Jürgen Dieringer, Markus M . Miller
EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT
TO THE EAST
The perspectives and expectations
of the Visegrad states
ABSTRACT
As the Central and East European candidates for the next round of
negotiation on joining the European Union were nominated, the debate on EU
enlargement has reached a critical point . Now the rhetoric of postulating
European solidarity and emphasizing the openess of the Union for all European
states is not enough any more . Concrete steps must be taken both in the
Union and the states applying for membership . The internal political,
economic and societal reforms of so called Visegrad states must be completed
as well as the institutional framework of the European Union, including its
patterns of decision-making. This article deals with question of reorganizing
the administrative structure, e .g. to decentralize in order to anticipate the
regional structure of the Union, and the question of how the structure of
the European agrarian policy should be reformed to make it fit for the
competition with the new members?
Key words: EU enlargement, reforms, political parties, development,
structual policies, decentralization
The European Union (EU) is a highly attractive community of states for the new
democracies in East and Central Europe (CEE) since the beginning of the transformation
processes of post-socialist societies . Ten countries of CEE have already signed
association agreements with the European Union : Poland, Hungary, the Czech and the
Slovakian Republics, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the three Baltic states . The goal
of becoming full members of the EU was, especially in the so called Visegrád-States,' not
taken into doubt neither by the governing parties, nor by the opposition . After a first
phase of maintaining the accession both by the countries of the EU and the govern-
ments of the CEE-states - against the background of the „return of these countries to
Europe," with emphasis on the unique chance to establish a united Europe - it is the time
now to concentrate on how to work out the unification .
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The perspectives and expectations of the Visegrad states
The debate on EU enlargement has reached a critical point, when the candidates for
the next round of negotiation on joining of the Union were nominated, i .e . Hungary,
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia.' As of now, the rhetoric of postulat-
ing European solidarity and of emphasizing the openess of the Union for all European
states is not enough anymore . As it becomes clear that these countries will join the
Union in the near future, 3 concrete steps must be taken .
We all know about the obvious necessities which must be fulfilled in order to inte-
grate the formerly socialist countries into the European Union . They are twofold :
First, internal reforms within these states must be completed - or at least be brought
to a level that allows for joining a community of states whose experience of democracy
and market-based economy goes back as far as more than forty years . This is not only
meant to adjust the legal system to the acquis communitaire, the legal framework . of the
union, but also to establish an administrative system that works well and efficiently.
Beside this it must be sure that the relevant political powers are sharing the wish of
integrating their country into the Union and that there will be no fundamental changes
in foreign policy after a change in government . And, finally, people must understand
and accept European values in order to create a political culture which fits the civil
society concept of Western European countries .
Second, the institutional framework of the European Union itself, including its pat-
terns of decision-making, needs to be reformed . Mechanisms of consensual decision-
making might be necessary and sufficient for an international organization . They are,
however, less than optimal for a. Union which assumes a major role in various fields of
policy-making . This role has already reached a critical level and raised concerns about
the democratic legitimacy of the Union . The joining of several new states in East-Central
Europe might, however, lead to both a constant gridlock and the erosion of legitimacy to
an extent unrivaled by what we have seen so far.
These two sets of problems, internal reforms within the candidates applying for
membership and institutional reforms within the European Union, are well-known .
However, if we break them down to the "micro-level," i .e . to concrete problems in various
issue areas, we might get a better understanding of what is needed in practice . It is also
necessary to deal with questions of interest constellations, i .e . what interests do prevail
in the associated countries, what kinds of coalitions of interests can be observed and
who are the proponents and opponents of EU enlargement? In this presentation we will
focus on the so-called Visegrád states, mainly Hungary and Poland . This is not meant to
be a complete overview. We will rather try to clarify a couple of points that seem impor-
tant to us by referring to different examples from the Visegrád states and by focusing on
one central point to be clarified by the EU before the enlargement . However, we want to
ensure that these problems are seen in their political, societal and historical background .
That is why it is necessary to refer to and clarify the wider structure of the above
mentioned points . Some questions are :
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Jürgen Dieringer, Markus M. Müller
- which are the developments in the party systems and which political forces support
the process of European integration?
- what must to be done to reorganize the administrative structure, e .g . to decentralize
in order to anticipate the regional structure of the Union?
- how should the structure of the European agrarian policy be reformed to make it fit
for the competition with the new members?
1. Problems within East and Central European countries
that ask for remedy
There are three general sets of motives which nourish the wish of East and Central
European countries to become members of the European Union relatively quickly :
First, ensuring economic prosperity by developing a market economy .
Second, ensuring democratization .
Third, ensuring peace and independence from the former Russian hegemony .
Integration into the European Union is considered crucial in order to successfully
pursue all three of them .
It might come as a surprise that many countries in East and Central Europe consider
the enlargement of the EU as being of equal importance for their military safety and
independence as the enlargement of the NATO . Becoming a member state of the NATO
is not likely to happen for a couple of states, especially the Baltic Republics, in the near
future.' However, membership of the EU can be an interim solution . This reasoning is
even more sensible, as there is mutual assistance within the West European Union
(WEU), which sometime will be part of the interior structure of the EU . Moreover, in
the future the reformed common European foreign and security policy will strenghten
this aspect. Especially the baltic states can be expected to become proponents of an
integrated European security policy if they are not becoming members of the NATO,
so that for these states the EU must fulfill the role as the protector of security . This is
particulary important as there is a outstanding consent with regard to integration into
the military and political structures of the NATO in CEE.5 Not considering their wishes to
join NATO would create big distrust as to promisses of Western states which even
could lead to a break in the reform process . The European Union is the only organiza-
tion which can counterbalance the disappointment of a possible,,no" for NATO-mem-
bership. Therefore the EU must reform its common foreign and security policy, e.g . in
integrating the West-European Union (WEU) into the ELT-structures in order to devel-
ope a system which is able to intervene militarily in a case of aggression to one of their
member states .
