

Niko TOŠ*

(DE)SECULARISATION OR (RE)CONFESSIONALISATION PROCESSES IN EUROPE

Summary. This article examines (de)secularisation or (re)confessionalisation processes in Europe at the turn of the millennium (1990–2010). Specifically, it presents the course of these processes in Eastern and Central European countries after the systemic turning points. It leans on the theory of secularisation and on Inglehart's theory of postmodernism and its operationalisation built on the »traditional-secular, rational« and »materialist-postmaterialist« dimensions. The analysis (summarised and our own) corroborates that during the observed period secularisation is the predominant condition and trend in the religious field in European societies. It reveals the importance of the social context (religious-cultural characteristics, level of economic development, democratic/authoritarian system organisation, systemic turning points, gaining independence, and emergence of new states) for the course of secularisation or confessionalisation – in particular, how they are influenced by systemic upheavals in the religious field in European societies or countries. While the highly developed and democratic (modern) Scandinavian societies of a Protestant religious-cultural origin are the most highly secularised, in the less developed, formally democratic post-communist countries of an Orthodox religious-cultural origin systemic changes typically trigger religious ones: the revival of their ethnic-religious identity and head-on (superficial) reconsecration.

Keywords: modernisation, democratisation (de)secularisation processes, religiosity, atheism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy, Islam

* Niko Toš is a Professor of Sociology and has been the Head of the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre (POMCRC) since 1966. The author thanks his colleagues at POMCRC Živa Broder, Rebeka Falle and Ivica Kecman for their professional support and help in writing this paper.

Definition of the Subject, Approach and Resources

(1) Secularisation refers not only to the assertion of laicism, the decline of religious believing and belonging and the disappearance of churches from public life, but also to a change in religious and non-religious value identities, the pluralisation of value and religious orientations, the pluralisation of civil-society, lay and religious practices and, finally, the de-monopolisation of religious institutions and opening up of space for new civil-society movements. Along with the accumulated results of empirical research carried out in Europe and the world over the past decades, the secularisation debate has created a group of convinced advocates of secularisation theory (Berger, 1967, 2005; Dobbelaere, 2002; Bruce, 2002), while also retaining the group of those who reject such an interpretation (Graf, 2004) or have built on the thesis about the relative constancy of religion inherent in human nature that is therefore permanent and indestructible¹, and continuously re-emerging and re-generating.²

Taking account of the research results regarding the phenomenon of religiosity in Europe over the past decades, we can readily agree with the first group. Secularisation is reflected in the decline of institutionalised religiosity and religious practices in most Western European countries. Moreover, in some places the conditions of post-Christianity have been gaining ground, conditions that were unprecedented in a span of several hundred years³. Although religion and religious organisations are socially very prominent and in some countries very important (privileged), they no longer feature as central social institutions. Church organisations have been experiencing a general loss of trust with the prevailing climate of distrust in the church and clergy etc.

(2) The topics in religiology are becoming increasingly conjunctural (Pickel, Sammet, 2011). Research by religiologists and debates among philosophers, psychologists, theologians and others move in a range between expectations and disappointments while coming from different starting points and offering different interpretations of and responses to the phenomena of the conversion, dissolution and decomposition of traditional religiosity, the spreading of religious indifference, the abandoning of the

¹ *Religiosity is in the course (process) of a permanent transformation; rather than disappearing it is merely changing its forms and fields of its manifestation, and becoming diffuse. Luckmann (1991) speaks about an invisible, non-institutional religion, a non-church religion.*

² *Graf (2004) speaks about the return of religion and god. Also Berger (2005) in his later works changes his original view of secularisation. It is deemed less controversial that secularisation is a European phenomenon. Therefore, does Europe represent an exception?*

³ *Habermas (2001, 2009) speaks about a post-secular society in which questions regarding the relationship between church, religion and politics or the state are being reconsidered.*

church, flights and desertions between religious communities and from them – the spreading of religious heterogeneity and expansion of non-confessionality (Hero/Krech, 2011), the emergence of new religious initiatives and communities etc. Religious spheres are becoming ever more manifestly pluralised along with preserving or even reviving tendencies toward religious discrimination, differentiation, shutting themselves away in closed religious groups, towards hostility and fundamentalisation spreading a feeling of endangerment and being ousted etc.

The phenomena of dechurchisation (Pollack, 2003, 2009), individualisation (Beck, 2008) and the erosion of religiosity, i.e. the secularisation processes have become the focus of religiological examination. Great shifts and changes are taking place in the religious structure of contemporary European societies, among them and particularly within them. The conjuncture of the religiological topic has been made even more acute by social and political upheavals in the transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The replacement of authoritarian institutional systems with democratic ones, the »de-ideologisation« of educational systems and introduction of elements of new worldviews in schools, the reinforcing of the role of local churches in the transitional process, and similar – all of these trigger expectations about the revitalisation of traditional Christianity in this part of Europe (Pollack, Pickle, 2007). However, these processes did not turn out in line with such expectations.

Answers to questions arising in the conditions of a tension between religion and modernity in contemporary societies, answers as were formed within the secularisation theory (Berger, 1967; Bruce, 2002; Wilson, 1982; Pollack, 2003), also represent a firm basis and starting point for explaining phenomena and changes in the formation and expression of religious consciousness in Eastern European countries. Typical examples of (de-)secularisation's upheavals or standstills include: FRG at the accession of the former GDR; Slovenia and Croatia along with Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, and particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo – after the disintegration of former Yugoslavia and during their gaining independence; Romania, Albania and others, when political coups were followed by religious changes.

(3) These questions have been undergoing a particularly interesting examination during the past decade among German religiologists.⁴ This is because modern Germany (FRG) represents a unique religiological laboratory in its simultaneous manifestations of all aspects of the transformation

⁴ This is also illustrated by the central topic addressed by the religiological section of the German Sociological Association, namely: *religion and religiosity in the 20 years after the turning point in the Federal Republic of Germany. The material was published in a book by Pickel, G. Sammet K. (Hrsg.) (2011): Religion und Religiosität im Vereinigten Deutschland.*

of modern Europe's religious world. Firstly, secularisation or dechurchisation as a response to modernisation processes⁵, which has been particularly expressed in individualisation and the decline of religiosity, in the fall of religious identification or belonging etc. Secondly, the pluralisation of the religious field (Hero/Kerch, 2011) which is (partly) emerging as the result of the dissolution of religiosity which has been expressed in new, unconventional forms, connections in and practices of expressing religiosity. Naturally, pluralisation of the religious field is also a reflection of a growingly manifest cultural pluralisation related to mass migration flows to the Western European and particularly German social, economic and cultural space (since the mid-20th century), and to the settlement of immigrant communities within it. Remaining on its edge, these communities are eliminated from its dominant structures (Tezcan, 2011). Beside the dominant, traditionally German-Christian (Catholic, Protestant) communities, ethnic-confessional (Islamic and also Orthodox, minority-Catholic and other) communities are emerging which are even achieving (local) domination in individual closed urban environments.⁶ Thirdly, the German religiological laboratory allows access to research of the entire body of religiological topics manifested in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in which authoritarian systems have been replaced by plural, democratic systems that are also leaving their mark on religious expression and the position of churches. As an example of the disintegration of the »old system«, GDR features as paradigmatic in its characteristics, and for being unique and specific considering the unfolding of the unification of the two Germanys and the course of its transition (Pickel, 2011a). The same applies to the shift in its religious field. If GDR's communist period was marked by the processes of de-churchisation and (forced) secularisation (Sammet, 2011), the so-called new countries – and increasingly the whole of FRG – are defined by non-religiosity as a stable phenomenon (Tifenzee, 2011), while as regards religion even twenty years after the German unification the Eastern federal provinces still remain »sonderfall« (Pickel, 2011a).

