ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX (2009) ŠTEVILKA 5/6 str. 47-73 TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS Igor Ž. Žagar The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), pioneered by Ruth Wodak (see Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart, 1999; Wodak, van Dijk, 2000; Wodak, Chilton, 2005; Wodak, Meyer, 2006; Wodak, 2009), is one of the major branches of critical discourse analysis (CDA). In its own (programmatic) view, it embraces at least three interconnected aspects: »1. ‘Text or discourse immanent critique’ aims at discovering internal or discourseinternal structures. 2. The ‘socio-diagnostic critique’ is concerned with the demystifying exposure of the possibly persuasive or ‘manipulative’ character of di- scursive practices. 3. Prognostic critique contributes to the transformation and improve- ment of communication.« (Wodak, 2006: 65) CDA, in Wodak’s view, » is not concerned with evaluating what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. CDA ... should try to make choices at each point in the research itself, and should make these choices transparent.1 It should also justify theoretically why certa- in interpretations of discursive events seem more valid than others.« »One of the methodical ways for critical discourse analysts to minimi- ze the risk of being biased is to follow the principle of triangulation. Thus one of the most salient distinguishing features of the DHA is its endeavour to work with different approaches, multimethodically and on the basis of a variety of empirical data as well as background information.« (Wodak, 2006: 65) One of the approaches DHA is using in its principle of triangulation is argumentation theory, more specifically the theory of topoi. Being a phi- losopher by formation, working within the field of argumentation theory 48 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEVILKA 5/6 and pragmatics, I will concentrate on this specific aspect: how topoi (and, consequentially, argumentation theory, are used in DHA as one of the most influential schools of CDA (curiously, other approaches (e.g. Fairclo- ugh (1995; 2000; 2003) or van Leeuwen (2004; 2008; van Leeuwen, Kress, 2006)) don’t use topoi at all). Within argumentation theory, Wodak continues, »‘topoi’ or ‘loci’ can be described as parts of argumentation which be- long to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises. They are the content-related warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ which connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the con- clusion (Kienpointner, 1992: 194).« (Wodak, 2006: 74) We can find the very same definition in Discourse and Discrimination (Re- isigl and Wodak, 2001: 75), in The Discourse of Politics in Action (Wodak, 2009: 42), in Michal Krzyzanowski’s chapter »On the ‘Europeanisation’ of Identity Constructions in Polish Political Discourse after 1989«, published in Discourse and Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (Gala- sinska and Krzyzanowski, 2009: 102), and in John E. Richardson’s paper (co-authored with R.Wodak) »The Impact of Visual Racism: Visual argu- ments in political leaflets of Austrian and British far-right parties« (manu- script, p. 3), presented at the 2008 Venice Argumentation Conference 2 . In addition to the above definition, Richardson (2004: 230) talks of topoi »as reservoirs of generalised key ideas from which specific statements or arguments can be generated«. Surprisingly, both definitions take the concept of topos/topoi as something self-evident, generally known and widely used, as, for example, bread, table, engine, to write, to clean up, and many other everyday obviousnesses. Also, one could wonder about the purpose of the two definitions: are topoi »content-related warrants« or are they »generalised key ideas«? Be- cause warrants are much more than (just) ideas, they demand much more to be able to secure the transition from an argument to a conclusion than just being »generalised ideas« (namely, a certain structure, or mechanism, in the form of an instruction or a rule). While ideas, generalised ideas, lack (at least) a kind of mechanism the warrants seem to poses in order to be able to connect the argument to the conclusion. 49 TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS But, let us proceed one step at a time. In the publications I’ve mentioned above 3 , we get to see the lists (reservoires?) of the(se) topoi. In the chapter »The Discourse-Historical Approach« (Wodak, 2006: 74) we read that »the analyses of typical con- tent-related argument schemes can be carried out against the backgro- und of the list of topoi though incomplete and not always disjunctive«, given in the following table: 1. Usefulness, advantage 2. Uselessness, disadvantage 3. Definition, name-interpretation 4. Danger and threat 5. Humanitarianism 6. Justice 7. Responsability 8. Burdening, weighting 9. Finances 10. Reality 11. Numbers 12. Law and right 13. History 14. Culture 15 Abuse. In Richardson (2008, p. 4) we get exactly the same list of topoi, but this time they are characterised as »the most common topoi which are used when writing or talking about ‘others’«, specifically about migrants. In The Discourse of Politics in Action (Wodak, 2009: 44) we get the fol- lowing list of »the most common topoi which are used when negotiating specific agenda in meetings, or trying to convince an audience of one’s interests, visions or positions«: 1. Topos of Burdening 2. Topos of Reality 50 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEVILKA 5/6 3. Topos of Numbers 4. Topos of History 5. Topos of Authority 6. Topos of Threat 7. Topos of Definition 8. Topos of Justice 9. Topos of Urgency In The Discourse of Politics in Action we can also find topos of challenge, topos of the actual costs of enlargement (of EU), topos of belonging, and topos of ‘constructing a hero’. Here the analyses of typical content-related argument schemes (as found in discourse) are not just carried out »against the background of the list of topoi«, but some parts of discourse »gain the status of topoi« (topos of the actual costs ...). So, as far as the (ontic) status of topoi is concerned, we got a bit further: there isn’t just a list of topoi that can serve as the background (for the analysis), more topoi can be added to the list. And, presumably, if topoi can be added to the list, they can pro- bably also be deleted from the list. Unfortunatelly, in the publications I am talking about, we get no epistemological or methodological criteria as to how this is done, i.e. why, when and how certain topoi can be added to the list, or why, when and how they can be taken off the list 4 . The most puzzling (and, for the very same reason, illuminating) list of topoi can be found in Krzyzanowski (2009: 103). In his article we get the »list of the topoi identified in the respective