ASIAN STUDIES SPECIAL ISSUE: TRANSFORMATIONS IN CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AT THE THRESHOLD OF MODERNITY Volume IX (XXV), Issue 2Ljubljana 2021 ASIAN STUDIES, Volume IX (XXV ), Issue 2, Ljubljana 2021 Editor-in-Chief: Jana S. Rošker Special Issue Editor: Jana S. Rošker Editor-in-Charge: Nataša Visocnik Gerželj Technical Editor: Nina Kozinc Managing Editor: Dorina Gujt Proof Reader: Paul Steed Editorial Board: Bart Dessein, Luka Culiberg, Jana S. Rošker, Tea Sernelj, Nataša Vampelj Suhadolnik,Nataša Visocnik, Jan Vrhovski, Weon-Ki Yoo, Selusi Ambrogio All articles are double blind peer-reviewed.The journal is accessable online in the Open Journal System data base: http://revije.ff.uni-lj.si/as. Published by: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani/Ljubljana University Press,Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana For: Oddelek za azijske študije/Department of Asian Studies For the publisher: Roman Kuhar, Dean of Faculty of ArtsLjubljana, 2021, First editionNumber printed: 50 copiesGraphic Design: Aleš CimpricPrinted by: Birografika Bori, d. o. o.Price: 10,00 EUR ISSN 2232-5131 This publication is indexed in the following databases: SCOPUS, Elsevier A&I, A&HCI (Emerging Sources),WEB OF SCIENCE, COBISS.si, dLib.si, DOAJ, ERIH PLUS, ESCI, CNKI, Sherpa Romeo, EuroPub. This journal is published three times per year. Yearly subscription: 25 EUR (Account No.: 50100-603-40227)Ref. No.: 001-033 ref. »Za revijo« Address: Filozofska fakulteta, Oddelek za azijske študije, Aškerceva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenijatel.: +386 (0)1 24 11 450, +386 (0)24 11 444faks: +386 (0)1 42 59 337 This journal is published with the support of the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS). This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. / To delo je ponujeno pod licenco Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva-Deljenje pod enakimi pogoji 4.0 Mednarodna licenca CIP - Kataložni zapis o publikacijiNarodna in univerzitetna knjižnica, Ljubljana 130.2(510)"18/19"(082) .tor-in-chief Jana S. Rošker]. - 1st ed. - Ljubljana : Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete = University Press,Faculty of Arts, 2021. - (Asian studies, ISSN 2232-5131 ; vol. 9 (25), issue 2) ISBN 978-961-06-0458-7 COBISS.SI-ID 61326851 Contents Contents SPECIAL ISSUE: TRANSFORMATIONS IN CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AT THE THRESHOLD OF MODERNITY Editor’s Foreword Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Jana S. ROŠKER Evaluations and Critiques Is “New Culture” a Proper Translation of Xin wenhua? Some Critical Remarks on a Long-Overlooked Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Joseph CIAUDO Beyond the Warring States: The First World War and the Redemptive Critique of Modernity in the Work of Du Yaquan (1873–1933) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 Ady VAN DEN STOCK Logic and Methodology A Few Important Landmarks in the Chinese Debates on Dialectical and Formal Logic from the 1930s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 Jan VRHOVSKI Researching the History of Chinese Logic:The Role of Wen Gongyi in the Establishment of New Methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Cui QINGTIAN Modernization of Chinese Philosophical Methodology: Zhang Dainian’s Innovation and the Challenges of Neo-Materialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Jana S. ROŠKER Foreign Ideals, Indistinct Hopes, and Intimate Passions Swiss Enchantment: Modern Chinese Intellectuals and a Federal Utopia . . . . . . 145 Federico BRUSADELLI Modernization of Beauty in China: From the “Great Debate on Aesthetics”to the “Aesthetic Fever” and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Téa SERNELJ OTHER TOPICS Japanese Reinterpretations of Confucianism: Ito Jinsai and His Project ....... 183 Marko OGRIZEK Contents DISCUSSIONS Towards Post-Comparative Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Interview with Ralph WEBER by Nevad KAHTERAN BOOK REVIEW Marie GIBERT-FLUTRE and Heide IMAI, eds.: Asian Alleyways: An Urban Vernacular in Times of Globalization . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Reviewed by Daniel BULTMANN SPECIAL ISSUE: TRANSFORMATIONS IN CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AT THE THRESHOLD OF MODERNITY Editor’s Foreword DOI: 10.4312/as.2021.9.2.7-10 Introduction Jana S. ROŠKER The notion of modernity is a concept which doubtless helped to form contempo­rary societies, and in this regard, China is no exception. If we want to historically evaluate the Chinese attempts at establishing a “typical Chinese” philosophical basis for modernization, we need to consider the context of the questions linked to Hobsbawm’s and Ranger’s (1995) concept of “invented traditions”. In oth­er words, we must consider to what extent are the “past” intellectual “traditions”based on historic assumptions, and to what extent are they merely a product of the (ideological and political) demands of the current period. An important conse­quence of the current trans-nationalization of capital is that, perhaps for the first time in modern history, the global mode of production appears as an authentically universal abstraction that is no longer limited to its specific historical origins in Europe. Hence, the narrative of modernization is no longer an exclusively Euro­pean one, and for the first time non-European societies are also making their own claims on the history of modernization (see Dirlik 1994). In this context, it also seems important to go beyond narrow views that consid­er the prospect of a clash between Chinese and Western civilizations (e.g. Hun­tington 1993) without a basic historical grasp of the developments of the diverse,complex and multi-layered Chinese traditions in modern and contemporary Chi­na,1 since the transition from the past to the present must necessarily be aware of these complexities (see, for example, Jiang 2011). Diverse approaches to the questions related to the specifically Chinese mode of modernization have several times been at the centre of our interest, with a num­ber of special issues of Asian Studies devoted to them. Among the papers pub­lished under the topic, several authors focused on the new modes of thought that were gradually brought to China from the Western world (e.g., Hocevar 2019;Vrhovski 2021), on the specifically Confucian forms of modernization (Huang 2020; Jia 2020), and on syntheses between Sinicized Marxism and the Chinese intellectual tradition (Dessein 2019; Paul 2021). However, most of these con­tributions were either centred on purely theoretical themes, or particularly fo­cused upon questions of ideological transformations. To grasp a more compre­hensive and coherent image of specific characteristics of Chinese modernity and For a well-grounded critique of such approaches see, for instance, Yu Ying-shih (2005, 215). its relation to the manifold historical developments of pre-modern China, we also need to examine the main elements that enable the amalgamation of tradition­al Chinese standards, principles and values into the framework of the dominant global developments in the realm of social and ideational history, sociology, and cultural studies. The present issue aims to fill up this gap in the current literature. It deals with theperiod which embraces eight decades that were crucial to the development andestablishment of present-day China. The period under research spans from thethreshold of the previous century up until the 1980s, i.e. until the margins of thenew millennium.This special issue explores how and why in the shaping of the firstrepublic, China started the process of “national” consolidation.It explores several as­pects of Maoist ideology which were brought to the fore in the subsequent socialistrevolution, and investigates the implementation of widely based modernist experi­ments in social engineering and socialist, even communist, utopias. It shows that theabundant ideas developed in these experiments remained influential in China untilthe mid-1970s. The issue also depicts the intellectual background of the importantshift in China’s new image of modernity, in which the so-called Post-Mao transfor­mations helped to establish a “state-socialist” directed approach to capitalism. It willhopefully help us to understand this significant shift and its consequences, whichstill pervade the social and political reality of contemporary China. The issue is divided into three scopes of contents. The first questions some of the central theoretical and conceptual backgrounds of China’s modernization. Joseph Ciaudo analyses whether the Western notion of “New Culture” can truly denote the scope of meanings and connotations implied in the Chinese term “Xin wen-hua”. Ady Van den Stock deals in the second article of this scope with the influ­ence of Du Yaquan, a “cultural-conservative” scholar who lived on the boundary between the 19th and 20th centuries. Van den Stock’s case-study analysis points to the hitherto overlooked complexity of different reactions to WWI in among Chinese academics on the edge of modernity. The second scope deals with questions related to logic and methodology. In the first paper, Jan Vrhovski explores the Chinese debates and ideas related to the Marxist notion of dialectical logic, which started to circulate in the Chinese in­tellectual world in the late 1920s. This paper outlines the major landmarks within these debates in the 1930s, and sheds light on some new aspects of the connection between formal and dialectical logic in the scope of the sinization of Marxism in this period. The second contribution, written by Cui Qingtian, also deals with logic, but concentrates on the history of investigating, reviving and re-interpret­ing classical Chinese semantic logic. The last article in this scope is my own. It Asian Studies IX (XXV ), 2 (2021), pp. 7–10 analyses Zhang Dainian’s work and shows its great importance in the search for a modernized methodology of Chinese philosophy. Throughout the world, modernization was always connected not only with a sense of economic and political urgency, but also with ideals, hopes and passions. These are the main concerns of the third and last scope of contents, which contains two contributions, written by Federico Brusadelli and Téa Sernelj. The former also belongs to a certain type of case study, although it does not explore any particu­lar person, work or idea. Instead, it investigates how the modernized form of a particular Western political order influenced certain Chinese intellectual strata.The author thus shows why and in which way the Swiss political system became a source of inspiration for several new institutions, organizations and intellectuals in modern China.The latter author also deals with an important source of inspira­tion, namely with the notion of beauty. It shows the connection of two large-scale aesthetic debates which took place in different periods of the second half of the 20th century, and have—each in their own way—profoundly influenced the con­temporary views on the role and function of Chinese aesthetics and its connection to politics and economy. Perhaps an important common thread of the present issue of Asian Studies is the fact that it confronts us with many unfulfilled ideals and promises that arose in the earlier eras of Chinese modernization, laying bare their opposites which man­ifest themselves in uncertainties and risks. It is important to see these risks, be­cause many of them are still being mirrored in today’s China. We must not forget that every uncertainty can also be seen as possibility; in this sense, new hopes can arise from old risks—as long as we are aware of them—and perhaps hopes and ideals are the most precious things we need to embrace when thinking about the present-day China and its future. References Dessein, Bart. 2019. “Guo Moruo on Marx and Confucius.” Asian Studies 7 (1): 129–51. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2019.7.1.129-151. Dirlik, Arif. 1994. After the Revolution: Working to Global Capitalism. Hanover, London: Wesleyan University Press. Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. 1995. The Invention of Tradition. Cam­bridge, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press (1st edition 1983). Hocevar, Marko. 2019. “Mao’s Conception of the Revolutionary Subject.” Asian Studies 7 (1): 247–67. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2019.7.1.247-267. Huang Kuan-min. 2020.“Dissemination and Reterritorialization.” Asian Studies 8 (3): 15–33. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2020.8.3.15-33. Huntington, Samuel P. 1993.“The Clash of Civilizations.”Foreign Affairs 2: 22–49. Jia, Jinhua. 2020. “Li Zehou’s Reconception of the Classical Confucian Concepts of Autonomy and Individuality: With a Focus on Reading the Analects To­day.” Asian Studies 8 (1): 59–75. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2020.8.1.59-75. Jiang, Qing. 2011. “From Mind Confucianism to Political Confucianism.” In The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China, edited by Ruiping Fan, 17–32. Dordrecht: Springer. Krawczyk, Adrian. 2019. “Marxist Theories of Ideology in Contemporary China.”Asian Studies 7 (1): 153–72. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2019.7.1.153-172. Paul, Gregor. 2021.“From Marx and Engels to Sino-Marxism Focusing on Com­munist and Confucian (rujia) Notions of Loyalty and Self-Criticism.” Asian Studies 9 (1): 263–80. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2021.9.1.263-280. Vrhovski, Jan. 2021. “Shadowlands of Objectivism and Comprehensiveness.”Asian Studies 9 (1): 227–62. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2021.9.1.227-262. Yu,Ying-shih. 2005.“Confucianism and China’s Encounter with the West in His­torical Perspective.” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 4 (2): 203–16. SPECIAL ISSUE: TRANSFORMATIONS IN CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AT THE THRESHOLD OF MODERNITY Evaluations and Critiques DOI: 10.4312/as.2021.9.2.13-47 Is “New Culture” a Proper Translation of Xin wenhua? Some Critical Remarks on a Long-Overlooked Dilemma Joseph CIAUDO* Abstract For several decades, we have been witnessing a profound renewal in our understanding of the “New Culture Movement”. However, the aptness of “new culture” as a proper trans­lation for xin wenhua ... has almost never been discussed. The present paper argues that uniformly translating xin as “new” and wenhua as “culture” tends to blur the picture instead of making it clearer, for by so doing one unconsciously endorses the narrative of radical Chinese intellectuals while silencing other voices. Furthermore, the article puts forward the idea that terms such as wenhua .. encompassed a “multiplicity of poten­tial readings” that have much to do with the transformation of Chinese language at the beginning of the 20th century, and with the emergence of a new conceptual repertoire. In their attempts to appropriate xin wenhua and turn it into a seemingly coherent movement with an agenda, Chinese intellectuals were fighting a war over the topic of “civilization/culture”, but also, and perhaps primarily education. Yet, by employing the term “culture”in academic writing today, we tend to produce a historical dissonance for their use of this term is not our own: we thus fall into the trap of semantic transparency, and forget that the concept of “culture” has a problematic history in both China and the West. By ques­tioning the use of wenhua with regard to the May Fourth Movement, I provide evidence that the accepted translation of culture can be problematic if one does not clearly spell out the meaning located behind it, as the Chinese wenhua often did not mean “Chinese culture” in our modern, all too modern, anthropological sense. Keywords: New Culture Movement, historiography, conceptual history, culture, China Ali je »nova kultura« ustrezen prevod za Xin wenhua? Nekaj kriticnih pripomb k dolgo prezrti dilemi Izvlecek Že nekaj desetletij smo prica temeljiti prenovi našega razumevanja »gibanja za novo kul­turo«. Vendar se o primernosti »nove kulture« kot ustreznega prevoda za xin wenhua... skoraj nikoli ni razpravljalo. Avtor v pricujocem clanku trdi, da enoznacno prevajanje * Joseph CIAUDO, Ghent University.Email address: joseph.ciaudo@UGent.be izraza xin kot »nov« in wenhua kot »kultura« zamegljuje sliko, namesto da bi postala jasnejša, kajti s tem nezavedno podpiramo naracijo radikalnih kitajskih intelektualcev,medtem ko utišamo glasove drugih. Poleg tega je v clanku predstavljena ideja, da izraz,kot je wenhua, zajema »množico potencialnih branj«, ki imajo veliko opraviti s preobrazbo kitajskega jezika v zacetku 20. stoletja in s pojavom novega konceptualnega repertoarja. V prizadevanju, da bi si prisvojili xin wenhua in ga spremenili v na videz skladno gibanje z agendo, so kitajski intelektualci bili bitko glede problema »civilizacija/kultura«, pa tudi in morda predvsem glede izobraževanja. Z uporabo izraza »kultura« v današnjem akadem­skem pisanju se nagibamo k ustvarjanju zgodovinskega neskladja, saj uporaba tega izraza ni naša lastna: tako pademo v past semanticne prosojnosti in pozabimo, da ima koncept »kulture« problematicno zgodovino tako na Kitajskem kot na Zahodu. S prevpraševanjem uporabe wenhua v povezavi s cetrtomajskim gibanjem avtor podaja dokaze, da je lahko sprejeti prevod kulture problematicen, ce ni jasno razložen pomen, ki se skriva za njim,saj kitajski izraz wenhua ponavadi ni pomenil »kitajske kulture« v modernem, vse prevec modernem, antropološkem smislu. Kljucne besede: gibanje za novo kulturo, zgodovinopisje, konceptualna zgodovina, kul­tura, Kitajska Introduction In the history of modern China, the “New Culture Movement” (xin wenhua yun-dong ..... ) has long been an iconic one. Often regarded as a decisive mile­stone in the Chinese modernity narrative, it has been intimately associated with the whole May Fourth Movement and era. Until recently, following the almost canonical study by Chow Tse-tung (1960), the beginning of the New Culture Movement has often been dated from 1915 and been regarded as the crystalliza­tion of the intellectual transformations that inspired the May Fourth demonstra­tion. Furthermore, it had an intricate relationship with the history of the Chinese Communist Party, of whom it would be legitimate to say that it integrated the former to its origin narrative. Yet recent academic literature has called into ques­tion these one-sided assumptions and readings. Not only have we gone beyond this “May Fourth paradigm” (Chow 2008), but we have also included dissonant voices, notably those of conservatives (Zheng and Jia 2005). The narrative of the Movement has thus been decentred (Ip and Lee 2003), and the overwhelming place given to “intellectual discourses” has been challenged as we have looked into the everyday social life of those involved (e.g. Lanza 2010). Far from being a clear break with the past, the May Fourth intellectual blossoming was in fact the result of a long process that stretched over several decades, and that found its origins in various forms of writings from the late-Qing period. The current state of the art has, furthermore, shown evolution with regard to the importance given to individ­uals as well as places outside Beijing and Shanghai. Additionally, there has been an ever-growing process of “memorialization of the movement as an event, sym­bol, and imagery” (Wang 2019, 144).The commemorations of its hundredth anni­versary confirm this orientation. Regarding the date of birth of the “New Culture Movement”, we have started to abandon the idea that the movement began with the publication of The New Youth journal in 1915, or even in 1914 with the maga­zine Tiger (Weston 1998, 260). Some scholars have astutely noticed that the word wenhua yundong .... was to be found in no titles of periodical essays before 1919 (Kuo 2017, 55). In fact: “The expression ‘New Culture Movement’ was only invented in the late summer 1919, a few months after the May Fourth demon­strations” (Forster 2017, 1254).1 The New Culture Movement found its origins in 1919 (Sang 2015). All in all, thanks to a better care given to the historical agents’vocabulary and positions, we have recently been witnessing a profound renewal in our understanding of this key moment in modern Chinese history. Yet, with the recent celebrations of the May Fourth Movement’s hundredth an­niversary, the term “New Culture Movement” has been given new publicity and been widely uncritically used in academic and non-academic discourses, as if the interrogations recently raised by the specialized scientific literature were still un­known. As a consequence, and taking as a departure point some recent and very stimulating readings of the May Fourth period by Elisabeth Forster and Kuo Ya-pei, the present paper wishes to push their historiographical insights further. In this vein, I would like to open a critical reflection on a problem long overlooked in the literature: by translating xin wenhua ... as “new culture” without adding clarification, we fail to capture the richness of what was being discussed in 1919 and project upon the past an anachronistic outlook. In a 2017 article, Elizabeth Forster analysed the Chinese expression “New Cul­ture Movement” and “the way discourses were created around it”, and conclud­ed that it not as a movement per se, but “a buzzword, used by little-known intel­lectuals to market a variety of agendas they had been endorsing for a number of years” (Forster 2017, 1254)2. It was thus a label retrospectively applied to a series 1 Forster had already put forward this idea in 2014. We also need to admit that about sixty years ago Chow Tse-tung had already noted that the term “New Culture” had only became popular in the early 1920s (Chow 1960, 194). However, he did not go as far as delimiting a clear line of separa­ tion between the “New Culture Movement” and the overarching “May Fourth Movement” as, for instance, Rana Mitter (2004, 18) has done. 2 Elisabeth Forster has since published a monograph on the year 1919 (Forster 2018) that discussed in detail not only the history of the “New Culture Movement”, but also how this hegemonic buzz­ word redistributed symbolic meaning “within a pool of competing agendas, which had existed for a while” (ibid., 195) and would continue for a long time after 1919. of propositions in order to market them (ibid. 2018, 91–129). Formulated by pe­ripheral intellectuals, the expression was to be reappropriated by figures such as Chen Duxiu ... (1879–1942) or Hu Shi .. (1891–1962). Kuo Ya-pei has also brilliantly argued that the New Culture Movement, with clear fault lines against all non-sup­porters and a stress upon ideological cohesion, was constructed in 1923–1924, when the young Chinese Communist Party formulated its propa­ganda strategy for the purpose of the United Front. (Kuo 2017, 54–55) Chen’s role was instrumental in building-up the proper noun “New Culture Movement”, later to be formalized by Qu Qiubai ... (1899–1935) and Deng Zhongxia ... (1894–1933). Kuo has, in this regard, brought more support to Forster’s position, while simultaneously deconstructing the genealogy of our his-toriographical outlook on the matter.3 Her distinction between wenhua yundong and xin wenhua yundong in the prose of Liang Shuming ... (1893–1988) is also very valuable (Kuo 2017, 62–63), as it has shown that wenhua yundong was obviously a term whose meaning was contested. In direct continuity with regard to the works quoted above, the present paper wishes to question our understanding of what the New Culture Movement was.However, instead of bringing out new materials that would offer some supple­mentary insights into the already numerous and diverse arrays of studies concern­ing with this topic, I would like to offer a critical inquiry into the very term xin wenhua yundong, how we historicize it, and analyse it. I argue that the Chinese term xin wenhua yundong ought not to be systematically and uncritically trans­lated as “New Culture Movement”, because it is an expression that is genuinely ambivalent, and it is this very ambiguity that has loomed large in its subsequent use. If the term “movement” does not raise much concern—except for the oppor­tunity of using the plural form of the word—I would beg to differ regarding xin as “new” and wenhua as “culture”: reading xin solely as an adjective is not only re­ductive, but translating wenhua into “culture” could be also deemed anachronistic,because “culture” bears in today’s parlance a strong national identity-related ori­entation that was not present in the concept of wenhua as discussed and contested at the time. In translating xin wenhua as “new culture”, we are in fact endorsing the thesis that this or these movement(s) were calling for the complete Western­ization of China, and destruction or at least transvaluation of Chinese national In 1987, Ursula Richter had already pointed out the decisive influence the Chinese radical intellec­tuals and their simplification (or should we say appropriated narrative) had had on the outlook the young European and American sinologist had with regard to Modern China. culture, understood as a social category that defines a specific way of life shared by a people.4 Last but not least, though the notion of “buzzword” has its heuristic virtues, I would rather use the German Schlagwort. Following the conceptual his­tory typology, I think that it is important to denote “culture” as both a “collective concept” (Sammlungsbegriff) and a “mobilization concept” (Bewegungsbegriff), i.e.concepts “capable of reordering and mobilizing anew the masses robbed of their place in the old order of estates” (Koselleck 1979, 113). The only remark I would add regarding this characterization is that before being a concept addressed to the masses, it first emerged as a concept to mobilize the intellectual elite as a social group, the “literati-cum-intellectuals” (expression taken from Hon 2013) and the students who were looking for new positions and a sense of belonging after the collapse of Imperial institutions. We must be very careful because xin wenhua encompassed a “multiplicity po­tential readings” that have much to do with the transformation of the Chineselanguage at the beginning of the 20th century and with the emergence of a newkey concept (Grundbegriff) in East Asia:.. (wenhua C., bunka J., munhwa K., van hóa V.). In their attempts to appropriate xin wenhua and turn it into a seem­ingly coherent movement with an agenda, Chinese intellectuals were fighting aconceptual war over the topic of “civilization/culture”, a struggle that, of course,shares some similarities with the opposition between the French La Civilisa­tion and the German Kultur during the First World War, but that should not be regarded as a bis repetita of Western debates.5 A strong emphasis on educa­tion and how one should write was also put to the fore. One therefore has totake into account the fact that if xin wenhua has often been translated as “New Culture”, it is because some historical agents that proclaimed themselves actorsof this movement translated the term as such. Yet, by employing this terminus technicus in academic writing today, we can produce historical dissonances astheir use of the term “culture” is not our own. We fall into the trap of seman­tic transparency, and forget that the concept of “culture” also has a problematic 4 Research on the term “culture” has shown that this concept was far from having a shared under­ standing in the academic literature. In 1952, Kroeber and Kluckhohn had already identified hun­ dreds of definitions (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952), and in the years since many have tried to subsume these definitions under broad categories (e.g., Certeau 1974, 167–68; Jenks 2005, 11–12). In this study I use category nº4 of Jenks or category d from for Certeau, that were built on Tylor’s affirmation that “culture or Civilization, (…), is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man a member of society” (Tylor 1871, vol. 1, 1). For a synthetic, but nonetheless pertinent description of the evolu­ tion of the use of “culture” as a category and concepts in the social sciences, see Cuche (2016). 5 In his investigation into culturalism and the concept of culture in Bengal, Andrew Sartori has al­ ready shown that it was possible to relocate the Bengali concept of culture into a global history without regarding it as a deviation or a reiteration of a European concept (Sartori 2008). history—Raymond Williams used to present it as “one of the two or three mostcomplicated words in the English language” (Williams 1976, 76),6 and this judgment is probably as valid in many other languages, including Mandarin. Assuch, the aim of this paper is not to offer a better alternative—something thatwould probably be difficult and perhaps not even necessary because in a senseour “culture” is as protean as the Chinese wenhua—but to raise our awareness that though there is never a truly ideal translation, it is always necessary toclearly denote the meaning of terms in context. Speaking of the “New CultureMovement” without any quotation marks or supplementary clarifications onthe Chinese terminology in the specific context in which it is used can lead usto read the terms anachronistically and, for instance, think that a unified NewCulture Movement was trying to dismiss the entirety of a Chinese traditionalculture, understood in a national sense.7 This paper will proceed in three stages: firstly, I will formulate some critical re­marks on our historiographical outlook regarding this movement, then the mean­ing of the character xin . will be reconsidered, and finally I will offer a brief preliminary inquiry into the problematic history of the concept of wenhua which operated at the core of the expression. Some Remarks on Our Historiographical Outlook To begin our reflection, one should take a step back, and consider the general schemes that orientated our understanding of the May Fourth period’s intellectu­al debates up to today. It is possible to say that the following two paradigms have been very influential. First, our approach to the sources has been dominated by the political agenda of the radicals. Following them, the so-called New Culture Movement has of­ten been considered as “a cultural revolution” whose motive was to draw a clear line with the past (Lin 1979). A partial access to the documents, the weight of the Communist Party’s discourse on the May Fourth Movement (notably Mao 1939), and also a conscious appropriation of the movement narrative by some 6 See the very rich notice provided by Jorg Fisch in the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe dictionary (Fisch 1992). 7 I here am not completely convinced by Julia C. Schneider’s recent argument regarding the idea that in China culturalistic concepts of the world became merged with nationalist concepts in the early twentieth century (Schneider 2020)—for her use of the term “culturalism” denotes more an analyt­ ical category used by researchers than a precise series of concepts in the source material. of its actors (Doleželová-Velingerová and Oldrich 2001, 1)—notably Hu Shi8— could be pointed out as the main culprits for this one-sided approach. This para­digm has, however, been shattered by several new elements put forward by recent research. The continuity between the intellectual fights of the late-Qing era in­tellectuals and those of the early Republican period has been underlined by many studies, notably in the literary field (Wang 1997; Chen 2011), and with regard to the evolution of the Chinese language (Kaske 2004). It has been pointed out that the radical agenda of people such as Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi were not at first regarded as in a winning position (Forster 2014). Instead of being the concrete political prolongation of the reform of thought movement upheld by New Youth intellectuals, the events of May 4th 1919 saved the agenda of the former by pro­viding it with a renewed popularity. Besides, the New Culture, or xin wenhua, was a project not exclusive to the radicals. Intellectuals often put under the “neocon­servative” label even considered themselves as part of this movement. In a letter to Liang Boqiang ... (1899–1968), Liang Qichao ... (1873–1929), for instance, insisted on the fact that he wished to “propagate the new culture” (xuan­zhuan xinwenhua..... ) (Liang 1920b, 6027). Liang Qichao, but also, Lan Gongwu ... (1887–1957), Zhang Dongsun ... (1886–1973), Zhang Junmai ... (1887–1969) and the entire group of scholars associated with the Research Clique (yanjiu xi ... ) regarded them­selves as contributors to this intellectual renewal movement (Peng 2003; Zhou 2019). As a matter of fact, they were the ones to establish the “Public Study As­sociation” (gongxue she ... ) and the “Lecture and Study Association” (jiangxue she... ), key institutions that made many translations of Western works pos­sible (Zhang 1992, 139–46). They are also the ones who invited Western scholars such as Russell and Dewey to China.These people, later castigated as the enemies of the New Culture, were in fact its most important proponents on the institu­tional side. Therefore, we need to keep in mind that the New Culture was not the property of the radicals, at some point almost all intellectuals believed in partic­ipating to the movement. Liang Shuming ... (1893–1988) is a well-known example here. But things changed when the intellectuals surrounding Chen start­ed a move to appropriate the movement’s entire narrative. The second paradigm, and perhaps the most important, has been the narrative pro­posed by Joseph Levenson when he pointed at a supposed contradiction between In his Chinese Renaissance, Hu put emphasis on his own contributions to the intellectual transfor­mation of modern China, with sometimes a glimpse of hypocrisy, castigating Liang Qichao as only a mere journalist (Hu 1933, 38) or Liang Shuming as the author of a book with a pretentious title (The Cultures of East and West and Their Philosophies) (ibid., 39), while suggesting that his own pro­posals for the reform of literature were “modest” (ibid., 58). “Chinese cultural identity” and “modernity” (Levenson 1958). There is an entire field of literature debunking parts of Levenson thesis. And yet an important as­pect of his work has been insufficiently discussed: the idea that Chinese Nation­alism emerged as “a denial of culturalism” (ibid., 105). Without entering into the debate as to whether such affirmation is appropriate or not in terms of content,there is here a latent problem with its very formulation. It presupposes that the vocabulary and imaginary of the nation set aside the one of culture.The problem is that by saying so we neglect the history of those concepts and forget that “culture”is as modern a notion as that of a “nation”, perhaps even younger. “Culture” has become such a common notion in our everyday vocabulary that we tend to forget that even during the historical period discussed here it was not a common term in Europe. In the early 1920s, it was still a novelty for French people to speak of a “national culture” (Bénéton 1975, 73–84), and only the Germans had any real use of the term Kultur. As has been rightly pointed out by Tessa Morris-Suzuki, the anthropological interpretation of culture as “the civilization of a people (particularly at a certain stage of development)” first appears in the Ox­ford English Dictionary in 1933, but for many decades the English use of “culture” remained unstable, hovering uncomfortably between the older notion of “mental and moral cultivation” and the newer notion of “the practices and beliefs of a particular society”. (Morris-Suzuki 1995, 761) The term “culture” gained worldwide popularity only from the 1920s on (Elliot 2002; Mauviel 2011; Cuche 2016). Even the idea that there exists a field of “culture” distinguished from those of politics and economy is a very late distinction, and perhaps not an operative one in this context, as suggested by Fabio Lanza (2010). Besides, “culture” has always been a political notion. Therefore, one needs to question how Chinese intellec­tuals used this notion, and pay much attention to the chronology of events and texts. For instance, Chen Duxiu hardly had an operative concept of culture under the word wenhua before 1918 (Ciaudo 2015). New Youth did not attack the fig­ure of Confucius because he was the core of “the traditional Chinese culture”, but because his thought served as the foundation of a rotten social system. As Chen said himself: “This journal attacks Confucius, because it is a moral of a patriarchal society that is not appropriate for modern life. We have never put forward any ar­guments that go beyond this” (....,.........,.......,........ ) (Chen 1916, 11). The critique of Confucianism was social and not cultural (van Ess 2012). And it is in fact the theme of social reform that was at the core of the May Fourth Movement (Yang 2009). Placing empha­sis on the importance of “society” (shehui .. ) as perhaps one of the most central concepts of the time is, in this sense, crucial. As a matter of fact, much research in conceptual history has outlined the rise of this term in the decades preceding 1919, and how it acted as both an indicator and factor of historical change (Tsin 1997; Jin and Liu 2008, 180–225; Vogelsang 2012). It is, furthermore, relevant that students and intellectuals organized themselves in a specific new form of social action, “the movement” (yundong .. ). Among the many features of these movements that were described in detail by Rudolf G. Wagner, one could point at their “elitist structure”: “Its protagonists assumed the roles not of spokesmen and representative but of teachers, avant-garde, and guide for the rest of the population” (Wagner 2001, 67). Chen Duxiu’s own un­derstanding of what a movement was clearly puts emphasis on its agency as a po­litical form of action realized by the citizens (ibid., 78). And, of course, through his intellectual and political activities, he intended to orientate the political ac­tivity of his readers. That is why one can legitimately regard his xin wenhua as a “mobilization concept”. Besides, it is worth mentioning that the term “movement”(yundong) was widely used to describe social and political activities and dynamics in the 1910s and 1920s (see the many examples given by Weston 2004, 217 or Forster 2017, 165). Basically, each “agenda” was promoted through a “movement”.Peter Zarrow was thus right when he framed this period as “an era of movements”(Zarrow 2006, 3). One should also note that the chronological proximity with the events of May 1919 and the rise of nationalistic claims by the Chinese population progressively estranged the “new culture” from a more globalized logic: civiliza­tional renewal was no longer an international phenomenon, but something that China had for itself.9 As such, when we speak of an overarching and all-inclusive “May Fourth Movement” (always with capital letters) as Chow Tse-gung first did it (1960, 5), we dismiss the plurality of sociopolitical actions under a unique label and we lock it up in a nationalistic theme.10 Therefore, it could be worth wonder­ing if instead of a May Fourth Movement it would not be better to speak May Fourth Movements, and by extension also New Culture Movements, exiting by this means the complete idea of a unified “May Fourth spirit”, as proclaimed by some historical agents of the time such as Luo Jialun ... (1897–1969) (Luo 1919). Affirming the existence of such a Zeitgeist when the events took place meant playing one’s part in an intellectual debate, but taking back this term in academic 9 In these regards, Kuo Ya-pei’s remarks about Cai Yuanpei or Zhang Dongsun first locating the debate in an international setting (Kuo 2017, 59) are very important. It points to the fact that the turmoil experienced by China were read through the angle of global transformation of human so­ciety, characterized by the rise of socialism (a topic put forward by the Research Clique). It was not simply a national issue. 10 Despite its international dimension, the idea of “Wilsonian Moment” postulated by Manela (2007) captures the May Fourth era into a nation-oriented narrative of modern Asian history. literature is a fallacy in historical reasoning. After all, the Chinese language does not mark the plural, especially in the context of a Schlagwort whose semantic am­biguity adds to its performative power. Needless to say, Liang Qichao’s “New Cul­ture Movement” was not Chen Duxiu’s. Moreover, one needs to include in our reading framework the concrete econom­ic and institutional dimensions of the problem. Despite the fact that they were located in an “intellectual field”, the debates literarily took place on the pages of newspapers and journals that participated in “print capitalism” (Reed 2004, 8–9).11 To survive, and to implement their agendas,“New Culture” actors had to sell their texts, a situation that explains the polemical tone frequently used. Accordingly,Wang Qisheng ... noted that the debates between the writers of New Youth and, for instance, The Eastern Miscellany (he took the 1917–1918 controversy be­tween Chen Duxiu and Du Yaquan ... (1873–1933) as an illustration) were also part of an economic war. Chen’s attacks against other journals were an edito­rial strategy: he hoped to delegitimize the journal and steal its readership (Wang 2007, 29–32). This problem became all the more important with the “war of the manuals” (Reed 2004, 206). Defining the New Culture meant defining what would be taught to students, and what manuals they would buy.The rise of baihua fostered a highly heated debate on whether it should be used as the main form of writing in manuals (Culp 2008). With the Education Ministry ordering all text­books to be published in baihua in April 1920 (Zheng 2001, 206), the concrete consequences of the intellectual debates became obvious. It is also in 1920 that the Commercial Press released their “new culture” Collection. In the early 1920s,many institutions, associations, libraries, and groups were founded with names re­ferring to the popular new expression of wenhua or xin wenhua (Zhang 1979). A section of Shanghai was even nicknamed the “Cultural Avenue” (wenhua jie ... ) because of the dense concentration of bookshops and editors there. Xin wen-hua was a term that crossed the entire society, and not simply a concept for intel­lectuals. Having these elements mind, let us now go back to the very term itself. New or Renew the Culture? An important historiographical remark I wish to make here is that one has to be cautious with how we understand and translate the character xin . . Lee Oufan has defended the idea that “in the popular parlance (of the May Fourth era), to be ‘modern’ mean(t) above all to be ‘new’ (xin), to be consciously opposed to the 11 See more generally the “material side” of books and journal publishing and its impact on society recently put to the fore by Culp 2019. ‘old’ (jiu. )” (Lee 1991, 159). To support this idea, he took as an argument the multiplication of terms and journal titles including the character xin. He saw here a watershed between the ancient and modern, a transition between a cyclical un­derstanding of time and a linear evolutionary approach. Chinese intellectuals felt they were part of a new epoch (Sun 1986), articulated by the “performative dec­laration” (Owen 2001, 171) of being xin. Lee’s thesis is valuable as it helps us to better understand the intellectual positions of some evolutionist thinkers, notably people gravitating around the New Youth journal. When someone like Wang Shu-qian ... wrote, “What we call ‘’ is nothing but the culture imported from the West; what we call ‘old’ is nothing enewlse but the culture that China has had for ages (......,.........;......,............ )” (Wang 1915, 3), it fits perfectly in Lee’s pattern. New Youth writ­ers’ uses of the term encompassed a Darwinian logic—Chen Jia’ai ... would later write in a column for New Tide that “new means being adapted, being adapt­ed that means being new” (Chen, Jia’ai 1919, 44). Yet, presenting the entire intel­lectual panorama under such a light would not only be incomplete but also partial. First, the examples often quoted to stress the opposition between the “ancient” andthe “modern” are more often taken from the debates relating to the problem of “thenew thought” (xin sixiang ... ) than from the one about “the new culture” (xin wenhua). It would be wise to distinguish the two, and also admit that in the scopeof the earlier debates not everyone, even among New Youth writers, was totalistic in their rejection of the old—borrowing Nietzsche’s term, Hu Shi understood thenew thought as “a transvaluation of value” (Hu 1919). Besides, in the discussions onwhether a new thought ought to be implemented in China in 1919, one finds al­most no intellectuals associated with the New Youth. Most of them came from the Research Clique, or from people gravitating around The Eastern Miscellany. Among the main debaters, one can mention the opposition of Chen Jiayi ... (1919) and Zhang Shizhao ... (1919) to Zhang Dongsun (1919a; 1919b), or the ex­change between Du Yaquan ... (1919) and Jiang Menglin ... (1920).12 Secondly, there is a logical pitfall in Lee’s argument; because it rests on the idea that xin is an adjective or a substantive: it neglects the possibility of reading it as a verb. Of course, xin means “new”, but it can also mean to “renew” or “renovate”.13 If one considers the reading materials used to teach Chinese pupils how to read at the end of the 19th century, like The One-Thousand-Character Text (qian zi wen 12 See also the synthesis of the debate proposed by Zhu Tiaosun (1920). 13 Reading xin as a verb in the intellectual texts of the late Qing and earlier Republican era has been a feature shared by several young French historians, such as Ma (2013) who translates Liang Qichao’s Xinmin shuo ... as De la rénovation du peuple, or Morier-Genoud (2014) who propos­ es reading xin shixue ... , “renouveler l’histoire” and not “new history” (ibid., 175, note 10). ... ) or The Great Learning (daxue .. ), xin is first understood in a transitive sense. Let us not forget that the older generation of intellectuals knew by heart those texts since their childhood.14 That is why considering xin wenhua as a Schlagwort and not only as a “buzzword”brings the matter under a clearer light. Rather more than a catchphrase, a Schlagwortis “an expression that gains particular topicality in a specific time, and with which oneoften promotes a program or an objective. Schlagworte are to orientate the thought, theemotions and the attitudes of men” (Niehr 2007, 496). They are therefore part of thevocabulary used in political debates, and it is a common move to try to transform theirmeaning to attack one’s opponent. Chinese intellectuals were not simply “surfing” ona trend, or marketing their position. With the popular expression xin wenhua, theycould, of course, advertise their program, but the term in itself implied a renewal ofWeltanschauung and social practices. In the case of civilization, Emile Benveniste hadspoken of a word “that inculcates a new outlook of the world” (Benveniste 1974, vol. 1,336). Such a description would also fit xin wenhua (especially when one considers that wenhua originally meant “civilization”, as noted below). The problem was, however,that the Chinese did not agree on the outlook to transmit to the people—a situationthat brought someone like Zhang Junmai to assert that to set the direction of a Chi­nese new culture one needed first to clarify an outlook on life (Zhang 1923,914).Thisposition stirred the 1923 debate over “Sciences and Outlooks on Life” (Huang 2002;Isay 2013). In his 1922 review of Liang Shuming’s Cultures of East and West and Their Philosophies, Zhang also implied that comparing the wenhua from East and West was no task for the present day, since China had no renewed culture (xin wenhua ... ) yet (Zhang 1922, 225–26).15 By raising the issue of the grammatical nature of the character xin, I wish not to say that translating it as an adjective is wrong—in most of its occurrences it is the smoothest way to proceed—but instead to put forward the possibility of a “mul­tiplicity of potential reading”: each intellectual understood it as it fit best with his 14 In his study of Zhou Zuoren ... (1885–1967), George Bê Duc did not hesitate to write that “forthe intellectuals educated during the Qing era, the wenyan was the natural language for writing” (BêDuc 2010, 28). I would go further as to say that it was also “the natural language for reading”. 