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The perspectives and expectations of the Vi segrad states
Why is the European Union important for political democratization in the countries
applying for membership? Four aspects must be mentioned :
First, the European Union and its members serve as a role model for many young
democracies in the East . They have been serving as models for both constitutional
engineering and establishment of a multi-party system . The separation of powers within
the institutional arrangement has often been copied from Western models, even though
all countries in East and Central Europe have modified them .
- Second, as good constitutional engineering alone cannot ensure the functioning of
democracy. The Union and its member states have served as role models for how to
deal with the new institutional framework as well . That is, the now operating institu-
tional arrangements need rules that ensure democratic decision-making and democratic
bargaining among and between various societal, political and economic interests . In-
terests must be represented within political institutions and be integrated in all pro-
cesses of formulating political goals . If the process of legislation is untouched by social
and economic interests, the political system is likely to lose legitimacy soon .
-Third, the modes of dealing with specific issue areas, including very specific poli-
cies, have often been inspired by Western models . Three issues might be taken as ex-
amples .
A) Regulation and the establishment of regulatory regimes . Both institutions and
policies in many fields such as transportation, telecommunication and utilities have
been either copied from the West (and again modified), or have been designed in a way
that fits with the standards and goals set by the European Union .
B) The relationship between church and state had to be based on a new foundation .
This is, of course, more important in some countries, such as Poland, than in others .
C) The rule of law and due process (Rechtsstaat) had to be guaranteed. Western
standards and Western understanding of what these principles mean and how farreaching
they are have had a crucial impact.
- Finally, the process of European integration has served as a role model for the
creation of regional structures of cooperation . That is, regional cooperation across na-
tional borders as well as among subnational units . There are several examples :`
- In 1991, the Visegrád group was founded by Poland, Hungary and former
Czechoslovakia .
- Furthermore, there was the Central European Free Trade Agreement,' the
Pentagonale,8 the Black Sea Cooperation, and later the Central European Initiative.
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Jürgen Dieringer, Markus M . Müller
- However, on the subnational level of regional cooperation, there are the Györ-Vienna-
Bratislava cooperation, the Carpatian Euregio,9 and since fall 1997 the Duna-Máros-
Tisza Euroregion . 10 These forms of regional cooperation follow a Westeuropean model
of dealing with international problems that needed a new mode of addressing them as
old structures of trade and economic exchange, in particular the CMEA, have broken
down .
One might assume that these forms of cooperation serve as "substitute integration ."
Instead of joining the European Union, so the argument goes, CEE states copy modes
of integration from the West . Eventually, they might even form a Union by themselves .
This argument misunderstands, however, both intention and effect . As often empha-
sized, especially by the Czech prime minister, Vaclav Klaus, any cooperation among
and between the newly formed democracies in Eastern Europe, is not meant to substi-
tute for or even delay participation in the process of European integration within the
framework set by the EU ." Nevertheless, both willingness and ability to take part in
building up forms of cooperation by oneself may be seen as an indicator for how "fit"
a state is to take part in the European Union . States that refuse to participate due to
tactics and political rationale, be it an upcoming election or be it resentments against
ethnic minorities, should not be surprised when their refusal now will be interpreted as
a lack of ability to cooperate in general . Cooperation between the CEE-states is not just
a possibility but a need in order to restructure the old trade-relations among them-
selves . West European countries transact the most of their trade with neighbors, the
intra-CEE trade is much lower than the trade between the CEE countries and countries
such as the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States . Here is a grand possibility
for CEE to extend their trade and to develop new markets . This is the more important as
even the Eastern parts of Hungary and Poland, in direct neighborhood to Romania,
Belorus and Ukraine are the weakest in their- industrial output and trade volume .
2. Problems in the regional structure of the countries asking
for accession to the EU
Notwithstanding optimistic views on behalf of most governments towards the Euro-
pean Union, there are still a lot of problems ahead to be resolved . Among the most
fundamental reforms needed are the following :
First, due to the socialist tradition of central government, there is still a lack of
subnational units that fit with the NUTS structure of ,the Union . This is not to say that
the were no . Even socialist regimes depended on subunits to govern and to administer .
However, these subunits need to be constructed and classfied in accordance with the
NUTS structure . The present structure of subnational units in CEE therefore is too
fragmented, the units too small .
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The perspectives and expectations of the Visegrad s tates
As we can see in table one, the average population at the subnational level of the
CEE states is just between 500,000 and one million, in some countries just below . In
comparison, the average of EU-countries is between 2,552,000 (Greece) and 6,304,000
(France)." The CEE-states must somehow reform their regional structure in accordance
with the EU-NUTS-structure . The new units then will be orientated more to the lower
level than to the structure of big countries such as Germany and France .
Table 1
Territorial-administrative structure in East-Central Europe, 1994
Number of
	
Average surface Average population,
Countries subnational units area, sq km thousands
Bulgaria 9 12,322 997
Czech Republic 76 1,671 137
Hungary 19 4,896 542
Poland 49 6,381 774
Romania 39 6,090 588
Slovakia 38 1,290 138
Croatia 20 2,835 239
Slovenia 147 138 13
Source:Gyula Horváth (1996) : Transition and Regionalisation in East-Central Europe,
Tübingen, S. 25.