(4) A peculiar religiological »laboratory« has also emerged in the newly formed states after the disintegration of Yugoslavia and in the course of their transitions. With the collapse of the authoritarian systemic framework

⁵ *Modernisation and secularisation go hand in hand. However, circumstances in the USA, China, India – as well as Turkey – show that this is not a general rule. Berger (2005) claims that modernisation can be accompanied by desecularisation.*

⁶ *There are growing phenomena of religious shutting-off, fundamentalisation – and religious sectarianism, rejection, hatred; e.g. islamophobia throughout Western Europe – including Germany (Pickel, 2011c); also see Leibold/Kummerer, 2011; immigrants being pushed into Islamisation by the majority environment (Tezcan, 2011).*

and ideological control, the differences between the former republics and their actual social plurality have become fully expressed. Seven decades of the co-existence of these societies in the common systemic framework of »Yugoslav society« (from the 1920s to the 1990s) has not done away with or covered over the cultural (historical, economic, religious etc.) differences among them, which have instead become even more clearly outlined. This was also evident in the course and way in which their common state disintegrated (wars, exiles, ethnic cleansings, genocide). The cleavages have deepened due to different religious origins, traditions and values. A whole spectrum of cultural-religious differences between the former federal republics and now new independent states has now unfolded, ranging from the predominant »Catholicism« in the Northwest to »Orthodoxy« in the Southeast – with all possible intertwinings between each of these two and Islam in the Central and South-Eastern part of the former state. Thus, Slovenia can today be defined as a moderately secularised Catholic state⁷, Croatia as (religiously-nationally cleansed) re-Catholicised, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia as distinctively re-confessionalised Orthodox countries, and the rest as ethnically-religiously revived and intertwined countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosnian Muslims, Serbs-Orthodox, Croats-Catholics; Kosovo: Albanians-Muslims, Serbs-Orthodox etc.). In the religious fields of these countries, cleavages and transition courses have been expressed in the Orthodox re-confessionalisation (in Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia), in Islamisation (among Bosnians in BiH, Albanians in Kosovo and in Macedonia) and in a pronounced re-Catholisation (among Croats)⁸. Slovenia has been the only one not to be essentially touched or affected by the course of Yugoslavia's disintegration and Slovenia's creation of an independent state. The flow of de-secularisation⁹ underway since the late 1980s has been coming to a standstill, triggering a moderate flow of secularisation.

⁷ As shown by the EVS (1992, 1999 and 2008) and WVS (1995 and 2005) research results during 1992-2005, the share of Slovenia's inhabitants of full age belonging to the RCC was (more or less) constant. The shares of Catholics (in %) by years are the following: 1992 (69.0%), 1995 (71.1%), 1999 (66.5%), 2005 (65.1%) and 2008 (66.1%). In the same period, the share of churchgoers (regular, weekly or at least monthly) was in sharp decline: 1992 (34.3%), 1995 (33.4%), 1999 (30.2%), 2005 (27.8%) and 2008 (26.0%). Source: Toš N., ed., *Vrednote v prehodu I. – IV. [Values in Transition I.–IV.]*, Dokumenti SJM – Documents of SPO, 1997–2009.

⁸ Berger (2005) calls attention to the contradictory relationship between the modernisation and de-secularisation processes.

⁹ Pollack, Borowik, Jagodzinski (1998) observe that in the 1980s in Eastern European countries (Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and also in GDR) secularisation was coming to a standstill, and religiosity was being reinforced. This is indicated by statements about religiosity among the adult population of Slovenia in: 1983 (47.7%), 1988 (56.3%) and 1993 (60.8%). Source: Toš, N., *Religioznost v Sloveniji [Religiosity in Slovenia]*, in: Toš, N., ed. (1999), *Podobe o cerkvi in religiji na Slovenskem v devetdesetih [Images of Church and Religion in Slovenia in the 1990s]*, Dokumenti SJM – Documents of SPO, Ljubljana. The trend of the reinforcement of religiosity in the late 1980s in GDR, Yugoslavia, Czech

(5) Everything described above is only a basic outline of structural shifts in religious fields (in Germany, in the countries of former Yugoslavia, in all transition countries) throughout Europe, ranging from the countries on its Eastern cultural edge all the way through to its Western, Southern and Northern frontiers. In short, the phenomena which will be indicated are quite evident: a big change during the past two decades in the European religious-cultural space (in all its diversity and plurality) – which is still going on. Today, it is even more diverse with changes still taking place in the (traditional) structure of institutions, relationships and values. This flow of changes and individualisation of religiosity on one hand and pluralisation (and fundamentalisation) on the other are only some of the expressions of the changed social conditions in this space and in the course of globalisation processes in the modern world. While democratic institutionalisation is opening up opportunities for freer development and, in turn, a more relaxed expression of religiosity and work of churches for Eastern European societies, which after the systemic turning points have been even more exposed to (globalisation, modernisation) impacts, it is simultaneously intensifying the effect of modernisation processes (which have already before been going on in these countries) and the related changes – and opening up the space to the secularisation that dominates in Western Europe. However, these processes simultaneously also experience standstills and even retrograde flows. Therefore, rather than being a process which after the disintegration of authoritarian systems would be flowing from the East to the West of Europe, secularisation is moving in the opposite direction. If in the West this has been a moderate – and unforced – process, in the East it has unfolded more jerkily – and coercively (Muelemann, 2012); with the introduction of democratisation coercion came to an end and secularisation was released. These processes have common origins, namely social-structural, socio-economic and cultural-political ones. However, the question remains: how deep has the coerced secularisation reached – and what is the extent of its impact? At the same time, the analysis will show that in Eastern Europe the expression of religiosity is experiencing shifts in the form of re-confessionalisation.

(6) Therefore, this paper will try to present the trajectories of (de)secularisation or (re)confessionalisation in the European cultural-religious space over the past few decades, particularly focusing on their courses in Central and Eastern European societies or states. We will lean on different (theoretical) starting points and interpretations regarding the origins, nature and

Republic and Hungary is also observed by the German sociologists Pollack and Pickel (2007) who, however, in this respect do not find Slovenia to be a »Sonderfall«.

flows of these processes, and on the findings of analyses (adopted and our own) which draw on the results of international sociological comparative studies of Europeans' value orientations; namely the EVS, WVS, ISSP and ESS research studies¹⁰ carried out in the past two decades and which also include Slovenia.

This paper will indicate alternative typologisations in keeping with the dominant religious-cultural characteristics of individual European societies, and based on the findings of secularisation theory and the results of empirical analyses. The most prominent of these is Inglehart's analysis and typologisation based on theory of postmodernism¹¹ and with an analysis based on the WVS results. Inglehart's typologisation – which we will employ – positions world societies according to their predominant value orientations in two dimensions »traditional – secular, rational« and »materialist – postmaterialist«. Our own analytical contribution will be added along with an attempt at a typology built on the data from the mentioned research studies. The results will show to what extent our analyses corroborate the *a-priori* (theoretical) and empirical typologisation offered by Inglehart et al. (2004) in inter-continental, and by Halman et al. (2011) in European, dimensions of their analyses. We will try to define and classify European societies according to their religious-cultural characteristics, in particular the societies of Central and Eastern European, former socialist countries after their systemic transitions over the past 20 years.

In the concluding part, we will indicate a perspective on the course of de-secularisation or re-confessionalisation processes in the European space under the influence of globalisation and the deepening social and economic crisis. A series of precursors and indicators shows that also in the European cultural-religious and value space the so far dominant tendency towards secularity and rationality will be increasingly coming to a standstill and the conditions of the social crisis could revive the trend of traditional value orientations.

