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MINDING THE BODY

FROM CORPOREAL MIND TO MINDED CORPOREALITY

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Abstract

In recent decades, the embodied approaches to cognition have become increasingly influential in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. However, despite their invaluable contribution to the field, there is some concern that they may have succumbed to what I call the “fetishization of the irrational.” This can be gleaned from a somewhat disconcerting tendency of such approaches to construe mind and reason as secondary phenomena that occlude or even distort the primary level of lived experience. There exists

a danger that, if left unqualified, a valid attempt to dispel one group of dualisms (mind vs. body) may bring forth another and perhaps even more pernicious group (rationality vs. experientiality). In the paper, I draw on the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a major source of inspiration for the embodiment movement, to show that a more nuanced understanding of the relation between body and mind is called for. More specifically, I argue that, in human beings, the idea that the mind is seamlessly interwoven with the body should be construed as a twofold relation: not only in the sense that human mind is *mind embodied*, but also in the sense that human body is *body minded*, a virtual center of behavioral patterns of qualitatively novel kind (i.e., symbolic behavior). Mind, in this view, is a unique dynamic structure that encompasses our whole mode of being.

Keywords: embodiment, Merleau-Ponty, mindedness, rationality, transformativism, vitality.

Umljenje telesa. Od telesnega uma do umljene telesnosti

Povzetek

6

V zadnjih desetletjih so postali utelešajski pristopi k spoznanju bolj in bolj vplivni znotraj filozofije uma in kognitivne znanosti. Vendar obstaja skrb, da so kljub njihovem pomembnemu prispevku k zadevnemu področju podlegli tistemu, kar imenujem »fetišizacija neracionalnega«. To je mogoče uzreti v nekoliko vznemirjujoči tendenci tovrstnih pristopov, da um in razum tolmačijo kot sekundarna fenomena, ki ovirata ali celo sprevrčata primarno raven živetega izkustva. Obstaja nevarnost, da ustrezen poskus odstranitve ene skupine dualizmov (um in telo) lahko, če ostane nekvalificiran, porodi drugo, celo bolj pogubno skupino (racionalnost in izkustvenost). V članku skušam s sklicevanjem na delo Mauricea Merleau-Pontyja, ki je poglavitni vir navdiha za utelešajsko gibanje, pokazati, da je potrebno bolj razdelano razumevanje razmerja med telesom in umom. Natančneje, predlagam, da je pri ljudeh idejo, po kateri se um brezšivno sprepleta s telesom, potrebo dojeti kot dvojni odnos: ne samo v smislu, da je človeški um *utelešeni um*, temveč tudi v smislu, da je človeško telo *umljeno telo*, virtualno središče vedenjskih vzorcev kvalitativno nove vrste (tj. simboličnega vedênja). V skladu s tem je um enkratna dinamična struktura, ki zaobsega naš celoten način biti.

Ključne besede: utelešenje, Merleau-Ponty, umskost, racionalnost, transformativizem, vitalnost.

0. Fetishization of the irrational?

The history of thought is punctuated by the ongoing swings of the conceptual pendulum, persistently swaying from one ideational extreme to another: realism vs. idealism, monism vs. dualism, empiricism vs. intellectualism, etc. The Sisyphean quality of these polarized movements has led many to look for their underlying reasons and for possible ways of transcending them. It could be said that, ever since the publication of *Embodied Mind* (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991), a project of this sort has been underway in the domain of philosophies and sciences of mind. For, in an attempt to acquire a more comprehensive view of mind and cognition, and thereby stay the unproductive conceptual swaying between realism and idealism, etc., it has been suggested—rightfully, in my view—that we need to treat the mind not as something relegated to the depths of our skulls, but as something encompassing our whole body and its dynamic engagements with the world, both natural and social. It was hoped that the so-called *embodied approach* may pave the way from what Francisco Varela so vividly characterized as the “disenchantment of the abstract,” i.e., “the rarefied atmosphere of the general and the formal, the logical and the well-defined, the represented and the foreseen” (Varela 1999, 6), towards the “re-enchantment of the concrete,” grounded on the recognition that “the proper units of knowledge are primarily concrete, embodied, incorporated, lived” (ibid., 7).

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However, there is, in my view, a growing concern that the proposed conceptual “recalibration” and the aim to attain the much-celebrated *entre-deux* or “middle ground” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 3) may have overshot the mark, bringing about, in its wake, another swing of the pendulum, this time in the form of what I would like to call the “fetishization of the irrational.” The reason for this dire foreboding is a somewhat disconcerting tendency within the embodied circles to portray “mind,” “reason,” “language,” etc., in predominantly *negative* terms: as secondary and derivative, as impoverishments and abstractions, as that which occludes, obscures, or even distorts the primary level of lived experience. Now, there are, as suggested by the advocates of the embodied approach, good reasons for such critical

pronouncements; however, there is also a danger that, *if left unqualified*,¹ a valid attempt to dispel one group of dualisms may bring forth another, perhaps *even more pernicious*, array of dichotomies.

In light of these concerns, I will try to thematize the notion of the *minded body*. The basic claim will be that, in human beings, the idea that mind is not severed from the body denotes not only that *it is embodied*, but also that it *permeates the body*, i.e., that the human body is *body minded*, a (virtual) center of behavioral patterns of a qualitatively novel kind. Thus, mind is not a mere corrective “add-on,” encroaching on our behavior solely when our lived engagements with the world go awry, but rather a *unique dynamic structure* that encompasses *our whole being, our whole mode of existence*. The main title of the paper is thus deliberately, and, I hope, productively, ambiguous: on the one hand, it reminds us *to be mindful of the body*, i.e., to recognize the role of corporeality in minded life; on the other hand, and perhaps even more importantly, it invites us *to be mindful of the mind*, i.e., to recognize the ineradicable mindedness of human corporeality.

8 The paper consists of four parts. In the first part, I provide a brief account of the famous philosophical exchange between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell. The debate is of utmost importance for our topic, as it vividly illustrates what is at stake if we fail to dissolve the tension between mindedness and embodied coping. In the second part, I provide a tentative account of the “minded body” by drawing on the neglected aspects of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. I do

¹ This is an important point, because one finds similar claims about “primacy” in Merleau-Ponty, the author whose work will serve as the centerpiece for my subsequent reflections. However, it should be noted—and I will expound on this presently—that, in several places, Merleau-Ponty states that such pronouncements are not to be interpreted in foundationalist terms. For instance: “In speaking of the primacy of perception, I have never, of course, meant to say [...] that science, reflection, and philosophy are only transformed sensations or that values are deferred and calculated pleasures. [...] It is not a question of reducing human knowledge to sensation, but of assisting at the birth of this knowledge, to make it as sensible as the sensible, to recover the consciousness of rationality.” Similarly: “We call this level of experience ‘primordial’—not to assert that everything else derives from it by transformations and evolution (we have expressly said that man perceives in a way different from any animal) but rather that it reveals to us the permanent data of the problem which culture attempts to resolve.” (1964c, 25)

this not only because Merleau-Ponty is considered to be one of the central sources of inspiration for the “embodiment turn” but also because, as I will argue, he himself was keenly aware of, and had therefore devised conceptual tools to fend off, the deleterious dichotomies that pervade many strands of contemporary embodiment narrative. In the third part, I link my reflections on the minded body to Merleau-Ponty’s conception of language, construed as an embodied praxis, which, although rooted in the gestural dynamics, discloses qualitatively new (virtual) domains of signification. Finally, in the concluding section, I point to the need for developing dynamic ways of thinking about relations between “lower” and “higher,” in which the former founds the latter (*embodied* mind), but the latter sublimates and transforms the former (*minded* body).

1. Mythomachia: Dreyfus contra McDowell

The Dreyfus-McDowell debate (Dreyfus 2005; 2007; 2013; McDowell 1991; 2007a, b; 2013; see also Schear 2013) is of particular interest to our discussion, as it revolves around the (seeming?) tension between mindedness/rationality and experience/corporeality. It was instigated by Dreyfus’s attack (2005) on McDowell’s book *Mind and World* (1994), which proposes a tentative solution to the old philosophical quandary concerning the rift between mind and nature. In his book, McDowell tries to walk the conceptual tightrope between two extremes: that of “bald naturalism” (ibid., xxi), which robs nature of mindedness, and that of “rampant platonism” (ibid., 78), which severs mind from nature. To this end, he argues that human beings are not only *natural* but also *social* beings who, through the process of *enculturation*, fashion themselves a “second nature” (ibid., 111), a set of “habits of thought and action,” which are intrinsically normative and rational. More specifically, if somewhat over-simplistically, through the process of “ethical upbringing” human beings become initiated into “conceptual capacities, which include responsiveness to other rational demands besides those of ethics” (ibid., 84), and thus morph into “animals whose natural being is permeated with rationality” (ibid., 79). The crucial point, for McDowell, is that humans, as “animal[s] endowed with reason,” need not be “metaphysically split” (ibid., 108), since—on account of their second (social and rational) nature and the corresponding responsiveness

to reasons—their engagement with the natural world becomes permeated with mindedness. Thus, unlike “dumb animals,” slavishly obeying “immediate biological imperatives,” human beings enter, through the doorway of language, into the “space of reasons” (ibid., 126), and this space extends—like turtles in the famous apocryphal story—*all the way down*: “[O]ur perceptual relation to the world is conceptual all the way out to the world’s impacts on our receptive capacities” (2007a, 338).

The specifics of McDowell’s elaborate account need not concern us here; what is pertinent for our purposes, is that Dreyfus reacts strongly to McDowell’s claim that human existence is *suffused with mindedness and rationality*. For Dreyfus, McDowell’s solution bespeaks of the prevailing, and (tacitly) insidious, tendency in the Western philosophical tradition to place mind and reason on the epistemic, ethical, and existential pedestal, while cloaking all other dimensions of human existence in the shroud of ignorance or deprecation. In Dreyfus’s own words:

10 Can we accept McDowell’s Sellarsian claim that perception is conceptual “all the way out”, thereby denying the more basic perceptual capacities we seem to share with prelinguistic infants and higher animals? More generally, can philosophers successfully describe the conceptual upper floors of the edifice of knowledge while ignoring the embodied coping going on on the ground floor; in effect, declaring that human experience is upper stories all the way down? (Dreyfus 2005, 47)

Dreyfus responds resolutely in the negative. Drawing on the phenomenological tradition, especially on the work of Martin Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, he argues that our primordial way of engaging with the world is not conceptual, but comprises “nonconceptual embodied coping skills” (ibid.). He substantiates this claim with examples from everyday life (riding a bicycle, cooking dinner, etc.) and examples of skills exhibited by specialists-experts (chess grandmasters, jazz players, etc.), suggesting that “to become experts [in everyday or domain-specific pursuits] we must switch from detached rule-following to a more involved and situation-specific way of coping” (ibid., 52). In his view, the (hyper)intellectualist approach of McDowell focuses

exclusively on the *disengaged, objective modes of knowing*, overlooking the “engaged, holistic mode of experience” (ibid., 52) characterized by “a way of coping in which reasons play no role” (ibid., 53).

According to Dreyfus, when I am engrossed in an activity, be it of a highly skilled or everyday kind, objects in my perceptual field do not appear to me as intelligible things, but as *affordances*—as obstacles and supports, solicitations and constraints (ibid., 56). But although non-conceptual, affordances are not devoid of content (ibid., 55); instead, their content is action-oriented (it pertains to our motor capacities), context-specific (solicited actions are situation-specific), and normative (solicited actions are bound by existential/affective conditions of satisfaction) (ibid., 56–57). Perception, then, is an embodied, contextual, and skillful attunement to our environment; reasoning, on the other hand, involves manipulation of concepts, which are universal (*ergo*: non-contextual), and intervenes in our lives only in anomalous circumstances, particularly when our embodied engagement with the environment breaks down and needs to be recalibrated (ibid., 57–58). Dreyfus concludes that, oblivious to the dynamics of lived experience, McDowell and his intellectual forebears have fallen prey to the *Myth of the Mental*, the myth of the all-pervasive mindedness of human existence.

In his response, McDowell emphasizes that his views are much closer to Dreyfus’s than the latter assumes them to be. For instance, he is more than willing to cede that human beings and animals share the “perceptual responsiveness to affordances” and that “there is a sense in which familiarity with affordances is a background for our openness to objects” (McDowell 2007a, 344). However, and this is crucial for McDowell, the mode of responsiveness to affordances in human beings differs radically from that found in other animals (ibid.). To substantiate this claim, he points to a distinction, taken from a *phenomenological* tradition of Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer (but also found in, as we will see shortly, Merleau-Ponty), according to which *animals live in an environment (Umwelt)* whereas *human beings are open to the world (Welt)* (McDowell 2007a, 343; cf. 1991, 115). In McDowell’s view, “[b]ecoming open to the world, not just able to cope with an environment, transforms the character of the disclosing that perception does for us, including the disclosing of affordances” (2007a, 344). In other words, since our relation to the world is

primarily *linguistic-conceptual*, all our engagements with the world, *perceptual responsiveness included*, differ *qualitatively* from those found in animals.

According to McDowell, phenomenology of embodiment should not be seen as a corrective to his views but rather as a “supplementation, filling out the details of something that needs to be presupposed by any acceptable version of that thought” (ibid., 349). Therefore, it is, by his lights, not he himself but Dreyfus, along with (some of) his phenomenological friends, Merleau-Ponty in particular, that have become ensnared by a myth. Only it was not the Myth of the Mental, but the *Myth of the Disembodied Intellect*, that has cast a dire shadow on their philosophical project (ibid.); for, in putting so much weight on the *perceptual understructure*, Dreyfus severs embodied coping from the *linguistic-conceptual superstructure*, and thus, instead of dispelling age-old dualisms wearing on our existential fabric, he effectively reaffirms them.

12 The depicted *mythomachia*, or the battle of the myths, illustrates some of the concerns mentioned at the beginning of my article. Dreyfus seems to make a convincing case for the importance of the “lived-through” (active, contextual, and corporeal) dimension(s) of our existence, which is bound to strike a sympathetic chord with contemporary embodiment enthusiasts. However, and as demonstrated by McDowell’s rebuttal, this “phenomenological foundationalism” (Berendzen 2010), if left unchecked, leads to a pernicious chasm between *lived (perceptual) experience* (the “ground floor”) and *linguistic (conceptual) thought* (the “upper floor”). Yet, despite having put forward a persuasive *negative* case against Dreyfus, it is dubious whether McDowell succeeds in developing a satisfactory *positive* alternative, one that would alleviate the concerns that have motivated Dreyfus’s critique in the first place. It is, as I would like to argue, precisely because McDowell lacks the phenomenological supplement that would, as he puts it, allow him to fill in the lacunae in his thought, and thus expand the conceptual framework, in which the debate has been framed, that there are good reasons to see Dreyfus’ reproach of (hyper)intellectualism as ultimately fitting.

In what follows, I will use Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy to mitigate between the two views, filling in the chasm left open by Dreyfus and fleshing out the overtly intellectual account defended by McDowell. There are several reasons as to why Merleau-Ponty is particularly pertinent to my inquiry. To begin with,

he is often proclaimed to be the *Urvater* of the embodied turn and features prominently in its “origin narratives” (e.g., Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991; Wilson and Foglia 2017). However, it is also the case that, in the embodiment circles at least, Merleau-Ponty tends to be read selectively,² which often leads to loose and strained interpretations. The Dreyfus-McDowell debate is a case in point, for, despite all their differences, the two authors seem to agree—and in doing so, they echo a widespread sentiment in the embodiment community—that Merleau-Ponty’s views tally well with those of Dreyfus, where the “lived” is pitted against the “conceptual,” the “embodied” against the “rational.”

While there are many factors that have contributed to this interpretative lopsidedness—Merleau-Ponty’s dense and often elusive idiom not being the least among them—I would like to focus on one that, in my view, bears particularly strongly on our topic. Namely, when one considers Merleau-Ponty’s *oeuvre* as a whole, it becomes clear that due to his premature death the philosophical project he had undertaken, and of which phenomenology of embodiment and perception was but one, albeit integral, aspect, was never brought to full fruition. Note that this is not an exegetical subtlety; in his later writings, Merleau-Ponty states explicitly that

13

[m]y first two works sought to restore the world of perception. My works in preparation aim to show how communication with others, and thought, take up and go beyond the realm of perception which initiated us to the truth. (1964a, 3)

Thus, in the author’s own words, *Phenomenology of Perception*, his most well-known and most often-quoted work in the embodied community, should be read as a “*preliminary study*, since it hardly speaks of culture or history;” one that he intends to complement by a more comprehensive account of the “*organic tie* [...] between perception and intellection” and the ways, in which lived experience “summons us to the task of knowledge” (1964c, 20, 25; my emphases). While many of these later works have been preserved in

² For a complex, and sometimes tenuous, relation between Merleau-Ponty and the so-called embodied cognitive science, see Pollard 2014 and Vörös 2020.

only fragmentary form, they still offer valuable glimpses into Merleau-Ponty's views on the topic. Even more importantly, however, one does not have to rely solely on Merleau-Ponty's later works to uncover a more balanced conception of experience and thought; instead, and as I will try to show in subsequent sections, if one approaches his texts without a preconceived idea of what one *ought* to find there, such a view presents itself both in *Phenomenology of Perception* (2002; originally published in 1945) and, perhaps even more prominently, in his very first monograph, *The Structure of Behavior* (1963; originally published in 1942).

2. Neither beast nor angel: the nascent logos

I would like to start my investigation by reiterating what I have already mentioned in passing, namely that, much like Heidegger and Gadamer, Merleau-Ponty subscribes to the distinction between “environment” and “world”:

14

Animal behaviour aims at an animal setting (*Umwelt*) and centres of resistance (*Widerstand*). [...] Human behaviour opens upon a world (*Welt*) and upon an object (*Gegenstand*) beyond the tools which it makes for itself [...] Human life ‘understands’ not only a certain definite environment, but an infinite number of possible environments [...] (2002, 381)

There is, then, something *unique* to the *human mode of being*, a point which, to the chagrin of many of his contemporary admirers, Merleau-Ponty never tires of emphasizing:

‘life’ does not have the same meaning in animality and humanity” (1963, 174);

“[in human beings] vital energies are no longer the motor forces of behavior; they have been really integrated into a new whole and eliminated as biological forces” (ibid., 179);

“Man is not a rational animal. The appearance of reason and mind does not leave intact a sphere of self-enclosed instincts in man.” (Ibid., 181)

When confronted with such pronouncements, it is all too easy to succumb to the Siren song of retroactive interpretation and dismiss them as *prima facie* speciesist. For already a cursory glance at the continuation of the last quote reveals that a more nuanced picture is at play:

“But if the alleged instincts of man do not exist apart from the mental dialectic, correlatively, this dialectic is not conceivable outside of the concrete situations in which it is embodied.” (Ibid.)

The preceding remarks about the animal-human distinction should not lead us to conclude that Merleau-Ponty endorsed a view reminiscent to that of René Descartes, who, at least on a certain familiar reading, argued that animals are but reflex-driven machines. In fact, Merleau-Ponty devotes the bulk of *The Structure of Behavior* to a systematic critique of behaviorism, a school of thought in biology and psychology that can be said to epitomize the mechanistic conception of (animal) life. The specifics of Merleau-Ponty’s critical (negative) account surpass the scope of this article;³ what is of particular importance for our discussion, however, is the alternative (positive) account he puts forward by drawing on the prominent non-mechanistic scientific theories of the time, most notably, but not exclusively, holistic biology of Kurt Goldstein (2000), Gestalt psychology of Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Köhler, and Kurt Wertheimer (Ash 1995), and theory of environment of Jakob von Uexküll (2010).

15

Merleau-Ponty’s central claim is that a living being *qua* living is not a conglomerate of organs causally governed by discrete physio-chemical stimuli, but rather a *dynamic unity* whose behavior is aimed towards *structured wholes* (*Gestalten*), i.e., towards specific configurations of stimuli that are significant for the organism in light of its organization, behavioral aptitudes, and developmental history. In general, Merleau-Ponty’s alternative calls for a radically different conception of both “organism” and “environment.”⁴ Firstly, the organism is no longer conceived of as a (decomposable) thing, “a chemical structure or an agglomeration of tissues” (2002, 409), but rather as a *living*

3 However, see Sheredos 2018 for a more in-depth account.

4 Some of these points were explored in greater detail in Vörös 2022.

body, an (indecomposable) *center of normative activity*. What this means, is that, in the words of Merleau-Ponty's contemporary Georges Canguilhem, "life is not indifferent to the conditions in which it is possible" (1991, 127). The organism's engagements with its surroundings are never neutral, but involve "preference and exclusion," "propulsion and repulsion" (ibid., 136), i.e., they are the enactment of the vital need for self-maintenance, as expressed in "self-healing or self-restoring behavior" (ibid., 127). As such, organisms as living (normative) bodies, as "center of actions which radiate over a 'milieu'" (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 97), engender a certain type of *rudimentary intentionality*, a certain type of directedness-towards-the-environment, which, crucially, is not of the order of notion (intellection) but of (*e*)*motion* (affection and action).

16 The organism, then, is not akin to a keyboard reacting to, in a predetermined way, a set of physico-chemical factors, but actively participates, "by its proper manner of offering itself to actions from the outside," in the process of *selecting and structuring* of the stimuli to which it is sensitive (ibid., 13). Again, what is significant for the organism, are not discrete physico-chemical factors themselves, but specific *relations* or *configurations*, in which they present themselves: their sequence, intensity, frequency, etc. The organism, thus, carves out of the physical domain a unique *virtual domain*—an "environment" or "milieu" (*Umwelt*)—, a domain of structures that are significant for the "*a priori* of the species," which it embodies (ibid., 122, 123, 129). This virtual domain is not structured as a system of geometrical and mechanical relations, but as a succession of challenges and opportunities brought forth by biological imperatives of the organism (cf. McDowell 1991, 115). Again, the signification of the environmental structures is not of intellectual-conceptual but of *motor-affective order*: they do not feature as things, but as *affordances* and *solicitations*, as that which affords or solicits a certain affective and behavioral poise. Crucially, these (environmental) structures are not given as isolated or isolable units in a geometrical space, but as *aspects of a concrete situation*, as affective vectors in a life-field.

In sum, Merleau-Ponty argues that living bodies and organismal behavior cannot be explained (away?) in terms of mechanical action, but must be understood in terms of (vital) norms and (motor-affective) signification. But, if this is true—if normativity and meaning, two characteristics usually

associated with mind and reason, are inscribed into life itself—why would one want to insist, as Merleau-Ponty seems to do, that animality is distinct from humanity? Could it not be maintained that human beings are *simply quantitative complexifications* of this selfsame vital dynamics?

Merleau-Ponty admits that, on the superficial level, this does seem to be the case. For just as, say, animals live in their unique *organic* environments, so human beings live in their admittedly more diverse, but structurally similar, *culturo-social* environments (ibid., 162). However, he is quick to add that

[w]hat defines man is not the capacity to create a second nature—economic, social, or cultural—beyond biological nature; it is rather the capacity of *going beyond* created structures in order to create others.” (Ibid., 175; my emphasis)

Thus, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, the animal-human distinction has less to do with greater complexity of human environments than with the *human ability to transcend and transform* each respective environment. But, how exactly are we to understand this “power of choosing and varying points of view” (ibid.), which is said to invest human behavior with a flexibility not found in animals? To arrive at Merleau-Ponty’s conclusions on these matters we need to consider his critical—ingenious, if somewhat dense—commentaries (ibid., 113-120) on Wolfgang Köhler’s studies of chimpanzee behavior (1925).⁵

Merleau-Ponty praises Köhler for showing that, “in addition to our own perceptual universe, we have to reconstitute the animal’s universe in all its originality, with its ‘irrational’ connections, its short-circuits, and its lacunae”; however, he believes that Köhler fell short of his goal, as his interpretations focus almost exclusively on the fact that both humans and animals “*gestalt* [i.e., structure] things,” while ignoring the different ways in which they do so (1964b, 84-85). To remedy this, Merleau-Ponty hones in on the *insufficiencies* in the chimpanzees’ handling of objective relations with the view of providing

⁵ I am referring to the ground-breaking research on chimpanzees carried out by Köhler, when he was employed as the director of an anthropoid research station on Tenerife between 1913 and 1920 (see Ash 1995, Ch. 10, for a comprehensive overview).

an account that would take seriously *both* similarities *and* differences between animal and human behavior (1963, 113ff).

For reasons of space, I will examine only two types of “short-cuts” analyzed by Merleau-Ponty.⁶ The first type relates to a peculiar obstinacy, with which the chimpanzees held on to a given signification of an object. For instance, Köhler noticed that, if left alone with a dried bush, a chimpanzee, which had previously learned to utilize a rod to acquire a piece of fruit, had great difficulties in establishing that it could break off one of the branches and use it for the same purpose: “The tree branch as a stimulus is not even the equivalent of a rod, and the spatial and mechanical properties which permit it to assume this function are not immediately accessible to animal behavior.” (Ibid., 113–114) Similarly, a chimpanzee, which had previously learnt to use a box to reach a banana hanging from the ceiling, would not use it as long as another monkey was sitting on it: “It leans against it; thus it cannot be said that it has not seen it; but it remains for him a means of support or rest; it cannot become an instrument.” (Ibid., 114)

18 Merleau-Ponty contends that, what these and similar examples show, is that a rod or a box is not experienced by the chimpanzee as a discrete thing that can be seen from different perspectives and manipulated in different ways; instead, it is “invested with a ‘functional value’ which depends on the effective composition of the field” (ibid., 116–117). More generally, the signification of a given object is co-determined by the signification of all other aspects of the concrete situation and, correspondingly, by the motor-affective aptitudes of the animal. Hence, if the situation changes, so does the signification of the entity:

This means that the signification which develops in objects is *viscous*. It adheres to their fortuitous distribution and is a signification only for a body engaged at a given moment in a given task. (1973, 104; my emphasis)

For the chimp, “rod-as-branch” and “rod-as-tool,” or “box-as-instrument” and “box-as-stool,” are not two aspects of the same object, but *literally two*

⁶ But see Moss Brender 2017 for a comprehensive and interpretatively brilliant account.

different objects (1963, 145): “It is a branch which becomes a stick, it is a stool which becomes a ladder, the way a shake of a kaleidoscope makes a new pattern appear without my being able to recognize the old one in it.” (1973, 119–120)

In human perception, this “kaleidoscopic mode of experiencing” gives way to what Merleau-Ponty calls “multiplicity of perspective” (1963, 122): “the tree branch which has become a stick will remain precisely a tree-branch-which-has-become-a-stick, the same thing in two different functions” (*ibid.*, 175). Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, McDowell is quite right in insisting that human responsiveness to affordances is radically different from that found in animals. For there is a certain *distance* or *remove* from the motor-affective significations presented in a given situation, which allows human beings to vary our perspective, resist the pull of vital significations, and finally, to thematize them. In words of Moss Brender:

Like the chimpanzee, we experience our situation as Gestalt, an organized and oriented whole. But unlike the chimp, we are able to reorganize or reorient this whole, to “Gestalt-shift” more or less at will between different possible configurations of the situation. (2017, 146).

19

Note, however, what Merleau-Ponty is *not* saying here. He is not saying that, by acquiring the novel mode of structuration, human beings become completely divested from the motor-affective dynamics. Quite the contrary, the capacity to vary one’s perspective is essentially a *behavioral* capacity, one that assumes, while transforming, its genealogical predecessors (more on this below).

The second type of insufficiency is even more revealing. In one experiment, Köhler placed a piece of fruit behind a grill and taught the chimpanzee to use a stick to pull it within its reach. In another trial, he placed a three-sided frame around the fruit, whose open side was facing away from the animal. So, to get to the fruit, the chimp had to first push the fruit away from itself, then move it around the frame, and finally pull it towards itself. However, Köhler observed that the chimp had great difficulty in completing the task and was stubbornly trying to pull the fruit towards itself. This may strike the reader as odd for, while the chimp had enormous difficulties in moving the fruit along

the required path, it could have easily retraced the same route with its own body if the conditions allowed it to do so (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 117).

What, for us, looks like two identical paths (from A to B and from B to A), are clearly not identical for the chimpanzee. In Merleau-Ponty's view, this is so because space, for the chimp, is not geometrical but *corporeal*: it has an anchorage, a zero-point, namely the *chimp's own body* (ibid.). The chimp's body *as lived* is the only stable (persistent) object in its experiential realm; all the other objects partake of the kaleidoscopic nature mentioned above. For this reason, the chimpanzee "does not experience itself as an object moving through a fixed landscape; rather, it is the landscape that shifts around the animal in response to animal's movements" (Moss Brender 2017, 148). In other words, movement for the chimp does not mean a *change of position* (a change *in* space) but rather a *change of situation* (a change *of* space).

20 To see how this differs from human perception, consider what it takes to successfully solve the puzzle in question. To begin with, it requires that one dissociates oneself from one's perspective and adopts the perspective of the object. Further, it requires that one sees oneself—one's own body—as *yet another object*, which stands in multiple relations with other objects and is therefore, at least in certain regards, divested of its privileged status: I have to "*there*" myself so that I may "*here*" the thing. Finally, it requires the ability to "transcribe a kinetic melody into a visual [sequence] [...] establishing relations of reciprocal correspondence and mutual expression between them" (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 118), i.e., to translate a *motor* sequence carried from the *object's* point of view into a *visual* sequence seen from *my current* point of view.

In short, the solution of the problem requires what Moss Brender calls the "mobility of perspective" (Moss Brender 2017, 149). This capacity allows one to not only alternate perspectives from the same point of view, as was the case with the multiplicity of perspective, but also to *alternate the point of view itself* and grasp the meaning of the action-to-be-taken "from a perspective *outside of the movement itself*" (ibid., 151; emphasis in the original). Note, again, what Merleau-Ponty is *not* saying here: he is not saying that human beings no longer have a center, but that, in our case, the center is *mobile*, which allows us "to take up a virtual point of view without actually moving our body to that location" (ibid., 149). This, in turn, means that these new virtual anchorages become

invested with the stability (permanence) which, in animals, is restricted to their bodies.

At this juncture, I would like to underline two points. Firstly, while analytically separable, the multiplicity and mobility of perspective are actually two aspects of what Merleau-Ponty calls the “function” or “power of projection” (2002, 130, 138, 139, 146, 181, 210–211). The said function enables me to “take a bird’s eye view of movement and project it outside of [myself]” (ibid., 146), and thus recognize, beyond my present environment, “a world of things visible for each ‘I’ under a plurality of aspects” (1963, 175). Correlatively, it enables me to orient myself not only “in relation to a limited [actual] milieu” but also “in relation to the possible” (ibid., 176), i.e., it opens up an *area of hypervirtuality*, “an area of free space,” in which various *possible* environments “take on a semblance of existence” (2002, 128).

Secondly, the power of projection is not a separate faculty added to the vital powers we share with animals, but entails a *transformation of our whole mode of being* and therefore manifests itself as a *new structure of behavior*. In this so-called *symbolic behavior*, it is, as mentioned, the *behavior itself* which becomes “the proper theme of activity” (1963, 103). If we go back to the problem of performing a detour, we notice that, to solve it successfully, we have to “trace by our very gesture the symbol of the movement which we would have to make if we were in [the object’s] place” (ibid., 118). Put differently, it requires that we establish correspondences—“relations of relations”—between behavioral patterns executed from different centers: the *actual* gesture I perform with my hand when I move the fruit from my present position *expresses the same signification* as that of the *possible* movement of my body traversing the selfsame path from the position of the object. Symbolic behavior thus stands for the ability to take up a *common signification* of these different—*actual* and/ or *possible*—behavioral patterns, and express it in (other) gestures, pictures, or words. These then stand for *symbols*, i.e., “structure(s) of structures” or structures of the second order, expressing reciprocal correspondences between actual and possible sensorimotor patterns (ibid., 122).

In short, the power of projection as a novel way of being-in-the-world is my entry-way into the “thing structure” and “an indefinite time and space” (ibid., 119). As such, it allows me to perceive not only “a narrow circle of human

‘milieus’ (*Umwelten*) but also, especially through language, art, and science, the “universe” or “world” (*Welt*), and to transcend “the experience of an immediate reality” to pursue a “knowledge of truth” (*ibid.*, 176). Further, if we consider that, etymologically, both *ratio* (Lat.) and *logos* (Gr.), the two classical terms for “reason(ing),” also denote “proportion(ality),” i.e., the establishment of relations between different variables, we see that, from a Merleau-Pontyan perspective, the power of projection—the power of establishing symbols as “relations of relations”—is a cradle of rationality, a “nascent *logos*” (1964c, 25) or a “*Logos* of the aesthetic [‘perceived’] world” (1964a, 10; 1973, 38, 42, 69; 2002, 498). Unlike non-human animals that strive to insinuate their “stubborn [vital] norms,” human beings have the ability to “de-realize” themselves (1963, 126) and adopt a *metanormative attitude*, which allows them to thematize, i.e., reflect upon, compare, and alternate, the norms they enact and environments they inhabit. It is because of the “circumscribed remove” from the actual and the ability of its thematization in light of the possible, that human beings are not only incarnate but also *epistemological* subjects. As beautifully expressed by Moss Brender:

22

The animal enacts a meaningful world through its behaviour, but it does so without *knowing* the meanings it enacts, without making them thematic. It sings a melody it cannot hear. Human *logos* is an awakening to the song that is all around us. It is the power to perceive meanings as such, rather than simply living in them. This does not mean that we cease *enacting* meanings in favour of *knowing* them. Rather, we enact meanings of a second order: the meaningful world that our bodies respond to includes the meanings that we and others are enacting. (2017, 152)

This provisional sketch should suffice to show why the power of projection can be said to constitute the core of human mind(edness) and reason(ableness). What is crucial, however, is that mind and reason so construed are not severed from corporeality—in fact, Merleau-Ponty sees such (sometimes inadvertent) decoupling as the main vice of intellectualist approaches (2002, 143 ff.)—, but are, as we have seen, a *new way of being*

a body, a body minded. By Merleau-Ponty's lights, we can understand *both* similarities *and* distinctions between animals and humans only if we are willing to admit that "there are *several ways for the body to be a body*" (2002, 143; emphasis in the original). The body in non-human beings is a center of normative activity embedded into a virtual domain of signification (environment), which is (more or less) fixed by each organism's organization and given from a single perspective. The body in human beings is a center of *metanormative* activity operating in a *hypervirtual* domain of signification (world/universe), which spreads out, around the socio-culturally acquired significations, the "halo" of possible de- and re-structurations:

[T]he human dialectic is ambiguous: it is first manifested by the social or cultural structures, the appearance of which it brings about and in which it imprisons itself. *But its use-objects and its cultural objects would not be what they are if the activity which brings about their appearance did not also have as its meaning to reject them and to surpass them.* (1963, 176; emphasis in the original)

23

A famous fragment from Blaise Pascal's *Pensées* reads: "Man is neither angel nor beast, and unhappily whoever wants to act the angel, acts the beast." (1995, § 557) In my view, the fragment captures nicely the middle-ground approach to human mindedness that Merleau-Ponty is striving for. On the one hand, human beings are not angelic intellects fortuitously tied to their bodies and the world, but corporeal minds ineradicably enmeshed with worldliness and otherness; on the other hand, their minded corporeality differs from that of other animals in that it is a vehicle of a new structure of behavior, a radically new way of being-in-the-world. Thus, human beings are *embodied* minds in the sense that the new structure (mind) is grounded in the older structure (body); but they are also *minded* bodies in the sense that the new structure (mind) transforms the meaning and functioning of the older structure (body). In the next section, I will try to shed more light on this point by focusing on Merleau-Ponty's conception of language.

3. Singing the world: the speaking speech

The reason why language is particularly pertinent to our topic is its amphibious nature: on the one hand, it is involved in human cognition; on the other hand, it is a specific form of bodily activity. As such, it often falls prey to two explanatory extremes: one may either reduce it to sheer intellectual activity and ignore its behavioral component (language as “mentalese” or language of thought); or one may reduce it to its gestural dimension and ignore its cognitive component (language as an elaborate reflex). In his account, Merleau-Ponty opts for a middle path, arguing that, while undoubtedly a form of behavior, language opens up qualitatively new ways of “structuring things,” and thus qualitatively new ways of being-in-the-world. But to understand this properly, we need to catch language “in the act,” i.e., as (*speaking*) *speech* or *linguaging*.

24 To begin with, Merleau-Ponty agrees that it is important to recognize the gestural dimension of language: “The spoken word is a genuine gesture, and it contains its meaning in the same way as the gesture contains its.” (Ibid., 213) So, how *does* a gesture contain its meaning? Clearly, the latter is not simply “given,” i.e., it is not an initial cause in a mechanical process, for I can be, and often am, wrong about what the other person is signaling. Instead, it seems to require an *act of understanding* on my part (ibid., 214). This understanding, however, is not a “cognitive operation” undertaken by a disembodied-angelic intellect (ibid., 214), but relates to something fleshier. For Merleau-Ponty, to understand a gesture involves an invitation to enter into a virtual domain of signification, to take up the behavioral style of the other and incorporate it into my own corporeal schema:

It is as if the other person’s intention inhabited my body and mine his. The gesture which I witness outlines an intentional object. This object is genuinely present and fully comprehended when the powers of my body adjust themselves to it and overlap it. The gesture presents itself to me as a question, bringing certain perceptible bits of the world to my notice, and inviting my concurrence with them. Communication is achieved when my conduct identifies this path

with its own. There is mutual confirmation between myself and others. (Ibid., 215)

What is involved in understanding and/or communicating a gesture, then, is an establishment of *dynamic synchrony* between my own intentions and the gestures of others (ibid.). This, again, is not a mechanical or intellectual process, but involves “a synchronizing change of my own existence,” “a transformation of my [whole] being” (ibid., 213–214).

According to Merleau-Ponty, the same is true of *speech* construed as a *linguistic gesture*. For instance, Merleau-Ponty remarks that to learn the meaning of a word is to become acquainted with its “place in a context of action,” which is achieved by “taking part in a communal life” (ibid., 208): “I learn it as I learn to use a tool, by seeing it used in the context of a certain situation.” (Ibid., 469) Language in its *active* dimension, language as *linguaging*, is thus an embodied *praxis* that is essential for the intersubjective establishment and maintenance of the jointly inhabited virtual domains. This is why, for Merleau-Ponty, “words, vowels and phonemes are so many ways of ‘singing’ the world” (ibid., 217), and why different languages are “but several ways for the human body to sing the world’s praises” (ibid.).

25

However, although *continuous* with gesture, language also *goes beyond* it; for it not only *sings the world*, but also allows *the worldly songs to be heard*. Language transcends gesture in two important ways. Firstly, unlike gesture, it is “able to settle into a sediment and constitute an acquisition for use in human relationships” (ibid., 220): technologies of writing transform intersubjectively enacted virtual domains into manuscripts, books, etc., thereby instituting an (artistic, intellectual, etc.) “tradition,” which lends itself to subsequent generations. Secondly, and unlike some other cultural practices (e.g., painting and music), language can be “indefinitely reiterated,” which is why “it is possible to speak about speech whereas it is impossible to paint about painting” (ibid., 221). There is an *inherent recursivity of language*, expressed in the fact that linguistic meaning, once constituted, can serve not only to disclose new meanings, but also to use the latter to thematize (i.e., adopt, modify, and/or abandon) the former—and so on, *indefinitely*. Language, then, is not a mere complexification of gesture,

but a *qualitatively novel structuration* centered around sedimentation and infinite recursivity.⁷

Most importantly, language allows for the sublimation of the *nascent logos*, already present in perception, into *explicit logos*, constitutive of full-blown thought:

This mute or operational language of perception begins a process of knowledge which it cannot itself accomplish. However firm my perceptive grasp of the world may be, it is entirely dependent upon a centrifugal movement which throws me toward the world. I can recapture my grasp only if I myself spontaneously posit new dimensions of its signification. Here is the beginning of speech, the style of knowledge, truth in the logician's sense. (1973, 124–125)

26 We have seen that what prevents me from becoming coagulated with a given domain of vital signification and allows me to open myself to the possibility of the universe/world, is the power of projection with its two aspects of multiplicity and mobility of perspective. I have to be able to fashion myself, by changing my perspective, a new (temporary) abode, a new domain of signification, which allows me to thematize the previous one from a certain remove, and then either take it up, alter it, or let it go. Language is particularly well-suited for this: as a *speaking subject* (1973, 38), I am able to not only skillfully reside among the established meanings, but also withdraw from them and establish new meanings offering themselves as possibilities on the horizon of my socio-cultural setting.

Note, however, that this maintenance and establishment of meaning is not something that *first* takes place in the autonomous realm of thought and *then* gets mediated through the vehicle of language; instead, it is something that *occurs in-and-through language*. To get a better grasp of what I mean by this, let us consider Merleau-Ponty's distinction between "speaking speech" (2002, 102; also: "authentic" (ibid., 202), "originary" (ibid., 409), "originating" (ibid., 453),

7 The "gesture-speech" comparison is a bit misleading since, in the human world, all gestures are embedded into a socio-linguistic context, so there are, strictly speaking, no natural gestures *strictu sensu*.

or “transcendental” (ibid., 454)) and “spoken speech” (ibid., 102; also: “second-order” (ibid., 207), “constituted” (ibid., 214, 453), or “empirical” (ibid., 454)). In a nutshell, *speaking* speech *presents* (establishes) a domain of signification, it “brings the meaning into being or makes it effective” (ibid., 212), whereas *spoken* speech *re-presents* (maintains) a domain of signification, it operates with “the ready-made meanings” (ibid., 214). Put differently, language as languaging *constitutes a new (domain of) signification*, whereas language as languaged *draws on the already constituted (domains of) signification*.

Since we live in a culture where language is an institution, we take the already acquired meanings for granted, although they originally arose out of an embodied, intersubjective process of coming to terms with the world and still require ongoing acts of intersubjective synchronization to maintain their signifiatory value. Things we live with—books, computers, etc.—are not simply “there,” but are meaning-nodes in a vast socio-cultural framework of sedimented symbolic behaviors, which need to be reaffirmed by continual use and custom. The presentational (“speaking”) aspect of language comes to the fore in *atypical* situations—in cases of breakdowns or in cases where the language is just being acquired. One such example is a well-known passage from Helen Keller’s autobiography. Keller was a remarkable woman who, despite becoming deaf and blind at a very early age, not only learned to read and write, but went on to become an acclaimed author and lecturer. In the passage that follows, she learns that words *signify* for the first time:

27

Someone was drawing water and my teacher placed my hand under the spout. As the cool stream gushed over one hand she spelled into the other the word “water,” first slowly then rapidly. I stood still, my whole attention fixed upon the motion of her fingers. Suddenly I felt a misty consciousness as of something forgotten—a thrill of returning thought; and somehow the mystery of language was revealed to me. I knew then that “w-a-t-e-r” meant the wonderful something that flowed over my hand. That living word awakened my soul, gave it light, joy, set it free! [...] As we returned to the house each object that I touched seemed to quiver with life. That was because I saw everything with the strange new light that had come to me. (Keller 1959, 23)

The “living word,” of which Keller speaks, is not a mere label attached to an already established domain of signification, but the *act of disclosing* a domain of signification that, previously, was merely an implicit possibility on the horizon of her life, a vector in her life-field. Language manifests this possibility as an actuality, thereby “opening a new field or a new dimension of our experience” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 212).⁸

28 Language, then, is a *vehicle of reason(ing)*, not in the sense of being a mere “envelope” of preformed thought, but in the sense of *embodying thought-in-action*. It is a retrospective illusion to believe that thoughts emerge, fully developed like Athena from Zeus’s head, in the silent depths of our mind. For, if this were the case, why are my ponderings so vague, before I say them out loud or write them down? As Merleau-Ponty puts it, speech “does not translate ready-made thought, but accomplishes it” (ibid. 207). It is what, in my concrete (cultural, social, temporal) situation, enables me to endorse an established signification or open up a new one, what allows me to reconfirm myself and the world I live in, or—often after a prolonged period of confusion and suffering—re-fashion myself in light of tacit possibilities permeating the nooks and crannies of what, previously, I have called “my reality.” As such, speech is not a mere addendum to my lived corporeality, but an integral part of a novel structure called minded body.

It is, therefore, naive to think that *any* type of inquiry—phenomenological or otherwise—can uncover, underneath the layers of linguistic and rational sediments, an Adamic sphere of lived experience, in which our primordial (direct, unobstructed) engagement with the world is said to unfold. Instead, the goal is to understand how, in a *cognitive and linguistic being that is human*, corporeal existence feeds into, and is ultimately transformed by, speech and thought.

Take, for instance, contemporary first-person approaches to the study of experience (Petitmengin 2006, Petitmengin et al. 2019, Varela and Shear 1999). These are not, and cannot be, relegated to “primordial silence,” but

8 It should be noted that, while this capacity of (self)transcending is inherent in language, the specific restructurations cannot be carried out on a whim, but are predicated on the possibilities surrounding the biologically and socio-culturally acquired structures. There is, then, an (admittedly fluid) historical horizon of comprehensibility, which, if surpassed, results in our attempted restructurations being devoid of signification.

take place in a dialogical setting, in the realm of *dia-logos*, *two-mindedness*. When the interviewer probes, suggests, hints, etc., and the interviewee seeks, responds, recasts, etc., are we to believe that the dialogical exchange—the linguistic encroachment of the speaker and the listener—has no bearing on the dynamics of lived experience, that the latter was, so to speak, simply *there*, in the silence of our being, waiting to be picked and enjoyed, like a ripe fruit? In other words, are we to believe that language here is merely a proverbial lamp shedding rays of thought onto fully-formed objects of experience, which, like fish in the depths of the ocean, lurk in the dark recesses of our mind? But, then, why does “the most familiar thing appear indeterminate as long as we have not recalled its name” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 206)? Moreover, what exactly are we to make of these elusive *unnoticed phenomena*—unnoticed body sensations, memories, etc.—if a “phenomenon,” by definition, is that which *appears*, that which *gives itself*, *precisely and inasmuch as it gives itself*?

4. Conclusion: on discontinuity-in-continuity

Let us now, by way of summary, return to the original question about the relation between lived experience (perception) and mind (thought). We have seen that, by Merleau-Ponty’s lights, the originality of mind *a propos* life is not one of *addition* but of *transformation*, of “a [wholesale] retaking and a ‘new’ structuration” of the preceding structural dynamics (1963, 184). Mind, then, is neither a spiritual add-on to, nor a quantitative complexification of, life; instead, it is a qualitatively novel structuration of one’s whole being: it *takes up* the preceding (lived, vital) structuration while simultaneously *transforming* it, i.e., integrating it into a new whole and investing it with a completely new meaning and function:

Man taken as a concrete being is not a psyche joined to an organism, but the movement to and fro of existence which at one time allows itself to take corporeal form and at others moves towards personal acts. Psychological motives and bodily occasions may overlap because there is not a single impulse in a living body which is entirely fortuitous in relation to psychic intentions, not a single mental act which has not

found at least its germ or its general outline in physiological tendencies.
(2002, 101)

In a normal (“well-integrated”) human being, all existential dimensions—perception included—are permeated with *mindedness* in the sense of being open to rational scrutiny. And yet, this mindedness is not relegated to the plane of angelic existence, but constitutes a novel mode of *corporeal* being, which is never completely freed from the ambiguities of concrete situations in which it finds itself: I may vary my perspectives, but I am still a *perspectival* being.

In Merleau-Ponty’s view, to do justice to this dynamic of existence, we must develop ways of thinking that would allow us to (re)capture the circulatory relation between “higher” superstructures and “lower” substructures. He himself uses different terms to express the said relation: for instance, he says that the “higher” “assumes and transcends” the “lower” (ibid., 61), it “continues while going beyond” (ibid., 68), “goes beyond [...] while still preserving” (ibid., 75), “fulfill[s ...] by destroying” and “destroy[s...] by fulfilling” (ibid., 99), “reconfirm[s ...] at the same time it supersedes” (ibid., 100), “sav[es ...] by destroying” (ibid.), “sublimates [... without] cut[ting] the roots” (ibid., 107), “prolongs and transforms” (ibid., 139), “surpasses [... while] prolonging its movement” (ibid., 141).⁹ The common denominator of these, and similar,¹⁰ phrases is that they all try to capture a movement that allows for both continuity and discontinuity, or more precisely, for a *discontinuity-in-continuity*.

Clearly, as a phenomenologist *of sorts*, Merleau-Ponty does not think that phenomenology, as an attempt to grasp and articulate the elusive dynamics of

9 Similar descriptions can be found in his other works, but for reasons of space I am unable to pursue this further. I would just like to add that they can be traced all the way back to his first monograph, where he notes that the “double aspect” of the said relation “both liberate[s] the higher from the lower and found[s] the former on the latter”: the superstructure “eliminates the preceding one as an isolated moment,” yet it also “uses and sublimates it,” “conserves and integrates it” (1963, 207, 208).

10 The closest Merleau-Ponty gets to a definition of this two-way dynamic is when he expounds it in terms of Edmund Husserl’s notion of *Fundierung* (2002, 458). However, limited space requires me to forgo a more thorough explication of that multifaceted notion (see Matherne 2017, 783, for a helpful overview).

lived experience, is condemned to silence. In fact, he claims that it is precisely *the linguistic and reflective practices* that, originarily, disclose the *realm of the prereflective* as a unique domain of inquiry and, ultimately, serve as, perhaps not exclusive, but undoubtedly *exemplary*, modes of its expression. Thus, the phenomenologist—or any philosopher, for that matter—should not try to separate the (distortive) contributions of *logos* from the (authentic) activities of *aisthesis*, but to gain a better (more comprehensive) understanding of *logos* in light of a better (more comprehensive) understanding of *aisthesis*. The experience, then, *is* (contra Dreyfus, pro McDowell) permeated by mindedness; but this mindedness is permeated with the *dynamic logics of the living*, and thus of a different kind than envisioned by McDowell.

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“BECOMING THE COLOR”

SYNESTHETIC GESTURE IN A CASE STUDY OF MULTIPLE FORMS OF SYNESTHESIA

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Abstract

Phenomenological investigations of participants with grapheme-color synesthesia—a condition wherein an *inducer* consistently and automatically triggers an additional *concurrent* perceptual experience—have revealed an apparent paradox. Namely, they describe the automaticity of their synesthetic experiences as being both willed and automatic. Here, we apply in-depth interviews and signal-contingent experience sampling to investigate the lived experience of a single case (HR) of

synesthesia to address this paradox. Our results suggest that for HR an inducer elicits a non-visual, spatially-localized, immediate, and intuitive knowledge about the concurrent. Critically, HR reports that in order to experience the concurrent visually, she must perform a specific mental gesture. We suggest that reporting on the former yields descriptions of concurrent experience as being automatic, and reporting on the latter yields descriptions of concurrent experience as being willful. Our findings demonstrate the need for detailed phenomenological investigations of the experience of synesthesia, in order to develop more accurate descriptions of this experience.

Key words: synesthesia, empirical phenomenology, signal-contingent experience sampling, constructivist grounded theory, gesture.

»Postajati barva.« Sinestetična gesta v študiji primera z več oblikami sinestezije

Povzetek

36 Fenomenološke raziskave udeleženk z grafemsko-barvno sinestezijo – stanjem, pri katerem *sprožilec* stalno in avtomatično sproži dodatno, *sočasno* zaznavno izkustvo – poročajo o navideznem paradoksu. Namreč, avtomatičnost svojih doživljanj sinestezije opisujejo kot hkrati tako voljne kakor avtomatične. Z namenom, da bi naslovili ta paradoks, tu uporabimo poglobljene intervjuje in od signala odvisno vzorčenje izkustva za raziskovanje živega izkustva sinestezije pri enem primeru (HR). Naši izsledki kažejo, da pri HR sprožilci vzbujajo ne-vizualno, prostorsko umeščeno, takojšnje in intuitivno vedenje o sinestetični asociaciji. Bistveno je, da HR poroča, kako mora za to, da izkusi sinestetično asociacijo v vidni obliki, izvesti točno določeno miselno gesto. Predlagamo, da poročanja o prvi vodijo do opisov sinestetičnih asociacij kot avtomatičnih, medtem ko poročanje o slednjih vodi do opisov sinestetičnih asociacij kot voljnih. Naši izsledki kažejo pomembnost podrobnega fenomenološkega raziskovanja doživljanja sinestezije, da bi razvili natančnejše opise tega doživljanja.

Ključne besede: sinestezija, empirična fenomenologija, od signala odvisno vzorčenje izkustva, konstruktivistična poskusna teorija, gesta.

1. Introduction

Synesthesia is a condition wherein an *inducer* consistently and automatically triggers an additional perceptual experience, referred to as the *concurrent* (Cytowic 1993). For example, in grapheme-color synesthesia, the presentation of a monochromatic letter leads to the automatic experience of color. Further, in sequence-space synesthesia, time-related concepts (e.g., years, days of the week) are experienced as salient locations in egocentric space. One of the defining features of synesthesia has been the automaticity of the concurrent. It is widely claimed that when synesthetes experience an inducer, the concurrent involuntarily presents itself in their visual awareness (Meier and Rothen 2009; Rothen, Seth, Witzel, and Ward 2013), provided that individuals attend to an inducer for a sufficient period of time (e.g., Mattingley, Payne, and Rich 2006).

Developmental theories have emphasized the associative nature of synesthesia (Mroczko-Wąsowicz and Nikolić 2014), motivating investigations into whether synesthesia can be acquired in adulthood. Roger Walsh (2005), for instance, notes that prolonged engagement in contemplative practice may cultivate the experience of synesthesia. Specifically designed training regimens have been used to investigate if it is possible to train non-synesthetic individuals to experience synesthetic concurrents. In these associative training protocols, a series of letters are repeatedly paired with colors through adaptive memory and reading tasks for a period of five weeks (Bor et al. 2014; Rothen et al. 2018). These studies found that following the training regimen, participant's performance for trained letter-color pairs on the gold-standard consistency test (Eagleman et al. 2007) passed the threshold indicative of synesthetic experience (Bor et al. 2014; Rothen et al. 2018). In addition, participants also displayed synesthesia-like behavior for trained letters on a synesthetic equivalent of the Stroop test (demonstrated by greater interference effects and slower response times in incongruent trials; see Meier and Rothen 2009; Ward et al. 2007). Critically, the majority of participants self-reported phenomenology that was suggestive of synesthesia-like experiences (Bor et al. 2014; Rothen et al. 2018). However, these studies only provided superficial descriptions of training-induced changes in phenomenology.

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In order to ascertain whether such training-protocols elicit experience that is comparable to naturally-occurring synesthesia, Schwartzman and colleagues (2020) conducted phenomenological interviews both on participants who exhibit training-induced perceptual experiences and individuals with naturally-occurring synesthesia. They report that participants with naturally-occurring and training-induced synesthetic experience display a large degree of overlap, characterized by descriptive similarities in the strength, stability, shape, and location of concurrent experience. They found that only the automaticity of color experience differed significantly between the two groups. While most (9/14) individuals with training-induced synesthesia required effort to experience concurrents, individuals with naturally-occurring synesthesia described a diverse range of experiences associated with the automaticity of their concurrents. First, there was the distinction between *automatic* (concurrents happen to participants) and *willful* (concurrents are willingly brought forward into awareness). Three other types of automaticity were detected in naturally-occurring synesthesia. *Contextually varied experience* refers to the experience wherein the automaticity of synesthetic concurrents changed depending on the situation (e.g., being able to ignore them while reading prose). Second, *semi-automatic* experiences are those, in which participants report being able to block the experience from occurring at all. Finally, *reflective association* describes situations, in which participants had to reflect on or consider the grapheme closely, in order to become aware of the concurrent experience. Paradoxically, ten participants with naturally-occurring synesthesia reported experiencing both willful and automatic synesthetic concurrents in the *same* interview using the *same* inducers. These findings call into question the automaticity of concurrents as a defining feature of synesthesia. To address the apparent paradox, the current study provides an in-depth phenomenological case study of synesthesia.

While case studies that observe the lived experience of synesthesia are common (e.g., Cytowic and Eagleman 2009), few studies (e.g., Gould et al. 2014) have taken into account the contemporary approaches to the acquisition of first-person data. The present study offers an in-depth empirical

phenomenological¹ study of one person's lived experience of synesthesia, as well as aspects of her phenomenology that must be taken into account if we wish to understand how her synesthetic experience fits into the broader description of how it is to be her (cf. Jaspers 1997).

Within this study, we observed a number of fundamental experiential gestures present in the visual experience of our participant that occur across different forms of synesthesia. While the training regimens outlined above focus on grapheme-color synesthesia, data from our case-study suggest that differentiating between types of synesthesia according to the modality of inducer is somewhat arbitrary. This observation is in line with recent critiques of building up theoretical constructs based on behavioral or functional criteria, which emphasize the need to start with the lived experience (Madeira et al. 2018). Therefore, we did not focus solely on grapheme-color synesthesia, but the entirety of synesthetic experiences reported by our participant. This allowed us to investigate the automaticity of synesthetic experience in more depth, observing its invariant properties as well as how it relates to other aspects of the case's mental life (e.g., empathy).

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This paper contains two supplementary materials available on the *Open Science Framework* (<https://osf.io/mcsu9/>):

- Supplementary materials A (SM-A): Transcripts of raw data;
- Supplementary materials B (SM-B): The codebook.

2. The case

We explore the lived experience of HR (herself a co-author of the paper). She is a 34-year-old, right-handed woman. She is ethnically white British, and a citizen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. By the

¹ In this paper, we (somewhat artificially) differentiate between empirical phenomenology and philosophical phenomenology, wherein the former refers to a practice of using qualitative research to inquire into individuals' lived experience (Kordeš 2016), and the latter refers to a systematic, philosophical, and logical analysis of the conditions of possibility of conscious experience (including domains of research such as transcendental and existential phenomenology). For a notable exception to this division, see Sartre 2010.

time she participated in this study, HR has had 20 years of formal education, and holds a bachelor's degree in textiles and costume design, a postgraduate diploma in theatre costumes, and a master's degree in Japanese studies. She is currently a doctoral candidate in creative and critical writing. She is a native speaker of English and speaks Japanese.

HR reports multiple forms of synesthesia. She self-reports grapheme-color, sound-color synesthesia (in relation to music), emotion-color synesthesia, person-color synesthesia, ordinal-linguistic personification (i.e., linking symbols with personalities), and sequence-space synesthesia. During the study itself, she also observed taste-color and smell-color synesthesia. Table 1 summarizes the colors and personalities she associates with individual letters of the English alphabet. She scores extremely high (eyes open = 79/80; eyes closed = 74/80) on the inverted Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Campos and Pérez-Fabello 2009), suggesting hyperphantasia, a condition wherein individuals experience mental imagery that is so vivid as to be barely distinguishable from perception (Zeman et al., 2020).

40 Contemporary first-person research emphasizes the relationship between observing one's own experience and contemplative practices (Kordeš et al., 2019). In light of this relationship, we note HR's experience with contemplative practices: she reports 10 years of active practice of mindfulness meditation.

Inducer	Color concurrent [RGB code]	Color name	Personality trait	Inducer	Color concurrent [RGB code]	Color name	Personality trait
<A>	192, 43, 11	Brick red	Proper, plastic	<N>	134, 225, 85	Lime green	Fun and playful
	12, 30, 39	Dark blue	Younger male	<O>	254, 254, 255	White	Huge, oppressive
<C>	229, 249, 20	Yellow	N/A	<P>	46, 9, 31	Purple	Uptight
<D>	22, 54, 12	Dark green	Kind old man	<Q>	11, 4, 7	Dark purple	Velvety texture
<E>	250, 47, 42	Pink-red	Cheeky	<R>	188, 59, 48	Dark pink	Older woman with glasses, also my collective family
<F>	9, 48, 1	Dark green	Old man librarian with moustache and glasses	<S>	199, 56, 44	Dark pink	Teacher
<G>	57, 23, 25	Dark purple	N/A	<T>	199, 163, 44	Yellow	Male
<H>	236, 25, 119 / 25, 36, 65	Magenta / blue	"Me!" (referring only to magenta)	<U>	219, 89, 9	Orange	Pleasing, background person
<I>	2, 5, 41	Dark blue	Demure, intelligent, calm	<V>	66, 7, 126	Blue-purple	Regal

<J>	216, 85, 4 / 137, 228, 102	Orange / Light green	My brothers	<W>	102, 43, 33	Brown	Strict and stern older woman with a soft side
<K>	71, 9, 143	Blue-purple	N/A	<X>	13, 1, 33	Dark blue	Mysterious male teacher
<L>	218, 223, 219	White-grey	Tall male, about 40-ish	<Y>	236, 245, 9	Yellow	Omnipresent in a positive way
<M>	6, 6, 169	Dark red	“Think of my mum”	<Z>	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 1:

Overview of HR’s grapheme-color concurrents.

The notation <> marks the letters as graphemes (i.e., elements of text) rather than phonemes (i.e., elements of speech).

Recently, it has come to light that implicit demand characteristics may drive experience, especially for subjects who score high on scales of hypnotic suggestibility (Lush 2020). Lush (ib.) suggests that in the case of mirror-sensory synesthesias, individuals may habitually (but involuntarily) implement phenomenological control in everyday life, when it is in-line with their goals, creating tactile sensations. These findings raise the possibility that habitual phenomenological control may also underlie the reported concurrent experiences in both induced and natural synesthesia. To control for this possibility, HR was tested on the *Sussex-Waterloo Scale of Hypnotizability* (SWASH, Lush et al. 2018). She scores 1.95 on a range between 0.0 and 5.0 on the SWASH test.

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3. Method

A mixed-method phenomenological study was conducted. An initial meeting with HR took place in person on March 2, 2020. She was introduced to empirical phenomenology, and asked about her synesthesia. She described how, in experience, her synesthetic concurrents feel connected to feelings of empathy and sensitivity to external sensations. She expressed interest in examining sequence-space synesthesia more closely. She agreed to participate in a long-term, multi-phase study. The study itself consisted of two phases. During Phase 1, phenomena of interest were explored in-detail using phenomenological interviews. In Phase 2, once salient experiential categories were defined, signal-contingent experience sampling was employed to see how

these experiences occur in HR's daily life, away from the specific context of a scientific study.

3.1. Phase 1: In-depth phenomenological interviews

15 in-depth phenomenological interviews were conducted. The in-depth interviews took place between March and June 2020. As the COVID-19 pandemic was ongoing, all communication was done via video conferencing. In the interviews, a specific phenomenon was elicited within the research setup. Then, HR was prompted to report on her experience either at a random moment or, if this was demanded by the provocation of the phenomenon, afterwards.

42 The interview was based on the *method of empathy*, used in descriptive psychopathology, that is, the field examining the lived experience of anomalous mental states (Oyebode 2008; Jaspers 1997). HR was asked open- and closed-ended questions. Occasionally, she was asked to perform *ad hoc* mental exercises to provide clarifying data on specific aspects of her experience. The interview began by asking HR to broadly describe all the salient events that were present in her experience at the time of the interview. After salient aspects of HR's experience were defined, each event was explored in detail. The interviewer guided HR from descriptions of folk psychological theories, general descriptions of experience, her own beliefs about experience towards descriptions of sensory experience, bodily feelings, mental gestures, and attitudes. After HR provided an account of her experience, the researcher recapitulated his understanding of her experience, in order to a) maintain her contact with the experience in question; and b) check whether his understanding of her experience was adequate. If there were any misunderstandings, the same aspect of experience was explored further. After HR agreed that the researcher's understanding of her experience is accurate, the interview continued. Normalizing statements were used if HR expressed her apprehension or embarrassment about some aspect of her experience (Oyebode 2008). Both audio and video recordings of the interviews were gathered.

Table 2 summarizes the tasks used throughout the interviews to elicit specific aspects of synesthetic phenomenology.

Interview code	Experience	Rationale	Interview code	Experience	Rationale
HR-I-01	Reading a short story	Does secondary activity (reading) change the nature of synesthetic experience	HR-I-09	Observing English phoneme /e/ and Latin-script letter <H>	What is HR's experience of grapheme- and phoneme-color synesthesia in her first language?
HR-I-02	Reading a short story	Same as HR-I-01	HR-I-10	Observing Russian phoneme /дз/, and corresponding Cyrillic-script <ДЗ>	What is HR's experience of grapheme- and phoneme-color synesthesia in a language she does not speak
HR-I-03	Listening to music	Obtaining experiential dynamics of music-color synesthesia	HR-I-11	Observing Russian phoneme /з/, and corresponding Cyrillic-script <Ж>	Same as HR-I-10
HR-I-04	Empathizing w/ imagined a) fictional character; b) bee; c) the interviewer	In the initial meeting, HR reported on intuitively felt similarities between synesthesia and empathy. HR's experience of empathy was explored	HR-I-12	Letter M, presented as the sound /em/ and the letter T, presented as the grapheme <T>	Same as HR-I-09
HR-I-05	Reflecting on color a) indigo; b) orange-yellow	What is the experience of synesthetic colors when carefully considering inducer, rather than merely glancing at them?	HR-I-13	Reflect on number related to time: 1962 CE.	Same as HR-I-06
HR-I-06	Reflect on numbers related to time: a) 1984 CE; b) 1911 CE; c) 1999 CE; d) 3017 CE; e) 3017 BC	What is the experience of sequence-space synesthesia?	HR-I-14	<E> presented in the color that is congruent to HR's synesthetic concurrent (RGB code: 250, 47, 42). <R> presented as a complementary color of HR's synesthetic concurrent (RGB code: 40, 1, 48)	How does HR experience situations where graphemes are presented in (in) congruent colors?
HR-I-07	Copying a 2D image	What is HR's experience of visual working memory?	HR-I-15	Memorizing a sentence while observing a triplet of graphemes in order to dissociate attention from synesthetic gesture	How does HR experience her synesthesia while performing a task that demands her attention?
HR-I-08	Reflecting on: a) a close friend; b) family member; c) stranger; d) celebrity; e) the interviewer.	What is HR's experience of person-color synesthesia?	N/A	Reflection on the study	Establishing the validity of interviews.