To fit the NUTS structure is important in order to (eventually) participate in pro-
grams funded by the EU . To participate in this European structure, these regions must
develop a kind of „European competence," 1³ which allows them to outline and to push
forward their specific needs and interests in Brussels . But such an „foreign policy" on
a subnational level, the most effectivly of which is practiced by the German
,,Bundesländer," is possible only if the units gain more competence from their central
governments to solve their own problems . Therefore in most accession countries the
units are to small . This problem was often recognized by both central governments and
the subnational units themselves and there are a lot of ideas how these problems can be
solved .
There are plenty of alternative suggestions for reform in Poland . The idea is to
reduce the relatively high number of administrative units (Wojewodships) and create
larger regions . There is hardly any consensus about what competences these newly
formed units shall have and thus, many regional elites oppose any reform as they can-
not be sure that they will keep their powers . Considering the German experience of a
failed fusion of two Länder, Berlin and Brandenburg, it is not surprising that there is
massive resistance to change. It seems that this discussion gained new impulse when
the new central-right government came to power in 1997 . But not just the size of the
subnational units is of importance, but also their legitimation . The Heads of the Polish
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Jürgen Dieringer, Markus M. Müller
Wojewodships, the Wojewods are nominated by the central government . This is not a
problem per se . Other European centralized countries are functionning in the same
way. But if a system which takes the above mentioned possibility of a European compe-
tence seriously were established, there would be a lack of democratic legitimacy as the
subnational units gained increasing competence . If more and more decisions are made
on subnational level, according to the principle of subsidiarity 14 of the EC-treaty," it
must be clear which unit is responsible for the actions taken. There must be a way for
people to agree or to disagree with the politics of the regional unit, and this is most
effectually possible if there are free elections and an elected government. To us this
seems to be not the only, but rather the best possibility in order to make the regions fit
for European integration .
But a growing competence of subnational units is not often actually maintained by
the central governments . Ilona Pál-Kovacs has discribed this problem for the Hungar-
ian case :
„The technocrats of public administration might accept that regional level adminis-
tration and coordination might accept that regional level administration and coordination
are necessary but they are definitely reluctant to let non-professional representatives of
a democratically elected political body interfere in professional issues .""
In Hungary, on the other side, discussion has led to a law on regional restructuring ."
According to this law, the existing subunits, the countries (Megye) have a choice of
either keeping their status quo or "teaming up ." The Hungarian capital Budapest is,
however, exempted insofar as it must unite with its agglomeration . The same holds for
the Lake Balaton and its surrounding area . As of now, negotiations have started and
concrete ideas have been put forward. For example, the Westernmost countries Vas,
Györ-Moson-Sopron and Zala consider to unite as all three of them lay on the border,
especially to Austria . Thus, the joining of these three promises a multiplication of funding
from European programmes supporting regional cooperation . Hardly surprising, that
inland countries such as Veszprém try to join those efforts of cooperation . After all, it
seems that the European Union and its programmes, i .e . its funding, has a major impact
on regional restructuring in Hungary .
Finally, the Slovakian Republic has already reformed its former East-West struc-
ture of regional division and replaced it by a more North-South orientated division . This
might make some sense with regard to the geographical situation of Slovakia . However,
whether intended or not, there is another side effect : formerly homogenous settlements
of the Hungarian minority in the South of the country are now sliced and merged with
Northern parts of Slovakia . Thus, whereas there was a Hungarian majority in some
regions before, there is no region with such a majority now. Furthermore, these new
regions were not given more competences which strengthens our guess that Europe did
not really play a decisive role here . Rather, the new structure seems to serve Meciar's
policy towards minorities .
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Second, due to a different chronological order of joining of the EU, a new boundary
will be drawn in Europe . Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia will prob-
ably accede to the Treaty at the same time . However, there is no reliable forecast of when
Bulgaria, Rumania, the Baltic states or Slovakia can, not to speak of Ukraina or Belarus .
The new frontier that will come into being if some East and Central European states join
the Schengen agreement, will bring about several technical and financial problems for
the new member states. If, for instance, Hungary joins the agreement, it will have an EU-
border with Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Ukraina and Slovakia . Almost five sixth of its
boundary will be identical with the outer EU-border as well . Beside enormous resources
needed to make sure that this frontier is safe, a new boundary will develop right in the
heart of an area that has just begun to unite as an economic region . Frontiers will become
bottlenecks for both people and economic goods . This will have negative consequences
in Hungary for the Eastern part of the country in particular . Whereas the West enjoys
economic properity and a booming economy operating at a high level of employment,
the East suffers from recession and high unemployment . High rates of crime, especially
among adolescents, an overaging population and industrial decline bear witness of the
negative consequences economic imbalance can have . Regional development must
therefore become a first priority and the European Union should provide here for financial
and technical help .
3. Political parties, political elites and the impact of ,european
orientation" for a stable economic development
Let us turn now to the goal of ensuring economic prosperity and creation of a mar-
ket economy as a precondition for the stability of the political sytem as a whole and for
the implication of both economic reform and Europeanization for the establishment of
stable and functionning party systems . The latter has been crucial in particular for those
countries, whose transformation was initiated by economic crisis . A prime example is
Hungary . The now (again) governing Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)" had a group
of reformers, namely Nemeth, Horn and Pozsgay, as a leading elite already in the late
80s. This elite knew that actual reforms need more than systemic modification . Any
reform that is meant to be more than cosmetics would put into question the system as
such. Economic crisis was no longer perceived as caused externally, but as an endogene
problem of the system itself. Thus, system transformation was inevitable and even
though Nemeth, Horn and Pozsgay could certainly not foresee the actual development,
they were convinced that there was and is no alternative . In short, system transforma-
tion in Hungary was initiated by the political, socialist elite .