¹⁰ We lean on the following basic sociological empirical research studies: (1) European Value Study – EVS; (2) World Values Study – WVS; (3) International Social Survey Programme – ISSP; (4) European Social Survey – ESS. For more on these surveys, see their webpages or Toš/Müller, ed. (2011), *Comparative Sociology, [Primerjalno družboslovje], Dokumenti SJM – Documents of SPO, Ljubljana*.

¹¹ While his operationalisation of postmaterialism has been critically examined (e.g. van Deth, 1983a; 1983b; Haller, 2002), it is nevertheless applicable to the analysis of religious-cultural processes at the level of intercultural (international) comparative research.

The Dominant Religious-Cultural Patterns in Europe

Religious-Cultural Patterns – Attempts at a Typologisation

When we enquire about the characteristics and (potential) peculiarities in the positions of religions and expressions of religiosity in the European space, it is appropriate to draw on past typologisations (Martin, 1978; Smrke, 1996) which for the European religious-cultural space point to the predominance of the so-called (a) Catholic or Latin religious-cultural pattern; and (b) Lutheran-Protestant religious-cultural pattern. To these we may add: (c) Orthodox religious-cultural pattern and – considering the state of affairs in the development of interculturalism in both Western Europe and in Central and Eastern Europe – (d) different intertwinings between them¹² (dualist, pluralist), when in individual social-cultural spaces Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and other religious patterns are asserting themselves simultaneously; and on Europe's South-Eastern cultural edge (Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina) (e) the Islamic religious-cultural pattern is being asserted. This pattern is emerging in the majority of Western European countries in the conditions of an increasingly pronounced religious-cultural pluralism that is developing as the result of displacement of populations in the process of the disintegration of colonial systems (Great Britain, France and others) and due to the settlement of immigrant communities from the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. FRG and others), and their permanent social settlement in Western Europe.

Inglehart's Approach: The Atlas of World Values

An important contribution to the religious-cultural typology of today's world and Europe is offered by Inglehart's (et al., 2004) classification based on extensive research into the value orientations of populations in more than 80 societies from all continents that has been conducted since the late 1980s.¹³ Inglehart's theory of modern societies' transition to postmodernism is grounded in two principal dimensions: the first is the dimension of »traditional, religious vs. secular, rational« values. In the course of modernisation, traditional valuation defined by confessionalism have been gradually replaced by secular, rational and libertarian values. The second is the dimension »materialist values (survival values) vs. postmaterialist values« (self-expression values). The starting point of this dimension attributes

¹² D. Martin speaks about six patterns: American, British, Latin (Catholic), Russian (Orthodox), Calvinist and Lutheran; summarised after (Smrke, 1996).

¹³ Inglehart's classification is based on a summary and synthesis of the WVS results in which population samples in more than 80 countries on all continents have been observed in five-year waves since 1990.

importance to (i.e. values) basic material pre-conditions for survival which in the development of modern democratic (welfare) societies is gradually being replaced by postmaterialist values. This tendency is expressed in (high/low) interpersonal trust, the valuation of an individual's personality, the expression of solidarity, participation etc. as presuppositions of the democratic institutionalisation of societies. In Inglehart's analysis, world societies are further divided according to the state and level of their economic development (low, medium, high) and according to their cultural-religious or systemic determination, leaning on Huntington (1993, 1997) and distinguishing between European-Protestant, European-Catholic, Eastern European-Orthodox (mainly formerly communist) sets of countries etc.¹⁴

As shown in Figure 1, when positioning 81 countries from all continents in a »zone« determined by the two mentioned basic dimensions, all highly developed (mainly) Western European countries in this zone are positioned at the top-right (Figure 1). They are defined by high scores in the dimension »materialist – post-materialist values« with a postmaterialist tendency, and at the same time have high scores in the dimension »traditional – secular values« tending towards secularity. Below these, there are all the remaining highly developed Western European and extra-European countries which, however, are defined by a more pronounced expression of traditionalist and religious values. Thus, Canada, Australia, Ireland as well as the USA find themselves together in this (bottom-right) quadrant, while (almost) all Central and Eastern European countries are positioned in the top-left quadrant, i.e. high up, tending towards the dominance of secular-rational values, but at the same time tending downward towards the dominance of materialist values. Those among them with a more traditional-confessional orientation are positioned lower, in the bottom-left quadrant. The lowest positions below these are taken by societies and the countries of South Asia, Africa and Latin America (as more traditionally-confessionally oriented), although the latter show a tendency towards post-materialist values, i.e. are located in the bottom-right quadrant. The placement of the observed (81) countries can also be evaluated in terms of their level of economic development. (Almost) all advanced

¹⁴ *The Inglehart-Huntington classification of world/European societies. Countries are classified according to the following criteria:*

A. according to their positions in the co-ordinate space, defined in dimensions:

– (horizontally, x-axis) »material (survival) vs. postmaterial (self-expression).

– (vertically, y-axis) »traditional, religious vs. secular, rational« and


B. according to the dominant cultural-religious pattern and systemic characteristics: Catholic Europe; Protestant Europe; Orthodox (former communist) Europe; English-speaking countries; Confucian cultures; Latin America; South Asia, Africa;

C. according to the level of economic development: highly developed: all Western European countries; selected Central and Eastern European countries; under-developed: the remaining Eastern European, post-communist countries.

countries are shown to be positioned at the top-right, i.e. they are defined by the dominance of secular and post-materialist values – and therefore a high degree of secularisation – while all underdeveloped or developing countries are positioned at the bottom-left and defined by the dominance of traditional and materialist values – and therefore a low degree of secularisation. Former socialist or communist countries largely defined by the prevalence of materialist values along with a relatively high degree of secularisation are located in the top-left quadrant. At the top-right there are countries of a Protestant and mixed cultural-religious type, while practically all countries of an Orthodox origin are to be found at the top-left, albeit with some exceptions.

Figure 1: ATLAS OF WORLD VALUES

The placement of 81 countries from all continents in the dimensions: »traditional – secular, rational values« and »materialist – post-materialist values«



Source: WVS 1990-92 (Inglehart, R. et al., 2004)

Let us examine these exceptions. Slovenia, for example, is positioned at the top-right, high up, tending towards secular-rational values. Although Croatia is also found in the same quadrant, it is positioned at its bottom edge, around the level of Spain, but markedly higher than Poland – and the USA. Considering their low degree of secularisation or their prevailing confessionalism, Poland and Romania are positioned together at the bottom-left:

the first traditionally Catholic, and the other, after experiencing social upheaval, re-confessionalised Orthodox. To understand all of the indicated placements we should keep in mind though that Inglehart's classification is based on results of the research from the (early) 1990s.

In fact, Inglehart's theoretical-analytical approach is a sort of »research tool«, also used by European researchers (Halman et al., 2011) within and based on data from the European Values Study (EVS, 2008). Let us take a look at what the application of this tool reveals.

*Inglehart's Approach Used in the Analysis of the European Value Space:
The Atlas of European Values (Halman et al.)*


To demonstrate the application of Inglehart's approach to the European value space, the so-called Atlas of European Values will be used (Atlas of European Values, Halman et al. 2011, Figure 2). As established above, the vertical dimension of the chart represents the basis for the placement of or differentiation between largely traditional-confessional societies (the bottom part) and largely rational-secular or even post-secular value-oriented societies (the top part). The placement in this dimension is based on the synthesis of a large number of variables and indicators showing: (non-)religiosity (belonging, believing, church involvement, acceptance of the doctrine etc.), attitude to (all kinds of) authorities, the valuation of parent-child relationships, conservative (traditional) or secular-libertarian moral standards (acceptance or rejection of divorce, abortion, euthanasia, suicide), along with the acceptance or rejection of (traditional) patriotic and nationalist emotions etc. Therefore, placement in the (upward) secular-rational direction means the rejection of all of the above listed, i.e. the low valuation of religion, non-religiosity (atheism), a libertarian moral orientation, the low valuation of authorities, the rejection of all sorts of discrimination, particularisms and nationalisms etc. This dimension leads to a wide range of European countries' placement which indicates the states of affairs in the processes of value convergence or divergence in the space of European societies in the late 2010s.

