spremembe, ki zahtevajo tehtno presojo, tudi v kontekstu spremljajocih ekonomskih in socialnih posledic, ki bodo vsekakor nastale z uveljavitvijo novih okoljskih politik. Okoljska transformacija bo uspešna le, ce bo nastajala v okviru širše druž­bene transformacije, ki bo povezana tako s pravicno distribucijo virov kot tudi tveganj. Ne glede na zahtevnost naloge pa gotovo velja, da bo vsako prelaganje odlocitev v nedoloceno prihodnost prinašalo samo še vec posle­dic, katerih sprotno blaženje bo ostala prevladujoca oblika okoljske poli­tike. Taka pa bo bolj kot ne nemocna za vsakršno dolgorocnejše reševanje podnebne krize. Priloga 1: Vir: lastni prikaz. Priloga 2: Vir: Fotografije in fotomontaža Tadej Bevk, 2019. LITERATURA Balzekiene, Aiste & Audrone Telesiene (2016): Vulnerable and insecure? Environ­mental and technological risk perception in Europe. Bevk, Tadej in Mojca Golobic (2020): Contentious eye-catchers: Perceptions of landscapes changed by solar power plants in Slovenia. Renewable Energy 152: 999–1010. Devine-Wright, Patrick (2009): Rethinking NIMBYism: The role of place attachment and place identity in explaining place-protective action. 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UDK [316.654: 502.1]:304.35 Marko POLIC, Matija SVETINA* POMEN OKOLJSKIH VPRAŠANJ PRI ZADOVOLJSTVU Z ŽIVLJENJEM** Povzetek. V clanku skušava z analizo podatkov SJM iz dveh casovnih obdobij, 2011 in 2020, ugotoviti, kako je odnos do okoljskih vprašanj povezan s subjektiv­nim blagostanjem/zadovoljstvom z življenjem. Analize podatkov SJM v omenjenem obdobju nakazujejo, da se ljudje okoljske problematike zavedamo, vendar ta vpra­šanja zaznavamo kot abstraktna, »nekje drugje«, zato se nam zdijo za oceno zadovoljstva s svojim življenjem manj pomembna kakor konkretna življenjska vpra­šanja, kot je zdravje ali materialno stanje. Ugotovitve komentirava v kontekstu teorije sestavljenih ravni in tudi okoljskih težav v letih 2022 in 2023, ko so nas pesti­le vrocina, suša in poplave, ki utegnejo to zaznavanje spremeniti. Kljucni pojmi: blagostanje, ekosistemske storitve, okolj­ska psihologija, podnebne spremembe, pozitivna psiho­logija, teorija sestavljenih ravni Uvod V zadnjih desetletjih se je zanimanje psihologije v veliki meri preusme­rilo s proucevanja psiholoških primanjkljajev in nezmožnosti na podrocje cloveškega blagostanja, odpornosti in obnove (Carr, 2004). Pojavilo se je novo podrocje raziskovanja in delovanja, t. i. pozitivna psihologija, ki se ukvarja s proucevanjem cloveških odlik in srece ter dejavnikov, ki spodbu­jajo blagostanje. Še sredi prejšnjega stoletja se je psihologija zacela ukvarjati s cloveškim odnosom in izmenjavami z okoljem, saj se je vse bolj krepilo spoznanje, da je kakovost življenja tesno povezana z znacilnostmi okolja, pa tudi, da ljudje pomembno vplivajo na samo okolje, žal v veliki meri v smeri njegovega unicevanja. Zato se zastavlja pomembno vprašanje, kaj na tako škodljivo vedenje vpliva in kako ga spremeniti (Steg in sod., 2013). * Dr. Marko Polic, redni profesor, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani; dr. Matija Svetina, redni profesor, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija. ** Izvirni znanstveni clanek. DOI: 10.51936/tip.60.4.717 Obe podrocji, okoljska in pozitivna psihologija, se tudi v raziskavah vse bolj povezujeta (La Placa in sod., 2013), saj se nedvomno kaže tesna poveza­nost med lastnostmi okolja in blagostanjem. V tem clanku skušamo z analizo podatkov raziskav javnega mnenja v dveh obdobjih, 2011 in 2020 (Hafner-Fink et al., 2013, 2021), ugotoviti, ali na subjektivni ravni obstaja povezanost med zadovoljstvom z življenjem in stališci do nekaterih okoljskih vprašanj. Zanima nas torej relativni pomen okoljskih vprašanj v primerjavi z drugimi (npr. vprašanj glede materialnega stanja, zdravja itn.). Pojem subjektivnega blagostanja je v psihologijo vpeljal Diener leta 1984 (Diener et al., 2018), nanaša pa se na posameznikovo celovito oceno lastnega življenja. Obravnava obseg, do katerega oseba meni ali cuti, da ji življenje dobro poteka. Ta ocena je subjektivna, povezana pa je z objektivnimi dejav­niki. Razlicni ljudje lahko objektivne življenjske okolišcine razlicno ocenju­jejo, odvisno od svojih ciljev, vrednot in kulture, zato subjektivno blagosta­nje odraža kakovost življenja z vidika danega posameznika. Kljub temu da so te ocene subjektivne, pa praviloma zajemajo razlicne vidike življenja, od spoznavnih do custvenih, socialnih in drugih. Winefield in soavtorji (2012) psihološko blagostanje pojmujejo kot kombinacijo custvenih in spoznav­nih stanj ter ucinkovitosti posameznikovega delovanja v socialnem okolju. Med custvenimi dejavniki avtorji omenjajo npr. sreco, žalost in druga custva, med spoznavnimi stanji pa je tudi ocena zadovoljstva. V Sloveniji je o tem pisal Musek (2008) in opozoril na stabilno dimenzionalno strukturo dejav­nikov višjega reda, ki tvorijo kontinuum od negativnega k pozitivnemu splošnemu pocutju. Raziskav zaznave in zavedanja okoljskih problemov je vse vec, saj so slednji postali globalni in jih obcuti vse vec ljudi (na primer suše, poplave, vrocina). Uzzell (2003) zaznavanje okoljskih problemov klasificira skozi razlicne ravni; višje okoljske oz. sistemske ravni predstavljajo probleme na globalni ravni, nižje ravni pa v tem kontekstu predstavljajo posameznikovo konkretno okolje, povezano z njegovimi vsakodnevnimi življenjskimi izkuš­njami. V zvezi s tem ugotavlja, da ljudje probleme na globalni ravni zazna­vamo kot resnejše v primerjavi s tistimi na nižjih ravneh, pri tem pa nastane zanimiv paradoks. Podatki so pokazali, da je zaznana osebna odgovornost za okolje najvecja na ravni soseske in se z oddaljenostjo zmanjšuje: ceprav se ljudje cutijo najbolj odgovorne za okolje na lokalni ravni, je to tudi raven, na kateri zaznavajo najmanj težav. Raven, kjer so težave najresnejše, je hkrati tista, za katero cutijo najmanj odgovornosti in možnosti vpliva (Uzzell, 2003). Težava nastane v tem, da z razlicnimi intervencijami, izobraževanjem in ozavešcanjem praviloma skušamo povecati okoljsko zanimanje in delo­vanje prav na ravni, ki se zdi ljudem najmanj problematicna, s tem pa se zmanjša ucinkovitost teh posegov. V zadnjih letih je vse vec govora o t. i. ekosistemskih storitvah. Gre za neposredne in posredne koristi, ki jih družbi ponuja ekosistem in ki ljudem omogocajo življenje ter dajo življenju vrednost. V tem kontekstu so zanimivi podatki, pridobljeni v okviru mednarodnega projekta Milenijska ekosistem­ska presoja (Ried et al., 2005), ki je skušal zbrati širok spekter informacij o povezavah med ekosistemskimi spremembami in cloveškim blagostanjem. Avtorji so ugotovili, da med ljudmi in ostalimi deli ekosistema obstaja dina­micna interakcija, pri kateri spremenjene bivalne razmere neposredno ali posredno povzrocajo spremembe v ekosistemih, s tem pa tudi spremembe blagostanja ljudi. Odnos ljudi do okolja v tem kontekstu opisuje rek »Dalec od oci, dalec od srca«. Ljudi zacne skrbeti onesnaženje, opustošenje okolja ali izginjanje naravnih virov, šele ko problem postane viden in motec ( npr. ko ozracje postane vidno onesnaženo in ima neprijeten vonj ali ko se stro­ški za ogrevanje mocno povišajo). Mednarodna komisija za podnebne spremembe v svojem zadnjem poro­cilu (IPCC, 2023), ugotavlja, da je cloveški vpliv na podnebne spremembe jasen in narašcajoc ter ga je mogoce opaziti povsod na Zemlji. Porocilo navaja vrsto težav, ki preprecujejo ucinkovito ukrepanje. Da bi posameznik sprejel odlocitev o spremembi svojega vedenja, povezanega z okoljskimi vprašanji, mora pred tem iti skozi zaporedje psiholoških procesov: posa­meznik mora najprej zaznati spremembo, jo prepoznati kot problem, prob­lem mora biti zaznan kot ogrožajoc, kar šele navede posameznika k nameri o spremembi vedenja. V zvezi s tem je bila v Sloveniji izvedena raziskava, ki je nakazala nekatere od teh korakov. V raziskavi odnosa do podnebnih sprememb na kvotnem vzorcu 1311 prebivalcev slovenskih statisticnih pokrajin so raziskovalci (Polic et al., 2014) ugotovili, da se ljudje podneb­nih sprememb zavedajo, da jih pripisujejo cloveški dejavnosti ter so zaradi njih zaskrbljeni. O posledicah podnebnih sprememb so imeli udeleženci bolj splošno sliko. Podnebne spremembe so v manjši meri povezovali s svo­jim lokalnim okoljem, kar potrjuje predpostavke teorije sestavljenih ravni (Liberman in Trope, 2008). Glede podnebnih sprememb se ljudje ne vedemo dosledno, kar skladno s teorijo sestavljenih ravni pojasnjujemo s tem, da podnebne spremembe psihološko zaznavamo kot oddaljen problem, ki prizadeva druge kraje in druge ljudi ter tiste v prihodnosti. Teorija sestavljenih ravni, ki sta jo raz­vila Liberman in Trope (2008), tako govori o štirih kljucnih razsežnostih zaznavanja psihološke razdalje: prostorska ali geografska razdalja, casovna razdalja, razdalja med opazovalcem in socialno tarco (npr. zaznavanje psi­hološke razdalje do drugega posameznika ali skupine, ki se je problem neposredno tice) in negotovost (kakšna je naša zaznava verjetnosti, da se bo dogodek, npr. poplava, res zgodil). Podnebne spremembe naj bi bile odda­ljene na vseh štirih razsežnostih. Po tej teoriji naj bi bila psihološka razda­lja do nekega objekta ali dogodka neposredno povezana s tem, kako ljudje dogodek razumejo oz. si ga reprezentirajo. Psihološko oddaljeni dogodki so reprezentirani kot abstraktni konstrukti na visoki ravni, ki jih sestavljajo splošne (dekontekstualizirane) lastnosti. Psihološko bližnji dogodki so zastopani s konkretnimi konstrukti na nizki ravni in jih sestavljajo posebne kontekstualne podrobnosti oz. posameznikove vsakodnevne izkušnje. Tako (psihološko) oddaljeni kot bližnji dražljaji so zastopani v istem misel­nem prostoru, vse razsežnosti razdalje pa so med seboj prepletene, tako da sprememba na enem vidiku razdalje lahko vpliva na vse druge (Liberman in Trope, 2008). Skladno s to teorijo bi lahko pricakovali, da bi vodna ujma v avgustu 2023 zaznavo okoljskih tveganj preusmerila iz splošnega na kon­kretno lokalno okolje. Slika 1: KOMPONENTE VZDRŽNOSTNEGA SUBJEKTIVNEGA BLAGOSTANJA Vir: prirejeno po Ronen in Kerret, 2020. Pojavljajo se tudi raziskave, ki neposredno povezujejo blagostanje in vzdržni razvoj1 (Slika 1, Ronen in Kerret, 2020) in opredeljujejo t. i. vzdržno blagostanje, ki je v presecišcu pozitivne psihologije in vzdržnosti (sustaina­bility). Nekateri drugi avtorji, npr. Gillis in Gatersleben (2015), povezujejo blagostanje z biofilicnim pristopom, tj. pojmovanjem, ki spodbuja uporabo naravnih materialov, sistemov in procesov pri nacrtovanju grajenega okolja. V pricujocem clanku smo raziskovali povezanost med spoznavnim vidi­kom subjektivnega blagostanja in ocenami drugih vidikov kakovosti življe­nja (npr. materialnimi razmerami, zdravjem) ter zaznavo okoljskih vprašanj. Podatke smo crpali iz arhiva SJM (2023) v dveh casovnih obdobjih (leta 2011 in 2020), s cimer smo skušali zajeti tudi casovno dimenzijo sprememb zaznavanja okoljske problematike, ki je bila ob obeh merjenjih povezana tudi s specificnimi socialnimi konteksti, gospodarsko krizo v letu 2011 in epidemijo covida-19 v letu 2020. Pojem vzdržni razvoj v clanku uporabljamo kot sopomenko pojmu trajnostnega razvoja. Metoda Evropsko družboslovno raziskavo je na reprezentativnem vzorcu ude­ležencev (N2011 = 1095 in N2020 = 1082 ) v Sloveniji, prek spleta, izpeljal Center za raziskavo javnega mnenja pri FDV UL. V tem clanku obravna­vamo podatke iz let 2011 in 2020 za Slovenijo. Vprašanja v obeh anketah niso bila povsem enaka, saj jih raziskovalci na osnovi pridobljenih podatkov posodabljajo, tj. izlocajo tista, ki ne ponudijo kakovostnih informacij in jih nadomestijo z aktualnejšimi in ustreznejšimi. To seveda lahko do neke mere oteži primerjave, vendarle pa daje dovolj dobro splošno podobo stališc in njihovih medsebojnih povezav, v tem primeru zadovoljstva z življenjem in stališc do okolja – vsaj v tem smislu, da pokaže relativno težo stališc do okoljskih vprašanj pri pojasnjevanju zadovoljstva z življenjem. Vprašanja so zahtevala bodisi nominalne odgovore bodisi so ponujala 5- ali 10-stopenj­ske lestvice Likertovega tipa in so podrobneje opisana na drugem mestu (Hafner-Fink et al., 2013, 2021; SJM, 2023). Rezultati in razprava Rezultati so sestavljeni iz treh delov. V prvem primerjamo odgovore, povezane z okoljskimi dejavniki v letih 2011 in 2020, ki so predstavljeni s frekvencami. V drugem delu predstavljamo rezultate multiple regresijske analize, v kateri smo ocenjevali relativno pomembnost okoljskih proble­mov glede na druge pomembne probleme v Sloveniji. V tretjem delu smo s pomocjo razvršcanja z metodo voditeljev (K-means) iskali profile udeležen­cev glede na njihova stališca do okoljskih vprašanj. Tabela 1: ODSTOTEK ODGOVOROV V LETIH 2011 IN 2020 ZA PRVA DVA IZBORA NAJBOLJ ŽGOCIH VPRAŠANJ V SLOVENIJI Katera od navedenih tem je danes v Sloveniji najbolj žgoca? SJM 2011 (%) SJM 2020 (%) zdravstveno varstvo 35 70 gospodarstvo 25 47 revšcina 50 28 priseljevanje 2 12 izobraževanje 7 11 okolje 10 10 kriminal 26 8 terorizem 2 1 Vir: Hafner-Fink et al., 2013, 2021 Odgovori na vprašanje o najbolj žgocih temah v Sloveniji kažejo troje: 1. Med vsemi težavami so najbolj pereci problemi zdravstveno varstvo, revšcina in gospodarstvo. 2. Problemi zaradi zdravstva, priseljevanja in gospodarstva so se po mne­nju vprašanih v zadnjem desetletju povecali, problemi zaradi kriminala in revšcine pa zmanjšali. 3. Okolje se med ostalimi težavami zdi relativno majhen problem. Mnenje glede tega se v zadnjem desetletju ni spremenilo – problemi okolja se zdijo (izmed naštetih težav) najbolj ali drugi najbolj žgoc problem le vsa­kemu desetemu udeležencu teh dveh raziskav SJM. Tabela 2: ODSTOTEK ODGOVOROV V LETIH 2011 IN 2020 NA VPRAŠANJE O POMEMBNOSTI POSAMEZNIH OKOLJSKIH PROBLEMOV Kateri od navedenih problemov (ce sploh kateri) je po vašem mnenju najbolj pomemben za Slovenijo kot celoto? SJM 2011 (%) SJM 2020 (%) onesnaženje zraka 24 17 podnebne spremembe 8 16 onesnaženje vode 14 15 odlaganje gospodinjskih odpadkov 15 15 kemikalije in pesticidi 18 13 gensko spremenjena hrana 6 9 izraba naravnih virov 4 7 drugo (nic od navedenega, ne vem, ni odgovora) 4 4 radioaktivni odpadki 3 3 pomanjkanje vode 2 1 Vir: Hafner-Fink et al., 2013, 2021. Med vprašanji, povezanimi z okoljskimi problemi, najbolj izstopajo one­snaženje zraka, tal, vode, odlagališca odpadkov. Prepricanja glede teh vpra­šanj se v zadnjem desetletju niso mocno spremenila, spremenilo pa se je prepricanje glede podnebnih sprememb. Kljub temu da se podnebne spre­membe med vsemi ostalimi okoljskimi težavami vprašanim niti leta 2011 niti 2020 niso zdele problematicne, pa se je relativna pomembnost podneb­nih vprašanj v zadnjem desetletju podvojila (z 8 na 16 %). Rezultati odpirajo vec novih vprašanj in pomislekov; med drugim so se Slovenci po letu 2020 soocili z vec vremenskimi ujmami (suša v letu 2022 in poplave v letu 2023) in se je lahko prepricanje glede podnebnih sprememb zaradi tega po letu 2020 spremenilo. Tabela 3: STRINJANJE S TRDITVIJO (V ODSTOTKIH), TJ. OCENA 4 ALI 5 NA 5-STOPENJSKI LIKERTOVI LESTVICI OZ. 8–10 NA 10-STOPENJSKI Vprašanje SJM 2011 (%) SJM 2020 (%) Ce govorimo na splošno, koliko vas skrbijo problemi okolja? 74 80 Naredim, kar je dobro za okolje, tudi ce zato porabim vec denarja ali mi vzame vec casa. 68 66 Okoljski problemi neposredno vplivajo na moje vsakdanje življenje. 47 43 Kako pogosto se odlocite, da dolocenih proizvodov ne boste kupili zaradi okoljskih razlogov? 30 39 Kako zelo bi se bili pripravljeni odpovedati svojemu življenjskemu standardu z namenom varovanja okolja? 32 38 Skoraj vse, kar sodi k modernemu življenju, škodi okolju. 47 37 Prevec nas skrbi prihodnost našega okolja, premalo pa vse, kar se danes dogaja v zvezi s cenami in zaposlitvijo. 45 33 Kako zelo bi bili pripravljeni placevati dosti višje cene z namenom varovanja okolja? 27 28 Za nekoga, kot sem jaz, je pretežko, da bi kaj dosti naredil za okolje. 32 25 V življenju obstajajo pomembnejše stvari, kot je varovanje okolja. 34 25 Nobenega smisla nima, da po svojih najboljših moceh skrbiš za okolje, ce tega ne pocnejo tudi drugi. 34 25 Težko presodim, ali s svojim nacinom življenja koristim ali škodujem okolju. 22 19 Kako zelo bi bili pripravljeni placevati dosti višje davke z namenom varovanja okolja? 17 18 Ljudje so prevec zaskrbljeni zaradi škode, ki jo okolju prizadene cloveški napredek. 34 16 Mnoge trditve o ogroženosti okolja so pretirane. 26 14 Moderna znanost bo rešila naše probleme v zvezi z okoljem, ne da bi se zato naš nacin življenja kaj dosti spremenil. 15 11 Vir: Hafner-Fink et al., 2013, 2021. Rezultati kažejo, da se relativna pomembnost okoljskih vprašanj v zadnjem desetletju ni mocno spremenila, odgovori, povezani z vedenjskimi namerami (Tabela 3), pa kažejo, da se vedenje ljudi verjetno kljub vsemu postopoma spreminja. Vprašani se npr. vse manj strinjajo s trditvami, kot so npr. »Zaradi okoljskih vprašanj smo prevec zaskrbljeni.«, »V življenju so pomembnejše reci, kot so okoljska vprašanja.«, »Nima se smisla truditi glede okolja, ce tega ne pocnejo tudi drugi.«, »Skrbi zaradi okolja so pretirane.«; tako so se – v primerjavi z letom 2011 – leta 2020 pogosteje odlocali, da okoljsko problematicnih izdelkov ne bodo kupili. Tabela 4: REZULTATI REGRESIJSKE ANALIZE ZA POJASNITEV ZADOVOLJSTVA Z ŽIVLJENJEM (SJM 2011) R = 0,471 R2 = 0.221 Prilagojeni R2 = 0.218 Std. napaka ocene = 0,79 SPREMENLJIVKE b t P Zadovoljstvo z materialnim stanjem družine. -0,217 -7,389 0,000 Kaj bi na splošno rekli, ali je vaše zdravje … 0,301 10,23 0,000 In kako zelo bi bili pripravljeni placevati dosti višje davke za varovanje okolja? 0,057 1,987 0.047 Za nekoga, kot sem jaz, je pretežko, da bi kaj dosti naredil za okolje. -0,133 -4,739 0,000 Vir: lastni izracun. Podobne rezultate kaže tudi regresijska analiza (Tabeli 4 in 5), v kateri smo prek problematike družbenih vprašanj modelirali zadovoljstvo z življe­njem. V regresijsko analizo smo vkljucili spremenljivke, povezane z okolj­skimi vprašanji (pregled teh spremenljivk je v Tabelah 2 in 3), zadovoljstvo z osebnimi razmerami, kot so posameznikovo zdravje, financno stanje ipd., ter družbena vprašanja (zadovoljstvo s stanjem glede zdravstva, gospo­darstva, šolstva, demokracije). V prikazanih analizah so upoštevane samo tiste spremenljivke, ki so pomembno pojasnjevale splošno zadovoljstvo z življenjem. Analiza podatkov iz leta 2020 je tako pokazala, da zadovoljstvo s socialnimi vprašanji, kot so zdravstvo, šolstvo, demokracija in okolje, ter osebno zadovoljstvo z zdravjem in materialnimi razmerami pojasnijo 45 % variance splošnega zadovoljstva z življenjem. Med njimi so najpomembnejši osebni dejavniki, kot sta zadovoljstvo z materialnimi razmerami in zdravje, kot pomembno pa se je pokazalo tudi vprašanje demokracije v Sloveniji. Pri razlagi teh podatkov moramo biti pozorni na to, da je anketiranje leta 2020 potekalo v obdobju pandemskih ukrepov, ki so lahko vplivali tudi na rela­tivno pomembnost teh vprašanj. Tabela 5: REZULTATI REGRESIJSKE ANALIZE ZA POJASNITEV ZADOVOLJSTVA Z ŽIVLJENJEM (SJM 2020) R = 0,671 R2 = 0.45 Prilagojeni R2 = 0.448 Std. napaka ocene = 1.441 SPREMENLJIVKE b t p Konstanta. 4.237 0,000 Zadovoljstvo z materialnimi razmerami. 0.553 21.703 0,000 Ocena zdravja. -0.126 -4.986 0,000 Kako slabi ali dobri bodo vplivi podnebnih sprememb za Slovenijo? 0.073 2.98 0.003 Koliko uživate v tem, da ste zunaj v naravi? 0.097 4.005 0,000 Zadovoljstvo z delovanjem demokracije v Sloveniji. 0.118 4.772 0,000 Vir: lastni izracun. Oglejmo si še rezultate analize z metodo voditeljev (K-means), v katerih smo iskali možne tipologije udeležencev glede na zadovoljstvo z življenjem in odnos do okolja. Spremenljivke v obeh analizah se razlikujejo, saj smo vsakic izbrali le tiste, po katerih so se udeleženci razlikovali. V obeh prime­rih poteka razlikovanje glede na bolj ali manj vzdržen odnos do okolja. Graf 1: ANALIZA Z METODO VODITELJEV GLEDE NA ODNOS DO OKOLJA ZA PODATKE IZ LETA 2011 Vir: lastni izracun. Analiza podatkov SJM 2011 in SJM 2020 z metodo voditeljev je glede na odnos do okolja nakazala obstoj dveh profilov udeležencev, ki se razlikujeta po prijaznosti do okolja in smo ju poimenovali »vzdržni« in »nevzdržni«. Po podatkih iz leta 2011 se udeleženci razlikujejo glede na pripravljenost, da se odpovedo nekaterim ugodnostim (npr. življenjskemu standardu), med­tem ko ostale okoljske spremenljivke ne prispevajo k razlikovanju skupin. Skupini se najbolj razlikujete glede omejitev uporabe avtomobila, verjetno zato, ker najbolj neposredno in konkretno zadeva vsakdanje življenje, ostali dve vprašanji pa sta bolj hipoteticni. Pri SJM 2020 se pojavljajo štiri okoljske spremenljivke, po katerih se ude­leženci razlikujejo. Vzdržni menijo, da bodo vplivi podnebnih sprememb za svet in za Slovenijo slabi, manj kot nevzdržni pa se strinjajo s tem, da je pretežko kaj narediti za okolje in da obstajajo pomembnejše stvari, kot je varovanje okolja. Rezultati niso v celoti skladni s teorijo sestavljenih ravni (Liberman in Trope, 2008), saj pri vzdržnih ni razlik v oceni vpliva pod­nebnih sprememb na svet in na Slovenijo, pri nevzdržnih pa so te razlike majhne. V celoti gledano zaznava okoljskih vprašanj glede na zadovoljstvo z življenjem ponuja bolj razlike v stopnji kot pa v smeri odgovorov. Graf 2: ANALIZA Z METODO VODITELJEV GLEDE NA ODNOS DO OKOLJA ZA PODATKE IZ LETA 2020 Sklep Analiza podatkov SJM za leti 2011 in 2020 je pokazala – deloma tudi zaradi sprememb v sestavi vprašalnikov –, da se odgovori in odnosi med spremen­ljivkami v razlicnih obdobjih lahko deloma tudi razlikujejo. Odgovori kažejo zanimivo dvojno sliko glede okoljskih vprašanj. Po eni strani udeležence okoljski problemi skrbijo (npr. tri cetrtine vprašanih tako v letu 2011 (74 %) kot v letu 2020 (80 %) poroca, da jih okoljska vprašanja skrbijo ali zelo skr­bijo), po drugi strani pa so okoljska vprašanja med vsemi ostalimi življenj­skimi skrbmi (npr. za zdravje, materialne razmere) relativno nepomembno povezana z zadovoljstvom z življenjem. Glede na subjektivno zaznano bla­gostanje oz. zadovoljstvo z življenjem odnos do okoljskih vprašanj nima velike teže; v pojasnjevanju zadovoljstva prevladujeta klasicni temi zaznanih materialnih razmer in zdravja. Leta 2020 se pojavlja tudi vpliv ocene stanja demokracije, kar je glede na družbeno polarizacijo ob epidemiji covida-19 verjetno pricakovano. Žal vprašanje o stanju demokracije leta 2011 v anketo ni bilo vkljuceno, zato ostaja vprašanje, ali so njen pomen za zadovoljstvo z življenjem sprožili tedanji dogodki ali pa gre za znacilen odnos, kar nakazu­jejo nekatere druge raziskave (Voukelatov in sod., 2021). Vsekakor se kaže, da okoljska vprašanja v spoznavnem prostoru v obrav­navanih obdobjih niso bila bistveno povezana z zadovoljstvom z življenjem, kar bi nakazovalo, da se ljudje sicer okoljske problematike zavedajo, je pa ne povezujejo neposredno s svojim blagostanjem. Okoljske težave »so nekje drugje« in ne pri nas, kar je skladno s teorijo sestavljenih ravni. Družbeni in okoljski dogodki, kot je covid-19 ali vremenske ujme leta 2023, zelo verjetno utegnejo te zaznave spremeniti. LITERATURA Carr, Allan (2004): Positive Psychology. New York: Brunner-Routledge. Diener, Ed (1984): Subjective well-being. Psychological Bulletin 95 (3): 542–575. Diener E., Richard E. Lucas, Shigehiro Oishi (2018): Advances and Open Questions in the Science of Subjective Well-Being. Collabra: Psychology 4 (1): 15. Dostopno prek http://online.ucpress.edu/collabra/article-pdf, 19. 10. 2023. EU, Evropska Unija(2023): Eurobarometer. Dostopno prek https://europa.eu/euro­barometer/surveys/detail/2954, 4. 11. 2023. Gillis, Kaitlyn, in Brigitta Gatersleben (2015): A Review of Psychological Literature on the Health and Wellbeing of Biophilic Design. Buildings 5: 948–963. Hafner-Fink, Mitja, Slavko Kurdija, Brina Malnar, Mojca Pajnik, in Samo Uhan (2021): Slovensko javno mnenje 2020/3: Ogledalo javnega mnenja, Odnos do okolja (ISSP 2020), Mediji in problematika migracij, Odnos do uporabe pripravkov iz industrijske konoplje. Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana, Slovenian Social Science Data Archives. ADP – IDNo: SJM203. Dostopno prek https://doi. org/10.17898/ADP_SJM203_V1, 1. 12. 2023. Hafner-Fink, Mitja, Janez Štebe, Brina Malnar, Miroslav Stanojevic, Miroljub Ignja­tovic, in Nevenka Cernigoj-Sadar (2013): Slovensko javno mnenje 2011/1: Mednarodna raziskava o okolju (ISSP 2010), zdravju in zdravstvenem varstvu (ISSP 2011), o odnosu delo-družina in psihicnem nasilju na delovnem mestu. Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana, Slovenian Social Science Data Archives. ADP – IDNo: SJM111. Dostopno prek https://doi.org/10.17898/ADP_SJM111_V1, 1. 12. 2023. IPPC (2023): AR6 Synthesis Report. Dostopno prek https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_LongerReport.pdf, 6. 11. 2023. La Placa, Vincent, Allan McNaught, Anneyce Knight (2013): Discourse on wellbeing in research and practice. International Journal of Wellbeing 3 (1): 116–125. Liberman, Nira, in Yaacov Trope (2008): The psychology of transcending the here and now. Science 322: 1201–1205. Musek, Janek (2008): Dimenzije psihicnega blagostanja. Anthropos 1–2: 139–160. Polic, Marko, Barbara Lampic, Marko Krevs, Dušan Plut, Irena Mrak, Karel Natek, Darko Ogrin in Boštjan Bajec (2014): Zavedanje vremenske in podnebne spre­menljivosti pri prebivalcih Slovenije in njihova pripravljenost na ukrepanje. V: Zorn M. (ur.): (Ne)prilagojeni, Knjižna zbirka Naravne nesrece (3). Ljubljana: Založba ZRC: 139–151. Reid, Walter V., et al. (2005: Ecosystems and human well-being-Synthesis: A report of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Island Press. Dostopno prek https:// www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf, 1. 12. 2023. Ronen, Tammie, Doritt Kerret (2020): Promoting Sustainable Wellbeing: Integrating Positive Psychology and Environmental Sustainability in Education. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17. Dostopno prek www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph, 19. 10. 2023. SJM, Slovensko javno mnenje. Dostopno prek https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/, 4. 11. 2023. Steg Linda, Van Den Berg, Anes in De Groot, Judith IM (2013): Environmental Psychology: An Introduction, Chichester: BPS Blackwell. Uzzell, David (2003): Our uncommon future. V: R. G. Mira, J. M. Sabucedo Cameselle, J. R. Martinez (Ur): Culture, Environmental Action and Sustainability. Gottingen: Hogrefe & Huber, 21–39. Voukelatou, Vasiliki, Lorenzo Gabrielli, Ioanna Miliou, Stefano Cresci, Sharma, Rajesh, MAurizio Tesconi, Luca Pappalardo (2021): Measuring objective and subjective well-being: dimensions and data sources. International Journal of Data Science and Analytic 11: 279–309. Wiunefield, Helen R., Gill Tiffany K., Taylor, Anne W., Pilkington in Rhiannon M. (2012): Psychological well-being and psychological distress: is it necessary to measure both? Dostopno prek http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/20, 19. 10. 2023. UDK 316.654:[351.78:502/504](497.4) Marjan MALEŠIC* JAVNOMNENJSKA ZAZNAVA OKOLJSKE VARNOSTI V SLOVENIJI** Povzetek. Dejstva, ki dokazujejo povezanost okoljskih in varnostnih problemov sodobne družbe, so neizpod­bitna, na kar opozarjajo številne znanstvene analize. Vprašanje je, ali se tudi slovenska javnost zaveda te povezanosti in ce da, v kolikšni meri, kar proucujemo prek analize podatkov o njenem odnosu do okoljske problematike. Kljucna metoda je analiza podatkov raziskav »SJM 2020/3 Odnos do okolja« in »SJM 2011/1 Okolje«. Ugotavljamo, da postaja slovenska javnost vse bolj obcutljiva za okoljske probleme, vendar pa skrbi zaradi le-teh niso tako izrazite, kot bi predpostavili na podlagi argumentov in podatkov o pogostosti in inten­zivnosti podnebnih nesrec, okoljskega terorizma in kriminala, nasilja ob državljanskih nemirih, okoljskih migrantov ter oboroženih spopadov, ki so tudi okoljsko pogojeni. Nekateri od teh pojavov namrec že mocno vplivajo na varnost Slovenije in njenih prebivalcev. Ugotavljamo tudi, da okoljske probleme javnost sicer zaznava, da jo skrbijo do dolocene mere, vendar njiho­vih posledic ne povezuje v zadostni meri s svojim vsak­danjim življenjem, vkljucno z varnostjo. Kljucni pojmi: okolje, okoljski problemi, viri ogrožanja, okoljska varnost, javnost, zaznava Uvod Okoljski in varnostni problemi sodobne družbe so mocno prepleteni. Podnebne spremembe, demografsko stanje, pretirano izkorišcanje narav­nih virov, vkljucno z vodo, dezertifikacija, deforestacija, dvigovanje morske gladine, erozija prsti in drugi okoljski pojavi marsikje povzrocajo revšcino, lakoto in bolezni. Okoljski problemi imajo tudi globalne varnostne impli­kacije v obliki podnebnih nesrec (ang. climatological disasters), okoljsko pogojenih migracij, državljanskih nemirov, okoljsko pogojenega terorizma * Dr. Marjan Malešic, redni profesor, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija. ** Izvirni znanstveni clanek. DOI: 10.51936/tip.60.4.727 in kriminala, hkrati pa prispevajo k razvoju in izbruhu (oboroženih) konflik­tov. Povezava med okoljem in varnostjo je postopno postala predmet teore­ticne obravnave in empiricnega proucevanja. V šestdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja so se okoljske razprave ukvarjale predvsem z vprašanji rasti prebi­valstva, onesnaževanja narave, zasaditve parkov v mestih ipd. Sedemdeseta leta so prinesla spoznanja o omejenosti virov in mejah rasti, v osemdesetih letih je bil poudarek na trajnostnem razvoju oziroma solidarnosti in pra­vicnosti med bogatimi in revnimi ter med generacijami. Tedaj so se zacele tudi razprave o varnostnih implikacijah okoljskih problemov. V devetdese­tih letih so znanstveniki poglobili premislek o povezavah med okoljem in varnostjo ter uveljavili koncept okoljske varnosti. V 21. stoletju v razpravah prevladujejo podnebne spremembe in njihove vsestranske negativne druž­bene posledice, tudi varnostne (Malešic, 2012). V clanku obravnavamo splošen odnos slovenske javnosti do okoljske problematike, zaznavo pomena razlicnih okoljskih problemov, še posebej podnebnih sprememb in njihovega vpliva na svet in Slovenijo. Koliko so ljudje zaskrbljeni zaradi okoljskih problemov? Zanima nas tudi ocena javno­sti glede stopnje nevarnosti, ki jo za okolje predstavlja višanje temperature na Zemlji, prizadetost bivalnega okolja anketirancev z ekstremnimi vremen­skimi pojavi, poslabšanjem kakovosti zraka in vode v zadnjem obdobju ter njihova presoja o (ne)varnosti jedrskih elektrarn. Kljucna metoda je analiza podatkov raziskav »SJM 2020/3 Odnos do okolja« in »SJM 2011/1 Okolje«. Interpretacija podatkov temelji na teoreticnem premisleku o povezavah med okoljem in varnostjo, razmerju med dejansko in zaznano ogroženostjo ter posamicnih virih ogrožanja, ki se mocno navezujejo na okoljske prob­leme. Teoreticna izhodišca o povezanosti okolja in varnosti Raziskovalci nacionalne in mednarodne varnosti so zaceli negativne pro­cese v okolju in njihov vpliv na varnost pogosteje omenjati v osemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja. Tako je na primer Brown (1982: 21–22) opozoril, da je treba poleg tradicionalnih vojaških virov ogrožanja nacionalne varno­sti upoštevati tudi okoljske in ekonomske vire ogrožanja. Mathews (1989: 162) je poudaril, da okoljski in demografski procesi ter usihanje naravnih virov predstavljajo vir ogrožanja nacionalne varnosti. Loske (1991: 25) je temu razmišljanju dodal pomembno ugotovitev, da ogrožanje varnosti ne izvira zgolj iz odnosa med državami, ampak tudi iz odnosa med clovekom in naravo. Pomembna je tudi njegova trditev, da okoljski problemi ogrožajo varnost prek meja držav, saj ne upoštevajo suverenosti nacionalnih držav in potemtakem zahtevajo intenzivno in temeljito mednarodno sodelovanje. V svojem konceptu (svetovne) družbe tveganja je tudi Beck (1982; 2008) prepoznal okoljske nevarnosti, najprej jedrsko in kemicno onesnaženje, kasneje tudi podnebne spremembe. Kot je ugotavljal Levy (1995), je bilo moc razpravo, ki je zacela opozarjati na povezavo med okoljem in varnostjo, opazovati prek treh argumentov. Eksistencni argument je zatrjeval, da so doloceni vidiki globalnega okolja tako tesno povezani z nacionalnimi vrednotami, da predstavljajo varnostni interes. Unicevanje okolja1 ogroža najbolj temeljne vidike clovekove varno­sti, saj spodkopava naravno podporo sistemom, ki so kljucni za clovekovo dejavnost in obstoj. Fizicni argument k povezavi med okoljem in varnostjo pristopa bolj selektivno, saj meni, da unicevanje okolja postane neposredni vir ogrožanja varnosti, takrat ko povzroca izgubo življenj in blagostanja državljanov ali na kak drug nacin ogroža temeljne družbene vrednote. Skladno s tem argumentom nimajo vsi okoljski pojavi takega znacaja ozi­roma obsega. Politicni argument si zastavi vprašanje, ali lahko unicevanje okolja na obmocjih, kjer postaja absorbcijska zmožnost okolja, da zagotovi preživetje ljudem, omejena, povzroci nasilne državljanske nemire in mno­žicne migracije, ki bi prerasli v konflikt in oboroženi spopad. Za interpretacijo javnomnenjskih podatkov o zaznavi ogroženosti je pomemben koncept okoljske varnosti, ki pomeni ohranjanje lokalne in pla­netarne biosfere kot temeljnih sistemov, na katerih temeljijo vse clovekove dejavnosti (Buzan, 1991), ali kot stanje ekosistemov, ki predstavlja temelj za ohranjanje dosežene stopnje civilizacije (Buzan, Wćver in de Wilde, 1998; Dalby, 2009). SIPRI (1992: 27) pa okoljsko varnost opredeli kot stanje, v katerem so vlade same ali s pomocjo mednarodne skupnosti sposobne obvladovati družbene in politicne ucinke usihanja naravnih virov. Chalecki (2001: 2) meni, da je okoljska varnost sposobnost države in družbe, da se spoprime z okoljskimi tveganji in škodljivimi posledicami ter nasprotji ali konflikti, ki so povezani s stanjem v okolju. White (2014: 836) pa obrne zorni kot gledanja in opredeli okoljsko nevarnost, in sicer kot »akcije in razmere, ki spodkopavajo sposobnost uporabe narave v meri, ki bi omogocala zado­voljiti clovekove potrebe«. Unicevanje okolja in posledicno pomanjkanje virov se po njegovem mnenju povezujeta s »clovekovim konfliktom« (ang. human conflict)2 na individualni, skupinski in državni ravni. Dalby (2017: 237) meni, da je v zadnjem casu razpravo o okoljski varnosti zamenjala raz­prava o podnebni varnosti. Razumemo jo kot del okoljske varnosti, torej kot povezavo med varnostjo in podnebnimi spremembami, ki so segment okoljske problematike. 1 Unicevanje okolja razumemo kot pospešeno rabo naravnih virov, onesnaženje ozracja (podnebne spremembe, ki jih povzroca ucinek tople grede, tanjšanje ozonske plasti, kisli dež), usihanje vodnih virov, zastrupljanje okolja s kemikalijami, unicevanje prsti in izgubo biološke raznovrstnosti. 2 Verjetno White »clovekov konflikt« uvede v razpravo, da bi opozoril na antipod konceptu »clovekove varnosti« (ang. human security). Dejansko in zaznano ogrožanje varnosti Razlicni viri ogrožanja varnosti družbe imajo svojo realno, objektivno razsežnost, ki se kaže v vojaških in politicnih razmerah v okolju dolocene skupnosti, ekonomskem in socialnem položaju ljudi, konfliktnosti znotraj družbe, stopnji kriminala, verjetnosti teroristicne dejavnosti, zdravstveno­-epidemiološkem stanju, stanju v fizicnem okolju, pogostosti in intenzivno­sti naravnih, antropogenih in tehnoloških nesrec, ter zaznavno razsežnost, ki ponazarja, kako pripadniki dolocene skupnosti subjektivno zaznavamo navedene vire ogrožanja, pri cemer se lahko med seboj zelo razlikujemo, kar je opaziti v družbenem diskurzu in posledicno v javnem mnenju. To v bistvu pomeni, da varnostni sistem deluje v dveh okoljih, v dejanskem in zaznanem okolju: prvo je domena prakse, skozi katero želi varnostni sis­tem na ucinkovit nacin zagotoviti varnost, obrambo in zašcito skupnosti pred razlicnimi viri, ki ogrožajo življenje in zdravje ljudi, njihove kulturne, naravne in materialne vrednote in interese, drugo pa je domena zaznav virov ogrožanja, odnosa do varnostnega sistema in obcutkov v zvezi z var­nostjo oziroma nevarnostjo, ki preti skupnosti. Varnostni sistem torej deluje v prostoru, ki ga oblikuje interakcija med dvema okoljema: okoljem notra­njega in zunanjega ogrožanja varnosti, ki je izviren razlog za oblikovanje, strukturiranje in organiziranje varnostnih mehanizmov in instrumentov, ter okoljem varnosti kot vrednote, v katerem obcutek ogroženosti in imidž var­nostnega sistema vplivata na javno zaznavo varnosti in na zaupanje v varno­stni sistem in njegove podsisteme. Pomeni, da varnost ni samo stanje strate­ških zadev, ampak tudi stanje duha: države, družbe, skupine in posamezniki potrebujemo dejansko varnost in obcutek varnosti. Treba pa je opozoriti tudi na povezanost nekaterih virov ogrožanja var­nosti, ki jo oznacimo kot »kompleksno« ali »prepleteno« ogroženost, saj na primer unicevanje okolja in prekomerno izcrpavanje naravnih virov lahko povzrocita socialno-ekonomske probleme, zdravstveno-epidemiološke izzive, politicne napetosti in tudi množicne migracije, vse našteto pa lahko posledicno pripelje do konflikta in celo oboroženega spopada. Na drugi strani pa vsak oborožen spopad v neki državi ali regiji povzroci tudi poten­cialne nevojaške vire ogrožanja varnosti, kot so nenadzorovani množicni beg ljudi, poslabšanje socialno-ekonomskih razmer, tihotapljenje orožja in mamil ter prekupcevanje z njimi, povecana verjetnost teroristicne dejavno­sti, razvrednotenje okolja in splošno poslabšanje življenjskih razmer. Tudi financni viri ogrožanja, kot je pokazal primer krize v letih od 2008 do 2014, se širijo po razlicnih obmocjih (iz ZDA po skoraj celotnem svetu) in podro­cjih (s financnega na preostale dele gospodarstva, socialo, politiko, varnost, demografsko podrocje in še bi lahko naštevali) (Malešic, 2014). Kompleksne ucinke je imela tudi kriza, ki jo je v letih 2020–21 povzrocil virus covid-19, ki je zahteval številna življenja po vsem svetu in je dolgorocno ogrozil javno zdravje.3 Generiral je negativne politicne in ekonomske ucinke, vplival na psihološko stanje posameznikov, skupin in družbe v celoti, hkrati pa spre­menil naravo družbenega diskurza, omejeval clovekove pravice, vplival na umetnost, kulturo, izobraževanje in šport ter imel velik ucinek na odnose med ljudmi (Malešic, 2021). Prav tako je virus vsaj zacasno marginaliziral okoljske teme. Tveganja, viri ogrožanja in skrbi pogojeni s stanjem v okolju Splošni premislek o povezanosti okolja in varnosti nadaljujemo z ope­racionalizacijo in s prepoznavanjem dejanskih, konkretnih virov ogroža­nja varnosti, ki se napajajo v okoljskih problemih sodobne družbe. Kajfež Bogataj (2006) navaja, da so posledice negativnih okoljskih pojavov vse­stranske, kar zadeva varnost pa avtorica izpostavi vecjo frekvenco in inten­zivnost nekaterih naravnih nesrec, vojaške posege in boj za naravne vire, migracije in konflikte, kar vse ima vpliv na varnost posameznika, družbe, države in mednarodne skupnosti. Okoljevarstveni problemi lahko torej sprožajo politicne, ekonomske, socialne, migracijske in zdravstveno-epide­miološke krize. Dalby (2017: 237) se strinja, da clovekovo poseganje v okolje in njegovo preoblikovanje prinaša razlicne oblike nevarnosti. Meni (2017: 233), da so nesrece in cloveška ranljivost vse bolj umetne zadeve v urbanizirani biosfe­ri.4 Po drugi strani pa segrevanje ozracja prinaša potencialno nove okoljske nesrece, katerih posledic še ne poznamo. Problemi, ki jih Dalby (2017) iden­tificira v povezavi s stanjem v okolju, so negativen vpliv na svetovno gospo­darstvo, financne krize, težave v kmetijstvu, razlicne nevarnosti in nesrece, skrajna revšcina ipd. Tudi Dalby (2017: 236) meni, da so spremembe v oko­lju in njihove številne družbene posledice novi vzrok za vojskovanje. White (2014) trdi, da vztrajanje na preživetih vzorcih delovanja cloveka v okolju spodbuja globalni kriminal, prispeva k širjenju specificnih kon­vencionalnih okoljskih kriminalnih dejanj in zavira uveljavljanje pravicno­sti. Neprimeren odnos do okolja se (re)konstruira na individualni, lokalni, državni in regionalni ravni, pri cemer gre za stanje duha in materialno stvar­nost. V duhu eksistencnega argumenta si postavi vprašanje, zakaj je toliko subjektov kolektivno vkljucenih v unicenje dolocenega nacina življenja. 3 Po podatkih spletne strani Worldometer Corona je do konca leta 2023 po svetu zaradi virusa covid­19 umrlo skoraj 7 milijonov ljudi, od tega 7.100 v Sloveniji (Covid 19 virus pandemic, 2023). 4 Kot primer navaja kompleksno krizo na Japonskem leta 2011, ko je potres povzrocil cunami, ta pa jedrsko nesreco v Fukušimi, kar pomeni, da je tehnološka inovacija (jedrska energija) povecala posledice naravne nesrece. Beck (2008) opozarja, da so za okoljsko ogroženost znacilne delokaliza­cija (njihovi vzroki in posledice niso omejeni na eno geografsko obmocje, ampak so vseprisotni), neizracunljivost posledic (posledice so naceloma neizracunljive, saj gre poleg znanih tudi za hipoteticna tveganja, ki temeljijo na znanstvenem nepoznavanju in normativnem nesoglasju) in nezmožnost kompenzacije (v preteklosti je bilo mogoce posledice tveganj kompenzirati, pri tveganjih, ki jih povzrocajo podnebne spremembe, pa se zdi, da je kom­penzacija prakticno nemogoca). Poglejmo podrobneje. Oboroženi spopadi. Svetovna komisija za okolje in razvoj je že leta 1987 opozorila, da bosta degradacija okolja in pomanjkanje virov vodila v poli­ticno nestabilnost in konflikt, zato bi bilo treba po njenem mnenju na glo­balni ravni nujno sprejeti koncept trajnostnega razvoja, ki bi uveljavil soli­darnost med generacijami svetovnega prebivalstva ter med bogatimi in revnimi državami (Bruntland Report, 1987). Kaplan (1994) je okolje oznacil za nacionalnovarnostno vprašanje 21. stoletja. Okoljski problemi sprožajo konflikte, vojne za vire so realnost. Deudney (1992) je tezo o oboroženih konfliktih in okolju zavrnil, saj je menil, da mešanje okoljskih in vojaških zadev prinaša konceptualne težave; ce okoljske zadeve imajo varnostne implikacije, so zgolj še en vzrok vojskovanja, ce ne pa tako razmišljanje prinaša zmedo v varnostno razpravo. Homer-Dixon (1994) pa se je vpra­šal, kako okoljske spremembe vodijo v konflikt? V nekaterih okolišcinah so okoljske zadeve verjetno povezane s konfliktom, malo pa je dokazov, da so v preteklosti povzrocale vojne, in zakaj bi verjeli, da bo v prihodnje drugace, se sprašuje. Gleditsch (1998) pa celo statisticno dokazuje, da ni povezave med okoljskimi problemi in vojnami. Gulden (2009) nasprotno meni, da mora mednarodna skupnost uravno­vešeno obravnavati dva povezana in soodvisna problema, torej oborožene spopade in globalne podnebne spremembe. Lahko mu pritrdimo, saj se zdi, da z nekaj intuitivnega razmišljanja in imaginacije lahko prepoznamo okolj­ske probleme kot vzrok razlicnih konfliktov, tudi oboroženih spopadov. Probleme, kot so revšcina, nerešena ozemeljska vprašanja med državami, slabe zdravstveno-epidemiološke razmere, verske in etnicne napetosti ipd., lahko neugodne okoljske razmere še dodatno zaostrijo. To pomeni, da lahko okoljski problemi, ce že niso primarni vzrok za razvoj in pojav oboro­ženih spopadov, zaostrijo njihove druge potencialne vzroke na sekundarni ravni. Tradicionalne vojaške napetosti so tako vse bolj prepletene z okolj­skimi problemi. Po našem mnenju lahko povezanost oboroženih spopadov s stanjem v okolju opazujemo ne zgolj na ravni vzrokov, o cemer smo razpravljali zgo­raj (ali okoljski problemi prispevajo k razvoju in izbruhu oboroženih spo­padov?), ampak tudi na ravni poteka oboroženih spopadov (ali so objekti, ki so potencialno nevarni za okolje, prepoznani kot tarca in del vojaške strategije?) ter na ravni posledic (v kolikšni meri oboroženi spopadi in pri­prave nanje škodijo okolju?). V poteku oboroženih spopadov namrec lahko prepoznamo akcije namernega unicevanja, izrabljanja ali spreminjanja oko­lja kot strategije med oboroženim spopadom. Na primer defolianti, ki jih je uporabila ameriška vojska v vietnamski vojni, zažiganje naftnih vrelcev s strani iraške vojske ob umiku iz Kuvajta v casu prve zalivske vojne;5 po Bennettovem mnenju (2023) pa je zelo realna možnost, da bi civilne jedrske zmogljivosti tudi med rusko-ukrajinsko vojno postale orožje.6 Prav tako je unicenje okolja, ki ga za seboj pušcajo vojne, ocitno in ima daljnosežne negativne posledice. Omeniti pa je treba še vpliv priprav na oboroženi spopad na okolje, saj gre v tem procesu za dodatno izkorišcanje naravnih, materialnih, financnih in drugih virov. Kot onesnaževalec oko­lja se pojavlja obrambna industrija, onesnaževanje okolja poteka tudi med urjenjem vojakov za bojevanje, in sicer v vojaških objektih, prometu in na poligonih. Prica smo izpustom nevarnih snovi v zrak, prst in vodo. Enormna je tudi rast vojaških izdatkov, ceprav bi denar lahko namenili za zagotavlja­nje varnosti na drugih podrocjih, na primer okoljskem.7 Postavlja se namrec vprašanje, kaj pomeni domnevno visoka stopnja vojaške varnosti države, v svetu, v katerem ljudje množicno umirajo zaradi negativnih ucinkov pod­nebnih sprememb. Ekološki terorizem. Stanje v okolju na razlicne nacine omogoca oziroma spodbuja izvajanje teroristicnih napadov. Te lahko razdelimo na dve vrsti, in sicer na napade, ki jih izvajajo radikalni okoljevarstveniki (ekoterorizem), in na napade konvencionalnih teroristov, ki uporabljajo vire in objekte v okolju (okoljski terorizem). Domjanic in Dobovšek (2014: 16) ekotero­rizem razumeta kot taktiko, ki jo uporabljajo radikalni okoljevarstveniki. Ekoterorizem opredelita kot uporabo nasilja za opozarjanje javnosti na okoljske probleme in doseganje sprememb okoljske politike. Eagan (1996: 1) je ekoterorizem opredelil kot uporabo nasilja kriminalne narave s strani podnacionalnih okoljskih skupin proti nedolžnim žrtvam ali lastnini, ki ima za cilj pridobiti javnost. Ekoteroristi želijo svojim žrtvam povzrociti custveno in fizicno stisko, ce verjamejo, da bo to pripomoglo k uresnicitvi njihovih okoljskih ciljev. Doslej so bili motivi za uporabo nasilja pretirana secnja v gozdovih, pretirano ribarjenje, uporaba jedrske energije, lovljenje kitov, 5 Pomembno je poudariti, da Rimski statut Mednarodnega kazenskega sodišca takšno spreminjanje ali unicevanje okolja obravnava kot vojni zlocin. 6 Bennett (2023) se v svoji analizi opira na Ramberga (1985), ki je postavil, da bi lahko v priho­dnji regionalni ali svetovni vojni ena od sprtih strani izrabila civilne jedrske zmogljivosti, še posebej jedr­ske elektrarne, kot orožje, ter s tem pridobila politicno nadvlado nad nasprotnikom in nevtralizirala sile nasprotnika pri manevriranju na bojišcu. 7 SIPRI poroca, da je vojaška poraba po svetu v letu 2022 rasla osmo leto zapored in je dosegla 2240 milijard ameriških dolarjev. Najvecja rast, ki jo generira agresija Ruske federacije na Ukrajino, je bila v letu 2022 v Evropi, in sicer 13-odstotna (SIPRI, 2023). gradnja avtocest, nošenje krzna ipd. Najveckrat je tarca njihovega delova­nja premoženje. S svojimi dejanji želijo te teroristicne skupine prepreciti ali posredovati v dejavnostih, ki so domnevno škodljive okolju. Napade, ki jih izvajajo konvencionalni teroristi za uresnicevanje svojih ciljev, pogojno poimenujemo okoljski terorizem, ki lahko povzroci neslu­tene posledice, na primer ob napadih na jedrske objekte, kemicne tovarne, tovarne za proizvodnjo umetnih gnojil in škropiv, skladišca nevarnih snovi, jezove ipd. Chalecki (2003) tovrstni okoljski terorizem opredeli kot neza­konito uporabo nasilja proti okoljskim virom, da bi prebivalstvo prikrajšali za njegove dobrine in unicili drugo lastnino. Gre za unicenje ali grožnjo z unicenjem okolja s strani držav, skupin ali posameznikov, da bi zastrašili oziroma prisilili vlade ali državljane v dolocena dejanja. Posebej ranljivi viri so voda, kmetijstvo, rudnine, nafta ter prostoživece živali in rastline. Napadi na te vire lahko povzrocijo bistveno vecje unicenje kot konvencionalni tero­rizem8. Verjetnost, da bodo teroristi izbrali take cilje napadov, je velika, saj je nacin dostopen, objekti pa so ranljivi. Kriminal. V zadnjih desetletjih je pomemben delež globalnega krimi­nala povezan z okoljsko problematiko. White (2014: 835) meni, da lahko pomanjkanje hrane, pitne vode in neobnovljivih virov, ki je posledica pod­nebnih sprememb, sproža moralno in legalno sporne dejavnosti, ki vklju­cujejo skupine organiziranega kriminala, transnacionalne korporacije in oblasti na razlicnih ravneh organiziranja države. Te dejavnosti lahko zaje­majo nezakonito in pretirano ribarjenje, nespoštovanje pravil o odlaganju nevarnih odpadkov, krajo vode in zemlje, prevare pri pridobivanju subven­cij za obnovljive vire energije, prevoz strupenih in kontaminiranih proizvo­dov prek nacionalnih meja, tihotapljenje ogroženih živalskih in rastlinskih vrst ipd. Posledica teh kriminalnih dejavnosti je še bolj grobo izkorišcanje naravnih virov, dodatno onesnaževanje zraka, prsti in vode, kar povecuje tekmovanje posameznikov, skupin in držav za preostale vire. Kriminalna dejanja izvajajo tudi okoljski aktivisti, ki pripadajo gibanju »Zadnja generacija« in unicujejo umetniška dela. Znani so primeri napadov na eksponate v galerijah in muzejih, na primer obarvanje vode v rimski fontani Trevi v crno, prilepitev aktivistov na steklo pred Botticellijevo stva­ritvijo v galeriji Uffizi v Firencah ali polivanje van Goghove slike z juho v Nacionalni galeriji v Londonu. S temi dejanji želijo okoljski aktivisti opozo­riti na podnebne spremembe in nujnost odlocnejšega ukrepanja držav in mednarodne skupnosti. Prica smo bili tudi grobim kriminalnim dejanjem, ki so bila uperjena proti okoljskim aktivistom. Nevladna organizacija Global Witness poroca, Porušitev jezu ali zastrupitev vode ima bistveno hujše posledice kot samomorilski bombni terori­sticni napad. da je bilo v letu 2022 po svetu ubitih najmanj 177 okoljskih aktivistov. Umori so bili zagrešeni v 18 državah, 88 odstotkov vseh ubitih pa je bilo v Latinski Ameriki, najvec v Kolumbiji (60 žrtev), sledita pa Brazilija in Mehika. Umori so bili najveckrat povezani z opozarjanjem žrtev na sporne prakse v kmetij­ski proizvodnji, rudarstvu in pri izsekavanju gozdov. V obdobju med letoma 2012 in 2022 pa je bilo ubitih 1910 okoljskih aktivistov, kar pomeni pov­precno po en umor na vsaka dva dneva. Vec kot tretjina vseh žrtev je bila med pripadniki domorodnih skupin (Almost 2.000 land and environmental defenders killed …, 2023). Podnebne nesrece. V zadnjem casu je vse vec dokazov, da se zaradi pod­nebnih sprememb nekatere naravne nesrece pojavljajo pogosteje in so tudi bolj intenzivne.9 Znanstveniki, zbrani pod okriljem IPCC, ugotavljajo nedvoumno korelacijo med globalnim povecanjem hidrometeoroloških in podnebnih dogodkov na eni ter antropogenimi podnebnimi spremem­bami na drugi strani (IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, 2022). Mednarodni odbor Rdecega križa in rdecega polmeseca (IFRC, 2023) med podnebne nesrece uvršca sušo, ekstremno vrocino oziroma vrocinski val in ekstremen mraz oziroma val hladnega zraka. Thomas in Lopez (2016) med intenzivne podnebno pogojene nesrece prištevata poplave, neurja, suše in vrocinske valove. Ameriški center za okoljske informacije med podnebnimi nesrecami prepoznava sušo, poplave, zmrzal, huda neurja, tropske ciklone, požare v naravnem okolju in zimska neurja (American Center for Environmental Information, 2023). Kaj pa ti pojavi pomenijo v vsakdanjem življenju ljudi? Globalno gle­dano so v zadnjih letih znani pogosti in unicujoci orkani, cikloni in tajfuni v Aziji ter Severni in osrednji Ameriki, požari v naravnem okolju v Avstraliji, Kanadi in na jugu ZDA, suša v Afriki, Srednji Ameriki in drugod ter ne nazad­nje poplave v Aziji, Evropi in drugod. V Evropi smo samo poleti leta 2023 utrpeli številne požare v naravnem okolju (v Grciji, Španiji, na Portugalskem …), poplave (v Franciji, Sloveniji…), najbolj unicujoc pa je bil ciklon Daniel, ki je pustošil po Grciji, Bolgariji in Turciji. Pustošil je tudi na obmocju mesta Derna v Libiji, kjer je podrl dva jezova in domnevno povzrocil prek dvajset tisoc smrtnih žrtev (Euronews, 2023). Svetovna meteorološka organizacija poroca o nesrecah, povezanih z vre­menom, podnebjem in vodami. Statisticno gledano so te nesrece v obdobju 1970–2019 v povprecju po svetu vsak dan povzrocile 115 smrti in za 202 milijona dolarjev škode. Zanimiv pa je podatek, da se je število smrtnih žrtev zaradi teh dogodkov (porocali so o 11.000 dogodkih) po letu 2010 Iz podatkov CRED (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters) Katoliške univerze v Louvainu lahko razberemo, da je bilo v letu 2022, v primerjavi s povprecjem v obdobju 2002–2021, vec primerov suš, poplav, neurij in požarov v naravnem okolju, medtem ko je bilo primerov ekstremne tempe­rature manj (2022 Disasters in numbers, 2023). v primerjavi s 70-timi leti prejšnjega stoletja zmanjšalo za trikrat, kar pripi­sujejo sistemom za zgodnje opozarjanje na nesreco, medtem ko se je eko­nomska škoda povecala za sedemkrat (World Meteorological Organisation, 2021). Ameriški center za okoljske informacije ugotavlja, da je v ZDA casovni interval med velikimi podnebnimi nesrecami vse krajši, kar pomeni vec odzivov sistema varstva pred nesrecami ter posledicno usihanje virov in skrajšanje casa za odziv na nesrece, obnovo in priprave na naslednji dogo­dek (American Center for Environmental Information, 2023). Svetovna meteorološka organizacija ocenjuje, da se bo zaradi podnebnih sprememb število vremenskih, podnebnih in vodnih skrajnih pojavov pove­cevalo in da bodo vse hujši. To pomeni vec vrocinskih valov, suš, poplav in gozdnih požarov, kot smo jim bili nedavno prica v Evropi in Severni Ameriki. V ozracje izhlapeva vse vec vode, kar pospešuje ekstremne padavine in smr­tonosne poplave. Segrevanje oceanov povzroca vse vec tropskih neurij, na cedalje širšem obmocju (World Meteorological Organisation, 2021). V kontekstu onesnaževanja in segrevanja planeta bi lahko zastavili tudi vprašanje o njegovih implikacijah na zdravje ljudi. Se bo zaradi teh spre­memb povecalo število rakavih in drugih obolenj? Lahko zaradi spreme­njenih življenjskih razmer pricakujemo razvoj novih virusov in posledicno neznanih nalezljivih bolezni? Okoljsko pogojene migracije. Okoljski begunec še ni mednarodnopravna kategorija,10 ceprav so se akademske opredelitve pojavile že pred desetletji (gl. na primer El Hinnawi, 1985, Kent in Myers, 1995, ter Jacobsen, 1996). Opredelitev, ki jo Mednarodna organizacija za migracije uporablja na aktivi­sticni ravni, pravi, da gre za osebo, ki je zaradi nenadnih ali postopnih spre­memb v okolju prisiljena zacasno ali trajno zapustiti svoje bivališce in se nahaja znotraj ali zunaj svoje države (IOM, 2017). Vzrocno-posledicne povezave med stanjem v okolju in migracijami so pogosto dokaj zapletene, saj se okoljski vzroki bega prepletajo z osebnimi, ekonomsko-socialnimi, politicnimi, varnostnimi in drugimi vzroki. Jasnejša je slika, ko gre za beg zaradi nenadnih dogodkov, kot so razlicne nesrece. V grobem bi lahko okoljske begunce kategorizirali na tiste, ki bežijo zaradi dezertifikacije, dviga morske gladine, ali so žrtve okoljskih konfliktov ali okoljskih nesrec11. Premislek gre tudi v smeri, da bi lahko množicne okolj­ske migracije povzrocale konflikte med državami in družbenimi skupinami z jasnimi varnostnimi implikacijami. Gre za domnevo, ki jo je treba prever­jati od primera do primera. 