

IS CAUSALITY ADMISSIBLE IN PHENOMENOLOGY?

A CORRECTIVE TO EDMUND HUSSERL'S IDEA

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Abstract

The article rejects the traditional limitation of causality in phenomenology and attempts to demonstrate the mistakes in Edmund Husserl's arguments for such an understanding, which limited natural causality to the empirical world and confused both natural as well as motivational causality with logical and psychological connections. The specificity of causality is stressed, in order to clarify the main structures of pure consciousness—thought, feeling, and will—as well as to elucidate the mutual

irreducibility of connections and interactions between them. Thus, phenomenology altogether can be outlined as being compatible with scientific discipline.

Keywords: phenomenology, causality, science, difference between thought and feeling.

Je v fenomenologiji kavzalnost sprejemljiva? Korektiv k Husserlovi ideji

Povzetek

Članek zavrne tradicionalno omejevanje kavzalnosti v fenomenologiji in skuša pokazati napake v argumentih za takšno razumevanje pri Edmundu Husserlu, ki so naravno kavzalnost omejili na empirični svet in so zamenjali tako naravno kot motivacijsko kavzalnost z logičnimi in psihološkimi povezavami. Poudariti želimo specifičnost kavzalnosti, zato da bi lahko razjasnili pogloblitve strukture čiste zavesti – misel, občutje in voljo – in obenem razgrnili medsebojno nereduktibilnost povezav in interakcij med njimi. Fenomenologijo nasploh potemtakem lahko orišemo kot združljivo z znanstveno disciplino.

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Ključne besede: fenomenologija, kavzalnost, znanost, razlika med mislijo in občutjem.

The limitation of causality by Husserl

Husserl clearly locates causality within the empirical world, pointing it out as “the external” (Husserl 1901, 369; cf. Husserl 2001c, 108). The acknowledgment of causality in constructing the thing of pure consciousness—“the substantial-causal thing” (Husserl 1976b, 352)—or the acknowledgment of causality in the periphery of the life-world (Husserl 1976a, 221–222) are, to my mind, no more than rhetorical; causality is by no means combined with the very mechanism of pure consciousness or the life-world. “The substantial-causal thing” is presented as constitutively connected with the experience of the subject and his ideal multiform perceptions (Husserl 1976b, 352) rather than through causality. What can be considered, at first glance, as an example of causality—the subject’s influence on his consciousness or, as in the case of the life-world, on his body—is comprehended instead through constituting, ruling (holding-sway), or radiating (Husserl 1976a, 208–209, 220; cf. Husserl 1970, 204–205, 217; Husserl 1976b, 281–282), which have nothing in common, to my mind, with causality; the first refers chiefly to the intentional-correlative and the other refers to a certain primordial spontaneity of the transcendental I (ego). How such connections come in touch with causality is unclear; although they evidently appear in the sense of the reconsideration of causality (Husserl 1976a, 221–222; Husserl 1970, 218–219), the continuity from the natural causality to the presupposed new causality as well as the boundaries of these causalities are not delineated distinctly enough. The latter one is differentiable from the natural causality by the sphere of its realization (in psychics) and by its elements as not having “persistent properties”—to the extent that it may even not be denoted as causality at all (cf. Husserl 1989, 140). Accordingly, the arguments for limiting causality in phenomenology as they might be extracted from Husserl’s conception are as follows: (1) as it is inseparable from the time-space structure of the empirical world, causality should be considered only within the empirical world; as it differs and is incompatible (2) with the intentional-correlative and (3) with the subject’s wholeness and his internal influences, natural causality should essentially not be considered within the pure consciousness or the life-world.

Husserl's understanding of causality and its origins

(1) That causality is based on time-space does not mean its localization in the empirical experience; as providing such experience, time-space itself is not reduced to it. Causality as such means the necessary difference and changes from the cause to its consequences, irrespective of any things or their qualities (cf. Kant 1998, 222–223; Kant 1922, 70); thus, the localization of causality is impossible. Time-space gives this specification to causality, but, as it is indifferent to any content, gives no content to causality. Whether inside the thing or not, the specificity of causality as causality is unchangeable; differences are permissible only in the character of its integration in various connections or qualities. Finally, as they possess their own specificity and have a certain relationship—as the condition and the construction above it—, the time-space structure and causality are certainly separable from each other, and causality can be constructed even in spheres indirectly connected with time-space.

206 My objection can also be formulated briefly in another way: as time-space and causality are transcendental, they are not limited within the empirical.