In the second dimension, European societies or countries are classified according to the prevalence of materialist or post-materialist values, which is expressed in their valuation of the conditions of material and social survival, the valuation of freedom, safety, order, solidarity, democracy, in their definitions of the quality of life etc. Countries placed in the left (negative) zone of this dimension are defined by the prevalence of »survival« or materialist value orientations, (including) expressing a non-libertarian attitude to gender-roles, openness of the public space, towards foreigners, the rejection of diversity and different life practices and relationships, the exclusion

and discrimination of certain (minority, immigrant) groups, low interpersonal confidence and trust in institutions etc. Placement in this dimension indicates a society's attitude to the functioning of systems, preferences for authoritarian or democratic orders etc. The positioning of countries in this dimension is thus (also) correlated to the condition and level of the development of their democratic institutionalizations; it reflects the potential for the release and enforcement of democratic reforms; and motivation for the assertion and development of democratic relationships in society etc.

Figure 2: ATLAS OF EUROPEAN VALUES

The placement of European countries in the two dimensions: »traditional – secular, rational values« and »materialist – postmaterialist values«



Source: L. Halman, I. Sieben and M. van Zundert, Atlas of European Values, EVS, Tilburg University, 2011

We shall not provide a description of the methodological-operational bases of the Atlas of European Values nor identify the two principal dimensions as they are explained in detail in accessible research documents (Inglehart, 2004; Halman et al., 2011). Instead, we will examine the results of the analysis conducted by administering this »tool« to show the placements of several tens of European countries with each of them having a intercorrelation with all the rest.


The Placement of Slovenia and the Countries of Former Yugoslavia in the Atlas of European Values

Figure 3, which presents a modification of Halman's synthesised presentation of the value classification of countries in the European value space, was supplemented by placing Slovenia and the other former Yugoslav countries in it. This review shows and re-corroborates the finding that both sets of European countries, EU members and non-members, are placed in the co-ordinate space with a characteristic distance of one set from the other. The Atlas of European Values (Figure 2) shows big differences in value orientations among the EU members themselves, for example between Sweden and Romania or Germany and Malta etc. Therefore, the average placement of a group of EU member states is significantly co-determined by the low placements (on both principal dimensions) of Malta, Cyprus, Romania and also Poland. Croatia, which (as a non-EU member) has not been included in the EU average, represents a special case, recording a high level of declared church or religious belonging in the 1980s (1987: 73%),¹⁵ along with Slovenia. Slovenia is placed in the direct vicinity of the EU members' average which further corroborates Slovenia's position alongside Western European developed countries in the European value sphere.

Figure 3 further illustrates the above conclusion regarding the social plurality of former Yugoslavia. The placement of individual post-Yugoslav countries in the Atlas of European values reveals very clear deviations. While Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Croatia find themselves roughly in a common »nest«, situated close together in the dimension of »traditional – secular, rational«, Kosovo represents a complete deviation; the positions of all countries in this elementary group also markedly deviate from Slovenia's. In this dimension, Slovenia is positioned above the average of the EU member countries, while the remaining post-Yugoslav countries (on average) are placed together with non-EU members. In the Atlas of European Values, Kosovo is located completely outside these comparisons, lying closer to Brazil and the USA – namely in the group of countries strongly dominated by traditional values.

¹⁵ This – and a series of other data – relativise the Balaban estimation (2010) of the long-term ghettoisation of the RCC which he believes to be evident even 20 years after the systemic turning point.

Figure 3: ATLAS OF EUROPEAN VALUES; A SYNTHETIC DISPLAY INCLUDES EU MEMBER AND NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES, SELECTED COUNTRIES FROM OTHER CONTINENTS AND COUNTRIES FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER SOCIALIST FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA



Source: Elaboration based on L. Halman, I. Sieben and M. van Zundert, Atlas of European Values, EVS, Tilburg University, 2011

Religious-cultural Typologisation of European Societies Based on the European Social Survey (2002–2010) and European Values Study (1992–2008)

Our own supplementary analysis will attempt to corroborate the applicability of Inglehart's concept (Atlas of World Values, Atlas of European Values) for explaining European religious-cultural landscapes and de-secularisation processes. This analysis was carried out using three tests. In the first, four religious variables taken from the international ESS datasets for 2002 and 2010 time cross-sections were included in a cluster analysis; in the second round, the analysis was limited to only one religious variable (belonging) based on the ESS dataset, also measured in two cross-sections (2002, 2010); in the third test, the analysis included additional religious dimensions taken from the international EVS datasets for 1992 and 2008.

(1) The first analytical test: a cluster analysis based on four religious dimensions; ESS 2002–2010 datasets. With its rich pool of data the ESS research¹⁶ allows for a religiological analysis of modern European societies (Meulemann, 2012). Although the operationalisation of the religious dimension is limited, it enables an insight into the state of non-religiosity in the European religious-cultural space. The dimension of religiosity is defined on the basis of two dimensions (A, B) which encompass this phenomenon at the institutional level, and two dimensions encompassing it at a personal, intimate level (C, D). The dimensions include the following: (A) belonging to religious communities; where respondents express their belonging or non-belonging to a religious community; (B) self-assessment of one's religiosity; where respondents assess their own religiosity on a scale from 0 (not religious at all) to 10 (very religious); (C) the frequency of attending religious services; although this dimension is defined at the institutional level, it presupposes active involvement and belief; attendance at religious services is a public act (1 to 7 scale); (D) the frequency of praying: this dimension expresses an individual's religious belief and attitude to the institution; it is a form of religious activity going on in the individual's intimate environment and is not publically controlled (1 to 7 scale).

The analysis also includes a time comparison component. While the tests were carried out based on data from the five ESS measurements, this account is limited to data from the initial (T1-2002) and end (T2-2010) measurements. We will aim to identify differences between T1 and T2, and then make conclusions about the trajectories and direction of change in (non-) religiosity in the observed countries. The situations and changes revealed are shown as the trajectory of (de)secularisation or de-confessionalisation.


We were interested in how the observed »countries« are clustered in sets according to affinities or differences regarding the four observed dimensions. Further, we examine whether these classifications correspond to the previously described typologies either in terms of countries' religious-cultural origin or/and whether their placements correspond to Inglehart's »typology« based on the dimensions of »traditional – secular, rational« and »materialist – postmaterialist« values.

¹⁶ *The European Social Survey (ESS) is a long-running infrastructural social survey which has so far been conducted in five successive waves (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010) in 22 to 32 EU member or candidate countries. The survey is carried out according to the highest methodological and sampling standards. For more on the methodology and survey results, see www.europeanvaluesurvey.org or Toš/Müller (2011), Comparative Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Documents of the Slovenian Public Opinion Centre [Primerjalno družboslovje, FDV, Dokumenti SJM], Ljubljana.*

Our expectations (hypotheses) can be defined as follows: the simultaneous inclusion of results of two measurements of four dimensions on two independent samples conducted for two time cross-sections (8 years apart) in the same country (and in many countries) allows the expectation that the grouping of countries in clusters will indicate the steadiness or change in the observed populations' religious orientations (and practice). Countries can be expected to be clustering according to their religious-cultural affinity and the degree or dynamics and direction of shifts in their respective religiosity (in the two time cross-sections). Countries with a similar religious structure and dynamics are expected to be grouped in the same cluster; the shift of an A1 country from the original (A1, B1, C1...) to a different cluster (e.g. A2, B2, E1, F1...) indicates a change in the dynamics or direction of its expression of religiosity. The positioning of countries based on both measurements or on one of them (T1 or T2) is expected to help us understand the direction of changes in their respective expressions of religiosity and, above all, it is expected to help indicate common characteristics and differences in each of these countries' expression of religiosity – that is to say, it indicates a potential typology.