10 Konvencija ZN o beguncih iz leta 1951 okoljskih beguncev ne zajema. Ceprav je zaradi podnebnih sprememb okoljskih beguncev vse vec, doslej še niso prejeli uradnega statusa ali pravne zašcite. 11 Zaradi posledic ciklona Nargis v Mjanmaru leta 2008 se je z obmocja nesrece umaknilo 800.000 ljudi, zaradi jedrske nesrece v Cernobilu leta 1986 400.000 ljudi, zaradi deževja in poplav v Braziliji leta 2008 pa 80.000 ljudi. Nasilje ob državljanskih nemirih. Tradicija nasprotovanja dela civilne družbe okoljski politiki in praksi, ki jo oblikujejo oziroma izvajajo države, mednarodne organizacije, korporacije in drugi akterji, je zelo obsežna in kon­fliktna. Gibanje Atlas okoljske pravicnosti je prepoznalo prek 3100 primerov. Vecina teh konfliktov se razrešuje na miren nacin, nekateri pa spodbudijo nasilje, bodisi da protestniki postanejo nasilni bodisi da nasilne skupine ali celo varnostne sile napadajo protestnike, kar nedvomno povzroca varnostne skrbi. S seznama konfliktnih protestov lahko razberemo, da se ti dogajajo zaradi podnebnih sprememb, rudarjenja, fosilnih goriv, obnovljivih virov, gozdarstva in kmetijstva, strupenih odpadkov, prevoza nevarnih snovi, infra­strukture in urbanisticnega razvoja, jezov in voda, jedrske energije, nesrec, ohranjanja naravne dedišcine ter turizma (Environmental Justice Atlas, 2023). Svet Evrope opozarja, da v zadnjem casu proteste, na katerih aktivisti zahtevajo bolj odlocno vladno akcijo za zašcito narave in okolja, zdravja ter za preprecevanje negativnih ucinkov podnebnih sprememb, spremlja vse vec nasilja. V prvi polovici leta 2023 se je protestna dejavnost nara­vovarstvenikov in aktivistov v Evropi intenzivirala, kar se kaže v številu, obsegu in raznolikosti oblik javnega protesta. Na Danskem, v Italiji, na Nizozemskem in v Združenem kraljestvu so protestniki na primer blokirali ceste, avtoceste, železnice, gradbišca in letališke steze. V razlicnih evrop­skih državah so protestniki motili umetniške in športne prireditve (Council of Europe, 2023). Izvajanje nasilja vsekakor ni primerno sredstvo za reševanje socialnih in politicnih vprašanj, vendar pa so kljub temu protestniki sooceni s policij­skim fizicnim nasiljem, preventivnim priporom in procesom kriminalizacije. Tako so proti okoljskim aktivistom v Avstriji uporabili solzivec, v Franciji so številne protestnike policijske sile ranile, v Gruziji so jih nasilno razgnale, na Finskem, Nizozemskem in v Srbiji so jih aretirali in priprli. Tridesetdnevni pripor in preiskovanje njihovih stanovanj so nekateri okoljevarstveniki izku­sili tudi v Nemciji. V Franciji, Španiji in Združenem kraljestvu so bili žrtve nasilja tudi novinarji, ki so o protestih porocali: aretirali in preiskovali so jih, nekatere so kazensko ovadili. Ocitna je tudi stigmatizacija protestnikov, saj njihovo dejavnost del politike in javnosti v nekaterih državah oznacuje kot ekoterorizem, ekovandalizem in nezakonito delovanje. Javna zaznava okoljskih problemov in varnost V luci zgornje razprave lahko ugotovimo, da unicevanje okolja nedvo­mno generira številne varnostne skrbi in kaže na jasno povezanost okolja in varnosti. Na tej tocki se nam postavlja vprašanje, kako vez med okoljskimi problemi in razlicnimi varnostnimi pojavi zaznavajo in razumejo politicne, uradniške in vojaške strukture v Sloveniji. O tej zaznavi in razumevanju lahko posredno sklepamo iz pregleda ustave, nekaterih zakonov in nacionalno­varnostnih dokumentov, kjer je mogoce preveriti, kakšen pomen se daje okoljskim problemom v povezavi z njihovimi varnostnimi implikacijami. Pregled pokaže, da slovenska ustava daje državljankam in državljanom pra­vico do zdravega življenjskega okolja in tudi pravico do pitne vode. Zakon o zašciti okolja zagotavlja namen, sistem, cilje in nacela okoljske zašcite. Tudi v nacionalnovarnostnih dokumentih (strategije, doktrine, resolucije) zasle­dimo zavedanje o povezavi med stanjem v okolju in varnostjo. Tako na pri­mer Resolucija o strategiji nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije med viri ogrožanja varnosti prepoznava podnebne spremembe, naravne in druge nesrece ter omejenost naravnih virov in degradacijo življenjskega okolja (Resolucija o strategiji nacionalne varnosti, 2019). Nic manj pomembno pa ni vprašanje, kako okoljske probleme zaznava in razume javnost, kar pa je razvidno iz interpretacije javnomnenjskih podatkov v nadaljevanju clanka. White (2014: 835) se ukvarja s politicnim, ekonomskim in ekološkim kontekstom okoljske nevarnosti in se sprašuje, kako ta vpliva na oblikovanje »miselnosti utrdbe«. Gre za položaj, v katerem ljudje menijo, da so »napadeni« in ne poslušajo nobene kritike oziroma ne sprejemajo pogle­dov, ki se ne ujemajo z njihovimi stališci in cilji, s cimer se osamijo od preo­stanka družbe. Giddens (2010: 2) namrec pravi, da se mnogi ljudje še vedno ne zavedajo razsežnosti problemov, povezanih s podnebnimi spremembami, ceprav nekateri avtorji menijo, da bo spoprijemanje z njimi podobno »voj­skovanju«, ne glede na to, da v tem primeru sovražnika ni moc jasno prepo­znati in se mu zoperstaviti. Zapostavljanje varnostnih ucinkov podnebnih sprememb gre pripisati predvsem dejstvu, da se zdijo nekako nerealne. Na drugi strani pa je vsakdanje življenje, z vsem, kar nam prinaša, privlacno; tega pa ne želimo opustiti. Politika podnebnih sprememb se bo morala soociti s t. i. Giddensovim paradoksom: nevarnosti, ki jih prinaša globalno segreva­nje ozracja, niso oprijemljive, takojšnje in vidne v vsakdanjem življenju in ne glede na to, kako škodljive se zdijo, mnogi ne bodo naredili nic konkretnega, da bi jih preprecili. Po drugi strani pa velja, da je, ko te nevarnosti postanejo vidne in izrazito ogrožajoce, že prepozno, da bi uspešno ukrepali (ibid.). Na podlagi teoreticne obravnave povezanosti okolja in varnosti, razmerja med dejansko in zaznano ogroženostjo ter okoljskih virov ogrožanja smo oblikovali dve podmeni. Prva postavi, da je na podrocju okoljskih virov ogro­žanja moc opaziti veliko neskladje med dejansko in zaznano ogroženostjo družbe, saj so skrbi slovenske javnosti zaradi okoljskih problemov v primer­javi z njihovimi oprijemljivimi varnostnimi implikacijami sorazmerno majhne. Druga podmena je, da javnost okoljskih problemov ne obravnava holisticno in jih posledicno ne povezuje v zadostni meri s svojo varnostjo. V luci javno­mnenjskih podatkov hkrati preverjamo veljavnost Whitove »miselnost utrdbe« (ang. fortress mentality) in Giddensovega paradoksa ter teze o avantgardnosti mlade populacije pri zaznavanju in reševanju okoljske problematike, o trajno­stnem razvoju in o mobilizacijskem naboju okoljskih tem v politiki. Metoda Temeljna vira podatkov, na katera se opira analiza, sta raziskavi javnega mnenja, ki ju je na temo odnosa do okolja izvedel Center za proucevanje javnega menja in množicnih komunikacij pri Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani (Slovensko javno mnenje 2011/1, 2011; Slovensko javno mnenje 2020/3, 2021). Prva raziskava je potekala med 9. marcem in 15. junijem 2011 in je bila izvedena z metodo anketiranja na terenu (ang. face to face), s pomocjo standardiziranega vprašalnika na reprezentativnem vzorcu polnoletnih prebivalcev Slovenije. Vzorcni nacrt je zajemal 1.800 oseb, realizacija vzorca je bila 60-odstotna in je zajela 1.082 respondentov. Druga raziskava je potekala med 10. novembrom 2020 in 31. januarjem 2021 in je bila izvedena z metodo samoizpolnjevanja s pomocjo spletnega standardiziranega vprašalnika ali samoizpolnjevanja s pomocjo pisemskega standardiziranega vprašalnika. Potekala je na reprezentativnem vzorcu pol­noletnih prebivalcev Slovenije. Vzorcni nacrt je zajemal 2.500 oseb, realiza­cija vzorca je bila 44,1-odstotna, kar pomeni, da sta na anketna vprašanja odgovorila 1102 respondenta. Raziskavi sta zajeli vecje število odvisnih spremenljivk, v tej analizi pa nas najbolj zanima, katere teme so v Sloveniji najbolj perece in kam je med njimi po pomembnosti uvršceno okolje, kolikšna je zaskrbljenost ljudi zaradi okoljskih problemov, ocena o pomembnosti okoljskih problemov za Slovenijo kot celoto, ocena o posledicah zvišanja temperature na Zemlji in ocena nevarnosti jedrskih elektrarn. Iz raziskave Slovensko javno mne­nje 2020/3 smo analizirali še podatke o vzrokih za spremembe v okolju, vplivu podnebnih sprememb na svet in Slovenijo ter o zaznavanju prizade­tosti sosesk, v katerih anketiranci živijo, zaradi onesnaženja vode in zraka ter zaradi ekstremnih vremenskih pojavov. Obe raziskavi sta zajeli tudi vecje število neodvisnih spremenljivk, kot so spol, starost in stopnja izobrazbe respondentov ter vrsta njihovega bivališca, zaposlitveni status, dohodek ipd., kar je pomembno z vidika križanja odvisnih in neodvisnih spremenljivk. Rezultati Do katere mere slovenska javnost zaznava okoljske probleme kot vpra­šanje njene varnosti? Podatki v Tabeli 1 pokažejo,12 da so bile za sloven­ 12 Zaradi vecje preglednosti bomo vse številke ob interpretaciji podatkov zaokrožili navzgor oziroma navzdol. sko javnost v letu 2020 zelo perece zgolj tri teme: zdravstveno varstvo, gospodarstvo in revšcina, sorazmerno malo pozornosti pa javnost namenja kriminalu, okolju in priseljevanju, še manj pa izobraževanju in terorizmu (anketiranci so izbirali najbolj pereco temo in naslednjo najbolj pereco temo). V letu 2020 je bila za anketirance najbolj pereca tema zdravstveno varstvo, ki je v skoraj petdesetih odstotkih prvi izbor, v 21 odstotkih pa drugi izbor. Gre za ociten vpliv epidemije virusa covid-19 na mnenje ljudi, saj enaka raziskava v letu 2011 pokaže, da je zdravstveno varstvo na prvo mesto postavilo le 16 odstotkov, na drugo pa 19 odstotkov vprašanih. Ta sprememba v zaznavi zdravstvenega varstva v javnosti pa ni vplivala na oceno okolja kot potencialno perece tematike, saj je tako v letu 2011 kot letu 2020 okolje pri treh odstotkih vprašanih prvi, pri sedmih odstotkih pa drugi izbor. Iz Tabele 1 je tudi razvidno, da sta kot pereci temi v primer­javi z letom 2011 v letu 2020 najvec pozornosti izgubila gospodarstvo in revšcina. Tabela 1: NAJBOLJ PERECA TEMA V SLOVENIJI DANES IN DRUGA NAJBOLJ PERECA TEMATIKA prvi izbor drugi izbor E1a E1b 1 – zdravstveno varstvo SJM111 16,1 19,3 SJM203 49,2 20,9 2 – izobraževanje SJM111 2,3 4,8 SJM203 2,5 8,3 3 – kriminal SJM111 10,7 15,0 SJM203 2,8 5,5 4 – okolje SJM111 2,9 6,8 SJM203 2,7 7,0 5 – priseljevanje SJM111 0,8 1,5 SJM203 4,9 7,1 6 – gospodarstvo SJM111 40,9 19,8 SJM203 17,8 29,2 7 – terorizem SJM111 0,3 1,6 SJM203 0,3 0,8 8 – revšcina SJM111 24,0 25,7 SJM203 12,5 15,7 9 – nic od navedenega SJM111 1,0 1,5 SJM203 4,1 1,7 88 – ne vem SJM111 0,9 3,6 SJM203 2,9 1,7 99 – b. o. SJM111 0,1 0,5 SJM203 0,4 2,0 Vir: Slovensko javno mnenje 2011/1 in Slovensko javno mnenje 2020/3. Treba pa je ugotoviti, da je stanje v okolju povezano tako z zdravjem ljudi, njihovo gospodarsko dejavnostjo, revšcino in priseljevanjem, tako da moramo ob razmišljanju o podatkih razumeti prepletenost teh spremenljivk in njihove vzrocno-posledicne povezave. Analiza podatkov raziskave iz leta 2020 razkrije, da spol, starost, izobrazba in vrsta naselja, v katerem živijo anketiranci, prakticno nimajo vpliva na njihov odnos do okolja kot perece družbene teme. Tabela 2: SKRB ZARADI PROBLEMOV OKOLJA sploh me ne skrbijo zelo me skrbijo ne vem b.o. 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 SJM11/1 1,8 3,7 20,1 34,4 39,6 0,3 0,0 SJM20/3 1,8 3,0 15,0 28,4 51,2 0,2 0,4 Vir: Slovensko javno mnenje 2020/3. Podatki v Tabeli 2 razkrijejo, da se je skrb ljudi zaradi okoljskih proble­mov v letu 2020 v primerjavi z letom 2011 povecala, saj je število zaskrblje­nih in zelo zaskrbljenih (seštevek ocen 4 in 5) povecalo s 74 na 80 odstot­kov, pri cemer je v podatku za 2020 bistveno vecji delež »zelo zaskrbljenih«. Analiza podatkov, pridobljenih leta 2020, pokaže, da so ženske zaradi stanja v okolju rahlo bolj zaskrbljene kot moški in da zaskrbljenost obcutno raste s starostjo, medtem ko izobrazba in vrsta naselja nimata opaznega vpliva. Tabela 3: NAJPOMEMBNEJŠI OKOLJSKI PROBLEM ZA SLOVENIJO KOT CELOTO SJM11/1 SJM20/3 1 – onesnaženje zraka 24,5 17,3 2 – kemikalije in pesticidi 18,1 13,2 3 – pomanjkanje vode 1,6 1,2 4 – onesnaženje vode 14,5 14,8 5 – radioaktivni odpadki 3,2 2,6 6 – odlaganje gospodinjskih odpadkov 15,3 15,5 7 – podnebne spremembe 8,4 15,9 8 – gensko spremenjena hrana 6,1 8,7 9 – izraba naravnih virov 4,0 6,6 10 – nic od navedenega 1,3 1,5 88 – ne vem 1,8 2,1 99 – b. o. 1,2 0,5 Vir: Slovensko javno mnenje 2011/1 in Slovensko javno mnenje 2020/3. Iz Tabele 3 razberemo, da so okoljski problemi, ki so po oceni anketi­ranih v letu 2020 najpomembnejši za Slovenijo kot celoto, onesnaženje zraka (17 odstotkov), podnebne spremembe (16), odlaganje gospodinjskih odpadkov (16), onesnaženje vode (15) in prisotnost kemikalij in pesticidov (13). V primerjavi z letom 2011 se je obcutno povecala skrb ljudi zaradi pod­nebnih sprememb, in sicer z 8 na 16 odstotkov. Analiza podatkov iz leta 2020 po demografskih kategorijah razkrije, da ljudje z nižjo izobrazbo bolj zaznavajo problem zaradi onesnaženosti zraka kot druge izobrazbene sku­pine, da problem kemikalij in pesticidov bolj zaznavajo starejše kategorije prebivalstva, da mlade bolj kot starejše skrbi onesnaženost vode in da je problem onesnaženosti zraka bolj zaznan v urbanem kot v ruralnem okolju. Primerjava med prebivalci Maribora in Ljubljane pokaže, da je zaznavanje problema onesnaženosti zraka v obeh mestih sorazmerno visoko in primer­ljivo, medtem ko Ljubljancani bolj zaznavajo problem kemikalij in pestici­dov, Mariborcani pa bolj problem gospodinjskih odpadkov. Iz podatkov raziskave, izvedene leta 2020, je razvidno, da vecina anketi­ranih (56 odstotkov) meni, da se svetovno podnebje spreminja predvsem zaradi delovanja ljudi, kar pritrjuje ugotovitvam IPCC o prevladujocem vplivu cloveka na podnebne spremembe (cit. po Vogler, 2011). Vec kot tre­tjina (38 odstotkov) vprašanih meni, da gre v enaki meri za vpliv naravnih procesov in cloveka, medtem ko štirje odstotki vprašanih menijo, da gre pri podnebnih spremembah predvsem za vpliv naravnih procesov. Analiza podatkov pokaže, da ženska populacija rahlo bolj kot moška, mlajša popu­lacija rahlo bolj kot starejša in prebivalci prestolnice rahlo bolj kot drugi prebivalci verjamejo v prevladujoc vpliv cloveka na podnebne spremembe (Slovensko javno mnenje 2020/3, 2021). Vplive podnebnih sprememb na svet kot celoto javnost ocenjuje kot slabe, in sicer je vrednost malo manj kot 3 na lestvici od 1 (izredno slabi vplivi) do 10 (izredno dobri vplivi), medtem ko naj bi bili ti vplivi na Slovenijo rahlo manj neugodni: 3,5 na enaki lestvici. To je v nasprotju z ugo­tovitvami znanstvenikov, da se v Sredozemlju, katerega del je tudi Slovenija, ozracje v povprecju segreva bolj izrazito kot v drugih delih sveta (gl. Žabkar in Malešic, 2014: 5). Iz podatkov medletnih primerjav (Slovensko javno mne­nje 2020/3, 2021) je tudi razvidno, da ljudje vse manj sprejemajo trditev, da nas »prevec skrbi za prihodnost našega okolja, premalo pa vse, kar se danes dogaja v zvezi s cenami in zaposlitvijo«. Ce je s to trditvijo v devetdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja mocno soglašalo ali soglašalo okoli polovica, je v letu 2020 takih le še manj kot tretjina vprašanih. Prav tako v letu 2020 skoraj dve tretjini ljudi ne bi bilo pripravljeno sprejeti zmanjšanja obsega zašcite­nih naravnih obmocij v Sloveniji v dobro gospodarskega razvoja na njih. V enakem duhu lahko ocenimo tudi soglašanje anketirancev z nekate­rimi drugimi trditvami, ki zadevajo okolje. Ce je bilo na prehodu v novo tisocletje »mocno soglašanje« in »soglašanje« s trditvijo »v življenju obstajajo pomembnejše stvari, kot je varovanje okolja« na ravni 43 odstotnih tock in leta 2011 32 odstotnih tock, je bilo leta 2020 pri zgolj 19 odstotnih tockah. S trditvijo »mnoge trditve o ogroženosti okolja so pretirane« je leta 2000 in 2011 mocno soglašalo in soglašalo 27 oziroma 26 odstotkov vprašanih, leta 2020 pa le še 14 odstotkov vprašanih. Prav tako je vse vecji delež anketiran­cev, ki menijo, da je zvišanje temperature na Zemlji kot posledica podneb­nih sprememb »izjemno nevarno« in »zelo nevarno« za okolje. V seštevku jih je bilo leta 2000 58, leta 2011 63 in leta 2020 72 odstotkov. Da je to sred­nje nevarno, jih je v letih 2000 in 2011 menila cetrtina vprašanih, leta 2020 pa petina. Delež tistih, ki so menili, da zvišanje temperature na Zemlji kot posledica podnebnih sprememb »ni zelo nevarno« ali sploh »ni nevarno« za okolje, je bil v letu 2000 v seštevku 5, v letu 2011 6 in v letu 2020 4 odstotke. S trditvijo, da »okoljski problemi neposredno vplivajo na moje vsakdanje življenje«, pa se je v letu 2011 (47 odstotkov) strinjalo celo vec anketirancev kot leta 2020 (43 odstotkov) (Slovensko javno mnenje 2020/3, 2021). Ministrstvo za infrastrukturo je sredi leta 2021 družbi Gen energija izdalo energetsko dovoljenje za drugi blok jedrske elektrarne Krško. Po pojasnilu Ministrstva v tem primeru naj ne bi šlo za dokoncno odlocitev o projektu, ampak o zacetku upravnih postopkov in pripravi dokumentacije, kar je nujna podlaga za kasnejšo dokoncno odlocitev in preverjanje družbenega soglasja o projektu. V tistem casu je bila sprejeta tudi Resolucija o dolgorocni podnebni strategiji Slovenije 2050, ki nacrtuje uporabo jedrske energije na daljši rok, s cimer bi do leta 2050 dosegli energetsko nevtralnost oziroma neto nicelne emisije (MMC RTV SLO, 2021). Zaradi pricakovanja, da bomo o gradnji drugega bloka jedrske elektrarne Krško odlocali na referendumu, je koristno poznavanje javnega mnenja o tej temi. Podatki naših raziskav kažejo, da je vse vec ljudi prepricanih, da jedrska energija ni nevarna za okolje, vendar pa je delež tistih, ki menijo nasprotno, še vedno prevladujoc. Tako je leta 2011 v seštevku 72 odstotkov vprašanih menilo, da so jedrske elektrarne »izjemno nevarne« ali »zelo nevarne« za okolje. Leta 2020 je bil ta delež 47-odstoten. Delež tistih, ki menijo, da so jedrske elektrarne »sred­nje nevarne«, se je povecal s 16 na 29 odstotkov, delež tistih, ki menijo, da »niso zelo nevarne« ali »sploh niso nevarne« za okolje, pa se je v seštevku vec kot podvojil, in sicer z 9 na 21 odstotkov. Ob primerjavi teh podatkov je nujno upoštevati dejstvo, da se je nekaj dni po zacetku raziskave leta 2011 na Japonskem zgodila velika jedrska nesreca (Fukušima, 11. marec 2011), ki je medijsko odmevala v celotnem obdobju izvajanja raziskave, kar je nedvo­mno imelo velik vpliv na odgovore anketirancev. Podrobnejša analiza podatkov iz leta 2020 sugerira, da ženska popula­cija bistveno bolj kot moška zaznava nevarnost jedrskih elektrarn, da je ta nevarnost bolj zaznana v starostni skupini 31 do 45 let in manj v naseljih od 2.000 do 10.000 prebivalcev. Zanimivo je, da zaznava nevarnosti jedr­skih elektrarn pada s stopnjo izobrazbe anketirancev, se pravi, da višja, kot je njihova izobrazba, manjša je zaznana nevarnost. Analiza podatkov po slovenskih regijah pa potrjuje, da se nevarnosti jedrskih elektrarn najmanj bojijo v regiji, kjer imajo izkušnjo z jedrsko elektrarno, torej v Posavju. Da so jedrske elektrarne izjemno ali zelo nevarne, tam meni le tretjina vprašanih, medtem ko v poudarjanju njihove nevarnosti prednjacijo v Pomurski (59 odstotkov), Podravski (58 odstotkov) in Obalno-kraški regiji (56 odstotkov). Da jedrske elektrarne »sploh niso nevarne«, v Posavju meni 15 % anketiran­cev, kar je v povprecju približno štirikrat vec kot v drugih regijah. Tabela 4: PRIZADETOST ZARADI NAŠTETIH STVARI V ZADNJIH DVANAJSTIH MESECIH V NJIHOVI SOSESKI do sploh neke ne nic malo mere precej zelo vem (b.o.) 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 a) onesnaženje zraka 18,6 28,6 31,2 10,6 3,9 6,7 0,5 b) onesnaženje vode 29,9 30,1 21,1 8,6 1,9 7,8 0,6 c) ekstremni vremenski pojavi (mocne nevihte, suše, poplave, vrocinski valovi, mocne ohladitve ipd.) 13,4 28,3 30,3 18,9 5,8 2,8 0,4 Vir: Slovensko javno mnenje 2020/3. Iz Tabele 4 je razbrati, da ljudje v vsakdanjem življenju v svoji soseski pretirano ne zaznavajo onesnaženja vode, zraka ali ekstremnih vremen­skih pojavov, kot so mocne nevihte, suše, poplave, vrocinski valovi, mocne ohladitve ipd. V seštevku je onesnaženje zraka do neke mere, precej in zelo mocno v letu 2020 zaznalo 46 odstotkov, onesnaženje vode 32 odstotkov ter ekstremne vremenske pojave 55 odstotkov vprašanih. Z drugimi besedami, povprecne ocene na lestvici od 1 (sploh nic me niso prizadele) do 5 (zelo so me prizadele) so 2,49, 2,15 oziroma 2,75. Analiza podatkov pokaže, da so bili v zadnjih dvanajstih mesecih pred izvedbo ankete ekstremni pojavi rahlo bolj zaznani med starejšimi kot med mlajšimi, med nižje izobraženimi kot višje, najbolj v kmeckih naseljih in najmanj v Ljubljani. Razprava Lukšic (2011, 423) je pred dobrim desetletjem ugotavljal da je okoljska kriza postala planetarna, zavest ljudi o tem pa je bila še šibka. Malnar in Šinko (2012: 471) sta v tistem casu poudarila, da longitudinalni empiricni podatki pri slovenski javnosti razkrivajo pomemben obrat v zaznavi okolj­skih skrbi, kar je predvsem povezano z zunanjimi dejavniki, kot je bila na primer jedrska nesreca v Cernobilu leta 1986. Podatkovni trend je pokazal ciklicno gibanje, saj so bile okoljske skrbi leta 2011 na ravni, ki je primerljiva s tisto v sedemdesetih letih, medtem ko je bil vrhunec v devetdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja. Med posameznimi vrstami okoljskih problemov pa ni bilo zaznati znacilnih vzorcev. Analiza je pokazala, da so razlike v odnosu do okoljskih problemov glede na izobrazbeno raven prebivalstva in njegovo starost postopno izginjale. Podatki o ogroženosti v raziskavah SJM Nacionalna in mednarodna var­nost v obdobju 1999–2012 kažejo, da prebivalci Slovenije unicevanje oko­lja kot vir ogrožanja varnosti Slovenije v povprecju postavljajo za skupino socialno-ekonomskih virov ogrožanja, kriminalom in korupcijo ter vštric s prometnimi nesrecami in zlorabo psihoaktivnih substanc. Vojaške in terori­sticne grožnje Sloveniji so po zaznavi javnosti na dnu lestvice virov ogroža­nja naše države (Malešic, 2014: 12–15). Pricujoca analiza pa pokaže, da je v letu 2020 – v primerjavi z letom 2011 – zaznava okolja kot perece družbene teme v javnosti ostala na enako nizki ravni, saj sta pred dobrim desetletjem kot pereci temi prevladovala gospo­darstvo in revšcina, v letu 2020 pa pod vplivom epidemije covida-19 zdra­vstvo in gospodarstvo. Skrb ljudi zaradi okoljskih problemov se je v letu 2020 kljub temu povecala, kar potrjuje zgoraj omenjeno ciklicnost gibanja, niso pa vzroki nujno vec zunanji. V primerjavi z letom 2011 se je obcutno povecala skrb ljudi zaradi podnebnih sprememb. Narašca tudi spoznanje, da ima pri podnebnih spremembah prevladujoco vlogo clovek s svojimi posegi v naravo. Ženske so zaradi stanja v okolju rahlo bolj zaskrbljene kot moški, zaskrbljenost obcutno raste s starostjo, medtem ko izobrazba in vrsta naselja, v katerem bivajo respondenti, nimata opaznega vpliva, kar v veliki meri potrjuje ugotovitve Malnarjeve in Šinka (2012: 471) o usihanju razlik pri razlicnih demografskih skupinah. White (2014: 835) je izpostavil problem »miselnosti utrdbe«. Ce jo apli­ciramo na okoljsko podrocje, pomeni, da cloveštvo skozi desetletja, kljub vse bolj alarmantnim podatkom, informacijam in izkušnjam, v temeljnih znacilnostih (izcrpavanje naravnih virov, nacin proizvodnje, poraba ener­gije, potrošništvo ipd.) vztraja pri zelo podobnih vedenjskih vzorcih in s tem odnosu do okolja. Na to tematiko se navezuje tudi »Giddensov paradoks«, ki opozarja, da so okoljski problemi manj oprijemljivi in vidni, zato ne storimo nic ali premalo, ko pa se manifestirajo v vseh svojih razsežnostih, je za ukre­panje že prepozno. Tudi Beck (2008) meni, da je za nova tveganja, med njimi tudi okoljska, znacilno, da so manj vidna in oprijemljiva od prejšnjih, so pri­krita in jih je treba znanstveno dokazovati, kar pomeni, da odgovorov nanje še nimamo. Morebiti bi na podlagi podatkov za slovensko javnost lahko rekli, da v zadnjem desetletju opažamo prve manjše razpoke v miselnosti utrdbe in da vidnost problemov (spremenjena zaznava) ter njihova rastoca oprijemljivost (na primer že omenjeni suša, požar, poplave in zemeljski pla­zovi) nakazujejo možnost realnejšega zaznavanja okoljskih problemov in njihovih varnostnih implikacij v javnosti? Še posebej, ker Lukšic (2011: 423) ugotavlja, da je lokalna in regionalna okoljska problematika bistveno bolj zasidrana v zavesti ljudi, kar je mogoce razbrati iz njihovega angažiranja, ko hoce kdo poseci v njihovo neposredno življenjsko okolje in jim s tem zni­žati kakovost bivanja. Attenborough (2019) postavi, da imajo rast prebivalstva, tehnološki razvoj, razvoj podjetništva, gospodarska rast, produktivnost, nacin prehrane, kakovost življenja, pricakovana življenjska doba ipd. svojo ceno. Izguba je zdaj vidna in zaceli smo se zavedati vrednosti okolja, saj smo blizu tocke, s katere ni vrnitve. Attenborough (ibid.) meni, da se ta zavest še najbolj spre­minja pri mladih in da je za njih smisel gospodarske dejavnosti boljša družba in ne zgolj dobicek. Križanje odvisnih in neodvisne spremenljivke (starost) na naših podatkih razkrije, da se v Sloveniji splošen odnos do okolja pri mladih bistveno ne razlikuje od odnosa drugih starostnih kategorij. Med vsemi okoljskimi problemi mlade bolj kot starejše skrbi le onesnaženost pitne vode. Mladi v vecji meri priznavajo negativen vpliv cloveka na stanje v okolju in se manj kot starejši bojijo negativnih ucinkov jedrskih elektrarn. Na podlagi podatkov ne moremo trditi, da v Sloveniji mladi predstavljajo avantgardo pri zaznavanju okoljskih problemov in njihovemu razreševanju. Izsledki teoreticne analize pricajo, da so številni avtorji (na primer Brown, 1982, Mathews, 1989, Buzan, 1991, in Loske, 1991) že pred desetletji opozarjali na varnostne implikacije okoljskih sprememb, s cimer so prispe­vali k razvoju koncepta okoljske varnosti. Postopno so prepoznavali, kako razlicni okoljski problemi vplivajo ali se povezujejo z varnostnimi pojavi, kot so oboroženi spopadi, nasilni državljanski nemiri, okoljsko pogojeni terorizem, kriminal, migracije in podnebne nesrece. Slovenska javnost se vse bolj zaveda negativnih ucinkov razlicnih okoljskih problemov, še pose­bej podnebnih sprememb, vendar te rahlo bolj zaznava kot globalni prob­lem, in ne toliko nacionalni, ceprav podatki o segrevanju ozracja kažejo, da je obmocje Sredozemlja, katerega del je tudi naša država, bolj izpostavljeno od svetovnega povprecja in lahko posledicno na tem obmocju pricakujemo bolj negativne družbene, tudi varnostne, implikacije. Podatek, da je javnost vecinoma »precej« in »zelo« nepripravljena, da bi zaradi gospodarskega razvoja zmanjšali obseg zašcitenih naravnih obmocij v Sloveniji (Natura 2000), je eden od indikatorjev, ki lahko kaj pove o prisotno­sti koncepta »trajnostnega razvoja« v zavesti ljudi. Celota predstavljenih podat­kov pa kaže, da mobilizacijski naboj okoljskih tem (gl. na primer Beck, 2008), v slovenskem javnem, predvsem politicnem življenju, ni pretirano mocan in težko je verjeti, da bi se na tej podlagi lahko kmalu razvilo množicno okolje­varstveno gibanje ali »zelena« politicna stranka, ki bi tudi z opozarjanjem na varnostne implikacije okoljskih problemov dosegla volilni uspeh. Sklep V izhodišce empiricne analize smo postavili dve podmeni. Prva izpostav­lja veliko neskladje med dejansko in zaznano ogroženostjo družbe zaradi okoljskih problemov. Znanstvene analize prepricljivo dokazujejo poveza­nost med stanjem v okolju in varnostjo posameznika, družbenih skupin, države in mednarodne skupnosti. Ali gre tudi zaznava slovenske javnosti v to smer? Iz analiziranih podatkov je razvidno, da slovenska javnost postaja vse bolj obcutljiva za okoljske teme in probleme, o cemer prica primerjava podatkov iz let 2011 in 2020. Okolje kot družbena tema je sicer med manj perecimi, vendar pa se skrb zaradi okoljskih problemov povecuje, pod­nebne spremembe postajajo vse pomembnejše, zavedanje o tem, da clovek vpliva na podnebne spremembe, raste, njihov vpliv na družbo je negati­ven. Vendar pa skrbi zaradi okoljskih problemov niso tako izrazite, kot bi predpostavili na podlagi podatkov o pogostosti in intenzivnosti podneb­nih nesrec, rasti okoljskega terorizma in kriminala, rasti nasilja, ki ga spro­žajo državljanski nemiri in odzivi represivnih organov nanje, številu okolj­skih beguncev ter vplivu stanja v okolju na tradicionalne vzroke za razvoj in pojav oboroženih spopadov. Nekateri od teh virov ogrožanja že mocno vplivajo na varnost Slovenije in njenih prebivalcev. Druga podmena poudarja, da slovenska javnost okoljskih problemov ne obravnava holisticno in jih posledicno ne povezuje v zadostni meri s svojo varnostjo. Kljub zgoraj orisanemu spodbudnemu trendu glede zaznave okoljskih problemov in skrbi zaradi njih, pa ravno pri trditvi »okoljski prob­lemi neposredno vplivajo na moje vsakdanje življenje« opažamo, da je bilo soglašanje z njo leta 2011 na višji ravni kot leta 2020, kar je presenetljiv podatek. Pomeni, da okoljske probleme javnost sicer zaznava, da jo skrbijo do dolocene mere, vendar njihovih posledic ne povezuje v zadostni meri s svojim vsakdanjim življenjem, torej s kakovostjo bivanja, prehrano, zdrav­jem, zaposlitvijo, varnostjo … Prihodnje raziskovanje na podrocju odnosa slovenske javnosti do okolja bi lahko bilo pod mocnim vplivom dveh nasprotujocih si trendov. Na eni strani pricakujemo, da se bo obcutljivost za okoljske probleme v tem desetletju v javnosti povecala, saj smo že doslej izkusili najvecjo sušo v Evropi v zadnjega pol tisocletja (2022), izmerili najvišje povprecne temperature ozracja, bili prica najvecjemu požaru v zgodovini na ozemlju Slovenije (na Krasu leta 2022) ter najvecjim poplavam in zemeljskim plazovom (v vecjem delu države leta 2023). Na drugi strani pa oboroženi spopadi (na primer aktualna agresija Ruske fede­racije na Ukrajino ter teroristicni napad Hamasa na Izrael in izraelski povra­cilni oboroženi napad na Gazo), veliki teroristicni napadi, izraziti ekonomsko­-socialni problemi in možnost pojava novih nalezljivih bolezni, marginalizirajo pomen okoljskih tem in jih izrivajo iz žarišca zavesti ljudi. LITERATURA Beck, Ulrich (1982): Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage. Beck, Ulrich (2008): World at Risk: The New Task of Critical Theory. Development and Society 37 (1): 1–21. 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UDK [004.65:502/504]:930.253:3ADP Sonja BEZJAK, Janez ŠTEBE* INTERDISCIPLINARNE TEMATSKE ZBIRKE PODATKOV KOT PLATFORMA POVEZOVANJA RAZISKOVALCEV: PRIMER RAZISKAV O OKOLJU V SLOVENIJI** Povzetek. Podatki o okolju so lahko pomemben gradnik v napredovanju spoznanj za reševanje izzivov in iska­nju odgovorov na vprašanja, s katerimi se srecujemo v zacetku 21. stoletja. Pricujoci clanek je razmislek o tem, kako konceptualizirati zbirko podatkov o okolju in kaj vanjo vkljuciti, da bo k sodelovanju pritegnila razlicne akterje in prispevala k oblikovanju široke skupnosti zainteresiranih. V podatkovno intenzivni dobi arhivi podatkov predstavljajo platformo povezovanja produ­centov podatkov in uporabnikov podatkov, raziskoval­cev, raziskovalnih infrastruktur, javnih služb, obcan­skih znanstvenikov in drugih. Dostopni in pregledni podatki ter druge s podatki povezane storitve prispeva­jo k interdisciplinarnemu sodelovanju in uresniceva­nju vkljucujoce odprte znanosti. Kljucni pojmi: podnebne spremembe, okolje, podat­kovni arhivi, raziskovalni podatki, obcanska znanost, družboslovni koncepti Uvod Ce so okoljska in naravovarstvena vprašanja nekoc bila stvar redkih oza­vešcenih posameznikov in posameznic, ki so spodbudili nastanek gibanj za rešitev akutnih problemov, kot so onesnaženje, unicenje, izumrtje vrst ipd., in so iz njih kasneje izšle tudi prve t. i. zelene stranke, so dandanes videti del obicajnega, skorajda vsakdanjega govora in so del politicnih dokumentov Evropske komisije. Raziskovalni temi »Okolje in podnebje« sta v Strategiji 2022–2024 za raziskave in inovacije v EU uvršceni med prednostne razi­skovalne teme, Evropska komisija pa v razpisih opredeli, katere podteme naj raziskovalci raziskujejo, npr. podnebje, energijo in mobilnost, hrano, * Dr. Sonja Bezjak, raziskovalka, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani; dr. Janez Štebe, docent, raziskovalec, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija. ** Pregledni znanstveni clanek. DOI: 10.51936/tip.60.4.753 bioekonomijo, naravne vire, kmetijstvo in okolje (glej grozda 5 in 6 financ­nega okvira Obzorje 2020, obdobje financiranja 2021–2027).1 Neodvisno od raziskovalnih prioritet se soocamo s procesi informatiza­cije, digitalizacije in upodatkovljenje številnih segmentov posameznikovega in družbenega življenja (Bezjak in Masten, 2021). Ti prinašajo vse vec podat­kov o posameznikih, skupinah in družbi nasploh, pa tudi o okolju. Med novejšimi izzivi je vprašanje, kako dostopati do raznovrstnih in množicno nastajajocih podatkov s ciljem, da bi jih obdelovali za razlicne namene. V raziskovalni sferi je eden od odgovorov izgradnja podatkovnih storitev in infrastrukture, ki je skladno z naceli FAIR2 ter omogoca kakovostno in hitro obdelavo velikih kolicin raznorodnih podatkov in z njimi povezane doku­mentacije. Pomemben del razvoja predstavljajo že delujoce ali šele nasta­jajoce nacionalne infrastrukture, povezane v podrocne evropske velike podatkovne infrastrukture, ki v znanosti prinašajo nove nacine raziskovanja in sodelovanja. Za znanstveni razvoj je pomembno, da podatkovne storitve in infrastruktura, namenjene raziskovanju, in uporabniki le-teh sodelujejo pri razvojnih izzivih, da raziskovalci poznajo in uporabljajo razpoložljive napredne storitve in infrastrukturo in da se slednje odzivajo na potrebe raziskovalcev, zagotavljajo usposabljanja in uporabnikom prijazne rešitve. Ker so podatki lahko zbrani na sistematicne ali nesistematicne nacine in raziskovalci pri tem uporabljajo razlicne metode, se podrocne raziskovalne infrastrukture, zadolžene za podatke, srecujejo s precejšnjimi izzivi pri stan­dardizaciji in t. i. FAIR-ifikaciji podatkov.3 Dodatne izzive prinašajo teme, s katerimi se ukvarjajo razlicne discipline. Okolje je že takšno podrocje, kjer je interdisciplinarno sodelovanje pri reševanju okoljskih težav smiselno in so spodbude za (iz)rabo raznolikih podatkovnih virov še posebej uteme­ljene (Zhao in Hellström, 2020; Clare in Barker, 2023). Na sociološkem srecanju 2022 je Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov (ADP) kot podrocna podatkovna infrastruktura in izvajalec podatkovnih storitev za družboslovje v Sloveniji nastopil s pobudo oblikovanja posebne temat­ske zbirke raziskovalnih podatkov za Slovenijo, osnovane na širokem polju raziskovalnih vprašanj, povezanih z okoljem. V clanku predstavljamo nabor tem, ki bi lahko sodile v zbirko podatkov o okolju, seznam obstojecih razis­kav, povezanih z raziskovanjem okolja, ki so s svojimi podatki že dostopne v ADP, skupaj z glavnimi mednarodnimi raziskavami, v katere je vkljucena Slovenija. S primeri razvoja podobnih tematsko opredeljenih podatkov­nih storitev v ADP in drugih evropskih podatkovnih arhivih so prikazane 1 Dostopno prek https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/strategy-2020-2024_en. 2 Nacela FAIR v središce ravnanja s podatki postavljajo naslednje vidike: Findability – najdljivost, Accessibility – dostopnost, Interoperability – povezljivost in Reusability – ponovna uporabnost. Za vec glej: https://www.go-fair.org/fair-principles/. 3 Za vec glej: https://www.go-fair.org/fair-principles/fairification-process/. podlage za zasnovo okoljske zbirke podatkov v Sloveniji in pricakovani ucinki njene izgradnje. Ob tem pa je pripravljen pregled izzivov, s katerimi se soocajo podatkovni repozitoriji pri razvoju storitev, ki bi prinesle pregled nad okoljskimi podatki, enostaven dostop do njih in njihovo informirano rabo za reševanje okoljskih izzivov ob podpori na podatkih utemeljenih ugotovitev. Pristop k oblikovanju tematske zbirke: primera obstojecih tematskih zbirk iz ADP Oblikovanje tematske podatkovne zbirke o okolju sledi nekaterim sploš­nim nacelom. Prvi pogoj za smiselnost oblikovanja zbirke je, da med upo­rabniki obstaja zadostno zanimanje za tematiko. Drugo je, da je mogoce pri­cakovati zadosten obseg podatkov in da jih je smiselno razporediti v loceno novo skupino oz. zbirko. Iz tega sledi potreba po ustrezni dokumentaciji, to pomeni, da se podatkom dodajo informacije, s katerimi jih je lažje najti, opisani pa so tako, da je jasen in razumljiv njihov pomen in možna uporaba za nadaljnje raziskovanje. V katalogu ADP je objavljenih vec kot 750 družboslovnih raziskav, ki so dostopne za ponovno uporabo. V letih 2020 in 2021 sta nastali prvi dve tematski zbirki: Zbirka podatkov COVID-194 in Zbirka podatkov s podrocja etnicnih in migracijskih študij.5 Pobuda za oblikovanje prve je prišla iz poziva Konzorcija evropskih arhivov družboslovnih podatkov (CESSDA) v prvih tednih po razglasitvi pandemije.6 Pri oblikovanju zbirke COVID-19 so bile clanicam CESSDA v pomoc smernice združenja Research Data Alliance (RDA) s pozivom k zagotovitvi cim hitrejšega dostopa do podatkov, upravi­cenim zaradi urgentnosti reševanja pandemicne situacije (RDA COVID-19 Working Group, 2020). Pandemija je pokazala nujnost interdisciplinarnega sodelovanja in povezovanja epidemioloških, medicinskih, zdravstvenih in družboslovnih podatkov.7 Napori pri oblikovanju nacionalne tematske zbirke so bili upraviceni tudi zaradi prispevka k mednarodnemu pregledu podatkov o COVID-19.8 Temu ustrezen je bil dober odziv ustvarjalcev podatkov, ki so v tistem obdobju raziskovali vprašanja, povezana s pandemijo. Skladno z omenjenimi 4 https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/uporabi/covid-19/ 5 https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/uporabi/etmig/zbirka_etmig/ 6 V Konzorcij evropskih arhivov družboslovnih podatkov (CESSDA) so vkljuceni arhivi iz 22 držav clanic EU in nekaterih drugih. Poslanstvo CESSDA je, da te arhive povezuje ter spodbuja harmonizacijo orodij, storitev in izobraževanj. Plod dolgoletnega mednarodnega sodelovanja arhivov je skupni katalog podatkov CESSDA (CDC), ki danes šteje okoli 43.000 družboslovnih raziskav (https://datacatalogue.ces­sda.eu/). 7 Primer takega sodelovanja je evropski projekt BY-COVID: https://by-covid.org/ 8 https://www.cessda.eu/Covid-19 naceli FAIR so pripravili raziskovalne podatke in spremno dokumentacijo, ki je nujna za njihovo razumevanje. V tematski zbirki COVID-19 je v ADP trenutno objavljenih 20 raziskav, ki vsebujejo tako besedilne kot številske podatke, dostopne za ponovno uporabo. Na organiziranih dogodkih (sple­tni seminar ADP,9 konferenca NIJZ10) se je pokazal potencial za oblikova­nje skupnosti raziskovalcev z razlicnih družboslovnih podrocij (psihologija, sociologija, etnologija, pravo …) in širše, saj so raziskave v zbirko prispevali tudi raziskovalke in raziskovalci s podrocja medicine in zdravstva (vec o zbirki COVID-19 v Štebe in Bezjak, 2022).11 Drug primer je zbirka podatkov s kratico EtMig, katere namen je prispe­vati k vecji preglednosti raziskav s podrocja etnicnih in migracijskih študij in boljšemu dostopu do kakovostnih raziskovalnih podatkov s tega podrocja. Pobuda za oblikovanje zbirke je nastala zaradi aktualnosti teme. Pri sno­vanju in oblikovanju zbirke se je pokazalo, da se raziskovalci na razlicnih raziskovalnih organizacijah ukvarjajo z etnicnimi in migracijskimi študijami, da nastajajo številne raziskave in z njimi povezani podatki, da pa ni celovi­tega pregleda nad njimi. Da bi preverili potencial, je ADP izvedel pogovore s predstavniki raziskovalnih organizacij, ki so med vecjimi ustvarjalci razis­kav s tega podrocja (Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Inštitut za slovensko izseljenstvo in migracije pri Znanstvenoraziskovalnem centru Slovenske akademije znanosti in umetnosti, Inštitut za družbene vede ZRS Koper in drugi). Obsežnejše sodelovanje je steklo med ADP in Inštitutom za družbo­slovne raziskave ZRS Koper. V zbirki EtMig je ob koncu leta 2023 objavlje­nih dvanajst raziskav, ki jih je mogoce poiskati in najti v katalogu ADP in katalogu CESSDA ter uporabiti za razlicne nove namene.12 Oblikovanje tematske zbirke je lahko tudi odgovor na potrebe v širši družbi. Dolocene tematike lahko zaradi svojega pomena za družbo pred­stavljajo prednostna raziskovalna podrocja, kakor kaže zgled iz britanskega arhiva UKDS, kjer so raziskovalne podatke predstavili po sklopih aktualnih družbenih izzivov: staranje, COVID-19, kriminal, gospodarstvo, okolje in energija, izobraževanje, etnicnost, hrana, zdravje, stanovanja, informacije in komunikacija, delo, politika in revšcina.13 Podobno so v Finskem arhivu družboslovnih podatkov (FSD) predstavili tematske sklope kot napotilo za Spletni seminar je potekal 17. novembra 2023, vec o programu na: https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/ dogodki/webinar_adp_covid-19_21/ 10 Konferenca v organizaciji Nacionalnega inštituta za javno zdravje je potekala 5. oktobra 2022, vec o vsebini in programu: https://nijz.si/dogodki/drugo-obvestilo-konferenca-javno-zdravje-in-covid-19-5-ok­tober-2022/ 11 Ena od udeleženk s podrocja medicine se je zahvalila, saj pred tem ni poznala ADP in podatkovnih virov (vir: zapiski s spletnega seminarja dne 17. november 2021). 12 Zbirka EtMig: https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/uporabi/etmig/novo_adp/ 13 https://ukdataservice.ac.uk/find-data/browse/ iskanje oz. kot predloge zanimivih raziskovalnih tem.14 Potencial za oprede­litev tematskih zbirk podatkov lahko predstavljajo tudi strateški dokumenti EU, v katerih so opredeljene raziskovalne teme, ki jih financira EU.15 Podatki o okolju v arhivih CESSDA in v ADP Hiter pregled kataloga podatkov CESSDA kaže, da arhivi širom Evrope ponujajo mnogo podatkov s podrocja raziskovanja okolja. V podatkovnem katalogu CESSDA (CDC) je na voljo 42.188 raziskav (20. 7. 2022), v katego­rijo »okolje« je uvršcenih 5864 raziskav, 57 raziskav je objavljenih v ADP. Pri podrobnejšem iskanju raziskav s podrocja »okolje« so lahko v pomoc pojmi iz tezavra ELSST (glej Preglednica 1: Raziskave o okolju v katalogu podat­kov CESSDA, v prilogi 1). Ta preglednica ni popoln popis stanja, je pa lahko prikaz izziva, s katerimi se srecujejo podatkovni repozitoriji in posledicno uporabniki takih raziskav; oznacevanje (klasifikacija) raziskav s koncepti namrec ni dosledno, npr. uporabljajo se razlicni koncepti za iste vsebine, o cemer deloma razpravljamo v nadaljevanju. V katalog ADP so do sedaj podatke iz raziskav s podrocja »okolje« prispe­vali raziskovalci iz vec kot 15 raziskovalnih centrov oz. organizacij. Najvecji ustvarjalec podatkov je Center za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in množic­nih komunikacij na Inštitutu za družbene vede FDV. V okviru raziskave Slovensko javno mnenje so bodisi celotno raziskavo namenili temi okolja bodisi so se o tem spraševali v okviru drugih tem. Za ponazoritev predsta­vljamo nekaj kljucnih besed, ki kažejo raznolikost spremenljivk: odnos do naravnega in bivalnega okolja, navezanost na kraj, odnos do nacina bivanja, odseljevanje s podeželja (1969); odgovornost za odpadke, prostorsko ume­šcanje odpadkov, dolocanje lokacije odlagališc, pogoji za soglasje za odlaga­lišca odpadkov v svojem kraju, druge rešitve za odpadke (1980); JE Krško, ekologija in napredek, placevanje ekoloških stroškov, zaznave splošne in osebne ogroženosti okolja (1997); vloga moderne znanosti v okolju, pravice živali, odnos do poseganja cloveka v naravo, odnos med naravo in gospo­darsko rastjo, odnos med naravo in vero, osebna pripravljenost za ekološko obnašanje (2000); klimatske spremembe, odnos do okolja (2018). Okoljske tematike so presecne za razlicne raziskovalne skupine, kar kaže pestrost organizacij in centrov, ki so objavili svoje podatke. Na FDV so jih poleg že omenjenega centra veckrat prispevali s Centra za prostorsko sociologijo in Centra za proucevanje družbene blaginje, po eno raziskavo tudi s Centra za teoretsko sociologijo, Obramboslovnega raziskovalnega 14 https://www.fsd.tuni.fi/en/data/by-theme/ 15 Evropska komisija je v financnem okviru programa Obzorje Evropa (2021–2027) opredelila pred­nostne aktualne družbene izzive, za katere bo razpisala raziskovalna sredstva (https://www.gov.si/zbirke/ projekti-in-programi/obzorje-evropa/o-programu-obzorje-evropa/). centra in Centra za politološke raziskave. Po eno raziskavo so objavili z Urbanisticnega inštituta RS, Znanstvenega inštituta Filozofske fakultete UL, Geografskega inštituta Antona Melika ZRC SAZU, Gimnazije Jesenice, CRJM UP ZRS – Centra za raziskovanje javnega mnenja Univerze na Primorskem, Znanstveno-raziskovalnega središca Koper, še dve raziskavi sta z Ekonomske fakultete UL. Med financerji raziskav so tudi obcine (npr. Nova Gorica, Koper), Stanovanjski sklad RS, Savske elektrarne in Zavod za gozdove ter razlicna ministrstva ali državni uradi. Omeniti velja še podatke, ki so nastali v sklopu velikih mednarodnih anketnih raziskav, kot so International social survey programme (ISSP), European social survey (ESS) in Eurobarometer (EB) ter podatke iz raziskav Nacionalna evidenca funkcionalno degradira­nih obmocij v Sloveniji za leti 2017 in 2020. Potencial okoljskih podatkov javnega sektorja Za razvoj družboslovne zbirke o okolju je pomembno upoštevati tudi podatke iz javnega sektorja in jih kolikor mogoce uporabiti za povezovanje z drugimi podatki (Cole in dr., 2020). Razlicne vrste registrov in zbirk podat­kov o prostoru nastajajo in se vzdržujejo na Geodetski upravi RS, Geološkem zavodu RS, Agenciji RS za okolje in na Statisticnem uradu RS. Na podlagi evropske direktive INSPIRE so vzpostavljeni metapodatkovni standardi in podlage za povezljivost podatkov.16 Iskanje po metapodatkih o podatkih iz teh virov in dostopu do njih je mogoce prek portala OPSI – Odprti podatki Slovenija.17 Dostopni so vecinoma agregirani podatki, za dostop do mikro­podatkov pa je potrebno izpolniti pogoje Statisticnega urada RS za delo z ne polno anonimiziranimi podatki.18 Najdljivost in povezljivost podatkov: oznacevanje pojmovnih opredelitev vsebine podatkov V podatkovno intenzivni dobi se vecajo potrebe po razvršcanju in ovred­notenju podatkov ter predvsem po dobrem opisu, ki omogoca, da najdemo podatke, ki jih potrebujemo. To je tudi namen nacel FAIR.19 Podatki so v arhi­vih, združenih v konzorcij CESSDA, opisani in opremljeni z izcrpnimi meta­podatki po shemi DDI, ki je namenjena za opis družboslovnih podatkov.20 Ti vsebujejo bibliografske informacije o avtorjih in ustanovi, financerju ter kraju 16 https://inspire.ec.europa.eu/inspire-directive/2 17 https://podatki.gov.si/ 18 https://www.stat.si/StatWeb/StaticPages/Index/for-researchers 19 Za uresnicevanje zastavljenih ciljev so pomembna vse bolj uveljavljena nacela FAIR, glej: https:// www.go-fair.org/fair-principles/ 20 Glej: https://ddialliance.org/ in casu nastanka podatkov in spremnih gradiv. V opisu raziskave so zajeti nacin zbiranja podatkov, informacije o populaciji in vzorcu in o dostopnosti podatkov, kadar so potrebne omejitve zaradi narave gradiv. Priloženi so tudi dokumenti o podrobnostih zbiranja podatkov in kopija ali opis merskega inštrumenta. Vse te informacije pomagajo uporabnikom najti in ovrednotiti podatke, vkljucno z oceno kakovosti in ustreznosti vsebinskega okvira za dani namen. K najdljivosti in povezljivosti podatkov pomembno prispeva t. i. preverjen nabor pojmovnih opredelitev (ang. controlled vocabulary), ki je uveljavljen znotraj dolocene znanstvene skupnosti. Arhivi CESSDA klasifici­rajo raziskovalne podatke s pomocjo t. i. vsebinskih podrocij21 in s koncepti iz tezavra ELSST (European Language Social Science Thesaurus).22 Podobno tudi na drugih podrocjih nastajajo klasifikacije, ki pa so izven podrocne skupnosti lahko malo znane in neuporabne. V okviru združenja RDA se je oblikovala pobuda za delovno skupino, ki bi imela nalogo poenotiti in ure­diti razlicne tezavre s sorodnih podrocij na globalni ravni. Pri uveljavljanju konsistentne rabe istih terminov za iste koncepte se pri opisovanju podat­kov v družboslovju soocamo z velikimi izzivi (RDA working group, 2023).23 Okolje z vidika družbe: kaj sodi v zbirko podatkov o okolju Pogled v globino: konceptualno oznacevanje spremenljivk Do sedaj smo omenjali vsebinsko oznacevanje sklopov podatkov na ravni opisov raziskav, se pravi celih raziskav in njihovih poglavij, kadar so bile razdeljene v vec vsebinsko locenih delov. Konceptualno oznacevanje v tematski zbirki podatkov je lahko še veliko bolj podrobno, v kolikor se nanaša na dejansko uporabljene indikatorje posameznih konceptov, se pravi na spremenljivke v podatkih. V tem primeru se izboljša možnost iden­tifikacije dolocene spremenljivke, ki bi jo nekdo lahko uporabil za svoje raziskovanje. Denimo, vprašanje o okoljskem politicnem delovanju se lahko skriva v tematsko neodvisni raziskavi, v sklopu baterije splošnih vprašanj o sodelovanju na protestih, podpisovanju peticij ipd. 21 https://vocabularies.cessda.eu/vocabulary/TopicClassification 22 https://thesauri.cessda.eu/elsst/en/ 23 Povedna je misel, ki jo je na nedavnem sestanku delovne skupine RDA podal George Alter iz Univerze v Michiganu: »Sodeloval sem pri oblikovanju preverjenega nabora pojmovnih opredelitev za demografijo. Obstaja veliko število slovarjev, v smislu nacel FAIR je to velik problem. Ce se koncept/spre­menljivka pojavi v dveh podatkovnih nizih – kako veste, ali sta enaka. Naceloma bi lahko uporabili trajni identifikator FAIR. Ce sta trajna identifikatorja enaka, je koncept enak. Kaj storiti, ce se trajni identifi­katorji pojavljajo v razlicnih preverjenih naborih pojmovnih opredelitev? Ce med temi ni povezave, ne morete ugotoviti, ali sta pojma enaka ali razlicna. Prehajamo v svet z vec deset preverjenimi nabori poj­movnih opredelitev, potem je nemogoce uporabiti trajne identifikatorje za primerjavo konceptov.