However, the people did not consider them able to "transform" the system and
conservative parties and groups gained electoral victories in the „year of elections,
1990." The same holds for Poland and Czechoslovakia . What is interesting though is
that the Socialists who had first been kicked out of the government came back to power
in Hungary, in Poland, and in Bulgaria. Moreover, it was the old socialist "transformation
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Jürgen Dieringer, Markus M. Müller
elites" who enforced consolidation of the market economy and thereby re-started the
stuck process of economic transformation in Hungary . This might come as a surprise, it
is, however, rather logical when looking at it in greater detail .
Conservative and liberal groups and parties endorsed the goal of becoming part of
Western structures of cooperation and ultimately taking part in the process of Euro-
pean integration . However, their rationale was not necessarily economic in nature . There
was a strong wish to "come back home to Europe," i .e. coming back to the roots of a
christian, bourgeois culture and leaving behind socialist traditions which were then
considered incompatible with the respective culture of the country . This ideological
cause ignored, however, two historically grown circumstances in Poland and Hungary
in particular:
In Hungary the trauma of Trianon in 1920, that is the loss of two thirds of the state
territory, including the loss of a formerly hegemonic position, has not been forgotten .
Foreign control over both the lost territories and the core country (through the Soviet
hegemon) did not resolve any problem, e .g. the Hungarian minorities in that region .
Nationalist groups brought this problem in particular back on the agenda right after the
break down of the Soviet Union. However, this did not help the progressive and West-
oriented parts of the government to cope with them. Nationalist overtones led some
Western observers to the wrong conclusion that the break down of communism has
freed a powerful wave of nationalism which is carried on by the whole people, when
only parts of it actually supported nationalist ideas . This is all the more important,
because such parties became governing parties, for example the Independent
Smallholders Party (FKGP) in Hungary, or became important and influential wings in
governing parties, such as the ,Csurka-group" in the Hungarian Democratic Forum
(MDF), the winner of the first free elections in Hungary in 1990 .
Under the rule of conservative government, the three "unwritten" goals of Hungar-
ian foreign policy, Western orientation, protection of the Hungarian minorities abroad,
and equalization (Ausgleich) with the Hungarian neighbors were unilateraly brought
out of balance in favor of what they called the "protection" of Hungarian minorities . In
this field their politics came into conflict with European standards . In this circum-
stances it would be rather difficult to establish a „good neighbor system" with coun-
tries such as Romania or Slovakia. As the absense of ethnic conflict is an important
precondition for joining the EU, this should have to be solved . As the Socialist-liberal
coalition came into power in 1994, the three goals of Hungarian foreign policy came
back into balance. But the question about the "conservative position" in this field couldn't
yet be solved. But what would have been the answer of the conservatives to this ques-
tion when they remained a governing party?
What is even important with regard to the process of European integration is the
rhetoric of some conservatives . While verbally pushing for membership of the Euro-
pean Union, some conservatives revealed central cleavages within conservative parties :
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One is, for instance, the alternative between Foreign Direct Investment and national
accumulation of capital . Some nationalists feared the „sellout of of the country" to
Western speculators . One of the most sensitive question here was and is the selling of
farm land to foreigner . This question will be the matter of a referendum in Hungary in
1998. Although the selling of farm land to foreigner had not been a problem in the past
and is not a burning question in Europe either, nationalists and conservatives alike
consider it a "sacred cow." It seems though that their concern is not purely ideological .
Rather, the rationale for blowing up a minor question to a problem that needs resolu-
tion through a referendum is political as many conservatives and nationalists see little
room for manoeuvre to compete with the governing MSZP which is a propagonist of
liberalizing all parts of the economy in order to fully participate in the common Euro-
pean market as soon as possible. In this case we have the same problem as in the
minority question . The conservative forces have to decide between Europeanization
and their ideological and personal background . If we take the outlined contradictions
into account, it must be better for the Hungarian conservatives not to receive governing
responsibility after the 1998 elections . As a governing party they would have no choice
but to choose .
A second example is what can be called "conservative collectivism ." That is, there is
a sharp cleavage between the dominant Western tradition of individualism and a specific
form of collectivism in East and Central European states which cannot be seen
independently from socialist tradition . Party camps and cleavages in CEE differ from
those in Western Europe in the straighteness of economic and political directions . As
surprising it might sound, often socialist parties link market orientations with political
individualism and freedom values. Therefore conservative groups are standing for an
important role of the state in the economy and for a social collectivism which is based
on an idea of the specific tasks for the "nation ." Table 2 outlines this for the Hungarian
case right after the breakdown of the socialist regime (see page 110) .
The lack of liberal and individualist orientation can be observed when looking at
electoral outcomes . All candidates for membership in the EU show that liberal parties
with a classical orientation towards economic liberalism and the value of freedom have
hardly a chance to get elected . The only way to survive electoral competition is to adopt
socialliberal or nationalliberal positions . "Conservative collectivism" is characterized by
an emphasis on national and populist values which sometimes support discrimination of
foreigners and dissidents . That has, of course, nothing in common with the idea of
European integration and is rather a hurdle on the way to a civic culture .
There is, however, a third cleavage which has gained great importance especially in
Poland . That is, the separation of state and church . The Polish episcopate sharply
critized European orientations with regard to the fact that Western societies are
individualistic and fragmented instead of based on social and Christian values . This is
the more important as the pope was a Polish citizen and played a major role in the Polish
dissident movements . The attack on Europeanization was partly supported by
conservative parties . The church gained great importance in the electoral campains of
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Jürgen Dieringer, Markus M. Müller
some of the sucesser parties to the Solidarnosc movement . The electorate disagreed,
however, and shifted towards the unified left afterwards . In the 1997 elections the church
played a more moderate role, which was an important factor for the victory of the
conservative camp . One might see wether the seperation of church and state which
naturally was supported by the united leftist in their period of governance will be partly
canceled by the new government .