A visual presentation of the cluster analysis – Figure 4. In the first stage of analysis six groups (clusters) are formed. The first group (G1) includes: Germany, Norway and Denmark with both measurements (T1/T2) carried out, and Great Britain and Belgium with the second measurement (T2). This shows that the course and dynamics of change in the four religious dimensions in Germany, Norway and Denmark in the T1/T2 cross-section has not changed, and they are joined by Belgium and Great Britain whose T1 measurements are classified in the fourth group. Considering the structure of the fourth group, the movement of these two countries shows their rapid secularisation. The second group (G2) consists of Czech Republic and Sweden (T1/T2), and France and Estonia (T2). In the T1/T2 measurements, also France and Estonia tend towards secularisation as indicated by their proximity to Sweden and Czech Republic etc. The third group (G3) includes Switzerland and Finland (T1/T2) and Austria and the Netherlands (T1). In the fourth group (G4) there are (Israel), Slovenia, Spain and Hungary (T1/T2), and Luxemburg, Belgium, Great Britain (T1), the Netherlands, Russia and Bulgaria (T2). The fifth group (G5) is made up of Portugal (T1/T2) and Italy (T1). The sixth group (G6) comprises Poland (T1/T2) and Ireland and Greece (T1). It is obvious that the fifth and sixth groups involve traditional Catholic countries – and Orthodox Greece.

Figure 4: THE CLUSTERING OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BASED ON FOUR RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS (BELONGING TO A RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY, SELF-ASSESSMENT OF RELIGIOSITY, FREQUENCY OF ATTENDING RELIGIOUS SERVICES AND FREQUENCY OF PRAYING), MEASURED IN TWO CROSS-SECTIONS (2002/2010) – CLUSTER ANALYSIS



(Dendrogram using Ward's Linkage Method; Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine)
 Source: Toš, N., European Social Survey (2002/2010)

In the second stage of the analysis, the observed countries are grouped in three big clusters based on the connections of the groups from the first stage. The first cluster (C1) includes countries from G1 and G2. This is a big group of highly secularised Scandinavian and Western European countries. The core of this cluster consists of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, France, Germany and Czech Republic (T1+T2), along with Great Britain, Belgium and Estonia (all T2). If this cluster is arranged within the »traditional, confessional – secular, rational« dimension, these turn out to be countries which are positioned in the highest positions tending towards the prevalence of secular, rational values; if they are arranged in the two-dimensional space of the so-called Atlas of European Values, that is, with the addition of the »materialist – postmaterialist values« dimension, these countries then become placed in the top-right quadrant. Although different surveys are used here (EVS; ESS) conducted in different time periods on different samples, with different operationalisations – both reveal similar findings and conclusions for the same dimensions.

The second big cluster (C2) consists of countries placed in G3 and G4 in the previous stage. This cluster comprises countries which in the Atlas of European Values are positioned in the top-right quadrant or in the centre directly below it. The following countries are found there: Switzerland, Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, (Israel), Hungary, Slovenia and Spain (all T1/T2). A feature of this cluster is Russia and Bulgaria that enter the comparative field with only their T2 measurement results and are (still) placed highly in the »traditional – secular« dimension and (still) relatively lowly in the »materialist – postmaterialist values« dimension.

The third big cluster (C3) includes countries from G5 and G6 which are defined by traditional Catholicism (Portugal, Poland, Ireland) or traditional Orthodoxy (Greece). This is a group of countries which given the level of their populations' secularisation fall behind all other countries participating in this analysis.

The cluster analysis conducted in 24 countries and their typologisation expressed in six groups (G1-G6) and in their interconnection in three clusters (C1-C3) corroborate the applicability of previous analyses presented in the Atlas of World Values and the Atlas of European Values according to the state and course of secularisation processes in these countries. However, a comparison of the clustering results with those in the Atlas of European Values is limited since most Eastern and Central European countries are not included in the Atlas.

(2) The Second Analytical Test: Classification of Countries According to Levels and Trends of Secularisation Based on ESS. The test is conceived on one religious dimension (A), i.e. exclusively on answers about »the belonging

to religious communities.¹⁷ Questioning about »belonging« is the most frequently used religiological dimension. Thirty-six European countries were classified according to shares of members of religious communities at the initial (T1-2002) and end (T2-2010) of measurement. In cases of data voids, this review of countries was supplemented with data from the EVS and other accessible studies. For countries that participated in the EVS at a later time, data about the initial measurements were supplemented from other sources.¹⁸ The observed countries were classified into three levels according to the shares of their populations' involvement in religious communities as follows: low (up to 55%), medium (from 56% to 70%), high level (76% and over), and according to the up trend (T2-T1 = +3% or more), stagnation (T1±2%) or down trend (T2-T1 = - 3% or more).

This was the basis of the classification shown in Figure 5 which helps explain the structure of the European religious-cultural field along with the situation and course of de-secularisation or re-confessionalisation processes in the observed European countries.

The 38 observed countries are classified low (10), medium (11) and high (17) according to the level of their religious belonging, and in the »up« (11), stagnating (14) and »down« (13) group according to their trend. The positioning of countries according to the level of belonging shows that mainly countries from the so-called »Scandinavian nest« (Sweden, Iceland, the Netherlands, Estonia) and Great Britain with a Protestant religious-cultural origin show a »low« level of involvement; these feature in the company of France, Belgium, Czech Republic and Slovenia which have a »Catholic« origin, and the religiously-plural (Catholic-Protestant/Orthodox) Germany and Latvia. This group consists both of traditional-democratic and transition countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia). The »medium« group of the »belonging« share also includes the rest of the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Denmark, Norway) and most Central European countries (Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Spain), including some transition countries (Hungary, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro). Thus the middle group consists of countries of different religious-cultural origins and countries with different politico-systemic pasts (democratic, authoritarian).

¹⁷ *Answers about belonging to a religious community or religious denomination are a simplified common expression – according to the level of various affiliations with a religious community. Wolf's (1999) classification: (1) highly integrated, (2) believers, but poor churchgoers, (3) church-affiliated but not accepting religious doctrines, (4) indifferent to church and doctrine, (5) reject religious doctrine, (6) not affiliated with the church nor its doctrine.*

¹⁸ *In countries included on the basis of the EVS data, the time deviations are bigger (T1 - 1992; T2 - 2008); for countries of former Yugoslavia it is T1 - 1987.*

Figure 5: THE PLACEMENT OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO THE STATE AND COURSE OF (DE)SECULARISATION AND (RE) CONFESSIONALISATION PROCESSES (BASED ON SHARES OF POSITIVE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION »DO YOU BELONG TO A RELIGION OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY«)

Countries are positioned according to the level (high, medium or low) and trend (up, stagnating, down; in two time cross-sections: T1 and T2) of their population's belonging to religious communities.

Trend Level	Up (T1+3% and more)	Stagnating (±2%)	Down (T1-3% or more)
Low (up to 55% included)		Sweden (30/30) Iceland (47/-)* France (50/49) Latvia (-/50)* Germany (55/55)	Estonia (28/20)* Czech Republic (33/22) Netherlands (44/41) Belgium (49/42) Great Britain (49/45) Slovenia (73) (51/55)***
Medium (56-70% included)	Switzerland (62/68) Norway (51/59) Russia (50/60)* Serbia /58**/70/ Montenegro /46**/59/	Denmark (58/60)	Hungary (63/59) Finland (76/61) Austria (70/66)* Spain (78/68)
High (76% and more included)	Israel (75/99)* Romania (-/93)* Bulgaria (76/81) Ukraine (71/74) Macedonija /82**/93/ Croatia (73**/80)* Bosnia & Herzegovina /71**/77/	Cyprus (98/99)* Turkey (97/97)* Kosovo (93**/92) Poland (93/91) Portugal (84/85) Italy (77/-)* Slovakia (75/77)*	Luxemburg (75/71)* Ireland (83/80)* Greece (97/91)*

Source: Toš, N. European Social Survey (2002/2010).