« Glej: https://www.rd-alliance.org/groups/vocabulary-services-interest-group.html Zgled, ki ga bomo predstavili kot primer enega od možnih ciljev temat­ske zbirke, so pojmovno oznacene zbirke raziskovalnih instrumentov (anket) in anketnih vprašanj. Konzorcij CESSDA koordinira vzpostavitev Evropske banke vprašanj (ang. European Question Bank, EQB), kamor so bila na zacetku poleg anketnih vprašanj iz serije mednarodne ankete Evropska raziskava vrednot (European Values Survey, EVS) vkljucena anke­tna vprašanja iz zbirke vprašalnikov Ethnic and Migrant Minorities (EMMs). EMM povezuje raziskovalce iz mednarodnega okolja po Evropi, da prispe­vajo in crpajo iz tematske zbirke vprašalnikov in z njimi povezanih razisko­valnih podatkov. EMM je bila ena od t. i. tematskih podatkovnih skupnostih, vkljucenih v pilotne projekte v evropskem projektu Social Sciences and Humanities Open Cloud (SSHOC) (Saji in Morales, 2020). Njihovo sodelova­nje je bilo namenjeno preizkušanju pristopov, ki so jih razvili strokovnjaki v podatkovnih arhivih, pri znanstvenih projektih raziskovalcev z dolocenega tematskega podrocja. Med cilji je bila identifikacija anketnih vprašanj iz pre­teklih raziskav za namen ponovitve v novih raziskavah in vsaj v omejenem obsegu ex post harmonizacija spremenljivk za namen združevanja podat­kov med državami in skozi cas (Morales et al., 2021a). Pri izvedbi so se srecevali z razlicnimi izzivi, ki so relevantni tudi za zasnovo zbirke podatkov o okolju. Pilot izdelave evidence anketnih vpra­šanj o migracijah je pokazal na omejitve pri kolicini vprašalniških enot, ki jih lahko z danimi cloveškimi viri in orodji obdelajo. Zato so za namen preiz­kusa pristopa s pomocjo skupnosti raziskovalcev, zbranih okoli zbirke EMM, dolocili tematske prioritete znotraj širšega nabora identificiranih tematik. V popisu vprašalnikov so zajeli 29 t. i. glavnih tematik, znotraj razdeljenih na podtematike (Morales et. al., 2021b). Pri pregledu anketnih vprašanj v pilotu SSHOC so uporabili standard DDI3 – Lifecycle,24 ki temelji na semanticnem modelu ISO/IEC 11179 (2023). Posameznim instancam vprašanj iz preteklih izvedb anket je pripi­sana konceptualna spremenljivka. Konceptualna spremenljivka tvori dru­žino vprašanj, ki jim je skupna ista konceptualna spremenljivka, npr. da so to ponovitve vprašanja v razlicnih jezikih. V povezavi s konceptualno oznako je funkcionalnost, ki doloceno vprašanje poveže z vsebinsko sorod­nimi vprašanji, kar je v pomoc pri iskanju primernih spremenljivk za dani namen. Banke anketnih vprašanj vzpostavljajo tudi drugi podatkovni centri po svetu.25 Ker je, kot smo omenili, z beleženjem besedila in kategorij odgovo­rov veliko dela, so te banke vprašanj vecinoma namenjene kontinuiranim 24 Na https://ddialliance.org/ so dostopne razlicne verzije standarda DDI. 25 Glej pregled ponudnikov iz Velike Britanije in drugod po svetu na UKDS: https://ukdataservice. ac.uk/help/other-data-providers/question-banks/. anketnim raziskavam, ki vec let sistematicno ponavljajo dolocena vpraša­nja. Tovrstni pregled je lahko osnova za tvorbo preoblikovanj izvedenih spremenljivk v harmonizirano skupno osnovo. Tako ustrezno zabeleženi identifikatorji vprašanj na ravni koncepta – lahko je to kar ime pripadajoce spremenljivke, ki se ohranja skozi leta – omogocajo združevanje podatkov in so hkrati uporabni pri izvedbi novih ponovitev. Takšno napredno orodje za združevanje in harmonizacijo podatkov, ki imajo skupne »latentne kon­strukte« oz. v naši terminologiji koncepte, so skonstruirali pri nemški druž­boslovni podatkovni infrastrukturi GESIS (Singh in Roth 2022). Uporabnik si lahko sposodi racunalniško kodo oz. skripte v programskem jeziku R, tako kot je to zastavljeno v pristopu pri znanstvenih revijah za namen reprodukti­bilnosti (Koren et al. 2022), in si skonstruira ustrezne kombinacije podatkov za konkretni analiticni namen. Primeri oznacevanja spremenljivk o okoljskih vprašanjih Pri globokem iskanju po podatkih so lahko v pomoc tematske oznake spremenljivk, kot so npr. prevzete iz omenjenega tezavra ELSST. Njegova nedvomna prednost je vecjezicnost in tudi to, da je v osnovi nastal s kombi­nacijo vnaprej pripravljenih pojmovnih kategorij iz predhodnega družbo­slovnega tezavra UNESCO (Balkan in Bell, 2015), obenem pa so ga posoda­bljali skladno s potrebami po opisih obstojecih spremenljivk v podatkovnih virih. Tovrstne oznake bi v prihodnosti lahko generirala tudi orodja umetne inteligence, še vedno pa bi za pripravo podatkov za usposabljanje modelov (treniranje) potrebovali cloveški prispevek. Pri iskanju spremenljivk in anketnih vprašanj obstajajo tudi bolj tradi­cionalni pristopi, npr. v longitudinalnem projektu Slovensko javno mne­nje vzdržujejo tematsko poindeksiran pregled anketnih vprašanj (Švara, 2023). Oznake vprašanj so generirane induktivno in z uporabo vsakdanjega jezika ter se tako približujejo neposrednemu pomenu, kakor je zajet v bese­dilu vprašanj. V pregledu ponudijo oznake EKOLOGIJA 25 izvirnih vpra­šanj, ODPADKI, RADIOAKTIVNOST nadaljnjih 40, OKOLJE, VAROVANJE OKOLJA 174 izvirnih vprašanj. Tu so še oznake, kot so NESRECE, DRUŽ­BENA GIBANJA, ENERGIJA, OBNOVLJIVI VIRI ipd., kjer se skrivajo nadalj­nja anketna vprašanja v zvezi z ekologijo. Ta delitev nakazuje vsebinsko vecplastnost ekoloških tematik, saj so lahko vezane na lokalne vidike posameznih onesnaževalcev (lokalna industrija, jedrski odpadki …) ali pa globalne, kot so podnebne spremembe. Delitev gre tudi po crti podrocij ekoloških vprašanj, kot so dileme glede potreb po energiji in podpore ter pripravljenosti za uvajanje obnovljivih virov, varovanja narave in biološke pestrosti ipd. Posebna tema raziskav je pogosto tudi promet: tako so priso­tne velike anketne raziskave podpore pri umešcanju avtocest (Toš, 1999; Kos, 2000; Toš in Kos, 2000; Kos, 2004 ), pa tudi podatki o uporabi mestnega prometa (Kos et al., 2018). Splošnejše oznake tipov spremenljivk na ravni konceptov v družboslov­nih anketah bi lahko bile razdeljene na sociotropne ocene stanja okolja in na egotropne ocene samega posameznika. Primer za prvo je ocena razširjeno­sti onesnaženosti, tudi v smislu, koliko to ogroža posameznika. Na posamez­nika osredišcene ocene pa so lahko strah (npr. pred jedrskimi nesrecami), mnenja in stališca glede razlicnih problemov, pa vse do posameznikovega porocanja o lastnih navadah in angažiranosti v zvezi z okoljem (primerjaj Fabjancic, 1997). Vsako od teh nadalje lahko delimo po podrocjih, npr. eko­nomski vidiki ekoloških vprašanj, vsakdanje navade, kot je pogostost sorti­ranja odpadkov, politicno delovanje v smislu podpore družbenim gibanjem idr. Ali pa se iskanje izvaja prek prostega besedila vprašanj.26 Teoretsko podkrepljeni viri konceptualnih ozadij Za iskanje in ovrednotenje podatkov so koristne tudi klasifikacije podat­kov glede na tipe, kot so ocene stanja, dejanski podatki o okolju, preprica­nja, stališca, navade in mnenja. Tako raziskovalci v svojih analizah locujejo npr. med okoljskimi stališci, okoljskimi navadami, pripravljenostjo delovati v prid okolju financno (v ang. environmental attitudes; pro-environmen­tal behavior; willingness to pay) (Meyer in dr., 2022). Izcrpno dokumenti­rani podatki ponujajo poglobljen vpogled v koncepte, anketna vprašanja in spremenljivke ter z njimi povezana gradiva, vkljucno z objavami, ki so nastale na njihovi podlagi. Vzemimo primer mednarodne ankete ISSP o okolju (ISSP Research Group, 2023). S tematskim modulom povezana dokumentacija se zacne s porocilom o raziskovalnih izhodišcih za pripravo vprašalnika. Samo poro­cilo operira z dvema nivojema pojmovanj: katere raziskovalne tematike vkljuciti in kakšna naj bodo vprašanja, ki zajemajo doloceno tematiko, se pravi njihova operacionalizacija. Tako npr. razpravljajo o vkljucitvi tematike prepricanj/skepticizma o podnebnih spremembah (ang. beliefs), v širšem smislu zaskrbljenosti zaradi okolja (ang. environmental concern), ki bi ga bilo zanimivo povezati s pripravljenostjo za ravnanja v prid okolju (ang. pro-environmetal behaviour). Predlagana operacionalizacija za prvo od tematik vkljucuje vprašanja, kot je prepricanje, cemu pripisati podnebne spremembe: »Do you think climate change is caused by natural processes, human activity, or both?« V podporo vkljucitvi posameznih tematik in njiho­vih operacionalizacij navajajo preteklo literaturo in pretekle izvedbe razis­kave. Temu prvemu koraku k predlogu tematik, ki naj jih vsebuje modul, 26 Primer iskanja podatkov po besedilu vprašanj glej Štebe, 2016 sledi skupinska presoja predstavnikov sodelujocih držav, ki vodi do konc­nega originalnega vprašalnika. Ta je podlaga za prevode v razlicne jezike. Izvedena anketa privede do podatkov, ki so retrospektivno dokumen­tirani v porocilu o dejansko vkljucenih spremenljivkah (GESIS, 2023). V primeru anket ISSP, ki jih dokumentira GESIS, so v opisu vsebin, zajetih v podatkih, podrobno našteti posamezni koncepti na nižji ravni, na ravni vse­bovanih spremenljivk, npr. v povezavi s podnebnimi spremembami: atti­tude towards climate change (the world’s climate has not been changing, the world’s climate has been changing mostly due to natural processes, the world’s climate has been changing about equally due to natural processes and human activity, the world’s climate has been changing mostly due to human activity). Sam opis raziskave vsebuje tudi seznam spremenljivk z angleškim besedilom vprašanj, po katerih je mogoce iskati. Priloženi pa so tudi vprašalniki v drugih jezikih. Dokumentacija na ravni spremenljivk in opis raziskave so skladni z že omenjenim uveljavljenim standardom za družboslovne podatke Data Documentation Initiative . Cloveško in strojno berljiv zapis dokumentacije spremenljivk – poleg besedila vprašanj in odgovorov ter dodatnih navodil za izpolnjevanje ankete – vsebuje imena spremenljivk in kratke oznake (ang. labels), kakor so vkljucene v podat­kovno datoteko. V povezavi z informacijami o projektu ISSP je tudi pre­gled narejenih raziskovalnih porocil z uporabo podatkov, ki ima podoben pomen kot v zakljucku prispevka omenjeni primeri študij z uporabo podat­kov v UKDS. To je precej izcrpna bibliografija publikacij,27 ki so nastale z uporabo podatkov serije raziskav ISSP, med njimi tudi štirih ponovitev modula Okolje (letnice izvedbe 1993, 2000, 2010 in 2020). Podana so tudi priporocila, kako citirati podatke (ISSP Research Group, 1995, 2003, 2019 in 2023), kar je pomembno tudi z vidika, da so objavljeni podatki še vedno premalo vidni in upoštevani kot samostojen znanstveni rezultat. K boljšemu pregledu in povezljivosti znanstvenih rezultatov GESIS prispeva s tekocim posodabljanjem informacij o znanstvenih objavah, ki uporabljajo podatke iz raziskav. Te v novejšem casu identificira s pomocjo stalnega identifika­torja podatkovne objave, ki je vkljucen v citat v clanku, v tem primeru je to DOI. Konkretni podatki raziskave ISSP o okolju so še zelo sveži, tako je med publikacijami, ki temeljijo na obravnavanih podatkih, trenutno samo Meyer et al. (2022). Stalni enolicni identifikatorji za verzije podatkov in za vsako spre­menljivko omogocajo, da se avtor v clanku sklicuje na doloceno verzijo podatkovne datoteke oz. še bolj konkretno, v njej vsebovane spremen­ljivke. Spremenljivko v besedilu lahko navede z imenom, skupaj s stalnim 27 ISSP bibliography. Bibliografijo ureja Tom W. Smith, direktor US General Social Survey pri NORC, ki še naprej zbira informacije o publikacijah, v katerih nastopata vsaj dve državi. enolicnim identifikatorjem datoteke (npr. DOI), ki je del citatne navedbe. Na ta nacin prihrani prostor v clanku, saj podrobnosti o uporabljeni spre­menljivki ni potrebno ponovno prepisovati. Sklicevanje na istovetno spre­menljivko, katere identifikator (npr. ime spremenljivke v doloceni datoteki) je vsebovan v priloženi programski kodi za obdelavo podatkov (pripravo in analizo), poleg zagotavljanja reproduktibilnosti objavljenih rezultatov omo­goca preverjanje in primerjavo, v katerih clankih so avtorji uporabili iste spremenljivke. Za potrebe metaanalize bi tako lahko generirali podatke iz rezultatov vec študij. Še robustnejši sistem strojno berljivega okolja obstoj­nih referenc na spremenljivke predlagajo raziskovalci iz nemškega GESIS (Klas et al., 2022). Interdisciplinarni viri V kolikor se v tematski zbirki oblikuje pregled obstojecih podatkov po tipih in podtematikah, se lahko uporabniki odlocijo za zbiranje novih podatkov, ce ugotovijo, da kaj pomembnega z dolocenega podrocja manjka (Open Data Manchester, 2023). Prav tako pa je še zlasti za nacrtovanje poli­tik za reševanje raznih okoljskih problemov potrebno upoštevati razlicne tipe podatkov z razlicnih podrocij: prometa, podnebnih sprememb, zdrav­stvene in socio-ekonomske (primerjaj Lee in Sener (2020) za podatke o pešcih in kolesarjih). Glede na to, da so podatki z razlicnih podrocij pogo­sto dostopni pri razlicnih ponudnikih podatkovnih storitev, ce sploh so dostopni, imajo oblikovalci politik težave z analizo in dolocanjem najboljših ukrepov. Tako da sta koristna nadgradnja in poenotenje obstojecih locenih podatkovnih storitev razlicnih disciplinarnih podrocij, da bi bile dostopne z enega mesta.28 Skupina, ki se ukvarja s kmetijskimi in okoljskimi podatki pri RDA, ugotavlja glavne izzive, kot so neenotnost standardov ob izredni raznolikosti podatkov, pomanjkljive usmeritve glede ravnanja s podatki po ustanovah in problemi lastništva in anonimnosti podatkov, ki jih lahko rešuje samo medpodorocno povezovanje in usklajevanje pristopov (Clare in Barker, 2023). Za zgled je lahko še en primer s podrocja migracij: projekt Whole-COMM (Yilmaz, 2022) predstavlja inventorij statisticnih podatkov. Pregledi obstoje­cih virov in podatkov so lahko v pomoc pri raziskovanju na podatkih ute­meljenih ukrepov s podrocij politik integracije, ocen javnosti in družbene kohezivnosti. Ena od zanimivih ugotovitev je pomanjkanje oz. odsotnost podatkov na nivojih nižjih od nacionalnih, kar omejuje primerljivost. 28 Glej https://www.greatermanchester-ca.gov.uk/what-we-do/digital/case-studies/case-study-integra­ting-environmental-socioeconomic-and-health-data-to-address-policy-challenges/. Vrednost okoljskih podatkov za ponovno uporabo in prispevek v družbi Promocija uporabe podatkov je pomemben del aktivnosti, ki jo velja upoštevati že pri zasnovi tematskih zbirk. Pomen zbirke o okolju in ener­giji v UKDS npr. utemeljujejo s potrebo po »razumevanju medsebojnih vpli­vov med družbo in naravnim okoljem na vseh ravneh, lokalni, regionalni, nacionalni in nadnacionalni, kar je kljucnega pomena za razvoj trajnostnih družb, zato UKDS omogoca dostop do podatkov, od porabe energije v gospodinjstvih do globalnih zbirk podatkov o izpustih toplogrednih plinov, ohranjanju ter proizvodnji in porabi nafte, plina in elektricne energije po vsem svetu«.29 Na krajši nacin in poljudno predstavljajo primere raziskav, v katerih so raziskovalci uporabili podatke, objavljene v UKDS.30 Na ta nacin raziskovalce, študente in širšo javnost izobražujejo o pristopih sekundarne analize in izkorišcanja obstojecih podatkov. Omeniti velja, da se raziskovalne organizacije v Veliki Britaniji sistema­ticno posvetujejo z javnostmi, da ugotovijo interes in dolocijo teme razis­kovanja glede na potrebe na nekem konkretnem podrocju. Npr. Univerza v Warwicku je leta 2021 ustanovila panuniverzitetno vozlišce za vkljucevanje javnosti v delo univerze. S ciljem demokratizacije znanosti skušajo razisko­valci ljudi pritegniti v vse faze raziskovanja, od zasnove raziskave do objave znanstvenih rezultatov.31 Morda obroben, toda ilustrativen za razmišljanje o vlogi javnosti pri odprti znanosti je primer regulacije dostopa do obcutlji­vih podatkov za raziskovalne projekte. V britanski Podatkovni banki SAIL (javno generirani zdravstveni podatki) vse predloge za projekte uporabe podatkov pregleda neodvisni Panel za upravljanje informacij, ki med dru­gim ocenjuje potencial projekta za obco družbeno korist.32 V panelu so poleg predstavnikov razlicnih organizacij udeleženi tudi predstavniki širše splošne javnosti. Na ta nacin sledijo geslu organizacije: javni podatki za javno dobro (ang. Public data for public good). Vkljucevanje zainteresirane javnosti v raziskovanje je ena od novejših nalog na podrocju znanosti. Evropska komisija je pripravila pregled in ana­lizo izbranih projektov, v katerih sodelujejo obcanski znanstveniki in znan­stvenice. Rezultati kažejo, da se vecina, 69 %, v analizo vkljucenih projektov obcanske znanosti ukvarja z naravo in biotsko raznovrstnostjo, vecinoma je šlo za opazovanje ali obcasno porocanje o pojavnosti vrst. Temu sledijo pro­jekti o naravnih virih (voda, zemlja, zrak), ki skupaj predstavljajo 16 % vseh 29 Glej: https://ukdataservice.ac.uk/find-data/browse/environment-and-energy/ 30 Npr. študija primera uporabe podatkov iz serije Understanding Society z naslovom Sick and stuck at home? Does living with health challenges influence people’s energy use? (Büchs et al. 2019). 31 https://warwick.ac.uk/wie/aboutwie/ 32 https://saildatabank.com/governance/approvals-public-engagement/information-governance/ projektov. Projekti imajo vecinoma nacionalni doseg ali obsegajo manjšo enoto znotraj države, vecinoma jih vodijo nevladne (41 %) ali akademske organizacije (29 %). Med priporocili, ki so nastala na podlagi analize, je tudi, da naj se javne organizacije povezujejo z aktivnostmi obcanske znanosti. Za boljše sodelovanje med razlicnimi akterji pa bi bile v pomoc tocke oz. središca, ki bi zagotavljale centraliziran dostop do virov obcanske znanosti (Turbe, 2019).33 Pred izzivom vkljucevanja zainteresirane javnosti v znanstvenorazisko­valno delo stoji tudi slovenska raziskovalna skupnost.34,35 Pravne podlage so lahko spodbuda, da tudi v razvejani in raznoliki znanstveno-razisko­valni skupnosti v Sloveniji išcemo priložnosti za nove oblike sodelovanja. Nekatere organizacije, ki so lahko podpora pri povezovanju obcanskih znanstvenic in znanstvenikov z raziskovalnimi organizacijami, so že že izka­zale interes, npr. splošna Mestna knjižnica Ljubljana je v program strokov­nega posveta z naslovom Knjižnica, srce mesta 2023: Obcanska znanost36 vkljucila predstavitev Arhiva družboslovnih podatkov o možnostih povezo­vanja z obcansko znanostjo, podobna predstavitev je potekala oktobra 2022 v sklopu Strokovnega posveta in razširjene seje mreže Slovenska univerza za tretje življenjsko obdobje z naslovom Raziskovalno ucenje na univerzah za tretje življenjsko obdobje.37 Da obcanska znanost predstavlja široko polje in številne priložnosti za povezovanje raznolikih akterjev, kaže obsežen zbornik z naslovom Izzivi obcanskega raziskovanja: Izkušnje in pricakova­nja iz Žirov in od drugod (ur. Mlinar, 2022). Zbirka podatkov o okolju lahko postane platforma za sodelovanje raziskovalcev in raziskovalk iz razlicnih disciplin, pa tudi priložnost za sodelovanje z okoljskimi nevladnimi organi­zacijami, ljudmi, ki so izpostavljeni okoljskemu tveganju, in posamezniki, ki lahko prispevajo znanje, izkušnje ali obratno uporabijo podatke za iskanje rešitev (za vec o tej temi glej Bezjak in Masten, 2021; Mlinar, 2021). 33 Oblikovali so tudi priporocila za obcanske raziskovalne projekte, namenjene za podporo okoljskim usmeritvam EU: https://data.jrc.ec.europa.eu/dataset/jrc-citsci-10004. 34 Glej glej Zakon o znanstvenoraziskovalni in inovacijski dejavnosti, Uradni list RS, št. 186/21, šesti odstavek 2. clena: »Znanstvenoraziskovalna dejavnost temelji na nacelih odprte znanosti, kar vkljucuje zlasti odprt dostop (po nacelu odprt, kolikor je mogoce, zaprt, kolikor je nujno) do vseh raziskovalnih rezul­tatov, ki morajo biti najdljivi, dostopni, interoperabilni in vnovic uporabni, pa tudi uporabo odgovornih metrik za ocenjevanje znanstvenoraziskovalne dejavnosti ter vkljucevanje skupnosti in obcanske znano­sti.« (http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO7733). 35 Glej Uredbo o izvajanju znanstvenoraziskovalnega dela v skladu z naceli odprte znanosti https:// www.uradni-list.si/glasilo-uradni-list-rs/vsebina/2023-01-1828/uredba-o-izvajanju-znanstvenoraziskoval­nega-dela-v-skladu-z-naceli-odprte-znanosti. 36 Glej program dogodka: https://www.mklj.si/dogodek/knjiznica-srce-mesta-2023-obcanska-znanost/. 37 Glej program dogodka: https://www.utzo.si/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Program-posveta.pdf. Sklep Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov (ADP) s prispevkom daje pobudo za obli­kovanje posebne tematske zbirke raziskovalnih podatkov s podrocja z oko­ljem povezanih vprašanj. Raziskovalce in druge ustvarjalce podatkov, javne službe, agencije za raziskovanje javnega mnenja, obcanske znanstvenike in znanstvenice, predstavnike in predstavnice nevladnih in civilnodružbe­nih organizacij, snovalce okoljskih politik in drugo zainteresirano javnost vabimo k pripravi in objavi podatkov, ki bodo lahko prispevali k iskanju odgovorov za izzive, povezane z okoljskimi vprašanji. Obenem vabimo k iskanju in nadaljnji rabi že objavljenih raziskovalnih podatkov in povezanih gradiv, ne samo v slovenskem ADP, ampak nasploh v skupnem katalogu podatkov Konzorcija evropskih arhivov družboslovnih podatkov. LITERATURA Balkan, Laura, in Lucy Bell (2015): Linking Thesauri – ELSST as a Hub for Social Science Data Terms. IASSIST Quarterly, 38 (2): 16. Dostopno prek https://doi. org/10.29173/iq775, 26. 11. 2023. 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Klinar, Aleksander (2002): Druga modernizacija pri jeseniških gimnazijcih [Podatkovna datoteka]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: MODJES01. Dostopno prek https://doi.org/10.17898/ ADP_MODJES01_V1, 23. 11. 2023. Kos, Drago (2000): Socialno prostorski vplivi avtocest v Sloveniji, 1997: Drugi del [Podatkovna datoteka]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: CESTE97. Dostopno prek https://doi.org/10.17898/ ADP_CESTE97_V1, 23. 11. 2023. Kos, Drago (2001): Družbena prehrana, 1981–1983 [Podatkovna datoteka]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: DRPREH81. Dostopno prek https://doi.org/10.17898/ADP_DRPREH81_V1, 23. 11. 2023. Kos, Drago (2004): Socialno prostorski vpliv avtocest v Sloveniji, 2002 [Podatkovna datoteka]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: CESTE02. Dostopno prek https://doi.org/10.17898/ADP_CESTE02_V1, 23. 11. 2023. 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Dostopno prek https://doi.org/10.17898/ ADP_BIVOK14_V1, 23. 11. 2023. Toš, Niko (2003): Slovensko javno mnenje 2003/2: Mednarodna raziskava o družini in narodni identiteti in Stališca o lokalni demokraciji [Podatkovna datoteka]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM032. Dostopno prek https://doi.org/10.17898/ADP_SJM032_V1, 23. 11. 2023. Toš, Niko (1999): Stališca obcanov o razvoju cestnega omrežja v Sloveniji 1970 [Podatkovna datoteka]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: CESTE70. Dostopno prek https://doi.org/10.17898/ ADP_CESTE70_V1, 23. 11. 2023. Toš, Niko (1999): Slovensko javno mnenje 1969 [Podatkovna datoteka]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM69. Dostopno prek https://doi.org/10.17898/ADP_SJM69_V1, 23. 11. 2023. Toš, Niko (1999): Slovensko javno mnenje 1980 [Podatkovna datoteka]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM80. Dostopno prek https://doi.org/10.17898/ADP_SJM80_V1, 23. 11. 2023. Toš, Niko (2000): Slovensko javno mnenje 1993/2: Mednarodna raziskava o okolju in družini [Podatkovna datoteka]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv druž­boslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM932. Dostopno prek https://doi.org/ 10. 17898/ADP_SJM932_V1, 23. 11. 2023. Toš, Niko (2000): Slovensko javno mnenje 1997/3: Mednarodna raziskava Stališca o delu in ekološka sondaža [Podatkovna datoteka]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM973. Dostopno prek https://doi.org/10.17898/ADP_SJM973_V1, 23. 11. 2023. Toš, Niko (2000): Slovensko javno mnenje 1998/1: Mednarodna raziskava o nee­nakosti in religiji [Podatkovna datoteka]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: SJM981. Dostopno prek https://doi.org/ 10.17898/ADP_SJM981_V1, 23. 11. 2023. 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Priloga 1: Tabela 1: RAZISKAVE O OKOLJU V KATALOGU PODATKOV CESSDA Število raziskav po izbranih pojmih iz ELSST Arhivi CESSDA ADP ENVIRONMENT – okolje 5864 57 BIODIVERSITY – biodiverziteta 76 0 COUNTRYSIDE – podeželje 229 1 ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS – okoljska ozavešcenost 397 0 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES – okoljska sprememba 701 0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION – varstvo okolja 807 3 ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT – okoljski management 552 2 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY – kakovost okolja 771 9 HABITATS – habitat 21 0 HUMAN ENVIRONMENT – clovekovo okolje 1089 5 LANDSCAPE – pokrajina 226 1 NATURAL ENVIRONMENT – naravno okolje 1235 5 NATURAL HERITAGE – naravna dedišcina 45 1 POLLUTION – onesnaževanje 1031 5 RURAL ENVIRONMENT – podeželsko okolje 897 6 SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT – družbeno okolje 5208 57 SUSTAINABILITY – trajnostni razvoj 257 2 URBAN ENVIRONMENT – urbano okolje 1100 5 WEATHER – vremenski pogoj 346 12 WILDLIFE – živalski in rastlinski svet 84 0 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES – okoljske vede 2101 7 ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING – okoljsko inženirstvo 81 0 HUMAN ECOLOGY – ekologija cloveka 53 0 Vir: https://datacatalogue.cessda.eu/, 20. 7. 2022. ARTICLES UDK 355.01(477)«2014/...«:303.446.4 Anton BEBLER* THE WAR IN UKRAINE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE Abstract. The war in Ukraine is the biggest, bloodiest and longest war in Europe since 1945. Its initial stage holds similarities with several other armed conflicts and wars in the last 50 years on Cyprus and in the territo­ries of the former Soviet Union and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Among the cases in ex-Yugoslavia, greatest similarity is seen with the war in Croatia (1991–1995). This conflict stemmed from two almost simultaneous breakdowns of multinational ‘socialist federations’ and their communist regimes that were similar in structure. The dissimilarity of the second stage of the war in Ukraine and the war in Croatia is primarily due to the processes of NATO and EU enlargement coupled with the USA’s policy of using NATO enlargement and Ukraine as tools to harm and weaken Russia. The conflict about Ukraine and the promise of NATO membership given to it has become an indirect war between Russia and the US-led West, where Ukraine is the West’s proxy and the main victim of the war. Like what occurred in Croatia in August 1995 and in Azerbaijan in September 2023, the final outcome of the war in Ukraine will be decided on the battlefield, not around a diplomatic table. Still, it will be very differ­ent from that in Croatia. Responsibility for the war in Ukraine and its consequences must be shared between the two direct belligerents, the co-responsible USA, and other NATO members. Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, Croatia, USA, NATO, inter­nal war, interstate war * Anton Bebler, PhD, Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenija. DOI: 10.51936/tip.60.4.775 Introduction The purpose of this article is to shed light on the wider context in which the war in Ukraine erupted in 2014, its two distinct phases, along with its causes, main parameters and consequences. The war in Ukraine is com­pared with several other wars, particularly in its first phase when it was the most similar to the war in Croatia (1991–1995) and in its second phase when it was with the wars in Cyprus (1974) and in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) (1999). Finally, the political responsibility for the wars in Ukraine and its likely outcome are also considered. The war in Ukraine has, for good reason, recently attracted considera­ble international attention. This armed conflict is the biggest, bloodiest and longest war in Europe since 1945. It has also produced a strong impact on Europe and the broader international community. According to two measures (at least), the war in Ukraine has been exceeded by a number of other wars since 1945, namely those occurring in Asia and Africa. In terms of mortality, it has been exceeded by the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Algeria, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and Iraq. In terms of duration, it is unlikely to be longer than the wars in Vietnam, Algeria, Sudan and Afghanistan. Among all these armed conflicts, the war in Ukraine may be sharply distinguished by the reverse ratio between military and civilian mortality. In the European framework, the central trigger of the first stage of the war in Ukraine was similar to what caused the armed conflicts and outright war occurring between 1974 and 1999 on Cyprus, in Moldova, Georgia, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan as well as the territory of the SFRY. Among the former, the early stage of the war in Ukraine most resembles the war in Croatia (1991–1995). Separated by temporal and geographic distance, these two wars have several features in common. The causes of each war were tangibly related to profound geopolitical changes underway in Europe about 35 years ago. These changes entailed the slackening and termination of the Cold War between two military-political blocs and the wave of liberal-democratic transformation of political systems in Eastern Europe. Over the span of 3 years, about 30 different state entities declared their sovereignty in the area of 3 ‘socialist federations’ (Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia). Of these, 23 entities survived and soon gained universal recognition as sover­eign states, including Croatia and Ukraine. The war in Croatia, which started prior to its international recognition, and the war in Ukraine 22 years after its recognition as an independent state, display a number of similarities that not accidental. The similarities The wars involved two adversary pairs of neighbouring and partly over­lapping Slavic nations. These wars unfolded in the territories of two defunct ‘socialist federations’ – the SFRY and the USSR. The causes of both wars were closely related to the almost simultaneous breakdowns of these two federations in 1991 and the demise of their communist regimes that had preceded and caused the breakdowns. The institutional structure of the SFRY was modelled after and closely resembled the structure of the older ‘socialist federation’, the USSR. Shared features of the two included the division of each federation into full-fledged republics and autonomies. Most or all of these federal units were ethnically designated. The minorities of the biggest ethnic groups (Serbs and Russians) were not accorded autonomy within other republics. In both cases, war fol­lowed the declarations of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘autonomy’ and referenda organ­ised by some members of the Serbian community in southwest Croatia and some members of the Russian and Russian-speaking community living in Eastern Ukraine. In each case, the central governments refused to negotiate with the insurgents and decided to suppress them militarily. The armed con­flicts in Croatia and Ukraine developed into partly different combinations of civil and interstate wars. The civil war component referred to armed conflict between the nationalist regime in the former second-most populous repub­lic on one hand, and part of the biggest national minority related to the larg­est ethnic group in the former federation, on the other. The civil war deep­ened the divisions based on loyalty within both the Serbian community in Croatia and the Russian community in Ukraine. Each war was fought almost exclusively on the territory of the former second-most populous republic, which suffered the most. In both wars, the two sides were responsible for gross violations of international humanitarian law. International sanctions were applied in these two wars. Apart from these and other similarities, the two wars also reveal several important dissimilarities. The specificity of the war in Ukraine While the causes of both wars are closely related to the breakdowns of two multinational federations, its effects in Ukraine erupted on the surface with a delay of 20 years. For two and a half centuries, until 1917 part of the Russian empire named Ruthenia and later Malorossiya, in 1918 it briefly became an independent state under the new name Ukrainian People’s Republic. The name Ukraine remained under the Bolsheviks and in 1922 Soviet Ukraine became a constituent republic of the Soviet Union. Over several decades, the territory of Soviet Ukraine was more than doubled by Moscow in several successive stages in 1920–1922, 1939–1940, 1945– 1947 and 1954. This was accomplished by including into it the lands of Novorossiya, with millions of Russian and Russian-speaking people in the East and South, as well as annexed parts of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and part of Moldova in the West. In all of these cases, this was done without their population’s consent. In 1991, all these territorial gains became parts of the independent Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, whereas the collective rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking popu­lation were left unprotected. The non-recognition of these rights by the Ukrainian authorities became a growing political problem with the rise of Ukrainian nationalism. Combined with divergent attitudes in Western and Eastern parts of the country concerning Ukraine’s relations with Russia, EU and NATO language-related problems contributed tangibly to political explosions in Ukraine in February/March 2014. Since 1991, two processes have altered the geopolitical map of Europe. These are the Eastward expansion of the US-dominated NATO along with the closely intertwined enlargement of the European Union. The first stage of these two processes in 1990–1991 – the absorption of Eastern Germany into both organisations – had no impact on the internal crisis in Yugoslavia, including the conflict in Croatia. Two decades later, however, the process of NATO expansion had already reached the borders of both Ukraine and Russia, thereby adding a very real extra-regional component to the conflict in and about Ukraine. For over two decades, one of the USA’s geostrategic goals has been to foster ‘colour revolutions’ to bring about regime change in the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine and also Russia. By using Ukraine as a tool, the USA has endeavoured to harm and weaken Russia. Under US pressure and notwithstanding German and French objections, at the NATO summit held in Bucharest in 2008 Ukraine was promised membership in the alliance, yet without stating a date. Openly and strongly opposed by Russia, this decision unleashed a chain of events, 6 years later leading to war in Ukraine. The European Union and its policy of Eastern neighbourhood materially con­tributed to these developments. The prospect of an association agreement with the EU deepened the internal political conflict in Ukraine, and also motivated a mass protest movement that was exploited in February 2014 to stage a US-guided coup d’état in Kyiv. The combination of Ukraine’s promised membership in NATO and the new regime in Kyiv fully dependent on the USA foretold that Russia would certainly lose its old, naval base in Sevastopol, for which it had paid high rent since 1992. Moreover, as a NATO naval and air base, Sevastopol would pose a direct threat to Russia’s geopolitical position in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean area. To thwart this threat, lightly armed detachments of Russian marines, already legally stationed on Crimea, were ordered to move in unmarked uniforms to take control of the entire peninsula. They did so without facing any resistance, on Kyiv’s strict orders, from the about 22,000 Ukrainian troops or inflicting any casualties. The Ukrainian offi­cialdom then simply vacated Crimea. This takeover was soon followed by a very successful referendum accompanied by international observers on approving Crimea’s legal separation from Ukraine and that it would rejoin Russia. Moscow thus took back Nikita Khrushchev’s present to Ukraine on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of its unification with Russia. First stage of the war in Ukraine Closely related to the dramatic developments in Kyiv, there were upris­ings in several Ukrainian cities and proclamations of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘autonomy’ in Lugansk and Donetsk. These uprisings largely featured pro­tests against the discriminatory measures adopted by the new authorities against the Russian and Russian-speaking population. The ultranational­ist regime in Kyiv responded on 13 April 2014 by branding the protesters terrorists, declaring a “wide anti-terrorist operation” and entrusting the Ukrainian Army to carry it out. This military operation launched the first stage of the war in Ukraine. In its attacks on the Donbas autonomists, the Ukrainian Army employed bombers, tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery while battalions of Ukrainian ultranationalist volunteers with neo-Nazi lean­ings and financed by Ukrainian oligarchs used artillery and light weapons. On the defending side, there were about 35,000 members of the territorial people’s militias of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics as well as Russian and other (including Serbian) volunteers. The Russian Federation offered multi-sided support to the two besieged republics, encompassing financial, material, humanitarian and military assistance. Russian profes­sional military personnel were integrated into the local militias and did not operate as separate and regular units of the Russian Army. At the same time, the US and British armed forces offered very sizeable material and other military assistance to the Ukrainian Army, also involving thousands of advi­sors and instructors. In numbers, they were comparable to the Russian mili­tary personnel on the other side of the frontline. By February 2022, this armed conflict had led to 14,000 and 20,000 dead. Two armistice agreements, Minsk 1 and Minsk 2, did not halt the Ukrainian shelling of Ukrainian territory, which was responsible for thousands of cas­ualties among the civilian population in the two self-proclaimed republics. These attacks continued for more than 9 years, accompanied by gross viola­tions of international humanitarian law. In February 2015, Petro Poroshenko, the President of Ukraine signed the Minsk 2 agreement. It was co-signed by the leaders of Germany, France and Russia and unanimously adopted as a resolution by the UN Security Council, thereby becoming part of international law. The Minsk 2 agreement pro­vided for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Donbas. Nonetheless, Petro Poroshenko and his successor Volodimir Zelenski refused to imple­ment most of Ukraine’s 12 obligations, including the key provisions under which Ukraine was to grant constitutionally guaranteed autonomy to the Russian and Russian-speaking population in Donbas. In addition, Zelenski reneged on his pre-election promise that saw him win the election in 2019 and did not stop the war. Second stage of the war in Ukraine On 21 March 2021, Zelenski blatantly violated the Minsk 2 agreement and international law by ordering the Ukrainian Army to liberate the territories of the two republics and Crimea. The bulk of the Ukrainian Army was then relo­cated to their vicinity, clearly visible by Russian satellites. Instead of peaceful resolution of the conflict, Zelenski, no doubt with the USA’s full approval, thus decided on full-scale military suppression of the Donbas autonomists and on reconquering Crimea, well aware that it would provoke a strong reac­tion from Russia. On 16 February 2022, upon his order the Ukrainian Army initiated the second and much more violent stage of the war. From that date on, the intensity of Ukrainian shelling started to grow from several tens to 1,500 explosions daily. Combined with movements of Ukrainian troops, this strongly indicated that a massive attack was coming as part of implementa­tion of the March 2021 order and similar to the Georgian offensive against the self-proclaimed Republic of Southern Ossetia on 7 August 2008. This escalation was no doubt coordinated with US President Joe Biden, who publicly predicted that Russia would invade on 16 February 2022. For the by far most frequent transgressor of international law, provoking Russia into an act of aggression fitted nicely with the USA’s strategic goal. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine provided a perfect occasion for demonising and isolat­ing it internationally, to unite the West under the USA’s guidance on impos­ing on Russia an unprecedented array of drastic economic and other sanc­tions. These punitive measures were expected to quickly ruin the Russian economy, hopefully bring down Vladimir Putin’s regime, defeat Russia mili­tarily without losing American lives, and cause the fragmentation of Russia into several states (as elaborated earlier publicly by Zbigniew Brzezinski and the RAND Corporation). However, these hopes have not materialised. Moreover, the effects of the Western sanctions were more harmful to the EU economies than to the Russia while in no way helping Ukraine. Ukraine’s stepping up the level of violence successfully provoked a pre­dictable Russian response. On the political and legal levels, this entailed the Russian Federation’s recognition of the two republics as independent states, signing two agreements on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, accepting their pleas for assistance and protection in line with Art. 51 of the UN Charter and invoking the Responsibility for Protect. On the military level, Putin was faced with the real prospect of Ukraine quashing the two cli­ent Russian-speaking parastates. This would have submitted their discrimi­nated Russian and Russian-speaking majority population to retribution by the Ukrainian ultranationalist and assimilationist regime, causing it to flee en masse across the border. Putin could not, also for domestic reasons, afford a humiliating political defeat similar to that suffered by Slobodan Milosevic in Croatia in August 1995. Unlike in August 2008 in Georgia, he did not wait for an all-out Ukrainian attack. Putin knew full well that stronger Western sanc­tions than those currently in place would follow, even if Russia’s response to the Ukrainian offensive were only moderate. Probably on the basis of a faulty assessment of both Ukraine’s capac­ity and determination to resist and the West’s response, he precipitously and knowingly in violation of international law ordered a ‘special military operation’ in the form of an invasion of Ukraine by a limited contingent of Russian land forces. This step was combined with extensive destruction of the Ukrainian air force, the air defence system, and military infrastructure. Ignoring an axiom of military science, an invading force of some 90,000 Russian land troops was sent against the Ukrainian Army thrice superior in numbers. It was also grossly insufficient and unprepared to accomplish the officially declared task of “demilitarising” and “denazifying” Ukraine. In spite of its shortcomings, this force managed to swiftly occupy an additional 15% or so of Ukrainian territory (some as a diversion and only temporar­ily) and effectively protected the two republics. It additionally established and secured a land bridge between Crimea and Donbas, made the Azov Sea part of Russia’s internal waters, took control of the largest European nuclear power station at Zaporizhie, and deprived Ukraine of its stocks of plutonium and uranium. These stocks would have been sufficient to make Ukraine the world’s fourth-strongest nuclear power. The latter was an effective response to Zelenski’s earlier declaration that Ukraine was intending to again acquire nuclear weapons. Preventing this dangerous prospect certainly served as an additional and important reason for Putin’s decision. By signing the Minsk 2 agreement in February 2015 in bad faith and then for 7 years allowing and encouraging, together with the USA, Poroshenko and Zelenski to sabotage any peaceful resolution of the Donbas conflict, the Western powers became co-responsible for the war in Ukraine transform­ing from a relatively limited internal war into a wider, much more lethal, bloody and destructive, predominantly interstate war. Two Western pow­ers, the USA and Great Britain, twice prevented (in February and March 2022) the conclusion of an agreement on the ending of hostilities. By pour­ing in arms and munition and advocating the continuation of the war, the West has become partly responsible for Ukraine’s tragedy. The two wars compared Still officially undeclared by the two direct belligerents, the war in Ukraine is already twice as long as the war in Croatia, and is still ongoing. There are also other important respective differences caused by the mis­match between Croatia and Ukraine in the size of their population and terri­tory (approximately 1:10), and by the different configuration and extent of the theatres of war. Further, there are differences in the size and structure of the armed forces involved, in the disparities between Serbia’s and Russia’s military capabilities compared to the respective capabilities of Croatia and Ukraine. The war in Ukraine in its second stage is also unlike the war in Croatia due to the massive use of particular weapons systems (notably drones and missiles). Vast differences also exist in the direct involvement of international organisations and other external actors in the two wars. In the autumn of 1991, the European Economic Community (EEC) sent Croatia its first mis­sion of white-clad and unarmed observers who as impartial intermediaries tried unsuccessfully to stop the armed clashes between the Croatian police and Serbian insurgents. The United Nations established UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) in February 1992, operating from Zagreb. It was followed by UNCRO (UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia) in 1995– 1998, UNTAES (UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Croatia) in 1996– 1998, and UNMOP (UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka) in 1996–1997. For several years, the UN-supported International Conference on Former Yugoslavia operating from Geneva was active. In comparison, there have been no UN or EU peacekeeping or observer missions in Ukraine. The OSCE had no observer missions in Croatia, although it deployed two such missions in Ukraine, notably the sizeable OSCE Special Monitoring Mission from 2015 until March 2022. In addition, the OSCE played an active role in preparing and concluding the Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 ceasefire agreements. It was the only peace-promoting international organisation during the war in Ukraine. Extra-regional states were not openly involved in the war in Croatia. In 1991–1992, the Croatian forces included 456 foreign fighters (British, French, German et.al.) accompanied by about 2,000 private American mili­tary instructors. On the other hand, Ukraine has received huge support from several dozen foreign states, in particular the USA, other NATO and EU members in the form of heavy arms, ammunition, training, intelligence, eco­nomic and humanitarian assistance. In 2022, around 11,800 foreign fighters, mercenaries and volunteers joined the Ukrainian Army (Poles, Americans, Canadians and others, also some 300 Croatians). This strong external involvement transformed the local war into an extra-regional armed conflict between Russia and the US-led collective West, with Ukraine acting and sac­rificing its soldiers and itself as the West’s proxy. The war in Croatia and its outcome were closely linked with the war in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, while there has been no similar regional linkage of the war in Ukraine or its spillover into Moldova. The war in Ukraine has also had by far a bigger international political and economic impact on other countries, not only in Europe, than the war in Croatia. Most importantly, there are enormous differences between the two wars in the number of dead (at least 1:25), number of refugees and displaced persons (approximately 1:25), and extent of destruction and amount of economic damage (at least 1:20). The war has inflicted considerably greater damage on Ukraine as a state and on Ukrainian society than the war did on Croatia. Since 2014, the population under Kyiv’s control has so far been reduced by at least one-third, and the territory by close to one-fifth. It is esti­mated that the Ukrainian Army, National Guard and volunteers have suf­fered well over 350,000 deaths. Ukraine has also lost a good deal of its indus­trial capacity, agriculture, energy generation and critical infrastructure. The dragging on war of attrition is sapping Ukraine’s ability to sustain itself, at least in its already rump shape. The war’s continuation suits the USA’s geo­strategic, chiefly anti-Russian objectives, whereas Ukraine is paying a hor­rible price for them. The first stage of the war in Ukraine and the war in Croatia revealed sub­stantial similarities as far as their causes and destructive consequences were concerned. In its second stage, the war in Ukraine may be sharply distin­guished from the war in Croatia by its magnitude, destructive outcomes, violations of international humanitarian law, international impact, and the involvement of great powers. At the beginning of the second stage of the war in Ukraine, on 24 February 2022 the Russian Army pre-empted the anticipated Ukrainian version of an offensive akin to the Croatian opera­tions “Flash” and “Storm”. It not only prevented the possibility of Volodimir Zelenski’s triumphant entrance in Donetsk like Franjo Tudjman’s entrance in Knin. The Russian Federation also annexed by way of referenda four Ukrainian provinces with strong Russian and Russian-speaking majorities in their populations and the Russian Army occupied a good share of them. In 2014 and 2022, Moscow thus took back a considerable part of former Novorossiya given to Soviet Ukraine in 1920 and 1954. Unlike in Croatia, the conflict in Ukraine has thus far added two more de facto changes to the list of the more than three dozen new or de facto changed borders between European states since 1945. Responsibility for the war in Ukraine In a speech given at the UN General Assembly, US President Joe Biden ascribed Russia with full responsibility for the war in Ukraine. Yet, in fact, several states are directly responsible and indirectly co-responsible for its outbreak, dimensions and continuation. First, the Ukrainian Army ini­tiated the war in April 2014 according to orders of the Ukrainian interim Presidency. Under two subsequent Presidents Poroshenko and Zelenski, Ukraine violated two armistice agreements and sabotaged realisation of the Minsk 2 agreement on peaceful resolution of the Donbas conflict. President Zelenski failed to fulfil his pre-election pledge to end the war, a pledge that had seen him win the election in 2019. On 21 March 2021, he ordered the Ukrainian Army to attack Donbas and Crimea in direct violation of both the Minsk 2 agreement and international law. The Ukrainian leadership’s instruc­tions to steeply increase the artillery shelling of Donetsk after 16 February 2022 together with the movement of troops provoked an invasion by the Russian army, leading to the armed conflict transforming from an internal to an interstate war. In March–April 2022, President Zelenski reneged on an initialled agreement with the Russian Federation on resolving the conflict, as forged with assistance from the leaders of Israel and Turkey as interme­diaries. Ukraine is responsible for the casualties and damage caused by the Ukrainian Army. On the other hand, the Russian Federation has grossly violated the UN Charter, the Helsinki principles, and a dozen international treaties and agree­ments by which it guaranteed Ukraine’s security and sovereignty within its internationally recognised borders. In February 2014, it committed an act of aggression by occupying and annexing Crimea. On 24 February 2022, it committed a second act of aggression by invading, occupying and annex­ing four Ukrainian provinces. The Russian Federation is responsible for the casualties and huge damage the Russian armed forces have caused in Ukrainian territory. The leading NATO members are indirectly co-responsible for the out­break and continuation of the interstate conflict and war in and over Ukraine. This primarily applies to the USA, which knowingly unleashed a chain reac­tion in the conflictual relations between NATO and Russia and used NATO to embroil the EU in this conflict, even though that contradicts the objective economic and other interests of many EU members, notably Germany. This chain reaction led to the political conflict deteriorating into a war in which the USA is using Ukraine as a tool to harm and weaken Russia. Germany and France with their swindling signatures under the Minsk 2 agreement and with subsequent policies for 7 years allowed Ukraine’s sabotaging of peace­ful solution of the Donbas conflict. As leaders in the European Union’s collective foreign policy, they encouraged and supported Ukraine’s active preparations for a war with Russia. In March–April 2022, the USA and Great Britain prevented the conclusion of an initialled Russian-Ukrainian agree­ment on resolving the conflict that had been agreed upon with the assis­tance of the leaders of Israel and Turkey as intermediaries. The members of NATO and the EU politically are encouraging and, by providing arms and funds to Ukraine, enabling the continuation of this war. Without such sup­port, the war in Ukraine would already be over. The NATO and EU members will certainly not achieve their main declared goal – Ukraine’s victory and hence Russia’s military defeat. They will thus suf­fer a political defeat. This applies chiefly to the leader of the West – the USA. After Afghanistan, it will be one more defeat. Nevertheless, the USA has this time been successful in realising several related goals. The USA has solidi­fied its hegemony in the Western camp and in most of Europe, rejuvenated NATO, attracted two new members Finland and Sweden, and bolstered its dominant role in the alliance, subordinated even further and simultaneously economically and politically weakened the European Union, for quite some time poisoned Germany’s and the EU’s relations with Russia, and inflicted very considerable economic and political damage on Russia. Conclusion Ukraine is today much farther away from accomplishing its cardinal strategic goal – to re-establish its sovereignty on the entire internationally recognised territory – than it was in February 2022, let alone in February 2014. Moreover, another goal remains unattained. It was stated in Zelenski’s decree as a condition for lifting the prohibition on any negotiations with the Russian Federation – to remove Putin from the position of President. On the other hand, the Russian Federation has achieved some of its goals, albeit not the two declared principal ones – Ukraine’s “neutralisation” and “demilita­risation”. Accordingly, responsibility for the war’s continuation and compli­ance during it with international humanitarian law must be shared by the two direct belligerents – Russia and Ukraine. Due to the two sides’ mutually exclusive objectives, the final outcome of the war in Ukraine will not be decided around a diplomatic table as a com­promise. Like what happened in Croatia in August 1995 and very recently in September 2023 with the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh, it will be decided on the battlefield. Still, it will be very different from both cases mentioned above and certainly will not be viewed as just by both belligerents. Just like how almost all wars end. BIBLIOGRAPHY Baud, Jacques (2023): Ukraine entre Guerre et Paix. Paris, Max Milo. Bebler, Anton (ed.). (2015): ‘Frozen conflicts’ in Europe. Opladen, Barbara Budrich. Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1997): Geostrategy for Eurasia. Foreign Affairs 76 (5): 56–68. Goldstein, Ivo (2008): Hrvaška zgodovina. Ljubljana, Društvo Slovenska Matica. Larrabee, F. Stephen, Peter A. Wilson and John Gordon (2015): The Ukrainian Crisis and European Security. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation. Maver, Aleš (2023): Ukrajina: Od Igre prestolov do Vojne za Samostojnost. Celje, Celjska Mohorjeva Družba. Pleiner, H. (2023): Der Konflict um die Ukraine. ÖMZ 5: 571–583. Wien. Plokhy, Serhii (2022): Vrata Evrope: zgodovina Ukrajine. Ljubljana, UMco. UDK 061.2(100):341.231.14 Ajda HEDŽET* STATE-CENTRISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: EXAMINING THE CONSTRUCTION OF NON­STATE COLLECTIVE ACTORS IN HUMAN RIGHTS SCHOLARSHIP** Abstract. This article addresses the deficiency in the area of human rights scholarship in International Relations (IR) by examining the theoretical advancements in IR theory that have led to the emergence of non-state collective actors as a pertinent research topic. It provides a review of the trajectory of the constructivist theoretical approach, which has brought major advancements in how international non-state actors are conceptualised in the human rights IR literature. This considers the limitations and implications of side-lining collective non-state actors within IR theory, arguing that expanding the theoretical understanding of how different collective actors are constituted and attrib­uted with agency can enrich IR human rights scholarship. The article also proposes a potential way forward with respect to non-state collective actors in human rights in IR by identifying a research programme based on practice-oriented approaches to help broaden the ability of scholars to foster interdisciplinary conversations. Expanding along these lines would bridge the existing boundaries within scholarly and disciplinary contexts. Keywords: non-state actors, state-centrism, collectives, international relations, human rights, international actors, constructivism Introduction In the last 30 years, international relations (IR) scholars have been increasingly challenging the state-centrism of the discipline (Keyman, 1994; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Lacher, 2003; Barnett * Ajda Hedžet, Teaching Assistant and Researcher, PhD Student, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. ** The article was written following research in Research Programme Group P5-0177 funded by the Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency. DOI: 10.51936/tip.60.4.787 and Finnemore, 2004; Bauman and Stengel, 2014; Dingli, 2015). The reifica­tion of state and interstate relations as fundamental topics in the study of IR has been highlighted as problematic, especially by scholars from the criti­cal theoretical tradition (Cox, 1999; Enloe, 2004), which helped broaden the scope of scholarly concern to inter-relations on all “levels” of social organi­sation (Edkins and Vaughan-Williams, 2009: 3). However, critical scholars are not alone in their calls to expand the selection of relevant forces, actors and issues in international politics (Hirst, 2022: 2–3) because they have found key allies in constructivist human rights scholars equally discontent with the rationalist and (thin) constructivist approaches dominating IR who have decided to also challenge this limitation (Davies and Pea, 2019). Therefore, the constructivist human rights scholars’ agenda emerging from the 1990s onwards rapidly contributed to expanding the understand­ing of entities capable of influencing international politics in IR (Berger et al., 2022) by emphasising the transformative potential, relevance and power held by transnational non-state actors in IR, while placing human rights on the research agenda (Dunne and Wheeler, 2019: 339). Yet, as the construc­tivist literature in IR on human rights proliferated, the issue with the setup of this developing inquiry became ever more visible. Scholars noted that the internalisation of the “object of human rights” and possible products of the concept were “black-boxed” (Madsen, 2011: 261), leading to subse­quent inquiries beginning at the point when non-state actors have already settled on the frame of a particular problem (Risse et al., 2013). The way normative change was conceptualised made it impossible for scholars to observe potential shifts occurring in the meaning of human rights (Berger et al., 2022: 15) given the assumption that the content of human rights norms remained stable (Risse, 2016: 13). Moreover, discussions on the relevance and power of transnational non-state actors proved too narrowly focused on a specific type of non-state actor (Berger et al., 2022: 9): the prototypical advocacy non-governmental organisation (NGO). Expectedly, the second generation of IR human rights scholarship turned to the concepts of the contestation and translation of international human rights norms to explain how non-state actors transform the mean­ing of human rights so that they resonate with the specific local contexts in which norms are promoted (Wiener, 2014, 2018; Berger and Esguerra, 2018; Draude, 2020) to address the shortcomings of the original framework. While this approach claims that turning to the constitutive dimension of the appropriation, contestation and translation of human rights can make more visible the strategic engagement of those generally assumed to be inactive ‘recipients’ of international norms (Zwingel, 2016, 2017), it nevertheless remains chiefly interested in researching the changing substance of interna­tional human rights norms. Many similarities between the two generations of constructivist scholar­ship have emerged as they share the common objective of capturing the presence of “nontraditional actors”, as previously overlooked in IR (Draude, 2020; Sikkink, 2022: 326). Moreover, both generations seek to shed light on how non-state actors contribute to the realisation, localisation and diffu­sion of human rights standards. These shared goals have not only prompted human rights scholars from each generation to draw on terminology and conceptual tools from neighbouring social science disciplines to update their frameworks, but also motivated them to present arguments based on the engagement of various non-state collectives with international human rights norm processes.1 However, even though these contributions have importantly helped advance the research agenda on non-state actors in IR, the discussion on how non-state collective actors are conceptualised contin­ues to be surprisingly ambiguous. This is because scholars of international norms in IR rarely engage in depth with the theoretical and conceptual advancements that have assisted with new non-state collectives becoming recognised as political actors in IR. In addition, there is a lack of scholarly discussions with respect to the capacities or qualities that enable a non-state collective entity to be attributed with the title of an international actor. Such enquiry could help scholars of human rights in IR better understand the extent to which the observed practices indicate these groups are acting in their own right and to what extent collective actions can be generalised to other discussed non-state actors (Braun et al., 2019: 790).2 Considering the long-standing critique of the lack of recognised non-state actors in IR theory and the key contribution made by IR human rights scholarship to this issue, this article takes on the task of critically unpacking the implications held by different approaches for the conceptualisation of the mentioned non-state actors for IR, specifically in the context of human rights scholarship in IR. In its goal of aiming to identify socially embedded patterns of meaning and the implications and effects they bring, it thereby remains methodologically grounded on a reflexive thematic analysis as a method that is used to map and decompose the state of knowledge when it comes to human rights and collective non-state actors – via their mutual reflexivity – to spotlight the need for a different agenda for further research 1 Most notably, “transnational groups of affected persons”, grassroots movements and activists, women and youth movements, and indigenous organisations (Berger and Esguerra, 2018; Holzscheiter, 2018; Baver, 2020; Knappe and Schmidt, 2021; Kotze and Knappe, 2023). 2 In this scholarship, an actor is generally considered to be “an identifiably human or collective sub­ject that in principle can gain agency and thus become an agent”; an “agent” denotes an entity that can act, and “agency” the corresponding ability to act. In turning away from problematising the constitution, the question of how non-state collective actors act is therefore frequently prioritised by scholars, whereas how they become agents is sidelined (Braun et al., 2019: 788). (Ward, House and Hamer, 2009; Braun and Clarke, 2022). In doing so, we aim to address the ambiguity surrounding international non-state collective actors in this scholarship. The article is arranged in four sections. The first section reviews the advancement of key theoretical debates that have influenced the develop­ment of constructivist scholarship on human rights in IR. The second sec­tion describes the advancement and limitations of the conceptualisation of the international non-state actors most prevalent in the human rights litera­ture in IR: NGOs. The third section takes a closer look at the limitations of the literature on normative contestations, with particular attention to con­tributions engaging with groups of affected persons given the contempo­rary relevance of this agenda for research on international organisations. The fourth, concluding section discusses how this research agenda could be beneficially enriched with insights from more practice-oriented approaches, thereby identifying a possible research programme to help broaden the aca­demic community’s ability to foster interdisciplinary conversations. Efforts to advance the position of non-state actors on the IR agenda Although non-state actors were advocating for rights long before the establishing of a comprehensive system of international human rights pro­tection or the modern global order in the 1940s, with notable examples being the campaigns against the slave trade and the women’s suffrage move­ment, it is only in the past four decades that human rights have become pro­foundly intertwined with both the practice and study of IR. Early IR theorists attempted to understand the nature of human rights and their significance in global politics by associating human rights with state sovereignty and a universal moral order, focusing primarily on the roles of state actors in their analyses of world politics (Dunne and Hanson, 2009; Dunne and Wheeler, 2019). Further, the dominant perspectives within the analysis of human rights in IR, which emerged from the Great Debates in IR (Lake, 2013), hold limited explanatory power and fail to comprehensively account for the past and emerging dynamics of human rights. The story of human rights in IR may hence be said to begin with the influence of (political) realist assumptions, which have guided much of the IR scholarship since its emergence. Yet, trac­ing the advancement of new theoretical approaches used to examine human rights in IR within this story also helps to highlight the theoretical limitations caused by realist-influenced state-centrism in the way collective non-state actors are conceptualised. After all, realist assumptions are also shaped by international law, conventional images of international relations, and states’ claims to exclusive authority in their domain (Gilpin, 1984: 300–301). According to realists, human rights are often seen as nothing more than “a polite fiction” (Dunne and Hanson, 2009: 62), while non-state actors have a small role in the realist narrative of international politics (Polizzi and Murdie, 2019: 254). Unsurprisingly, the strengthening of rationalist approaches during the Cold War did not bring significant changes to this view because rationalist accounts of international politics also provide little consideration for actors beyond the state in their analysis of the interna­tional system’s functioning. Namely, rationalist perspectives also prioritise great powers, national interests, and foreign policy factors, while leaving minimal room for the inclusion of non-state actors (Arts, 2000; Cutler, 2001; Johnston, 2001). It is, however, surprising to observe that even as human rights were gaining international attention as part of the United Nations’ (UN) agenda (Dunne and Hanson, 2009: 61), IR scholars continued to dis­regard the significance of non-state collective actors: “Waltzian structural­ists” chose to safeguard the epistemology of IR from “the autonomous influ­ence of democracy, ideology, economic integration, law and institutions on world politics” (Legro and Moravcsik, 2014: 6); institutionalists (Drezner, 2008a, 2008b) remained apprehensive about civil society potentially equat­ing visibility with causality, with this concern causing an overemphasis on the secondary role of civil society actors in international processes (Davies and Pea, 2019: 69). Therefore, the “epochal moment” occurred came in the 1990s when the Cold War ended and authoritarian regimes collapsed, giving rise to new opportunities for a world characterised by “freedom, rights and equality” (Eckel, 2022: 11). These circumstances provided fertile grounds for the flourishing of liberalist scholarship, which aligned well with the pre­vailing international developments of the time, where states were pursuing policies in rational accordance with human rights principles (Moravcsik, 1997: 516). In addition, during the 1970s and 1990s, significant growth and formalisa­tion of the UN’s international human rights system and affiliated institutions played a crucial role in monitoring compliance. The emergence of human rights NGOs and activists, along with the greater prioritisation of human rights in the diplomatic practices of Western states, further added to the pop­ularisation of liberalism in IR (Dunne and Hanson, 2009). It is not surprising then that these trends led to the widespread acceptance of the regime’s con­ception of human rights in the early 1990s (Donnelly, 1986), which today forms an established part of the legal, political and moral landscape in IR (Alston and Goodman, 2013; Roter, 2016).3 Yet, even as human rights came to be seen as neutral and impartial standards that all governments should An international regime is formed by “norms and decision-making procedures accepted by interna­tional actors to regulate an issue area” (Haas, 1980: 358). be held accountable to within international regimes, sovereignty remained the fundamental ordering principle, and states remained the central actors (Goodhart, 2020) because regimes necessitated “limited renunciations of sovereign national authority in an issue-area to limit the expenses of inter­national anarchy” (Donnelly, 1986: 601). The end of the Cold War drew attention to the role of non-material fac­tors and norms in international relations since it led to considerable politi­cal changes that could not be adequately explained by rational interests alone. This moment resonated deeply with constructivist scholarship, which sought to provide a sociological perspective on world politics (Reus-Smith, 1996: 2) and stressed the importance of norms (Katzenstein, 1996: 26). Constructivist scholars thereby argued that neglecting normative dynam­ics was hindering the study of international relations (Klotz, 1995) and thus sought to expand the research topics addressed by IR scholars by explor­ing previously unstudied phenomena (Klotz, 1995; Risse et al., 1999). They were confident that, in light of the end of the Cold War, constructivism could “shake up” the research agenda in IR (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). This new avenue of constructivist inquiry made significant progress by pro­viding an explanation that world politics is socially constructed, whereby power constellations, rules and institutions are the products of social inter­actions and their meanings are inseparable from the interpretations of the actors involved (Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1992). Although constructivists recog­nised the limits of structural determinism and reductionism, they concep­tualised agency and structure as being mutually constitutive (Wendt, 1987: 350–351; Dessler, 1989: 451). However, despite these advancements, early constructivists often continued to stress states’ role as “the dominant politi­cal actors in the international system” (Wendt, 1992: 424). Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with the “very top-down structural construc­tivism” (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986; Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1992, 1995, 1999) was also what motivated scholars like Finnemore and Sikkink to “tell a more agentic piece of this” story (Sikkink, 2022: 327). This decision significantly transformed the human rights research in IR scholarship by causing a sig­nificant increase in contributions by constructivist scholars who theorised the formation of state interests (Finnemore, 1996) and developed conceptu­alisations and models to examine human rights change and the creation and diffusion of norms (Brysk, 1994; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The most noteworthy contribution in terms of scholarly influence was the “spiral model”, which scholars and practitioners still use today (e.g., Naglic, 2016),4 since it sheds light on the vital role played by non-state actors (Willetts, The spiral model demonstrates how those experiencing oppression can appeal to sympathetic state actors to exert pressure on their governments (Risse et al., 1999). 1982; Price, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse et al., 1999; Peter and Brglez, 2007). Moreover, the ground-breaking “boomerang model” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) helped scholars explain the unexpected influence of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) in countries of the Global South (Risse et al., 1999), which became central to the interpretation of transnational activ­ism within the literature on human rights and social movements in political science and IR scholarship (Waites, 2019: 388). As the conceptualisation of the influence of transnational non-state actors on world politics was devel­oped further, scholars argued that these actors can fundamentally change domestic and international structures (Berger et al., 2022: 3–4), not merely influence individual governmental policies (Keohane and Nye, 1974), while the power of transnational non-state actors became understood as being derived from a particular type of agency based on their persuasive force (Berger et al., 2022: 3–4). This breakthrough proved useful for breaking the state-centric framing within the discipline “at just the right time” (Sikkink, 2022: 325) because it broadened the scope of actors acknowledged as legitimate research objects in IR to include non-state actors, particularly highlighting TANs that pro­mote human rights (Reus-Smit and Zarakol, 2023: 20). Still, from a contem­porary perspective, the three decades of research that built on or stemmed from these seminal contributions also reveal the limitations of this research agenda in terms of methodology and research focus, challenging many of the fundamental assumptions made in early constructivist scholarship. Scholars have noted that the research has exhibited unwavering confidence in liberalism as a positive force in world politics, leading to the adaptation of an approach that is somewhat idealistic and normative when explaining the progressive potential of human rights (Berger et al., 2022: 9; McCourt, 2022: 113). In addition, scholars have highlighted the existence of the lack of reflection on the problematic reproduction of Western cultural hegemony (Epstein, 2012; Epstein et al., 2014; Mende, Heller and Reichwein, 2022), which forms a central part of the liberal victory narrative (Moyn, 2010) and is extendable even to the link between theorising relations in a homogenis­ing manner (DeMars and Dijkzeul, 2015; Hofferberth and Weber, 2015).5 This is because of the tendency to categorically separate norms from actions and the methodological commitment to a framework that posits a unidirectional or linear causal relationship between independ­ent and dependent variables (DeMars and Dijkzeul, 2015: 291; Hofferberth and Weber, 2015). Scholars have argued that constructivism’s “dedication to a neopositivist research methodology” in a demonstration that norms matter led to norm research having a structuralist bias (Hofferberth and Weber, 2015: 81). This isolation of norms as independent variables relegates actors to the status of “throughputs” for pressures located in the structure of the international system (Jackson, 2003: 231–233), with lacking theorisation of the relationship between norms and action not taking the interpretive performances of human actors into account (Goddard and Nexon, 2005: 37). Thus, all of these findings importantly contributed to the constructivist setup and the conceptualisation of human rights NGOs becoming a topic of concern among scholars, for example, researching the agency of subaltern actors participating in normative processes (Dunford, 2015, 2017) and try­ing to better understand normative socialisation (Acharya, 2008, 2009). The pitfalls of researching human rights NGOs The limits of seminal constructivist scholarship are clearly illustrated while examining the favoured non-state actors of IR scholars: human rights advocacy NGOs. In the IR scholarship, NGOs are commonly defined as the “secular, professionally run, and transnationally involved segment of civil society” (Götz, 2019: 19). While human rights NGOs are generally conceptu­alised in a similarly broad manner, for instance, as “any” NGO “with a human rights-related mission statement” (Polizzi and Murdie, 2019: 252), it is the global nature of international human rights that makes NGOs which work in this area also global in their very essence. Thus, to understand the research inclination towards broad conceptualisations of NGOs in the IR scholarship, it should be first noted that NGOs gained broader recognition in interna­tional relations through the UN system (Götz, 2019: 19). As research objects directly linked to the IR apparatus, human rights NGOs therefore form part of the thinking tools that help establish disciplinary borders instead of just imports of neighbouring social sciences.6 Second, although scholarly engagements with NGOs within IR continue to be a highly popular and valuable endeavour, as shown by the consid­erable output on this topic in key IR journals, scholars have nonetheless become ever more mindful that “non-governmental” is by no means an empty signifier but instead a catch-all phrase. Namely, in the traditional state-centric perspective of IR, “non-governmental” indicates minor significance (Götz, 2019: 20). Considering the concept of an NGO as mutually consti­tuted by the global norms that they enforce or implement and by the repre­sentative rights claims articulated by marginalised groups calls for recognis­ing that it also carries a strong affective element, one that has indeed enticed IR scholars to examine this agenda (DeMars and Dijkzeul, 2019). Further, it is by acknowledging the affective dimension of this research agenda that we can also start to gain a deeper understanding of how strongly the the­oretical inclination towards idealist constructivism has influenced human rights research in IR. This is because putting underlying the theoretical Still, other disciplines use their own, often conceptually more precise, terminology to refer to the overlapping phenomenon, which includes for example social movement organisations, voluntary agen­cies, think tanks and pressure groups (Götz, 2019: 20) tenets of idealist constructivism under examination reveals the simultane­ous presence of pluralist and globalist insights, which are further reinforc­ing the legitimating discourse surrounding human rights NGOs (DeMars and Dijkzeul, 2015:11; 2019: 86).7 As an illustrative example of these dynamics, the most prevailing per­spective on NGOs in IR serves well, which follows Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) concept of the ‘boomerang pattern’, due to its clear-cut use of the combination of a pluralist approach, emphasising the bottom-up power of NGOs, and a globalist constructivist understanding of top-down power dynamics, as visualised here through the imagery of a boomerang’s rotary path (DeMars and Dijkzeul, 2019: 75–76).8 With this type of approach, NGOs derive their influence from the representative claims they articulate and the global norms they enforce. Accordingly, this portrayal of NGOs not only resonates with the ideals of cosmopolitanism, but also contributes to the legitimisation and moral authority ascribed to NGOs within IR.9 While it is crucial to recognise the inherent complexities of the politi­cal landscape within which NGOs operate, the different manoeuvres used by human rights NGOs to evade strict accountability to specific principals, norms, citizens or ‘affected’ communities, such as working children (see, e.g., Holzscheiter and Hahn, 2013; van Daalen, 2023), whom they claim to repre­sent, have however been relatively omitted from this scholarly discussion. A recent illustration of this deficiency arose when Amnesty International (AI) published a ‘legally questionable’ press release about the war in Ukraine in August 2022 without engaging with the Ukrainian authorities or con­sidering “the lived knowledge of people of Ukraine” (Tsymbalyuk, 2023). In response, the accuracy of the information in AI’s document was loudly questioned online and offline by the wider public along with the Ukrainian authorities and scholars (Beaumont, 2023; Schmitt, 2023).10 To deal with the 7 DeMars’s (2005: 36) review of the nature of global NGOs divides the NGO literature into three main approaches: pluralist, globalist and realist. In “pluralist constructivist” views, NGOs empower and advo­cate for societies against repressive states, representing a bottom-up power dynamic that originates from the grassroots. On the other hand, in “globalist constructivist” perspectives, NGOs enforce global norms on states and corporations, embodying a top-down power trajectory that stems from an international norma­tive authority. 8 The boomerang model of TANs entails domestic NGOs seeking international allies to exert pressure on their own states. As the boomerang gains momentum and gathers international allies, such as states and intergovernmental organisations, it applies normative and material pressure on the original state. This model combines the representative claim of pluralist theory with the normative enforcement of glo­balist theory (DeMars and Dijkzeul, 2019: 75–76). 9 Cosmopolitanism embodies a belief in universal reason and human emancipation, rejecting par­ticularistic attachments (Goodhart, 2023: 33–34). However, the formation of cosmopolitan human rights opposes local contexts and can be perceived as a hostile response to egalitarian politics because of its cos­mopolitan nature (Goodhart, 2023: 40). 10 The document was for example also instrumentalised by Russia’s ambassador to the UN who rising criticism, AI appointed a panel of five seminal experts in international humanitarian law to provide a legal review of the document to determine what had gone wrong. Yet, it took months for it to publicly release the final report, which criticised the language AI had used; the report was finally leaked by the New York Times in April 2023 (Schmitt, 2023). Even though scholars of human rights and international law engaged in important analysis of AI’s understanding of international norms in the document (van Dijk, 2022; Wright, 2022, Schmitt, 2023), their analysis of AI’s usage of language primarily focused on the deconstruction of the rigorous documenting and impartiality mentioned by AI in defence of its actions. However, scholars were mostly focused on knowledge produc­tion practices, largely overlooking 1) how the way in which representatives of AI emphasised the hierarchy between supposedly ‘objective’ and par­tial knowledge that is extremely deeply embedded in academic and legal thinking made invisible the “knowledge coming from the passions of our bodies that mobilises us to bring justice”, as stated by Tsymbalyuk (2023); and 2) how AI’s engagement with this language contributed to a change in semantic infrastructure, which in the end helped state actors redraw the limits of what is legally permissible while discussing violations of human rights (dos Reis and Grzybowski, 2023). This incident thus illustrates the need for a more critical examination of the work of human rights NGOs not just through a political but also a sociological lens because their actions may sometimes align in unexpected ways with the expectations established by their stated mandates and the global norms they are supposed to espouse. Insisting on the adaptation of more nuanced perspectives that acknowl­edge both the positive contributions and potential limits of NGOs in shaping world politics, while also capturing the politics of rights and human rights that take place in “most of the world” (Madhok, 2022: 6), should thus be an imperative for IR scholars. Hence, although the work of Keck and Sikkink (1998: 1–6, 29–37, 209–217) has significantly contributed to advancing the theoretical discussion of human rights NGOs and TANs within IR, their read­ing of the “logic of appropriateness” problematically relies on a determinist concept of actors that does not allow for a full reflection on human rights norms (Hofferberth and Weber, 2015: 83–84). In their perspective, actors merely internalise roles and rules without conscious choice, conforming to what they consider is appropriate behaviour (Finnemore, 1996: 29). Still, doing this neglects the agency of the collective actors engaging with human rights and fails to account for acts that may contradict the global structures embodied by the international human rights regime. claimed that, “We don’t use the tactics Ukrainian armed forces are using – using the civilian objects as military cover – (…) what [AI] recently proved in a report” (Schmitt, 2023). It must also be pointed out that deeper analysis shows that a significant discrepancy even exists in this approach regarding agency, which remains ambiguous but has to be further clarified (DeMars and Dijkzeul, 2015, 2019: 76) since it attributes agency to activists or the NGOs they run or sometimes to the TANs that activists and NGOs form and participate in. However, the authors of the boomerang model initially only assigned agency to NGOs because it is they that throw the boomerangs. Namely, the key contribution of their work is the model that provides insights into NGO agencies actively contributing to human rights campaigns.11 In addition, in this approach NGOs suffer from homogenisation tendencies since authors assumed that actors automatically share common global human rights and principles, which they visibly and publicly signal through the everyday discourse they use while pursuing a shared goal. In contrast, scholars studying patterns of global organising around women’s rights and environmentalism (Smith et al., 2021), for example, stress the need to distinguish different types of organising. They find that only multilateralist organisations are strongly connected with international human rights agencies, pragmatists main­tain selective ties, and rejectionists completely discard the international arena. This means the issue lies not simply in the fact that NGOs do not engage in this practice, but also in the theoretical assumption that the global human rights norms articulated by NGOs are constitutive of their existence (Hofferberth and Weber, 2015: 82). Nonetheless, the identified leap in theory also obscures other dynamic aspects of rights politics and political practices that go beyond the idealised pluralist representation of society against the state or the globalist enforce­ment of human rights norms on the state (DeMars and Dijkzeul, 2019: 77). As a result, this causes the scholarship to overlook the centuries of social struggle that have led to the formalisation of international human rights (Chowdhury, 2011; Goodhart, 2020: 36) and, more significantly, contempo­rary political struggles on the ground, with their particular political “imagi­naries and subjectivities” that contest and challenge oppressive practices and relations, generating new visions of human rights (Madhok, 2022: 16). When considering the consistency in the dominant positioning of contem­porary advocacy within the spiral model, it is however almost unsurprising that scholars continue to fail to adequately account for the diverse ways in which local contexts shape the role of TANs in human rights activism, the convergence and disintegration of different actors within networks, and the movement of actors and ideas within them (Hertel, 2016; Goodhart, 2023). 11 Keck and Sikkink (1998: 2, 7) define TANs as “actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” and campaigns as compositions of “members of a diffused principled network” that develop “visible ties” and “mutually recognized roles” and “consciously seek to develop a ‘common frame of meaning’”. Moving forward: paradigm of affectedness and contestations of international human rights norms Despite a considerable portion of human rights scholarship in IR con­tinuing to focus on the international human rights regime, the diffusion of global human rights norms and providing new empirical insights concern­ing the dynamics of global human rights NGOs (Dancy and Sikkink, 2017; Sikkink, 2017; Brysk, 2018), a new branch of IR scholarship has emerged. Known for its critical constructivist approach (Wiener and Puetter, 2009; Wunderlich, 2013; Lantis and Wunderlich, 2022), this branch aims to address the limitations of previous norm scholarship and offer an alterna­tive approach. Equipped with improved tools, these scholars delve into the multidirectional and interactive processes of norm change, emphasising the contingent, ambiguous and indeterminate nature of norms. Their research programme sheds light on the evolving landscape of international human rights norms, challenging traditional perspectives and opening new ave­nues for understanding normative dynamics in IR. By posing inquiries regarding the agency of a broader array of actors, their relationships and capacities (Wunderlich, 2013), scholars have pro­gressed from the constrained view of actors presented in early constructiv­ist norm research to examining “normative contestations”. Scholars attuned to contestations have become interested in the (de)stabilising effects of ostensibly static norms and their potential for normative change (Lantis and Wunderlich, 2022: 4). As a result, they scrutinise challenges to the diffusion, localisation, contestation and even erosion of norms (Acharya, 2004; Wiener, 2007, 2009; Panke and Petersohn, 2012; Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, 2013, 2019), underscore their fragility, and the diverse forms of resistance linked to their legitimacy and applicability (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, 2013). Scholars studying normative contestations exhibit the distinct trait of more thoughtfully conceptualising the relationships between agents and structures while designing their conceptual and empirical frame­works (Acharya, 2011; Wunderlich et al., 2013; Wiener, 2014; Müller and Wunderlich, 2018). They recognise that contestations and resistance can serve as sources of (normative) agency for governed actors (Zimmermann et al., 2020). Still, it is equally important to note that they also emphasise that their conceptualisation of contestation does not inherently represent a critique or rejection of norms, but instead aims to foster mindfulness about engaging with the content of international treaties and regulations (Holzscheiter, 2018: 648). The scholarship on normative contestation, with its focus on the translation and enactment of norms into discursive and social practices, thus offers potential for revealing the agents and actions involved in realising and localising human rights standards. First, this is due to the fact that critical constructivism acknowledges the “‘high flexibility’ of international norms”, and therefore enables scholars to better capture the normative insecurities of actors and the situations in which different international norms are perceived as conflicting, contradictory or difficult to reconcile. Second, critical constructivism also stresses the importance of observing their “contemporary meaning and productive effect” in global discourses, policies and practices. By examining how norms are utilised in discursive interactions and studying how actors frame specific issues based on normative expectations, scholars can hence better determine whether the meaning of the norm is shared or contested among actors with different identities (Holzscheiter, 2018: 648). Interestingly, simultaneous to the growth of critical constructivist schol­arship in IR we were able to observe the rise of another human rights non-state actor, which was actually caused by the growing doubts of scholars regarding the effectiveness of the public interest paradigm that NGOs implement. Namely, it was becoming increasingly clear after the turn of the century that the public interest paradigm limits the representation of public interests in decision-making (Nanz and Dingwerth, 2016), which prompted discussions on the need for more democratic forms of international partici­pation (Falk and Strauss, 2000, 2001). Unsurprisingly, the normative contes­tation scholars enhanced human rights research in IR, particularly on this intersection with the literature concerned with those social groups affected by international policies. The concept of affectedness in IR, however, must be highlighted here for two reasons. First, due to its importance in allowing individuals affected by international regulations to voice their concerns and lodge complaints with international organisations (Jokubauskaite, 2020). Second, because this approach is based on the recognition and codifica­tion of individuals’ rights to meaningful political participation in the inter­national arena (Peters, 2009, 2021; Maisley, 2017).12 Taken together, the two factors help clarify the rising importance of the concept of affectedness in IR, and why the affectedness paradigm is starting to replace the public inter­est paradigm as the central foundation for including civil society organisa­tions in intergovernmental decision-making processes (Sändig et al., 2020). This scholarly overlap, which focuses on the positioning of the indi­viduals and groups affected by international regulations, therefore took centre stage in the analysis of norm contestation, where it calls for schol­ars to pay more attention to the question of agency in international human rights politics, especially for social groups (Holzscheiter, 2018: 650). This 12 Although UN institutions and agencies have already begun introducing formal rules that con­nect civil society participation to affectedness, case studies and research on this trend remain mostly isolated (Von Bernstorff, 2007; Abbott and Gartner, 2012; Tramontana, 2012; Fraundorfer, 2015; Vandenbogaerde, 2017; Sändig et al., 2020). is an outcome of the fact that in the past 30 years a salient criticism of IR theory has been its tendency to overlook and ignore instances of corporeal and epistemic violence, particularly concerning marginalised social groups such as women, postcolonial actors and those disempowered by neoliberal globalisation (Dingli, 2015; Haglund, 2023). Scholars have consequently become more responsive to this critique, leading human rights scholarship to adopt a more nuanced understanding of agency as both tangible and contested. In response, today normative contestation and translation schol­arships highlight the significant overlap in examining the participation and human rights practices of non-state actors within international human rights organisations and institutions, and in the broader context of global gover­nance and IR (Holzscheiter, 2018, 2020; Braun et al., 2019; Hofferberth, 2019; Zimmermann et al., 2020; Hofferberth et al., 2022). With these discussions recognising and emphasising these practices as contentious and shaped by relations, the key contribution of this scholarship lies in providing insights regarding how non-state collective actors, such as groups of affected indi­viduals, challenge international human rights norms by pushing the bound­aries and recontextualising them. This process, in turn, brings normative inconsistencies and ambivalences to the surface, leveraging norm conflicts that are present within international human rights treaties (Holzscheiter, 2018). However, even though the human rights contestation scholarship has considerably helped to advance our understanding of the role and effects of human rights norms in IR, it still faces many limitations (Niemann and Schillinger, 2016; Wolff and Zimmermann, 2016; Dunford, 2017; De Almagro, 2018; Blouin-Genest, 2019; Georgi, 2019; Linsenmaier et al., 2021). It falls short in establishing a clear relationship between human rights and the transformative potential of human rights practices for non-state actors by privileging “normative orders that reshape rejection into /…/ status quos” and neglecting “the violent tension that characterizes the relation between the abstract standards and norms of global civil society, and the multiplici­ties of difference that trouble its narrative” (Chua, 2017: 89; Epstein, 2017). This aspect remains under-theorised given the intense focus on normative contestation practices directly related to the global governance of human rights or codified globalised human rights norms. As a result, the concep­tualisation and self-agentification of non-state actors also take a secondary role (Hofferberth and Lambach, 2022), becoming surrounded by ambigu­ity, despite critical constructivist scholars’ general intention to promote an approach that increases the visibility of human rights practice by highlight­ing the actors that are not states. Discussion and conclusion: identifying the IR (human rights) research agenda Today, scholarship on human rights constitutes a broad interdiscipli­nary field of inquiry that began as a branch of international law focused on monitoring the development of intergovernmental agreements to address cross-border abuses (Brysk, 2020). However, within the field of IR, the inclu­sion of human rights in scholarly discussions was triggered by the grow­ing importance of human rights in foreign policy, global governance and social movements. This expansion led to a broader scope of research in IR, one encompassing topics like political violence, democratisation and the involvement of new non-state actors such as human rights NGOs (Brysk, 2020; Sikkink, 2022). The rapid recognition of the relevance of social groups and movements for transnational human rights advocacy by IR scholars of human rights (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; David, 2007; Appiah, 2011; Schmitz and Sikkink, 2013; Davies, 2014) has nevertheless brought unintended nega­tive consequences for IR scholarship. Constructivist scholarly accounts of human rights actions by non-state collective actors participating in inter­national politics often rely on conceptual approaches that are inadequate for capturing the complex agendas, dynamics of exclusion and inclusion that define their presence in international relations and for best showing their agency. These conceptual shortcomings were caused by the domi­nance of legal studies in the development of human rights research in IR, along with the state-centric nature of IR as a relatively new discipline, and led to the methodological and implicit normative implications embedded in the conceptual frameworks of both generations of constructivist schol­arship on international human rights norms. Scholars were thereby influ­enced to mostly examine the normative ambiguities related to international law and human rights regulations and binding documents while neglecting those ambiguities related to non-state collectives actively engaging in inter­national human rights practices, which leads to development of biases and homogenising tendencies (Haglund, 2023: 49). IR human rights scholarship accordingly seemed to have missed an opportunity to advance its insights when sociology, anthropology and his­tory entered the human rights discussion at the start of the 21st century. The growing globalisation at the time motivated scholars to join in the conver­sation and bring a critical perspective with them, shedding light on global, collective and interdependent struggles, abuses and power relations rele­vant to human rights (Dudai, 2019; Brysk, 2020). Yet, the lack of interest in an interdisciplinary conversation led to the creation of a parallel body of work (Wilson and Mitchell, 2003; Morris, 2006; Hunt, 2007; Goodale, 2009; Moyn, 2010; Madsen and Verschraegen, 2013), defined by a different view of the ontological and epistemological grounding of rights (Goodhart, 2020: 40) while maintaining disciplinary boundaries (Banai and Chase, 2020: 46). Especially within IR scholarship, which is intensely focused on examining the spread, diffusion or contestations of human rights norms, there is a strong dependence on more traditional lenses that prefer global or macro perspectives when it comes to analysing human rights (Dudai, 2019). This means it is not surprising that critical insights (Kennedy, 2002, 2005; Moyn, 2010, 2018; Hopgood, 2013, 2017) challenging the usefulness of human rights or viewing it as part of a hegemonic discourse intertwined with power deployments have increasingly gained popularity. Still, within much of the IR scholarship it seems as if little ground has actually been gained (Acharya, 2010; Chase, 2012); and scholars seem to be stuck singing the same tune of defending the normative foundations, legitimacy and effec­tiveness of human rights (e.g., Sikkink, 2017; Brysk, 2018). They nonetheless simultaneously lack conceptual tools capable of capturing the dynamic and transformative potential of the practice and politics of human rights, as evi­dent even in examinations of normative contestations that chiefly focus on the impact of practice on shaping the content of international human rights, thus providing a narrative centred on the reshaping of international human rights norms. The key takeaway from this article, in which the state of knowledge of major conceptual developments in IR human rights research and the limits of non-state actors is decomposed and mapped, is to suggest that there is a pressing need to more closely engage with a sociological perspective on human rights (Hynes et al., 2012, 2016). Scholarly attention to the lived expe­riences of those claiming human rights and their real-world interactions (Dudai, 2019) is essential. In this inquiry, it is contended that “due attention must be paid to the social actors involved in the creation of rights if we are to fully understand rights regimes” (Short, 2009: 96; Dudai, 2023) alongside prioritising rights and regulations. Recognising a broader range of actors that encounter, resist, strategically employ and engage with human rights theories and practices in their various activities (Merry, 2006) aligns with the practice turn observed in wider IR scholarship. 