15 In 1920, Hu Shi also had a similar line saying that “China has, as of now, no culture, and even less a new culture” (.......,........ ) (Hu in Sang 2015, 5). The lines of both Hu and Zhang are impossible to understand if one remains mired in the idea that “culture” should be understood in a totalistic or anthropological sense. A few years later, Zhang Junmai would re­sume this line of thought by stressing the fact that the mind of China was a battlefield between the proponents of “national quintessence” (guocui .. ) and those wishing to “Westernize” the country (xihua .. ).The consequence of this situation was that there were no longer any criteria on which on could establish a proper education for the young (Zhang 1925, 113). On the cultural outlook of Zhang in the 1920s, see Ciaudo (2016). own program. And therefore, xin wenhua yundong could be as much a “New Cul­ture Movement” as a Kulturerneuerungsbewegung—a translation used first, to my knowledge, by Thomas Fröhlich (1998). After all, while in the United States Feng Youlan ... (1895–1990) also wrote that, “The ‘new’ culture movement may be, after all, simply the self-consciousness and self-examination of the old” (Fung 1922, 611).16To dive deeper into this “multiplicity” of meaning, it is worth reading attentively the intellectuals that have been cast it out of it by previous scholarship.The authors of the “conservative” Xueheng .. journal are here a great example. Wu Mi .. (1894–1978), one of the main writers of this periodical, offered for example a great critique of the possibility that the “new” ought to simply be the negation of the past, and the full-scale adoption of something foreign. For him,instead of opposing a “new culture” to an “inherent” (guyou .. ) Chinese culture,the problem was to aim at the fusion of different intellectual horizons. Following the definition of culture by Matthew Arnold, he wrote: Nowadays, the Xin wenhua yundong has translated itself as New Culture Movement, meaning as such that wenhua is “culture”. Matthew Arnold has given of this term the following definition: (…) Culture is the best of what has been thought and said in the world. According to this, those who todaydesire to build the (re) new (ed) culture of China should select the quintes­sence of Chinese and Western civilizations, cast and thread them together. ......,..... New Culture Movement,...... Culture.. Matthew Arnold..... : ...,............. Culture is the best of what has been thought and said in the world...,...........,...............,.... (Wu 1922, 13–14) Wu Mi was, furthermore, very harsh on the young students who, according to him, did not understand the meaning of the movement. Elsewhere, he noted: Nowadays, young students read too little and lack experience, they make a mistake when consider that xin wenhua yundong advocate it only as the sole and full representative of Western civilization. ....... , .... , .... , ....................... (ibid., 2) 16 Another Confucian thinker, He Lin .. would later even write in this regard that “On the sur­face, the ‘New Culture Movement’ was one big movement to ‘smash the Confucian shop’ and to overturn Confucian thought. In reality however, the movement made a far greater contribution to the new unfolding of Confucian thinking than the support for Confucianism by individuals from the previous period (of the Self-Strengthening Movement) such as Zeng Guofan (1811–1872) and Zhang Zhidong” (He in Van den Stock 2016). It is obvious that the term xin wenhua yundong was at the centre of an intellectual fight. And one can find in Chen Duxiu’s texts many elements that clearly show that he was conscious of this battle for the term. In “What is the New Culture Movement?” he wrote: “Now among the detractors of the xin wenhua yundong, there are two ill-omened voices: the first claim that Science is useless, and that one should focus on Philosophy.The second is the one that claims that Westerners are nowadays turning themselves toward Oriental culture.” (Chen 1920, 1) With the tone of a polemist, Chen was trying to cast out of the global movement those supporting these two assertions. But more conservative minds, like the writers of the Xueheng journal, answered Chen’s criticisms, by accusing the promoters of xin wenhua (in Chen’s logic) of being no more than “sophists”, “imitators and no creators”, “people looking for fame but no scholars”, “politicians and not educa­tors” (Mei 1921). They did not reject the idea of a xin wenhua, they rejected the one offered by Chen. They also had Western models, but they were not the same (Ong 2004). They looked up to Irving Babbitt (1855–1933) (Hon 2008), who personally supported their attempt to renovate Chinese literature and education (Wu 2004). By limiting us to the narrative that the New Culture Movement was an attempt to establish a clear break from the past, we fall into the trap of the radical dis­course, and forget the entire context of the discussions and notably their origins in the late 19th century. As Chen Pingyuan has written, one should “pay a special attention to the ‘late Qing’ inside ‘May Fourth’” (Chen 2011, 4). As it has already been noted by previous studies (see notably Zhang 2002), the early years of the 1920s were marked by the segmentation of the intellectual field and ever-growing attempts for the various intellectual groups to mark a distance between “us” and “them”. Different groups had very different understandings and uses of this until then uniform “New Culture Movement”. And this was not only the case for in­tellectual groups, since official political groups also defended their own new cul­ture.17 However, the strategy of the New Youth group to lump together all their opponents as conservatives who were enemies of “the New Culture” was success­ful in the long run, as the polarity between “conservative vs. radical” became an established historiographical convention.18 Even today, the weight of a unified May Fourth narrative is so powerful that many still fall into the epistemological trap and affirm, like Ouyang Zhesheng, that “the opinions held by Chen Duxiu gained a consensus among the contemporary New Culture camp” (Ouyang 2016,93), although in truth they did not, or at least not before the mid-1920s. The 17 See the example of the Nationalist Party, studied by Ouyang Junxi (2009). 18 For a discussion of this polarity and the problem of grouping Chinese intellectuals under such la­ bels, see Kuo (2017). so-called official or orthodox new culture camp simply cut out of his own narra­tive the dissonant voices, as has been shown by Kuo Ya-pei (2017). “Culture” as an Anachronistic Concept: Some Remarks on the Meaning of wenhua Let us now turn to the biggest problem that challenges our understanding of this movement, that is the meaning of wenhua. Here we should perhaps take inspira­tion from Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann’s “crossed history” (his-toire croisée), that they presented as a “triple historicization practice”: a historiciza­tion “of the object studied, of the scientific categories to analyze it, and also of the re­lationship between the researcher and his research” (Werner and Zimmermann 2004,10, my emphasis).We often see “culture” as a totalistic concept with a strong foot­hold in anthropology. Tylor’s definition of “culture” as “the most complex whole”has had in this regard much influence in the general meaning associated with the term. In historical studies, “culture” is either used as a field of experience dis­tinguished from, for instance, the political (le politique) or as “the instance of the social totality” (instance de la totalité sociale) (Chartier 2009, 73). Yet, one needs to keep in mind that culture is perhaps the “largest concept of social sciences”(Wallerstein 1990, 221), and that it has come to supplement a multiplicity of con­cepts. Indeed, one cannot fail to notice that it has become an unwieldy powerful indicator of difference, be political, social, racial, linguistic, or other. Furthermore,it is a fact that “definitions of culture are inevitably programmatic” (Bal 2002, 9).Therefore, culture as a direct translation of wenhua appears dangerous. The notion of “culture” is a heuristic tool that,in our case,brings more complexity to the prob­lem than clarification. To relocate precisely the meaning of the debate over the term xin wenhua yun-dong, we need to distance the vocabulary of the historical actors from our concept of “culture”. A conceptual history of wenhua is all the more necessary because this topic has often been disregarded by previous research in conceptual histo­ry. Luckily, over the last two decades two Chinese scholars, Fang Weigui (2003) and Huang Xingtao (2006, later translated into English 2011) have attempted to study the history of the Chinese concepts of wenhua .. and wenming .. in a contrastive approach, setting up the first chronology for these terms. Huang offers a five-step narrative. First, China had her own notions completely inde­pendent from the Western ones. Then the Western concept of civilization was first introduced in the middle of the 19th century by missionaries. Fang even mentions documents written in 1833 in which they supposedly used wenming as a translation of “civilization”. Third, the period surrounding 1895 and the One Hundred Days Reforms witnessed a vast dissemination of this vocabulary in the writings of political figures and statesmen.19 These were followed by a short peri­od at the beginning of the 20th century in which emerged a reflection about the spirit (jingshen .. ) of “civilization”. The last and final step was the May Fourth Era. This chronology is acceptable, but it has the default position of keeping the wenhua concept in subordination to the notion of wenming, aggravating the clas­sic confusion between the two terms. As reckoned by both scholars, wenhua was a very rare term at the end of the 19th century. Huang identified its first occurrence in an article published in 1887 (Huang 2006, 20), but it only gained real popular­ity during the May Fourth Era, a time in which it seemingly distanced itself from wenming, a process unfortunately not analysed in Fang’s and Huang’s research. Furthermore, despite this first framework, one needs to admit that their papers arenot without epistemological issues.They strongly contrast what they call “tradition­al concepts of wenhua and wenming” with “modern concepts of wenhua and wen-ming”. However, it is hard to accept that there were clearly established wenming and wenhua compounds before the end of the 19th century.20 Of course, the literary and semantic background of the characters’ wen . , ming . and hua . , that wasembedded in Confucian thought, may have played a role in the orientation of themodern trajectory of wenhua and wenming, as they disclosed the persistence of pastexperiences. Yet, as noted by Koselleck, “the historical depth of a concept, whichis not identical with the chronological succession of its meanings, gains (…) sys­tematic import, which must be duly acknowledged by all sociohistorical research.”One has to be concerned with the “contemporaneity of the uncontemporaneous”(Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen) and not simply alternate between diachron­ic and synchronic readings (Koselleck 1979, 90). The problem is not to determinehow a classic concept uninfluenced by the West turned into a “modern concept” forcivilization or culture, but how different “Spaces of Experience” (Erfahrungsräume) and “Horizons of Expectation” (Erwartungshorizonte) interplayed in producing newmeanings that in the end set the society on the move. 19 A situation probably triggered by the fact that “civilization” was a key term in the international en­ vironment (Gong 1984), and one can also agree with Prasenjit Duara when he presented “civiliza­ tion” as “a postcolonial concept” (Duara 2001, 103). 20 A great example to illustrate this point is Luxun’s text “Wenhua pian zhi lun..... ” (Luxun 1908). Most translations available today (be they in English, French or German) tend to translate wenhua into “culture”. But in fact, the word appears only four times in the text, which is very few in comparison to the 29 wenming. Furthermore, on examining Luxun’s prose it is obvious that the term doesn’t have its modern, anthropological connotation. Its meaning oscillates between some­ thing very close to wenming, or a body of knowledge and practices that transforms men. On some occurrences, one could even doubt the fact that wenhua was one word, as it could be read as two. Before going back to this issue, it could, however, be helpful to widen our outlookon this matter by considering the history of the “culture” concept in a larger EastAsian context. Indeed, a burgeoning literature on the Japanese bunka and the Ko­rean munhwa is very helpful here. First, in the Japanese case, it has been shown that bunka was a term developed after bunmei, and it gained its popularity only duringthe 1920s (Morris-Suzuki 1995, 763). Of course, some authors who participat­ed in the “Nipponist moment” (1888–1897) (Perroncel 2016) articulated aroundthe Japanese journal (Nihonjin ... ) and the Society for Public Education (Sei­kyo¯ sha... ), had occasional uses of the term bunka. Kuga Katsunan ... (1857–1907) notably spoke of a “national culture” (kokumin bunka .... ) atthe end of the 19th century (Nishikawa 2001, 249–63). But we need to differenti­ate the multiple chronologies, as it is not because one or a few authors use a termthat it then becomes a concept. Indeed, according to Quentin Skinner, “the surestsign that a society has entered into the secure possession of a new concept is that anew vocabulary will be developed, in terms of which the concept can then be pub­licly articulated and discussed” (Skinner 1979, vol. 2, 352). As Suzuki pointed out,the term bunka was first used in Japan to translate German political notions such as Kulturstaat, it also held a role in the translation of Kultur as used by Neokantian philosophers.21 However, during the public debate of the Meiji Era, it was not onlyvery rare (it is for instance, absent in Fukuzawa Yukichi’s .... (1835–1901) writings), but it also often meant the same thing as bunmeikaika.... , and was but an abbreviation of this (Suzuki 1981, 54–55).22 That is notably attested in Nishi Amane’s .. (1829–1897) writing (Nishikawa 2001, 225). Furthermore, saying that bunka, or wenhua for that matter, served as a translation of the Ger­man Kultur, is rather doubtful, for a host of studies have now documented how thetranslation of the Western vocabulary in East-Asia didn’t simply entail moving onepiece of vocabulary to another context: translating was “a creative act of generatingmeaning and constructing discourse” (Howland 2003, 45). More recent researchhas furthermore strengthened the thesis that the concept bunka emerged out of the expression bunmeikaika (Chen 2016). This brings the attention to the importanceof distinguishing the use of a term in a specialized field of discourse and on a moregeneral level. In 1922, Liang Qichao could write that the term wenhua had been long discussed by German philosophers like Rickert and Wundt, but completelybypass their thesis in the production of his own definition (Liang 1922). 21 One could also mention here the contrasting example of the early translation of “culture” as under­ stood by Matthew Arnold in his Culture and Anarchy (1869). The early Japanese rendition of this term was bunka .. and not bunka .. (Shimizu 2016; 2017), a term later abandoned. 22 One should note that there is also a problem in our translation of bunmei kaika in a Japanese con­ text, since originally the first part, bunmei, meant “enlightenment” and the second, kaika, “civilisa­ tion” (on this issue, see Howland 1996, 33–35, 212). Until recently, it has often been considered that wenhua was a loan word from Japanese (Saneto 1982, 328; Liu 1995, 308, 312). However, it is difficult to fathom that “wenhua” was translated from the Japanese as early as its neighbour concept of wenming (bunka is, for instance, absent of Masini 1993’s corpus). It is well at­tested that bunmei or wenming were imported from Japanese as early as the end of the 19th century, and that Liang Qichao played a decisive role in its dissemi­nation (Huang 1972, 53–56; Kawajiri 2010). But at that time, the most common term used to defend what we would call today a Japanese “cultural identity” was kokusui .. and not bunka— a term that would be imported by the Chinese in­tellectuals such as Zhang Taiyan or Liu Shipei, and the people revolving around the Journal of National Essence (Guocui bao ... ) (cf. Hon 2013). It is by the way worth recalling some remarks made by Laurence Schneider on this topic. He has written that at the end of the 19th century Chinese scholars discovered “culture”(guocui .. ) as “a special body of native literature and art as a thing-in-itself, in­dependent of and even more fundamental than the political and even social insti­tutions which until then had been intimately associated with it” (Schneider 1976,57). Schneider’s translation of guocui as “culture” is perfectly understandable and legitimate in the context of the end of the Qing. However, it raises the question of why wenhua emerged later as a competing concept for this semantic field. Some scholars have suggested that there was a transition from guocui to wenhua (Liu 1995, 239–56), and the latter term gained pre-eminence over the former. But this process still needs to be documented and analysed in detail. As noted above, in Japan bunka, as culture, only gained popularity in the 1920s,when there emerged “a competition over cultural goods”. Jordan Sand has right­ly pointed out that the discourse over bunka— and the multiplication of bunka as a prefix for anything and everything, a process translated as “cultural splash”(bunka donburi ... ) by Harootunian (2000, 57)23––signified a “fragmentation of public discourse” (Sand 2000, 99). Bunka was not a term used by intellectuals alone in their quest to identify and defend a specific culture or civilization, but embraced the entire society in its most practical and concrete sense. The rise of bunka in the 1920s and 1930s is in this regard impossible to isolate from the rise of what we would call “mass culture”. According to Tsumura Hideo .... (1907–1985), quoted by Harootunian, “the term culture had been entirely ab­sorbed by material artifacts, leaving nothing for the realm of spirit” (Harootunian 2000, 57), a phenomenon denounced as Americanism. In the intellectual field, we 23 In China, one does not find this kind of semantic construction. However, the word wenming was often used in the sense of “Western” and “modern” in association with daily products. In her review of Chinese neologisms, Mateer gives the original example of the “Foreign-style shop” (wenming jianfa chu ..... ) (Mateer 1922, 39). also have to wait for the writing of Sakaguchi Takakimi (.... (1872–1928)) to put forward the idea that bunka is the most important unifying factor of a peo­ple, before race or ethnicity (Doak 1998, 191). In a purer philosophical register,“The Concept of bunka”(Bunka no Gainen..... ) by Hajime Tanabe ... (1889–1962) published in 1922 can also be regarded as one of the first publi­cations raising bunka toward the status of a local philosophical concept and not simply a translation device. As a matter of fact, wenhua became popular in China at the same time as bunka in Japan. The Korean scenario also points toward the late development of the concept of wenhua. Ku Inmo has argued that munhwa was a concept imported from Japan only in the 1920s and was part of a Japanese attempt to call “its colonial ethnic groups the people of the Japanese Empire” (Ku 2007, 169). Despite the research on a common Korean munhwa developed by the intellectuals associated with the Gaebyeok journal stirred up Korean nationalism (Robinson 1988, 57–64), Ku has claimed that munwha was a highly instrumentalized notion. In those years, it was redefined through its relation with the Japanese bunka. If the term munhwa was present in Korean writing at the end of the 19th century, it was at this point only a synonym of “civilization”. In his description of the history of munhwa in Ko­rea before the 1920s, Kim Hyunjoo dates back to the years 1906–1908 the use of this term to translate the European notion of “culture/Kultur”. Such a position is for instance obvious in Choe Nam-seon’s writing, where it is understood it as “the whole lifestyle of a nation” ( . ... .. .. .. or . ... ...... ) (Choe in Kim 2015, 26). Yet, despite the appearance of this “emergent”concept of munhwa, Kim insists that the understanding of munhwa as “civiliza­tion” remained the “dominant” approach. In his partition between a “residual con­cept” of munhwa, a “dominant” and an “emergent” concept, Kim Hyunjoo’s article is here illuminating, and offers elements for comparison in the Chinese intellec­tual field. In China, as in Korea, under the term wenhua were included various different concepts, or I would say conceptual directions. Let us focus on the problem of the residual, or what I would rather frame as the “contemporaneity of the uncontemporaneous”. In analysing the term wenhua, we often have one word in mind. Yet when we say that wenhua is one word, we close our analysis to other possibilities. Of course, wenhua is a neologism, but Chinese neologisms have a specific feature that we need focus on. As Michael Lackner framed it “their indivisibility is but apparent, because the semantic depth of the elements building every neologism act in such a manner that the reader is tempt­ed to analyze them separately and dissociate them from one another” (Lackner 1993, 149). Therefore, a conceptual history of wenhua, or any modern Chineseconcept, would require both semasiological and onomasiological studies at the level of the final concept, and at the one of the morphemes working as suppress building blocks. We have to be conscious of the transformation underwent by wen to understand the potential meanings of wenhua. In these regards, the meaning of wen has experienced important changes throughout its history, and notably by the end of the 19th century, when it shifted from “Ornament” to “Literature”(Blitstein 2016). But let us not open too many doors at once, and come back to the problem of how to read wenhua. For some leading intellectuals, notably those who had been educated in the traditional system before the collapse of the Impe­rial examination system, it was still possible to divide the wenhua compound. A striking example is offered by Zhang Junmai in 1922: The direction for the (re)new(ed) Chinese culture of tomorrow should depart from our own choices, and take its sources in the exigencies for­mulated by our people’s spirit and initiative.When the Westerners do one thing, and we imitate them, we are but puppets on a stage or hat-wearing monkeys, there is nothing that could be called a wen, there is even less that could be called a hua. ..........,.....,........... ..........,....,......,..... .,.....,...... (Zhang 1922, 225) Although Zhang was obviously aiming for a literary effect, his division of the term wenhua shows us that it was not counterintuitive for him to read the compo­nents of the word separately. As such, wenhua could be understood as the fusion of two morphemes having clearly distinct meanings. In fact, four possibilities could be offered to us. One could read it as one lexeme, one syntagm, two lexemes or one lexeme with a supplementary suffix. This later reading—that is understand­ing wenhua as the adding up of the suffix -hua “-ation” to the concept of wen— could in this regard be very engaging. In such a manner, wenhua would not mean “culture” but “wenization” or education, alphabetization. With such a reading, the importance of promoting a new language (a new wen) but also new “civilized” or “Western” social practices and patterns24 (wen in one of its original sense) by the most famous activist of the xin wenhua yundong would be clearly put under a new light. It, for example, clearly applies to Zhang Dongsun’s affirmation that the wenhua movement had as its main aim promoting education (guangyi de jiaoyu ..... ) (Zhang 1919c). In 1920, Jiang Menglin also defined the “raging tide of xin wenhua” as something similar to the European Renaissance. It was mainly focused on education (jiaoyu.. ) and scholarly knowledge (xueshu .. ) ( Jiang 1919). In those utterances it appears clear that wenhua did not mean “culture” in 24 See notably the discussion around civilizing the emotion of the Chinese people in Messner (2015). its contemporary anthropological sense, but “a patrimony of ‘works’ (oeuvres) to preserve, to diffuse, or in reference to which one positions oneself ” (de Certeau 1974, 167). Keeping in mind that the “(re)new(ed) culture” was understood as a body of knowledge, and how to express this would give more force to a strand of academic literature that stresses that the literary revolution was the core or even the origin of the May Fourth and New Culture Movements (e.g. Geng 2015,234; Xie 2017, 166). As such, one could even make the point that the problem is not located in the difficulty in understanding what Chinese activists meant when using each specific term—for this is exactly what scholarship is supposed to find out—but in the inappropriateness or fuzziness of our contemporary vocabulary to translate, denote, or explain them. One could wonder whether Philippe Bénéton was not right when he wrote in his history of the term “culture” that it would be a good idea to simply get rid of this term for the sake of clarity (Bénéton 1975, 149). Returning to the conceptual history of wenhua, we have said that like in Japan and Korea, the notion of wenhua was at first understood as “civilization”. Indeed, the American missionary William A. P. Martin, who was the director of the Tong-wenguan ... , used the word wenhua as a translation of “civilization” (Huang 2011, 5). The first time wenhua was used in a Chinese-foreign language diction­ary, in 1913 (A Modern Dictionary of the English Language Translated into Chinese1913, 114), it was again a translation of “Civilization, n., the state of being civi­lized”. If we check the first texts mentioning the word wenhua in the New Youth journal one must admit that it did not cover the entire semantic realm of “cul­ture”, only the ergologic division between nature and culture (see notably Tao 1917). In those texts it meant “civilization” as a universal process that leads man out of his state of nature. With each passing year, it started, however, to take a more spiritual connotation. In 1920, Chen Qixiu wrote that the word wenhua “designates the progress and the amelioration of the spiritual life of individuals and society” (Chen 1920, 1), a meaning still very close to what Fukuzawa Yukichi had coined for bunmei in Japan (Fukuzawa (1875) 1967, vol. 4, 3). A progressive distancing of wenhua from wenming seems to have started with the 1917–1918 debate between Chen Duxiu and the editors of the Eastern Miscellany.25 During the exchanges, wenhua emerged as a competing notion used to criticize “modern”and not simply “Western civilization”. And the intellectuals who started to use the term wenhua endowed to the Chinese the mission to save the entire universal and modern civilization (see Li 1919, and Liang 1920a). They proclaimed a Chinese Sonderweg (Meissner 1994) that bears many resemblances with the utopian aspi­ration of German Kulturkritik. It is only in 1921 that we can really find in a text by Chen Jiayi the operative use of the term of wenhua closer to our contemporary 25 For a general presentation, cf. Jenco 2013; Wang 2013 and Ciaudo 2016, 214–36. totalistic understanding of it. Chen defined it as “the ensemble of spiritual phe­nomena of our nation” (Chen 1921, 299–300, note 1). He furthermore distin­guished the term from the logic of “going back to Antiquity” (fugu .. ) and from the rules and social systems implemented by the first Chinese emperors (di­anzhang zhidu .... ). One can say that from that time on emerged two tendencies, that supplementedthe more classical understanding of a body of texts and knowledge: 1) the an­thropologically inclined attempt to see in wenhua the totality or the form (Ge­stalt) of the spirit shared by a nation/people; and 2) the relocalization of wen-hua as a field of experience distinguished from other fields such as the political,the economic, le culturel or der Kulturbereich. Indeed, wenhua was not a totalistic concept for people like Chen Duxiu or Luo Jialun (Luo 1920) who clearly sep­arated a wenhua movement and a social movement. From the 1920s on, Chen only used wenhua in this reduced sense, limiting it to the domain of arts andknowledge, understood as distinct from politics and economics (Huang 2006,27–28). But here again we cannot simply put the radicals on one side, and themore conservative ones on the other.26 Zhang Junmai, for instance, sometimes used wenhua as a field like Chen (Zhang 1921, 311–12), and sometimes as atotalistic notion. It seems that no intellectual succeeded in clearly imposing aprecise definition for this term. The border between wenming and wenhua re­mained very porous during the Republican Era. As with any concept, wenhua was no univocal term. The marketization of wenhua and xin wenhua by the edi­torial world also complexified these potential ambiguities, because, as noted byForster, they used it to market everything and anything. This leads me to a last remark. The vocabulary and the meaning associated with the different compounds used by the intellectuals was still far from being estab­lished in the mid-1920s. The famous text of Hu Shi, “Our Opinion toward the Modern Western Civilization”, in which he articulated perhaps in the most sys­tematic manner his plea for the Westernization of Chinese society, is notable here.This text was first published in Japanese (Hu 1926a), before being made available for a Chinese readership (ibid. 1926b). However, by comparing the content, one can note a clear discrepancy between the two versions. In Japanese, Hu Shi uses bunmei and bunka in a very fluid manner without really questioning their mean­ings. In contrast, the Chinese text opens up what Hu Shi wanted to be authori­tative definitions of the terms wenming and wenhua. Considering that the Chi­nese discussion was going nowhere because of a lack of precision in the terms, 26 See the problem of the notion of culture and its links with conservatism, as studied by Axel Schnei­der (2010). he took on himself, probably with a particular agenda, to define once and for all what wenhua and wenming were in Chinese—something less needed in Japanese.Such a situation should alert us to the problem of the multiplicity of readings that permitted all May Fourth intellectuals’ participation in the xin wenhua yun-dong, while not agreeing on its definition. In short, since Chinese intellectuals did not agree on what “wenhua”27 was, was it even possible for them to agree on a xin wenhua? Conclusion As has become obvious after the historiographical considerations set out above,the potential re-evaluations of what was/were the (Re)New Culture(?) Move-ment(s) are far from being over. Elizabeth Forster rightly pointed it out that “the New Culture Movement meant, or was made to mean, different things for differ­ent people” (Forster 2017, 1257). This situation can be explained because it was a Schlagwort employed in editorial and political battles, but also because there was much ambiguity concerning the meaning of the compound wenhua. Intellectuals rarely specified what this “wenhua” was; they kept talking about, and many possi­bilities were at hand. Furthermore, it is not because a writer wrote this term with a specific and clear-cut idea in his mind that his readers understood it in this sense.Let us remember that Chinese intellectuals with different European educational backgrounds did not understand the terms “culture” and “civilization” in the same manner if they had received their educations in Germany, France, Great Britain,the United States or Japan. Furthermore, these Chinese debates took place just at the end of the First World War, after a period in which the German Kulturkri­tik discourse went to war, by claiming the superiority of the German Kultur over Western Civilization, while the French claimed that they were fighting “to defend Civilization” (Beßlich 2000; Beßlich and Agard 2018). Thus, one really needs to question whether “culture” is always an appropriate term to understand the intellectual debates over xin wenhua. We tend to forget that it is too ambivalent and covers too large a semantic field that changes from one Eu­ropean language to another to be a very apt heuristic notion. I would argue that by translating xin wenhua as “new culture” we have sometimes blurred the picture instead of making it clearer. I do not believe that there is an ideal translation for 27 One should also clearly point to the fact that Chinese intellectuals were completely aware that they were fighting a war over vocabulary, and that the precise definitions of wenhua and wenming, and their semantic historical and transnational contexts, were of key importance, see notably the reply of Zhang Shenfu ... (1893–1986), alias Zhang Songnian, to the above-mentioned article by Hu Shi (Zhang 1926) that term, and as I already pointed out above, the polysemic term “culture” could be very appropriate to render wenhua as it is also polysemic. Yet, a key issue is that scholarship has long tended to regard wenhua as a translation of a Western concept of “culture” without considering the difficulties that faced Chinese intel­lectuals in their appropriation of the Western vocabulary,28 nor the very complex transnational history of the concepts at hand. Hence, writing a full-scale history of the cluster of concepts that articulated what we would nowadays locate under the semantic field of “culture” appears to be a necessity if we want to grasp what was going on in these debates on the terms of those involved. More thorough at­tention should be given to the many Sclagworte that were deployed during this period, and how they affected ongoing debates, but we could also investigate the broader socio-linguistic aspect of words, concepts and constructions during this time29. A much more systematic exploration of the web of connections between people who read and wrote about these terms is also required, as this paper could not explore extensively all the productions of the time. Of course, these are pro­jects that would go far beyond this paper, and that would require the collaboration of many colleagues. For the time being, the author of the present paper finds sol­ace in the thought that his potential readers may wish to delve into these tremen­dous tasks. My goal with his article, still plagued with many loose ends, was not to give a definitive answer to the problem, but rather to raise awareness and fire new questions, in short, to open a discussion. With the one-hundredth anniversary of May 4th already behind us, it is probably the time to approach its historical real­ity seriously by giving full attention to the terms used by its participants, except if we want to continue employing the expression “New Culture Movement” as a Schlagwort with a contemporary political purpose. References A Modern Dictionary of the English Language Translated into Chinese. 1913. Shang­ hai: Commercial Press. Bal, Mieke. 2002. Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Be Duc, Georges. 2010. “Zhou Zuoren et la traduction.” In Les belles infidèles dans l’Empire du Milieu: Problématiques et pratiques de la traduction dans le monde chinois moderne, edited by Isabelle Rabut, 17–32. Paris: You Feng. 28 A topic that has notably been studied in the context of the translation of scientific terms (see no­ tably Wright 1998; Lackner, Amelung, and Kurtz 2001; Elman 2009). 29 Ivo Spira’s (2015) work on “-ism” (zhuyi .. ) has already shown the relevance of this type of inqui­ ry to our understanding of the intellectual debates as well as their political and social ramifications. Bénéton, Philippe. 1975. Histoire de mots: culture et civilisation. Paris: Les Presses de Sciences Po. Benveniste, Emile. 1974. Problèmes de linguistique générale. Paris: Gallimard. Beßlich, Barbara. 2000. Wege in den “Kulturkrieg”: Zivilisationkritik in Deutschland 1890–1914. Darrmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Beßlich, Barbara, and Olivier Agard, eds. 2018. Krieg für die Kultur? Une guerre pour la civilisation? Intellektuelle Legitimationsversuche des Ersten Weltkriegs in Deutschland und Frankreich (1914–1918). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Blitstein, Pablo Ariel. 2016. “From ‘Ornament’ to ‘Literature’: An Uncertain Sub­stitution in Nineteenth-Twentieth Century China.” Modern Chinese Litera­ture and Culture 28 (1): 222–72. Chartier, Roger. 2009. Au bord de la falaise: L’histoire entre certitudes et inquiétude. Paris: Albin Michel. Chen, Duxiu ... . 1916. “Tongshu .. (Letters).” Xin qingnian ... 2 (3). –––. 1920. “Xin wenhua yundong shi shenme? ........ (What is the New Culture(s) Movement(s)?).” Xin Qingnian... 7 (5). Chen, Huifen ... . 2016. “‘Wenming’ kaihua yu ‘wenhua’ baohu: Jindai riben yu gu yangren de dongfang xiandaihua jianyan .............--................ (Deployment of “Civili­zation” and “Culture” Protection—The Construction of a Discourse on Ori­ental Modernisation by Western Advisors in Modern Japan).” In Jindai Dong Xi sixang jiaoliu zhong de xixue dongjian.............. (Modern Circulation of Knowledge between East and West, and the Transmission of the Tramission of Western Scholarship to the East), edited by Lin Weijie, 213– 44. Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyan Zhe yanjiusuo.Chen, Jia’ai ... . 1919. “Xin . (New).” Xinchao 1 (1): 35–44. Chen, Jiayi ... . 1919.“Wo zhi xinjiu sixiang tiaohe guan ........ . (My Opinion on the Harmonisation of Old and New Thoughts).” Dong-fang zazhi .... 16 (11). –––. (1921) 1985. “Dongfang wenhua yu wuren zhi daren .......... (Oriental Culture and Our Responsabilities).” Dongdang zazhi 18 (1). Re­produced in Wusi qianhou Dong Xi wenhua wenti lunzhan wenxuan .............. (Selected Texts Regarding the Debates over Eastern and Western Cultures around the May Fourth Era), edited by Chen Song .. , 266–315, Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe. Chen, Qixiu ... . 1920. “Wenhua yundong di xin shengming ........ (The New Life of the Culture Movement).” Wenyi .. 2 (2). Chen, Pingyuan. 2011. Touches of History: An Entry into ‘May Fourth’ China. Lei­den: Brill. Chen, Song .. , ed. 1985. Wusi qianhou Dong Xi wenhua wenti lunzhan wenxuan .............. (Selected Texts Regarding the Debates over Eastern and Western Cultures around the May Fourth Era). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe. Chow, Kai-Wing, ed. 2008. Beyond the May Fourth Paradigm: In Search of Chinese Modernity. Lanham, Md. Toronto: Lexington Books. Chow,Tse-tsung. 1960. The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Mod­ern China, 1915–1924. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ciaudo, Joseph. 2015. “Replacer Chen Duxiu dans son vocabulaire: La Nou­velle Jeunesse et le problème de la culture chinoise.” Oriens Extremus 54: 23–57. –––. 2016. “Sinodicée en question: Essai d’histoire intellectuelle à partir des dis-cours culturalistes de Zhang Junmai (1919–1931).” PhD diss., INALCO,Paris. Cuche, Denys. 2016. La notion de culture dans les sciences sociales. Paris: La Découverte. Culp, Robert. 2008. “Teaching Baihua: Textbook Publishing and the Production of Vernacular Language and a New Literary Canon in Early Twentieth-Cen­tury China.” Twentieth-Century China 34 (1): 4–41. –––. 2019. The Power of Print in Modern China: Intellectuals and Industrial Pub­lishing from the End of Empire to Maoist State Socialism. New York: Columbia University Press. de Certeau, Michel. 1974 (1993). La culture au pluriel. Paris: Seuil. Doak, Kevin M. 1998.“Culture, Ethnicity, and the State in Early Twentieth-Cen­tury Japan.” In Japan’s Competing Modernities, edited by Sharon A. Minichiel-lo, 181–205. Honolulu: University Press of Hawai’i. Doleželová-Velingerová, Milena, and Král Oldrich, eds. 2001. The Appropriation of Cultural Capital: China’s May Fourth Project. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. Du, Yaquan ... (Cangfu .. ). 1919.“He wei xin sixiang ..... (What is New Thought ?).” Dongfang zazhi .... 16 (11). Duara, Prasenjit. 2001. “The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism.” Jour­nal of World History 12 (1): 99–130. Elliot, Michael A. 2002. The Culture Concept: Writing and Difference in the Age of Realism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Elman, Benjamin. 2009. On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550–1900. Cam­bridge: Harvard Univeristy Press. Fang, Weigui. 2003. “Genese und Wandel des modernen chinesischen Kultur- und Zivilisationsbegriffs.” Intercultural studies 1. Accessed April 16, 2015.http://www.intercultural-studies.org/ ICS1/fang.htm. Fisch, Jörg. 1992.“Zivilisation, Kultur.” In Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 7, edit­ed by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhard Koselleck, 679–774. Stutt­gart: Klett-Cotta. Forster, Elisabeth. 2014. “From Academic Nitpicking to a ‘New Culture Move­ment’: How Newspapers Turned Academic Debates into the Center of ‘May Fourth’.” Frontiers of Chinese History 9 (4): 534–57. –––. 2017.“The Buzzword ‘New Culture Movement’: Intellectual Marketing Strat­egies in China in the 1910s and 1920s.” Modern Asian Studies 51 (5): 1253–82. –––. 2018. 1919—The Year that Changed China: A New History of the New Culture Movement. Oldenburg: De Gruyter. Fröhlich,Thomas. 1998.“Theorie-Rhetorik im ‘Vierten Mai’: Hu Shi und die Be-wegung für Neue Kultur.” In Autumn Floods: Essays in Honour of Marián Gá­lik, edited by Raoul D. Findeisen, and Robert H. Gassmann, 269–82. Berne:Peter Lang. Fukuzawa, Yukichi .... . (1875) 1967. “Bunmei ron no gairyaku...... (An Outline of a Theory of Civilization) (1875).” In Fukuzawa Yu­kichi zenshu...... (The Complete Works of Fukuzawa Yukichi), vol. 4. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Fung, Yu-Lan. 1922. “Review of Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philos­ophies by Liang Shuming.” The Journal of Philosophy 19 (22): 611–14. Geng, Yunzhi. 2015. An Introductory Study on China’s Cultural Transformation in Recent Times. Heidelberg: Springer. Gong, Gerrit W. 1984. The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society. Ox­ford: Oxford University Press. Hajime,Tanabe ... . (1922) 1964.“Bunka no Gainen ..... (The Con­cept of Culture).” In Hajime Tanabe zenshu ..... (Complet Works of Hajime Tanabe) (1964) vol. 1, 425–47. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo. Harootunian, Harry. 2000. Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Commu­nity in Interwar Japan. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hon, Tze-ki. 2008. “From Babbitt to ‘Bai Bide’: Interpretations of New Human­ism in Xueheng.” In Beyond the May Fourth paradigm: In Search of Chinese Mo­dernity, edited by Chow Kai-wing, 253–67. Toronto: Lexington Books. ––––. 2013. Revolution as Restoration: Guocui xuebao and China’s Path to Modernity,1905–1911. Leiden: Brill. Howland, Douglas R. 1996. Borders of Chinese Civilization: Geography and History at Empire’s End. Durham: Duke University Press. Howland, Douglas R. 2003.“The Predicament of Idas in Culture:Translation and Historiography.” History and Theory 42: 45–60. Hu, Shi .. . 1919. “Xin sichao de yiyi ...... (The Meaning of New Thought).” Xin Qingnian ... 7 (1): 12. –––. 1926a. “Kindai seiyo bunmei ni Suru gojin no taido”............... (My Attitude toward Modern Western Civilisation).” Kaizo¯.. May 1926. –––. 1926b. “Women duiyu Xiyang jindai wenming de taidu”............. (My Attitude toward Modern Western Civilisation).” Xiandai pinglun 4 (83), July 10: 3–11. Hu, Shih. (1933) 1963. The Chinese Renaissance: The Haskell Lectures. New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp. Huang, Philip. 1972. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Modern Chinese Liberalism. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Huang, Kewu ... . 2018. “Wanqing shexue xue de fanyi”........ (The Translation of Sociology in Late Qing). In Yazhou gainianshi yanjiu....... (Research in the Conceptual History of East Asia), vol. 1, edited by Sun Jiang .. , 13–52. Beijing: Sanlian shuju. Huang, Xingtao ... . 2006. “Wan Qing Min chu xiandai “wenming” he “wen­hua” gainian de xingcheng jiqi lishi shixian ...................... (The Formation of Modern Concepts of “Civilization”and “Culture” and their Application during the Late Qing and Early Repub­lican Times).” Jindai shi yanjiu 6. –––. 2011. “The Formation of Modern Concepts of “Civilization” and “Culture”and their Application during the Late Qing and Early Republican Times.”Journal of Modern Chinese History 5 (1): 1–26. Huang, Yushun ... . 2002. Chaoyue zhishi yu jiazhi de jinzhang –– “kexue yu xuanxue lunzhan” de zhexue wenti.......... ––“.......” ..... (Overcoming the Tension between Knowledge and Values—The Philosophical Question within the Debate over Science and Meta­physics). Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chuban she. Ip, Hung-yok, Hon Tze-ki, and Lee Chiu-chun. 2003. “The Plurality of Chinese Modernity: A Review of Recent Scholarship on the May Fourth Movement.”Modern China 29 (4): 490–509. Isay, Gad C. 2013. The Philosophy of the View of Life in Modern Chinese Thought.Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. Jenco, Leigh. 2013. “Culture as History: Envisioning Change Across and Beyond ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ Civilizations in the May Fourth Era.” Twentieth-Cen­tury China 38 (1): 34–52. Jenks, Chris. 2005. Culture. New York: Routledge. Jiang, Menglin ... . 1919. “Xin wenhua de nuchao...... (The Fury of New Culture).” Xin Jiaoyu 2 (1): 19–22. –––. 1920. “He wei xin sixiang ..... (What is New Thought?).” Dongfang zazhi .... 17 (20). Jin, Guantao ... , and Liu Qingfeng ... . 2008. Guannian shi yanjiu:Zhongguo xiandai zhongyao zhengzhi shuyu de xingcheng ..... : ............. (Studies in History of Concepts: The Forma­tion of the Modern Chinese Important Political Terms). Hongkong: Chinese University. Kaske, Elisabeth. 2004. “Mandarin, Vernacular and National Language—Chi­na’s Emerging Concept of a National Language in The Early TwentiethCentury.” In Mapping Meanings: The Field of New Learning in Late Qing China, edited by Michael Lackner, and Natascha Vittinghoff, 265–304.Leiden: Brill. Kawajiri, Fumihiko .... . 2010. “Kindai Chugoku ni okeru ‘bunmei’............ (‘Civilisation’ in Modern China).” In Higashi Ajia kindai ni okeru gainen to chi no saihensei.................. (Reorganising Concepts and Knowledge in East Asian Modernity),edited by Suzuki Sadami .... , and Ryu Kenki ... , 131–60. Kyoto: Kokusai Nihon Bunka Kenkyu, Senta¯. Kim, Hyunjoo . .. . 2015. “Gyemong-gi munhwa gaenyeom-ui undong­seong-gwa sahoeilon ... .. ... .... .... (The Chang­ing Concept of ‘Munhwa (.. )’ and Social Theory during the Korean En­lightenment).” Concept and Communication 15: 5–44. Koselleck, Reinhart. (1979) 1995. Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Kroeber, Alfred, and Clyde Kluckhohn. 1952. Culture: A Critical Review of Con­cepts and Definitions. Cambridge (Mass.): The Museum. Ku,In Mo. 2007.“‘Culture’ as an Imported Concept and ‘Korea’ as a Nation-State.” Korea Journal 47 (1): 152–76. Kuo, Ya-pei. 2017. “The Making of the New Culture Movement: A Discursive History.” Twentieth-Century China 42 (1): 52–71. Lackner, Michael. 1993. “Les avatars de quelques termes philosophiques occiden­taux dans la langue chinoise.” Études chinoises XII (2), automne: 136–60. Lackner, Michael, Iwo Amelung, and Joachim Kurtz. 