

CULTURAL TURNS IN AESTHETICS AND ANTI-AESTHETICS

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1. The cultural turn of aesthetics

As is well known, aesthetics understood as a philosophical discipline, followed an independent road from the theories of art developed by artists and critics that accompanied the history of art. When in the eighteenth century aesthetics became an independent discipline, it held throughout the nineteenth century an independent status vis-à-vis poetics and art criticism, thus confirming its own affiliation with philosophy.

Only recently this exclusive dominion of philosophy over aesthetics has been put into question, especially in the English-speaking world where the need to widen the boundaries of the discipline and to understand it as a much larger field, within which philosophy is only a part, is particularly felt. This tendency has already found a major expression in the monumental *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics*, directed by Michael Kelly and published in four big volumes, to which more than five hundred scholars from various disciplines have contributed (Kelly, 1998). This enterprise was inspired by a methodology that regards aesthetic as a “meeting place” of many disciplines and various cultural traditions. This project foreshadows a *cultural turn* in aesthetics that intends to bridge the existing gap between aesthetic knowledge and contemporary society. In fact, what characterizes the latter is the encounter and mixing of codes belonging to different fields, and developed by means of a continuous interaction of signs and an incessant sliding of meanings. What is inadequate, with respect to contemporary society, is not so much traditional aesthetics as the structure that presides over its articulation, its self-enclosed character, that makes its knowledge seem obsolete. It seems that aesthetics can bear fruit only if it succeeds in opening up an epistemological horizon characterized by flexibility. After all, at the basis of the methodology of *Cultural Studies* there is the Baroque principle of wit that consists in

making the distant appear near and the near distant. This principle is even more important when applied to research, which is generally more original, and innovative, the more it explores the margins and the boundaries of canonical knowledge.

These orientations seem to inspire Kelly's work, which is characterized by three main aspects. In the first place, we should stress his non-conformist approach to the problematic of contemporary aesthetics. Ample space is given to alternative phenomena, generally considered marginal by traditional aesthetics such as "obscenity", "situationist aesthetics", or "iconoclasm and iconophobia". **This non-conformist choice is confirmed by the introduction into the aesthetic canon of phenomena that do not belong to "high culture" such as "comics", "popular culture", "fashion", "rock music", "jazz", or phenomena that belong to the more transgressive artistic avant-garde such as "anti-art", "performance art" or "installation art".**

In the second place, the cultural turn imposed on aesthetics by Kelly is clear in the attention to non European and non Western cultures. This is the most striking and exciting aspect of aesthetics' cultural turn which appears to open very wide horizons to a discipline too often considered to be, and not entirely unjustifiably, stale. Thus, African, Black, Caribbean, Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Islamic, Latin American and pre-Colombian aesthetics appear on the scene, to which many more could be added.

The third aspect that characterizes many of the contributions of this encyclopedia is the influence exercised by post-structuralism and the theories of deconstruction. While traditional aesthetics remains anchored to a philological methodology that often verges on pedantry and on erudition for its own sake, the deconstructive analysis is attentive to what deviates from the norm and from custom. It gives birth to an aesthetics of submerged experience that through the study of secondary aspects of artistic production reveals emotions and affects often not yet codified in definite cultural forms. For example, the entries of the encyclopedia devoted to "outsider art" and to "art of the insane" **delve on phenomena bordering on art and non-art. But the deconstructive method is also and above all applied to canonical works, in making explicit what in them is left unsaid.**

Nevertheless, all that glitters is not gold! Regarded closely, the encounter between aesthetics and the problematic connected with the notion of culture does not constitute a great novelty! I wonder if aesthetics has not always been, ever since its origins, a "meeting place" of numerous disciplines and cultural traditions. The cultural turn that an always greater number of researchers considers a characteristic of the present development of aesthetics, is perhaps a trait that was always at the origins of aesthetics, and is connect-

ed with the complex events that in the West have accompanied the thinking on the beautiful and on art. As is well-known, these two aesthetic objects coincide only in the eighteenth century, entertaining extremely controversial relations with a third philosophical question, strictly connected with the autonomous constitution of the discipline that hinges on the possibility and the characters of sensible knowledge.