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Metaphors can be researched as specific political technologies (strategies of power) that influ­ence/create regimes of truth. Keywords: political metaphors, political theory, linguis­tic theory, political discourse, power, knowledge Introduction In Poetics, Aristotle points to the usefulness of a metaphor by emphasis­ing its creative potential and character. Contrary to Aristotle, by employing rigorous grammatical analysis classical linguists reduce metaphor to a mere figure of speech, an ornament of language, with no added functionalities. Later, cognitive linguists and proponents of hermeneutics ‘rediscovered’ the functionalities of the metaphor that stretch beyond language. Contemporary approaches to metaphor, e.g., Georg Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s conceptual metaphor, Paul Ricoeurs’ hermeneutics of metaphor, Andrew Ortony’s or Raymond W. Gibbs’ interest in metaphor within cognitive science, con­sider it as a much more useful ‘tool’ that yields knowledge about the world beyond words, while revealing social and political schemata that are not immediately clear. Nonetheless, research on metaphor largely remains con­fined to the linguistic and cognitive theoretical approaches. The aim of this article is to move beyond the well-established theoreti­cal and methodological approaches and position metaphor as ‘political’, * Jernej Pikalo, PhD, Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia; Petra Podobnikar, MA, Teaching Assistant, Faculty of Public Administration, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. DOI: 10.51936/tip.60.4.814 thereby opening it up in terms of its functionality. By constructing a politi­cal metaphor anew, we seek to establish a theoretical and methodological alternative to the existing approaches and widen the possible scope of meta­phor for analysing socio-political realities. The dominant linguistic and cog­nitive methodological framing of metaphor, where metaphor is understood as part of language formation, as a tool of language and communication, will be re-considered in line with (post)Marxist and (post)structuralist meth­odology. Further, the re-examination of different theories of metaphors – classical and contemporary – will enable us to open the field of the meta-metaphorical and grasp social and political phenomena differently. We shall argue that the conception of ‘political metaphor’ based upon Foucauldian power relations goes beyond the word-games or textual analyses offered by hermeneutics and, when entering the field of politics, metaphor becomes a political technology. In this sense, metaphor in the interplay of diverse dis­courses sheds light on specific socio-political relationships. We argue that linguistic, cognitive and hermeneutical traditions lack the power to elaborate the ‘real’ potential/effect of a metaphor. We try to demonstrate that metaphor is more than just a linguistic structure and is more an event, thus a discursive practice. Drawing from the Foucauldian methodological position and its theoretical concepts, we try to ‘reveal’ the metaphor’s material effect, which is broader than word-based or thought-based metaphor theories. Within this framework, we attempt to formulate a concept of metaphor as a political technology, the point where we basically ‘ground’ our notion of metaphor as a ‘circular relationship’ of power and truth – as a discursive construction that indicates a certain socio-political reality or ‘determines’ what is to be tru(th)e. The (post)Marxist account of language and Foucauldian conceptualisation of power will act as the start­ing point to position metaphor as a political technology. Methodological framing of metaphor The initial question in our considerations is whether we can think about metaphor beyond its widely accepted and deeply rooted linguistic tradi­tion. Most of the modern theories of metaphor, whether addressing its sig­nificance within social, cultural, cognitive, neural etc. fields, generally just ‘broaden’ the linguistic approach; namely, the semantics and semiotics of language. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of metaphor and Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual metaphor, for example, provide a notion that partially exceeds ‘classical’ definitions. Their understanding of metaphor is based on the the­ory of language that is creative and fluid in nature, yet does not go beyond the linguistic field since it reduces discourse to statements or text (as basic units of language). This implies the existence of a homogeneity of meaning: a ‘hermeneutic circulation’ between text and context or a ‘cognitive func­tion’ revealing the ‘hidden meaning’. A methodological ‘re-framing’ of meta­phor seems to be essential for ‘deconstructing’ the linguistic dominance of the understanding of metaphor. A re-examination of metaphor at the inter­section of three methodological positions – hermeneutical, archaeological, genealogical, and partly also (cognitive) linguistics – calls for metaphor to be established in the sphere of discourse to be able to reveal its ability to (re)produce socio-political effects and hence point to its ability to transform socio-political events. Hermeneutical position, primarily in Gadamer’s “hermeneutic circle”, Ba(k)htin/Voloshinov’s “dialogical hermeneutics”, and Ricoeur’s “hermeneu­tics of suspicion”, provide fertile grounds for breaking with the monological understanding of language. Hermeneutics shows that metaphor has a role/ function in creating the socio-political reality by giving meanings to things and events, that it can represent them in a certain way, and expose certain mean­ings and conceal others. Ricoeur’s (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983) “hermeneu­tic of suspicions” assumes that individuals do not have direct access to the meaning of their own discourses and practices, but, and here Ricoeur remains Heideggerian, an essential continuity exists between everyday intelligibility and certain profound intelligibility, which everyday views tend to mask. The interpretation, as Gadamer (Ricoeur, 1974: 107; Wilson and Hutchinson, 1991; Laverty, 2003) puts it, is the process of discovering/revealing new forms of being; the hermeneutics is “dialectical circulation” between discovering the world and self-understanding. It is the articulation and revealing of profound, deep meanings (McGaughey, 1988: 423). Ricoeur acknowledges that we can really identify/discern the meaning, or it can be disclosed, only with a con­sideration of the specific context of the text. Despite the important conclu­sion drawn by Ricoeur – only in context can meaning be known – language remains, as Gadamer (2004: 389) notes, the “universal medium” for discover­ing knowledge/understanding: only through language can we see Sache, the Thing itself, the truth that one seeks to comprehend. According to Gadamer (Grondin, 2006: 16–19), the interpretation is not subjective, which the author has intended, but the reality of a particular (historical) event. Interpretation does not appear as such and instead disappears into the work itself: […] understanding is always more than merely re-creating someone else’s meaning. Questioning opens up possibilities of meaning, and thus what is meaningful passes into one’s own thinking on the subject […] To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one’s own point of view, but being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were. (Gadamer, 2004: 368–371) Gadamer’s “hermeneutic circle” and Voloshinov’s “dialectical her­meneutic” break with the tradition of the existence of full transparency of language. Language and meaning (truth) become a question of the human experience. Bahtin (Dovic, 2002), with the “dialogical construction of language” whereby dialogue is understood as a minimal unit of actual language, made it very clear that language is not to be understood in an atomised sense, but as a communicative–social interaction (Dolinar, 1996; Bahtin and Voloshinov, 2005). The meaning is therefore the effect of this inter-action. Bahtin’s (2003: 270–272) concept of heteroglosia points to what hermeneutics is lacking and what later became Foucault’s major point of critique of the hermeneutical approach. Heteroglosia implies the multiplic­ity of languages as various forms of social speech and other rhetorical tools. Multiplicity does not refer to the heterogeneity and multiplicity of the mean­ing of words and phrases based on the signifier/signify distinction, but on strategies, as various ways of speaking and rhetorical strategies, which are immanent to every statement (Bahtin, 2002: 270–272). Hermeneutics and cognitive linguistics position metaphor as a “crea­tive thought” (Lakoff and Johnson) or “creative language” (Ricouer). For Ricoeur (1973: 97), the “extraordinary attribute of words is their capability of meaning more than one thing”. He sees the strategic nature of language in its three components: sentence as an actual carrier of the meaning and the whole creativity of language, polysemy as the potential creativity of the word, and metaphor as the third strategy of discourse, the poetic (Ricoeur, 1973). While Ricouer finds that polysemy and deep meanings are immanent to language, its creative character or even excess of meaning – the strategy of language – Foucault sees power relations as a strategy immanent to every discourse. Although Foucault and Ricoeur agree that individual can see what an everyday behaviour means, he can even detect its deepest meanings masked by its everyday behaviour, “what neither he, nor authority direct­ing the hermeneutical exegesis can see, is what exegetical situation is doing to both of them and why” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 124). For Foucault (Mottier in Pikalo and Carver, 2008: 186), the production of meaning is part of the wider discursive practices, institutions and power relations, and the point where hermeneutics and Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy part ways. His formulation of a statement as a non-linguistic entity (as discourse), a statement as an event, positions metaphor in the field of power relations: To describe a group of statements not as the closed, plethoric totality of a meaning, but as an incomplete, fragmented figure; to describe a group of statements not with reference to the interiority of an inten­tion, a thought, or a subject, but in accordance with the dispersion of an exteriority; to describe a group of statements, in order to rediscover not the moment or the trace of their origin, but the specific forms of an accumulation, is certainly not to uncover an interpretation, to discover a foundation, or to free constituent acts; nor is it to decide on a rational­ity, or to embrace a teleology. It is to establish what I am quite willing to call positivity. To analyse a discursive formation therefore is to deal with a group of verbal performances at the level of the statements and of the form of positivity that characterizes them; or, more briefly, it is to define the type of positivity of a discourse. (Foucault, 1972: 125) Foucault’s statement – as a discursive formation – is a historical analysis of the effects of a specific discourse on the socio-political reality. Foucault eliminates what hermeneutics are so eager to find, the profound and pen­etrating (Kuhn and Foucault, 2010a): “in the statement is not to find the unsaid, or what they are hiding. The proper question is the way on which they exist, the conditions of their existence” (Foucault, 1972: 119; Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 11). Foucault clearly shows that the statement should be analysed on the level of production of the effects. A statement seen as an event (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 45; Fubion, 1954/1984: xxii) is Foucault’s disposition, whereby power relations penetrate – produce, reproduce and transform – the whole socio-political reality. The polysemy that hermeneu­tics advocates is about searching for a new meaning. As such, it remains on the level of the sentence or semantic field. Words can produce heterogene­ous meanings and constructions, yet remain on the level of a statement, even as polysemy (Foucault, 1972: 120). The unsaid, hidden or subtle, which inter­est hermeneutics, are also significant for an archaeologist according to what appears on the surface (uttered/said). Still, an archaeologist of discourse also analyses it as an effect of discourse, a “statement is always an event, that neither the language nor the meaning can’t quite exhaust” (Foucault, 1972: 28). Archaeology analyses statements as systems of heterogeneous sets, gov­erned by certain rules (rules of formations). Foucault’s statement is not an isolated atom, but is constituted in the field of power relations – a statement not depending on linguistic elements (words and sentences) that deter­mine its content, but on the constellations of power. That is where a state­ment emerges (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 54–55). Foucault’s fundamental objective is to “determine specific forms of articulation” in archaeological writings qua power, as power relations in genealogy. With the “politics of the scientific statement” as a singular event, Foucault implies that discourse is a “constitution of different elements” – it is a singular event, yet simul­taneously draws on heterogeneous forces; the referential, the subject (the positions he occupies), the field of enunciation where statements enter in the specific relationships, and the repeatable materiality to which the state­ments are subjected (Foucault, 2002: 112; Dolar, 2010: 60). Instead of being something said once and for all – and lost in the past like the result of a battle, a geological catastrophe, or the death of a king – the statement, as it emerges in its materiality, appears with a status, enters various networks and various fields of use, is subjected to trans­ferences or modifications, is integrated into operations and strategies in which its identity is maintained or effaced. Thus the statement circu­lates, is used, disappears, allows or prevents the realization of a desire, serves or resists various interests, participates in challenge and struggle, and becomes a theme of appropriation or rivalry. (Foucault: 1972: 105) Foucault’s statement-event shows the immanence of power. The power as a strategy that penetrates all human practices – his language, cognition, institution, conducts, truth and body, the point where metaphor emerges within the “strategic play of power”, thus as a specific political technology. The hermeneutical assumption of ‘deep’, contextual understanding of discourse implies the existence of a homogeneous discourse and in turn the possibility of determining a homogenous meaning. Cognitive linguists and hermeneutics disregard the broader socio-political context. Metaphor is reduced to the unit of a statement outlining how meaning is constituted in the given communication interaction (Mottier, 2008), that is, how metaphor structures human cognition and perception. The socio-political effects that metaphors produce are not taken into account – reinforcing, reproducing or undermining power (Mottier, 2008). Foucault’s methodological account of the archaeology and genealogy of discourses enables an explication of the strategic notion of metaphor. The concept of event through which Foucault explains the “constitution” and function of discourse, and the one of power, opens up the possibility to think and construct metaphor also out­side of language as a political technology. Metaphor – beyond semiotics towards semantics Contemporary theories of metaphor are chiefly based on the semiotics of language where metaphor is reduced to a figure/trope (of speech). The focus for ‘non-classical’ theorists of metaphor is to move beyond the syn-chronic notion of metaphor, namely, the existence of a fundamental differ­ence between literal and metaphorical language – the proper and the figu­rative. With his interaction theory (1954: 293), Max Black was probably the first to attempt to resolve this deeply rooted classical assumption. Interaction theory of metaphor tries to demonstrate that meaning is produced in certain relations, in an interactional relationship between “the undivided meaning of the statement and the focused meaning of the word”. (Ricoeur, 2003: 98). The metaphorical function is to select, accent, supress or organise the features of the primary subject referring to the statement of the secondary subject. For Black (Ricoeur, 1981: 89; Ortony, 1933: 21–33), metaphor is not a deviant nam­ing, but the “unordinary usage of predicate” (Ricoeur, 1986: VI). However, remaining within the proper–figurative dichotomy, Black proposed that an actual distinction between them is not possible. As a result, using the proper or a more suitable word means the “loss of cognitive content” (Black, 1954: 293; Zashin and Chapman, 1974: Massen, 1995; Miller, 1992), implying that the ‘interaction metaphor’ cannot substitute the literal meaning without the original meaning (cognitive content) being lost. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in Metaphors we live by (1980/2003) subsequently extensively ana­lysed the cognitive function of the metaphor. Cognitive linguists generally assume that metaphor is the way of thinking and understanding the reality. Apart from creating the reality, metaphor is the mental processing of things and events, since reality is irreducibly metaphorical. The metaphorical is an immanent “moment” in every thought (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003). In this sense, language becomes an extremely dynamic concept where the cog­nitive potential of the human mind enables diverse ‘colours’, perceptions and understandings. Lakoff and Johnson ontologically position metaphor within the relation of perception (the question of the nature of human cog­nition) and text (sentence). Language is the mirror-image of the operational and organisational modes of mind: “ontological mapping across domains, that is ontological mapping through source domain, from target domain” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1989/2003: 246; Lakoff, 1993: 278; Walter and Helmig, 2008: 125). Metaphorical meaning appears with the conceptual metaphori­cal mappings ultimately “originating” from the relation (correspondences) in our bodily experience, that is, from the (nature of) the body, interactions in the physical experiences and cultural practices (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980/2003). Accordingly, the aim of ‘conceptual theory’ is to demonstrate that metaphor is essentially a conceptual and not a linguistic entity, it ‘exists’ in thoughts (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980/2003; Lakoff, 1993: 320) and arises from the process of reasoning. Neural theories of language similarly suggest that metaphor emerges in the neurological networks as an “effect” of neural circuits (Feldman, 2003: Xii; Gibbs, 2008). If metaphor is the way of thinking, then metaphorical expressions are inherently related to the conceptual system that is intrinsic (connected) to perception, cultural practices etc. Cognitive theories of metaphor suggest that metaphors influence our perception of socio-political events. While objective reality is mainly contested on the grounds of the power of human cognition, the aspect that neither cognitive linguists nor hermeneutics con­sider is the diversity of human practices and specific discourses (images, systems, authorities etc.) that produce, constitute and transform the entire socio-political »body«. The existence of the literal, proper meaning implies the existence of an objective world where language occurs as uniform, constituted by transpar­ent entities; language as inter-subjectively and trans-subjectively uniform (Pikalo, 2008: 41–54; cf. Pušnik, 2022: 315; cf. Kokol and Pikalo, 2015: 1091). This classical notion of language assumes that the language–mind relation­ship is univocal and transparent, whereby any irrationalities in language are the effects of its deviant usage, possibly occurring as metaphor. We could argue that in Poetics and Rhetoric Aristotle ‘invents’ metaphor as a rhetor­ical figure. By associating metaphor with a noun or a word rather than a discourse, Aristotle set the orientation vis-ŕ-vis poetics and rhetoric for cen­turies (Ricoeur, 1981: 16; Aristoteles, 1959). However, at the same time the Aristotelian definition of metaphor is quite distinct: it has a unique struc­ture (word) but two different functions, rhetorical and poetical – that of trope and that of epiphora. In Ricoeur’s opinion, epiphora – which means transposition – indirectly implies the semantic essence of a discourse. In Rhetoric, Aristotle (2004, 139) suggested the following conceptualisation of metaphor, as epiphora: Liveliness is specially conveyed by metaphor, and by the further power of surprising the hearer; because the hearer expected something differ­ent, his acquisition of the new idea impresses him all the more… Well-constructed riddles are attractive for the same reason; a new idea is con­veyed, and there is metaphorical expression. In metaphor, Aristotle ‘fused’ two seemingly distinct elements, the stra­tegic one (rhetorical, as techne of speech): “to make things visible/vivid” as they were in action (Aristotle, 2004), and as meaning, as making sense of it (the proper meaning of the word). In this context, in the strategic play of discourse Aristotle introduces the logical power of analogy and power of comparison – the power of making things visible, the power of speaking of the inanimate (Ricoeur, 1981: 43). Ricoeur bases his theory of metaphor as a metaphorical reference on Aristotelian poetics, where metaphor is defined as mimemis, Frege’s divi­sion between meaning and reference, and Benvestine’s ‘extension’ of refer­ence to extra-linguistic reality – indicating the shift from semiotics to seman­tics. While semiotics applies to the inner relations of language – relations between signs, semantics alludes to the relation between sign and signifi­cation, namely, between language and the world (Benvestine, 1988: 36). Hermeneutics has two important distinctions when defining a discourse. Saussurean semantics, which excludes the denotative function of language, analyses the signification, the thing itself – the relationship between the “thing” and reality (Ricoeur, 1981: 125; Benvestine, 1988: 60; Howarth, 2000: 11) and that of the semantics of the word, when meaning becomes appar­ent, realised or transformed only within the mediation of the whole state­ment/sentence, which relates to the contextualisation of the word within the statement. Indicating the important shift from the figure-word based theory to the sentence-based theory (semantics), hermeneutics formulates metaphor as “work in miniature” since both text and metaphor, world and word fall under the one and same category, that of discourse (Ricoeur, 1974: 97; 1981, 217–256). Where the word and sentence are two poles of a single semantic entity, together alone they form a meaning and reference. In the ‘position’ of the reference (extra-linguistic reality or the object), metaphors hold the power to transform reality. Discourse alludes to the extra-linguistic reality, i.e., to its referent, “…the shift of meaning which needs the contribu­tion of the whole text, effects on words…” (Ricoeur, 1974: 96). Ricoeur uses the Aristotelian notion of tragedy to further elaborate the hermeneutical understanding of metaphor – the undividable relationship between muthos (Aristotelian conception of the story, narration) and lexis (the reference) where the meaning of metaphor is only possible within muthos, that is, within the discourse as a whole. In the Ricoeurian defini­tion, the ‘power’ of metaphor is lexis, namely the reference, but a meta­phorical sense is solely possible in the immanent relation to the whole text (Aristotelian muthos) (Ricoeur, 1973; 1981: 259–280). Understanding of the work as a whole provides the ‘key’ to the metaphor (Ricoeur, 1973: 107), the interpretation – hermeneutical circle – unveils the new form of being, i.e., the metaphor. Ricoeur’s positioning of metaphor in the sphere of refer­ences to co-construct the world and Aristotle’s notion of mimesis (Greek, to unveil the world) establishes the strategic ‘nature’ of metaphor – fabrication, construction and creation (Ricoeur, 1973: 109). Ricoeur’s metaphor exists at the intersection of the story (discourse), its distinctive parts and as diction (reference), which directs and creates it at the same time. The (post)Marxist and (post)structural implications for metaphor Poststructuralist and (post)Marxist theory and ontology allow for an inno­vative conceptualisation of metaphor that moves away from the tradition of the linguistic, conceptual and hermeneutic theory of metaphor. Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy of power and discourse show the possibility of re-inventing metaphor within discourse theory. Foucault’s notion of state­ment, as a non-linguistic entity, as an assemblage/set of articulations and actualisations, that is, specific forms which culminate in discourse, posi­tion metaphor in the field of ‘power relations’. Discussing metaphor as an element of Foucault’s discourse, produced within the immanence of the power-knowledge structure, is an innovative approach that allows us to differently evaluate the role and power of metaphor within the political. To do so, Jakobson and De Saussure’s structural theory of language must be taken into account. This is also a point of departure from hermeneutics (and cognitive linguist) discourse, and of entry to the (post)Marxist and (post) structuralist ‘definition’ of language/discourse where metaphor ‘becomes’ a practice of language and is hence epistemologically effective. De Saussure’s structural linguistic theory develops the “relational theory of language”. Language is a ‘system of differences’ where meaning and iden­tity are produced within the (relational) relationship of signifier and signi­fied. De Saussure breaks with the transparency of language in relation to the object, which lies at the heart of hermeneutics. The structure, the sym­bolic order, as a ‘empty field’ of variation of relations (Lacan and Deleuze, 2004), or the Foucauldian (2010a) ‘radical event’ – the play of differences – is what determines the sense, meaning, reality and truth (cf. Foucault, 1994: 217) Language is arbitrary. All that exists is only its function and conven­tion. De Saussure (in Howarth, 2000: 19; de Saussure, 1977: 81) draws on the notion of language, where there is no natural relationship between the signifier and signified: “in language there are just differences…the system of language is a set of differences … and in a particular set of differences the system of values emerges” (de Saussure, 1974: 81). The relational and dif­ferential concept of language is an essential element of structuralism: every structure represents two aspects, a system of differential relations in which the symbolic elements are mutually determined and the system of singu­larity that corresponds to these relations and delineates the space of struc­ture (Deleuze, 2004). If we simplify the Deleuzian notion and use Foucault’s conception of discourse, the symbolic order or the structure as a relational relationship determines the position of the subject (Foucault, 2010a; 2003). Meaning (sense) arises from the combination of the elements that in them­selves hold no meaning. Ducrot (1988; Šumic-Riha, 1988: 51) made a similar assumption: in discourse, there are rules and forces which are not outside the discourse (‘the material reality’), but are immanent to every discourse, they are not decisive for his discourse, but constitute the discursive situation itself in which discourse proceeds from the relationship with the speaker. From the de Saussurean structural principle of language as autonomous order, Ducrot develops the theory of discourse as a historical event. The statement is an event; “the realisation of the statement is the historic event, that is the emergence of a statement”, and Ducrot (1988: 178) regards that emergence as an “enunciation”, neither as an act nor as someone’s posses­sion, but the fact of the emergence of the statement. Ducrot’s (1988: 241) polyphonic theory of discourse refutes the conception where subject is the ultimate author, the producer of the statement, and the source of meaning. The statement has a ‘gap’ – the meaning of the statement is never identical to what the speaker ought/intended to say (Ducrot, 1988: 260). The state­ment is never identical to enunciation. “Communication thought” is never the same as the thought of the speaking subject – what was said/uttered is never identical to the ‘thing’ that the speaking subject intended (Ducrot, 1988: 260). The meaning of a statement is constituted within the culmination of different elements of discourse, where the simplest sentence is produced through dialogue, and not with the authority of a subject. The ‘performative’ statement influences reality. In a similar manner, Voloshinov and Bahtin (2005) underlined the historical aspect of discourse production, somehow trivial to Saussure’s hegemony of the sign, as Ricoeur notes. Voloshin’s ‘ideo­logical turn’ in language and Bahtin’s dialogical nature of language enabled language to be ‘bound’ to reality, to think language as neither an instrument nor a grammatical element, but in its effective function, as an articulation of reality. Voloshinov understands sign in its ‘ideological charge’, the moment that allows language to be connected to the material reality of human psy­chological and social practices. Although language is not a simple reflection of reality as objectivists would claim, it is a grasping of reality through lan­guage, which as practical consciousness pervades all social ‘being’; language is an articulation of active and changing experiences in the world (Williams, 2005: 136). Consequently, meaning is an inevitable social act, depending on social relationships (Williams, 2005: 136). Bahtinian language is immanently ideological and material. Opposing de Saussure’s ‘hegemony’ of structure/ form, Bahtin (2005, 17) thinks of language as a practice: language-speaking is not an abstract system of linguistic forms, nor an isolated monological statement, not even a psychophysiological act of its realisation. Language is a social event of speaking inter-action that is realised within the statement and statements. Speech as a ‘living dialogue’ (Bahtin and Vološinov, 2005: 61) is an essential reality of language. Structure, the symbolic order in Lacanian and Deleuzean’s “language”, is the moment where the imaginary is eliminated from the language. The structure determines the meaning. It is determined in the series of differ­ences, in the relations between the signifier and signified (not in the rela­tion to the object), the precise relation that determines the identity, the very truth. Meaning/sense arises from the combination of elements that are shifted through the structure and which by themselves have no meaning. Jakobson’s structuralist notion of language depicts specific implications of metaphor (and metonymy). Metaphor and metonymy are not perceived as figures of imagination, but fundamental structural ‘components’ – indi­cating movement from one series to another and within the same series (Deleuze, 2004). In Laclau’s view, Jakobson provides the ground for a stra­tegic notion of discourse. Ricoeur also indicates that with the broadening of the de Saussurean model of language Jakobson allows metaphor to enter into discourse. Jakobson’s theory of two types of aphasic disturbances defines the constitution and workings of discourse. The mutual implica­tion of ‘metaphoric chain’ and ‘metonymic mesh’ form a specific discourse where Laclau (2009) sees the totalisation effects on discourse. The function­ing of language through two different operations, combination and contex­tualisation, by which the sign obtains its location and selection and substitu­tion, by which the sign can be replaced, indicates the mutual implication of metaphor and metonymy (Jakobson, 1989/1996: 89). This brings rhetorical categories to their specific locations (Laclau, 2009: 6), whereby metaphor and metonymy are not just figures among others, but as Laclau (2009: 6) points out, the two fundamental matrices around which all other figures and tropes should be ordered. Jakobson ‘models’ a movement of discourse on the axis of similarity and association, the aphasia on both axes results in the concentration on either axis (Jakobson, 1989/1996: 89). Fixation of the meaning for Jakobson always depends on the wider sets of cultural prac­tices (specific individual styles, practices and habits). Laclau’s discourse is immanently constituted as a ‘mixture’ of metaphor-metonymy circulation, intersected by rhetoric as a dimension of significa­tion that has no limits in its field of operation (Laclau, 2009). Accordingly, Laclau indicates that discourse is every practice of signification connected to social life. As there is no distinction between the signification and activ­ity (Laclau and Muffe, 1985; Laclau, 2009), if words, actions and effects are interdependent networks, then the de Saussurean categories signifier/signi­fied, paradigmatic/syntagmatic aspect quit being linguistic categories as the synchronic method anticipates. In Laclau’s (2009) opinion, if we theorise them appropriately, these categories could define relations at work in the field of common ontology; otherwise, rhetoric could not be ontologically constitutive. If we think of any identity or truth as a construction, then we are implying shifts/crossing from metaphor to metonymy: from the start­ing point of association (metonymic relation) to its consolidation in analogy (metaphoric relation) (Laclau, 2009). This is how the construction of a spe­cific identity or hegemonic discourse is created. We have tried to show that Ducrot, Voloshinov and Bahtin provide the grounds for thinking about metaphor as part of the wider discursive prac­tices. This connects with Foucault’s conceptualisation of metaphor within power strategies. Bahtin and Voloshinov’s notion of language as being dia­logically “produced” and their “disclosure” of a sign in its immanent material­ity is valuable. Bahtin with heteroglosia (opposite to monological language) introduces the idea that language is a strategy, implying that diverse strate­gies are displayed in language. Thus, heterogeneous meanings, which are reflected in language similar to Ricoeur’s notion of the inherent creativity of language, demonstrate that language reveals/indicates social speech/ language, which shows the ideological and material ‘nature’ of a sign. In this sense, sign is not a linguistic element, but a social event of speech interactions that is realised in the statement. Language in this diachronic perspective is a social practice. With Bahtinian’s “dialogical language” and Voloshinov’s “ideological sign”, metaphor ‘clashes’ with the very materiality. In the last part of this article, we show that neither Bahtin nor Foucault con­sider structure to be perfectly homogenous and uniform. In the Foucauldian sense, power (relations) penetrate the entire socio-political body. In the Bahtinian and Voloshinov senses, “social sign” is produced within (and a product of) the “arena of class struggles”. Discourses are material, they emerge in different relations, and in the language interaction: language is a social event of language interactions, realised with statement(s) (Bahtin, 2005: 61). Ducrot similarly considers a statement as an historic event, where precisely the appearance of this statement is an enunciation (Ducrot, 1988: 178). Consequently, the meaning of a statement is apparent within the con­frontation and crossing of different voices (Ducrot’s polyphonic theory). It is constituted within the culmination of various discourses. If we acknowledge Voloshinov’s “ideological sign”, or go along with Bahtin’s heteroglossia, or if we argue with Foucault and Ducrot’s conception of discourse: a statement is an event where language as everything uttered/enunciated (Ducrot) and said (Foucault) induces/effects and enables discourses. Metaphor can thus depart from the linguistic tradition and definitions. Ducrot, Voloshinov and Bahtin provide the basis for a strategic notion of metaphor. In Laclau’s explanation of the totalisation of discourse, strategic metaphoric-metonymic movements, shifts and intersections, constitute hegemonic discourse or (temporarily) determine particular political identity. For Laclau, discourse or hegemonic identity ‘resides’ at the intersection/crossroads of metaphor and metonymy as strategic movements or continuous antagonisms that form discourses on one or the other side of ‘the end’. Language as a system of differences, where ‘antagonism’ is failure of difference, can exists only in its interruptions – that is as metaphor (Laclau, 1985). Metaphor as a political technology In Foucault’s formulation of discourse, statement as an event shows two aspects of discourse: contingency and historical development in language. Foucault asserts that the historicity of the statement must be restored and so it is developed in the relations of power rather than in the relations of meaning (Foucault, 2008: 116). A statement as a series of what is actually said, written or uttered, on its surface (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 45) is Foucault’s “order of discourse” (2008: 26) – that is, the nature of the event and nullification of the signifier1. Although Foucault never addressed the function of metaphor within discourse, we can draw certain methodologi­cal/theoretical conclusions from his work: metaphor should be analysed on the level of event, which contradicts/negates the assumption of the origin; metaphor should be analysed as a series of enunciations in contrast to the metaphor as a unit of the statement; regularities should be traced in contrast to the original/identity or the original meaning; identification of the con­ditions for the possibility of emergence in contrast with identification of the real meaning. Discourse in Foucault’s (2008: 116) sense does not refer to the unsaid or not meant, but to discontinuity, involving all practices that intersect or fuse, ignore or exclude; it does not dwell on the interplay of meanings of a certain pre-discursiveness. Discourse is a practice and within this practice discursive events acquire the principle of their regularity – i.e., the discourse does not imply truth, meaning or sense, but on the level of discourse itself its conditions of existence can be detected. In this vein, a metaphor is neither a figure, a tool nor a word whose essence is to produce diverse and multiple meanings. Being intrinsic to discourse, metaphor is the culmination of different discursive practices and articulations. It must be examined as a singular event that neither language nor meaning can exhaust (cf. Foucault, 2002: 130). In Foucault’s event, there is immanent contingency in its singularity. This means that reasoning about metaphor should be out­side the ‘meaning–perception’ (trans)formative role and instead take met­aphor as an epistemological determinant that produces (communicates) knowledge of the world and to the world. In line with Foucault’s reasoning, metaphor seems to be immanent to every discourse. As such, it becomes epistemologically productive/effec­tive. Similarly as with knowledge, power is always present: Power must […] be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as something that functions only when it is part of a chain. It is never local­ized here or there, it is never in the hands of some, and it is never appro­priated in the way that wealth or a commodity can be appropriated. Power functions. Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise this power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are always its relays. In other words, power passes through individuals. It is not applied to them. (Foucault, 2003a: 29) Foucault’s subject is to be analysed as a complex discursive function. The proper question is not who speaks, but the real question we should pose is to identify the modes of discourse, that is, the different modalities of enunciation: “[…] discourse is not majestically unfolding manifestation of thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary a totality in which dispersion of a subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined” (Foucault, 1972: 55). Foucault’s “analytics of power” stresses that every discourse is a consti­tution/product of power relations (and produces them). Discourses in this sense are “transparent” (Kelly, 2009) and the question is no longer what the unsaid or the real meaning is, but for whom it serves (Foucault, 2008: 119; Kelly, 2009). Discourse as a set of discursive practices outlines the “nature of metaphor and metaphorical” – in every statement there are circulations of power and its effects (Foucault, 2008: 114–115). As we observed with Laclau’s (2009: 75) assertion that metaphoric-metonymic movement is what is immanent to discourse, i.e., the inherent strategic play that temporarily determines the ‘hegemonic discourse’ (sublime metaphorical fixation) and at the same time acknowledges its contingency (moderate metonymic asso­ciation), Foucault’s notion of power – present in any relationship and rela­tion (Kelly, 2009; Foucault, 2010b), it is relational and dispersed, intentional and non-subjective (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 187; Foucault, 2010b) – pro­vides the grounds for taking the strategies of metaphorical and metaphor even further. It is not about the production of additional/surplus meanings that ought to be analysed, but that procedures, techniques and technologies are the new ways of examining metaphor. In turn, the real question is what kind of relations is a metaphor producing in particular socio-political con­texts, how it inscribes itself into the socio-political body. Metaphor should be examined within the “meshes of power” or “economies of power” (cf. Foucault, 2008: 120). Metaphor should be examined as a specific strategy of power: as a game of strategies that are mobile, transformative and reversible, including relationships between the people and relationships that they have with themselves (Foucault, 2010b: 252; Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 204). Foucault’s economies of power or meshes of power demonstrate the per­vasiveness of power that spreads throughout the whole socio-political body, depicting the failure of any objectivity, or any possibility of truth. Applying this to different theories of metaphor that rely on the assumption that some kind of ‘objective law’ exists, implying that certainty, true meaning, could be known or discovered by a ‘deep’ investigation (interpretation), despite refuting literal meaning as objective truth. What we see with Foucault is that every meaning is caught in the meshes of power, every truth is a product of specific ‘economies of power’, every language practice is where power effects become visible, and every metaphor, despite being ‘different’, is an object of the same power/knowledge dispositive. A metaphor is about telling the truth in every single moment. Not an ‘excess’ of meaning, but as something that we are still understanding as met­aphor, even though it is part of the same strategies of truth: What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthro­pomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten are illusions … met­aphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins. (Nietzsche, 2019: 6–7) Fearless speech, as Foucault would describe truth telling, is the terrain where “metaphorical interplay” reveals itself in strategies of power. Truth constantly appears in varying forms, conceals itself with different masks, seems elusive, yet at other times is apparent, visible and liberating. However, in the moment we wish to seize it, in a moment of our awareness, to discover a real, truthful meaning, when we make sense of our being, as we have been embodying it, the precise moment when we think that we are expressing it, the truth that we are so eager to grasp disappears in intermission, loses itself in the ashes of discourses, in the said, but not really meant. In relation to parrhesia, metaphor uncovers its ‘true nature’ – as neither a tool, a fig­ure nor the interplay of words and thoughts, but as a political technology that circulates around the truth, around the true meaning, consistently shifts its game (of meanings), accumulates multiple discourses, displaces and so clearly divides the subject in his belief that what he is is truly him, and what he speaks is the truth (Foucault, 2009). Metaphor exposes the truth, the ‘true’ meaning or nature of every iden­tity in immanent contingency, raptures and fluidity, revealing metaphorical circulation in every ‘word’ we say, in every view we have, in every activ­ity we participate in. The meshes in truth, its immanent ruptures, are not what determines its character. The truth is the ‘economy’ of discourses that repeatedly (re)constitute it, the ‘politics’ which establishes and destroys it. In these ruptures and meshes, metaphor emerges as the Aristotelian techne or a Foucauldian technology of procedures and techniques. Metaphorical play constitutes every discourse, but at the moment of our certainty dis­solves it in an instance. To speak the truth in metaphors appears to be the work of an autonomous individual. However, any use of metaphors is not about ‘escap­ing’ power, but restoring it, with new ‘rules’ and new ‘laws’ that determine the place of the emergence of truth. Metaphor is to be understood as a ‘stra­tegic instance’, which continually circuits in the discursive field, and within the struggle of diverse discourses determines the rules of the un-true. In this sense, metaphor is a specific political technology, a strategy of power, that decides about the regimes of truth. Metaphor, as a technology, is a struggle over the status of the truth. Conclusion In this article, we wanted to go beyond the established methodological and theoretical visions of metaphor and open it up in terms of new function­alities. We sought to widen the possible scope of metaphor for analysing socio-political realities. We showed how metaphor as a strategy gives insight into how power relations determine a particular hegemonic discourse. The contemporary linguistic theories, where we mostly analysed the theories of metaphor put forward by Ricoeur, Lakoff and Johnson, rightly assumes that metaphor can be understood only within the socio-cultural context, but simultaneously these theories assert that the creative-polysemic nature of language and mind is what ontologically produces metaphorical meaning. The ‘power’ of metaphor manifests itself in generating multiple meanings and in the sense of these approaches we process reality, give meaning to events, discover, and perceive the world in a given way. It is seen as a sub­jective endeavour whereby while interacting humans produce meanings as interpretations and creations of reality. Contrary to the mentioned theories, with Foucault we showed that mean­ings are always already present and hence subjectively-creative ontological (re)creations of ‘classical’ theories of metaphor miss the realities of power/ truth relations. 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UDK 341.75:395.83(497.4) Simona KUKOVIC, Jelena JOKSIMOVIC* CEREMONIAL GIFTS – NICE GESTURE OR POTENTIAL RISK? GIFT REPORTING DISCREPANCIES IN SLOVENIA** Abstract. Integrity and transparency are crucial ele­ments of modern democratic countries, and trust in politico-administrative institutions must be pursued and maintained at every turn, including when it comes to reporting ceremonial gifts. Despite their (often) problem­atic connotations, ceremonial gifts are a major element of building strong relationships, from the highest posi­tions in politics and diplomacy to the closest public serv­ants. This article examines data concerning reported gifts in the Republic of Slovenia. Through in-depth statistical analysis, the authors established anomalies in the report­ing of ceremonial gifts, in particular flawed descriptions of gifts and problematic assessment of their monetary 833 values, which in most cases is left to the layperson. The authors conclude that a problem clearly exists with imple­mentation of the normative framework because only the technical aspect and less the qualitative side is taken into account while reporting ceremonial gifts. Keywords: ceremonial gifts; reporting; anomalies; trans­parency; trust; Slovenia Introduction When discussing ceremonial gifts,1 we cannot go past the most com­monly cited example from Greek mythology, the large wooden horse the Greeks gave to the Trojans. Believing that this gift was the sign of a truce, * Simona Kukovic, PhD, Associate Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, School of Advanced Social Studies, Nova Gorica, Faculty of Information Studies, Novo mesto, Slovenia; Jelena Joksimovic, PhD, Scientific Associate, Rudolfovo – Science and Technology Centre Novo mesto, Slovenia. ** We acknowledge the support of the Slovenian Research Agency for financing this work through projects MR-Joksimovic (53925) and research core funding for the programme Complex Networks (No. P1-0383). The data and the code used for the analysis presented in this section are fully available for reproduc­ibility at our GitHub Repository, url: https://github.com/jelenajoksa/Gift-Reporting-Discrepancies. DOI: 10.51936/tip.60.4.833 1 In the literature, one can also find synonyms such as diplomatic or protocol gifts. the Trojans dragged the horse into the city, without knowing that it was hid­ing Greek soldiers, who then opened the wall gates at night for their army to enter. Troy was deceived and defeated in this way, and ceremonial gifts are still considered to be given and received with caution. The story of the Trojan Horse is explained by Nagy (1981) as a paradigm according to which the giver of the gift has an advantage, and the receiver is in danger. The latter is especially true in the political world as the recipient country runs the risk of becoming beholden to the donor country by accepting the gift (Kustermans, 2021: 105). From this point of view, it is unsurprising that many countries around the world have established and adopted rules for accepting and giving ceremonial gifts. Despite the risk, the presentation of gifts is a constant in diplomatic practice as gifts symbolise welcome, honour and the cultivation of bene­ficial diplomatic relations, and often emphasise the workmanship of local businesses, historical craftsmanship, or local luxury goods and materials (Aubert, 2022). The extent of the gifts often depends on the country where the visit takes place and the customs of the country involved. In the Middle East, for example, countries give lavish gifts on each other during state visits as a sign of their generosity and respect for each other. This is much less common in the West, where the meaning of a gift is more important than its price (Monod de Froideville and Verheul, 2021). In this article, we examine the reporting of ceremonial gifts in the case of the Republic of Slovenia, including all public and state entities. Through in-depth statistical analysis, we investigate the dataset of reported gifts to see if we can detect some discrepancies or anomalies in the reporting by public officials and their family members. We hypothesise that while the report­ing of gifts received is an essential element for ensuring integrity and trust in administrative and political institutions and public officials, mere report­ing is not enough given that the quality of reporting is also important in terms of accuracy and a fair assessment of gifts. In the first part of the article, we focus on the normative framework applying in the Republic of Slovenia regarding the receiving and reporting of ceremonial gifts. Part two of the article contains a comprehensive analysis of data collected in the gift report­ing database managed by the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (hereafter: the CPC). Theoretical and normative framework In a modern democracy, the quality of governance or indicators that measure the quality of regulation, the rule of law, the effectiveness of governance, and the control of corruption are very important (Wiatr, 2018: 7–8). According to administrative theory (Bogason and Toonen, 1998) and corresponding administrative argumentation, the consistency of adminis­trative values is vital for the quality of governance. Administrative values are decisive for ensuring answering the legitimacy of the administration, i.e., for the transformation of its power into authority and its recognition in society. Within the framework of open public administration, two key principles stand out: the principle of openness and the principle of transparency. The principle of the openness of public administration is broader than the prin­ciple of transparency as it aims at direct active communication between the administration and the user (Brezovšek et al., 2014). The openness of public administration is also a condition for citizens’ trust in administrative and political institutions (Hacek and Brezovšek, 2014: 6–7). Gamson (1968: 42) argues that trust in political and administrative institutions is important because it serves as a “creator of collective power”, enabling the government to make decisions and commit resources without resorting to coercion or seeking the explicit consent of citizens for every decision. In modern democracies where citizens are in control, it is trust that gives representatives the leeway to set aside the electorate’s short-term con­cerns while pursuing long-term national interests (Mishler and Rose, 1997: 419; 2001). In the Republic of Slovenia, trust in the central institutions of the democratic political system is quite low; however, Hacek (2019: 436–437) notes that trust has dropped further in the last decade due to the permanent state of political crisis.2 One area where the trust of citizens should not be further eroded is the reporting and recording of ceremonial gifts received by representatives or officials3 of political and administrative institutions.4 The tradition of gift-giv­ing between political leaders and other state officials is a long-standing prac­tice and a strong element of peaceful diplomatic relations. The earliest evi­dence of a diplomatic exchange of this kind is engraved stone vessels from Egypt given to the Hittite neighbours. Later, gifts between European ambas­sadors and the Ottoman Empire, albeit mainly textiles, also included clocks and watches. Gift-giving between European monarchies was also unique in that it involved realpolitik: receiving objects became a way of securing or maintaining an advantageous position with a diplomatic counterpart or 2 A similar trend appears in other Central and Eastern European countries as well (see Agh, 2020: 30–32). 