2001. New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China. Leiden: Brill. Lanza, Fabio. 2010. Behind the Gate: Inventing Students in Beijing. New York: Co­lumbia University Press. Lee, Ou-fan. 1991. “Modernity and Its Discontents: The Cultural Agenda of the May Fourth Movement.” In Perspectives on Modern China, edited by Kenneth Lieberthal, 158–77. Armonk: An East Gate Book. Levenson, Joseph R. 1958 (1968). Confucian China and Its Modern Fate, vol. 3. Berkeley: University of California Press. Li, Dazhao ... . 1919 (1985). “Dong Xi wenhua genben zhi yi dian ......... (Fundamental Differences between Eastern and Western Cul­tures).” Yanzhi .. 3. Reproduced in Wusi qianhou Dong Xi wenhua wenti lunzhan wenxuan .............. (Selected Texts Regard­ing the Debates over Eastern and Western Cultures around the May Fourth Era), edited by Chen Song, 56–69. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe. Liang, Qichao ... . 1920a (1999). “Ouyou xinying lu..... (Europe­an Travelogue).” In Liang Qichao Quanji ..... (The Complete Works of Liang Qichao), 2968–3009. Beijing: Beijing chubanshe. –––. 1920b (1999). “Zhi Liang Boqiang .... (To Liang Boqiang), letter of May 12. In Liang Qichao Quanji ..... (The Complete Works of Liang Qichao), 6027. Beijing: Beijing chubanshe. –––. 1922 (1999). “Shenme shi wenhua ..... (What is Culture ?).” In Liang Qichao Quanji ..... (The Complete Works of Liang Qichao),4060–63. Beijing: Beijing chubanshe. Lin, Yusheng. 1979. Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in May Fourth Era. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Luo, Jialun ... (Yi. ). 1919. “Wusi yundong de jingshen”....... (The Spirit of the May Fourth Movement).”Meizhou pinglun .... , May 16. –––. 1920. “Yi nian lai women xuesheng yundong di chenggong shibai he jianglai ying qu de fangzhen ...................... (The Sucesses and Failures of our Student-Movement over the Past Year and the Approach to be Taken in the Future).” Xinchao .. 2 (4). Liu, Lydia H. 1995. Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Trans­lated Modernity—China 1900–1937. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Luxun .. . 1908.“Wenhua pian zhi lun..... (Discussion Regarding the Bias of Civilisation).” In Luxun Quanji .... (The Complete Works of Lux­un), vol. 1, 45–64. Beijing, Renmin wenxue chubanshe. Ma, Jun. 2013.“Liang Qichao et la trajectoire politique moderne de la Chine: Les aléasde l’institutionnalisation républicaine (1912–1917).” PhD diss., EHESS, Paris. Manela, Erez. 2007. The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the Interna­tional Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mao, Zedong ... . 1939 (1952). “Wusi yundong .... (May Fourth Movement).” In Mao Zedong xuanji ..... (Selected Works of Mao Ze­dong) (1952), vol. 2. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe. Masini, Federico. 1993. The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon and its Evolution towards a National Language: The Period from 1840 to 1898. Berkeley: Journal of Chinese Linguistics (Monograph Series 6). Mateer, Ada Haven. 1922. New Terms for New Ideas: A Study of the Chinese News­paper. Shanghai: The Presbyterian Mission Press. Mauviel, Maurice. 2011. L’histoire du concept de culture. Paris: l’Harmattan. Mei, Guangdi ... . 1921. “Ping tichang Xin wenhua zhe ....... (The Promoters of the New Culture). Xueheng.. 1. Meissner, Werner. 1994. China zwischen nationalem „Sonderweg“, und universalerModernisierung – Zur Rezeption westlichen Denkens in China. München: Wil­helm Fink Verlag. Messner, Angelika C. 2015. “Transforming Chinese Hearts, Minds, and Bodies in the Name of Progress, Civility and Civilization.” In Civilizing Emotions: Con­cepts in Nineteenth-Century Asia and Europe, edited by Margrit Pernau, and Helge Jordheim, 231–49. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mitter, Rana. 2004. A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern world. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Morier-Genoud, Damien. 2014. “Ecrire l’histoire vis-à-vis de la guerre: postures historiennes, conceptions et récits de l’histoire sous la République de Chine (1912–1949).” Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident 38: 169–206. Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. 1995. “The Invention and Reinvention of ‘Japanese Cul­ture’.” The Journal of Asian Studies 54 (3): 759–80. Niehr, Thomas. 2007. “Schlagwort.” In Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, edited by Gert Ueding, vol. 8, 496–503. Tübingen: M. Niemeyer. Nishikawa, Nagao .... . 2001. Kokkyo¯ no koekata : kokumin kokkaron josetsu ...... : ....... (Transcending National Borders: An Intro­duction to the Theory of the Nation-State). Tokyo: Heibonsha. Ong, Chang Woei. 2004. “‘Which West are you Talking about?’ Critical Review: AUnique Model of Conservatism in Modern China.” Humanitas 17 (1): 69–82. Ouyang, Junxi .... . 2009.“Guomin dang yu xin wenhua yundong ......... (The Nationalist Party and the New Culture Movement).” Jour­nal of Nanjing University 1: 72–84. Ouyang, Zhesheng. 2016. “Expanding the Discursive Domain of Research on the New Culture Movement: An Incomplete Review of Studies on the New Cul­ture Movement.” Chinese Studies in History 49 (2): 90–101. Owen, Stephen. 2001. “The End of the Past: Rewriting Chinese Literary History in the Early Republic.” In The Appropriation of Cultural Capital: China’s May Fourth Project, edited by Milena Doleželová-Velingerová, and Král Oldrich,167–92. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. Peng, Peng .. . 2003. Yanjiu xi yu Wusi siqi xinwenhua yundong ............ (The Research Clique and the New Culture Movement during May Fourth Era). Guangzhou: Zhongshan daxue chubanshe. Perroncel, Morvan. 2016. Le Moment nipponiste (1888–1897): Nation et démocratie à l’ère Meiji. Paris: Belles Lettres. Reed, Christopher A. 2004. Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876–1937. Vancouver: UBC Press. Richter, Ursula. 1987. “La tradition de l’antitraditionalisme dans l’historiographie chinoise.” Extrême-Orient, Extrême Occident 9: 55–89. Robinson, Michael Edson. 1988. Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920– 1925. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Rohkrämer,Thomas. 2017.“‘The West’ in German Cultural Criticism during the Long Nineteenth Century.” In Germany and the ‘West’: The History of a Modern Concept, edited by Riccardo Bavaj, and Martina Streber, 201–15. New York: Berghan Books. Sartori, Andrew. 2008. Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sand, Jordan. 2000. “The Cultured Life as Contested Space: Dwelling and Dis­course in the 1920s.” In Being Modern in Japan: Culture and Society from the 1910s to the 1930s, edited by John Clarke, and Elise K. Tipton, 99–118. Syd­ney: Australian Humanities Research Foundation. Sang, Bing .. . 2015. “‘Xin wenhua yundong’ de Yuanqi’.....”... (The Origins of the ‘New Culture Movement’.” Aomen ligong xuebao renwen shehui kexue ban ...... . ....... 4: 5–19. Saneto, Keishu .... . 1982. Zhongguoren liuxue Riben shi........ (Histories of the Chinese Studying in Japan). Translated by Tan Ruqian ... , and Lin Qichan ... . Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press. Schneider, Laurence A. 1976.“National Essence and the New Intelligentsia.” In The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China, edit­ed by Charlotte Furth, 57–89. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press. Schneider, Axel. 2010. “The One and the Many: A Classicist Reading … and Its Role in the Modern World—An Attempt on Modern Chinese Conserva­tism.” Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2: 7218–43. Schneider, Julia C. 2020. “When the World Shrinks: Chinese Concepts of Cul­ture, Identity and History.” Global Intellectual History, March 12, 2020. doi/ab s/10.1080/23801883.2020.1738655. Shimizu, Hitoshi ... . 2016. “Kindai Nihon ni okeru ‘bunka’ gainen no seir­itsu ................. (The Formation of the Con­cept of ‘Culture’ in Modern Japan).” Seigakuin daigaku ronso¯ 29 (1): 171–87. –––. 2017. “Kindai Nihon ni okeru ‘bunka’ gainen no seiritsu ................. (The Formation of the Concept of ‘Culture’ in Mod­ern Japan).” Seigakuin daigaku ronso¯ 29 (2): 57–69. Skinner, Quentin. 1979. The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 2. Cam­bridge, Cambridge University Press, 2 vol. Spira, Ivo. 2015. A Conceptual History of Chinese –Isms: The Modernization of Ideo­logical Discourse, 1895–1925. Leiden: Brill. Sun, Lung-kee. 1986. “Chinese Intellectuals’ Notion of ‘Epoch’ (Shidai) in the Post-May Fourth Era.” Chinese Studies in History 20 (2): 44–74. Suzuki, Shuji .... . 1981. Bunmei no kotoba ...... (The Language of Civilisation). Hiroshima: Bunka Hyoron Shuppan. Tao, Ligong ... . 1917. “Renlei wenhua zhi qiyuan ....... (The Origins of Humanity).” Xin Qingnian 2 (5–6). Tsin, Michael. 1997. “Imagining ‘Society’ in Early Twentieth-Century China.” InImagining the People: Chinese Intellectuals and the Concept of Citizenship, 1890–1920, edited by Joshua A. Fogel, and Peter G. Zarrow, 212–31. Armonk and London: M. E. Scharpe. Tylor, Edward B. 1871. Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of My­thology, Philosophy, Religion, Art and Custom, vol. 2. London: John Murray. Van den Stock, Ady. 2016. The Horizon of Modernity: Subjectivity and Social Struc­ture in New Confucian Philosophy. Leiden: Brill. van Ess, Hans. 2012. “Der Konfuzianismus und die globale Weltkultur: Überle­gungen bei der Lektüre der Konfuzianismuskritik im frühen 20. Jahrhun­dert.” In The Globalization of Confucius and Confucianism, edited by Kaus Mühlhan, 63–71. Münster: LIT. Vogelsang, Kai. 2012. “Chinese ‘Society’: History of a Troublesome Concept.”Oriens Extremus 51: 155–92. Wagner, Rudolf G. 2001. “The Canonization of May Fourth.” In The Appro­priation of Cultural Capital: China’s May Fourth Project, edited by Milena Doleželová-Velingerová and Král Oldrich, 66–120. Cambridge (MA): Har­vard University Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1990 (2010). “Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-System.” In Cultural Theory, edited by David Oswell, 221–41. Londres: Sage. Wang, David Der-wei. 1997. Fin de siècle Splendor: Repressed Modernities of Late Qing Fiction, 1849–1911. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Wang, Edward Q. 2019. “The Chinese Historiography of the May Fourth Move­ment, 1990s to the Present.” Twentieth-Century China 44 (2): 138–49. Wang, Hui, 2013. “The Transformation of Culture and Politics: War, Revolution,and the ‘Thought Warfare’ of the 1910s.”Twentieth-Century China 38 (1): 5–33. Wang, Qisheng ... . 2007. “Xin Wenhua shi ruhe ‘yundong’ qilai de ......“..”... (How has New Culture Risen as a ‘Movement’).” Jindai shi yanjiu 1: 21–40. Wang, Shuqian ... . 1915. “Xin jiu wenti .... (The Question of New and Old).” Qingnian zazhi .... 1 (1). Werner, Michael, and Bénédicte Zimmermann. 2004. “Penser l’histoire croisée:entre empirie et réflexivité.” Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales 58: 7–36. Weston, Timothy B. 1998. “The Formation and Positioning of the New Culture Community, 1913–1917.” Modern China 24 (3): 255–84. –––. 2004. The Power of Position: Beijing University, Intellectuals and Chinese Polit­ical Culture. Berkeley: University California Press. Williams, Raymond. 1976. Keywords: Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Glasgow: Fontana. Wright, David. 1998. “The Translation of Modern Western Science in Nine-teenth-Century China, 1840–1895.” Isis 89 (4): 653–73. Wu, Mi .. . 1922. “Lun xin wenhua yundong ...... (Remarks on the New Culture Movement(s)).” Xueheng 4. Wu, Xuezhao. 2004. “The Birth of a Chinese Cultural Movement: Letters be­tween Babbitt and Wu Mi.” Humanitas 17 (1): 6–25. Xie, Dikun. 2017. “The Eternal ‘May Fourth Movement’: Between Enlighten­ment and Tradition.” Social Sciences in China 38 (2): 165–74. Yang, Nianqun ... . 2009. “Wusi” jiushi zhounian ji – yi ge “wentishi” de huisu yu fansi “.. ” ..... : ..“...”...... (The 90th Anni­versary of May Fourth: Retrospection and Reflection on the History of a Question). Beijing: Shijie tushu chuban gongsi. Zarrow, Peter, ed. 2006. Creating Chinese Modernity: Knowledge and Everyday Life, 1900–1940. New York: Peter Lang. Zhang, Dongsun ... . 1919a. “Tubian yu qianbian ..... (Sudden and Latent Changes).” Shishi xinbao .... October 1. –––. 1919b “Da Zhang Xingyan jun ..... (Response to Zhang Xingyan).” Shishi xinbao.... October 12. –––. 1919c. “Di san zhong wenming ..... (The Third Type of Civilisa­tion).” Jiefang yu gaizao ..... 1 (1). Zhang, Junmai ... . 1921 (1981). “Xuanni zhi shehui gaizao tongzhi hui yiji-an shu ............. (Letters Submitted to the Comrades of the Association for Social Transformation).” Gaizao 4 (3). In Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji ....... (Collected Works Regarding Chinese, West­ern and Indian Philosophies), 306–21. Taibei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju. –––. 1922 (1981).“Ouzhou wenhua weiji ji Zhongguo xin wenhua zhi quxiang ............... (Crisis of Culture in Europe and the Di­rections of our New Culture in China).” Dongfang zazhi 19 (3). In Zhong Xi Yin zhexue wenji ....... (Collected Works Regarding Chinese, West­ern and Indian Philosophies), 218–27. Taibei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju. –––. 1923 (1981). “Rensheng guan ... (The Outlook on Life).” Qinghua zhoukan 272, et Chenbao fukan .... . Reproduced in Zhong Xi Yin zhex­ue wenji ....... (Collected Works regarding Chinese, Western and In­dian Philosophies), 907–15. Taibei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju. Zhang, Junmai ... (Zhang Jiasen ... ). 1925. “Lun jiaohua biaozhun: Guoli zhengzhi daxue xin xueshe chengli ji .....:............ (Remarks on the Standards of Civilisation: Discourse for the Establishment of a New School within the National Political University).”Chenbao qizhou jinian zengkan ........ , December: 113–16. Zhang, Pengyuan ... . 1992 (2011). Liang Qichao yu Minguo zhengzhi ........ (Liang Qichao and Politics under the Republic). Taibei: Zhongyan yuanjiu yuan jindai shi yanjiu suo. Zhang, Qing .. . 2002. “Yijiuerling niandai: sixiangjie de fenlie yu Zhong­guo shehui de chongzu 1920.. : .............. (The 1920s: The Split in Thought and the Reorganization of Chinese Society).”In Yijiuerling niandai de Zhongguo......... (China in 1920s),edited by Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan, Minguo shi shi, and Sichuan shifan daxue lishi wenhua xueyuan, 383–402. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan. Zhang, Shizhao ... (Zhang Xingyan... ). 1919. “Xin shidai zhi qingnian...... (The Youth of a New Era).” Dongfang zazhi .... 16 (11). Zhang, Songnian ... . 1926. “Wenming huo wenhua ..... (Civilisa­tion or Culture).” Dongfang zazhi .... 23, 24: 25. Zhang, Yunhou ... . 1979. Wusi shiqi de shetuan ....... (The Socie­ties of May Fourth Era), vol 4. Beijing: Sanlian shudian. Zheng, Dahua ... , and Jia Xiaoye ... . 2005. “Ershi shiji jiuling nian­dai yilai Zhongguo jindaishi shang de jijin yu baoshou yanjiu pingshu .......................... (A Review of Studies regarding Radicalism and Conservatism in Modern Chinese History since the 1990s).” Jindaishi yanjiu 4: 289–314. Zheng, Yuan. 2001. “The Status of Confucianism in Modern Chinese Education,1901–1949: A Curricular Study.” In Education, Culture, and Identity in Twen­tieth-Century China, edited by Glen Peterson, Ruth Hayhoe, and Lu Yon-gling, 193–216. Ann Arbor: The University Press of Michigan Press. Zhou, Yuefeng ... . 2019. “Ling yi chang xin wenhua yundong: Liang Qichao zhuren de wenhua nuli yu Wusi sixiang jie ....... : ................ (Another Cultural Movement: The Works of Liang Qichao and His Colleagues Regarding Culture and the Intellectual Field).”Zhongyang yanjiu jindai shi yanjiu suo jikan 105: 49–89. Zhu, Tiaosun ... . 1920. “Yanjiu xin jiu sixiang tiaohe zhi biyao jiqi fangfa ............... (The Necessity of Reconciling Old and New Ideas and the Method to Do So).” Dongfang zazhi .... 14 (4). DOI: 10.4312/as.2021.9.2.49-77 Beyond the Warring States: The First World War and the Redemptive Critique of Modernity in the Work of Du Yaquan (1873–1933) Ady VAN DEN STOCK* Abstract The intellectual impact of the First World War in China is often understood as having ledto a disenchantment with the West and a discrediting of the authority of “science”, whileat the same time ushering in a renewed sense of cultural as well as national “awakening”.Important developments such as the May Fourth Movement, the rise of Chinese Marxism,and the emergence of modern Confucianism have become integral parts of the narrativesurrounding the effects of the “European War” in China, and bear witness to the contestedrelation between tradition and modernity in twentieth-century Chinese thought.Through acase study of a number of wartime and post-war texts written by the “cultural conservative”thinker and publicist Du Yaquan (1873–1933), this paper tries to draw attention to thecomplexity and occasional ambiguity of responses to the “Great War” in modern Chineseintellectual history. More specifically, the following pages offer an analysis of Du’s critiqueof “materialism” in the context of his quest for social freedom and cultural continuity, hisenduring commitment to scientific notions of social evolution and political governance, andhis approach to the relations among war, the nation-state, the individual, and the interna­tional interstate order developed against the background of the First World War. Keywords: First World War, modern Chinese intellectual history, Du Yaquan, war, na­tionalism, science Onkraj vojskujocih se držav: prva svetovna vojna in odrešilna kritika moder-nosti v delu Du Yaquana (1873–1933) Izvlecek Vpliv prve svetovne vojne naj bi na Kitajskem v intelektualnem smislu pripeljal do ra­zocaranja nad Zahodom in do diskreditacije avtoritete »znanosti«, hkrati pa naj bi povz­rocil obnovljen obcutek kulturnega in narodnega »prebujenja«. Pomembni dogodki, kot so cetrtomajsko gibanje, vzpon kitajskega marksizma in pojav modernega konfucijanstva,so postali sestavni deli pripovedi o ucinkih »evropske vojne« na Kitajskem ter pricajo o problematicnem odnosu med tradicijo in modernostjo v kitajski misli 20. stoletja. S * Ady VAN DEN STOCK, Department of Languages and Cultures,Ghent University.Email address: ady.vandenstock@ugent.be pomocjo študije primera številnih vojnih in povojnih besedil »kulturno konservativnega« misleca in publicista Du Yaquana (1873–1933) clanek poskuša opozoriti na komplek­snost in obcasno nejasnost odgovorov na »veliko vojno« v moderni kitajski intelektualni zgodovini. Receno natancneje, naslednje strani ponujajo analizo Dujeve kritike »material­izma« v kontekstu njegovega iskanja družbene svobode in kulturne kontinuitete, njegove trajne zavezanosti znanstvenim pojmom družbenega razvoja in politicnega upravljanja ter njegovega pristopa k odnosom med vojno, nacionalno državo, posameznikom in mednar­odnim meddržavnim redom, ki so se vzpostavili v ozadju prve svetovne vojne. Kljucne besede: prva svetovna vojna, moderna kitajska intelektualna zgodovina, Du Yaquan, vojna, nacionalizem, znanost There is hardly any difference between the situation in the age of the Warring States and the present day anymore. (Du 1918b, 364) Introduction: The “Great War” in China as Event and Narrative There is an oft-quoted saying by the French poet and essayist Paul Valéry (1871–1945) according to which the First World War confronted humanity with the factthat civilizations too are mortal beings (Valéry 1977, 94).1 In the context of the intellectual history of modern China, it might be more accurate to say that in thewake of the war, Chinese thinkers learned that Western civilization in particular wasmortal, if not already moribund.This at least is how the story was and still is oftenframed: the post-war period in China was one of national as well as cultural “awak­ening” (juewu.. ) (see Wang 2016, 41–48), and entailed a call for nothing lessthan a “liberation from the West” (Zheng 2011).2 Generally speaking, the discoursesurrounding the impact of the First World War on China hinges on fluid terms suchas “civilization” and “culture”, and draws heavily on dramatic metaphors of “death”,“awakening”, and “rebirth”. Perhaps this already indicates that the war does not fig­ure so much as a factual event in this context, but rather as a narrative structure, oneallowing for a decoupling as well as recombination of discursive elements from his­torically and culturally distinct traditions, at least on a more abstract level. 1 What is usually ignored however is that Valéry’s melancholy diagnosis is followed by a celebration of the “European genius” in the second part of his text. 2 More precisely, Zheng Shiqu ... understands such “liberation” as coinciding with an end of the normative appeal of capitalism and the rise of historical materialism, as if the social reality of the war had opened up the cracks in the ideological superstructure of the New Culture Movement necessary for Chinese Marxism to impose itself. Admittedly, the horror of trench warfare, massive civilian casualties, and unimag­inable destruction during the “Great War” may seem to rail against the adoption of such a dispassionate approach. However, we are not, in my view, merely dealing with a stubborn indifference to the cruelty and contingency of historical events which always threaten to shatter the crystal palace of philosophical abstraction. In retrospect, we can clearly see that the brutal reality of armed conflict did not pre­vent Western as well as Chinese thinkers from approaching the struggle between the great powers as an opportunity for reassessing their respective traditions as well as the prospects for a possible encounter or reconciliation between them. In turn, such a rethinking was seen as a response to very real and pressing socio-po­litical issues. After all, as the historian James Q. Whitman claims, in the modern conception of war, armed conflicts are supposed to deliver a “verdict”, in the sense that “victory in war either proves or legitimates a certain cultural, moral, or meta­physical value” (De Warren 2014, 727). To be sure, the many problems besetting the embattled nations were widely report­ed in Chinese media (Sachsenmaier 2007, 118), even if the First World War seemsnot to have been primarily approached from a “phenomenological” standpoint fo­cused on the lived experience of soldiers and civilians on the frontlines by mostChinese thinkers.Travel journals and the reports of Chinese living in Europe at thetime and published after the war contain detailed eyewitness accounts which offer amore personal and lively counterweight to the somewhat dreary and repetitive dis­course on the “Decline of the West” often associated with this period.3 As Eugene W. Chiu ... indicates, while the Chinese experience of the “European War” (Ouzhan.. ), as it still sometimes referred to in China, was at first characterizedby a certain detachment, the mass of reports and analyses in journals and newspa­pers allowing the events on the Western front to be approached as a gargantuan“text”, Chinese commentators gradually shifted their attention to the actual livingconditions of common people caught up in the war (Chiu 2005, 94, 118). Just as importantly, many if not all intellectuals in China were highly concerned with how the situation in Europe would impact the East-Asian context, especially after Japan (aided by Great Britain) started moving in on Germany’s concessions in Shandong province. As such, they were hardly unaware of the global dimen­sion and broader geopolitical implications of what was, after all, an increasingly worldwide conflict. What is crucial to point out, however, is that more philosoph­ically minded observers approached the war not so much as a factual occurrence,but rather from a more macroscopic perspective, that is to say, as an epochal event 3 Professor Jing Chunyu ... at Shanghai University’s Department of Literature is currently in­ volved in a study of Chinese accounts (by figures as diverse as businessmen and novelists) of their wartime experiences in France. (in a quasi-Badiouian sense) necessitating an “awakening” and a retrospective in­sight into its larger historical and cultural causes and conditions. China’s definitive loss of Shandong to Japanese imperialist ambitions following the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 obviously played an important role in this respect. As Du Yaquan’s ... (1873–1933) statement which serves as an epigraph tomy paper indicates, the causes and conditions of the First World War were notnecessarily sought in the recent past alone. For Du, chief editor of the influen­tial journal Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi .... ) between 1911 and 1920,4 the social and ideological upheaval characteristic of the modern era couldin some sense be seen as entailing a return to the political chaos and intellectu­al confusion (or, in positive terms, richness and ferment) of the Warring Statesperiod (481–221 BCE) in Chinese history.5 As anyone familiar with the devel­opment of traditional Chinese philosophy knows, such an identification shouldnot only be read in a negative sense, since this period is also the origin of the“hundred schools” of pre-Qin thought. More to the point, as Nicolas De War­ren notes with respect to the philosophical response to the war in Europe, it iseasy to forget that when the First World War broke out, it was also greeted witha certain sense of enthusiasm by some thinkers, as an event harbouring the po­tential for a social revolution and “destructive renewal” of the world within itself 4 Du had de facto already been in charge of the journal’s affairs since 1909, see Wang (2016, 5). 5 The analogy between the Warring States period and the modern world order following the end ofthe Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and the collapse of the tianxia .. (“all-under-heaven”) paradigmbecame an even more prevalent theme during the Second World War with the appearance of theso-called “Warring States Faction” (Zhanguo ce pai .... ), a group of intellectuals (most of themTsinghua University graduates) associated with the bimonthly journal Zhanguo ce ... , whichwas published in the beginning of the 1940s and was followed up by an eponymous supplement tothe Chongqing-based newspaper Dagongbao ... . Common themes in the writings of “WarringStates” intellectuals were a reappraisal of the philosophy of Nietzsche (and German culture in gen­eral), a tone of militarist nationalism, and a defence of “hero worship”. He Lin .. (1902–1992),often credited with having been the first to use the expression “New Confucianism”, was also countedamong the ranks of the “Warring States Faction”. For more information, see Fung (2010, 120–26). Arepresentative figure of this relatively short-lived current of thought, which came to be condemnedas “fascist” on the mainland after the founding the People’s Republic, was the Shakespeare specialist Lin Tongji ... (1906–1980), in whose article “The Recurrence of the Age of the Warring States(Zhanguo shidai de chongyan ....... )” many of the themes mentioned in the above arejoined together. In this text, Lin makes it clear that the idea of the “Warring States” refers to a uni­versal phase in the history and socio-cultural evolution of different societies (each culture having adistinct Gestalt, tixiang .. ). As such, it denotes a stage of total warfare (quantizhan ... ), whereevery single thing and person is mobilized for the sake of war, a process Lin sees as being epitomizedby the Qin dynasty which unified China at the end of the Warring States period in 221 BCE. ForLin, war was thus not something to be solved or prevented, but rather embraced as a means for theself-assertion of the Chinese nation (see Lin 1983, 443–44). (see De Warren 2014, 716).6 Likewise, in China, figures as diverse as the radical intellectual Chen Duxiu ... (1879–1942) and the more moderate and rec­onciliatory Du Yaquan saw the Great War as a tragic manifestation of the pat­riotism of the citizens of European nations. As such, it was also an opportunityto reflect on what they perceived to be the lack of patriotic spirit among theircompatriots and raise the Chinese nation from its state of slumber and stagna­tion (see Zheng 2011, 70–71; Zhang 2016, 113).7 As Du wrote, in biologistic terms which I will further explore below, the mind of organisms is always stimulated and aroused to action by im­pressions coming from its surroundings. The same applies to the people of a country (guomin .. ). Our self-absorbed and protective compatri­ots have remained in a state of stagnation for thousands of years due to a lack of stimuli from the outside world. (Du 1914b, 187) Additionally, there was a perhaps surprising amount of Germanophile sentiment among Chinese intellectuals after the war broke out, at least until China official­ly declared war on Germany in 1917. Contributors to the flagship journal of the New Culture Movement New Youth (Xin qingnian ... ), such as Chen Dux­iu saw the Germans as a “springtime people” (qingchun zhi guomin ..... ), whose cultural energy they contrasted with that of older and “decaying”European nations, most notably France, as the birthplace of a revolution that had failed to make good on its promises and normative demands on a global scale (see Zhao 2017, 109–12; Zhang 2016, 112). In more general terms, a relatively positive appraisal of the intellectual impact ofthe war is still seen among contemporary Chinese observers. The Taiwanese schol­ar Edward W. Chiu, for instance, presents the Great War as a veritable catalystfor an “Enlightenment” in China (Chiu 2005). The mainland Chinese historianZheng Shiqu ... has argued that these dramatic historical events allowed theWest to overcome an arrogant and exaggerated belief in the merits of its own civi­lization, while at the same time freeing Chinese thinkers from decades of self-de­preciation and feelings of cultural inferiority (Zheng 1997, 213–14). Similarly, XuGuoqi, a historian who has done much to draw attention to the neglected roleof China in the First World War, characterizes the latter as a “vehicle for China’s 6 Some scholars believe that the First World War played a considerable role in the already emerging rift between continental and analytical philosophy, and served as a catalyst for the closely related decline of British Idealism after the latter’s German Idealist sources fell into disrepute. (See Vra­ himis 2015, 84–93, and Morrow 1982) 7 A few months after the armistice, Du wrote a short article outlining the various “benefits” (liyi . . ) China had gained during the conflict in predominantly pragmatist terms (Du 1919b). transformation, renewal, and regeneration” (Xu 2005, 10). As he puts it, “the warprovided the momentum and the opportunity for China to redefine its relationswith the world through its efforts to inject itself into the war and thus positionitself within the family of nations” (ibid., 9). While such arguments are proba­bly intended to be descriptive rather than ideological, it should at the same timeremind us of the importance of carefully considering in what sort of narrativethe Chinese response to the war is framed and retold. According to DominicSachsenmaier, already at the time “a variety of groups in China, from free-tradeliberalists to early Marxists (…) saw the Great War as part of a teleological his­tory” (Sachsenmaier 2007, 120). In Xu Guoqi’s opinion, the ultimate explana­tion behind China’s apparent eagerness to join the war effort is to be found inwhat he calls the Chinese “obsession” (Xu 2005, 2) with joining the ranks of theinternational order, an attitude which supposedly also conditioned the overallresponse of Chinese intellectuals to the outbreak of the war. However, if we direct our attention to analyses of the cultural-historical trajec­tory seen as leading up to the war, specifically those made by thinkers critical of (Western) modernity, a less clear-cut picture imposes itself.8 More precisely, Xu Guoqi’s assessment seems to underestimate the extent to which reflections on the war were not only about an imagined and long-awaited convergence between China and the West, and were not merely focused on the prospect of China finally coming into its own as one nation-state among others, but also gave rise to more ambiguous and at times incongruous reflections on the nature and limits of mo­dernity and its political institutions.The intention of this paper is to highlight and explore some of these ambiguities in the writings of Du Yaquan, who is usually labelled as a cultural conservative without further examination of to what degree this is actually true. Before turning to a more detailed analysis of Du’s philosoph­ical reflections on the “Great War” in relation to the question of Chinese moder­nity, I will proceed by first providing some additional background information that will allow us to get a better picture of the broader cultural impact of the First World War on Chinese intellectual history. For studies on the impact of the First World War on Chinese intellectuals, specifically on cultur­al conservatives, see Zheng 2002; Zheng 2008; and Sachsenmaier 2007. To date, one of the only analyses of the relation between the war and the emergence of “New Confucianism” in particular (somewhat predictably focused on the debate concerning “science and metaphysics”) is Lei (2015). Post-war Chinese Discourse on Science and the Shifting Boundaries of the “New” The above observations indicate that the Chinese response to the Great War,in which China participated as a “forgotten ally” (Alexeeva 2015)9 supporting the Allied Forces by dispatching an estimated 140,000 Chinese labourers to the Western Front,10 has to be framed in a larger historical context. The two Opi­um Wars and China’s defeat at the hands of Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 had already made it clear that the waning Qing empire needed to adopt modern (especially military) technology. With the increasing implausibility of maintaining a rigid conceptual distinction between a Chinese “substance” (ti . ) and a Western “function” or “application” (yong . ), the adoption of technol­ogy was gradually discovered not be a mere matter of “technique” (shu . ) as op­posed and inferior to “learning” (xue . ), but to involve the appropriation of “sci­ence” (gezhixue ... , later kexue .. (see Elman 2004)) as well. In this con­text, “science” was understood not so much as a mathematized form of objective inquiry, but rather as a much more generally applicable and socially performative “method” and “spirit” (see Luo 2000, 57–66) that would allow China to success­fully achieve modernization and position itself in the world as a sovereign nation.As Wang Hui .. has aptly put it, science thus took on the form of a veritable “moral imperative” (Wang 1989, 23). Moreover, modernization was seen as something that not only had to occur on an institutional and political level, but also on that of individual virtue, not in the least by radically reinterpreting the relation between the “private” sphere of moral­ity and the “public” domain of politics, a view epitomized by Liang Qichao’s ... (1873–1929) call for the creation of a “new citizen” or “new people” (xinmin . 9 For Olga Alexeeva (2015, 44), the fact that the design for a grandiose mural entitled Panthéon de la guerre, commissioned by the French State while the war was still ongoing as a celebration of all allied nations and their contributions to the envisaged victory, originally included Chinese labour­ers, only to be replaced by the figures of American soldiers in the final version, symbolizes the fact that the Chinese war efforts were consigned to oblivion in Western historical consciousness. 10 See Xu 2005, 114–54. The Republic of China adopted a strategy known as “labourers in the place of soldiers” (yigong daibing.... ), labourers which were recruited and dispatched to Europe through the intermediary of private companies, thus allowing China to retain a semblance of neu­trality while still supporting the Allied Forces against Germany.This strategy was devised by Liang Shiyi ... (1869–1933), a cabinet minister and a close confidant of Yuan Shikai. Liang, some­times dubbed the “Chinese Machiavelli”, had already started arguing for the strategic importance of China entering the war at the side of the Allied Forces in 1914. He saw it as a way for China to achieve full recognition as a nation-state, not in the least through a return of German conces­sions in Shandong. (See ibid. 82–83, 87, 90–91) Ironically, most of the Chinese labourers sent to the frontlines were recruited from Shandong province, which was later ceded to Japan at the Paris Peace Conference. . ).11 The growing awareness of the need for science, as the blueprint for culture as a whole, is usually understood as coinciding with an increasing loss of the nor­mative power of the Chinese tradition, particularly of Confucianism, as a mod­el for political governance, communal life, and individual conduct. The failure of the newly founded and politically unstable Chinese Republic to prevent General Yuan Shikai from proclaiming himself emperor in 1915, a move that was backed by Kang Youwei’s ... (1858–1927) “Confucian Religious Society” (Kongjiao hui ... ) which proposed installing Confucianism as a state religion, further fuelled calls for the abolishment of traditions seen as inhibiting the emergence of a “new culture” (xin wenhua ... ) and to what the intellectual historian Luo Zhitian ... has termed a “worship of the new” (Luo 2017, 1–60). Within this familiar synoptic account, the period following the First World War is usually interpreted as signalling a shift away from this “worship of the new” and a naïve celebration of all things Western toward a more conflicted and at times syncretistic approach to what became known as the “problem of Eastern and Western cultures” (dongxi wenhua wenti ...... ).12 As far as Du Yaquan for instance was concerned, the war had endowed the seemingly straightforward yet highly changeable and indeterminate terms “old” and “new” with a completely different sense. In his view, the “new”, which had previously more or less meant imitating the West, now had to give way to a different kind of “novelty”, that is to say, to the creation of a genuinely “new” form of culture that would not simply co­incide with a one-sided emulation of Western civilization, but combine elements of the “new” and the “old” within itself (see Du 1919c, 401–2). Just as importantly,after the war “the West” ceased to be seen as a consistent totality, but instead be­gan to appear as a force-field of contradictory if not antagonistic forces (see Luo 2017, 250–51). The spectacle of advanced technology being put to the service of relentless slaughter and destruction had caused science to be “put to shame by the cruelty of its applications” (Valéry 1919, 97). In turn, the continuity between “science” and “democracy”, as symbols for the epistemological and institutional requirements of modern society (and quasi-religious objects of faith in the dis­course of the New Culture Movement, see Wang 1989, 22–23) was ruptured, in the sense that scientific and technological ingenuity had clearly failed to translate into a rational organization of individual societies and the international order as a whole (see Han 2017). Instead, a gaping chasm had opened up between “force”(li . ) and “principle” (li . ) (Zhang 2016). The reputation of the sort of social 11 See in particular the chapters “Lun gongde ... (On Public Virtue)” and “Lun side ... (On Private Virtue)” in Liang (1994, 16–22, 161–94). 12 See Wang Yuanhua (2000) for a good overview focused on the role played by Du Yaquan in particular. Darwinism previously embraced by many Chinese thinkers suffered considerably in the process (Xu 2018, 163). Additionally, Western philosophers associated with German militarism became symbols of the malaise of modernity and prominent targets of critique.13 In a lecture entitled “The Crisis of European Culture and the Direction of Chi­na’s New Culture” (Ouzhou wenhua zhi weiji ji Zhongguo xin wenhua zhi qux­iang ................ ) from 1922, Zhang Junmai ... (1887–1969) went so far as to claim that continuing to slavishly emulateWestern nations after the war would signify the end of culture (wenhua .. ) as such, since there would no longer be any “patterns/refinement” (wen . ) or “transformation” (hua . ) (Zhang 1922, 238) in the first place.14 To be sure, al­though it is tempting to be carried along by the sweeping statements many in­tellectuals made at the time, some nuance and restraint is necessary in this con­text. This much Zhang Junmai actually indicates himself a little further on inthe text of the same speech, when he argues against making simplistic overgen­eralizations concerning Western and Chinese cultures. A similar caution shouldbe displayed when it comes to the supposed discrediting of science in post-warChina. It is often claimed that the destruction and suffering brought on by thewar put a definite end to the optimistic belief in science, the most well-knownexample undoubtedly being Liang Qichao’s call to awaken from the “dream ofthe omnipotence of science” following his tour of Europe between 1919 and1920 (see Zheng 2006). However, what Wang Hui has called the “community of scientific discourse” (kex­ue huayu gongtongti ....... )—a community extending beyond the “sci­entific community” in the narrow sense, thus including all intellectuals who in­voked concepts derived from scientific reasoning or articulated their views by ap­pealing to the discourse of science—managed to far outlive such largely rhetorical attacks. Wang argues that the two world wars did not in fact end up undermining the authority of science, quite to the contrary: this competitive world scene reinforced sovereign states’ demands for science and technology, further guaranteeing the development of 13 It appears that the wartime and post-war discrediting of Nietzsche as a philosopher of militarism, not in the least by British propaganda efforts which managed to spread the appealing myth accord­ ing to which every German soldier carried around a copy of Also Sprach Zarathustra in his backpack instead of the Bible (see Vrahimis 2015, 86), seems to have influenced Chinese thinkers as well. See for example Cai Yuanpei’s ... (1863–1940) text “Dazhan yu zhexue ..... (The Great War and Philosophy)” (Cai 1984, 200–1). 14 For a more detailed study of Zhang Junmai’s understanding of the war, see Ciaudo (2013). science and technology, professionalization, state control of scienceand technology, and the dominant position of the scientific worldview.(Wang 2008, 131) In his view, this dominant position is also reflected in the influential “debate onscience and metaphysics” from 1923, a debate in which “metaphysicians” suchas Zhang Junmai and Liang Qichao argued for maintaining the proper bound­aries between scientific and humanistic modes of reasoning and cast doubt onthe applicability of a scientific outlook to the domains of “existence”, “morali­ty”, “culture”, and “politics”, as distinct fields of knowledge and action irreduc­ible to “science”. As Wang Hui emphasizes, the position of the “metaphysical”camp was thus not that of an outright rejection of science, but rather reflectedan implicit acceptance of the scientific attempt to arrive at a rational divisionof labour and functionally differentiated taxonomy of knowledge across fieldsof learning which could no longer be reconstituted into a coherent whole or anunmediated continuum (see ibid., 132–37). Crucially, questioning the “omnipotence” of science in the context of the post­war “awakening” to its limitations and pathological consequences almost nevercame down to a straightforward call for the restoration of traditional forms ofknowledge, but rather entailed a shift toward an assertion of the importanceand autonomy of other, equally novel fields of knowledge, such as “philoso­phy”.15 This much becomes apparent in the following passage from an arti­cle Zhang Dongsun ... (1886–1973) published in Liang Qichao’s journal Xuedeng .. (The Lamp of Learning) in 1919 in response to Chen Duxiu’continued pleas in favour of the authority of “Mr. Science” (Sai xiansheng ..s. ) and “Mr. Democracy” (De xiansheng ... ): And now that we have just experienced the anguish and suffering of the war, everyone feels the need to invite Mr. Philosophy (Fei xiansheng ... , fei being the abbreviation for earlier transliterations of the term “philosophy” such as feilusufeiya ..... and feilusuofeiya ..... before the adoption of the Japanese neologism tetsugaku/zhexue .. ) back in to provide us with a fundamental and peaceful solution.This is because Mr. Philosophy can be of great help in allowing Mr. Science to reach his goal. Moreover, if we as human beings want to attain a more exalted state of existence, we have no choice but to rely on Mr. Philoso­phy. In sum, if the previous ten years can be described as a dictatorship 15 For more background on the relation between the fields of “science” and “philosophy” in modern Confucian philosophy in particular, see Van den Stock (2016, 197–215). of Mr. Science, we have now entered the era of a commonwealth of Mr.Science and Mr. Philosophy. (quoted in Dai 2009, 145)16 Here, “science” and “philosophy” have already become universally applicable cat­egories of knowledge that are no longer constrained by geography, culture, or time and are explicitly framed in relation to the equally universalist desideratum of social freedom (a “commonwealth” instead of a “dictatorship”). Following the abandonment of traditional Chinese taxonomies of knowledge, it would be these universalized terms that would serve as vehicles for the reassertion and renego­tiation of cultural particularity. Additionally, we should bear in mind that, atleast to some extent, Chinese post-war critiques of science and “Western mate­rialism” echoed the Romantic self-critiques of many European intellectuals atthe time (see Zheng 1997, 213; Sachsenmaier 2007, 111). As such, they shouldnot be confused with indiscriminate assaults on Western culture as a whole, butcan rather be seen as creative appropriations and reconceptualizations of suchauto-critiques.17 The post-war European interest in Chinese “wisdom”, or the“wisdom of the East” in general, undoubtedly influenced the attitude of Chi­nese intellectuals toward their own tradition as well.18 What is also importantto remember is that such reappraisals of the value of Chinese culture were notalways met with a warm welcome in China. Some like the liberal pragmatistHu Shi .. (1891–1962) feared that the protests directed at Western powerpolitics and the perfectly justified critiques of the atrocities of the Great Warwould degenerate into a renewed Chinese sense of “arrogance” and “complacen­cy”, the Orientalist admiration for China expressed by some Western scholarsin his view merely counting as a “temporary psychopathological state” (quotedin ibid., 210). In any case, as the title of Zhang Junmai’s lecture quoted in the above indicates,what was at stake for Chinese thinkers in their reflections on the war was both 16 In a similar vein, Mou Zongsan ... (1909–1995) would later castigate proponents of the New Culture Movement for having forgotten about “Miss Morality” (Mo guniang ... ). (See Mou 2003, 252) 17 Henri Bergson (1859–1941), one of the thinkers most often invoked by the “metaphysicians” in their critique of scientism during the 1923 debate, was involved in propagandist denunciations of “the mechanization of spirit” (Bergson 1915, 36) he associated with Prussia/Germany and in drawing binary distinctions between the “élan vital” of the French people and the mechanistic materialism of Germany. Similarly, on the German side, the vitalist philosopher Rudolf Eucken (1846–1926), another favourite of the Chinese “metaphysicians”, approached the war as a means for the liberation of Germany and German culture. 