Therefore, there are no grounds for the distinction between natural and motivational causality—*there can only be one causality, for its quality is not determined by the content of this distinction*. The distinction only conceals the quality of causality, presupposing in it properties that do not concern it. The distinction between the empirical world and psychics means no more than a gap in unfolding causality (rather than a difference in quality). Thus, there is no problem in combining the notions of causality in one common notion or in replacing one notion by the other; natural causality coincides fully with causality as such—to additionally multiply this essence, is irrelevant. My following arguments confirm this point of view.

(2) The difference between causality and the intentional-correlative does not mean the impossibility of causality among these connections. A view of the kettle in a shop and a reminiscence about the kettle with boiling water on a stove are certainly combined in one representation without any incompatibility with causality; indeed, a view of the kettle can cause the excitation of a reminiscence about boiling water, and there is no need to admit here only an associative connection of different acts. Combined acts can be simultaneously causal-

consequential by their origin. Making a distinction among these objects as the empirical and as the content of acts does not diminish causality; instead of considering the real kettle or boiling water as influencing the subject from the outside, they would be considered here examples of different states of the same subject, that is, when one excites the other, the quality of the connection as the necessary succession remains the same in both cases. Or, taking Husserl's example (Husserl 2001c, 108–109), even if the landscape is not the external object and the pleasure in it relates to how this landscape appears to me, the landscape can excite the pleasure as its consequence—my new state—parallelly to the complex act of thought embracing both the pleasure and the landscape. When pleasure is considered as a structure qualitatively different from thought (as stream rather than an act), the compatibility of different connections becomes clearer: no combination of the pleasure and the landscape in one thought can exclude or principally change their causal relation, for their representation in thought should be differentiated from the experience of the pleasure as feeling. Interpreting feeling after the pattern of thought (Husserl 1976b, 220, 279–280; cf. Husserl 2001c, 108), Husserl obviously understands this representation and experience as shades of a single (thoughtful) process, which, as supposing nothing but the intentional-correlative, only means “the motivational causality.”

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The fact that Husserl does not see the manner of combining (natural) causality with the intentional-correlative can be illustrated at the very beginning of his construction of phenomenology with the help of the following note:

Closer consideration shows it to be absurd in principle, here or in like cases [in the original: hier und überhaupt; I. K.], to treat an intentional as a causal relation, to give it the sense of an empirical, substantial-causal case of necessary connection. For the intentional object, here thought of as “provocative,” is only in question as an intentional, not as an external reality, which really and psycho-physically determines my mental life. (Husserl 2001b, 108–109; cf. Husserl 1968, 391.)

It is also curious that in discussing causality related to the psychical, Husserl means only material-psychical interactions and does not mention causal

connections within the psychical as such, even when their consideration in a detailed review of rational psychology seems very appropriate (Husserl 1980, 14–15; cf. 33–39). Insofar as “the motivational causality” exclusively works in psychics, causal connections as belonging to nature are here excluded.

208 On the other hand, Husserl’s understanding of “the motivational causality” through the intentional-correlative (cf. Husserl 1989, 231) does not clarify it *as still causality*—as the necessary one-directed succession. It remains unclear how such succession would be possible on the basis of subject–object interactions, which “refer back and forth” (Husserl 1989, 236, 237): “I am occupied with [the object], it stimulates me to occupy myself with it [...]” (Husserl 1989, 228.) The same can be said about the syntheticism of this “causality”; Husserl does not show how the new (which was not at the entry of this process) occurs within transition of causality to its consequences. Husserl evidently sees the new (being “unknown”) as independent of any determination (Husserl 1989, 146, cf. Husserl 2001a, 233)—through the intentional-correlative as a reserved unity a possibility of syntheticism is quite obscure. And even when Husserl admits the new within this causality, he considers it through the time grounded by the intentional-correlative and thereby does not denote the new distinctly. The succession of time is formed through “the objectlike” formation and in submergence of future in the past (Husserl 2001a, 237–238)—this bilateral process, reproducing subject–object interactions, shows the unity between time and this causality (additionally stressed in describing inductivity) rather than asymmetry of both as unfinished and non-logical. The understanding of structures of consciousness as being more or less homogenous—the intentional-correlative—only aggravates this view. Thus, Husserl’s argument that the given in psychics can necessarily stimulate consequences in it would prove the intentional-correlative as the basis for “the motivational causality” (cf. Husserl 1989, 227–228, 239, 243) only if the properties of this causality could be understood through the intentional-correlative, and if the intentional-correlative itself would have undoubtedly embraced the whole pure consciousness. Otherwise, this argument only demonstrates coincidences of the intentional-correlative elements with this causality—and nothing more.