3 Officials include public officials, officials in positions and other public servants, employees working at the Bank of Slovenia, executive officers and members of management, leadership, and supervisory bod­ies in public sector entities. Family members include spouses, children, adopted children, parents, adoptive parents, siblings and persons living in the same household or in a non-marital partnership with the person concerned. The prohibitions and restrictions on accepting gifts also apply to companies in which the state or municipality holds a majority stake or exercises a controlling influence, and which were established on a statutory basis. 4 For more on diplomacy in the Republic of Slovenia, see Udovic (2023). opponent, based on the value of the gift. Another famous gesture was intro­duced by the Chinese government in the 1950s when it began sending pan­das to its communist allies and later to other foreign governments, becom­ing known as panda diplomacy. In Western democracies where the goal of diplomacy is to promote security, prosperity, democracy and economic development, the exchange of gifts may seem an unusual tactic, although this tradition still has a firm place in international relations today (Aubert, 2022). The exchange of gifts, even if made by individuals, is not considered a personal exchange as these individuals represent the state or an institu­tion and the gifts are thus considered to be state or public property.5 The exchange of gifts is not limited to the supranational, national or state levels, but is also seen on other levels of government (e.g., regional and local) and, in the broadest sense, concern all officials in public and government institu­tions. Institutions, ministries, public entities and state companies are there­fore subject to special rules and instructions for accepting gifts (e.g., only gifts up to a certain amount may be given). These rules are about integrity and, in many cases, giving and accepting gifts is prohibited to avoid any kind of preferential treatment or even corruption. In other cases, every gift must be reported and evidenced in a database monitored by the respective state institution or commission. The main element of the Slovenian normative framework that (also) regulates ceremonial gifts is the umbrella Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act (2010/2020),6 Article 30 of which talks about the prohibi­tion and restrictions on accepting gifts in the public sector. In paragraph 2 of Article 30, the law is limited to ceremonial gifts and states that “… a public official or his/her family member may accept a ceremonial gift on behalf of the entity for which (s)he works, which becomes the property of his/her employer regardless of its value. Gifts given by foreign or domestic legal or natural persons at work events are considered ceremonial gifts”. In the third paragraph of Article 30, the law states that an official may accept a gift tra­ditionally or customarily given on specific occasions (cultural, ceremonial, completion of education, training, holidays etc.) or when performing diplo­matic activities, but its value may not exceed the value of EUR 100, regard­less of the form of the gift and the number of givers of the same gift.7 5 In some countries, ceremonial gifts are located in state museums or other suitable places and exhib­ited to the public. 6 The Decree on restrictions and duties of public employees as regards the acceptance of gifts (2003) was in force until 2021. 7 As long as the gift is not a ceremonial gift or a gift presented on certain occasions, the official person is obliged to warn the donor of the prohibition against accepting gifts and to refuse the gift offered. A family member of the official person is also obliged to refuse the gift. If the donor insists on the gift, the official or his/her family member is obliged to deliver the gift to the official’s employer. An official or a family member may not accept a gift if the delivery or acceptance of such a gift would constitute a criminal act; it is prohib­ In terms of openness and transparency, paragraphs six and seven of Article 30 (Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act, 2010/2020) are par­ticularly important, requiring that a public entity keeps a record of gifts received,8 containing information on the type and estimated value of the gift, the donor and other circumstances of the gift’s delivery. The latter instructs all recipients of gifts to enter information9 on gifts whose value exceeds EUR 50 on the list of gifts. The public sector entity is obliged to submit a list of gifts to public officials, their family members and ceremonial gifts to the CPC by 31 March for the previous year. The way gifts are dis­posed of, how the value of gifts is determined and how a list of gifts is main­tained, together with other issues related to implementation of this Article, are determined by the Minister responsible for systemic control of the limi­tation of corruption through regulations. In addition to the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act, the Rules on restrictions and duties of officials as regards the acceptance of gifts (2021) are in force. These rules regulate the manner in which gifts maybe be disposed, the determination of the value of gifts, the maintenance and content of the list of gifts given in connection with the performance of one’s function, work or public service or received by public officials or their fam­ily members in connection with their position, as well as other implementa­tion issues related to the prohibitions, restrictions and duties of public offi­cials in accepting gifts. The following sections of the Rules are especially relevant for our analysis. The third section determines the conduct in the case a gift is accepted. Article 5 prescribes that in the case of the acceptance of a gift, the recipi­ent10 must, as soon as possible and at the latest within 8 days, fill in a form to record the gift received and hand it over to the person who maintains the list of gifts in the public entity where they work.11 On this form, the recipi­ent of the gift must provide the following information: his/her first and last name and the activity he/she carries out; the first and last name and address ited by another law or regulations issued under it; money, securities, gift certificates and precious metals are given as gifts; the acceptance of the gift would impair or appear to impair the impartial and objective performance of the official’s public duties (Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act, 2010/2020: Article 30). 8 The CPC publishes the list of reported gifts on ERAR.si application. A link to this dataset can be found here: https://erar.si/darila/. 9 The gifts that public officials receive are reported via the online form accessible at https://registri. kpk-rs.si/registri/prejeta_darila/prijava/. 10 If the gift is accepted by a family member of an official, the official is obliged to fill in the form and hand it over to the person responsible for keeping the list in the public entity where they work. 11 The recipient does not complete the form if they receive a gift of negligible/symbolic value. Gifts of symbolic value traditionally given in connection with work are not considered work-related gifts (plaques, badges, flags, promotional materials and similar items). Prohibitions and restrictions on the acceptance of gifts do not apply to these types of gifts and officials may accept them. of the donor or the title and registered office of a legal entity if the gift was given on behalf of a legal entity; the date of acceptance of the gift; informa­tion about whether the gift was received by a family member; an indication of whether the gift is diplomatic or occasional; the nature and value of the gift and an indication of how the value of the gift was determined; the rea­sons for, or circumstances in which, the gift was given; the manner in which the gift was given (e.g., in person, by post); an indication of whether the gift has become the property of the recipient or the public entity that employs the recipient; the date of completion of the form and the signature of the recipient. Further, the regulations provide that the recipient of ceremonial and occasional gifts that become the property of the public entity where the recipient works, as well as gifts that the recipient is not allowed to keep, must be handed over to the person responsible for maintaining the list of gifts at the public entity that employs the recipient immediately upon receipt or as soon as possible, but no later than within 8 days. The person maintaining the list of gifts at the public entity where the recipient works shall also enter on the form the way the gift was recorded and used or kept if the gift has become the property of the public entity where the recipient works. Article 8 states that while assessing the value of gifts the market price of the gift must be considered. Where the gift is one whose value cannot be determined based on market prices, its value shall be determined accord­ing to the lay estimate of the person keeping the register of gifts, noting the prices of similar or comparable things, rights, services or other benefits. If the gift is a work of art or an object of historical value or other value that can­not be assessed based on market criteria, the gift’s value is to be determined based on the assessment of a professional valuer. Each gift shall be recorded in the electronic list under a consecutive number for the period of the calendar year and kept for 5 years from the end of the year in which it was given. In each public entity, one or more persons must be designated as responsible for the proper management of the record of gifts in accordance with the Rules (the person maintaining the list of gifts). If the mentioned person has doubts over the accuracy of the data entered in the record of gifts, they shall determine, as far as possible, whether the data provided are true. If they find that the information on the form is untrue or that it is not an occasional gift of symbolic value, they must inform the recipient and the head of the public entity. They are obliged to do the same if they discover violations in the transmission of data to the record or if the Rules have been violated in any other way. External control is carried out by the CPC to which public entities must submit a list of gifts received in the previous year by 31 March at the latest, including all the information that must be provided while registering gifts. In addition to the CPC, internal control is carried out by the heads of the public entities (Rules on restrictions and duties of officials as regards the acceptance of gifts, 2021: Article 15). Detailed instructions on how to report, record and deal with ceremonial gifts may be found on the official website of the CPC, as well as the website of the Court of Audit of the Republic of Slovenia, where Guidance on the restrictions and obligations when accepting gifts (2021) and the Form for recording a gift received are available. Analysis of the normative framework shows that the recording of cer­emonial gifts received is obligatory for all recipients and regulated quite precisely, also in the light of an open, transparent, credible and trustworthy public and state administration. In the following section of the article, we examine how the provisions of the umbrella law and the Rules are consid­ered in practice. Data and methods For the statistical analysis, we use the publicly available dataset provided by the CPC at the ERAR.si portal. The table contains 3,954 gifts reported between January 2014 and February 2023. For each gift, the following data points are reported: date of receipt, recipient, donor, gift type (ceremonial or occasional), description of the gift, value, method of value determination, reason for giving the gift and the final owner of the gift. The initial hurdle in dissecting this dataset becomes apparent on a cur­sory inspection (as shown in Figure 1) – the lack of uniformity in the report­ing of gifts is evident.12 The CPC mandated this reporting with the aim of enabling the public to closely monitor public officials. However, it is clear that the process can be challenging for those without considerable com­puter skills. 12 Evidently, due to unrestricted inputs such as case sensitivity and organisation type, discrepancies arise within the raw fields of the database. For instance, “MUNICIPALITY OF ŠENCUR” and “Šencur munic­ipality” are recognised as distinct entities. This observation extends to “Municipality of St. Jurij”, highlight­ing the need for extensive data pre-processing. See Figure 1. Figure 1: TOP 15 REPORTED GIFT DONORS BY NUMBER OF GIFTS THEY SENT Data pre-processing The first method we performed was to translate all the data points from Slovenian to English. We did this automatically using the deep transla­tor library in Python. To minimise the amount of noise in the dataset, we cleaned the data for the following attributes: • Case sensitivity: As may be seen in the accompanying dataset, all data points in the collected data are missing case sensitivity. To address this issue, we first converted all text to lowercase to reduce the possibility of category duplication, such as “books” vs. “BOOKS” and similar cases. • Stop words: Stop words (such as the, a, an, in, of) are often used in descriptions of gifts, but provide little context about the gift. The nltk. corpus Python package was used to filter out stop words in gift charac­teristics, such as the description of the gift, the occasion on which the gift was received etc. • Dates: Textual date fields were converted to timestamps to allow various forms of aggregation and time series analysis. Unsupervised machine learning One of the techniques for extracting the most frequent gifts in our data­set entails clustering them based on their description. For this purpose, the K-means algorithm was applied to the Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) matrix of features (Karabiber, 2023) obtained from the vectorisation step. K-Means divided the gift descriptions into k clusters based on their feature similarity. • TF-IDF vectorisation: To represent our text fields numerically, we vector­ise our text data using the TF-IDF technique. It measures how important a term is within a document (i.e., the gift description) compared to a col­lection of documents (i.e., all gift descriptions). The words in a text docu­ment are converted into numbers indicating their importance through a text vectorisation process. TF-IDF vectorises (scores) a word by mul­tiplying the word’s Term Frequency (TF) with the Inverse Document Frequency (IDF). • Silhouette Score & Calinski-Harabasz Index: the evaluation methods we use for our clustering algorithm are the Silhouette Score (SS) and the Calinski-Harabasz Index (CH) (Wang, 2019). We calculate the average SS for the whole dataset and for each cluster using the function from the sklearn.metrics module. The Silhouette Score measures the compactness of each data point within its assigned cluster and the separation between different clusters. A higher Silhouette Score (ranging from -1 to 1) indi­cates better defined and well-separated clusters. The Silhouette Score for a data point i is given as follows: thus, bi is the inter-cluster distance, defined as the average distance to the nearest cluster of data point i, other than the one to which it belongs; and ai is the intra-cluster distance, defined as the average distance to all other points in the cluster to which it belongs (Tushar, 2021). The Calinski-Harabasz Index (also known as the Variance Ratio Criterion) is an evaluation index based on the degree of dispersion between clu­sters and clusters and is defined as follows. A higher value indicates more compact and better separated clusters. The index is calculated in this way: where k is the number of clusters, n is the number of samples, W(k) is the intra-cluster divergence and B(k) is the inter-cluster divergence. Keywords utilisation and words filtering After running the clustering algorithm, we performed a manual review of the clusters step. This is necessary because there are no labelled records of this type. First, we inspected the SS of each cluster and extracted the most frequent word (gift object) from each cluster. For the clusters with large SS (strong clusters), we took the most frequent word as the keyword for further use in the analysis. For clusters with small SS (weak clusters), there were only a few possible solutions. First, we used the keywords from the strong clusters and then performed word filtering to extract all the expressions that fit better with the other clusters. We assigned these expressions to the clus­ters they belong to. For the remaining expressions, there were two steps to ensure the most optimal results: • The first step was to repeat the task of clustering and using keywords (i.e., consequently several times) until we arrived at a satisfactory result (we managed to group all the gifts in a meaningful way). However, due to the multiple descriptions of the gifts leading to a single large, weak cluster, this method yielded suboptimal results, explaining why we only performed it twice. • After the second manual inspection, instead of performing a new itera­tion of clustering, we conducted a subsequent reorganisation of the remaining weak clusters and made a concerted effort to group similar items (e.g., teacups, pots, sets and samovars). Through this process, we also identified different types of keywords that can be used effectively by focusing on gift materials rather than the objects themselves. Named entity recognition (NER) In data categories such as Donors of the gifts, our focus was on uncov­ering the countries or municipalities that mostly provide gifts to Slovenian public officials. To achieve this, we use Named Entity Recognition (NER) techniques, concentrating on the identification of geopolitical entities, referred to as “GPE” in this feature. To this end, we used the capabilities of the spaCy library. We employed the pre-trained English language model “en_core_web_sm”, which includes various text processing and analysis components, including tokenisation, part-of-speech tagging, dependency parsing, and NER (Majumder, 2021). Record of ceremonial gifts received in practice: results and discussion Following our initial phase of data cleansing and transformation, we present a series of insightful graphs to spotlight various attributes of cer­emonial gifts in our dataset. We begin by presenting the distributions of the most prominent gift recipients (Figure 2) before moving on to the distribu­tions of the leading gift givers (Figure 3). This is to provide clearer insight into the characteristics of the dataset, especially as concerns the most impor­tant participants. We then look in more detail at the descriptions and values of the gifts, revealing the most striking differences within the dataset. Figure 2: DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANISATIONS (PANEL A) OFFICIALS (PANEL B) THAT RECEIVE GIFTS Source: Data from ERAR.si portal (2023). Panel A in Figure 2 shows that the recipients of gifts – as was also to be expected – include the three highest state bodies in ceremonial terms, i.e., the President of the Republic, the National Assembly and the Prime Minister’s Cabinet, followed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Constitutional Court, various municipalities and the Ministry of Economics, the Bank of Slovenia, the National Council, and others. It is particularly inter­esting that, among the municipalities, the highest number of gifts received was reported by the Municipality of Šencur and not – as one might antici­pate – by the Municipality of Ljubljana as the capital city of the country. In Panel B, we observe that most gifts went to functionaries (and interestingly not also their family members), followed by a much smaller number of civil servants and local authorities. Figure 3: DISTRIBUTIONS OF GIFT DONORS * Panel A: top 25 words used to describe gift donors. We chose this preview since there are more than 3000 unique records for donors, so this graph presents a more meaningful star­ting point for further grouping of donors. Panel B: Top 25 geopolitical entities the gifts come from. Panel C: Number of gifts per top 3 geopolitical locations donated in the particular year. Source: Data from ERAR.si portal (2023). Panel (A) in Figure 3 shows that the majority of gifts were sent by presi­dents, ministries, mayors and ambassadors, while we end up with few coun­try names. It is indeed interesting to see which geopolitical entities most often gave gifts to officials in Slovenia (Panel B) and how this evolved over time (Panel C). Panel B shows the 25 geopolitical entities from which the gifts originate. It is worth noting that among the most common Asian coun­tries are China, India, Iran, Qatar and Japan, followed by countries from the region such as Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Serbia, Albania etc. In Panels B and C, we see that China was the largest gift donor in the period 2014– 2018, which coincides with the fact that the Republic of China and Slovenia have strengthened their economic cooperation through the Platform 16+1 and the Belt and Road Initiative. This led to a rise in trade of goods, service activities, the number of tourists and investments in both countries (Rašcan, 2019). As a result, the number of protocol visits between the two countries’ summits increased during this period. Further, in 2015 Slovenia adopted the Foreign Policy Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia that states with respect to cooperation with countries in Asia that in this part of the world the most important partners of the Republic of Slovenia are India, Japan, and China as one of the biggest economies in the world. The government at the time began to implement the new Strategy (2015), which led to more frequent political contacts between the countries and hence also to the exchange of ceremonial gifts, as may be clearly seen in Panel C where China and India are prominent. There is another interesting observation in Panel C; namely, that countries were donors for 2 years in a row and then either stopped or reduced their gifts (e.g., India in 2014 and 2015, Macedonia in 2019 and 2020, Bulgaria from 2018 to 2020, Japan in 2021 and 2022 etc.). On the other hand, Hungary was a constant donor. Figure 4: NUMBER OF GIFTS PER YEAR Source: Data from ERAR.si portal (2023). Since the analysed timeframe incorporates the COVID-19 pandemic, which had a strong impact on diplomatic activities, we additionally ana­lysed the possible effects of the lockdowns on the presenting of ceremo­nial gifts. The number of reported gifts (Panel A) during the COVID-19 period was about half the usual number, on average about 100 reported gifts per year between 2020 and 2022. In this period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proved to be the most important organisation receiving gifts. As for Slovenian municipalities, Ljubljana, Šencur and St. Jurij were the most fre­quent recipients of gifts in the pre-COVID-19 period, but were replaced by the municipalities of Piran and Štore during the pandemic. There was a shift in the recipients (Panel B) themselves during the COVID-19 period. While in the pre-COVID-19 period, functionaries were the main recipients, during the pandemic they almost disappeared in favour of civil servants. In the pre­COVID-19 period, China, Hungary, India, Iran and Serbia were the most com­mon donors of gifts, while in the COVID-19 period, Qatar, Hungary, Japan, Georgia and India were the main donors. Figure 4 shows the number of gifts received by individual years. We observe that the year 2015 stands out with the highest number of ceremonial gifts received over the entire study period.13 We attribute the latter mainly to the government’s then foreign policy, mainly focused on Asian countries. On the other hand, another political promises of the coalition at the time was transpar­ency and the fight against corruption, which may have led to the more con­sistent registration of ceremonial gifts. Still, it is somewhat surprising that the number of gifts received did not increase during the period when the Republic of Slovenia was presiding over the Council of the European Union (in 2021) and was hosting many events on the level of the highest national and European representatives. It should indeed be stressed that while the amendments to the normative framework on the reporting of ceremonial gifts (i.e., Amendments to the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act; Rules on restrictions and duties of officials as regards the acceptance of gifts) were adopted in 2020 and 2021, no changes in the following years are evident from the data shown in Figure 4. Gift values We now consider the reported values assigned to the gifts and look at the main statistics: Median = EUR 40, Minimum = 0, Mode = EUR 50, Q3 = EUR 70, Maximum = EUR 62,000, Mean = EUR 135.8, with all gifts worth more than EUR 131 being outliers. Table 1 presents the frequency distribu­tion of the reported values. It is interesting to note that the most frequently reported value coincides with the threshold of EUR 50 set by the CPC. Table 1: NUMBER OF GIFTS PER THEIR VALUES Reported gift value (EUR) Number of gifts 0–50 2632 50–100 828 100–200 276 200–1000 187 1000–62000 31 * We can notice that it drastically drops in two pints, after 50 and after 1000 EUR. Source: Data from ERAR.si portal (2023). It is clear from Figure 5 that a significant proportion of gift values does not have a professional valuation. While it is unrealistic to expect entities to hire professionals to value all gifts, there does seem to be an expectation of more conscientious evaluation. Currently, the prevailing view appears to be that, in the absence of further regulation, evaluations of gifts are undertaken 13 The six main recipients of ceremonial gifts in 2015 were the President of the Republic of Slovenia, the National Assembly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Municipality of Šencur, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Municipality of Ljubljana. casually, often with the underlying motivation of them being personally acquired. Figure 5: BAR-PLOT OF VALUE DETERMINATION METHOD * We can notice that most of the gifts are evaluated non-professionally (first three groups). Only a minor fraction is appraised based on account or verified market value. Source: Data from ERAR.si portal (2023). Gift descriptions We found that distinguishing between objects (e.g., “plate”, “vase”, “bowl”) and adjectives (e.g., “silver”, “crystal”, “glass”) is a challenge for any clustering or topic grouping algorithm. For example, consider an object like a glass bowl – deciding whether it belongs more to the cluster “glass” or “bowl” presents a conundrum. An illustrative case, representative of many in our dataset, is the description “decorative, traditionally decorated stone plate with carved wooden frame” – wording for which the machine strug­gles to determine the most meaningful cluster assignment. To enable the most comprehensive understanding and analysis of gift descriptions, we take a dual approach: clustering of objects and clustering of materials. Object clustering The application of the K-means algorithm for clustering objects required testing with different values of k (k = 10, 15, 20, 50, 100). Observations showed that as k increased the Sum of Squares (SS) rose, but the Calinski-Harabasz (CH) score decreased. For all k values tested, a clear trend emerged: a prominent larger cluster (comprising almost half of the items) coexisted with a weaker cluster (which turned out to be negative SS) com­prising a wide variety of items. The optimal balance between the SS and CH scores materialised at k = 20. The clusters and their corresponding SS scores are listed in Table 2. This clustering primarily facilitated the identification of the most frequent expressions within the gift descriptions and enabled the gifts to be grouped around these expressions. Table 2: TWENTY CLUSTERS OF DESCRIPTIONS OF GIFTS ID Keyword Examples n SS 0 ‘book’ ‘golden book issued on the 60th bank’s anniversary’, ‘Huawei P8 mobile phone’, ‘Cartier wristwatch’ 1790 -0.35 1 ‘–’ ‘a gilded model of the palace in a box’, ‘mosaic of the symbol of the autonomous region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia” 521 -0.01 2 ‘glass’ ‘Hand-crafted glass and amber water obelisk with Saudi motifs’, ‘swarovski glass horse’ 127 0.04 3 ‘bowl’ ‘marble bowl’, ‘silver bowl with wooden bottom’ 43 0.16 4 ‘books’ ‘6 books’, ‘a collection of books’ 44 0.66 5 ‘–’ ‘archaeological find from the ruins of Göbekli Tepe’, ‘shot of central Slovenia from space’ 51 0.005 6 ‘carpets’ ‘Baku carpet’, ‘silk carpet’, ‘carpet – hand woven’ 31 0.30 7 ‘plates’ ‘marble plate with print’, ‘engraved silver plate’, ‘hand painted decorative plate’ 127 0.15 8 ‘set’ ‘set of porcelain tea cups’, ‘set of crystal glasses with stars’ 112 0.06 9 ‘tickets’ ‘tickets for a cultural event’, ‘tickets for a theatre performance’ 48 0.3 10 ‘picture’ ‘framed copper picture’, ‘a picture of a woman in Africa’, ‘art picture’ 162 0.15 11 ‘painting’ ‘painting – oil on glass’, ‘painting, oil on canvas, 50 cm × 37 cm, pine house’ 80 0.07 12 ‘bottle’ ‘crystal aperitif glasses and a bottle’, ‘whiskey set’, ‘6 bottles of wine’ 116 0.15 13 ‘book’ ‘book’, ‘2x book’ 81 0.98 14 ‘pen’ ‘fountain pen, book “EU.RO” and a set of commemorative coins’, ‘fountain pen in silver filigree and ink’ 52 0.17 15 ‘gift’ ‘a gift bag containing wine, a calendar, dried fruit, prosciutto, salami, cheese and honey’ 126 0.24 16 ‘wooden’ ‘handmade wool carpet (2.97 × 2.02 m) and a gold coin in a wooden box’ 206 0.02 17 ‘coin’ ‘gold collector’s coin’, ‘tashkent uzbekistan coin collection’, ‘the gold coin falls’ 105 0.07 18 ‘new’ ‘new year’s gift’, ‘gift basket’ 51 0.66 19 ‘vase’ ‘porcelain vase’, ‘ceramic persian vase’, ‘traditional chinese vase’ 81 0.27 * Average Silhouette Score (SS) obtained is 0.06, while Calinski-Harabasz Index (CH) is 33.9. Source: Data from ERAR.si portal (2023). While clusters such as 4, 6, 9, 13, 14, 15, 18 and 19 had strong SS scores, there was considerable room for improvement in the other clusters. Conversely, clusters 0, 1 and 5 had strikingly low Silhouette scores. Moreover, the most frequent words did not adequately characterise the items in these clusters. In cluster 0, for example, the word “book” was mentioned the most frequently, even though only about 600 of 1,790 items were books. The composition of the cluster extended to various items such as wristwatches, sculptures and plaques. These cases are due to extensive and complex descriptions that confound the understanding of the clustering algorithm. Despite these challenges, our main goal of describing the gifts remained achievable. By using cluster keywords, the items could be grouped effec­tively. The main entities identified included [“book”, “bowl”, “rug”, “plate”, “set”, “ticket”, “painting”, “bottle”, “pen”, “gift”, “coin”, “vase”]. Items contain­ing these keywords were categorised accordingly. Subsequently, 1,679 gifts that did not contain these common expressions were subjected to repeated k = 20 clustering. The results yielded a SS of 0.06 and CH of 19.5. This pro­cedure produced extensive keywords for strong clusters such as [“cuff”, “medallion”, “plaque”, “monograph”, “saint’s mark”]. Similarly, more abstract clusters emerged, including [“silver”, “wood”, “New Year’s gift”]. A larger, weak cluster comprising 1,188 items was also found. Manual examination of this cluster revealed common words such as [“frame”, “statue”, “model”, “replica”, “plaque”, “sculpture”, “wristwatch”, “photo”, “coat arms”, “award”, “Huawei”]. To further refine the grouping, we conducted manual restructur­ing by grouping similar items. The final list of 782 gifts that defy meaning­ful grouping was identified. Notably, adjectives like “glass”, “porcelain” and “silver” played a major role in this sub-grouping. This finding paved the way for a second iteration to group the gift items by their materials. The final compilation of the most important object groups, paired with their materi­als, is shown in Table 3. Materials Clustering Turning to materials, we draw insights from our objects clustering approach to optimise our methodology. Here, we focus directly on extract­ing the most frequently occurring adjectives, which are also significant in the context of our topic of investigation. In particular, the most frequently occurring adjectives include “gold”, “silver”, “pearl”, “glass”, “wood” and “porcelain”. A comprehensive list of these adjectives and their correspond­ing frequencies is given in Table 3. Table 3: FINAL LIST OF 28 GROUPS REGARDING ITEMS (OBJECTS AND MATERIALS) Gifts as objects Count Gift materials (adjectives) Count books 865 glass 217 paintings 472 wooden 198 gift bags 347 silver 162 bottles 297 porcelain 87 statues 199 ceramic 83 plates 191 golden 79 sets 176 crystal 65 coins 172 handmade 58 luxury gifts 144 stone 46 frames 120 bronze 34 vases 110 leather 28 photos 96 jewellery 12 pens 88 marble 10 boxes 86 pearl 7 plaques 82 cuffs 80 monographs 64 tickets 54 bowls 47 medallions 42 coat of arms 39 watches 32 carpets 32 awards 28 mobile phones 27 saint’s sign 25 Source: Data from ERAR.si portal (2023). Gift Value vs. the Description To obtain insight into the variations of values in the above clusters, we may consider Figure 6 for objects and Figure 7 for the clustering of materi­als. It is worth noting that for most clusters the median values are either around or below EUR 50 (solid red line), even for clusters such as paintings, carpets, vases, pearls, crystals, marbles and the like. Since the greatest differences are evident in this segment of reporting, we explain these results in more detail in the section below. Figure 6: BOX-PLOT OF VALUES OF REPORTED GIFTS (OBJECTS CLUSTERING) * Horizontal line depicts a value of 50 EUR that the government set as a boundary. On y-axes we have values in a log-scale, for the better preview. Source: Data from ERAR.si portal (2023). Figure 7: BOX-PLOT OF VALUES OF REPORTED GIFTS (MATERIALS CLUSTERING) * Horizontal line depicts a value of 50 EUR that the government set as a boundary. On y-axes we have values in a log-scale, for the better preview. Source: Data from ERAR.si portal (2023). Problematising records and determining the value of an individual gift Our exhaustive investigation of the reporting in Slovenia revealed some problematic aspects of the system. First, the frequency of reporting of the value of EUR 50, established as the minimum by the CPC, seems somewhat convenient given the negligible threshold. Second, we found several prob­lems with the reporting of gifts, ranging from underestimates with high variability to inconsistent expressions and case usage. These challenges could prevent non-technical people from using the ERAR.si application for hypothesis testing. In addition, our analysis revealed intriguing discrepan­cies while comparing reported gift values with gift types and materials. For example, the median value of “golden” items was barely above EUR 100; 75% of them were valued below EUR 200, which arouses suspicion. There were also similar discrepancies when it comes to “bronze”, “pearls” and “silver”. Moreover, the 3rd quartile of “paintings” hovered around EUR 100 (meaning that 75% of the paintings received were valued at less than EUR 100), while there were carpets valued at less than EUR 30. These findings underline the need to strengthen the gift reporting system and modify it so that fewer anomalies occur in the future. Addressing these discrepancies in reported gift values calls for proactive measures to correct the gift reporting system and assure its effectiveness. As part of these efforts, the CPC could consider implementing additional requirements to enhance transparency and accuracy. Based on our findings, we recommend the fol­lowing improvements. First, to avoid naming the same entity differently, the electronic form should contain a pre-prepared, drop-down list of public enti­ties from which the person declaring the ceremonial gift can choose. Second, the persons entering the descriptions and values of ceremonial gifts into the database should have access to more precise rules, especially as regards the description of items and assessment of their value. Third, in terms of transpar­ency, it is necessary to provide for a simple yet effective step, such as attaching a photograph of the items, measurements, or information about the material (if applicable) to the description of the gift in the database, so as to provide valuable evidence and verification. This would allow the CPC to match the reported values with the actual nature and value of the gifts received, provid­ing an additional layer of accountability, and reducing the potential for mis­representation or undervaluation. Fourth, the CPC should not only provide the dataset, but also develop a simple tool to observe the different distribu­tions of characteristics in the database – as shown in our Results section. Fifth, the CPC should tighten control over the reporting of ceremonial gifts and make any established irregularities public. Gift reporting should be an essen­tial part of the code of ethics of all politicians, civil servants, and other employ­ees working in political institutions, the public sector and the state sector. Conclusion Ceremonial gifts symbolise welcome, honour and the cultivation of advantageous diplomatic relations. They form a crucial part of building strong relationships, from the highest positions in politics and diplomacy to the closest people in the public service. Nevertheless, ceremonial gifts are seen as problematic in several ways, not simply since the recipient risks being beholden to the giver by accepting the gift, but also because the receipt of ceremonial gifts is often associated with potential favours, pref­erential treatment or even corruption. To minimise such commercialisation and to ensure the integrity, transparency and openness of politics and pub­lic officials, and to maintain trust in political and administrative institutions, many countries around the world have established and adopted rules for the acceptance and giving of ceremonial gifts. Through detailed statistical analysis, we examined the reporting of cere­monial gifts in the Republic of Slovenia where trust in the most visible politi­cal institutions (the political parties, the President of the Republic, the gov­ernment, the National Parliament) is at a relatively low levels, also due to the many scandals in the political arena over the last two decades. Our analysis reveals anomalies in the reporting of ceremonial gifts as well as weaknesses in the normative framework. In our article, we uncover the most obvious discrepancies in reporting, from the name of the reporting body, to flawed descriptions of gifts, through to the particularly problematic assessment of gift values, which is typically left to the layperson. Further, the question of the control by the CPC (its sufficiency) arises. In relation to our initial hypothesis, we note that in the case of Slovenia there is clearly a problem with implementation of the normative framework since register entries only show that the technical aspect and less the qualita­tive side of the reporting of ceremonial gifts is complied with. We believe that the gift reporting system could become more transparent if our rec­ommendations and actions are implemented. This can only help to further strengthen the integrity of politics, public administration and the entire pub­lic sector, increase public trust and act as a robust safeguard against fraud, favouritism and corruption in Slovenia. 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Rules on restrictions and duties of officials as regards the acceptance of gifts (2021 and later amendments): Official Gazette of Republic of Slovenia, no. 106/2021. Accessible at http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=PRAV14250, 6. 10. 2023. UDK [316.34+316.346.2]:355.11-057.86(496.5) Mimoza BUDECI* THE WAYS DIVERSITY AND GENDER AFFECT MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND HOW DIVERSE GROUPS PERCEIVE THIS CONCEPT Abstract. Not much research has looked at how diver­sity and gender affect military professionalism and diverse groups perceive this concept. Using a qualitative approach, the study examined perspectives on military professionalism and unprofessionalism among diverse members of the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF). To ensure a diversity of participants, the study was based on the constructivist paradigm (multiple realities) as well as the Gender Perspective in the Albanian Armed Forces report (2013), which helps identify the vary­ing impacts of such research on diverse groups of men and women. A total of 150 individuals participated in interviews and focus groups between October 2022 and August 2023. The findings show that professionalism and unprofessionalism each have distinct characteris­tics, where leadership is a key factor. This study sheds light on the members’ experiences and how the latter affect the way in which professionals are perceived. Keywords: Albanian Armed Forces, Military Professio­nalism, Qualitative Research, Diversity Introduction The Long-Term Plan for the Development of the Albanian Armed Forces 2016–2025 (2015) (“the Plan”) is a guiding document created by the Albanian Forces leadership under the auspices of the Parliament of Albania. The Plan has defined professionalism in the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) for almost a decade. The concept of placing others ahead of oneself, the lawful and proper use of military force, and acceptance of unlimited accountability are what distinguish military professionalism. Its members have accumulated an organised and specialised body of military knowledge * Mimoza Budeci, PhD candidate, Defense Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. DOI: 10.51936/tip.60.4.856 and talents via education, training and experience, which they utilise com­petently and impartially while carrying out their objectives. Military profes­sionals in Albania adhere to a shared set of core beliefs and ideals known as the military ethos, which guides them in their tasks and allows them to maintain a special relationship of trust with Albanian society (Long-Term Plan for the Development of the Albanian Armed Forces 2016–2025, 2015). Military professionals in Albania follow a common set of basic values and principles found in the military ethos (On some changes and additions to Law no. 59/2014 for the Military Career in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania, 2021). These principles direct the performance of their duties and enable them to preserve a unique bond of trust with the Albanian popu­lation. Traditional military concepts like unlimited liability, fighting spirit, discipline and teamwork are woven into Albanian military values such as duty, loyalty, integrity, courage, and the warrior’s honour, along with the traditional touchstones in Huntington’s (1957) and Janowitz’s (1960) defi­nitions of professionalism – specialised knowledge, responsibility, compe­tence, and the nature of civil–military relations (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). Various levels of responsibility (organisational and professional etc.) and categories of competency (core, supporting, specialised and common knowledge etc.) are also outlined (Long-Term Plan for the Development of the Albanian Armed Forces 2016–2025, 2015). The Plan sets out the leader­ship, professional development policies, history, heritage and traditions, as well as the crucial responsibilities these ideas play in upholding the armed forces profession. This profession must remain relevant (i.e., meet the needs of Albanians), open (i.e., knowledge and relevant skills are available), consistent (i.e., attributes of responsibility, expertise and identity are con­sistent) and provide reciprocity (i.e., expectations and obligations between Albanian society and the profession, and vice versa). The Plan also recog­nises that the surrounding culture and values shape military professional­ism. Such professionalism has been developed over time by conceptual and cultural factors. On the conceptual level, notions of military profession­alism have evolved since Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960) follow­ing changes in both society and the function of the military (Snider and Matthews, 2005). Researchers have sought to comprehend the impact on the societal, organisational and human levels, including a shift from a more traditional perspective on the military (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Sarkesian, 1981) to one formed by the external environment (Evetts, 2003). On the cultural front, in 2013 the Government of Albania issued the Gender Perspective in the Albanian Armed Forces report (2013) (“the Report”) that described the current state of women’s involvement in the Albanian Armed Forces (Gender Perspective in the Albanian Armed Forces, 2013; Baka et al., 2011). The Report calls for institutionalised culture change that is more inclusive of gender and diversity. Although significant research has been conducted on the military as a profession (Snider, 2005) and the military’s efforts to boost diversity, few researchers have investigated the diverse per­spectives of members themselves with respect to the concept of military professionalism and how diversity fits into it. The purpose of this project was thus to examine views on military professionalism held by various AAF members using a qualitative technique influenced by the Report (Gender Perspective in the Albanian Armed Forces, 2013). The Report (2013) ques­tions assumptions made about shared experiences among a range of men and women to better comprehend the diverse viewpoints and experiences in the Albanian military to do with the concept of military professionalism. Theories of military professionalism As stated above, numerous frameworks of military professionalism, notably those of Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960) and Sarkesian (1981), have long dominated the literature. Other models such as those devel­oped by Moskos (1997), Abbott (1988) and Nuciari (1994) have focused on comparative analysis and evolution in military professionalism. With a focus on the officer corps, Huntington (1957) described professionalism as “a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized character­istics” (Huntington, 1957: 7), with expertise, responsibility and corporate­ness composing professionalism. Expertise refers to military personnel’s specific talents, as well as the education and training required to develop such skills. Huntington (1957) followed Harold Lasswell (1941) in charac­terising the specific expertise of military professionals as the “management of violence”, implying that the military’s primary role is to plan and direct combat operations as well as organise, equip and train the force that is to carry them out. Responsibility relates to the officer corps’ societal obliga­tion, which gives rise to civil–military relations: the officer corps is granted a professional monopoly in exchange for delivering a service “essential to the functioning of society” (Huntington, 1957: 9). Finally, corporateness, in Huntington’s definition, signifies a shared sense of unity among offic­ers within a hierarchical structure that includes non-professionals like non-combat officers and reservists. Later scholars criticised the Huntingtonian approach for dismissing non-combat officer specialities as unprofessional (Huntington, 1957). Moreover, given the era, Huntington’s (1957) frame­work examined male officers exclusively and their experience as individual professionals (Huntington, 1957). Janowitz (1960) was likewise concerned with the officer corps and its transition to a profession, describing military professionalism as expertise through skill and performance, responsibility, group identity and cohesion, and education and training. He also viewed the military’s future as being preoccupied with challenges that military lead­ers must confront, such as the impact of improvements in technology and the social environment. While Janowitz (1960) is more inclusive of exter­nal effects on the military (e.g., societal forces), like Huntington (1957), he focuses on a male officer corps (Huntington, 1957). Following Lasswell (1941), (Sarkesian, 1981) who defined the purpose of the military profes­sion as the “management of violence” situates the military profession within the broader political and societal environment, alongside the institutional perspective (e.g., military–civilian relations) and the individual perspec­tive (i.e., as shaped by institutional socialisation). Sarkesian (1981) defines professionalism as “honesty, integrity, loyalty, honour, and gentlemanly conduct” (Sarkesian, 1981: 11). Military professionalism includes civilian command, dignity and worth, justice, unique knowledge and competency, legitimacy, collective identity, and professional ethos. Professionalism fails when personal ideals, institutional requirements, and community perspec­tives clash (Sakresian, 1981). Sarkesian’s (1981) paradigm, like those of Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960), concentrates on the officer corps, with a broader focus given to the intersections between the individual, the institution, and social issues (Sarkesian, 1981). Moskos’ (1977) Institutional/ Occupational (I/O) model applies to all types of military personnel, not sim­ply officers. Unlike previous frameworks, his model seeks to explain the military’s shift from a professional to an institutional and occupational force. Institutional components include service to country (legitimacy), proximity of job and residence (residence), and a major commitment to the organi­sation (role commitment). A marketplace economy (legitimacy), the sepa­ration of employment from the location of a member’s home (residence), and a secondary commitment to the organisation (role commitment) are examples of occupational elements. In actuality, the military contains both parts (Moskos, 1977). Cafforio (1988) proposed the Bureaucratisation/ Professionalisation (B/P) model, which shows how components of both are present in the officer corps to measure processes of change within the pro­fession, based on the I/O model. Central to this model are elements like “the objective of officers’ actions, courses of action, dominant ethical norms, primary sources guiding their thought processes, desired forms of gratifi­cation, socio-cultural influences, and reference groups” (Moskos, 1977: 64). According to Nuciari (1994), “all scholars dealing with the military profes­sion agree on one peculiarity: it is simultaneously a bureaucracy and a pro­fession” (Nuciari, 1994: 15). Abbot (1988) defined military professionalism as an “exclusive occupational group applying somewhat abstract knowl­edge to particular cases” (Abbot, 1988: 8) and as including work, jurisdiction and competition. Knowledge and abilities are controlled by occupational groups, and abstraction separates professionals from non-professionals. Work refers to the tasks performed within a profession as well as the people who perform them. Further, activities have subjective qualities (e.g., diag­nosis and therapy) as well as objective qualities (e.g., technological impli­cations). The power and reputation of the profession’s academic under­standing are critical for its continued jurisdiction. Accordingly, “diagnosis, treatment, inference, and academic work provide the cultural machinery of jurisdiction” (Abbot, 1988: 59). Methods and participants To capture experiences from a diverse range of participants, the research was developed using a constructivist paradigm, which emphasises the inclu­sion of many social realities experienced by participants (Creswell, 2007; Morse, 2015), and the Gender Perspective in the Albanian Armed Forces report (2013). This paradigm explores how racial, cultural, ethnic and gen­der identities are incorporated into the military institution, which has in place extensive socialisation processes to foster a sense of shared identity. To ensure diverse participation, members of the Albanian Armed Forces were invited to participate via a parallel subgroup (Guest et al., 2006) and the snowball sampling technique (Mason, 1996). Participants were chosen from a variety of demographic groupings encompassing age, gender, mili­tary rank, geographic area, and varied identities, including ethnic minori­ties. Participants in occupations with a low representation of men (medics, nurses, lawyers) or women (women in combat weaponry) were sought. Potential participants were invited by email to in-person interviews or focus groups throughout Albania and a phone interview at their leisure. All infor­mation was gathered between October 2022 and August 2023. The duration of the interviews and focus groups, which included the administration of a consent form, semi-structured conversation using the interview and focus group procedures, and debriefing addressing follow-up contact should they have any additional questions, ranged between 30 and 90 minutes. While all the data were combined for the data analysis, some focus groups either had men or only women in them. As shown in Table 1, the final participant pool comprised 150 individu­als affiliated with the AAF, representing all three branches (Army, Air Force, Navy), including both active-duty and reserve components. These partici­pants spanned age groups ranging from 18 to 60, encompassing various ranks from OR2 (junior NCOs) to OF5 (senior officers), and both male and female members. The sample also contained a diverse range of com­munities, with a mix of majorities and minorities, and was drawn from dif­ferent geographical regions. While efforts were made to integrate varied views, there are limitations on understanding the intersectionality of these perspectives (in the context of a minority of women). Since the purpose of the research was to investigate military professionalism among various AAF members, several questions were designed to elicit their opinions on professionalism: 1. Is serving in the military considered to be a profession? 