In fact the three traditional objects of aesthetics, so to speak, the beautiful, art, and sensible knowledge, are in their turn the meeting point of many and disparate issues. Just to realize how many-sided and multi-layered this discipline is, consider that the same notion of art (called in antiquity with two words that have little to do with one another, namely *téchne* and *ars*) in the Renaissance alone becomes a unique concept with which the various arts are comprehended.

But the beautiful, art, and sensible knowledge are not the only objects of traditional aesthetic thought. One also needs to add culture understood as the formation of a discursive public sphere where everyone can take part. It is not by chance that the word for aesthetics employed in England in the eighteenth century is *criticism*. Therefore, from the beginning, the Anglo-Saxon aesthetic approach to society and to the arts is distinctly non-conformist. With the word *criticism*, in fact, it is understood the right of everyone to express an evaluation and an appreciation independent of official canons and conventional hierarchies.

As to the second aspect of the cultural turn promoted by Kelly, namely the widening of research to extra-European aesthetics, it reveals itself as a very problematic one. Not only because of the well-known difficulties inherent to the comparative approach (for instance the fact that Western thought tends to attribute to aesthetic experience an autonomy with respect to ethics and to religion that other cultures do not recognize), but also because European aesthetics tends to assign to the subjectivity and singularity of the artist a greater importance than other cultures. These differences lead to question the very notion of culture that can be formulated in these terms: to what extent is this notion exportable outside the West? Is the category of culture applicable to societies that don't think of themselves as cultures? In other words, in the aesthetic project of a non-Western culture, what is at issue is not only the notion of aesthetics but of culture too.

After all, from the moment we attribute a decisive importance to the self-reflection of societies, even the presumed unity of the Western point of view breaks down in a multiplicity of different perspectives. For instance, *Kultur* in German sounds very differently from *culture* in English. In the German word there is an allusion to what is authentic, true and profound as opposed

to *Zivilisation*, the superficial good manners of the civilizing process. The Russian words *kul'tura*, *ku'lturnyi* and *ku'lturnost* are strictly connected to Russia's political and social events. As to Italy, I wonder whether one can overlook the connection between the notion of culture and classical heritage, for what it contains of the ancient and the pagan, moderate and extreme, rational and delirious. In short, the cultural turn ends up by deconstructing not only the presumed unity of Western or European culture, but also that of the single national cultures. As a result, there is a revival of many of the secular trends of feeling and thinking that the processes of nationalization at work in every country in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century hid or removed.

Post-structuralism and deconstructionism have alerted us to the totalizing claims of philosophy and the human sciences. Therefore, it is somewhat puzzling that these same claims return under the banner of the encounter between aesthetics and *Cultural Studies*. The very idea of an *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* appears to be evidence of a systematic ambition. Michael Kelly defends himself from this objection distinguishing the *comprehensive*, that is, unilateral, non sectarian point of view, from the systematic and totalizing one. Actually, only a small number of the contributors are philosophers and, without doubt, it is within the interests of aesthetics to appear to be relatively autonomous from philosophy, just as it is in the interest of philosophy to take its distances from those who want to reduce it to a history of philosophy.

However, the questionable aspect is another and it emerges clearly in the entry by Ian Hunter on *Cultural Studies* (Kelly, 1998: I, 480–3), who sees a continuity between Schiller's ideal of an aesthetic life proposed at the end of the eighteenth century and the program of *Cultural Studies* put forward by the *Birmingham Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies*, and chiefly by Raymond Williams in the Sixties. What Schiller's aesthetics and Cultural Studies seem to have in common is an organic idea of society viewed as a totality endowed with completeness and immediacy. The aesthetic project of a harmonic life would condition the Cultural Studies program whose basic intention would be the naively humanist search for an existence that removes every conflict and every difference. Williams' advocacy of "the whole way of life" reveals itself as the replica of the eighteenth century's "beautiful soul", the famous figure of a spirit entirely reconciled with himself and the world that was ridiculed by Hegel and Nietzsche. Not even the "subcultural" developments of this orientation in social studies would succeed in fulfilling the premises of humanist aesthetics. The lifestyles of the youth subcultures would be an incorporation of the aesthetic dimension in the lived and spontaneous experience of the new generations. Thus, *Cultural Studies* would be

reduced to importing sociological themes in aesthetics or to exporting aesthetic themes in the fields of anthropology, sociology and history.