Table 2:
Overview of prompts for Phase 1 interviews.

3.2. Phase 2: Signal-contingent experience sampling

Signal-contingent experience sampling was used to gather HR's lived experience in an everyday setting, unconstrained by a research setting. The sampling took place between May and August 2020. On a prearranged day, HR received seven prompts via phone for her to sample her experience. Sampling prompts were delivered to her at random moments between 9:00 and 22:00. A script was programmed in Python, creating seven random values in a given time interval. Upon receiving a prompt, HR was instructed to describe her experience according to seven elements:

1. date and time;
2. context: objective facts about the situation;
3. general description about your experience;
4. visual experience;
- 44 5. subspace region: an aspect of HR's field of experience identified within the study itself—a space overlaying the world she experiences beyond her body that contains mental imagery and other aspects of her thinking (see below for more details);
6. sensory awareness;
7. aspects of empathy.

After each sampling, HR provided feedback to the researcher on whether the sample was valid, meaning whether she was able to report on her experience *immediately* after the prompt. Whenever samples were invalid, the researcher did not inquire into the reason as to why. At the end of each sampling day, HR sent her reports to the researcher. The next day, a follow-up interview was conducted, clarifying discrepancies and providing additional detail to samples. Typically, two samples were explored in detail. The follow-up interview was structured in the same way as in Phase 1. In total, 13 sampling days took place.

3.3. Analysis

Recordings were transcribed verbatim. Whenever HR made a bodily gesture relevant to the description of experience, it was described in the metatext. HR commonly made idiosyncratic sounds when describing experience, which were transcribed as well. The first stage of the analysis of the gathered qualitative data was segmenting the descriptions into experiential episodes. Not all interviews and samples contained a single experiential episode. In some cases, two samples were constructed out of one. In Phase 1, 37 episodes were explored. In Phase 2, 97 samples were gathered, of which 16 samples were explored in follow-up interviews.

The analysis of the qualitative data was conducted simultaneously with the data acquisition, following the principles of constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz 2004). First, line-by-line coding was performed: a meaningful code was assigned to every line of interview data, thereby minimizing the analyst's bias.

Following this step, inductive coding was employed: raw data were assigned more abstract, general descriptive tags (e.g., all HR's experience that included color were grouped together as *color*, rather than coding for specific shades). Categories were constructed from the data without deference to existing theoretical concepts. Finally, categories were grouped together according to their descriptive similarities (see Figure 1).

In the final stage of the analysis, a codebook was constructed (Nelson 2017; Hurlburt and Heavey 2006; Kordeš et al. 2019), containing a detailed description of induced categories. Experiential categories were specified according to: a) name; b) definition; c) relationships to other categories; d) relevant examples; and e) considerations (i.e., elaborations explaining and examples demonstrating the specific differences between similar categories and notes on dynamic interactions between them). The codebook serves three purposes: a) it represents a system of organization of categories; b) a logically consistent codebook provides evidence towards the validity of the coding process; and c) it provides an independent researcher who would be interested in replicating the findings an instrument to familiarize herself with the analysis procedure.

4. Findings

The categories, constructed within this study, are organized into three classes: *structure of visual consciousness*, *phenomenological dimensions of synesthetic experience*, and *synesthetic gesture*. HR's synesthesia seems to be more dependent on the mental acts she performs than the modality of the inducer (see Section 4.3. below). Thus, we provide a description of synesthesia in general, rather than focusing on specific forms of synesthesia (i.e., based on the modality of the inducer). The constructed experiential categories and subcomponents of HR's synesthesia are described in Figure 1.

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


Figure 1:
Experiential categories of HR's synesthesia.

Table 3 summarizes how often HR experienced synesthesia during the second phase of the study (signal-contingent experience sampling). Out of the 97 valid samples, 51% contained some form of synesthetic experience. By

far the most common were linguistically-mediated synesthetic experiences: grapheme-color and concept-color synesthesia occurred 13% and 10% of the time respectively. By comparison smell-color synesthesia occurred only once.

Synesthetic Experience	Grapheme-Color	Concept-Color	Taste-Color	Taste-Color	Emotion-Color	Person-Color	Sequence-space	Smell-Color
51%	13%	10%	6%	6%	5%	3%	5%	1%

Table 3:

Relative frequencies of HR's synesthetic experience during the second phase of the study.

4.1. Structure of HR's visual consciousness

Structure of visual consciousness divides HR's experience into three poles: *mental space*, *visual field*, and the *subspace region*.

Mental space describes the part of HR's field of experience that corresponds to the location of her point of view; it is internal to her body and it is where she conducts her mentation, where her thoughts arise, and her inner speech takes place. On the other hand, *visual field* is HR's experience of the world as uncovered by her senses and present to her consciousness in the visual mode. *Visual field* corresponds to what Anil Seth (2014, 100) refers to as *subjective veridicality*, that is, perception as “experienced as part of—as continuous with—the real world.” This experience of the world is sometimes termed the *objective pole*. It is not objective in the metaphysical sense of having access to an observer-independent reality, but, as Charles Laughlin and Jason Throop (2006, 327) summarize, in the sense “where the ‘objective’ elements of experience are those that can be grasped by any given experiencer regardless of cultural, historical or social position.” For HR, accessing pure *visual field* takes willful action:

[It is the], erm, exact feel of the soil and the roots, and what that felt like on my fingers, the color of the soil, the color of the roots, looking at the intricate root system that was all intertwined [...]. Looking it, sort of as minutely as I can possibly look. Zooming in as far as I possibly could.

[...] I suppose it is like slowly and, like, methodically and carefully running my eyes and registering each little part of something, and really, erm, gaining all the visual information. (HR-II-D04-S02)

The *subspace region* (a term HR uses and is itself a Star Trek reference) is the part of HR's field of experience that connects the *visual field* and the *mental space*. It refers to the part of HR's field of consciousness that belongs to her, to her attitudes, and imagery she projects into the world. HR describes it as follows:

[I]t's a sort of subspace region. [...] So, it's like a filtering. This is what I know or think to know to be reality here [waves her arm in front of her] and then there's a filter of things I know to be my mind's eye or my imagination. Filtered on top. So, I can be in both. Simultaneously. I can choose to be in one or I can choose to be in the other. [...] It doesn't seem to be limited at all by anything. So, vast, you know, multidimensional canvas. (HR-I-02-01)

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It is a space of her experience that begins at the edge of her embodiment and extends outwards into space:

So, I'm aware it's not happening in the outside world. [...] That it isn't within the objects that I share with other people. It isn't in that space. [...] It feels very much like it is my own domain and that [pause] it is not populated by other people. (HR-I-03-01)

Cassandra Gould and colleagues (2014) describe a similar aspect of synesthetic experience. What they call the "mental room," is experienced as a field of experience that is superimposed on the real world. Attention can be willingly shifted between the mental room and the real world.

Let us now recapitulate this section with an illustration that depicts the structure of HR's visual consciousness (Figure 2).




Figure 2:

The structure of HR's consciousness, constructed to describe her experience of the sound of a violin (see Table 4).

A: HR's embodiment; B: mental space; C: inducer; D.a and D.b: subspace region; E: peripheral vision; F: visual field; G: subjective veridicality.

The subspace region overlays her body, her visual field, as well as the entirety of the space she is aware of. HR is aware of her synesthetic experience—the red teardrop shapes—within her subspace region. Where the subspace region overlaps with the visual field, the visual experience of concurrents is the strongest. The image was shown to HR and she verified it accurately describes her lived experience.

4.2. How it feels to be a synesthete: Phenomenological dimensions of HR's synesthesia

Now that we have oriented ourselves within HR's field of experience, we go on to discuss how she experiences individual phenomenological dimensions of synesthesia. HR reports multiple forms of synesthesia (see Section 2.). Based on HR's reports, we do not differentiate between them. Rather, we describe the more fundamental aspects of experience that remain common across the different forms of synesthesia.

All of HR's experiences are described as being spatially localized. She experiences them, first, within her *subspace region* and, second, at a certain distance from her point of view. Consider the following experience of concept-color synesthesia that HR had while reading a story:

So, I, I'm at the "his face cut by the backlash of the branch." And, erm, *cut* was instantly a red word. And I like felt the motion of *cut* and *backlash* similarly. [...] Like something in front of me was torn open and it was red. Like a carmine red. Like the fabric of whatever it is here. The air. Was torn open and that was red. The gash was red. [...] [It was] in my perception, yeah. It was both. It was both in the outside world but also in my perception. So, spatially, I felt it beyond my body but I didn't see it as being located outside of me. (HR-I-02-01)

50 The previous example further demonstrates that HR's synesthetic experiences are not perceptions, but are located in her perception; what we referred to as the *subspace region*.

HR's linguistically-mediated synesthetic experiences (concept- and grapheme-color synesthesias) are the most common but also phenomenologically sparse. They only contain *color* content and a presence in space. By contrast, emotions and sounds elicit richer experiences. The first reason for this is that these synesthetic experiences contain a strong bodily component.

[My friend] is a very bright and optimistic person, and I think those colors make me feel bright and optimistic. [...] I feel that her brightness in my sort of diaphragm. It's a ball of light in my diaphragm. And yellow is pretty much in my chest. (HR-I-08-01)

Consider also the following experience when HR hears a specific word:

Watching *Suffragette* [a TV show]. Speaker in parliament just said: "eloquence is that which gets things done, Mrs Watts." [...] Focused on *eloquence*, which was a very red and gold word. [...] It is definitely a feely word. [...] I was not speaking it, but I could feel the word in my

voice box. And the way that my body would response. And the way the word would feel in my mouth and throat. (HR-II-D07-S07)

Speech sounds exhibit synesthesia as well. In the following example, HR heard a phoneme in Russian, a language she herself does not speak:

[Points at the height of her forehead] It was here, [whistles three times] in a silver, blue, and sort of shard-like shapes in the subspace. [...] This physical sensation that I feel is like at the top of my head, there. [...] It's already there. And it's silver and light blue shards. Dancing shards. [...] Like a prickly sensation. Prick, prick, prick, prick, prick. (HR-I-10-02)

However, HR's strongest experiences of sound-color synesthesia are associated with listening to music, which is made more complex by a specific spatial experience. Namely, her synesthetic color experiences take on discernible shapes and forms. While listening to a piece of classical music, HR drew the shapes that individual instrument sounds have. Her illustrations are reproduced in Figure 3.

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


Figure 3:

Shapes HR associates with the sound of a violin (left) and a harpsichord (right).

4.3. Synesthetic gesture: From hints of color to becoming the color

The aim of this study is to attempt to better understand the automaticity of synesthetic experience by examining, in detail, the lived experience of HR's

multiple forms of synesthesia. In the previous sections we first described the overall structure of visual consciousness as experienced by HR, and the static dimensions, according to which we can specify her synesthetic experiences. These sections served to orient ourselves within HR's broader field of experience. Now, we will examine how HR's synesthetic experience evolves through time in relation to specific (willful) mental acts, captured by five identified experiential categories: *hint*, *unraveling*, *impinging*, *blocking*, and *becoming the color*.

4.3.1. *Hint*

52 *Hint* is the experience whereby HR becomes aware of an inducer and the concurrent simultaneously. This immediate awareness of the associated properties is *not* visual. HR experiences *hint* within the *subspace region*. It also has an egocentric location (most commonly on HR's right shoulder or above and to the front of her head). For example, she reports: "It was a literal sensation on my shoulders. As if I was, as if I was carrying something over my shoulder and it was touching my head and shoulders. It had a weight but it wasn't heavy." (HR-I-09-01). Finally, *hint* takes the form of intuitive knowing:

[I]t feels like they will come over my shoulder. Loodidodido. In a rolling fashion. But I think, ordinarily, [pause] they are like a cloudy mass. Separate and together at the same time. [...] It's like powdery and disparate around the edges. There's no fixed point to it. It's like a very definite presence. [...] I feel like the weight of the presence. [...] It's just a knowing. (HR-I-01-01)

Hint also has a mass, and, by extension, density. It is by virtue of this density that HR feels attracted to it, as if she wants to direct her attention onto it. Consider the following report:

I wasn't taking the time to look at it. It was just the information was there. [...] It wasn't like at the front of experience. So, [pause] it's like a background. Erm, visual experience. Like a [pause] just a really, like,

almost translucent filter. So, it's [pause] it's more like a sense of knowing that there is a visual element to it. (HR-I-11-01)

4.3.2. *Unraveling*

Unraveling is a specific mental gesture that is used for HR to become visually aware of her synesthetic experience. *Unraveling* begins with an awareness of *hint*: "So, with [the word] *backlash*, the purple was over here [points to the back of her head on the right] on my right-hand side. Shoulder. Happening over here. And I zoomed into it." (HR-I-02-02)

While this gesture can be performed unconsciously, the automaticity has a character of being habitual for HR, rather than being a passive event. Conversely, the gesture of *unraveling* has a willed component:

I just decide to think about [the colors]. Yeah, it's definitely a decision. Not a verbalized decision. It's in my mind. Yeah. [...] An attentional decision, I guess. [...] It takes time, but it's quite quick. [...] it's just a growing awareness, I think. [...] They come out and I am looking at them. (HR-I-01-01)

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HR's descriptions of *unraveling* all share two components. First, she focuses her attention on *hint*, making it more present in her consciousness. The second is a concrete glance. She directs her gaze at the *hint*. Consider the following excerpt, in which both of these dimensions are present:

It's like a knowing that the red is there on some level. And then looking and zooming in and seeing. [...] So, it's sort of that zooming in, zooming out. [...] It is quite literally me looking to the right. [...] I look with my eyes to the right and I turn my head to the side. [The cherry red] just sort of occupies this whole space over here. And I can very much feel it over my shoulder, and it is contained, but it does feel infinite. In the subspace. (HR-I-09-01)

Finally, in the case of sequence-space synesthesia, *unraveling* does not (necessarily) result in the awareness of a color, but the experience of being immersed in a dense region of space, associated with a specific chronological element:

So, if I'm looking back in time [pause] erm, [pause] it's sort of a choice of zooming in, zooming out again. So, I see this block, with a wall, bookended by the decade. Erm, and then it's sort of a [pause] you know, I can just see the years. Just there. And if I zoom in, I can see the years, closer, as individual sections. [...] See in the subspace. (HR-I-06-01)

4.3.3. *Becoming the color*

54 Once the visual awareness of colors or the felt spatial awareness of sequence-space synesthesia is present to her, HR can extend the gesture of *unraveling* further. Continuing *unraveling* results in the experience of *becoming the color*. This is a synesthetic experience, in which the entirety of HR's *subspace region* and *mental space* become filled with color. Additionally, she experiences a prickly sensation in her body, giving her the sense that her body itself is transforming into that color:

[The indigo]'s like a warm, unctuous river, out here [moves hands horizontally from her mouth outwards]. And it's very still. But also, quite solid. I can be in it. But I can also see what's above it. Erm [pause] So, it's like a very warm, very comfortable river. A bath. With no edges. So, it's sort of an ocean. [...] I just looked into my mind's eye. Into my subspace. [...] It was there. Instantly. [...] I can see it. It's vast. Like before, I said, like an ocean but very thick. I can sense its infinite size. [...] And I can feel it. Like the physical sensation of its warmth. (HR-I-05-01)

She further reports the sense of her embodiment disappearing into color:

I can see parts of my body disintegrating and becoming the color [orange and yellow]. [...] Sort of it happening to my arms and shoulders and the rest of my body. I just see it happening. [...] It's also very tactile. [...] It's very relaxing and very pleasurable to have your body disintegrate. (HR-I-05-02)

HR reports that the strongest of her synesthetic experiences is the sequence-space synesthesia. Its relative strength may be related to it sharing a number of phenomenological similarities with *becoming the color*. Namely, HR enters the synesthetic awareness with her entire body, and the fabric of her *subspace region* organizes itself into the spatial representation of time:

I am inside of it, not looking at it. But that is how they arrange themselves. I am looking at it, I'm in it. [...] I am completely immersed in it. In it. So, it is not about separation. Not about where I am located within it, but there is a sort of [pause] additional focus to it. Which is similar to the ocean of indigo. (HR-I-06-05)

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Further, the gestures of *unraveling* in general, and *becoming the color* in particular share similarities with how HR experiences empathy. HR experiences empathy as a gesture forward, towards the entity she is feeling with (as if glancing towards them), leading to her being aware of their emotions in her body. Loss of bodily boundaries bears some similarity with dissolution experience (Caporusso and Demšar 2020). Further, similar phenomenological descriptions of being overwhelmed by a sensory stimulus come from accounts of mystical experiences associated with the Kabbalah, in which it is reported that meditating on specific letters of the Hebrew script, the *aleph-beth*, can be associated with *becoming-the-color*-like experience where “written letters [expand] ‘to the size of the mountains’” (Abram 2017, 245).

Figure 4 schematically depicts the phenomenological dynamics of *unraveling hint* first into the visual experience of synesthesia, and then, if HR chooses to do so, into the state of *becoming the color*.




Figure 4:

HR's phenomenological dynamics of unraveling hint into visual experience of synesthesia, and becoming the color.

Full arrows represent gesture-dependent experiences.

4.3.4. *Impinging and Blocking*

Impinging describes synesthetic concurrents passively happening to HR. There are two phenomenological dynamics associated with this dimension. The first is when HR is attending to the world with a close, investigative, examining attention, an aspect of experience that she refers to as “meticulous observation”:

56

I think it was more attention-grabbing in his voice, and because of his, perhaps change in voice. Because he enunciated it, he said it with more importance, more gravitas maybe. The, I [pause] my attention was peaked. [...] It is [pause] focused listening. (HR-II-D06-04-02)

This meticulous listening is then followed by a visually apprehended synesthetic experience of her interlocutor's voice:

I could see it as a sort of a mass of purple. And you know, much like when I've seen letters and then the mass of colors is below here. This time it was the word *global* and the color was a mass behind it. [...] Black typed letters. [...] It happened. [...] [It is] just there. (HR-II-D06-S04-02)

It seems that a particular style of observation, an engaged and mindful attention leads to the visual awareness of synesthesia occurring automatically.

Or, as HR poetically puts it: “Interest creates agency. Because I was interested in [it], it happened automatically.” (HR-I-04-02)

The second phenomenological dynamic associated with visual awareness of a synesthetic concurrent *impinging* itself onto HR’s awareness is when the inducing experience co-occurs with difficult emotional content:

I am experiencing resistance on that particular year, because it is, has trauma attached to it. [...] My body is holding me back. And I am feeling a sense of reticence and unwillingness. I am not willing. [...] There is curiosity in 1911. [...] Whereas the 1999 feels forced, there’s more force involved and I feel [pause] the emotional landscape is very complicated and [pause] I am not [pause] the curiosity isn’t there. (HR-I-06-03)

When visual awareness of concurrents impinges onto her awareness, HR is able to perform a counter-gesture to prevent it. She does this by constructing a sense of solid space within her *subspace region*, a mass that prevents the visual synesthetic awareness from coming into the forefront. Consider the following for an example of *blocking* with difficult emotional content:

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There’s like a [pause] [...] a block, a self-preservation block. [...] Almost like I am aware of something that I am refusing to look at it. [...] There is definitely like a huge [...] movement of resistance, I think. [pause] And I feel dense. [...] It’s like a pushing away. A complete rejection. (HR-I-08-02)

Figure 5 schematically depicts the phenomenological dynamics of *impinging* and *blocking*.




Figure 5:

Description of HR's phenomenological dynamics of impinging (above) and blocking (below).

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Full arrows represent gesture-dependent experience. Dotted arrows represent the experience where HR can change the course of the experiential dynamics.

5. Discussion

In this paper, we presented an empirical phenomenological case study of HR, who experiences multiple forms of synesthesia, in order to better understand the automaticity of synesthetic phenomenology. We provided a general description of how HR experiences her visual consciousness, the phenomenological properties of her synesthetic experience, and how her synesthetic experiences evolve over time, depending on the specific mental gestures she performs. We observed an experiential category *hint*, an automatic, non-visual, spatially-localized and immediate awareness of the synesthetic concurrent. It takes a specific mental gesture—*unraveling*—for HR to bring a visual awareness of the concurrent into the foreground of her experience. She is able to *unravel* this visual awareness further, experiencing *becoming the color*. In this state, her entire field of experience disintegrates and becomes the awareness of a specific (concurrent) color.

The case study presented in this paper attempts to resolve paradoxical findings from neuroscientific research on synesthesia (i.e., Schwartzman et al., 2020). Neuroscience conceives of synesthesia as a) a stable trait of a specific subpopulation of individuals; and b) an automatic association of an inducer and a concurrent. This narrow conception of synesthesia, however, is not consistent with its phenomenological understanding. In *Phenomenology of Perception*, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2012, 275), for instance, writes that rather than being a non-normative kind of experience, synesthesia is the property of everyday consciousness:

In fact, each color in its inmost possession is but the inner structure of the thing manifested on the outside. [...] By opening up to the structure of the thing, the senses communicate among themselves. We see the rigidity and the fragility of the glass and, when it breaks with a crystal-clear sound, this sound is borne by the visible glass. We see the elasticity of steel, the ductility of molten steel, the hardness of the blade in a plane, and the softness of its shavings. The form of objects is not their geometrical shape: the form has a certain relation with their very nature and it speaks to all of our senses at the same time as it speaks to vision.

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The dynamic described above by Merleau-Ponty bears striking resemblance to Edmund Husserl's conception of the experience of transcendental objects. In *Thing and Space*, Husserl (1997) writes that objects that are present to consciousness are primarily experienced as extension (i.e., things taking up space). This empty spatial topology is then secondarily filled up with specific sensory qualities (e.g., color, illumination). We can relate this idea to how HR reports on her experience of sequence-space synesthesia: that is, as spatial topology, which, while not filled with sensory qualities, is filled with knowledge about temporal structures.

Further, in the same text, Husserl (ib.) explores the notion of kinesthetics, a synesthetic association between movement (and associated awareness of one's own body) and perception. In HR's lived experience, this association is clear, as she experiences an embodied gesture that unravels hint into a modally-present

experience of, for instance, color. Subspace region, the part of HR's experiential field, in which her synesthetic experiences occur, bears resemblance to the notion of body schema. In phenomenological thought, we can distinguish between two conceptions of the body: the body that one has (*Körper*) and the body that one is (*Leib*). It is through the latter that we are in contact with our surroundings (Fuchs 2016). We can, thus, relate HR's embodied gesture, which engenders her synesthetic to her engaging with her lived space. Her experience is different from normative experience, described by Merleau-Ponty, in that this embodied gesture constitutes novel sensory content.

60 Finally, we can relate this novel sensory content to the notion of value-ception (*Wertnehmung*) introduced by Max Scheler (1973). Value-ception refers to objects that are present to consciousness containing an immediately felt value. In the data provided above, we see how for HR, her synesthetic experiences are never (even prior to unraveling) affectless. They always constitute a rich landscape of affectivity, which then influences whether she chooses to unravel or block the synesthetic content. To summarize, the active and embodied character of HR's synesthesia in combination with the observation that synesthetic experiences can be acquired suggests that neuroscientific conceptions of synesthesia may be too narrow to fully explain its phenomenology.

Multiple observations within empirical phenomenology suggest that we are always attending to our experience from a particular observational perspective. Urban Kordeš and Ema Demšar (2018; 2019) propose the notion of *horizons*, i.e., different observational perspectives, from which we can—in the context of an empirical phenomenological study—attend to experience, and which ultimately co-determine the precise nature of the resulting findings. For example, when comparing naturally-occurring and training-induced synesthetic experience Schwartzman and colleagues (2020) noted that the same participants observing their synesthetic concurrents during the same interview session provided different data regarding the automaticity of synesthetic experience. When asked about the automaticity of the color concurrents via a closed-form question, most natural synesthetes report their experience was completely automatic. When moments later, however, they were asked to elaborate on their experience of the automaticity of their

concurrent experience using open-ended interview questions, many of them reported that the experience consisted of a willful act of bringing the colors to the forefront of their awareness. This dynamic was also reported by HR in detail when she was prompted to read a short story and then describe the concurrents associated with specific words (HR-I-01 and HR-I-02). When reading rapidly through the text, the concurrents took the form of amodal knowledge, localized in space:

Background feeling of the colors being there, but because I was reading them quickly, and I wasn't crunching down on them, on each letter, it wasn't right up there. [...] I was not focusing on them. So, I couldn't say to you it was this, this, and this. [...] They were just here [points to her right shoulder] [...] Yeah, right there [points to her right shoulder again]. (HR-I-01-01)

Only when HR was asked to attend carefully to specific words in isolation, this amodal knowledge of color (*hint*) took the form of visual awareness. Schwartzman and colleagues (2020) identified an aspect of experience similar to *unraveling* as reported by HR: reflective association. This is the observation that, in experience, some individuals with naturally-occurring grapheme-color synesthesia have to carefully consider the letter, in order to become aware of the concurrent. Our phenomenal data correspond to findings that link the awareness of synesthetic concurrents to attention. Individuals must either allocate sufficient attentional resources to the inducers (Rich and Mattingley 2003; Ward, Jonas, Dienes, and Seth 2010) or the inducers themselves have to be adequately processed (Mattingley et al. 2006). As noted in Table 2, the session HR-I-15 was dedicated to a mock-experiment, where the researcher told her a sentence that she had to memorize. While repeating the sentence (*John and Mary painted the walls of their new apartment white and yellow*), she was shown a series of three letters (*XHA*). HR memorized the sentence by “slotting” it into her *subspace region*:

I knew that I lodged the words in the left-hand corner. [...] I can see the sentence across the top of the subspace. But I didn't have those

connecting visual experiences that time. I was just focusing on the lettering. [...] When I started saying *John*, it definitely had a quality of white to it. *Mary* had a quality of blue to it. [...] I looked at X first, and I saw black, then I looked at H, and I saw pink, and then I looked at A, and I saw red. [...] I think I faulted in my speech, and then I was back to what I was supposed to speak. So, my attention did go from speaking to reading back to speech again. And I was able to look back at the subspace and continue saying what I was saying. [...] So, it was a [pause] I didn't have to look at them. [...] I didn't see [the sentence] [...] I felt its presence. [...] It was in my periphery. [...] Exactly like I know these plants are here. Wooop [tilts the laptop to show flowers to her left] (HR-I-15-01)

62 This example demonstrates how, in experience, HR's concurrents cannot be *unraveled* at the same time as paying attention to a secondary task. Further, the apparent paradox of the same participant reporting on incongruent experience of automaticity of synesthetic experience reported by Schwartzman and colleagues (2020) corresponds to findings that the means, by which we inquire into experience, co-determines the resulting information reported about a specific experience (Sikka et al. 2017). It has been proposed that the reason for this is that different prompts for subjective reports lead participants towards attending to different aspects of their experience (Heimann 2020). HR's first-person reports, thus, provide a plausible understanding of the divergent response regarding the automaticity of synesthetic experiences.

We suggest that, when using a closed-form question asking if a specific concurrent experience is automatic or willful, participants report on the experience of *hint*. By definition, *hint* is an immediate and intuitive, non-visual awareness of the concurrent. In the literature, synesthetes who report such non-visual experiences are referred to as *know-associators* (Edquist et al. 2006). Conversely, when asking participants to report on their concurrents in more detail using open-ended questions, they attend to their experience more closely, *unraveling* it into a visual awareness of the color. Since *unraveling* has to be actively performed, the participants may be prompted to report on their experience as willful, despite creating an inconsistency in their reporting.

For HR, *unraveling* mirrors the experience of empathy. In a similar way as she might experience intersubjective feelings with another person (HR-II-D06-S05), a fictional character (HR-I-04-01), or an inanimate object (HR-II-D04-S02), HR projects a personality onto inducers via an attentional mental gesture. Richard Cytowic and David Eagleman (2009) report on a number of cases for whom synesthesia is associated with affect (most commonly familiarity). Based on these observations, Cytowic (1993) argues that the primary function of cognition is not a logical parsing of the world, but an emotional one. Our findings, similarly, suggest that empathy and synesthesia are similar in terms of mental gestures that engender them. This has earlier been asserted by David Abram (2017) in his anthropology of animism. He claims that, phenomenologically, synesthesia, defined broadly as the multi-sensory experiences, is directly related to recognizing life in other beings. For Abram, this includes other animals, plants, as well as non-living parts of the world, such as rock formations, much how HR reports empathizing with a wide range of entities, such as bees (HR-I-04-02), soil and seedlings (HR-II-04-02), and grain (HR-II-D01-S01).

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Finally, *hint* and the experience of *unraveling* it into a modal awareness bear similarity to the notion of *gist* (Lipič and Kordeš 2017; Kordeš and Demšar 2018; Kordeš et al. 2019). Gist is a phenomenological modality wherein individuals are aware of the potentiality of an experience. This experience is brought to the foreground of their awareness either by simply attending to it, waiting for its emergence, or by interrogating it with a specific intention (cf. Eilan 1998). Thus, *hint* and *gist* share two principal phenomenological properties: first, they are not present in the same modality as the object they refer to; second, it takes a process or a gesture of unfolding for these aspects of experience to translate itself into a modally present object.

6. Conclusion

Here, we presented an empirical phenomenological case study of HR, who experiences multiple forms of synesthesia. The goal of the study was to provide a better understanding of synesthetic phenomenology, in order to address a paradox reported by Schwartzman and colleagues (2020). Namely, synesthetic

participants reported that their concurrent experience was both automatic and willful. HR reports an experiential dynamic whereby her experience of inducer co-occurs with *hint*, a non-visual, spatially-localized, immediate, and intuitive experience of knowledge about the synesthetic concurrent. HR can then perform the mental gesture of *unraveling*, bringing the *hint* spatially forward and glancing towards it, resulting in a visual experience of a synesthetic concurrent. We suggest that, when using closed-form questions, synesthetes report on *hint*. However, when they are asked to provide a more detailed account of synesthesia, they attend to their experience differently, performing a mental gesture, i.e., *unraveling*, causing them to describe their experience as being willful. Using the methods of empirical phenomenology, we were able to provide a precise phenomenological description of a single case of multiple forms of synesthesia, which yielded a potential solution to a paradoxical insight regarding the automaticity of synesthetic experience. Such work has the potential to transform consciousness science by bringing objectivity to experiential phenomenology. Finally, we acknowledge that qualitative research does not reflect an objective, opinion-free point of view, but we suggest that its strength is in adding a unique level of understanding to a condition, such as synesthesia, which in turn can be used to drive future experimental work.

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TRANSFORMATIONS AND THEIR DOMINANTS

BETWEEN DYNAMICS AND PROCESSUAL STRUCTURE

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Abstract

The paper discusses meta-pedagogical transformational contexts in the space of human activities and fate, making use of hermeneutics, critical reflection, psychoanalysis, anthropology, and the “applied humanities” project. The basic approach is the hermeneutic practice *per se*. Problems at stake are: (1) moving of the dominant factors in professional processes and practices, such as: dialogue, rationality of actions, understanding of tradition, freedom, change, the ideal of the space of action; (2)

transversal, structural duality and oscillations around action dilemmas and dominants in psychosocial development; (3) traps, limitations, and gaps of traditional approaches to the relationship between the factors in the transformation of a person's identity, misleading discontinuities and internal tensions; (4) an anti-positivist breakthrough in understanding the explanation of processes and the threefold "explosive effect" in the transformations of the emotional-cognitive representation of actors, including their self-transformation and interactive alliance in action; (5) other approaches to the indicated conceptualization.

Keywords: dominant duality, dynamics, the *versus* operator, structures, meta-pedagogical processes, transformations.

Transformacije in njihove dominante. Med dinamiko in procesno strukturo

Povzetek

70 Prispevek obravnava meta-pedagoške transformacijske kontekste znotraj prostora človeške dejavnosti in usode, pri čemer se poslužuje hermenevtike, kritične refleksije, psihoanalize, antropologije in projekta »uporabne humanistike«. Temeljni pristop članka je hermenevtična praksa *per se*. Razpravljamo o naslednjih problemih: (1) gibanje dominantnih faktorjev v profesionalnih procesih in praksah, kakršne so: dialog, racionalnost dejanj, razumevanje tradicije, svoboda, sprememba, ideal prostora delovanja; (2) transverzalna, strukturna dvojnost in oscilacije glede dilem delovanja in dominant v psihosocialnem razvoju; (3) pasti, omejitve in vrzeli tradicionalnih pristopov k razmerju med faktorji v transformaciji identitete osebe, zavajajoče diskontinuitete in notranje tenzije; (4) antipozitivistični preboj v razumevanju pojasnjevanja procesov in trojni »eksplozivni učinek« v transformacijah emocionalno-kognitivne reprezentacije akterjev, ki vključuje njihovo samo-transformacijo in interaktivno zaveznitvo v delovanju; (5) drugi pristopi k naznačeni konceptualizaciji.

Ključne besede: dominantna dvojnost, dinamika, operator *versus*, strukture, meta-pedagoški procesi, transformacije.

Introduction

There have been many attempts to “think transformation” in many ways for a long time, noticing its different manifestations in nature, history, social life, and the individual development of man. New manifestations of these change processes, such as globalization and probably the most dramatic phenomena in the sphere of the “Anthropocene” epoch, bringing about the threat of the destruction of civilization and even the planet, have started to dominate. Many of them significantly affect social practices in many areas, including the management of macro processes, institutions, and procedures in professional activities. The Enlightenment myth of a linearity of progress has fallen, and the principles of “growth zero” or “nuclear moratorium,” and “sustainability” of processes, have long since been formulated. All this becomes necessary in terms of the chances of survival in the face of the multiplied threats resulting from the scale of the potential for self-destruction and self-degradation. We know that we can transform the world into a ruined civilization or planetary rubbish dump with excesses in some spheres and deficits in others. However, this has not led to effective care for sustainable development, and many activities turn out to be counterproductive. Thus, they serve radical changes, often contrary to the intended or declared ones, having their own life in the “hidden program” mode at various levels and at various scales of harmful effects. In addition, the reflective valorization of processes is sometimes delayed, devoid of any insight into the real “logic” of the changes taking place. It has been common for a long time to disregard their importance or manifest excessive attachment to the assumption of their safe automatism, self-regulatory ability to self-correct. Meanwhile, transformation is sometimes entangled in the dynamics of a “snowball” beyond control and the possibility of stopping without radically changing the imagination, habits, and procedures. Social activities are too often dominated by the lack of awareness of impending crises, generated catastrophes, and even the most painful deficits or mistakes. Impacts are not subject to the necessary reflection or self-correction in time. Unrecognized complexities take their revenge by surprisingly destroying assumptions about the rationality of actions. More and more in the daily ritual of

social appearances, rush, and instrumentalization, the process of spiritual atrophy grows (as a cause and effect), accelerating the “disappearance of space for reflection” (Baudrillard 1998, Sloterdijk 2014). This is done with the participation of institutions that were supposed to serve this reflection, such as schools, churches, and the institutions of democratic life, including parliaments, which often provide mainly an *ad hoc* spectacle of electoral arithmetic. The COVID-19 pandemic runs in a long chain of epidemics of increasing degradation, self-degradation, frustration, anxiety, and phobias on the one hand, and blindness, fanaticisms, violence, and narcissism on the other. Not only do the processes of change and their pathologies get out of hand, as with populism, but they are not engulfed in time in self-critical reflection and correction by those who unconsciously and egoistically escalate them, deepening contradictions and inequalities, and hate speech. We are not sufficiently sensitive to the complexity of the processes, to their often-paradoxical course and effects, requiring changes in their perception, still too superficial, immediate, and local. Additionally, it is only slowly and not without hesitation that we learn to assign new meanings to various terms and their practical implementations, and to associate them with the newly postulated normativity, requiring fundamental corrections in the practices of professional influence. Transformation may require resistance, it may face resistance on its own, even a blockade of susceptibility to change, or a refusal to cooperate. Sometimes it comes to the fore by activating course-altering pressures that have their own direction, even inertia, which one tries to break in the interests of some other process that cannot break through. These are the dramatic contexts that must not be forgotten when wanting to “think transformation” for social theory and practice.

The field of meta-pedagogical professionalism

From the mosaic of this drama, it is worth considering one field in particular, although with more valid applications. The article aims to indicate the need to integrate a number of categories that form the basis for the analysis of transformation processes in the contexts of professional practice of a quasi-pedagogical nature. Here, action always stands directly against (*versus*) the

other, defining this relation not only in objective categories (impacts “on”), but also subjective (impacts “for”) and interactive (impacts “together”) ones, constructing situations or process states, for which the attitude of who/ what is being acted upon is crucial. Sometimes the condition of a successful transformation is getting its participants not only to accept it, but also to strengthen and actively cooperate in its course. Institutional pressures or simply “bringing awareness” are not enough when it comes to the necessity of a new level of reflection and responsibility in action. Similarly, it may be all the more necessary to attract participants of the transformation that is being launched to maintain its duration, persistently and independently, in their own subjective attitude in the future. It is about a new identity as a “style of experience synthesis” (Erikson, cf. Witkowski 2015), where various aspects and sides involved in being a professional subject as a socio-cultural “hybrid” collide. And they are conditioned in particular by: (a) perception and valorization of one’s own subjective *condition*; (b) building the *conception* of oneself and its symbolic base; (c) expanding the *competence* to act and the potential of its technical and communicative means; and (d) strategically deciding about its further fate as a trajectory of existence and functioning in the world, in which one is dynamically involved (Witkowski 2010). All this is related to the concern for the scope of emancipatory self-defense in the reality of one’s own entanglement, or even subordination in the structure of social relations (e.g., a teacher disciplining students and having a mission to develop their autonomy is himself subject to entanglement in official subordination and pressures that institutionally deprive him of his freedom of action).

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Therefore, I am mainly interested in the psychosocial view of transformation related to the practice and mechanisms of influence, the resistance, with which they meet, where the dynamics are entangled in the hallmarks of an internal knot, structural tensions, and harmful reactions to them in process management. The sets of categories form “cognitive screens” (Balcerzan 2013), allowing for a modelling of understanding of the representation (conceptual screening) of invariants of experience. These invariants are always temporary, constitutive for a given process and its subjects at a given stage of identity formation or shaping (coordinating) the relationship of cooperation and evolution of development potential. Invariants in action are practically and

structurally grounded as long as there is no fracture, internal destruction, or a scale of crisis generated that cannot be treated with available means and previously dominant rationality.

The basic assumption of these considerations is the belief that the resulting binary systems of opposing poles cannot be treated as consisting of independent parts. Entangled in a process of change, they often have a structure that connects their relations into tangles or knots, into connections with variable dynamics, of the nature of bipolar oscillations or fluctuations. This dynamic takes into account the dialectics of sustainability within the ongoing transformation as a condition for controlling and directing the process. It is also a condition for avoiding a functional catastrophe of the system, chaos, or systemic disintegration into a unipolar mechanism, eliminating from the system the opposite pole, but complementarily, paradoxically—together with this conflict and not despite its presence—necessary to maintain the complexity of operation or system integrity.

74 In this text, a further approach is presented—by necessity only briefly—highlighting the structural complexity of the processes, often misunderstood during professional practices (interventions). The dynamics of changing the situation (phases) of a given process is shown through the prism of the question about the dominants (dominant factors, such as needs, interests, tasks, components) and their interrelationships. The following tropes (only signals) are used, inscribed in the trends of research and reflection: the hermeneutic, critical, psychoanalytical, anthropological, those present in the project known as “applied humanities.” For such an approach in pedagogical activities of all types, the key is to take care of virtuosity in action, passion for commitment, and the depth of initiatory rooting in symbolic spaces that can constitute a “cultural soil,” life-giving development (after Radlińska: Witkowski 2014). Its processing and inclusion in interactions in a process involving at least a dyad of entities may significantly affect the course of the triggered processes.

The thesis of the article is to suggest that the transition in the sequence of understanding the ontology of social activities: functions—structure—process, should be completed with an analogous epistemological transition in the sequence: alternative—continuum—structural duality in the dynamics of the process. This requires considering “double binds” as complex relationships

and references (Bachelard 1980; French: *les liaisons doubles*) to the risk of becoming entangled in traps on the verge of schizophrenia (Bateson 1987; *double bind*). This requires, in particular, a deep reflection and a re-evaluation of the circulating uses of the operator *versus* as sensitizing to an understanding of the complexity of the operation of a given system, facing a task entangled in reference to at least pairs of dimensions or factors—sometimes in conflict, excesses or deficits for repeated balancing. This applies to systems with only temporary sustainability, in the face of constantly new states of processes affecting them, including new states of internal factors. This operator is often mistakenly used in the theory and practice of action (also in academic textbooks) as only an expression of opposition, negation, or an alternative to an unambiguous decision in the face of the allegedly necessary choice with the elimination of the second term. It seems important to look at the challenges related to the mature problematization of transformations inherent in the professionalism of meta-pedagogical professions, as capable of correcting the premises of their own actions and their balanced interconnection. This requires that the practice combining knowledge and action as well as their structural statuses (relations) be included in both the anti-positivist breakthrough and the breakthrough of duality, which I discuss and describe separately. Detailed theses are developed in the author's works, indicated in the bibliography and published in recent years (cf. Witkowski 2018, 2020). Here, they are treated as an outline of a certain problem map or as showing what within it can be displayed on the transformation screen and its stake in the game, which should be taken into account more seriously than this is usually the case.

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Feedback and displacement of the dominator: examples

The theoretical background of contemporary humanities (Erikson, Gadamer, Habermas, Merton, cf. Witkowski 2015, 2018) is increasingly used to indicate the phenomenon of translocation (translation) of factors dominating in the structure of various processes, as the basis for transformation in their course. Other profiles and structures of the dominant factors, i.e., those perceived as the most important in the periodic trajectory of processes, may come to the fore.

I. Changing the relationship between the dimensions of what is right, what is different and what is one's own generates differences in the direction of dialogue processes—with the transition from the dominance of the power of persuasion, reducing the difference, through understanding someone else's voice, to giving oneself food for thought thanks to meeting with a point of view from outside the repertoire of previously available means of self-understanding. In this case, revealing unconscious prejudice, understood as pre-judgement by Gadamer (1993), becomes especially important for the transformation. The “hidden curriculum” of such strategies allows, in the first case, the indication of something as bad as a refusal of agreement. In the second option, praising tolerance can be reduced to hidden indifference and refusal to take it seriously. In the third variant, the affirmation of the value of meeting another may be relegated to an interest-related usefulness from a short-term perspective. Meanwhile, openness to a transformation of a long duration requires “creative adaptation” (Obuchowski 1985), in the form of work for a “long distance task” with no guarantee of success.

76 II. Similarly, it is possible—using Habermas's theory of communicative action and the “cognitive interests” present in it—to show the difference in the types of rationality present in professional activities and the changes in impact they generate (Habermas 1971). This takes place depending on the relationship between: (a) the technical nature of the activity (the ability to control it efficiently); (b) the quality of communication practice (the quality of building relationships in cooperation); and (c) the scale of the scopes of releasing the situation and relations from constraints (emancipation from barriers, deficiencies, and obstacles to opening an alternative that also recognizes unconscious content). Then the following can be indicated: (1) the domination of instrumentality in professional action, establishing the relationship of power and subordination; (2) consensuality, oriented towards a bond and community of understanding; and (3) launching a new quality thanks to the “decentration effect” (including a new point of view in process understanding) (Witkowski 2009a). The issue of “rationality of the education process” receives new impulses here (Milerski and Karwowski 2016).

III. Establishing a dominant element in the structure of the strategy to the attitude that shapes the social subject works in a similar way—e.g., with regard

to understanding tradition, designing a vision of freedom, determining the type of desired change and defining the “ideal place” for the emerging cultural formation. This generates other types of transformation: conservative, liberal, socially radical, or dialogical (“decentrative”), where the same dimensions acquire new meanings by changing their location. For example, the model “liberated” man will once act as the priest of a binding truth that requires transmission and exegesis; and, at another time, as an artist who gives himself the right of transgression in original interpretations. Separately, the formation serves a revolutionary commitment to change the structure of the social environment for the emancipation of others. Finally, it is about access to the use of the reservoir of cultural texts as a symbolic heritage, thanks to which the reader obtains educational impulses translocating him beyond the scope locally available in the mode of necessary “desocialization,” going beyond the “whirlwind reduction of the cultural complexity of the world” of his own place of roots (Kundera 2004, Heidegger 1994; cf. Witkowski 2007a).

IV. The paradigmatic reference pattern of complexity that can be seen here in the structure of social roles (e.g., doctor, politician, scientist, any type of pedagogue) is a game in the mode of sociological ambivalence between the poles of proximity and detached concern, between giving direction and following pressure, or between criticism of external reference and self-critical control of one’s own actions (Merton, cf. Witkowski 2007b).

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Transversality, oscillation, duality

Likewise, it is fundamental for thinking about the quality of professional impact processes to emphasize the importance of the transversal approach and revealing structural duality in feedback. We already have some considerations for the scopes of activity in pedagogical professions in social pedagogy (Marynowicz-Hetka 2019, 2020). The transverse building of rational coping with the complexity of challenges requires an alternate use of various strategies and techniques, taking into account the oscillations in the field of the “aesthetics of educational situations” (Witkowski 2007b), between activating power relations (being “the First,” reigning), using the force of the seductive personality (being “the Second,” significant), mediating, invoking someone

else's perspective as an interpreter (being "the Third," catalyst of the meeting), and finally creating a situation of acquiring competence to cooperate without interference (being "the Fourth," withdrawn animator). For professional competence, this set of aesthetics (models of forms of action and interaction) requires not so much the choice of one of them, but the ability to alternate their use with the displaced dominant factor of the situational style. This is possible in the integrated approach of oscillatory aesthetics, for which each of the aesthetics is double-edged, carrying positives, but also the threat of ethical and strategic errors, giving and taking away, as it happens with the structures organizing our action and social relations (Giddens, cf. Witkowski 2018). In the background, it is also possible to use the hermeneutical circle model as a necessary description of the situation of understanding the complexity of the bipolar relations between the part and the whole, between dynamizing the process and maintaining the ability to balance its course, where it is necessary to practice reflectivity and correct the situation of operation in the "eternal return" mode, reacting to the new conditions. Taking into account such dual systems in the processes of starting professional intervention seems to be the basis for understanding their complexity in every social activity and the evolution of the participating subjects.

About dual dominants in the process of psychosocial development

The basis of the adopted approach is to read the logic of the development process inscribed in Erikson's model of the life cycle, which allows us, contrary to frequent textbook reductions, to see a complex (dual) structure of phases in the process of psychosocial development with displaced dominants (Witkowski 2015, 2020). They determine the fundamental tension between the pole that dynamizes the process and the pole that stabilizes the stage of the process—which requires seeing their bonded coupling, oscillation, and interaction, along with a different orientation. This requires producing connections against the convenient but reductive attempts to establish illusory unambiguity (like one-sidedness), disconnectability, and alternation. Depending on the structure of connections between psychosocial factors and the degree of intensity (distrust, shame, guilt, distraction, withdrawal, stagnation, despair), their function and

value in the development process differ. Neither one-sided negativity nor one-sided positivity make it possible to dynamize the process of development and development support interventions. Orientation to an attitude devoid of coordination with functional opposition (trust, autonomy of action, initiative, adequacy, identity, caring, creativity and integrity) generates excesses of some factors and deficits of others. The lack of connections between them disturbs the processes of balancing factors in the tensions between them and in their necessary displacements, conditioning development. The paradigmatic pattern for the described situations is the quality of the sailing of a yacht. The tension between the sail (exposed to gusts of wind, but also giving the opportunity to use them) and the keel or the quality of *ad hoc* stabilizers created by the crew is a challenge in the process of navigating at sea. It determines the necessary functional changes (oscillations, fluctuations, alternations) in fusing a complex whole between dynamizing movement and caring for its stabilization in an effort to balance opportunities and threats, risk and potential success (Witkowski 2020).

About the dangers in overly traditional approaches to the relationship between factors

Traditional approaches (see criticism in: Witkowski 2015, 2018, 2020) in the sphere of conceptualizing the processes of transformation and professional intervention are excessively—and, therefore, harmfully—focused on the categories of emerging crossroads, crossings, alternatives, opposing, eliminating poles within choices (fixed either/or, binary relations). It is worth exposing the weaknesses of this view—and building a complementary position to it—, in order to overcome the resulting frame that restricts access to complexities based on couplings, complementarities, and combinations of seemingly conflicting functions. This is possible thanks to a more advanced lexicon, more maturely screening the contexts of anthropology, ontology, and epistemology in the practice of professional transformations (Barbier 2016a, 2016b). Meanwhile, these traditional approaches are dominated by the affirmation of dichotomies as bifurcations or polarizations, supplemented at best by pointing to the spectrum of possibilities in a distribution described on a continuum of gradations or in a sequential hierarchy. All this usually loses the necessity, and

does not recognize the value (significance) of seeing here feedback, structural dilemmas, tangles, bundles, and other types of connections; entangled in tensions, conflicts, and contradictions, but complementing each other and functionally balancing each other as necessary. The vision of an illusory choice loses the view that understands the structural dilemma as entanglement in the coupling expressed by the *versus* operator sensitizing to the difficult, but necessary, fusion of members facing each other and not triggering an easy and natural split, antagonism and breakdown, eliminating one of them. In the structure of processes, the operator *versus* does not generate alternatives, separations, or extreme opposites, but a tension that creates conditions and even requires cooperation as part of a functional strategy to be guided only through the emerging new whole with a higher level of complexity.

80 This makes it possible to counteract extremes, excesses, and deficits, separateness, and eliminate the misunderstanding of interconnections. Among the harmful dichotomies that affect the quality of pedagogical interactions and difficulties in starting the processes of personal and identity transformation (which is often a condition for developmental change in the addressee), there is also, due to psychological flattening, the juxtaposition of cognitive (intellectual) processes and phenomena inscribed in the sphere of emotions, experiences, and commitment. In professional reports about the mechanism of action weakened in this way, the “ritualization of appearances” (Bourdieu, cf. Witkowski 2018) is present, indifference and emotional distancing, blocking the processes of identifying and recognizing the meaning of the impulses obtained for oneself with indifference.

At the same time, this dominant traditional approach is not able to include in its understanding of transformation processes the necessity of enabling a jump, discontinuity, break with the previous order, to pave the way to a new quality. In terms of the anthropology of professional practices (Barbier 2016a, 2016b), this requires the inclusion in the understanding of transformation processes of the necessary minimum of references to such phenomena as rites of passage and initiation thresholds. These are the structural aspects of the processes enabling a new type of experience, overcoming previous practice invariants and requiring the finding of new invariants taking into account the new stage of identity, understood as the “experience synthesis

style” (Erikson, cf. Witkowski 2015). This requires taking into account also the understanding of barriers, obstacles, and blockades embedded in the unconscious “defense mechanisms,” the scale of resistance of the previously dominant structure of competences and the concept of self (identity definitions). So, it is not just about reconstructing the process. In fact, the work of “deconstructing” the process is often necessary here, as an opening of a new base for conceptualization and attempts at its structural reorganization, in search of new dynamics and other qualities of functioning. In educational contexts (education as transformation), this means the necessity of allowing “desocialization” as giving—by leaving the previous local “whirlwind of reducing the cultural complexity of the world” (Kundera 2004)—the possibility of triggering the developmental “decentration effect” (Habermas). This contributes to transformation, opening a broader horizon of interpretation, in which the variety of available points of view becomes a reservoir of innovation and the source of a new repertoire of social roles and the ability to creatively “play with roles” (postconventional in Habermas after Kohlberg’s approach, cf. Witkowski 2010), and not only to fulfill previous role scenarios. Obviously, post-conventional activities, the demand for them, as well as the scale of the available “innovative structures” that enable them to exist, may in various ways facilitate or hinder the transformation of the space of activity and the acquisition of professional competences (Przyborowska 2003). In particular, in the processes of transformation and their stimulation, “mediation competences” become very important in professional practices, e.g., in the area of social work (Grudziewska and Lewicka-Zelent 2015).

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The challenges of the anti-positivist breakthrough in understanding the process

It is also necessary to develop a readiness to participate in processes, for which there is no prior (anticipatory) access to knowledge, allowing for full control of the process requiring intervention, and even less for establishing a procedure leading to success (positivist hope/illusion). There is a need for action that allows for the reflexive accumulation of partial, situational knowledge, locally generating invariants of the available field of experience—however, with readiness to “correct the premises of action” (complaint), i.e.,

learning from errors, processed as the basis for reorganization and even basic re-conceptualization of the exit point (the need for an anti-positivist perspective on understanding professional practice). The epistemological vector of positivist methodological awareness: to know in order to foresee → to foresee in order to act, requires replacement with the paradoxical anti-positivist vector to see the relationship between action and knowledge: to act in order to know → to know in order to correct the premises of action.

82 This means—as Bachelard’s (2000) epistemological considerations could be applied—that the usually postulated cognitive “realism” in the course of action must be associated with the awareness of being entangled in sometimes only sufficient, and sometimes even harmful attitudes from different levels of understanding the situation of a given subject. These are the following types of approach: (1) naive, devoid of a sense of difficulty, assuming diagnostic clarity and ease of access; (2) instrumental, seeking support in parameterization, reducing quality to quantity; (3) conceptual solidarity, merging in a lexicon set with a varying degree of perception of its limitations to full satisfaction; (4) an attitude of conceptual openness, assuming the complexity of even what is considered elementary, devoid of internal paradoxes or tensions; (5) and finally a variant of “dispersion” realism, which dares to build (construct) a new approach from attitudes without a ready theoretical background and only gradually interconnecting and cohering into a more complete framework of complex conceptualization as a new construction strategy (Witkowski 2018). As is known, the crowning achievement of the processes of action, cognition, and transformation—within them as well as between them—requires, along with an anti-positivist maturity, the recognition that the theories produced in such situations can at best be perceived in terms of a “hypothetical conceptual representation of experience invariants” (Enriques 1906). These last, due to possible turns, cracks, clashes of pressures, and adaptive weaknesses, may be negated, or at least exposed to their scope limitations, bringing disasters (Thom 1980, 1991), or turning points, in line with the medical understanding of the phenomenon of crisis with the expected sudden turn in process flow. This forces the emergence or carrying out of a revolution, requiring a new interpretation up to the level of basic factors and their relations and modes of understanding and assigning meaning.

Due to the original inclusion of the category of “cognitive interest” in epistemological thinking by Habermas (1971), which, depending on the connections between technicalities—communicative practice and the scope of emancipation—, determines other types of rationality, it is necessary to consider the advisability of developing the category of “transformation interest” in relation to individual phases of the ongoing process with the emphasis on the thesis that it is subject to displacements within the phase dominant, which requires seeing its structure as dual. This is what seems to be the interpretation of human “developmental interest” in Erikson’s life cycle model, which has already been reconsidered in separate analyses (Witkowski 2015).

Concern for the “explosive effect” in transformation

Among the processes launched professionally in the space of (quasi-) pedagogical professions, it is important to pay attention to attracting interaction partners, including recipients of the activity. One must be able to win them over to “care for themselves” and to use “self-techniques” (Foucault) or “anthropotechnics” (Sloterdijk 2014). In making such an interaction, it is important to activate the triple complex mechanisms of “emotions—awakening—change” (Hesse, cf. Jaworska-Witkowska and Witkowski 2010), which make up the threefold range of “the explosive effect.” All this conditions the quality of the presence in the process as “readiness to be involved in the meeting” (Maritain), where the meeting means “experiencing a community of experience” (Gadamer) in the agreed type of “normative rightness”—as a validity claim according to Habermas (Witkowski 2009a). As is known, this reconciliation is sometimes impossible with the divergent ways of defining their lives by the addressees of the process of influence in terms of “being on the road” (Bauman and his types: pilgrim, vagabond, tourist, flâneur, or player). Getting them to cooperate as a condition for the successful course of the process can be difficult or even impossible (Witkowski 2018).

For the addressee of professional interactions, the condition for reaching an “existentially significant experience” (Eliade) is often an essential “initiation experience.” The basic explosive effect, which destroys the earlier stage, becomes indispensable as an expression of naivety, unpreparedness, and lack of

imagination about what will happen after crossing the next threshold (not only maturity). In the first aspect of the impact, it is necessary to destroy superficial obviousness or deep beliefs entangled in appearances or unconscious sources of disasters and failure to cope in life. Hence, the importance of creating a plane for the “pedagogy of survival.” In the second aspect of starting the education process as a transformation, it is necessary to explosively pave the way to a new perspective, a new point of view, to open the way to an experience that would not occur to the addressee on its own. This type of explosion not only destroys earlier invariants, but also opens the way, paves access to previously inaccessible areas of one’s own unconscious, to the scopes of symbolic culture as an “invisible environment” (Radlińska, cf. Witkowski 2014). Thus, it is an explosion that opens the eyes to a new type of reflection, made possible, inscribed in a type of “awakening pedagogy.” Awakening becomes a paradoxical definition of an important level of quality of the impact process, often present in various types of narratives. Now, it requires the inclusion of professional practices in anthropology. And, finally, an integral link in the process of reaching education as transformation is the initiation of the process of “internal transformation” in the addressee, of “giving food for thought” so that certain stimuli (symbolic impulses) are received and processed, becoming internal components of a new scope and level of identity, influencing the condition of existential self-concept and the quality of competence to act. It is a component of the outbreak of transformation to the extent that, in the conditions of an identity crisis, it leads to a paradoxical “rebirth” (Erikson, cf. Witkowski 2015). By saturating oneself with “someone else’s speech,” gathering and processing symbolic “pearls of thought,” one gains deeper access to understanding and expressing oneself (Bakhtin, cf. Witkowski 2000).

On the importance of an interactive alliance

The quality of professional impact, devoid of usurpation to the unequivocal directing of the process, may become entangled in the refusal to cooperate up to the level of generating a “negative identity” (Erikson, cf. Witkowski 2015), triggering the process of identifying with content that is opposite to that persuaded, not in spite of, but because of the inability to establish a

“development covenant” in self-care. As is known, the “psychotherapeutic covenant” (Witkowski 2020) is an integral condition for any attempts at therapeutic help, and at the same time analogous concerns about the covenant condition in establishing transformation processes are too often overlooked in other fields of professional experience. A new vision of a professional as an intervener in the cognitive, emotional, and competence space of the addressee of interactions aimed at taking over the subjective role of the latter in “taking care of himself” becomes indispensable. It is to create a style of synthesis of professional experience from the position of a “transformative intellectual” (Giroux, cf. Giroux and Witkowski 2010), who understands that his task is to enable the potential of “empowerment” as the ability to stand up for oneself in social interactions and “emancipation” from the limitations dictated also by the unconscious of the addressee, including attachment to a professional, psychoanalytically recognized as a “transfer.” Institutional actions may lack subjectivity by “taking away civil courage” for autonomy and criticism, and, on the other hand, significantly damaging this subjectivity through the mechanisms of seduction and attachment, through the fascination with the personality of a professional and his power of influence.

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In terms of authority in the educational relationship and the process of personal transformation, this means the need to replace the interactively convenient mechanisms that make up: authoritarianism, authoritativeness, and formal authorization to move to the next phases of the process (diploma of transition to a higher class at school). It becomes necessary to gain cooperation from the position of “authority at one’s feet,” which specifies the phenomenon of “transition authority,” which I have described using anthropological inspirations, where the transformational effort (*rite de passage*) requires the independent growing of culture as “symbolic soil,” for obtaining growth in the confrontation with a professional subjective potential, as the emergence of readiness (abilities, motivation, tools) to grow autonomously into the task of facing challenges.

Limitations of the transformativity of interactions

The dominant inscribed in such professional activity cannot be the practice of one-sided or one-way transmission of content without concern for its

significance FOR the recipient, since this content is to significantly affect the quality of the addressee's identity, but on conditions acceptable to the recipient if they join the process of self-transformation. Professional action to encourage self-realization-oriented transgression is also not enough. This is especially true if the individual is in a state of identity crisis and his potential to define himself is dispersed, or has been negated after the collapse of previous experience invariants in a new field of existential collapse and a lack of motivation to stay within the existing framework of the organization of life. This is all the more so when there are difficulties with spiritual energy motivating transformation that reshapes the fate of the individual, or unlocks development and brings out their collapse (Orzelska 2014). Professional intervention may have no chance for an individual without vital energy to make new attempts, when the imagination, hope, and determination necessary for efforts to start new developmental processes are lacking. It is also not enough to dominate the entanglement of transformation with professional motivation towards an attitude of solidarity with others, where a person cannot cope with themselves. Professional action aimed at starting the processes of personal transformation requires changing the motivating dominant and organizing this action to open up the space of diversity and complexity, in which the recipient of this practice must be understood and taken into account in one's own actions. A professional cannot show anything in the transformation mode, but only help to see, providing the participant of the process with a different perspective of looking at himself, oriented towards him, which, however, will not exist if he does not see himself as a subject of cooperation in the new community of commitment, breaking with the previous damage to his condition and ability to be himself. The term "community" also requires awareness of the differentiation of its possible levels of impact: from the community of interest, instrumentalizing the relationship of cooperation, through the community of tasks, functionally entangled in strictly binding rules, imposed as an absolutized minimum, to the most difficult—the maintenance of which requires constant renewal of effort giving it value—the community as a task involving the agreed and experienced affirmation of values, which is to be served in a way that requires a subjective attitude and respects the subjectivity of each party participating in the process.

Transformation as self-transformation

Its requirements deeply understood (as in Maritain, Gadamer), a “real” meeting with the Other—with a readiness to engage in the experience of a meaningful community of dialogue—can become an opportunity for everyone in terms of changing perception and understanding of oneself. Moreover, this is the only way it can be activated, shared, in order not to be rejected, disregarded, or shallow as an opportunity, even if it is significantly transformed beyond the subjective horizon of the professional’s intention as the Other (e.g., in psychotherapy, education, social work, or re-socialization). The transformation process acquires a new quality (a new level of transformations of its own mechanism or program), when it is capable of self-correction, when it allows for the meta-process of self-transformation, freeing itself from the original project, from the interpretation framework and the scope of the means used. Gombrowicz, Wojtyła, and Ingarden have stressed, each in their scope of interest (creativity, actions in relation to the person, and filling in places of undefined description in literature), that a work can create ... a creator, just as an act is the creating person, and the text lives in its reception when we give it a meaning that is alive for us. The anthropology of professional practice must take into account such circumstances and include them in the postulates regarding the quality of transformation processes that fulfil many practices of involvement in the fate of another human being by placing them in a new culture and social life. This requires the effort of equipping a professional with the ability to process the achievements of an integrally understood, holistic humanities, so that the process of influence opens symbolic spaces, made available to interested parties as opportunities to use. As a rule, we cannot assume a readiness to cooperate in this direction and its creation cannot be excluded from the concerns of the professional (teacher, therapist, manager...). It was not for nothing that Antonin Wagner developed—in the context of deliberations on barriers to social work—the “homo disoeconomicus” model to denote the attitudes of the addressees of professional influence, who are deprived of the ability to behave rationally in various scopes of understanding their own interest or profit. They are neither ready to take on (or free themselves from) burdens and overloads nor able to operate under conditions without

certainty, including being hostages to past pressures; without the ability to open up to the long-term perspective of distant tasks, and finally—e.g., in the addiction mode—, they cannot evaluate the support in the community available to them, and even reject it as meaningless or hostile. In such a situation, many of the assumptions regarding professional cooperation must be thoroughly verified, because the lack of readiness to cooperate does not always ethically exempt us from the effort of transforming such an attitude that the initiation of the recovery process itself is possible at all. The educator is sometimes necessary, especially in the face of the addressee's lack of readiness to cooperate for his own development and to "care for himself" by changing his own life (Sloterdijk, Foucault, Erikson, cf. Witkowski 2018).

Conclusion

88 Full documentation and illustrations of the theses presented above, together with their in-depth development, are to be found in the author's books mentioned (Witkowski 2010, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2018, 2020). It is worth emphasizing that the approach suggested above can be found more and more often as present and developed—regardless of the above-mentioned references—in analyses from different perspectives and from different disciplines, such as sociology or philosophy. It is certainly significant to consider the aspects of transformation in terms of social transactions, the conceptualization of the in-between (*l'entre-deux*) in the contexts of social fluidity (Foucault 2016), and some versions of hermeneutics emphasizing, among other things, unstable balancing as a type of state that still requires transformation (Wierciński 2003, 2019). Also, in the sociology of education and the theory of social work in Poland, structural and dynamic references to the terms of the new lexicon as the theoretical basis and methodological framework—such as dilemmas, duality, weaves, tensions—constitute the axes of analyses and application attempts (Frysztański 2019). The broadest framework in sociology for this type of approach seems to be proposed in terms of the civilization process (Elias 2011).

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BIT, VIDEZ IN GOLA NAVIDEZNOST

OD PARMENIDA K PLATONU

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Povzetek

Prispevek je poskus osmislitve razumevanja razmerja med bitjo in videzom na začetku metafizike, kot se kaže na obzorju Heideggrovega bitnozgodovinskega mišljenja. Sledeč Heideggrovi interpretaciji Parmenidove pesnitve *O naravi*, v kateri je nakazana trojnost poti, ki jih ubira smrtnik na poti k biti, članek osvetljuje izvorno razmerje med bitjo in videzom pod okriljem starogrške proto-metafizične *phýsis* in nakaže ključne momente, ki so prek sofistike vodili od Parmenida k Platonovemu

dokončnemu opuščanju sopripadnosti videza in biti na račun osvetljevanja biti same. Pokazano je, kako se je na tej poti od votlinskega videza k izvenvotlinski vednosti videz sam moral oddaljiti od biti in preobraziti v golo navideznost.

Ključne besede: videz, bit, ontologija, Parmenid, Platon, Heidegger.

Being, Seeming, and Mere Seemingness. From Parmenides Towards Plato

Abstract

The present paper is an attempt to rethink the relationship between being and seeming at the outset of metaphysics as demonstrated in Heidegger's history of being. Following Heidegger's interpretation of Parmenides's poem *On Nature*, the paper demonstrates the original ancient Greek relationship between being and seeming, when both were understood in terms of the proto-metaphysical *phýsis*. It illustrates crucial moments in the search for being from Parmenides to Plato, which lead to the abandonment of seeming. It is shown how the movement from cave-like seeming to knowing transformed the notion of seeming and drew it away from being into mere seemingness.