2. Which features point to military professionalism? 3. Which features point to military unprofessionalism? After the interviews and focus groups were completed, the data were coded using the protocol questions, followed by a deeper investigation of themes and patterns in the data (Miles et al., 2014). NVivo (2015) was used to arrange the data and present bigger themes, Microsoft OneNote to sum­marise and articulate the themes, and Microsoft Excel to create a summary matrix of all the themes found. Results This section presents the major themes concerning professionalism and unprofessionalism the participants identified. Professionalism When asked about the characteristics of professionalism in general and whether the Albanian military was considered to be a profession, 95% of the participants declared that it is, while the remaining 5% viewed it more as a job than a career. This minority perspective did not significantly alter the overall perception of Albanian military personnel regarding military professionalism. The military’s significance within Albanian society, on the other hand, was generally mentioned by those who believed it that it is a profession. When probed about the characteristics of professionalism in the military, participants declared that having their peers’ support, being able to trust that they will get the task done, and having the Albanian public’s confidence in their efforts and strategy are all key components of military professionalism. Many participants compared professionalism to the mili­tary’s mission and the reasons people join, saying that professionals realise the risks involved, demonstrate a readiness to serve and, above all else, the military is different from other professions. The main themes regarding professionalism in the AAF that emerged are: (1) allegiance and corporateness; (2) education, training, and professional development; (3) military discipline and code of conduct; (4) personal qual­ities and competencies (positive); (5) diversity and inclusion; and (6) social norms and public perception. Allegiance and corporateness. Several participants stated that being pro­fessional entails allegiance to one’s country as being as a cornerstone of military professionalism, exemplifying the unwavering commitment and profound sense of duty held by soldiers. Rooted in a deep love for their nation, military professionals dedicate themselves to safeguarding its sov­ereignty, security and values. This allegiance transcends personal interests, reflecting a selfless willingness to place the needs of the country above all else. Through sacrifice, discipline and unwavering resolve, these individu­als uphold the honour of their nation, responding to the call of duty with an unyielding dedication as embodying the essence of military profession­alism. Other participants mentioned teamwork and feeling connected to those around you, “To me, professionalism means building a team, being loyal to your superiors above within the limits of the law, and showing loy­alty downwards to your subordinates” (Interviewee 1). Another participant stated, “We all learn about each other, and then we have this symbiotic work relationship that we all understand and do” (Interviewee 2). Education, training, and professional development. Professionalism was defined as a competency in one’s occupation and a continuing desire to learn through training, education and professional growth. One partici­pant stated, “I think professionalism is based on education” (Interviewee 3), whereas another noted, “We are a group of people who have to be highly skilled” (Interviewee 4). Given the level of skill needed for a variety of AAF positions, several participants believed that maintaining and pursuing edu­cation, training, and professional development opportunities are critical parts of being a military professional. Military discipline and code of conduct. The Ministry of Defence and the Albanian Armed Forces operate pursuant to the law on Military Discipline in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania (2014), which establishes a standard of conduct for AAF personnel. The law and its purpose were acknowledged as important characteristics of professionalism by the partici­pants. According to one participant, “To be a professional, in general, means that you have a culture and understanding of what is right and wrong and how to do things to succeed” (Interviewee 5). Professionalism meant adher­ence to military and societal standards (Law on the status of the armed forces of the Republic of Albania, 2004). As one participant put it, “It also means act­ing ethically in terms of not taking advantage of people, either in the chain of command, those who are above, or those below you” (Interviewee 6). Personal qualities and competencies (positive). Several individuals men­tioned a range of skills and personality traits that are crucial to being a profes­sional, including discipline, respect, loyalty, altruism and honesty. A significant number of participants believed that self-control and discipline are essential components of military professionalism: “I’d say a high degree of discipline and self-control makes one a professional” (Interviewee 7). One participant stated, “I would suggest that a professional treats every human being the same regardless of their culture, or where or how they identify” (Interviewee 8). Social norms and public perception. Several participants argued that pro­fessionalism is influenced by broader social norms and one’s public image. The military must be professional because not only are they projecting a sense of professionalism out to the civilian population who are looking at us every day … it’s something the country can use to be proud of their mili­tary as an institution (Law on the Powers and Authorities of Management of the Armed Forces Command of the Republic of Albania, 2014). Another criterion was accountability to the public, “We’re accountable to the public, there’s that expectation of accountability” (Interviewee 12). As a final point, some individuals believed that professionalism includes one’s personal life, where one’s activities either positively or negatively reflect on one’s profes­sionalism. A participant (Interviewee 12), stated: I believe it ought to be accepted outside of the workplace as well. You are constantly in the spotlight. When you swear allegiance to your country, you do so for the duration of your life, not just for 8 hours a day. Diversity and inclusion. Ethnic-, cultural- and gender-based diversity can significantly enhance military professionalism in numerous ways. Diverse teams bring a range of perspectives to problem-solving, in turn fostering innovation and creative solutions. Cultural sensitivity is vital for international operations, and diverse personnel are better equipped to navigate cultural nuances. Inclusive leadership promotes equitable decision-making and boosts morale and cohesion. Embracing diversity also expands talent recruit­ment and retention efforts, contributing to a more effective, adaptable and ethical military force overall. One participant (Interviewee 16), stated: Women bring diverse perspectives and life experiences to the table, enhancing the understanding of complex issues and revealing alterna­tive solutions. In diverse teams, including women, collaboration flour­ishes, fostering creativity and innovation. Women often possess higher emotional intelligence, which aids in conflict management, inclusive leadership, and considering well-being in decision-making. Unprofessionalism Out of the 150 participants, 90% believed that several features of unpro­fessionalism exist in the military, yet also recognised that these features are not exclusive to the military. The remaining 10% declared that the features of unprofessionalism in the military have evolved over time and are difficult to define clearly. The following themes arose among individuals who iden­tified elements of unprofessionalism: (1) a lack of respect and discipline; (2) alcohol abuse; (3) toxic leadership; (4) personal qualities (negative); (5) stereotypes; (6) double standards; and (7) discrimination. Lack of respect and discipline. Disrespectful behaviour to one’s peers, subordinates or superiors undermines the principles of mutual respect and dignity that are important in a professional military environment. Disregarding military rank and authority can hold profound implications for the chain of command and overall military discipline. Disrespecting the authority of higher-ranking officers or non-commissioned officers under­mines the established structure, eroding the foundation of order and obedi­ence that is essential for effective operations. In addition, the consequences extend beyond immediate implications, potentially causing a ripple effect that affects the morale and cooperation of the entire unit. Recognising and upholding the hierarchical structure of the military is paramount for main­taining a functional and cohesive armed force. Alcohol abuse. Alcohol laws in the military have changed over the years (Draft Law of the Ministry of Defence “On some additions and changes to Law no. 173/2014 “On Discipline in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania”, 2021), and several participants acknowledged the influence of unprofessionalism. One participant said that when a ritual incorporates drinking, “unprofessional behaviour can follow” (Interviewee 19). Although drinking still formed part of mess life, several participants believed there had been a considerable shift in the way alcohol is used in the military. Toxic leadership. Leaders who mistreat their subordinates, create a hos­tile work environment, or prioritise personal gain over the well-being of their team exhibit toxic leadership, which goes against professional stand­ards. One participant (Interviewee 21), stated: Working under dysfunctional leadership is not only demoralising. It can also have an impact on the overall performance of a team. Because toxic leaders prioritise their interests, their actions jeopardise the well­being of their teams. Personal qualities (negative). Several participants believed that the way people present themselves and specific personal traits of new members can impact professionalism. One participant noted, “There are certain personal­ity traits you want in this organisation… However, several of the politically correct ideas that we observe appear to conflict with a person’s highly posi­tive traits” (Interviewee 22). Another feature mentioned by participants was being self-serving. “Most people are there for themselves”, one participant observed, adding “Either they will try to take all the credit to look good and get promoted” (Interviewee 24). Stereotypes. Gender stereotypes, in particular, can shape people’s per­ceptions of military professionals. The military has traditionally been viewed as a male-dominated institution, leading to stereotypes about what a ‘typi­cal’ soldier/officer looks like. These stereotypes can affect how individuals evaluate the professionalism of service members of different genders. One participant (Interviewee 25), stated: When gender-based stereotypes are prevalent, there can be lower expec­tations for women in terms of physical fitness and combat performance. This can result in women being underestimated or not given the same opportunities to excel in combat roles, despite their capabilities. Double standards. Gender-based double standards in military are com­mon and stem from entrenched gender stereotypes. Examples include dif­fering physical standards, higher expectations for women in leadership roles, scrutiny of female service members’ appearance, biases regarding emotional expression, differing perceptions of language and behaviour, career progression obstacles for women, and harsher criticism of mistakes. These double standards vary by military culture and policies. One partici­pant (Interviewee 26), stated: While evaluating leadership potential and performance, double stand­ards may arise. Men may receive more favourable evaluations for dis­playing traits associated with stereotypical masculinity, even if their actual leadership abilities are not superior to their female counterparts. This can lead to a lack of recognition for the leadership skills of female service members. Discrimination. Gender-and cultural-based discrimination, including sexual harassment and bias, can impact how military professionals are per­ceived. Experiences of discrimination or harassment can affect a person’s career trajectory and may lead to negative perceptions of professionalism. One participant (Interviewee 27), stated: Discrimination can result in women or ethnic minorities being passed over for promotions and career advancement opportunities in favour of their white male counterparts, even when they are equally or more qualified. This can create a perception of unfairness and hinder the development of a professional and merit-based military culture. Leadership Leaders were seen as essential to the professionalism or unprofession­alism of their subordinates. Participants believed that people who wanted to be role models needed to assist both their chain of command and their subordinates. The relationship between leaders and professionalism was best summed up by one participant as follows: “Leading from the top and setting those standards and achieving them yourself…: ‘A professional can’t hold anyone else to a standard if they’re not willing to do it themselves’” (Interviewee 30). Another noted, “There has to be an active interest on the part of leaders to develop and mentor those who are coming after them” (Interviewee 31). Those who highlighted unprofessional features of leader­ship referred to specific leadership styles and organisational practices. One participant stated, “When unprofessional behaviour happens, leaders must engage themselves on all levels, echoing the approach to unprofessional behaviour” (Interviewee 32). Some interviewees believed that a lack of clear organisational messaging and consistent responses to unprofessional behaviour had harmed military professionalism as well. As regards how to handle unprofessional behaviour, another participant said, “But you don’t get fired, even if you don’t show up for work, even if you do something bad, the punishment is so ridiculous – you get promoted anyway” (Interviewee 34). Discussion This qualitative study investigated the views held by various AAF mem­bers on military professionalism and unprofessionalism. This section explores the primary characteristics that emerged and how they compare with the notion of military professionalism defined in the Long-Term Plan for the Development of the Albanian Armed Forces 2016–2025 (2015). In the Plan, the relationship between professionalism and leadership is mirrored, with leadership being critical for maintaining the profession. Leadership is also in charge of developing a culture that is inclusive of gender and diver­sity and is ultimately accountable for presenting, understanding and practis­ing professionalism for the participants. Given the significance of leader­ship in regulating military professionalism, issues arise when that leadership is toxic (Padilla et al., 2007; Lipman, 2005), ineffective (Lipman, 2005; Bass, 1985) or perceived to be narcissistic (Lipman, 2005; Mackey et al., 2021). This can be a problem when there are ethical lapses that call for leadership involvement. Toxic leadership can be mitigated by leadership performance that considers subordinate input (Padilla et al., 2007), advisory panels (Bass, 1985) and a stronger emphasis on the traits of good leadership (Lipman, 2005). The AAF leadership model defines leadership as “directing, moti­vating, and enabling others to accomplish the mission, professionally and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mis­sion success” (Long-term Plan of the Development of the Albanian Armed Forces 2016–2025, 2015; Decision of Council of Ministers for the approval of the Sectoral Strategy of the Ministry of Defence 2007–2013, 2007). Finally, cohesiveness is a key feature of group performance and mission accom­plishment; a leader’s effectiveness influences how members collaborate (Segal et al., 2015). As mentioned above, the key characteristics of profes­sionalism include maintaining and pursuing training, educational and pro­fessional development opportunities. Although group cohesion was seen as being critical to performance, research has shown that task cohesion, not group cohesion, is more crucial for success (Mullen and Copper, 1994; Matthews, 2002; Segal et al., 2015). In other words, group cohesion is less important than the competency of the group members working toward a common goal, which holds consequences for diversity. Leaders who focus on tasks and practise respecting and caring for others produce more suc­cessful teams (Matthews, 2002; Segal et al., 2015). The participants agreed that adhering to a code of conduct, rules and societal standards, while also maintaining a professional public image are important aspects of profes­sionalism. These features depend on clear and concise policies, as well as how members are socialised into them (Sion, 2006). This emphasises the significance of inclusive policies and leadership sticking to and ensuring consistent implementation of these policies. People are a vital aspect of the military, as expressed in Albanian’s latest defence and human resources management policy (Human resources management strategy 2020–2024, 2020). As pointed out in the Long-Term Plan for the Development of the Albanian Armed Forces 2016–2025 (2015), participants considered: (1) allegiance and corporateness; (2) education; training, and professional development; (3) military discipline and code of conduct; (4) personal qualities and com­petencies (positive); (5) diversity and inclusion; and (6) social norms and public perception as the main themes of military professionalism. When asked how they would rank such themes based on their impor­tance and level of impact in shaping their perception of military profession­alism, 98% of the interviewees considered allegiance and corporateness as the central theme; military professionalism, education, training and profes­sionalism as the second-most important characteristic; military discipline and code of conduct as the third-most; diversity and inclusion as the fourth-most; social norms and public perception as the fifth-most, and positive per­sonal qualities and competencies as the sixth-most important characteris­tics. The remaining 2% of interviewees proposed a slightly different ranking which, in principle, does not significantly alter the general perception of Albanian military personnel concerning military professionalism. The interviewees’ answers indicate a high level of agreement within the AAF regarding on constitutes military professionalism and its primary themes. The fact the majority of focus groups participants (95%–98%) ranked each theme consistently indicates a strong consensus among the surveyed group. This suggests these themes are seen as highly important and that there is little variation in their perceived importance among the interview­ees, where allegiance and corporateness is considered the most important characteristic by 98% of them. This shows that loyalty to the military institu­tion and a sense of unity within the military community are overwhelmingly valued. Education, training and professionalism are ranked as the second-most important theme by 98% of interviewees, in turn highlighting the sig­nificance of continuous learning, skill development, and adherence to pro­fessional standards. The high ranking of military discipline and the code of conduct as the third-most important characteristic (97%) underscores the importance of adhering to ethical and behavioural standards within the mil­itary. While slightly lower in ranking than the previous themes, the fact that 96% of interviewees still considered diversity and inclusion as the fourth-most important theme reveals there is recognition within the military com­munity of the importance of these values, albeit it may not be as universally emphasised as the top three themes. Social norms and public perception, along with positive personal qualities and competencies, are considered the fifth-most important theme by 98% of interviewees. The remaining 2%–4% of interviewees proposed a slightly different ranking which, in principle, does not significantly alter the general perception of Albanian military per­sonnel about military (un)professionalism. While these characteristics are still highly regarded, they are not ranked as prominently as the top four themes. To further promote the desired themes within the military, includ­ing allegiance and corporateness, education, training, professional develop­ment, military discipline, positive personal qualities, diversity and inclusion, and a positive public perception, military leadership can implement vari­ous strategies. These strategies encompass reinforcing the mission and val­ues, fostering camaraderie through team-building, investing in high-quality training and mentorship programmes, consistently enforcing discipline and codes of conduct, cultivating positive personal qualities and competen­cies, ensuring equal opportunities and diversity training, engaging with the community to shape public perception, and maintaining transparency and media relations. Encouraging continuous learning, feedback mechanisms, and accountability while conducting periodic assessments is the key to fos­tering a culture of professionalism, unity and positive public perception within the military organisation. Alongside the themes of professionalism, themes of unprofessionalism were examined. Unprofessionalism was attributed to: (1) a lack of respect and discipline (disrespectful behaviour towards peers and subordinates); (2) alcohol abuse (at events or during customs and traditions); (3) toxic leadership (creation of a hostile working environment); (4) personal quali­ties (negative: individualistic versus collectivist features); (5) stereotypes; (6) double standards; and (7) discrimination. When asked to rank the themes of military unprofessionalism and based on their importance and impact on shaping perceptions, three groups of interviewees gave the following rankings: Group 1 (comprising 58% of all interviewees) ranked them as: (1) a lack of respect and discipline; (2) stereotypes; (3) double standards; (4) discrim­ination; (5) toxic leadership; (6) alcohol abuse; and (7) negative personal qualities. Group 2 (22% of interviewees) ranked them as: (1) stereotypes; (2) dou­ble standards; (3) discrimination; (4) toxic leadership; (5) a lack of respect and discipline; (6) negative personal qualities; and (7) alcohol abuse. Group 3 (20% of interviewees) ranked them as: (1) stereotypes; (2) dou­ble standards; (3) discrimination; (4) a lack of respect and discipline; (5) alcohol abuse; (6) toxic leadership; and (7) negative personal qualities. The research findings reveal a significant diversity of opinions among the interviewees regarding the ranking of themes concerning military unprofessionalism. Various interviewee groups prioritise these characteris­tics differently, indicating a lack of agreement on what is most important in shaping perceptions of military un/professionalism. Despite these vari­ations, some common characteristics emerge. Stereotypes, double stand­ards, and discrimination consistently rank among the top concerns for all interviewee groups, which means that addressing these issues is crucial for enhancing professionalism in the military. In addition, the research highlights varying perceptions of professionalism among the interviewee groups. For instance, Group 1 places stronger emphasis on issues related to respect and discipline, while Group 2 is more focused on concerns related to hostile work environments created by toxic leadership. Notably, Group 3 appears to prioritise gender-related issues and leadership positions, sug­gesting a specific concern with gender disparities within the military’s lead­ership hierarchy. These findings hold significant policy and training implications for mil­itary organisations. Improving professionalism may require a wide range of issues to be addressed, yet it is also essential to tailor interventions to address the specific concerns raised by the different interviewee groups. Overall, the research shows the complexity of perceptions of military un/professionalism within the military and stresses the important need to understand and address the unique concerns and priorities of diverse segments within the military. Military leadership can effectively mitigate unprofessional themes in the military by implementing customised strate­gies. These strategies include leading by example, enforcing standards, pro­viding diversity and inclusion education, ensuring consistency, fostering accountability, addressing toxic leadership via training and intervention, promoting responsible alcohol consumption, nurturing collectivist values, and actively promoting equal opportunities for leadership roles. By empha­sising communication and accountability while conducting regular cultural assessments, military leadership can create a culture of professionalism, respect and inclusivity, in turn mitigating unprofessional behaviours within the organisation. Findings of the research align with the conclusions drawn by Brožic and Pešec (2017) in Teorija in Praksa, Brown et al. (2020) in Military Psychology, and Vuk and Galici (2022) in Teorija in Praksa. These studies point out the significance of equal treatment, and respect for the dignity and integrity of individuals in the workplace, which can have a profound impact on interest in the military profession and the retention of military personnel. Further, they highlight how workplace commanders or superiors can add signifi­cantly to the military culture and collective tolerance through their leader­ship. Important considerations and limitations While evaluating the results presented in this study, it is vital to consider several factors and limitations, particularly those stemming from external influences. For example, the release of news regarding the involvement of Albanian Air Force pilots in drug trafficking (Bushati et al., 2015; Ora News, 2015)1 or the news about cannabis being cultivated in the Zall Herr mili­tary barracks (Isa, 2023)2 may have influenced the participants’ responses. Another factor that should be taken into account is the research methodol­ogy, which was influenced by the gender perspective within the Albanian Armed Forces (Gender Perspective in the Albanian Armed Forces, 2013) to ensure a diversity of participants. A third significant factor tied to the inclusion of a variety of individuals is the sampling process, which aimed 1 On 29 January 2015, a helicopter carrying nearly 1 tonne of drugs from Morocco to Spain crashed into a high-voltage pole on the outskirts of Malaga, Spain. This incident occurred during a pursuit by the Spanish Civil Guard. The helicopter was being piloted by Major Sokol Feka, an active-duty pilot of the Albanian Armed Forces. Major Feka served as an instructor at an Albanian Air Force base. 2 During a police operation, 125 cannabis plants being cultivated at the Zall Herr military barracks were discovered, resulting in the arrest of 13 service members of different ranks in connection with the case. to gather feedback from specific groups (males and females of Roma com­munities – the least represented minority). However, there are certain con­straints in terms of the applicability of the findings to the entire AAF popula­tion, as well as the representativeness of the experiences of both men and women. Despite efforts to include a range of AAF members through the sampling method, only binary information regarding gender was collected. As a result, other gender identities could not be incorporated into the sam­pling technique, which is equally important for understanding a multitude of perspectives. Moreover, the study was unable to address intersectional­ity and its influence on opinions concerning military careers, professional identities, and experiences. Future studies should therefore explore how different gender identities and their intersections are affected by role mod­els in the professional realm. In fact, the primary objective of a qualitative study is to provide insights into the experiences of a subset of AAF mem­bers, which can subsequently shape future research inquiries. It is worth noting that military professionalism has been subject to numerous studies in the past five decades, and its definition has evolved considerably. While the findings cannot be extrapolated to encompass the entire AAF community, they do indicate that opinions and experiences of AAF personnel align with the conventional definition of military professionalism. Notably, leadership is considered one of the most pivotal factors in cultivating a diverse culture within the military. It has the potential to influence both professional and unprofessional behaviours alike. Conclusion This research focussed on exploring the diverse viewpoints of AAF members and their perceptions of professionalism and unprofessionalism. Employing a qualitative approach that incorporates the gender perspec­tive outlined in the 2013 report of the Albanian Armed Forces (Gender Perspective in the Albanian Armed Forces, 2013), the study involved inter­views and focus groups conducted throughout Albania. The role of leader­ship in conveying, comprehending and practising professional behaviour emerged as a critical factor. The research sheds light on several aspects of military professionalism and unprofessionalism, containing important considerations and pointing to future research in the field of military professionalism. Further research can help in gaining a deeper comprehension of how diversity contributes to, and to what extent different perspectives become integrated within, the traditional frameworks of military professionalism. BIBLIOGRAPHY Abbott, Andrew (1988): The Systems of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labour. Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd. Baka -Peço, E., E. Salihi and E. Leka (2011): Security reform issues in Albania – Institute for Democracy and Mediation. Institute for Democracy and Mediation. Accessible at https://idmalbania.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/security­reform-issues-in-albania-_Vol-1_2009.pdf, 14. 08. 2023. 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BOOK REVIEWS Christopher Blattman Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Piece Penguin Books UK, 2023 400 str., 15 EUR (ISBN 978-0-241-98925-8) Christopher Blattman is Canadi­an-American political scientist and economist specialising in a variety of issues, mostly global conflicts, inter­national development and poverty. Since 2016, he has been working as E. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies at the University of Chicago, the Harris School of Public Policy and the Pearson Institute. He is also known for his blog about internation­al relations and global development, which for over 15 years has been very popular. Blattman also regularly contributes to The New York Times, The Washington Post or Foreign Af­fairs Journal. By writing the book Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace as his first commercial book, Blattman’s aim was to bring his re­search and ideas closer to a general audience. In the presented book, the author deals with a framework to understand the reasons that drive violence and result in conflicts. On the other hand, Blattman attempts to offer solutions to achieve a stable environment through several strate­gies. The book combines knowledge from various disciplines, not only international relations, but also eco­nomics, sociology and history. Over 11 chapters, the author focuses on the importance of: the costs of wars, enforcement of values, sufficient ac­cess to information, motivation to en­ter conflicts, peace persisting, ensur­ing the stability of society, as well as many other phenomena associated with fights and peace. The book begins with a brief in­troductory chapter on game theory, serving as a foundation for a bet­ter understanding of the events de­scribed in subsequent chapters. In this part, the author also presents the concept of balance of power where he describes how actors can function stably in an uneven environment. At the end of the first chapter, reference is also made to the theory of realism – through the idea that an attack on another actor does not always have a bad intention. 875 The first section of the second chapter, entitled Unchecked Inter­ests, illustrates the causes of fighting with the example of Liberia. Liberia was selected as an example of many decolonised states where the au­tocratic leaders did not reflect the needs of society, which caused ris­ing tensions and led to a protracted civil war. In addition, Blattman notes that Africa is not the only region where a war bias is considered to be the cause of fights; it has happened throughout history all around the world. Unchecked interests, which are directly related to war bias, are presented by the author as one of the fundamental causes of the fights in pre-modern Europe and America; in Africa, the war bias, as a cause of wars, appeared just prior to post-co­lonial times. Alongside the events in Liberia, Blattman illustrates war bias by referring to events in medieval Italy and the fights for American in­dependence. This time difference is explained on the basis that war bias is the main cause of the conflicts when there is a lack of democracy, absence of rules as well as an excessive con­centration of power. The third chapter, Intangible In­centives, is devoted to non-material objectives, which also play a key role as a trigger for fights. Ideals and values, such as freedom and justice, proved to be crucial during the Arab Spring. The book points to the val­ues of unfairness and willingness as some of the major values that were the cause of many fights. The author describes the gain of better status and fame as other intangible motivations of the fight; this happened mainly during both world wars. Blattman further notes that the prospect of gaining fame and status is not only a trigger for wars, but also a means of keeping warriors motivated. The sec­ond part of the chapter refers to ide­ologies and their role as one cause of fights. The primary issue with ideolo­gy is considered to be the fact that its proponents often view the enforce­ment of their ideology as the only vi­able solution. At the end of the chap­ter, the author reflects on whether people are inherently violent, which he tries to point out through the the­ory of parochialism. The fourth chapter describes Un­certainty; according to Blattman, un­certainty stems chiefly from a lack of information. Uncertainty is also related to the fact that many actors deliberately send out mixed infor­mation about themselves in order to unsettle their rivals. In the book, un­certainty is also shown to be linked to the concept of reputation; the prob­lem is that reputation may not reflect the current conditions. As an exam­ple of uncertainty associated with a bad reputation, the author presents the USA’s invasion of Iraq. In that time, both sides were sending mixed signals to confuse the opponent and suffered reputational damage from their reckless actions. In the fifth chapter, the book deals with Commitment Problems, which are directly connected with leaders’ abilities and their responsibility for the decisions. It is stated that the most accurate example of commitment problems is a “preventive” war. It is interesting that the author considers Germany’s actions which started the First World War as a preventive act since Germany’s primary goal could have been to cause a shift in power. The violation of the Thirty Years Peace between Sparta and Athens is also mentioned as an example of commitment problems being the rea­son for the start of fighting. Despite the valid truce, Sparta pre-emptively attacked Athens with the aim of pre­venting Athens’ domination of the ancient Greek world. Civil wars are seen as an even more extreme exam­ple of commitment problems since the state is unable to fulfil its com­mitment to protect its population. At the end of the fifth part, readers can find reflections on the fact that many conflicts could have been avoided had the leaders better considered their actions; this is also linked to the observance of domestic and interna­tional commitments. The sixth part is entitled Misper­ceptions. In this chapter, Blattman deals with psychological and emo­tional aspects, which can have mas­sive impact on the start of fights. However, it is stated that the degree to which psychological and emotion­al factors are involved as triggers of fights is difficult to study since there are no quantifiable data. The author points to some interesting examples showing that there is almost no dif­ference between inexperience, panic, fear and self-preservation. The start of a fight is also caused because each actor might hold a different point of view on a given situation. The influ­ence of psychological factor is also described through group decision-making. The bigger the groups, the more the opinions of the members vary, which creates pressure to adopt the final decision. The last pages of the chapter describe how every per­son has certain tendencies towards hatred and destruction. However, as indicated in the book, whether and how strong they are manifested de­pends on the current circumstances. While the first part of the book is devoted to the causes of fighting, the second part documents the possibili­ties of peace strategies. The seventh chapter, Interdependence, begins with one of Ronald Reagan’s famous statements: “Peace is not the absence of conflict”. Based on some actions undertaken during Reagan’s presi­dency, the concept of détente is il­lustrated. Blattman builds on the idea that interdependence is an effective peace strategy when it benefits all actors involved. If the actors are iso­lated economically or politically, they are much more prone to provoke fights. Social interdependence is pre­sented as an effective strategy for preventing civil wars as the barriers between the population of the state are erased. The author also presents the concept of moral interdepend­ence, which is based on the premise that so long as dignity is granted to all people the level of violence will be lower. The eight chapter focuses on the concept of Checks and Balances, which is related to the decentralisa­tion of power. The author stresses that effective enforcement of the concept of checks and balances calls for transparent institutionalisation – whether on the corporate, sub-state, state or international level. The con­cept of checks and balances is also clarified via the theory of polycen­trism. Polycentrism refers to situa­tions, where polities with a lack of decentralisation of power (e.g., dic­tatorship or military juntas), are more susceptible to cause conflicts. The chapter ends with the author reflect­ing on the fact that the current setup of the international system supports greater centralisation, which can dis­rupt the stability of the international environment. The ninth chapter is dedicated to Rules and Enforcement; the existence of these two elements is necessary to maintain order in every society. Emphasis is placed on the thesis that society can these days only be fully stable if the state has full control over it and has effective mechanisms in place to enforce order. Hobbs’s theory of anarchy is used as proof of this statement, when in the absence of rules: “A man is a wolf to another man”. In the second part of the chap­ter, Blattman shows that the enforce­ment of rules on the international lev­el is much more difficult than on the state level. The reason for this is the non-existence of central authority, as well as the uneven distribution of power across almost 200 states. At the end of the eighth chapter, the author asks whether wars could be prevent­ed if there were some type of “world government”. Nevertheless, Blattman currently sees the effective function­ing of international and regional or­ganisations as the most effective way of preventing inter-state violence. The tenth chapter is concerned with Interventions and their contri­bution to obtaining and maintaining peace. Blattman illustrates peace­keeping interventions through five selected strategies – punishing, en­forcing, facilitating, incentivising and socialising. International/foreign sanctions are mentioned as an ex­ample of punishing. This section of­fers an interesting debate about the effectiveness of sanctions as well as whether excessive sanctions lead to an increase in tensions. Enforc­ing is presented through the actions of third parties – UN peacekeeping operations or humanitarian military interventions. Facilitating is illustrat­ed through using the art of media­tion; with mediation between Israel and Egypt or the situation in Liberia serving as examples. The idea of so­cialisation is discussed through the education of society towards non-vi­olence. The tenth part concludes with the incentivising strategy, which is connected with the idea of free elec­tions and their contribution to peace in society. The eleventh chapter, entitled Wayward Paths to War and Peace, offers an interesting perspective on changes in the organisation of so­ciety as possible tools for conflict prevention. Blattman first explains the strategy of putting more women in charge as a possible way of en­suring peace. In this case, it is men­tioned that, even though women have a greater inclination for paci­fism, whether leadership by a woman brings more peace would depend on the person involved. There is also an interesting view about whether reducing poverty would also lead to more peace, where once again the correlation is not confirmed. Here, the author also reflects on where the line is between the positive conse­quences of war and the share of the costs, whether financial or human. The final part of the book is en­titled The Peacemeal Engineer. In ten separate parts, Blattman tries to explain why social and political problems cannot be solved as easily as happens in other sectors. He also presents a theory about how difficult it is to resolve conflicts – although we have many examples of how peace was achieved, most situations are fundamentally different, and it is fre­quently impossible to apply previous solutions. In this context, the book ends with the author writing: “For the path of peace today there is no uni­versal template. I can give you some concepts, tools…”. A positive aspect of the book is that one can find many situations taken from everyday life being used as examples to ensure better under­standing of the motivations for the actions by important actors through­out history. Also interesting is the fact that at the beginning of several chap­ters the author describes a story from the environment of gangs, where he looks for subsequent parallels be­tween gang rivalries and conflicts on a much larger scale. Blattman thereby seeks to illustrate the situa­tions where the causes of ‘everyday’ violence are not so different from the causes of massive conflicts and their resolution. The book is recommended main­ly for because it offers many inter­esting instances and reflections that would be overlooked without the impulses that are mentioned. Chris­topher Blattman used his years of experience as a blog writer, as well as a contributor to major newspapers, to write an interesting and engaging book. While the peer-reviewed book is a valuable addition to the library of all students of social and politi­cal sciences, it is additionally recom­mended to anyone interested in the functioning of society and its chang­es that lead to either the unleashing of a conflict or the establishment of a path to peace. Tomáš ŽIPAJ Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani Mike Hulme Climate Change Isn’t Everything: Liberating Climate Politics from Alarmism Polity Press, Cambridge, 2023, 200 strani, Paperback 17,00 EUR (ISBN 9781509556168) Kako prepoznamo dobre knjige, še preden jih preberemo? Zame je priporocilo vedno na prvem mestu. Me je pa nekoliko presenetilo, ko je na dogodku Univerze v Mariboru De-dišcinska znanost in podnebne spre­membe Johanna Leissner (predstav­nica Inštituta Fraunhofer v Bruslju in aktivna clanica vec evropskih pobud na podrocju podnebnih sprememb in kulturne dedišcine) s posebno vznesenostjo priporocila relativno »staro« knjigo Mika Hulma Why We Disagree About Climate Change? (2009). Fotografijo naslovnice je na dogodku pospremila z besedami, da bi to knjigo moral prebrati vsak, ki deluje v polju podnebnih sprememb. Knjigo z ocitno družboslovnim, celo komunikološkim naslovom priporo­ca kemicarka, ki dela v humanistic­nem polju kulturne dedišcine? Hulme je res avtor, ki ga tudi jaz priporocam v branje vsem v polju t. i. »zelenega prehoda« – naravoslovcem morda še prej kot družboslovcem, ce­prav so teme izrazito družboslovne. Ko sem odložila Why We Disagree About Climate Change?, sem vzela v roke še druga njegova dela. Tudi njegovo zadnje delo z namenoma provokativnim naslovom Climate Change Isn’t Everything je vsekakor vredno branja, gre pa Hulme tokrat v svojem razmišljanju še precej dlje kot v preostalih delih, ceprav je osrednje ideje zacel izrisovati že v knjigah Why We Disagree About Climate Change? in Weathered: Cultures of Climate. Mike Hulme je vecino svojega živ­ljenja posvetil raziskovanju ucinkov podnebnih sprememb in opozarja­nju na njihove negativne posledice. Je profesor družbene geografije na Univerzi Cambridge s castitljivo zgo­dovino raziskovanja. Med drugim je bil med letoma 1995 in 2001 tudi clan Medvladnega panela za podnebne spremembe pri Združenih narodih (IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change) in je pomagal pri pisanju 2. in 3. porocila IPCC (2021 je izšlo 6. porocilo) – tistih dveh porocil, ki sta avtorjem IPCC leta 2007 »prislu­žila« Nobelovo nagrado za mir; med soprejemniki je bila tudi dr. Lucka Kajfež Bogataj. Ceprav je naslov mogoce brati dvoumno, pa Hulme nikakor ne go­vori o tem, da podnebne spremembe ne bi obstajale in da ne bi bile rezul­tat jasno znanih razlogov povecanih izpustov toplogrednih plinov. Tudi ne govori, da ni potrebno ukrepanje. Slednje v monografiji izrecno in vec­krat izpostavi, saj se zaveda, da bi bilo njegovo delo lahko hitro izrabljeno kot orožje v javni razpravi o podneb­nih spremembah v smislu pozicije t. i. »zanikovalca« podnebnih sprememb (angl. climate denayer). Pri cemer pa tudi ne nasprotuje javni razpravi, temvec nasprotno: celotno delo je prežeto z idejo pomembnosti javne razprave, saj bodo, opozarja, le na tak nacin politike podnebnih sprememb ubežale depolitizaciji. Depolitizacijo vidi v casovni in vsebinski zožitvi raz­prav o podnebnih spremembah. Casovno zožitev razprav vidi v alarmiranju, ko se s pritiskanjem za takojšnje in hitre odlocitve sprožajo ukrepi izrednega stanja, nevarnega za demokracijo. Na tem mestu pre­poznava, da se mu bo verjetno vsaj deloma upraviceno pripisovalo po­zicijo t. i. »upocasnitelja« (angl. »cli­mate delayer«), s tem ko opozarja na zmernost pri alarmiranju – ne zato ker ukrepanje ne bi bilo potrebno, temvec ker s pozivom na izredne razmere ožimo polje razmišljanja o podnebnih spremembah v urgentnih razmerah. Vsebinska zožitev razprav ima po njegovem mnenju vec razsežnosti, na tem mestu izpostavim tri: (a) v pou­darjanju enega cilja pred vsemi osta­limi, (b) v enovzrocnih obrazložitvah, ki kompleksne probleme ožijo zgolj na vidik podnebnih sprememb, in (c) v nedemokraticnem izkljucevanju drugace mislecih in dogmaticnemu sledenju lastnemu prepricanju. V prvi vrsti vidi vsebinsko zožitev razprav o podnebnih spremembah v priseganju na podnebne cilje nad vsemi ostalimi. Blaženje podnebnih sprememb ne bi smelo biti nad cilji, ki so vsebinski argumenti za blaženje podnebnih sprememb: dobrobit in zdravje ljudi, biodiverziteta, družbena pravicnost. Nabor tovrstnih argumen­tov je v prvi vrsti odvisen od vsako­kratnega vrednotnega sistema družb. Namesto priseganja na zgolj en cilj, ki da naj bo nad vsemi ostalimi, Hulme opozarja na pomembnost hkratnega prepoznavanja raznolikih ciljev. Bolj primeren kot je cilj 1,5°C povprecne globalne temperature nad industrij­sko dobo Pariškega sporazuma, je po Hulmu pristop SDG 2030 Ciljev trajnostnega razvoja do leta 2030, ki skrb za globalni ekosistem umešcajo ob skrb za socialne pravice in demo­kraticen razvoj družb. Hulme s tem razširi kritiko o tiraniji metrik(e), ki jo sicer poznamo iz kriticnih razprav o vsepomembnosti BDP-ja, tudi na podrocje podnebnih sprememb, pri cemer se boji, da v želji po cim vecji ucinkovitosti z osredotocanjem na zgolj en cilj (globalna povprecna tem­peratura ali svetovni ogljicni odtis) spregledamo inherentno kompleks­nost problemov in teh problemov v najboljšem primeru ne rešujemo, v najslabšem pa povzrocamo nove ali pa izvirni problem še poslabšamo. Prepoznavanje zgolj enega cilja pred vsemi ostalimi lahko namrec po Hulmu prehitro pripelje do per­verznih ucinkov: od maladaptacije do socialnih krivic ali celo vecje ener­getske odvisnosti od drugih držav, namesto manjše. Eden izmed prime­rov tovrstnih nezaželenih ucinkov je nenacrtovan rezultat zmanjšanja podpore zahodnih držav projektom, ki so povezani s fosilnimi gorivi v dr­žavah svetovnega juga. Kar 2,5 mili­jarde ljudi, približno 30% globalnega prebivalstva, živi v gospodinjstvih, ki za kuhanje uporabljajo odprti ogenj ali peci na kerozin, oglje, gnoj ali druge oblike biomase. Po podatkih WHO (v Hulme 2023, str. 126) lahko 3,8 milijona preranih smrti pripišemo tovrstnemu nacinu kuhanja, kar pri­marno zadeva ženske in otroke. Ker pa se je zmanjšala financna podpora zahodnih držav za projekte fosilnih goriv, je to vkljucevalo tudi podpo­ro menjavam nevarnih kuhalnikov za najcenejšo in glede na trenuten tehnološki razvoj najprimernejšo al­ternativo – gorilnike na plin. Slednji imajo sicer za približno 30 % manjše izpuste toplogrednih plinov kot alter­nativa, a še pomembneje: zamenjava ima izredno velike ucinke na zdravje in življenja predvsem žensk in otrok; njihova dobrobit je navadno prvi ar­gument, zakaj sploh v boj proti pod­nebnim spremembam. V knjigi so predstavljeni še drugi primeri, npr. v Evropi najbolj znan primer poslabša­nja stanja na globalnem trgu hrane in krcenju gozdov za monokulture v na­men biogoriv. Drugic in povezano, vsebinsko zožitev razprav o podnebnih spre­membah Hulme vidi v enovzrocni/ monokavzalni naravi podnebnih diskurzov. »Monokavzalne razlage so navadno napacne in vcasih ne­varne« (Hulme, 2023, str. 14). Mono­kavzalnost vidi v vse pogostejšem pripisovanju vzrokov za komplek­sne družbene fenomene podneb­nim spremembam, npr. razumevanje sirijske vojne kot posledice suše za­radi podnebnih sprememb – inter­pretacija, ki sicer ustreza Asadovemu režimu, saj spregleda pomembnost zgodovinskih odnosov v državi in politicno odgovornost režima. Drug zapomnljiv primer je vprašanje upravljanja delte reke Mekong, ki leži zgolj meter nad morsko gladino in se pocasi potaplja. Hulme opozori, da bi ozko razmišljanje o prihodnosti te delte naslovilo zgolj vprašanje dviga­nja morske gladine (napovedano za 30 do 70 cm v naslednjem stoletju). Ozka osredotocenost zgolj na vplive podnebnih sprememb na dvig mor­ske gladine bi usmerjala aktivnosti v globalno zmanjšanje ogljicnega od­tisa. Spregledala pa bi širšo in kom­pleksnejšo sliko stanja v delti in pri­mernega prepleta ukrepov: grajenje jezov onemogoca nanose sedimen­tov, rudarjenje v kanalih odnese 54 megaton peska vsako leto, intenzivna agrikultura in preprecevanje poplav sta nadomestila naravne vodne poti in mangrove z nasipi in akvakulturo, varovanje pred poplavami z betoni­ranjem nasipov pa z rigidnostjo vo­dnih strug pomeni še vec poplavlja­nja (Kondolf idr. 2022 v Hulme 2023, str. 158). Dvig morske gladine je torej zgolj manjši del mozaika trajnostnega upravljanja delte Mekonga. Kot tretje, depolitizacijo javne razprave o podnebnih spremembah Hulme prepoznava v drži »ce nisi z nami, si proti nam«. Hulme uvede koncept »ideologije klimatizma«, ki ga prepoznava v dogmaticnih dis­kurzih »vseobsegajocih narativ« in »polarizirajocega moralizma«. Prvo predstavlja podnebne spremembe kot enostavno in koherentno obra­zložitev delovanja sveta, drugo jasno zgodbarsko slikanje dobrega in zle­ga, oboje prepleteno z apokalipticno retoriko, ki ponuja religiji podobno dogmaticno iskanje smisla lastnega obstoja in politicne akcije. Vendar pa Hulme opozarja, da problem podnebnih sprememb ni enostavna zgodba zlikovcev proti pogumnim herojem, temvec komple­ksen (»wicked«) problem, za katerega ni ene enostavne rešitve, temvec mo­rajo v prvi vrsti biti prepoznane plu­ralnosti vrednot, možnosti specific­nih aplikacij in pluralnosti ciljev – kar Hulme imenuje »nerodne rešitve«. Z »nerodnimi rešitvami« se Hulme vrne k osrednjim idejam »Why We Disa­gree About Climate Change« in opo­zori na nujnost umešcanja podneb­nih sprememb v širše zgodovinske in politicne kontekste, predvsem pa v razmerja do drugih družbenih prob­lemov in ostalih družbenih trendov. Ce sklenem, Climate Cange Isn’t Everything je delo vredno branja, ki pomaga k refleksiji razlogov, zakaj se sploh borimo proti podnebnim spremembam. Monografijo v prvi vr­sti berem kot opozorilo o družbenih dejavnikih, v katere je umešcena raz­prava o podnebnih spremembah, s tem pa tudi kot poziv o pomembno­sti vloge družboslovnega in humani­sticnega pristopa k zelenemu preho­du. Odlikuje jo razumljiv, mestoma celo pogovorni slog pisanja. Posebno vrednost daje pisanju tudi neposred­no naslavljanje potencialnih protiar­gumentov in s tem preobrazba teksta iz monologa v razpravo z zamišljeni­mi kritiki (npr. »Ce se je treba zoper­staviti kapitalisticni potrošniški ideo­logiji, mar za družbeno mobilizacijo ne potrebujemo protiideologije, kot je klimatizem?