If this were the case, aesthetics' presumed cultural turn would not be a turn at all, but only a further re-statement of something already entirely found in the Enlightenment and in pre-Romanticism. Philosophy, however, has intervened to disturb this idyllic scene first with German thinkers of conflict such as Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Freud and Wittgenstein, and later with the French theorists of structuralism and post-structuralism who have radically put into question the conciliatory, harmonizing and humanistic pretenses of eighteenth century aesthetics. For those who have been through the tormented paths that they have opened, there is no going back to vitalistic and organicistic naiveties. If a new phase of *European Cultural Studies* is indeed being opened, in which the aesthetic dimension plays an essential role, they will be able to say something adequate to the complexity of the contemporary world only by freeing themselves from cultural as well as from aesthetic ideology.

2. The cultural turn of the anti-aesthetics

A reflection on the aesthetic culture of the modern world is not to be found in the eighteenth century but a century later in the work of Charles Baudelaire who expands and develops the anti-aesthetic orientation inherent in the intuitions of Edgar Allan Poe, De Quincey, Stendhal and Heine. In fact, in his prose works, important phenomena of modernity such as fashion, the city, material life, drugs, prostitution, conflict, and exoticism find a sharp and profound treatment that still constitutes today a fundamental theoretical reference point. Thus it would seem that aesthetics' cultural turn will have to be postponed a century and that it occurs paradoxically in polemics with eighteenth century aesthetics, and it takes on the form of an *anti-aesthetics*.

The origins, however, of this anti-aesthetics can be traced already to the end of the eighteenth century to the criticism that poets and writers moved to academic aesthetics reproaching it of shutting art and beauty in an ivory tower (Ritter, 1971: I, 555–79). While thinkers were promoting the ideal of an aesthetic society where all the conflicts are reconciled in a higher harmony, the writers of the *Sturm und Drang* were starting a poetic revolt against academic aesthetics that has continued to this day. The target of this polemic has been, ever since its beginnings, the concept of aesthetic disinterestedness, that is the idea, common almost to every thinker of the eighteenth cen-

tury, that the judgment of taste is independent of any cognitive and practical interest: in fact, according to Kant, an interest ruins a judgment of taste and deprives it of its impartiality. According to some writers, instead, the beautiful has to create the greatest interest because, it is none other than the promise of happiness. Heine and Baudelaire have sarcastic words for the modern professors of aesthetics, who pretend to make the beautiful disappear from earth by confusing all the types, all the ideas, all the sensations “*dans une vaste unité, monotone et impersonnelle, immense comme l’ennui et le néant*” (in a vast unity, monotonous and anonymous, immense as boredom and nothingness) (Baudelaire [1855], 1961: 956).

Anti-aesthetics replaces aesthetic disinterestedness with a relation to the world characterized by a type of “over-interest”. In one of his tales, Poe describes the power of the imagination as capable of covering the entire external world with an intensity of interest. On the basis of this observation, Baudelaire establishes a veritable theory of *surnaturalisme*. Nature as a whole can be perceived with an “*intérêt surnaturel qui donne à chaque objet un sens plus profond, plus volontaire, plus despotique*” (supernatural interest that confers to every object a more profound, more voluntary and more despotic sense) (Baudelaire, [1855], 1961: 974). The emphasis is no longer placed, as in eighteenth century aesthetics, on detachment and extraneity to any desire, but on the intensity of feeling and on the splendor of what presents itself to the imagination.

Surnaturalisme rejects both subjectivism and naturalism. It has nothing to do with an arbitrary imagination that, deprived of every relation with the world, is lost in the fog of transcendence: “L’imagination est la reine du vrai et le possible est une province du vrai” (imagination is the queen of truth and the possible is a domain of truth) (Baudelaire, [1855], 1961: 1038). That is why Baudelaire’s most important prose piece is entitled the *Painter of Modern Life* where the image of the artist that he proposes is that of “*homme du monde*”, “*c’est à dire homme du monde entière, homme qui comprend le monde et les raisons mystérieuses et légitimes de tous ses usages*” (that is of the whole world, which includes the world and the mysterious and legitimate reasons of all its customs) (Baudelaire, [1855], 1961: 1158) *Surnaturalisme* revolves around this notion of the “scene of external life”. The landscapes of the big city, the pomp of civilian and military life, the alternation of gravity and coquetry, the varied images of shady beauty, the challenge of dandyism, the seductions of the artificial, the *charme* of the horror, are precisely the elements of a new sensibility miles away from the disinterested contemplation of academic aesthetics. One accesses this type of sensibility through a worldly asceticism that finds in the dandy its highest expression. The dandy represents a synthesis