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Keywords: seeming, being, ontology, Parmenides, Plato, Heidegger.

I. Parmenidova trojnost poti

Parmenid v svoji mistični pesnitvi *O naravi*, voden od boginje, ki se razodeva z različnimi imeni, Heidegger pa jo imenuje *Alétheia*,¹ razkriva trojnost poti, ki jih lahko ubere in jih tudi mora ubrati smrtnik, da bi se misleč dokopal do biti. Do te »slovite poti« razodevanja »neskritosti« ga, kot pravi, privedejo »dajmoni«, na samo pot pa ga vlečejo kobile: »te so vlekle voz, dekleta pa vodila so po poti«. ² Kaže se vprašati, kdo so pot vodeča dekleta? Parmenid jih imenuje Heliade, to je »Sončne«, pripadajoče soncu, ki so, da bi smrtniku razkrile pot spoznanja, »noči domove zapustile in v sprevedu pohitele, da čimprej pridejo k svetlobi«. ³ Heliade, zapuščajoč temo svojega skritega domovanja, smrtnika tako vodijo k neskritosti svetlobe spoznanja.

Ko Heliade v naglici dospejo do vrat »poti Noči in Dneva«, jih tam, sklicujoč se ponovno na Heideggra, pričaka boginja *Alétheia*. Pot neskritosti, ki vodi k biti, je tako po Parmenidu najpoprej pot od *teme* Noči k *svetlobi* Dneva, po kateri vodijo dekleta Heliade. Na tej ravni smrtnik še ni vedoči, marveč zgolj vprašujoči človek, ki se, odprt za jasnino neskritosti, pušča nagovarjati boginji, ki je sama ta Neskritost, *Alétheia*. Sprejemajoč ga v svoj okoliš, boginja na tem mestu smrtniku spregovori:

Nuja je (tebi, ki zdaj stopaš na pot k biti), da izkusiš vse:
tako lepo zaokrožene neskritosti netrepetavo srce
kot tudi poglede ljudi, ki neskritosti ne zmorejo slediti.

Toda pri vsem tem moraš ravno tako spoznati, kako se ob tem ohranja navideznost,

četudi se na videz (na svoj način) vleče skoz vse, vse so-dovršujoč.⁴

1 Glej poglavje »Moirā« v: Heidegger 2003.

2 Parmenid, fragment B1/5. Fragmenti predsokratikov so v članku citirani po novem slovenskem standardnem prevodu *Fragmenti predsokratikov* (2012), ki ga, kadar se zatečem k drugemu prevodu, vselej navedem tudi v opombi.

3 Parmenid, fragment B1/9–10.

4 Parmenid, fragment B1/28–32. Prevod naveden po: Heidegger 1995, 113. V

Nagovor boginje razodeva neko nujnost. Čeravno smrtnik stopa k biti, je »nujno«, pravi boginja, da ta izkusi »vse« poti, saj šele sopripadnost vseh poti sprošča celoten uvid v *phýsis*. Izkusiti mora tako razkritost biti kot tudi njeno skritost. Pripuščajoč ga zato v *ne-skritost* samo, v »nedrhteče srce zaokrožene neskritosti«, boginja takoj zatem razodene prvi dve poti, ki slišita na imeni »pot k biti« in »pot k nebiti«:

Tako torej pravim: varuj besedo, ki jo boš slišal (o tem),
katere poti izpraševanja je kot edine treba imeti pred očmi.
Prva je: kako je (kar ta, bit, je), in kako (je) nebit nemogoča.
To je steza utemeljenega zaupanja, sledi namreč neskritosti.
Druga pa: kako ni, in tudi kako je nebit nujna.

Ta torej, tako oznanjam, je neka steza, o kateri sploh ne moreš govoriti,

niti ne moreš poznati nebiti, učiti se je namreč ne da,
niti je ni mogoče podati z besedami.⁵

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Bit je, nebiti pa ni, zato tudi pot k nebiti ni mogoča. S temi besedami sta po Parmenidu naznanjeni izključujoči se poti izpraševanja, pri čemer je prva pot naperjena k biti, k predsokratski *prisotnosti prisotnega* v stalnosti vznikajočega ponikanja. Bit sama, kot v sporu zedinjujoča prisostvovanje in odsostvovanje, je oznanjena kot *prisotnost*, ki se postavlja nasproti vsemu postajanju svetno bivajočega in je zato bistveno neko *ostajanje*. Zato boginja v osmem fragmentu ob koncu pesnitve povzemajoč *pot k biti* pravi:

Fragmentih predsokratikov se prevod glasi: »Izvedeti pa moraš vse: / nedrhteče srce lepo zaokrožene resnice, / pa tudi mnenja smrtnikov, v katerih ni resnične zanesljivosti. / A izvedel tudi boš do kraja, kako preskušene bi biti morale / navidezne reči, ki vedno prečijo skoz vse.«

⁵ Parmenid, fragment B2. Prevod naveden po: Heidegger 1995, 111. *Fragmenti predsokratikov*: »Daj, jaz bom govorila, ti pa besedo sprejmi, ko jo slišiš, / katere (mogoče) umeti je poti iskanja. / Prva je, da je, da ni ne biti; / to steza je prepričanja, saj sledi resnici. / Druga pa je, da ni in da mora ne biti, / o tej poti pokažem ti, da o njej ni mogoče izvedeti prav nič, / saj ne bi spoznal, če bi ne bilo (saj to bilo bi nemogoče) / niti ne bi pokazal [...].«

Edina pa še ostaja poved poti
 (na kateri se odpira), kako je glede biti;
 na tej (poti)
 je dano celo dosti tega, kar se kaže;
 kako je treba postaviti bit brez nastajanja
 in brez propadanja,
 tako polno stalnostno tu sámo,
 kot tudi brez nihanja v sebi in sploh ne šele
 dovršujočo se;
 nekdam je ni bilo, nekoč je več ne bo,
 kot sedanost je namreč vse-hkrati, edina
 enotujoča enotna, iz sebe vase zbirajoča se
 (držéča skupaj polna sedanosti).⁶

Če sledimo tu navedenim Heideggrovim prevodom fragmentov, ki so, to je vendarle treba priznati, kot vsako prevajanje že hkrati interpretacija izvorne misli, je treba Parmenidovo *pot k biti*, ki vselej je in je kot taka s svoje strani negibna, neminljiva ter v tem stalnem sostvovanju breztemeljna in »enotujoča enotna«, misliti v okviru *poti k phýsis*. In sicer kljub temu, da se sprva zdi paradoksalno in poljubno, da bi bit v Parmenidovi pesnitvi enačili s *phýsis*, ki vendarle naznačuje vzgibanost v premenah vznikanja in ponikanja iz neskritosti v skritost, torej ponazarja neko *giblјivost*, medtem ko Parmenid ravno prepove, da bi stalnost biti lahko mislili v kakršnikoli vzgibanosti, »kajti nič drugega ni in ne bo razen Bivajočega, saj ga je Usoda vklenila, da biva celo in negibno«. ⁷ Z drugimi besedami, Parmenidova bit *je*, je negiblјiva in kot taka *eno*, medtem ko *phýsis* vendarle razumemo v obzorju *mnoštva* porajanja in minevanja vsega bivajočega. Vendar se tako le zdi, dokler ne upoštevamo, da k vzgibanosti *phýsis* bistveno spada *sostvovanje* kot *ostajanje* ter stalno prisostvovanje sebe-kazanja v igri prihajanja v ne-skritost in odhajanja nazaj v

⁶ Parmenid, fragment B8/1–6. Prevod naveden po: Heidegger 1995, 97. *Fragmenti predsokratikov*: »Ostaja edino še beseda poti, / da biva. Na njej zelo je mnogo / znamenj: nenastalo je in nepropadljivo, / saj je celoudno in nedrhteče in neskončno. / Ni nékdaj bilo in ne bo, saj je zdaj, obenem vse, / eno, sovisno.«

⁷ Parmenid, fragment B8/36–38.

skritost. *Phýsis* kot *ostajajoče* sisanje neskritosti se potemtakem že zoperstavlja *postajanju* in *videzu*, vendar ji tako *videz* kot *postajanje* bistveno spadata k njej. S tem je naznačena prva pot.

Druga pot, ki jo smrtniku razkrije boginja neskritosti, je *pot k nebiti*. Tudi ta mora biti smrtniku znana, čeprav naj ne bi o tej poti vedel ničesar, saj je ni mogoče preiti. O *nebiti* se ne da ne govoriti, pravi Parmenidova boginja, niti se je ne more poznati niti učiti. Vendarle je pot *nebiti* kot pot k *nič* naznačena.

98 Kolikor je pot k *nebiti* naznačena, mar se potemtakem v tej sicer *aporetični* napotitvi pri Parmenidu vendarle že ne javlja tista neznanska slutnja *groze nič*, tisto tesnobno sprevidenje, da k *biti* bistveno spada tudi *nič*, v grozi katerega se faktično nahaja sleherni smrtnik, zasnavljajoč se v svojo lastno zmožnost biti? Oziroma drugače: ali ni napotitev k *nebiti* namig na *breztemeljno brezno biti*, ki je prišlo na površje šele skozi zgodovinsko dogoditev *nihilističnega ničanja* biti vsega bivajočega in je vodilo v dandanašnje osiromašenje smisla celote bivajočega z ozirom na bit? Je potemtakem Parmenid že slutil sopripadnost *nič* in *biti*? Vsekakor je *nič* v pesnitvi mišljen, kolikor boginja naznanja neprehodno *pot k nebiti*, čeprav le toliko, da se smrtnik lahko odvrne nazaj k tistemu, kar je.

Če naposled *nebiti* ni, potem se vsa nasprotja zedinjajo v *biti*. Toplo in hladno, živo in mrtvo, svetlo in temno, žensko in moško, dan in noč – vse je hkrati in se zgrinja v *harmonijo biti*, o kateri pa smrtniki, vpotegnjeni v praobičajnost danzadnevnega življenja, vedo le malo. Ker *nebiti* ni, ne more biti tako, da bi bilo vsak čas le eno izmed nasprotij, na primer zdaj tema v nebiti svetlobe, zdaj svetloba v nebiti teme, temveč tako tema kot svetloba vsak čas v sebi nosita svoje nasprotje. Še drugače, tako tema kot svetloba *sta*. V tem se mora Parmenid strinjati s Heraklitom, ko slednji pravi, da smrtnikom »ne gre skupaj, kako tisto, kar se razlikuje, soglaša s samim sabo: nasprotujoča si harmonija kot pri loku in liri.«⁸

In ravno iz navidezne vsaksebnosti izrača še tretja pot Parmenidovega izpraševanja. Ta se razodeva kot pot *dokse*, pot *videza*, po kateri stopamo nevedni smrtniki, razločujoč izvorno harmonijo na izključujoča se nasprotja. A to je pot zablode, pred katero svari boginja *Alétheia*, ko nagovarja Parmenida, razkrivajoč pot *dokse*:

8 Heraklit, fragment B51.

Svoja mnenja (*gnómas*) so namreč postavili tako, da so imenovali dvoje oblik (*dúo morphàs*), to pa ni potrebno – v tem so zablodili; razdvojili so (skladno) zgradbo in ločili vsaksebi njene značilnosti: tu plamen nebesnega ognja, blag in lahkoten, s seboj povsem isti, z drugim pa ne isti; a nasprotno sámo na sebi notri noč brez svetlobe, gosta in težka zgradba. Ta raz-pored kot dozdeven/navidezen (*diákozmon eoikóta*) ti bom v vsem razložila, da te nikoli nobeno mnenje smrtnikov ne bo zapeljalo.⁹

V čem je torej zabloda *doksične* poti, ki naj ne zapelje smrtnika? In, še pomembneje, ali govori Parmenid že tudi o *doksi* v obzorju Platonovega mišljenja? O *doksi* kot zgolj videznosti votlinskega sveta, ki se upira zavezujočnosti umnega spoznanja in jo bo kot tako potrebno opustiti v onkrajvotlinskem brezpogojnem védenju kot videnju svetlobe brez senc? Vsekakor Parmenidova boginja spregovarja o neki razdvojitvi, ki jo zakrivijo smrtniki, s tem ko razporejajo »(skladno) zgradbo« nasprotij v navidezen red dvoje ločenih oblik, torej ko razporedijo svetlobo *in* temo na svetlobo in temo, pri čemer zdaj ni več poudarka na tistem »in«, ki povezuje obe, temveč na ločenih in v tej ločitvi izključujočih se oblikah. Zabloda se po tem branju potemtakem skriva prav v navidezni razporedu, v *diákozmon eoikóta*, o bistvu katerega je v svojem članku zavezujoče pisal Urbančič:

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Diákozmon eoikóta govori o navideznosti tistega razporeda, ki ga naredijo nevedneži s tem, ko razdvojijo, razločijo vsaksebi na dvoje nasprotujočih si oblik skladno célo zgradbo in zato zablodijo v svoja mnenja. Zablodijo s tem, ko razločijo vsaksebi in postavijo nasproti njene značilnosti, ki bi morale ostati skupaj kot skladba nasprotnega v sporu,

9 Parmenid, fragment 8/53–61. Prevod naveden po: Urbančič 1994, 119. *Fragmenti predsokratikov*: »Postavili so namreč dve obliki, da bi ju imenovali za prepričanji, / izmed katerih pa ene ne bi smeli – in v tem so zablodili. / Presodili so, da sta si nasproti po telesu in postavili so znamenja, / druga ločeno od drugih: tu eterični ogenj plamena, / ki je blag in zelo lahek, povsod isti s seboj, / a z drugim ne-isti; tam, nasprotno, pa tudi ono po sebi, / nevedno noč, gosto in težko obliko. / Izrečem ti vso to navidezno razporeditev, / da te kdaj ne ukani kako prepričanje smrtnikov.«

kot takšno eno. Take značilnosti so na eni strani tisto dobro: plamen nebesnega ognja: tisto svetlo, sijajno, blágo, in lahkotno; to postavljajo kot s seboj povsem isto, z drugim pa ne isto, torej ločeno. Na drugo stran pa postavljajo kot nasprotno tisto slabo sámo na sebi: noč in temina brez svetlobe, tisto gosto in težko. Prvo jim velja za edino »resnično« in iz njega izključujejo tisto drugo: temno, gosto, težko kot »neresnično«. In ravno v tem, v tej raz-ločitvi vsaksebi te skladne cele zgradbe na dve ločeni obliki je bistvena zabloda, zabloda vseh zablod: na nji leži takorekoč vsa poznejša filozofija, saj je prav ona ravnala na naznačen način blodno. Pred to zablodo svari, to zablodo zavrača Parmenid. Pravo spoznanje – mišljenje, govorjenje, raziskovanje – je potemtakem le tisto, ki se drži cele skladne zgradbe svetlega IN temnega; nebesnega, sijajnega IN nočnega, temnega; lahkotnega blagega IN težkega, gostega (zemeljskega); »dobrega« in »slabega«, ne da bi se pustilo zapeljati v navideznost tistega raz-po-reda in raz-dvojitve vsaksebi tiste skladne cele zgradbe. Ki skratka ostajajo pri harmoniji, pri izvirnem skladu tiste zgradbe.

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Nobene druge ali drugačne take skladne zgradbe ni kot edinole *alétheia*, raz-kritost, če gre za spoznanje in pravo pot. Le o nji je mogoče izreči vse tiste nasprotujoče si značilnosti, saj je sama sklad takega raz-pora. (Urbančič 1994, 120.)

Tretja pot, pot *dokse*, mnenj smrtnikov, je s tem razkritjem različitve sklenjena. Po njej je sicer moč hoditi in je povečini tudi hojena, a je obenem zaobidljiva, kolikor se smrtnik usmeri na po boginji razkrito pot *ne-skritosti* biti, ki se je starim naznanjala kot *phýsis*, vznikajoče-zadržujoče se vladanje prikazovanja v premenah vznikanja v »ne« *ne-skritosti* same in ponikanja nazaj v skritost *neskritosti*. Če torej Parmenidovo bit razumemo kot *sostvovanje*, tj. v obzorju *phýsis*, se zdaj trojnost poti po Heideggru steka v enotno napotilo, ki sovključuje tako *bit* in *nič* kot tudi *videz* smrtnikov, in sicer:

Pot do biti je neizogibna.

Pot k niču je neprehodna.

Pot k videzu je ves čas dostopna in hojena, a zaobidljiva.

Resnično vedeči zato ni ta, ki slepo dirja za resnico, temveč le ta, ki ves

čas ve za vse tri poti, za pot biti, pot nebiti in pot videza. Nadmočno vedenje, in vsako vedenje pomeni premoč, je podarjeno le temu, ki je izkusil navdihujoči vihar na poti k biti, ki mu groza druge poti k breznu ničā ni ostala tuja in ki je tretjo pot, pot videza, prevzel kot stalno nujo. (Heidegger 1995, 114.)

Nikakršna poljubnost torej ni, da Parmenidova boginja *Alétheia* oznanja trojnost poti, in sicer kljub temu, da ji gre v resnici za doumevajoče razkrivanje biti. Spoznanje namreč nikakor ni le usmerjenost k absolutni prosojnosti zgolj umevanja nespremenljive biti, temveč naj bi se doumevanje biti usmerjalo k celotni situaciji, v kateri stoji vsakokratni človek, ko, razpet med *tèmo noči* in *svetlobo dneva*, eksistira v okrožju *biti, ničā* in *videza*. Le vsota vseh treh poti tako človeku daje uvid v celoto njegove lastne situacije, v kateri se nahaja kot doumevajoče bitje, vrženo v vmesje *ničēčega ničā, razkrivajoče-skritosti biti* in *doksične vsakdanjosti*, v domačnosti katere biva v bližini vselej preddanega in predrazloženega sveta.

Doksa kot videz – v katerem se že svita neka svojevrstna razklenjenost *biti*, saj k razkrivajočemu prikazovanju biti bistveno spada tudi videz, s katerim se bit na bivajočem vsakokrat javlja – zato sama spada v tisto bližino doumevajočega razkrivanja, o kateri govori morda najslavnejši rek Parmenidovih fragmentov τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι,¹⁰ ki se v Sovretovem (2002) prevodu glasi: »saj je misliti isto, kar biti«, v Kocijančičevem prevodu (*Fragmenti predsokratikov*) pa takole: »Isto je namreč umevati in biti«.

Naš pogled bi segel prekratko, če bi ostali pri običajnem prevodu in v tem fragmentu prepoznali le pogosto z njim povezani novoveški subjektivistični idealizem, po katerem o vsakokratnem kajstvu bivajočega odloča le človekov pogled, razsvetljen z vsemogočnostjo absolutnega uma, saj bi na ta način že zapustili obzorje izvornega starogrškega razumevanja biti kot *prisotnosti*, kjer vendarle o novoveški subjektivni pred-metnosti pred-metnega ni bilo ne duha ne sluha. Zato Heidegger (1995, 169) predlaga izvorni misli primernejši prevod, in sicer: »bit [εἶναι] in doumevanje [νοεῖν] sta vzvratno sopripadajoča«. *Noeîn* v tem kontekstu potemtakem še ni mišljenje, temveč »doumevanje«, ki

10 Parmenid, fragment B3.

je prehod skozi križišče tropotja. To pa lahko postane le, če je že v temelju *od-ločitev za bit zoper* nič in s tem spoprijem z videzom. Takšno bistveno od-ločenje pa v izvrševanju in vztrajanju zoper stalno pritiskajoče zapletanje v vsakodnevno in običajno vsekakor mora rabiti silo. Nasilstvo tako od-ločenega prodora na pot k biti tako človeka porine ven iz domačega kot tistega najbližjega in običajnega. (Heidegger 1995, 169.)

Človek je namreč tisto bivajoče, ki se doumevajoč približuje razumetju biti, bit pa obenem spada k doumevajočemu človeku, ki se je podal na pot tropotja *biti, nič* in *videza*. Spoprijem z *videzom* je, kot pravi Heidegger, tisti (nasilni) prelom z vsakdanjostjo običajnega življenja, v katerem se običajnost znotrajsvetnega bivajočega razkrije v svojem najneobičajnejšem prikazovanju *bivajočega v celoti* kot prikazovanju v razliki do tega, kar se vsakokrat *prikazuje*.

102 Vendar tako uzrta vsakdanjost, na kateri leži *pot dokse*, še ni gola *navideznost*, ki bi jo človek mogel in tudi moral zapustiti na poti k *biti*, saj *doksa*, kolikor jo še mislimo izvorno starogrško, bistveno spada k biti kot prikazujočemu sebe-kazanju. Šele kasnejša metafizika je namreč tista, ki z zahtevo umnosti za vsako ceno ob pozabi *dokse* razglasi videz za golo navideznost. Mar ni potemtakem pozaba vsakdanjosti kot primarno razkrivajoče dimenzije razkrivanja biti tisto mesto, kjer človek vstopa v domnevno, da lahko z naporom stroge umnosti zagospoduje nad bivajočim v celoti? Kako je torej z *bitjo, videzom* in *navideznostjo* v prehodu od Parmenida k Platonu?

II. Votlinska doksa med *videzom* in *golo navideznostjo*

S stališča Platonove *prispodobe o votlini* smo z razgrnitvijo Parmenidovega vznika starogrškega mišljenja še vedno na začetni stopnji, čvrsto umeščeni v zidove *votlinskega sveta*, v danzadnevnom domovanju v svet vržene faktične eksistence. Vendar, in to je bistveno, (*votlinski*) svet predmetafizičnega mišljenja biti še ni votlinski svet Platonovih vklejnencev. Pred- oziroma proto-metafizični

človek, prižigajoč si luč v temi,¹¹ še ni jetnik lastnega domovanja,¹² temveč iz običajnosti vsakdana doumevajoč že sega onkraj senc k prikazujočemu se *blisku biti*, v katerem se razkriva *bivajoče v celoti*, to je prikazovanje v razliki do tega, kar se vsakokrat prikazuje.

Prikazovanje se tu razkriva kot *prisotnost prisotnega*, ki v izmenični igri *svetlobe* in *senc* privaja bivajoče v ne-skritost izgledov. Bivajoče je torej kot prikazovanje na začetku grškega mišljenja vsakokrat uzrto v neskritosti svojega *videza* kot to, kar se kaže, kot prikazovanje, *samo-na-sebi-kažoče-se*, skratka kot φαίνόμενον, saj, kakor pravi Heidegger (1995, 109), »k biti sami kot prikazovanju spada videz. Bit kot videz ni prav nič šibkejša od biti kot neskritosti.« Samo zato, ker se bivajoče privaja iz *skritosti* biti v *videz* svojega izgleda, človek zmore doumevajoč stati v *ne-skritosti* biti, vtem ko iz skritosti izvijajoč zbira bivajoče v stalni zbir λόγος-a. Ker k bistvu biti kot *phýsis* spada, da to, kar je *ne-skrito*, vseskozi ponika nazaj v *skritost*, ker se torej *videz* vselej lahko izmakne v zgolj *navideznost*, se resnica neskritosti godi le v vztrajni sopripadnosti *phýsis* in *lógos*. Zato Lozar pravi:

Začetna soizvornost resnice, mišljenja in biti pove najprej to, da videz in navideznost spadata k resnici biti. Bivajoče je pod obnebjem resnice kot neskritosti dojeta kot fenomen, torej tisto samo-na-sebi-kažoče-se *in* samo-na-sebi-skrivajoče-se. Bivajoče kot tako in v celoti je razkrivanje v stalni izgled in skrivanje v navideznost. (Lozar 2003, 162.)

Bit, *videz* in *navideznost* v obzorju začetnega mišljenja so potemtakem ubrani v *neskritosti* votlinskega *bivajočega*. V taistem obzorju se človek nahaja tako v *resnici* kot *neresnici*, v votlinskem vmesju obeh, na poti *dokse*, a hkrati napoten tako k *biti* kot *nebiti*, k *sostvovanju* tako svetlobe kot teme. Vendar le

11 Primerjaj Heraklitov fragment 26B, ki se v prevodu pri Barbariću (1997, 127) v celoti glasi: »Človek v noči prižiga sebi luč, ugašenega očesnega vida. Živeč se dotika mrtvega speč, prebujen se dotika spečega.« Barbarićev članek »Človek v noči« predstavlja pronicljivo interpretacijo fragmenta. Prim. tudi Uranič 2018.

12 V tem oziru se hvaležno ponuja Heraklitova drža, ko tujce, ki so ga želeli obiskati, a so se zaustavili ob njegovem domu, ko so videli, kako se greje ob peči, povabi, da naj vstopijo, češ, »saj tudi tukaj prebivajo bogovi« (εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεοῦς).

do Platonovega metafizičnega zaobrata, ki v razločitvi biti in mišljenja zapušča votlinsko *dokso* in v zasnovanju drugačnega razumetja biti stopi na *pot svetlobe* brez senc, na pot *epistemološkega* zapuščanja votline.

Da bi bila pot navzgor sploh mogoča, da bi torej sploh bilo zares mogoče misliti *votlinsko prisposobo*, se mora potemtakem pri Platonu najprej dogoditi razpor med *resnico* in *videzom*. Videz mora biti izločen iz območja resnice in ponižan v *golo navideznost*, v *temo noči*, ki ni več kot poprej *prisotna* v harmoniji skladne zgradbe biti, temveč je *tèma* zgolj in samo še *nebivajoči* »manko luči, se pravi: odsotnost svetlobe« (Hribar 1993, 18). Kako se torej na začetku metafizike dogodi usodna premena *videza* v *golo navideznost*, ki vodi v brezpogojno filozofsko zapuščanje votline?

104 Zastavljeno vprašanje najpoprej cilja na razjasnitev starogrške besede δόξα, ki jo običajno prevajamo s slovenskim izrazom *videz*. Slovar slovenskega knjižnega jezika kot pričevalec jezikovne rabe pravi, da je videz najprej to, kar je na rečeh videno, »z vidom zaznavne lastnosti, značilnosti česa«, a hkrati tudi to, »kar se kaže na zunaj«, kar le daje videz, kar je skratka le navidezno, pri tem pa podaja primer rabe »videz je eno, resnica pa drugo«, ki še kako ustreza razločitvi Platonove metafizike, s katero je, hočeš nočeš, zaznamovana zgodovina zahodnega mišljenja. Podobna večpomenskost, ki je danes ohranjena v slovenski govorici, pritiče tudi starogrški *doksi*. Glagol δοκέω, iz katerega izhaja *doksa*, starogrško »pomeni: pokažem se, prikažem se, stopim v luč« (Heidegger 1995, 104), samostalnik δόξα pa napotuje na četrto pomenov, ki jih v *Uvodu v metafiziko* Heidegger razbira takole:

Ime δόξα pomeni torej marsikaj: 1. ugled kot slavo, 2. u-gled kot preprosti prizor, ki ga nekaj nudi, 3. *u*-gled kot le izgledati tako: »videz« kot gola navideznost, 4. pogled, ki si ga kak človek ustvari, mnenje. Ta mnogopomenskost besede ni malomarnost govorice, marveč globoko utemeljena igra znotraj dorasle modrosti tiste velike govorice, ki v besedi ohranja bistvene poteze biti. Da bi že od začetka pravilno gledali, se moramo varovati tega, da bi videz vzeli in popačili kratko malo v nekaj »izmišljenega«, »subjektivnega«. Predvsem velja: kot k samemu bivajočemu spada prikazovanje, tako spada k njemu tudi videz. (Heidegger 1995, 105.)

Le to, kar se prikazuje, kar vznikna iz skritosti *phýsis* v neskritost prikazovanja, lahko izžareva svoj *videz*. A tudi obratno, le bivajoče, ki v prikazovanju izžareva svoj *videz*, je lahko *neskrito*. Stati v neskritosti kot sebe-prikazovanje je za Grke tako pomenilo: najprej (1) ugled posameznika, slavo, ki pomeni toliko kot nekoga »postaviti v luč in s tem priskrbeti stalnost, bit« (ibid., 103); nadalje (2) ugled kakega bivajočega, razkrivanje izgleda v neskritosti; in nato (3) goli izgled, zakrivanje bivajočega nazaj v skritost. Ker se bivajoče v svojem izgledu lahko tako razkriva kot tudi zakriva, ker namreč prehaja iz neskritosti nazaj v lastno skritost, nazadnje *doksa* zmore pomeniti tudi (4) človekov pogled, mnenje o vsakokratnem videzu bivajočega. *Doksa* v tem oziru bistveno pripada biti kot *prisostvovanju*, kolikor bit vstopa v prikazovanje prek vsakokratnega *videza*, a vendarle *videz* še ni bit sama.

Pod okriljem naznačene večpomenskosti razumevanja *dokse* sta tako *videz* in *navideznost* plat istega kovanca, ki sliši na ime *prikazovanja phýsis* same. Spadata k sami igri razkrivajočega skrivanja, sredi katere se nahaja smrtnik, in v tem združujeta *phýsis* in bit zbirajoči *lógos* v enotnost biti in doumevanja, kakor je izpričano pri Parmenidu. Pot *dokse* je zatorej pot, na kateri se skozi protigiro *videza* in *navideznosti* človeku odpira zmožnost, da zbirajoč privede *phýsis* v enotnost *lógos*-a.¹³ V tem se kaže tista *agonalnost*¹⁴ starogrškega človeka, ki si *prižiga luč* v spopadu z *videzom* na poti k *neskritosti* doumetja skladne zgradbe biti.

Človek se zatorej na poti k biti vselej že nahaja v razmerju do *dokse*, do *videza* vsakokratnih reči, o katerih si tako ali drugače ustvarja mnenja. Mnenja pa se nadalje v skritosti bivajočega, kolikor doumevanje zgreši stvar samo,

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¹³ Zdi se, da v tem smislu *pot dokse* sploh šele napotuje na pot doumetja biti. Je torej *pot dokse* pogoj razkrivanja *poti biti* in s tem v resnici *nezaobidljiva*?

¹⁴ Da *agonalnost* spada k starogrškemu razkrivanju biti, je v svoji obširni študiji pokazal Urbančič (1993, 213–214): »Tako pri grškem človeku spadata skupaj izbojevanje (iz-bor) in razkrivanje: *agonizein* in *aletheuein*. Izvorno razkrivanje biti ni zgolj prihajanje že obstoječega iz skritosti za kulisami na oder vidnosti – na sceno! – ter nato spet odhajanje s scene za kulise v skritost. Izvorno razkrivanje je v zgodovini arhaičnih Grkov *agonalno porajanje in ustvarjanje*: je iz-bor, iz-bojevanje po nezadržni sli in osvobajajoči mōči razkrivanja, ki zmeraj znova žene v boj. Kot takó po razkrivanju zasnovan, človek iz-bori svojo izpolnjeno časno bit: gosposkost/mogočnost in je tako po ‚bistvu‘ *bit-je te časne biti*. Izvorno razkrivanje se nakazuje kot začetni zgodovinski način proizvodjanja (*poiesis*): kot izbojevanje ali iz-bor.«

lahko sprevržejo v zakrivajoč pogled, v domnevanje, ki v rečeh ne najde več nikakršne opore. A tudi takšno zgolj-mnenje, ki ga ima človek o stvareh, je del *videza* kot *navideznosti*, pripada *doksi*, brez katere ni poti k biti, kar je še zlasti dobro vedela in nato v svoj prid zaobrnila *sofistika*, na čelu katere stoji Protagorov stavek *ánthropos métron*. In ravno zavrnitev tega stavka bo Platona vodila v dokončno opuščanje *dokse* v prid *episteme*.

106 *Sofistika* namreč spregovori iz predrugečenega razumevanja odnosa med *phýsis* in *lógos*, s tem ko v območje razkrivanja bivajočega na vodilno mesto postavi človeški *lógos* v smislu govora, ki z retorično veščino zmore obvladovati in tudi bistveno obvladuje *dokso* kot mnenje o vsakokratnem izgledu bivajočega. Na nek način gre zato pri sofistiki za prevlado Parmenidove *poti dokse* – ob pozabi, da ta vendarle sousmerja na *pot biti*. Kar je bilo pred tem v temeljni skušnji arhaičnih mislecev iztrgano iz skritosti skrivajoče se *phýsis* in privedeno v svetlobo *neskrite* zbranosti bivajočega v *lógosu*, se zdaj zvaja na človeku pripadajoči *lógos* sam, ki postane razsodnik o tem, kaj bivajoče vsakokrat je. Še drugače, sofistčna resnica ne temelji več toliko na sami *neskritosti* biti, temveč svojo oporo najdeva v *lógos-u* kot govoru, ta pa je v službi sofista, ki z retorično nadvlado usmerja mnenja ljudi in izenačuje *dokso* kot *videz* z *golo navideznostjo*. Stvari same v tem kontekstu tako ne prihajajo več v *neskritost* iz svojega lastnega vznikanja, temveč jih v neskritost prikazovanja uvaja človeški *lógos*. Človek, kakor se glasi Protagorov stavek, zdaj postane *mera vseh stvari*.

V celoti Protagorov metafizični izrek *ánthropos métron* običajno prevajamo s »človek je *mera vseh stvari*, *tistih ki so, da so, in tistih, ki niso, da niso*«,¹⁵ in v tem pod vplivom novoveškega mišljenja najdevamo začetek *subjektivističnega* mišljenja, ki to vendarle ni, kolikor prisluhnemo Heideggrovemu hermenevtičnemu prevodu fragmenta v delu *Evropski nihilizem*:

Vseh reči (tistih namreč, ki jih človek uporablja in rabi in ga tako stalno obdajajo – χρήματα, χρησθαι) *mera* je (vsakokratni) človek,

15 »πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν«. Protagora, fragment B1. Prevod naveden po: *Fragmenti predsokratikov*.

prisotnih, da *takó* prisostvujejo, kot prisostvujejo, tistih pa, ki jim ni dano prisostvovati, da ne prisostvujejo. (Heidegger 1971, 128.)

Heideggrov prevodni premik je trojen, in sicer *hrémata* niso reči nasploh, temveč reči, ki jih človek uporablja, človek ni kar tako človek nasploh, temveč vsakokratni človek, smrtnik, izročen faktični eksistenci, nazadnje pa prevod Protagorovo bit neposredno umešča v starogrško razumevanje biti kot *prisotnosti*.¹⁶ V nadaljevanju razprave zato Heidegger poda razlago fragmenta, iz katere ob prevodnih spremembah postane očitno, da Protagora še vedno misli v obzorju, ne le prednovoveškega, temveč tudi predsokratskega stališča (proto)metafizike:

Način, kako določa Protagoras odnos človeka do bivajočega, je le poudarjena omejitev neskritosti bivajočega na vsakokratni okoliš spoznanja in skustva sveta. Ta omejitev *predpostavlja*, da prevladuje neskritost bivajočega. [...] Človek je vsakokrat mera prisotnosti in neskritosti z umerjenjem in omejitvijo na najbližje odprto, ne da bi zanikal tisto najbolj oddaljeno zaprto in si drznil odločati o njegovi prisotnosti ali neprisotnosti. (Heidegger 1971, 132.)

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Heideggrov Protagora tako še misli v obzorju skrivnostne *phýsis* kot *prisotnosti prisotnega*, h kateri bistveno spada sebe-skrivanje. Človek je tu resda *merilo*, a ne vsega *bivajočega v celoti* in obenem tudi *biti* nasploh, kot da bi edino *doksa* (mnenje) lahko odločala o resnici biti, temveč je človek kot *merilo* umerjen v omejen okoliš v vsakdanu prisotnih reči, ki so mu kot *neskrite* že vselej dostopne, ne da bi pri tem domneval, da lahko z lastno voljo odloča o tistem breztemeljnem ozadju prikazovanja kot skrivnostnem breznu *prisostvovanja*. Protagora sam pravi: »o bogovih ne morem vedeti niti da so, niti da niso in niti, kakšni so po obliki. Veliko tega je, kar omejuje spoznanje: njihova nezaznavnost in kratkost človeškega življenja.«¹⁷ S tem Protagora domet človekovega védenja zaustavi pred vrati *skrivnosti biti*, onkraj katere se

16 Prim. tudi: Lozar 2017, 249.

17 Protagora, fragment B4.

umerjeni človek z védenjem ne zmore prebiti. Ali ga to že odvezuje od poti k biti in usmerja k domnevi, da je *doksa* (mnenje in videz) sploh vse, kar je?¹⁸ Platon in njegovi somišljeniki bi, kot se zdi, nedvomno odgovorili pritrdilno.

V Platonovem *Teajtetu*, v katerem Sokrat v dialogu s Teodorom in Teajtetom razpravlja »o spoznanju v obzorju sofistike« (Urbančič 2011, 141), tako beremo vse drugačno razumevanje Protagorovega stavka, bistvo katerega se zdaj v nekakšnem slabem silogizmu glasi: *spoznanje*, ki se nanaša na bivajoče, je čutno zaznavanje, mnenja (*dóxai*) pa nastajajo iz čutnega spoznanja, torej je »meniti« [...] isto, kar biti« (Tonkli-Komel 1995, 122). S Sokratovimi besedami:

S: Potemtakem je zame moje zaznavanje resnično, saj je vselej lastno moji bitnosti, jaz pa sem po Protagoru razsodnik tega, kar zame je, da je, in tega, kar ni, da ni.

T: Videti je tako.

S: Kako torej jaz kot nekdo, ki je nezmotljiv in v razumu ne dela napak glede bivajočih in postajajočih stvari, ne bi bil tudi poznavalec vsega, kar zaznavam?

T: Nikakor ni mogoče, da ne bi bil.

S: Nadvse lepo si rekel, da védenje ni nič drugega od zaznave, in tako je skladen (nauk) pri Homerju, Heraklitu in vsej takšni vrsti (ljudi), da se namreč vse stvari gibljejo kot tokovi, (z izrekom) najmodrejšega Protagora, da je človek mera vseh stvari, in (s trditvijo) Teajteta, da je pri takšnem stanju teh stvari védenje zaznavanje. Mar ne, Teajtet? Bova rekla, da ti ta tvoja (trditev) pripada kot nekakšen novorojen otrok, meni pa kot uspeh babiške veččine? Ali kako misliš? (Platon 2004, 237; *Teajtet* 160c–e.)

Majevtik Sokrat prvotne mislece *phýsis* tako vrže v isti koš s *sofisti*. Če je namreč spoznanje izenačeno z zaznavo, grško *aísthesis*, potem je vsakokratna

18 S tem ko smo s Heideggrovo razlago Protagore slednjega umestili pod okrilje prvotnega razumetja biti kot *prisotnosti*, še ne želimo zagovarjati *sofistike* nasploh, a hkrati *duhu metafizične teže* – v Nietzschejevi maniri – ne želimo olajševati zagovarjanja nujnosti zaobrata k umnosti za vsako ceno, ki se dovrši ravno v spopadu s *sofistično skepso*.

resnica biti pač zgolj v tem, kar vsak izmed nas zagleda v čutni zaznavi, védenje pa ni nič drugega kot vselej spreminjajoče se mnenje smrtnikov. *Doksa* v tem oziru bi bila identična z *episteme*, ki pa ni več *doksa* kot *videz*, v katerem se na svojstven način na bivajočem javlja neskritost biti, ki jo je potrebno iztrgati skritosti, temveč *doksa* kot *gola navideznost*. Ta ne zmore več potešiti vedoželjnosti po tem, kar utemeljuje bivajoče v celoti, saj v svoji stalno spreminjajoči se vzgibanosti ne zadane nikakršne obstojnosti, nikakršne stalnosti izgleda, ki bi omogočala, da bi védenje bilo kaj več kot le vsakokratno *mnenje* in kot tako tržno blago v rokah kramarjev – sofistov.¹⁹ V tej zaskrbljenosti filozofske izgube tal pod nogami se mora zato Platon obrniti ne le proti sofistiki, temveč tudi proti Parmenidu, kolikor slednji s svojim naukom izenačuje doumevanje z bitjo, kajti če je »misliti« res »isto, kar biti«, to je, če tako *svetloba* kot *tema* vseskozi sta, potem se *sofistika* v svojih mnenjih preprosto ne more motiti. Platonova aporija se zdaj kaže v tem, da sofisti, ki jih ugleda kot mislece *teme* brez *svetlobe*, mislijo zgolj in samo *temo* kot *goli videz*, ki zaradi Parmenidove identitete pomeni isto kot bit. Da bi torej Platon lahko ubranil spoznanje pred *sofistično* skepsa, mora v polemiki s Parmenidom pokazati, da so mnenja lahko tudi napačna. Pokazati mora, da *mišljenje* lahko zadeva tudi ob nebivajoče oziroma, drugače, da tudi nebivajoče na nek način je. Tonkli-Komel zapiše:

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Sofistična skepsa pripada na svojevrsten način samemu začetku filozofije – ne le zavoljo kritike neutemeljenih mnenj, pač pa najprej zavoljo tega, ker sploh odkrije nekaj takega, kot je mnenje. Kolikor pa sofist resnico prikazuje kot mnenje, filozofu ni treba samo še dokazati, da je mnenje lahko resnično, nasprotno, če naj utre pot pravemu znanju, ki je res za kaj pristojno in ni zgolj »ironično posnemanje«, ki se dela, da se na vse spozna, čeprav se ne, potem mora prvenstveno izboriti možnost, da je tako mnenje lahko tudi napačno. (Tonkli-Komel 1995, 122–123.)

19 V dialogu *Protagora* Sokrat tako postavi proti sofistom usmerjeno retorično vprašanje: »Ali ni sofist bržkone nekakšen trgovec ali kramar z blagom, s katerim se hrani duša?« (Platon 2004, 772.)

III. Sklep

Platonov prelom s Parmenidom se zatorej dogodi, ko Platon *nič* razdvoji od *nebivajočega*, da bi s tem lahko pokazal, kako sofistčna skepsa temelji v zmotnih mnenjih (*pseudēs dóksa*), ki ne zadevajo bivajočega v njegovi biti, temveč se nanašajo na nekaj, česar ne bi smelo biti, a kar hkrati še ni čisti nič, na *nebivajoče*. Kar je pri tem ključno, je, da *doksa* zdaj ni več doumeta kot k biti spadajoči *videz*, ki bivajoče privaja v neskritost, temveč je *doksa* v svojih premenah pravilnosti (*orthós*) in lažnosti (*pseūdos*) odslej ugledana kot *temačni pogled* neveščega človeka, ki ob pomanjkanju *paideía* zgreši pravi *izgled* bivajočega. *Videz* tako nič več ne uvaja v neskritost skladne zgradbe sopripadnosti *teme* in *svetlobe*, temveč drži človeka v *temačnosti* votlinskega bivališča, kamor *svetloba biti* ne pobliskne več.²⁰ *Videz* postane *gola navideznost*, oziroma, kakor ugotavlja Heidegger (1995, 106), »[š]ele v sofistiki in pri Platonu je bil *videz* razglašen za goli *videz* in s tem ponižan«, praobičajnost človeškega prebivališča pa s to premestitvijo dokončno postane *senčnati* 110 *votlinski svet* vklenjencev, iz katerega je od tega zgodovinskega trenutka dalje potrebno, kolikor gre Platonu vendarle za utemeljitev (*pravega*) spoznanja, enkrat za vselej pobegniti v onkrajvotlinsko svetlobo sijanja večne *svetlobe biti*.

Toda to ni več prehod k *biti* kot *prisotnosti* v obzorju *phýsis*, temveč k *biti* kot večni navzočnosti *idej* na čelu z *idejo dobrega*, v *luči* katere votlinski svet vzvratno ponikne v *senčnato* podobo nič več bivajočih *golih videzov*.

20 Urbančič (2011, 209) v tej vsaksebности *teme* in *svetlobe* odločno umesti Platonovega *sofista* in *filozofa* na njima odmerjeno mesto: »To mesto umeščenosti je pri »sofistu« mrak/temina skritosti, pri ,filozofu' pa je božanska svetlost one skrivnostne svetlobe. Svetloba vidnosti in temina skritosti sta sicer skrajno različni in vsaksebi, a vendar nekako skupaj spadajoči in isti. Platon ju je povsem ločil, ker ni našel tistega, kar ju drži skupaj v istem. Tisti, ki je umeščen v svetlobi, je – po izpeljani filozofiji – zasnovani novi svetovnozgodovinski človek produktivno dejavne znanosti: je razsvetljeni novi človek uma/logosa/znanosti. Oni drugi, ki obstaja v temini in skritosti, pa ravno ni razsvetljeni človek znanosti: je nerazsvetljeni, »predznanstveni« človek negotove izkušnje in blodenja.«

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ARNAULD IN DESCARTES

NARAVA IDEJ IN PROBLEM METODE

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Povzetek

Članek v kontekstu spora z Malebranchem predstavi odnos med Antoinom Arnauld in Descartesovo teorijo idej. Najprej zariše srž spora ter pokaže na razlike med starejšo in moderno interpretacijo njihovih teorij idej: prva je vsem trem pripisala objektno teorijo idej, medtem ko je druga trdila, da Arnauld ideje razume kot dejanja. S tem je omogočila novo branje Descartesovih idej kot dejanj zaznavanja. Odnos zvestobe Descartesu prispevek prikaže na specifičnem načinu uporabe sosledja metod

analize in sinteze, ki se ga je Arnauld poslužil v svoji kritiki Malebrancha. Pokaže, kako tako odsotnost problema narave idej pri Descartesu kot njegov vznik in razčlenitev v Arnauldovi polemiki z Malebranchem izhajata iz istega metodološkega sosledja in drugačnega postavljanja problemov, ki ga terja vsaka metoda posebej.

Ključne besede: Arnauld, Malebranche, Descartes, narava idej, metoda.

Arnauld and Descartes. The Nature of Ideas and the Problem of Method

Abstract

114 The article examines the relation between Antoine Arnauld and Descartes's theory of ideas in the context of his quarrel with Malebranche. After examining what the quarrel was about, it shows the difference between the older and the modern interpretation of the problem: while the first took all three to hold an object theory of ideas, the new one understands Arnauld to hold an act theory. A new reading of Arnauld made possible a re-evaluation of Descartes's ideas as acts of perception. The relation of fidelity to Descartes is demonstrated by Arnauld's specific use of the sequence of methods of analysis and synthesis against Malebranche. It is shown that the lack of the problem of the nature of ideas in Descartes and its appearance as well as its elaboration in Arnauld's polemic with Malebranche follow from the same succession and different forms of problem-posing, necessitated by each respective method.

Keywords: Arnauld, Malebranche, Descartes, nature of ideas, method.

Več kot deset let trajajoč spor med Nicolasom Malebranchem in Antoinom Arnauld, avguštinskima kartezijskima, je eden temeljnih dogodkov filozofije druge polovice 17. stoletja. V njem so, občasno kot neposredni udeleženci, v določenih primerih kot zunanji komentatorji ali kot avtorji postumno odkritih spisov, sodelovala največja imena tistega časa: Leibniz, Locke, Régis, Bayle ... Če lahko izvor spora res lociramo v teološko problematiko različnih koncepcij božjega upravljanja redov narave in milosti, lahko rečemo, da se je v zgodovino filozofije zapisal predvsem kot spor o ontologiji idej, tj. *naravi idej*. Ali natančneje: izmenjava stališč se je osnovala na drugačni konceptualizaciji tistega izmed aspektov ideje, ki ga Descartes v III. meditaciji imenuje *predmetna realnost*. Tam zatrjuje, da ravno prisotnost različnih predmetnih realnosti idejam omogoča, da kažejo različne reči. S sodobnim besednjakom lahko rečemo: debata med Malebranchem in Arnauld se je osredotočala na problem ontološkega statusa reprezentacije, ki vznikne z delom Renéja Descartesa.

Zakaj predvsem Descartes? Če v lastnosti reprezentiranja danes spontano prepoznamo temeljno značilnost mišljenja, se je pojem reprezentacije v 17. stoletju šele uveljavljal. Vseprisotno začudenje nad Descartesovim enačenjem ideje, misli končnega subjekta in reprezentacije, ki smo mu priča v *Ugovorih na Meditacije* kaže, da je bila Descartesova koncepcija ideje v veliki meri nova. Soočenje med Arnauld in Malebranchem lahko zato razumemo kot enega izmed prvih dogodkov v zgodovini filozofije, ko danes splošno sprejeta funkcija reprezentacije ni nastopila kot predmet čudenja, temveč kot že uveljavljen koncept, ki mora postati predmet eksplicitne filozofske razprave. Ker je problem reprezentacije osnovni del vsake epistemologije, je obravnava spora med Malebranchem in Arnauld relevantna tako za specialistično obravnavo notranjih antagonizmov kartezijske filozofije kot za analizo zgodovine epistemologije nasploh.

Namen članka je, da pripravi teren za specialistično razumevanje spora med dvema glavnima kartezijskima. Navezava na moderno filozofijo je v najboljšem primeru sekundarna. Glede na to, da gre za preučevanje razmerij znotraj paradigme s skupnimi temeljnimi viri (Descartes, Avguštin), je ustrezna metoda prikaz določenih temeljnih deviacij poznejših kartezijskecev od Descartesovega dela, s čimer označimo relacije ortodoksije in kritike. Prikaz skladnosti Arnaulda

z Descartesom bo tako ponudil osnovo za nadaljnjo obravnavo relacij. Odklon tu ne indicira logične napake, prav tako kot argumenti temeljnih besedil svoje morebitne resničnosti ne utemeljujejo s temeljnostjo, temveč njegovo prepoznanje omogoča prikaz razcepov znotraj skupnega teoretskega polja. V ta namen mora izolirati perspektivo, ki bo služila kot najboljši uvod v tematiko. Najprej mora omogočiti, da je pravilno opredeljen problem, ki smo mu priča v antagonizmu med Descartesovimi dediči.

Članek je razdeljen po naslednjem principu. V prvem koraku je stenografsko orisan kontekst spora med kartezijskima in s pomočjo Descartesovega besedila definirano tisto, čemur bomo rekli problem narave idej. Pokazano je, da vzroki za spor v osnovi ne izhajajo iz teorije narave idej, temveč iz teologije.

V drugem razdelku sta prikazani dve interpretaciji Arnauldove filozofije idej: prva, tradicionalna, ki spor med Malebranchem in Arnauldovom reducira na problem *mesta idej*, s čimer onemogoči zastavitev vprašanja *narave idej*, ki sta ga ves čas poudarjala oba pisca; druga, modernejša in sedaj splošno sprejeta, ki Malebrancha in Arnaulda razume kot privrženca dveh različnih teorij narave idej, *objektne* in *dejavne*.

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V zadnjem in najobsežnejšem delu pokažemo, kako sam problem narave idej v Descartesovem besedilu umanjka iz specifičnih metodoloških razlogov, podrejenih specifičnemu *znanstvenem cilju*. Pokažemo, kako v skladu z isto metodo, v skladu s popolnoma drugačnimi, tj. *teološkimi cilji*, izhajajočimi iz problemov, ki smo jih navedli v prvem delu, Arnauld problem narave idej formulira v prvi kritiki Malebrancheve teorije idej. Primernost skladnosti Arnauldove metode z Descartesovo kot prizme preučevanja celotnega polja razmerij med trojico je osnovana na Malebranchevem samorazumevanju *De la recherche de la vérité* kot metodološkega besedila.

Teološki pogoji spora

Zgodovino kartezijske filozofije je nemogoče razumeti brez figure Antoina Arnaulda (1612–1694), enega izmed glavnih predstavnikov janzenističnega gibanja. Gre torej v prvi vrsti za teologa, ki je bil pred soočenjem z mislijo Descartesa v Četrthih ugovorih na Meditacije leta 1641 takratni javnosti znan predvsem kot glasnik bojev gibanja, osnovanega okoli opatije Port-Royal, proti

teološko-politični spregi med jezuiti in vzpostavljajočim se absolutizmom: večji del le-teh se je vrtel okoli zagovora *teorije učinkujoče milosti*, izhajajoče iz Avgušтина in ponovno formulirane v delu *Augustinus* Corneliusa Jansena, po katerem se imenuje tudi samo janzenistično gibanje. Srž nauka predstavlja trditev, da nas zavoljo naše, od izvirnega greha skvarjene narave lahko odreši le vedno uspešna, tj. učinkujoča, božja milost. Z drugimi besedami: Bog z vsakim posamičnim dejanjem svoje milosti nujno doseže odrešitev grešnika, ki mu je kot *izbranemu* namenjena. Ta teza je v nasprotju s tezo jezuitov, ki so trdili, da za našo odrešitev zadošča naša svobodna volja, in kasneje z Malebranchevo teorijo božje milosti.

Zunaj teoloških kontroverz, ki so botrovale, da je Arnauld večino svojega življenja preživel v skrivanju pred aktualno oblastjo, podvržen stalnemu nadlegovanju, in v izgnanstvu, ga danes poznamo predvsem kot avtorja številnih markantnih del na področju kartezijanske filozofije. Med njimi najdemo ugovore na Descartesove *Meditacije* (Descartes 1988),¹ ki jih je slednji označil za najboljše med vsemi (AT III, 331; CSM III, 175), in *Logiko ali umetnost mišljenja* (Arnauld in Nicole 1992), znano kot *Logiko Port-Royala*, ki jo je napisal v tandemu z janzenistom *Pierrom Nicolom*. Gre za delo, v katerem mrgoli parafraz in preglednejših sistematizacij Descartesovih argumentov (v nadaljevanju *Logika*). Njegov gotovo največji prispevek h kartezijanski filozofiji najdemo na področju *teorije idej*, v delu *Des vraies et de fausses idées* iz leta 1683 (Arnauld 2011) (odslej *VFI*).

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Raje kakor »na področju epistemologije« sem zapisal »na področju teorije idej«, saj se besedilo prej kot z vprašanji tipa, »kaj dela idejo resnično«, ukvarja z vprašanji tipa: »Kaj so ideje?« Če je prvo v prvi meri epistemološko, je drugo v celoti ontološko. Da sta problema vsaj v grobem ločena, dokazuje dejstvo, da specifična določitev narave idej še ne implicira njihove resničnosti in obratno. Omenjeno delo je namreč v prvi vrsti polemika proti teoriji idej drugega velikega Descartesovega naslednika, oratorijca Nicolasa Malebrancha. Če je

¹ Poleg slovenske izdaje bomo v oklepaju vedno dodali še mesto v izdaji *Ceuvres complètes* (Descartes 1996) z navedbo številke zvezka in strani (npr. AT VII, 5) in mesto v angleški izdaji *The Philosophical Writings of Desartes* v treh zvezkih (Descartes 1984; Descartes 1985; Descartes 1991), ki so jo s prevodi oskrbeli Cottingham, Stoothoff in Murdoch (npr. CSM II, 20).

problem idej predvsem filozofsko-ontološki problem, je povod zanj, tako kot v Arnauldovih kontroverzah z jezuiti, ponovno teološki.

Malebranche leta 1680 objavi *Traité de la nature et de la grace* (odslej *Razprava*), v kateri formulira serijo tez, ki vsemogočnost božje volje podredijo sklopu univerzalnih, absolutno zavezujočih zakonov. Ti izhajajo iz neskončne, konstantne, modre in avtonomne božje narave, ki si kot taka sama narekuje zakone delovanja. Ti univerzalni zakoni Boga v zakonito delovanje ne primorajo le na področju reda narave, tj. na področju fizikalnih zakonov, ki jih je Bog vzpostavil ob kreaciji sveta, ampak zakonitemu delovanju podredijo tudi red božje milosti. Z drugimi besedami: tako kot Bog reda narave ne upravlja s posamičnimi posegi, temveč v skladu z univerzalnimi fizikalnimi zakoni, tudi svoje milosti ne deli v skladu z določenimi partikularnimi in vedno odrešujočimi posegi, namenjenimi specifičnim grešnikom, ampak to počne v skladu z določenim univerzalnim zakonom milosti, ki v določenih primerih nima učinka odrešitve. Kot dež občasno namesto na polje, ki potrebuje vodo, pade v morje, tako božja milost v skladu z zakonom občasno pade na nekoga, ki je v takšni meri sprijen, da ne more biti učinkujoča, da ne prinese odrešitve. Med Malebranchevo teorijo milosti, ki deluje v skladu z občimi hotenji in je le včasih uspešna, in Arnauldovo teorijo učinkujoče milosti, ki se kaže v posamičnih in vedno uspešnih dejanjih stvarnika, je torej konflikt.

V takšni nomološki zamejitvi božje vsemogočnosti je Arnauld videl nelegitimno težnjo končnega uma, da bi zrl na področje zanj neizpodbitno nedoumljive neskončnosti. V Malebranchevi teologiji je prepoznal mešanje ločenih polj razuma in vere. Kot osnovo herezije je Arnauld v skladu z določenimi Malebranchevimi napotki v *Razpravi* prepoznal teorijo videnja vseh stvari v Bogu, zapisano v 2. delu 3. knjige Malebrancheve *De la recherche de la vérité* (*De la nature des idées*, predvsem v 6. poglavju naslovljenem »Que nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu«; v nadaljevanju *Recherche*) (Malebranche 2006, 453; OC I, 437).²

2 Kot pri Descartesu tudi pri Malebrahcu poleg zadnje izdaje *Recherche* iz leta 2006 pri založbi Vrin dodajamo mesto v *Œuvres complètes*, ki so začela izhajati v letu 1958 (Malebranche 1958–1984; sigla OC).

Na kratko povzeto: naše misli ali zaznave (*perceptions*) same po sebi nimajo resničnostne vrednosti, saj ničesar ne *reprezentirajo*. Resnica temelji v intimnem odnosu naših misli z božjim umom, ki v sebi na inteligibilen način (v slogu platonskih form) vsebuje celotno stvarstvo. Prek zrenja idej v Bogu duša spozna svet na sebi neinteligibilnih razsežnih teles. Takšna teorija spoznanja posameznika postavlja v intimen odnos z nedoumljivim Bogom in tako »na nek način divinizira« predmete nizkotnih znanosti materialnega sveta (Arnauld 2011, 158). Tem v Bogu stoječim reprezentacijam, istočasno različnim od naše misli in od reprezentiranega objekta, Arnauld poda ime *êtres représentatifs* (ibid., 55).

Da bi spodkopal temelje heretične teologije, se Arnauld spopada najprej loti na področju idej. Začetni načrt, da o problemu idej napiše le kratek spis, ki bi služil kot uvod v spopad s tezami *Razprave*, kmalu preraste v obsežno knjigo, ki izide leta 1683: *Des vraies et de fausses idées*. Njen neposredni cilj je pokazati, da so ideje v smislu *êtres représentatifs* lažne, *fausses*, tj. neobstoječe, »da so ideje vzete v tem zadnjem smislu resnične himere« (ibid., 57) in da to, kar o njih zapiše, »ni osnovano na ničemer drugem kot na umišljanjih, ki so nam ostala od predsodkov otroštva« (ibid., 58). Proti Malebranchu bo poskušal nakazati, da lahko vsakdo, kolikor je »pozoren na to, kar se dogaja v njegovem duhu« (ibid., 48), pride do dognanja, da sta »ideja objekta in zaznava objekta« ista stvar (ibid., 67). Gre torej za sam *ontološki status* idej.

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Problem mesta idej in problem narave idej

Kot smo rekli, namen pričujočega besedila ni prikaz konflikta med Arnauldom in Malebranchem, spora, ki se bo od svojih začetkov leta 1683 zavlekel v zgodnje 18. stoletje, od koder bo v zadnjih etapah Malebranche svojo filozofijo zagovarjal proti že 15 let preminulemu Arnauldu. Pričujoče besedilo v ozir jemlje nek drug odnos: odnos med metodologijo Arnaulda in Descartesa. Arnaulda in Malebrancha lahko namreč razumemo kot dva pretendenta za prestol, ki ga je izpraznila Descartesova smrt. Če je Malebranchev program reformističen, Arnauldov program na vseh točkah zaznamuje doktrinarna ortodoksija. Odstopanja med Malebranchevo in Descartesovo teorijo idej so tako velika, da lahko Malebranchevo teorijo idej

v najboljšem primeru opredelimo kot notranjo kritiko Descartesove teorije, v najslabšem za platonistično reakcijo proti Descartesovi psihologizaciji ideje. V Arnauldovih delih po drugi strani ugledamo čisto zvestobo. V *VFI* se namreč konsistentno sklicuje na skladnost svoje misli z mislijo svojega učitelja. A to ni vse: kolikor bi Arnauld zgolj ponovil tisto, kar je Descartes zapisal, pač ne bi veljal za enega največjih Descartesovih naslednikov. Arnauldova analiza Descartesove teorije idej, povod katere je res Malebranchevo delo, proizvede dodatek v obliki razlage določenih navideznih nejasnosti. Slednje najdemo na mestih, ki jih Descartesu za zadostitev specifičnega znanstvenega cilja njegovega dela v skladu z lastno koncepcijo metode (s tem mislimo predvsem na problem, ki si ga zastavijo *Meditacije*) ni bilo potrebno eksplicitno obdelati. Trdili bomo, da je Descartesova opredelitev v teh mestih implicitna in da je ravno Arnauld tisti, ki jo je med prvimi ekspliciral.

Slepo pego Descartesove teorije idej tvori domnevna nejasnost Descartesove določitve razmerja med konstitutivnimi elementi ideje v III. meditaciji. Tam zapiše:

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[K]olikor so te ideje zgolj neki modusi mišljenja, med njimi ne vidim nikakršne neenakosti in o vseh se zdi, da izhajajo iz mene na enak način. Kolikor pa kaže [*repraesentat*] ena ideja eno stvar in druga drugo stvar, je jasno, da sta med seboj močno različni. (Descartes 1988, 70; AT VII, 40; CSM II, 27.)

Vidimo, da vzpostavi ločnico med idejo kot *zgolj nekim modusom mišljenja*, čemur bi lahko rekli tudi dejavnost duha ali zaznava, in idejo, obravnavano v oziru na njeno *reprezentacijsko funkcijo*. Ideja kot modus mišljenja bo, kot vse stvari, ki imajo dejanski obstoj v Descartesovi filozofiji, kmalu zatem opredeljena prek pojma formalne realnosti (*realitas formalis*), njena reprezentacijska funkcija pa bo označena s pojmom predmetne realnosti (*realitas objectiva* – v starejšem prevodu »objektivna realnost«). Vprašanje je, kakšno je razmerje med modusom mišljenja in reprezentacijsko funkcijo, med formalno in predmetno realnostjo.

Mesto prevladujoče paradigme interpretacije je dolgo zasedala teza, da je Descartes zasnoval tako imenovano *objektno teorijo idej*. Napajala se je predvsem

na določenih mestih iz odgovorov na *Druge* in *Tretje ugovore*. V *Odgovorih na druge ugovore* Descartes idejo opredeli kot »tisto formo vsake misli, po katere neposredni zaznavi [*per cuius immediatam perceptionem*] se zavedam prav te misli; če razumem to, kar govorim, z besedami ne morem izraziti ničesar, ne da bi bil zaradi tega gotov, da je v meni ideja tistega, kar označujejo besede« (AT VII, 160; CSM II, 113).³ V odgovor Hobbesu, ki metaforo ideje kot podobe razume dobesedno, tj. kot materialno sliko, sam trdi, da z besedo ideja označuje »vse, kar duh zaznava neposredno [*quod immediate a mente percipitur*]« (AT VII, 181; CSM II, 127). Objektna interpretacija je navedena pasusa razumela, kakor da je predmetna realnost določen idealen objekt, duhovna vsebina, ki je *neposredno zaznana od* od nje razločljive modifikacije mišljenja ali zaznave duha (raba pasiva [*a mente percipitur*], ki idejo [*quod*] postavlja v slovnični položaj direktnega objekta takšno interpretacijo še spodbudi).

Ker med idejami kot »zgolj [nekimi] modusi mišljenja« (Descartes 1988, 70; AT VII, 40; CSM II, 27) ni opaziti neenakosti, zaznava kot modus mišljenja sama po sebi ne reprezentira. Reprezentacijo omogoča šele njena naperjenost na *idejo kot neposredni miselni objekt-reprezentacijo*. Ko *neposredno zaznamo* specifično *idejo-objekt* (npr. idejo trikotnika), prek njene reprezentacijske narave *posredno zaznamo* predmete, ideja katerih je (trikotnik). Objektna teorija ideje torej postavlja določeno vnanje razmerje med predmetno in formalno realnostjo ideje, ki implicira posreden odnos do reprezentirane stvarnosti in neposreden odnos do reprezentacije kot specifičnega miselnega objekta.

Takšno razumevanje kartezijske ideje prvič vznikne v Malebranchevem delu *Recherche*, ko ideje razglasi za »*l'objet immédiat de notre esprit*« (Malebranche 2006, 435; OC I, 413) in zapiše, da je »absolutno nujno, da je ideja tega objekta [duhu, tj. *l'esprit*] dejansko prisotna [*actuellement présent*]« (ibid.). Ta interpretacija, ki svojo popularizacijo doživi v zdravorazumski

3 Prevod vseh mest iz ugovorov na *Meditacije* in odgovorov nanje je povzet po delovnem prevodu besedila, ki ga je opravil Kajetan Škraban. V primerih, ko njegov prevod modificiram, to izrecno omenjam. V tem primeru frazo *per cuius immediatam perceptionem* prevaja z »po neposrednem dojetju«, medtem ko jo sam slovenim kot »po neposredni zaznavi«, da bi tako ohranil širši pomen, ki ga je imel glagol »zaznavati« v 17. stoletju, kar med drugim nakazuje nestrinjanje med Malebranchem in Arnauldovom.

filozofiji Thomasa Reida in jo danes imenujemo *posredni realizem* ali *representacionalizem*, je še v začetku druge polovice 20. stoletja predstavljala vsaj določen vidik interpretacije Descartesove teorije idej. Anthony Kenny v delu *Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy* (Kenny 1968) na primer trdi, da Descartes ideje včasih razume kot *objekte*, včasih kot *dejanja percepcije*. Podobno delitev najdemo v članku Roberta McRaeja »‘Idea’ as a Philosophical Term in the Seventeenth Century« (prim. 1965).