18 One anecdotal indication for this surge of interest is the fact that no less than eight different Ger­man editions of the Daodejing... appeared in the years following the end of the war. (See Zheng Shiqu 1997, 208) the “crisis” of Western culture as well as the development of a “new culture” for China. The adoption of a civilizational discourse in which a wedge was driven between “novelty” or “modernity” on the one hand and “the West” on the other was a means of articulating this ambiguous and unstable position. In the process,“conservative” critics of “Western” modernity tried to wrest equally “Western” ide­ologies such as Marxism and socialism from their cultural confines and redefine them as genuinely universal political projects that could draw on, or be reconciled with, the Chinese tradition. As Du Yaquan for one insisted, after the war the “old”Europe had to give way to a new civilization propelled by the rebirth of the “old”culture of China in combination with a “new” (i.e. non-militarist) Western culture.Hence, it is not so surprising to find the “supposedly conservative” Du Yaquan de­claring the lower classes of all countries to be the true subjects and victors of the war, and greeting the rise of international socialism with much enthusiasm. In his view, it is only from the perspective of the “old world” of militarism where “right is might” that the end of the war and a farewell to its “instruments of misfortune”(..... )19 could count as defeat instead of a liberation (Du 1919a, 206–8).Du believed the abolition of class differences and economic inequalities to be the only sure means to put an end to military conflict once and for all (see Du 1914b,191; Du 1918e, 458). His position thus hardly shares anything in common with a straightforwardly conservative withdrawal into already discredited political and ethical models without any regard for the structural features and ideological dis­course of modern societies. The post-war “problem of Eastern and Western cultures” gave rise to heated de­bates between radical iconoclasts and more moderate thinkers who still believed in the viability of certain aspects of the Chinese tradition. However, both shared a mistrust of the Western powers following the “betrayal” of the Versailles Peace Treaty, which led to student demonstrations and strikes across the whole of Chi­na, ushering in what later became known as the May Fourth Movement. As such,they shared a common concern over “culture” (wenhua .. , Kultur), and not merely “civilization” (wenming .. , Civilization), that is to say, a form of “awak­ening” and “enlightenment” that would, in one way or another, reflect and serve the particularities of China as a nation, regardless of whether these particularities were understood in a culturally determinate or a more universalist sense (see Xu 2018). After the Versailles “betrayal”, cultural conservatives had to abandon the no­tion that Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations counted as an incarnation of the 19 A reference to chapter 31 of the Daodejing: “Weapons are instruments of misfortune, such things are always detestable, that is why one who possesses the Dao does not involve himself with them (...,....,....,...... ).” age-old Confucian idea of datong .. (“great unity”) (see Xu 2005, 253–54). Nor could Chen Duxiu still speak, as he had done in the period of short-lived enthu­siasm immediately following the German defeat, of a “victory of universal prin­ciple over power” (...... , or, more colloquially: “the victory of right over might”) (quoted in Gao 1999, 9). Instead, Chen had come to terms with the fact that any “universal principle” always remains dependent on the support of politi­cal and military power, without which it would remain an easy prey for the pow­ers that be (see Chen 1982). Clearly, then, following the war, both radicals as well as conservatives were engaged in a pursuit of the “new”, that is to say, a different kind of “novelty”, the semantic horizon of which had expanded considerably in the meantime.20 20 In this respect, it is worthwhile considering the work of Ku Hung-Ming (Gu Hongming) ... (1857–1928), born in the British colony of Penang (in Malaysia) and educated in Edinburgh, who is usually portrayed as the epitome of an arch-conservative “reactionary” and a living fossil from Imperial China. However, a closer examination of one of his books, The Spirit of the Chinese Peo­ple, which bears the Chinese subtitle Chunqiu dayi .... (The Great Meaning of the Spring and Autumn Annals) from 1915, partly written in response to the American missionary Arthur Hen­derson Smith’s (1845–1932) (in)famous Chinese Characteristics from 1894, which had remained popular in the first decades of the 20th century, quickly complicates the picture. The Spirit of the Chinese People contains a lengthy appendix entitled “The War and the Way Out” (Ku 1915, 147–68) which is interesting to consider in the present context. The importance Ku attached to this essay is apparent from the fact that he already provides a summary of his main argument in the preface to the whole book, which has the ambition of showing his readers the “real Chinaman” and the actual “characteristics” of Chinese civilization. While Ku claims that Chinese civilization is now in a po­sition to “save” the war-torn West, his staunchly “conservative” line of reasoning is full of praise for Germany, which he sees as “the true, rightful, and legitimate guardian of the modern civilization of Europe”(ibid.,preface,15).While he concedes that German militarism is the immediate culprit for the outbreak of the war, Ku argues that the German “worship of might” should actually be seen as a reaction against the “religion of mob-worship” (the subtitle of his essay) he associates with Brit­ish civilization in particular. As he puts it later on in the main text of the essay itself: “If there is to be peace in Europe, the first thing to be done, it seems to me, is to protect the rulers, soldiers and diplomats from the plain men and women; to protect them from the mob, the panic of the crowd of plain men and women which makes them helpless.” (ibid., 154) He then goes on to argue that the German (over)reaction against “mob worship” can be balanced out and remedied by return­ing to a Confucian “religion of good citizenship”, that will allow nations to expect absolute loyalty from their subjects, thus giving rise to a “Magna Carta of loyalty” (see ibid., 9–12). Additionally,in Ku’s view, the “mob-worship” on the level of politics had been exacerbated by the “mob rule” of the commodity in the “selfishness and cowardice” of what he calls “the spirit of Commercialism”(see ibid., preface, 18–19). For Ku, then, the problem that surfaced with the war was not the rup­ture between “science” and “democracy”, or an excess of “Westernization”, but rather the delirious influence exerted by the “mob-worship”, as represented by democratic politics and the capitalist economy, on Western civilization as a whole. While his position clearly contain elements which are straightforwardly identifiable as “conservative”, his radical reinterpretation of Confucianism as simply amounting to a “religion” that can ensure loyalty to the state confronts us with the unwield­iness and indeterminacy of the term “conservatism” in modern Chinese intellectual history which Benjamin I. Schwartz already identified decades ago. Du Yaquan on War, Materialism, Evolution, and Statehood In the remainder of this paper, I will attempt to provide more concrete illustra­tions of the general observations made in the above by analysing a number of Du Yaquan’s wartime and post-war writings that are indicative of the complexity of the cultural conservative Chinese response to the First World War. In doing so, I will start by considering the socio-political dimension and significance of his cri­tique of “materialism”. Although this type of anti-materialism may at first sight appear to be a hackneyed and predictable theme echoing the cliché of a “spiritual East” versus a “materialist West”, we should bear in mind that it continued to fig­ure prominently in later Republican-era “debates” (literally “wars of opinions/dis­courses”, lunzhan .. ), namely those on “science and metaphysics” (1923), the applicability of historical materialism and its categorization of the developmental stages of society to Chinese history (from the late 1920s to early 1930s), and the conceptual validity of dialectical materialism vis-à-vis formal logic and science (during the first half of the 1930s). Moreover, as I will try to show in what follows,post-war cultural conservative attacks on “materialism” are not to be dismissed out of hand as reactionary gestures drawing on a simplistic and culturalist East-West dichotomy, but have to be understood as part of an intellectual effort to rethink the modern normative requirement of social freedom. Du Yaquan almost immediately started paying close attention to the “Europe­an War” and contributed a significant number of articles to this topic in Eastern Miscellany, which became one of the journals providing the most extensive and detailed coverage of the war under his editorial leadership (Chiu 2005, 95–98;Wang 2016, 54). Du wrote a series of reports (xuji .. ) on the latest state of af­fairs concerning the war from 1914 to 1917, which were later collected in a slim volume entitled A History of Events in the European War (Ouzhan fasheng shi ..... ) published by Shanghai Commercial Press in 1924 (see Chiu 2005, 103).However, it is not these factually oriented and largely descriptive texts, but rather his philosophical analyses of the underlying causes behind the war as well as the latter’s broader cultural significance for which Du is still remembered to this day.In a particularly well-known text, entitled “The State of Our Compatriots’ Awak­ening After the End of the Great War” (Dazhan zhongjie hou guoren zhi juewu ruhe ............ ) from 1919, Du makes it clear that the war has led to an awareness of the necessity of spiritual as well as material reform on a global level (Du 1919a, 205).21 In other words, he is not simply proposing a reas­sertion of the dominance of “spirit” over “matter” along the lines of Rabindranath 21 The passage in question is sometimes rather misleadingly translated as denoting an opposition be­tween material and spiritual values. (See for example Xu 2018, 164) Tagore’s (1861–1941) triumphalist praise for the putative spiritual superiority of Asia as a whole. In effect, one of the most interesting aspects of Du’s writings is the coexistence of culturalist and universalist orientations, which are not always easy to disentangle. Thus, while Du famously described the West as a “dynamic civilization” as opposed to a “static” China, insisting that this is not merely a grad­ual but a substantial difference, he at the same time took care to note that the lives of a considerable portion of the Western populace were still entirely “static”in nature. Employing the universalist distinction between the urban and rural as metaphors for the tension between tradition and modernity, Du compared his compatriots’ pre-war blind admiration for the West to the situation of a farmer or shepherd from the countryside who is dazzled by the hustle and bustle of city life without being aware of all the contradictions and social suffering there (see Du 1916c, 343). As Feng Youlan’s ... (1895–1990) (see Van den Stock 2016, 144–52) and Liang Shuming’s ... (1893–1988) socio-political philosophy (see Van den Stock, forthcoming) as well as the development of Maoism bear out,the deceptively simple binaries of traditional-modern, Chinese-Western, and ru-ral-urban would give rise to varied and by no means straightforward conceptual constellations throughout the subsequent history of modern Chinese thought. The abovementioned tension between “culture” and “civilization” can also be found in Du Yaquan’s critique of materialism. Already a year before the war broke out,Du published a series of three essays bearing the title “On Saving the Nation through Spirit” (Jingshen jiuguo lun ..... ) in Eastern Miscellany. Howev­er, in contrast to what the title might suggest, Du does not engage in an indis­criminate attack on the philosophical position of materialism here, but rather targets the latter more selectively and strategically, namely by engaging in an ex­tensive critical overview and discussion of evolutionary theory and social Dar­winism. These reflections are explicitly articulated against the background of the rise of European colonial militarism, which Du portrays as an incarnation of the “animal nature” unleashed by the “materialist” view of the world as a struggle for power in which might is right. Du argues that the “materialist” pursuit of “wealth and power” (fuqiang .. ) and lopsided interpretations of the theory of evolu­tion (tianyan .. )22 were introduced into China at a time when their adverse social consequences had already begun to become evident in the West and a re­surgence of “idealist” positions could begin to be discerned (Du 1913, 33–34). In this context, Du explicitly links “idealism” with a certain voluntarism, that is to say,a belief in the power of human autonomy and self-determination. In contrast to 22 Du is obviously referring to Yan Fu .. (1854–1921) here. Incidentally, the war led to a volte-face in Yan’s own attitude toward Western culture and the Chinese tradition at large. (See Luo 2017, 251) “materialism”, Du saw an urgent need for the pursuit of a social freedom that de­parts from the irreducibility of the human being and its spiritual-moral capacities.That “idealism” is a very fluid category for Du becomes clear from the fact that it is supposed to includes thinkers as diverse as Montesquieu, Hume, and Hegel.Another indication of Du’s association of idealism and materialism with autono­my and heteronomy, respectively, can be found in his analysis of the authoritarian turn in Japanese politics following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, which Du sees as reflecting a departure from an “idealist” belief in the power of the hu­man mind that was still embraced at the beginning of the Meiji Restoration (see ibid., 37–38). What Du Yaquan proposes over and against the immoral kind of “materialist” evo­lutionary theory that had cast the modern world into a merciless struggle for thesurvival of the fittest is what he calls “social cooperationism” (shehuixielizhuyi ...... ) (Du 1915a), a notion inspired by the anarchist Peter Kropotkin’s (1842–1921) idea that “mutual aid” plays an important role in biological as well as socialevolution. After the war, Cai Yuanpei ... (1863–1940) would also describe thevictory of the allied forces as coinciding with a triumph of Kropotkin’s ideas over “militarist” Nietzscheanism and social Darwinism (see Cai 1984, 203). Crucially,for Du, “cooperationism” also points toward a future synthesis between nationalismand internationalist pacifism. In his view, such a synthesis had become unavoidablegiven the increasing economic interdependence between nations in a world gov­erned by military and monetary power (see Du 1918c). Even more importantly, areconciliation of nationalism and internationalism would ideally serve to preventevents such as a world war from ever happening again. However, invoking the tran­sition from “governing the state” (zhiguo .. ) to “pacifying all-under-heaven” (ping tianxia ... ) prescribed in the classical Confucian text of The Great Learning (Daxue .. ), Du argues that any future form of “internationalism” would have tobe grounded in a prior cooperation between citizens on the level of the nation-state(see Du 1915a, 21–22). The need for attaining a balance between “strength” (jian­qiang .. ) as well as “reconciliation” or “harmony” (tiaohe .. ), as quasi-cosmo­logical concepts Du primarily deploys in analysing the “phenomenal” (youxing .. ) dimension of politics, would first of all have to be realized “internally”, that isto say, inside of a certain nation-state and people, before the latter can attempt topeacefully position itself within an international interstate order (see Du 1916b,171–73). In short, in the same sense that “inner” moral perfection is the precondi­tion for “outer” social order in the traditional Confucian logic of governance, nation­alism counts as the logical precondition for internationalism here. In Du Yaquan’s view, while China had traditionally been preoccupied with “gov­erning” (zhi . ), that is to say, ensuring the general well-being of its own people, and thus remained relatively indifferent to the possible existence of other states falling outside of the scope of “all-under-heaven” (tianxia .. ), it now had to come to terms with a more competitive world-order in which “protecting” (wei . ) the nation had imposed itself as a new and urgent political imperative, all while remaining on guard against a form of militarism that would depart from China’s supposed tradition of pacifism (see Du 1915c).23 In his own words: “our compatriots should become aware that the existence of the state is a factual and not a conceptual affair, and that its basis of existence is located in military power,and not governance through culture (wenzhi .. , more colloquially: ‘civil admin­istration’)” (Du 1915c, 149). Interestingly enough, Du associates what he takes to be the traditional Chinese focus on “internal governance” (neizhi .. ) with an attitude of indifference toward the external material world supposedly found in “Indian contemplative philosophy (....... )” (ibid., 148). This again in­dicates that his attack on “materialism”has little or nothing in common with “ide­alism” as it is defined in more vulgar examples of Marxist intellectual historiog­raphy. In contrast, Du’s “idealism” is profoundly activist in orientation and serves as a means of safeguarding the possibility of autonomy in the face of historical processes which are beyond the control of individual human beings. In this sense,before all else, “spirit” serves a symbol for autonomy rather than denoting a spe­cific metaphysical position. Indeed, for Du, the problem lies not so much in the analytical privilege given to the tangible aspects of human existence by materialist theories, but rather in the very notion of ideology and its imposition of mislead­ing abstract requirements on social reality, as the passage below vividly illustrates: Those who are now propagating various “isms” seem to be begrudge the integratedness (tongzheng .. ) of our traditional culture and cannot refrain from engaging in manoeuvres to acquire power and luxurious wealth, using Western thought as a pretext to bring it to ruins (…) Ex­pecting to be saved by these various isms would be like expecting the devil to show us the way into paradise. Oh you demons, the end is upon you! (...,...,.... )” (Du 1918b, 367) Despite his frequent appeal to the Chinese tradition, then, Du Yaquan’s posi­tion cannot be straightforwardly identified as “conservative”, and does not entail 23 By contrast, in his wartime private correspondence Yan Fu favoured a much more pragmatic and utilitarian approach, in which any moral and normative considerations would have to be tempo­rarily subordinated to the task of saving the nation. Yan argued that China needed to return to the military strength and vigour of the Qin dynasty and the strategic acumen of the Legalist school of pre-Qin philosophy, rather than focus on moral supremacy. Additionally, his observations of the “European War” had led him to the conclusion that the democratic system was hardly conductive to the efficient mobilization of military force. (See Chen 2012, 122–23) a rejection of the new political form of the nation-state, but rather involves acomplex attempt to mediate between tradition and modernity. This is preciselywhy the term “reconciliation” (tiaohe .. ) figures so prominently in his writ­ings on the “problem of Eastern and Western cultures”. Du’s repudiation of so­cial Darwinism is a case in point, since he continues to work under the assump­tion that there is a strong parallelism and even a continuum between nature andsociety and that the same force or constellation of forces govern the domainsof the physical and the social. The use of physiological metaphors of “anaemia”and a symptomatic “excess of blood” in his post-war diagnosis of the conditionof a “static” China and a “dynamic” West (see Du 1916c, 342) already suggestsas much.24 These biologistic metaphors obviously call to mind Chen Duxiu’s call to reinvigorate the “metabolism” of the Chinese body politic with the cellsof a new culture and remove its old and “rotten” elements in A Call to the Youth (Jinggao qingnian .... ) from the inaugural issue of New Youth in 1915 (see Chen 1915).25 As Du himself put it unambiguously with reference to the ques­tion as to whether the current situation of a world embroiled in war can reallybe blamed on individual states or political parties: “That which governs the ten­dencies in the world of society is actually no different from the natural forcesgoverning the ten thousand things.” (Du 1917c, 194) This also becomes appar­ent in a text from 1916, where Du describes the war in cosmological terms asan embodiment of the tension between “love” (ai . ) and “strife” (zheng . ) (Du1916a). Evolution in both the natural and the social world is thus approachedas the result of an interplay between contradictory forces such as the centripetaland centrifugal forces in physics (cf. Du 1916b; 1918a). While such an approachseems to shift the burden of accomplishing a transformation of society from theindividual to history as a process that escapes the immediate control of nationsas well as citizens, Du’s “anti-materialist” leanings leave the door open for theindividual (and by the same token, the state) to regain command of its own fate. The cosmological appropriation of the logic of evolutionary theory sketched in the above has important consequences for understanding Du Yaquan’s approach to the reconciliation of nationalism and internationalism he envisaged against the backdrop of the Great War. Again, for all of his criticism of the social Darwinist sort of “evolution without ethics” (to paraphrase the title of Huxley’s famous book),Du clearly embraces the basic logic of evolutionary thinking in arguing that the 24 In another text, Du argued that civilizations, much like children, have to go through periods of illness in order to develop and be reborn. (See Du 1917b, 346) 25 For an extensive analysis of the notion of “youth” as a symbol for the social change in Republican China, with specific reference to the emergence of the Communist Youth League, see Graziani (2014). progression from a state of savagery to one of civilization involves a change in the reasons for which war is fought: from a broader historical perspective, Du discerns a progression from the rationale behind warfare which moves from contingent empirical reasons (i.e. immediate bodily needs, in which case wars remain on the level of struggles between animals or squabbles between children), to a calculat­ed consideration of “interests” or “benefit and harm” (lihai .. ), to finally reach a point where normative and ideological considerations enter the fray, and wars are fought over “right and wrong” (shifei .. ), such as for example the American Civil War (see Du 1915b).26 Within this line of reasoning, the Great War counts as an archetypal “war of ideas” (sixiang zhan ... ) over right and wrong, and is not merely a battle between conflicting, unreflective animal instincts. In this sense,we can say that Du’s “conservatism” is one which has already internalized cer­tain “scientific” narratives of historical development that were far from discredited through the event of the war. Rather, the latter provided him with an opportunity to rethink and redeploy these narratives, all while attempting to link them with elements from the Chinese philosophical tradition. We should bear in mind here that Du started his career as an autodidact intel­lectual who devoted himself to introducing natural scientific knowledge intoChina after having abandoned the prospect of pursuing a career as a scholar-of­ficial after reaching the entry-level degree of xiucai .. (“flowering talent”) inthe imperial examination system at the age of 16. Eight years later, in 1898, Duwas recruited by Cai Yuanpei, the future president of Peking University whothen still served as rector of the Shaoxing Chinese-Western School (Shaoxing zhongxi xuetang ...... ) in Zhejiang, to become a teacher in mathemat­ics, meanwhile applying himself to the study of natural scientific subjects suchas chemistry, mineralogy, zoology, as well as philosophy, politics, and other “hu­manist” disciplines, which were more likely still seen as part of the epistemo­logical continuum of what Neo-Confucian thinkers called the “investigation ofthings” (gewu .. ). In 1900, Du founded an academy for the study of sciencein Shanghai and published the inaugural issue of Yaquan zazhi.... , one 26 In an earlier text (Du 1911), invoking the authority of German authors such as Heinrich von Tre­itschke (1834–1896) who affirmed the positive significance of war, Du still argued that a people hasto possess a certain “martial spirit” (..... ) in order to uphold itself among other nations. Ad­ditionally, he presented a typography of various kinds of war, including racial, religious, economic(with colonialism as an example), and political wars. Within the category of “political war”, he furtherdistinguished between “internal” and “external” warfare, the latter being concerned with conquest andcontrol. The category of “internal war” is further differentiated into wars for independence and dom­ination on the one hand, and “purely internal wars” (..... ), that is to say, “revolutionary wars” (.... ) in the proper sense on the other. Already here, Du is engaging with the question con­cerning the relation between the “internal” establishment and reform of the nation-state (“revolu­tion”) and the “external” positioning of the state in the global order through war. of the first Chinese journals devoted to popularizing the natural sciences (witha focus on chemistry), to which he would personally contribute a significantnumber of texts and translations (from the Japanese) until it ceased publicationin 1901. Du invested much of his time and sometimes his own resources in sci­ence research and education, as well as to such mundane affairs as a setting upa shop selling laboratory equipment in Shanghai. His endeavours as an authorand editor at Shanghai Commercial Press led to the publication of pioneeringworks such as the Comprehensive Botanical Dictionary (Zhiwuxue da cidian ...... ) (1918) and the Comprehensive Dictionary of Zoology (Dongwuxue da cidian ...... ) (1923) (see Xie 1988, 8–11). Tellingly, Du’s activities to­ward the spread of scientific knowledge hardly stopped after the war (see Chen,Kang, and Yao 2008, 1046–49). As late as December 1933, a few months beforehis death, Du put the last touches to the compilation of book entitled Natural Scientific Terms for Elementary Education (Xiaoxue ziran keci shu ....... ), an endeavour that would not have made sense if he had lost his faith in sci­ence following the war. Crucially, Du Yaquan’s appeal to the authority of “science” also surfaces in hiscritique of the deficiencies of modern democracy. In Du’s view, the majority ofthe common people want as little as possible to do with politics and remaincompletely indifferent to the affairs of the state. The Chinese people’s overall apathy and lack of knowledge makes them questionable subjects of the “awak­ening” necessitated by the Great War. As Du put it: “the so-called will of thepeople is actually so somnolent as to appear involuntary (.....,......... )” (Du 1917c, 195). In this sense, it seems that Du expected “Mr.Science” to come to the aid of “Mr. Democracy”: in his utopian vision of a futurewhere all nations and military factions will be abolished and national democra­cies will give way to global socialism, he imagined the emergence of a new so­cial class that would combine specialized scientific knowledge with the practicalskills and energetic potential of the labouring population. This activist class ofscientists would serve to supplant the apathetic unconscious “will of the people”largely driven by “material” desire instead of rational choice (ibid., 198).27 27 His socialist leanings notwithstanding, Du was highly suspicious of the lower classes in China,who he saw as lacking organization and as not yet having sufficiently internalized the ideals of so­cialism. Additionally, for Du, the majority of the lower classes in China was to be found not in the industrial proletariat, but rather in its “wandering population” (youmin .. ), an indeterminate and unstable mass of people resembling what Marx called the Lumpenproletariat, as a reserve army of industrial labour power. Du presented this “wandering population” as a highly dangerous section of society, suffused with resentment they cannot yet canalize in a productive and targeted manner,thus giving rise to uncontrolled outbursts of anger and violence that can never succeed in ushering in positive social change. (See Du 1919a, 211; Wang 2000, 281–82) Du’s cosmological-evolutionary framework for the interpretation of natural as well as social changes provides us with an important clue to the significance of what he defended as the outlook of “continuism” (jiexuzhuyi .... ) (Du 1914a). From a “continuist” perspective, there is no necessary contradiction be­tween the old and new or tradition and modernity. In socio-political terms, this means that the continuation of the past into the present does not come down to a reactionary attitude aimed at restoring an already defunct social order, but rather embodies a unity of conservatism and progressivism ensuring that national unity is not only safeguarded on a spatial-territorial, but also on a temporal-historical level. As Wang Hui has shown, the questions of national sovereignty and cultural continuity were closely connected in Du’s writings (Wang 2016, 60), where the “reconciliation” of the old and the new is presented as being predicated on such a “continuist” attitude. Interestingly enough, whereas Du’s 1914 text on continuism written just before the outbreak of the war still called for subordinating the indi­vidual to the interests of the state, in his wartime and post-war writings, the na­tion-state begins to appear as the medium for the reconciliation of opposites, that is to say, as a place where the dialectical interplay between the cosmological forces of the centripetal (“love”) and the centrifugal (“strife”) as well as the opposition between the private and the public could be balanced out. In an article from 1917 entitled “On the Boundaries between the Individual and the State” (Geren yu guojia zhi jie shuo ........ ), Du came to argue that individualism should be reconciled with, and not sacrificed to, nationalism, a position he takes up in opposition to German militarism (Du 1917a, 168). Such a reconciliation involves drawing the proper boundaries between the domain of the individual and that of the state, instead of propagating a straightforward sub­ordination of individual to national interests. At the same time, he assumed that upholding these boundaries could also serve the purpose of preventing individu­al interests from usurping the public good. Once again, Du’s argument is framed within the Confucian logic of the continuity between individual self-cultivation and the governance of the state, with Du invoking a passage from the Analects (14.42) which insists on the necessity of “cultivating oneself in order to bring peace to the common people (...... )” (quoted in Du 1917a, 167). His line of reasoning thus wavers between the two poles he seeks to reconcile and takes up an ambiguous position in between individualism and nationalism. Du proposes that if individuals are simply sacrificed for the sake of the nation without being given the opportunity to “cultivate themselves”, they would in effect cease to be of any use to the state, since they would have no proper self or “personality”(renge .. ) to sacrifice in the first place. In his own words: “if we want people to fully devote themselves to the affairs of the state, we have to first allow them to care for themselves” (ibid.). In his view, top-down government measures have tobe supplemented with a “spiritual socialism” (........ ) (Du 1919a, 210)on the level of individual morality. It is not clear if this should be read as a defence ofindividualism per se, or merely as a functionalist argument in which individuals mustbe allowed to develop themselves for the greater good of the state. On the one hand,Du seeks to reaffirm the traditional continuity between “governing the self” (zizhi .. ), that is to say, moral autonomy, and “governing the state” (zhiguo .. ), while atthe same time insisting on the importance of upholding the proper boundaries be­tween state and individual. In short, Du seems to be struggling here with what wouldcontinue to be a dominant theme in retrospective evaluations of the New Culture andMay Fourth Movement, namely the conflict between the search for “national salva­tion” and the pursuit of “enlightenment” (i.e. individual autonomy) as Li Zehou ... famously, if rather simplistically, put it (see Li 1987). In spite of his rejection of Li’s diagnosis, a very similar conclusion was reached by Gao Like ... , who argued that in these movements of “unfinished enlightenment”, “‘individual awakening’ was merely an indirect manifestation of ‘national awakening’” (Gao 1999, 11). Du Yaquan’s historically informed writings on the relation between individual and state can thusbe seen both as a precursor to more recent Chinese discourse on the “dialectics of En­lightenment”, as well as a possible resource for comparative philosophical reflectionson the possibility of social freedom in the modern world. Conclusion The examples given in the above indicate that Du Yaquan did not seek to repu­diate, but rather to redeem modernity, as something containing the potential for a “reconciliation” between the past and present, as well as contradictory aspects of intrastate and interstate politics within itself. As such, Du’s critique of evolution-ism could go hand in hand with an analysis of war as a quasi-natural catastrophe,one destined to eventually evolve into a vehicle for the attainment of political freedom and economic equality on a global level. Similarly, his condemnation of the economic injustices he saw as the basis of the Great War was accompanied by a strong belief in the ability of industrial capitalism to continue increasing pro­ductivity, while redirecting the latter toward the creation of actual material wealth and disentangling it from unequal relations of distribution (see Du 1918e, 459).Perhaps most importantly and timely from our current perspective, in analysing the Great War Du explicitly called for critically reflecting on the limitations and dangers of nationalism, an ideology he tended to present as a necessary evil rath­er than a positive good, and, paradoxically, as the only means available to China to secure a position within a more long-term historical process leading to the overcoming of the nation-state (see Du 1917d, 398; 1918d). Rather than sim­ply being concerned with the relation between individual and state in general,the problem for Du would seem to have been that, under the condition of the continuing threat of war and the ever-present possibility of a return to an age of “Warring States”, it is the “individuality” of the state within a competitive global order of nation-states which provides the basis for individual human well-being and the right to subsistence. Within this logic, there is no space of mediation and “reconciliation” between the individual (private) and the social (public) in the ab­sence of the nation-state. Lacking the necessary cohesion and resistance against external aggression, China would become violently assimilated into the econom­ic realm of Western colonialism and lose its autonomy to unbridled and goalless “material”impulses,thus effectively falling back to a more atavistic,pre-normative stage in the evolution of society and being severed from the necessary “continuist”connection to its own tradition. As such, for Du, the “individuality” of the state comes before that of the individual in the strict or ordinary sense, precisely be­cause war has consistently threatened to undercut the already fragile social and moral cohesion of the Chinese people throughout its modern history. While not going as far in his critique of the category of the nation-state as contemporary Chinese intellectuals who advocated reasserting the traditional notion of “all-un­der-heaven” (tianxia), Du’s conflicted attitude toward nationalism is testament to the modern dialectics of autonomy, where the requirements of freedom and au­tonomy are always caught in a tension between the spheres of the individual, the state, and geopolitical interstate conflicts. By contrast, invocations of the ideal of “all-under-heaven” as a straightforward alternative to the “Western” notion of the state conveniently ignore the fact that the logistics behind the realization of a uni-versalist vision such as that of tianxia risk remaining caught up in the geopolitical logic of modernity, that is to say, one of different nation-states ruthlessly compet­ing for the benefits of global capitalism, as the only de facto universality in the contemporary world. Over a century after the armistice, Du’s wartime and post­war writings remind us of the fact that relation between intrastate political free­dom and interstate war is not an extrinsic one, and that the historical specificity of this relation should not be left out of the picture in comparative political thought. References Alexeeva, Olga. 2015.“Forgotten Ally: China in the First World War.” In Representing World War 1: Perspectives at the Centenary. Essays from the Humber College of LiberalArts and Sciences at the International Festival Of Authors Conference in 2014, editedby Daniel Hambly, and Lisa Salem-Wiseman, 42–77.Toronto: Humber Press. Bergson, Henri. 1915.The Meaning of the War: Life and Matter in Conflict. London: Unwin. Cai, Yuanpei ... . (1918) 1984. “Dazhan yu zhexue ..... (The Great War and Philosophy).” In Cai Yuanpei quanji ..... (The Complete Works of Cai Yuanpei), vol. 3, 200–5. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. Chen, Duxiu ... . (1915) 1982. “Jinggao qingnian .... (A Call to the Youth).” In Zhongguo xiandai sixiang shi ziliao jianbian ........... (A Concise Sourcebook in Modern Chinese Intellectual History), edited by Cai Shangsi ... , vol. 1, 1–7. Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe. –––. (1919) 1982. “Shandong wenti yu guomin juewu......... (The Shandong Problem and Civil Awakening.” In Zhongguo xiandai sixiang shi ziliao jianbian ........... (A Concise Sourcebook in Mod­ern Chinese Intellectual History), edited by Cai Shangsi ... , vol. 1, 49–51. Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe. Chen, Yiwen ... , Kang Xiaoyu ... , and Yao Yuan .. . 2008. “Du Yaquan nianpu (1912–1933) .....: 1912–1933 (Chronology of Du Yaquan’s Life and Works, 1912–1933).” Xibei daxue xuebao ...... (Journal of Northwest University) 38 (6): 1044–50. Chen, Youliang ... . 2012. “Yan Fu de di yi ci shijie dazhan guan........... (Yan Fu’s Views on the First World War).” Shehui zongheng .... (Social Review) 27 (10): 121–24. Chiu, Eugene W.... . 2005. “Zhanzheng yu qimeng: ‘ouzhan’ dui Zhongguo de qishi.....:“..”...... (War and Enlightenment: How the ‘European War’ Enlightened China).” Guoli zhengzhi daxue lishi bao .......... (National Chengchi University Historical Journal) 23: 91–146. Ciaudo, Joseph. 2013. “La Grande Guerre à travers les yeux d’un intellectuel chi-nois: altérité culturelle et description d’un conflit.” Paper presented at the International Society for First World War Studies Conference, Paris, 26–27 September 2013. Dai, Qing .. . 2009. Zai rulaifo zhang zhong: Zhang Dongsun he tade shidai ......:........ (In the Buddha’s Palm: Zhang Dongsun and his Age). Hong Kong: Zhongwen daxue chubanshe. De Warren, Nicolas. 2014. “The First World War, Philosophy, and Europe.” Tijd­schrift voor Filosofie 76: 715–37. Du, Yaquan ... . (1911) 2003. “Geming zhanzheng.... (Revolutionary War).” In Du Yaquan wencun ..... (Collected Writings of Du Yaquan), edited by Xu Jilin ... , and Tian Jianye ... , 141–46. Shanghai: Shang­hai jiaoyu chubanshe. (Hereafter abbreviated to DYQWC.) (Note: all of Du’s texts listed below were originally published, often using pseudonyms such as Cang Fu .. and Gao Lao .. , in Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi .... ) while he served as the journal’s main editor.) –––. 1913. “Jingshen jiuguo lun..... (On Saving the Nation through Spirit).” In DYQWC, 33–55 (three parts). –––. 1914a. “Jiexuzhuyi.... (Continuism).” In DYQWC, 12–15. –––. (1914b) 2014. “Dazhan yu Zhongguo ..... (The Great War and China).” In Du Yaquan juan .... (Writings of Du Yaquan), edited by Zhou Yuefeng ... , 186–92. Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe.(Hereafter abbreviated to DYQJ.) –––. 1915a. “Shehui xieli zhuyi ...... (Social Cooperativism).” In DYQWC, 16–23. –––. 1915b.“Lun sixiang zhan .... (On the War of Ideas).” In DYQWC, 56–60. –––. 1915c. “Guojia ziwei lun ..... (On National Self-Defense).” In DYQWC, 147–51. –––. 1916a. “Ai yu zheng ... (Love and Strife).” In DYQWC, 24–27. –––. 1916b.“Li zhi tiaojie .... (The Harmonization of Forces).” In DYQWC, 171–74. –––. 1916c.“Jing de wenming yu dong de wenming ......... (Static and Dynamic Civilizations).” In DYQWC, 338–44. –––. 1917a.“Geren yu guojia zhi jie shuo........ (On the Boundaries between the Individual and the State).” In DYQWC, 166–70. –––. 1917b.“Zhan hou dong xi wenming zhi tiaohe......... (The Post­war Reconciliation of Eastern and Western Civilization)”. In DYQWC, 345–50. –––. 1917c. “Weilai zhi shiju..... (The Future State of the World).” In DYQWC, 194–99. –––. 1917d.“Xuanzhan yu shiju zhi guanxi........ (The Relation be­tween the Declaration of War and the Current Situation).” In DYQJ, 398–401. –––. 1918a. “Maodun zhi tiaohe..... (The Reconciliation of Opposites).” In DYQWC, 28–32. –––. 1918b. “Miluan zhi xiandai renxin....... (The Confusion of the Modern Human Mind).” In DYQWC, 362–67. –––.1918c. “Jinquan and bingquan..... (Economic Power and Military Power).” In DYQWC, 222–26. –––. 1918d. “Guojiazhuyi zhi kaolü....... (Reflections on National­ism).” In DYQJ, 447–51. –––. 1918e. “Dui weilai shijie zhi zhunbei ruhe........... (How Should We Prepare for the Future World?).” In DYQJ, 458–65. –––. 1919a. “Dazhan zhongjie hou guoren zhi juewu ruhe............ (The State of Our Compatriots’ Awakening after the End of the Great War). ” In DYQWC, 205–11. –––. 1919b.“Dazhan hou Zhongguo suo de zhi liyi.......... (The Benefits Gained by China in the Postwar Period).” In DYQJ, 484–88. –––. 1919c. “Xin jiu sixiang zhi zhezhong....... (Reconciling New and Old Ideas).” In DYQWC, 401–07. Elman, Benjamin A. 2004. “From Pre-Modern Chinese Natural Studies (... ) to Modern Science (.. ) in China.” In Mapping Meanings: The Field of New Learning in Late Qing China, edited by Michael Lackner and Natascha Vittinghoff, 25–74. Leiden and Boston: Brill. Fung, Edmund S. K. 2010. The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity. Cul­tural and Political Thought in the Republican Era. Cambridge (N.Y.): Cam­bridge University Press. Gao, Like ... . 1999. “Wusi qimeng de kunjing: zai lishi yu jiazhi zhi jian .......:........ (The Predicament of May Fourth En­lightenment: the Tension between History and Value).”Zhejiang xuekan .... (Zhejiang Journal) 2: 5–12. Graziani, Sofia. 2014. “Youth and the Making of Modern China: A Study of the Communist Youth League’s Organisation and Strategies in Times of Revolu­tion (1920–1937).” European Journal of Asian Studies 13 (1): 117–49. Han, Han. 2017. “The First World War, Scientific Thought, and Chinese Politics in the 1920s.” The Journal of East-West Thought 7 (3): 71–78. Ku, Hung-Ming. 1915. The Spirit of the Chinese People, With an Essay on ‘The War and the Way Out’. Peking: The Peking Daily News. Liang, Qichao ... . (1902–1906) 1994. Xinmin shuo ... (On the New Cit­izen). Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe. Lei, Yi .. . 2015. “Yizhan yu ‘xin rujia’ de yuanqi: yi ‘ke xuan lunzhan’ wei zhongxin ...“...”... : .“....”... (The First World War and the Rise of ‘New Confucianism’: A Case Study of the ‘De­bate on Science and Metaphysics’).” In Yi zhan yu Zhongguo..... (The First World War and China), edited by Wei Gelin ... , and Zhu Jiaming ... , 107–24. Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe. Li, Zehou ... . 1987. “Qimeng yu jiuwang de shuangchong bianzou.......... (Variations on the Double Theme of Enlightenment and National Salvation).” In Zhongguo xiandai sixiang shilun ........ (Essays in the History of Modern Chinese Thought), 7–49. Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe. Lin, Tongji ... . (1940) 1983. “Zhanguo shidai de chongyan....... (The Recurrence of the Warring States Period).” Reprinted in Zhong­guo xiandai sixiang shi ziliao jianbian ........... (A Concise Sourcebook in Modern Chinese Intellectual History), edited by Jiang Yihua ... , vol. 4, 442–52. Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe. Luo, Zhitian ... . 2000. “Zouxiang guoxue yu shixue de ‘Sai xiansheng’ – wusi qianhou Zhongguoren xinmu zhong de ‘kexue’ yi li ........“...”——...........“..”.. (Toward Na­tional Learning and Historiography as ‘Mr. Science’—A Case Study of the May Fourth View of ‘Science’ in China).” Jindai shi yanjiu..... (Stud­ies in Modern History) 3: 59–94. –––. 2017. Shifts of Power: Modern Chinese Thought and Society. Leiden and Bos­ton: Brill. Morrow, John. 1982. “British Idealism, ‘German Philosophy’ and the First World War.” Australian Journal of Politics & History 28 (3): 380–90. Mou, Zongsan ... . (1979) 2003. “Wusi yu xiandaihua ...... (May Fourth and Modernization).” In Shidai yu ganshou xubian....... (Supplements to ‘Impressions of the Times’), 251–74. Vol. 24 of Mou Zong­san xiansheng quanji ....... (The Complete Works of Mou Zongsan), 32 vols. Taibei: Lianjing. Sachsenmaier, Dominic. 2007. “Chinese Debates on Modernization after theGreat War.” In Decentering America, edited by Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht,109–31. New York: Berghahn Books. Valéry, Paul. (1919) 1977. “The Crisis of the Mind.” In Paul Valéry: An Antholo­gy, 94–107. London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Van den Stock, Ady. 2016. The Horizon of Modernity: Subjectivity and SocialStructure in New Confucian Philosophy. Leiden and Boston: Brill. –––. (forthcoming). “Liang the Rural Reformer.” In Dao Companion to the Phi­losophy of Liang Shuming, edited by Thierry Meynard, and Philippe Major. Dordrecht: Springer. Vrahimis, Andreas. 2015. “Legacies of German Idealism: From the Great Warto the Analytic/Continental Divide.” Parrhesia 24: 83–106. Wang, Hui .. . 1989. “Yuyan yu weiji: Zhongguo xiandai lishi zhong de ‘wusi’ qimeng yundong .....:........“..”.... (Prophecy and Crisis: the ‘May Fourth’ Enlightenment Movement in Mod­ern Chinese History).” Wenxue pinglun .... (Literary Review) 3: 15– 25; 4: 35–47. –––. 2008. “Scientific Worldview, Culture Debates, and the Reclassification ofKnowledge in Twentieth-Century China.” boundary 2, 35 (2): 125–55. –––. 2016. “The Transformation of Culture and Politics: War, Revolution, andthe ‘War of Ideas’ in the 1910s.” In China’s Twentieth Century, edited by Saul Thomas, 41–109. London and New York: Verso. Wang, Yuanhua ... . 2000.“Du Yaquan yu dong xi wenhua wenti lunzhan............ (Du Yaquan and the Debate on the Problem of East­ern and Western Cultures).” In Ershi shiji Zhongguo sixiang shilun .......... (Essays in the History of Twentieth-Century Chinese Thought), edit­ed by Xu Jilin ... , vol. 1, 275–95. Shanghai: Dongfang chuban zhongxin. Xie, Zhensheng ... . 1988. “Du Yaquan zhuanlüe..... (A Short Bi­ography of Du Yaquan).” Zhongguo keji shiliao ...... (Documents in the History of Science and Technology in China) 9 (3): 8–14. Xu, Guoqi. 2005. China and the Great War: China’s Pursuit of a New National Iden­tity and Internationalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Xu, Jilin. 