Table 2
Categorization of the Hungarian parties according to their programmes
and political orientations
left
	
right
international SZDSZ, FIDESZ, MSZP national MDF, FKGP
secular
(atheistic, anticlerical) SZDSZ, FIDESZ, MSZP religious KDNP (MDF,
FKGP)
urban SZDSZ, FIDESZ, MSZP rural FKGP (MDF)
industrial (MSZMP, MSZDP) agrarian FKGP
employee MSZDP employer -
disarmament ('fighter') SZDSZ, FIDESZ defence ('stronger')
MDF,FKGP
liberal (human rights,
against death penalty,
pro right to abortion) SZDSZ, FIDESZ' 9 `conservative`
(authority) MDF, FKGP,
KDNP
Source: Körösényi, András (1990): Politische Gliederung (Political Structure) ; in : Bayer,
József/Rainer Deppe(ed.):D r Schock der Freiheit Ungarn auf dem W g n die
Demokratie (The shock of freedom . Hungary on its way to democracy), Frankfurt/
Main, p. 122 .
Cleavages such as the ones mentioned above could be observed in many conserva-
tive parties and the party systems and there were quite a few instances where they led to
coalition crises and division . For example, MDF and the Christian-Democratic People's
Party (KDNP) in Hungary split . There was, however, now real solution to these prob-
lems as the conservative parties lost their power in exactly those countries where the
cleavages were most visible.
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In short, it is the Leftist sphere of the political spectrum which represents the idea of
European integration in some cases much better than the Right . This holds at least in
countries such as Poland and Hungary where the former socialist parties were funda-
mentally modernized and reformed . These socialists have become socialdemocrats,
even though there are still differences to their Western counterparts . However, Bul-
garia and Romania differ somewhat as their conservative parties have not gained re-
sponsibility within the government until recently .
What is the rationale for leftists parties to endorse moderate but consequent integra-
tion into the EU? Two seem somewhat evident :
- First, there was a need to evade stigmatization during the first years of conserva-
tive government after the break down of communism . One promising way was to gain
respect abroad . Socialist governments have quickly learned that nationalistic overtones
put Westeuropean governments off. By not playing the nationalistic card, the socialists
gained new standing . While conservative governments had just begun to get into con-
flict with European heads of government and heads of state, the newly elected socialist
governments quickly settled distputes as they had nothing to lose with regard to "na-
tional questions ."
- Second, there was strong fear of a "second failure ." The economic breakdown of
the socialist regime was inevitable blamed on socialist governments . As, for example,
the Hungarian conservatives did a bad job when they were in government, they were
kicked out in 1994 . Now, the socialists had a second chance . They knew quite well why
they were elected. People assumed that the Socialist Party was more professionalized
with better expertise in governing a country than the conservatives . Thus it was clear
that they had to follow a different line . As conservative collectivism prevailed before,
they now had to do something which appears to be a paradoxon for a socialist govern-
ment: cut back of the budget deficit, bring the budget back into balance and an eco-
nomic policy which basically copies Western monetarism and a supply-sider philoso-
phy. The former conservative government never dared to engage in such radical eco-
nomic reforms . The lack of public funding for welfare and deficit spending provoked a
lack of internal demand for goods and services . As a consequence, firms faced
undercapitalization . To cope with this problem, the government quickly realized that
capital from abroad was needed . From here, it was only a small step to make out Euro-
pean integration as an indispensible part of a socialist political profile .
Against this background it is surprising that different authors have seen the rule of
post-socialist parties as a "cause of concern ."20 A clause of concern is rather the fact that
in some countries conservative parties still haven't found their way to present them-
selves as an alternative to the leftist "governments of experts ." If these parties are not
seen as an alternative to the socialist government by the electorate, the possibility of
change which is so important for democracies is not given, which an evident effect to
the change of governments .
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4. European Union enlargement to the East and the pressure
to reform European sectoral policies
The economy of all East and Central European States is not yet fit for a common
market . Industrial structures suffer in many cases from large and ineffective organiza-
tion . Many countries still hesitate to make these industries subject to the full force of
international competition . Therefore we can see a lack of real privatization in some
sectors as the most sensible. Privatization in this sectors, however, will be necessary in
the long run .
On the other side, the European Union has successfully built up barriers against
products such as steel, textiles and agricultural products which actually could compete
if we only let them . Here, the Union itself violates fundamental principles of the mar-
ket. A future accession of the CEE's to the EU will strenghten the need to reform this
sectors . It is against the background of recession in some EU-countries, the need to
consolidate the central budgets in order to fulfill the Maastricht criteria for European
Monetary Union (EMU), and not least the wish of the big ,netto-payer" Germany to
reduce its payments that it is not conceivable that the current system (which would,
strenghtening it to the new members, mean around 12 percent of public spending 21 to
the CEE countries) could be maintained after the enlargement .