122 V delih večinoma mlajših avtorjev (Nadlerja, Yoltona, Cooka, Coste, Lennona in drugih) opisana interpretacija, ki idejo razume kot *dejansko prisoten objekt*, različen od *zaznave*, popolnoma odpade. Pomembno je, da je bil povod za to ravno ponovno soočenje z Arnauldovim delom, predvsem z *VFI*. Misel Antoina Arnaulda je bila namreč dolgo časa deležna iste interpretacije kot Descartesova teorija: predvsem po Reidu Arnauld predstavlja predstavnika objektne teorije ideje, ki idej sicer ne pojmuje kot neposrednih objektov naše duše, postavljenih v božji razum, kot to stori Malebranche, temveč kot specifične objektne modifikacije duha, ki omogočajo reprezentacijo, do katerih se dostopa prek drugih operativnih modifikacij (zaznav objekta-ideje). Po tej logiki problema *narave idej*, v katerem naj bi se soočila Malebranche in Arnauld, v bistvu ni. Oba namreč tako kot Descartes posedujeta isto teorijo idej kot objektov, ločenih od zaznave. Edina razlika med Descartesom ter Arnauld, na eni strani, in Malebranchem, na drugi strani, je tako *mesto ideje*, duh namesto Boga.

Da se je interpretacija spremenila, opazimo že v omenjenem McRaejevem članku (Mcrae 1965, 175): ko slednji znotraj Descartesa ločuje različne opredelitve ideje, Arnauldovo razumevanje Descartesa izenači s *teorijo idej kot dejanj*, ki jo strogo loči od vseh, ne le od Malebrancheve teocentrične objektne konceptualizacije. Po objavi prvega članka leta 1974, Cook leto kasneje objavi »The Alleged Ambiguity of ‘Idea’ in Descartes’ Philosophy«, v katerem spodbija objektno interpretacijo Descartesove teorije idej. V 6. opombi izrecno zapiše: »Prepričan sem, da bi bila arnauldovska interpretacija Descartesa pogostejša, če bi bil na voljo angleški prevod Arnauldovih *Des vraies et des fausses idées*.« (Cook 1975, 93) Nato leta 1987 izda še članek z naslovom »Descartes’ Alleged Representationalism« (Cook 1987), v katerem argumente proti objektni interpretaciji Arnaulda preprosto prenese na Descartesa in na način dejavne

teorije idej razloži vsa tista mesta, ki bi jih bilo mogoče interpretirati v smeri objektne teorije. Skoraj identične interpretacije najdemo v članku Michaela J. Coste »What Cartesian Ideas Are Not« (Costa 1983) iz leta 1983, v Yoltonovih študijah razvoja teorije zaznave v 17. in 18. stoletju (predvsem *Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid* iz leta 1984) ter nazadnje v Nadlerjevi *Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas* iz leta 1989, najbolj sistematični obravnavi Arnauldove teorije idej (Nadler 1989).

Vsa ta besedila so si enotna v tezi: Arnauld ni imel objektne teorije idej, temveč je ideje enačil z *dejanji zaznave* (*perceptions*), ki zavoljo svoje inherentne strukture vsebujejo zmožnost reprezentacije. Nič manj kakor za Arnaulda to ne velja za Descartesa. Arnauldovo teorijo idej se je tako začelo obravnavati kot edini zvesti prikaz Descartesove teorije. Od tod sledi, da lahko iz branja njegovih del vzemo tisto, kar je bilo v Descartesovi filozofiji zapisano zgolj na impliciten način. Z drugimi besedami: spremenjena interpretacija Arnaulda nam omogoča boljše branje odklonov v Malebranchevem primeru.

Zaradi obsežnosti problema bo v pričujočem besedilu obravnavan le eden od vidikov merodajnosti Arnauldove interpretacije Descartesa. Ta ozir 123 bo predstavljal osnovo za obravnave vseh naslednjih problemov, ki bodo postali predmet novih besedil, med drugim obravnave problema narave idej. Tako Descartes kot kasneje Arnauld in Malebranche so si enotni v kritiki sholastičnega procesa odkrivanja resnice, ki naj bi brez reda na zmedenih idejah, povzetih iz čutov, in na splošnih pojmih brez vsebine zgradil krhko zgradbo vednosti, polno konceptualnih himer. V skladu s temeljnim nagibom 17. stoletja mu zoperstavijo svoje metodično razreševanje problemov. Ko Arnauld Malebranchu očita, da svojo vednost snuje na predsodkih iz otroštva (Arnauld 2011, 58), da so njegovi pojmi navadne himere (ibid., 57), da se ne drži reda, ko ni najprej pozoren na to, kar se odvija v njegovem lastnem duhu (ibid., 48) in podobno, v bistvu ne trdi ničesar drugega kakor to, da mu očita nemetodičnost.

Članek si bo zato za nalogo zadal, da prikaže, kako je Arnauld problem lažnosti Malebranchevih *êtres représentatifs* zastavil v skladu z Descartesovo lastno logiko postavljanja znanstvenih problemov, v skladu z njegovo metodo.

Preostanek besedila bo tako vseboval obravnavo metodološkega razloga, ki omogoči, da pride do formiranja problema nejasnosti Descartesove opredelitve

narave idej. Ta razlog bo povezan z dvojico *analize* in *sinteze*, ki jo navede v odgovoru na Mersennovo prošnjo po geometričnem prikazu *Meditacij*. Pokazalo se bo, da se Arnauld Descartesovih metodoloških razmislekov zaveda in da jim v svoji kritiki Malebrancha zvesto sledi, ko osnovo izpeljav *VFI* podvrže dvojni *sintetični organizaciji*: sintetične navedbe temeljnih metodoloških pravil, deduciranih tekom analitičnega sosledja odkritij *Meditacij*, in sintetične navedbe temeljnih ugotovitev *Meditacij*. Na podlagi te dvojne sintetične navedbe bo celotno problemsko polje idej razčlenil na določene, med seboj neodvisne problemske sklope in v skladu z Descartesovimi lastnimi načeli proizvedel okvir raziskave, ki bi se ga morala držati vsaka nadaljnja analiza Descartesove teorije idej, zavezana k cilju imanentne razlage Descartesove misli. Pokazali bomo torej, da Arnauld kritiko Malebrancheve teorije izvaja na isti način, kot bi jo izvedel Descartes, ko bi bil leta 1683 še živ.

Metodološki pogoji možnosti problema narave idej

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Preden se spustimo k Descartesovemu besedilu, najprej opravičimo merodajnost preučevanja relacij metodološke odklonskosti/doktrinarnosti kot osnove za interpretacijo razmerij znotraj kartezijske paradigme. Zakaj je Arnauldova metodološka zvestoba pomemben člen v njegovi kritiki Malebrancheve teorije idej? Odgovor na to je dokaj preprost. Kot je večkrat zapisal Thomas M. Lennon, avtor angleškega prevoda *Recherche*, je navedeno besedilo v svojem bistvu Malebrancheva razprava o metodi (Lennon 1997, xii; Lennon 2000, 8). Knjiga je, najprej, podnaslovljena »*Où l'on traite de la nature de l'esprit de l'homme et de l'usage qu'il en doit faire pour éviter l'erreur dans les sciences*«, iz česar lahko v kombinaciji z naslovom sklenemo, da Malebranche cilj besedila, tj. odkritje resnice, pogojuje s predhodno raziskavo narave človeškega duha in iz nje sledečih oblik zmot, ki nam onemogočajo dostop do resnice.

In res v četrtem poglavju prve knjige naletimo na sicer klasično kartezijsko tezo, ki razliko med voljo kot virom sodb in preostalimi zmožnostmi človeškega duha najde v inherentni povezavi volje z resnico in zmoto, ki v ostalih zmožnostih umanjka. Malebranche piše: »kolikor je natančno rečeno edini vzrok zmote sicer res le slaba raba svobode, kljub temu lahko rečemo, da

imamo veliko zmožnosti, ki so vzroki naših zmot, ne resnični vzroki temveč vzroki, ki se jim lahko reče *okazionalni*» (*Recherche*, 145; OC I, 65). S tem v bistvu ponovi klasično Descartesovo tezo iz *Tretje meditacije*, po kateri so ideje in strasti na sebi indiferentne do resnice, saj nam kot gole fenomenalne danosti bodisi zgolj kažejo stvari bodisi tvorijo naše občutke in tako ne trdijo niti tega, da so stvari res takšne, kot jih zaznamo, niti da res bivajo. Volja po drugi strani počne točno to, ko bodisi poda bodisi odkloni soglasje vsebini, ki ga priskrbijo druge zmožnosti: razum, imaginacija, čuti, nagibi in strasti. Vsaka izmed njih s svojo specifično notranjo organizacijo omogoča specifično vrsto preuranjenih sodb ali zmot v pravem pomenu besede. Od tod sledi načrt dela: Malebranche najprej poda pet poglavij namenjenih zmotnim sodbam, ki slede iz napačnega razumevanja specifičnih funkcij različnih človeških zaznavnih in praktičnih zmožnosti – čutov, imaginacije in čistega razuma ter nagibov in strasti. »Kajti nujno je, da duh najprej občuti svoje šibkosti in zmote, da prejme pravilno željo po tem, da se jih osvobodi.« (ibid., 146; OC I, 66) Potem ko Malebranche bralca pouči o človeških zmožnostih in ga osvobodi predsodkov, mu v šestem in zadnjem poglavju besedila poda »občo metodo, ki vodi v iskanju resnice« (ibid., 148; OC I, 68). Predsodkov pa se bo človek osvobodil, če se bo držal *občega pravila*, po katerem sme popolno soglasje »podati le propozicijam, ki se kažejo kot tako evidentno resnične, da jih ne moremo zavriniti, ne da bi čutili notranjo bolečino in skrite očitke uma« (ibid., 135; OC I, 55). Z drugimi besedami: popolno soglasje naj poda le jasnemu in razločnemu spoznanju. Program Malebranchevega prvenca je torej v njegovi strukturi metodološki program, ki je v marsičem osnovan na Descartesovi ideji metode, zaradi česar je metodološka relacija med Arnauld in Descartesom torej primerna kot temelj preučevanja relacij med vsemi tremi.

Zakaj je metodološki vidik odnosa med Descartesom in Arnauld pomemben za vprašanje narave idej? Začnimo z dodatnim vprašanjem: kaj je cilj, ki si ga v *Meditacijah* zastavlja Descartes? Odgovor je metafizična dedukcija matematičnega značaja kartezijske fizike. To je razvidno iz podnaslova *Meditacij*: »v katerih je dokazano bivanje božje in različnost človeške duše in telesa«. Descartes bo namreč matematični značaj resnične fizike lahko vzpostavil, če bo dokazal geometrično bistvo materije. To pa bo lahko storil le, če bo idejo materije popolnoma ločil od ideje duše, jo izenačil

s čisto geometrično razsežnostjo in nato dokazal, da oblikovane ideje izražajo dejansko naravo stvarnosti. Fiktivna hipoteza varljivega duha ga je namreč primorala v to, da je pod vprašaj postavil veljavnost vseh idej, celo jasnih in razločnih. Problem je razrešen z dokazom božjega bivanja kot garanta intrinzične resničnosti vse realnosti. Cilj je torej *znanstven* ali *ontološki* v smislu določitve teorije substanc.

Kaj so torej pogoji uresničitve programa? Naštejmo jih *v vrstnem redu*, ki ga ugledamo v *Meditacijah*: gotovost lastnega obstoja kot čiste misli, tj. kot pogoja obstoja *idej*; oblikovanje jasnih in razločnih *idej* duha in telesa ter od tod izpeljana *ideja* jasnosti in razločnosti kot kriterija resničnosti naših *idej*; dokaz Boga prek *ideje* Boga, od koder sledi utemeljitev veljavnosti kriterija jasnih ter razločnih *idej* in nazadnje dokaz veljavnosti naših senzoričnih *idej* v razmerju do vprašanja obstoja različnih teles.

126 Razkrile so se nam tri karakteristike dokaza kot celote: dokazi posamičnih členov so postavljeni v določen vrstni red; vsi se izvedejo prek rabe idej; narava ideje ni eden izmed problemov, ki ga je potrebno razrešiti, da je cilj *Meditacij* izpolnjen. Kot na številnih mestih opozori Steven Nadler, Descartesov sistem, ne glede na določitev narave idej, trči ob skeptične probleme, ki sledijo iz hipoteze varljivega duha. Mar so narave stvari res takšne, kot jih umevamo (problem veljavnosti jasnih in razločnih idej); mar stvari, ki jih umevamo kot obstoječe, dejansko obstajajo (problem veljavnosti čutil)?⁴ To so epistemološki problemi. Problem narave ideje je ontološki in se izraža v vprašanju: ali gre v primeru idej za dejanja ali objekte? Očitalo bi se nam namreč lahko, da je Descartes idejo definirjal in da si zastavljamo vprašanje, ki ga ni, saj ga je Descartes že razrešil. Odgovarjamo, da je to storil le v določeni meri. Res je, da je podal definicije vseh njenih aspektov. Poleg *definicije ideje* iz odgovorov na druge ugovore, ki smo jo že navedli, tako sledi še *definicija predmetne realnosti ideje* kot »bitnost[i] stvari, ki jo ideja predstavlja

4 Najbolj jedrnat izrek teze najdemo v članku »The Doctrine of Ideas« iz leta 2006: »Zdi se mi, da je vprašanje ali so Descartesove ideje objekti ali dejanja duha epistemološko gledano irelevantno. Descartes se mora, ne glede na to, kaj ideje ontološko so, soočiti z glavnim skeptičnim vprašanjem, ki si ga je zastavil v *Meditacijah*: kako naj ve, v kolikšni meri je način, kako se mu stvari na svetu kažejo (bodisi v matematiki bodisi v katerikoli drugi znanosti), skladen s tem, kar dejansko so?« (Nadler 2006, 90–91.) Daljšo razlago najdemo v knjigi *Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas* (prim. Nadler 1989, 131–136; 138).

[*entitatem rei repraesentae*], kolikor je v ideji« (AT VII, 161; CSM II, 113). Gre za to, da Descartes ni podal definicije razmerja med dvema nujnima aspektoma ideje in je tako omogočil, da je mesta mogoče interpretirati na tri načine, kot smo pokazali v prejšnjem poglavju: nekonsistentna teorija (McRae, Kenny), objektna teorija (Malebranche, Reid), teorija dejanj (Arnauld in domala vsa moderna interpretacija). Ko govorimo o naravi idej, mislimo le obliko problema, kakor ga poznamo od kratkega stika med Malebranchem in Arnauldovom dalje.

Manko analize narave idej je mogoče razložiti, če se osredotočimo na prvo izmed treh opazk, na *vrstni red problemov*. Na koncu *Drugih ugovorov* Descartes prejme prošnjo, da bi

[...] na koncu vaših razrešitev naših ugovorov najprej postavili nekaj definicij, postulatov in aksiomov, nato pa dokaz izpeljali po geometrijski metodi, v kateri ste tako izvedeni, tako da boste napolnili duha vsakega izmed bralcev, ko bo tako rekoč z enim samim uvidom dojel vaše delo. (AT VII, 128 CSM II, 92.)

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V odgovoru, naslovljenem *Argumenti, ki dokazujejo obstoj Boga in razloček med dušo in telesom, urejeni po geometrijski metodi* (odslej *Geometrični prikaz Meditacij*), Descartes zatrdi, da se je geometrične metode v *Meditacijah* že poslužil ter najprej vpelje distinkcijo med *redom* in *metodo dokazovanja*, pri čemer slednjo razdeli na *analitično* in *sintetično*. Beseda »red« označuje »le to, da mora biti to, kar je navedeno najprej, spoznano brez vsakršne pomoči tega, kar sledi; preostalo pa mora biti razvrščeno tako, da je dokazano le na osnovi tega, kar je navedeno prej« (AI VII, 155; CSM II, 110). Jasno je, da se takšnemu redu ne more izogniti nobena k resnici stremeča metoda. Bistvo problema odsotnosti obravnave narave idej je torej v različni metodi. Descartes zapiše, da se je v *Meditacijah* poslužil analize ter o njej poreče, da

[...] kaže pravo pot, po kateri je bila neka stvar odkrita metodično in tako rekoč *a priori* [*per quam res methodice & tanuquam a priori inventa est*], tako da jo bo bralec, če ji želi slediti in biti dovolj pozoren na vse, razumel enako popolno in jo napravil za svojo, kakor če bi jo bil odkril sam. (AT VII, 155; CSM II, 110.)

Analiza je torej metoda odkritja, vodilo, ki v skladu z redom omogoča napredovanje k novim spoznanjem. Lahko razumemo, zakaj se sosledje analitičnih gotovosti začne s *cogitom* in se v nadaljevanju vedno posluži njegovih idej, od katerih kot od učinkov preide do njihovih vzrokov. Resnica *cogita* je bila namreč prva, ki jo je v pogojih vladavine univerzalnega dvoma lahko z gotovostjo odkril. Ideje, prisotne v njegovem mišljenju, pa so bile zavoljo zanikanja neduhovne stvarnosti edino možno sredstvo dokaza stvari zunaj njega. Skupaj na tej točki tvorita meje polja poznanega. To odkritje vedno poseduje točno določen obseg. V odgovorih na druge ugovore Descartes o spoznanju *cogita* zapiše, da je

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[...] to nek prvotni spoznatek [*prima notio*], ki ga nismo izpeljali iz nobenega silogizma; in tudi, ko kdo reče: »Jaz mislim, torej sem ali obstajam,« obstoja ne izpelje iz misli s pomočjo silogizma, ampak stvar prepozna kot takorekoč samo po sebi spoznatno s preprostim uvidom duha [*mentis intuitu*], kot je to očitno iz dejstva, da bi moral, če bi ta spoznatek izpeljal s pomočjo silogizma, prej vedeti, da je resnična višja premisa »vse tisto, kar misli, je ali obstaja«; toda vse prej se o njem pouči tako, da pri sebi izkusi, da se ne bi moglo zgoditi, da bi mislil, če ne bi obstajal. Narava našega duha je namreč takšna, da izoblikuje splošne propozicije iz spoznavanja posebnih. (AT VII 140-141, CSM 100.)

Bolj kot metoda dokazovanja je analiza torej metoda odkritja. Ne uporablja silogizmov, temveč začenja s posebnimi dognanji, od katerih prehaja do oblikovanja sicer vedno implicitno prisotnih aksiomov ali splošnih propozicij. Prej namreč spoznamo, da kot misleči sami gotovo obstajamo, kot pa da »vse tisto, kar misli, je ali obstaja« (ibid.). Isto relacijo lahko najdemo med gotovostjo *cogita* ter splošnim pravilom jasnosti in razločnosti idej kot kriterijem gotovosti. Preden z gotovostjo trdimo, da je »resnično vse tisto, kar dojemam zelo jasno in razločno« (Descartes 1988, 66; AT VII, 35; CSM, 24), namreč spoznamo, da uvid (*intuitio*) naše eksistencialne gotovosti poleg evidentnosti vsebuje karakteristiko jasnosti in razločnosti. Merodajnost formalno praznega kriterija jasnosti in razločnosti bo namreč izpeljana iz gotovosti uvida.

Analitičnega postopka zato ne pričinja navedba sklopa štirih metodoloških pravil, ki jih najdemo v *Razpravi o metodi*. Prvo pravilo ni nič drugega kot pravilo jasnosti in razločnosti, ki je v *Meditacijah* deducirano iz uvida gotovosti *cogita*. Drugo, tj. zahteva, da vsak problem razčleni na najmanjše možne člene, je njegova nujna posledica: jasnost in razločnost namreč nista nič drugega kot razčlenitev, zaris meja. Tretje, da bo od enostavnega in lažje spoznavnega prehajal k kompleksnejšem, ni nič drugega kot evidentnost reda (Descartes 2007, 31; AT VI, 18-19; CSM I, 120). Metodološka pravila so namreč rezultat analize in ne njena osnova. Izpeljana pa bodo zgolj pod pogojem, da bodo za nadaljnjo veriženje končnega odkritja nujno potrebna. Vedno gre namreč za rešitev določenega problema, ki potrebuje le določena sredstva. Ta je v *Meditacijah* utemeljitev geometričnega značaja fizike. Descartes zato odstavek, ki definira analizo, zaključí z naslednjimi besedami: »Pogosto se tudi zgodi, da se ta pot [analize] mnogih stvari, ker so te dovolj pozornemu bralcu pač očitne, komajda dotakne, čeprav bi bilo nanje treba posebej opozoriti.« (AT VII, 156, CSM II, 110.)

To pomeni, da bodo določena možna dognanja preprosto neizpeljana, ker to za rešitev problema ni nujno. Resničnost propozicije, po kateri »je resnično vse tisto, kar dojemam zelo jasno in razločno« (Descartes 1988, 66; AT VII, 35; CSM, 24), je namreč nujna za potrditev objektivne veljavnosti jasnih in razločnih idej duha in telesa. Narava idej ni takšen problem. Pokazali smo namreč, da so skeptični, tj. epistemološki problemi neodvisni od ontološkega statusa idej. Rešitev ontološkega problema idej je v Descartesovem besedilu v najboljšem primeru vsebovana na impliciten način, ker njena eksplikacija za razrešitev ontološkega problema substanc ni potrebna. Poleg tega lahko dokažemo, da je Descartes karakteristike ideje, razkritje katerih je za izvedbo celotnega dokaza realne razlike med duhom in telesom dejansko potrebno, uvrstil med tiste, ki so pozornemu bralcu *dovolj očitne*, da se jih lahko Descartes *komajda dotakne*. Ko trdi, da se mu ideje prikazujejo kot »nekakšne podobe stvari« (Descartes 1988, 67; AT VII, 42; CSM II, 29), od koder sledi, da potrebujejo zunanji vzrok, ki vsebuje najmanj takšno formalno realnost, kot je v njih predmetne (*ibid.*), se v iskanju spoznavnega razloga obeh tez skliče na *naravno luč*, metaforo samorazvidnosti (*ibid.*). Ker večina bralcev po Descartesovih kriterijih očitno ni bila *dovolj pozorna*, se je vprašanje narave idej kasneje pojavilo v številnih

izmed ugovorov, ki jih lahko pripišemo sholastični in empiristični naravi filozofij njihovih piscev: Caterus (AT VII, 92–94; CSM 66–68), Hobbes (AT VII, 179–180; CSM II, 126–127), Gassendi. Njihov rezultat je bil na koncu predvsem to, da je bralce dodatno zmedel.

Toliko o *analizi*. Premaknimo se k *sintezi*. O njej Descartes zapiše:

Narobe pa sinteza rabi nasprotno pot in se poslužuje tako rekoč raziskovanja *a posteriori* [...], da jasno dokaže svoje sklepe in pri tem rabi dolgo vrsto definicij, postulatov, aksiomov, teoremov in problemov, tako da v primeru, da kdo zanika katerega izmed sklepov, metoda nemudoma pokaže, da je ta sklep vsebovan že v predhodnih izjavah [...]. Vendar nas ta pot ne zadovolji tako kakor prva in ne zadošča ukaželjnim duhovom, saj ne pouči o načinu, po katerem je bila stvar odkrita. (AT VII, 156; CSM II, 110-111.)

130 Sinteza torej nasprotno od analize ni pot, ki bi pokazala, kako smo neko stvar odkrili, temveč dognanja analize razvrsti v skladu z organizacijo temeljnih, tj. splošnih aksiomov, postulatov in definicij, iz katerih na osnovi silogistične logike izpelje sklepe o singularnih stvareh. Namesto za metodo odkritja gre torej za *a posteriori* izvedeno metodo dokaza. Kot Descartes poudari v *Razpravi o metodi*, »silogizmi in večina drugih pravil v logiki bolj rabijo temu, da z njimi drugim ljudem pojasnujemo nekaj, kar že vemo« (Descartes 2007, 31; AT VI, 17; CSM I, 17). V silogistično zaznamovani sintezi torej ne gre za to, da odkrijemo novo vednost, temveč da drugim dokažemo tisto, kar že vemo. Pot se zato v tem primeru ne začne s *cogitom*, temveč s trditvijo, da je resnično vse tisto, kar dojemam jasno in razločno. Metodološka pravila in temeljni aksiomi zato v tem primeru niso rezultat dedukcije, temveč njen začetek. V *Geometričnem prikazu Meditacij* zato najdemo definicijo misli, ideje in predmetne realnosti.

Arnauld se je ločnice med analizo in sintezo zelo dobro zavedal.⁵ Navsezadnje so *Odgovori na četrte ugovore* poleg *Geometričnega prikaza Meditacij* edino mesto znotraj *Meditacij*, kjer Descartes omeni »analitični način pisanja, ki sem mu sledil« (AT VII, 249; CSM II, 173).

5 O problemu kartezijanske metode pri Arnauldu prim.: Nadler 1989, 34–40.

A to je le indikacija. Neizpodbiten dokaz najdemo v drugem poglavje četrte knjige *Logike*, naslovljenem »Dve vrsti metode, analiza in sinteza. Primer analize«. Če je kasnejši *VFI* ena najboljših razlag Descartesove teorije idej, metodološka poglavja *Logike* predstavljajo eno preglednejših razlag Descartesove metodologije, ki nam pod luč postavijo postopek, ki ga bo Arnauld kasneje uporabil proti Malebranchu. Pisca takoj na začetku zapišeta:

Obstajata torej dve vrsti metode, ena za odkrivanje resnice, ki jo poznamo kot *analizo*, ali kot *metodo razčlenitve* [*méthode de résolution*], in ki jo lahko okličemo *metoda odkritja* [*méthode d'invention*]. Druga je namenjena pojasnjevanju že odkrite resnice drugim. Ta je poznana kot *sinteza* ali *metoda kompozicije* [*méthode de composition*] in ji lahko prav tako rečemo *metoda poučevanja* [*méthode de doctrine*]. (Arnauld in Nicole 1992, 281–282.)

Razlika med *méthode d'invention* in *méthode de doctrine* se sklada z Descartesovo ločnico v *Geometričnem prikazu Meditacij*. Poleg tega ni enostavna parafraza. Medtem ko se Descartes zapleta in najprej obe metodi razglasi za metodi dokazovanja, pisca *Logike* takoj na začetku, brez vsake dvomnosti, določi resnično funkcijo vsake izmed obeh metod.

Ne glede na to, kaj je predmet analize, gre v njej vedno za to, da iz nečesa *znanega* najdemo nekaj *neznanega*. Pogoja takšnega iskanja sta *določitev pogojev odkritja neznanega* in *raziskava znanega*. V primeru neznanega je treba najprej »jasno in razločno umeti, po čem sploh sprašujemo, tj. kaj točno je smisel vprašanja« (Arnauld in Nicole 1992, 283). To nepoznano »je potrebno določiti s specifičnimi pogoji«, ki nas prisilijo, da »raziščemo eno stvar in ne druge, in ki nam bojo, ko jo najdemo, omogočili, da jo prepoznamo« (ibid.). Za odkritje neznanega ne smemo po nepotrebnem dodajati pogojev za razrešitev problema, ki v njem niso implicirani, in ne izpuščati tistih, ki so v problemu nujno vsebovani. Kot smo že večkrat pokazali, bi bil primer takšnega nepotrebne dodajanja pogojev razrešitve problema matematičnega statusa kartezijanske fizike obravnava narave idej izvedena na ravni debate med Malebranchem in Arnauldom.

Nadalje je potrebna obravnava znanega. Ne smemo namreč predpostavljati, da »moramo odkriti neko novo vrsto bitja, temveč da lahko naša luč seže le tako daleč, da prepozna le to, da je iskana stvar na tak ali drugačen način udeležena [*participe en telle et telle manière*] v stvareh, ki jih poznamo« (ibid., 285). Celotna umetnost analize je v tem, da iz obravnave tega znanega »potegne številne resnice, ki nas peljejo k spoznanju tistega, kar iščemo« (ibid.). Takšen primer znanega je *cogito* in njegove *ideje*, ki ga Arnauld sam večkrat poda kot temelj vseh znanosti: v začetku četrth ugovorov je navdušen nad tem, da je Descartes tako kot Avguštin lastno misel postavil za temelj svoje filozofije (AT VII, 197; CSM II, 139), kot uvod v svoje *postulate*, ki jih navaja proti Malebranchevi teoriji idej kot *êtres représentatifs, distingués des perceptions*, pa poprosi

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[...] da vsak izvede natančno refleksijo [*sérieuse réflexion*] tega, kar se odvija v njegovem duhu, ko spoznava različne stvari, opazujoč vse to, kar bo opazil z enostavnim uvidom [*par une simple vue*], ne da bi sklepal ali iskal primerjave vzete iz telesnih reči, in naj se ustavi le pri tem, kar bo videl kot tako gotovo, da o tem ne bo mogel dvomiti. (Arnauld 2011, 70.)

Predviden rezultat teh *réflexiones*, izvedenih na enostavnem uvidu (*simple vue*) *cogita*, bo v tem, da bo vsak v sebi odkril le ideje kot *perceptions* in ne kot *êtres représentatifs*. Vse povedano je popolnoma skladno s tem, kar izreče Descartes.

Po obravnavi značilnosti *analize* in podajanja ponazoritev avtorja preideta do njenega razmerja do *sinteze*.

Najprej navedeta točko ujemanja: obe metodi napredujeta »od tistega, kar je bolj poznano, do tistega, kar je manj poznano; saj ni nobene pravilne [*vraie*] metode, ki bi se lahko izognila temu pravilu« (Arnauld in Nicole 1992, 286). Ne gre za nič drugega kot za parafrazo Descartesove ideje reda.

V drugi točki zapišeta, da se analiza od sinteze razlikuje v tem, da

[...] v njej poznane stvari povzamemo iz preučevanja posamične stvari [*vérités connues dans l'examen particulier de la chose*], ki jo želimo spoznati, in ne iz bolj splošnih stvari, kot to storimo v metodi poučevanja [*méthode*]

de doctrine]. Prav tako v primeru, ki smo ga ponudili, ne začenjamo prek vzpostavitve teh občin maksim [*maximes générales*]: da nobena substanca ne propade zares; da to, čemur rečemo uničenje, ni drugega kot uničenje delcev; ... temveč se postopoma povzpne do teh občin spoznanj [*connaissances générales*]. (Ibid., 286–287.)

V tretji točki pravita, da teh *maximes claires et évidentes* ne uporabimo, razen »v primeru, ko jih potrebujemo, medtem ko jih tu [v sintezi] vzpostavimo najprej« (ibid., 287). Problem narave ideje je očitno eden izmed takšnih primerov, prav tako kot njihov izvor.

V četrti točki trdita, da se analiza in sinteza ne razlikujeta drugače, »kot se pot, ki jo opravimo med vzpenjanjem z doline na goro, od tiste, ki jo naredimo med spustom z gore v dolino« (ibid.). Analiza in sinteza se razlikujeta kot dve smeri genealogije določene osebe, prednika katere želimo poiskati. V analizi se od sina do sina spustimo k odkritju neznanega očeta, medtem ko v sintezi od očeta napredujemo po sosledju potomcev. Isto počnemo v znanostih, »kjer, potem ko se poslužimo analize, da odkrijemo neko resnico, uporabimo drugo metodo, da razložimo tisto, kar smo našli« (ibid.).

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Nazadnje zapišeta, da analiza bolj kot v »določenih pravilih« obstaja v »razsojanju in v spretnosti duha« (ibid.), in kot uporabna navedeta metodološka pravila iz *Razprave o metodi*.

V naslednjem poglavju četrte knjige, namenjene sintezi ali *méthode de doctrine*, navedeta pravila formiranja *definicij, aksiomov* in *dokazov*, ki jih lahko za naše potrebe zvedemo na tri točke: naj definicije ne bodo dvoumne; naj bodo aksiomi zares evidentni; naj dokazi temeljijo le na nedvoumnih definicijah in neizpodbitno gotovih aksiomih (ibid., 288–290). To je pomembno, saj kritika Malebrancheve dvoumne rabe temeljnih pojmov predstavlja najzajetnejši del Arnauldove *VFI*. Pred obravnavo vsake teze tako najdemo uvodno poglavje, v katerem Arnauld pokaže, da je Malebranche v prvih dveh knjigah *Recherche* (o čutni zaznavi in o *imaginaciji*) idejo razumel kot *perception* ali kot *modification de l'âme*, v drugem delu tretje knjige kot *être représentatif*. Ko beremo zrelejša Malebrancheva dela, takšnih ekvivokacij ni več. Povedano kaže, da sta Arnauld in Nicole v celoti povzela Descartesov nauk o metodi in določene teze, ki smo jih pri Descartesu izpeljali sami, eksplicitno formulirala.

Vrnimo se k idejam. V skladu s kartezijsko metodo Arnauld v prvem delu *Logike*, posvečenem idejam, teoretsko polje razdeli na pet glavnih problemov: na naravo in izvor idej; na različnost reprezentiranih objektov; na njihovo enostavnost in sestavljenost; na njihov obseg in zamejitev; na njihovo jasnost ali temnost, razločnost ali zmedenost (ibid., 34). Sami bi dodali še večkrat omenjeni problem resničnosti idej.

134 Vidimo, da je Arnauld že v *Logiki* iz leta 1662, približno dve desetletji pred začetkom spopadov z Malebranchem, posedoval zelo jasno predstavo strukture problemskega polja idej. Vedel je, da se problem narave idej razlikuje od problema njihove jasnosti in razločnosti. Razrešitev problema narave idej je torej neodvisna od tega, ali so ideje razločne ali nerazločne. Prav tako vidi, da problem razločnosti idej ni istoveten s problemom njihovega izvora: če je res, da so v kartezijski filozofiji ravno »pridobljene« ideje temne in nerazločne, problema zato še nista ista. Gre le za to, da razrešitev dveh različnih problemov doprinese k skupni osvetlitvi iste stvarnosti. Na enak način mora biti, kot bo Arnauld večkrat emfatično opozoril v *VFI*, problem narave idej razrešen brez vsakršnega sklicevanja na njihov izvor. Ali je ideja vrojena, pridobljena ali ustvarjena, je za njeno naravo irelevantno (Arnauld 2011, 50; 56; 78; 80; 214–224).

Kljub jasnemu uvidu v odnose med razčlenjenimi problemi, pa med 1662 in 1683 opazimo očitno razliko. V poglavju »O idejah glede na njihovo naravo in izvor« namreč ne preberemo ničesar, česar ne bi našli v *Meditacijah*. Pisca začneta z razmejitvijo ideje od podob, naslikanih v imaginaciji, in pokažeta, da imamo lahko idejo marsičesa, česar si ne moremo predstavljati (referenca na primer tisočotnika iz Šeste meditacije in odgovore Hobbesu); trdita, da je ideja »vse, kar je v duhu, ko lahko resnično rečemo, da umevamo neko stvar, kakorkoli jo umemo« (Arnauld in Nicole 1992, 35), in da omogoča razumevanje vsega, kar izrečemo (spet referenca na odgovore Hobbesu in na definicijo ideje v *Geometričnem prikazu Meditacij*); prikaz se konča s kritiko empiristične teze o čutnem izvoru vseh idej, naperjeno proti celotni empiristični tradiciji. V poglavju skratka ni ničesar, česar ne bi našli v Descartesovem delu. Ne najdemo nobene dodatne razlage, nikakršne nove sistematizacije.

To kaže, da Arnauld leta 1662 ni čutil nobene potrebe, da bi naravo idej dodatno razložil. Glede na to, da ne v prvi ne v drugi seriji ugovorov (*Novae objectiones* iz

1648) – razen problema materialne lažnosti v Četrlih ugovorih in problematizacije teze, da se duh kot misleča stvar zaveda vseh svojih misli – ne zasledimo problema, ki bi bil vezan na ideje, lahko sklepamo, da so Descartesovi odgovori Arnaulda zadovoljili. Ideja je za Arnaulda, kot v *Geometričnem prikazu Meditacij* pravi Descartes, ena tistih stvari, ki so dovolj »pozornemu bralcu pač očitne in se jih sam zato komajda dotakne« (AT VII, 156; CSM II, 110), saj v prvem stavku poglavja o naravi in izvoru idej z Nicolom zapišeta: »Beseda ‚ideja‘ je ena tistih, ki so tako jasne, da jih ne more razložiti nobena druga, saj ni nobene druge bolj jasne in enostavne.« (Arnauld in Nicole 1992, 33.) Nakar leta 1680 Malebranche objavi svojo *Razpravo*, v kateri zapiše, da Bog v nasprotju z janzeistično koncepcijo indiferentnega in vseмогоčnega Boga vse počne v skladu s splošnimi, v njegov um zapisanimi zakoni; da zato kreacija ni najboljša – kot bi lahko bila, če bi Bog vse stvari urejal s posamičnimi ukrepi svoje indiferentne volje –; da celo v svoji milosti ni vedno učinkujoč, obenem pa je tudi tu zamejen s svojo regularnostjo; in da je potemtakem na nek način impotenten.

Kako Malebrancha obravnava Arnauld? Najprej seveda kot avtorja heretičnih tez. V primeru, da ne bi imel teoloških razlogov, ki smo jih navedli v prvem poglavju, nikoli ne bi napisal *VFI*. Kako ga obravnava z metodološkega vidika? Kot kartezijanca, ki se je izneveril odkritjem svojega učitelja. Z drugimi besedami, Descartes je že odkril, kaj ideja je, in Arnauld je to odkritje *naredil za svoje*. Edino, kar mu torej preostane, je, da Malebranchu razloži, kaj ideja zares je, da ga podučí, da uporabi *méthode de doctrine* ali sintezo.

Prvo poglavje *VFI* se zato glasi: »Règles qu'on doit avoir en vue pour chercher la vérité dans cette matière des Idées et en beaucoup d'autres semblables« (Arnauld 2011, 49). V njem pred vsako obravnavo problema poda sklop sedmih *metodoloških vodil*. Navedimo le najpomembnejše.

V *prvem pravilu* zahteva, da »začenjamo z najbolj enostavnimi in najjasnejšimi rečmi, ki so takšne, da v njih ni mogoče dvomiti, kolikor smo na njih pozorni [*pourvu qu'on y fasse attention*]« (ibid., 49). Skratka, naša sklepanja snujmo le na jasnih in razločnih idejah.

V *tretjem pravilu* terja, da »ne iščemo razlogov v neskončnost, temveč da ostanemo pri tistem, za kar vemo, da je narava stvari: ne smemo se spraševati po tem, zakaj je razsežnost deljiva in zakaj je duh zmožen mišljenja, saj je narava razsežnosti, da je deljiva in duha, da misli« (ibid., 49).

V *petem* terja, da »stvari, na katere je potrebno odgovoriti s formalnim vzrokom [*cause formelle*], ne mešamo s tistimi, kjer je potrebno odgovoriti z učinkujočim [*cause efficiente*]« (ibid., 50). Ker formalni vzrok ni nič drugega kot narava neke stvari, omenjena v tretjem pravilu, in učinkujoči vzrok tisto, kar stvar proizvede, lahko v zvezi s problemom idej rečemo, da vprašanja narave idej ne smemo mešati z vprašanjem njihovega izvora.

V šestem terja, da ne »umevamo duhov kot teles in teles kot duhov« (ibid., 50).

136 In, nazadnje, v *sedmem* zahteva, da »bitij ne množimo brez potrebe, kot je v navadi v običajni filozofiji [*Philosophie ordinaire*, tj. v sholastiki]; kot na primer, ko nam različne postavitve in konfiguracije delcev materije ne zadoščajo za tvorbo kamna, zlata, svinca, ognja in vode, ne da bi obstajala še določena substancialna forma kamna, zlata, svinca, ognja in vode, ki bi bila stvarno različna od vseh postavitev in konfiguracij delcev materije, ki si jih lahko zamislimo« (ibid., 51). Z drugimi besedami: v skladu s *tretjim* in četrtnim *pravilom* poznamo naravo duha in poznamo naravo telesa. Ko razlagamo določen pojav, na primer spoznanje materialnih teles ali pa strukturo določenega telesa, si ne izmišljajmo novih narav in razlag ne iščimo v analogijah, pridobljenih iz obravnave substanc drugega tipa, temveč sklepajmo le na osnovi tistega, kar vemo na način enostavnega uvida (*per simple vue*). Takšna nova narava v primeru fizike je substancialna forma, v primeru teorije idej Malebrancheve ideje, tj. *êtres représentatifs, distingués des perceptions*, idejni-objekti predhodni njihovi zaznavi. Videli smo, da je isto zahtevo postavil v *Logiki*, ko je terjal, da pred vsako analizo ali iskanjem neznanega iz tega, kar vemo, preučimo to, kar vemo.

To je prva velika indikacija, da se Arnauld v kritiki Malebrancha ravna v skladu z Descartesovo logiko sosledja analitične in sintetične metode, podano v *Geometričnem prikazu Meditacij* in v *Logiki*. Videli smo že, da v poglavju o naravi in izvoru idej Arnauld in Nicole nista zapisala ničesar, česar ne bi našli v Descartesovih najbolj dostopnih besedilih. Od tod smo sklepali, da se pod Descartesovo teorijo ideje v celoti podpiše. To nas je napeljalo na domnevo, da je edina metoda, ki jo lahko uporabi v spopadu z Malebranchem, sinteza. Ker Descartesova dognanja obravnava kot odkrita, analiza odpade. Da domnevo spremenimo v tezo, potrebujemo dokaze rabe sintetične metode, ki začenja z določenim seznamom definicij, aksiomov in postulatov.

Slednje najdemo v petem poglavju *VFI*, naslovljenem: »Que l'on peut prouver géométriquement la fausseté des Idées, prises pour des êtres représentatifs. Définitions, Axiomes, Demandes, pour servir de principes à ces démonstrations« (ibid., 66). Arnauld v *drugi definiciji* zapiše, da so »misliti, spoznati, zaznati iste stvari«, in v *tretji* zatrdi, da »za isto stvar jemljem idejo objekta in zaznavo objekta« (ibid., 67). *Ideje* so torej *zaznave*. Nakar v *šesti*, nedvomno najbolj pomembni, zatrdi:

Rekel sem, da idejo in zaznavo jemljem za isto stvar. Potrebno pa je opozoriti, da ta stvar, kolikor je sicer ena, poseduje dva odnosa: enega do duše, ki jo modificira, drugega do zaznane reči, kolikor je predmetno v duši; in da beseda *zaznava* bolj neposredno označuje prvi odnos in beseda *ideja* zadnjega. Tako *zaznava* kvadrata bolj neposredno označuje mojo dušo, ko *zaznava* kvadrat, in *ideja* kvadrata bolj neposredno kvadrat, kolikor je *predmetno* v mojem duhu. (Ibid., 67–68.)

Ta opomba je zelo pomembna, ker z njo poudarimo, da »ne gre za dve različne stvari, temveč za eno samo modifikacijo naše duše, ki na bistven način vsebuje dva odnosa« (ibid., 68). Ideja in zaznava sta skratka ena in ista stvar, obravnavana z dveh zornih kotov, eno in isto dejanje, ki stoji v dveh odnosih, v razmerju do duše kot njen modus in v razmerju do reprezentirane stvarnosti kot njena reprezentacija. Arnauld torej na sintetičen način zatrdi: *Dejanja zaznave so reprezentacije in reprezentacije niso objekti zaznave*. Naša teza, da lahko kot zvest Descartesov učenec Malebrancha s svojo teorijo narave ideje napade le sintetično, se je izkazala za pravilno. Skoz Arnauldov tekst tako govori glas njegovega učitelja, ki razlaga samega sebe.

Skratka: Arnauld *VFI* začne z dvojno sintezo, s čimer se v razmerje do Descartesove teorije ne postavi kot nekdo, ki bo odkril novo celino, temveč kot ta, ki jo bo razložil komu, ki ni bil dovolj pozoren na delovanje lastnega duha, najbolj gotovo izmed vseh resnic. Arnauldova kritika Malebrancha je torej Descartesova. Za spopad z Malebranchem je zbral celotno artilerijo kartezijskih odkritij, od metodologije do Descartesovih izrekov o idejah, in lahko rečemo, da bi bil v napadu gotovo uspešen, če bi bil Malebranchev cilj v tem, da Descartesovo teorijo idej ohrani, in ne, da jo kritizira in preobrazi.

V zadnjem poglavju *Recherche* res najdemo marsikatero tezo, ki je neposredno povzeta iz Descartesovega dela, npr. metodološka pravila iz *Regulae* in *Razprave o metodi*. A poleg tega ne najdemo nikakršne opozicije med sintezo in analizo. Pojavi se le zadnja, in še to v smislu moderne matematične discipline in ne kot element dvojca Descartesovih metod. Posledica odsotnosti tega dvojca je obenem, da Malebranche vedno bolj, ko je njegovo delo zrelo, vsekakor pa od *Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion*, tj. od 1688 dalje, opušča *cogito* kot začetno točko analitične vednosti in takoj začenja s splošnimi metafizičnimi aksiomi, ki so bili v Descartesovi in Arnauldovi koncepciji rezultat predhodnega analitičnega odkritja in temelj sintetičnega dokazovanja. Njegov cilj torej ni bila ortodoksna zvestoba Descartesu. Ker je v marsikateri izmed kartezijskih prvin prepoznal tarčo upravičene kritike, se pod večino ortodoksno kartezijskih Arnauldovih definicij Malebranche na koncu preprosto ni podpisal.

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MAX SCHELER'S SOCRATESISM

AN INTRODUCTION OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL NORMATIVE ETHICS

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Abstract

Socrates's question is the starting point of all ethics. In his phenomenological value-personalism, Scheler transformed it to the question: "How 'should' 'I' be and live?" Fundamentally, "I" refers to the person, and "should" means the "ideal ought." Ultimately, "I" as the person should engage in self-becoming towards its own ideal *ordo amoris* and ideal value-essence. In this sense, the end-result of Scheler's material ethics of values is precisely a phenomenological normative ethics, which is neither a

normative ethics in the general sense nor an Aristotelian ethics of virtue, but a more essential ethics of person.

Keywords: person, ideal ought, phenomenology, ethics, M. Scheler.

Sokratizem Maxa Schelerja. Vpeljava fenomenološke normativne etike

Povzetek

Sokratovo vprašanje je izhodišče sleherne etike. V svojem vrednostnem personalizmu ga je Scheler transformiral v vprašanje: »Kako 'naj' bi 'jaz' bil in živel?« V temelju se »jaz« nanaša na osebo, medtem ko »naj« pomeni »idealno najstvo«. »Jaz« kot oseba naj bi se navsezadnje predal samo-postajanju na poti proti idealnemu *ordo amoris* in idealnemu vrednostnemu bistvu. Potemtakem je poslednji rezultat Schelerjeve materialne etike vrednot natanko fenomenološka normativna etika, ki ni niti normativna etika v splošnem smislu niti aristotelovska etika vrline, temveč bolj bistvena etika osebe.

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Ključne besede: oseba, idealno najstvo, fenomenologija, etika, Scheler.

“Socrates’ question, “How should we live?” is the best start point for moral philosophy. It is better than the questions of ‘What is our duty?’ or ‘How may we be good?’ or even ‘How can we be happy?’” (Williams 2006, 4) In Bernard Williams’s view, each of these questions presupposes too much to be answered. This inability contributes to the confusing situation in the contemporary study of moral philosophy or ethics. In Plato’s *Republic*, Socrates said: “All the same, we must look more closely at the matter, since what is at stake is far from insignificant: it is how one should live one’s life.” (Plato 1993, 352d)

In his manuscript, Scheler claimed that: “Ultimately ethics is ‘a damned bloody affair’, and if it can give me no directives concerning *how ‘I’ ‘should’ be and live* now in this social and historical context, then what is it?” (Scheler 1973a, xxxi; emphasis added by the author)¹ This self-reflection could be completely taken as Scheler’s response to Socrates’s question. The unique change from Scheler here is to use the first person “I” in asking Socrates’s question, so that the question now is asking: “how ‘should’ ‘I’ be and live?” This paper will focus on discussing Scheler’s answer to this question, and, on its basis, reveal the potential forms of a phenomenological normative ethics.²

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1 Cf. the German original: Scheler 1980, 591.

2 Scheler’s phenomenological ethics manifests itself, first, as a phenomenology of value and, second, as a phenomenology of person. When viewed in the context of the history of ethical thought, these two parts constitute a style of phenomenological meta-ethics and phenomenological normative ethics, respectively. Specifically, the phenomenological metaethics is concerned with the question “What is good?” and the “foundational question of ethics,” i.e., what is the basis for our answer to the question “What is the good?” (cf. Zhang 2021). Phenomenological normative ethics, on the other hand, is concerned with the “Socrates’ question,” i.e., the question of “how ‘I’ ‘should’ be and live,” as Scheler transformed it. Scheler’s phenomenology of person is the answer to this question, or, rather, the fundamental destination of Scheler’s ethics

I. “Person” and “I” as the form of address

In Scheler’s above-mentioned self-reflection, “I” and “should” are both put in the quotation marks, which means that he is reminding readers to pay attention to these two concepts. Let us focus on the “I” first of all and leave the “should” for the next section to discuss. That is to say, the first thing to think about is: What does the transition of “one” in “how should one live” to “I” in “how should I live” mean?

It is a simple question since Scheler’s guidance has been clear enough. In the “phenomenological” work *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, Scheler did not give up using the “linguistic” analysis. When discussing the problem of the person, Scheler clearly said:

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The use of the word *person* in *language* already reveals that the form of unity meant by this term has nothing to do with the form of unity of the “consciousness”-object of inner perception or consequently the “ego [*Ich*]” (either the “ego” in opposition to a “thou [*Du*]” or the “ego” in opposition to the “outer world”). (Scheler 1973a, 389.)³

Here, Scheler clearly distinguished the *person* from the “ego.” In his opinion, the “ego” in any case is merely the object of inner perception, but the *person* can never be objectified. However, we have another question here. Scheler followed up with an example:

If I say, “I perceive myself”, the “I” [*Ich*] is the form of address, not the psychic ego of experience. “Myself [*mich*]”, however, does not mean “my I”; it does not answer the question of whether I perceive “myself” in an outer or inner fashion. (Scheler 1973a, 390.)⁴

is a response to the Socrates’s question. In that sense, we can propose the notion of “Scheler’s Socratesism.”

3 Cf. Scheler 1980, 389.

4 Cf. Scheler 1980, 389.

Only if we say “I perceive my ego,” does the term *ego* mean the psychic ego of experiences and the object of inner perception.⁵

Putting the difference of these two expressions (“I perceive myself” and “I perceive my ego”) aside, the “I” in them, i.e., the “I” as the subject, essentially is the same. It is a linguistic form of address, an “occasional expression,” and that basically refers to the *person*. The same as in the expressions, such as “I act,” “I go for a walk,” etc., the “I” is only a form of address. Only the person could be the executor of acts. We would never say that an “ego” acts or goes for a walk, for only the person can execute acts and unify the execution of acts. Only the person can perceive the ego or my ego.

Scheler’s discussion here easily reminds us of related themes in contemporary theory of self-consciousness (*Selbstbewußtsein*). The study of contemporary theory of self-consciousness starts from examining the traditional “reflection-model” of self-consciousness. The so-called “reflection-model” of self-consciousness means the ego as subject presents itself as an object. However, such the reflection-model is stuck with a “circular dilemma.” According to D. Henrich, this circular dilemma is embodied in two fundamental difficulties. Firstly, the theory of reflection discusses self-consciousness via the presenting or knowing of the ego as object by the ego of subject, but the presenting “ego-subject” has been presupposed here. If the “ego-subject” has not been conscious of itself, then how could it be possible for the “ego-subject” to turn back upon itself? Therefore, a typical “circle” appears here: the problem to be solved (i.e., self-consciousness) has been actually presupposed at the beginning of the discussion. Secondly, the theory of reflection presupposes that the ego’s cognition of itself is possible only in the way of turning back to itself, and thus it has to presuppose that the “ego-subject,” which knows and turns backward, is identical with the known object-ego, or, rather, presupposes the identity of the act of knowing and what is known. Only in this way can one speak of *self*-consciousness (or one’s own consciousness). But, in order to be aware of this identity, the “I” must have known in advance how to ascribe (*zuschreiben*) to himself

5 Cf. Scheler 1980, 95; 389. Cf. also Scheler 1973a, 76–77; 390.

what happens to him. Therefore, this self-consciousness of self-ascription cannot be the result of reflection, but rather the premise of it. Actually, the reflection model of the traditional theory of self-consciousness, and even any theory of self-consciousness, has presupposed this self-ascription from the very beginning, so that it is stuck in the dilemma of “circle” once again.⁶

146 The above example of “linguistic analysis” in Scheler shows that he actually “*delayed*” or “*restated*” the circular dilemma in the traditional theory of self-consciousness in his own way. For him, traditional self-consciousness does not mean a grasp of an “object I” by a “subject I,” but a grasp of “ego,” the object of inner perception, by “person.” However, he used the expression “my ego” (*mein Ich*) to indicate the object of inner perception, and yet the problem returns: how could this “ego” (*Ich*) be “my” (*mein*)? It is exactly the problem of “self-ascription” in the traditional theory of self-consciousness. Therefore, in this sense, we can say that Scheler merely “delayed” the arising of self-consciousness. From another point of view, however, we can also say that Scheler stated the problem of self-consciousness more clearly. The perception or grasp of “my ego” by the person is actually the grasping of the “object I” by a “subject I” in the traditional sense of self-consciousness. Scheler took it as inner perception, whereby he defined it as the level of “self-cognition” (*Selbsterkenntnis*) as Manfred Frank said. On the other side, in Scheler’s view, the stream of personal lived-experience is originally “I-you indifferent,” and this differentiation or “self-ascription” takes place in the “vortexes” of the stream of lived-experiences.⁷ In other words, the “self-ascription” in itself, or the “self-consciousness” (*Selbstbewußtsein*) in the narrower sense, as Manfred Frank said, is completed right in the stream of personal lived-experiences, a non-objective completion.⁸ Simply, the expression, “I perceive my ego” in Scheler includes two

6 Cf.: Henrich 1966, 193 ff.; Henrich 1982, 62 ff.; Henrich, 1970, 266 ff. For a related discussion, cf. also Zhang 2016.

7 Cf. Scheler 1973c, 240 (English translation: Scheler 1970, 246). For a related discussion, cf. also Zhang 2017.

8 As for the distinction between “self-cognition” (*Selbsterkenntnis*) and “self-consciousness” (*Selbstbewußtsein*), cf. Frank 1991, 6 f.; Frank 2001, 217–242.

levels: non-objective “self-consciousness” and objective “self-cognition,” while according to him the “subject” here belongs to the “person.”

Now we see that the question of “how should I be and live?” is actually asking: “how should the person be and live?” In other words, the possible answer Scheler would give to Socrates’s question is: one should live as a person. What does it mean to live as person? To resolve this problem, we have to make clear what is the person in a moral sense. F. Hammer expressed this question very appropriately as the “individual person’s self-ingathering (*Sammlung*).” “Ingathering” refers to “a concentrated being-in-oneself, or ‘living deeply in oneself’. In such a state our total psychic life, including our past, is grasped as *one* and is effective as *one*.” (Scheler 1973a, 420)¹⁰ Through such ingathering, each experienced life is “present” and “effective” in some way, so we are not empty, but entirely “full” and “abundant” here. Such a “self-ingathering” refers to the expansion of a phenomenology of “having oneself” (*Sichselbsthaben*) (Scheler 1973a, 420),¹¹ or “self-identification” (*Selbstidentifizierung*) as Scheler talked about elsewhere: in the execution of acts, a “self-identification” is taking place at the same time, that is, one attributes or “self-ascribes” this execution of acts to an “executor of acts” (person). It is this “executor of acts” living in each of his acts who permeates every act with his peculiar character. In each present execution of acts, there remains “lived life” made possible by retention. Although the person is not the “lived life,” he lies in each of his present execution of acts and ascribes this “lived life” to himself. Therefore, “self-ingathering” or “self-identification” basically means that, with present acting, the person himself “partakes of” or “participates in” the “halo” (including retention and protention)¹² of this execution of acts, in and through which he lives.¹³ Of course, in *Formalism in Ethics and*

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9 Cf. Hammer, 1972, 226–248. Undoubtedly, “ingatheredness” is an extremely important concept in Scheler’s person theory. Other researchers have noticed that as well (for instance, M. Gabel, H. Leonardy, etc.).

10 Cf. Scheler 1980, 417.

11 Cf. Scheler 1973a, 420; Scheler 1980, 417.

12 Here, the author uses Husserl’s concepts of his phenomenological analysis of inner consciousness of time.

13 Cf. Scheler 1973c. 219 f.; Scheler 1970, 224–225. Cf. also Scheler 1980, 384 f.;

Non-Formal Ethics of Value, this “ingathering” is discussed more in the context of the “self,” but later, in *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, “self-ingathering” is used to discuss the person.

Generally, “self,” “self-consciousness,” or “self-feeling” (*Selbstgefühl*) is in Scheler applied in two ways: on the one hand, they are tied closely to “egoness”;¹⁴ on the other hand, the concept of person itself must be discussed more fundamentally. It is in the latter sense that Scheler said: “let us call this act ‘ingathering’ and let us call, collectively, its goal, ‘concentration on one’s own self’, or the consciousness of the spiritual act-center of itself, ‘self-consciousness’” (Scheler 2009, 29).¹⁵ Since the so-called “spiritual act-center” refers to the person, it is clear that what Scheler talked about here is the self-ingathering or self-consciousness of person.

148 In this sense, the person in a moral sense has the same basic character and function as the self-preserving and self-becoming dynamic subjectivity in D. Henrich. The living process of the so-called “conscious life” in Henrich is presented as a continuous act of self-preservation.¹⁶ Subjectivity would by no means be a static entity that is in opposition to the object, but is present as the activity of “conscious life.”¹⁷ “Person” essentially means a non-objectifying subjectivity, which does not stay in the traditional subject-object model, an uncircumventable (*unhintergebar*) subjectivity as the unity of the execution of specific acts. Thus, the person as person in itself is a “self-ingathering” “halo,” but not a single and static point. “Man” or “I” as the “person” “should” be and live in the form of a “halo,” but not a “point.”

Scheler 1973a, 385–386.

14 In this sense, Scheler said: “The word *person* cannot be applied to every case wherein we *assume* something like animation, egoness, or even consciousness of the existence and value of ego (self-consciousness or consciousness of self-value).” (Scheler 1973a, 476; cf. Scheler 1980, 469) What Scheler refused here, is the “self-consciousness,” which is tied to “egoness,” or, more specifically, he was against founding the person itself on the ego. For a more detailed discussion about this problem, cf. Zhang 2011, 265–284.

15 Cf. the German original: Scheler 1976, 34.

16 Cf. Henrich 1996, 121–126.

17 Cf. Henrich 1999; Henrich 2006, 183–210; Henrich 2007, 49–81.

II. “Ought” as “ideal ought”

What does “should” or “ought” (*soll*) mean? How can “ought” be “ought”? Why should “I” as the “person” follow the “ought” to live? In Socrates’s question, the term “should” does not mean the “ought” (*sollen*) of duty or the imperatives of the later moral philosophy.¹⁸ Socrates’s question only concerns the “good life” or the so-called “life worth living,” so that it eventually refers to one’s own essential life attitude, not the questions of “what to do” or “how to evaluate,” etc., in the context of some specific time or location.

The “ought” is intentionally placed in quotation marks in Scheler’s self-reflection, by which he wanted to show that “ought” should not be understood as the “ought” in the sense of the norms of acts, which is the normal understanding in modern moral philosophy. Actually, Scheler clearly distinguished two types of “ought” (or “should” in ordinary writing), i.e., the ideal ought (*ideales Sollen*) and the normative ought (*normatives Sollen*). At the very beginning of *Formalism*—chapter 4, section 2: “Value and the Ought”—, Scheler confirmed the founding relation between these two types of “ought”: “this second type of ought is dependent on the former,” (Scheler 1973a, 203)¹⁹ i.e., the normative ought is founded on the ideal ought. Next, Scheler claimed the relation between the ideal ought as the foundation of normative ought and values. This is a unilateral relation of foundation: “every *ought* has its foundation in values, but values are *not* founded in the ideal ought” (Scheler 1973a, 206).²⁰ Thus, the relation of “values,” “ideal ought,” and “normative ought” is very clear: every “ought” (including “ideal ought” and “normative ought”) has its foundation in values, and “normative ought” is founded on “ideal ought.” But how can such a founding relation be possible?

Every “ought” has its foundation in values, because only values ought or ought not to be.²¹ In other words, ought refers to *ought-to-be* (*Seinsollen*) of something, and only values can be the “subjects” of *ought-to-be*, which in Scheler’s point of view is a law that can be grasped by phenomenological

18 Cf. Williams 2006, 5 f.; Wolf 1996, 11.

19 Cf. Scheler 1980, 211.

20 Cf. Scheler 1980, 214.

21 Cf. Scheler 1980, 100; Scheler 1973a, 82.

insight. Even if we say “you ought to do so,” it means this “do so” ought to be. The “do so” ought to be done, just because it may have a “value of the act.” No matter who gives the order that “you ought to do so,” it can be given meaningfully right because of a “value of the act” in itself.

According to Scheler’s two formal axioms, i.e., “anything of positive value ought to be, and anything of negative value ought not to be” (Scheler 1973a, 206),²² only if “do so” has a positive value, can it be a real “ought-to-be,” otherwise it is a “deception” (*Täuschung*), no matter what causes this “deception,” such as wrong desire or external power, etc.

150 Ideal “ought” means the ought-to-be of something that ideally ought to be. Ideal “ought” is founded on values and only values ought or ought not to be. Then, eventually, the so-called ideal “ought” is nothing more than the ought-to-be of something of values that ideally ought to be. More specifically, something of positive values that ideally ought to be ought to be, and something of negative values that ought not to be ought not to be. Moreover, there is an essential prescription that is already clearly present in the expression of “ought,” i.e., something that ought to be is factually not existent (real), so it “ought” to be. Then, the above positive proposition can be transformed further into: something of positive values that does not exist, but ideally ought to be ought to be. This proposition actually expresses another meaning, i.e., what presently exists is the opposite of something of positive value that ideally ought to be. It is called a “negatively critical” character of an ought proposition by Scheler.²³ That is to say, although an ought proposition can be expressed as a positive statement, it actually refers to the “exclusion” of negative values, the opposite of positive values. In other words, “ought” initially means an “exclusion” of negative values.

The “formal” analysis, here, gives us three theoretical results. (1) Scheler’s “normative” ethics starting with the ideal “ought” is not directed to any existing values at hand, but only to the values that ought to be, but are not yet. (2) The “directed” as such means an “exclusion” of the opposite of the values that ought to be, but are not yet, which by no means implies the pursuit of the positive

22 Cf. Scheler 1980, 214.

23 Cf. Scheler 1980, 217; Scheler 1973a, 210.

value itself, as Scheler always thought that: “the *necessary* condition of realization of these values is precisely their being *non-intended* in willing” (Scheler 1973a, 508).²⁴ (3) The “ought” is essentially the ought-to-be of values; in other words, an ideal “ought” can be an “ought,” can be a “measure,” or make us feel a certain “binding force” or “normativeness,” just because all these are “given” by values: positive values ought to be, and negative values ought not to be.

The so-called normative “ought” refers to the “normative” binding force given by a “command,” “prohibition,” or “duty,” which ought to be such and such, and which generally indicates a willing, pursuit, or an act. It is distinguished from the ideal “ought” first of all, for the latter primarily means an “ought” of “being,” while the former is an “ought” of “willing, pursuit, or act of such and such.” As in the above example “you ought to do so,” in fact, the “ought” of “do-so” eventually depends on the ought-to-be of the ideal “value of act,” which exactly shows the founding relation between the “normative” “ought” and the ideal “ought.” It is in this sense that Scheler criticized any ethics starting from the “normative” “ought” for having the “tendency of pragmatism” or the “prejudice of pragmatism” (Scheler 1973a, 214; 582).²⁵ Scheler talked about “pragmatism” in the most general literal meaning, i.e., about the actual use or actual act, etc. Obviously, if “normative ethics” refers to an ethics starting from the “normative” “ought,” then undoubtedly Scheler would refuse “normative ethics” in any form.

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However, there is another possibility, which is also the reason why we add quotation marks on “normative” in “normative” ethics earlier: it refers to a “normative” or “binding” ethics based upon an “ought” (ideal ought, for sure). “Ideal” in “ideal ought” indicates it cannot only be “completely independent of existing natural laws,” and thus effective by itself, but “can also be considered valid for men of a nature quite different from ours” (Scheler 1973a, 217).²⁶ In a word, only by virtue of its self-given essence or essential relation to phenomenological insight, the ideal “ought” is effective in itself, so that the ideal “ought” basically means that it is independent of any real constructs of

24 Cf. Scheler 1980, 499.

25 Cf. Scheler 1980, 221; 567.

26 Cf. Scheler 1980, 224.

social history, but only based on the “ought-to-be” of the self-given essence or essential relation (value-*a priori*) given in the phenomenological insight. Its “ought force” comes from value-*a priori* itself.

Simply put, in Scheler, the “ought” in the question of “how ‘ought’ I be and live?” means an ideal “ought.” It is the foundation of the normative “ought,” but at the same time it looks for its own foundation in values. In this regard, Scheler’s material ethics of values not only includes phenomenological “meta-ethics” whose main thesis is the phenomenological-existential essence of values, but also includes a phenomenological “normative ethics” whose task is to answer Socrates’s question. “Meta-ethics” constitutes the foundation of Scheler’s material ethics of values, and “normative ethics” represents the end-result of material ethics of values.

III. Phenomenological normative ethics: value-personalism

152 What does such a “normative” ethics of the “ideal ought” finally mean? Scheler also designated it as “value-personalism.” Its central points can be briefly outlined as follows.

Firstly, with regard to the bearers, moral values as good or evil must be defined as values of the person.²⁷ The question “what is (morally) good?” does not mean “what is a ‘good’ act?,” but “what is a ‘good’ person?” Thus, for Scheler, the central question of normative ethics is not “how can one do ‘good’?,” but “how can one become a ‘good’ person?” or “how does the person self-become?” In other words, the main task of normative ethics is to answer Socrates’s question.