(3) Also, there is insufficient grounds to depict the subject’s activity outside causality, even if such an activity is primordial to any experience and to time-

space. A certain difference between the subject and his activity or among any forms of transcendentalty would be impossible without the time-space structure; the intentional-correlative could not provide such a difference independently of time-space—as it is evident in the example of the bodily in pure consciousness with its kinetics from “here” to “there” (cf. Husserl 1950, 128). Husserl’s depiction of the subject’s self-determination in view of “the motivational causality” shows no possibility for the subject’s change from one state to the other (in the sense of non-logical differences and of something new occurring). Such determination, as well as the whole “motivational causality,” seems deductive rather than synthetic, for the intentional-correlative as a reserved unity evidently provides a deduction/induction through its mutual penetrating elements; “the motivational causality” of reason is not occasionally depicted mainly as logic, and this sense of the causality is called “the most authentic” (Husserl 1989, 232).

Thus, the distinction between causalities distorts the understanding of causality as such, not only in pure consciousness, but—as I attempt to demonstrate now—in the empirical world as well.

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At first sight, Husserl rightly describes (natural) causality as bringing “something forth that could have existed independently” (2001c, 108). But in comparing this causality with the motivational one he repeatedly stresses the separation of spatial elements involved in this (natural) causality (cf. Husserl 1989, 140–141, 144) rather than the synthesis of this transition in time (a synthesis can be even missed in discussing time-consciousness and motivation; Husserl 1989, 239, 143). That is, synthetic connection of causality remains in any case concealed or overlooked. The natural causality, as well as the motivational one, is considered in a mixture with logical connection, especially, as this causality, together with all the logical-objective, has been displaced to the periphery of phenomenological discourse as not concerning the essence of the life-world (Husserl 1976a, 144).

Indeed, Husserl interprets the natural causality as a unity, first of all, by reducing the time-space relations of the whole and the parts to the logical, the deductive. He uses for this interpretation the possibility of understanding everything in the empirical by its notions, abstracting from its empirical reality, insofar as it has already been understood in view of this reality. However, this

twofold understanding in no way indicates the surpassing of one by the other. The “house,” taking Husserl’s example (Husserl 1901, 248; cf. Husserl 2001c, 21), contains no parts, unless they have already been discovered or supposed in it in accordance with the time-space structure. If considered only by their notions, irrespectively of their empirical reality, neither the “house” nor the “roof,” nor the “walls,” nor anything else could be understood as whole or parts and presuppose each other. In view of the empirical, these notions have no logical connection; they should clearly be comprehended in a generic-specific correlation—the notion of roof should be contained in the notion of house as its gender, in order to realize such a connection. But Husserl misses this distinction between time-space and logic with their attendant contexts, representing the judgment “the existence of this house includes that of its roof, its walls, and other parts” as analytic rather than synthetic and empirical, as if the word “includes” denotes the logical transition from the “house” to the “roof” and their generic unity rather than simply the temporal-spatial combination of the empirical, and as if the disappearance of the pronouns in this judgment as reformulated in the sense of the pure analytic law would not distort this judgment. He states that the analytic formula of the whole and parts works here, thus ignoring the specificity of the time-space structure as such and of the empirical world, as he interprets the whole and parts only logically and considers logic as the specificity of the empirical world itself.

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Accordingly, Husserl interprets the qualitative difference between the analytic and the synthetic “laws” from the point of view of formalization of their notions—“Each pure law, which includes material concepts, so as not to permit a formalization of these concepts [...] is a *synthetic a priori* law” (Husserl 2001c, 21)—, thereby missing that this criterion is invalid, because it is independent of the new knowledge, by which this difference has been determined. Any law *a priori*, whether synthetic or not, more or less succumbs to formalization, if it has already been included and re-comprehended in correlation with the system of knowledge. Otherwise, as it is incompatible with the system, the law cannot be formalized at all—even if it does not denote anything new or anything material, empirical, etc. Although designed to make a new distinction (despite Kant) between the analytic and synthetic *a priori*, the formalization criterion loses both and the synthetic *a posteriori* as

well. In view of formalization, all these spheres appear to be the same, further predisposing them to logic. The use of the expression “analytic law” instead of “analytic judgment” further conceals the difference, creating an impression of obtaining something new analytically (as if logic could really obtain the new).