corpora« (the national and the European one - IŽŽ). Here they are: Topoi in the national corpus 1. Topos of national uniqueness 2. Topos of definition of the national role 3. Topos of national history 4. Topos of East and West 5. Topos of past and future 6. Modernisation topos 51 TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 7. Topos of the EU as a national necessity 8. Topos of the EU as a national test 9. Topos of the organic work 10. Topos of Polish pragmatism and Euro-realism Topoi in the European corpus Topos of diversity in Europe Topos of European history and heritage Topos of European values Topos of European unity Topos of Europe of various speeds Topos of core and periphery Topos of European and national identity Topos of Europe as a Future Orientation Modernatisation topos Topos of the Polish national mission in the European Union Topos of joining the EU at any cost Topos of preferential treatment. How these topoi were »identified«, and what makes them »the topoi« (not just simply »topoi«), we don’t get to know; Krzyzanowski just lists them as such. Is there another list that helped them identify? If so, it must be very different from the lists we have just mentioned. Maybe there are several different lists? If so, who constructs them? When, where, and especially, for what purpose and how? Is there a kind of a grid, conceptual or in some other way epistemological and/or methodological that helps us/ them do that? If so, where can we find it? And how was it conceptually constructed? And if there isn’t any grid, how do we get all these (different) lists of topoi? By casuistry, intuition, rule of a thumb? And when we (fi- nally) do get those lists, do they ever change (and how), or are they here to stay (and why)? Are they universal, just general, or maybe only contin- 52 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEVILKA 5/6 gent? Judging from the lists we have just seen there are no rules or criteria, the only methodological precept seems to be: »anything goes«! In philosophy (of science), from 14th century onward, we have some- thing called Occam’s razor. It could be phrased as Entia non sunt multi- plicanda praeter necessitatem, which could be roughly translated as »en- tities must not be multiplied beyond necessity.« Or in alternative version: Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate, which translates as »plurality should not be posited without necessity.« In the lists of topoi we have just browsed (through), Occam’s razor was, no doubt, left without work. We’ve seen identical/similar bundles of topoi for different purposes or occasions, we’ve seen different bundles of topoi for identical/similar purposes or occasions, we’ve seen different bundles of topoi for different occasion, and we’ve seen pretty exotic bun- dles of topoi for pretty particular/singular purposes. Which leads us to a key question: can anything be or become a topos? And, consequentially, what actually is a topos? But before we try to answer these questions, let us have a look at how these topoi are used in the respective works. In Discourse and Discrimination (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 75) as well as in »The Discourse-Historical Approach« (Wodak, 2006: 74), we can find the following definition of the topos of advantage (many more topoi are listed, of course, but for the purpose of this article, I can only discuss a few): »The topos of advantage or usefulness can be paraphrased by means of the following conditional: if an action under a specific relevant po- int of view will be useful, then one should perform it (...) To this topos belong different subtypes, for example the topos of ‘pro bono publi- co’ (‘to the advantage of all’), the topos of ‘pro bono nobis’ (to the ad- vantage of us’), and the topos of ‘pro bono eorum’ (‘to the advantage of them’).« And then the definition is illustrated by the following example: »In a decision of the Viennese municipal authorities (...), the refusal of a residence permit is set out as follows: Because of the private and family situation of the claimant, the refu- sal of the application at issue represents quite an intrusion into her private and family life. The public interest, which is against the resi- dence permit, is to be valued more strongly than the contrasting pri- 53 TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS vate and family interests of the claimant. Thus, it had to be decided according to the judgement.« If a topos is supposed to connect an argument with a conclusion, one would expect that a reconstruction would follow, namely, what is the ar- gument (in the quoted fragment), what is the conclusion (in the quoted fragment), how the above mentioned topos is connecting the two, and where is the analysis (of the quoted fragment). Unfortunatelly, all these elements are missing (including the analysis); the definition and the quo- ted fragment are all there is. It is also interesting to follow, how the working of topoi is described (especially in Discourse & Discrimination which is the most thorough in this respect): topoi are mostly »employed« (p. 75), or »found« (p. 76), when speaking about their supposed application in different texts, but also »tra- ced back (to the conclusion rule)« (p. 76) or »based on (conditionals)« (p. 77), when speaking about their possible frames of definitions. How topoi are »based on (conditionals)«, or »traced back (to the conclusion rule)«, and how these operations relate to argument(s) and conclusion(s) that topoi are supposed to connect is not explained. Let us have a look at another example, this time from Discourse of Politics in Action (Wodak, 2009: 97): »Among MEPs 5 no one cluster characteristics is particularly promi- nent; however, most MEPs mention that member states share a certa- in cultural, historical and linguistic richness that binds them together, despite differences in specifics; this topos of diversity occurs in most official speeches (Weiss, 2002). Among the predicational stra- tegies employed by the interviewees, we see repeated reference to a common culture and past (topos of history, i.e. shared cultural, historical and linguistic traditions; similar social models) and a common present and future (i.e. European social model; ‘added va- lue’ of being united; a way for the future). Morover, if identity is to some extent ‘based on the formation of sameness and difference’ (to- pos of difference; strategy of establishing uniqueness; Wodak et al., 1993: 36-42), we see this in the frequent refferal to Europe, especi- ally in terms of its social model(s), as not the US or Asia (most promi- nently, Japan).« Let us try to reconstruct the »topological« part of this analysis. 54 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEVILKA 5/6 Three topoi are mentioned: topos of diversity, topos of history and topos of difference. Surprisingly, only the topos of history is listed and explain- ed in the list of topoi on p. 44: »Topos of History - because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation.« The absence of the other two should probably be accounted for with the following explanation on pages 42-43: »These topoi have so far been investigated in a number of studies on election campaigns (Pelinka and Wodak, 2002), on parliamentary deba- tes (Wodak and van Dijk, 2000), on policy papers (Reisigl and Wodak, 2000), on ‘voices of migrants’ (Krzyzanowski and Wodak, 2008), on visual argumentation in election posters and slogans (Richardson and Wodak, forthcoming), and on media reporting (Baker et al., 2008).« But in the study »on visual argumentation in election posters and slogans«, for example, the(se) topoi are not discussed at all, they are presented as a fixed list of names (of topoi), without any explanation of their functi- oning, while the authors (Richardson and Wodak) make occasional refe- rence to their names (not to the mechanism of their functioning), just as Wodak does in the above example from The Discourse of Politics in Acti- on. In argumentation theory, such an »approach« would be called fallacy of circular reasoning (petitio principii). Furthermore, topoi are characterised as (Wodak, 2009: 43) being ap- plied »to justify and legitimize positions by providing ‘common-places’, instead of substantial evidence«, or »some topoi are used as appeals to human rights, to democracy or to justice«, or »topoi are used to promote such typical ambiguities, which serve as quasi-argumentative shortcuts linking unclear moves in negotiations, decision-making and so forth.« How all these rather different characterisations are linked to the definiti- on of topos as a warrant connecting the argument with the conclusion is, once more, not explained, that is all the analysis we get (as far as topoi are concerned). If, again, topos is to serve the purpose of connecting an argument with a conclusion (as respective works emphatically repeat), one would expect at least a minimal reconstruction, but there is none. What we see could be reconstructed as reffering to topoi or evoking them or simply mentioning them, which mostly serves the purpose of legitimating the (already existing) discourse and/or text analysis, but gives little analytical or theorethical added value in terms of argumentation analysis. 55 TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS When I speak of reconstruction, what I have in mind is (at least) a minimal syllogistic or enthymematic structure of the following type (as an example, I am using one of the topics from The Discourse of Politics in Action (Wodak, 2009: 132-142), namely the problem of EU enlargement): 1) If a specific action costs too much money, one should perform actions that diminish the costs. (Topos connecting argument with conclusion) 6 2) EU enlargement costs too much money. (Argument) 3) EU enlargment should be stopped/slowed down ... (Conclusion) A real case in point of such hunting for topoi is the analysis we find in Krzyzanowski (2009: 104). First he gives an example from one of his cor- pora, then he provides an analysis: Example: »As General de Gaulle said, ‘one’s geography cannot be changed and one can only change one’s geopolitics’. Two dictators, Hitler and Sta- lin, changed our geography. Yet, with help of democratic institutions of the West and also thanks to a democratic rebirth in the East, we have been changing our geopolitics on our own in the recent years. Our current endeavours to join NATO and the European Union, our efforts to create new shapes of the regional politics, shall be seen as crucial, yet only as fragments of construction of a new, just and solid- based European order (PS-13: 2).« Analysis: »The fact that it is the national and not any other form of history whi- ch is eventually invoked in discourse constitutes an attempt typical of the constructions of national identities and identifications. In turn, the topos of East and West emphasises another strictly national aspect of the first corpus in question. It includes a set of elements of pre-1989 political language which very strongly emphasised the differences that existed between Europe’s East and West and which reinforced the devisions introduced by the post-Second World war geopolitical order. Accordingly, this topos seeks (!) a unique placement of Poland above the devisions of East and West, and thus (heading back (!) into 56 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEVILKA 5/6 the topos of national uniqueness) reinforces Poland’s attractiveness vis-a-vis the European Union: it argues (!) that Poland has a unique role as a ‘bridge’ between Europe’s East and West. Then, the topos of past and future also constructs (!) Polish national identifications, yet within the dichotomy between collective ‘scope of experience’ and ‘horizon of expectations’ (Koselleck, 1989). While this topos is used to emphasize that the Polish past might have been troubled and nega- tive (...), it insists (!) that the Polish ‘European’ future will be almost entirely positive and peaceful. Unlike the previously elaborated (sic!) topoi, the topos of moderni- zation clearly stands out and reaches beyond (!) the constructions of national identification. It focuses (!) mostly on presenting the European Union as carrying some unique modernising force which would help reform Polish state and society. The topos of modernisa- tion is therefore frequently tied to the topos of the EU as a national necessity and to the topos of the EU as a national test of which both construct the ‘power’ of the Union over Poland in a similar way. By implying that the Union is characterised by some unique principles and standards of social and political organisation (...), the topos of mo- dernisation, contrary to the previous ones, constructs a very positive image of the Union to the detriment of Poland, which is portrayed in a negative way.