Secondly, what value-personalism advocates, is the autonomy of the person, but not Kantian logonomy (*Logonomie*). Although Scheler absolutely agreed with Kant’s criticism on “substance ontology” of the theory of person, wherein the person refers to a substance or a thing with certain faculties or powers (such as reason, etc.), he refused the Kantian way of tightly interconnecting the person with reason, and refused the so-called “rational person” (*Vernunftperson*), for “the being of the person is never exhausted in being a subject of rational acts of

27 Cf. Scheler 1980, 49; Scheler 1973a, 28.

a certain lawfulness” (Scheler 1973a, 372).²⁸ Such a “rational person” is nothing more than a logical subject of rational acts following ideal laws, or “the X of rational activity.” Such concretizing of the ideal of the person in a concrete person fundamentally implies a “depersonalization” (*Entpersonalisierung*), thus “logonomy” eventually is not an “autonomy,” but an extreme “heteronomy” of the person. The autonomy of the person basically indicates the independence of the person himself, not the obedience to regulations and laws. In the meantime, autonomy is nothing but the presupposition of the moral significance of the person, and the autonomous person is by no means already a good person. Therefore, the individual person is not already completed, but should self-become continuously, or continuously come-to-be towards the good ideal personal value-essence or the ideal *ordo amoris*. Such autonomy of the person at least does not preclude “the principle of the moral ‘solidarity (Solidarität) of all persons’” (Scheler 1973a, 496).²⁹

Thirdly, the authentic mode of the personal being is personal becoming (*Personwerden*) or personal salvation (*Heil*). Each “ought” of “to-be” (*Zu-sein*) or “personal self-becoming” (*personales Selbstwerden*) as such is based on insight into objective values, such as insight into a moral good “whose *objective* essence and value-content contain a *reference* to an individual person, and whose ought therefore comes to this person and to him alone as a ‘call’ (*Ruf*), no matter if this ‘call’ is addressed to others or not” (Scheler 1973a, 490).³⁰ The “ought” here surely is not the “normative ought” or the “imperative ought” in Kant, but the “ideal ought.” And the so-called “normative meaning of the *ordo amoris*” should be understood in the sense of this “ideal ought” as well.³¹ “Normative meaning” does not indicate that the *ordo amoris* itself is a sum of all norms or imperatives, but rather refers to an “ideal ought” of the ideal *ordo amoris*, i.e., the ideal *ordo amoris* with positive values’ ought-to-be, and the overthrown *ordo amoris* with negative values’ ought-not-to-be. “The objectively correct *ordo amoris* becomes a norm only when it is seen as related to the will (*Wollen*) of man and as commanded to him by a will.” (Scheler

28 Cf. Scheler 1980, 371.

29 Cf. Scheler 1980, 488.

30 Cf. Scheler 1980, 482.

31 Cf. Scheler 1973c, 111; Scheler 1970, 103.

1973b, 98–99)³² In this sense, the normative meaning of the ideal *ordo amoris* just constitutes the phenomenological “normative” ethics in Scheler.

Fourthly, the personal salvation or personal becoming refers to an authentic “alteration in moral tenor” (*Gesinnungswandel*). “Moral tenor” (*Gesinnung*) as one of the central categories in Scheler’s phenomenological ethics is an important component in most ethical systems of German ethicists as well (including Kant). In Scheler, the moral tenor of the person is the foundation of human reason and will, and is the “orientation” of all personal acts (including acts of will), which affects the *beginning* of each act. “An alteration in the basic moral tenor is a moral process; commands (including self-commands, if there were such), educational directives (which do not reach the moral tenor), and advice and counsel cannot determine such an alteration.” (Scheler 1973a, 580–581)³³ This alteration basically arises from the “demand of the moment” (*Forderung der Stunde*, Goethe) or “moment” (*Kairos*),³⁴ which is precisely the essential category of ethics.³⁵

154 Finally, there are two possible elements of alteration in moral tenor: (1) following (*Gefolgschaft*) the personality of a model (*Vorbild*) in love, which involves taking some foreign person as model;³⁶ (2) the personal self-feeling or self-value-feeling (*Selbstwertfühlen*), which is related to one’s own person.³⁷ In this sense, a person can reveal his ideal *ordo amoris* or individual determination (*Bestimmung*) both through himself and through other persons. Just as Scheler said, the claim that

32 Cf. the German original: Scheler 1957, 347.

33 Cf. Scheler 1980, 566.

34 Cf. Deeken 1974, 113–129.

35 Cf. Scheler 1980, 485; Scheler 1973a, 493.

36 Cf. Scheler 1980 560 ff.; Scheler 1973a, 574 ff. In *Formalism*, Scheler mentions that the alteration of moral tenor is determined by the fidelity of a model “alone” (*nur*) (cf. Scheler 1980, 566; Scheler 1973a, 581). That is to say, in reference to the external aspects (such as commands, educational directives, advices, or counsels), the fidelity of a model alone can achieve the alteration of moral tenor. But this, according to Scheler, by no means refers to the impossibility of existing internal aspects (i.e., personal self-feelings).

37 In Frings’ outstanding study of Scheler’s problem of the person, he actually emphasized not only the importance of the fidelity of a model, but also the importance of the acts of feelings such as regretting (*Reue*), but he did not distinguish clearly these two different possible moments. Cf. Frings 1969, 81 ff.

“each is necessarily the best judge of his salvation” is absolutely groundless (Scheler 1973a, 491).³⁸ In the phenomenological sense, these two possible moments of alteration in moral tenors are equally original and equally effective.

Thus, within this framework of Scheler’s phenomenological value-personalism, the question “how should I be and live”? can be answered. First of all, the “I” should become the “person” through “self-ingathering,” and then be and live as a “person.” To be and live as a person means to be or to become oneself by achieving one’s personal ideal value-essence (including not only individual personal value-essence, but also the value-essence of the member of a collective person [*Gesamtperson*]), i.e., the “I” as the person should undertake self-responsibility as well as co-responsibility (*Mitverantwortlichkeit*). And the moment of the becoming of this person lies in feeling the values of one’s self and in following one’s model. Both of these “moments” are correlated with values, or, in other words, both are a call to the “I” from value itself, an “ought force” to the “I”; and the ideal *ordo amoris* itself refers to the ideal personal center or ideal personal value-essence. When we say “I” “should” be and should self-become towards my own ideal *ordo amoris* and ideal value-essence, this denotes an ideal because it is not composed by any fact of social history; it is the “ideal ought” and therefore indicates that its own ideal *ordo amoris* and the ideal value-essence itself “ought to be,” but actually are not yet; in the meantime, this implies that, as a matter of fact, this “ideal ought” is directed to the “exclusion” of its opposite. Based on this, we now can understand why Scheler called this becoming the person one ideally is as “personal salvation,” which indicates the “exclusion” of the disordering (*Unordnung*) or confusion (*Verwirrung*) of the *ordo amoris*.³⁹ It is in this “exclusion” that self-salvation becomes possible. It may be realized just when we do not will the “ego’s ideal *ordo amoris* or ideal value-essence” in itself. What the “normative” ethics of the “ideal ought” presents, is nothing but that: “the idea of the person of the highest non-formal value is also the highest norm for moral being and comportment” (Scheler 1973a, 572).⁴⁰

38 Cf. Scheler 1980, 483.

39 Cf. Scheler 1957, 350; Scheler 1973b, 103.

40 Cf. Scheler 1980, 558.

The “normative” ethics of the “ideal ought” eventually speaks of the question of how the “man” or the “person” himself should “be and live.” He cannot depart from values, but is concerned more centrally about the self-becoming of person as the “bearer” of values. Based on this, different from Kant’s normative ethics, Scheler’s phenomenological “normative” ethics concerns the question of how “person” himself should “be and live,” not the question of how to do, how to act, or how to will. It is this essential character that generally leads Scheler’s ethics closer to Aristotle rather than Kant. Or, in the terms of modern moral philosophy: Scheler’s basic position tends to the ethics of the “actor” rather than the ethics of “acts.” This by no means implies that Scheler’s phenomenological material ethics of values is identical with the Aristotelian ethics of virtue. As a matter of fact, the end-result of Scheler’s ethics is neither the Kantian “ethics of duty” nor the Aristotelian “ethics of virtue,” but a more fundamental “*third road*”: “the ethics of the person.” For Scheler, “that which can be called *originally* ‘good’ and ‘evil’, i.e., that which bears non-formal values of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ prior to and independent of all individual acts, is the ‘*person*’, the being of the person himself” (Scheler 1973a, 28).⁴¹ In this regard, Scheler’s phenomenological value-personalism is basically asking how one can become a good person. “Only persons can (originally) be morally good or evil; everything else can be good or evil only *by reference to persons*, no matter how indirect this ‘reference’ may be.” (Scheler 1973a, 85)⁴²

In each “reference” (*Hinsehen*), the first thing worth mentioning are the properties of the person, i.e., his virtues and vices. The so-called “virtue” or “vice” basically indicates the direction of a moral “to-be-able-to” (*Können*), and this “to-be-able-to” refers to “being able to realize the areas of the ideal ought which are differentiated by basic value-qualities” (Scheler 1973a, 28).⁴³ Virtue is fundamentally the immediately experienced “power” (*Mächtigkeit*) to do something that ought to be done. Thus, the concept of virtue springs from the factual situation, in which something that ideally ought to be given is directly given as something that “can” be.⁴⁴ But the “virtue” is essentially different

41 Cf. Scheler 1980, 49.

42 Cf. Scheler 1980, 103.

43 Cf. Scheler 1980, 50.

44 Cf. Scheler 1980, 213; Scheler 1973a, 205.

from “proficiency” (*Tüchtigkeit*) or the ability or instinct to do something or accomplish something. The phenomenological essence of virtue must contain two equally original and immediately given experiences or essential facts: the experience of the ideal “ought” of a content and the experience of the ability to do such a content.⁴⁵ In a word, as a property of the person, “virtue” itself is correlated with values, which is an ability to realize the ideal “ought.” For example, the virtue of “obedience” contains two equally original and immediate experiences: I am moving towards my ideal value-essence (the experience of the ideal “ought”), and I am able to be such in personal feeling or in the self-value-feeling of “obedience” (the experience of ability).

In these “references,” the acts of the person would be in the second place, including the acts of willing and action. The kind of acts as forgiving, commanding, obeying, and promising are often regarded as “good” by us essentially, because they are “personal” acts.⁴⁶ Duty or norm is exactly correlated with the acts of the person.

Based on the essential relation of three possible bearers of moral values (the person is immediate, while virtues and acts are mediate), Scheler emphasized specifically the essential relation of the ethics of person, the ethics of virtue, and the ethics of duty: “the theory of virtue precedes the theory of duty” (Scheler 1973a, 28),⁴⁷ and the ethics of person precedes the former two. Finally, Scheler’s phenomenological “normative” ethics is founded upon the most fundamental ethics of the person.

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IV. A brief conclusion

Socrates’s question is the starting point of all ethics. In his phenomenological value-personalism, Scheler transformed it to the question: “How ‘should’ ‘I’ be and live?” Fundamentally, “I” refers to the person, and “should” means the “ideal ought.” Ultimately, “I” as the person should come to be and engage in self-becoming towards its own ideal *ordo amoris* and ideal value-essence. The ethics of the person is an ethics of the person’s to-be or self-becoming

45 Cf. Scheler 1980, 244 f.; Scheler 1973a, 237 f.

46 Cf. Scheler 1980, 50; Scheler 1973a, 29.

47 Cf. Scheler 1980, 50.

towards its own ideal value-essence or ideal *ordo amoris*. In this sense, the end-result of Scheler's material ethics of values is precisely a phenomenological normative ethics, which is neither a normative ethics in general sense nor an Aristotelian ethics of virtue, but a more essential ethics of person. And such a phenomenological "normative" ethics precisely shows Scheler's essential asking and answering of Socrates's question.

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NELSONS INFRAGESTELLUNG DER ERKENNTNISTHEORIE

EIN BEITRAG ZUR SYSTEMATISCHEN REKONSTRUKTION UND
DISKUSSION, UNTER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DES KOMMENTARS VON
VICTOR KRAFT

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**Nelson's Questioning of Epistemology. A Contribution to the Systematic
Reconstruction and Discussion, with Consideration of the Commentary by Victor
Kraft**

Abstract

The present paper attempts to reconstruct some of the key presuppositions of the critique, with which Leonard Nelson (1882–1927) confronted the problematic

of gnoseology. Nelson recognized the demand for a general criterium of the veracity of knowledge—this confirms also Victor Kraft's (1880–1975) interpretation—as the central question of all foundation of the possibility of knowledge. The latter cannot be considered as a problem, but as the original givenness. Thus, Nelson's questioning of epistemology argues neither for skepticism nor for dogmatism, but instead represents a sort of epistemological fundamentalism.

Keywords: Leonard Nelson, gnoseology, Victor Kraft, epistemological fundamentalism.

Nelsonova postavitev spoznavne teorije pod vprašaj. Prispevek k sistematični rekonstrukciji in diskusiji, z upoštevanjem komentarja Victorja Krafta

Povzetek

162 Pričujoči članek skuša rekonstruirati nekatere temeljne predpostavke kritične misli, s katero se je Leonard Nelson (1882–1927) spoprijel s problematiko spoznavne teorije. Kot osrednje vprašanje slehernega upravičenja možnosti spoznanja je Nelson razgrnil, kakor v svoji interpretaciji poudarja tudi Victor Kraft (1880–1975), zahtevo po splošnem kriteriju resničnosti spoznanja. Možnosti spoznanja ne smemo dojeti kot problema, temveč je ona sama izvorna danost. Nelsonova postavitev spoznavne teorije pod vprašaj potemtakem ne zagovarja niti skepticizma niti dogmatizma, temveč predstavlja neke vrste epistemološki fundamentalizem.

Ključne besede: Leonard Nelson, spoznavna teorija, Victor Kraft, epistemološki fundamentalizem.

Axel Bühler zugeeignet

Wer mit den Ansprüchen an Wissenschaftlichkeit, wie sie in den Spezialwissenschaften üblich sind [...] an die Erkenntnistheorie herantritt, wird es nicht bestreiten, daß die Erkenntnistheorie im Allgemeinen auch heute noch auf eine sehr unsolide Weise vorgeht.

Victor Kraft, 1926

Wenn die Erkenntnislehre Wissenschaft sein soll, muß sie über Gegenstand, Aufgabe und Methode klar Bescheid geben können.

Victor Kraft, 1960

1. Der philosophische Hintergrund von Nelsons Kritik an der Erkenntnistheorie

Leonard Nelsons berühmte Kritik der tradierten philosophischen Erkenntnistheorie war vom rationalistischen Glauben an der „Möglichkeit einer Philosophie *als Wissenschaft*“ – den auch noch E. Husserl sowie die logischen Positivisten geteilt haben – und dem kantianischen Programm einer kritizistischen Erkenntnislegitimierung insgesamt geleitet: Durch eine eingreifende Reform des Verfahrens philosophischer Theoriebildung, die sich als „*Kritik der Vernunft*“ versteht, will Nelson die Philosophie dem Zustand fortdauernden „planlosen und unfruchtbaren dogmatischen Streitigkeiten“ verschiedener Schulen entziehen und auf den Weg eines wissenschaftlich gesicherten Denkens, der „gemeinsamen philosophischen Arbeit“ bringen (vgl.: Nelson 1973, 461; 483). Dadurch sollen die Philosophen in den Stand versetzt werden, wie die Wissenschaftler an der Lösung der gemeinsamen Aufgaben mittels eines allgemein akzeptierten methodischen Verfahrens arbeiten zu können.

Die philosophische Disziplin, die in der Kant'schen Tradition die Aufgabe hatte, die „Anarchie der Schulmeinungen“ zu beenden, „den ewigen Frieden in der Philosophie herbeizuführen“ und die „unlösbar erscheinenden philosophischen Fragen einer wissenschaftlichen Behandlung zugänglich zu

164 machen“, war eben die Erkenntnistheorie (vgl.: Nelson 1973, 90; 463). Sie sollte nicht bloß ein Zweig philosophischer Untersuchungen neben anderen, sondern eben die alle anderen begründende Disziplin sein: Die „Bearbeitung der Erkenntnistheorie“ sollte jeder „philosophischen Untersuchung“ als ein „unentbehrliches wissenschaftliches Fordernis“ vorausgehen (ibid.,158). Erkenntnistheorie schien außerdem nicht nur für die Philosophie bedeutsam, sondern auch die Voraussetzung für die wissenschaftliche Theoriebildung im Allgemeinen zu bilden. Nun stellte Nelson jedoch fest, „daß der Streit und Mannigfaltigkeit der philosophischen Lehrmeinungen“ gerade in der Erkenntnistheorie „am größten ist“ (ibid., 463)! Und wenn wir die Frage nach den gesicherten Ergebnissen der Erkenntnistheorie stellen, so müßten wir konstatieren, daß sie weder bezüglich der „Lösung der eigentlichen philosophischen Probleme“ noch bezüglich der „Grundprobleme der theoretischen Wissenschaften“ die erwarteten positiven Ergebnisse zeitigt hat. Wenn wir vom „Verzicht auf alles Metaphysische“ absehen, der aus der „sogenannten Selbstbescheidung der Erkenntnistheorie“ resultierte. (Es geht um eine Bestandaufnahme von Ergebnissen erkenntnistheoretischer Bemühungen, mit der jene, die etwa ein Jahrzehnt später V. Kraft formuliert hat, weitgehend ähnlich ist; vgl. Kraft 1926, 1–5.) Dies sei, so fand Nelson, eine „merkwürdige“, erklärungsbedürftige Tatsache. Wir sollten uns daher fragen:

Wie erklärt sich, daß diese anscheinend so berechtigten Hoffnungen auf eine friedliche, wissenschaftliche Gestaltung der Philosophie sich nicht nur nicht erfüllt, sondern der Streit der Schulen ins Unermeßliche gesteigert haben? (Nelson 1973, 463.)

Deshalb sollten wir

den Gründen nachforschen, warum es noch nicht gelungen ist, die Philosophie [auf diesem erkenntnistheoretischen Wege] in den Gang einer Wissenschaft zu bringen und auf welchem Wege wir hoffen können, diesem merkwürdigen Zustand ein Ende zu bereiten. (Ibid., 462.)

Ein weiteres Motiv für diese Untersuchung der Möglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie war Nelsons Auffassung, im Kritizismus Kants habe man unterlassen, *die Voraussetzungen für die Erkenntnistheorie* selbst zu prüfen. Denn es lasse sich ja nicht von vorneherein ausschließen, daß auch in die Erkenntnistheorie selbst – nicht nur in die vorkantische Metaphysik – gewisse Vorurteile eingegangen seien und sie möglicherweise auf der Stellung von Scheinproblemen beruhen. In diesem Sinne denkt Nelson radikaler als Kant und stellt die Forderung, eine kritizistische Philosophie müsse also ihre „kritische Reinigungsarbeit“ auch noch auf die Erkenntnistheorie selbst ausdehnen und deren Möglichkeit in überzeugender Weise darlegen. Daher muss man sich auf die Aufgabe begeben, die Möglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie zu untersuchen:

Alle Erkenntnistheoretiker sind demnach von ihren Geschäften feierlich und gesetzmäßig so lange suspendiert, bis sie die Frage: Wie ist die Erkenntnistheorie möglich? genugtuend beantwortet haben. (Ibid., 87.)

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2. Nelsons Methode der Untersuchung der Möglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie und die Zielsetzung der Erkenntnistheorie

Nelson will die Erkenntnistheorie nicht hinsichtlich ihrer „Ergebnisse und äußeren Leistungen“ prüfen, sondern hinsichtlich der „Zulässigkeit von Voraussetzungen und Methoden“, angesichts „der Konsequenz und innerer Haltbarkeit“ (ibid., 83). Eine solche Prüfung verlange die Anwendung einer Methode, die die Voraussetzungen von Behauptungen „rückwärtsschreitend“ aufweise: diese Methode

[...] dient dazu, ehe wir uns an die Lösung eines Problems machen, erst die Bedingungen seiner Lösbarkeit zu untersuchen: uns zu vergewissern, ob das Problem überhaupt lösbar ist, welche Voraussetzungen in der Problemstellung selbst schon enthalten sind, und zu entscheiden, welche Voraussetzungen zu einer bestimmten Lösung des Problems notwendig und hinreichend sind. (Ibid., 465.)

Die allgemeine Problemstellung der Erkenntnistheorie bestimmt Nelson folgendermaßen:

Die Erkenntnistheorie ist – nach allgemeinem Sprachgebrauch – die Wissenschaft, die die Untersuchung der objektiven Gültigkeit der Erkenntnis zur Aufgabe hat. (Ibid., 92.)

In dieser Formulierung, so findet weiter Nelson, wird *die Ungewißheit* über die objektive Gültigkeit der Erkenntnis *vorausgesetzt*: man zweifelt an der Erkenntnis, und „ihr Vorhandensein“ bildet ein Problem. Die Erkenntnistheorie ist also nicht voraussetzungslos, und man muß sich darüber im Klaren sein, „daß überhaupt eine solche Voraussetzung in der Problemstellung schon enthalten ist“ (ibid., 466)! Diese, „der Erkenntnistheorie unentbehrliche Voraussetzung“ wirkt sich dann auf ihre Zielsetzung aus:

166 Wenn man die Frage stellt, ob man überhaupt gültige Erkenntnisse besitzt, so setzt man voraus, daß die Objektivität der Erkenntnis zunächst zweifelhaft ist, und daß wir uns erst mittelbar, nämlich durch das Verfahren der Erkenntnistheorie, dieser Objektivität versichern können. (Ibid., 466–467.)

Nun ließe sich die von Nelsons angenommene „Unentbehrlichkeit“ jener Voraussetzung von Erkenntnistheorie doch relativieren. Sie ist nämlich zu stark und ideengeschichtlich stellt sie praktisch eine gewisse Konzession an die Tradition des philosophischen Skeptizismus dar. Statt der Voraussetzung der Ungewißheit (objektiver Gültigkeit) jeweiliger Erkenntnis ist in der Geschichte der Erkenntnistheorie aber – wie ich hervorheben möchte – eher eine mildere konzeptionelle Annahme am Werk gewesen, jene nämlich einer *möglichen* Ungewißheit, die ausserdem im Sinne einer *Auch*-Möglichkeit verstanden worden war, so also, dass es galt, unsere Annahmen *könnten sich als ungewiss aber auch als gewiss erweisen*, und daher bräuchten wir Beurteilungsmaßstäbe zur Feststellung des Vorliegens des einen oder des anderen Falles, bzw. zur entsprechenden Demarkation. Diese wichtige Änderung in der Ausgangsposition bei der Auslegung des Vorhabens der philosophischen

Erkenntnistheorie beeinträchtigt aber nicht direkt die daran anschließende Argumentation, setzt sie nicht automatisch außer Kraft. Jetzt wollen wir zur Darlegung und Betrachtung dieser Argumentation übergehen.

3. Nelsons dritter Beweis der Unmöglichkeit der Lösung des Erkenntnisproblems

Nun erfordert dieses Ziel, sich der Gültigkeit der Erkenntnis zu versichern, „eine Anwendung des logischen Satzes vom Grunde“ („Jede Behauptung bedarf einer Begründung“) (Ibid., 467). Und dieser Satz setzt seinerseits die These voraus,

daß der Verzicht auf die Begründung einer Erkenntnis den Zweifel an ihrer Wahrheit zur Folge haben müsse, oder daß [...] eine Erkenntnis, um als wahr gelten zu können, einer Begründung bedürfe. (Ibid., 497.)

Die Erkenntnistheorie will *die objektive Gültigkeit* unserer Erkenntnis überhaupt untersuchen und sicherstellen, und das heißt also, daß sie die Begründung *jeder* Erkenntnis zu ermöglichen hat. Mit dieser „Behauptung der Notwendigkeit der Begründung einer jeden Erkenntnis“ „steht und fällt in der Tat die Erkenntnistheorie“ (ibid., 467). Hinsichtlich dieser Aufgabe der Erkenntnisbegründung, wonach *alle* Erkenntnis bezüglich ihrer Gültigkeit so lange zu bezweifeln sei, bis sie von der Erkenntnistheorie als gültig gerechtfertigt wäre, verweist Victor Kraft auf ihre nicht hinreichende Klarheit bzw. eigentümliche Zweideutigkeit:

Sie kann einerseits dahin gedeutet werden, daß die Erkenntnislehre nachweisen soll, daß unsere [...] konkrete Lehrmeinungen wirklich Erkenntnis sind; andererseits dahin, daß es sich nicht um bestimmte Erkenntnisansprüche, sondern um die Erkenntnis überhaupt handelt, darum, zu untersuchen, ob wir überhaupt imstande sind, zu erkennen, d.h. Aussagen von objektiver Gültigkeit zu machen. (Kraft 1960, 2.)

Ihrem Wortlaut nach scheinen Nelsons Ausführungen näher bei der zweiten Auslegungsmöglichkeit zu liegen, wobei er sich auf den „allgemeinen

Sprachgebrauch“ beruft. Die erste Auslegungsmöglichkeit wäre insofern auch sinnvoll, als die Lösung der Begründungsaufgabe üblicherweise an diese oder jene Erkenntnisansprüche, und nicht an alle Erkenntnis insgesamt bzw. „überhaupt“ gerichtet wird. Eine Verknüpfung zwischen den beiden Interpretationen mag, wie ich feststellen möchte, darin erblickt werden, als die Erkenntnistheorie vorerst das *allgemeine Verfahren* zur Lösung der Begründungsaufgabe konzipiert, so daß dieses dann im jeweiligen aktuellen Falle des Entscheidens über bestimmte Erkenntnisansprüche *operationalisiert* werden kann. Ob diese Operationalisierung von der Erkenntnistheorie (oder vielleicht von einer „angewandten Erkenntnistheorie“) selbst betrieben werden soll, dürfte eine Frage der Übereinkunft darstellen. Im Rahmen üblicher Erkenntnispraxis wird die letzte Aufgabe den praktizierenden Erkenntnissubjekten selbst zugewiesen – so wenn es um wissenschaftliches Erkennen geht, den jeweiligen Forscher, die etwa eine Vorhersage oder eine nomologische Hypothese zu legitimieren suchen u. Ä.

168 Nelson argumentiert nun weiter, daß diese leitende Anforderung (alle Erkenntnis zu begründen) einen Widerspruch nach sich zieht. Die Behauptung der Notwendigkeit der Begründung einer jeden Erkenntnis ist nämlich mit einer zusätzlichen Annahme verbunden, und zwar mit der Annahme der „Mittelbarkeit aller Erkenntnis“ (Nelson 1973, 467). Dies erklärt er folgenderweise: Daß jede Erkenntnis begründungsbedürftig ist, bedeute ja nichts anderes, als „daß sie *eine andere als ihren Grund voraussetzt, auf die sie um als wahr behauptet werden zu können, zurückgeführt werden muss*“ (ibid.). Und diese Behauptung ist eigentlich jene, die dazu führt, daß sich die Lösung der Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie als „wissenschaftlich unmöglich“ erweist. Denn sie ist in sich widersprüchlich:

[...] wenn jede Erkenntnis nur durch eine andere, ihr zurückliegende möglich ist, so müssten wir, um zu irgendeiner wahren Erkenntnis zu gelangen, einen unendlichen Regressus ausführen, und es wäre daher gar keine Begründung einer Erkenntnis möglich. (Ibid.)

Die Forderung nach der Begründung jeder Erkenntnis führt also zum unendlichen Regress; da dieser definitionsgemäß nicht ausgeführt werden

kann, folgt, daß keine Begründung aller Erkenntnisse möglich ist. Aus der Forderung folgt also als Konsequenz die Behauptung ihrer eigenen Unmöglichkeit; und darin liegt der Widerspruch. Folglich erweist sich die Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie aufgrund dieses Widerspruchs als *unlösbar!*

Interessanterweise – woran auch Kraft erinnert – hat der Klassiker des deutschen Idealismus, F. W. J. Schelling, Mitte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, eine solche Kritik gewissermassen vorweggenommen. Und zwar mit dem Blick auf die Aufgabenstellung des Kantschen Vorhabens der Vernunftkritik, das von dem folgenden, auf den ersten Blick „ungemein einleuchtenden“ Gedanken, geleitet wird:

Ehe man etwas erkennen wolle, sei es nötig, unseres Vermögen, zu erkennen, selbst einer Prüfung zu unterwerfen. [...] Bei näherer Betrachtung findet sich aber, daß es dabei um *ein Erkennen des Erkennens* zu tun ist. Demnach bedürfte erst einer Untersuchung über die Möglichkeit eines solchen Erkenntnis des Erkennens, *und so könne man ins Unendliche zurückfragen*. (Schelling, zitiert nach Kraft 1960; Hervorhebungen von mir.)

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Es handelt sich also um eine eng verwandte Problemstellung, wobei Nelson, der mehr die begründungslogische Seite der Frage fokussiert, dieser kritische Hinweis von Schelling offensichtlich nicht bekannt war. Er hat sich übrigens im Rahmen seiner kritischen Beurteilung von Kants Epistemologie eher an anderen älteren deutschen Philosophen orientiert – etwa an dem „transzendentalen Skeptiker“ Salomon Maimon. Nichtdestoweniger stimmen er, wie etwas später auch Nicolai Hartman, mit Schelling darin überein, daß Kant das Problem einer Erkenntnis *des Erkennens* selbst weitestgehend unthematisiert gelassen und stattdessen seine Aufmerksamkeit hauptsächlich auf die Erkenntnis von *Gegenständen* gerichtet hat.

4. Ein anderweitiger Versuch, „das Erkenntnisproblem“ zu lösen und seine Zurückweisung

Wäre es nun ein Ausweg aus dieser Situation, wenn wir unsere Erkenntnis „vorerst nur als hypothetisch gültig“ annehmen, und den „unendlichen

Regreß in einen Progreß“ verwandeln? Dabei müssten wir verlangen, „daß die zunächst nur hypothetisch aufgenommene Erkenntnis sich mehr und mehr *bewährt*“ (Nelson 1973, 492). Hierdurch kann die Erkenntnistheorie jedoch nicht gerettet werden. Denn es stellt sich die Frage: „wenn wir jede Erkenntnis vorderhand als *problematisch* beurteilen, woher kommt dann das Kriterium der Bewährung?“ (Ibid.) An diese Frage knüpft Nelson die folgende Überlegung an. Dieses Kriterium

könnte ja selbst nur problematisch vorgestellt werden, bedürfe also selbst erst der Bewährung an einem weiteren Kriterium und so fort, ohne daß wir jemals zu einer wirklichen Bewährung gelangen könnten. Ob übrigens diese Bewährung den Charakter absoluter Gewißheit oder nur allmählich zunehmender Wahrscheinlichkeit hat, darauf kommt für diese Frage gar nicht an. Denn auch für die Wahrscheinlichkeit bedürfen wir schon irgendwelcher Kriterien, die ihrerseits nicht bloß problematisch sein können. (Ibid.)

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Also bekämen wir eine Art von *progressus ad infinitum*, der zu keinem Abschluß kommt, so daß uns *kein unproblematischer Beurteilungsmaßstab* vorliegt, durch deren Anwendung die fortschreitende Bewährung vorerst hypothetisch angenommener Erkenntnisse (bzw. Annahmen) festgestellt werden könnte. Hiermit bleibt die Zielsetzung der Erkenntnistheorie gleichfalls unerfüllt!

Nelsons Argumentation können wir auch so explizieren:

1. Unsere Erkenntnisse sind hypothetisch gültig.
 2. Wir können sie aber immer besser bewähren.
 3. Wenn wird dieses progressives Bewährungsverfahren weit genug verfolgen, so können wir einmal zu einer Begründung der Gültigkeit unserer Erkenntnis kommen.
 4. Aber wenn (1.) gilt, könnten die für die Bewährung geltenden Kriterien selbst auch nur hypothetisch angenommen werden.
 5. Um die Gültigkeit dieser Kriterien sicherzustellen, müssten wir diese an einem weiteren Kriterium gemessen bewähren lassen, und wenn dieses Kriterium nicht wiederum bloß hypothetisch bleiben soll, müssen wir eine
-

Bewährung nach einem weiteren Kriterium auch für es suchen usw., *ad infinitum*.

6. Somit werden wir niemals zu „einer wirklichen Begründung“ der als hypothetisch angenommenen Erkenntnisse gelangen.

Dieses Argument überzeugt aber nicht ganz, bzw. hat nicht die gleiche Kraft wie das vorher dargelegte *regressus ad infinitum*-Argument. Mit ihm wird von Nelson vorausgesetzt, daß die erkenntnistheoretische Analyse irgendwelche zu begründende *Erkenntnisse* mit den *Erkenntniskriterien* selbst gleichsetzten muß. Dies dürfte aber doch fraglich sein. Die beiden Fragen liegen auch nicht auf der gleichen Ebene: die Frage nach der Festlegung von Erkenntniskriterien wird nämlich auf der Ebene der *Metaerkenntnis* gestellt und gelöst. Und wir können uns auf eine Bestimmung des Erkenntniskriteriums einigen, das plausible Gründe für sich beanspruchen kann, und es dann bei den ursprünglich fortschreitenden Objekt-Erkenntnissen, ihrer Annäherung an den Status objektiv gültiger oder sehr wahrscheinlicher Annahmen anwenden, bzw. die erzielten Fortschritte beurteilen. Insofern dürfte hier die gesuchte „wirkliche Begründung“ grundsätzlich doch erzielbar sein!

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5. Die Forderung eines allgemeinen Erkenntniskriteriums und daraus hervorgehende Schwierigkeiten

Laut Nelson liegen die Schwierigkeiten der Erkenntnistheorie nicht in den angebotenen Erklärungen der Wahrheit als solcher, sondern entspringen vornehmlich der Forderung „*eines allgemeinen Kriteriums der Wahrheit der Erkenntnis* überhaupt“, durch dessen Anwendung „wir entscheiden können, ob eine Erkenntnis wahr ist oder nicht“ (ibid., 465). Hiermit werden wir aber zur folgenden problematischen Konsequenz hingeführt:

Ein solches Kriterium müßte, um anwendbar zu sein, erkannt werden können. Ob aber diese Erkenntnis des Kriteriums gültig ist, könnten wir nicht entscheiden, ohne das Kriterium schon anzuwenden. Dieser Zirkel muß sich in jedem Versuch wiederholen, ein Wahrheitskriterium aufzustellen, das für alle Erkenntnis gelten soll und daher natürlich nicht selbst eine Erkenntnis sein kann. (Ibid. 402.)

Um Nelsons Gedankengang weiter zu verdeutlichen, wollen wir nun für das allgemeine Erkenntniskriterium die Bezeichnung „*K*“ einführen, für seine inhaltlichen Gestaltungen „*K*-Prädikate“ (wie Nützlichkeit, Evidenz, allgemeinem Konsens entsprechend usw.), für die durch die letzteren aufgestellten Bedingungen „*K*-Bedingungen“. Damit *K* überhaupt anwendbar wird, müßten wir „erkennen können, daß es ein Kriterium der Wahrheit ist“, müssten also dessen sicher sein, daß *K* eben *das Wahrheitskriterium* ist. Damit wir nämlich aus der Anwendung von *K* überhaupt einsehen können, daß eine gegebene Erkenntnis wahr ist, müßten wir wissen, daß die Erkenntnisse, die die *K*-Bedingung erfüllen, eben „die wahren sind“. In der Folge müssen wir voraussetzen, daß *K* ein richtiger Beurteilungsmaßstab ist. Um aber zu wissen, daß *K* das Kriterium der Wahrheit ist, müssen wir auf die Annahme, die lautet „*K* ist das fragliche Kriterium“, *K* selbst schon anwenden. Nur dadurch können wir nämlich überhaupt wissen, daß eben *K* das Kriterium ist, indem wir *K* selbst als einen gültigen Beurteilungsmaßstab bereits einsetzen. Die Möglichkeit der Anwendung von *K* setzt ein Wissen darüber voraus, daß *K* *das Kriterium* der Wahrheit ist. Dazu gilt es aber unbedingt zu wissen, daß das *K*-Prädikat auch für das Denken, daß *K* selbst richtig ist, zutrifft (also, *K* muß bei der Beurteilung seiner Richtigkeit selbst vorausgesetzt werden). Dies führt dann aber zur *Zirkelhaftigkeit des Verfahrens*. So etwa:

Um zu erkennen, daß die Nützlichkeit ein Kriterium der Wahrheit ist, müßte man das Kriterium der Nützlichkeit schon auf diese Erkenntnis anwenden, man müßte also seine Richtigkeit schon voraussetzen und würde sich also in Zirkeln bewegen. (Ibid. 507–508.)

Und genauso so würde es sich mit anderen relevanten Kriterien, bzw. *K*-Prädikaten und *K*-Bedingungen verhalten.

Ist nun die von Nelson hier vermutete Zirkelhaftigkeit wirklich unvermeidlich? Meinem Urteil nach geht er eigentlich bei seiner Kritik von zwei unexplizierten, aber fragwürdigen Annahmen aus, die er als für das Unternehmen der Erkenntnistheorie unverzichtbar ansehen möchte:

– Erstens, daß die Erkenntnistheoretiker bei ihren Betrachtungen die *Metaebene* des Erkennens einerseits und die *Objektebene* andererseits nicht auseinanderhalten.

– Zweitens, daß selbst, wenn sie dies (etwa implizit) auch tun würden, sie jedoch *auf den beiden Ebenen nur eine und die gleiche Lösung* für die Frage nach dem Erkenntniskriterium praktizieren müßten – wozu es angeblich für sie keine Alternative geben sollte.

Und erst unter der Beibehaltung von diesen beiden, insbesondere aber der zweiten Annahme, wird die Zirkelhaftigkeit des erkenntnistheoretischen Vorgehens unausweichlich bzw. Nelsons Vorwurf gültig. Entgegen seiner Vermutung, sind die Erkenntnistheoretiker aber nicht dazu verpflichtet, den beiden Annahmen zu folgen. Und aus ihrer eigentümlichen Fragestellung, wie diese von Nelson dargestellt wurde, ergibt sich kein Zwang dazu. So etwa könnte ein Erkenntnistheoretiker, der die Nützlichkeit als Erkenntniskriterium gelten lassen möchte, eine solche Lösung auf die Frage, wie wir wissen sollen, daß eben *die Nützlichkeit* authentischer Beurteilungsmaßstab für die epistemische Legitimierung unserer Meinungen, Annahmen, Theorien usw. sei, die These vertreten: „Dies entspricht der Intuition des menschlichen gesunden Verstandes!“

Und wenn es um die Legitimierung *des Konsens*-Kriteriums ginge, etwa die These: „Die intellektuelle Tradition unseres Kulturkreises spricht dafür, dass Konsens-Kriterium als richtig anzuerkennen ist, bzw. dieser epistemische Beurteilungsmaßstab hat sich innerhalb ihr bewährt.“

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Ähnlich kann auch für andere denkbare Erkenntniskriterien (wie Evidenz u. a.) eine von ihnen inhaltlich jeweils *verschiedene* Begründung für sie selbst auf der Ebene der Metaerkenntnis aufgestellt werden, die also mit ihrem eigenen Informationsgehalt *nicht* koinzidiert. Auf dieser Weise würde dann jene logisch unhaltbare Lage vermieden, daß beim Erkennen eines Erkenntniskriteriums dieses selbst als bereits gültig vorausgesetzt und verwertet wird. Daher würde ich den Nelson'schen Zirkularitätsvorwurf als nicht ganz überzeugend ansehen. Seine versuchte Problematisierung der logischen Rolle von Erkenntniskriterien beim Projekt einer philosophischen Erkenntnistheorie mag aber weiterhin anregend sein.

Für Nelson bliebe nur noch die Möglichkeit einer sprachlich-konventionellen Verteidigung seines Zirkularitätsvorwurfs übrig, indem man nämlich darauf verweisen würde, es sei von einem „*allgemeinen* Kriterium der Wahrheit der Erkenntnis“ die Rede, d. h. von der erkenntnistheoretischen

Bemühung, ein solches Kriterium zu formulieren, „das für alle Erkenntnis gelten soll“. Die Festlegung des Prädikats der *Allgemeinheit* verbietet uns als solche aber zunächst nicht, die beiden Ebenen der Metaerkenntnis und der Objekterkenntnis zu unterscheiden. Und genauso wird damit auch die Möglichkeit nicht *a priori* ausgeschlossen, daß auf der einen und der anderen Ebene die Frage von Erkenntniskriterien auch in einer grundsätzlich uneinheitlichen, *nicht-identischen* Weise gelöst werden kann. Die Allgemeinheit des gesuchten Erkenntniskriteriums könnte man dabei wohl so verstehen, daß *alle* zu entscheidenden Fälle innerhalb einer, sowie genauso *alle* zu entscheidenden Fälle innerhalb anderer Ebene, gerade nach dem gleichen, für die jeweilige Ebene vorgesehenen Kriterium beurteilt werden sollen.

Die andere, mit der gleichen Ausgangslage verknüpfte Schwierigkeit, die Nelson hier vermutet, können wir nun so darlegen: Die Wahrheit des jeweiligen Urteils „A ist B“ (also auch des Urteils „K ist das richtige Wahrheitskriterium“) beruht darauf, daß das entsprechende Urteil „A ist B“ *x-voll sei* (evident, nützlich, allgemeinem Konsens entsprechend usw.), d. h. denselben
174 entsprechenden *K*-Bedingungen genügen muß. Um eine solche Einsicht als wahr zu erweisen, müßten wir uns also davon überzeugen, daß es *x-voll sei* zu urteilen, es sei *x-voll* zu urteilen, daß *A* ein *B* ist, etc. (es sei *nützlich* zu denken, Wahrheit sei Nützlichkeit, es sei *evident*, zu denken, Wahrheit sei Evidenz, es sei *allgemeinem Konsens entsprechend*, zu denken, Wahrheit sei Konsens, etc.).

Also

[...] um den Sinn der [erkenntnistheoretischen] Behauptung klarzumachen [müßten wir] eine unendliche Reihe von Aussagen vollziehen. Eine Reihe, in der jedes Glied erst durch den nächstfolgenden definiert wird, nämlich jede Teilaussage erst durch die Aussage ihrer [Evidenz, Nützlichkeit, Konsensfähigkeit, etc.] [...] Da aber die Vollendung einer unendlichen Reihe einen Widerspruch einschließt, so folgt, daß die Behauptung, Wahrheit sei [Evidenz, Nützlichkeit, Konsens, etc.], überhaupt keinen definierbaren Sinn haben kann. (Ibid., 398.)

Hiermit würden wir also erneut konfrontiert mit dem Problem eines *infiniten Regresses*.

Interessanterweise hat Kraft die soeben dargelegte Argumentation Nelsons im Prinzip akzeptiert, wollte sie aber insofern ergänzen lassen, als er darauf bestand

[...] daß das Kriterium objektiver Gültigkeit *nicht unbedingt durch Erkenntnis* legitimiert sein müßte. Die Übereinstimmung erkennender Subjekte könnte *auch auf einer Überzeugung beruhen*. Das würde aber nicht der Tendenz des ganzen Unternehmens entsprechen, das auf eine *absolute Begründung* ausgeht. (Kraft 1960, 3; Hervorhebungen teilweise von mir.)

Es handelt sich also um einen Ergänzungsvorschlag, den er selbst explizit problematisiert hat und der offensichtlich erst unter der Bedingung seinen vollen Sinn bekäme, daß man die ursprüngliche Zielsetzung, eine völlig unbezweifelbare Begründung zu erreichen, aufgeben würde. Letzteres entspricht aber eben nicht der Struktur der epistemologischen Fragestellung, die Nelson in Sicht hat, und bezüglich der er auch seine Gegen-Argumentation entfaltet. Insofern ist Krafts Bemerkung im gegebenen Zusammenhang nur beschränkt relevant. Derartige Ergänzungsvorschläge zur Nelsons Kritik erübrigen sich aber, wenn man unsere vorher formulierte Argumentation berücksichtigt. Denn aufgrund dortiger Hinweise wird das zusätzliche Regressus-Argument im Voraus hinfällig, so daß kein Bedarf danach mehr besteht, weitere speziell darauf bezogene Argumente zu entwerfen zu versuchen. Die gleichen Gründe, die den Zirkularitätsvorwurf problematisch machen, entziehen auch dem soeben dargelegten Regressus-Argument seine Berechtigung.

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6. Konsequenzen, die Nelson zieht

Aus der Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie ergibt sich aber laut Nelson weder Skeptizismus noch Dogmatismus als Konsequenz: Denn aus der Unmöglichkeit der Begründung unserer Erkenntnis dürfen wir nicht darauf schließen, daß unsere Erkenntnisse ungültig sind: Die Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie bedeutet noch nicht die Unmöglichkeit der *Erkenntnis* selbst (vgl.: Nelson 1973, 472). Eine solche Folgerung durch eine „skeptische

Erkenntnistheorie“ setze bereits „das erkenntnistheoretische Vorurteil“ voraus; wenn wir dies aber aufgeben, sind wir nicht dazu gezwungen, den Skeptizismus zu übernehmen.

Die dem Skeptizismus entgegengesetzte Lösung des Dogmatismus, d. h. die Auffassung, wir müssten „irgendwelche Urteile ohne alle Begründung“ aufstellen, erweist sich gleichfalls als unberechtigt. Denn aus der Unmöglichkeit der Begründung aller Erkenntnis können wir nicht auf die „Notwendigkeit einer dogmatischen Metaphysik“ (Hegel, Herbart, Lotze usw.) schließen. Hier wird zu viel bewiesen: die Notwendigkeit der Aufstellung von Behauptungen als „Dogmen“ ergibt sich nicht aus der Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie allein (vgl.: *ibid.*, 473).

Also, weder die eine noch die andere Position zeigt sich als notwendige Konsequenz aus der erwiesenen Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie.¹

Was die Schwierigkeiten angeht, zu denen die Forderung eines allgemeinen Erkenntniskriteriums führt, so meint Nelson, man „erhebe“ sich über solche „Widersprüche“

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allein dadurch, daß man auf ein außerhalb der Erkenntnis liegendes Kriterium verzichtet, ohne darum doch auf die von der Erkenntnis unabhängige Wahrheit selbst zu verzichten. (*Ibid.*, 403.)

¹ Hinsichtlich des Nelson'schen Nachweises der These von der Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie hat H. Albert bemerkt, daß er stellt „[...] ohne Zweifel selbst erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchungen im üblichen Sinne dieses Wortes an, in denen er zu positiven Konsequenzen hinsichtlich der Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis kommt, so daß sein Nachweis *einen etwas paradoxen Eindruck hinterläßt*“ (Albert 2011, 24; Hervorhebung von mir). Es kann aber keineswegs von irgendwelcher „Paradoxie“ hier die Rede sein, wenn man berücksichtigt, wie Nelson die Erkenntnistheorie selbst definiert – wozu jeder Interpret verpflichtet sein dürfte, selbst dann, wenn er mit gegebener Begriffsbestimmung nicht ganz einverstanden ist. Nelson geht nämlich eben von einem engeren Begriff der Erkenntnistheorie aus, und falls man dagegen einen breiteren Begriff dem vorzuziehen möchte, kann man dies gerne tun – nur ohne dabei Nelson aufgrund einer anderen Definition eine Paradoxalität seiner Ausführungen zu unterstellen. Für eine allgemeine und zuverlässige, teilweise auch kritische Darstellung von der Konzeption der Fries'schen, bzw. Fries-Nelson'schen Schule vgl.: Cassirer 1974, Bd. III.

Es gilt also eine *immanentistische* Position einzunehmen, ausgehend von dem Konzept unmittelbarer Erkenntnis. Ein Zurückgreifen auf die letztere erweist sich auch darum als unbedingt erforderlich, als es ohne „die Zugrundelegung irgendeiner vollständigen Gewißheit“ „gar keinen Sinn“ hat, von einer auch nur wahrscheinlichen Erkenntnis zu reden (ibid.)!

Und die gesuchte vollständige Gewißheit wird uns allein durch *die unmittelbare* Erkenntnis verfügbar gemacht. Also ein epistemischer Standpunkt, der mit einigen eigentümlichen Nuancierungen von vielen anderen epistemologischen Fundamentalisten innerhalb der Epistemologiegeschichte geteilt worden ist.

7. Nelsons eigene Lösung des Erkenntnisproblems

Nelson meint, wir sollten die Forderung nach der Begründung einer jeden Erkenntnis aufgeben, und anstatt dessen von der Annahme ausgehen, daß die „Forderung der Begründung einer Erkenntnis“ selbst „ihren Sinn erst unter Voraussetzung *einer unmittelbaren* Erkenntnis“ erhält (ibid., 496). Wenn nämlich keine solche Erkenntnis vorhanden wäre, „so könnten wir freilich auch nicht wissen, wie wir es anfangen sollten, uns der Wahrheit zu versichern“ (ibid.). Ohne Einbeziehung unmittelbarer Erkenntnis könnten wir deshalb „gewiß durch keine Aufbietung noch so großen Scharfsinns einen Weg finden, um vom Zweifel zur Wahrheit zu gelangen“ (ibid.).

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Sein Argument können wir auch so rekonstruieren:

1. Angenommen, wir hätten allein hypothetische oder jedenfalls solche Erkenntnisse, für die wir einer weiteren Begründung benötigen.

2. Dann würden wir uns aber nie dessen gewiß sein können, auf welchem Wege die Gültigkeit unserer Erkenntnis sichergestellt werden sollte.

3. Deshalb werden wir in diesem Fall nicht „vom Zweifel zu Wahrheit“ fortschreiten können, und die angestrebte Legitimierung der Gültigkeit unserer Erkenntnisse erlangen.

4. Also, Besitz einer unmittelbaren Erkenntnis bildet die notwendige Bedingung einer jeden Begründungsprozedur.

Das Phänomen *unmittelbarer Erkenntnis* macht darüberhinaus die Skepsis hinsichtlich unserer Erkenntnisse widersinnig. Hier handele es sich um „das einzige Mittel“, den Skeptizismus „von Grund aus zu heben“:

Den Skeptizismus durch einen logischen Gegenbeweis zu widerlegen, ist gänzlich unmöglich; aber es bedarf dessen gar nicht, denn durch die erste beste wirkliche Erkenntnis, die der Skeptiker in sich selbst erlebt, führt er sich selbst *ad absurdum*. (Ibid.)

Anstatt vom Zweifel oder von „vorderhand“ bloß problematischen Erkenntnissen auszugehen, sollten wir den Anfangspunkt bei der vorliegenden unmittelbaren Erkenntnis machen, wir sollten mit dem „Faktum der Erkenntnis“ beginnen. Es ergibt sich also, daß die Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis nicht ein Problem ist, sondern *eine ursprüngliche Gegebenheit!* Die Fragestellung ist dann nicht mehr „Wie ist unsere Erkenntnis überhaupt möglich?“, sondern: „Welche unserer Vorstellungen sind eigentlich Erkenntnis?“

178 Die von Nelson befürwortete Lösung des Erkenntnisproblems befindet sich offensichtlich im Zeichen eines rekonstruierten *epistemologischen Fundamentalismus* – einer Position also, die im Rahmen gegenwärtigen Diskussionen mehrfacherweise kritisiert wurde. Rückkehr zum rationalistisch gesinnten Fundamentalismus verstand Nelson als die einzig verbleibende Alternative nach dem vielfachen Versagen des Kant'schen Kritizismus. Und hiermit schließt sich der Kreis von Nelsons versuchter Problematisierung der philosophischen Erkenntnistheorie. Nichtsdestoweniger ist ein bleibender Verdienst Nelsons, unseren Blick für die Problematik der Erkenntnisbegründung wesentlich geschärft zu haben.²

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² Zum epistemologischen Fundamentalismus und zu seinen fragwürdigen Aspekten vgl., u. a.: Jakovljević 1998. Und zur Nelsons Kritik an Kant vgl.: Jakovljewitsch 1988, 18–41.

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CARLOS ASTRADA AND TETSURŌ WATSUJI ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANDSCAPE

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to critically compare the phenomenologies of landscape of two 20th-century philosophers deeply engaged with Heidegger's thinking: Carlos Astrada and Tetsurō Watsuji. In the first section, I show how they understood the relationship between the human being and landscape. With specific peculiarities, they both considered that the analysis of "temporality" must be complemented with a treatment of "spatiality." In the second section, I show that their analysis of spatiality

was connected, on the one hand, to a re-evaluation of corporality, and, on the other hand, to a quest to emphasize the social-communitarian dimension of human existence. In the third section, I present their different interpretations of Heidegger's notion of "Being-towards-death," and establish the links between it and their phenomenologies of landscape. In the final section, I propose Astrada and Watsuji's thoughts as the basis for *an alternative modernity* to that of the West.

Keywords: phenomenology, landscape, spatiality, corporality, Heidegger.

Carlos Astrada in Tetsurō Watsuji o fenomenologiji pokrajine

Povzetek

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Namen pričujočega članka je kritična primerjava fenomenologij pokrajine dveh filozofov 20. stoletja, ki ju jo močno zaznamovalo srečanje s Heideggrovo mislijo: Carlosa Astrade in Tetsura Watsujija. V prvem razdelku pokažem, kakor sta razumela razmerje med človekom in pokrajino. Čeprav z določenimi razlikami, sta oba menila, da je analizo »časovnosti«¹ potrebno dopolniti z obravnavo »prostorskosti«. V drugem razdelku pokažem, da je bila njuna analiza prostorskosti povezana, na eni strani, s ponovnim ovrednotenjem telesnosti in, na drugi strani, s potrebo po poudarjanju družbeno-skupnostne razsežnosti človeške eksistence. V tretjem razdelku predstavim njuni različni interpretaciji Heideggrove ideje »biti-k-smrti«² in načrtam vezi med njo in njunima fenomenologijama pokrajine. V zadnjem razdelku misli Astrade in Watsujija razgrnem kot osnovo za alternativno modernost od óne, ki zaznamuje Zahod.

Ključne besede: fenomenologija, pokrajina, prostorskost, telesnost, Heidegger.

I. Introduction

The intellectual career paths of the Argentine philosopher Carlos Astrada (1894–1970) and the Japanese philosopher Tetsurō Watsuji (1889–1960) have remarkable similarities. In 1927, both thinkers made a formative journey to Germany, where they came into direct contact with Scheler’s and Heidegger’s phenomenological approaches. This European experience was a milestone in their careers as well as in the field of philosophy in their home countries: once they went back to Argentina and Japan, both became undoubtedly recognized as great proponents of the 20th-century philosophy and promoters of the discipline in their national contexts.

Carlos Astrada traveled to Cologne after obtaining a fellowship thanks to his essay *El problema epistemológico en la filosofía actual* (1927), in which he reviewed the latest trends in German philosophy at that time. This essay focused on Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and some relevant members of his circle, namely, Alexander Pfänder and Max Scheler. In the winter semester of 1927–1928, he attended Scheler’s seminar on *Philosophical Anthropology*, which was decisive for the unfolding of his own philosophical views in the following years. Astrada and Scheler established a friendly relationship, abruptly interrupted by the latter’s untimely death in May 1928. Astrada, then, traveled to Freiburg with the main goal of studying with Martin Heidegger, who occupied the center stage of philosophy thanks to the publication of *Sein und Zeit* (1927). Astrada lived in Freiburg until 1930, when he decided to return to Cologne. From there, he made regular trips to the University of Bonn, where he attended his last courses in Germany. He returned to his homeland in August 1931.¹

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Tetsurō Watsuji was a Professor of Ethics at the Department of Philosophy at Kyoto Imperial University. In the summer of 1927, he traveled to Berlin thanks to a fellowship—very common at the time in Japan among prominent young professors—expecting to stay there for three years. However, he could not complete his stay: his father died in 1928 and the philosopher had to return to his country. During the year he spent in Europe, Watsuji

¹ For a biographical exposition of Astrada’s stay in Europe, see David (2004).

was strongly influenced by the phenomenological works of Scheler and Heidegger, whom he read extremely carefully. Both Scheler and Heidegger will be main references for his later writings on philosophical anthropology and ethics.²

Beyond the parallels presented, their previous intellectual experiences also show some similarities. Carlos Astrada's juvenile formation took place amid the anti-positivist movement that was widespread in Argentina between the decades of 1910 and 1920. The most important authors that had influenced him were the *Lebensphilosophie* thinkers: Henri Bergson, Jean-Marie Guyau, Georg Simmel, and, fundamentally, Friedrich Nietzsche. Furthermore, one must also consider Astrada's early readings of some of the proto-existentialist authors like Søren Kierkegaard, Miguel de Unamuno, and Arthur Schopenhauer.

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For his part, during the 1910s and 1920s, Tetsurō Watsuji received a strong education in modern Western philosophy mainly oriented towards ethics. He was also one of the first introducers of the works of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard in Japan, developing their ideas in his early essays published between 1912 and 1915. He had also a passionate interest in British romantic literature and a vast knowledge of the history of Japanese thought (Carter and McCarthy 2019, 1).

Once back to their respective home countries, during the 1930s and 1940s, Astrada and Watsuji intersected their ideas with their respective national contexts. In fact, the national question had concerned them both in the previous decades; while Watsuji had already written some articles on the history of Japanese thought and Buddhism (McCarthy 2019, 503), Astrada's early essays show a concern for the *Argentine destiny* and the so-called *national question*.³ The estrangement that they experienced during and after their stay in Europe reinforced in both of them their former concerns for Japanese and Argentinean peculiarities and lead them to analyze the relations between the human being and its particular

2 For a brief intellectual biography of Watsuji, see Carter and McCarthy (2019).

3 For an introduction to Astrada's early thought, with a special focus on the *national question*, see Prestía (2021, 33–68).

environment. Astrada and Watsuji both replied to the question of the specificity of a single culture by placing the focus on the way a distinctive human type is configured by its relations with the landscape. Thus, their thought unfolds not only as a phenomenology of the landscape, but also as an attempt to elucidate the characteristic *ethos* of their national communities, of the Argentinean and Japanese *selfhood*.

There is no evidence that could confirm that either Astrada or Watsuji had read each other's works. Thus, I will not try to point out mutual influences. Instead, I will seek to establish a counterpoint between both authors' ideas, hoping that they can illuminate each other. Such a reading is possible as a result of the shared common ground of their inquiries: the phenomenological method, learned by both authors from Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger; and, more specifically, the attempt to elucidate the structure of human existence. To the best of my knowledge, there is no research that relates the theoretical developments of both authors.

In the first section of this article, I will focus on presenting the shared basis, from which Astrada and Watsuji tried to establish the nature of the relationship between the human being and landscape. Therefore, I will describe the peculiarities of their approaches. I will show how both arrived at similar conclusions through a critical reading of *Sein und Zeit*. Astrada and Watsuji considered that the analysis of "temporality" had to be complemented with a treatment of "spatiality." In addressing the core of the connection of both dimensions of human existence, both authors stated that a human being understands itself not only through history, but also through environment. In the second section, I will show that their analysis of spatiality was connected, on the one hand, to a re-evaluation of corporality, and, on the other hand, to a quest to emphasize the inter-individual and social-communitarian dimensions of human existence. In the third section, I will present the different interpretations that both authors made of Heidegger's concept of "Being-towards-death," and I will establish possible links between this critical reception and their phenomenologies of landscape. In the final section, I aim to explore Astrada's and Watsuji thoughts as an original ground for re-thinking *an alternative modernity* to that of the West.

II. The humanized landscape or the historicity of nature

The most important contributions that the Western academia recognizes to Tetsurō Watsuji are: *Fūdo*, from 1935, and *Rinringaku* [*Ethics*], published in three volumes in 1937, 1942, and 1949, to which I will resort, in order to clarify the concepts of the former. *Fūdo* was translated into English in 1961 as *Climate: A Philosophical Study*. Later, in 1988, it was reissued as *Climate and Culture: A Philosophical Study*. The term “climate” attempts to replace the particular concept of *Fūdo*, which expresses a correlation between the human being and “environment” that cannot be reduced to an external relationship between two objects.⁴ On the contrary, Watsuji aimed to analyze the “phenomena of climate” not as a mere physical or “natural environment”—that is, as a matter of natural sciences—, but as “expressions of subjective human existence” (Watsuji 1988, v). Indeed, according to the Japanese philosopher, “[t]he most frequent misunderstanding about climate occurs in the commonplace view that influences exist between man and his natural environment” (Watsuji 186 1988, 8). This standpoint is the effect of abstracting the phenomenon of the environment—climate and landscape—, disconnecting it from human existence and its cultural history, and reducing it only to a natural environment. For Watsuji, this procedure is reflected even in the statement that “not only is man conditioned by climate, but that he, in his turn, works on and transforms climate” (1988, 8). Such dualism does not match with a phenomenology of *climate*. In this sense, Watsuji attempted to emphasize the mutual relations between historical and environmental conditionings as main characteristics of the fundamental structure of human existence.

In the prologue of *Fūdo*, Watsuji explained that the relationship between the human being and the environment was unconcealed to him in its “true

4 Augustin Berque (2004, 390–391) explains in detail the translation problems that Watsuji’s work has had both in English and German. Berque is also the French translator of *Fūdo*, and in the cited article he justifies his choice of the word “*milieu*” as the most suitable to express Watsuji’s thought. In the Spanish translation, Juan Masiá and Anselmo Mataix opted for the word “*ambientalidad* [environmentality],” and they usually add “*paisaje y clima* [landscape and climate]” for a more comprehensive definition, as they explain in their prologue: Masiá and Mataix (2006, 9–14).

guise” during his journey to Europe, when his mind “was full of a variety of impressions” gathered throughout that period (1988, vi). Watsuji’s contact with different landscapes, in addition to the reading of the problem of temporality displayed by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit*, impelled him to “ruminate over and to concentrate [his] attention on [his] impressions about climate” (1988, vi; mod. text). The last part of *Fūdo* established the peculiarities of the conditioning of the monsoon environment in Japan composing, thus, an inquiry into the *authentic self-understanding* of the Japanese people.⁵

During the 1930s, while delving into his study of Heideggerian philosophy, Astrada wrote a series of essays centered on the relationship between the human being and landscape. The most outstanding of these studies, “La existencia pampeana” (1934), rewritten and published in 1938 under the title “Para una metafísica de la pampa,” was an attempt to elucidate the “characteristic landscape” of “Argentine humanity” (Astrada 2021c, 581).⁶ For Astrada, while the human being itself, “by the essential structure of its existence, is primarily a distant, ecstatic being, that is to say that, for it, the being of its existence is the farthest thing,” the Argentine human being, by virtue of the landscape, to which it has been thrown into existence, the telluric desolation of the Pampas, is “doubly ecstatic,” a “being of distance,” “a vanishing shadow and dispersion on its total melancholy, spiritual correlate of the monochord infinitude of the extension” (Astrada 2021c, 583–584). Ten years later, this essay will be a part of *El mito gaucho*, one of his main works. Astrada argued that “[t]he vague outline of the Pampas is the very outline of our intimacy”. We cannot “get rid of it,” because “it is part of our being” (Astrada 1948, 14). As Watsuji, he added a personal experience to his reflections:

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“when we were far away from the Pampas, at the mercy of the hallucination of European cities, we suddenly felt scattered, helpless in a desert area, superimposed, or better, under-imposed magically to our

⁵ The last section of *Fūdo* includes numerous contrasts between the “East” and the “West.” See, for example, the comparison between European and Japanese cities and housing and the reflections on the possibility of parliamentary democracy in Japan (Watsuji 1988, 157ff; 168–170).

⁶ All translations of Astrada’s works are mine.

urge to deal with the values of European culture [...]; we felt carried by a kind of inner discontinuity, by an emotional silence. A silence filled with the shadow of distant nights. It was the enigma of the Pampas traveling by our side.” (Astrada 1948, 13-14)

Far from his native landscape, Astrada discovers himself as what he really is: “a man of the Pampas.” But the Pampas are not simply “the physical environment,” but “spiritual Pampas,” “constituent” of the “ontological structure” of the Argentine human being (Astrada 1948, 14).

In *El mito gaucha*, Astrada draws conclusions on the historical-political dimension of the Pampean existence. According to the author, the inclination to dispersion of the Pampean *Dasein* would have been historically shaped by a generation that deserted its own destiny, vicarious of foreign modes of existence, a “transplant civilization” that turned the Pampas into a *Hinterland*, “colonized according to the requirements and to meet the needs of the European metropolis” (Astrada 1948, 36). Hence, the first task imposed to the Argentinean *Dasein* is to recover itself from the dispersion. This would make possible its authentic existence.

I would like to focus on Astrada’s considerations on the relationships between landscape and the human being. In *El mito gaucha*, the author remarked on the positive contributions of *geopsique* and climatology, while he at the same time also characterized the Pampas as an “existential structure of the Argentinean man” (Astrada 1948, 1, 5–6; 14). However, it must be noted that *geopsique* and climatology are *natural sciences* and, as such, they cannot reach the question of landscape in its ontological dimension.⁷ Only in 1949, Astrada developed such an attempt, in his article “Historicidad de la naturaleza,” a part of a friendly controversy between him and the Italian philosopher Ernesto Grassi.⁸ Astrada vindicated that all nature is already historized and, in a certain

7 In *Tierra y Figura*, Astrada returns to *geopsique*, climatology, and “*geobiology*,” but his treatment is rather ambiguous, tending to point out the inadequacy of those approaches for an ontological inquiry (Astrada 1963, 11–12).