Accordingly, Husserl speaks about the natural laws and their results as the deductive link—“[...] the naturalist deduces from the laws of a lever, from the law of gravitation and so on the manner in which a certain machine works [...]” (Husserl 1901, 94; cf. Husserl 2001c, 226)—, as if this link would not be only the logical reasoning of the researcher about previously acquired knowledge, but the principle of acquiring the new. By confusing the synthetic and analytic, Husserl *thus loses the difference between logic and causality, because the synthetic judgments, through which new knowledge is acquired, are directly connected with causality that always produces something new, because it does not include its consequences.*

As causality seems to be logical, its understanding as combining the multiform concretes of the same form that are constantly transiting into each other in unity (Husserl 1901, 248) or in a unity, in which all things are so bound together that “[...] with only the one thing coming out, series of changes of others are at once modified, and [...] it is completely impossible to dismember the whole group into several groups indifferent to each other [...]” (Husserl 1901, 250; my translation), is not surprising. Husserl may doubt the possibility of such an understanding—when writing about the need to expand the notion of the whole as including successions rather than simply unities and links, he takes into account the difficulties this understanding of causality could encounter (Husserl 1901, 251)—, but later he decisively declares:

[...] through a *universal causal regulation, all that is together in the world has a universal immediate or mediate way of belonging together; through this the world is not merely a totality [Allheit] but an all-encompassing unity [Alleinheit], a whole* (even though it is infinite). (Husserl 1970, 31.)

Nothing interferes in considering the notion of fire as including the notion of boiling water and thus interpreting the judgment “fire is the cause of boiling

water” as being deductive. But if the judgment is considered relevantly causal, on no account would it be deductive; fire and water do not combine in any unity, nor can their notions, insofar as they describe this empirical as combined. Clearly, the succession of the world does not coincide with the way of thought, although the world can be demonstrated in thought by the use of thought instruments. But the demonstration of succession from fire to the changes in water as the logical necessity is not interpretable as causality; otherwise, the described would be perverted in the judgment. One may blend logic with the world and speak about “non-logical behavior,” “the lack of logic in events,” etc., distinguishing them practically, even without understanding their difference. However, to understand the differences between the world and thought, and between causality and logic, such wide uncertainties of everyday talk should be overcome.¹

212 As it is only the necessary succession of entities, causality is not formulated in terms of typological rows, groups, and their modifications; such typologies do not touch causality, but only the elements involved. With all changes of boiling water under the influence of fire, hot sand, the sun, etc., the very specificity of the influence (as necessary, successive, and synthetic) remains the same.

Husserl strengthens his idea of (natural) causality as unity and mutual belonging through contemplation that gathers all things of experience—clearly using here the idea of time-space as general form of contemplation (*Anschauung*):

Such types of relatedness between bodily occurrences are themselves moments of everyday experiencing intuition [in the original: *Anschauung*; I. K.]. They are experienced as that which gives the character of *belonging together* to bodies which *exist together* simultaneously and successively, i.e., as that which *binds* their being [*Sein*] to their being-such [*Sosein*]. [...] Thus our empirically intuited [anschauliche; I. K.] surrounding world has an *empirical over-all style*. [...] we necessarily

¹ Leonid V. Maximov wrote most plainly about this, but on other material; cf. Maximov 1986, 59–62.

represent it according to the style in which we have, and up to now have had, the world. [...] we can make into a subject of investigation the invariant general style which this intuitive world [anschauliche Welt; I. K.], in the flow of total experience, persistently maintains. Precisely in this way we see that, universally, things and their occurrences do not arbitrarily appear and run their course but are *bound* a priori by this style, by the invariant form of the intuitable world [der anschaulichen Welt; I. K.]. (Husserl 1970, 30–31; cf. Husserl 1976a, 28–29.)

But this approximation of causality to contemplation through time-space as its mediator can by no means, despite Husserl, bring them together. No contemplation representing the kettle with boiling water on fire can tie them in any way, but psychologically; its complex act occurs relatively independently of its content. One can change his attention to these things, representing them in different ways, but their causal connection or their understanding in logical propositions will not change. Similarly, absolutely unconnected things, bound together by one view, will certainly still remain unconnected, even if they are considered as only the content of this view rather than in the world, and “the motivational causality” would be here no less irrelevant than the natural one. Husserl himself undertakes great efforts to differentiate logic from psychics (and we must suppose something similar), but in the cited reasoning evidently confuses or conflates psychics with causality (and probably indirectly—through the logical-causal confusion—even with logic), similar to his prescription of the correlative to causality. As independent of its consequences in all senses—fire can be whether there is boiling water or not; *modus tollens* plays no role here—the cause does not stand in correlation with the consequences; there is no necessary reverse connection. The one-sided extra-logical correlation from the cause to its consequences is qualitatively different from the mutual correlative in terms of unity, mutual belonging, etc. The interpretation of that approximation as a constitutive dependence of causality on psychics or even only as a correlative link between them does not prevent their confusion; that is, it would show neither how the one generates the other, their transition into each other, nor their resemblance or grounds for correlativity. This psychical-causal mixture further aggravates the logical-