« Surprisingly, we learn that topoi in this rather long excerpt are »elaborated«, while Krzyzanowski doesn’t even gloss (on) them, let alone define them or give a possible pattern of their functionning (as Reisigl and Wodak do in the first part of Discourse and Discrimination). In his analysis, the words and phrases that are labeled topoi not only do not serve to connect the arguments and the conclusions, but act on their own: they can be argu- ments and conclusions, sometimes even both (actually, it is rather difficult to identify what arguments and conclusions could be in this text). Even more, they are clearly and openly antropomorphized, since they »seek«, »head back«, »argue«, »construct«, »insist«, »reach beyond« and »focus« (if we stay with the quoted part of the article). In their seminal work Traité de l'argumentation - La nouvelle rhéto- rique (1958/1983: 112-113), Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca bitterly commented on the degeneration of rhetoric in the course of histo- ry, but what we have just seen in the above quote is not just degeneration, but pure vulgarisation and abuse of one of the most important rhetorical 57 TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS concepts, the concept of topoi. So, it is probably high time that we answer the crucial question: what are topoi? It is quite surprising that none of the quoted works even mention the origins of topoi (theory), their extensive treatment in many works and the main authors of these works, namely Aristotle and Cicero. And I have already mentioned that the definition, borrowed from Kienpointner, does not come from them either (i.e. Aristotle and Cicero).. All this is even more surprising because it is today almost a common- place (a topos of its own, if I may say so) that for Aristotle a topos is a pla- ce to look for arguments (which is true), a heading or department where a number of rhetorical arguments can be easily found (which is true as well), and that those arguments are ready for use – which is a rather big misunderstanding. According to Aristotle (and above all, according to many of his commentators), topoi are supposed to be of two kinds: general or common topoi, appropriate for use everywhere and anywhe- re, regardless of situation, and specific topoi, in their applicability limited mostly to the three genres of oratory (judicial, deliberative and epideictic; but we will come to that later). Or, as Aristotle (Rh. 1358a31-32 1.2.22) puts it: »By specific topics I mean the propositions peculiar to each class of things, by universal those common to all alike«. The Aristotelian topos (literally: ‘place’, ‘location’) is an argumentati- ve scheme, which enables a dialectician or rhetorician to construe an ar- gument for a given conclusion. The majority of Aristotle’s interpreters see topoi as the (basic) elements for enthymemes, the rhetorical syllogisms. 7 The use of topoi or loci, as the Romans have called them, can be traced back to early rhetoricians (mostly referred to as sophists) such as Protago- ras or Gorgias. But, while in earlier rhetoric topos was indeed understo- od as a complete pattern or formula, a ready made argument that can be mentioned at a certain stage of a speech (to produce a certain effect, or even more important to justify a certain conclusion) – an understanding that also prevailed with the Renaissance -, most of the Aristotelian topoi are general instructions allowing a conclusion of a certain form (not content), to be derived from premises of a certain form (not content). That is why I emphasized that a rather widespread conviction that Aristo- telian topoi were places where ready to use arguments could be found was a big misunderstanding. In fact, it is even more the other way round. 58 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEVILKA 5/6 If we look at the list of common topoi, usually attributed to Aristotle 8 : Common Topoi Special Topoi Definition Genus / Species Division Whole / Parts Subject / Adjuncts Comparison Similarity / Difference Degree Relationship Cause / Effect Antecedent / Consequence Contraries Contradictions Circumstances Possible / Impossible Past Fact / Future Fact Testimony Authorities Witnesses Maxims or Proverbs Rumors Oaths Documents Law Precedent The supernatural Notation and Conjugates Judicial justice (right) injustice (wrong) Deliberative the good the unworthy the advantageous the disadvantageous Ceremonial virtue (the noble) vice (the base) and if we compare them with the list of his categories (from Metaphysics): Substance Quantity Quality Relation Place Time Position State Action Affection 59 TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS it becomes pretty obvious that Aristotle derived his common topics from his categories. While categories represent the most general (and basic) relations between different entities in the world (and are, therefore, me- taphysical in nature), the common topics (i.e. topoi) represent the most general (and basic) relations between concepts, notions, or words repre- senting (or denoting) these different entities in the world. That is why Aristotle could present them as a »list« (though it really wasn’t a list in the sense DHA is using the term): because they were so very general, so very basic, that they could have been used in every speech or writing. Intentionally or not. Which is not the case with the DHA lists of topoi we have been discussing above: these topoi can not be used in just any situa- tion, but in rather particular situations, especially the topoi »identified« by Krzyzanowski (in that regard they could be classified not as common to- poi, but more likely as specific topoi, something Aristotle called idia (idia could be roughly translated as »what is proper to...«; »what belongs to...«)). Also, this »list« of common topoi wasn’t there for possible or prospective authors »to check their arguments against it«. This »list« was there for ge- neral use, offering a stock of (possible and potential) common topoi for (possible and potential) future arguments (and speeches). Here is a short (and schematic) overview of how Aristotle defines the mechanics and the functioning of topoi and their parts in his Topics, a work that preceded Rhetoric. We have to start with a few definitions. Problems (what is at stake, what is being discussed) are expressed by propositions. Every proposition consists of a subject and predicate(s) that belong(s) to the subject. These predicates (usually referred to as predica- bles) are of four kinds: definition, genus, property, and accident: »Definition is a phrase indicating the essence of something.« (T. I. v. 39-40) »A genus is that which is predicated in the category of essence of several things which differ in kind.« (T. I. v. 32-33) »A property is something which does not show the essence of a thing but belongs to it alone and is predicated convertibly of it.« (T. I. v. 19-21) »An accident is that which is none of these things ... but still belongs to the thing.« (T. I. v. 4-6) And here is how Aristotle describes the role of these predicables and their interdependence: 60 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEVILKA 5/6 »Now the bases of arguments are equal in number and identical with the subjects of reasonings. From arguments arise ‘propositions’, while the subjects or reasoning are ‘problems’. Now every proposition and every problem indicates either a genus or a peculiarity or an accident; for the differentia also, being generic in character, should be ranged with the genus. But since part of the peculiarity indicates the essence and part does not do so, let the peculiarity be divided into the two above-menti- oned parts and let that which indicates the essence be called a ‘definiti- on’, and let the remaining part be termed a ‘property’ in accordance with the nomenclature usually assigned in these cases.