8 The polemic took place as a result of the First National Congress of Philosophy in Mendoza, Argentina (1949). Grassi and the main European philosophers attended the Congress. Grassi’s work, “Contacto con la Naturaleza ahistórica y el mundo occidental

sense, “humanized.” This argument contrasted with the “lack of historicity” of nature that Grassi, overwhelmed by the monumentality of the Andes, thought to have found in the Americas—in a clear reminiscence of an old topic of Hegel’s regarding the *peoples without history*. As Astrada stated, “we owe it to Heidegger to have posed this problem in its true terms and on the basis of a strict elucidation of the ‘world’ phenomenon and an adjusted ontological approach to the nature and the being of the historical” (Astrada 1949, 159). In that sense, “nature is already involved in the historicity of Being-in-the-world of human being. Whatever the attitude, with which we place ourselves in front of nature,” Astrada argued, “every natural being is already within the existential perspective of our worldhood,” and, consequently, “all nature, even in its greatest distance from man’s possibilities, is always historical.” In other words, for Astrada all nature

is always the object of a more or less historical experience, experience that ranges from the mathematical formulas of physics in function of the purpose of mastering it technically to the aesthetic enjoyment of its multiple forms, and the awe and reverence in the presence of its uncontrollable power. (Astrada 1949, 159)

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Watsuji would agree with Astrada. For him, climate and landscape do not

exist alone and in isolation from history, entering and becoming a part of the content of history at a later juncture. From the very first, climate is historical climate. In the dual structure of man—the historical and the climatic—history is climatic history and climate is historical climate. History and climate in isolation from each other are mere abstractions; climate as I shall consider it is the essential climate that has not undergone this abstraction. (Watsuji 1988, 10)

técnico” and Astrada’s response were both published in the third fascicle of *Cuadernos de Filosofía* (Universidad de Buenos Aires), directed by Astrada himself. On the Astrada-Grassi debate, see David (2007).

Watsuji recognized that in *Sein und Zeit* there is, in fact, a treatment of spatiality—which can be found mainly in §§ 22–24. Nevertheless, he argued that, in Heidegger’s approach, spatiality remains “almost obscured in the face of the strong glare to which time was exposed” (Watsuji 1988, v). Watsuji was “intrigued by the attempt [of Heidegger] to treat the structure of man’s existence in terms of time,” but he also found it “hard to see why, when time had thus been made to play a part in the structure of subjective existence, at the same juncture space also was not postulated as part of the basic structure of existence” (Watsuji 1988, v). In that sense, Watsuji tried to point out a “limitation” in Heidegger’s work, to which he intended to reply with a *cultural phenomenology of the landscape* capable of filling the gap between temporality and spatiality.

190 Watsuji’s conception is clearly expressed in his commentary to the analysis of the “things-being-at-hand,” in which he complemented the Heideggerian perspective with his own standpoint of the landscape phenomenology: “the essential character of the tool lies in its being ‘for a purpose,’ lies, that is, in this purpose-relation. Now this purpose-relation derives from human life and at its bases we find the climatic limitation of human life” (Watsuji 1988, 13). Then, Watsuji developed a phenomenological consideration that we could call *historic-genetic*:

clothes are to be worn, yet they are worn above all as a protection against cold. Thus this purpose-relation finds its final origins in climatic self-comprehension. As well as understanding ourselves in cold or heat, we take measures, as free agents, for protection. We should not devise clothes completely spontaneously in the absence of the factors of cold or heat. [...] It is clear, then, that such tools have a very close relationship with climatic limitation. To say, then, that tools are to be found nearest to hand is, in fact, to say that climatic limitation is the foremost factor in objective existence. (Watsuji 1988, 13–14)

After his attempt at phenomenological clarification of the importance of “climate” in the basic structure of human existence, which is the main purpose of the first chapter of his book *Fūdo*, Watsuji dedicated the remaining chapters

to analyze three different types of landscape with their respective human types: the desert, the meadow, and the monsoon. He focused his attention on the latter to reinforce the specificities of the Japanese human type, which he characterized as “receptive and resigned,” with raptures of “savage resistance” (Watsuji 1988, 134; 137).

In quoting Heidegger as the one who made possible the analysis of the “historicity of nature” on ontological bases, Astrada did not pretend, like Watsuji, to point out a “limitation” or insufficiency of Heidegger’s work. However, Astrada’s developments could be easily read in that key, bringing it closer to the Japanese philosopher’s approach. The “Being-one’s-Self,” he would say on the first page of *Tierra y Figura*—a book from 1963, in which he resumed his inquiry of the relationship of the human being with the environment—, “it is a function *not only* of its time and its cohabitants, *but also*, and to a large extent, of its land, of the *genius loci*, of the landscape’s numen” (Astrada 1963, 9–10; my own emphasis).⁹ Thus, the “historical self-comprehension” of a community, its “self-awareness” (Astrada 1963, 25), is not produced solely in relation to the dimensions of temporality and historicity—which were in the foreground in Heidegger—, but it is also produced on the basis of a characteristic environment, already historized; in other words, the discovery “of ourselves,” the “self-apprehension” of the human being, according to Watsuji’s analogous formula, always occurs in a climate and landscape that condition and limit all the cultural objectivities of a community, and that is expressed in “literature, art, religion, and manners and customs” (Watsuji 1988, 6–8).

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On the very first pages of *Tierra y Figura*, Astrada stated that “it has not been rehearsed, as far as we know, a human typology based on the predominant shaping influence of the landscape” (Astrada 1963, 13). He then outlined some brief observations on this “typology”: the “somewhat lost

9 Although pointing out the need to consider nature from a perspective that intertwines environmentality and historicity, Astrada did not reach the depth of a concept like *Fūdo*. Instead, he frequently used the ambiguous and imprecise expression, *genius loci*. Some of the difficulties that the notion of *genius loci* has in the Astradian work are exposed in Prestía (2019). Lorenzo Marinucci has convincingly proposed a clarification of *genius loci*, bringing it closer to the precision of the vocable *Fūdo* and presenting it as its Western substitute (Marinucci 2017, 221–222).

look, requested by the mountain” of the “man of the Andes”; “the looking that penetrates distances and gets lost in them” of the man of the Pampas; and the particular look of the man of the mountain valleys, who shortens and narrows distances, “losing the real sense of them.” Those notes complete the picture of “Argentinean humanity,” which fifteen years earlier had been reduced to the Pampean landscape (Astrada 1963, 13–14; 18).

III. The corporality, the others, the community

192 It is possible to find another common ground in Astrada’s and Watsuji’s works in their insistence on considering *the individual human being* as an abstraction. Along these lines, Watsuji’s reading of Heidegger places the latter alongside the entire modern Western philosophical tradition, which the former considers to be of an *individualistic* tendency. For Watsuji, “an attempt to treat the structure of human existence as one of time only would fall into the error of trying to discover human existence on the level only of individual consciousness” (Watsuji 1988, 9). Thus, for the Japanese philosopher it is necessary to “investigate the temporality of *ningen sonzai* [human existence] in line with that subjective spatiality in which the self and the other, although opposed, are nonetheless brought into unity” (Watsuji 1996, 228). The emphasis on landscape and climate conditioning also implies an appreciation of the *social* dimension of the human being, as it will be shown further on.

As others have highlighted (Janz 2011, Liederbach 2012), Watsuji’s critique seems to forget that Heidegger had argued that *Dasein*, as Being-in-the-world, is always a Being-with [*Mitsein*] and that Being-with-Others [*Mitdasein*] is an essential determination of existence.¹⁰ However, it is true that Heideggerian *Daseinsanalytik*, especially with regard to the treatment of authenticity [*Eigentlichkeit*], falls entirely on the individual *Dasein*, leaving little room for the relation to others—of which, in the form of the everydayness of the they [*das Man*], the resolute *Dasein* is in fact subtracted. In short, Watsuji’s critique of Heidegger could be linked to what some authors have established

10 For a reading that defends Watsuji’s critique, but tries to show that some of his developments could be found in Heidegger’s lectures on Aristotle (*Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 1924), see Culbertson (2019).

as the *Dasein*'s "solipsism."¹¹ According to Watsuji, in Heidegger's work "the relation between person and person" was "overlooked" and "hidden behind the relation between person and tools." "For this reason," he continues, "his disciple K. Löwith tried to bring to light this hidden element and clarify the idea of 'world' mainly with reference to relationships between person and person." (Watsuji 1996, 17) With such words, Watsuji addressed Karl Löwith's *Habilitationsschrift, Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen, ein Beitrag zur anthropologischen Grundlegung der ethischen Probleme* (1928), of which Heidegger himself was supervisor. Watsuji took into account Löwith's view to develop his own conception, centered on the interpersonal character of human existence.¹²

A critique such as Watsuji's is completely absent in Astrada, who, from the beginning, focused on *Mitdasein*. He dedicated a chapter of his first book, *El juego existencial* (1933), to comment extensively on Heidegger and to criticize other philosophical approaches regarding the problematic relationship between oneself and the others. Astrada succinctly expounded upon Löwith's arguments, but did not find a divergence between them and Heidegger's stance. Instead, Astrada acknowledged a complementarity between them, which would not allow him to delve too deeply into that inter-personal character of existence:

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Löwith, following the direction marked by Heidegger, has exposed [...] the fundamental and immanent structures of contemporaneity (*Mitwelt*). [...] World is always world of contemporaries. The concept of "the others" lies at the basis of the world's most primary determination of contemporaries or co-beings. (Astrada 1933, 91)

¹¹The earliest contestations to *Dasein*'s solipsism can be found in Scheler's critical account of Heidegger's ontological treatment of *Angst* and *Weltlichkeit* (1928) in *Sein und Zeit*, posthumously published as *Zu «Idealismus-Realismus» – Aus Teil V: Das emotionale Realitätsproblem* (GW 9, pp. 254–304). One should also consider Gadamer's phenomenology of the *pólis* as well as his ethical rehabilitation of the (Platonic) dialectic after Heidegger's criticism in *Sein und Zeit*, which was published in his *Platos dialektische Ethik* (1931) (GW 5, 5–163).

¹²For a reading of Löwith's critique of *Sein und Zeit*, see Riesterer (1969).

It should be noted that the reading of Heidegger carried out by Astrada was done from the very first point onwards with an emphasis placed on the ethico-political possibilities derived from *Mitsein*. This can be seen in “Heidegger y Marx,” a lecture delivered in September 1932 in Buenos Aires, one of the first theoretical rapprochements between these two thinkers. Astrada endorsed *Sein und Zeit*'s § 74, in which Heidegger states that *Dasein*, as Being-in-the-world, “exists essentially in Being-with-Others,” and that “its historizing is a co-historizing,” “determinative for it as *destiny* [*Geschick*],” a word that designates the “historizing of the community, of a people” (Heidegger 1962, 436). In this sense, the link with Marx is given from the consideration that revolutionary practice “surpasses individual human existence,” and is always done by a collective historical subject (Astrada 2021b, 472). Thus, for Astrada, *Dasein*'s solipsism was never raised as a problem because “own existence” is always considered within a community.

194 Watsuji began from the observation of the dual character of human existence, which is at the same time “individual” and “social.” Watsuji rejected “anthropology, which treats man the individual, [and] sociology, which takes up the other aspect” (Watsuji 1988, 9). None of them respond to the reality of the human being, whose basic structure must be grasped at the same time “as individual and as whole” (Watsuji 1988, 9). The dual character of human existence, upon which Watsuji insisted, removes ontological primacy from both sides of that duality, seeking instead a relational approach: neither the self can be understood outside of a totality, nor the totality can lose sight of the many individual beings that make it up. On the basis of the Japanese terms *ningen*, which implies the individual and social dimensions of human being, and *aidagara*, which points to the *interpersonal* character of human existence or *in-betweenness*, Watsuji developed his own philosophical anthropology. Such a development is based on his thought about historical-environmental conditionality and his ethics—which does not imply a normative discourse, but the “order or the pattern through which the communal existence of human beings is rendered possible” (Watsuji 1996, 11). There is no individual subject that simply relates to another, but in all subjectivity, there is always already implied an in-betweenness, which is the way of being of human beings (Watsuji, 1996, 10). That in-betweenness is what, according to

Watsuji, Heidegger had neglected, although he considered human existence as essentially *Mitdasein*.

The dual character of human existence reveals itself in the phenomenology of landscape: when we feel cold, “we stiffen, or we put on warm clothes, or we draw near the brazier. Or, we may feel more concern about putting clothes on our children or seeing that the old are near the brazier” (Watsuji 1988, 5). “We feel the same cold in common. [...] Thus, it is not ‘I’ alone but ‘we’, or more strictly, ‘I’ as ‘we’ and ‘we’ as ‘I’ that are outside in the cold.” (Watsuji 1988, 4) Later, Watsuji exemplifies this duality of human existence with the experience of *the rejoicing in the cherry blossoms*: “the blossoms take our attention and we invite our friends to go blossom-viewing or drink and dance with them under the trees. Thus, in our relationship with the spring scene, either individually or socially we adopt various measures for securing enjoyment from it” (Watsuji 1988, 5–6).

Therefore, the self-understanding within the environment “reveals itself in the ways of creating communities, and thus in the ways of constructing speech, the methods of production, the styles of building, and so on” (Watsuji 1988, 12), objectivities, in which the individual human beings recognize themselves as belonging to a social dimension that is beyond them and that, at the same time, constitutes them—and that they also contribute to constitute. Hence, for Watsuji, “the basic unit of the structure of being inherent in *ningen* [human being] cannot be conceived of apart from the community” (Watsuji 1996, 228).¹³

Likewise, environmental conditioning means for the individual the awareness of its own body (Watsuji 1988, 12). In the reassessment of corporality, Watsuji turned away again from Heidegger, who gave little importance to it in *Sein und Zeit*. Conversely, for Watsuji, “the body is not mere matter,” but it is also subjectivity, a “self-active” principle that has “its foundation [in] the spatial and temporal structure of human life” (Watsuji 1988, 11). To establish a connection between corporality and environment implies a consideration of both dimensions of human life that goes further than the analysis that can

13 Hans Peter Liederbach (2012) has critically pointed out that, while “in a strict logical sense”, neither the “individual” nor the “totality” has ontological primacy, “in a practical level” “the individual has to submit itself to society”.

be offered by natural sciences or scientific anthropology. It cannot even be properly grasped by the “philosophical anthropology of today”—Watsuji was probably alluding to Scheler—, because it is limited to “the study of ‘individual man,’ without considering him as a whole, that is, in his relations with the others, relations that are historically-environmentally placed (Watsuji 1988, 10). In that sense, “Watsuji did not treat *fūdo* as solely the natural environment, but as a concept in which biological, physical, and geographical features exert forces on human living and through which human beings in turn transform the environment” (Murphy 2021, 22).

196 Astrada also addressed corporality in a controversial attitude towards Heidegger. In *La revolución existencialista* (1952), he argued that the human being is an “individual of a biological species with the functional ontological possibility of rising [...] to the *humanitas*,” elevation that occurs “without nullifying its nature.” For Astrada, “to exist [...] presupposes the ontic conditionality of *Dasein* (of the human being),” namely, its “entitative or psychophysical support,” its “biological substrate” (Astrada 1952a, 111–113). In discussion with the later Heidegger, Astrada concedes to his Freiburg Professor that “existence can never be thought of as a specific modality among other ways, and that the body of man is something different” from the animal organism, “but not ‘essentially’ different, as Heidegger claims”. Accordingly, “man, as he humanizes, makes his body an instrument for his humanity” (Astrada 1952a, 112). Thus, Astrada opened the possibility of thinking the historicity inscribed in human corporality itself as a result of the co-constitutive bond between *Dasein* and its surrounding world. This is evident in the “human typology” contained in *Tierra y Figura* (Astrada 1963, 13).

Furthermore, *corporality* allowed Astrada to challenge the representation of the universal and “abstract” human being. This representation, erected by the enlightened rationalism as a self-legitimizing image of the upcoming bourgeois civilization, is dominated by the instrumental *ratio* and the hypostasized “spirit.” At this point, the influence of German romanticism and historicism becomes evident.¹⁴ Astrada emphasized the reference to the

14 In *La revolución existencialista*, Astrada drew on the important contributions of Herder and Dilthey (1952a, 189ff). See also Astrada (1945; 1952b).

“national” dimension and argued for a human being “with an instinctive and emotional repertoire of historically conditioned preferences” and a reason developed in the “historical and psychovital reality” of such human groups. Such ideas should replace the “universal” and “cosmopolitan” character of the former “image of man” (Astrada 1952a, 194). Astrada contested the abstract universalism—in short, Eurocentrism—, in which each historical personality is diluted in the technical progress and its apparent neutrality. Yet, this did not result in particularism or exclusivism because, as I will show in the last section, he looked ultimately for an integration or complementarity of different human types. Universality is only achieved through immersion in the historical particularity of each community.

In this way, Astrada reintroduced the collective dimension of mankind, which makes superfluous the “pseudo-antinomy of *individualism* and *collectivism*” (Astrada 1952a, 194). In the same manner as Watsuji, for Astrada, “the singular man only exists and becomes meaningful within the community, in which he was born and to whose destiny he is bound” (Astrada 1963, 66).

Likewise, as the environment is already historized, the ways of dealing with it also involve the appropriation and recreation of the cultural objectivities that a community developed in the past: “it is not only we ourselves who today cooperate to defend ourselves or work against the cold, the heat, the storm, or the flood. We possess an inheritance of self-apprehension accumulated over the years since the time of our ancestors.” (Watsuji 1988, 6)

In summary, both Watsuji’s and Astrada’s proposals for a *cultural phenomenology of landscape* laid the foundations for an analysis of human life capable of giving an account of the mutual imbrication among the historical conditioning, the *incarnated* human being, the inter-personal relations of different orders—of kinship, friendship, erotism, labor, etc.—, and, finally, the dimension of the totality that gathers them, which both authors addressed: the people or national communities.

IV. “Own death” and “being for life”

For Carlos Astrada, the question of finitude was always the touchstone of Heidegger’s philosophy. This can be seen in the first articles, in which he

introduced Heidegger to the Argentinean public towards the beginning of the 1930s. There, he announced “the truth of the great new word brought to us by Heidegger: metaphysics of finitude” (Astrada 2021a, 406). As it is well known, in *Sein und Zeit* the “*anticipatory* resoluteness” allows an “authentic existence,” which is experienced as a subtraction from the “the ‘they’” [*das Man*] that permanently “conceals” it in the face of death (Heidegger 1962, 299). In Astrada’s reading, in which the ethico-political scope of Heidegger’s conception is emphasized, “own death” is always understood as subtraction from “the ‘they’” as well as *Dasein*’s reference to the national community or “political people”—the collective subject of historical change according to Astrada. In this sense, “true philosophy [...] is what leads man to meet his finitude, to his self-determination that allows him to have a destiny” (Astrada 1952a, 90). That self-determination is, at all times, *with-others*. As a consequence, Astrada frequently assumed the heroic and sacrificial *pathos* that can be found, at times, in Heidegger’s work (Losurdo 2001).

198 For Watsuji, the Heideggerian treatment of finitude is insufficient to the extent that it does not manage to break the sphere of the individual. Thus, his criticism of what he considers the “individualism” of Heideggerian thought is also revealed in his scant appreciation of the notions of “Being-towards-death” [*Sein zum Tode*] and “authenticity” [*Eigentlichkeit*].¹⁵

Watsuji argued that “[e]ven though such events as one’s last moments, the deathwatch, the funeral, a tomb, a Buddhist service held after forty-nine days in which a bereaved family, relatives and friends participate all belong to human death, [Heidegger] omits them” (Watsuji 1996, 219). According to Robert Carter, for Watsuji “[t]he preoccupation with one’s death is by itself insignificant, unless one includes the implication one’s death has for others or for society at large” (Carter 1996, 342). Death must be considered a phenomenon that occurs in the in-betweenness of human existence. Hence, “only in the relationship between self and other that the preparedness for death gives full play to its genuine significance” (Watsuji 1996, 226).

The inauthenticity of daily life, in which “one dies,” thereby hiding the most fundamental of *Dasein*’s possibilities, is well suited to a phenomenology of the

15 For a reading of Watsuji’s “authenticity,” see Liederbach (2012) and Shuttleworth (2019).

urbanized modern life of the Western Europe between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, the soil, from which Heideggerian philosophy sprang. The very phenomenon of the concealment of death responds, in fact, to a recent historical process—as Philippe Ariès, for example, has shown in his classic historical-anthropological work (1974). Thus, we could say that the awareness of one’s own finitude always occurs in a particular historical-environmental conditioning. The ontic contents of that disposition toward death are entirely traversed by that conditioning. I am not referring only to the way, in which we deal with the deceased body, although in that case we may also think that the environment conditions our death, *what to do* with it. I am thinking especially of the way of being, in which daily life is associated with the natural cycle of seasons, in which death is in fact involved in life as one of its moments. Astrada’s and Watsuji’s development helps us to understand that the historical-environmental conditioning weaves the ways, in which the individual human being is linked to its own death and the death of the others.

Complementary to his critique regarding the Heideggerian conception of death, Watsuji argues that what Heidegger portrays as “authenticity” also remains in the individual sphere. As Liederbach explains, “*Dasein*’s ‘authentic self’ (*eigentliches Selbst*) is nothing but the individual self insisting on its individuality and turning its back to all communal forms of existence” (Liederbach 2012, 131). Thus, according to Watsuji, “what Heidegger calls *authenticity* is, in reality, inauthenticity. And when this in-authenticity becomes further negated through the nondual relation of self and other, that is to say, when the *self* becomes annihilated, only then is authenticity realized” (Watsuji 1996, 225).

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In the light of Astrada’s and Watsuji’s works, perhaps the individual finitude can be thought beyond the extremes of sacrifice or solipsism. Astrada argues in *Tierra y Figura*:

at the end of their life cycles, all human beings remain leveled by the earth in an oblivion so remote that, in relation to it, it leads them to the immemorial [...]. This telluric oblivion erases the temporal differences of their emergency to life; the birth is poured into a slope, which knows no milestones or limits. (Astrada 1963, 15)

Herewith, the Argentinean author seems to evoke what Watsuji proposed: the “existence for death” [Being-towards-death] of the individual conscience is, in truth, “existence for life” [Being-towards-life] of the national community:

Men die; their world changes; but through this unending death and change, man lives and his world continues. It continues incessantly through ending incessantly. In the individual’s eyes, it is a case of an “existence for death”, but from the standpoint of society it is an “existence for life.” (Watsuji 1988, 10)

Finite individual existence, conditioned by an *ethos* that it recognizes and responds to, is thus inserted into the cycle of continuous renewal and transformation—identity in difference—, which is precisely a human collectivity.

V. The recovery of “landscape” as a critique of the Western capitalist modernity

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As I mentioned, Carlos Astrada’s and Tetsurō Watsuji’s remarks involved not only a phenomenology of landscape, but also an attempt to elucidate the *ethos* of their national communities. These inquiries into the peculiar characteristics of each people can be read as starting points for dealing, in the historical situation of the Western modernity, with the dynamics of capital itself, which pushes towards the imposition of a sole human type, de-historicized and de-environmentalized: the individual-consumer.

The question can be put as an urge: synthesizing a humanity that escapes the homogenization, to which the global era leads. However, by virtue of our own historical situation, we cannot ignore the cultural objectivities that we identify with the unfolding of the West, such as modern science and technology; dimensions that both authors recognize. This is based on the common conviction that in the various human types complementarity must be sought. For Watsuji, knowing one’s own character allows “an understanding of characters different from one’s own and facilitates the supplementation of one’s own failings through the adoption of another’s strong points” (Watsuji 1988, 132). Understanding the “Self,” is a necessary condition for understanding

otherness. By deepening into our *ethos*, we can “make contributions to human culture of which no other people is capable” (Watsuji 1988, 207). Similarly, Astrada argues that,

no single people, however extraordinarily gifted it may be, has access by its own means to the whole of truth and beauty, to the realization of full humanity. Rather, all other peoples participate with their thoughts, efforts, own ideals, and dreams, to its unveiling and full achievement. (Astrada 1963, 22)

From another standpoint, the matter can be approached in the terms of *modernity* and *tradition*, poles of an antinomy that, taken separately, are equally sterile. The works of Astrada and Watsuji aim to pursue an integration that would allow not to fall on the extremes of modernization—understood in its mere economic dimension—or traditionalism—as an exclusivism. In this sense, although with different degrees, it is clear that both philosophers are expressing their concerns from a similar historical-geographical situation: from the countries of semi-periphery, possible protagonists of an *alternative modernization*.¹⁶

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It becomes necessary, then, to delve into the peculiarity of landscape. It constitutes a limit: someone is neither free from being Argentinean or Japanese, nor can they escape it. In other words: we are not free of being who we are due to a historical-environmental particularity. Moreover, as Astrada and Watsuji intended, wherever we go, we carry with us our landscape, our limit. To go beyond that limit, to overcome it, we first have to understand and apprehend it, we have to be what we can be, in fullness. They both called for an assumption of the limit understood as possibility. This implies a challenge to an abstract *idealistic* vision that seeks to introduce universal models to unique dissimilar realities. As Watsuji explained, “we must remain conscious of the significance of, and love, our destiny, our destiny to have been born into such a climate,” but also: “the conquest of climate” “can only be achieved only by a

¹⁶ For a related approach to Watsuji’s philosophy, which tries to make it a resource for decolonial theory, see Murphy (2021).

climatic path—by the attainment, historically, of an awareness of climate. This done, man may surmount climate.” (Watsuji 1988, 207; 39)

In short, what Astrada and Watsuji suggested is that the human being is, individually and socially, solely in a historized landscape. The threads of human existence are intertwined with a characteristic historical-environmental conditionality, which in its sedimentation expresses a peculiar way of being of a national community, an *ethos* that can be seen in its cultural objectifications. From the comparison presented between the work of both authors, a similar proposal emerges, which calls for us to assume our historical-environmental conditionality and bring it to the fullest of its possibilities as a way of transcending it.

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PENSIERO CALCOLANTE E NICHILISMO

IL CASO DEL LINGUAGGIO E LA TERRA NATALE

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Računajoče mišljenje in nihilizem. Primer govornice in domovine

Povzetek

Članek skuša pokazati povezavo med nihilizmom in računajočim mišljenjem v Heideggrovi filozofiji. Nihilizem v skladu z njegovo opredelitvijo obravnava kot »zanikanje odtegovanja biti«, kar je v nasprotju s pojmovanjem nihilizma kot odsotnosti bivajočega: potemtakem nihilizem ni izraz odsotnosti, temveč manifestacija

eksesa bivajočega. Vprašanju računajočega mišljenja se članek približa v kontekstu refleksije o tehniki in razpolaganju s »tistim, kar je« (*Gestell*), ki sovпада s sodobnim nihilističnim poudarkom glede bivajočega: nihilizem obdobja tehnike je *enotujoča zahteva* po dostopnosti vsega kot razpoložljivega obstanka. Tovrstna zahteva zadeva tudi obravnavo govorice kot golega sredstva komunikacije in lastnega (*das Eigene*) kot izkustva v zatonu. Avtor trdi, da prazno identiteto kot bistvo današnjega nihilizma lahko presežemo z označitvijo značilne diference materinščine in domovine: namen članka je torej osvetlitev predhodnosti istega (*das Selbe*) pred identičnim (*das Gleiche*) v procesu prevladovanja sodobnega nihilizma.

Ključne besede: nihilizem, računajoče mišljenje, govorica, domovina, diferenca.

Calculative Thinking and Nihilism. The Case of Language and Homeland

Abstract

208 The paper shows the link between nihilism and calculative thinking in Heidegger's philosophy. Nihilism is considered in accordance with the definition as the "denial of the dispossession of Being," which opposes its conception as absence of beings: it is, thus, not the expression of absence, but a manifestation of the excess of beings. Calculative thinking is addressed in the context of the reflection about technology and disposal over "that which is" (*Gestell*) that coincides with the contemporary nihilistic emphasis regarding beings: nihilism of the technological times as *the unifying exigency* of everything as reserve. This exigency is extrapolated onto the consideration of language as merely a means of communication and of the own (*das Eigene*) as experience in decline. The author argues that empty identity as the essence of current nihilism could be overcome with the emphasis on the characteristic difference of mother language and of homeland: the intention, therefore, is to highlight the pre-eminence of the same (*das Selbe*) over the identical (*das Gleiche*) in the process of an overcoming of the contemporary nihilism.

Keywords: nihilism, calculative thinking, language, homeland, difference.

Introduzione

Nell'*Überlegungen II-VI* (1931–1938), specificatamente nelle “Riflessioni VI”, si afferma: “Quando l'impossibile – ciò che si sottrae al calcolo – è diventato impossibile, l'uomo ha falsato la sua più meschina piccolezza facendola passare per grandezza” (GA 94, 496). Questa affermazione, che può essere considerata in linea generale come una diagnosi dello stato attuale del mondo,¹ non è altro che l'espressione non ancora sviluppata di un fenomeno fondamentale: la manifestazione contemporanea di uno stato della storia dell'essere nella quale questo non solo si sottrae (*entzieht*), si rifiuta (*sich weigert*), ma che tale rifiuto è negato nell'esaltazione dell'ente, e nel passaggio dal primato di questo alla disponibilità in quanto riserva (*Bestand*) nel mondo globale della calcolabilità tecnica: è l'esperienza dell'uomo contemporaneo nel mondo della civilizzazione mondiale (*Weltzivilisation*),² dominata da ogni tipo di “presenza”³ e dalle diverse forme del suo inarrestabile consumo.

Però oltre a descrivere questo stato attuale delle cose (*Sachverhalt*), dove il primato dell'ente riservato al consumo è quello che caratterizza il tratto dell'uomo con il mondo, Heidegger desidera segnalare che il “fondamento” di questo “stato delle cose” ha le sue radici nel dispiegamento ultimo dell'oblio dell'essere e del suo rifiuto. È così che superando la concezione tradizionale della opposizione fra ente e nulla come origine del concetto del nichilismo, che ovviamente include per lui la riflessione filosofica di Nietzsche fondata sulla svalutazione dei valori supremi (Heidegger GA 6.2, 31–398; GA 5, 209–267) – un altro modo di indicare il declino di questi, la loro nullità, e suo

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1 Cfr. inoltre: Heidegger 2008; GA 16, 530–533, 558–561, 574–582, 711–713, 715–717, 742–743 e 744–745.

2 Termine usato da Heidegger per significare la cultura contemporanea dove predominano le scienze naturali, l'economia, la politica e la tecnica con il suo carattere calcolante. Cfr. GA 16, 711–713, 742–743 e 744–745. Un'analisi della fase tardiva della filosofia di Heidegger si può vedere in: Guzzoni 2009.

3 È anche il senso del chiamato “mondo virtuale”, che malgrado la sua prima apparenza è un altro modo dello stare davanti, che addirittura determina, per esempio, forme dell'essere e del comportarsi socialmente. La virtualità, i social network e internet sono, in questo senso, solo un modo in più del venire alla presenza dell'ente. Riguardo alla relazione tra nichilismo e tecnica (*Information and Communication Technologies* (ICTs)), cfr. Schuck 2020, 51–60.

“nessun senso” per la vita umana –, Heidegger ipotizzerà che la sua esperienza nichilista fa direttamente riferimento all’essere e non al nulla dell’ente. In questo modo si potrà segnalare che è precisamente nell’epoca più sviluppata del primato dell’ente su “quello” che sfugge alla calcolabilità tecnica quando è possibile sperimentare il culmine del nichilismo, concepito come eccesso dell’ente e non come evidenza del nulla.

210 Come è noto ormai, nel suo *Nietzsche II*, Heidegger tratta dettagliatamente il nichilismo come esperienza,⁴ e rimarca la concezione nietzschiana di questo in termini della svalutazione dei valori supremi e il conseguente bisogno di una trasvalutazione. Heidegger sostiene, tuttavia, che questa via d’uscita non è altro che il culmine (*Vollendung*) della metafisica occidentale, che nella sua preminenza conferita alla volontà di potenza considerata come fondamento, trascura il carattere del rifiuto dell’essere nell’ente, e con ciò non riesce a comprendere la vera essenza del nichilismo, che consiste nella negazione della sottrazione essenziale dell’essere nell’ente (ibid., 321 sgg.). La cosa implicita nel paragrafo delle *Überlegungen* citato recentemente è, quindi, il vincolo dell’avvenimento storico del nichilismo proprio del rifiuto dell’essere nel suo stato più sviluppato, e il calcolo tecnico che considera tutto l’ente come riserva (*Bestand*) e disponibilità.⁵ Ambedue si incontrano quindi, per la loro natura, nell’oblio della domanda per il senso di quello che è, e in questo modo nella “cecità” di fronte all’“impossibile” di un’esperienza che trascenda il semplicemente amministrabile attraverso il calcolo.⁶ Le parole dello stesso Heidegger permettono di chiarire ancora di più questa relazione:

[...] con la metafisica della soggettività che arriva al suo termine, il quale corrisponde all’estrema sottrazione della verità dell’essere, inizia l’epoca dell’oggettivazione incondizionata e completa di tutto quello

4 Questa è la concezione generale che attraversa il resoconto storico del concetto in: Volpi 2009. Altre presentazioni generali e alquanto descrittive del nichilismo sono: Fabris 2020 e Soncini 1999.

5 È l’essenza della tecnica moderna considerata come *Gestell* (disposizione congiunta di tutto l’ente come disponibilità). Cfr. fra gli altri: Heidegger GA 5, 72 sgg.; GA 7, 5–36; GA 11, 31–50; GA 76, 283–379 e GA 79, 24–45. Cfr. anche: Siani 2020, 173–181.

6 Cfr. Rocha de la Torre 2019, 57–81.

che è. Nell'oggettivazione, l'uomo stesso, e tutto quello che appartiene all'umanità, diventa una mera esistenza consistente (*Bestand*) che, calcolato psicologicamente, rimane integrato al processo del lavoro della volontà di volontà. [...] Tanto gli uni come gli altri sconoscono l'essenza occulta secondo la storia dell'essere, cioè, l'essenza nichilista, [...] Il fatto che, nel processo dell'oggettivazione incondizionata dell'ente in quanto tale, l'umanità convertita in materiale umano rimanga addirittura posticipata rispetto alle materie prime e ai materiali da lavoro, non risiede in una preferenza presumibilmente materialista per la materia e la forza rispetto allo spirito, ma si fonda sull'incondizionale dell'oggettivazione stessa, che deve arrivare a possedere e ad assicurare il possesso di tutte le esistenze consistenti, di qualsiasi tipo siano. (Heidegger 2000b, 314; GA 6.2, 387)

1. Calcolo tecnico e nichilismo

Però cosa sostiene questo collegamento del nichilismo come storia dell'essere con il calcolo e con l'epoca del predominio tecnico? Possiamo trovare la risposta iniziale a questa domanda nella distinzione heideggeriana del pensiero calcolante e del pensiero meditativo. Mentre la domanda iniziale del pensiero occidentale indagò per il "che-cosa" (*Was*) di tutto l'ente, per l'ente in quanto ente,⁷ che condusse verso una soluzione che trova la sua risposta in un altro ente, stabilendo in questo modo il modello onto-teo-logico per la spiegazione di tutta la relazione ontica tra un'entità fondante ed un ente fondato (Heidegger GA 11, 51-79), il modo di procedere calcolatore indaga per il rapporto di mezzi e fini, così come per i legami che possono essere stabiliti tra enti disponibili (esistenze in riserva) e la loro assicurazione in un intreccio di disponibilità, cioè, in una disposizione congiunta di tutto quello che è in quanto disponibilità (*Gestell*).

La domanda per il "che-cosa" si trasforma in un'indagine strumentale sul "perché" proprio della pianificazione, organizzazione e assicurazione dell'ente,

7 Cfr. Aristoteles 2003, IV 1, 1003a20-25. In GA 45 Heidegger segnerà che questa domanda corrisponde all'indagare proprio della tempra d'animo dello stupore (*Er-staunen*), differenziandolo dello spavento (*Erschrecken*), tempra fondamentale dell'altro inizio.

che trascura la ricerca del senso di quello che è, e non chiede nemmeno per il “che-cosa” che fonda la propria azione calcolatrice. Si configura in questo modo un intreccio di disponibilità “cieche” – chiuse allo stupore ed al mistero (Rocha de la Torre 2019) –, e con questo un’impalcatura di ovvietà ed abitualità che liberano l’ente da tutto quello che non sia la semplice riserva e la mera sostanzialità della sua presenza. Questo intreccio di disponibilità è quello che Heidegger descrive segnalando, per esempio, la trasformazione della corrente del fiume, del vento e del suolo di una regione in fonti energetiche, del bosco in riserva di carta ed i suoi derivati, ecc. (Heidegger GA 7, 8 sgg.; GA 79, 26 sgg.).

Da questa prospettiva assicuratrice dell’ente nella sua totalità – amministratrice delle riserve disponibili, con funzioni e fini stabiliti a priori – si indebolisce il modo caratteristico dell’indagare proprio del pensiero meditativo, e con esso l’apertura al mistero, cioè, di “quello” che nello stare più in là del semplicemente presente pone dinnanzi allo stupore la verità dell’“impossibile” – la sottrazione che si disoculta (Rocha de la Torre 2019).⁸ Però “dato che il ‘mistero’ (μυστήριον) non è solo quello che rimane sconosciuto per essere irraggiungibile alla ragione umana, ma fondamentale l’esperienza di ‘un chiudere gli occhi e le labbra’ (μύστις, derivato dal verbo μύω)” (ibid., 68), lo stupore di fronte a quello che si ritira nell’occultamento di quello che appare, non può essere equiparato alla semplice e grossolana curiosità dell’ansia di novità che determina il vivere quotidiano dell’uomo contemporaneo. Lo stupore sarà, quindi, la tempra d’animo fondamentale (*Grundstimmung*) (Heidegger GA 45), che preservando il mistero mantiene chiusi gli occhi e le labbra, quindi sospende simultaneamente la semplice percezione dell’ente come presenza e la mera indicazione di questo come oggetto di descrizione del linguaggio concepito come strumento (Rocha de la Torre 2019, 68): è un andare più in là della semplice sostanzialità del “che-cosa” e dei suoi casi, così come del mero sfruttamento della riserva particolare di un ente nel tutto delle disponibilità intrecciate.

In questo modo “lo stupore è un’apertura affettivamente mediata di fronte al disoccultamento dell’ente, preservando tuttavia la ritirata, l’assenza,

⁸ Questa esperienza, contraria alla prospettiva che si limita a concepire tutto l’ente come quello che semplicemente si mostra, lasciando da una parte la domanda per il rifiuto di quello che si sottrae in questa manifestazione, è un altro nome per l’esperienza della verità come esser-scoperto (*alétheia*).

l'occultamento e il rimanere fuori da quello che rimane sottratto più in là degli occhi e delle parole" (ibid.): è un prevalere della sottrazione che si sa "presente", che non si dimentica né si nega. Heidegger, tuttavia, considera lo stupore come tempra fondamentale della domanda originaria per l'ente (primo inizio) e, con ciò, come un indagare proprio della metafisica occidentale (GA 45, §§ 31–41). Questo apparente vicolo cieco è risolto, ciononostante, in una "mutua appartenenza" (*Zusammengehörigkeit*) di stupore (*Er-staunen*) e spavento (*Schrecken*), nel quale il primo e l'altro inizio hanno un punto d'incontro che impedisce considerare la tempra fondamentale dello stupore semplicemente come un fenomeno lasciato alle spalle in tutta la pretesa post-metafisica (ibid., 197). Si può sostenere, quindi, che lo stupore diventa in questo modo un elemento essenziale dello spavento e, con ciò, si va trasformando in una tempra la cui essenza non consiste nell'indagare per l'ente e la presenza, ma per l'impossibile e la sottrazione: per "quello" che supera la presenza captata dagli occhi e che va più in là della mera funzione indicativa e descrittiva della parola.⁹ La domanda per il senso, e conseguentemente l'apertura al mistero propria dello stupore, è pertanto il superamento del semplicemente lì, dell'esclusivamente concepito come ente per l'uso e la disponibilità: prevale l'impercettibile e l'indicibile, che è l'inconsueto e l'impossibile al senso comune e alla cultura di massa; la filosofia in quanto inquietudine per la sottrazione nella presenza. Prevale, quindi, la domanda per l'essenza come indagine per l'essenziar-si del fenomeno in questione.

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La morte dello stupore considerato come apertura al mistero, e con ciò la negazione e l'oblio della sottrazione dell'essere nell'ente, proprio della domanda per il "che-cosa" ed il "perché" della disponibilità tecnica del pensiero calcolante, non solamente offrono gli indizi più palpabili del dispiegamento storico della metafisica, ma anche, e fondamentalmente, del nichilismo in quanto storia dell'essere (Heidegger GA 6.2, 23–361). Nel declino della domanda per il senso e nella preminenza del procedere tecnico coincidono, quindi, come un solo fenomeno, il culmine della metafisica, l'auge del pensiero che calcola, la paralizzazione dello stupore di fronte a quello che si rifiuta e si occulta, la

9 A "questo" si può anche dare il nome dell'"il sublime", quello che si trova sotto il limite raggiungibile dai sensi e dal linguaggio nella sua versione strumentale (Rocha de la Torre 2019).

banalizzazione del mistero e l'avvenimento dell'essenza del nichilismo, che ormai non si spiega in termini di un nulla dell'ente, di una carenza di valori supremi, ma come un vuoto e banale tralasciare ("negazione") l'essenziale sottrazione dell'essere nella comparizione dell'ente: tutto questo non significa nient'altro che la caduta nel "sì" della quotidianità dominata dall'uso e dalla manipolazione di enti nel mondo attuale della civilizzazione del consumo.¹⁰ È per questa ragione che un presunto sconfinamento dei limiti stabiliti dai valori hanno prevalso in tutta la cultura occidentale e che, malgrado la diversità di figure nelle quali si esprimono, si sono convertiti in fili conduttori del patto dell'uomo con il mondo, non è altro che il culmine interrato del dominio finale del nichilismo in quanto negazione della sottrazione dell'essere:

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Solo il presunto superamento del nichilismo istaura il dominio dell'incondizionato lasciar fuori dal rimanere fuori dall'essere stesso in beneficio dell'ente del tipo della volontà di potenza che pone valori [...] il rimanere fuori dell'essere essenza nel modo di ammettere l'estremo lasciar fuori da sé e dare così appoggio alla scossa del meramente reale [...], che si vanta di essere quello che è, arrogandosi allo stesso tempo l'azione per decidere solo l'efficace – il percepibile e la sensazione, il vissuto e l'espressione, l'utile e il successo – devono valere come ente. (Heidegger 2000b, 305; GA 6.2, 375 sgg.)

È a partire del predominio del pensiero calcolante come forma esclusiva di impegnarsi con gli altri e con la natura – come manifestazione di una volontà instauradora di valori inclini all'ente – che questo assume il carattere unificatore proprio della sua essenza tecnica in quanto *Gestell*: tutto l'ente concepito e trattato come semplice disponibilità assicurata nell'intreccio di disponibilità. Pretendo mostrare in seguito che questo carattere è generatore di un vuoto che implica la manifestazione del nichilismo che si esprime nella negazione del sottrarsi dell'essere nel mezzo dell'accentuazione dell'ente.

10 La società caratteristica della civilizzazione mondiale contemporanea, dominata dal consumo e dalla carenza dello stupore, così come dalla morte dell'esperienza del sublime nell'accettazione avventata dell'abituale, dell'ovvio e dell'approvato socialmente.

2. Nichilismo, linguaggio e terra natale

La conseguenza più propria di questo nichilismo consumato sarà l'identità carente di differenza. Il termine più appropriato per illustrare questo vuoto, che si identifica con la carenza di differenza prodotto della negazione della sottrazione (*Entzug*) dell'essere, è quello di "identità" in quanto *Gleichheit* (Heidegger GA 7, 196 sgg.; GA 8, 244 sgg.; GA 10, 116; GA 11, 55). Due possibili esempi, fra tanti, dell'anteprema storica di questa carenza di carattere ontologico, sono il decadimento del linguaggio proprio (*Muttersprache*) e l'oblio della terra natale (*Heimat*).¹¹ Con la loro totale dissoluzione inizieremmo a sperimentare il compimento dell'autentico nichilismo come storia dell'essere: trasformazione di tutto in un'identità vuota, caratterizzata dall'ente indifferenziato nella sua completa disponibilità e amministrazione.

L'espressione "linguistica" di questo processo di negazione della sottrazione dell'essere nell'ente, e con questo del mistero che conserva il lato occulto di tutto il disoccultamento, e conferisce un senso all'apertura affettivamente mediata dallo stupore, è la disposizione del linguaggio come semplice strumento di comunicazione, come mezzo di designazione e segnalamento degli enti intramondani, e come oggetto di analisi.¹² Da queste tre prospettive, il linguaggio è considerato come un ente in più fra molti altri e, di conseguenza, è concepito esclusivamente come una possessione umana che obbedisce alle determinazioni conferite dall'uomo nel suo uso come nella sua analisi. A partire da questa considerazione strumentale del linguaggio, l'"essere" è convertito, per esempio, in una semplice categoria logico-linguistica, la cui funzione consiste nel servire da copula ad una proposizione costituita da soggetto e predicato.¹³

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Però il linguaggio inteso semplicemente come un ente in più, può anche spiegare quelle espressioni linguistiche che sembrerebbero poter fuoriuscire

11 Riguardo al rapporto fra l'oblio della terra natale (*Heimatlosigkeit*) e il mondo di oggi, cfr.: Volpi 2003, 1261–1267).

12 Cfr. la postura heideggeriana rispetto alla filosofia del linguaggio in relazione alla sua domanda per l'essenza della parola: Heidegger GA 9, 318; GA 12, 13 e 231; e GA 38, 14 sgg.).

13 È quello che succede nel molto conosciuto lavoro di Rudolf Carnap (1931, 219–241).

dai limiti stabiliti dal pathos dell'assicurazione di tutto quello che è. Una manifestazione di questo pathos è, per esempio, la determinazione del linguaggio poetico come linguaggio metaforico, che fornisce alla creazione del poeta una sfumatura di realtà ontica imprescindibile nel momento di dar senso a quello che enuncia nella sua parola. Persino nel caso della creazione letteraria di questo tipo, si presume un minimo di intenzionalità comunicativa e di funzione mostrativa (*zeigen*): il linguaggio non può superare la sua determinazione come ente riferito a enti. È per questa ragione che nella società del predominio tecnico e calcolante, la valutazione positiva del linguaggio è direttamente proporzionale alla sua vicinanza parametrica ad un ente particolare o ad un insieme di enti determinati. D'altronde, quello che pretende essere un altro di fronte al linguaggio della mera designazione, può essere catalogato dispettivamente come inefficienti parole proferite dal poeta o dal filosofo, che non riescono ad afferrare quello che, presumibilmente, cercano di descrivere.

216 In questo contesto è pertinente ricordare la distanza proposta da Heidegger rispetto alla metafora ed al bisogno di accudire alla filosofia del linguaggio all'ora di cercare di comprendere la verità dell'essere. Posteriore alla caratterizzazione del linguaggio come "casa dell'essere" (GA 9, 313–364), e segnalando pertanto la relazione fra l'essenza del linguaggio e la verità dell'essere, Heidegger ribadisce il bisogno di considerare l'altra versione del linguaggio, dimenticata dalla sua prospettiva strumentale e antropologica. Solamente la comprensione di quello che il linguaggio è nella sua essenza (GA 9; GA 12, 7–30, 147–204 e 227–257; Rocha de la Torre 2006, 121–155), ci porterà a capire tanto il senso ultimo della caratterizzazione dello "stesso" (*Selbigkeit*) di essere e linguaggio, come il processo di decadimento di detta essenza nel primato della metafisica della soggettività e dell'opinione pubblica. Al rispetto Heidegger sostiene:

[...] quando la verità dell'essere raggiunge finalmente lo status che la rende degna di essere pensata dal pensare, anche la riflessione sull'essenza del linguaggio deve raggiungere un altro livello. Ormai non può continuare ad essere mera filosofia del linguaggio [...]. La devastazione del linguaggio, che si estende velocemente dappertutto [...] nasce da una minaccia contro l'essenza dell'uomo [...]. Anche il

linguaggio ci ruba la sua essenza: essere la casa della verità dell'essere. Il linguaggio si abbandona al nostro volere e fare sotto forma di strumento di dominazione sull'ente (GA 9, 19–20 e 318).

La concezione esclusivamente strumentale del linguaggio è quindi una forma in più di tralasciare la sottrazione dell'essere nell'ente – l'impossibile da essere raggiunto dalla parola che designa – e, con ciò, la maniera più effettiva di sfuggire all'esigenza di pensare la differenza – portarla al linguaggio in quanto “lasciare che accada” (*Erscheinenlassen*) (GA 12, 196 sgg., 202, 224 e 251). “Designare” e “segnalare”, così come analizzare da un versante tecnico della filosofia il modo in cui questo lavoro si compie, non sono altro che espressioni di una forma particolare di voltare le spalle a quello che rimane protetto oltre l'evidenza presente. È l'occlusione dell'apertura al mistero, di quello che supera i limiti del comprensibile agli occhi e del designabile dalle parole: è in questo modo la messa in scena del nichilismo nella sua fase più sviluppata come negazione della sottrazione dell'essere nell'apparire dell'ente.

Il linguaggio concepito solamente come strumento è l'espressione della riduzione della parola all'evidente della presenza che deve essere designata, analizzata, catalogata, amministrata ed assicurata, anche “linguisticamente”, nella disposizione congiunta di tutto quello che è. Non c'è con questo una forma accettata dal linguaggio dell'amministrazione, e dal linguaggio amministrato, di chiedere per l'assente nella presenza di ciò che si presenta, né di indagare a fondo per la possibilità di un nesso essenziale fra parola ed essere all'orizzonte della sottrazione che “fondamenta” come abisso (*Abgrund*). In questo consiste, di conseguenza, la “nichilizzazione” dell'essenza del linguaggio: nella rinuncia alla sottrazione dell'essere nell'accentuazione dell'ente disposto per essere nominato ed assicurato.

Sono tali le portate di questa determinazione tecnica del linguaggio, che pur nei tentativi più riusciti per fuggire dalla ristretta funzione di designazione delle parole, questa si impone nel momento in cui valuta le creazioni “linguistiche” a partire dal suo legame con l'ente o l'insieme di enti riferiti in essa. Heidegger valuterà che questo è il caso particolare della metafora, che malgrado il fatto di essere una creazione letteraria non riesce a fuggire, tuttavia, dal suo obbligato riferimento ad un mondo di enti che sembra precederla. È per questo che la

metafora sarà legata indissolubilmente al confronto fra il sensibile (l'ente lì presente) e il non-sensibile (la figura letteraria), e per questa ragione sarà il frutto di un'attività del pensare attraverso la quale questo compie un processo di "figurazione" (di traslazione: *Übertragung*) dall'ente sensibile verso l'ente non-sensibile. In questo contesto, il punto di riferimento della produzione figurata sarà il suo livello di avvicinamento al sensibile preventivamente passato al vaglio del procedere tecnico figurativo del pensare: il livello somiglianza raggiunto fra l'ente figurato e la figura che lo rappresenta permetterà di definire, per lo meno a grandi linee, l'uso riuscito o non della capacità figurativa del pensare.

Come non capire, per esempio, la metafora della pelle considerata come velluto sciupato, nel senso di una traslazione figurata del decadimento di una persona anticamente rigogliosa e giovane? Sarebbe valutata come una metafora valida se facesse riferimento, per esempio, ad una bella e giovane persona che conserva la freschezza e l'esuberanza caratteristica della gioventù? La distanza che potrebbe stabilirsi in questo caso tra la figura letteraria e la realtà che questa tenta di tradurre, sarebbe catalogata come un tentativo fallito di portare come metafora il passare del tempo sul viso di una persona.

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In qualsiasi caso, qui si tratta di un processo di adeguamento del pensare all'ente – una bella forma di rispettare l'esigenza di concordanza tra intelletto e cosa (Heidegger GA 13, 179) –, malgrado l'apparenza di essere riusciti attraverso la figura letteraria ad andare più in là del requisito che determina il procedere logico (coerenza) e scientifico (concordanza). Con la metafora, quindi, il linguaggio non riesce ancora a superare i limiti stabiliti dalla sua concezione strumentale, dato che resta legato al procedere rappresentativo del pensare e si mantiene ancora nell'ambito della riduzione dell'essere al presente e alla sua traslazione (*μεταφορά*). Malgrado tutta l'apparenza, la metaforizzazione rimane legata al primato dell'ente e, con ciò, alla negazione della sottrazione dell'essere dell'apertura al mistero, dato che continua ancora legata alla rappresentazione del trasferito dal presente obiettivo al presente immaginato. È solo una forma in più dell'espressione metafisica del rinvio all'ente di spalle all'esperienza dell'essenza stessa del linguaggio e del pensare.¹⁴

14 Tanto il linguaggio, concepito come "lasciar accadere" (*Erscheinenlassen*), come il pensare, considerato come "portare lì avanti" (*Hervorbringen*) sono collegati con

Nell'ambito di una riflessione sul "pensare", Heidegger segnalerà questo carattere metafisico della metafora:

La rappresentazione del "trasferire" (*übertragen*) e della metafora si trova nella differenziazione [...] fra il sensibile e il non-sensibile. [...] L'istaurazione di questa divisione fra il sensibile e il non-sensibile, il fisico ed il non-fisico, è un aspetto fondamentale di quello che si chiama metafisica. [...] Con l'intellezione che penetra nel carattere limitato della metafisica, diventa caduca anche la rappresentazione della "metafora", che detta la regola [...]. Per questo, la metafora serve come un mezzo ausiliare, frequentemente utilizzato nell'esegesi delle opere del poetizzare e della plastica artistica in generale. Solo all'interno della metafisica si dà il metaforico. (GA 10, 72)

Tutto l'uso del linguaggio come mezzo disponibile, pertanto, non permette accedere all'essenza del linguaggio (GA 12, 9–33, 157–216 e 239–269; GA 95, 20, 68–69, 92–95 e 288–289). Però in che cosa consiste tale essenza? Nel *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (GA 12), incontriamo la più chiara riflessione da Heidegger al rispetto. Dato che ormai non si tratta semplicemente di confermare l'ente preesistente attraverso la designazione ed il segnalamento, o la figurazione metaforica, ma di trovare la mutua appartenenza del linguaggio e dell'essere (Heidegger GA 9; GA 12, 106 sgg., 155 e 255; GA 8, 262 sgg.), Heidegger segnalerà che la forma indicata di accedere all'essenza del linguaggio è l'"esperienza": è necessario fare un'esperienza con il linguaggio affinché questo ci mostri la sua essenza. Però cos'è "esperienza" e cos'è "essenza" in questa rinnovata accezione heideggeriana del linguaggio?

In "L'essenza del linguaggio", Heidegger caratterizza l'"esperienza" come quello che ci oltrepassa (*widerfahren*) e ci trasforma (*verwandeln*). Non sta

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l'accadere della verità in quanto *alétheia* e, in questo modo, con il fenomeno del lasciar comparire, così distante dal semplice processo di traslazione figurata della "realtà". In riferimento al senso non tecnico-moderno del "*Hervorbringen*", si può vedere fra l'altro Heidegger (GA 9, 313 sgg.; GA 7, 22 sgg. e 161 sgg.), dove si caratterizza questo "*Hervorbringen*", dovuto al suo collegamento etimologico con la *téchne*, come un "lasciar che accada nel presente" (... *in das Anwesende erscheinen lassen*).

pensando, pertanto, in un mero vissuto soggettivo che può essere significato e trasformato d'accordo al libero arbitrio dell'uomo, ma in un avvenire che si impossessa di noi (*überkommen*) e ci domina (GA 12, 149). È per questo che non possiamo semplicemente affermare che “abbiamo un'esperienza con qualcosa o con qualcuno”, ma al contrario, ed essendo rigorosi con quello che Heidegger vuole far capire, dobbiamo sostenere che un'esperienza ci appoggia e ci tempera aprendoci all'apertura della sua essenza. Quindi, un'esperienza con il linguaggio non può significare altro che aprirsi al dispiegamento della sua propria essenza.

220 E cosa vuol dire Heidegger con “essenza”? Nelle conferenze 1957/1958 (GA 12, 190) Heidegger concepirà che il termine “essenza” (*Wesen*) è limitato per poter esprimere quello che, per esempio, il fenomeno del linguaggio esige nel suo proprio dispiegamento. Per questa ragione andrà oltre il senso stretto del sostantivo (*Wesen*), per arrivare alla forma verbale del participio presente o attivo (*wesend*), per far capire che non si tratta della definizione di una sostanza specifica nella sua sostanzialità, ma di fare l'esperienza nel modo in cui accade (*geschieht*) il proprio (*das Eigene*) del linguaggio nel suo dispiegamento: questa risorsa permetterà di pensare l'essenza in termini di un incessante essenziar-si in quello che si è (ibid., 164 sgg.). Questo quadro di riferimento impedirà, per esempio, cadere nella leggera ed errata interpretazione di alcune affermazioni heideggeriane in termini di tautologia e circoli linguistici carenti di senso: verbigratia “la cosa cosea” (*das Ding dingt*) (GA 7, 175 sgg.), la temporalità temporizza (*die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt*)¹⁵ e, nel caso del quale qui mi occupo, “il linguaggio parla” (*die Sprache spricht*),¹⁶ che in un'accezione più adeguata al senso filosofico heideggeriano, potrebbe enunciarsi come “il linguaggio è essendo linguaggio”. È in questo contesto che ha senso l'asseverazione che l'essenza del linguaggio solo diventa accessibile nell'esperienza del suo

15 Cfr., per esempio: Heidegger GA 2, 403 sgg. (§ 61 sgg.), esattamente p. 435 (§ 65). Anche: “die Zeit zeitigt” (GA 21, 410), “die Welt weltet” (GA 5, 30 sgg.; GA 7, 181 sgg.), ecc., fra gli altri molti possibili esempi.

16 Dato che la tradizionale traduzione come “il linguaggio parla” genera l'idea di un soggetto, denominato linguaggio, portando a termine un'azione che è parlare (Heidegger GA 12, 9–33, 13 sgg., 239–268, e 244 sgg.).

dispiegamento: nell'ascolto e nella corrispondenza (*Entsprechen*) alla sua interpellanza (*Anspruch*) (ibid., 29 sgg. e 203 sgg.).

Ormai non si tratta di acquisire conoscenze circa il linguaggio e la sua essenza – concepita come “quello che qualcosa è” (ibid., 9 e 190) –, ma di ascoltare l'essenza di questo e corrisponderle nel parlato (*Sprache*). Però l'essenza del linguaggio secondo Heidegger è un “Dire” (*Sagen*) che rimanda al “mostrare” (*Zeigen*) nel senso di “lasciare che accada” (*Erscheinen lassen*) (ibid., 188 sgg., 224 e 241 sgg.), che simultaneamente occultando ed illuminando conferisce libertà alle regioni del mondo (*Weltgegende*) (ibid., 202–203). Il linguaggio è nella sua essenza, pertanto, un avvenire che lascia che venga presso quello che è, lasciandolo presentarsi nella sua doppia figura di disoccultamento-occultante (*alétheia*). Su questo concorda quindi il linguaggio con la caratterizzazione heideggeriana del “pensare” in quanto “portare avanti” (*Hervorbringen*), cioè, in quanto lasciare che appaia (*begegnen*) quello che viene alla presenza.

Questa concezione, sviluppata nelle conferenze “Il linguaggio”, la già riferita “L'essenza del linguaggio” e “Il cammino verso il linguaggio”, ha come precedente quanto sostenuto da Heidegger sul nesso fra il pensare, l'essere ed il linguaggio, nella sua “Lettera sull'umanismo”. In questa lettera, tale come lo fa in molteplici occasioni, Heidegger conferisce a poeti e pensatori (al poetizzare ed al pensare) il compito di salvaguardare il linguaggio nella sua essenza, quello che significa assumere dal suo orizzonte il compito di custodire la “mutua appartenenza” di sé stesso con l'essere ed il pensare. Il senso di questa “mutua appartenenza” diventa evidente in quello che afferma lo stesso Heidegger nel 1946, quando sostiene che “[...] nel pensare l'essere arriva al linguaggio”, infatti questo è la casa dell'essere (GA 9, 313). Questa prospettiva è riaffermata per lo meno in altre due maniere.

a) Nella considerazione della custodia del linguaggio, che poeti e pensatori compiono, come portare a termine (*Vollbringen*) la manifestazione (*Offenbarkeit*) dell'essere nel dire (*Sagen*) (ibid.) e, pertanto, nel mostrare (*Zeigen*) in quanto lasciar che avvenga o che si manifesti quello che viene alla presenza.

b) Nell'impossibilità di pensare l'essere nella carenza di linguaggio nella sua accezione essenziale, e del pensare nel suo versante non tecnico. Questa

maniera di formulare la “mutua appartenenza” di essere e linguaggio è plasmata in tre espressioni poetiche evidenziate da Heidegger:¹⁷

– Incontriamo la prima di queste espressioni nel poema di Stefan George “La parola”, oggetto della riflessione di Heidegger in “L’essenza del linguaggio” ed in “La parola”: “Nessuna cosa sia dove si rompe la parola” (“*Kein Ding sei wo das Wort gebricht*”) (GA 12, 153 sgg. e 208 sgg.).

– Un secondo esempio è la dichiarazione “Però quello che perdura, lo fondano i poeti” (“*Was bleibt aber, stiften die Dichter*”) (Heidegger GA 4, 33 sgg., 75 e 81 sgg.; GA 39, 32 sgg. e 214 sgg.; GA 12, 161), alla quale il pensatore tedesco dedica, per esempio, la sua conferenza del 1936 “Hölderlin e l’essenza della poesia”.

– Alla fine, troviamo la stessa postura nella risposta offre alla domanda sollevata al poema di Georg Trakl “Una notte d’inverno” (*Ein Winterabend*). Heidegger mantiene in un primo momento l’accezione tradizionale del linguaggio come nominare e designare, asseverando che nel poema si descrive e si nomina semplicemente una notte d’inverno. Si domanda successivamente se questo nominare è semplicemente segnalare con parole il rappresentabile di una situazione, come in questo caso sarebbe nominare tutti quegli aspetti che caratterizzano quella notte d’inverno: la neve, i rintocchi della campana, la finestra della casa, ecc. Quindi si tratta solamente di descrivere quello che si osserva in quella notte d’inverno? Heidegger sosterrà di no, enfatizzando che:

Il nominare non distribuisce titoli, non impiega parole, ma chiama le cose alla parola. Il nominare invoca [...] l’invocazione chiama al venire. In questo modo porta ad una vicinanza la presenza di quello che precedentemente non era stato chiamato. [...] La neve che cade e la campana del pomeriggio che suona ci è detto qui ed ora dal poema. (GA 12, 18)

Mantenendosi nell’ambito della stessa domanda per l’essenza del linguaggio, però concentrandosi ora nella specificità della lingua materna e

17 Anche se queste tre esigono un’attenta delucidazione separatamente, oltrepassano l’obiettivo ultimo di questo testo, ragione per la quale solo saranno riferite come esempi generali del vincolo segnalato fra essere e linguaggio.

del dialetto (*Mundart*), Heidegger accudirà nella sua opera più tardiva alla poesia dialettale di Johann Peter Hebel (GA 13, 123–125, 133–150 e 155–180; GA 16, 491–515, 530–548 e 641–649) per mostrare per lo meno tre fenomeni fondamentali: a) il carattere essenziale di questo linguaggio del proprio, b) il senso ontologico, e non meramente strumentale, della lingua natale e, con ciò, c) l'apertura del mondo inerente a questa (Rocha de la Torre 2012, 37–55). In questo processo, nel quale si cerca di delucidare l'esperienza del linguaggio proprio (*Muttersprache*), Heidegger inizia realizzando una diagnosi negativa rispetto al riconoscimento del valore di questo linguaggio. Segnerà che per l'intromissione della spiegazione metafisico-tecnica del mondo, è stato molto difficile poter affrontare adeguatamente il carattere del proprio (*Eigentümlich*), ed addirittura pensare al modo particolare di “parlare” collegato con la terra. Questa situazione ignora anche – quello che può significare una perdita irreparabile – il fatto stesso del vincolo de la terra (*Erde*) con le radici e il radicamento (*das Bodenständige*) al proprio (GA 12, 193–194).

Con questo contesto di fondo, Heidegger sviluppa una concezione riguardo il dialetto e la sua relazione con il linguaggio in generale, che chiarirà anche la sua idea della terra natale (*Heimat*), concepita al di là dell'affrettata e dell'esclusoria interpretazione di questa come il luogo dove si nasce, dato che detta accezione conduce ad un'ingenua difesa conservatrice del proprio.¹⁸ Pensando nei *Allemannische Gedichte* di Hebel, Heidegger si domanda nel suo discorso di Zähringen de 1954, “Johann Peter Hebel”, se il fatto che questi siano stati scritti in dialetto germanico (la lingua materna del poeta) li converte automaticamente nell'espressione del mondo ristretto e limitato (GA 16, 491 sgg.), quello della Germania del sud a principio del secolo 19 nel quale furono scritti. La risposta a questa domanda, così come il significato ultimo dell'universalità conferita da Heidegger alle creazioni di questo poeta, saranno direttamente vincolate, precisamente, con una prospettiva non restrittiva della terra natale e della sua lingua.

Anche se abitualmente si considera che il dialetto è un maltratto (*Mißhandlung*) e deterioro (*Verunstaltung*) del linguaggio colto e del

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18 Riflessioni molto importanti sul concetto della terra natale si trovano in: Buchner 1985, 72–82 e Welsch 1985, 83–111, Marten 1980, 136–159 e Trawny 2004, 80.

linguaggio scritto, esso è, al contrario, sostiene Heidegger, la misteriosa fonte di tutto il linguaggio maturo (ibid.): in esso fluisce tutto quello che si salvaguarda nello spirito del linguaggio (*Sprachgeist*) (ibid.), quello a partire dal quale non solo si parla, ma si pensa e si agisce (GA 16, 155 sgg.). Da questo avvicinamento in difesa del dialetto, è possibile osservare una specie di “incarnazione” del linguaggio originario, che implica che si consideri non solo nella vicinanza all’essenza stessa del linguaggio, ma anche come un’apertura affettivamente mediata di entrare nel “rapporto” (*Umgang*) con il mondo.