Let us take the agrarian sector as an example for the current discussion : Poland,
Hungary, Romania or Bulgaria are traditional strong agricultural countries. The aver-
age of people working in this sector is higher then in the EU. Therefore agrarian policy
playes a key role for the „stabilisation of the associated countries ." 22 It is counterpro-
ductive that the association agreements between the countries asking for membership
and the EU are to some extent a disadvantage to the CEE's . 2i Even though it was often
mentioned that the Visegrád countries profit from the uneven reduction of trade barri-
ers, the EU could gain a trade surplus not only as the result of the modernization pro-
cess in the CEE-countries, but as the result of the unequal treaties . And besides the
Association Agreement, there are fundamental non-market elements in the EU agrar-
ian sector which make it difficult for CEE's to compete . It is unreasonable that e.g . the
former socialist Hungarian agrarian sector gained less subventions than the taxes and
payments they had to pay over to the state ."
Import restrictions, fixing quotas, subsidies, price fixing and EU standardization
have effectively established a regulatory regime in the EU, that has hardly any market
elements left . As Gabriella Izik-Hedri described the current European agrarian system,
it is rather orientated to protectionistic central decision-making than free market system . 11
With a couple of transformation states waiting to join, the European Union is trapped
in a Catch 22 situation : liberalizing the current agricultural regime will open up the Euro-
pean market for products that are more competitive and will thus get EU-farmer into
trouble. Beside, a laissez-faire market is impossible as certain standands as to nutrition
facts, health, etc . seem indispensible . On the other side, extending the current mode of
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The perspectives and expectations of the Visegrad states
pricing, subsidies and quotas will cause enormous costs for the EU member states .
Therefore, any reform of the current agricultural regime must find a new balance of
market-based pricing and production and state-guaranteed quality of food and income
for farmers .
Several proposals for reform have been put forward . Beside a general call for freer
markets, there are conceptions which argue in favor of a graduate integration of the
new members and recommend decentralization and re-nationalization . Notwithstand-
ing the reality of the agricultural sector just described, there are other aspects which
have to be kept in mind when discussing reform proposals ."
First and foremost, agricultural policy within the EU is more than other policies
characterized by a "status quo orientation ."27 It is a highly sensitive issue area that faces
a lobby of interest groups, namely famers, who are willing to defend their privileges .
Those member states facing a particularly strong lobby of farmers, such as France, will
probably protect these privileges in negotiations of a new agricultural regime . Not eco-
nomic reasoning, but political bargaining has brought into being the current regime and
consequently, it is protected by political interests rather than an economic rationale . 2 "
From an inside view of the Visegrád-states it is clear that it is difficult to accept a
situation keeping the present advantages for old member states and refusing them for
new member states . This is the more understandable when considering the Union's
advice towards the CEE's to establish a regulatory regime which leaves the market a
central role in the economy, but not taking this into account for their own interior
market. For the CEE's in their rationale there are only two possibilities left : that the
present system be opened toward them, or that a system of open and competitive mar-
kets be established. The differences in the expectations of the CEE's and the Union in
the case of European agrarian policies once were the reason „for the standstill in nego-
tiations in September 1991 ."29 This matter will be the most difficult part of the negotia-
tions in the next years .
For the Undersecretary of the German Foreign Ministry, Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz,
the question of the reform of the agrarian sector must not be answered now . Against the
background of the negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) there's a dis-
cussion starting anyway . Therefore the EU scarcely is making any „forsighting deci-
sions" (Vorratsentscheidungen) before time pressure leaves any room to make a decision ."'
It even could be a question of tactics not to make a decision in order to gain a stronger
position in the WTO-negotiations .
Let's look at the proposals for reform in the agrarian sector in greater detail : gradu-
ate integration ultimately means that the new member states do not fully participate in
the EU system of subsidies for agriculture . Although this would protect the budget for
agriculture, which already accounts for about half of the Union's budget total, against
overburdening, the new member states will not understand this two-class system . Further-
more, technical innovation and modernisation of agriculture in the new member states
will certainly be hindered . This the same for the European agriculture as a whole in the
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competition of the world market .' 1 It seems rather unlikely that the European Court will
tolerate any two-class system for longer than just a period of transition . However, if the
European Union does not take this historical instance as a chance to fundamentally
reform its agricultural regime, the pressure for change will weaken and the current strategy
of "muddling through" will prevail once again .
Re-nationalizing seems to be an alternative, especially if one takes the principle of
subsidiarity serious . Each state would set its modes of securing income for farmer and
of fair pricing. The EU would then lose its dominant function . In view of a mere dou-
bling of farmers after the candidates will have joined the Union, one might actually
raise the question whether the current regulatory regime can cope with the new prob-
lems or whether agricultural policy should be given back to the member states . More-
over, as Ockenden and Franklin have argued, there is a fundamental problem to a com-
monly funded agricultural policy facing different conceptions of what agriculture means
to the member states :
"For some countries rural policy could be about economic efficiency, for others the
appearance of the countryside might be important . If this latter aspect is depicted as an
arm of cultural policy, then, under close supervision from the Commission to ensure
that competition is not distorted, there is no more reason to expect the policy to be
commonly funded than that for opera houses ." ³2
It has often been claimed that there is "competition between regulatory regimes,"
including subsidies . Two scenarios are possible . First, there will be a "race to the bottom"
with weak and weaker regulation in order to cornpete with other countries on the world
market . Second, governrnents will respond to the wishes for subsidies on behalf of the
farmer's lobby and effectively create separate agricultural markets . According to their
financial resources, countries will be more or less able to support their farmers . Neither
scenario, race-to-the-bottom versus diversification of financial assistance due to budget
resources, seems to be acceptable to the CEE's .
5. Summary and Outlook
As we have seen, the enlargement towards the East of the EU is despite all the
problems the only way to maintain the CEE's „way back to Europe ." Accession to the
European structures would solve some of the most important problems in the region .