Note: For every country, the initial (2002) and end (2010) shares of members of religious communities are stated, e.g. Czech Republic (33/22) based on the ESS 2002 and 2010 results. In cases where the first or last measurement for a given country was not made, data from the earliest or last accessible measurement were included in this table. In all cases* where data are written between the slashes (e.g. Kosovo/93/92/), the EVS 2008 data are given, while the placement of countries as regards the up or down trend is based on different secondary sources. In all cases** of former Yugoslav countries, the first measurement data are taken from my study »Class Essence of Contemporary Yugoslav Society« [»Razredna bit sodobne jugoslovanske družbe«, 1987, which is based on representative samples of populations of former YU republics and autonomous regions. For Slovenia, data are available for all five ESS measurements along with the results of the ISSP and WVS/EVS measurements; to better understand the former Yugoslav context, for Slovenia data from the »Class Essence« study (1987) are also added.

As a rule, the group with a »high« share of members of religious communities consists of all (the remaining) transition countries along with Italy, Portugal, Cyprus, Turkey, Ireland, Greece and Luxemburg – and Israel. This set of countries, largely determined by an Orthodox religious-cultural origin, also includes countries which can be characterised as »traditionally Catholic«. They include both »the old democratic« (among the Orthodox

e.g. Greece, Cyprus, and among the Catholic Italy, Ireland, Luxemburg) and transitional countries (Orthodox: Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine etc.; Catholic: Slovakia, Croatia, Poland etc.).

Finally, let us consider the placement of countries according to their indicated trends of increasing or decreasing shares of members between the two measurements ($T1-T2 = d$).¹⁹ Among the countries in the »upward« trend there are mainly Orthodox, mostly transitional countries. The biggest rise in the share of members is indicated for Croatia ($d=17\%$), Montenegro ($d = 13\%$), and Serbia ($d = 12\%$).²⁰ The group defined by the »down« trend comprises highly secularised countries (Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Belgium, Estonia, Slovenia) as well as traditionally Catholic countries (such as Ireland, Spain) and Orthodox countries (Greece). They include the »old« democratic countries (Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium etc.) and transitional countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia²¹). The »down« trend group includes Protestant countries (the Netherlands, Great Britain), Catholic countries (Belgium, Spain, Austria, Ireland) and Orthodox Greece.

(3) *The third analytical test: classification of countries based on EVS religious dimensions.* Two analyses taken from the EVS material are added to the two presented analyses based on the ESS. We relied on answers to two questions, namely:

- how »important is religion in your life«; our analysis was limited to the answers »religion is very important«; and
- what is the extent of »your trust in the church«; our analysis was limited to the answer »my trust in the church is strong«.

The first dimension delves into the individual's intimacy, and the second comprises their institutional attitude to religion. Also this data is obtained in two measurements ($T1 - 1992$; $T2 - 2008$). The 30 participating countries are classified according to the share or degree of answers »religion is very important« or »trust in the church is strong«. Figures 6 and 7 present the placement of countries in both dimensions.

Here we will not enter into an analysis of the meaning of the dimensions included, although it is obvious that they thematically complement the dimensions analysed on the basis of the ESS survey data.

¹⁹ *Methodologically very heterogeneous material was used here, i.e. data from surveys with different sampling and measurement conceptions, measurements in different time cross-sections etc.*

²⁰ *In all three countries, the first point of measurement is distant ($T1-1987$)!*

²¹ *In the ESS ($T1 = 51\%$; $T2 = 55\%$; $d = 4$) measurements, Slovenia is placed in the »upward« group. For the evaluation of changes in participation, and a comparison with other former Yugoslav countries a common measurement $T1=1987$ has been used.*

Figure 6: RELIGION AS A VALUE (QUESTION: »HOW IMPORTANT IS RELIGION IN YOUR LIFE?«; ANSWER: VERY IMPORTANT)

Level \ Trend	Up (T1+3 % and more)	Stable (±2 %)	Down (T1-3 % or more)
Low (40% and less)	Estonia (18/24) Latvia (21/32)	Denmark (31/30) Slovenia (42/40)	Czech Republic (27/19) Sweden (27/23) Germany (35/27) Finland (37/28) Norway (40/35) France (42/37) Belgium (47/39) Spain (51/39) Hungary (50/40)
Medium (41% to 69%)	Lithuania (41/45) Macedonia (-/49) Bulgaria (27/53) Slovakia (53/61)	Great Britain (46/44) Netherlands (43/45)	Austria (58/46) Ireland (84/66)
High (70% and more)	Kosovo (-/89) Romania (74/87) BiH (-/80) Montenegro (-/75) Serbia (-/72) Croatia (-/71) Italy (67/73) Portugal (62/67)		Poland (87/74)

Source: Toš, N., European Values Study (1992/2008)

In Figure 6, the placement of the countries corroborates the impressions given above. The high importance of »religion in life« is most frequent in Kosovo, Romania, BiH etc..., and also in Italy and Portugal. These countries are largely marked by a post-transitional status and an Orthodox denomination – also including among them traditional »Catholic« countries at a lower level of secularisation (such as Italy, Portugal, Croatia, Slovakia). Figure 6 shows highly secularised European countries being placed at the extreme top-right including most Scandinavian and Protestant countries, including other highly secularised European countries. Again the diagonal structure of their placement is apparent as was already evident in past analyses and corresponds to these countries' positions in the AEV.

Similar observations and findings are provided by the analysis based on the data about declaration of »great trust« in church. Above all, the presentation implies that the evaluators (mainly members of national churches) have little faith in their respective churches. In general, great trust in the church is a rare »commodity«. The diagonal classification of countries is corroborated: Figure 7 shows countries with the highest shares at the bottom-left, and countries with the lowest shares of »great trust« at the top-right; (almost) all Orthodox, traditionally Catholic, Islamic-affiliated post-transitional countries are at the bottom-right,

while Scandinavian, all Central European, both Protestant and Catholic by origin, are at the top-right – including Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia. Significantly, the lowest levels and sharp declines of »great trust in the church« are recorded for Sweden, Norway, France, Finland, Czech Republic etc. A relatively sharpest decline of great trust is recorded among the Irish (40/20) and the Poles (45/23). In the same time sections »great trust in the church« is strengthening among the residents of Kosovo, in Romania etc.

Figure 7: TRUST IN THE CHURCH (QUESTION: WHAT IS THE DEGREE OF YOUR TRUST IN THE CHURCH?; ANSWER: I HAVE GREAT TRUST IN THE CHURCH)

Level \ Trend	Up (T1+3% and more)	Stable (±2%)	Down (T1-3% and more)
Low (10% or less)	Netherlands (8/10)	Czech Rep. (9/8) Estonia (12/12) Denmark (10/10) Finland (7/8)	Sweden (6/4) Norway (11/7) France (12/7) Belgium (16/7) Slovenia (14/8) Austria (18/8) Germany (16/8)
Medium (10 to 20%)		Bulgaria (12/13) Lithuania (15/14) Croatia (-/18) Italy (26/26)	Great Britain (18/11) Hungary (21/13) Ireland (40/20)
High (over 20%)	Serbia (-/21) Latvia (17/22) BiH (-/26) Montenegro (-/26) Slovakia (21/27) Macedonia (-/28) Portugal (26/33) Kosovo (-/50) Romania (37/55)		Poland (45/23)

Source: Toš, N., EVS (1992/2008)

It is more than obvious that, while being contradictory, these processes take place or unfold mainly within the unified matrix of the course of secularisation processes in contemporary Europe.