of three cultural types that, according to Baudelaire, exercise the greatest attraction: the warrior, the monk and the courtesan. Of the warrior the dandy possesses the heroic spirit and the readiness to die at any instant. Of the monk, the mastery over oneself and the indifference toward money, of the courtesan the cult of appearance and provocation. In short, all three do not identify intimately with their bodies that they consider a dress, and they are a strange mix of placidity and boldness, coldness and ardor, self-control and ease. *Surnaturalisme*, therefore, is far from the colorless subjectivism of eighteenth century aesthetics. As Baudelaire writes: “*C’est un moi insatiable du non-moi, qui à chaque instant, le rend et l’exprime en images plus vivantes que la vie meme, toujours insatiable et fugitive*” (it is an *I* insatiable for the *not-I* that at every instant renders it and expresses it in images more alive than life itself, always unstable and fugitive) (Baudelaire, [1855], 1961: 1161). It implies that permanent duality, the power of being at the same time itself and other, that is the essence of laughter, of the *comique absolu*, distinct from the meaningful one which, since it targets other human beings, appears to Baudelaire naive and devoid of the vertigo of the double.

But *surnaturalisme* is equally distant from any naturalism or realism that reduce art to imitation of things beautiful. In themselves things are neither beautiful nor ugly, and there is no natural hierarchy between them. Baudelaire combats neoclassical poetics according to which only what is solemn, pompous and ancient is beautiful. He vindicates the poetic character of modern life: Parisian life is fertile with wonderful poetic subjects. The marvelous envelops and surrounds us like the atmosphere, but we do not see it, if we have no imagination. In fact, the entire visible universe is only a deposit of images and signs to which the imagination must attribute a place and a relative value. It is a type of nourishment that the imagination must “assimilate and transform”. **Poetic and artistic experience loses its self-respect if it prostrates before external reality, seen in its brute immediacy. Only by passing through the filter of memory and poetic imagination the “fantastic real of life” becomes able of generating interest and astonishment.** It is as if any aspect of the world could be subject to a *legendary translation* that renders it enchanting.

Baudelaire’s anti-aesthetic *surnaturalisme* could represent, therefore, the real cultural turn capable of giving intensity and liveliness to any thing. After all, the three characteristic of *Cultural Studies* appear in it even more self-evident than in academic aesthetics, namely rejection of conventionality, openness to extra-European cultures and attention to alternative and even pathological experiences of drug addiction and psychosis.

As we said, aesthetic disinterestedness found its rigorous formulation

in Kant. Anti-aesthetic over-interest, even if it has created some interest among philosophers, for instance Wittgenstein, has not been the object of an equally theoretical treatment. Perhaps in Freud's notion of *Überbesetzung*, *over-cathexis*, *over-investment*, it is possible to find important elements for a more precise characterization. In Freud's concept of *investment*, what is striking is its quantitative and not qualitative aspect. It points to the fact that a quantity of psychic activity can occupy a certain representation, but it can also detach itself from it and move on to another. For Freud the functioning of the entire psychic apparatus can be described in economic terms as a play of investments, un-investments, counter-investments and over-investments. One can conclude that it is not possible to establish whether an external object of the real world is more or less worthy of interest on the basis of its quality. Anything can become greatly "interesting" even if one arrives at it only through an associative chain of representations.

If anything can be an object of affective investment, everything is liable of culturalization. This way, psychoanalysis seems to provide *Cultural Studies* with a legitimacy equally solid as the idea of aesthetic disinterestedness promoted by Kant. Now the notions of aesthetic *disinterestedness* and of psychoanalytical *investment* have one thing in common, the fact that in their origin they are both formal and non-content oriented. The connection between aesthetic disinterestedness and the fine arts is a subsequent step that was historically accomplished only in the second half of the eighteenth century (Sasaki, 1985). The aesthetic attitude of disinterestedness does not imply that there are objects that are necessarily "disinterested", in which the cognitive and practical dimensions are thought to be irrelevant. In other words, aesthetic disinterestedness is a much more a general attitude than the appreciation of a work of art and its evaluation.