Questo è quello che sembra voler dire Heidegger con la sua concezione del dialetto, così come della lingua materna, in termini di “quello” dal quale si pensa e si agisce. Si tratta con questo, allora, di segnalare un superamento dei limiti strumentali del linguaggio, legati alla sua funzione che designa, per evidenziare il suo carattere costitutivo di mondo nel pensare e nell’agire.

224 Questa delucidazione dell’essenza del dialetto, dalla quale lo si fa vedere come un semplice strumento di comunicazione ormai decaduto e superato, e al contrario si evidenzia nel suo carattere di origine e fonte (GA 13, 117 sgg., 124 sgg., 134 sgg. e 155–180; GA 16, 495 sgg.), finisce per conferirgli un ruolo fondamentale nell’esperienza umana del lasciar comparire e venire alla presenza quello che è.

È precisamente per questa ragione che Heidegger sosterrà che quello che salvaguarda lo spirito di una lingua non sono altro che le impercettibili (*das Unscheinbare*), “semplici (*einfache*), pero fruttifere relazioni con Dio, con il mondo, con gli uomini e le loro opere, e con le cose, cioè, tutto il supremo e tutto quello che governa (*das Durchwaltende*), dal quale ogni cosa procede facendosi vigente e fruttificando” (GA 13, ibid.). È in questo punto, di conseguenza, dove il dialetto e la lingua materna coincidono interamente con la caratterizzazione già segnalata dell’essenza del linguaggio come lasciar-che avvenga.

Questa è la ragione per cui Heidegger considera che nel dialetto è radicata l’essenza stessa del linguaggio e, con esso, il casalingo dell’essere a casa (*das Heimische des Zuhaus*), cioè, la terra natale: “Il dialetto non è solamente il linguaggio della madre [sostiene], ma simultaneamente, e anzitutto, la madre del linguaggio”, quello che determina che in sua assenza o perdita definitiva l’uomo diventa carente di parola (GA 13, 156) e, in questo modo, carente di

verità e di mondo proprio. Senza il superamento del linguaggio limitato alla sua funzione strumentale si perderebbe, di conseguenza, non solo il potere aletheologico della parola – il lasciar che accada proprio del dispiegamento del linguaggio nella sua essenza: il disoccultamento che porta alla presenza sostenendo, tuttavia, la sottrazione –, ma anche il radicamento della stessa al proprio delle relazioni che l'uomo sostiene con gli altri, con Dio e con il mondo. La “carezza della parola” significherebbe, alla fine, il trionfo di galatei linguistici vuoti ed universali al servizio della designazione di quello previamente accettato come dato. Tale sembra essere il destino dell'umano nel mondo della civilizzazione mondiale in auge, nella quale non solo muoiono lentamente le lingue materne, ma anche i modi particolari di entrare in una “relazione” (*Umgang*) significativa con il mondo.

La difesa heideggeriana di un mondo caratterizzato dalla differenza, contrario all'apogeo del globale nel suo versante unificatore, fa che il linguaggio proprio e terra natale siano valutati come antidoti al nichilismo caratteristico della preminenza dell'ente sulla sottrazione ed il mistero. Questa è la ragione per cui Heidegger sosterrà nella sua conferenza “Sprache und Heimat”, che non si tratta ormai solo di pensare “linguaggio e terra natale”, ma di pensare il linguaggio come terra natale (GA 13, 180), segnalando in questo modo l'indissolubile mutua appartenenza dell'uno e dell'altro nel vincolo del proprio (*das Eigene*), che è il marchio indelebile del diverso.

Questa concezione del dialetto, e con esso della lingua materna più originaria, segnala in definitiva il senso essenziale del linguaggio: il lasciare che accada o si manifesti (*Erscheinenlassen*) di quello che appare in *un mondo*, concepito, tale come è stato già segnalato, come quella forma particolare (propria) di entrare in relazione (*Umgang*) con gli altri, con Dio, con il mondo e con le cose. In questo senso, *ogni mondo* è retto completamente da quell'insignificante ed impercettibile che rimane salvaguardato, nascosto sotto il limite di quello che possono raggiungere gli occhi e la bocca che enuncia parole come strumenti (Rocha de la Torre 2019). Il salvaguardato della lingua materna, e con esso della terra natale, rimane come mistero sotto il limite di quello che è lì semplicemente presente agli occhi di molti, e che per questo si configura come un'esperienza con il non evidente del suo.

3. Superamento dell'identità vuota

Dato che l'essenza del proprio (terra e lingua natale) è l'avvenire di *un mondo* in relazione già menzionata con "il supremo" e con "quello che governa" (*waltet*), il proprio (*das Eigene*) sarà la manifestazione della differenza e, pertanto, "dello stesso" (*Selbigkeit*) fondato sulla diversità di modi di relazione ed apertura al mondo. Però "lo stesso" (*das Selbe*) non è l'identico (*das Gleiche*), sosterrà Heidegger in "La costituzione onto-teo-logica della metafisica", dato che mentre nell'identico scompare la differenza (*Verschiedenheit*), nello stesso, al contrario, questa si manifesta nella sua pienezza (Heidegger GA 11, 55).

226 E cosa può essere la negazione della sottrazione dell'essere nell'ente, se non vuota identità e, di conseguenza, negazione della differenza che irradia su tutta l'esperienza umana del proprio, e che nel mezzo del mondo omogenizzato dall'esigenza universale di disposizione tende ad essere annichilata? La vacuità che implica il cammino che sembra intraprendere l'uomo contemporaneo verso un unico mondo (calcolo e disponibilità di tutto l'ente in quanto riserva) e verso un unico linguaggio (quello della pubblicità – *Öffentlichkeit* – e quello del "si" – *man* – inerente alle designazioni che presuppongono sensi dovuto alla preminenza del consueto – *das Gewöhnliche* – e della ovvietà – *die Selbstverständlichkeit* –), non sono altro che l'indicazione del primato ogni volta più dominante del pensare assicuratore di tutto l'ente nella civilizzazione tecnica mondiale attuale.¹⁹

È con questo quadro di riferimento che Heidegger si domanda (GA 16, 578) se in mezzo al dominio della tecnica moderna e delle trasformazioni prodotte da essa, è ancora possibile che ci sia la terra natale (Held 2012, 99–113). Però questa non è, tuttavia, una domanda di origine conservatrice che cerca di difendere il proprio (*das Eigene*) inteso in senso stretto ed esclusorio

19 In *Zu Ernst Jünger* (GA 90), due concetti caratterizzano lo stato più sviluppato del primato della tecnica: la macchinazione (*Machenschaft*) e la mobilitazione (*Mobilisierung*), forme estreme dell'assicurazione dell'ente nella sua totalità come manifestazione della volontà di potenza in quanto volontà di volontà. Rispetto al pathos dell'assicurazione, si veda anche *Nietzsche II* (GA 6.2, 21 sgg. e 145 sgg.). D'accordo con il carattere assicuratore e macchinale del dispiegamento attuale della tecnica, non posso esserlo tuttavia con l'identificazione heideggeriana della volontà di potenza nietzschiana con il dominio dell'ente nella sua totalità (Rocha de la Torre 2020, 61–75).

dall'altro e dallo strano: Heidegger osserva, al contrario, che questa non è una domanda che riguarda esclusivamente la sua città, il suo paese o Europa, ma tutti gli uomini della terra.²⁰

Non si tratta nemmeno di un'ingenua riflessione di chi pretende conservare le abitudini ed il paesaggio del suo ambiente e del suo paese senza nessuna variazione – le sue tradizioni nel senso più banale del termine –, ma di una profonda meditazione ontologica, che cerca di delucidare sulla causa ultima del vero nichilismo nel contesto dello spiegamento totalizzatore-identificatore del *Gestell*.

La vacuità non sarà quindi la carenza di tutto l'ente – il nulla dell'ente, la morte dei valori supremi –, ma l'oblio della sottrazione dell'essere nella manifestazione di tutto quello che è e nel suo intreccio uniforme di disponibilità e, in questo modo, nell'oblio della differenza. Il calcolo come unica forma di pensare e procedere è eminentemente nichilista, e segna con la sua svolta dominatrice la morte del proprio (*das Eigene*) che si apre nel linguaggio e nella terra natale: nel suo dominante esigere tutto l'ente lo stesso (*das Gleiche*)²¹ – la disponibilità e la riserva –, il calcolo non è altro che l'esemplificazione ontica di questo dispiegamento della vacuità così piena di enti. Questo nichilismo consumato, incline alla vacuità dell'identico, si rivela in molteplici forme: nella propensione all'ansia di novità in contromano allo stupore, nella tendenza all'ovvio ed all'abituale a detrimento del mistero e del *sub-lime*,²² nel primato

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20 Cfr. Heidegger GA 16, 578 e GA 9, 338 sgg., nelle quali si concepisce la carenza di terra natale (*Heimatlosigkeit*) dall'essenza della storia dell'essere.

21 Nell'ambito del linguaggio, per esempio, l'esigenza di disponibilità di una lingua funzionale, facilmente utilizzabile, pratica nell'uso e nel processo di apprendimento, così come semplice nella sua struttura, in relazione con lingue con una struttura grammaticale più complessa. In questo processo di generazione di disponibilità comunicativa si determina la morte della diversità linguistica, che comporta il declino della diversità culturale in favore dell'universalità dell'egemonia culturale del potere politico ed economico, che tende ad influire sulle abitudini, sulle idee e persino sugli immaginari e sugli ideali propri. Il dominio tecnico-politico ed economico del mondo si corrisponde con l'introduzione di una lingua universale, coerente con la disposizione di tutto l'ente come riserva disponibile. Il pericolo risiede, tuttavia, nella minimizzazione di questo fenomeno, al considerare ingenuamente il linguaggio come un semplice mezzo di comunicazione (Rocha de la Torre 2012, 129–150).

22 Cfr. Rocha de la Torre 2019, 57–81.

crescente della lingua che rappresenta il potere e nella morte inesorabile di diversi linguaggi, nella carenza di significato proprio per l'esperienza umana, ecc., in altre parole, nella fossilizzazione de l'“impossibile” come “impossibile”.

È per questo che l'unico movimento ontico viabile di confronto con la forma del nichilismo contemporaneo nel quale primeggia l'identità vuota, è l'accentuazione della differenza nei diversi ambiti dell'esperienza umana. Nel mezzo dell'egemonia politica, economica, sociale, culturale, ecc., delle icone della globalizzazione – manifestazioni di un nichilismo reale soffocante – solo la permanenza nella differenza, nel mistero e nello stupore, contribuirà al non oblio della sottrazione e del rifiuto di quello che non si esaurisce nell'identità del calcolo e dei suoi parametri d'azione. Heidegger fonderà su una prospettiva ontologica la possibilità di questo confronto: “Per noi, la questione del pensare è lo stesso (*das Selbe*) [...] l'essere, però l'essere dalla prospettiva della sua differenza con l'ente [...] Per noi, la questione del pensare [...] è la differenza in quanto differenza (*Differenz als Differenz*)” (Heidegger GA 11, 56 e 70 sgg.) Nel contesto del mondo attuale solo rimane ancora la testardaggine della speranza, che di fronte al potere dominante dell'identico ci fa vedere verso il lato opposto della vacuità che sembra imporsi.

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O MATERINŠČINI

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Povzetek

Razvoj filozofije kot pojmovne govorice lahko določimo kot zgodovino metamorfoz logosa. Vendar filozofiji gotovo ne naredimo kake posebne usluge, če njeno besedo zvedemo na pojem, že zato, ker je sleherno filozofsko pojmovanje potrebno izvesti. Zgodovinsko se je ta živi logos filozofije najneposredneje izpričeval skoz prevajanje. Prevajanje zmeraj vključuje odnos lastnega in tujega jezika, kar v posebnem pogledu sproži vprašanje topologije materinščine v prenosu filozofske besede.

Ključne besede: jezik, materinščina, topologija, prevod.

On Mother Tongue

Abstract

The development of philosophy as a conceptual language can be defined as a history of the metamorphoses of logos. However, we certainly do not do any special service to philosophy if we reduce its word to the concept, simply because every philosophical conception needs to be performed. Historically, this living logos of philosophy has been most directly attested through translation. Translation always involves the relationship of one's own and a foreign language, which in a special way raises the question of the topology of the mother tongue in the transmission of the philosophical word.

Keywords: language, mother tongue, topology, translation.

Že uvodoma je potrebno opozoriti, da sleherna zastavitev razmisleka o materinščini in njenem pomenu za besedno ustvarjalnost v najširšem smislu zahteva, da se predhodno osmisli *tvornost* materinščine, ki je v prvi vrsti povezana s tem, da *smo doma* v nekem jeziku. Za materinščino velja, da je *prvi jezik*. Karkoli se ustanavlja z jezikom, se mora najprej *udomačiti* v njem, v čemer lahko že prepoznamo bistveno tvornost materinščine. Hkrati se poraja vprašanje, ali je ustrezno, da materinščino kot prvi jezik omejujemo na prostor domačnosti. Mar ne otvarja z lastnega kraja, ki se hkrati izpričuje kot *lastnost* človeškosti, krajine govorice kot take, s tem pa tudi pot do slehernega od krajev govoric? Ali ni zavoljo tega njena krajevnost posebne vrste, ki ni niti pozicija univerzalnosti niti depozit nase zvedene individualnosti? Kaj potemtakem bistveno *je*?

Kar zadeva izkustvo slovenščine kot materinščine, je bila njena vloga pri oblikovanju narodne zavesti, kulture, izobraževanja, znanosti, pa medijskega sporočanja in komunikacije, nedvomno deležna široke pozornosti, ki je značilno prestopala v izrecno narodnoobrambno nazorskost. Ta vidik obravnave in ravnanja s slovenščino kot maternim jezikom nedvomno prevladuje vse do danes – kar pravzaprav začudi, saj je Slovenija kot samostojna država vključena v Evropsko unijo, znotraj katere se ne le načeloma zagovarja, marveč po najboljših močeh tudi uradno zastopa enakopravno rabo jezikov vseh držav članic. Po drugi plati seveda ne moremo zanikati vplivov vse bolj vztrajnega diktiranja jezikovne unifikacije, podpirata jo predvsem interes kapitala, ki narekuje pogoje dela, in informacijska tehnologija, ki opredeljuje načine komuniciranja. Katere ukrepe se v zvezi s tem sprejema na državni ravni, ali so ustrezni in zadovoljivi, ali položaj slovenščine nemara še bolj temeljno opredeljujejo druge družbenoekonomske in kulturne ravni, kaj in koliko lahko tu prispeva – sicer prepotrebno – digitalno dograjevanje slovenščine, nedvomno terja kritični pretres.¹ Vsekakor pa zavzemanje

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1 Objave v zvezi s tem so dostopne na spletni strani: <http://www.zagovor-slovenscine>.

za odgovornejšo rabo lastnega jezika v izobraževalnih, kulturnih in raziskovalnih dejavnostih samo po sebi ne prispeva odgovora na vprašanje jezikotvornosti slovenščine. Tak odgovor ni že vnaprej poznan in razviden tudi tistim, ki o tem jeziku govorijo kot o maternem oziroma ga štejejo za lastnega. Poznavanje nekega jezika, pa tudi vse znanje o njem, pravzaprav ne ve, kako je jezik tvoren, kolikor se od nagovora tega jezika samega ne porodi samolasten nagib k taki vednosti, ki jo zaznamuje eksistencialna prevzetost in zavzetost, *vestnost* v najširšem smislu.² Ta tvorna trpnost svesti dopusti, da nas neposredno nagovori govorica dotičnega jezika, ki ji, z odgovornostjo ali brez nje, bistveno že odgovarjamo. Zdi se, da je tu kot prvo poklicano pesništvo; poezija – če se opremo na starogrško oznako *poiesis* – sama pomeni tvorjenje. Že od Hezioda in Homerja naprej pa velja predstava, da si pesništvo zgolj nekaj utvarja in v svojem izmišljanju ne seže od domišljije do mišljenja, od videza do resnice. Kako je to predstavo pesništva možno uskladiti z okoliščino, da *poiesis* kot »tvorjenje« po filozofskih naukih prvotno označuje *physis*,³ ne v omejenem pomenu »narave«, pač pa »bivajočega v celoti«, tj. načina, kako se tvori in kar tvori – *svet*, je vprašanje, ki ga velja prebuditi na ravni epohe in iz nje.⁴

si/. Hkrati napotujem na moje predhodno besedilo v reviji *Phainomena* (Komel 2019b).

2 »Marsičesa v zgradnji periode in v spajanju govora pa se ne da zvesti na zakone, temveč je odvisno od vsakokrat govorečega oziroma pišočega. Tedaj pa ima jezik to zaslugo, da raznovrstnosti rekel jamči svobodo in bogastvo sredstev, pa četudi pogostokrat ponuja le možnost, da le-ta v vsakem trenutku ustvarjamo sami. Čas – ne da bi jezik spreminjal v njegovih glasovih in še manj v formah in zakonih – z rastočim razvijanjem idej, stopnjujočo se silo misli in še bolj pronicljivo zmožnostjo občutenja vanj pogosto uvaja tisto, česar prej ni posedoval. Tedaj je v taisto ohišje položen drugačen smisel, taisti kov podaja nekaj drugega, taisti zakoni povezovanja pa nakazujejo drugače gradiran tok idej. To je nenehni sad literature kakega ljudstva, v tem pa predvsem pesništva in filozofije.« (Humboldt 2006, 88–89)

3 »Kakor veš, je beseda *poiesis* (ustvarjanje, delo) kaj širok pojem: zakaj sleherni vzrok za prehajanje iz nebivanja v kakršnokoli bivanje je *poiesis*. Tako so vsa dela, ki sodijo v področje umetnosti, *poiesis* (*stvaritve*) in njih mojstri vsi *poietai* (*ustvarjalci*).« (Platon 1960, 97, 205b)

4 V tej luči je naravnost prebojen Nietzschejev raport iz *Času neprimernih premišljevanj*: »[...] pojem kulture kot nove in zboljšane *physis*, brez pretvarjanja in konvencije, kulture kot enotne osvetljenosti življenja, mišljenja, pojavljanja in hotenja« (Nietzsche 2007, 64).

Oznaka »jezikotvornost« je sama po sebi dvoznačna, podobno velja za »svetotvornost«. Po eni strani izražata to, kar ustvarjamo kot jezik ali svet, po drugi strani pa to, kar se tako rekoč samo od sebe tvori z jezikom in s svetom. Predvsem znotraj hermenevtične tradicije, ki jo je začrtal Giambattista Vico, kot tako pa jo je povzel Gadamer v *Resnici in metodi*, se je uveljavilo stališče, da je tvornost jezika bistveno predložena v svetotvornosti: s tem da »imamo jezik«, »imamo svet«. Jezik sam naj bi bil prvotno položen in ga »imamo« z materinščino. Edvard Kocbek je v eseju »Misli o jeziku« iz leta 1962 takole opredelil njeno tvornost:

Izrazu domačije pravimo materinski jezik. S tem ni označen le pradačni izvor jezika, ampak tudi njegovo nenehno organsko javljanje. Otrok postane človek v pravem pomenu šele, ko si prisvoji materin jezik. Ni nobenega drugega popolnejšega pristopa k resničnosti, kakor je imenovanje sveta z materinščino. Zato ga sprejemamo vase z materinim mlekom, na podzavesten in igriv in vendar najtotalnejši način. Jezik ni nikoli sredstvo do cilja, ampak del človekove samobiti. Jezika se naučimo hkrati s svojim počlovečevanjem. Kdor se nauči materinskega jezika, izvrši prvo in največje duhovno dejanje, stvari si vzdigne iz nejasnosti v znanje, tujstvo si spremeni v domačnost, spoznanje v položajno resnico. Prvi človekovi doživljaji so zavečna dejanja, le enkrat samkrat se prvič nasmehnem svoji materi, le enkrat samkrat rečem prvokrat večer, le enkrat samkrat doživim smrt. Vse te in neštete druge enkratnosti se uresničijo le v prvinskem jeziku in v njegovem deviškem stanju. Le materinski jezik ustvari bitni stik med človekom in resničnostjo, le v njem se začne proces človekove preobrazbe in v nekem smislu tudi proces preobrazbe sveta. Izroči mu že dognane besede, ki se je v njih utelesila domačijska usoda, nauči ga izvirnega grajenja stavkov, odkrije mu nepozabno melodijo govora, predvsem pa mu razodene skrivnost o večvrednosti življenja, presežnostnega izražanja, magične moči njegove nad naravo in nad zgodovino. Resnica človeštva ima mnogo obrazov, vsak jezik je zase del te resnice o svetu in življenju. Jeziki niso ista poznamenovanja stvari, vsak jezik drugače pristopa k stvarim, vsak jih drugače zajema, vsak se jim drugače odreka. Tudi njihovi govorci so zamejeni, nihče si ne more sam izbrati svojega jezika ali se šele pozneje

svobodno odločiti zanj. Jezik je človeku določen z rojstvom vred, zato ga nihče ne more in ne sme odvreči ali zamenjati. Ta nemoč je hkrati tudi človekova moč, domačijska zamejenost je, kakor smo že rekli, človekova spontanost, varnost in avtentičnost. (Kocbek 1963, 515–516)

Kocbekova opredelitev tvornosti materinščine je izjemno sežeto podana in pospremljena z vpogledom, ki ga verjetno lahko prispeva le pesniška poklicanost. Da prav pesniška ustvarjalnost najneposredneje zajame tvornost materinščine in svetotvornost jezika kot takega, je samo po sebi upoštevanja vredno, tudi in predvsem, ko razmišljamo o odnosu *misli in besede*, ki ga Kocbek že naslovno nakaže in zlasti zadeva *filozofijo*, ne le tam, kjer se izrecno uveljavlja kot filozofija jezika ali se konceptualno navezuje na lingvistiko, kar je značilno za različne usmeritve filozofije v preteklem stoletju, marveč že v lastnem izhodišču in prehodnosti, ki zaznamuje misel.⁵

238 Glede razumevanja tvornosti jezika se sicer običajno sklicujemo na Humboldtovo opredelitev, da je jezik bolj dejavnost kot delo.⁶ Opredelitev jezika kot »dela duha« je vsekakor zavezana duhu svojega časa in ga tudi kot

5 Tako Hegel v predgovoru k drugi izdaje *Znanosti logike* poudari: »Miselne forme so v prvi vrsti izpostavljene in zapisane v človekovem jeziku; dandanašnji ni mogoče dovolj pogosto opozarjati na to, da je prav mišljenje tisto, po čemer se človek razlikuje od živali. V vse, kar se prebije v njegovo notranjost, v kakršnokoli predstavo, v vse, kar naredi za svoje, se že vrine jezik, in kar pretvori v jezik ter v njem izreče, na prikriti, pomešan ali izdelan način že vsebuje neko kategorijo; tako zelo naravna je zanj logičnost, ali bolje, logičnost je prav njegova svojska *narava*.« (Hegel 1991, 17–18) Glede Heglovega filozofskega motrenja jezika podrobneje: Pavić 2004.

6 »Ker pa je ta izraz, namreč forma, pri raziskovanju jezika v rabi tako, da se navezuje na različne stvari, menim, da bom moral izčrpneje razviti, v katerem smislu bi ga rad sam jemal na tem mestu. To se mi zdi še toliko bolj nujno zato, ker ne govorimo o jeziku nasploh, temveč o posameznih različnih ljudstvih, torej gre tudi za to, da razmejujoč določimo, kaj velja razumeti s posameznim jezikom v nasprotju z jezikovnim deblom na eni in dialektom na drugi strani, in kaj velja razumeti kot en jezik tam, kjer ta v svojem toku izkuša bistvene premene. // Jezik, dojet v svojem resničnem bistvu, je nekaj stalnega, obstojnega in v slehernem trenutku prehajajočega. Celo njegovo zadržanje s pomočjo pisave je vedno le nepopolno, mumiji podobno ohranjanje, ki je pač samo spet potrebno tega, da v njem skušamo ponavzočiti živo izvajanje [jezika]. Jezik ni delo (*ergon*), temveč dejavnost (*energeia*). Tako je njegova resnična definicija lahko samo genetična. Je namreč ponavljajoče se delo duha, da bi artikulirani glas usposobili za izraz misli.« (Humboldt 2006, 44–45)

takega obeležuje. V isti dobi, ki jo izpolnjuje duh romantike, je deloval tudi Jernej Kopitar; ohranjena je njegova korespondenca s Humboldtom in drugimi pomembnimi jezikoslovci tistega časa. Predvsem zaradi »napetih odnosov« s Prešernom se Kopitarjeva osebnost in delo vse do danes, lahko rečemo neupravičeno, sprejemata z zadržki. Nič bolje ni z drugim »Prešernovim cenzorjem«, Franom Miklošičem.⁷ Vsekakor je Prešernova poezija tako v pogledu jezikotvornosti in svetotvornost slovenščine odločilno prispevala k *narodotvornosti*,⁸ tako da se je v zvezi s tem uveljavil naziv »prešernovska struktura«.⁹ Prešernovo osmislitev položaja in samosvojesti slovenščine (v primežu takratnih panslavističnih in panslovanskih naziranj) je moč rekonstruirati na podlagi ohranjene korespondence. Prešeren tako v pismu Stanku Vrazu 5. julija 1937 piše:

Tendenca naših *carmina* in druge literarne dejavnosti je samo ta, da bi kultivirali naš materin jezik. Če imate vi drugačen cilj, ga boste težko dosegli. Združitev vseh Slovanov v *en* knjižni jezik bo ostala najbrž pobožna želja. Ne utegne Vam tako lahko uspeti, da bi povzdigovali štajersko-hrvaško narečje na slovstveni avtokratski prestol. Vendar je tudi napačno prizadevanje boljše kot apatija do domovinskega. (Prešeren 1964, 343)

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V pismu Stanku Vrazu, 10./26. oktobra 1840, Prešeren strne svoj jezikovni nazor:

⁷ Igor Grdina v svojem prikazu zgodovine slavistike na ljubljanski univerzi pripominja, da »verjetno ni znanosti, katere razvoju bi Slovenci (vse nazaj do Hermana iz Karintije) prispevali tako veliko, v mnogočem celo odličnen delež kakor jezikoslovju« (Grdina 1992, 233).

⁸ Glede sočasnih Slomškovich jezikovnih prizadevanj prim. Ogrin 2012.

⁹ Pirjevec 1978, 78. Pirjevčeva razprava »Vprašanje o poeziji« je bila najprej objavljena po poglavjih leta 1969 v *Naših razgledih*; v uredništvu Rudija Šeliga pa je nato v knjižni obliki izšla leta 1978, skupaj z razpravo »Vprašanje naroda«, ki je bila prvotno objavljena v tematski številki revije *Problemi Vprašanje naroda na Slovenskem*, ki vključuje še druge pomembne razprave; naj omenimo Urbančičevo študijo o razmerju med filozofijo in slovenstvom na primeru Janka Pajka (Urbančič 1970, 58–73).

knjižnega jezika, tj. zapisanega in predpisanega jezika, zadana na predhodni danosti lastnega jezika, na tem, da imamo lastni jezik, da govorimo neko govorico, se pravi na regiji materinščine.

Materinščina je najprej govorjen jezik, govorica, narečje. Govorni zapis, ki ohranja govorjeno v nekem jeziku, ob tem ni nekaj drugotnega, kolikor upoštevamo, da z branjem zapisanega prepoznavamo samolastnost nekega jezika, tako da pride na dan tako njegova lástnost kot lastnosti. Pisanje in branje v lastnem jeziku potrdi jezikotvornost in sleherno drugo tvornost materinščine. Vendar, v čem neposredno sestoji tvornost materinščine kot prvega jezika, tako rekoč jezika pred jezikom, in kakšno posredniško vlogo ima tu narečje, ki omogoča pogovor v neki govoric? Za *pogovorni jezik* je v primerjavi z *izbornim jezikom* značilno, da se v njem jezikotvorno od vsepovsod nabere karkoli, vendar ta nabor hkrati zaznamuje možnost razbiranja tega, o čemer se govori, o čemer teče beseda. Da se vzpostavi ustanova jezika, kar je v primeru knjižne slovenščine prvenstveno Trubarjeva zasluga,¹¹ mora že obstajati neka ustanovitvena podlaga v jeziku samem, ne glede na to, koliko je poenotena ali ne.

Jože Rajhman v svoji študiji o Trubarjevem katekizmu, opirajoč se na obsežne študije Franceta Kidriča, Ivana Prijatelja, Ivana Grafenauerja in drugih raziskovalcev zgodovine slovenskega slovstva, poudari, da se je Trubar poleg izrazja, ki mu je bilo na voljo iz teološkega izročila, posluževal besedi, ki jih je našel v domačem narečju:

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V marsičem se je mogel nasloniti na tradicijo, to dokazuje že podobnost njegovega slovarja z brižinskim [...]. Trubar pa je segel tudi

prvič v zgodovini slovenskega jezika uveljavila enotna knjižna norma za vse Slovence.« (Jesenšek 2009, 1)

11 Kritično vzporednico z današnjim časom zariše Marko Marinčič: »V temelju gre za možnost jezikovne skupnosti, da se prav glede na svoj objektivno šibkejši položaj v intelektualnem in kulturnem smislu razvija na enaki stopnji kot večje jezikovne skupnosti. Da tu ne gre za vprašanje narodnega ali kakšnega drugačnega prestiža, temveč za povsem konkretno politično in socialno vprašanje, se je jasno pokazalo v nedavnih razpravah o jeziku na univerzah. Zahteva po ‚internacionalizaciji‘ (beri ‚anglizaciji‘) univerz, ki da nas bo rešila zatohlosti, se je izkazala za ideološko puhlico in špansko steno ponudnikov študijskih programov, ki si od tekme na globalnem trgu obetajo dobiček.« (Marinčič 2021, 417–418)

po izrazih, ki jih je poznal iz vsakdanjega življenja in jih prilagodil, bodisi da je ohranil prvotni pomen bodisi da ga je premaknil, vendar s spremljajočo razlago. Po načelu razumljivosti je Trubar pač moral govoriti v jeziku svojih bralcev, imel pa je pred seboj predvsem bralčevo ukaželjnost. (Rajhman 1977, 24)

242 Nasploh se poudarja, da Trubarjeva formacija knjižne slovenščine, tako kot Luthrova formacija nemščine, sledi načelu razumljivosti oziroma berljivosti, ki jo je predpostavljal v lastnem jezikovnem okolju. Ob tem vsekakor nastopi vprašanje, kako dialekt, učinkujoč kot vsakdanji jezik, ki je govorcem domač od rojstva naprej, ne izraža le pomena besed, marveč tudi in predvsem izpoveduje besedo samo, v tem primeru *slovensko besedo*, ki jo je mogoče *prestaviti* (v Trubarjevem jeziku to pomeni *prevesti*) v knjižno formacijo jezika. Ne le pomeni besed, pač pa predvsem *smisel besede* kot take mora že biti tvoren, da ga lahko pretvorimo v skladu s sporočilno intencijo, ki vključuje horizont jezikovne celote. Vsekakor ni moč domnevati kake izvirne in čiste jezikovno podlage, saj prav Trubarjev primer kaže, da se v dialektu nabere vse tisto, kar njegovi govorce tako rekoč sproti poberejo, predvsem pa, da dialektna jezikovna raba ne – vsaj ne strogo – razmejuje, čeprav obmejuje, med »tujim« in »domačim« izrazjem. Ta besedičnost pogovornega jezika se ne le ohranja, marveč tudi znova vzpostavlja s prehodom v besedilnost, ki ustreza normalnosti in normi knjižnega jezika. Temelji namreč na neki *mero-dajnosti*, vzpostavljanje katere ni narekovano od kakršnihkoli jezikovnih pravil, marveč od tvornosti govornice same. Kot bi bilo v govorico samo že vpisano, kar se v njej lahko izpiše.

Oznaka »knjižni jezik« napotuje na knjigo, knjižnost, književnost, predvsem pa na element *branja*, ki opredeljuje zapisano besedilo (in ne morda narobe). Knjiga ni zgolj sešitek popisanih listov, marveč *berilo*, čitanka, ki terja, da se naučimo brati. Trubar je leta 1550 za ta namen hkrati s *Katekizmom* izdal tudi *Abecednik*. Element branja prav tako predpostavljajo *rokopisi*, na katere naj bi se Trubar opiral pri oblikovanju knjižne slovenščine,¹² ob čemer seveda še posebej izstopajo *Brižinski rokopisi*.

12 Glede srednjeveške in novoveške slovenske rokopisne dediščine glej: Ogrin 2017; 2019.

Brati na splošno pomeni: razbrati pomen in prebrati smisel zapisanega, kar izpričuje tudi istopomenski glagol *čitati*. Vsako branje je samo zase in posebej *prevod*, ki se ne vrši zgolj med jeziki, marveč že v jeziku samem, prav v meri, da ga jemljemo za lastnega (prim. Gadamer 1993a, 279–285). Branje ni zgolj in le posebna oblika jezikovne dejavnosti, marveč je kot taka določilna v pogledu tvornosti govorce, tako govornice kot zapisane. To prav posebej izpričuje starogrška »beseda vseh besed« in hkrati beseda za »besedo« – *logos*, ki ni opredelila le ožjega filozofskega, znanstvenega, kulturnega, političnega in znanstvenega polja, pač pa najširše duhovno izročilo sploh, vključno in tudi še posebej s krščanskim. Je sama po sebi izročilo s sporočilom. Glagol *legein* pomeni »brati«, »nabirati nekaj«, in s tem »spravljati skupaj«, ter nadalje »nekaj položiti«, »zložiti« (Dokler 1915, 464–465, 472–474; Lidell in Scott 1996, 1033–1934, 1057–1059). V latinščino je *logos* preveden kot *ratio* in *verbum*, v starocerkvenoslovanščino kot *slovo*, v slovenščino kot *beseda*.¹³

13 V hrvaških prevodih starogrških filozofskih besedil se *logos* pogosto prevaja kot *zbor*, *legein* pa kot *zboriti*. Igor Mikecin, prevajalec Heraklita in Parmenida in hrvaščino, glede tega pove: »Vendar tisto skupno, kar edini vse mogoče pomene besede *logos*, dovršeno pomenja beseda ,zborovanje'. Ker je *logos* izpeljanka iz *legein*, v sebi nujno prenaša in ohranja izvorni pomen tega glagola, o čemer pričajo tudi druge tvorjenke iz besede *logos*, denimo *katalogos*, ,popis', *synlogos*, ,nabor' itd. Četudi je beseda *logos* nastala šele tedaj, ko je glagol *legein* začel pomenjati predvsem ,govoriti', moramo pomensko bogastvo besede *logos* pri Heraklitu zajemati, izhajajoč iz ,bere', ,branja'. Besedo *logos* dovršeno prenaša beseda ,zborovanje', saj ta v sebi združuje ,zbiranje' in ,govorjenje'. Beseda ,zborovanje', ,zbor' je, podobno kot njej sorodna beseda ,sabor', nastala iz praslovanske besede *sъborъ*, ki je že v stari cerkveni slovanščini imela dvojen pomen: ,skupščina ljudi' in ,beseda, govor, razgovor'. Gre za samostalnik, izpeljan iz glagola *sъbrati*, ,nabirati, zbrati', ki ga sestavlja predpona *sъ-*, ,z-', in praslovanski glagol *brati*, ,brati'. Glagol ,(iz)birati' je iterativ od ,brati'. S tem je branje vedno izbiranje tistega, kar naj se obere, kar je vredno branja, bere, s tem pa je tudi razbiranje, razločevanje uberljivega od neuberljivega.« (Mikecin 2010, 119–120) Etimološka razlaga glagola »brati« sicer navaja: »Pslavan. **brāti*, sed. **běro*, nabirati, zbirati' je dalje sorodno s stind. *bhāрати*, ,nese', gr. *phérō*, ,nesem', lat. *ferō*, alb. *bie*, arm. *berem*, ,nesem', got. *baírjan*, ,nositi, prinesiti, roditi'. Ide. koren **b^her-* je pomenil ,nesti' (Be I, 39, SP I, 485 s., Po, 128 s., LIV, 740), kar je razvidno še iz sloven. *bréme*, *bréj* in sorodnega. Prek pomena ,prinesiti, prinašati' se je razvil v vseh slovan. jezikih znani pomen ,zbrati, zbirati'. Sloven. pomen ,čitati' je dobesedni prevod lat. *legere*, nem. *lesen*, kar oboje prvotno pomeni ,zbirati, nabirati (npr. sadeže)', preneseno ,zbirati (črke pri branju)', tj. ,brati, čitati'.« (Snoj 2016)

Aristotelovo določilo človeka kot *zoon logon echon* se prevaja bodisi kot »umno živo bitje« bodisi kot »živo bitje, ki ima govor«, vsled česar vse do danes ostaja odprto vprašanje, ali je um ta, ki opredeljuje zmožnost govora in jezika, ali pa je možnost jezika ta, ki omogoča umnost uma. Hkrati velja opozoriti na obrazilo -logija, ki se ga v slovenščini deloma nadomešča s -slovje (npr. naravo-slovje), in kot tako nastopa v vrsti oznak za znanstvene discipline od biologije do teologije. Za slednjo je glede na svetopisemsko izročilo sploh določen uvod v Janezov evangelij »V začetku je bil *logos* – beseda«.

Vseeno na tej podlagi ni že neposredno razvidno, kako naj bi se *logos* kot beseda, ki zbere misel o nečem in jo izrazi, povezoval s tem, kar od določenega jezika jemljemo za lastno v jeziku oziroma z njim. Določilo človeka kot *zoon logon echon* sicer kaže, da si človek lasti *logos* kot besedo, govor, smisel, um ..., česar vseeno ne moremo istovetiti z načinom, kako »ima jezik«, kar pomeni: govorimo, pišemo, občujemo itn. v nekem jeziku, ki nam je neposredno ali posredno dan tako, da se ga naučimo ali, kot tudi pravimo, *navadimo*. Zdi se, da materinščina kot jezik, v katerega smo, kot pravimo, narojeni, nam je dan po rojstvu, še posebej odstopa od črte *logosa*, kolikor naj bi opredeljeval naše 244 govorno oziroma jezikovno in na tej podlagi sleherno drugo izkustvo, kar je tudi pogoj sleherne univerzalizacije izkustva v domeni znanosti – vselej in zmeraj v neki verziji jezika, najsi bo ta logično, matematično ali informacijsko prirejena.

Fenomen materinščine je moč zapopasti z immanentno lingvističnih, etnoloških, socioloških in podobnih vidikov, vseeno pa ostaja nedoločeno, kaj z njim vsakokrat *zapopademo*. Fenomen materinščine terja razmislek, kako in če sploh pristopamo k njemu na način zapopadenja, pojmovanja. »Pojem« je eno osrednjih izrazil, s katerimi se prevaja *logos*. Hegel, ki je logiki pojma podelil polno veljavo in veličino, je sam štel, da se določena logičnost in pojmovnost predhodno že nahajata v predfilozofsko izkušenem »naravnem« jeziku, iz česar izhaja tudi njegova nagnjenost k uporabi izrazov materinega jezika.¹⁴ »Šele izrečeno v materinem jeziku je nekaj moja last,« poudari Hegel v *Predavanjih o zgodovini filozofije*.¹⁵ Heidegger v tem pogledu stopi še korak

14 Celovit prikaz pojmovanja jezika v nemškem klasičnem idealizmu sicer podaja Forster 2011.

15 Hegel (1986, 16–17) se uvodoma zadrži ob Luthrovem prevodu *Svetega pisma* v nemščino, ki je izšel leta 1534 (ob prevajalski pomoči Melanchthona in drugih sode-

dlje: »V pogledu zgodovinsko zrasle govorice – ki je materinščina – smemo reči: pravzaprav govori govorica, ne človek. Človek govori le, kolikor vsakokrat odgovarja govorici.« (Heidegger 1983)

Dušan Pirjevec, čigar knjiga *Vprašanje naroda. Vprašanje o poeziji* (glej opombo 8) je obveljala za referenčno delo, kar zadeva sodobno slovensko narodno in državno samopojmovanje, je ob dekonstrukciji t. i. prešernovske strukture, opredelitve slovenstva kot zgodovinsko blokiranega gibanja in bitnozgodovinske teze o koncu naroda/nacije kot subjektivitete,¹⁶ je na Heideggrovi sledi podal na prvi pogled presenetljivo ugotovitev, da šele v taki »nihilistični« konstelaciji lahko polno vzsije izkustvo materinščine:

Jezik, ki ni več nacionalni jezik, je v resnici *materinski* jezik. Materinski jezik pa ni več privilegiran jezik. Vendar pa dobi najbrž materinski jezik, ki ni v nobenem smislu privilegiran, svoje »privilegirano mesto«. To privilegirano »mesto« je skoraj gotovo poezija in samo poezija, zaradi česar je možno danes misliti o bistvenih premikih znotraj tako imenovanih besednih umetnosti. Na eni strani je jasno, da se jezik kot poezija v koncu naroda nikakor ne more dogajati samo kot avtodestrukcija, čeravno se *mora* dogajati tudi kot samorazkroj. Ker pa je prav poezija privilegirano mesto materinega jezika, se morajo zgoditi bistvene spremembe znotraj vseh drugih nepoetskih literarnih zvrsti, kakor sta drama in pripovedna proza. Te zvrsti so se poetizirale.

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lavcev): »Ne da bi prevedel Sveto pismo v nemščino, Luther ne bi dovršil svoje reformacije; in brez te forme, misliti v lastnem jeziku, bi ne obstajala subjektivna svoboda.« (Hegel 1986, 53) V vzporednici lahko prav tako govorimo o pomenu Dalmatinovega prevoda *Svetega pisma* v slovenščino iz leta 1583. Z ozirom na oblikovanje novoveške, na principu samozavedanja zasnovane filozofije, Hegel v nadaljevanju ob obravnavi Leibnizeve in Wolfove filozofije poda še podrobnejšo opredelitev: »Vendar pa lahko, kot smo že navedli, predvsem rečemo, da neka znanost lahko pripada nekemu narodu, ko jo ta poseduje v svojem lastnem jeziku, še najnujnejše je to pri filozofiji. Kajti misel ima v sebi prav ta moment, da pripada samozavedanju ali da je njegovo najlastnejše; izraženo v lastnem jeziku, npr. določenost namesto determinacija, bistvo namesto esenca itn., je to neposredno za zavest, da so ti pojmi njeno najlastnejše, s čimer ima vedno opraviti, ne kot z nečim tujim.« (Hegel 1986, 259)

16 Med novejšimi obravnavami naj omenimo: Knop 2011; Dović 2017; Juvan 2019; Virk 2021.

Ob poeziji, ki je privilegirano mesto materinskega jezika, stoji mišljenje, ki ni več isto kot racionalno logična in znanstvena misel. Prav zato, da bi lahko bilo to, kar po svoji najgloblji določenosti je, se mora vrniti k materinskemu jeziku, ki nanj racionalno logična misel znanosti in tradicionalne filozofije ni bistveno navezana. (Pirjevec 1978, 130–131)

246 S polstoletne časovne razdalje se nam Pirjevčeve diagnoze konca naroda, nemara pa tudi s tem povezan status poezije kot privilegiranega »mesta materinskega jezika«, ki sicer nima več privilegija narodne reprezentativnosti, morda zdijo naivne. Jih verjetno ne vemo prav dobro kam, če sploh kam, umestiti. Seveda lahko pripomnimo, kako Pirjevec ni mogel vedeti, da se bo v doglednem času vzpostavila slovenska država, ki se bo potem vključila v evropsko skupnost itn. Vendar Pirjevčeva teza ne zanika takih možnosti znotraj (post)zgodovinskega procesa, marveč jim je celo pripravila pot, o čemer nemara pričajo neposredna navezovanja Ivana Urbančiča, Tineta Hribarja, Spomenke Hribar, Rudija Šeliga, Nika Grafenauerja, Borisa A. Novaka in drugih na Pirjevčev kritični premislek narodne samobitnosti. Podobno velja za njegovo zapopadenje procesa *globalizacije*, čeravno ta oznaka faktografsko takrat še ni bila v obtoku, je pa faktično že nastopila v funkciji prevzemanja opolnomočene moči nad vsem. *Funkcioniranje moči*, ki kot tako odplavi subjektiviteto naroda v toku neznanske subjektivnosti (podrobneje o tem Komel 2019a), po Pirjevčevem gledišču vendar izpre *naznanilo eksistencialno zavezujočega izkustva materinščine*. Zavezujoče – tako kako pravimo, da je ljubezen zavezujoča. Prav zato lahko to naznanilo oznani razliko med *potegovanjem za funkcijo* in *pritegom eksistence*, ki vztraja na sledi epohalnega odtega biti, nihilizma, kakor ga je razumel Heidegger. Vprašanje je, do katere mere je stekel pogovor o tem, koliko sploh lahko steče in kako to zadeva samo tvornost jezika in ustvarjalnost v njem, še posebej, če ju motrimo s tistega *kraja*, ki ga kot izvorno človeškega kroji pokrajina materinščine.

Kolikor se Pirjevec izrecno opira na Derridajevo dekonstrukcijo in z njo povezano kritiko logocentrizma in fonocentrizma, velja opozoriti, da to povleče s seboj kritiko slehernega *centriranja strukture* (glej Derrida 1993b). *Razsrediščenje* prešernovske strukture in nanjo oprtega narodnokulturnega

ustroja zadeva postroj slovenščine nasploh, vseeno je, če tu pridamo še »kot jezika naroda« ali ne. Ta odprava jezika kot *središča*, v katerem je usrediščeno narodno zavedanje, pa, kakor zatrjuje Pirjevec, vendar ne odpravi tudi same *sredine* slovenščine kot materinščine; ta, prav nasprotno, s tem šele zadobi svobodni prostor, tj. prostost. Po drugi plati to podobno velja za človeškost človeka, ki je »logocentrično« določena kot *zoon logon echon* in *animal rationale*. Onkraj logocentrizma se sprosti vprašanje *kraja*¹⁷ človeškosti, ki neposredno zadeva njeno nastanjenost v pokrajini govornice, prvotno podarjene z materinščino. Ta sprostitev, ki jo Heidegger pod nazivom »*Gelassenheit*« zajema v razprostrtosti *Gegend* kot *proste plani* (Heidegger 2004, 111–126), je temeljno izzvana z razmerjem do tehnognanstvenega obratovanja, ki ga zaznamuje informacijska nameščenost (*aparatura*) sleherne jezikovnosti; ta je v svoji funkcijski koncentraciji *brezkrajna* ter vedno na mestu, povsod na dosegu in človeku zmeraj ne le pri, marveč v roki. V resnici, to se pravi znotraj postavljanja v funkcijo, pa ona človeka drži v svojih krempljih (o tem Malpas 2019). To bi hkrati pomenilo, da smo, ko naj spregovorimo o pokrajini govornice

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17 O tem »kraju človeškosti« v neposredni zvezi z jezikovnim izkustvom iz hermenevtične perspektive spregovori že Schleiermacher: »Potemtakem je vsak človek po eni strani kraj, v katerem se dani jezik na svojevrsten način oblikuje. Njegov govor lahko razumemo le iz totalitete jezika. Je pa tudi stalno razvijajoči se duh in njegov govor je le kot eno dejanje tega duha v sovisju z drugimi. Posameznika v njegovem mišljenju opredeljuje (skupen) jezik. Misli lahko le tiste misli, ki v njegovem jeziku že imajo svoje označenje. Druge, nove misli ne bi mogli sporočiti, če ne bi bila že vezana na v jeziku obstoječe odnošaje [označenja?]. To temelji na tem, da je mišljenje notranje govorjenje. Iz tega pa se pozitivno zjasni, da jezik pogojuje napredovanje posameznika v mišljenju. Kajti jezik ni le complexus posameznih predstav, temveč tudi sistem sorodnosti predstav. Te so povezane prek forme besed. Vsaka sestavljena beseda je neka sorodnost, pri čemer ima vsaka predpona in končnica svojevrsten pomen (modifikacijo). A sistem modifikacij je v vsakem jeziku drugačen. Če si jezik objektiviramo, ugotovimo, da so vsi akti govorjenja le en način, kako jezik prihaja na plan v svoji svojevrstni naravi. Vsak posameznik je kraj, na katerem se govornica prikaže: tako kot pri pomembnih pisateljih našo pozornost usmerjamo na njihov jezik in pri njih opažamo različnost stila. – Prav tako je treba vsak govor razumeti iz celotnega življenja, kateremu pripada, in to pomeni: ker je vsak govor mogoče prepoznati kot življenjski moment govorečega v pogojenosti vseh njegovih življenjskih momentov, in to le iz celote njegovih okolij, s čimer je določen njegov razvoj in nadaljnje obstajanje, je vsak govorec razumljiv le prek svoje nacionalnosti in svoje dobe.« (Schleiermacher 1998, 231) Glede sklopa kraj-pokrajina-krajina glej sicer Malpas 2011.

in kraju človeškosti, pahnjeni nekam tja na obrobje in na poseben način »nefunkcionalni« zunaj centra. Vendar pa »zunaj centra« po drugi plati kaže v *ekscentrično ekstatiko eksistence*. Heideggrovo ontološko določilo bivajočega, ki smo mi sami, kot *Dasein, tubiti*, je krajevno-prostorsko opredeljeno, kolikor »da« v nemščini pomeni »tu« in »tam«. »Topografija« in »topologija« (k temu Günzel 2007) se javljata tudi kot poseben strukturni problem namestitve in umestitve »dekonstrukcije«, kar še najbolj odločilno kaže Derridajev poskus približanja Platonovi razpravi o *chori* v dialogu *Timaj* (Derrida 1993a), kjer podaja neko, lahko rečemo, »dekonstrukcijo pred dekonstrukcijo«.

Beseda *chora* je slovarsko opredeljena kot: »(vmesni) prostor«, »vmesnost«, »dežela«, »domovina«, »odkazano mesto«, »prostor v človeški družbi«, »veljava«, »ugled«. Glagol *choreo* v stari grščini pomeni »grem z mesta«, »naredim prostor«, »se pomikam naprej«, »se lotim česa ali koga«, »grem skozi kaj«, »predrem«, »obsegam«, »držim«, »sprejemem koga«. Prislov *horis* pomeni »različen«, »sam zase«, »ločen«, »posebej«, »vsaksebi«, »drugačen«, »razen kolikor«, »izvzemši«, »proč od koga«, »zunaj«, »daleč«. *Choros* in *horion* označujeta »ograjen prostor«, »mesto«, »kraj«, »okolico«, »posestvo«, »njivo«, »bivališče«, »trdnjavo«. *Chorismos* pomeni »(raz)ločitev«. *Chorites* je »poljedelec«, »kmet«, *horidion* »majhno posestvo«, »pristava«. Glagol *horizo* pomeni »oddaljujem«, »odkažem mesto«, »postavim«, »delim«, »ločim«, »razdružujem«, »sem ločen«, »različen od koga« (Dokler 1915, 836–837). Platon v *Timaju* (47e–53c) odpre razpravo o *chori* v kontekstu razmisleka o *vmesju*, ki posreduje med principom biti in principom postajanja, kot takega pa ga ni mogoče opredeliti kot tretjega principa poleg drugih dveh, marveč je sam po sebi principiелно neopredeljiv. Glede na ta okvir Platon v *Timaju* razvije pojmovanje *chore* kot »sprejemališča vsega postajanja, kot nekakšne dojilje«, »snovi za odtiskovanje«, »matere in sprejemališča vsega«, »nevidne in brezoblične oblike, ki sprejema vse«, »večnega rodu prostora«, »dojilje postajanja«, »Prejemnice« (Platon 2004, 1279–1285).¹⁸

Fenomenološko relevanten poskus razlage *chore* je sicer podal Klaus Held v študiji »Svet, praznina, narava« (Held 1998, 109–129), kjer Platonovo

18 Celovito in poglobljeno interpretacijo dialoga je prispeval Damir Barbarić (2014), ki je *Timaja* tudi prevedel v hrvaščino (Barbarić 2017).

razumevanje *chore* poveže z izkustvom praznine, kakor se je razvilo v japonskem budističnem izročilu; v fenomenološki paraleli jo opiše v smislu *dajanja prostora za odpiranje horizontov sveta*:

Nevidnost dajanja prostora po svetu je bila, kolikor mi je znano, v velikih zahodnjaških miselnih tradicijah artikulirana le enkrat samkrat, in še takrat le deloma: Platon v svojem dialogu *Timaj* uvede »*choro*« kot izvorni, vendar komajda dojemljivi predpogoj lepe ureditve prikazovanja, »*kosmosa*«. »*Chora*« pravzaprav pomeni »mesto«. Beseda je povezana s »*choreo*«. Kaj ta glagol pomeni, lahko opišemo približno takole: »z umikanjem dati mesto in postati sprejemajoči prostor«. *Chora* je komajda dojemljiva, saj daje vsemu v kozmosu prostor ravno s tem, da se sama umakne in se tako odtegne dojemljivosti. »*Choro*« lahko, kot je to običajno, prevedemo z besedo »prostor«. Toda bit tega prostora ni statična danost neke posode, temveč zgoraj omenjeno dogajanje.

Kljub temu pa se pripetljaji nahajajo »v« prostoru sveta tako, da vsakokrat zavzemajo nek kraj (*topos*), nek delen prostor v vseobsegajoči celoti prostora. Razmerje, v katerem je prostor, ki se dogaja kot *chora*, z drugimi kraji, je Platon v *Timaju* pustil neopredeljeno. Njegov učenc Aristotel je pozornost analize prostora nemudoma v celoti premestil v *topos*. S tem ko je tudi on pustil neobravnavano razmerje krajev do *chore*, je v veliki meri prispeval k njeni poznejši pozabi vse do danes. O tej pozabi bo treba še enkrat spregovoriti.

Chora kot dogajanje umikajočega se dajanja prostora v stvari ni nič drugega kot praznina, ki je svet. Ker je bistvo te praznine popolna nevpadljivost, je tudi na noben način ni mogoče dojeti. To absolutno nedojemljivo se ustrezneje označuje kot nič. Ta pojem ima pomembno vlogo tudi v zahodnjaškem mišljenju. Vendar pa je nič le v vzhodnjaški tradiciji artikuliran kot tista prostor izpolnjujoča praznina, ki ni pomanjkanje napolnjenosti in ni nič drugega kot bit sveta (Held 1998, 116–117).

Tisto neopredeljeno in neopredeljivo – *chora* – naj bi bilo potemtakem določilno za to opredeljeno in opredeljivo – *horizont*. »Opredeljenost«

vključuje topološko določilo *predela*, hkrati pa napotuje na topiko dela in celote, meje in brezmejnosti. To je neposredno pokazalno v zvezi z grškim izrazom *horizon*, ki se je razvil iz glagola *horízo* v pomenu »določim mejo«, »delim«, »razmejim«; *hóros* pomeni *mejo*, *mejnik*, *rob*, *deželo*, *(ob)rok*, *konec*, *določitev*. (Dokler 1915, 536–557).¹⁹ Oznaki *horismos* v starogrški, pa tudi v vsej nadaljnji filozofiji (*determinatio*, *Bestimmung*, določitev) pritiče odlikovana raba v kontekstu pojmovne opredelbe in razpredelbe.²⁰ Iz glagola *horizo* se je prav tako razvil izraz *aphorismos*, kar je pomembno glede aforistične zaznamovanosti Nietzschejeve misli, pa ne zgolj njegove. Pojmovanje horizonta kot tako prejme posebno mesto znotraj Husserlovega in Heideggrovega fenomenološkega odstrtja dogodne svetnosti sveta,²¹ na katerega Held opre svoj premislek *chore*.

Znotraj fenomenološke obravnave svetnosti sveta izhodiščno izstopi konstitutivna veljavnost t. i. *naravnega* oziroma *najbližjega okolnega sveta* (glej Komel 2019a), s tem da je ta primordialna in zato »naravna« preddanost sveta

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19 Dokler (1915, 317) izpeljuje etim. *osnovo horizo* iz gl. *erouomai* oz. *ruomai* v pomenu »varovati«, »rešiti«, »čuvati«, »biti pozoren« (etim. koren *war, lat. *ora*, skrb).
 20 Slovenske ustreznice za horizont so »obzorje«, »obnebje«, »vidni krog« (> gr. *horizon kyklos*, nem. *Gesichtskreis*). Beseda obzorje napotuje na *zor*, *zrenje*, razvito iz etim. korena *gther(H) (»žareti«, »sijati«, »blesteti«), ki se nahaja tudi v izrazih *nazor*, *nadzor*, *oziraje*, *obzorje*, *pozor*, *vzor*, *prezirati*, *zorni*, *zrklo*, *zrcalo*, *zrak*, *zora*. Murnov verz »Horizont molči« v pesmi »Nebo, nebo«, v kateri je nagovorjeno ob-nebje in o-zemlje prostranstva sveta, horizmično napotuje čez obnebje in obzorje v brezmejno prostost. Dušan Pirjevec v spremni besedi h Kondorjevi izdaji Murnovih pesmi (1967) poudari izstopajočo veljavo Murnovega pesništva z vidika konca »prešernovske strukture«: »Murnova lirika je po vsem videzu začetek konca lirike, tistega konca, ki se je v slovenski poeziji na svoj način dovršil v današnjih dneh. Pomen Murnove poezije kot poti v konec lirike bi lahko doumeli le, ko bi o njej razpravljali v sklopu celotne zgodovine slovenske lirike od Prešerna do Župančiča.« (Pirjevec 1967, 143) Pirjevec tu neposredno nakaže svojo razpravo »Vprašanje o poeziji«, ki je sledila kmalu zatem. O položaju lirike danes je sicer obširneje spregovoril Brane Senegačnik v knjigi *Smrt lirike?* (2019).

21 Iz te fenomenološke obravnave horizontnega obeležja svetnosti sveta vodi tudi pot do Gadamerjevega hermenevtičnega dojetja *svetovnosti* učinkovne zgodovinskosti skozi »stapljanje horizontov«. Celovito obravnavo pojmovanj horizonta, ki vključuje antično in srednjeveško filozofijo, Leibniza, Kanta, Nietzscheja, Husserla, Heideggro, Levinasa, Merleau-Pontyja, Freuda, Lacana, Gadamerja ter azijska religiozna in miselna izročila, najdemo v zborniku *Horizonte des Horizontbegriffs. Hermeneutische, phänomenologische und interkulturelle Studien* (Elm 2004).

podlaga izkustvu kakršnihkoli drugih svetov in tudi sveta kot univerzuma. Husserl v zvezi s tem pove:

Aritmetični svet je zgolj zame tu, dokler proučujem aritmetiko, si sistematično ustvarjam aritmetične ideje, jih ugledam in se trajno posvečam univerzalnemu horizontu. *Naravni svet* pa, ki je svet v navadnem smislu besede, je in je bil zame vedno pričujoč, dokler pač v njem naravno živim. Dokler gre za to, da sem »naravnan naravno«, oboje izraža pravzaprav isto. Prav ničesar mi ni treba spreminjati, ko se ustrezno naravno posvečam aritmetičnemu svetu ali podobnim drugim »svetovom«. Naravni svet *ostaja potemtakem »pričujoč«*, kot prej sem tudi zdaj nanj naravnan naravno, ne da bi me *nova naravnost motila*. (Husserl 1997, 91–92)

Ob tem se poraja vprašanje, kako je to obdajanje s svetom v naravni naravnosti vpleteno v odvijanje svetnosti sveta sploh,²² če vzamemo, da ni spleteno z njim kot zgolj še enim v vrsti horizontnega obdajanja v dajanju fenomenov. Hkrati je moč dodati: ni mogoče ugledati nobenega, pa tudi ne enega in enotnega horizonta svetnosti, kolikor ne stojim (že) na nekih tleh,²³ ki nudijo vsakokratno gledišče, ki ni kaka poljubno izbrana zorna točka in s tem povezana nazorska pozicija do sveta, marveč se tu narekuje kot zavestna pozicioniranost sveta sploh. Husserl tako na podlagi ugotovljene predanosti naravnega sveta izpelje *generalno tezo naravne naravnosti* sleherne zavesti, ki zadeva *faktum*, da vse to, kar kakorkoli menim, tudi jemljem za dejansko. Ta *pra-do-mena*, *pradoksa*, ki pred-po-postavlja vse, čemur namenjam mojo pozornost in nazorskost v svetu ter korelativno namembnost in pomenskost sveta sploh, je kot taka hkrati postala izgotovitev sleherne univerzalizacije

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22 »Že vsak posameznik ima bistvenostno ‚svoj‘ univerzalni izkušenski horizont, ki vsebuje, čeprav neeksplicirano, odprto brezkončno totalnost bivajočega sveta kot nekaj, kar je stalno soveljavno.« (Husserl 1997, 100) Nadalje prim. Husserl 2005, 176–184.

23 »Treba bi se bilo samó nekoliko premakniti južno ali proti Velikemu medvedu, pa bi krog horizonta postal očitno drugačen, tako da se zvezde nad našo glavo precej spremenijo in se tistemu, ki gre proti jugu ali Vélíkemu medvedu, ne pokažejo več iste.« (Aristotel 2004, 169–171, 297b–298a)

svetnosti sveta kot ideelno ene in enotne. Vendar me taka vse-obsežna in vse-obsegajoča izgotovitev svetovnosti sveta in svetovnosti univerzuma vseeno vrne na vprašanje gotovosti mojega bivanja v svetu, ki me obdaja in s katerim se obdajam, vendar ni zgolj izgotovljena, marveč se samodejno ponuja, tako kot moje delovanje znotraj nje.

252 Husserl ob tem poudari, da se o vsem tem lahko sporazumemo s soljudmi in postavljamo s tem objektivno prostorsko-časovno dejanskost, in sicer kot »naše čisto bivalno okolje, ki mu sami vendarle pripadamo« (Husserl 1997, 125), kar Klaus Held opredeli kot »*komprezentnost*«, ki je kontemporalno opredeljena s tem, da se v »njej skriva popolnoma negotova prihodnost in ta inertnost identičnosti predmetov sega ravno v to prihodnost« (Held 1998, 115). Se pravi, da vsa dejanskost, stvarnost, resničnost, skupaj z vso bitno pragotovostjo zavesti, po predhodni razkritosti, v kateri se naznanja svet, lahko gre tudi v nič. Husserl sam to predhodno razkritost na podlagi *fenomenološke epoche* premesti na transcendentalno raven dajanja zavesti sveta. Held, sledeč Heideggrovemu uvidu v fenomenološko stanje biti-v-svetu, v katerem iz izpostavljenosti (ek-sistence) razkrivanju biti »naravno« zapadamo bivajočemu (in-sistenca), tu odkriva epohalno dogodevnost sveta samega kot »praznega prostora« po/javljanja bivajočega v njem, s katerim smo iz/javno prevzeti in zavzeti, nikoli nevtralno in indiferentno, tudi s še take »znanstvene distance«. S to samo po sebi ne-javljano epohalno igro sveta²⁴ je pogojena tudi *diferenciacija* sveta v svetovih, kar narekuje, da enotni horizont skušamo v *horizmični diferenci*.²⁵

Held se problematike univerzalnosti in posebnih verzij sveta, ki je dodobra zaposlovala že Husserla, kot taka pa ima tudi osrednjo relevanco za obravnavo naseljenosti, priseljenosti in odseljenosti v besedi, sicer podrobneje loti v tekstu »Domači svet, tuji svet, en svet« (Held 2013, 39–54). Znotraj horizmično potencialno neskončno odprtega horizonta sveta, katerega *odprtost ni* podana

24 S fenomenološkega vidika Eugen Fink postavlja igro kot »simbol sveta« (Fink 1960), Heidegger pa v spisu »Stvar« vpelje »zrcalno igro sveta«, »Spiegelspiel der Welt« (Heidegger 2003), kot rej štirih, zemlje in neba, smrtnikov in bogov, četrtostranega kolovrata. »Zrcalo« je besedno sorodno z »obzorjem«. Glede na rej zrcalne igre sveta, bi k *chora* in *horizon* morali pridati še *ho horós* – rej, ples, rajanje, kolo, kor, zbor, roj, zbrana množica.

25 Tako Heraklit v fragmentu DK 108 poda rek, da je to *sophon* (tisto modro) *panton kechorismenon*, »od vsega razmejeno«.

v pritegu tega horizonta (ta v svoji razpotegnjenosti postane »vodoraven«), marveč sama pada v *odteg*, izpade *domači svet*, ki ga lahko karakteriziramo kot lastnega, okolnega, običajnega, vsakdanjega, navadnega in naravnega, *končen*. Kot takega ga formira generativnost, teritorialnost, običajnost, navajenost, domačnost, izročilo, družinskost, opravljenost, pripovednost. To končnost domačega sveta pa nadalje in določilno specificira *konica*, da se neobhodno javlja v paru in kontrastnosti, nasprotstvu in konfliktnosti s *tujim svetom*, ki vključuje tako svet drugega kot druge svetove. Čeprav se razumevanje ali nerazumevanje tujega in drugega, tujine in drugosti vzpostavlja iz samorazumljive danosti primordialnega okolja domačega sveta in zavetja domovine, ga ni moč zvesti *na odnos prisvojitve*, ki si prilasti tuje kot tuje, se polasti drugega kot drugega, pač pa je tu vselej na delu neki predhodni in skoz to predhodnost določilni *odteg* tujosti, ki nas začudi (v tem pogledu je povedna nemška beseda *Befremdung*) spričo odtega, ki se kot tak lahko izpričuje ali ne; to lahko privede do nasilnega vdiranja lastnega v tuje in tujega v lastno, pa vse do tega, da lastno in domačno postane tuje in nedomačno. Kot ugotavlja Held, sledeč Husserlovim analizam (Held 2013, 63; Husserl 1973, 216), je vnanji horizont domačega sveta prazen, kolikor ga že zaznamuje element prisvajanja, po drugi strani pa sleherni horizont iz svoje odprtosti, znotraj katere potencialno lahko seže do neskončnosti, potrebuje svoja tla, ki se kot taka lahko tudi sama spodmikajo, kar pogojuje, da se tudi horizont do neskončnosti potuji. Vendar te tujosti ne gre enačiti z izmikanjem in odtegotvanjem horizonta, saj je slej ko prej pogojen z njim, kar samo po sebi napotuje tudi v razliko med tujim in drugim ter drugačnim.