Findings and Conclusions

The placement of the observed 46 countries in the Atlas of European Values (AEV, Figure 2) indicates their dispersion and simultaneous (high) concentration. The comparison of placements in the Atlas of European Values (EVS 2008) with the placements of countries in Inglehart's original Atlas

of World Values (AWV, Figure 1), which is based on the results of older WVS research from the 1990s,²² shows the following:

- the course of change in European countries' religious fields in the last 25 years can be defined as a process of secularisation;
- evident tendencies of value convergence, and therefore the mutual approaching of the observed European (world) countries, and specifically their higher value concentration or identification;
- the observed countries are concentrating (condensing) in two value »spaces« which can be defined as: firstly, the prevalence of secular, rational and postmaterialist values and, secondly, the prevalence of traditional and materialist values. In the Atlas of World Values and the Atlas of European Values these two value »spaces« are placed diagonally (top-right and bottom-left) with most of the observed countries being positioned within them;
- placements of countries in these two »spaces« - thirdly, as the prevalence of secular and at the same time materialist values; and fourthly: the prevalence of traditional and at the same time post-material values - in the Atlas of World Values as typical and in the Atlas of European Values only as exceptions.

The comparison between the AWV and AEV shows that in AWV many Central and Eastern European post-communist countries are positioned as secular, rational and materialist, which however in the second cross-section (AEV) are placed significantly lower, i.e. as more traditional. This shift »down« towards the prevalence of traditional values indicates a typical de-secularisation (confessionalisation) course in these countries during their period of transition. This has also been corroborated by all supplementary analyses, which indicate high levels of and a rise in confessionalisation particularly for this group of countries.

Therefore, what do these positioning denote? Are they empirical artefacts, mere accidental positionings, or a clustering of countries that can be explained by their cultural values?

The positionings of the countries according to their prevalent religious-cultural characteristics show the applicability of the indicated typology. Certain »nests« are formed: (1) the Scandinavian »nest«; in the AWV and AEV Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are placed at the extreme top-right; (2) the central Western European »nest«: Germany, France, Luxemburg, Belgium, Great Britain, Austria, along with Estonia, Czech Republic and Slovenia are placed at the top from the centre-right; (3) the Baltic »nest«, at the top-left in the AEV we find Lithuania, Latvia,

²² WVS: *World Values Study*

Hungary, along with Spain and Bulgaria. In the bottom part of the AWV and AEV there are at least three concentrations. First, (4) the bottom-right group includes Italy, Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Malta; at the bottom-left there are mainly Eastern European countries among which there is a distinctive subgroup of countries consisting of (5): Poland, Croatia, Portugal, Greece, Slovakia and Macedonia; and a second subgroup (6) which (placed significantly lower and more to the right) in the AWV, the AEV unites the most traditionally and materialistically oriented Eastern European and Balkan – mainly transitional – countries, in particular Russia, Serbia, Albania, Ukraine, Romania, Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also Turkey, Northern Cyprus etc.

If we define these placements of countries and their indicated »nests« according to their original religious cultural typology, along with taking account of their indicated secularisation levels and trends (Figures 4 to 7), we can conclude that in the observed period divergent de-re-secularisation and other formative processes were taking place in the European value and religious-cultural space, which express themselves to a significant degree in the value structures as revealed in the observed societies, along with the simultaneous occurrence of their typical expressions or effects of merging, convergence of value structures. Most importantly, the conclusion is that the state of human values in developed European societies is defined by the prevalence of secular values over traditional ones, along with the trend of their development towards secularisation. First of all, this is unquestionably shown in the Scandinavian example with Scandinavian societies having repeatedly proven to reveal common values and value convergence, to be geographically, culturally and socially condensed, and defined by a successful course of (post-)modernisation, a high degree of democratic institutionalisation and especially the prevalence of a Protestant-Evangelical cultural pattern. Revealing a very relaxed attitude to values, a high level of personal autonomy, prevalence of libertarian values, a high level of economic development, and highly developed democratic systems and practices, Scandinavian societies stand out with their high-level secularisation, which is growing.²³

A *second* unity similar to the Scandinavian one is represented by a group of central Western European countries. This group includes Germany, France, England, Belgium and most of the remaining Northern and Western European countries along with Czech Republic, Slovenia, Spain etc.²⁴ These are also secularised societies developing in conditions of (relatively)

²³ In these societies belonging to religious communities, trust in the church and ascribing meaning to religion in personal life is mainly low – and falling (see Figures 5 to 7).

²⁴ It is worth noting that in the AWV, among the transitional countries only Slovenia is classified among highly developed countries. Its placement is based on the results of the WVS conducted in the 1990s.

high material well-being in which people are (mostly) expressing (also) post-materialist values. This group mainly includes countries of a Catholic and also a mixed religious-cultural origin. Thus Luxemburg, Belgium, Austria, Spain and also Slovenia are defined by a predominantly Catholic population; in Germany and England Catholic-Protestant religious and cultural orientations are intertwining etc. Therefore, rather than being defined by their belonging to a single religious-cultural pattern, these countries' placement is due to them displaying common libertarian values and a high level of secularisation.²⁵

Third, featuring further to the right with a tendency towards the prevalence of material values, and also (high up) towards secular-rational values, we encounter the following countries: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria and Hungary. With significant differences among them in their dominant religious-cultural patterns, they still occupy same position in both principal value dimensions. These societies are mainly defined by transition processes, while also sharing a relatively high degree of secularisation and the secularisation trend.

Fourth, a large majority of the observed countries, such as Poland, Croatia, Portugal, Greece, Slovakia etc. position themselves (with typical convergences and deviations) in the bottom-left quadrant of the Atlas of European Values. This group of countries is defined by a high level of religious traditionalism, consisting of societies which were not markedly touched by secularisation processes or the disintegration of religiosity which prevails in Europe; these are (still) dubbed the strongholds of traditional Catholicism (Poland, Portugal) or Orthodoxy (Greece), and deemed countries in which pronounced processes of re-confessionalisation (re-Catholisation: Croatia, Slovakia) were triggered after the systemic breaks. Tending even more strongly towards the prevalence of materialist and traditional values this group are all the remaining participating post-communist countries, namely those of an Orthodox origin (Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia – and also Cyprus) or Islamic religious-cultural origin, i.e. both traditionally Islamic (Turkey, Northern Cyprus) as well as post-communist and re-confessionalised Islamic countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo).

Fifth, countries that formed after the disintegration of Yugoslavia differ from each other in the positions they occupy in the Atlas of European Values in the value space of the »traditional – secular« and »materialist – post-materialist« dimensions. While Slovenia is placed together with the focal (secularised) European countries, the positions of all other countries on the

²⁵ Also these societies are mainly placed high up, i.e. tending towards secularity in the traditional-secular dimension in the AWV and AEV, while most are placed »low« in giving meaning to religion in personal life, and in religious belonging and trust in the church (Figures 5 to 7).

territory of former Yugoslavia display a tendency towards traditional and materialist values. This empirically and after Yugoslavia's disintegration and upon the foundation of independent states re-corroborates the finding that Yugoslavia consisted of a plurality of societies (Hafner-Fink, 1994)²⁶ displaying great historical, economic, social, cultural, religious – and therefore, inevitably, value – deviations and differences between them. It proves that, even after seven decades of life in the common politico-economic (systemic) and ideological framework, rather than being abolished these have merely been covered up only to re-emerge as even more pronounced – social, cultural, religious – differences in the new circumstances of the disintegration of the common state. This is also shown by the intense re-secularisation shifts taking place in these new countries (except in Slovenia) in which national-religious identities are being replaced by cultural-social ones.