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causal confusion by reproducing similar notions and properties. As it has already been noticed, the same mixtures can be observed also in admitting “the motivational causality” as considered through the intentional-correlative—losing its causal specificity as such. This wide tendency of mixtures *originates in the general construction of pure consciousness with its transcendental I as the origin of all these connections*. Because these connections are different in their totality from the I and reduced to pure consciousness, they may become more confused with each other. A portion of the mechanism of this confusion can be observed using another example of the search for correlates among causality, logic, and psychics. When “A summons B into consciousness,” they assume “mutual pertinence” and build “intentional unities” through the work of associative function; both are felt in “mutual belongingness” (Husserl 2001c, 187; cf. Husserl 1901, 29–30). Thus, Husserl understands causality from the perspective of psychical connections and confuses it with logic; in view of this “felt mutual belongingness,” causality is interpreted in terms of unity, belonging together, etc., and finally brought together with psychics itself (there is a tendency among researchers, by the way, not to see these confusions, for they understand causality without discussing its differences from the point of view of its syntheticism and its principal quality as such; Walsh 2013, 74; Spano 2022, 673–674). Causality, logic, and psychics are differentiated chiefly *through the difference between acts of pure consciousness and their content (noesis and noema in general) rather than through the differences among peculiarities of these connections as such*. Husserl refers the natural causality and logic to special spheres (the empirical or objective), distinguishing them as belonging to the act’s content, whereas psychics concerns the acts and their unities with content (what is “felt” and that by which it is “felt” are obviously differentiable here in the act-content unities). Indeed, there is no other manner, in which to differentiate among these connections, using the acts-content difference and conjugation, except to locate these connections in different spheres. That is, not only “the motivational causality,” but causality as such is represented on the basis of the intentional-correlative or activity of the transcendental I in its totality—in the single thoughtful process without special distinctions between the cognitive and non-cognitive.

A re-comprehension of Husserl's understanding

At the beginning of phenomenology, all of these mixtures by Husserl were useful—by simplifying the structures of pure consciousness, they showed its quality more clearly. Now, they have become an obstacle in distinguishing structures and in determining the correlation between pure consciousness and the world.

Understood in its specificity, irrespectively of its localization, causality can be discovered in any sphere of pure consciousness, clarifying the irreducible quality of the structures of this consciousness. The necessary influence of one act on another is no longer blended with their intentional-correlative interconnections, associative dependences, etc., not because such influence is impossible among acts, but because of its other qualities. The boundary between the causal and the psychical connections of acts would be clearer, that is, the cause–consequence transition from the view of landscape to the feeling of pleasure in it versus the representation of the landscape and the pleasure in one complex thought. This causal-psychical difference promotes the understanding of the qualitative difference between thought and feeling (as act and stream; my arguments for this distinction are formulated in: Kirsberg 2018, 263– 265; cf. Kirsberg 2019, 159–160), thereby preventing the mixture of the experience of the feeling with its representation and, accordingly, the mixture of the experience of the pleasure as the consequence of the landscape with its representation together with the landscape (as mentioned above). Like causality, by its specificity, logic is distinguishable from the psychical: any structures of pure consciousness are representable logically, but are irreducible to logic in their experience. Against the background of the differences of these connections, the distinctions among the structures of pure consciousness may be continued further; it is possible to clarify the specificity of will, including what properties it has or even whether it exists as a single structure and is not only the effect of interactions of thought and feeling. The differences also show the irreducibility of causality not only to the concrete connections, but also to pure consciousness altogether, stimulating a new comprehension of the genesis of these connections within pure consciousness—in view of their interactions, rather than by extending the thoughtful noesis–noema synthesis

to all pure consciousness with corresponding mixtures of these connections and structures. Such irreducibility may also be one of the signs of the general irreducibility of the world to pure consciousness, thereby promoting searches to limit the reduction, *epoché*, eidetic vision, and other traditional phenomenological methods, in order to finally combine phenomenology with scientific criteria (using for that also the irreducible qualities of thought and feeling as the ground for strictly distinguishing between knowledge and value.²