2018. “Two Kinds of Enlightenment: Civilizational Consciousness or Cultural Consciousness.” In Rethinking China’s Rise: A Liberal Critique, 155– 90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zhang, Fan .. . 2016. “‘Li’ yu ‘li’ zhi jian: ouzhan yujing xia Zhongguo ‘kexue’ gainian de daode kunjing yu yiyi zhuanxiang “. ”. “. ”..:....... “.. ”............ (Between ‘Force’ and ‘Principle’:The Moral Predicament and Change in Meaning of the Chinese Conception of ‘Science’ in the Context of the Great War).” Xueshu yuekan .... (Ac­ademic Monthly) 48 (7): 109–22. Zhang, Junmai ... . (1922) 1981. “Ouzhou wenhua zhi weiji ji Zhongguo xin wenhua zhi quxiang ................ (The Crisis of European Culture and the Direction of China’s New Culture).” Reprinted in Zhongguo xiandai zhexue shi ziliao huibian: dongxi wenhua lunzhan ...........:...... (Collected Documents in the History ofModern Chinese Philosophy: The Debate on Eastern and Western Cultures), edit­ed by Zhong Limeng ... , and Yang Fenglin ... , 235–39. Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe. Zhao, Bing .. . 2017.“Ouzhan qianhou Zhongguo xin wenhua yundong zhong de ‘Deyizhi jingshen’ ji qi zhuanxiang .............“.....”.... (The Notion of the ‘German Spirit’ during the New Culture Movement and its Transformation in the Period of the First World War.)” Deguo yanjiu .... (German Studies) 32 (1): 102–17. Zheng, Dahua.... . 2002. “Di yi ci shijie dazhan yu zhanhou Zhongguo wen-hua baoshouzhuyi sichao de xingqi....................... (The First World War and the Postwar Rise of Cultural Con­servatism in China).” Zhejiang xuekan .... (Zhejiang Journal) 5: 38–50. Zheng, Shiqu ... . 1997. “Lun ouzhan hou Zhongguo shehui wenhua sichao de biandong ............... (Changed Conceptions of Society and Culture in China after the Great War).” Jindai shi yanjiu ..... (Studies in Modern History) 3: 207–21. –––. 2006. “Ouzhan hou Liang Qichao de wenhua zijue ........... (Liang Qichao’s Postwar Cultural Consciousness).” Beijing shifandaxue xuebao ........ (Journal of Beijing Normal University) 3: 49–59. –––. 2008. “Ouzhan qianhou guoren de xiandaixing fansheng ............ (Chinese Reflections on Modernity Around the Time of the Great War).” Lishi yanjiu .... (Historical Research) 1: 82–106. –––. 2011. “Ouzhan hou guoren de ‘dui Xifang qiu jiefang’......“......” (The Chinese Search for ‘Liberation from the West’ Following the End of the Great War).” Beijing shifandaxue xuebao ........ (Journal of Beijing Normal University) 2: 64–79. SPECIAL ISSUE: TRANSFORMATIONS IN CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AT THE THRESHOLD OF MODERNITY Logic and Methodology DOI: 10.4312/as.2021.9.2.81-103 A Few Important Landmarks in the Chinese Debates on Dialectical and Formal Logic1 from the 1930s Jan VRHOVSKI Abstract With the rise of the discourse on dialectical materialism in the late 1920s, ideas related to the Marxist notion of dialectical logic started to circulate in the Chinese intellectual world. Not long after the first public discussions on dialectical materialism started to emerge in the early 1930s, the discussants on both sides started to address the question of the Marxist notion of logic and its relationship with Western formal logic. Consequent­ly, over the 1930s, a series of separate public debates ensued, in which dialectical logic contended against the “conventional” forms of logic, such as traditional Aristotelian and modern formal logic. This paper outlines the major landmarks within the public as well as internal Marxist debates on logic in the 1930s. The discussion starts with a general overview of the intellectual background of the debates, and proceeds by analysing the principal developments in them, starting with Ye Qing’s and Zhang Dongsun’s polemic about “dynamic logic” from 1933, and concluding with the internal Marxist discussions on the sublation of formal logic in the last years of the decade. Keywords: dialectical materialism, dialectical logic, formal logic, 1930s debates on logic,Republican China Nekaj pomembnih mejnikov v kitajskih razpravah o dialekticni logiki iz tridesetihlet 20. stoletja Izvlecek Z vzponom diskurza o dialekticnem materializmu v poznih dvajsetih letih 20. stoletja soideje, povezane z marksisticnim pojmom dialekticne logike, pricele krožiti med kitajskimiizobraženci. Kmalu po vzniku prvih javnih razprav o dialekticnem materializmu v zgodnjihtridesetih letih 20. stoletja so udeleženci razprav na obeh straneh priceli naslavljati vprašan­ja, povezana z marksisticnim pojmom logike in njegovim odnosom z zahodno formalnologiko. Posledicno je v tridesetih letih prišlo do razvoja vec locenih javnih razprav, v katerih The author acknowledges the support of the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS) in the scope of the research project N6-0161 (HUMEC) Humanism in Intercultural Per­spective: Europe and China. * Jan VRHOVSKI is a research fellow at University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.Email address: jan.vrhovski@ff.uni-lj.si je pojem dialekticne logike nastopil v nasprotju s tradicionalno aristoteljansko in modernoformalno logiko. V tem clanku bom orisal osrednje mejnike tako javnih kot internih mark­sisticnih razprav o logiki iz tridesetih let 20. stoletja. Pricujoca razprava se zacenja s splošnimpregledom intelektualnega ozadja razprav ter se nadaljuje s podajanjem analize njihovihglavnih razvojnih smernic. Analiticni del clanka tako podaja pregled osnovnih vsebinskihsegmentov razprav, od polemike med Ye Qingom in Zhang Dongsunom iz leta 1933 dorazprav o sublaciji formalne logike v zadnjih letih istega desetletja. Kljucne besede: dialekticni materializem, dialekticna logika, formalna logika, razprave o logiki v tridesetih letih 20. stoletja, republikanska Kitajska Introduction Following the gradual introduction of classical works of dialectical materialism anddialectics of nature, in the late 1920s a general discourse on dialectical logic started toform, which in the years to come was shaped both by the Chinese adherents of dia­lectical materialism as well as proponents of other philosophical worldviews in China(see Tian 2019, 149). At the initial stage, the discourse had been deeply immersed inthe traditional Chinese world of ideas, poised between the classical philosophical con­cepts of complementarity, harmony, change, and so on one hand, and novel scientific,universalist systems of objectivity on the other (Rošker 2019, 204). With the subse­quent introduction of more recent Soviet theories into Chinese Marxist discourse,which was heavily permeated with political ideas of class struggle and the notion ofan unbridgeable distinction between idealism and materialism (Heubel 2019, 38), bythe mid-1930s the discourse shifted onto an entirely different plane.2 While the textual and conceptual introduction of the Marxist philosophy of logic andmathematics started already in the mid- to late-1920s, the first extensive public debates The article does not discuss the general discourse on logic in the above-mentioned period, but fo­cuses only on the debates on dialectical logic in the 1930s. Although, in the 1930s, the discourse on dialectical logic also involved debates on the nature of formal logic, these did not represent the actual state of the science in the country. Furthermore, these debates did not overlap with the ac-ademic—at the time essentially philosophical––discourse on formal logic, yet were nevertheless partially dependent on it, in the sense that certain ideas about formal logic were extracted from the works of the members of Qinghua School of logic. The article further treats the development of the discourse on dialectical logic as a consequence of the establishment of dialectical material­ism in Chinese intellectual circles, which were not directly connected to hose associated with other schools of logic. As such, the 1930s discourse on dialectical logic was, in the first place, a process of introduction and theoretical appropriation, which, in the case of its propagators, also indirectly involved a general idea of logic and dialectics prevalent among non-expert members of the intelli­gentsia. Finally, the manner in which the academic discourse on formal logic overlapped with the discourse on dialectical logic depended heavily on the participants’ relationship with the former. started to ferment only at the beginning of the 1930s.The first major polemics relatedto dialectical logic broke out in the framework of broader debates on dialectical ma­terialism, which, speaking more generally, developed between a group of philosophersled by Zhang Dongsun ... (1886–1973), on the one side, and Chinese adherents of Marxism headed by Ye Qing .. (original name Ren Zhuoxuan ... , 1896–1990) on the other. The various discussions which developed in the course of the fol­lowing decade (up to 1939), were extremely numerous and complex, with the partici­pants addressing the question of dialectical logic at different stages of the debates.Overtime, the arguments and sources adopted in the discussions also varied. If the debates inthe early 1930s revolved around Plekhanov’s notion of “dynamic logic”, around 1935,when a second motion was promulgated in the framework of internal Marxist debateson dialectical logic by Li Da .. (1890–1966) and Ai Siqi ... (original name Li Shengxuan ... , 1910–1966), the focus of the debate shifted to the question ofthe overall relationship between formal and dialectical logic. Finally, between the years1937 and 1939, a more scattered discussion on “sublation of formal logic” developed. In the following discussion, I shall try to outline the main developments in the publicand internal Marxist discussions on logic in the 1930s. Since, due to the broadness,wide scope and complexity of the discourse on logic in the focal decade, it would beimpossible to convey a complete picture of the debates, I shall only focus on a fewdevelopments and contributions that are most relevant for the 1930s discussions onthe Marxist notion of dialectical and formal logic. At the same time, the main aimof the following discussion will also be to provide considerable supplementationsand, to a much lesser degree, corrections to the already existing contemporary sur­vey on development of dialectical materialism in Republican China. Moreover, thefollowing overview will represent one of the first surveys focusing on the debates ondialectical logic in Chinese 1930s in the Western sinological discourse.3 In Chinese, the earliest systematic overview focusing on the criticism and polemics on formal logic in the 1930s was given in the Vol. 5 of the series Zhongguo luoji shi ..... (History of Logic in China), written by Zhou Yunzhi ... and Zhou Wenying ... (1989). Akin to the men­tioned monograph, the later historical overviews of Chinese logic or logic in China tend to attach less importance to dialectical logic and mainly only provide a summary of the content of the Marx­ist criticism of formal logic. In specialized studies devoted to the history of dialectical logic in Chi­na more attention is usually given to the much wider discussions which developed throughout the 1950s, also referred to as the Great Debates on Logic (Luoji da taolun..... ). By and large,the 1930s discourse on dialectical logic has been more intensively discussed in studies devoted to history of dialectical materialism in China. In more recent years these also represented the aspect of Chinese scholarship which has been most extensively translated into English, which is also the reason why the present article, in its attempt to contribute to the Western scholarship on the topic,seeks to complement Tian Chenshan’s historical overview of (materialist) dialectics in China. Setting the Stage: Translations and Early Chinese Treatises on Dialectical Logic An early important translation, which probably catalysed the early part of thedebates on dialectical logic, was Zheng Chaolin’s ... (1901–1998) trans­lation of an excerpt from Georgi V. Plekhanov’s (1856–1918) FundamentalProblems of Marxism (1908). The text “Dialectics and Logic (Bianzhengfa yuluoji ...... )” was first published in 1924 in the influential La Jeunesse (Xin qingnian... , New Youth) journal. In this, Plekhanov posited that, inopposition to formal logic, the logic of dialectics incorporated the laws of achanging, perennially moving universe. Using the principle of change as themain condition of objectiveness, Plekhanov distinguished between a “dynam­ic” logic (dongde luoji.... ) and a “static” logic (jingde luoji.... ). Because, according to classic dialectics of nature, movement arises as a resultof inner contradictions that underpin all existence, a “dynamic” logic wouldhave to integrate the principle of contradiction into its fundamental laws.Thus, if the partial and subjective formal logic asserts that “yes is yes, and no isno”, the “dynamic” dialectical logic reflects the principles of movement by pos­tulating that “yes is no, and no is yes”. By that token dialectical logic surpass­es formal logic in realism and objectiveness. He believed that, while formallogic is concerned mainly with a mechanical idea of motion, dialectical logictakes into account the inner characteristics of change as such, and while for­mal logic is only concerned with the rational formal characteristics of humanthought, dialectical logic encompasses the laws which underpin all aspects ofmaterial existence (Plekhanov 1924). In the following years, the increase in the number of Chinese translations ofclassical and contemporary Marxist works broadened the scope of available ma­terial on the topic in China. Through the gradual introduction of work andthought of Hegel, Marxist intellectuals also became familiar with certain as­pects related to the Hegelian roots of Marxist dialectics as well as the notion ofdialectical logic itself. At the same time, translations of Engels’s thought on thedialectics of nature and some minor aspects of Lenin’s view on dialectical ma­terialism helped Chinese intellectuals to gradually gain a more comprehensiveview of the foundations of, as it were, the “classical” philosophy of dialecticalmaterialism. A significant increase in both translations and Chinese treatises on dialecti­cal or dynamic logic occurred around the year 1929, in the framework of the general surge in Chinese translation of quintessential works of Marxism.4 The early translations of works on dialectical logic included Ke Bonian’s ... (1904–1985) translation of Josef Dietzgen’s (1828–1888) Dialectical Logic (Bi­anzhengfa de luoji...... ) from 1930, and Peng Weisen’s ... (?) translation of A. K. Toporkov’s Elementary Principles of Dialectical Logic (Bi­anzheng luoji zhi jiben yuanli......... ) from 1932, among others.The earlier presence or even overall relevance of the notion of “dynamic log­ic” (dongde luoji.... ) in Chinese intellectual discourse was also affirmedby the pragmatist logician and psychologist Shen Youqian’s ... (Eugene Shen, 1899–?) review of B. Bogoslovsky’s book The Technique of Controversy: Principles of Dynamic Logic (1928), where the so-called “dynamic logic” wastreated as the third contemporary alternative to the “orthodox Aristotelian log­ic” (Shen 1930, 1). The remaining two contending logics were the form-centredmathematical logic and the profoundly psychologistic pragmatist logic (or “ex­perimental logic”) (ibid.). Another notion synonymous to dialectical logic, the “logic of contradictions”(maodun luoji.... ) was discussed in an early example of a Chinese trea­tise on dialectical materialism, Guo Zhanbo’s ... (original name Guo Haiqing ... , 1905–1989) A Study of Dialectics (Biazhengfa yanjiu..... ) from 1930. In this book, Guo discussed the dialectical method as aform of logic equal in value to Western formal logic. One year later, Guo pub­lished “A Comparative Study of Formal Logic and Dialectics (Xingshi luojiyu bianzhengfa de bijiao yanjiu ............. )”, where healready expounded on “logic of contradictions” as a logic completely dissim­ilar to formal logic. Following the paradigm of Plekhanov, he described thelatter as a narrow, static and extremely abstract perspective on reality, while indialectical logic he recognized such characteristics as dynamism, wholenessand a practical approach. According to Guo, its main principle was to pene­trate the inner contradiction between “movement in stillness and stillness in movement” and the “identity in differences and differences in identity”. Atthe time, Guo found the resolution of the relation between dialectical and 4 Such as Li Tiesheng’s ... translation of Bukharin’s Dialectical Materialism, Yang Dongchun’s .. translation of Josef Dietzgen’s Materialist View of Dialectics, and Lin Boxiu’s ... transla­tion of Deborin’s Materialist Dialectics and Natural Sciences were all published in 1929. Ling Ying­fu’s ... translation of Deborin’s Introduction to Materialist Dialectics was published in 1930, and Du Weizhi’s ... translation of Engels’ Dialectics of Nature in 1932. The year 1935 saw the publication of Li Da’s and Lei Zhongjian’s ... translation of Shirokov’s Textbook of Dialectical Materialism (Bianzhengfa weiwulun jiaocheng........ ) and Pan Gushen’s translation of the Soviet manual Outline of Dialectics of Natural Sciences (Bianzhengfa de ziran kexue gailun.......... ). formal logic in their complementarity, rather than in precedence of one overthe other.5 Between 1930 and 1932, individual treatises on Hegel’s dialectic and relat­ed questions started to emerge. In 1930, for instance, Shen Zhiyuan ... (1902–1965) composed his book Hegel and Dialectics (Heigeer yu bianzhengfa....... ), which touched on what Shen called Hegel’s “logic of revolu­tion” (geming de luoji..... ) and his idea of sublation (Ger. Aufhebung), as philosophers and other scholars such as He Lin .. (1902–1992) and Zhou Gucheng ... (1898–1996) started pondering Hegel’s notion of dialectics more intensively from various standpoints. The early signs of Chinese Marx­ists’ discovery of Hegelian dialectics came to expression, for example, in WangZhaogong’s ... (?) controversial article “The Decline of Formal Logic andCompletion of a New Scientific Methodology (Xingshi luoji zhi bengkui yuxin kexue de fangfalun zhi wancheng .................. )” from 1931. In his paper, Wang enunciated that Hegelian dialectics hadalready superseded formal logic and negated its fundamental laws. Hegel’s dia­lectics, however, represented only the first stage in the subsequent developmentof materialist “synthetic” (zonghe .. ) scientific methodology.6 Between 1932 and 1934, perhaps the most important platform through which ideas of both dialectical materialism as well as logical positivism and mathemat­ical logic were disseminated was the “World Currents of Thought (Shijie sichao .... )” column in the Dagong bao... (L’Impartial) newspaper (Tianjin). The chief editor of the column was Zhang Shenfu ... , original name Song-nian .. (1893–1986), who was a professor of mathematical logic and modern Western philosophy (specializing in Russell and the Vienna School) at Qing­hua University, as well as an ardent propagator of dialectical materialism and one of the original founders of the Communist Party of China. In the early 1930s,Zhang developed a syncretistic philosophical worldview, whose main goal was a synthesis between dialectical materialism and logical analysis. During his ed­itorship of the “World Currents of Thought” column, Zhang himself published a wide array of articles and translations on contemporary logic, while the topics 5 In 1932, the philosopher Zhu Baiying ... (original name Zhu Tingzhang ... , alias Fang Yiru ... ?)—writing under the pseudonym Yiying .., composed two essays, “For­ mal Logic and Contradictory Logic in Epistemology (Renshilun zhong de xingshi lunli yu mao- dun lunli .............. )” and “Rule of Equilibrium and Law of Contradic­ tion ( Junhenglü yu maodunlü ....... )” in the influential Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi.... ). 6 A similar approach was adopted by Li Shicen ... (1892–1934) in his article “Bianzhengfa yu xingshi luoji ........ (Dialectical Method and Formal Logic)” from 1932. in dialectical materialism and logical positivism were taken over by his young­er brother, the philosopher Zhang Dainian ... (1909–2004), who later also became a lecturer at Qinghua University. Emulating his older brother, between 1933 and 1934 Dainian wrote prolifically on the possibilities of attaining a “crea­tive synthesis” between new (dialectical) materialism, logical positivism (including logical analysis and mathematical logic) and the idealism inherent in traditional Chinese philosophy. In the 1930s, the Zhang brothers, especially Zhang Shen­fu, became widely known as the proponents of a syncretistic faction of dialectical materialists, advocating the synthesis between mathematical logic and dialectical method (see Guo 1935, 183–90 etc.). Zhang Dongsun, Ye Qing and the Polemic on “Dynamic Logic”,1933–1936 Although the main debate on dialectical materialism between Zhang Dongsun and his followers on one side, and Ye Qing and other Marxists on the other,had already started in 1931, the discussion began to involve dialectical logic only around 1933 (cf. Tian 2005, 110). Apart from the influential Dagong bao, where Zhang Dongsun’s article which sparked the debate had first appeared, 7 another important locus of the discussion was also the New China (Xin Zhongua... ) review. Following the initial confrontations between Marxists and the critics of dialectical materialism, led by Zhang Dongsun, another one of Zhang’s articles, “Is Dynamic Logic Possible? (Dongde luoji shi keneng de ma? ......... ?)”, published in the abovementioned periodical, opened a new minor discus­sion on dialectical and formal logic. In his essay from 1933, Zhang refuted the plausibility of the concept of “dy­namic logic”, pointing out that within logic there is no such polar antagonismas that between a static and dynamic quality (Rošker 2015, 112). By a relat­ed token, Zhang stressed that dialectical logic can only be considered a formof methodology, which meant that it pertained strictly to dialectical principlesas inherent in cognitive models and hence could not be a priori objective. Hefurther criticized both prevailing interpretations of the relationship betweenformal and dialectical logic in Marxist discourse, namely that dialectical logiccan either supplement or completely replace formal logic, stating that while the 7 The polemics were probably initiated by Zhang Dongsun’s article “I also Discuss Dialectical Ma­terialism (Wo yi tantan bianzheng de weiwulun .......... )”, which appeared in the “Modern Currents of Thought (Xiandai sichao .... )” column of the Dagong bao newspaper in September 1931. dynamic aspect is already encapsulated in natural science per se, in epistemologythere only exists a dualism between intuition and intellect, where formal logicrepresents the only function (yong. ) of the latter.8 Furthermore, since reality isalways in a “dynamic” state, this entailed that there cannot be something calleda “static” mode of understanding, which in turn implied that the notion of “dy­namic logic” had no meaning. Not long afterwards, Ye Qing’s “A Dynamic Logic is Possible! An Answer toProfessor Zhang Dongsun (Dongde luoji shi keneng de! Da Zhang Dongsunjiaoshou ........!...... )” and Deng Yunte’s ... (?)essay “Formal Logic or Materialist Dialectics? (Xingshi luoji haishi weiwu bi-anzhengfa? ........... ?)” were published in the new “Polemic on ‘Dynamic Logic’ (“Dongde luoji” lunzhan ...... )” column of the New China review. Both emphasized that in his criticism of dialectical logicZhang misunderstood Hegel’s idea of sublation and the dialectical principle ofevolution in the context of the relationship between formal and dialectical log­ic. Ye further claimed that dialectical logic was the “affirmation of negation” offormal logic, and thereby a higher evolutionary stage of the latter. Moreover, Yeasserted that in its evolution dialectical logic had already integrated the induc­tive method through a positive development process and was therefore equal toa “general scientific method” (pubian de kexue fangfa....... ), whereas by means of sublation (Aufhebung) it absorbed the method of deduction. A ma­jor corollary to that was that dialectical logic was more comprehensive than anyother form of logic, and it also implied that it was more objective than formallogic, as well as more universal. The Zhang-Ye debate on dialectical materialism reached its peak by 1934, while in 1934 and 1935, respectively, Zhang and Ye, each according to his own views,compiled an anthology of the most important contributions to the debate (see Zhang 1934a; Ye 1935a). In 1934, Ye Qing published his lengthy work A Critique of Zhang Dongsun’s Philosophy (Zhang Dongsun zhexue pipan....... ) in two volumes. The problem of “dynamic logic” was addressed at length in the sec­ond volume of Ye’s book (see Ye 1934, 615–60). In 1934, Zhang recapitulated his criticism in various writings, such as “A Few Fashionable Questions in the Forum of Ideas (Sixiang de luntan shang jige shimao wenti ............ )”. In this lengthy essay, Zhang gave an overview of the main questions raised in the framework of the ongoing discussions, such as “Can dialectics replace the law of identity?”, “Is contrariety (xiangfan.. ) contradiction (maodun.. )?”, “Are 8 Zhang claimed that he followed Russell’s logicist idea of logic. all changes sublation (xiaoliu.. , Aufhebung)?”9 and so on. This time Zhang’s criticism of the idea of dialectical logic was also directed exclusively against Ple­khanov’s theory of logic.10 On both sides a number of other discussants addressed the question of dialectical logic. On Zhang Dongsun’s side of the debate, the most notable argument against dialectical logic came from Mou Zongsan ... (1909–1995), who at the time maintained a deep interest in mathematical logic. Mou Zongsan raised his objections against the Marxist notion of dialectical logic in an article entitled “Logic and Dialectical Logic (Luoji yu bianzheng luoji ....... )” from 1934. In his argument against dialectical logic, Mou draw from the idea of pure logic advanced in the contemporary Chinese New Realist circles. Having repeated the same maxim as advanced by the Qinghua logician Jin Yuelin in the very same year (see Jin 1934), Mou stated that there only exists one logic, which is objective, absolute, universal, normative and in accord with “what is potentially so”. Mou presented a rare perspective in the debate, in which the mathematical logic of Principia Mathematica was described as the highest devel­opmental stage of formal logic. In the same text, Mou implicitly indicated that “modern” formal logic was far beyond the antiquated Marxist doctrine on logic.After having outlined the general characteristics of “pure logic”, Mou compared his fundamental laws (principles) with those of the proposed dialectical logic. He noted that the main flaw of dialectical logic resided in its definition of the “law of contradiction”, which did not discern between the identity expressed by a propo­sition and negation in the form of a term (mingcheng.. ). In other words: dia­lectical logic distorted the law of contradiction by treating “is A” (. A) as the op­posite value of “non-A” (. A). This all originated in its misunderstanding of the law of identity, which could be defined using three different concepts of identity (cf. Suter 2017, 158–67). From his own point of view, identity and contradiction were based on the a pri­ori essence of human intellect, which meant that they can neither be proved nor disproved, nor can they be derived from each other. Furthermore, these laws are 9 Zhang used the word xiaoliu.. as a translation of Hegel’s Aufhebung or the verb aufheben. The term combined the words xiaoshi.. “dissolution” and baoliu.. “preservation”. More common­ ly used Chinese terms for sublation, such as qiyang.. and zhiyang.. , had been borrowed from Japanese sources. 10 By 1939, Zhang seems to have changed his mind. In his novel theory of cultural conditionality of logic (see Zhang 1939), Zhang treated dialectical logic as one of the four kinds of logic, calling it “the socio-political” logic. He even claimed that although Chinese culture did not produce mathe­ matical logic because there was no historical need for it, metaphysical and socio-political logic had always constituted an important segment of traditional Chinese thought. applicable solely to logical propositions and bear not direct relation to the factual state of affairs, or even time and space. This was in essence his idea of pure logic.To further illustrate how dialectical logic can lead to inconceivable fallacies, Mou cited a few examples from Jin Yuelin’s article “Immediate Inference of A, E, I and O” (1930). Following his direct criticism of Chen Baoyin’s ... (original name Chen Qixiu ... , 1886–1960) lectures on dialectical materialism from 1932,11 Mou then concluded that dialectical logic is not logic, but a theory oc­cupied with analysing facts; neither is it a methodology nor can it be considered a special method of thinking. Finally, he also listed four Marxist misconceptions about logic: (i) that formal logic is the starting point for analysis of the world; (ii) that dialectical logic is a scientific fact; (iii) that objective facts are logic and that dialectical logic is the counterpart of formal logic; and (iv) that the laws of logic depict objective facts.12 Internal Marxist Debates: From the Relationship between Dialectical and Formal Logic to Sublation of Formal Logic,1935–1939 The early confrontations between the group of philosophers led by Zhang Dongsun and Ye Qing and other Marxists led to two particular developments: on the one hand, they gave rise to inner philosophical debates in the circles of Chi­nese adherents of dialectical materialism, in which more moderate interpretations of the classical doctrine, such as that of Ye Qing, were set in contrast with the nar­rower, mainstream expositions of current Soviet doctrine. On the other hand, the early debates communicated a sense of the broader intellectual relevance of dia­lectical logic—as a most advanced method reasoning with practical applications in all everyday matters and not only in strict formal inference—to the members 11 “Methodology of Studies in Social Sciences”. Chen’s lectures were recorded by Xu Wanjun ... and Lei Jishang ... and published as a monography in 1932. 12 Earlier in 1932, a similar attempt had been made by Wang Dianji ... (1900–1979) in his article “A Critique of Principles of Formal Logic (Xingshi luoji yuanli de pipan ......... )”. Wang had shown how formal logic had been superseded and rectified by mathemat­ical logic, a form of logic closely connected to contemporary science and mathematics. By having demonstrated how traditional formal logic could not be considered representative of deductive logic as such, Wang rendered the Marxist criticisms outdated and irrelevant for the contemporary discourse on logic. Secondly, if the exponents of dialectical logic claimed that dialectical logic was superior or equal in value to formal logic, the same could not hold for mathematical logic. Finally,this also implied that Marxist evaluation of deductive logic ought to take place within the compar­ison between dialectical and contemporary mathematical logic, were the laws of contradiction and excluded middle had already been proven inadequate. of Marxist circles, stimulating their active engagement in the developing public discourse. Thus, in 1935, an intensive debate developed between Ye Qing and Ai Siqi, which reflected the Chinese instigation of the Soviet controversy between Deborin’s and the official interpretation of dialectical materialism (Tian 2005,112). Concurrently, in 1935, Li Da also started a new chapter in the debate on the relationship between dialectical and formal logic, which channelled and prolifer­ated the more recent mainstream Soviet doctrine into Chinese Marxist discourse on logic. The year 1935 thus marked a pivotal moment in the history of Marxist discourse on logic in China, mainly because it delineated the main direction of Chinese debate on the same topic for the following few decades. Ye Qing and Ai Siqi, 1936 In his Lectures on Philosophy (Zhexue jianghua.... ), first published in 1936,Ai Siqi set out to refute the notion of identity in formal logic. In a derogatory manner, Ai remarked that, in accordance with its paradoxical law of identity, for­mal logic leads one to believe that the young are always the young, even after they become adults. Otherwise, Ai’s criticism of logic further accentuated the main points of contention against formal logic as outlined by Li. (Ai 1936a, 151–63)13 In the same year, Ai’s critique was countered by Ye Qing, who published two arti­cles titled “Formal Logic and Dialectical Logic (Xingshi luoji yu bianzheng luoji ......... )”. As in his early reflections, Ye assumed a more moderate position, claiming that dialectical logic was, in fact, a synthesis between inductive and deductive logic. Ye advocated a resolution to the problem of the relationship between formal and dialectical logic dissimilar from the idea of dialectical sub-lation, in which the fundamental laws of both logics would have been conjoined in a harmonic unity. Ye’s ideal of complementarity (xiangfan xiangcheng.... ) presupposed that in the new logic the laws of dialectics would be juxtaposed against the principles of formal logic, forming a series of principles that would correspond to the law of unity of contradictions (maodun tongyi lü..... ). If in formal logic the law of identity stipulated that “A is A”, in dialectical logic its principle of identity would have been directly modified to state that “at the same time A is A and A is not A” (Ye 1936a, 73). In turn,Ye also impugned Ai’s critical remarks on laws of contradiction and identity in formal logic, saying: The statement “this young person is a salesman” is clearly (an example) of the use of the law of excluded middle from formal logic. The formula 13 In the same year Ai also wrote a few responses to other participants in the debate. (See, for instance Ai 1936b) of the law of excluded middle is “A is B or A is non-B” (A . B ... B), and the meaning of “this young person is a salesman” is the same as “Ais B”. The formula of the law of unity of contradictions would here be “Ais B and A is non-B” (A. B... B), that is “yes-no, no-yes”. Followingthat example, we get: “this young person is a salesman and a non-salesman”or “this young person is a salesman and also is not a salesman”. (ibid., 80) Ye stated that Ai did not properly understand the laws of contradiction and exclud­ed middle in formal logic, and hence was unable to understand the real relation be­tween formal and dialectical logic. By advocating his harmonistic view, Ye caused aconsiderable rift between two interpretational currents among Chinese adherents ofdialectical materialism. He caused a stir among the hard-line Marxists who main­tained that dialectical logic was superior to formal logic, whose responses subse­quently caused the debate to shift to a different level. Thus, in 1937 a debate on the“sublation of formal logic” (xingshi luoji de yangqi....... ) started to fer­ment among Chinese Marxists, which ultimately reached its peak in 1939. Li Da on Logic, 1935–1936 In the years 1935 and 1936, Li Da’s writing aimed at rectifying the content of the Chinese discourse on dialectical logic. In comparison with more, so to say,“moderate” interpretations of the dialectical variety of logic, his article “Dialecti­cal Logic and Formal Logic (Bianzheng luoji yu xingshi luoji ......... )” utilized a more politically coloured rhetoric, which depicted formal logic as a mere ideological invention of metaphysicians and idealists. All metaphysicians or idealists are not aware that in their mental view,apart from formal logic, there is also a dialectical logic. They praise for­mal logic as the science of the method of correct thinking and declare that formal logic is a scholarly instrument “unchangeable in all times,countries and people” and that for any learning, problem and course of events formal logic is (always) the right method of thinking. Whenever a polemic arises about a certain question, they will employ this “Mr. For­mal Logic” to serve as their advocate.Therefore, metaphysical and idealist views on nature, on society as well as their general worldview all take formal logic as their (only) methodology. (Li 1935a, 1) Akin to other examples of Soviet criticism, Li’s text revolved around the three laws of logic. Li’s updated exposition of the Soviet dogma led him to reject all three laws as abstractions of the principle of identity, claiming that a false notion of identity had caused formal logic to neglect the true principle of dialectical unity of identity and difference. Hence, according to Li, formal logic was devoid of any real substance. It was: • Subjectivism, whose form did not represent objective reality. • Devoid of an evolutionary or developmental perspective. • It ignored the principle of interrelatedness of all phenomena (dialectical logic was “comprehensive” or “holistic”). • Its principles were isolated from all aspects of social practice. (ibid., 4–5) Li also presented a theory of development of logic, which was based on the theory of “historical developmental process of human cognition” from Engels’s Dialec­tics of Nature. In Li’s historical model, formal logic emerged at the developmental stage of “metaphysical thought”, while its successor, mathematical or symbolic logic, developed under “the social conditions of the age of (capitalist) manufac­tures”. Because it emerged in the same period as natural sciences and modern mathematics, it absorbed their knowledge and emulated their form. In contrast,dialectical logic developed at the highest evolutionary stage of human thought.Consequently, dialectical logic was not only a form of logic which superseded mathematical logic, but a higher form of thought which sublated all the lower forms: it cleansed the idealist elements and integrated its concrete elements. In this regard, Li’s idea of the superiority of dialectical logic was closer to Hegel’s idea of sublation (Aufhebung) (see Hegel 1986, 365–67, 565). On the other hand,sublation also implied a conceptual dissolution of formal logic as such. Other contemporary writings of Li reveal his strong interest in a dialectics of nature, and especially in a Marxist philosophy of mathematics. He maintained a positive view of mathematics and called it a universal language for describing the spatial principles of material reality (see Li 1935b; 1936a). In 1936, however, Li also published a number of other articles on logic. In an article entitled “Dynam­ic Logic” he reviewed Plekhanov’s idea of dialectics as the logic of change. In a lecture entitled “The Logic of Dialectics (Bianzhengfa de luoji ...... )”, which was recorded by Yang Mingzhang ... and published in Yanching Uni­versity Weekly Magazine (Yanda zhoukan.... ), Li integrated the notion of “dynamic logic” into his general outline of characteristics of the advanced form of dialectical logic. In “Dynamic Logic” Li further defined change as the embod­iment of two main principles: the world as a totality of the material transforma­tions and general developmental laws of the physical world. He treated dialecti­cal materialism as scientific truth and philosophy as scientific methodology, and disputed Bohr’s model of atom as an argument against the claims of dialectical materialism, defining the objectivity of science or philosophy in terms of their ac­cordance with the process of change and practice. In the same year Li Da’s “Fun­damental Principles of Logic (Luoji de genben yuanli ....... )” and “Essentials of Logic (Luoji dayi .... )” were published in the Zhongshan In­stitute for Culture and Education Quarterly (Zhongshan wenhua jiaoyu jikan........ ). Sublation of Formal Logic, 1937–1939 By 1937,Ye recapitulated his views in yet another article on “Formal Logic and Di­alectical Logic (Xingshi luoji yu bianzheng luoji ......... )”, which presented a comprehensive response to all criticisms directed against him. Later the same year, Ai Siqi epitomized and further expanded the criticisms against Ye in an extensive monograph Critique of Ye Qing’s Philosophy (Ye Qing zhexue pipan...... ). Finally, in the same year Ye presented an expanded exposition of his views on logic in his monograph Problems of Logic (Lunlixue wenti..... ), which also devoted part of its discussion to mathematical logic—Ye’s sources were Kurt Joachim Grau’s Grundriß der Logik (1921) (translated into Chinese in 1927 by Chen Daqi ... ) and Wang Dianji’s A Treatise on Logic and Mathe­matical Logic (Luoji yu shuxue luoji lun........ ) from 1927. Although Ye believed that, as the most developed Western logic, mathematical logic pos­sessed the same theoretical limitations as its predecessor, he nevertheless made the following striking conclusion: I have already quoted Engels’s words, which say that dialectics is “a the­ory of thought and its laws” or “the science of the laws of the process of cognition in itself ”. In that way, dialectics must also be an investigation of the form(s) of thought.That is so because, besides content, thought has also got form. Content is a reflection of external things, and [the disci­pline] which investigates it is epistemology. Then, the only thing which reflects one’s [inner] self is form. And this form (xingshi .. ) is thought, that is the form of movement (yundong xingtai.... ) of external things taken in (shequ.. “absorb”, “receive”) by our thinking organ (siguan.. ). Because of that dialectics must be the science of the form of thought. According to my view, following the example of formal logic,dialectics could also adopt the mathematical form (shuxue xingtai.... ) and become a dialectical mathematical logic (bianzhengfa de shuli luoji........ ). (Ye 1937b, 138) Between 1937 and 1938, a series of treatises recapitulating the views expressed in the previous years, supported with new material on the matter, were published.These treatises argued in favour of either of the two options. Thus, for instance,in 1937 Pan Zinian ... (1893–1972) composed a treatise entitled Logic and the Science of Logic (Luoji yu luojixue...... ). Pan presented an overview of the materialist version of the history of logic, propagating the idea that formal logic had been sublated by the dialectical logic. The book was probably the first Chinese monograph to offer a comprehensive overview of the Soviet Marxist theory of physical matter. One year later (1938), the book was republished under the title Science of Logic and Logical Methods (How Dialectics Sublated Formal Log­ic) (Luojixue yu luojishu (Bianzheng zenyang yangqi le xingshi luoji) ....... (............ )), to emphasize its main doctrinal purport and orientation. The number of articles advocating the sublation of formal logic increased be­tween 1937 and 1939. Probably the earliest article adamantly asserting the or­thodox Marxist view on formal logic was Feng Ding’s .. (1902–1983) “Sub­lation of Formal Logic (Xingshi luoji de yangqi ....... )” from 1937. Feng, who at the time was writing under the pseudonym Beiye .. , outlined the main paradigm which was to underlie the forthcoming mainstream discourse on the sublation of formal logic in Chinese Marxist circles. Feng claimed that, due to its idealist essence, formal logic lacked all practical implications in the modern world: “Formal logic could indeed be used in everyday domestic environment, but this kind of domestic environment would be an old-fashioned one, with no deeper connection to the (current) society …” (Feng 1937, 252). Feng continued: “In the future, dialectics will enable small children to effortlessly acquire advanced knowl­edge.” (ibid.) Whereas, in the same future, dominated by dialectical materialism,the antiquated formal logic would be only found “in the local museum”. By 1939, the idea of sublation became commonly accepted in Chinese Marxist circles. The only question which still remained to be answered was: how was it supposed to be carried out? Or, in other words: to what degree ought formal logic be assimilated14 into dialectical logic? A notable case against the total elimination of formal logic was put forward by Ai Siqi in his critique of Pan Zinian’s book from 1938 (Ai 1939). This time, Ai spoke about a “critical assimilation of formal logic”. Although he described modern formal logic as a complete antithesis to di­alectical logic—since its main purpose was to resolve the paradoxes or contradic­tions from human thought—he still believed that it contained numerous useful 14 It appears that for some authors, like Ai Siqi, sublation was synonymous or at least closely related to “assimilation”. This again shows a substantial diversity of interpretations of these key notions in Chinese Marxist circles at the time. “techniques” which could be extracted from their idealist background and incul­cated into dialectical logic. In the same manner, Ai proposed that the laws of for­mal logic could be reformulated to fit dialectics and fused into an expanded body of dialectical logic, where deduction and induction would attain a complementary union. In comparison with the standpoint advocated in his earlier writings, the ideas presented in his work from 1939 appear to have conveyed a less narrow no­tion of logic. The debate was more or less concluded by Li Da’s article “On the Question of Sublation of Formal Logic (Xingshi luoji yangqi wenti ........ )” (1939), which also recapitulated the most important points indicated in the preceding discussions. At the same time, Li also presented some new arguments.As the chief contemporary sources in the theory of logic Li listed Wang Tefu’s ... The System of Logic (Lunlixue tixi..... ) (1933), Lin Zhongda’s ... vitalist treatise Synthetic Logic (Zonghe Luoji.... ), Ai Siqi’s Methodology of Thought and Pan Zinian’s Science of Logic and Logical Methods. In addition to the abovementioned commonly advocated views on the history of dialectical and for­mal logic, Li also provided a detailed criticism of two contending contemporary forms of logic: Russell’s mathematical logic and Dewey’s experimentalist logic. Li criticized the former, saying that: The philosophical foundation of mathematical or symbolic logic is ra­tionalism (lixinglun... ). Rationalism advocates that the actual world must be explained in terms of the truth as contained in human intellect. In consequence, mathematical or symbolic logic advocates that logic is merely a formal development of human intellect as such, it is a boundless derivation and advancement of reason. This is why mathemat­ical logic constructs logic on the forms of thinking and tries to assemble these forms so that they might be mystically turned into an illusion of the objective world. Since this school of logic investigates only the develop­mental forms of reason, it must necessarily resort to the use of the deduc­tive method. However, no other discipline is more able to rigorously use the method of deduction than mathematics. Therefore, it was necessary that this logic, which focuses on form as its object of research, adopts mathematical method of deduction, … claims that akin to mathematics logic has also got permanent and unchanging formulae, and advocates that the forms of thinking contain some unchanging “logical constants”,and that (in this manner) one can detect objective facts. Therefore, the members of this school of logic, such as Mou Zongsan, advocate that “logic is universal, formal and semantically undefined inferential relation between (different) propositional functions” … We could really call this school of logic an extreme and pure (version) of formal logic. (Li 1939, 111–12) Finally, in 1939 Li also enumerated four major laws of formal logic, including the law of sufficient reason (chongzu liyou lü..... ). Correspondingly, he also listed four kinds of limitations of formal logic: (1) formal logic is divorced from epistemology, (2) it totally neglects the developmental viewpoint, (3) it totally ne­glects the aspect of interconnectedness of things, and (4) it separates theory and practice. As noted above, Li’s critique of mathematical logic followed the very same lines, with a special emphasis on the assertion that its sole focus was the form of human reasoning. Conclusion Though presenting only a superficial view of the debates on dialectical and for­mal logic of the 1930s, the above discussion confirms the conjecture made in the introduction to this article, namely that the complex network of influences, con­tributions and opinions was webbed into the general intellectual discourse on di­alectical materialism and logic before and during the 1930s debates in China. A brief comparison of arguments and advocacies presented on both sides of the de­bates shows that at the time the discourse was undergoing constant change, while at the same time some doctrinal precepts, such as the extensions and derivations of the paradigm set down by Plekhanov or the Marxist interpretation of the basic laws of logic, were consistently preserved throughout the whole period under ob­servation. While it is highly probable that the special circumstances which arose during a time of war drastically affected or even overturned the overall intellectual trends that had ensued from the intellectual developments in the 1920s, the ideo­logical dissonances of the late 1930s opened up a new window of opportunity for establishment of the Soviet hard-line doctrinal model in Chinese Marxist philo­sophical discourse. To put it in concrete, plain terms: The main conceptual background for the above-mentioned debates in the early 1930s were the general philosophical discourse on logic and science from the 1920s, on one side, and the more specialized Chinese Marxist discourse on dialectical materialism from the same period, on the oth­er. Although the debates between Zhang Dongsun and Ye Qing ensued in direct consequence of the large-scale popularization of dialectical materialism and the sudden surge in number of publications on the topic in the late 1920s, contextual­ly these discussions were still rooted in the discourse of the mid-1920s. Ye Qing’s attention to Plekhanov’s “dynamic logic” as the, as it were, “logic of change”, and his synthetic solution of the problem of the relationship between formal and di­alectical logic was thus profoundly reflective of his semi-traditional notion of di­alectics, which still did not completely absorb the incoming current of sources on dialectical materialism. Similarly, the very idea of the significance of logic alsoderived from the developing Chinese philosophical discourse on logic from the1920s, as well as the current developments in the notion of logic as an academ­ic discipline at most prestigious Chinese universities in Beijing—especially theQinghua circle of logicians and New Realists. This was also the reason whymathematical logic and the analytical notion of pure logic were brought up bythe opponents of dialectical materialism so early on in the debate—Wang Dian-ji in 1932 and Mou Zongsan in 1933. The subsequent integration of mathemat­ical logic in Marxist discourse on the sublation of formal logic was also a rela­tively special feature of Chinese debates on dialectical materialism. Historically,this tendency might have been an extension of the strong presence of Russell’s philosophy of mathematics and the notion of mathematical logic in discoursegenerated in the early Communist circles in Beijing in the late 1910s and all ofthe 1920s. As mentioned above, the person facilitating a theoretical synthesis ofthe two theories was Zhang Shenfu, one of the cofounders of the CommunistParty of China and a professor at Peking and Qinghua universities.15 Moreover,a strong syncretistic tendency has been an underlining feature of the thoughtof a great number of important shapers of Chinese intellectual discourse in the1910s and 1920s, and seems to have also been retained as an important attitudein some of their students, who later became affiliated with the Chinese Marxistdiscourse. On the other hand, the influx of new knowledge about the Soviet doctrine ondialectical materialism as well as other translations of classical works of Marx­ism caused an internal rift in the lines of Chinese Marxists. The internal antag­onisms were at their peak between the years 1935 and 1937, when, for example,Ye Qing’s moderate views clashed with Ai Siqi’s more critical attitude towards the sublation of formal logic. Setting aside the internal tensions related to oth­er aspects of political or philosophical doctrine, which probably existed in theMarxist circles throughout the 1930s—also due to diverging opinions with re­gard to the notion of “Sinicization” of dialectical materialism and science—inthe years between 1937 and 1939 the views of some of those named above seemto have undergone a considerable transformation, in which parts of the dis­course seem to have aligned with the sentiment of cultural relativism, which 15 Zhang’s teaching on mathematical logic and dialectical materialism influenced the discussants on both sides of the debate, from Guo Zhanbo to Mou Zongsan. permeated the intellectual climate, allowing a greater degree of compromisebetween the two logics. Concurrently, different opinions finally started to con­verge, creating an impression of consensus and a general move towards codifica­tion of the tenets of “Chinese Marxism”.16 Thus, in the end, on both sides morecomplementary solutions and syncretistic visions of coexistence of the “two log­ics” took ground. On the other hand, in the case of Zhang Dongsun the samerationale as incapsulated in the idea of “Sinicization” came to expression in theform of neo-traditional cultural relativism, and in leftist circles the harmonicsynthesis as advocated by Zhang Shenfu and Zhang Dainian gradually mani­fested in a short-lived increase in the relevance of a more moderate notion of sublation of formal or mathematical logic into dialectical logic. Bibliography Ai, Siqi ... . 1936a. Zhexue jianghua.... (Lectures in Philosophy). S.l.: Dushu shenghuo she. –––. 1936b. “Guanyu ‘Xingshi luoji yu bianzheng luoji’: Da Zhang Youren QuMinggao jun deng .. “......... ”:......... (About ‘Formal Logic and Dialectical Logic’: An Answer to Mr. ZhangYouren, Qu Minggao and Others).” Dushu Shenghuo 4 (2): 28–33. –––. 1936c. Sixiang fangfalun..... (Methodology of Thought). Shanghai: Shenghuo shudian.–––. 1936d. Dazhong zhexue.... (Popular Philosophy). Shanghai: Dushu Shenghuo chubanshe.––– (Ai Sheng .. ). 1937a. Ye Qing zhexue pipan...... (Critique of Ye Qing’s Philosophy). Shanghai: Sixiang chubanshe. –––. 1937b. Zhexue yu shenghuo..... (Philosophy and Life). Shanghai: Du-shu shenghuo chubanshe. –––. 1939. “Xingshi lunlixue he bianzhengfa: bing lüeping Pan Zinian xiansheng de ‘Luojixue yu Luojishu’.........:......... “....... ” (Formal Logic and Dialectics: Also, a Brief Criticism of Pan Zinian’s Science of Logic and Logical Methods).” Lilun yu xianshi (Chongqing) 1 (2): 122–31. –––. 1940. Zhexue yanjiu tigang...... (An Outline of Studies in Philoso­phy). S.l.: Chenguang shudian. 16 The apparent push towards the codification of the tents of dialectical materialism in Chinese Marxist circle might have also been facilitated by Stalin’s promulgation of Marxist-Leninist dia­lectical materialism—also known as “Diamat”, as the official ideology of the Soviet Union in 1938. Bukharin, Nikolai I. (Buhalin ... ). 1929. Bianzhengfa de weiwulun....... (Dialectical Materialism). Translated by Li Tiesheng ... . Shang­hai: Jiangnan shudian. Chen, Baoyin ... . 1932. Shehui kexue yanjiu fangfalun......... (Methodology of Studies in Social Sciences). Beiping: Haowang shudian. Deborin, Abram (Debolin ... ). 1929. Weiwu bianzhengfa yu ziran kexue.......... (Materialist Dialectics and Natural Sciences). Translated by Lin Boxiu ... . Shanghai: Guanghua shuju. –––. 1930. Weiwu bianzhengfa rumen....... (Introduction to Material­ist Dialectics). Translated by Ling Yingfu ... . Shanghai: Jiangnan shudian. Deng, Yunte ... . 1933. “Xingshi luoji haishi weiwu bianzhengfa? ............ (Formal Logic or Materialist Dialectics?).” Dagong bao 1 (23): 69–75. Dietzgen, Josef (Dicigen ... ). 1929. Bianzhengfa de weiwu guan....... (Materialist View of Dialectics). Translated by Yang Dongchun ... . Shanghai: Kunlun shudian. ––– (Dizhigen ... ). 1930. Bianzhengfa de luoji...... (Dialectical Logic). Translated by Ke Bonian ... . Shanghai: Nanqiang shuju. Engels, Friedrich (... ). 1932. Ziran bianzhengfa..... (Dialec­tics of Nature). Translated by Du Weizhi ... . Shanghai: Shenzhou guoguangshe. Feng, Ding .. (Beiye .. ). “Xingshi luoji de yangqi ....... (Sub­lation of Formal Logic).” Zixiu daxue 1 (13): 250–52. Guo, Zhanbo ... . 1930. Bianzhengfa yanjiu..... (A Study of Dialec­tics). Beiping: Jingshan shushe. –––. 1931. “Xingshi luoji yu bianzhengfa zhi bijiao yanjiu ............. (A Comparative Study of Formal Logic and Dialectics).” Beida xuesheng zhoukan 2 (1): 23–27; 2 (2): 19–24. –––. 1935. Jin sanshi nian Zhongguo sixiangshi......... (Chinese In­tellectual History in the Last Thirty Years). Beiping: Dabei shuju. Hegel, G. W. F. 1986. “Wissenschaft der Logik II.” In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Werke, vol. 6. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Heubel, Fabian. 2019. “Beyond Murderous Dialectics.” Asian Studies 7 (1): 37–54. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2019.7.1.37-54. Jin, Yuelin ... . 1930. “A, E, I, O de zhijie tuilun A, E, I, O..... (Im­mediate Inference of A, E, I and O).” Zhexue pinglun 3 (3): 8–64. –––. 1934. “Bu xiangrong de luoji xitong ........ (Alternative Sys­tems of Logic).” Qinghua xuebao 9 (2): 309–29. Li, Da .. . 1935a. “Bianzheng luoji yu xingshi luoji ......... (Di­alectical Logic and Formal Logic).” Faxue zhuankan 5: 1–22. –––. 1935b. “Shuxue de benzhi he yingyong ........ (The Essence and Use of Mathematics).” Kexue shijie 4 (11): 1043–44. –––. 1936a. “Shuxue he ziran kexue ....... (Mathematics and Natural Science).” Kexue shijie 5 (8): 667–70. –––. 1936b.“Dongde luoji .... (Dynamic Logic).”Shehui shenghuo 1 (1): 37–39. –––. 1936c. “Bianshengfa de luoji ...... (The Logic of Dialectics).” Re­corded by Yang Mingzhang ... . Yanda zhoukan 7 (2): 6–8; 7 (4): 17–20. –––. 1936d. “Luoji de genben yuanli ....... (Fundamental Principles of Logic).” Zhongshan wenhua jiaoyuguan jikan 3 (1): 283–307. –––. 1936e. “Luoji dayi .... (Essentials of Logic).” Zhongshan wenhua jiao­yuguan jikan 3 (3): 975–93. –––. 1939. “Xingshi luoji yangqi wenti ........ (On the Question of Sublation of Formal Logic).” Lilun yu xianshi 1 (2): 101–21. Li, Shicen ... . 1932. “Bianzhengfa yu xingshi luoji ........ (Di­alectical Method and Formal Logic).” Dushu zazhi 2 (5): 27–46. Lin, Zhongda ... . 1936. Zonghe luoji.... (Synthetic Logic). Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju. Mou, Zongsan ... . 1934. “Luoji yu bianzheng luoji ....... (Log­ic and Dialectical Logic).” In Weiwu bianzhengfa lunzhan....... (The Polemic on Materialist Dialectics), edited by Zhang Dongsun ... , vol. 1, 93–138. Beiping: Minyou shuju. Pan, Zinian ... . 1937. Luoji yu luojixue...... (Logic and the Science of Logic). Shanghai: Shenghuo shudian. –––. 1938. Luojixue yu luojishu (Bianzheng zenyang yangqi le xingshi luoji) ....... (............ ) (Science of Logic and Logical Meth­ods (How Dialectics Sublated Formal Logic). Shanghai: Shenghuo shudian. Plekhanov, Georgi. 1908 (1928). “Osnovnye Voprosy Marksizma (Fundamental Prob­lems of Marxism).” In Sochinyeniya (Works) Vol. 18 – Ot Utopii k Nauke (From Uto­pia to Science), edited by D. Rjazanov, 340–504. Moscow, Leningrad: Gosizdat. ––– (Puliehanuofu ..... ). 1924. “Bianzhengfa yu luoji ...... (Dialectical Method and Logic).”Translated by Zheng Chaolin ... . Xin qingnian 3: 41–49. Rošker, Jana S. 2015. “Two Models of Structural Epistemology: Russell and Zhang Dongsun.” International Communication of Chinese Culture 1 (2):109–21. http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40636-015-0020-3, doi:10.1007/s40636-015-0020-3. –––. 2019. “Li Zehou and His Rocky Relationship with Marx.” Asian Studies 7 (1): 201–15. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2019.7.1.201-215. Shen, Youqian ... . 1930. “Dongde luoji .... (Dynamic Logic).” Renw-en (Shanghai) 1 (7): 1–3. Shen, Zhiyuan ... . 1932. Heigeer yu bianzhengfa....... (Hegel and Dialectics). S.l.: Bigengtang shudian. Suter, Rafael. 2017. Logik und Apriori zwischen Wahrnehmung und Erkenntnis: Eine Studie zum Frühwerk Mou Zongsans (1909–1995). Berlin: De Gruyter. Tian, Chenshan. 2005. Chinese Dialectics: From Yijing to Marxism. Lanham, Boul­der: Lexington Books. –––.2019.“Mao Zedong, Sinization of Marxism,and Traditional Chinese ThoughtCulture.”Asian Studies 7 (1): 13–37. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2019.7.1.13-37. Toporkov, Aleksey K. (Taopoerkaofu ..... ). 1932. Bianzheng luoji zhi ji­ben yuanli......... (Elementary Principles of Dialectical Logic) Translated by Peng Weisen ... . Shanghai: Chunqiu shudian. Wang, Dianji ... . 1927. Luoji yu shuxue luoji lun........ (A Trea­tise on Logic and Mathematical Logic). Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan. –––. 1932. “Xingshi luoji yuanli de piping ......... (A Critique of the Principles of Formal Logic).” Biance zhoukan 1 (9): 7–10. Wang, Zhaogong ... . 1931. “Xingshi luoji zhi bengkui yu xin kexue de fang-falun zhi wancheng .................. (The De­cline of Formal Logic and Completion of a New Scientific Methodology).”Dushu zazhi 1 (2): 8–35. Ye, Qing .. . 1933. “Dongde luoji shi keneng de! Da Zhang Dongsun jiao­shou ........!...... (A Dynamic Logic is Possible! An Answer to Professor Zhang Dongsun).” Xin Zhonghua 1 (23): 52–69. –––. 1934. Zhang Dongsun zhexue pipan....... (A Critique of Zhang Dongsun’s Philosophy). 2 Volumes. Shanghai: Xinken shudian. –––, ed. 1935a. Zhexue lunzhan.... (The Philosophical Polemic). Shanghai: Xinken shudian. –––, ed. 1935b. Heigeer – qi shengping qi zhexue jiqi yingxiang... --- .......... (Hegel—His Life, Philosophy and Influences). Shanghai: Xinken shudian. –––. 1936a. “Xingshi luoji yu bianzheng luoji ......... (Formal Logic and Dialectical Logic). Yanjiu yu pipan 2 (2): 73–82. –––. 1936b. “Xingshi luoji yu bianzheng luoji ......... (Formal Logic and Dialectical Logic).” Yanjiu yu pipan 2 (3): 49–54. –––. 1937a.“Xingshi luoji yu bianzheng luoji ......... (Formal Log­ic and Dialectical Logic).” Zhongshan wenhua jiaoyuguan jikan 4 (2): 663–79. –––. 1937b. Lunlixue wenti..... (Problems of Logic). Shanghai: Zhenli chubanshe. Zhang, Dongsun ... . 1931. “Wo yi tantan bianzheng de weiwulun .......... (I Am also Discussing Dialectical Materialism).” Dagong bao, September 18: 11. –––. 1933. “Dongde luoji shi kenengde ma? ......... ? (Is Dynamic Logic Possible?).” Xin Zhonghua 1 (18): 18–28. –––, ed. 1934a. Weiwu bianzhengfa lunzhan....... (The Polemic on Ma­terialist Dialectics). 2 Volumes. Beijing: Minyou shuju. –––. 1934b. “Sixiang de luntan shang jige shimao wenti ............ (A Few Fashionable Questions in the Forum of Ideas).” Xin Zhonghua 2 (10): 54–59; 2 (11): 56–59. –––. 1939. “Butong de luoji yu wenhua bing lun Zhongguo lixue .............. (Different Types of Logic and Culture—Discussed To­gether with Chinese Neo-Confucianism).” Yanjing xuebao 26: 2–39, 282–83. Zhou, Yunzhi ... , and Zhou Wen Ying ... . 1989. Zhongguo luojishi ..... (The History of Chinese Logic), vol. 5: Xiandai juan ... (Modern Era). Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe. Zhu, Baiying ... (Yiying .. ). 1930a. “Junhenglü yu maodunlü ....... (Law of Equilibrium and Law of Contradiction).” Dongfang zazhi 29 (5): 47–51. ––– . 1930b. “Renshilun zhong de xingshi lunli yu maodun lunli .............. (Formal Logic and Contradictory Logic in Epistemolo­gy).” Dongfang zazhi 29 (6): 11–15. DOI: 10.4312/as.2021.9.2.105-120 Researching the History of Chinese Logic:The Role of Wen Gongyi in the Establishment of New Methodologies Cui QINGTIAN* Abstract During the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), the progressive intellectuals, who were confront­ed with the all-embracing crisis of Chinese society, yearned to find the new truth within the Western ideas on the one hand, and the works of the classical Chinese philosophy of the pre-Qin era on the other. These social and historical circumstances started the research into the history of Chinese logic. In the process of these investigations, it soon became clear that more appropriate methodologies were needed to explore Chinese logic,as those used for researching Western logic were not suitable for the task. The revival and modernization of such methods took place in the latter half of the 20th century, and one of the most important figures in these processes was Professor Wen Gongyi, who was hence one of the pioneers of modern research into the history of Chinese logic.Therefore,the present article also offers a short presentation of his biography and his contributions to the development of the research into traditional Chinese logic. Keywords: Chinese logic, traditional Chinese methodology, historiography, Wen Gongyi Raziskovanje zgodovine kitajske logike: vloga Wen Gongyija pri vzpostavl­janju novih metodologij Izvlecek V obdobju dinastije Qing (1644–1911) so si napredni izobraženci, ki so se soocali z vseob­segajoco krizo kitajske družbe, mocno prizadevali najti novo resnico v zahodnih idejah na enistrani in na drugi v klasicnih filozofskih delih iz obdobja pred dinastijo Qing.Te družbene inzgodovinske okolišcine so dale zagon raziskavam o zgodovini kitajske logike. V poteku tehraziskav je kmalu postalo jasno, da so za raziskovanje kitajske logike potrebne primernejšemetodologije, saj so bile tiste, ki so jih uporabljali v raziskavah zahodne logike, popolnomaneprimerne za to nalogo. Obujanje in modernizacija teh metod sta potekala v drugi polovici 20.stoletja. Med najpomembnejšimi osebnostmi, ki so prispevale k temu procesu, je bil pro-fesor Wen Gongyi, ki tako velja za enega od pionirjev modernih raziskav o zgodovini kita­jske logike. Zato bom v tem clanku podal krajšo predstavitev njegovega življenja ter njegovihprispevkov k razvoju raziskav o tradicionalni kitajski logiki. Kljucne besede: kitajska logika, tradicionalna kitajska metodologija, zgodovinopisje, Wen Gongyi * Cui QINGTIAN, Professor Emeritus, Nankai University,Tianjin, PR China.Email address: qingtiancui21@gmail.com Introduction: Historical and Intellectual Background In classical Chinese theory, there was no term for logic or “Chinese logic”, and the modern Chinese word luoji.. is a phonetic translation of the Western term.The appearance and investigation of “Chinese logic” are a matter of the 19th cen­tury, and therefore belong in the era of modern Chinese history. Following the First Opium War of 1839–1842, great changes took place with­in Chinese society. During this period, China was confronted with the gradual spread of Western ideas into the East, which also included a systematic introduc­tion of Western logic. This gradual import of Western ideas naturally also involved the introduction of Western logic. The first person to introduce Western logic into the Chinese sys­tem of thought during this period was Yan Fu .. . He not only presented the importance of understanding logic on the basis of the current urgent problems in China, but also established academic organizations which were involved in adopt­ing the logical knowledge of the time. He translated the most prominent works of Western logic and systematically introduced this discipline to others in China.His translations of J. S. Mills A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive was first published in 1905, and followed in 1909 by his translation of W. S. Jovons’Primers of Logic. These translations, which found their way to China at the beginning of the 20th century, represented the first systematic introduction of traditional Western logic,which was based on the elementary contents of Aristotelian logic. They not only provided a solid ground for a new, more integral understanding of this discipline in China, but also paved the way for certain progressive intellectuals, who started to rethink traditional Chinese theories from the viewpoint of Western logic.Thus,a very important precondition for the beginning of the research into the history of Chinese logic was fulfilled. The central subject of this research was concentrated on the investigation of Moist logic, which could be found in the disputations of this philosophical school. How­ever, the Moist school was forcibly shut down after the end of the Han dynasty.Thus, their main work, Mozi, was also discarded, drowned in the long, deep river of Chinese history. It was only at the end of the Qing dynasty that it was revived by the representatives of the so-called Hanxue movement within the scope of new,reflective theoretical investigations in the classical philosophical schools from the pre-Qin era. Concerning Mozi, their research deserves our attention in two aspects. Firstly, they (to a certain extent) managed to overthrow the orthodox Confucian interpretation of this book; within this intellectual mainstream, Mozi was regarded as a “false doctrine”.1 Therefore, the theoretical reinterpretations of the Hanxue scholars managed to re-legitimize this work, as well as the Moist School as a whole. Thus,Moist philosophy was finally adequately evaluated and was once again rendered its proper position within the system of traditional Chinese thought. Secondly,the Hanxue theoreticians from the Qing period were diligent and accurate schol­ars, who were strict at applying the method of provable evidence. In a few decades of difficult and tiresome work, they updated Mozi with a huge amount of qualita­tively outstanding commentaries. Due to their efforts—and consequently also due to the achievements of their followers, who were specialized in the investigations of the Moist School—Mozi, which was always regarded as lacking both tradition­al mediation as well as comprehensible commentaries or interpretations, became a readable book once again. Their work paved the way and established a solid basis for the entire modern and even contemporary research into Moist philosophy. Since Moist theory represents one of the most important issues in classical Chinese logic, their work also pro­vided a basic fulfilment of the second crucial condition for investigations into the history of traditional Chinese logic. After the First Opium War, 1839–1842,“learning from the West” was the mostvisible tendency in Chinese culture.This resulted in the following question: whatis the basis of the so-called “Western”, or “new” learning? Certain intellectualsbelieved that the elementary foundation of Western culture was to be foundin the spirit of natural sciences, which were capable of providing methods for“eliminating falseness and preserving the truth”.2 Logic was seen as the embod­iment of such spirit and its methods. Yan Fu quoted Francis Bacon, saying thatlogic was “the method of all methods, and the science of all sciences”. Therefore,it was only natural for logic to become one of the most influential discourseswithin the scope of “Western learning”, which gradually spread to the East. ButChinese scholars, who focused on studying Western logic, could hardly secedefrom their habituated way of thinking, which was rooted in traditional Chinese 1 This was, among other issues, probably connected with the fact that the Mohist, and especially the Later Mohist School were much more analytical in their approaches than Confucianism, in the sense that they tended to proto-theorize their philosophical arguments with an analytical language (Rošker 2015a, 305), without placing too much emphasis to ethics and morality, which was in the forefront of Confucian concerns. 2 However, this—sometimes much too naïve—faith in the consequent and straightforward Western reliance on “truth” was certainly linked to China’s confrontation with European economic and mil­ itary supremacy in the 19th century, which, among other issues, often invoked a period of self-crit­ icism among Chinese intellectuals (Dessein 2020, 252). culture.3 For this reason, a reflective search of those elements within traditionalChinese thought, which could be understood as compatible with Western logic,became one of their crucial theoretical issues. This can be seen as another indis­pensable element, which contributed to the development of the research intothe history of Chinese logic. As follows from the above, the main factors which contributed to the develop­ment of investigating the history of Chinese logic can be found in the gradual spread of Western ideas to the East, which resulted in deeper research into clas­sical Chinese philosophy, as well as in the revival of Mozi. Furthermore, the in­quisitive respect shown toward the Western learning, which was brought to life by enlightened Chinese intellectuals, accompanied by reflective reinvestigation of their own traditional thought, is also of great importance in this respect. Establishing Research into the History of Chinese Logic The 20th century was the initial era of research into the history of Chinese logic.The most important representatives of this work were Liang Qichao ... and Hu Shi .. . Concerning classical Chinese logic, the following works of Liang Qichao can be named as the most influential: Mozi’s Ethics (Mozizhi lunlixue...... (1904)), Mozi’s Studies (Mozi xuean .... (1921)) and The Interpretation of Mozi (Mozi xiaoshi.... (1922)). Hu Shi’s main work in this field includes The History of Logic from the Pre-Qin Era (Xian Qin mingxue shi..... ), which was completed in 1917, but published in 1922, An Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy, Part I (Zhongguo zhexue shi da gang....... (1919)), and A New View of the Chapter ‘Xiao qu’ in the Book of Mozi (Mozi xiaoqu pian xin gu....... (1919)). Their direct successors did not manage to overcome their theories, neither concerningthe elementary methods, nor in respect of their basic interpretations. This is why thisperiod can be regarded as the initial era of research into the history of Chinese logic. According to the basic opinion, which imbues these works, the classical Chinese “disputes” (bian xue.. ) and the traditional “theories of naming” (ming xue.. ) were equivalent to Western logic. Therefore, the attempts to construct a Chi­nese theory of logic, based on the reinterpretations of classical Chinese disputes and the theories of names—mainly those from The Moist Disputes (Mo bian. By the late 1920s, however, various forms of modern Western logic had already been widely establishedthroughout the most progressive Chinese intellectual and academic circles (Vrhovski 2020, 232). . )—through the optics of Western, especially traditional European logic, which is grounded on the contents of Aristotelian theories, became part of the main­stream of cognitional and methodological issues in researching the history of Chinese logic. But some scholars in this period already asserted that the book The Moist Disputes was a classic, which was used by the Moist school for debates, and that The Book of Disputes (Bian jing.. ) was nothing more than a handbook for the art of disputation. This opinion gave rise to further considerations as regards the relation between The Moist Disputes and traditional Western logic, as well as the connection of this logic and the logical elements, which were contained in The Moist Disputes. Expansion: New Methods and New Approaches New developments in the research into the history of Chinese logic appeared in the 1930s. The most important works in this field published during this period were Wang Zhanghuan’s ... Survey of Ethics (Lunlixue da quan..... (1930)), Feng Youlan’s ... History of Chinese Philosophy, Part I (Zhongguo zhexue shi, shang ce..... /.. / (1931)), Guo Zhanpo’s ... History of the Art of Disputes of the pr -Qin Era (Xian Qin bianxue shi..... (1932)), Tan Jiefu’s ... Simple Explanation of the Moist Classic (Mo jing yi jie.... (1935)), Zhang Dongsun’s ... Thought and Culture (Sixiang yu wenhua..... (1938)), and Different Logics and Chinese Rationality (Bu tongde luoji bing lun Zhongguo lixue........... (1939)). The above-mentioned works involved different tendencies. The first one fol­lowed the basic cognitional and methodological guidelines of Liang and Huand was based upon the opinion that the classical Chinese disputes and the­ories of naming were equivalent to Western logic. The second tendency wasbased upon the conviction, that it was wrong to interpret those discourses ac­cording to the model of traditional Western logic, and that it was necessary toreconstruct the autochthonous Chinese logic. One of the most important rep­resentatives of this conviction was Zhang Dongsun (see Rošker 2015b, 110).He asserted that logic depended upon culture, and that different cultures gaverise to different types of logic. According to his opinion, logic should be in­terpreted with respect to the particular culture in which it arose. Tan Jiefu wasalso against comparisons of classical disputes and theories of naming with tra­ditional Western logic, and stressed the independence of Chinese logic. How­ever, he did believe that The Moist Disputes were to a great extent similar to tra­ditional Indian logic. Although the concrete expositions that derived from their basic prepositions were not always absolutely valid, Tan Jiefu’s and Zhang Dongsun’s thesis about the “independence” of logic, contained in the ancient Chinese theories, as well as their stressing of the necessity of cultural interpretations of logic, were of ut­most importance. To a certain extent, their arguments represent an improvement of Liang’s and Hu’s theories. Since they had a very stimulating effect on further studies in modern Chinese thought, their contribution should not be underesti­mated in this regard. The Period of Stagnancy, Revival and New Development Following the beginning of the anti-Japanese war in the 1940’s, the economic and cultural situation in China became extremely difficult, which brought the research into the history of Chinese logic to a standstill. Therefore, only a few publications from that period are worth mentioning, e.g. Zhang Shizhao’s ... The Essential Issues of Logic (Luoji zhiyao.... (1943)), Guo Moruo’s... Review of the Theories of Naming and Disputes (Ming bian sichao pipan...... (1944)), as well as Hou Wailu’s ... , Zhao Jibin’s ... and Du Guoxiang’s ... General History of Chinese Thought (Zhongguo sixiang tongshi...... (1947)). Zhang Shizhao stressed the equality of the theories of naming and traditional Western logic. He strove for a systematic ordering of Chinese “laws of naming” in accordance with the framework of traditional Western logic, while Guo Moruo,on the contrary, stressed the differences between traditional Western and tradi­tional Chinese logic. In his opinion, The Moist Disputes is a book about the art of disputation, i.e. about the methods of disputation; therefore, it could not be equat­ed with the strict system of Western logic. Hou Wailu and several other scholars,however, was one of the few who explicitly pointed out the tight connection be­tween traditional Chinese logic and epistemology. Following the 1950s, research into the history of Chinese logic gradually began its revival. The first work in this regard, which was published at the beginning of the decade, was Shen Youding’s ... The Logic of the Moist Classic (Mo jingde luoji xue...... ). The author believed that this Moist work represented the summit of the development of the classical Chinese logic. His book was based upon the hypothesis that the laws of human cognition and the form of logic do not depend on an individual nation or class. On the other hand, it also stressed the special influence of particular languages on the different modes of logical expression. In 1957, Lu Jianfeng’s ... book The Moist Formal Logic (Mo jiade xingshi luoji....... ) was published. It followed the opinion that the art of disputes,as formulated by Mozi in his Moist classic, was logic, and that it set up a basis for Chinese formal logic. Wang Dianji’s ... work The History of Chinese Logical Thought (Zhongguo luoji sixiang shi....... ) was written already in the 1960s but was not pub­lished until 1979. Although the author believed that the so-called disputes of the Moist school were a kind of logic, he also clearly asserted that Chinese logic, in­cluding the Moist form, had autonomous particularities, and that its systematic reconstruction does not need a comparison with Western formal logic. Wen Gongyi’s ... The History of Logic from the Pre-Qin Era (Xian Qin luo­ji shi..... ), The History of Ancient Chinese Logic (Zhongguo gu luoji shi..... ) and The History of the Mediaeval Chinese Logic (Zhongguo jingu luoji shi....... ) were published in 1983, 1989 and 1993, respectively. In the first of these he asserted that it was always wrong to compare Moist disputa­tion or logic to Western or Indian logic, because the mode of logical thought was tightly connected to the linguistic expressions of particular languages. In his opin­ion, each particular language has its own idiomatic structure and expressions, and therefore the particular structural organisations of each single type of logic differ from each other. In the same book, we also encounter (for the very first time) the differentiation between the “Moist logical thought” and the “logical thought of the theories of correct naming”. On this basis, the author drew a new outline of the development of logic in the pre-Qin era. During the 1990s, a number of Chinese scholars started to review the past re­search into the history of Chinese logic. They began to review the previously per­formed work and discuss its results.The following questions appeared based upon this reflection: -What is the kind of logic that is actually contained in the ancient disputes and theories of naming? -Are those discourses equal to Western logic? -Are the thoughts expressed in ancient Chinese theories the same as those expressed in traditional Western logic? -Do the Chinese theories of logic have an autonomous quality, and how is this quality expressed? -Which methods should be applied in the research into Chinese logic? -What is the connection between the research into the history of Chinese logic and the establishment of a new Chinese culture? The above-mentioned problems are only some examples of a whole array of other,similar questions, that turned up during the 1990s. They still attract the attention of many theoreticians, and continue to promote deeper investigations and accel­erate the more sophisticated development of further research into the history of Chinese logic. Elaboration of Crucial Research Methods The “gradual irruption of Western ideas into the East”, which generated the ini­tial research into the history of Chinese logic after the 19th century, also provided Chinese scholars with a number of related research tools and methods. Above all,this meant that they tried to explain Chinese logic through the optic of the “grad­ually irrupted Western ideas” (i.e. traditional Western logic). The basic character­istic of this method was “to compare ancient Chinese theories to the new laws of European or Western thought”. The essence of this kind of “comparison” within the research into the history of Chinese logic was basically the application of ele­mentary traditional Western logical concepts, principles and systems, which were used as a basic pattern to explain and reconstruct the classical Chinese disputes and theory of names, with the single aim to show that those ancient Chinese dis­courses were actually equal to traditional Western logic. We have to admit that under the given historical conditions, the application of this method was in fact meaningful to a certain extent. For example, it led towards an important conceptual shift in this research: the investigations of traditional disputes and theories of naming escaped the frame of the general research in an­cient classics and found their way to completely new developments. It also caused researchers of classical disputes and theories of naming to no longer concentrate solely on commenting on old texts; at the same time, they started to pay greater attention to analysing and expounding their semantic systems. It was also very effective regarding the fact that the Chinese academic world became acquainted with traditional Western logic, for it opened a new way of thinking for the future research into the history of Chinese logic. It provided elementary support, as well as a solid basis for further investigations in this field. However, on the other hand, this method also showed severe deficiencies. Al­though the classical Chinese disputes and theories of naming have certain simi­larities with traditional Western logic, it is still impossible to regard them as com­pletely equal. They are quite different in regard to their objects and contents, and thus cannot be seen as the same discipline. The object of the Chinese theories of naming can be found in the name.Their main problem is the relation between the name and the actuality, and the central content of these theories is “the correction of names”.The main object of the art of disputation are arguments, its basic prob­lem is the exploration of the essential quality and functionality of disputes. The elementary contents of this discipline are centred on the principles and methods of disputation. However, the object of traditional Western logic is to be found in the proper form, as well as in accurate principles of cognition, while its basic con­tent is to be found in efficient reasoning.Therefore, the above-mentioned method,which was based on the complete equalization of disputes and theories of naming with traditional Western logic, muddled up different disciplines with different ob­jects and contents. Thus, it is understandable that the application of this method with regard to the comparison of both kinds of logic was not necessarily free from certain habitual elements. These elements not only impeded an accurate compre­hension of classical Chinese disputations and theories of naming, they also hin­dered the proper understanding of the logical theories contained in these ancient Chinese discourses. If we want to overcome the above-mentioned deficiencies and deepen the inves­tigations into the history of Chinese logic, it is necessary to change the meth­od of explaining the classical Chinese discourses and reconstructing the Chinese logic solely according to the laws of traditional Western logic. For this sake, we have to be aware of the importance of historical analysis and culturally bounded interpretations. Historical Analysis and Culturally Bounded Interpretations The so-called culturally bounded interpretation is based on the presumption that Chinese logic is an organic part of traditional Chinese culture. Such interpreta­tions attempt to find a rational explanation for Chinese logic, and take into ac­count the characteristic elements of traditional Chinese philosophy, ethics, polit­ical theories, linguistics and traditional scientific technology. A culture is always a culture of a certain specific historical period. This is why every culturally bounded interpretation has to involve a historical analysis. This means that such an interpretation of Chinese logic sees this discipline as deep­ly rooted in the geopolitical context of the historical period in which it was es­tablished. Theoreticians who work on culturally bounded interpretations have to form concrete analyses of the specific conditions, which determined the social,economic, political, and cultural life in that period. Moreover, they have to elabo­rate precise analyses of the influence of all these elements on scholars and thinkers who created the Chinese theories of logic. Historical analyses and culturally bounded interpretations by no means exclude comparative research, but this has to be grounded on a clear awareness of the spe­cial social and cultural background which created and determined Chinese logic. The reason for the necessity of historical and culturally bounded interpretations in the investigations of the history of Chinese logic is connected to the requirement for a proper understanding of theoretical thought.Thus, we have to understand its basis, which can be found in the concrete social circumstances of the thinkers who brought it to our attention, as well as in the social problems they were confronted with. We have to understand the characteristic features of their specific cultural background and their motivations. Only once we have understood the socio-cul­tural factors which formed and determined those ancient theories will we be able to understand their specific quality. The understanding of these factors also rep­resents an urgent precondition to an objective and correct interpretation of the texts which contain ancient theories. The problems that arise cannot be solved solely on the basis of their comparison with different, foreign ideas (so much less if the respective comparisons are based on the mode of identification). Therefore,a proper understanding of this academic thought must also be grounded on the concentration upon historical and culturally bounded interpretations. In this re­spect, the research into the history of Chinese logic is by no means an exception.The application of the above-mentioned methods is even more important if we take into account the close connection between logic and culture. This close connection is determined by the wholeness of culture, as well as by the special position of logic as one of the main forming factors of this wholeness. In a broad sense culture represents the totality of all human activities and their re­sults within a civilization. It is formed by mutual connections of many different elements, which are compounded by certain modes of interaction. It represents an entity or a system of special qualities and functions. Logic as a discipline, inves­tigating the various modes of reasoning, represents an important part or element,which takes part in the formation of this entity. It is tightly connected to the dif­ferent modes, and even with the different customs of thinking, and represents an important content of cognition. On the other hand, specific manners of cognition are even deeper and more elemental factors of every individual culture. The systematic nature and the wholeness of culture reveal that the vital basic of its regulated totality has been compounded by a number of important culturally bounded elements, including logic. These elements have a great effect and a huge influence upon the changes and development of every culture. On the other hand,logic, as one of these elements, is regulated by the totality of culture. It needs the systematic nature and wholeness of culture as a vital precondition, for this determines its existence, its development and enables it to express its meaning. The regulative function of culture determines every single logical system, which is to a certain degree always also a product of certain historical circumstances and therefore has a universal, as well as a specific side. The European logician Anton Dumitriu expressed the plurality of logic very clearly. Proceeding from the history of the development of logic, he wrote: We have already expounded two thousand five hundred years of the de­velopment of logic, and this period have been able to see many different ways, in which human beings constructed and interpreted this discipline.It is obvious that there are huge differences between different periods ...Each single stage in the developmental process of logic reflects a specific historical background. (Dumitriu 1977, 12) The well-known contemporary Chinese logician Zhou Liquan also pointed out: Each proper understanding and each science have to apply and respect the correct forms of reasoning and laws, which are the object of logical inquiry and represent a common good of entire mankind.Therefore, logic itself, which reflects the proper ways of reasoning and their laws, is also common to the humanity as a whole. In this sense, there is no discrepan­cy between the particular logic of different nations, classes or individuals.But, on the other hand, if we look at logic as a system of knowledge, it is always a product of a certain historical era, certain nation or a certain in­dividual and therefore necessarily comprises of the characteristic features of this era, nationality, or individual person. Consequently, the historical process of the development of logic produced a number of different log­ical classifications, which can be summarised in three large systems: the Chinese, the Indian and the Greek logical system. (Zhou 1987, 535) No matter whether dealing with the above-mentioned “huge differences”, or with “the characteristic features of an era, nationality, or individual person”—each in­quiry always has to be grounded on a specific part of logic, which is formed by the specific historical, social and cultural background. On this background, the above-mentioned universality of logical thinking comes into existence. On this reasoning, all human beings apply the same, universal components and functions, which are always grounded on common elementary classifications and principles. Simultaneously, these universal features also con­struct the universality of basic logical theories and contents of thought. On the other hand the above-mentioned specific nature of an individual logic points outthe discrepancies between different logical traditions, which were derived fromparticular social and cultural traditions. The most important differences in thisrespect are the particularity, based on the prevailing classification of reasoning,the specific modes of its expression, differences in the particular processes oftheir change and development, and so on. Only the consideration of the specif­ic historical and cultural backgrounds, which formed and determined differentlogical traditions, enables us to analyse and interpret a certain logical tradition.Proceeding from this basis, we can understand not only the universality, butalso the specific features of different logical traditions. Only this kind of inwardknowledge enables us to explain logic in a proper way. Therefore, the researchinto Chinese logic needs to be grounded on historical analysis and culturallybounded interpretations. Wen Gongyi and the Research into the History of Chinese Logic at the Nankai University This important method, which takes into account the cultural conditionality of different types of logical reasoning, can be traced back to the cultural studies of the aforementioned scholar Zhang Dongsun. However, in the second half of the 20th century it was also continued and upgraded by several scholars, mainly those belonging to the so-called “Nankai School of Chinese logics”.The founder of this school and its basic methodological approaches was Professor Wen Gongyi ... (1904–1996). Hence, in this last part of the present paper, we must—at least briefly—introduce his pioneering research work in the field of the cultural condi­tionality of Chinese logic. Wen Gongyi was a contemporary Chinese philosopher, logician and teacher. He worked as a professor at the following institutions:Beijing University,The College of Educational Sciences in Beijing,The Girls College for Educational Sciences in Hebei and the Hebei Branch of the College for Educational Sciences in Beijing,where he also served as the Chair of the Department of Chinese Language and Literature. At Nankai University in Tianjin, he worked as a professor and Chair at the Department of Philosophy. In addition, he was the vice–president and aca­demic adviser of the Chinese Association of Logic. In his early years his main research fields were Western and Chinese philosophy,especially in the field of ethics. The most important works that he published at that time, were: An Outline of Philosophy (Zhexue gailun.... (1937)), Mor­al Teachings (Daode xue... (1937)) and Logic (Luoji xue... (1958)). Although his History of Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue shi ..... ) was already given to the publisher in 1994, it was never published. In the 1970’s, Professor Wen Gongyi started to focus his research on the historyof Chinese philosophy and logic. After this period, most of his work was on vari­ous investigations into the history of Chinese logic. In the 1980s he published thefollowing titles: History of Logic from the pre-Qin Era (Xianqin luoji shi ..... (1983)), The Medieval History of Classical Chinese Logic (Zhongguo gu luoji shi ....... (1989)), The Premodern History of Classical Chinese (Zhongguo jingu luoji shi....... (1993)), and the first textbook on the history of Chinese logic entitled A Textbook on the History of Chinese Logic (Zhongguo luoji shi jiaocheng....... (1988)). In addition to his academic research work, Professor Wen Gongyi raised a compe­tent professional team of young researchers and established the basic conditions forfurther investigations into the history of Chinese logic. Due to his dedicated tutorial efforts, his work has been carried on to the present day.This work was based upon his previous research results and carried out by a num­ber of specialized, independent-thinking researchers, working at the Departmentof Philosophy at Nankai University. Thus, the Chinese academic world has longregarded this department as an important research and education institution in thefield of the history of Chinese logic. With respect to the research methodology applied to the history of Chinese logic,Professor Wen Gongyi opposed the method of comparing Chinese logic to West­ern and Indian logic at all costs. He believed that the application of this methodalone could not provide an explanation for the genuine essence of traditional Chi­nese logic. He was convinced, that logic forms a tool of human rational thought; it is a bridge that helps man­kind obtain new knowledge.Thus, it naturally contains universal features ofthe entire mankind. The three main branches of logic systems that can befound in the Western (and Eastern) traditions of thought have therefore anumber of common points. However, the cognitive tools have been tightlyconnected to the languages of the various societies, in which they came tosee the day of light. Every language is determined by specific social andhistorical particularities. Therefore, different logic systems can not be en­tirely the same in respect to their organizational structure.4 (Wen 1983, 12) ............,........,............,.................. .