Similar considerations can be made on psychoanalytical investment with respect to any representation. *Over-investment*, however, is something more. It implies an intensification, a supplementary amount of psychic energy. Even though Freud did not examine this notion closely, it is symptomatic that it should appear in *Totem and Taboo* with reference not only to the magical primitive world, but also to that of art (Freud, [1912], 1940–52, VIII, 3, 3). The omnipotence of thoughts, Freud writes, has been preserved in our society only in one context, that of art. Only in art, it still happens that a man consumed by tormenting desires creates something similar to their realization, and that this fiction, thanks to artistic illusion, has the power of evoking the same affective reactions as reality. That is why one speaks of the magic of art and one compares the artist to a magician.

3. *New Age and the culture of performance*

What is left of Kant's disinterestedness and of Baudelaire's over-interest-edness? Where can we find in the experience of today manifestations of these two great cultural turns that have characterized the experience of modernity? To be sure, a return to their origins is always possible. Aesthetic disinterestedness can rediscover the religious origins from which it derived. In fact, the movements of the so-called Protestant awakening (Pietism in German speaking countries, and Methodism in England) have provided the model of spirituality on which aesthetic experience was founded. Analogously, anti-aesthetic over-interest-edness can find in the descriptions of drug addiction and psychosis provided by de Quincey and Poe their own archetype.

The cultural movement of today that can be considered the heir of the eighteenth century seems to me to be the so-called *New Age*. In this trend we find the three characteristics that we have singled out as the essential aspects of aesthetic cultural turns: rejection of conventions, openness on extra-European cultures and attention to alternative experience. It has been rightly observed that it is impossible to describe *New Age* as the sum of simple elements. In it flow tendencies that have nothing to do with one another, so that the movement in its complexity is varied and indefinite. In fact, *New Age* originates from a mixture of elements that come from esotericism, from youth counter-cultures, from different forms of Oriental spirituality, and from the world of alternative therapies. It, furthermore, is characterized by a low theoretical and intellectual profile and by the absence of a rigid normative ethic, all factors that naturally facilitate its social circulation.

At first sight, there seems to be an incongruence between aesthetic disinterestedness, which by definition leaves out of consideration any utilitarian and functional point of view, and *New Age* that has been interpreted as the introduction of a pragmatic point of view in religion. However, in my view, the affinity between aesthetic disinterestedness and *New Age* resides in the special emphasis on the subjective experience of harmony and conciliation, which is common to both. Both aesthetic disinterestedness and *New Age* escape the perception of opposition and conflict tending to present the image of a world where contrasts can be overcome in the individual experience of reconciliation and quietness. In *New Age*, this rejection of conflict ends up by escaping from any determination. Since "omnis determinatio est negatio", any determination is a negation, to the spirit of *New Age* is proper the avoidance of identification, the escape from any type of definition. Also striking is the affinity between the aesthetic figure of the eighteenth century "beautiful

soul”, that was the object of Hegel’s sarcasm, and the trans-personal way of being outlined by the psychology of New Age. For Hegel, it is a divine and noble soul that rejects everything as unworthy of her, as it moves in its very personal religious and moral lucubrations.

In actual fact the objective of trans-personal psychology does not consist in a stabilization of a personal identity but, on the contrary, on the overcoming of all identities and in the attainment of a “depth of the soul”, a subterranean region of the mind” that brings along a feeling of profound tranquillity and superiority over everything (Dobroczyński, 1997). Thus New Age would be the present manifestation of what Umberto Eco has defined “hermetic semiosis” (whose origins are in Platonism), which by rejecting any determination as inadequate takes away from language any communicative power, at the same time conferring on its adept the presumption of possessing the secret of the world and of happiness (Eco, 1990).