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Bernhard Waldenfels, ki se je obravnave »domačega sveta« lotil v okviru širšega zasnutka fenomenologije tujega, ob upoštevanju širokega toka francoske fenomenologije in poststrukturalizma, je v več razpravah, ki v marsičem odstopajo in gredo v nasprotno smer od Heldovih, pokazal na omejitve fenomenološkega konstitucionalizma (kar ga zbližuje z Derridajem), in sicer prav na tisti meji, ki izkustvo tujega sooča z izkustvom tujosti, ki pogojuje tudi razliko med tem, kar odgovarjamo in na kar odgovarjamo v izkustvu in z njim. V tem oziru govori tudi o »fenomenološki hoji po meji«, ki predpostavlja *hiperfenomene* (Waldenfels 2012). Z vidika diskurzivne respozivnosti, kot jo Waldenfels zastavi znotraj razvitja fenomenologije tujega (glej Božič 2017),

prejme odlikovan značaj izkustvo *domovine na tujem* (Waldenfels 1999) ali, kot tudi pravimo, *domovine v eksilu*, ki kot *domovina v tujini* pogrēša *azil domačega*. V tem pogledu se pogosto navaja Novalisov rek, da je filozofija domotožje (*Heimweh*) po biti vsepovsod (doma).

Univerzalni horizont sveta bi brez te *inverzije* v primarno porajanje in hkrati *reverza* sveta ne bil mogoč niti kot predpostavka, ne bi imel nobene verzije. Gre za ponotranjanje horizonta, brez katerega ta ne bi bil mogoč kot tista zunanost, ki se obrača drugam in je nekje (od) drugje. To ne izključuje, marveč vključuje možnost, da si delimo svet, ki nam sam odteguje svoje podeljevanje, tak pa se nujno deli v naravni in zgodovinski, moj in tvoj, domač in tuj, notranji in zunanji, podzemni in nadzemni, subjektivni in objektivni ..., nenazadnje pravimo, da je vsak svoj svet. To pomeni, da sleherni ni samo doma v svetu, pač pa hkrati na poti domov in od doma, domačin sveta, obenem pa zdomec. To stanje, ki je hkrati nestanje, moramo ugledati v luči tiste premičnosti, v kateri se pravzaprav giblje svet in z njim karkoli v svetu, gre za premikanje ali odmikanje *tal in horizonta*, glede na kar smo *doma in na poti*, kot sta »zemlja in nebo«, kot je *naselitev in seljenje* na *zemlji* in pod *nebo*. To premičnost samo po sebi, v kateri se giblje svet (*panta rhei*), pri tem polni in prazni tista *vmesnost*, ki je bila nakazana s *choro*. Ta *vmesnost* sama omogoča *prevodnost* iz enega sveta v drugega, iz ene govorice v drugo, in stori, da je *svet možen v enem samem verzu – pesmi*.²⁶ Omogoča pa tudi *konverzacijo* z drugim. En svet lahko izkušamo pred njegovo univerzalizacijo, namreč ravno skozi *verz* in *konverzacijo*. S »konverzacijo« na splošno najprej opisujemo »lahkoten, sproščen pogovor v tujem jeziku, zlasti zaradi vaj, drugič pa pogovor sploh«. Konverzacija (od lat. *conversatio*) je pogovor v smislu obračanja skupaj drug k drugemu. Toda zakaj je pogovor tako obračanje skupaj drug k drugemu? Podobno lahko glede pesniškega povprašamo, čemu pesnjenje potrebuje *versus, obrat*. Beseda »konverzija«, ki je po obliki podobna »konverzaciji«, pomeni »spreobrnjenje«, »sprevračanje«, »prestop«. *Verzija* pomeni »inačico«, »različico«, »izvedbo« ter *vrstico*. Z verzom opredeljujemo pesniško vrstico, celo kar pesem. Pomenljivo je tudi etimološko pojasnilo: »Vrsta, vrstica (in

26 Ključno napotilo v zvezi s tem nam ponudi Gadamer v zapisu »Verz in celota« (Gadamer 1993c, 249–257).

posledično *vêrz*) je poimenovana kot ‚obrat‘ zato, ker orač, ko zorje eno vrsto, obrne in začne orati drugo.« (Snoj 2016)

Vprašanje je zdaj, mar tako *obračanje v drugo vrstico* ne razodeva ključnega načina odnosa, v katerega vstopa horizmična vmesnost razmerja med *doma »od«* in »s« *tujega*? To razmerje ni vselej za-obrnljivo, se pa vrti in obrača v konverzaciji – vzajemnem pogovoru, ki se kot tak hkrati jemlje *iz* domačega v sprejemanju in dojemanju tujega ter *od* tujega v dovtetnosti in privzemanju. Tako drug drugo jemlje *od* in *iz* sebe ven. Materinščina kot govorica, v kateri smo najprej doma, s tem da *imamo* govorico, *se ima* iz tega obračanja v drugo vrstico, obračanja v smislu, da omogoča *izbiro* (sleherne) druge govorice, kolikor izvorno odpira vrata in prehaja vanjo.²⁷ Kar tako *izbiro* onemogoča, je v nasprotju s tem ravno univerzalizacija enega jezika. Materinščina omogoča prevod jezika v samem sebi in s tem obračanje v vse druge jezike, kar vodi v razumevanje (skupnega) sveta in sporazumevanje v njem (prim. Gadamer 2019). Univerzalni jezik ne omogoča nobenega prevoda, kolikor sploh vzamemo, da bi bil en jezik sploh mogoč.

Tu se hkrati začrtuje razmerje med materinščino in filozofijo; *logos* njene misli prav tako opredeljuje *vrstenje*, vse do tistega izvrstnega, ki ga uvrščamo pod ime »biti« in daje razlog vsemu, kar kakorkoli je, sama pa ostaja brez razloga. Tako Heidegger v predavanju *O načelu razloga* napoti: »Zdavnaj že v naši zgodovini pove misliti toliko kot: odgovarjati pozivu biti in iz tega odgovarjanja razpravljati o bivajočem v njegovi biti. To razpravljanje [*Durchsprechen, dialegesthai*] se v zgodovini zahodne filozofije razgrne v dialektiko.« (Heidegger 1997, 128) Heidegger ne poskuša, tako kot recimo Gadamer v opiranju na Platona in zoper Hegla, razpreti dialektike v dialog, čeprav element razpravljanja postavi v moment razgovora. To ni zato, ker bi (kritičnemu) razgovoru, diskusiji, pretresu dajal prednost pred pogovorom kot bolj ali manj »prosti izmenjavi besed«. Heidegger, kakor je razvidno iz navedka, razgovor in pogovor vzajemno naveže na *nagovor*. Da je to ključnega pomena v primeru obravnave materinščine kot govorice, ki kot prva odpira vsako drugo govorico in drugo govorico drugega, kaže njegovo opiranje na isti grški glagol

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27 Boris A. Novak v svoji zbirki razprav o prevajanju poezije to »obračanje« izostreno opredeli kot *salto immortale* (Novak 2011).

dialegesthai ob karakterizaciji pokrajine materinske govornice, kakor se prvotno razgrinja v *dialektih, narečjih*, v kratkem predavanju »Domovina in govornica« (1960):²⁸

Ta pogovor drug z drugim, v katerem se [govornica] govori, se grško imenuje *dialegesthai*. To je neki izborni, vselej poseben pogovor drug z drugim in tj. poslušanje drug drugega. Razbiranje je izvorni pomen grškega glagola *dialegesthai*. Izboren pogovor drug z drugim, *dialegein* v dvojnem smislu, je materinščina kot dialekt. V nemščini pravimo: *Mundart*. To ime je pozorno le na uglasovljenost in zvenskost jezika. Tuja beseda dialekt, če jo previdno uporabimo, v primerjavi s tem pove več.

Jezik je glede na svoje bistveno poreklo dialekt. To ostane celo še takrat, ko postane svetovni jezik. Tudi ta ima namreč svoje odbrano in posebno. Obstaja v posplošeni uniformnosti enolično razumljivega, v kateri so podrazviti [jeziki] prav tako izgubili svojo prirojeno svojskost, kot je potem od domnevno visoko razvitih [jezikov] zatajena.

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V narečju je zakoreninjeno bistvenje govornice. V njem korenini, če je narečje govornica matere, domačnost doma, domovina. Narečje ni le govornica matere, marveč hkrati in vnaprej mati govornice. Toda ob tej uri, zdaj ko se opaža imenovano, mislim na svetovno uro naše svetovne dobe, so običajni in podedovani odnosi med jezikom, materinščino, narečjem in domovino že raztkani. (Heidegger 2003, 156)

V navedku ima osrednje mesto določilo, da je dialekt *mati govornice*, ki ga ni moč vzeti v jezikoslovnem, pač pa filozofskem kontekstu.²⁹ *Pogovor drug*

28 Gadamer je v svojem predavanju »Govornica in domovina« (1995, 366–372) verjetno namerno zaokrenil naslov Heideggrovega besedila, kar bi lahko razumeli v smislu Habermasovega dovtipa, češ da je Gadamer urbaniziral Heideggrovo provinco, seveda če pustimo ob strani vprašanje po *pro-venire*. Prim tudi Barbarić 2018.

29 Glede Heideggrovega sklicevanja na *dialegesthai* pri opredelitvi dialektu velja napotiti na hermenevtični kontekst rabe oznake *dialektos* v Aristotelovi razpravi *O duši*, na katero je opozoril Valentin Kalan, sicer tudi prevajalec tega dela v slovenščino, v svoji obravnavi pojmovanja glasbe pri Aristotelu: »Aristotelov pojem glasu kot *phone* ima zelo širok pomen, saj pomeni tako akustično kakor jezikovno sestavino glasu.

z *drugim* je namreč, kakor poudari Heidegger, zasnovan na zmožnosti, da poslušamo in čujemo drug drugega, kar je neposredno povezano z razbiranjem in ubiranjem smisla, kakor zaznamuje *logos*, ki ga človek »ima s posluhom«. ³⁰ Predpono *dia-*, *raz-*, ki obeležuje *dia-log*, *dia-lektiko* in *dia-lekt*, tako lahko dojamemo v smislu *raz-ločnosti poslušanja*, ki je ključna za to, da slišimo drug drugega – kolikor smo nagovorjeni od tega, kar drug od drugega čujemo.

Upoštevajoč Pirjevčev poseg vsekakor ostaja relevantno Heideggrovo napotilo na vladajoči kurz, kjer razmerje med jezikom, narečjem, materinščino in domovino spravlja v brezrazmerje, ki ga sicer določi kot *brezdomovinskost* sodobne človeškosti (Heidegger 1967, 180–233). Heidegger z *brezdomovinskostjo* opredeljuje nihilistično bistvo svetovnosti današnje epohe, ki potegne s seboj brezodnosnost do materinščine kot jezika (k temu Erzetič 2019), v katerem smo doma kot v »hiši biti« in ki ga vselej zaznamuje pokrajina narečja. Ne gre za brezdomovinskost, ki je posledica svetovnih razmer, marveč se z njo naznanja razpoloženje, položaj in lega *kraja* človeškega bistva v izmeri govornice, ki je v svojem *kroju* (tekstu) kot taka odprta za druge govornice sveta.

Humboldt (2006, 89) navaja, da »v sočasnem napredovanju in nazadovanju jeziki sebi primerno vplivajo na tek razvoja, tako kot jim je to odmerjeno v veliki duhovni ekonomiji človeškega rodu«. »Ekonomija« tu, kolikor je duhovna, izrazno presega to, kar danes razumemo z ekonomijo, pa tudi ekologijo, ki jo sicer radi zoperstavljamo »brezobzirni ekonomski logiki«. Je razen logistike v njej sploh kaka logika? Je v ekologiji še kakšna *oikia*? *Oikos* v duhovnem smislu, s katerim nagovarja *dialegesthai*, še odzvanja v *ekumeni*, ki naj bi izpovedovala ves naseljen svet – zemljo (*v̄sel'ēnaja*). Vprašanje pa je, koliko nas lahko njeno oznanilo še nagovori, kot se je, recimo, še nadejal Gadamer v svojem predavanju »Evropa in ekumena« izpred tridesetih let (Gadamer 1995). ³¹

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Razlika med glasom kot glasbo in glasom kot govornico je utemeljena tudi v anatomiji: grlo in sapnik sta organ za glas in glasbo (*phone*), medtem ko je jezik (*glotta*) organ za govornico (*dialektos*) in izražanje (*hermeneia*) (420b 18–19). Oboje pa je tu zaradi dobrobiti.« (Kalan 2001, 26)

30 Napotilo v zvezi s tem najdemo pri Heraklitu, fr. DK 50: *ouk emou alla tou logou akousantas homolegein sophon estin hen panta*; »če čujete, ne mene, marveč logos, se je modro strinjati, da je eno vse.«

31 »Izkustvo moderne zgodovine Evrope lahko poimenujemo prakso razdiranja jezika

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kot forme duhovne biti. Jezik ma mistično moč v večznačnem rekanju resnice. Zato se tudi v dobi-brez-besede, ki jo določa prehod v posthumano stanje digitalne slike čuti potreba po vzpostavitvi nove obče gramatike.« (Paić 2015, 259)

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LA VIE EST UNE RÉUSSITE

PETITE DIALECTIQUE DE L'ÉCHEC

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Life is a Success. Small Dialectics of Failure

Abstract

The logic of success—betting that failure is or has a virtue—is problematic: if it is good and maybe even necessary to fail, in order to succeed, what ought I do here and now and what may I hope for, to succeed or to fail? For those who understand that success in life is neither a success of life nor failing at it a failure, failure appears not

only inevitable, but undoubtedly enviable because it allows to achieve—in the sense of reaching the shore. The purpose of these lines is to think failure as a stranding.

Keywords: failure, success, life, game.

Življenje je uspeh. Mala dialektika poraza

Povzetek

Logika uspeha – staviti, da je neuspeh vrlina ali da jo poseduje – je problematična: če je dobro in morda celo nujno, da nam spodleti, zato da bi lahko uspeli, kaj naj bi storil tukaj in zdaj, na kaj naj bi upal, da uspem ali da mi spodleti? Za óne, ki razumejo, da niti uspeh v življenju ni uspeh življenja samega niti poraz v njem njegova spodletelost, se neuspeh kaže ne samo kot neizogiben, temveč brez dvoma tudi zaželen, saj omogoča dovršitev – v smislu doseganja obale. Namen pričujočega besedila je misliti poraz kot brodolom.

264 *Ključne besede:* poraz, uspeh, življenje, igra.

Non contente de poser à nouveaux frais de nos jours¹ la question, débattue depuis toujours, de la vie bonne, sinon de la vie heureuse, ressaisie comme *la vie réussie*,² la philosophie étudie désormais aussi celle, moins saugrenue qu'elle n'y paraît d'emblée, non pas de la mauvaise vie — la morale ne fait plus succès —, mais, plus que de la vie manquée, de *la vie ratée*³ — l'éthique fait encore recette. Serait-ce une curiosité dans nos sociétés laïcisées où le star-système est réellement seul à encore faire vraiment rêver, chacun aspirant à crever l'écran devant le succès des autres et espérant derrière le sien à monter au firmament de son vivant ? Non, c'est là manifestement une nécessité puisque, d'une telle interrogation, le profit non moins que le besoin sont grands. Penser l'échec en effet, c'est non seulement faire échec à l'échec, ou presque — sans en expliquer les raisons en détail, comprendre de nos échecs les causes en général invite à mieux essayer ceux que nous n'éviterons pas demain —, mais c'est encore, donc, chercher son salut hors salut, ou quasiment — aujourd'hui sans au-delà où les derniers seront les premiers, tout se joue ici-bas en un coup dont tout est fait pour qu'il soit gagnant. En tentant de passer outre ces deux difficultés que sont le caractère forcément subjectif et, par conséquent, arbitraire de tout jugement par lequel on prétend décider de la valeur d'une vie — car à l'aune de quel(s) critère(s) décréter une vie ratée alors qu'aucun ne fait plus l'unanimité, à commencer par celui d'une vie commune, chacun étant réputé libre de mener la sienne comme il l'entend, si tant est d'ailleurs qu'il y entende quelque chose ? —, et le plan fatalement temporel et, par conséquent, fluctuant de l'existence dont la teneur comme le sens ne sont jamais fixés — car à quel(s) moment(s) décréter une vie ratée alors qu'aucun ne permettra de les éclairer tous, son début présageant de sa fin sans rien en préjuger, sa fin attestant de son début sans rien en révéler, son milieu ne pouvant être saisi qu'à la fin mais atteint que du début ? —, l'on réfléchit ainsi à la pire des destinées pour que soit définie la meilleure, en sorte que réfléchir à l'échec nous est dicté par le diktat même de la réussite, leitmotiv du temps. On aura beau le décrier, on ne saura le renier : réussir à se libérer de l'impératif de réussir reviendra encore à y obéir volontiers

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2 On renverra nécessairement à l'essai de Luc Ferry (2002).

3 On songera évidemment au livre de Charles Pépin (2016).

et les manuels de coaching pourront bien désirer faire baisser la tension, ils ne font que faire monter la pression. Mais lorsque Julien Green se désole de ce que « rien ne ressemble plus à des vies ratées que certaines réussites »⁴ et que Jacques Prévert, lui, se console de ce que « chaque réussite est l'échec d'autre chose »,⁵ c'est alors plus problématique qu'apparaît le rapport, dialectique, qui à la fois unit et dissocie nos succès et insuccès. Bien sûr, échouer n'empêche pas de progresser ni réussir de faillir. Reste que si la réussite a son revers et l'échec ses mérites, que dois-je faire ? Réussir ou échouer ? Plus encore, si la réussite est un échec et que l'échec a de la réussite, que m'est-il permis d'espérer ? Échouer ou réussir ? Comment, finalement, ne pas se demander à la fois s'il n'est pas plus souhaitable d'échouer dans la vie que de réussir et s'il nous est seulement possible de réussir à rater notre vie ? D'où la nécessité de débrouiller la logique, épique, de l'échec.

Échec et réussite

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Pour ce faire, commençons par tenter de revenir aux choses même en partant des mots pour s'élever à leurs idées. On désigne d'abord par échecs ce jeu de plateau dans lequel deux adversaires déplacent, sur un tablier de 64 cases, deux séries de 16 pièces jusqu'à ce que l'un d'eux soit « échec et mat » et, qu'ainsi, il perde, non sans avoir été prévenu du danger qu'il courait par un ou plusieurs *échec !*, interjection par laquelle l'autre joueur l'aura averti que son roi était en passe d'être pris. Par l'intermédiaire de l'arabe, le terme échec dérive du persan *šāh*, qui signifie « roi » et a dû croiser l'ancien français *eschec*, le « butin » — rappelons que le jeu a été introduit dans le sud de l'Europe à partir du x^e siècle par les Arabes mais qu'il dérive du *chattrang* perse, lui-même adaptée du *chaturanga* de l'Inde classique. Nom, au pluriel donc, d'un divertissement en général et, au singulier, d'un revers dans une partie en particulier, le mot en vient ensuite à évoquer l'obstacle et même le dommage par lequel se solde une entreprise, à l'opposé du terme *réussite* que l'on tient communément pour son antonyme. Si ce substantif désigne d'emblée le résultat, bon ou mauvais, d'une affaire, bientôt en effet il ne renvoie plus qu'à

4 Julien Green, *Journal*, mars 1951, dans : Green 1955, 75.

5 Jacques Prévert, *Fatras* (1966), dans : Prévert 1996, II, 52.

l'issue favorable d'un projet, puis à ce jeu de cartes solitaire apparu en Europe au tout début du XVII^e siècle. D'abord appelé « patience »⁶, puis « ruée vers l'or », il consiste, à partir de leur placement désordonné, à réaliser des combinaisons déterminées de cartes, le plus souvent à reconstruire l'ordre de celles de la même couleur. S'il connaît un essor particulier au XIX^e siècle comme en témoigne la parution de nombreux ouvrages sur le sujet, en particulier celui de la marquise de Fortia en 1842, il conservera longtemps un caractère divinatoire : on forme alors un vœu qui sera exaucé si la combinaison « réussit » — aussi a-t-on pu vouloir distinguer le nom du jeu selon ce que l'on désirait faire à s'y adonner, « patience » lorsqu'il s'agit de jouer pour le seul intérêt de combiner des séries, « réussite » lorsqu'il s'agit de jouer pour la connivence de ce jeu avec les forces du hasard. Curieux : on passe, avec les échecs, *du jeu au sérieux* et, avec la réussite, *du sérieux au jeu*, non sans un paradoxe d'ailleurs puisque les échecs sont un jeu difficile où l'on peut facilement perdre vu que rien n'y dépend du hasard, quand la réussite est un jeu facile où l'on peut difficilement gagner attendu que tout y dépend de la chance. L'échec serait dès lors le contraire de la réussite tout comme l'insuccès du succès avec, d'emblée, la même ambiguïté justement, car la même ambivalence littéralement dans les termes de réussite et de succès.

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Réussite et succès

La réussite, on l'a dit, est l'issue, le résultat quel qu'il soit — de l'italien *riuscita*, lui-même dérivant d'*uscita* qui provient du latin *exire*, soit « sortir », c'est-à-dire « aller hors de... » —, comme le succès est, tel quel, ce qui arrive parce qu'il suit, s'ensuit — du latin *successus*, participe passé de *succedere*, « succéder à... ». C'est pourquoi il n'est à l'origine aucun pléonasme à parler d'une « bonne réussite » ni aucun oxymore à évoquer un « mauvais succès ». Apparemment synonymes, la *réussite* et le *succès* ne le sont essentiellement pas.⁷ Certes, avoir

6 Stendhal est réputé introduire l'usage de ce terme dans les notes qu'il consigne par-devers lui : « Elle a fait une patience pour voir si je me marierais. [...] Le résultat de la patience a été que j'aurais une femme très blonde » (*Journal*, 9 juillet 1811, dans : Stendhal 1955, III, 1083).

7 Le lexicographe Jean-Charles Laveaux établit leur différence par l'exigence : « La *réussite* est toujours l'accomplissement d'un dessein, d'un projet, d'un plan, etc. Le *succès*

du succès est toujours une réussite même s'il peut n'en impliquer aucune — combien sont les hommes en vogue qui n'ont jamais rien accompli ? Mais l'inverse n'est pas vrai : avoir de la réussite n'est pas toujours un succès puisque cela n'implique pas qu'on l'obtienne — combien sont les hommes de génie qui ne sont jamais passés à la postérité ? Là où, pour être connu, le succès doit être reconnu, la réussite n'a nul besoin de plébiscite car elle s'impose d'elle-même, et c'est pourquoi, par envie, on aime l'homme qui a du succès — le chanteur ou l'acteur, quelle que soit la qualité de ses prestations — alors que, par jalousie, on hait celui qui a réussi — le lauréat ou le vainqueur, en raison de la qualité de ses réalisations. Bien des éléments parfaitement exécutés — des « réussites » comme on dit par métonymie — restent par là même parfaitement boudés tandis que d'autres, fort mal composés, trouvent leur public. Si la réussite se rencontre donc sans le succès et le succès sans la réussite, avec le temps la réussite qui, on l'aura compris, passe par quelque chose et non par quelqu'un, par une œuvre qui demeure et non par des commentaires qui meurent, a cependant plus de chance de mener au succès que le succès de mener à la réussite. C'est ainsi et 268 Gilbert Chesterton l'écrit : « rien n'échoue comme le succès » (1905, 21) qui, en grisant celui qui le connaît, le rend souvent si aigri qu'on ne le reconnaît plus.

Réussir sa vie/réussir dans la vie

Dans ces conditions, loin s'en faut qu'une succession de succès fasse la réussite, tant il s'avère que *réussir sa vie* est une tout autre affaire que *réussir dans la vie*, c'est-à-dire réussir dans les affaires comme on l'entend principalement en Occident — soit, dorénavant, aux quatre coins du globe et non dans la direction de ce seul des quatre points cardinaux. Ne songeons qu'au héros du chef d'œuvre d'Orson Welles, Charles Foster Kane qui, longtemps béni des dieux au vu de sa chance, n'en finit pas moins abandonné par les hommes en dépit de sa fortune. Né dans une famille modeste du Colorado mais élevé dans le luxe à New York, celui qui gagne tout au départ — une place dans les meilleures

a rapport à l'action par laquelle on exécute ; à la fermeté, au courage avec lesquels on agit ; c'est le résultat des efforts, des travaux. [...] La *réussite* ne dit rien d'extraordinaire ; le *succès* marque une importance, une supériorité reconnues, de grandes difficultés vaincues, de grands obstacles surmontés » (Laveaux 1826, II, 161-162).

universités du pays, la direction d'un journal réputé, la main de la nièce d'un président américain... —, perd tout à l'arrivée — les élections pour devenir gouverneur, son couple avant même son divorce, son fils dans un accident d'avion, sa deuxième femme après une énième dispute... —, sans doute parce qu'il se perd ou qu'on le perd à l'origine — l'étrange mot qu'il prononce en rendant l'âme, « *Rosebud* », n'est-il pas celui qui était gravé sur la luge que lui avait offerte sa famille lorsqu'il était enfant, réminiscence de l'innocence qui lui a été enlevée quand on l'a contraint à quitter son foyer et qui, jusqu'à la fin, l'empêchera d'en avoir un qu'il puisse faire partager aux siens ? Cas d'école s'il en est, le « citoyen Kane » étant exemplaire de la condition humaine : même traumatisant, c'est un premier succès qui permet sa réussite — la mine d'or reçue par sa mère en héritage rend possible son éducation par un banquier de Wall Street —, sa réussite qui le fait enchaîner les succès, l'enchaînement de ses succès qui lui donne le sentiment de la réussite, le sentiment de la réussite qui lui fait accumuler les insuccès, l'accumulation de ses insuccès qui nous donne le sentiment de son échec — l'ancien magnat de la presse milliardaire meurt désespérément seul dans son immense palais de Xanadu.

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Perdue d'avance ?

Quelle leçon tirer de ce film à clef qui est d'autant plus réaliste qu'il n'est pas seulement quasi-biographique mais qu'il est totalement dramatique ? Celle-là même pour sûr que Jean-Paul Sartre énonçait déjà, jeune, et qu'il ne cessera de répéter sur ses vieux jours, à savoir que « la vie est une partie perdue d'avance » ; tenons-nous le pour dit par celui qui fait le récit de la sienne en même temps que celui de tant d'autres : quel que soit le moment et quel que soit le lieu « pardieu, la vie était ratée puisqu'elle se terminait toujours par un échec »⁸. On flirte ici avec la périssologie. Non seulement la vie ne peut pas ne pas se terminer toujours puisque la mort en est la condition mais, bien plus, la vie ne peut pas ne pas s'achever par un échec puisque nul ne saurait triompher de la mort. À l'article de celle-ci, la vie trouve alors son terme qui, en la rendant faite, sonne sa défaite, si bien que « l'histoire d'une vie [...] est

⁸ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Carnets de la drôle de guerre. Septembre 1939 – mars 1940*, dans : Sartre 2010, 356.

l'histoire d'un échec [,] le coefficient d'adversité des choses [é]tan]t tel qu'il faut des années » — que nous n'avons pas tous assez — « de patience » — que tous nous n'avons pas assez — « pour obtenir le plus infime résultat » (Sartre 1943, 561) ; bref, « la vie d'un homme se manifeste comme un échec ; ce qu'il a tenté, il ne le réussit pas » (Sartre et Lévy 1991, 25). Toutefois, si la fin de la vie n'en était pas sifflée, nul ne pourrait se voir souffler sa victoire et, au-delà du fait que c'est d'être si éphémère et si coûteuse qu'elle nous est si chère et si précieuse, c'est sans conteste d'être sans cesse mise en jeu que la vie est enjeu, mieux : son propre enjeu, soit cela même que l'on risque de gagner comme de perdre dans l'entreprise qui consiste à vivre celle qui nous est prêtée. Apprécions ce délicieux paradoxe : pour nous autres hommes, la vie est ce jeu si sérieux que seul gagne celui qui la perd en s'en voyant donner une, souvent bien après avoir reçu la sienne mais juste avant de l'achever, même et peut-être surtout s'il n'en a eue aucune.

Réussie au final ?

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Le « *Es ist gut.* » kantien illustre parfaitement ce point. Qu'on ait pu juger la formule ambiguë dans la bouche de celui à qui on venait d'offrir un verre qu'il vida avant de la prononcer — qu'est-ce, alors, qui est par le philosophe de Königsberg jugée bonne, l'eau qu'il boit ou sa vie qu'il revoit ? — n'empêche en rien l'excellence du bilan qu'il dut et, surtout, put faire sur son lit de mort, puisque la vieillesse l'emporta sans hâte : cinquante et un an d'enseignement en quatre-vingt années, d'abord en tant que précepteur chez des familles aisées puis en tant que *privatdozent* et bientôt professeur ordinaire de logique et de métaphysique à l'Université, une œuvre aussi considérable que considérée lui ayant apporté et la renommée dans sa cité, et la gloire dans l'histoire, un travail auquel n'aura mis fin que sa propre fin qui fut une cessation de la vie et non une agonie. « *Es ist gut.* » donc, « c'est bien » au sens de « tout est bon », et non « *Es ist genug.* », « c'est bon » au sens de « en voilà assez ». L'eau, certes, lui fit du bien, mais sa vie en fit aussi et il y a fort à parier que si elle s'était poursuivie, il n'aurait ni failli à la tâche, ni faibli dans la sienne. Mais quelle vie, au fond, que cette vie dont beaucoup douteront qu'elle en fût une ! Rigoriste, Kant mena une existence si rigoureuse que son seul fait marquant est qu'on en trouve aucun,

ses biographes se bornant à la décrire aussi réglée que rectiligne.⁹ Belle, sa mort ne fut-elle pas celle d'un mort-vivant tant, calme, sa vie ne fut pas celle d'un bon vivant ? Et comment dire si elle fut réussie ? La difficulté est grande ici : ce n'est qu'avec un critère précis en tête que peut se faire, si on le doit, l'évaluation — car de quel droit juger celle d'autrui à partir de celui qu'on aura choisi pour soi mais qu'il n'aura peut-être pas retenu pour lui ? Mais l'embarras est moindre qu'ailleurs : ce n'est qu'au moment strict du trépas que doit se faire, si on le peut, l'estimation — car dans combien de cas l'intéressé ne s'intéresse plus assez à tout ce qui lui est arrivé depuis qu'il est né ! Bref, *quid* ?

Règles de vie/règles de la vie

De même qu'un portrait n'est réussi que s'il coïncide à l'original dont il est la copie, de même la vie ne l'est que si elle concorde avec le modèle qu'elle suit. Aussi tâcher de ne pas gâcher sa vie pour tenter de la réussir commence-t-il par se choisir un héros, dont l'exemple donne des règles de vie auxquelles il faudra, sinon suffira de se conformer pour jouir ou, à tout le moins, espérer bénéficier

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9 « L'histoire de la vie d'Emmanuel Kant est difficile à écrire, car il n'eut ni vie ni histoire ; il vécut d'une vie de célibataire, vie mécaniquement réglée et presque abstraite, dans une petite rue écartée de Königsberg. Je ne crois pas que la grande horloge de la cathédrale ait accompli sa tâche visible avec moins de passion et plus de régularité que son compatriote Emmanuel Kant. Se lever, boire le café, écrire, faire son cours, dîner, aller à la promenade, tout avait son heure fixe, et les voisins savaient exactement qu'il était deux heures et demie quand Emmanuel Kant, vêtu de son habit gris, son jonc d'Espagne à la main, sortait de chez lui, et se dirigeait vers la petite allée de tilleuls, qu'on nomme encore à présent, en souvenir de lui, l'allée du Philosophe. Il la montait et la descendait huit fois le jour, en quelque saison que ce fût ; et quand le temps était couvert ou que les nuages noirs annonçaient la pluie, on voyait son domestique, le vieux Lampe, qui le suivait d'un air vigilant et inquiet, le parapluie sous le bras » écrit Heinrich Heine (« De l'Allemagne » (1834), dans : Heine 1835, 152–153). Aussi est-ce un comble que Kant ait vu quatre de ses amis lui dédier une biographie : Johann Gottfried Hasse — *Merkwürdige Äußerungen Kant's von einem seiner Tischgenossen* (Königsberg : Hering, 1804) —, Ludwig Ernst Borowski — *Darstellung des Lebens und des Charakters Immanuel Kant's* (Königsberg : Nicolovius, 1804) —, Ehregott Andreas Christoph Wasianski — *Immanuel Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren, ein Beytrag zur Kenntniss seines Charakters und seines häuslichen Lebens aus dem täglichen Umgange mit ihm* (Königsberg : Nicolovius, 1804) — et Reinhold Bernhard — *Immanuel Kant geschildert in Briefen an einen Freund* (Königsberg : Nicolovius, 1804).

de la même destinée. C'est ainsi que l'entendent, plus que les spectateurs, les sectateurs de Bouddha, de Socrate ou de Jésus. Persuadés que ne peut qu'être bonne la maxime invitant à imiter l'homme dont la vie est bonne, ils ont un patron autant qu'un étalon de mesure à l'aune duquel estimer leur séjour sur terre aussi bien que la carrière de quiconque. Reste que les leurs seront quelconques aux yeux des autres qui en auront d'autres, surtout à l'heure de la mort de Dieu qui est aussi celle de la naissance de l'individu. Chaque homme ayant désormais sa vision du monde, tous ont, sur et dans la vie, et leur avis, et leurs envies. On pourra bien sûr opposer à la relativité parce qu'à la particularité (elle-même relative) de toute opinion — nous avons beau différer en termes d'identité et, surtout, d'ipséité, nous sommes loin de tous penser différemment — l'absoluité parce que l'universalité (elle-même absolue) de toute intention — nous avons beau tous penser différemment, nous sommes loin de différer en termes de désir ou, plutôt, de volonté — étant donné que nul n'aspire à autre chose en fin de compte qu'au bonheur — ici-bas ou dans l'au-delà, même combat. N'en demeure pas moins que jamais des *règles de vie*, destinées à chacun pour faire comme tous avec eux, ne seront des *règles de la vie*, menée par tous sans être comme celle d'aucun autre parmi eux. Les règles qui régissent des affaires variées sont particulières et la vie qui se décline sur plusieurs « plans »¹⁰ générale ; les règles qui régissent une même assemblée sont universelles et la vie que ne conduisent que des personnes uniques singulière.

Nos fins, notre fin

De même qu'un tir est raté lorsqu'il manque la cible qu'il visait, de même une vie l'est lorsqu'elle ne touche pas au but qu'elle poursuivait. Après avoir compris

10 « Plans de vie » est le nom donné par Ricœur à « ces vastes unités pratiques que nous désignons comme vie professionnelle, vie de famille, vie de loisir, etc. » et qui représentent un « niveau médian » entre nos différentes activités — « métiers, jeux, arts » — et « le projet global d'une existence » (Ricœur 1990, 186). En distinguant, dans l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*, trois grands types de vie qui, si elles ont généralement la faveur des hommes, suscitent nécessairement des préférences : la vie hédoniste, la vie politique et la vie philosophique, Aristote suggérait déjà la difficulté de ne pas privilégier un domaine à d'autres — ici le plaisir, le pouvoir ou la sagesse — et, bien plus, l'impossibilité de leur synthèse. En témoignent Calliclès, Polos et Socrate dans le *Gorgias* de Platon.

que nous sommes, après Dieu — quelle que soit la manière de le concevoir et de l'imaginer —, seul maître à bord de la nôtre que d'autres voudront peut-être diriger mais que nul ne saura mener pour nous, tâcher de ne pas gâcher sa vie pour tenter de la réussir revient dès lors à l'inscrire dans un cadre et à s'y fixer des objectifs pour parvenir à ses fins. Mais n'y a-t-il pas là, déjà, au moins trois défis des plus délicats ? Soumettre ce qui, au vu de son énergie (la vie), ne va qu'à hue et à dia et se montre rétif à l'envi dès qu'on s'emploie à le dompter ; définir ce qui, au vu de son intermédiation (des objectifs), ne nous fait rien finir en sorte de nous obliger à recommencer ; atteindre ce qui, eu égard à son extrémité (des fins), nous condamne à nous éteindre sitôt l'avoir rejoint, voire avant même de le gagner. Le pire est pour la fin, *nos fins* qui sonnent aussi la nôtre, *notre fin*. Car s'en assigner une dans la vie, ceci ou cela, n'est-ce pas signer son arrêt de mort ? Dans le meilleur des cas, nous obtiendrons ceci justement non cela et, sans être complètement ratée, notre vie ne sera que partiellement réussie lors même que largement entamée ? Or y a-t-il échec plus cuisant qu'une réussite qui ne soit pas totale, *a fortiori* quand on se voit trop avancé dans une voie pour en changer ? Rebrousser chemin sera inconséquent, couper à travers champ imprudent. Avec l'âge au demeurant, le « pratico-inerte »¹¹ rend pratico-pratique : après compromis et compromissions, on se résigne. Ceci étant, est-ce bien un mal ou ne serait-ce pas un mal pour un bien, quand on est jeune, de ne pas savoir ce que nous voulons faire et, qui plus est, de ne pas vouloir ce que nous savons faire — d'où notre ambition — comme de ne pas faire ce que nous savons vouloir — d'où notre distraction —, autant de traits qui disparaissent quand nous sommes vieux ?

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11 « Pratico-inerte » est le nom donné par Sartre à tous ces éléments par nous déjà choisis qui « pèsent sur notre destin par la contradiction qui oppose en eux la *praxis* (le travail qui les a faits et le travail qui les utilise) et l'inertie », d'où, au fur et à mesure, notre « impuissance » (Sartre 1960, 138 et 154). Certes, tant qu'il y a de la vie, il y a de l'espoir. Mais le champ des possibles a la forme d'un entonnoir. Si, tant que nous sommes, nous restons libres et gardons ainsi le choix, de faire ou de ne pas faire, de parfaire, de refaire ou de défaire ce qui a été fait, tous autant que nous sommes portons le poids des décisions que nous avons prises, chacune resserrant toujours davantage l'étau dans lequel notre vie se trouve comprise.

Réussir à échouer/échouer à réussir

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12 On songe bien entendu au titre grinçant du facétieux psychologue, psychothérapeute, psychanalyste jungien et sociologue américain d'origine viennoise Paul Watzlawick : *Ultra-Solutions. How to Fail Most Successfully* (New York : W. W. Norton & Company, 1986). L'éditeur de sa traduction française — signée par Anne-Lise Hacker aux éditions du Seuil en 1988 — le présente ainsi : « Paul Watzlawick nous avait enseigné dans son précédent livre, *Faites vous-même votre malheur*, les moyens les plus raffinés pour devenir malheureux. Maintenant il cherche à comprendre et à approfondir les recettes qui mènent infailliblement à l'échec. *Comment réussir à échouer ? C'est simple*. À chaque problème, il suffit de trouver l'ultrasolution. Qu'est-ce qu'une ultrasolution ? C'est une solution qui nous débarrasse non seulement du problème, mais aussi de tout le reste. C'est un peu comme la vieille blague du carabin : mission accomplie, patient décédé. Il existe beaucoup d'ultrasolutions, étudiées et répertoriées dans ce livre : elles s'appliquent tout autant aux conflits conjugaux qu'aux relations internationales. La règle est simple : il faut que le jeu que l'on joue avec l'autre soit de *somme nulle*, c'est-à-dire que vous ne puissiez gagner que si l'autre perd, et vice versa. Il est par conséquent impossible que les deux gagnent, mais normal que les deux perdent. Personne n'aura de mal à trouver dans sa vie et dans celle de ses proches des ultrasolutions. Il suffit de lire les journaux ou d'écouter les informations, mais leur mécanisme est dans ce livre minutieusement détaillé et mis à la portée de tous. »

qui, à première vue, nous empêchent de vaincre, il est des facteurs psychiques qui, à notre insu, nous font faillir. Solidaires, les sentiments d'infériorité et de culpabilité qui nous animent depuis l'enfance durant laquelle nos parents ont monnayé leur amour en nous intimant de changer pour le mériter, s'expriment par un désir de succès auquel nous ne pouvons aisément donner suite puisque, pour expier notre indignité, il nous faut échouer, ce que garantit le fait de nous interdire de réussir. En résulte, héritée de notre éducation, une culture de l'échec que, à mesure d'une nouvelle inculcation, pourra en quelque façon corriger une culture de la réussite toujours fondée sur le même présupposé — ou préjugé, on jugera.

Échouer pour réussir/réussir pour échouer

Cependant qu'il est seulement possible et rien moins que contingent de *réussir pour échouer*, on y part en effet de cette fausse bonne idée selon laquelle il s'avère nécessaire d'échouer pour réussir. Tel est notamment le credo des pionniers américains dont se fait le chantre Thomas Edison, autodidacte forcené car enfant fort indiscipliné et handicapé forcé mais inventeur aux 1093 brevets en soixante-deux ans de carrière, lui qui, tant qu'il n'avait pas réussi ce qu'il entreprenait, refusait d'admettre qu'il avait échoué, préférant affirmer qu'il avait simplement trouvé 10 000 solutions qui ne fonctionnaient pas.¹³ L'échec serait ainsi le fondement de la réussite¹⁴ et, plus encore, la seule voie qui y mène.

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13 Il en va ainsi de son perfectionnement de l'ampoule. Après les premiers travaux de James Bowman Lindsay, un Anglais qui, en 1835, présente un prototype de très faible puissance permettant, selon ses dires, de lire un livre à presque un demi-mètre, son compatriote, Joseph Swann, a l'idée d'utiliser un filament de papier carbonisé dans un globe en verre sous vide. L'éclairage fourni n'étant par lui pas jugé satisfaisant, il ne revient à ses recherches que vingt-cinq ans plus tard. En 1878, il dépose un brevet d'ampoule à incandescence basée sur des filaments de carbone. Il équipe sa maison et, bientôt, le Savoy, célèbre théâtre de Londres. Un an plus tard, après avoir recherché le matériau idéal aux quatre coins du monde pour prolonger la combustion lente dans l'ampoule, après avoir testé 6000 échantillons de végétaux et réalisé quelque 1200 tentatives, Edison opte pour un filament en bambou du Japon. Swan et Edison se disputant la paternité de l'ampoule électrique, tous deux obtiennent le droit, après une décision de justice, d'en fabriquer. Le premier ayant mis au point le culot à baïonnette, le second créé le culot à vis.

14 On prête d'ordinaire à Lao Tseu, dans le livre majeur du taoïsme qu'on lui attribue,

Logique : l'homme est cet animal raté car privé d'instinct. Toujours immature et parfois prématuré, il ignore d'emblée et ce qu'il fait sur terre, et ce qu'il doit y faire, n'en venant à le savoir qu'à se tromper. C'est par essais et erreurs que cet être qui, n'étant pas doué, n'a d'abord rien pour lui, peut bientôt tout ceci dit et, ainsi, se doter du meilleur comme du pire quoiqu'après lui. Mal fini sinon pas fini, perfectible et non parfait, il jouit d'une marge de progression indéfinie à l'échelle de l'individu mais infinie à l'échelle de l'espèce. De ce point de vue, l'échec est une vertu, du moins a les siennes. Reconnu, il rend le réel mieux connu, enseignant qu'il est toujours, plus ou moins, tout un monde entre lui et moi — d'où le rappel, élémentaire, qu'il est des choses qui dépendent de moi et d'autres qui n'en dépendent pas. Admis, il rend le moi plus réfléchi, enseignant que je suis toujours moins ce que je fais que ce que j'en fais — d'où l'appel, salutaire, à distinguer le projet de la personne, le fait d'avoir raté de celui d'être un raté. Accepté, il rend ce que je fais plus approprié, enseignant que mes actes sont toujours plus des réactions que des actions — d'où l'éveil, nécessaire, à l'idée qu'un acte manqué en est bien un,¹⁵ soit le compromis de deux intentions, « une demi-réussite et un demi-échec » (Le Guen 2008, 12).

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une telle formule qui, pourtant, ne s'y trouve pas, le seul passage approchant se situant au chapitre 23 de l'ouvrage qui invite l'homme à accueillir les choses comme elles viennent, autrement dit à les prendre avec philosophie. On y lit exactement ceci : « Celui qui va selon la Voie, son chemin ne fait qu'un avec la Voie. Quand il réussit, il est un avec le succès ; quand il échoue, il est un avec l'échec. Quand il est un avec la Voie, alors il se réjouit de l'accueil de la Voie » (Lao Tseu 2003). Quoi qu'il en soit, on en finirait pas d'inventorier les échos qu'a pu avoir une telle pensée jusque, récemment, le livre à succès, justement, de l'économiste et journaliste britannique Tim Harford : *Adapt. Why Success Always Starts with Failure* (2011).

15 D'aucuns iront plus loin, gageant que la véritable dimension d'un acte est peut-être son échec même. C'est la leçon freudienne matinée de l'apport hégélien que retient Lacan quant au « travail », psychique ou dialectique donc, « du négatif » selon l'expression forgée en 1807 par le natif de Stuttgart (Hegel 1980, 18) : « la première forme de l'acte que l'analyste ait pour nous inaugurée, c'est cet acte symptomatique dont on peut dire qu'il n'est jamais si bien réussi que quand il est un acte manqué », mais « s'il n'y a rien de si réussi que le ratage quant à l'acte, ce n'est pas dire pour autant qu'une réciprocité s'établisse et que tout ratage en soi soit le signe de quelque réussite, j'entends réussite d'acte » (*Le séminaire. Livre XV. L'acte psychanalytique*, 6 décembre 1967, dans : Lacan 2021).

Loi de l'échec, logique de la réussite

Contrairement au succès, qui rend ivre et donc fou, l'échec rend ainsi sobre puisque sage celui qui l'essuie et n'en meurt pas tout de suite. Comment ne pas entendre résonner ici la voix de Nietzsche : « Appris à l'école de guerre de la vie : ce qui ne me tue pas me rend plus fort » (KSA 6, 60) ? Mais il faudra nuancer ou, plutôt, écouter la nuance de l'apophtegme si bien repris qu'il en est mal compris. Plus qu'un combat pour la survie, plus qu'une lutte pour la bonne vie, la vie est une guerre de laquelle on meurt. Aussi les épreuves que nous y subissons n'ont-elles rien d'une mithridatisation. Celles que nous dépassons ne nous font que mieux passer à d'autres jusqu'à ce que, fragilisés par chacune, nous nous brisions en de plus menus morceaux encore que ceux que nous avons déjà maintes fois recollés. Pourquoi, autrement, serions-nous tous largement kakorrhaphiophobes ? Ce qui entame le corps entame l'âme ou le moral et il n'est pas même besoin de douleur pour générer la souffrance tant elle se nourrit d'elle-même. N'en reste pas moins que cette dernière est un merveilleux instrument de connaissance dont la principale leçon est d'initier à son inanité, à sa vanité, à son absurdité. Qui comprend en effet que la souffrance, qui n'est pas sans réalité, est sans intérêt, sans valeur et sans sens, arrêtera de s'en infliger, y compris en s'en affligeant. Par suite, il vivra ses échecs, petits ou grands et même retentissants comme l'occasion de développer « son ingéniosité et sa vaillance », pour ne pas dire comme la chance de « supporter le malheur » autant que de « l'exploiter jusqu'au bout » afin non seulement de continuer à vivre mais, peut-être, de commencer à vivre pleinement la seule vie sur laquelle il puisse compter malgré la promesse de son échec, celle du « grand naufrage » (Nietzsche, KSA 5, 161). Comment la *logique de la réussite*, quelle qu'elle soit puisqu'il en est trois, arriverait-elle à outrepasser la *loi de l'échec*, seule qui soit d'airain pour nous, êtres humains, vu qu'elle l'est pour tout être vivant ?

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Échouer, arriver

On distinguera en effet trois logiques de la réussite, elles-mêmes classées selon leur propre degré de réussite dans la tâche de favoriser la nôtre : celle, déprimante, du « tout ou rien », pour laquelle le moindre échec l'interdit ; celle, consolante, du

« ça ne fait rien », pour laquelle aucun échec ne l'hypothèque ; celle, inspirante, du « ça fait tout », pour laquelle tout échec, et non des moindres, la permet. La première, « tout ou rien », fait mal en tout parce qu'elle ne rime à rien : il est pour chacun, sa vie durant, des réussites et des échecs, et des réussites plus ou moins belles d'ailleurs comme des échecs plus ou moins graves, car bien des intrigues et plus d'une entreprise qui peuvent connaître de bons ou de mauvais succès¹⁶. La seconde, « ça ne fait rien », ferait presque du bien quand ça fait mal mais ne fera pas tout : que l'on ne nous tienne pas rigueur de nos échecs nous évite de nous voir briser des ailes que nous nous sommes brûlées sans aucunement stimuler leur vigueur tant le réconfort offre un confort où s'abîme bientôt tout effort. La troisième, « ça fait tout », fera forcément mal quand on fait bien puisqu'elle n'y fera rien : nous aurons beau aller de réussite en réussite et, même, nous voir couronner de succès, il faudra bien, l'heure venue, abandonner tout ce que l'on aura gagné, le donner à d'autres si tant est qu'il puisse être conféré n'évitant pas qu'il soit ultimement perdu. Dans cette perspective où nous nous réapparaissons enfin tels que nous sommes, à savoir voués à l'échec, nous qui aimons d'abord disparaître à nos yeux en privilégiant le paraître à l'être, la réussite aurait-elle encore un sens ? Faute de pouvoir réussir puisque, même à nous en sortir dans la vie, il nous faudra sortir de la vie, notre devoir n'est-il pas alors d'échouer et, dès lors, notre espérance d'y *arriver* ? N'est-ce pas ce à quoi nous invite finalement cette autre maxime, célèbre elle aussi, de Samuel Beckett : « Déjà essayé. Déjà échoué. Peu importe. Essaie encore. Échoue encore. Échoue mieux » (1983, 7) ?

Qui perd gagne

« Échoue » et non « réussis » donc, mais « échoue mieux » car « échoue bien » vu qu'il arrive de mal échouer ou, plutôt, de mal s'échouer. Avec un tel

16 Jean-Charles Laveaux insiste sur cette relativité : « les deux substantifs *réussite* et *succès*, mis seuls, sans épithète, signifient un événement heureux ; mais la *réussite* n'est pas toujours un *succès* final [...]. Une affaire est composée de plusieurs événements qui peuvent réussir ou ne pas réussir, de plusieurs actions qui peuvent avoir de bons ou de mauvais *succès* ; et le résultat de ces diverses *réussites* et de ces divers *succès* forme la *réussite* totale ou le *succès* final. Ces mots *réussite* et *succès* peuvent donc être appliqués également et à chaque événement partiel, et à la totalité de l'événement, ou à la suite, à l'enchaînement des événements » (1826, 162).

échec ou, mieux, échouage, qui est la loi de la vie, nous sortons de la logique de la réussite pour entrer dans celle de la marine. Ballotés par les flots durant notre carrière sur terre qui s'avère un passage soldé par le trépas qui en constitue un autre — d'où l'image ancestrale de la traversée¹⁷ —, nous finirons, c'est-à-dire finirons par échouer, c'est-à-dire par arriver *stricto sensu*. À bon port ou non, jetés sur le rivage nous toucherons la rive où, en expirant, donc en rendant cette vie qui nous a seulement été prêtée de notre vivant — nos expressions pour dire la mort le suggèrent : « rendre son dernier souffle » comme « rendre son âme à Dieu » ne se peuvent que « si Dieu me prête vie » —, une autre, la nôtre nous sera donnée par la mort et, cette fois, pour de bon, comme si nous jouions à qui perd gagne. Certes, ce jeu en est moins un qu'une variante de tout jeu possible dans lequel, par jeu justement, on renverse le but du jeu. Au lieu de gagner, les joueurs se fixent pour objectif de perdre¹⁸ et « c'est le vaincu qui, en *tant* que vaincu, remporte la victoire » (Sartre 1947, 93). Le jeu est alors

17 Si, pour la tradition judéo-chrétienne, notre vie ici-bas est cette « vallée de larmes » (Ps, 84.7) par laquelle nous transitons, au terme de celle-ci l'accès à l'au-delà suppose encore une autre pérégrination, cette fois à travers la « vallée de l'ombre de la mort » (Ps, 23.4). Traversées le sont donc la vie et la mort et l'idée de se trouver ou retrouver dans plus d'une mythologie. Chez les Égyptiens, le soleil est dit naître chaque matin à l'orient puis croître jusqu'au zénith et vieillir jusqu'à l'occident où il disparaît dans le royaume des morts. Cette course diurne constitue le voyage du dieu solaire Rê qui l'accomplit à bord d'une barque, le *mandjet*, sur laquelle il charge l'âme des défunts, et le périple de se poursuivre pour lui le soir venu mais sur une autre embarcation, le *mesektet*, pour entamer la traversée de la nuit. Chez les Grecs et les Romains, après que Hermès ou, si l'on préfère, Mercure les a conduites dans l'Hadès, Charon, nocher des Enfers, fait, sur les marais de l'Achéron, franchir le Styx contre une obole aux âmes des morts ayant reçu une sépulture, sans quoi elles sont condamnées à errer sur les bords du fleuve pendant cent ans. Chez les Celtes, placé sur une barque, le corps des trépassés est poussé à l'eau en direction de l'ouest pour gagner une île au-delà de l'Océan, Avalon, pays paradisiaque où le temps n'a pas de prise et où poussent des pommiers chargés de pommes d'or et d'argent. Et nombreuses sont ailleurs encore les autres figures de dieux psychopompes, donc de passeurs qui, eux, ne sont pas nécessairement navigateurs mais encore chevaliers. Ainsi chez les Vikings, Odin montant Sleipnir pour emporter les morts au Valhalla, les soldats tombés au combat y étant, eux, mener par les Valkyries ; ainsi aussi chez les Inuits, Pinga chevauchant un caribou pour guider les personnes récemment décédées vers Adlivun.

18 La première attestation du qui perd gagne remonte à Pierre Mallet dans son *Jeu de Dames, avec toutes les maximes et règles tant générales que particulières, qu'il faut observer en icelui, et la méthode d'y bien jouer*, Paris, au Palais, en la grande salle, 1668.

vécu dans toute sa pureté dans la mesure où on y abolit le résidu de profit, de revenu, d'avantage qu'il comportait encore pour en faire une activité totalement désintéressée, suivre ses règles jusqu'à les maîtriser interdisant désormais de l'emporter. Mais rien ici n'est désespérant tant rien n'est désespéré : dans ce cas de figure où l'on doit se faire battre, on peut toujours se battre pour bien le faire et se montrer le meilleur en cette affaire. Il est un premier même chez les derniers en effet et comme les choses sont ici censées aller de mal en pis, Jean Genet précise la façon de faire en sorte que tout se passe au mieux : « quand on a échoué, il ne reste plus qu'une seule façon de réussir, c'est celle qui consiste à réussir à échouer en noyant l'échec dans l'échec, de façon à conférer à celui-ci la grandeur d'un désastre. »¹⁹

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Mais noyer l'échec dans l'échec ou, ainsi que nous le suggérons, dans l'échouage, ne serait-il pas là encore une manière, en plus d'arriver à la fin, d'arriver à nos fins ? Le fait est que, par une étrange coïncidence — ou pas ! —, le verbe *arriver* dans notre langue est bien chargé de cette ambiguïté : arriver, c'est à la fois toucher au but et toucher le bout, atteindre et rejoindre, parvenir et aborder, réussir et accoster. Or, comment ne pas en être saisi une fois admis que, bon gré mal gré, « nous sommes liés au désastre » (Blanchot 1955, 256) ? C'est que l'échec ne vient pas qu'à la fin, dans la faillite, fatale, de l'heure fatidique ; « l'échec revient » ici-bas au travers de petites morts à répétition qui, ou nous en apprendrons l'essence — « il faut entendre que l'échec est justement ce retour » (ibid.) assume Maurice Blanchot —, ou nous en laisserons le goût — « la *situation d'échec* » n'est pas le « sentiment d'échec » qui, parce qu'il peut émerger même « dans le succès », est « la preuve que l'échec est au-delà de tout ce qu'il y a d'objectif et d'historique en lui » assure Jean Lacroix (1964, 28 et 61). Que l'on pense à toutes ces pertes qui nous préparent à la nôtre quand elles ne la préparent pas directement en y participant ! Car nous ne perdons pas que nos parents lorsqu'ils déclinent et nos enfants lorsqu'ils s'envolent : dès avant souvent et plus d'une fois parfois, nous perdons notre temps, notre argent, notre envie, notre énergie, quand ce n'est pas notre travail, notre santé, notre toit, notre foi. Bref, nous ne cessons de perdre nos repères et, avec eux, l'illusion que nous pouvons en avoir que nous saurons garder. Il est en conséquence,

19 Jean Genet, dans : Vergely 1997, 194.

précédant notre échouage final, « de vrais échecs » et, par là même, « une vraie damnation terrestre », et si Simone de Beauvoir y voit la raison pour laquelle « les mots de victoire, de sagesse ou de joie ont un sens » (1947, 49), on s'étonnera que son compagnon n'ait point pour cela fait le choix de soutenir que, plutôt qu'un échec — ou une vaine partie d'échecs, c'est selon —, *la vie est une réussite* — ou, comme on l'a dit précédemment, une patience. Une patience parce qu'il en faut toujours *in fine* : Marcel Proust le retient, « il est peu et de réussites faciles, et d'échecs définitifs »²⁰ si bien qu'il faut savoir autant attendre que tendre.²¹ Sanctionnée par un as qui permet aussi de la célébrer — voici un succès —, la fin d'une belle série de remises en place des cartes désormais découvertes — voilà une réussite — signe le début d'une nouvelle suite de remises en ordre des cartes encore recouvertes dans une réussite en sorte que, tant qu'il en reste dans le talon, la partie se voit relancée à chaque fois qu'on la croit terminée. *Une réussite* parce qu'il en vient parfois *in extremis* : Romain Gary le soutient, « toutes les réussites sont des échecs qui ont raté » (1982, 136) vu qu'il arrive même à l'échec de ne pas être en veine. Lorsque, dans la partie, le dernier as a été révélé mais qu'il est encore des cartes qui n'ont pas été dévoilées — voici un insuccès —, tout semble perdu quand les retourner seulement peut suffire à gagner — voici l'échec en échec — et, ainsi, à signer le succès de la réussite elle-même, autrement dit de la réussite distinguée à sa juste valeur — d'où l'expression, rien moins que redondante, de « réussir avec succès »²². Par où se déduit ce que l'on pressent parfois, à savoir que, *hic et nunc*, on peut être en pleine réussite sans aucun succès — ainsi l'anonyme plein de mérites en action — comme être en tout dans l'échec en plein succès — ainsi la vedette émérite en perdition — mais que, au bout du compte, tout peut arriver quand ce qui doit arriver arrive — la mort — et, donc, nous échoit, jusqu'au succès de cette réussite qu'est l'échec — la vie.

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20 Marcel Proust, *Le temps retrouvé* (1927), dans : Proust 1989, IV, 311.

21 C'est le sens des fameuses formules attribuées à Winston Churchill sans certitude aucune de leur authenticité — ni grande assurance de leur légitimité — : « Le succès, c'est d'aller d'échec en échec sans perdre son enthousiasme », « Le succès n'est pas final, l'échec n'est pas fatal. C'est le courage de continuer qui compte » ; voir sur ce point : Langworth 2017, 218.

22 C'est là pour sûr ce qui fait dire à l'historien François Guizot que « la réussite est le succès final [...], c'est un succès réel, le vrai succès » (1809, II, 812).

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Potem ko je leta 1980 ugledala luč sveta njegova prva knjiga *Vježbe u filozofiji* [*Vaje v filozofiji*], je postalo jasno, da je v našo filozofsko krajino vstopil avtor, ki od svojih bralcev pričakuje pred in nad vsem nekaj, česar do tedaj nismo bili vajeni, namreč sopotništvo v poznavanju, muki in naporu metodičnega prevpraševanja in prebiranja klasičnih filozofskih besedil. Damir Barbarić je od samega začetka praktical pristop k besedilom, tj. način branja, rabo enega vidika razlage. Zato tudi ves njegov opus – od navedenega prvenca do najnovejše knjige, ki jo imamo pred seboj, naslovljene *Iz radionice duha* [*Iz delavnice duha*] – obstaja kot ena, edinstvena knjiga, četudi ne vsebuje ene same pozitivistične misli, ene temeljne konstitutivne teze in tudi ne ene edinstvene nosilne teme. Ničesar iz vsebine njegovih knjig ne moremo razglasiti za »glavno, poglobljeno«; v njih ni nikakršne napredujoče razlage: ne glede na to, ali pa morda prav zato, so vsa njegova dela povezana in edinstvena, se kličejo, si sledijo in se smiselno strnjujejo; – v njih kot to obstojno vztraja nekaj tipično barbaričevskega, in to je – z besedami njegovega prvenca: obračanje, prevračanje, *vrtenje*, »*vrtnja*«, ki se vrši povsod – skrajno sistematično in metodično.

Ta metodično izvedeni pristop je pravzaprav nenehno, neumorno nadejanje, da pomembne teme in pomembne mislece zgodovine filozofije pretolmačimo s pomočjo in skoz starejšo in novejšo filozofsko tradicijo. S tem pri Barbariću iz brezupno raznorodnih in raznovrstnih vsebin razkrivamo tematske leit-motive, ki se raztezajo skoz vsa njegova razpravljanja. To so pred vsem: eno in drugo oz. množstvo, smrt in nesmrtnost, sovraštvo in ljubezen, to, *kar je*, in to, *kar je*.

Prav zato je bila vsaka Barbarićeva knjiga pomemben dogodek v filozofskem življenju, pomembna kot poskus in kot dosežek, nič manj pa tudi kot naznaka tistega, kar še lahko pričakujemo. Za mojo generacijo so njegova dela – zaradi svoje resnosti – glavni vir opomina in streznitve, budnica iz dremeža šolske filozofije, shematizma tradicionalnega mišljenja; spodbujala so nas in hrabrila, da velikih filozofov ne gledamo preveč zlahka kot nekakšne monolitne bloke, odsekane, ločene od tradicije mišljenja. Barbarić nas je zatorej nenehno opominjal na to, da je resnično filozofiranje od davna vzgibavajo poskusi vnovičnega napetega pričakovanja in prebiranja že branih besedil. Ti stari in znani teksti niso z
286 branjem iz nove perspektive osvetljeni le bolje in globlje, marveč spremenjeno, na do tedaj neznan način. To je Barbarić s svojimi knjigami ves čas suvereno in spodbudno dosegal, s tem si zasluži naše iskreno priznanje.

Najnovejša Barbarićeva knjiga, *Iz delavnice duha*, prinaša nekaj avtorjevih pomembnejših del, nastalih v zadnjih letih, skupaj 25, ki se tematsko raztezajo od vprašanja šolanja in izobrazbe, sija lepote in ljubezenskega hrepenenja pri Platonu, budnih sanj pri Schopenhauerju, do poslušanja in mislenja pri Aristotelu. Precej jih je krajših, kakor da bi se avtor natihem držal modrega nasveta književnika Iva Andrića, da je treba na vsako besedo trdno stopiti in jo uporabiti le, če zdrži ta pritisk; vse zapise obeležuje avtorjeva pretanjena filozofska duhovnost. Prav duh je skupni okvir vseh del v knjigi, skupna atmosfera, vodilna nit, to prežemajoče, vsekakor za vsakega po svoje. Barbarić je kandidovski dedič najzgodnejšega izkustva grškega mišljenja, duha misli – z Nietzschejevimi besedami – kot življenja, ki (za)seka v življenje, kot edini kraj preobračanja oz. obrata – najbolj in najostreje boli v spokojni lahnosti eksistence v svobodi. Duh je obenem najmračnejše brezno in najjasnejši previs bivanja in človeka. Ne lebdi le (biblični) duh nad vodami, temveč lebdijo tudi vode, človek in sama Zemlja, preobraženi v etru duha.


Duh je lahko tudi prečiščenje in povzdignjenje življenja v čisti eter svobode – če je dolgotrajno, potrpežljivo in napeto »delo pojma«. Za Barbarića mišljenje ni računanje brez števil, neobvezno domišljanje, duhovit domislek, plitka učenost ali spretno ostroumje. Oddaljeno od slednje vnaprej predpisane metode, mišljenje sledi svoji poti strogosti (*methodos*), spoštuje kanone logike, jih obvladuje, a ga ti ne zaustavijo ali zavrejo. O mišljenju kot dejanskem delu duha nas uči vsa velika filozofija. Kot posebno in izjemno delo duha se ograjuje od vseh drugih oblik: ni pozitivistično znanje (v smislu znanstvene vednosti), ni svobodna igra domišljije in navdahnjenje (kot umetnost), ni preroški razglas resnice (za čemer stremlji vsaka religija). Da bi ohranilo svojo naravo, mora mišljenje tudi danes – pravi naš avtor – najprej biti delo in napetost pojma, in tako svoja delavnica.

Od ohranjanja mišljenja kot dejanskega dela duha sta zato odvisni nosilnost in resnica vsakega filozofskega podjetja. To je, na kratko rečeno, pereče vprašanje; v filozofiji ima prednost pred odgovorom, glede na to, da neposredno in neprestano obnavlja njeno življenjsko moč.

Barbarićeva knjiga *Iz delavnice duha* je sicer dokaj pomembno uvajajoče, propedeutično čtivo. Predvsem je na delu jasen in retorično uglajen stil, prava osvežitev v poplavi specialnih jezikov in zaprtih terminologiji sodobne filozofije. Knjiga prinaša mnogo navedkov in virov, ki so precizno in pretanjeno prevedeni iz izvornika, kar v naši filološko zapuščeni srenji veliko pomeni. In, naposled, delo vsebuje več besedil, ki so obenem edina dela v hrvaškem jeziku na to temo.

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Mario Kopic
(Prevedel Aleš Košar)



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