The most helpful thing would be to ensure the accession of the candidate states to the
European interior markets . Unfortunately these sectors, in which the CEE countries are
strong, i .e . the agrarian sector, coal and iron, textil, are those which are protected the
most in the EU. Therefore there's a serious pressure to reform not only single fields,
but also the European decision-making system . In the mutual system of reform pres-
sure both the EU and the CEE states can find a way of modernization which helps
Europe as a whole to stand the pressure of globalisation .
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Nevertheless, important steps must be taken to ensure that nationalist or even com-
munist tendencies cannot find their way back to power . Therefore it is necessary to
maintain the establishment of a civic culture . The rule of law, party competition, Euro-
pean orientation and not least market oriented politics must be guaranteed even when
government is changing . Thus democratic European oriented forces - both on the left
and on the right of the spectrum of the party systems - are needed to ensure the mainte-
nance of this direction even when government is changing .
It's not new when we say that the CEE countries differ extremly in their develop-
ment of structures mentioned above . But the accession of single states to the EU will
create a bottleneck both in economic development and security structure . The EU must
integrate the countries which cannot become members in the near future in some way .
Nothing could be less useful even to Western Europe as a region than neighboring a
region in which instability and backwardness destroys the wish of the peoble to find
their way back to Europe . Avoiding such a situation is also in the interest of the coun-
tries accessing to the EU in a first wave .
Regional cooperation, both between states and between single subnational units
can function as a „cardiac pacemaker" for establishing structures ensuring the solution
of minority problems as well as the potential problems resulting from the cut off of the
former united economic regions divided by the breakdown of the federalist systems in
Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia or by a possibly newly established „iron curtain" after
the acession of a first wave of CEE's to the EU. Regional cooperation could also
strenghten new and renewed trade relations which were often hindered by political
reasons .
Now, as negotiations are leading to a critical point, the enlargement of the EU is not
only a future goal but a real task for the negotiating teams . We will now see how the
relations between the CEE's and the EU can stand even a situation where problems
must be solved without just extending payments .
NOTES
' Hungary, Poland and the sucessor states to the former Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia .
2 As Cyprus is not a country of Central- and Eastern Europe and its case differs from the
above mentioned states, it cannot be taken into consideration here .
' Opinions about the concrete time for the countries of CEE to join the EU differs from article
to article and from country to country. In our opinion an accession of a first group around the year
2005 as suggested by Michael Kreile seemes to be more realistic than some of the expectations in
the CEE's of a possible accession right after the year 2000, cf . to a timetable Kreile, M . (1997), p .
251 ff.
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4 As we have seen in the decision of NATO heads of governments and heads of state to accept
in a first wave just three of the candidates, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and if we take
into consideration how difficult it is in domestic policy to gain acceptance of the enlargement (see
e .g . the example of the discussions in the american congress) nobody can guarantee if there will be
a second wave at all, i .e . a second wave which considers more countries than Romania and
Slovenia .
5 See e .g . the result of the referendum about the accession of Hungary to the NATO of
November 16 . 97, which brought a 85.33 percent majority for the accession .6 For a detailed overview on these topics see Dieringer (1998) .
' Which was founded in 1991 by Hungary, Poland and the former Czechoslovakia ; new
members are Slovenia and Romania .
" Founding members : Hungary, Austria, Italy, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia .
y Members are subnational units of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraina and Romania .
10 The Duna-Máros-Tisza Euroregion is a cooperation between four Hungarian countries,
four Romanian countries and the autonomous region Vojvodina in Yugoslavia, see for this point
the additional of the Hungarian daily Népszabadság, November 21, 1997 ." As mentioned by a speech of the Czech Ambassador to Germany, Jiri Grusa ; c .f. Grusa, J .
(1993), S . 9 .12 Cf . Horváth (1996), p . 35 ; an acception to this sizes is Luxembourg (with a population of
318.000), which is as a national state a region itself .
13 As discussed for West European subnational units by Schmitt-Egner (1995) ." We take into consideration that the principle of subsidiarity is understood in different ways
by both the member states of the union and the institutions like European Comission . We unterstand
that principle just as consideration of subnational units in the decision making system of the EU .
Cf. to this discussíon GroBe Hüttmann (1996) .
'5 Cf . Art. 3b, EC-Treaty.
"Pál-Kovács (1996), S . 11 .
" Law No XXI/1996 on regional development and regional structure (Törveny a
területfejlesztésröl és területrendezésröl) .
'" To the return to power of the MSZP cf. Dieringer (1997) .
'y After 1994 elections the MSZP can also be described as liberal oriented (J .D.) .21 Cf. Rose/Haerpfer (1995), p . 6 ff .
~' Cf . data of Dauderstädt, M . (1996), p . 13 .
22 Altmann/Andreff/Fink (1995), p . 12 .
2' As mentioned by the Polish Ambassador to Germany, Janusz Reiter ; Cf. Reiter, J . (1993),
p. 11 .24 Cf. Izik-Hedri, G. (1993), p . 161 .
25 Ibidem, p. 160
2e These proposals are mainly outlined in the opinion (Gutachten) made by Prof . Dr . Roland
Sturm for the Bertelsmann Wissenschaftsstiftung and the Forschungsgruppe Europa, Centrum
fur angewandte Politikforschung, University of München in 1997, cf . Sturm, R. (1997) .27, Sturm, R. (1997), p . 160 .
2R Ibidem, p . 164.
21 Mulewicz, J . (1995), p . 190 . In this case concerning the negotiations of the association
treaties between the EC and the countries applying for membership ."' Cf. von Ploetz, H.-F. (1997) .
" Cf. Urff, W. von (1995), p. 103 .
'2 Ockenden/Franklin (1995), p. 95 .