Sixth, the comparison of the participant countries' placements in the Atlases of World and European values indicates a typical shift of level – mainly in Eastern European post-communist countries – within the »traditional – secular, rational« dimension towards the de-secularisation or a more pronounced confessionalisation and prevalence of traditional values. Among the Central and Eastern European transition countries which in the first measurements (AWV) were mainly placed as secular (top-left), with the exception of Romania and Poland, at the second measurement (AEV) they are mainly placed as traditional (bottom-left); with only Czech Republic, Slovenia and the Baltic group of states remaining in a higher (high) position in this dimension (as secular). In all other countries from this group which are defined by Orthodox religious-cultural belonging, and experiencing the disintegration of old structures and value bases (transition) and social and political crises, people choose and form new identity bases. These societies reveal an evident reverse shift back to religion and church.²⁷ This is vividly illustrated by the assertion that Russians have Orthodoxy written in their genes; which allegedly also applies to Serbs, Montenegrins, Romanians etc. Typically, until their systemic transitions all of these countries and nations, which for many decades had developed in the conditions of authoritarian systems that pushed religion and the church to the system's edge, revealed the prevalence of secular and rational value orientations. The awareness of having your own nation in the new circumstances, i.e. new national self-confidence, increasingly relies on a resurgent religious consciousness, on

²⁶ *The analysis of the research Class Essence of Contemporary Yugoslav Society [Analiza rezultataov raziskave Razredna bit sodobne jugoslovanske družbe] (Toš, N. et al.), which in 1989 comprised representative population samples of all the republics and autonomous regions of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.*

²⁷ *These societies are defined by the highest levels of belonging to and trust in the church, attributing meaning to believing – and by the growing trend, i.e. the highest level of transparent religiosity.*

belonging to the Orthodox religious community, and involvement in it. In these changed social conditions, the forced secularisation from the earlier period is being replaced by a new form of superficial and mass (and due to this almost coercive) re-confessionalisation expressed as a new national/religious identity. Previously highly secularised Russians, Romanians, Serbs, Montenegrins etc. are becoming confessionalised Orthodox; previously moderately secularised Croats, Slovaks are becoming highly confessionalised Catholics²⁸. Similar shifts are also observed among Bosnian and Kosovo Muslims etc. Only Poles, Czechs, Slovenians, Hungarians along with populations of the so-called new federal states (FRG) reveal no essential shifts in or quests for the building of new identity bases. Thus, the Czechs remain highly secularised, even tending to atheism; the same applies to Estonians; Poland is retaining its traditional affiliation with Catholicism, but with an ever more pronounced secularisation tendency. Compared to the pre-transitional conditions, there have been no essential changes in Slovenia since the transition – i.e. after the removal of the alleged political and systemic restrictions on expressing religiosity and the work of the church; in a part of the Slovenian population Catholicism is – most probably – traditionally anchored, yet there is the unstopped trend of secularisation. Considering the degree of secularisation, Slovenia is placed somewhere in the middle, around the average of EU member countries (Figure 3).

Seven, the analysis shows (Figures 4 to 7) that in the EU religious-cultural space extreme positions are occupied on one hand by Czech Republic and Estonia as the most secularised and with a distinctive trend of the decline of confessionalism and, on the other, Macedonia, Romania (and Israel) as the most highly confessionalised countries with a distinct trend of growing confessionalism.²⁹ When analysing how the countries are placed according to the level and trend of their dominant religious-cultural patterns, a high level and a growing trend of confessionalisation is revealed as (mainly or even, we could say, exclusively) typical for countries or societies with an Orthodox religious-cultural origin; and further that these are mainly transitional, also newly formed countries, while the group of the most highly (but very stably) confessionalised include Turkey, Cyprus and Kosovo, namely three countries defined by an Islamic origin.

Eight, among the countries in the post-Yugoslav group Croatia and Slovenia occupy special positions. Typically, they are both traditionally Catholic

²⁸ However, doubts remain that the »depth« of this post-transitional Evangelisation remains at a transparent level and is not expressed in inner religiosity.

²⁹ The most explicit falls in involvement (at different levels) in religious communities in the 2002–2010 cross-section are found in Finland ($d=-15\%$), Czech Republic ($d=-11\%$), in Spain ($d=-10\%$), Estonia ($d=-8\%$) etc., while the most distinct growth (in share of members) is observed for Israel ($d=+24\%$), Montenegro ($d=+13\%$), Serbia ($d=+12\%$) and Macedonia ($d=+11\%$) etc.

and experienced a shared course of de-confessionalisation or secularisation in the conditions of the old system.³⁰ While after 1991, i.e. after gaining independence and during time of the so-called Homeland War, Croatia was exposed to radical re-Catholisation, in Slovenia the trend turned towards moderate secularisation. Accordingly, Croatia is placed among the highly and stably confessionalised countries, while Slovenia belongs among the (quite) secularised countries, somewhere in the middle of the European value or religious-cultural space (Rus/Toš, 2005)³¹. Although more historically and culturally anchored, similar divergences can be seen between Czech Republic and Slovakia, i.e. among countries with a common Czechoslovakian and Austro-Hungarian past. Along with Scandinavian countries, Czech Republic is found in the »nest« of the most secularised countries, while Slovakia is included among the (highly and stably) confessionalised countries.

Nine, a review of shifts between the measured cross-sections (Figures 4 to 7) reveals a significant »downtrend« (1992–2008) in giving meaning to believing in highly secularised, and including some traditional Catholic countries. Typically, Poland experienced a strong downtrend (87/74), Austria or Spain a medium downtrend (58/46 and 51/39, respectively), while Czech Republic had a weaker downtrend (27/19). A universal secularisation trend is occurring in the Central-West and the South of Europe encompassing countries or societies which are sharply different from each another regarding their religious structures and traditions (such as Poland and Czech Republic or Spain and Finland, or Austria and Sweden etc.). An opposite trend is seen in post-transitional, markedly Orthodox-bound and less developed countries, among which there are also »Catholic« and more developed countries which are tied to traditional values (such as Croatia, Italy, Portugal). In short, the relationship between the individual and religion or society and religion is being freed up in a large number of European countries or societies. Individuals (as well as societies) are entering these relationships in a freer, more rational way. This is also reflected by gradual de-churchisation flowing into the course of secularisation. These processes are also simultaneously undergoing standstills and overturns. In under-developed, traditional environments where modernisation and democratisation exist

³⁰ A 1987 research study shows that in both former republics (Croatia, Slovenia) 73% of all interviewees responded that they belonged to a (mainly Roman-Catholic) religious community.

³¹ Indeed, the analysis of so-called »inner religiosity« (Toš, 1999, grounded in the research: *Aufbruch der Kirchen in Ost- und Mitteleuropa*, Zulehner/Tomka/Toš, 1997) reveals deep secularisation in Slovenia in the period after the turning point. The analysis classified the observed countries as follows according to the shares of non-religious/autonomously religious and church members (in %): Poland (21/34/45); Croatia (31/30/39); Lithuania (41/29/30); Slovakia (49/23/28); Slovenia (60/21/19); Hungary (65/20/15) and Czech Republic (77/12/11).

at a low level, and where people and societies cannot find the way out from the conditions of the deepening economic crisis, traditional value bases are being reinforced: religion as a value and the church as an institution are maintaining their (focal) meaning in the lives of individuals and societies, with religion becoming an additional pillar of national identification, and the church representing »support« to the state which, in turn, is expressed in transparent re-confessionalisation.

Conclusion. In their examination of de-secularisation processes in contemporary Europe, the analyses and visual displays presented in this paper remain at a transparent superficial level. Nevertheless, we may claim that the course of secularisation in this intertwined and heterogeneous social and religious cultural space is explicit – and ubiquitous. Secularisation goes »hand in hand« with the course of the modernisation of European societies.

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