«, str. 154). Prednost delu daje tudi prilože­no poglavje »Nadaljnje branje«, kjer nam Hulme predstavi osrednja pi­sanja, na katerih gradi kljucne ideje in predvsem vrednote lastnega pri­stopa. Pri tem pa naletimo tudi na eno izmed kljucnih pomanjkljivosti monografije – šele v tem priloženem poglavju izvemo zelo na kratko o tem, da svoje misli uvršca v »ekomo­dernizem«, ki da je »tretja pot« med la­issez-fair ekonomijo in antikapitaliz­mom. V monografiji pogrešam pred­vsem razpravo o tej poziciji in kako je usmerjala pisanje dela Climate Chan­ge Isn’t Everything. Maja TURNŠEK Univerza v Mariboru Fakulteta za turizem AUTHORS’ SYNOPSES / AVTORSKI POVZETKI Igor LUKŠIC: HEGELIANISM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE OF ADOLF BIBIC Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, Vol. LX, No. 4, pp. 593–616 Bibic encountered Hegel on several levels. He tackled Hegel directly in his PhD dissertation in which he studied the relationship between civil soci­ety and the state according to Hegel and Marx. Here he did not stop at the Philosophy of Law, but also tackled the Phenomenology of Spirit, namely, Hegel’s key work for entering the Hegelian way of thinking. In terms of the depth of theoretical elaboration the attachment to Hegel crystallised in the 20th century. The thought that bypasses Hegel’s legacy is shallow, the thought that at least tries to learn from Hegel intends to reach deep. Hegel places the state as the highest form in the development of the human being, the highest in the hierarchy of the forms of existence of the freedom of humanity. For him, politics not only resides in the state, but already begins in a natural and civil society form and, in the state as a global process, it shows its mastery. Slovenian political science is fortunate that its primary founder, Adolf Bibic, decided to base his politics on Hegel. Keywords: Hegel, Hegelianism, civil society, state, freedom Jure SMOLE, Boštjan UDOVIC: THE COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY OF SMALL COUNTRIES: A COMPARISON OF SLOVENIA, SERBIA AND AUSTRIA Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, Vol. LX, No. 4, pp. 617–640 The article seeks to analyse and compare the commercial diplomacy of three small countries – Austria, Slovenia and Serbia. The aim of our research is to establish whether and how various political and economic structures in different countries (Austria with a market-oriented economy, Slovenia as a post-transition country, Serbia as a transition one) influence commercial diplomacy. Comparative analysis based on a large number of interviews conducted with commercial diplomacy actors showed that: (1) the coun­try itself always has an influence regardless of the model used by the said countries for formulating their commercial diplomacy, especially when problems or complications arise in a target market (the ex-post approach); (2) each country analysed faces the same challenges related to commercial diplomacy, which do not arise from their particular economic and political system, but from the international environment and the export/import or investment activities of companies; and (3) as concerns the conceptualisa­tion and operationalisation of commercial diplomacy within the study of diplomacy, there is still a lot of missing research that would allow it to be generally accepted because commercial diplomacy and its associated con­cepts have yet to be uniformly conceptualised, hierarchised and included in the canon of diplomatic studies in the 20 years since the field started to be actively researched. Keywords: commercial diplomacy, Austria, Slovenia, Serbia, diplomatic studies Žiga SELAN, Janja VUGA BERŠNAK: DEPRESSION AMONG FIRST RESPONDERS DURING THE PANDEMIC COMPLEX CRISIS: CASE STUDY AMONG SLOVENIAN HEALTHCARE WORKERS, MILITARY AND POLICE Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, Vol. LX, No. 4, pp. 641–659 The pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus did not spare Slovenia. On the contrary, it called for a long-term and exhausting response from employees in certain critical professions. During the pandemic, noting the restrictions and need for a greater volume of work, they were exposed to a series of factors that affected their health and general well-being. In the article, we present self-assessments obtained with the help of a quantita­tive measurement instrument of employees in critical professions (medical personnel, police officers, members of the Slovenian Armed Forces) with regard to their feelings of stress, strain and depression during the select­ed period of the pandemic, between March 2020 and June 2022. The sur­vey shows that 30% of respondents in a critical profession felt depressed. Further, the results show a correlation between depression and pandemic factors (r = .567, p = < 0.01) in all professions under study. Keywords: critical professions, pandemic, mental health, depression, stress Brina MALNAR: PODPORA POLITIKAM BLAŽITVE PODNEBNIH SPREMEMB: ŠTUDIJA 64 CLANKOV S PODATKI IZ MODULA EVROPSKE DRUŽBOSLOVNE RAZISKAVE 2016 Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, let. LX, št. 4, str. 664–690 Clanek je metaanaliza znanstvenih clankov na podatkih modula Evropske družboslovne raziskave »Klimatske spremembe«. Cilj je bil strniti kljucne individualne in institucionalne dejavnike, ki oblikujejo posamezni­kova okoljska stališca, ravnanja in podporo politikam, ter ublažiti problem razdrobljenosti izsledkov pri pretoku znanja med akademsko in javnopo­liticno sfero. Rezultati, predstavljeni v obliki hevristicnega modela, izpo­stavijo pomen ozavešcenosti, zaupanja in socialnopoliticnih dejavnikov in izrišejo kompleksen odnos med stališci do podnebnih sprememb, custveno angažiranostjo in javnopoliticnimi preferencami posameznika. Z metodo metaanaliticne sinteze razpršenih izsledkov je študija razpoznala kljucne ovire, s katerimi se srecujejo evropski nosilci odlocanja pri uveljavljanju ukrepov za blažitev podnebnih sprememb. Kljucni pojmi: podnebne spremembe, okoljsko ravnanje, okoljske poli­tike, Evropska družboslovna raziskava Slavko KURDIJA, Tadej BEVK: CLIMATE CHANGE AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, Vol. LX, No. 4, pp. 691–716 The article presents survey findings concerning public attitudes to renew­able energy sources (RES) (SJM 2019/1) within the context of cross-national climate change comparisons from the ESS 2016 Climate Change module. The results indicate a high level of public agreement with the climate change paradigm, yet reticence with respect to concrete environmental measures. Similar findings emerge in the RES study, which shows a strong preference for the wind and solar scenarios, presented in more detail from the public’s perspective, with the advantages and disadvantages. However, when analys­ing the specific spatial implementation, public opinion slowly has slipped from an environmental to an economic mentality. A comparative analysis of ESS data provides a similar impression, especially when looking at the differences between developed Western European/Nordic countries and Central/Eastern European countries. The authors stress that environmental transformation (including RES implementation) will not be successful with­out a broader transformation of society which ensures that the benefits and risks are equitably distributed. Keywords: climate change, renewable energy, ESS, public opinion, wind farm, solar farm, spatial effects Marko POLIC, Matija SVETINA: THE IMPORTANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS FOR LIFE SATISFACTION Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, Vol. LX, No. 4, pp. 717–728 In this article, we present analysis of SJM data from 2011 to 2020, explor­ing the link between attitudes to environmental concerns and subjec­tive well-being/life satisfaction. The findings reveal that, while individuals exhibit awareness of environmental issues, these concerns tend to be per­ceived as abstract and remote. Overall life satisfaction places less emphasis on environmental considerations, prioritising day-to-day worries like per­sonal health and finances. We discuss these observations with respect to the Composite Levels Theory. Further, we discuss the potential impact of weather-related challenges in 2022 and 2023 – such as higher temperatures, reduced rainfall, and flooding – on shaping future environmental attitudes. Keywords: well-being, ecosystem services, environmental psychology, climate change, positive psychology, composite level theory Marjan MALEŠIC: PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN SLOVENIA Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, Vol. LX, No. 4, pp. 729–752 This study examines the undeniable connections between environ­mental and security issues in contemporary society, supported by scien­tific analyses. We specifically investigate the Slovenian public’s awareness of these connections through data analysis of SJM surveys (2020/3 and 2011/1) regarding attitudes to environmental problems. While we observe increasing sensitivity to environmental issues, public concern does not align with the severity of climate disasters, environmental terrorism, crime, civil-unrest-related violence, environmental refugees, and associated armed conflicts. Some of these phenomena have already impacted Slovenia’s secu­rity. Although the public acknowledges environmental problems, the conse­quences are insufficiently connected to daily lives, including security con­siderations. Keywords: environment, environmental problems, threats, environmen­tal security, public, perception Sonja BEZJAK, Janez ŠTEBE: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEMATIC DATA COLLECTIONS AS A PLATFORM FOR BRINGING RESEARCHERS TOGETHER: THE CASE OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH IN SLOVENIA Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, Vol. LX, No. 4, pp. 753–774 Environmental data can be an important element in advancing knowl­edge to address the challenges and questions we face at the beginning of the 21st century. This article reflects on how to conceptualise and what to include in an environmental database to engage different stakeholders and contribute to building a broad community of stakeholders. In our data-intensive era, data archives are a platform for connecting data producers and data users, researchers, research infrastructures, public services, citizen scientists and others. Accessible and transparent data and other data-related services contribute to interdisciplinary collaboration and the implementa­tion of inclusive open science. Keywords: climate change, environment, data centres, research data, citi­zens’ science, social science concepts Anton BEBLER: VOJNA V UKRAJINI V PRIMERJALNI PERSPETIVI Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, let. LX, št. 4, str. 775–786 Vojna v Ukrajini je postala najvecja, najbolj krvava in najdaljša vojna v Evropi po letu 1945. Njena prva faza je kazala vec podobnosti z oborože­nimi spopadi in vojnami na Cipru in prostorih nekdanje Sovjetske zveze ter SFRJ. Med jugoslovanskimi primeri je bila najbolj podobna vojni na Hrvaškem (1991–1995). Ta podobnost je izvirala iz skoraj socasnega razpa­da dveh strukturno podobnih vecnacionalnih »socialisticnih federacij« in nji­hovih komunisticnih režimov. Razlicnost med drugo fazo vojne v Ukrajini in vojno na Hrvaškem je bila tesno povezana s procesom širjenja NATA in EU ter s politiko ZDA, ki je širjenje NATA in Ukrajino uporabljala kot orodje za škodovanje in slabitev Rusije. Konflikt okoli Ukrajine in njej obljubljenega clanstva v NATU se je tako degeneriral v posredno vojno med Rusko fede­racijo in Zahodom pod vodstvom ZDA ter Ukrajino v vlogi agenta Zahoda in glavne žrtve prave vojne. Tako kot se je zgodilo na Hrvaškem avgusta leta 1995 in v Azerbajdžanu v septembru 2023, bo o izidu vojne v Ukrajini odlo­ceno na vojskovališcu in ne za diplomatsko mizo. Toda ta izid bo povsem drugacen od izida na Hrvaškem. Odgovornost za vojno v Ukrajini in njene posledice si delijo dve vojskujoci državi in posredno soodgovorne ZDA in druge clanice NATA. Kljucni pojmi: Ukrajina, Rusija, Hrvaška, ZDA, NATO, notranja vojna, meddržavna vojna Ajda HEDŽET: DRŽAVOCENTRICNOST V MEDNARODNIH ODNOSIH: ANALIZA KONSTRUKCIJE NEDRŽAVNIH KOLEKTIVNIH AKTERJEV V ŠTUDIJAH CLOVEKOVIH PRAVIC Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, let. LX, št. 4, str. 787–813 Clanek proucuje vrzel v študijah clovekovih pravic na podrocju Med­narodnih odnosov (MO) z analizo napredka v teoriji MO, ki je pripomogel k uveljavitvi nevladnih kolektivnih akterjev kot relevantnih objektov prouce­vanja v MO. S poglobljeno študijo konceptualizacije kolektivnih nedržavnih akterjev v konstruktivisticnem teoreticnem pristopu in z analizo omejitev tega pristopa clanek obravnava posledice obstojece konceptualizacije za marginalizacijo nevladnih kolektivnih akterjev v teoriji MO. Clanek ugotav­lja, da bi razširitev teoreticnega razumevanja, ki se osredinja na konstitucijo razlicnih kolektivnih akterjev in njihovo sposobnost delovanja, obogatila študije clovekovih pravic v MO. Poleg tega ponudi premislek o oblikovanju raziskovalne agende, utemeljene na socioloških teoretskih pristopih, ki so usmerjeni v analizo praks. Te bi lahko prispevale k obogatitvi študij clove­kovih pravic v MO s spodbujanjem interdisciplinarnih razprav ter presega­njem obstojecih omejitev na znanstvenih in disciplinarnih podrocjih. Kljucni pojmi: nedržavni akterji, državocentricnost, mednarodni odnosi, clovekove pravice, mednarodni akterji, konstruktvizem Jernej PIKALO, Petra PODOBNIKAR: METAFORA KOT POLITICNA TEHNOLOGIJA Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, let. LX, št. 4, str. 814–832 Razprava o politicnih metaforah so plodna podlaga za razumevanje vpra­šanj v politicni teoriji in politicni praksi. Clanek se odmika od uveljavljenih teoretskih in metodoloških pristopov k obravnavi politicne metafore (npr. klasicnega, konceptualnega, hermenevticnega, kognitivnega) in vpeljuje (post)strukturalisticne in (post)marksisticne metodološke in teoretske pod­lage. Zagovarja, da so uveljavljeni pristopi k preucevanju funkcionalnosti in ontologij politicnih metafor možni predvsem z raziskovanjem njihovega delovanja v politicnih diskurzih in kot dogodka(ov) v dispozitivu oblasti/ resnice. Metafore je mogoce obravnavati kot specificne politicne tehnologi­je (strategije oblasti), ki vplivajo/ustvarjajo režime resnice. Kljucni pojmi: politicne metafore, politicna teorija, teorije jezika, politicni diskurz, oblast, vednost Simona KUKOVIC, Jelena JOKSIMOVIC: PROTOKOLARNA DARILA – LEPA GESTA ALI POTENCIALNO TVEGANJE? NESKLADNOSTI PRI POROCANJU DARIL V SLOVENIJI Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, let. LX, št. 4, str. 833–855 Integriteta in transparentnost sta bistvena elementa sodobnih demo­kraticnih držav, zaupanje v politicno-upravne institucije pa je treba zasle­dovati in ohranjati na vsakem koraku, tudi pri porocanju o protokolarnih darilih. Protokolarna darila so kljub (pogosto) problematicnim konotacijam eden kljucnih elementov pri gradnji trdnih odnosov, od najvišjih položajev v politiki in diplomaciji do najožjih javnih uslužbencev. Clanek obravnava nabor prijavljenih daril v Republiki Sloveniji. S poglobljeno statisticno ana­lizo so avtorji ugotovili nepravilnosti pri porocanju o protokolarnih darilih, predvsem pomanjkljive opise daril in problematicno ocenjevanje vrednosti daril, ki je v vecini primerov prepušceno laikom. Avtorji ugotavljajo, da se pojavljajo težave pri implementaciji normativnega okvira, saj se pri poroca­nju protokolarnih daril upoštevajo predvsem tehnicni, manj pa tudi vsebin­ski vidiki. Kljucni pojmi: protokolarna darila, porocanje, anomalije, preglednost, zaupanje, Slovenija Mimoza BUDECI: KAKO RAZNOLIKOST SKUPIN TER VIDIK SPOLA VPLIVATA NA VOJAŠKO PROFESIONALNOST IN KAKO RAZLICNE SKUPINE DOJEMAJO KONCEPT PROFESIONALNOSTI? Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2023, let. LX, št. 4, str. 856–874 Obstaja majhno število raziskav o tem, kako raznolikost skupin ter vidik spola vplivata na vojaško profesionalnost in kako razlicne skupine dojema­jo koncept profesionalnosti. Ta študija je preucevala poglede razlicnih sku­pin znotraj albanskih oboroženih sil (AOS) na vojaško profesionalnost in neprofesionalnost z uporabo kvalitativnega pristopa. Da bi zagotovila ude­ležbo raznolikih skupin, je študija temeljila na konstruktivisticni paradigmi (vec realnosti) z uporabo porocila Vidik spola v albanskih oboroženih silah (2013). Omenjeno porocilo pomaga opredeliti razlicne ucinke raziskav skozi vidik spola. V intervjujih in fokusnih skupinah je od oktobra 2022 do avgusta 2023 sodelovalo 150 posameznikov. Rezultati so pokazali, da obsta­jajo edinstveni vidiki, povezani s profesionalnostjo in neprofesionalnostjo, pri cemer ima voditeljstvo kljucno vlogo. Ta študija osvetljuje izkušnje pri­padnikov in kako njihove izkušnje oblikujejo dojemanje profesionalnosti. Kljucni pojmi: albanske oborozene sile (AOS), vojaška profesionalnost, kvalitativna raziskava, raznolikost SEZNAM RECENZENTK IN RECENZENTOV CLANKOV LETNIKA LX AMON PRODNIK, Jernej BURGER, Anže FAGANEL, Armand FARCNIK, Daša GARB, Maja GRIZOLD, Anton GRUŠOVNIK, Tomaž HADALIN, Jurij HAFNER-FINK, Mitja HLEBEC, Valentina HOCEVAR, Marko IGNJATOVIC, Miroljub ISTENIC, Tanja JAKEŠEVIC, Ružica JELUŠIC, Ljubica JOGAN, Maca JUVAN, Jelena KALIN-GOLOB, Monika KAVCIC, Matic KOGOVŠEK, Tina KOMEL, Mirt KOSTEVC, Crt KRPIC, Tomaž KUHAR, Metka KUHAR, Roman KURDIJA, Slavko KURNIK, Andrej LENGAR VEROVNIK, Tina LESKOŠEK, Vesna LUKŠIC, Igor LUTHAR, Breda MALI, Franc MALI, Jana MALNAR, Brina MANDIC, Srna MITREVSKA, Marina PAVLIN, Samo PEVCIN, Primož PIKALO, Jernej POLIC, Marko POPOVIC, Petar PRAŠNIKAR, Janez RAJGELJ, Barbara RAKAR, Tatjana RAŠKOVIC, Matevž SOBOCAN, Ana Marija STANKOVIC, Peter SVETINA, Mitja SVETLICIC, Marjan ŠVAB, Alenka TOMC, Gregor TRDINA, Andreja TUŠKEJ LOVŠIN, Urška UDOVIC, Boštjan UHAN, Samo ULE, Mirjana URŠIC, Matjaž VEHOVAR, Vasja ZUPANCIC, Rok ŽIVODER, Andreja KAZALO LX. LETNIKA TEORIJE IN PRAKSE B Bebler, Anton The war in Ukraine in a comparative perspective Beidollahkani, Arash The regularity of political science in South Korean and Taiwan academic contexts: Reasons and consequences Bešter, Janez managerske napovedi in dejanski ucinki pandemije COVIDA-19 na slovenska podjetja Bezjak, Sonja, Janez Štebe Interdisciplinarne tematske zbirke podatkov kot platforma povezovanja raziskovalcev: primer raziskav o okolju v Sloveniji Bezlaj, Lucija Zala Interpelacija ucencev in ucenk v nosilce clovekovih pravic: retoricna analiza ucne priprave Budeci, Mimoza The ways diversity and gender affect military professionalism and how diverse groups perceive this concept D Dokmanovic, Mirjana, Neven Cveticanin Regulation of the use of facial recognition technology – limitations and challenges from a human rights perspective Durnik, Mitja has the liberal internationalist conception of the EU’s foreign policy made it incapable of acting in international conflicts? E Erjavec, Eva, Tjaša Redek Impact of digitalisation and investments in intangible capital on the non-financial performance of firms in Slovenia F Ferbežar, Nika, Marko Gavriloski Rezilientnost LGBTQ+ mladih v okviru vzgoje in izobraževanja: integrativni pregled literature Fetoshi, Arben, Dren Gërguri Agenda setting about the war in Ukraine: the impact of television in Kosovo H Hedžet, Ajda State-centrism in international relations: examining the construction of nonstate collective actors in human rights scholarship Št. revije Št. strani 4 775–786 1 90–108 3 392–412 4 753–774 3 413–440 4 856–874 3 548–564 1 5–23 1 109–135 1 151–169 1 68–89 4 787–813 J Jeretic, Sebastjan hegemony, morality and emotions: power in the neural architecture of the human mind K Kalin Golob, Monika, Boštjan Udovic In memoriam Tomo Korošec (1938–2022) Kalin Golob, Monika O stilistiki in njenem pomenu: jezikoslovna disciplina v družbi 21. stoletja Kovacic, Helena Occupational health in Slovenia Kržišnik, Erika Nekaj stalnih, nekaj nevarnih in nekaj težavnih lastnosti rabe frazeologije v medijskih besedilih Kukovic, Simona, Jelena Joksimovic Ceremonial gifts – nice gesture or potential risk? Gift reporting discrepancies in Slovenia Kurdija, Slavko, Tadej Bevk Podnebne spremembe in odnos javnosti do rabe obnovljivih virov energije L Lengar Verovnik, Tina Vprašalni nagovori in druge besedilotvorne strategije v intervjujih na radiu in- v podkastu: sredstvo žanra ali znak konverzacionalizacije? Ljubotina, Predrag, Andrej Raspor Deležniki slovenske glasbene industrije v kriznih razmerah Lukšic, Igor heglovstvo v politologiji Adolfa Bibica M Malcic, Matevž Political polarisation in Slovenia and its effects on liberal democracy Malešic, Marjan Javnomnenjska zaznava okoljske varnosti v Sloveniji Malnar, Brina Iskanje poti od okoljske ozavešcenosti do podpore okoljskim politikam: kaj nam povedo podatki družboslovnih anket? (Uvodnik) Malnar, Brina Informing climate mitigation policies: a scoping study based on 64 articles using the 2016. European social survey rotating module Št. revije 1 2 2 1 2 4 4 2 3 4 1 4 4 4 Št. strani 48–67 199–202 203–220 136–150 221–236 833–855 691–716 237–252 441–459 593–616 24–47 729–752 660–663 664–690 P Pikalo, Jernej, Petra Podobnikar metaphor as a political technology Polic, Marko, Matija Svetina Pomen okoljskih vprašanj pri zadovoljstvu z življenjem Popov, Maxim Authoritarian liberalism, ordoliberal rationality and the european integration project Potocnik, Gregor The legal status of alien combatants in the Ukrainian armed forces within the context of the international judicial reality R Ramet, P. Sabrina Spinoza, liberalism and ‘the class of 1632’ Rasya, Natasya, M. M. Ngatno, Bulan Prabawani The effect of greenwashing perception, green word of mouth, and green marketing on h&m purchase intentions in Jakarta Rozman, Tadeja Odgovorno z jezikom – družbena vloga jezikovnopoliticnega portala S Selan, Žiga, Janja Vuga Beršnak Prisotnost depresije v izbranih kriticnih poklicih v obdobju pandemije v Sloveniji: primer zdravstvenega osebja, pripadnikov in pripadnic slovenske vojske ter policistov in policistk Sherifi, Zana, Elmedina Nikoceviq-Kurti Attitudes of economics students to searching for jobs through social media: the case of Kosovo Smole, Jure, Boštjan Udovic Gospodarska diplomacija majhnih držav v primerjalni perspektivi: primer Slovenije, Srbije in Avstrije Stanic, Sanja Exploitation of children in the 21st century – socially neglected childhoods Š Šadl, Zdenka, Maja Osolnik Emotional labour and emotional burnout: empirical analysis of service sector employees Šterbenc, Primož Afganistan: kako razumeti odnos talibanov do žensk Št. revije Št. strani 4 814–832 4 717–728 3 475–492 2 316–333 2 295–315 3 460–474 2 281–294 4 641–659 3 532–547 4 617–640 3 493–513 3 355–373 Št. revije Št. strani U Udovic, Boštjan “Le vstani, vbrni národ moj, do dánes v prah teptán”: o nastajanju diplomatske terminologije na slovenskem in njenih zagonetkah 2 253–268 V Vuk, Pavel Prispevek Colina Graya k sodobni strateški misli in teoriji strategije 3 374–391 Ž Žele, Andreja Clenki: slovarski prikaz njihove pragmaticne moci oz. sobesedilne vloge 2 269–280 NAVODILA AVTORICAM IN AVTORJEM Teorija in praksa sprejema v presojo za objavo izvirna znanstvena bese­dila, ki še niso bila objavljena drugje ali niso v recenzentskem postopku pri kateri drugi znanstveni reviji oziroma monografiji. Objava clanka ali knjižne recenzije v Teoriji in praksi je brezplacna. Besedilo pošljite na elektronski naslov teorija.praksa@fdv.uni-lj.si. Besedilo naj bo v formatu A4 z 1,5-vrsticnim razmikom, tip crk Times New Roman, velikost 12, obojestransko poravnano, z robovi 2,5 cm. Vse strani besedila morajo biti zaporedno oštevilcene. Ime in priimek avtorice/avtorja naj bo izpisano na posebni naslovni strani pod naslovom prispevka, skupaj s strokovnim nazivom in trenutno zaposlitvijo, s polnim naslovom, telefonsko številko in naslovom elektronske pošte. Priimek avtorice oziroma avtorja naj bo izpisan z velikimi tiskanimi crkami. Prva oziroma zacetna stran besedila naj vsebuje le naslov besedila in povzetek besedila. Besedilo mora spremljati izjava avtorice oziroma avtorja, da besedilo še ni bilo objavljeno oziroma ni v pripravi za tisk pri kateri drugi znanstveni reviji ali monografiji. Avtorica/ avtor naj v izjavi navede svoj predlog uvrstitve besedila v skladu s tipologijo dokumentov/del (izvirni, pregledni clanek ali knjižna recenzija) za vodenje bibliografij v sistemu COBISS. O koncni uvrstitvi odloca uredništvo revije. CLANKI Znanstveni clanki v slovenskem ali angleškem jeziku naj ne presegajo 6.500 besed. V kolikor želi avtorica oziroma avtor objaviti daljše besedilo, naj se o tem predhodno posvetuje z glavnim urednikom. Clanek naj bo opremljen s povzetkom v slovenskem in angleškem jeziku v obsegu do 100 besed. Pov­zetek naj vsebuje natancno opredelitev teme besedila, metodo argumenta­cije in zakljucke. Avtorica/avtor naj navede tudi do sedem kljucnih pojmov, tako v slovenskem kakor tudi v angleškem jeziku. Naslovi morajo biti jasni in povedni. Glavni naslov, izpisan s krepkimi velikimi tiskanimi crkami, ne sme presegati dolžine 100 znakov. Besedila, daljša od 1.500 besed, morajo vsebovati podnaslove, ki so lahko najvec dvonivojski. Podnaslovi druge ravni naj bodo tiskani poševno. Tabele, grafi in slike morajo biti izdelani kot priloge (in ne vkljuceni v besedilo) z jasnimi naslovi, pri cemer naj avtorica/avtor uporabi velike tiskane crke v poševnem tisku; biti morajo zaporedno oštevilceni (Slika 1: NASLOV SLIKE, Graf 2: NASLOV GRAFA, Tabela 3: NASLOV TABELE). Vsaka tabela in slika mora biti izpisana na posebnem listu papirja. V besedilu naj bo okvirno oznaceno mesto, kamor sodi. Avtorica/avtor naj pri vsaki tabeli, grafu in sliki opredeli, koliko prostora zavzema v besedilu. Tabele, grafe in slike naj avtorica/avtor šteje v obseg besedila bodisi kot 250 besed (pol strani) ali 500 besed (celotna stran). Pod tabelami in grafi je potrebno nave­sti vir. Navedba vira naj se zakljuci s piko. Uporabljajte orodje za oblikova­nje tabel v programu Word. Tabela 1: UCINEK ODBOROV Regulativni ucinek Mešani ucinek Distribucijski ucinek BUDG, TRAN, IMCO, ECON, ENVI, ITRE, LIBE EMPL, AGRI, PECH, REGI JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA Vir: Yordanova, 2009: 256. Opombe morajo biti v besedilu jasno oznacene z zaporednimi števil­kami od zacetka do konca, napisane na ustreznem mestu v besedilu in po enakem vrstnem redu razvršcene pod besedilom. Število in dolžina opomb naj bo omejena. Opomba o avtorici/avtorju in morebitna zahvala naj vklju­cujeta informacije o organizacijski pripadnosti avtorice/avtorja, ki so rele­vantne za obravnavano problematiko v besedilu, ter o financnih in drugih pomoceh pri pripravi besedila. Dobesedni navedki, ki so dolgi tri ali vec vrstic, naj bodo postavljeni v poseben odstavek, robovi odstavka naj bodo obojestransko zamaknjeni, besedilo naj bo v poševnem tisku in brez narekovajev. Ce so gibanja za pravice vložila svoja telesa v aktivizem in mobilizira­nje novih oblik diskurza, da bi tako omajala njihovo marginalizacijo in zatiranje, so filozofske in teoretske kritike kartezijanstva na novo pre­tehtale subjekt in ga opredelile kot hkrati razsredišcenega (ki v sebi ni v celoti koherenten) In utelešenega (ne cisti “kogito”). (Jones, 2002: 239) RECENZIJE KNJIG TIP sprejema v objavo recenzije domacih in tujih znanstvenih del, ki niso starejša od dveh let. Recenzija naj ne bo daljša od 1.500 besed. V recenziji naj se avtorica/avtor dosledno izogiba navajanju literature in virov. Recen­zija naj ne vsebuje naslova ali podnaslovov. Na zacetku recenzije naj navede podatke o sebi in recenzirani knjigi v spodaj navedeni obliki: Ime PRIIMEK Institucionalna pripadnost Ime in priimek avtorja knjige Naslov knjige: podnaslov Založnik, Kraj letnica objave, število strani, cena (ISBN številka) Janez NOVAK Fakulteta za družbene vede, UL Eviatar Zerubavel Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past The University of Chicago Press, Chicago in London 2003, 184 str., 25.00 $ (ISBN 0-226-98152-5) NAVAJANJE Osnovna oblika reference v besedilu je (Novak, 1994). Za navajanje strani naj avtorica oziroma avtor uporablja naslednjo obliko navajanja: (Novak, 1994: 27–29). Ce sta avtorja reference dva, naj avtorica oziroma avtor navede oba: (Novak in Kosec, 2007). Ce je avtorjev reference vec, naj se v tekstu uporablja naslednja oblika navajanja: (Novak et al., 1994: 27), v seznamu LITERATURE pa naj se navedejo vsi avtorji. Ce avtorica oziroma avtor besedila ne uporablja prve izdaje knjige, naj pri navajanju zabeleži tudi letnico prve izdaje: (Novak, 1953/1994: 7). Vec referenc hkrati naj avtorica oziroma avtor loci s podpi­cjem: (Novak, 1994: 7; Kosec, 1998: 3–4; 2005: 58). Pri navajanju vecjega šte­vila referenc enega avtorja, objavljenih v istem letu, naj avtorica oziroma avtor reference med seboj loci s crkami a, b, c itd.: (Novak, 1994a: 27–29; Novak, 1994b: 1), in sicer v zaporedju, v kakršnem se prvic pojavijo v besedilu. Seznam referenc sodi na konec besedila in naj ima podnaslov LITERATURA. V seznam referenc naj avtorica oziroma avtor vkljuci vso uporabljeno literaturo. Morebitne vire naj navede za seznamom referenc, in sicer s podnaslovom VIRI. Seznam referenc mora biti urejen po abecednem redu priimkov avtorjev referenc ter v primeru istega avtorja po casovnem zaporedju izdaj. Knjige Priimek, ime (letnica izdaje knjige): Naslov knjige: Podnaslov. Kraj: Založba. Geertz, Clifford (1980): Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zborniki Priimek, Ime (ur.) (letnica izdaje knjige): Naslov knjige: Podnaslov. Kraj: Založba. Featherstone, Mike (ur.) in Mike Hepworth (ur.) (1991): The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory. London: SAGE Publications. Samostojni sestavek ali poglavje v monografiji Priimek, Ime (letnica izdaje monografije): Naslov prispevka v zborniku. V: Ime Priimek urednika (ur.), Naslov zbornika, strani prispevka. Kraj: Založba. Palan, Ronen (1999): Global Governance and Social Closure or Who is to Governed in an Era of Global Governance? V: Martin Hewson (ur.) in Thimothy J. Sinclar (ur.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory, 55–72. Albany: State University New York Press. Clanki Priimek, Ime (letnica izida clanka): Naslov clanka. Ime revije letnik (šte­vilka): strani. Bachrach, Peter in Morton S. Baratz (1963): Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework. American Political Science Review 57 (3): 632–42. Svetovni splet (WWW) Priimek, Ime (letnica): Naslov. Dostopno prek Internetni naslov, datum dostopa. Deluze, Gilles (1978): Spinoza. Dostopno prek http://www.imaginet.fr/ deluze/TXT/420178.html, 10. 1. 2001. Viri Avtorica/avtor je sam odgovoren za spoštovanje materialnih in moralnih avtorskih pravic, povezanih z uporabo podatkov, datotek, reprodukcij in del (v nadaljevanju vir) drugih fizicnih in pravnih oseb v njegovem clanku. Avtorstvo vira, ki ga avtorica oziroma avtor uporablja v clanku in ki ni plod njegovega raziskovalnega dela, mora biti jasno razvidno v obliki ustreznega navajanja vira v seznamu VIROV in v navajanju vira v besedilu clanka. Avtorica oziroma avtor naj smiselno navede cim vec podatkov o viru, kot so na primer avtor vira, mesto oziroma institucija, v kateri se vir nahaja, naslov, ime ali opis vira, evidencna številka vira, naslov spletne strani, kraj in leto nastanka vira in podobno. Pri tem je smiselnost navajanja opredeljena kot zmožnost sledenja viru oziroma zmožnost intersubjektivne preverljivo­sti uporabljenega vira. Avtorica oziroma avtor naj navede tudi datum, ko je bil vir pridobljen, ce gre za elektronski vir. Priimek, Ime (letnica nastanka vira): Naslov/nosilec vira. Mesto hranjenja vira. Dostopno prek Internetni naslov, datum dostopa. Koprivec, Daša (2005–2008): Avdio kasete. Kustodiat za slovenske izse­ljence in zamejce SEM. Dostopno prek http://www.imaginet.fr/deluze/ TXT/420178.html, 10. 1. 2010. ali Luthar, Breda, Samo Kropivnik, Tanja Oblak, Blanka Tivadar, Mirjana Ule, Slavko Kurdija in Samo Uhan (2006): Življenjski stili v medijski družbi 2001. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. Ce gre za vir iz zasebnega arhiva avtorja clanka, kakega drugega razi­skovalca ali posameznika, naj bo to jasno navedeno. Navajanje identitete lastnika vira iz zasebnega arhiva je zaželeno, vendar ne nujno, kadar gre za zašcito njegovih materialnih pravic ali varovanje njegove osebne identitete. Priimek, Ime morebitnega avtorja (morebitna letnica nastanka vira): Ime ali opis vira/arhivska številka. Mesto hranjenja vira. Zasebni arhiv. Zbirka navijaških šalov. Avtoštoparski muzej, Kanal ob Soci. Zasebni arhiv Mirana Ipavca. ali Zbirka pisem Janeza Novaka. 1953–1989. Privatni arhiv. Avtorica oziroma avtor naj v primeru znanega avtorja in leta nastanka vira uporabi enako dolocilo o navajanju v besedilu clanka, kot je to v primeru navajanja clanka, prispevka v monografiji ali monografije. Kadar avtor in leto nastanka vira nista znana, naj avtorica oziroma avtor v besedilu clanka smiselno uporabi naslov, ime ali opis vira. V primeru, da so naslov, ime ali opis vira daljši od petih besed, naj avtorica oziroma avtor pri navajanju vira smiselno uporabi zacetne besede iz naslova, imena ali opisa vira tako, da bo nedvoumno razpoznavno, kateri v seznamu literature navedeni vir navaja. (Porocilo o delu državnega zbora, 2000) ali (Zbirka navijaških šalov) Glede ostalih dodatnih oblik navajanja uporabljene literature ali virov naj se avtorica oziroma avtor obrne na uredništvo TIP. RECENZENTSKI POSTOPEK Uredništvo TIP uporablja za vse vrste clankov in za knjižne eseje obojestran­sko anonimni recenzentski postopek. Clanke in knjižne eseje recenzirata vsaj dva recenzenta. Postopek recenziranja, od oddaje besedila do seznanitve avto­rice/avtorja z recenzentskimi mnenji, traja dva meseca. Uredništvo TIP lahko brez zunanjega recenziranja zavrne objavo besedila, ce ugotovi, da avtorica oziroma avtor besedila ni pripravil v skladu z zgoraj navedenimi navodili, ali pa ce oceni, da besedilo ne sodi na znanstveno podrocje, ki ga revija pokriva. Uredništvo ima pravico, da prispevkov, ki ne ustrezajo merilom knjižne slo­venšcine (ali anglešcine, ce je clanek oddan v anglešcini; upošteva se British English) ne sprejme v recenzentski postopek. Stroški obveznega lektoriranja angleških besedil se avtorjem zaracunavajo po predhodnem dogovoru. Avtorica/avtor ima od trenutka, ko je seznanjen z recenzentskimi mnenji, tri tedne casa, da v besedilo vnese popravke in popravljeno besedilo vrne v uredništvo TIP. V primeru, ko recenzenti zahtevajo temeljitejše popravke, se popravljeno besedilo ponovno vrne recenzentu v presojo. Avtorica/avtor naj popravljenemu besedilu priloži poseben obrazec “avtorjevo porocilo”, ki ga dobi skupaj z recenzijama besedila, v katerem naj obrazloži, katere dele besedila je popravil in kako. Ce avtorica/avtor oziroma avtor meni, da so pripombe recenzenta neutemeljene, pomanjkljive ali kakorkoli nera­zumljive, naj neupoštevanje recenzentskih pripomb pojasni in utemelji v posebnem porocilu glavnemu uredniku. Avtorica/avtor in soavtorji ob objavi dobijo po en brezplacen izvod šte­vilke revije, v kateri je bil objavljen njihov prispevek. Vsak dodaten izvod stane 10 evrov (plus poštnina). Na zahtevo lahko avtorici/avtorju pošljemo brezplacen izvod njegove objave v formatu pdf. Avtorica/avtor prenese materiale avtorske pravice za objavljeni prispe­vek na izdajatelja revije. ETIKA OBJAVLJANJA Revija Teorija in praksa upošteva Pravila o ravnanju Odbora za etiko objav­ljanja Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE Code of Conduct guide­lines in zahteve za recenzirane revije, ki jih je oblikovala založba Elsevier Publishing House (skladno z mednarodnimi pravili založniške etike za znan­stvene publikacije). Revija Teorija in praksa je te politike in postopke sprejela z namenom podpreti urednike, recenzente in avtorje pri izpolnjevanju njihovih eticnih dolžnosti skladno s temi smernicami. Od avtorjev, recenzentov in urednikov se pricakuje, da upoštevajo smernice dobre prakse glede eticnega ravnanja, kot jih dolocajo te politike in postopki. INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS Submitted texts should not be previously published or the subject of a peer-review procedure for another journal or book/monograph. The publishing of an article or a book review in Teorija in praksa is free of charge. Texts should be sent to the e-mail address: teorija.praksa@fdv.uni-lj.si. A text should be in A4 format with 1.5 spacing, Times New Roman of 12-point font size, and the centre aligned with 2.5 cm margins. All pages of the text should be numbered consecutively. The first and last name of the author/s should be placed on a separate cover sheet showing the title of the article, along with their academic title and current employment, full postal address, telephone number and e-mail address. The last name of the author/s should be printed in uppercase. The initial page of the text should only include the title of the text, and the abstract. The text should be accompanied by the author/s’ statement that the text has not previously been published or is not in press with any other journal or monograph. In the statement, the author/s should also make a proposal for the article’s classification in compliance with the typology of documents/works (an original article, a review article, or a book review). 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Table 1: COMMITTEE EFFECT Relugative effect Mixet effect Distributional effect BUDG, TRAN, IMCO, ECON, ENVI, ITRE, LIBE EMPL, AGRI, PECH, REGI JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA Source: Yordanova, 2009: 256. Footnotes should be clearly marked in the text with consecutive num­bers from beginning to end; written in appropriate places in the text; and arranged in the same order under the text. Footnotes must be limited in both number and length. Notes about the author/s, as well as any acknowl­edgements, should include information on the organisation to which the author/s belongs when relevant to the subject addressed in the text, and should also include information regarding any financial or other assistance given for preparing the text. Quotations of three or more lines in length should be placed in a sepa­rate centre-aligned paragraph, with the text appearing in italics and without inverted commas. The fact that most of the posts have been liked is an evidence that citizens find the posts made by the local government interesting and useful, but they do not show any further interest by sharing the information with friends or by engaging in dialog commenting on them. (Bonsón et al., 2013: 12) BOOK REVIEWS Book reviews not older than 2 years are accepted for publication in Teorija in praksa and should contain up to 1,500 words. In a book review, the author should strictly avoid making any references to any sources and literature. The book review should not include title or subtitles. Information about the author and the reviewed book should be given at the review’s start in the form shown below: First Name LAST NAME Institutional affiliation Author’s First and Last Name Title: Subtitle Publisher, City Year of publication, number of pages, price (ISBN number) John SMITH Oxford University Eviatar Zerubavel Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2003, 184 pages, USD 25.00 (ISBN 0-226-98152-5) REFERENCES The basic form of an in-text reference is (Smith, 1994). To indicate the page, use the following form: (Smith, 1994: 27–28). If two authors are referred to, they should both be stated: (Smith and Doe, 2007). When there are three or more authors, the following form should be used: (Smith et al., 1994: 27), while all authors should be mentioned in the reference list. If the author does not use the first edition of the book, the year the first edition was pub­lished should also be given: (Smith, 1953/1994: 7). Several simultaneous ref­erences should be separated by a semicolon: (Smith, 1994: 7; Doe, 1998: 3–4; 2005: 58). When citing several references by the same author published in the same year, references should be separated by letters a, b, c etc.: (Smith, 1994a; 27–29; Smith 1994b: 1) in the order they first appear in the text. The list of references should be placed at the end of the text, under the heading BIBLIOGRAPHY. It should only include units of literature used in the text. Sources should be listed after the list of references under the head­ing SOURCES. The bibliography should be arranged in alphabetical order of the last names of the authors and, in the case of multiple works by the same author, by the consecutive order of editions. Books Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title of the Book: Subtitle. City: Publisher. Geertz, Clifford (1980): Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Edited Books Last Name, First Name (ed.) (year of publication): Title of the Book: Subtitle. City: Publisher. Featherstone, Mike and Mike Hepworth, Bryan S. Turner (eds.) (1991): The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory. London: SAGE Publications. Chapters or Essays in Monographs Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title of the Chapter/essay in the Edited Book. In First Name Last Name of the editor (ed.), Title of the Edited Book, pages of the chapter/essay. City: Publisher. Palan, Ronen (1999): Global Governance and Social Closure or Who is to Be Governed in an Era of Global Governance? In Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair (eds.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory, 55–72. Albany: State University New York Press. Articles Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title of the Article: Subtitle. Name of Journal Volume (Number): pages. Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz (1963): Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework. American Political Science Review 57 (3): 632– 642. Internet (WWW) Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title. Accessible at Internet address, date of access. Deluze, Gilles (1978): Spinoza. Accessible at http://www.imaginet.fr/deluze/ TXT/420178.html, 10. 1. 2001. Sources It is the author’s sole responsibility to respect the material and moral copy­rights related to the use of data, files, reproductions and works (hereinaf­ter: the source) of other natural and legal persons in his or her article. The authorship of a source an author uses which is not the outcome of their own research must be clearly identifiable by properly including the source in the list of SOURCES and by citing the source in the text. The author should give as much data as reasonably necessary about the source such as its author, city or institution, address, name or description, evidence number, webpage address, place and year of its creation, and simi­lar. Such details should allow the traceability or intersubjective verifiability of the source. With electronic sources, the author should also include the date the material was accessed. Last name, First name (year of creation of the source): Address/holder of the source. Place of keeping the source. Accessible at Internet address, date of access. Featherstone, Mike (2005–2008): Audio cassettes. National Museum of New Zealand. Available at http://www.imaginet.nz/deluxe/TXT/420178.html, 10. 1. 2010. or Activity Report of the National Assembly of Republic of Slovenia, 1996– 2000. Ljubljana: National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 2000. If a source is the author’s private archives or those of another person, this should be clearly stated. An indication of the identity of private archives’ owner is recommended, but not necessary if this may affect the protection of their material rights or personal integrity. Last name, First Name of any author (potential year of creation of the source): Source name or description. The place where the source is kept. Private archives. Collection of supporters’ scarves. Hitcheiker Museum, Richmond upon Thames. Private archives of James Longfield. or Collection of letters by Janez Novak. 1953–1989. Private archives. When a source’s author and year of creation are known, the same way of citing it in the article text applies as for the citation of articles, chapters in a book or books. When the source’s author and year of creation are unknown, the source’s title, name or description should be used sensibly in the arti­cle text. If the title, name or description of the source consist of more than five words, the initial wording of the source’s address, name or description should be used when citing the source in the main text so that it will be clearly identifiable in the Bibliography. (Activity Report of the National Assembly, 2000) or (Collection of supporters’ scarves) Concerning other ways of citing the literature or sources used in articles, please contact the Editorial Board of Teorija in praksa. PEER-REVIEW PROCEDURE All types of articles undergo a mutually anonymous peer-review procedure organised by the Editorial Board of the journal. Articles and book essays are to be reviewed by no fewer than two reviewers. As a rule, the review procedure takes 2 months from submission of a text to notification of the reviewers’ opinions. 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The Editorial Board reserves the right not to commence the review procedure of papers which failed to meet the standards of formal written language. Every author is entitled to one free copy of the issue in which their article appeared. Each additional copy may be purchased for EUR 10, plus postage. Upon request, the author(s) may be provided with a pdf file of their article free of charge. The cost of mandatory language editing of English texts will be charged to authors on prior agreement. Published papers become the material copyright of the Journal’s publisher. PUBLISHING ETHICS Teorija in praksa journal follows the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Code of Conduct guidelines and the requirements for peer-reviewed journals, elaborated by the Elsevier Publishing House (in accordance with international ethical rules of scientific publications). Teorija in praksa Journal is adopting these policies and procedures to support editors, reviewers and authors in performing their ethical duties under these guidelines. It is expected of authors, reviewers and editors that they follow the best-practice guidelines on ethical behavior contained therein.