« (T. I. iv. 15-23) These are the theorethical and methodological preliminaries that lead us to topoi, not yet the topoi themselves! To be able to select subject appropriate claims (premises for concrete (context-dependent) reasonin- gs) from this pool of (potential) propositions, we need organa (tools). Aristotle distinguishes four: »The means by which we shall obtain an abundance of reasonings are four in number: 1) the provision of propositions, 2) the ability to distinguish in how many senses a particular expres- sion is used, 3) the discovery of differences and 4) the investigation of similarities.« (T. I xiii. 21-26) Strictly speaking, we are still not dealing with topoi here, though very often and in many interpretations 9 the four organa as well as the four predicables are considered to be topoi (in the case of predicables maybe even the topoi). Another complicating moment in this respect may be that Aristotle described topoi as »empty places« where concrete arguments, for diffe- rent purposes, can be found. And even if it sounds paradoxical, it is quite logical: if those places weren’t empty, allowing for each concrete matter to be moulded in them, but already filled up, they just wouldn’t be common anymore, and we wouldn’t be able to use them for each and every subject- matter, but just in that one described and defined with the concrete con- tent of a particular premise. 61 TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS As one of Aristotle’s ambiguous characterizations of topos says – and he has given many, not always very consistent one with another - (Rhet. 1403a17-18 2.26.1): »I call the same thing element and topos; for an element or topos is a heading under which many enthymemes fall«. It is important to emphasize that by ‘element’ Aristotle doesn’t mean a proper part of the enthymeme, but a general form under which many concrete enthyme- mes of the same type can be subsumed. According to this definition topos is a general argumentative form or pattern, and concrete arguments are instantiations of this general form. Or as Auctor ad Herennium puts it (3-29.15ss): loci are the background, and concrete arguments are imagines (images) on that background. In the Topics Aristotle actually established a very complex typology of topoi with hundreds of particular topoi: around 300 in the Topics, but just 29 in the Rhetoric 11 . Two important sub-types of his typology are; a) topoi concerning opposites, and b) topoi concerning (semantic) relationships of ‘more and less’. Here are two examples: Ad a) If an action Y is desirable in relation to an object X, the contrary acti- on Y’ should be disapproved of in relation to the same object X. This is a topos (as Aristotle would have formulated it). And this is its application to a concrete subject matter that can serve as a gene- ral premise in an enthymeme (topos can’t): »If it is desirable to act in favor of one’s friends, it should be disappro- ved of to act against one’s friends.« Ad b) If a predicate can be ascribed to an object X more likely than to an object Y, and the predicate is truly ascribed to Y, then the predicate can even more likely be ascribed to X. Once more, this is a topos. And this is its application to a concre- te subject matter that can serve as a general premise in an enthyme- me (topos can’t): »Whoever beats his father, even more likely beats his neighbour.« 62 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEVILKA 5/6 These examples may sound kind of square and flat nowadays. But here are a few Aristotelian topoi that could well be used in critical discourse analysis (instead of just checking the possible arguments »against the background of the list of topoi«). They are not »common truths«, or »gene- rally accepted probabilities«, but a kind of precepts for finding and testing these »common truths« or »generally accepted probabilities«: »For philosophic purposes we must deal with propositions from the point of view of truth, but for purposes of dialectic, with a view to opi- nion. Propositions must always be taken in their most universal form.« (T. I. xiv. 30-31) »One commonplace is to look whether your opponent has assigned as an accident something which belongs in some other way.« (T. II. ii. 34-36) »Another commonplace is to make definitions both of the accident and of that to which it belongs, either of both separately or one of them, and then see if anything untrue has been assumed as true in the defini- tions. For example, to see if it is possible to wrong a god, you must ask, what does ‘wrong’ mean?« (T. II. ii. 30-34) »Furthermore, if a term is used with more than one meaning and it has been stated that it belongs to or does not belong to something, we ought to demonstrate one of the several meanings if it is impossible to demonstrate both.« (T. II iii 23-26) It should be pretty clear by now, I think, that we can distinguish two ways in which Aristotle frames topoi in his Topics. Even more, topoi in the Topics would (usually) be twofold, they would consist of an instruction, and on the basis of this instruction a rule would be formulated: 1) Instructions (precepts): »Check whether C is D.« 2) Rules (laws): »If C is D, then B will be A.« Instructions would (usually) check the relations between the four predi- cables (definition, genus, property, accident), and upon this check up, a kind of a rule would be formulated that could - applied to a certain su- bject-matter - serve as a general premise of an enthymeme. Topoi therefore serve as heuristic devices, and can be of three types: 1) Some topoi instruct one to examine, for instance, whether »the contrary of A holds of the contrary of B«, if B is A is to be proved. 2) Other topoi consist merely of such an introductory label and an exam- ple of the type of argument in question. Here the introductory label 63 TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS is apparently meant to guide as associative process that might lead to an argument rather than to give a precise description of a premise to be used in a rhetorical syllogism. 