216 The perception of consciousness structures as more or less cognitive has still not been overcome in psychology, as is made clear by the widespread interpretation of emotion (attempts to differentiate it from feeling are not considered here) as containing certain cognitive components by its nature (Vekker 1981, 120–121; Kenny 2003, 36–52). Even if emotion is interpreted as not giving “any information about the external world” (Kenny 2003, 38), it preserves nevertheless a direction to objects as a thought-like structure: “[...] it is not possible to be ashamed without being ashamed of anything in particular [...] it is not possible to be delighted without knowing what is delighting one” (Kenny 2003, 41). On the contrary, to my mind, such examples demonstrate certain, probably causal connections rather than any direction: an object in thought excites this or that emotion. Indeed, if emotion informs nothing about the external world, it remains unclear how emotion can be directed to objects, given that the underlying mechanism of such direction requires cognitivity. By comparison, the transition from thought to emotion in terms of causality seems quite distinct: the difference between thought and emotion as cognitive and non-cognitive is additionally fixed in the cause–consequence relation. A possible objection that thought as neutral by its nature cannot excite emotion as always possessing a determined sign (this argument may be extracted from the reasoning about the correlation between representation and will: Müller-Freienfels 1924, 229, 237) is declined, if such an excitement is interpreted as activation rather than generation of emotion. Questions like “What are

2 The general reconsideration of phenomenology, using materials of religion and phenomenology of religion, is undertaken in my book: Kirsberg 2016a; see also my article: Kirsberg 2019, 145–151. For an example of the use of this reconsidered phenomenology concerning early Christianity, cf. Kirsberg 2016b, 339–348; cf. also: Kirsberg 2019, 151–153.

you afraid of?” or “What is embarrassing you?” (cf. Kenny 2003, 51) are not comparable, to my mind, to questions such as: “What do you see?” In the last question, we ask about an object *per se*, in order to understand through its peculiarities the specificity of our sight—whether we see, for example, something in perception or in representation, attempting to recognize, if an object is not an illusion, etc. Thus, this question presupposes a certain isolation of an object in the act of sight and therefore unity of the object and sight in the intentional-correlative connection. Nothing of the kind is presupposed in the first two questions, which do not clarify an object, but rather look for the source of fear or embarrassment or for something that is realized in emotion as its material. In the last case, the question “What are you afraid of?” could be, strictly speaking, reformulated as: “How do you fear this or that thing?” It is unclear how the knowledge of a certain object permits the specification of emotion: the same emotions can be experienced through different objects (abstract, illusory, or from the empirical world), whereas emotions when experiencing the same object can be very different. Unlike the case of mental content and acts, there is no necessary connection between object and emotion. Therefore, there is no intentional-correlative relation in emotion; emotion is not, to my mind, specified by its object as such (despite cf. Kenny 2003, 42, 44, 50–51). The marks of some emotions are reconstructed, strictly speaking, only through the experience of objects as emotions (which are evidently no longer objects). How and with what intensity and expressiveness all this is experienced and in what measure it is adapted to be experienced—this is what specifies emotions. In any case, a re-comprehension of causality in pure consciousness would stimulate studies of not only different connections in consciousness, but also of the specificity of its structures: in order to answer the questions, whether emotions do contain intentional-correlative connections and whether the other structures (will) can be partly reconstructed under the pattern of thought or at least function with some signs of cognitivity.³

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Thus, regardless of Husserl’s attempts to limit (natural) causality in phenomenology, representing it in the periphery of pure consciousness or the life-world within the empirical world (which is not always comprehended

3 Cf. Störing 1922, 134; Erismann 1924, 108; Rohracher 1971, 497–498.

inside this consciousness in his early works), separating it from the motivational causality or confusing in any case causality as such with logic or even with psychics, a new perspective of phenomenology emerges, and the shortcomings of these attempts are elucidated in this light.

We can summarize our contemplations as follows:

1) The limitation and, after all, perversion of causality in phenomenology is explained by Husserl's simplification of pure consciousness as only thoughtful-cognitive and pure.

2) The specificity of causality admits its possibility in any sphere of phenomenology, without any need for splitting its quality.

3) Finally, the use of causality in phenomenology would clarify the differences of the main structures of pure consciousness as irreducible to each other as well as the genesis of their connections, and promote the reconsideration of phenomenology as a strict cognitive discipline.

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
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
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


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
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