New Age constitutes the present version of aesthetic experience. The present heir of anti-aesthetics, instead, is that social phenomenon contemporary to New Age that we could call the “culture of performance”. Differently from New Age that corresponds to a type of sensibility that privileges peace and relaxation, emotional over-investment finds its own model in sport performance. The energetic aspect is emphasized to the highest level. A living style is elaborated whose dynamic is characterized by the attainment of always new records or by overcoming handicaps. An acute observer of the phenomenon observes: “Sport has by now taken the place of school becoming one of the major referents of social excellence and fair competition” (Ehrenberg, 1999, 18). This dimension, however, does not entail a discovery of subjectivity, singularity, or individual creativity. It does not come into conflict with the so-called “egalitarian common sense” because it constitutes “a perfectly impersonal process”, a way of feeling that falls within the category of the “già sentito” (*already felt*) (Perniola, 2002). In other words, the cult of performance is not the invention of a personal destiny but the taking on of a “ready made” type of sensibility, *prêt à porter*, so to speak.

The basic tonality of the culture of performance is not directed toward the fulfillment of pleasure but toward the preservation of excitement. As the sociologist Anthony Giddens asserts, the gratification connected to it cannot be described in hedonistic terms. It is rather the slang term *high* that characterizes this type of experience, which is a type of euphoric state closer to an “artificial feeling”, to an *addiction*, than to a feeling of intimacy (Giddens, 1993).

What is striking is the enormous cultural pervasiveness of the *addiction*. This notion, originally tied almost exclusively to the consumption of alcohol

and drugs has acquired in the last few years an unlimited extension until becoming a general form of feeling that can pertain to any context. One can be addicted to smoking, food, sex but also to work, exercise, love! These contexts are interchangeable. As Giddens remarks, often an individual fights to escape one addiction only to fall prey to another. At the basis of this functioning there is naturally the plasticity of psychic processes, their mobility.

The culture of performance can also acquire a violent aspect. However, this violence is qualitatively different from functional violence understood as a mean of obtaining something that one cannot have peacefully: “this ‘traditional’ violence is a ‘practical’ sort of violence: chosen as one means over others [...] for such ends as money, career, power, revenge, or jealousy” (Kupfer, 1983, 42). Even political violence is still a type of traditional violence because directed to the fulfillment of a certain purpose. Here, instead, we have to do with a type of behavior that is an alternative to traditional logic and belongs rather to the society of the spectacle. It has no other purpose than “to insert the self into one’s image of the world. The violent act forces the individual into the ‘public view’, perhaps with the aid of the media” (Kupfer, 1983, 50).

Sporting events in the last few decades of the twentieth century also provide the most adequate instruments for the understanding of violence. As Ehrenberg remarks, soccer is not only a sport but also a way of life (Ehrenberg, 1999, 18). In this respect, the last generation of *ultras* provides elements of particular interest. In fact, they are different not only from traditional fans but also from the hooligans of the sixties and seventies who were held together by a kind of community solidarity, however distorted. The new hooligans, that Ehrenberg rightly considers the heir of the *dandies*, do not constitute a crowd, but are individuals that temporarily gather together to act *in the crowd*. In other words, they do not constitute an universe of formless and dangerous mass, but they “exhibit a will of making only themselves visible.” (Ehrenberg, 1999, 173.) Sociologists define them as “casual hooligans” also because they often have a social and cultural position much higher than the “hooligans” belonging to the working class. Violence for them is not an outlet, but a cultural sign where appearance counts more than substance. The English word “*aggro*” (in French “*accro*”) renders very well this dimension that combines “aggravation” and “aggression”.

4. Conclusion

New Age and the culture of performance, even if presenting opposite traits, have one thing in common. They translate at the empirical and factual

level experiences that originally belonged to another sphere, the spiritual and the symbolic. In the shift from aesthetic experience to New Age there is compressing of profound experiences into a narrow and one-dimensional reality. Disinterestedness is transformed in physical well-being. The same occurs in the shift from over-interestedness to the culture of performance. What counts is precisely the performance, the result. Translated in the language of toxico-dependents, the first is a “*pot*” experience, which is tied to the consumption of substances that bring about relaxation, the second is a “*speed*” experience, tied to the consumption of amphetamines and cocaine.

By introducing in capitalist society, types of logic that are opposed to utilitarian interest, New Age and the culture of performance both place themselves as an alternative to present society. In fact, they seem to come together in the movement against globalization, representing, respectively, the pacifist and the violent side. Aesthetics and anti-aesthetics become in this way immediately political, in a sense that has nothing to do with political ideology, which constitutes the mediation between ideas and actions. Thus they escape the traditional political characterization and cannot be classified under the label of right or left. They constitute a global alternative that, however, is not programmatic but factual.

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