3) A third group provides no logical analysis or characterization of a pos- sible type of argument. Aristotle occasionally acknowledges that he is drawing on useful material he found in contemporary handbooks. What is especially important for our discussion here (i. e. the use of topoi in critical discourse analysis) is that though they were primarily meant to be tools for finding arguments, topoi can also be used for testing gi- ven arguments. Which seems to be a much more critical and productive procedure than testing hypothetical arguments »against the background of the list of topoi«. But to be able to do that, DHA analysts should 1) clearly (unequivocally) identify and formulate arguments and conclusions in a given discourse fragment, and 2) show how (possible) topoi relate to these arguments. In the DHA works quoted in the first part of our article, neither of the two steps was taken. This is how topoi were treated in the Topics. But when we turn from the Topics to the (later) Rhetoric, we are faced with the problem that the use (and meaning) of topos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric is much more hetero- geneous than in the Topics. Beside the topoi which perfectly comply with the description(s) given in the Topics, there is an important group of topoi in the Rhetoric, which contain instructions for arguments not of a certain form, but with a certain (concrete) predicate (for example, that something is good, honorable, just, etc.). In Rhetoric 1358a2-35 I.2 Aristotle distinguishes between general/ common topoi on the one hand and specific topoi on the other. In that same chapter, he explains the sense of ‘specific’ by saying that some thin- gs are specific to physics, others to ethics, etc. But from chapter I.3 on he makes us think that ‘specific’ refers to the different species of rhetoric, so that some topoi are specific to deliberative, other to epideictic, and still others to judical speech. While he is inclined to call the general or common topoi simply topoi, he uses several names for the specific topoi (idiai protaseis, eidê, idioi topoi). Therefore, it may be tempting to call the specific topoi ‘material’ and the common topoi ‘for- mal’. But in doing so we may easily overlook that some of the common topoi (in chapters II.23-24) are not all based on those formal cate- 64 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEVILKA 5/6 gories on which the topoi of the Topics rely (the four predicables). Most of them are ‘common’ only in the sense that they are not specific to one single species of speech, but to all of them (Aristotle calls those koina, »what is general, common«). Some of them offer strate- gic advice, for example, to turn what has been said against oneself upon the one who said it. For this reason, it would be completely misleading to say that the functions of common topoi and specific topoi (i.e. idia) are complementary, insofar as the common topoi offer the logical form to a content that has been provided by the specific ones (idia). With Romans topoi became loci (which is a great »improvement« for the speakers of Romance languages …), and Cicero literally defines them as places, as »the home of all proofs« (De or. 2.166.2), »pigeonholes in which ar- guments are stored« (Part. Or. 5.7-10) or simply »storehouses of arguments« (Part. Or. 109.5-6). Also, their number was reduced from 300 hundred (in Topics) or 29 (in Rhetoric) to up to 19 (depending on how we count). Here is a list of Cicero’s loci corresponding to the topoi in Aristotle’s Rhe- toric B 23 (Rubinelli, 2009: 143): Topos from opposites: Locus ex contrario Topos from correlatives Topos from grammatical forms of the same word: Locus ex coniugatis Topos from the more and the less: Ex comparatione maiorum Ex comparatione minorum Topos from the belonging on a similar degree: Ex comparatione parium Topos from definition: Definitio Topos from division: Partium enumeratio Topos from induction: Ex similitudine Topos from a [previous] judgement: Loci extrinseci Topos from the parts: Partitio Topos from the consequence: Ex adiunctis Topos from analogy: Ex similitudine Topos from looking at contradictions: Ex repugnantibus Topos from the cause: Ex efficientibus rebus Topos from the meaning of a name: Notatio 65 TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS Although the list correlates pretty much (though not completely) with Aristotle’s list from the Rhetoric B 23, there is a difference in use: this is a list of concepts that may trigger an associative process rather than a collection of (implicit) rules and precepts reducible to rules, as the topoi in Aristotle’s Topica are (as we have seen). In other words, Cicero’s loci mostly function as subject-matter indicators and loci communes 12 . Or, in Rubinelli’s words (2009: 107): » A locus communis is a ready-made argument that, as Cicero correctly remarks, may be transferable (...) to several similar cases. Thus, the ad- jective communis refers precisely to the extensive applicability of this kind of arguments; however, it is not to be equated to the extensive applicability of the Aristotelian topoi /.../. The latter are ‘subjectless’, while the former work on a much more specific lever: they are effec- tive mainly in juridical, deliberative and epideictic contexts.« But being ready-made, doesn’t mean that they prove anything spe- cific about the case that is being examined, or that they add any factual information to it. As Rubinelli puts it (2009: 148): »... a locus communis is a ready-made argument. It does not guide the construction of an argument, but it can be transferable to se- veral similar cases and has the main function of putting the audi- ence in a favourable frame of mind.« Which brings us a bit closer to how topoi are used in DHA. In the works quoted in this paper, the authors never construct or re-construct arguments from the discourse fragments they analyse by invoking topoi - despite the fact that they are repeatedly defining topoi as connecting ar- guments with conclusions -, they just hint at them with short glosses (not even definitions). And since there is no reconstruction of concrete argu- ments on the basis of topoi, hinting at certain topoi, referring to them or just mentionning them, can only serve the purpose that could be descri- bed as »putting the audience in a favourable frame of mind.« »Favourable frame of mind« in this respect would mean invoking or directing reader’s attention to a »commonly known or discussed« topic, but without explici- tly phrasing or reconstructing it, so the reader can never really know what exactly the author had in mind and what exactly he/she wanted to say. Let us jump from the old rhetoric to the new rhetoric now, skiping more than 2000 years of degeneration of rhetoric, as Chaim Perelman puts it in his influential work Traité de l'argumentation - La nouvelle rhétorique. 