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The perspectives and expectations of the Visegrad states
LITERATURE
Altmann, Franz-Lothar/Wladimir Andreff/Gerhard Fink (1995) : Future Expansion of the
European Union in Central Europe; IEF Working Papers No . 8, Vienna, March .
Dauderstädt, Michael:C n the Democra ies of East-Central Europe Cope with the Double
Impact of Transformation and Integration?; Paper prepared for the conference on „Political and
Social Change in Central Europe" held by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Prague on May 8 to
10, 1996 .
Dieringer, Jürgen (1998) : Federalism and Decentralization in East and Central Europe . An
Introduction ; in : George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (ed.) : Federalism and
Decentralization in East and Central Europe . An Analysis of the Applicability of Western Mod-
els of Federalism for East and Central Europe, forthcoming .
Dieringer Jürgen (1997) : Political Culture and the renaissance of the socialist party in Hun-
gary, in : Goutorov, Vladimir/Alexander Koryushkin/Gerd Meyer (eds .) : Political Culture and
Political Change in Post-Communist Societies, St . Petersburg .
Eurorégio, Additional to the Hungarian daily Népszabadság, November 21, 1997 .
Große-Hüttmann, Martin (1996) : Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip in der EU - eine Dokumentation
mit einer Einführung zum Bedeutungsgehalt and zur Rezeption dieses Prinzips ; ECRF Occa-
sional Papers No . 5, Tübingen .
Grusa, Jiri (1993) : ,,Die Mittel-Ost-Europäischen Staaten and die Europäische Gemeinschaft
- Bìlanz - Erwartungen - Perspektiven ; in : Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Bereich Forschung and
Beratung - Internationale Politik , Dokumentation, Sankt Augustin, November.
Horváth, Gyula (1996): Transition and Regionalism in East-Central Europe ; ECRF Occa-
sional Papers No . 7, Tübingen .
Izik-Hedri, Gabriella (1993) : Die EG and die Staaten des ,Visegráder Dreiecks" . Zu den
Assoziierungsabkommen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft mit Polen, der Tschechoslowakei mid
insbesondere Ungarn ; in : Osteuropa 2 .
Körösényi, András(1990): Politische Gliederung 1990 (Political Structure 1990); inBayer,
Jószef/Deppe, Rainer(eds.):D r Schock der Freiheit Ungarn auf dem W g n die Demokratie
(The shock of freedom . Hungary on its way to democracy), Frankfurt/Main .
Kreile, Michael (1997) : Eine Erweiterungsstrategie für die Europäische Union, in : Weidenfeld,
Werner (ed .) : Europa öffnen . Anforderung an die Erweiterung, Gütersloh .
Mulewicz, Jan (1995) : Complex Bargaining with a Difficult Partner - Poland's Experiences
with the Community ; in : Lippert, Barbara/Heinrich Schneider (eds .) : Monitoring Association and
Beyond: The European Union and the Visegrád States, Bonn .
Ockenden, Jonathan/Michael Franklin (1995) : European Agriculture . Making the CAP Fit
the Future, London .
Pál-Kovacs, Ilona(1996): The Chances for Regionalism in Central Europe; Paper prepared
for the conference „Federalism and Decentralisation in East and Central Europe", November 24 .-
26., Garmisch-Partenkirchen, unpublished manuscript .
Ploetz, Hans-Dietrich von : Die EU nach der Regierungskonferenz and vor der Erweiterung ;
speech delivered at the 7 1" annual meeting of the German-Hungarian Forum, 30 .10.1997 .
Reiter, Janusz (1993) :,,Die Mittel-Ost-Europäischen Staaten and die Europäische Gemeinschaft
- Bilanz - Erwartungen - Perspektiven ; in : Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Bereich Forschung and
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Eastwards, EUI Working Papers No . 95/12 .
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Schmitt-Egner Peter (1996) : Die ,Europäische Kompetenz" von Regionen - ein Paradigma
für den Transnationalen Regionalismus?, in : Interregiones 5 .
Sturm, Roland (1997) : Die Reform der Struktur- and Agrarpolitik, in : Weidenfeld, Werner
(ed.) : Europa Offnen . Anforderung an die Erweiterung, Gütersloh .
Urff untried von (1995): Agrar- and Fischereipolitik; in: Weidenfeld, Werner/Wolfgang Wessels
(eds .) : Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1995/96, Bonn .
Abbreviations
CEE
	
Central and Eastern Europe
CMEA Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
EC European Community
EMU European Monatary Union
EU European Union
FIDESZ Fiatal Demokráta Szövetsége (Alliance of Free Democrats)
FKGP Független Kisgazda Párt (Independent Smallholders Party)
KDNP	Keresztény Demokráta Néppárt
(Christian Democratic Peoples Party)
MDF Magyar Demokrata Fórum (Hungarian Democratic Forum)
MSZDP Magyar Szocialdemokráta Párt (Hungarian Socialdemocratic
Party)
MSZMP Magyar Szocialista Munkáspart
(Hungarian Socialist Workers Party)
MSZP Magyar Szocialista Part (Hungarian Socialist Party)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NUTS Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics
SZDSZ Szabad Demokráta Szövetsége (Alliance of Free Democrats)
WEU West European Union
WTO World Trade Organization
Note on the authors
Jürgen Dieringer and Markus M . Müller are currently working on regulatory politics in East-
Central Europe at the Research Center of Social Sciences, University Erlangen-Nürnberg. We
would like to thank Professor Dr . Roland Sturm for his suggestions, especially with regard to the
reform of the European agrarian sector and David Martin for the correction of the text .
1 1 8 DR, Vol. XIV (1998) 26