66 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEVILKA 5/6 Commonplaces (topoi) are caracterised by their extreme generality, says Perelman (1958/1983: 112-113), which makes them usable in every situation. It is the degeneration of rhetoric and the lack of interest for the study of places that has led to this unexpected consequences that »oratory developments« - as he ironically calls them - against fortune, sensuality, laziness, etc., which school exercises were repeating ad nauseam became qualified as commonplaces (loci, topoi), despite their extremly particular character. By commonplaces we more and more understand, Perelman continues, what Giambattista Vico called »oratory places«, in order to di- stinguish them from the places treated in Aristotle’s Topics. Nowadays, commonplaces are caraterised by banality which doesn’t exclude extre- me specificity and particularity. These places are nothing more than Ari- stotelian commonplaces applied to particular subjects, concludes Perelman. That is why there is a tendency to forget that (common)places form an indispensable arsenal in which everybody who wants to per- suade others should find what he is looking for. And that is exactly what is happening in DHA approach to topoi. Mo- reover, the works quoted in the first part of the article give the impression that DHA isn’t using the Aristotelian (or Ciceronian) topoi, but the so cal- led »literary topoi« as developed by Ernst Robert Curtius in his Europae- ische Literatur und Lateinisches Mittelalter (1990: 62-105). And what is a literary topos? Well, already oral histories passed down from pre-historic societes contain literary aspects, characters, or settings which appear aga- in and again in stories from ancient civilizations, religious texts and even more modern stories. These recurrent (and repetetive) motives or leitmotifs would be labeled literary topoi. »They are intelectual themes, su- itable for development and modification at the orator’s pleasure«, argues Curtius (1990: 70). And topoi is one of the expressions Wodak is using as synonyms for leitmotifs (2009: 119): »In the analysis of text examples which were recorded and transcribed I will first focus on the leitmotifs, which manifeste themselves in va- rious ways: as topoi, as justification and legitimation strategies, as rules which structure conversation and talk, or as recurring lexical items ...« For the New Rhetoric (Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca1958/1983: 113) to- poi aren’t defined as places that hide arguments, but as very general pre- mises that help us build values and hierarchies, something Perelman, whose background was jurisprudence, was especially concerned about. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca therefore distinguish two main types of 67 TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS techniques of argumentation: schemes of association and schemes of dissociation (a dichotomy that turned out as very handy in latter ap- plications and analyses within argumentation theory). Let us have a quick look at the associative schemes: Associative schemes I. Quasilogical arguments: 1. Contradiction and incompatibility 2. Identity and definition 3. Tautology 4. Rule of justice 5. Argument of reciprocity 6. Argument of transitivity 7. Inclusion of the part in the whole 8. Division of the whole into its parts 9. Argument by comparison 10. Argument by sacrifice 11. Probabilities II. Arguments based on the structure of reality A. Sequential relations 1. Cause-effect 2. Pragmatic argument 3. Means-ends 4. Argument of waste 5. Argument of direction 6. Unlimited development B. Relations of co-existence 1. Person-act 2. Argument from authority 3. Speech-speaker 4. Group-member 5. Act-essence 6. Symbolic relation C. Double hierarchy D. Differences of degree/order 68 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEVILKA 5/6 An attentive reader will no doubt notice that most of the subtypes of class I are based on well-known semantic relationships from the Topical traditi- on: opposites, identity, similarity and part-whole/genus-species. However, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce an interesting case of identity- relationship called ‘rule of justice’. The rationale of this special/new argu- ment scheme is in a warrant that asks for identical treatment of entities or situations that can be subsumed under one and the same category. Another novelty is to be found under I.10: arguments of sacrifice are supposed to increase the value of a goal by comparing it with the great ef- fort, which has been invested to achieve it. And the gist of subtype I.11 lies in a presumption that some entities are considered to be similar enough to justify quasi-probabilistic inferences. If we turn to the class II, we find three innovations: II.4 is used to argue against stopping before the goal of an action has been reached because of the energy already invested for performing the first stages of the action. II.5 is used to predict a definitive (disastrous) endpoint of a chain of cau- ses and effects. And finally, II.6 also concerns predictions about chains of causes and effects, but in a positive way (unlimited development). So, in a way, the New Rhetoric is moving from (more) formal to less formal use. But, in opinion of many argumentation theorists, The New Rhetoric has three main deficiencies: 1) Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do not develop sufficient criteria for the distinction between sound and fallacious arguments. 2) They rarely provide explicit reconstructions of arguments, despite their clearly expressed intention to reconstruct their internal structure. 3) They don’t develop systematic criteria for the demarcation of argument schemes, and they don’t even claim that they are mutually exclusive. In other words, Perelman left topoi on a somewhat descriptive level, and exactly the same could be said for the Discourse-Historical Approach wi- thin CDA 12 . But, in contrast to DHA, Perelman has made some very interesting and important observations regarding the role and the use of topoi in con- temporary societies. He argued that (Perelman 1983: 114) even if it is the general places that mostly attract our attention, there is an undeniable interest in examining the most particular places that are dominant in different societies and allow us to characterize them. On the other side, even when we are dealing with very general places, it is remarkable 69 TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS that for every place we can find an opposite place: to the superiority of lasting, which is a classic place, we could oppose the place of precarious, of something that only last a moment, which is a romantic place. And this repartition gives us the possibility to characterize soci- eties, not only in relation to their preference of certain values, but also according to the intensity of adherence to one or another member of the antithetic couple. This sounds like a good research agenda for CDA, as far as its inte- rest in argumentation is concerned: to find out what views and values are dominant in different societies, and characterize these societies by reconstructing the topoi that underlie their discourses. But in order to be able to implement such an agenda - an agenda that is actually very close to DHA’s own agenda -, DHA should dismiss »the list of (prefa- bricated) topoi« that facilitates and legitimizes its argumentative endeavor somehow beforehand (the topoi are already listed, we just have to check our findings against the background of this list of topoi), and start digging for the topoi in concrete texts and discourses. How does it achieve that? Curiously enough, the same year that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyte- ca published their New Rhetoric, Stephen Toulmin published his Uses of Argument, probably the most detailed study of how topoi work. I say »cu- riously enough« because he doesn’t use the terms »topos« or »topoi«, but the somewhat judicial term »warrant«. The reason for that seems obvious: he is trying to cover different »fields of argument«, and not all fields of ar- gument, according to him, use topoi as their argumentative principles or bases of their argumentation. According to Toulmin (1958/1995: 94-107), if we have an utterance of the form, »If D then C« – where D stands for data or evidence, and C for claim or conclusion – such a warrant would act as a bridge and authorize the step from D to C (which also explains where Manfred Kienpointner’s definition of topos comes from: not from Aristo- tle but from Toulmin). But then, a warrant may have a limited applicabili- ty, so Toulmin introduces qualifiers Q, indicating the strength conferred by the warrant, and conditions of rebuttal (or Reservation) R, indicating circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside. And finally, in case the warrant is challenged in any way, we need some backing as well. His diagram of argumentation looks like this: 70 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEVILKA 5/6 Grounds, reasons of evidence Qualifier Claim Warrant Rebuttal Backing It is worth noting that in Toulmin’s diagram, we are dealing with a kind of ‘surface’ and ‘deep’ structure: while data and claim stay on the surface, as they do in everyday communication, the warrant is – presumably because of its generality – »under the surface« (like the topos in enthymemes), and usually comes »above the surface« (only) when we try to reconstruct it. And how do we do that, how do we reconstruct a warrant? What is attractive and useful about Toulmin’s theory is the fact that he is offering a kind of a guided tour to the center of topoi in six steps, not just in three. All he asks is that you find/identify the claim or the standpoint of the text or discourse you are researching, and then (mostly for the beginners) he provides a set of five questions that lead you through the process. If we return to our semi-hypothetical example with the topos of actual costs (of enlargement) (Wodak, 2009: 132-142): 1) If a specific action costs too much money, one should perform acti- ons that diminish the costs. 2) EU enlargement costs too much money. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3) EU enlargment should be stopped/slowed down ... and »translate« it into the Toulmin model, we could get the following: 71 TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS Claim EU enlargement should be stopped/slowed down … What have you got to go on? Datum EU enlargement costs too much money. How do you get there? Warrant If a specific action costs too much money, one should perform actions that diminish the costs. Is that always the case? Rebuttal No, but it generally/usually/very often is. Unless there are other reasons/arguments that are stronger/ more important … In that case the warrant doesn’t apply. Then you can’t be so definite in your claim? Qualifier True: it is only usually… so. But then, what makes you think at all that if a specific action costs too much money one should perform actions … Backing The history (of EU) shows… If the analysis (text analysis, discourse analysis) would proceed in this way 13 - applying the above scheme to concrete pieces of discourse each time it wants to find the underlying topoi - the »lists of topoi in the backgro- und« would become unimportant, useless and obsolete (as they, actually, already are). Text mining (if I may borrow this expression from compu- tational linguistics) would bring text’s (or discourse’s) own topoi to the surface, not the prefabricated ones. And these topoi, which would be the product of a concrete empirical analysis, could then indeed be compared with a (possible) list of »historical« topoi in the background. For contrasti- ve or other reasons, depending on the analysis in question. Therefore, if DHA really wants to make choices at each point in the research itself, and at the same time make these choices transparent (as it claims it does), taking all these steps (in finding the topoi) would be the only legitimate thing a credible and competent analysis should do. If DHA wants to incorporate argumentation analysis in its agenda, of course. 72 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEVILKA 5/6 Notes [1] All emphases (bold) in the article are mine (IŽŽ). [2] The paper was recently published in Critical Discourse Studies 6/4 (2009), under the title »Recontextualising fascist ideologies of the past: right- wing discourses on employment and nativism in Austria and the United Kingdom«. In this article, I will be referring to the manuscript version. [3] There are many more, I’ve just limited my analysis to the most recent ones. [4] Let alone the fact that there is no (theoretical) explanation why there should be list(s) at all. [5] Members of the European Parliament (IŽŽ). [6] It is worth noting that each topos can (usually) have two »converse« forms. Therefore the phrasing of this topos could also read: »If a specific action costs too much money, this action should be stopped«, depending on the context, and/or on what we want to prove or disprove. [7] An important and more than credible exception in this respect is Sara Rubinelli with her excellent and most thorough monograph on Topoi, Ars Topica, The Classical Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero, Argumentation Library, Springer, 2009. [8] This table is an extrapolated and reworked version of the topoi listed in Aristotle’s Rhetoric B 23. It was taken from an excellent website on rhetoric, Silva Rhetoricae (http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/Silva.htm). [9] See Rubinelli, 2009: 8-14. [10] The 29 topoi in the Rhetoric cannot all be found among the 300 topoi from the Topics. There is a long-standing and heated debate about where these 29 topoi come from, and how the list was composed. Rubinelli (2009: 71-73) suggests that their more or less »universal applicability« may be the criterion. [11] Which is probably due to the fact that Cicero was selecting and using loci in conjunction with the so-called stasis theory (or issue theory). What is stasis theory? Briefly (and simplified), the orator has to decide what is at stake (why he has to talk and what he has to talk about): 1) whether something happened (or not); 2) what is it that happened; 3) what is the nature/quality of what happened; 4) what is the appropriate place/authority to discuss what has happened. And Cicero’s loci »followed« this repartition. 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