…...........................................,.................. . He also firmly believed, that “the origins of logic theories could not be subjective products of certain logicians, but were tightly connected to the social actualities,in which these logicians lived.”5 (ibid.) On the basis of such an understanding, he appealed for the establishment of a unified view of history and logic in his research into the history of Chinese log­ic. In his opinion, the interpretations of the various theories by ancient Chinese thinkers had to be based upon the considerations of specific social conditions and actualities by which they were influenced in their time. Proceeding from Professor Wen Gongyi’s thought, the Nankai School clarified and defined the following new ideas concerning research into the history of Chi­nese logic: 1. There is a tight connection between logic and culture; the development of logic is defined by culture. On the other hand, the development of culture is also pro­foundly influenced by logic. 2. Different traditions of logic have been marked by universal, as well as specific,particular elements. 3. Therefore, “historical analysis and cultural interpretation” should be applied as the basic method in researching the history of Chinese logic; in the comparison of Chinese logic to other logic systems, one should be focused upon the similarities,but should also pay attention to their differences. 4. Any research into logic should consider the cultural interpretations. To the same extent, cultural studies should also reflect the developments in logic. Conclusion There can be little doubt that understanding ancient Chinese practices and the­ories of thought has broad cross-cultural value. There has always been consid­erable debate about the proper approach to classical Chinese logic. This debate corresponds with various phases of the reception of Western logic in the Chinese scholarly community. However, a survey of the views involved shows how rich and fascinating this discourse is and how diverse the interpretative spectrum (Rošker 2015, 309). This article has clearly demonstrated that the reconstruction of classi­cal Chinese logic offers a paradigmatic case for the epistemic shifts that continue to shape interpretations of Chinese intellectual history. It thus remains one of the .......,.............,............. . most important areas of research in contemporary sinology, Chinese philosophy,and transcultural methodology. References Dessein, Bart. 2020. “The Heritage of Taixu.” Asian Studies 8 (3): 251–77. https:// doi.org/10.4312/as.2020.8.3.251-277. Dumitriu, Anton. 1977. History of Logic—Conclusion. Tunbridge Wells: Abacus Press. Feng, Youlan ... . 1931. Zhongguo zhexue shi, shang ce..... /.. / (History of Chinese Philosophy, Part I ). Shenzhou: Guoguang she. Guo, Moruo ... . 1944. Ming bian sichao pipan...... (Review of the Theories of Naming and Disputes). Chongqing: Junyi chuban she. Guo, Zhanpo ... . 1932. Xian Qin bianxue shi..... (History of the Art of Disputes of the pr -Qin Era). Shanghai: Shanghai shudian. Hou, Wailu ... , Zhao Jibin ... , and Du Guoxiang ... . 1947. Zhong­guo sixiang tongshi...... (General History of Chinese Thought). Bei­jing: Renmin chuban she. Hu, Shi .. . 1919a. Zhongguo zhexue shi da gang ....... (An Out­line of the History of Chinese Philosophy). Shanghai: Shahgwu yinshuguan. –––. 1919b. Mozi xiaoqu pian xin gu ....... (A New View of the Chap­ter ‘Xiao qu’ in the Book of Mozi). Shanghai: Shahgwu yinshuguan. –––. 1922. Xian Qin mingxue shi ..... (The History of Logic from the Pre-Qin Era). Shanghai: Shahgwu yinshuguan. Liang, Qichao ... . 1904. “Mozizhi lunlixue ...... (Mozi’s Ethics).” Juemin (7): 13–18. –––. 1921. Mozi xuean.... (Mozi’s Studies). Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan. –––. 1922. Mozi xiaoshi .... (The Interpretation of Mozi—Preface). Beijing: Shangwu yinshu guan. Lu, Jianfeng ... . 1957. Mo jiade xingshi luoji....... (The Moist Formal Logic). Tianjin: Nankai daxue chuban she. Rošker, Jana S. 2015a. “Classical Chinese Logic.” Philosophy Compass 10 (5): 301– 09. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12226. –––. 2015b. “Two Models of Structural Epistemology: Russell and Zhang Dongsun.” International Communication of Chinese Culture 2 (2): 109–21. doi: 10.1007/s40636-015-0020-3. Shen, Youding ... . 1980. Mo jingde luoji xue...... (The Logic of the Moist Classic). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan. Tan, Jiefu ... . 1935. Mo jing yi jie.... (Simple Explanation of the Moist Classic). Shanghai: Xinwen feng chuban gongsi. –––. 1946. Mobian fawei .... (Subtle Notices to Moist Disputes). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. Vrhovski, Jan. 2020. “Qinghua School of Logic and the Origins of Taiwan­ese Studies in Modern Logic.” Asian Studies 8 (3): 231–50. https://doi. org/10.4312/as.2020.8.3.231-250. Wang, Dianji ... . 1979. Zhongguo luoji sixiang shi....... (The His­tory of Chinese Logical Thought). Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chuban she. Wang, Zhanghuan ... . 1930. Lunlixue da quan..... (Survey of Eth­ics). Shanghai: Shangwu yinshu guan. Wen, Gongyi ... . 1983. Xian Qin luoji shi..... (The History of Logic from the Pre-Qin Era). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chuban she. –––. 1989. Zhongguo gu luoji shi..... (The History of Ancient Chinese Logic). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chuban she. –––. 1993. Zhongguo jingu luoji shi....... (The History of the Mediaeval Chinese Logic). Tianjin: Nankai daxue chuban she. Yan, Fu .. . 1986. “Tian yan lun... (The Natural Evolution: Preface).” In Yan Fu ji... (Collection of Yan Fu), edited by Bianji weiyuan hui, vol.5. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. Zhang, Dongsun ... . 1938. Sixiang yu wenhua..... (Thought and Culture). Shanghai: Shangwu yinshu guan. –––. 1939. Bu tongde luoji bing lun Zhongguo lixue........... (Different Logics and Chinese Rationality). Shanghai: Shangwu yinshu guan. Zhang, Shizhao ... . 1943. Luoji zhiyao.... (The Essential Issues of Log­ic). Shanghai: Shangwu yinshu guan. Zhou, Liquan ... . 1987. “Zhexue .. (Philosophy).” In Zhongguo da baike quan shu....... (Great Chinese Encyclopedia), edited by Zongbi-an Weihui. Beijing: Zhongguo da baike quanshu chuban she. DOI: 10.4312/as.2021.9.2.121-141 Modernization of Chinese Philosophical Methodology: Zhang Dainian’s Innovation and the Challenges of Neo-Materialism1 Jana S. ROŠKER* Abstract The present paper aims to shed light on certain methodological challenges that Chinese intellectuals faced in the process of coming to terms with Marxist thought. Even at the beginning of these processes, i.e., in the first decades of the 20th century, Chinese theo­rists faced several difficulties regarding the issue of cross-cultural philosophical synthe­ses. Thus, in their endeavours to adapt Marxism to the specifically Chinese worldview,they sought suitable adaptations of traditional philosophical methodologies that would enable them to fruitfully integrate classical Chinese and modern Marxist discourses.Zhang Dainian ... (1909–2004) has played a particularly prominent role in this process. Therefore, this paper aims to shed light on his contribution to the establishment of new Chinese and cross-cultural philosophical methodologies. In terms of exploring general philosophical issues, Zhang established a unique philosophical system known as “neo-materialism” in which he attempted to integrate Marxist materialism with some basic approaches of traditional Chinese philosophy. The crucial features that defined this philosophical system were based on his innovative methodology, which is critically pre­sented in this paper. Keywords: modern Chinese philosophy, Chinese and intercultural philosophy, moderni­zation of Chinese thought, methodology of Chinese philosophy The author would like to express her gratitude to the Institute for International Communication of Chinese Studies at the Beijing Normal University for its support of the research work which has led to the publication of this paper. The author also acknowledges the support of the Sloveni­an Research Agency (ARRS) in the framework of the research core funding Asian Languages and Cultures (P6-0243) and in the scope of the research project N6-0161 (Complementary scheme) Humanism in Intercultural Perspective: Europe and China. * Jana S. ROŠKER, Professor of Sinology, Department of Asian Studies,Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.Email address: jana.rosker@ff.uni-lj.si Modernizacija kitajske filozofske metodologije: Zhang Dainianova inovacija in izzivi neomaterializma Izvlecek Pricujoci clanek je nastal s ciljem osvetlitve metodoloških izzivov, s katerimi so bili sooceni kitajski izobraženci in izobraženke v procesu sprejemanja marksisticne miselnosti. Že na samem zacetku teh procesov, tj. v prvih desetletjih 20. stoletja, so bile kitajske teoreticarke in njihovi moški kolegi prisiljeni ukvarjati se z reševanjem problemov v zvezi z medkul­turnimi filozofskimi sintezami. Tako so v prizadevanjih po prilagoditvi marksizma speci-ficno kitajskemu videnju sveta iskali primerne nacine prilagoditev tradicionalnih filozof­skih metodologij, ki bi jim omogocili plodno integracijo klasicnih kitajskih in sodobnih marksisticnih diskurzov. Zhang Dainian ... (1909–2004) je v teh procesih igral še posebej pomembno vlogo. Zaradi tega želi pricujoci sestavek osvetliti njegov prispevek k vzpostavitvi novih kitajskih in medkulturnih filozofskih metodologij. Za reševanje splošnih filozofskih problemov pa je Zhang poleg tega ustvaril enkraten filozofski sistem z imenom »neomaterializem«, s pomocjo katerega je želel marksisticni tip materializma povezati z dolocenimi temeljnimi pristopi tradicionalne kitajske filozofije. Kljucne znacil­nosti, ki so opredeljevale ta filozofski sistem, so temeljile na njegovi inovativni meto­dologiji, ki jo avtorica v tem prispevku kriticno predstavi. Kljucne besede: moderna kitajska filozofija, kitajska in medkulturna filozofija, moder-nizacija kitajske miselnosti, metodologija kitajske filozofije Political and Intellectual Background: The Troubled Waters of Sinicized Marxism Before focusing on Zhang Dainian’s new methodology, we need to introduce the in­tellectual background against which it was established. Its roots can be traced backto the beginning of the 20th century and the emergence of the so-called “New In­tellectuals”, who were mainly educated abroad and were mostly advocating a moreintense Westernization of Chinese culture. Among the most influential of the youngscholars, who dedicated themselves to the dissemination and popularization of Marx­ist thought in the 1920s, and especially during the 1930s, were Chen Duxiu ... (1879–1942), Li Dazhao ... (1889–1927) and Ai Siqi ... (1910–1966). While Ai Siqi’s reputation is based on his systematic treatises in the field of “so­cialist philosophy”, which were a mainstay of standard philosophical textbooks for many decades, the first two figures are among the founders of Chinese Marxism. As the first party leader, Chen drew many intellectuals away from earli­ er Chinese radical movements, such as anarchism, while Li’s arguments for interdependent moral and economic revolutions formed the basis for Marxist ethical thinking in China. (Bunnin 2002, 9) The works of these pioneers of Chinese Marxism were mostly aimed at intro­ducing and popularizing a theoretical framework and providing social, as well as historical constructions of dialectical materialism.2 Here, we should also mention the modern logician, Zhang Shenfu, who translated Wittgenstein’s Logical Philo­sophical Treatise, and is best known for his attempt to fuse Confucianism with the philosophy of Bertrand Russell and dialectical materialism. These beginnings bore their fruits much later, during the second half of the 20th century in which a more profound study and theoretical elaboration of Marxism,in terms of integrating certain aspects of traditional Chinese approaches into the framework of Marxist thought, was carried out. Of the long list of theorists who, each in their own way, contributed to a similar cognitive synthesis and succeeded in formulating their own, more or less inno­vative theories, we should mention the Modern Confucian, Feng Youlan ... (1895–1990), whose work was examined in the previous chapter, as well as Feng Qi .. (1915–1995), and Zhang Dainian ... (1909–2004). The works of the latter will be summarized in later sections of this paper. Alongside the creation of these new cognitive systems, “philosophy” also served as a purely symbolic tool for the formation of dominant ideologies.The main goal of these popularized forms of “Marxist-Leninist” or “Maoist” theories was, ob­viously, to preserve the political power of the ruling oligarchy, and to formulate the direction of concrete policy. This form of popularized philosophy, which was usually expressed in all-inclusive slogans, assumed the role of providing ideologi­cal links between the existing power structure and those it ruled, in the same way as orthodox forms of Confucian doctrine had done in traditional China. Hence,every major government official was also a “leading philosopher” who formulat­ed the “correct” interpretation of “Marxist” (and, in Taiwan, Modern Confucian) “truth”, which replaced the dogmas of orthodox Confucianism in the latter half of the 20th century, while most leading politicians were also immortalized in phil­osophical encyclopaedias and modern histories of thought. This practice, which had already emerged during the first Nationalist Republic, is still alive and well today, not only in the People’s Republic, but also in Taiwan. The gamut of “theoretical systems” in contemporary Chinese encyclopaedias and philosophical textbooks thus includes a great number of ideological currents, For a more detailed information on these processes, see for instance Tian (2019, 13), Rockmore (2019, 56), Altinok (2019, 76), and Sernelj (2019, 102). beginning with Sun Zhongsan’s (Sun Yat-Sen’s) ... concept of “Three Na­tional Principles .... ”, and followed by Mao Zedong’s “Maoism ..... ”. Even in later periods, these kind of slogan-guided ideologies have flourished,for instance in Deng Xiaoping’s ... “Theory of Socialism with Chinese Fea­tures ........... ”, Jiang Zemin’s ... ideology of the “Three Representations .... ”, and the current “Chinese Dream ... ” promoted by Xi Jinping ... . However, it is clear that these theories do not in any way represent new theoret­ical systems, and are therefore of little scholarly interest and, besides, the major­ity of these treatises were not written by the political figures to whom they were ascribed, but by their “court ideologues”. For example, modern sinology demon­strated many years ago that the works of Mao Zedong ... , who is still con­sidered by many to be the spiritual father of so-called “Maoism” (i.e. the sinicized form of Marxist-Leninist theories), was mostly of plagiarized. Several works analyzing the close dependence of Mao Tse-tung’s the­oretical works on Soviet sources, and his plagiarisms, have already ap­peared (Wittfogel, Takeuchi Minoru, Schram, Lippert, Wylie, Knight,Fogel) and do not need to be discussed at length here. Wittfogel notes the fact that approximately 40 per cent of Mao’s work Dialectical Materi­alism is plagiarism, while the other parts hardly deviate at all from Soviet models. (Meissner 1990, 11) The transformation of Marxism to Maoism was, to a great extent, based upon the “inertial” principles of Chinese tradition, which also pervaded the social reality of the new “socialist” society: There is little evidence to suggest that contemporary China has aban­doned any significant elements of its syncretic Confucian orthodoxy.The dynastic leadership of contemporary China maintains many of the same characteristics that have dominated since the Han dynasty: a govern­ing state ideology that assigns each person their respective place in their community, the nation understood as a family, a programmatic consti­tution which functions more like a “Bill of Rites”, than a Bill of Rights,a filial respect for the ruler as “father and mother” of the people, and the consequent sense of rule as a personal exercise. With respect to the personal character of ruler, objecting to the policies that articulate the existing order continues to be considered a condemnation of the ruler’s person. (Hall and Ames 1998, 10) The only real changes that Mao made in his modification of Marxist thoughtare his emphasis on specific elements which, in his view, define even the mostgeneral category, and his idea of permanent revolution. This idea, which servedMao Zedong throughout his long rule as an ideal foundation for mobilizingthe masses in order to preserve his power, was rooted in the classical conceptof correlative dialectics, by which synthesis (as the repeated reappearance of aqualitatively new state) does not occur in an instantaneous leap, but through acontinual process of interaction between contradictory poles. The former ideacan also be found in ancient Chinese tradition, in its specific understanding ofhumanness (.. ) and its tendency towards more flexible criteria for regulat­ing human social interactions, which considers the particularities of a given sit­uation (and which is most clearly expressed in the classical concept of rituality(. )). It is precisely this situational adaptability that provides the crucial discri­minant with respect to the normative, legal regulation of social relations whichforms the basis of Western societies (Rošker 1996, 71). Human malleability and the fluidity of social nature go far beyond the standard Marxist line. Where Marx stresses the uniformity of class-orig­inated identity, Mao emphasizes the importance of those differences which derive from ways of living and thinking that must be factored into the evaluation of any specific ‘concrete’ personality. There is in Mao a basic distrust of abstract, general claims, and a recurrent return to spe­cific cases and historical examples. The contemporary Chinese view so historicizes the Marxist sensibility as to allow for an almost unlimited flexibility in terms of the shaping of individual personalities and the de­velopment of individual skills. (Hall and Ames 1998, 10) However, this very Maoist version of popularized Marxism also establishedelementary valuation criteria for public debates that embraced a wide rangeof socially significant disciplines, including philosophy and the theory ofknowledge. The utopian aims and ideological rigidities of Mao’s thought were used repeatedly to restrict the range of debate, even though Mao’s theory of contradictions distinguished between acceptable and dangerous disa­greements. The imposition of orthodoxy curtailed much of the potential creativity of Marxist theory. Nevertheless, some philosophers contribut­ed to serious Marxist thought and historical reassessments of Chinese philosophy. (Bunnin 2002, 9–10) Among these “court ideologues”, whose theories were entirely at the service of the ruling party and its ideological directions, we can mention Guo Moruo ... (1892–1978), who created a new periodic classification of the history of Chinese philosophy. His categories were based upon a simplified application of Marxist conceptual frames and provided new valuation criteria for a number of philos­ophers. His judgement of philosophers as either progressive or reactionary did much to shape the study of the history of philosophy in China. In the open ex­changes earlier in the century, Guo’s rejection of a static essence of Chinese soci­ety and thought “contributed to the development of historical understanding, but when imposed as orthodoxy, these views distorted and constricted philosophical study” (ibid., 10). Most of Hou Wailu’s later works ... (1903–1978) are based upon similar,though much more complex and theoretically more profound periodizations, and,in terms of content, much better differentiated approaches, making him one of the most important modern historians of Chinese thought. From the 1930s on, he explored Chinese history in accordance with Marxist theories and methods. His research was an important pioneer­ing work in the fields of social and ideal history. His General History of Chinese Thought, a work of many volumes which he co-authored with others, still remains the most complete work on the history of Chinese thought and had a profound influence on the academic world. Other works worthy of mention are: On the Social History of Ancient China, A History of Ancient Chinese Theoretical Thought and A History of Modern Chinese Theoretical Thought. He was also a chief editor of The History of Modern Chinese Philosophy, An Outline of Chinese History of Thought and A History of the School of Principles of the Song and Ming Dynasties.3 (Zhexue xiao cidian 2003, 485) Despite the great, at times almost unbearable, political and ideological pres­sures in the latter half of the 20th century a number of theorists were suffi­ciently subtle and creative (and sufficiently courageous) to plant the seeds ofnew theories that combined Marxist, Confucian, Daoist and even Buddhistapproaches. While maintaining a Marxist perspective, they tried to reconstruct . 30... , .................... , .... , ................. . ......... ‘...... ’, ................ , ........ . .... ‘........ ’, ‘......... ’, ‘......... ’ . , ... ‘....... ’, ‘...... ’, ‘..... ’. Chinese philosophy and methodology. Through this combination of commit­ments, they were perhaps more culturally representative than many other Chi­nese philosophical figures from the 1940s through the 1990s (Cheng Chung-Ying 2002, 381). Zhang Dainian, to whose work and thought we will turnin the next sections of this paper, belongs to such brilliant scholars who havetruly and distinctively shaped the modern image of Chinese philosophy andits methodology. Zhang Dainian’s Life and Work Zhang Dainian was one of the most influential Chinese philosophers of the erathat was very briefly described above. He thus belongs among the most impor­tant Chinese philosophers and historians of philosophy who left an enduringimpact on the development of modern Sinophone thought. His research mainlyfocused on interpretations of Chinese intellectual history, on developing a newmethodology of Chinese philosophy, and also on questions linked to intercul­tural philosophy and various encounters with Western thought. In his culturalphilosophy, Zhang rejected total Westernization, but also disagreed with cul­tural nationalism. He strove for a synthesis of Chinese and Western culture anda mutual completion of different Chinese and Euro-American philosophicaldiscourses. Due to his revitalization of classical categories and the concepts of tradition­al Chinese philosophy he later—in the second half of the 20th century—also became famous outside China. One of the reasons for this international fame doubtless lies in his important contribution to the modernization of cross-cul­tural methodology. Among other issues, he established numerous innovative and extremely significant methodological approaches for researching ancient Chinese traditions of thought and created a number of specific tools for comparative phi­losophy and related cultural sciences. The continuation of the Chinese tradition was already apparent in the philosophical works of Jin Yuelin and Feng Youlan. With Zhang Daini-an, this continuity finally became a conscious, self-aware methodology. It can be said that Zhang Dainian, as opposed to Jin or Feng, was not only vigilantly preserving the special characteristics of traditional Chinese thought but, more importantly, was also preserving and continuing tradi­tional methodological principles ... In terms of its range, Zhang Dainian’s continuation of the Chinese philosophical tradition goes far beyond Jin Yuelin’s and even Feng Youlan’s. His work represents a genuine synthesis of the continuations of traditional philosophy.4 (Hu 2002, 230) Zhang Dainian was born in the Xian . district of Hebei .. province. Influ­enced by his older brother, he began studying philosophy at an early age. He at­tended Beiping University of Education (...... ), graduating in 1933. A number of his early philosophical treatises attracted considerable attention and even before the establishment of the People’s Republic he was recommended by Feng Youlan ... and Jin Yuelin ... (Cheng Lian 2002, 235). He first taught Chinese philosophy at Qinghua University (.... ) in Peking, where his brother was also a professor, and in 1952 he began teaching at Peking Univer­sity (.... ), where he worked as professor emeritus until his death in 2004.However, the turbulent periods of the Anti-rightist Campaign and the Cultur­al Revolution did not spare Zhang Dainian, and he was forbidden to lecture or publish for a number of years. Because of political and historical factors, his ideas received little attention until the last two decades of the 20th century. Although his major works were written before 1949, only a few were published. Thus, while his older contemporaries Feng Youlan and Jin Yuelin established their academic reputations before 1949, Zhang was not so fortunate (ibid. 244). In China, Zhang Dainian is also well known for elaborating and completing the innovative philosophy developed by his brother, Zhang Shenfu ... (1893– 1986), which combined analytical, Marxist and ancient Chinese thought. His major works were published in 1996 in eight volumes with the title Collect­ed Works of Zhang Dainian (..... ). His most important works include An Outline of Chinese Philosophy (...... ), the modern methodological classic Key Concepts and Categories in Classical Chinese Philosophy (............ ), which has also been published in English and German, the collections of essays Culture and Philosophy (..... ) and Searching for the Truth (... ), and the anthology Zhang Dainian’s Collected Academic Essays, selected by the Author (.......... ). During the first three decades of the 20th century, Zhang closely followed the ideological disputes between the radical proponents of a complete Westerniza­tion (.... ) and the conservatives who argued for a renewal of the ancient .......... , ....................... , ...... , ........................ . ... , ... , ... , ...................... , .............. ................ , ...... , ........ , ....... , ........... ’ ...’ . Chinese traditions (... ). However, Zhang, who actively participated in these debates, began looking for a middle way which would combine the most appro­priate aspects of both discourses. This view of culture has obtained popularity in China over the lasttwo decades as the “synthesizing innovation theory of Chinese cul­ture” ... An enhanced version was developed and expounded duringthe period of the cultural debate in the 1980s. For Zhang, the im­portant question is not what to synthesize, but how to synthesize.(Cheng Lian 2002, 243) Over the course of his intellectual and academic career, Zhang gradually devel­oped his own specific vision of a method capable of achieving such a synthesis.As a young man, he was interested in certain Western philosophical issues, and was especially attracted to the analytical philosophy of Moore and Russell. But increasingly he devoted himself to exploring ways of integrating analytical meth­ods into re-constructions and reinterpretations of classical Chinese philosophy.A systematic treatment of this approach, which would henceforth constitute the main thrust of his intellectual interests, can be found in his Five Essays on Men and Nature.... , which appeared in 1940 and can also be found in his Col­lected Works (1996). Methodology and Epistemology: From Chinese Tradition to Marx and Beyond For Zhang, approaching Chinese philosophy from a Marxist point of view was extremely fruitful, for Marxism represented an important contribution to examin­ing the relationship between being and consciousness (Sein – Bewusstsein). Although Chinese philosophy has its own specifics, its basic problem is still the problem of being and consciousness. This is a universal charac­teristic of all philosophies.5 (Zhang 2003, 12) In his cultural studies, he sought a synthesis of traditional Chinese and Western approaches, especially with regard to the relations between men and nature, the in­dividual and society, and analytic and dialectical reasoning (Bunnin 2002, 11). He believed that future Chinese philosophy should be based upon the development .............. , .................... . ................ . and elaboration of positive elements from within its own tradition: “In the fu­ture, Chinese philosophy will surely be influenced by Western philosophy; but at the same time, it also has to be the product of its own ancient thought”6 (Zhang 1982a, 587). His vision of intercultural syntheses was based upon a renovation of the central approaches belonging to traditional Chinese philosophy: Contemporary Chinese philosophy should remain connected to and continue the Chinese philosophy of the past. The kind of philosophy we need should not be based only on the most recent results of Western currents but should look primarily to the authentic and original Chinese tradition.7 (ibid. 1984, I, 219) Of course, this did not imply denying the need to confront Western (and in­ternational) philosophy. European and Indian philosophy were especially val­uable here, for they contained many elements that could not be found in theChinese tradition. In Zhang’s view, the exploration and application of theseelements not only provided a precious tool for generating new systems ofthought, but also helped the Chinese to gain a better understanding of theirown tradition: In studying Chinese philosophy we must also possess at least an ele­mentary knowledge of Western philosophy. Ancient Greek philoso­phy developed clear concepts and sound argumentation. Its system wasquite well developed. This can help us to practise our reasoning. Andmodern bourgeois philosophy represents one of the most developedstages of world philosophy. German classical philosophy, which is partof this tradition, also provides one of the ideal foundations of Marxism.Thus, it is even more worthy of being understood ... In general, theworks of ancient Chinese philosophy did not establish such a formalsystem. Their philosophical positions were usually expressed hermeti­cally and between the lines. Therefore, its profound meaning is difficultto understand. But if we first gain some knowledge in Western philos­ophy, and then try to explore Chinese philosophy anew, we will discoverits genuine profundity. Only by comparing these works with Westernphilosophy, we will be able to discern the real value of dialectic logic 6....... , .............. , .............. . 7........ , ................ , ......... , .............. , .............. . in Laozi or Yizhuan, or the real significance of Mo Di’s and Xunzi’s logical theories.8 (ibid. 2000, 2) Zhang underscored the error of using incompatible methods, which try to explore and evaluate China’s history through the perspective of Western concepts and categories: “Different philosophical theories apply different concepts and catego­ries. Concepts and categories applied by philosophical theories which arose from different cultures (nations), are even more divergent”9 (Zhang 2003, 118). According to Zhang, Chinese philosophy differed fundamentally from Europe­an or Indian philosophy; systematizing it, therefore, meant first understanding its basic characteristics, for if we tried to apply European or Indian paradigms, the subtle essence of Chinese philosophy would necessarily elude our comprehension (ibid. 1982a, 5). In his historical research he thus tried to develop a specific sys­tem which would inherently correspond to Chinese philosophy. To this end, he made an exhaustive analysis of semantic contexts and formal functions in order to establish a framework for traditional categories that avoided the limits of (often misleading) purely chronological categorizations. In 1935–36 he explored conceptual categories and the multi-layered sys­tem of Chinese philosophy, and integrated it into his book An Outline of Chinese Philosophy, which represents the first modern systematization of Chinese philosophical categories.10 (Zhexue da cidian 2003, 1911) His system followed a strict differentiation between the notions of categories and concepts which, as he pointed out, had already been developed by classical Chi­nese philosophy in inquiries into the relation between names and actualities. This approach placed him in disagreement with most modern students of tradition­al Chinese logic, who generally considered distinctions of “names” (ming. ), as 8....... , .............. . ......... , ...... , ...... , ...... , .............. . ............ , ............ , .................... , ....... ..................... , ........’..’ , ‘.. ’ ..... , ............. . ........... , .......... , ........... . ..‘..’ , ‘.. ’ .... , ‘.. ’ ‘.. ’ ..... , ........ , ........... . 9.............. , .. . .......... , ......... , .. . 10 1935–1936 ................. , ..‘......’ , ..................... . applied by Moist, Nomenalist and other logical traditions, as differentiations be­tween concepts and categories: “Concept” (gainian) and “category” (fanchou) are translated notions. An­cient China developed the so-called “name” (ming). This word had a dualmeaning: terms, and concepts. In the “Mo Jing” it was written: “Terms(ming) can be divided into complete and particular (partial)”. Here, both kinds of terms represent concepts. Xunzi’s distinction between “Great uni­versal names” (which referred to every thing or being) and “Great particu­lar names” (which referred to particular species) in his essay on “Correctnames” was also dealing with concepts in both cases.11 (Zhang 2003, 118) Thus, Zhang Dainian saw concepts as a way of naming concrete objects and phe­nomena. Naming could embrace wider, more general entities, as well as their specificor partial features, but in each case they always referred to concrete existing things.These distinctions were therefore always of an exclusively quantitative nature. Hence,the two meanings implied by the ancient Chinese term ming . did not represent anydifferentiation between concepts and categories. For Zhang, the latter notion repre­sented only a formal, arbitrary tool for decomposing actuality. In the ancient Chinesetradition, it could be found, for example, in the work of the philosopher Han Yu .. : In his work The Origin of the Way (The Origin of Dao), Han Yu developed a theory of categories “xuwei” and concepts “dingming”. In this work he wrote: “Humanity and justice are concepts, while Dao and virtue are cate­gories”. A so-called category is an empty shelf, which can be filled by var­ious contents. Confucians, Daoists and Buddhist all spoke about Dao, but for each of these currents, Dao meant something different; therefore, this term refers to a category (xuwei). On the other hand, the terms humanity (ren) and justice (yi) do have precise, fixed, inherent meanings. While Confucians professed humanity and justice, Daoists opposed them. They did not advocate any other form of humanity or justice. Hence, the terms humanity and justice are concepts (dingming). The meaning of Han Yu’s term “xuwei” is very close to the Western term “category”.12 (ibid.) 11 ‘.. ’ . ‘.. ’ ...... . ....... ‘. ’. ‘. ’ ..... , .... , .... . ‘.. ’ . : ‘. : . , . : . ’. ‘.. ’, ‘.. ’ .... . .. ‘.. ’ ... ‘... ’ (‘. ’) . ‘... ’ (‘.. ’) ..... . 12.. ‘.. ’ ....... . ‘.. ’ . : ‘...... , ...... ’. ......... , ......... . .. , .. , ..... , ..... , ...... , ...... . .... , ....... . ...... , ...... , ........... , ....... . ...... , ........... . He also tried to prove this difference based on the etymological meaning of the Chinese translation of the western term “category”: The expression category (fanchou) is a foreign word. It is a compound of two words taken from the essay “The Great Plan” from the book Shang Shu. This essay is divided into “nine sections (chou) of the universal plan (fan). Here, the word ‘fan’ means a principle, and the word ‘chou’ ‘kind’. The compound word ‘fanchou’ means principal kinds (or the prin­ means ciples of sorting). The use of this compound word as a translation of the Western term ‘category’ seems quite appropriate.”13 (ibid., 118–19) Zhang stressed the importance of understanding essential and culturally deter­mined specifics of categories and concepts. Exploring the history of thought without an analytical comprehension of these methodological foundations could easily result in false interpretations. This was especially important when research­ing traditional Chinese thought, an area in which many of his contemporaries critically applied Western methodological premises: When researching the history of Chinese philosophy, we have to know and understand the original meanings of Chinese philosophical catego­ries and concepts. Only on this basis will we be able to properly perceive (i.e. in a relative sense) the ideas of individual philosophers. We must also know the processes of the modification of these categories and concepts.Only in this way will it be possible to gain a deeper knowledge of the developmental processes of Chinese philosophy.14 (ibid., 130) From Marxist Philosophy to Marxist Ideology However, due to objective circumstances which prevailed in his country after the establishment of the PRC, the understanding of these processes always implied the ideological valuation of particular currents and their representatives. Until the mid-1990s, such valuations had to be based on the opposition between material­ism and idealism. In this respect, Zhang Dainian was no exception; just like most 13..... , ....... ‘.. ’ . ‘.. ’ . , .. ‘.... ’. .... , .... . ........... . ......... ‘.... ’ , ....... . 14......... , ........... , ....... , .................... . .. , ....... , ....... , ....................... . other scholars of the time, he had to adapt to the prevailing guidelines of creating “proper” theory. The struggle between the defenders of materialism and idealism is funda­mental and most important. The history of the human processes of com­prehension is intricate and complex, but at its heart, this process is one of the triumphs of truth over error. Basically, materialism is the current which explains the world as it is. Therefore, this direction is the proper one. Idealism, on the contrary, drowns in illusory escapes from reality;it deals with fragmentary treatises on insignificant matters. Therefore,this current is false. We cannot avoid this great issue of the difference between right and wrong.15 (ibid., 117) The second important criteria for distinguishing between “good” and “bad” phi­losophers was, in keeping with the Marxist theory of class struggle, class affiliation and, consequently, the moral-political integrity of a specific philosopher’s thought. We also have to accurately determine which class of that society was supported by the opinions of a given philosopher, we have to discover to which class interests a philosopher’s theory was serving and to which class his theory was useful. This is the most important method for evalu­ating the class essence of any thought or teaching.16 (ibid., 34) The “consistency” of Zhang’s analyses in his historical work can be seen from the fact that all “idealistic” philosophers are introduced as potential explorers, where­as proponents of the “materialist” worldview are usually seen as possessing social awareness and as potential revolutionaries. Li Zhi, for instance, criticized the Mencian stream of Confucianism,while still acknowledging the importance of Confucius himself. He criti­cized false feudal morals and strove for equality between men and wom­en, and showed compassion for the suffering peasants and merchants,but opposed peasant uprisings. Hence, it is obvious that his thought to a 15...................... , ..... . ............ , ..... , .......... . ....... , .................. , ...... ; ................. , ......... , ...... . ............. . 16.. , ....................... , .......................... , ................. . ..................... . certain extent corresponded to the needs of the bourgeois class. The fact that he was not able to create an independent, authentic and coherent philosophical system of his own indicates the weakness of the bourgeois social class at that time. Let us also look at the class background of Wang Fuzhi, whom some people also believe to be a representative of the bour­geois class. Wang advocated the feudal system. He passionately opposed landlords and their tyrannical usurpation of land. He showed pity for the suffering of the people, but opposed peasant uprisings. We can therefore conclude that he represented the interests of the lowest class of proprie­tors.17 (ibid., 35) Zhang’s main argument for the correctness of the materialistic worldview was based upon a materialistic worldview itself, an irony which was typical of the Chi­na of that time. He explained this in the following way: Why do we say that materialism is theoretically more valuable? Above all,because it is closely connected with the natural sciences. Natural scienc­es are based on materialism and therefore represent the chief support for philosophical developments. Hence, materialism is the force which brings about progress in philosophy.18 (ibid., 114) In his historical studies Zhang, being an orthodox Marxist, concentrated upon the exploration and exposition of “materialistic” traditions in ancient Chinese thought, the interpretations of traditional dialectical methods and on different aspects of humanism and Confucian social ethics. In the 1990s, however, Zhang was a firm supporter of the campaign for the liberation of thought (sixiang jiefang.... ) and a severe critic of the exaggerated politicization of theory: In recent years, we witnessed unhealthy tendencies, namely tendencies of calculation. Articles were written in accordance with the prevailing current. The interests of the ruling authorities were more important than 17.... , .......... , ............. ; ....... , ...... , .......... , ....... , .... , .................... . ..... , ............ , ............... . ............. , .............. . ................ , ............ ; ............. ; ....... , ....... , .. , ................. . 18..................... ? .................... , ............... , ................. , .................... . the actual situation. If they declared that something was right or wrong,it had to be accepted. This attitude is not an academic one and articles,written in this spirit, cannot be regarded as scholarly either. Now we have to eliminate these unhealthy tendencies.19 (Zhang 2003, 134) Later, in a private conversation with Edmund Ryden, the English translator of his work Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy, Zhang admitted that he was forced to apply “Marxist jargon” during periods of intense political pressure, and he per­mitted Ryden to omit from his translation those portions of his book which were included only as a tribute to the then prevailing ideology (Ryden 2002, XV). Foundations of “Neo-Materialist” Thought and Dialectics of Complementarity Although Zhang’s theories were based upon a materialist worldview, he still stressed that ideas cannot be reduced to the category of matter (Bunnin 2002, 10),and tried to apply the traditional binary categorical pair of “roots or basis” (ben . ) and “completion or (achieved) perfection” (zhi. ) as a dialectical basis for the unification of (primary) matter and (secondary) idea. Zhang revised Marx’s dia­lectical materialism in accordance with the Neo-Confucian modification of the classical Chinese model of correlative relations. Although he still saw matter and idea (or economic base and ideal superstructure) as parts of a strictly hierarchical structure, in this context they were mutually dependent and complementary. Both revisions produced similar results, though tending in opposite directions. While the Neo-Confucian revision of the classic correlative dialectics, in its original con­struction of egalitarian correlativity, introduced the principle of the (unequal) val­uation of both poles, Zhang’s revision of the Marxist dialectic, in its primary hier­archically structured construct based upon an absolute contradiction (discrepancy and mutual exclusion) between both poles, introduced a principle of relativity and mutually complementary interaction. In this model, which to some extent was both Neo-Confucian and Maoist, the elementary poles of the dialectical process were no longer seen as absolutely contradictory, but merely as parts of a con­tradiction, based upon mutual interdependence. In contrast to the classical con­cept of ancient China, which already appeared in the oldest “proto-philosophical” 19...... , ........ , ..... , ...... , ........ , ......... , ............. . ......... , ....... ; ....... , ............ . ............. . theories of yin and yang.. , and which had remained unchanged in its basic structure until the Song . dynasty, this renewed type of correlativity was no longer seen only as an interaction between two parts (or situations) of the same entity, which because of the all-embracing relativity of all that exists, manifested itself in a bipolar opposition; in this new framework it became a relation, based upon a hierarchically valued differentiation of both poles (Zhang 2003, 23–24).While this new construct destroyed the original balance of the bipolar relation,it also made possible a dynamic development of both poles, which grew out of the inherent tension of this new imbalance. Thus, for Zhang, the economic base still represented the “basis” (ben. ), without which the ideal superstructure could not exist; but without the superstructure, the basis could not manifest itself in its “wholeness” (zhi. ), which represents the only relevant reality (ibid. 1982b, 9). For reasons which can be easily understood (the possibility of a “higher” valua­tion of ancient Chinese philosophy from the viewpoint of Marxist conceptual patterns), Zhang argued that traditional Chinese theories, which are based upon the principle of complementarity, represented a kind of dialectic. He saw this construct as a form of an ideational pattern which had to be distinguished from the traditional European structure based on static, formalized concepts of thesis,antithesis and synthesis, but which were still defined by interaction between two opposite poles. Therefore, according to Zhang, the principle of complementarity also represented a form of dialectical thought. Dialectic thought in Chinese philosophy arose from observing nature and men. (Ancient Chinese) Philosophers claimed that these necessary principles defined reality, while Hegel believed that they represented a necessary form for understanding ideas. We have formulated arguments for applying the term dialectical method to the aforesaid theories of Chi­nese philosophy, just as we can apply the term dialectical method to cer­tain ideas of Heraclitus or Spinosa.20 (Zhang 1984, I, 139) In our view (which is based on different assumptions), defining the traditional principle of complementarity in this way is admissible, especially if we consid­er the etymology of the word dialectic. As with the concepts of philosophy or logic, the concept of dialectic, in different cultures and within divergent linguis­tic structures, has been expressed differently and can appear in diverse structural 20........... , ............ . .............. , ......... , ............. . .......................... , ............................... . patterns which are mainly defined by the language itself. As demonstrated at the outset of this study, if the naming of certain theoretical discourses is based solely upon Western categorical patterns, then traditional Chinese philosophy cannot be considered as philosophy at all. The same holds true for logic, dialectic or epis­temology. However, if we accept the premise that these concepts assume different structural forms in different cultures, then the ancient Chinese theories of the principle of complementarity can also be considered as belonging to the discourse of dialectical thought. Zhang Dainian also found a categorical correspondence to the Western concept of matter in traditional Chinese thought, which despite its dialectical union with the idea, in his view indubitably represented a primary defining pole of the afore­said binary pair. As with the majority of other (much earlier) Chinese advocates of materialism, Zhang saw a determinant of matter in the ancient (and much disputed) notion qi. (substantiality, vitality). He supported his assertion by cit­ing specific interpretations of Laozi’s .. , Zhuangzi’s .. and Xunzi’s .. philosophies, which are analysed, however, for the most part without taking into account their full contextual connotations: Qi is a thing that constructs everything that exists ... Qi itself has no life,and no consciousness, but it is their basis. It can be said that qi is the con­cept of matter within Chinese philosophy ... In short, the so-called qi in Chinese philosophy is a lifeless objective substance without awareness thatrepresents a foundation of life and consciousness.21 (Zhang 1984, 123–24) The supposition of the existence of a clear concept of substantiality (matter) in traditional Chinese philosophy would characterize all of Zhang’s efforts to reas­sess his own tradition of thought. Although insufficiently grounded in terms of academic discourse, it still satisfied the demands for a popularised sinization of Marxism, which was dictated by the specific circumstances in China during the latter half of the 20th century. In this respect, Zhang’s research was an adequate response to the obligations he had to meet if he wished to survive (in an intellec­tual sense) and continue to work and develop. His focus upon “materialistic” streams that could be found in the framework of the historical development of Chinese philosophy, also led Zhang to analyse one of the basic differences between Chinese and European philosophy, or their different approaches to the problem of the relation between noumenon and phenomena. 21.......... ....... , .. , ........ . ..... , ... ......... ..... , ...................... .......... . While Western philosophy proceeded from the presupposition of a strict division between the concepts of substance and appearances, as Zhang pointed out, this distinction was completely alien to traditional Chinese thought: Although materialism is not an orthodox Chinese current, we can still find some basic tendencies in Chinese philosophy which are compatible with it. The unity of appearances and reality is a basic cosmological ten­dency in Chinese philosophy. Appearances are identical with reality and vice versa. The concept of a reality situated somewhere beyond appear­ances is completely alien to Chinese philosophy.22 ( Zhang 1984, I, 231) The Chinese translation of the European term substance with the old Chinese expression benti .. was thus mistaken and could lead to profound misunder­standings in the field of ontological research. According to Zhang, the term ben-gen .. was a much more appropriate translation of the notion of substance,though even here he cautioned against simplified equivalents. In his view, the most influential currents of the European ideal tradition saw the relation between substance and being as primarily a relation between actual and non-actual (...... ), while Chinese tradition treated this relation as one between sub­stance and non-substance (...... ) (ibid. 2003, 231). He was thereby re­lying once again (though only implicitly) upon the ancient Chinese principle of immanent transcendence. In Chinese tradition “the relation between substance and actuality is not a relation between superficial appearances and reality which lies beyond them, but a relation between source and stream, between roots and branches”23 (Hu 2002, 236). Conclusion Zhang Dainian’s most significant contribution to modern Chinese philosophy is to be found in his attempts to synthesize Chinese and Western traditions of thought, and therefore in the field of intercultural methodology. His “theory of creative synthesis ..... ” differs from most of his predecessors and contem­poraries in terms of its specific content, but most especially in its methodologies.His search for the most reasonable interactions between different discourses was much more complex and subtle than first appears. Zhang’s aim was not that of 22............. , ............ , ...... . ... . ,..................... , ..... ,..... . .. ......... , .......... . 23...................... , ......... . finding a balance between the conservative (... ) and progressive (..... ) currents, for he realised that both discourses proceeded from flawed premises. At the same time, intercultural synthesis for him was something more than a con­glomerate of discrete, mutually unrelated contents or methods, which could (in a scientific or moral sense) serve as suitable tools for constructing a fusion of inter-cultural discourses. While his methodological studies are not always fully realized,one senses the genuine search for an innovative integration of both cultural tra­ditions which could meet the demands of a global world, and which were based upon the principle of equality. For Zhang, a cultural project is an everlasting en-deavour that constantly assimilates new truths. His philosophy displays a passion for truth and morality, a capacity to incorporate a broad scope of human values,and an attachment to the needs and problems of his era (Cheng Lian 2002, 234–44). In this sense, we cannot but acknowledge the great significance of his theories for the modernization of Chinese philosophy. References Altinok, Ozan Altan. 2019. “Mao’s Marxist Negation of Marxism.” Asian Studies 7 (1): 75–96. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2019.7.1.75-96. Bunnin, Nicholas. 2002. “Introduction.” In Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, ed­ited by Chung-ying Cheng, and Nicholas Bunnin, 1–15. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Cheng, Chung-ying. 2002. “Recent Trends in Chinese Philosophy in China and the West.” In Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, edited by Chung-ying Cheng,and Nicholas Bunnin, 349–404. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Cheng, Lian. 2002. “Zhang Dainian: Creative Synthesis and Chinese Philoso­phy.” In Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, edited by Chung-ying Cheng, and Nicholas Bunnin, 235–44. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Hall, David L., and Roger T. Ames. 1998. “Chinese Philosophy.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. Craig. London: Routledge. Accessed August 4, 2020. http://www.rep.routledge.com/article /G001SECT10. DOI:10.4324/9780415249126-G001-1. Hu, Weixi ... . 2002. Zhishi, luoji yu jiazhi – Zhongguo xin shizai lun sichaode xingqi..,.....-........... (Knowledge, Logic and Values—The Rise of New Chinese Realism). Beijing: Qinghua daxue chu-ban she. Meissner, Werner. 1990. Philosophy and Politics in China: The Controversy over Di­alectical Materialism in the 1930s. Translated by Richard Mann. London: C. Hurst & Co. Rockmore,Tom. 2019.“Hegel and Chinese Marxism.” Asian Studies 7 (1): 55–73. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2019.7.1.55-73. Rošker, Jana. 1996. Metodologija medkulturnih raziskav. Ljubljana: Filozofska fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani. Ryden, Edmund. 2002. “Translator’s Preface.” In Zhang Dainian: Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy, translated and edited by Ryden, Edmund XV–XVII. Lon­don, Beijing: Yale University Press, Foreign Languages Press. Tian, Chenshan. 2019.“Mao Zedong, Sinization of Marxism, and Traditional Chi­nese Thought Culture.” Asian Studies 7 (1): 13–37. https://doi.org/10.4312/ as.2019.7.1.13-37. Sernelj, Téa. 2019. “Modern Confucian Objection Against Communism in Chi­na.” Asian Studies 7 (1): 99–113. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2019.7.1.99-113. Zhang, Dainian ... . 1982a. Zhongguo zhexue dagang...... (An Out­line of Chinese Philosophy). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chuban she. –––. 1982b. Qiu zhen ji... (Searching for the Truth). Changsha: Hunan ren-min chuban she. –––. 1984. Zhang Dainian wenji..... (A Collection of Zhang Dainian’s Es­says). Beijing: Qinghua daxue chuban she. –––. 1988. Wenhua yu zhexue..... (Culture and Philosophy). Beijing jiaoyu kexue chuban she. –––. 1996. Zhang Dainian quan ji. ..... (Collected Works of Zhang Daini-an). 8 Volumes. Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chuban she. –––. 2000. “Zenyang xuexi Zhongguo zhexue shi? ......... ?” (How to Learn the History of Chinese Philosophy?). In Zhongguo zhexue sanbai ti ....... (300 Questions Regarding Chinese Philosophy), edited by Xia Nairu, 1–2. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chuban she. –––. 2002: Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy. Translated and edited by Edmund Ryden. New Haven, London, Beijing: Yale University Press, Foreign Lan­guages Press. –––. 2003. Zhongguo zhexue shi fangfalun fafan.......... (Intro­duction to the Methodology of the History of Chinese Philosophy). Beijing: Zhon­ghua shuju. Zhexue da cidian, xiuding ben shang, xia ........ , . ,. . 2002. (The Great Encyclopedia of Philosophy—An Actualized and Expanded Edition in two Volumes). Edited by Feng Qi. Shanghai: Cishu chuban she. Zhexue xiao cidian..... . 2003. (A Small Philosophical Dictionary). Edited byYu Penglin, Zhang Liangyi, and Liao Jianhua. Shanghai: Cishu chuban she. SPECIAL ISSUE: TRANSFORMATIONS IN CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AT THE THRESHOLD OF MODERNITY Foreign Ideals, Indistinct Hopes, and IntimatePassions DOI: 10.4312/as.2021.9.2.145-164 Swiss Enchantment: Modern Chinese Intellectuals and a Federal Utopia Federico BRUSADELLI* Abstract A vast and hyper-centralized Asian empire built on the premise of an alleged cultural homogeneity. A small, federalist Alpine state sustained by the ideal of coexistence of different languages and religions. The differences between China and Switzerland could not be wider, and it is therefore understandable that the Swiss confederacy has been fas­cinating Chinese intellectuals in both the modern and contemporary era. In the late Qing and early Republican period, Switzerland was mentioned by prominent figures like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, who praised its democracy, and in the 1920s the Swiss political system became a source of inspiration for “provincial patriots” in Hunan or for Chinese federalists such as Chen Jiongming. The present paper intends to survey these political encounters and perceptions, focusing on the transformation of the Swiss institutional model and historical experience into a “political concept”, and on the reasons for its final rejection as an unrealistic utopia unsuited for China. Keywords: Chinese federalism, utopia, China and Switzerland, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Chen Jiongming. Navdušenje nad Švico: sodobni kitajski intelektualci in federalisticna utopija  Izvlecek Ogromno in mocno centralizirano azijsko cesarstvo je zgrajeno na predpostavki dom­nevne kulturne homogenosti, majhna, federalisticna alpska država pa vztraja pri idealu sožitja razlicnih jezikov in religij. Razlike med Kitajsko in Švico ne bi mogle biti vecje,zato je razumljivo, da je švicarska konfederacija kitajske intelektualce navduševala tako v modernem kot sodobnem casu. V poznem obdobju dinastije Qing in zgodnjem republi­kanskem obdobju so Švico omenjale ugledne osebnosti, kot sta bila Kang Youwei in Liang Qichao, ki so hvalile njeno demokracijo, v dvajsetih letih pa je švicarski politicni sistem postal vir navdiha za »provincialne domoljube« v Hunanu in kitajske federaliste, kot je Chen Jiongming. Pricujoci prispevek namerava raziskati ta politicna soocanja in predstave s poudarkom na preoblikovanju tega švicarskega institucionalnega modela in zgodovinske izkušnje v »politicni koncept« ter na razlogih za njegovo dokoncno zavrnitev kot nereal­isticne utopije, neprimerne za Kitajsko. * Federico BRUSADELLI, University of Naples “L’Orientale”.Emal address: fbrusadelli@unior.it Kljucne besede: kitajski federalizem, utopija, Kitajska in Švica, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Chen Jiongming Introduction: Confucius in Switzerland In 2010 the Chinese journal Bijiaofa yanjiu..... (Comparative Law) published a paper entitled “Royal is not Necessarily Big: Common Values be­tween China and the West through a Survey of Swiss Federalism (Wang bubi da: cong Ruishi lianbangzhi taolun zhongxi gongtong de jiazhiguan .... : ................ )”. Its author, Su Yigong ... (1962–)—who two years earlier had been a guest at the University of Fribourg present­ing a lecture on Swiss federalism “from the perspective of Confucianism”—ar­gues that the institutional and political mechanism of the Alpine confederacyseems to reflect many of the Confucian prescriptions on “good government”.More specifically, according to Su, the Swiss system is a rare embodiment of the“kingly way” (wangdao .. ) as opposed to the ruthless “autocratic way” (badao.. ), or “way of the hegemon” (Su 2010). The latter, implying concentration ofpower in one man, with an extensive use of violence and constriction, was tradi­tionally associated with the short-lived Qin dynasty, but often extended to de­fine any tyrannical figure censored by the Confucian orthodox historiography.1 Mixing classical quotations—from the Lunyu .. , the Daxue .. , the Meng­zi.. (especially with regard to its well-known theory of “the people as thefundament” (.. minben)), or from the Song scholar Zhang Jiucheng ... (1092–1159)2—with descriptions of the Swiss institutional arrangement and ofits practices, Su Yigong portrays the confederation as the almost utopian real­ization of a harmonious polity based on consensus and local self-government.He writes 1 As Sumner Twiss and Jonathan Chan observe,“given the misuse to which the system of lords-pro­ tector (ba) was put—that is, its devolution into aggressive hegemony relying on military force— both Mencius and Xunzi clearly think that a more legitimate and virtuous authority is needed to use properly such a powerful tool of statecraft” (Twiss and Chan 2012). However, under a careful observation the Xunzi seems to provide a more nuanced view on the issue, looking at the badao as a historical necessity (often leading to “decent” political experiences), rather than as a moral abom­ ination. (See also Kim 2013, and Harris 2017) 2 Besides reflecting on the minben theory, Zhang Jiucheng also rearticulated the aforementioned relationship between wangdao and badao as a neatly binary opposition between good and bad governance. Switzerland is one of the few countries in the world that still make an extensive use of direct democracy. But where does the essence of its de­mocracy reside? From a Confucian point of view, it is not in the fact that it is governed by many people, but in the fact that it does not need to dwell on a strong authority or on the force of violence in order to gain the trust of the people. (Su 2010, 123) Such praise from a Confucian perspective echoes the Deweyan interpretation ofdemocracy, by which the diffused practices of consensus building, embodied by “cul­tural” or “social” policies, are seen as the pathway to allow a broader political partic­ipation among the populace, more than the normative establishment of a specificset or rules and mechanisms.3 No pressure from above is needed to convince thecitizens to trust and take part into the administration, and no single (or personal)authority is entitled to make decisions for the entire community, thus allowing thepublic spirit to triumph over the selfish tendencies (and here, in his Swiss eulogySu returns to another binary opposition inherited by the Confucian classics: theone between “common interest”, gong . , and “disruptive selfishness”, si . ). TheSwiss confederacy is presented as inspired by the “acceptance of differences” andthe “division of power”, and favouring the bottom-up participation of “self-govern­ing political communities” to the federal government of the country (ibid., 125). Inconclusion, promoting an “external neutrality” and an “internal federal democracy”,Switzerland deserves to be defined as “closely resembling the Royal Way praised bythe Sage Philosophers of the Chinese antiquity” (ibid., 132). Su Yigong’s approach might be considered as a curious, partially naive, somehowisolated exercise in comparative analysis, inspired more by the venerable Confuciantradition of “praise and blame” than by scientific objectivity. However, with his pa­per Su puts himself in continuity with a perhaps marginal—but nonetheless signif­icant—tradition of Chinese idealized descriptions of the Swiss confederacy, whichare the object of the present article and which will be examined in their “ideal” and“conceptual”—more than purely historical—entanglements and resonances. Conceptualizing the West: Nations as Political Models This analysis of some modern Chinese descriptions of the Swiss political system is based on two assumptions. First: the observation of foreign models (specifically 3 For an extensive analysis of how Dewey’s views on democracy resonate with modern and con­ temporary Confucian elaborations, and of how they were imported in China, see Ames and Hall (1999). Western, with the exception of Meiji Japan) was a central element in the intellec­tual and political discussions on how to save China and build a strong state thatdeveloped from the late Qing to the mid-20th century. As Peter Zarrow explains“Educated Chinese at the end of the nineteenth century, no matter how greattheir pride in their culture’s general accomplishments, saw China as a loser, nota pacesetter, in the historical race”. Consequently, “they were willing to forgomany long-accepted ideas about political order to build a modern nation-state,taking as models various examples of success: Britain, Germany, France, theUnited States, Russia and Japan” (Zarrow 2012, 20). Rather than looking within China in search of virtuous examples from their past, as the traditional Confu­cian understanding of history prescribed, they looked outside and forward, po­sitioning China and the West along a linear vision of time and using Westerninstitutional inspirations in order to catch up with the most advanced countries.In this process, “intellectual resources from the West and from China’s past(were) cited, translated, appropriated or claimed in moments of perceived his­torical contingency so that something called change (might) be produced” (Liu1995, 30). As the collapse of the traditional order, and the very real threat of apartitioning of China by foreign powers, grew in intensity, the knowledge of the“Occidental Other” became less a neutral process of knowledge transfer, than––as Theodor Huters points out in his study on the appropriation of the West inlate Imperial China—a somehow forced exchange, charged with a sense of ur­gency and anxiety. For the Chinese intellectuals of the time, then, “the recourseto the West was at the same time mandatory and highly distasteful” (Huters2005, 14). By this token, “the question of the position of Western knowledgebecame an important—if not the most important—leitmotif within late Qingthought, with overtones reaching throughout the twentieth century” (ibid., 45).Talking about the West was not an exclusive feature of the discourse promotedby the Westernized radicals, as Edward Fung calls them (Fung 2010, 27–58).Praising foreign models could mean looking at experiences as different as theenlightened authoritarianism of Peter the Great (as in the case of Kang You-wei), US Republicanism (as for Sun Yat-sen), at the German centralized state,or at the British constitutional monarchy. In some cases these foreign examplescould also serve to reinforce conservative positions on the necessity to nurtureand express a “Chinese essence”, as European countries had presumably donein the past. Countries—or more precisely, the political system represented bythose countries in that specific historical moment—became a pivotal part of thetransfer of concepts between China and the outside world. Indeed—and this isthe second assumption of the present paper—as this process was not limited toan objective geographical or anthropological description, but was entangled topolitical discourses, those countries became “political concepts” in themselves. Therefore, they can be studied, in their “translation”, “circulation” or “appropria­tion”, through the methodological lens of conceptual history/Begriffsgeschichte— defined as the study of concepts seen as focal points of interpretations and understanding; as identify­ing regularities and differences in human discourse; as windows through which we can appreciate how comprehensions of the world are organized and brought to bear on action. (Steinmetz, Freeden and Fernández-Se­bastián 2017, 1–2) In this regard, “nation-concepts” can be observed as undergoing all the four pro­cesses defined by Reinhart Koselleck as pertaining to the Sattelzeit—the sad-dle-epoch in which a “jump to modernity” took place in 18th century Europe.They were “temporalized”—by virtue of a linear understanding of history; they were “politicized”—as part of a political discourse on how to reform China; they were subsequently “ideologizable”, in other words they could be used in the con­struction of an ideology; they were “democratized”—as knowledge of the foreign countries became an essential part of a much broader debate than the pre-1850s discussions on the external world, which were limited to the elite. When we look at the circulation of these concepts, we are also exploring two di­mensions of “comparative political thought”, following the guidelines by Michael Freeden and Andrew Vincent, namely “the self-understanding of the entity in question” (China, in this case), and “how the entity understands others” (Freeden and Vincent 2013, 12). Within this framework, I will try to show that the “nation-concept” of Switzer­land presented some interesting and unique features. More specifically, it was per­meated by a utopian nuance from the beginning of its transfer into China, some­thing which—as witnessed by Su Yigong’s article—has survived until today. Why was Switzerland-as-a-concept temporalized by being positioned at the end of history—if we intend Utopia as a premonition of the final stage of mankind’s evolution, the non plus ultra of historical development? Why did it become a counter-concept to the traditional Chinese political order—if by “traditional” we intend the centralized, monarchical and authoritarian model that was blamed by the late Qing modernizers (as well as by the late Ming reformers)? And why was it presented to the public as an unreachable option for China? I will argue that the answer to this confinement of the Swiss model to the realm of utopia is to be found not so much in the democratic nature of Switzerland (which also plays a role in the Chinese fascination with it, of course), but in its de-centralized structure—both administratively and culturally—and in its bot­tom-up processes of political legitimation: in other words in its radical federalism. The “Peach Blossom Spring” of the West The idealization of the Swiss system—or its conceptualization as a utopian politi­cal order—was already explicitly discernible in the first description of the country circulating in modern China. In 1849, at a moment in which the knowledge of the Western world was an al­most virgin field of inquiry, and yet a matter of pressing urgence, Xu Jishe ... (1795–1873) wrote the Yinghuan zhilüe.... (A Short Account of the Mar­itime Circuit), a text whose production and circulation overlaps with the more fa­mous Haiguo tuzhi .... (Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms) by Wei Yuan .. (1794–1857), which in its third edition, completed in 1852 and marking a pivotal moment in the Qing understanding of the external world,4 con­tains passages identical to Xu’s work. In the fifth chapters of his atlas, Xu depicts the small Alpine country. There, in the author’s personal remarks concluding the survey, Switzerland is described as the “Western land of happiness” (Xitu zhi lejiao..... ), a land in which the “thought of liberty” has thrived, a spot “untouched by military invasions” and “admired by all the Western countries”. The importance of local government is stressed as the historical peculiarity of the country: “At first Switzerland was di­vided into three parts, then in 13, and they all elect their local administration.” “I would say that Switzerland is the Peach Blossom Spring of the West”, Xu con­cludes (Xu 1849, juan 5).5 With this last observation, Xu presents a Western country as the realization of a popular Chinese fictional topos, introduced in the eponymous work by the poet Tao Yuanming ... (365?–427) in the 5th century. In his short poem Tao-hua yuan ... (The Peach Blossom Spring), Tao had imagined a small and idyl­lic community undisturbed by the unification of the Qin Empire, in which a communal and pre-Imperial way of life had been preserved in the midst of a pristine natural environment. This narrative, reused and reshaped throughout the 4 To quote Peter Michell, in Wei’s work “errors occurred, particularly in the confused description of Western religions, but still it was commendably accurate, illustrating a comprehensive inquisitive­ ness and detailed attention to facets of barbarian culture outside of mere curiosities and exoticisms meant for the reader’s amusement” (Mitchell 1972, 192). 5 Wei Yuan will include Xu’s chapter on Switzerland in the third edition of his famous Atlas, without altering a single word (the reference to the Peach Blossom Spring included). following centuries, has often (but not unanimously) been credited as the first example of utopian literature in China (see Zhang 2002). Through Xu’s literary comparison, Switzerland is thus put in connection with Tao’s anti-authoritari­an dream, and indirectly contrasted to the badao imposed on China by the First Emperor and later allegedly preserved across the dynasties. The Swiss political system—sketched by Xu in its basic features, through which its strong local and anti-centralist orientation are highlighted—is de facto praised as an anti-author­itarian (anti-Legalist, to frame it in the traditional philosophical debate of Im­perial China) model of governance. At the same time, however, by comparing it to the non-historical community described in Tao’s fictional poem, it is pushed to the borders of utopia. In other words, rather than being presented as a credible political model to be used—at least for inspiration, if not for full adoption—it is de-historicized, and treated as a fascinating but ultimately useless antipodean po­litical structure coming from the “far West”. The perception of the Swiss model as exotic and useless (in political terms), be­comes even clearer when looking at how, in the same text, Xu Jiyu introduces another federal country of 19th century Europe, Germany (Xu 1849, juan 4).In contrast to the utopian treatment reserved for Swiss federalism, the German ex­ample is conceptually adapted to the Chinese context by connecting it not to a fable-poem, but to a historical precedent: namely, the fengjian (.. ) system. The latter, following Arif Dirlik’s definition, indicated something akin to a ritual enfeoffment, or the establishment of a fief, that prevailed during the early Zhou dynasty, when the Zhou kings formally made grants of land and labor to their subordinates, creating a landed no­bility with whom they shared the administration of the Zhou territories.(Dirlik 1996, 229) As will be discussed later in this article, the association of a modern federal systemwith the Zhou model of shared governance—used here by Xu as a way to familiar­ize his audience with a foreign political structure—would ultimately strike a fatalblow to the aspirations of Chinese federal movements in the early 20th century. “Turning Swiss”: A Model for Independence As the crisis of the Qing Empire accelerated towards its dramatic conclusion, ref­erences to Switzerland started appearing in texts charged with a clearer political urgency, when compared to the prevalently informative nature of Xu’s and Wei Yuan’s works. In 1902, a few decades after the publication of Xu’s accounts, Yang Yulin ... (1872–1911), a Hunanese patriot fighting for the independence of his province in the last years of the Manchu rule over China, would optimistically claim: “We will turn my Hunan into a Cuba, we will turn my Hunan into a Switzerland” (Yang in Platt 2007, 119). The pairing between Cuba and Switzerland is interesting: it might suggest an anti-colonial interpretation of two very different historical ex­periences, but the fact that this claim for independence was not directed towards foreign invaders, but rather against the Qing Court, underlines its autonomist component. Provincial independence was to those activists the only way towards a new China, free from Manchu domination but also free from an oppressive “cen-tre” of internal domination. A much more famous revolutionary from Hunan, Mao Zedong ... (1893–1976), would also use Switzerland as a model for his project of provincial auton­omy in 1920 (before turning into an admirer of Qin Shi Huangdi .... and of his hyper-centralism, once the CCP was set to conquer power at the national level): “Some people regard Hunan as the Switzerland of the East. We can indeed look at Switzerland as a model for our ideal Hunan” (Mao in Platt 2007, 195).6 “Turning Swiss” might have been an unprecedented—and exotic—slogan for Hunan. Yet, a book with this title by Thomas Brady, published in 1985, shows how this had been a relatively popular political claim across 15th-century central Europe (a historical fact which, we would guess, was not common knowledge in 20th century Hunan). At that time, in the decades preceding the Reformation, the Swiss confedera­cy was a powerful “political model for surrounding peoples” (especially in South Germany), a freedom-based model which appeared to “reproduce itself by exam­ple” (Brady 1985, 30). In that context, “turning Swiss” became a “revery” for the country’s neighbours as a new concept of “liberty” seemed to threaten the Impe­rial order (ibid. 34). Liberty in the old sense, which began to fade during the seventeenth century, appeared in the heart of the feudal order and could, and did, be­come lordship’s bitterest foe. It could mean a monastery’s immunities, a city-state’s autonomy, the clergy’s freedom from lay jurisdiction, the pro­vincial estates’ rights to consent to taxes, or simply the rights of self-ad­ministration of a city or of a rural folk. Though radically egalitarian only by contrast with dominant social patterns, nowhere did liberty in this Mao, “Declaration on the Occasion of the Founding of the Association for Promoting Reform in Hunan”, again quoted in Platt (2007, 195). sense flourish more radically than in the Swiss Confederacy, and therenowhere more fully than in the Forest Cantons. What seems radicalabout this self-administration of ordinary people is the association ofliberty with productive labor, a European idea that departed dramatical­ly from Graeco-Roman culture’s belief in the incompatibility of humanlabor with true humanity. The disruptive power of the idea of liberty laytherefore not so much in its formal definition as in its extension to the commons, those free and mostly free persons who were normally ruledby their social betters and who “are now allowed to have minds andspirits”. (ibid., 6) “They deprive the nobles against their will of their serfs” and “make the sub­jects disobedient” (ibid., 31), a Habsburg supporter lamented, commenting on the Swiss threat against the imperial system.Through the eyes of those whose author­ity was menaced by it, the Swiss model appeared as the negation of a naturally hierarchical political order. It is easy to imagine that the Imperial Confucian bu­reaucrats at Court, facing the demands for a larger degree of local autonomy or—even worse—some forms of communal liberty and “self-administration” raised by Yang Yulin and his fellows, would have shared the contempt of the Habsburg sup­porters, rather than the 21st-century admiring look of Su Yigong at the fulfilment of a Confucian “royal way”. The emergence of small and autonomous (and dem­ocratic) polities might have realized a utopian condition in literature, but when applied to politics it would have presented a dystopic threat to the Confucian-le­galist principle of a single and undisputable source of authority and legitimacy for the entire tianxia (.. )—a barbaric subversion of the necessary hierarchy that assigns the junzi.. (gentleman) and the xiaoren.. (common man) to their respective duties and positions.7 Facing the crisis of the Qing, the idea of localism started to attract more interest, seen as all the more exciting in the radical politi­cal change that it would bring to a traditionally holistic conception of the polity.And again, Yang Yulin’s coupling of Cuba and Switzerland in his pamphlet seems to suggest this conceptual focus on the issue of self-determination and rupture of an Imperial (or imperialistic) political order in the name of grassroots freedom. As Luo Zhitian wrote in this context, Shortly after the Boxer disaster, Chinese scholars began to feel that the Qing government could not be relied upon to save the country and start­ed engaging in a type of intellectual gymnastics that resulted in the no­tion that national salvation could only be achieved without the central On the endurance of monarchic values in China, see Pines (2012). government, only through the fragmentary method of local self-rule (di-fang zili .... ). (Luo 2017, 324) Back to Utopia: Kang Youwei in the “Garden of Europe” As for the fortunes of the “Helvetic model” across Europe and America, in the centuries following the Reformation idealizing the political system of Switzer­land became ever more common, especially among Republican thinkers or feder­alist theorists—from Rousseau (who defined the Swiss “among the happiest peo­ple in the world”) to John Adams (who praised the canton of Neuchatel as having “the only constitution in which the citizens can truly be said in that happy con­dition of freedom and discipline, sovereignty and subordination”) (see Maissen 2019). Xu Jiyu’s description of the country, noted above, clearly carries an echo of that laudatory tradition. Two years after the appearance of Yang Yulin’s pamphlet in Hunan, a prominent Chinese intellectual—who was fighting his political battle on the opposite camp, advocating the re-centralization and constitutionalization of the Manchu monarchy—was equally fascinated by Switzerland as such a “hap­py” place. In contrast to Yang, though, Kang Youwei ... (1858–1927) had ac­tually been to that small and diverse European country. His impressions became a short text among his collection of travel journals from Europe. The following excerpts clearly show the picturesque (and again, almost unrealis­tically utopian) impression left in Kang’s eyes by the Swiss confederacy in 1904. Switzerland is not a country; it is the garden of Europe. And it is not just a garden for Europe; in fact, it is an unsurpassed place of pleasure for the entire world. Family houses along the lakes are incredibly old and their gardens are sur­rounded by small fences; up and down on the mountains, you can see somany churches, but they are old and covered with white dust, many ofthem shabby and run-down.There are villages with a hundred families, andsome three-storied houses are extremely worn-out; villagers are poor, butthey collect firewood and carry it on their backs to embellish their homes. People living on the Swiss mountains are so poor, their homes so humble ...Even in the city of Luzern, the buildings along the main avenues aremodest, houses are low, streets are narrow: being surrounded by mountainpeaks, they have had no development, and their old traditions are stillpreserved. Walking in the capital you won’t find shops: people are too poor to go shopping, and there is nothing worth seeing except for the Parliament,the University, the Museum, that are all nice and new.8 (in Kang 2007, book 7) (author’s translation) Poor and happy, Switzerland appears as an almost idyllic context in which there is no need for authoritarianism or political coercion: Their political system is extremely egalitarian, every individual has the right to vote. All the political power emanates from the Parliament which convenes in the Swiss capital, they have no Imperial Palace and they have no pres­ident. As they have no president, instead of him they have a speaker.9 (ibid.) (author’s translation) As noted earlier, differently from Yang and other “provincial patriots”, Kang could not be counted among the supporters of federalism, of Republicanism (at least in his activity as a political activist for China) or provincial independence. On the contrary, his failed reform plan of 1898 for the transformation of the Qing into a constitutional monarchy might be considered as the last attempt at re-centraliz­ing the ailing Manchu dynasty, a response to the increased provincial power from the Taiping War onwards, rather than a blueprint for de-centralization.10 Kang’s fascination with Switzerland, then, reflects his utopian propensity, more than his concrete political plans. Such a propensity—built over his progressive in­terpretation of Confucianism and his linear view of history as moving from chaos and separation to order and unity—would be fully expressed in the Datongshu ... (Book of Great Concord). In this text, allegedly completed in 1902, but deriv­ing from a much longer reflection started in the 1880s—and fully revealed to the public only posthumously in 1935—Kang describes human history as a triumphal 8.....,.................,..................,......,....,....,.....,..........,.........,....,....,....,..............,....,............,.....,...,......,....,..............,....,............,.....,...,......,....,............,....,.....,..........,......... In the following decades, more Chinese intellectuals, journalists or officials would visit Switzerland and write their impressions. A collec­tion (translated into German) is provided by Fröhlich and Gassmann (2000). 9.....,..............,.........,......,............,..... 10 For an in-depth study of the 1898 reforms, see Karl and Zarrow (2002). march from conflicts and suffering to an age of global stability. At the end of his­tory, a one-world democratic and republican government, in which political offic­es are time-limited and elective, will rule over the entire planet, abolishing bound­aries (social, economic, sexual, racial, linguistic, religious) and granting peace and welfare for every individual. At first sight, the political system imagined for the Age of Supreme Equality very much resembles a “globalization” of the Swiss di­rect democratic model. At the same time, however, Kang’s one-world utopia does not seem to adopt the Swiss federalist structure (and inspiration). If we define fed­eralism as underpinned by the principle of a “shared rule” (Kincaid 2011)—and,from a cultural point of view, as a system based on and conducive to the accept­ance of linguistic, religious, ethnic pluralism—then the utopian world cultivated by Kang out of the classical concept of Datong (.. ) does not seem to be in­spired by such a necessity for the preservation of pluralism. On the contrary, the Great Concord is the universal expansion of a process of centralization—meaning central planning and redistribution of resources, and centralized institutions—from the national to the global level.11 Kang thus offers yet another variation on the Swiss conceptual theme. Admired for its peace and frugality, the country is seen as something of a utopia for its democratic and republican system, which is openly praised (including the practice of a “collective leadership”); but its federal-ism—so central in the rhetoric of Hunan’s independentists—is left out of the pic-ture.The ultimate goal of history, according to Kang, is the highest possible degree of unity as a protection against conflict. If Switzerland recognizes linguistic and religious pluralism, in the world of Datong only one language will be spoken and religion will exhaust its function, as the hopes and aspirations of mankind will be fulfilled by the power of technology and pervasive socio-political planning. The need for a universal homogeneity, as marshalled by Kang, makes the Swiss garden an idyllic but politically fragile solution to the pressing questions of “modernity”. Liang Qichao and Chen Jiongming: Switzerland and the “Immaturity”of China A few years after Kang’s Swiss travelogue, his most famous pupil would cast a less picturesque and more substantially political look at the confederacy, consid­ering Bern as a potential (although ultimately discarded) model for actual reform.In “Issues Concerning the Construction of a New China” (Xin Zhongguo jian-she wenti ....... ) written in 1911 during the tumultuous revolutionary 11 For an analysis of Kang’s apparently ambiguous reflections on democracy and republicanism, fo­cusing on his two-sided (utopian vs. statist) approach to political action, see Brusadelli (2017). autumn, Liang Qichao ... (1873–1929) describes the institutional asset of the small country at the heart of Europe as part of a survey of the possible models for post-Imperial China: How about a political system with no head of state? This is possible with­out incurring in frauds and problems only in very small countries like Switzerland.The power of the Swiss central institutions can be extremely weak, and in cases of extremely important laws the National Assembly hands the power to vote to every citizen. This is a country that has been always neutral, with no foreign aggres­sion, small and scarcely populated, with a perfected habit of self-gov­erning, which therefore did not aim at a strong government. As for our country, if we do not get a strong and powerful central government, how could we even survive as a country?12 (Liang 1999, vol. 8, 2434) (author’s translation) The key element in Liang’s reflection—and in his subsequent considered rejection of the Swiss model—is, again, the acknowledgement of the necessity of having a strong central authority in China. Even for a convinced reformer like Liang,the Confucian-Legalist paradigm of a central power, hierarchically superior to any possible local sub-power, cannot be sacrificed on the altar of representative democracy. If modernization means building a stronger and more efficient state,the geographical, social, cultural and external conditions of China—in combina­tion with the existential threat posed by the foreign powers—make it imperative to look at centralizing processes rather than at a radically federal solution. And if China needs a new and “modern” community of citizens, as Liang firmly be­lieved, this requires a centralized nation to be constituted and nurtured, without dispersing energies on the local level, at least until those “new citizens” are mature enough to make decisions at a grassroots level without jeopardizing national uni­ty. Japan or Germany, countries that interpreted local government not in terms of federalism—as a “shared rule”—but as a top-down “devolution” of power, are taken by Liang as better examples than the ultimately ‘utopian’ Swiss institutional architecture. Although put aside by Liang, Switzerland unsurprisingly became the focus of at­tention as a potential source of inspiration for the (unsuccessful) Chinese federalist 12.....................,................,......,......,.......,.......,.................,....,.......,.......,...............,............,..... movements that thrived during the following decade, partially following on the steps of the “local patriots” of the pre-1911 period. After the provincial secessions of 1911/1912, and before the success of Jiang Jieshi’s ... (1887–1975) reunification in 1927, the adoption of a federalist in­stitutional asset seemed to be a reasonable solution for post-Imperial China. One of the most complete and detailed plans for a federal China—and at the same time one of the last attempts at providing a political alternative to the centralism of the Guomindang (GMD)—was written during the completion of the Northern Ex­pedition by the “intellectual warlord” Chen Jiongming ... (1878–1933). A key ally of Sun Yat-sen ... (1866–1925) in 1911, then governor of Guang-dong, Chen opposed the GMD’s idea of using the southern province’s revenue to finance the Northern Expedition in 1923–1924. His defence of the local pre­rogatives of Guangzhou led him to a conflict with the father of the Republic that marked him as a traitor.13 Sun’s turn to the Soviet Union influenced his own polit­ical agenda: his federalist sympathy was buried under the Leninist organizational model of democratic centralism, thus fuelling the conflict with Chen. After fleeing to Hong Kong, Chen would continue to advocate a federal solution to the division of China. In 1927, as the GMD was finally conquering the North,fulfilling Sun’s dream of a newly reunified Republic under the control of a strong central administration, the exiled Chen published his own roadmap for a different kind of national reunification. In his Modest Proposal for the Unification of China (Zhongguo tongyi chuyi ...... ) (1927), Chen wanted to prove that a convinced federalist could also be a “national patriot”. He drafted a program that, at least in his opinion, would har­moniously blend a democratic approach to local legitimacy with the need for a strong state (and for a unified military, overall). It is not the work of a philosopher,but the reflection of a xiucai.. “(talented official) of action”—the man that John Dewey described as “the most impressive of all the officials whom I have met in China” (Dewey in Chen 2000, 1).14 Opening with a foreword by the prominent nationalist intellectual Zhang Binglin ... (1869–1936), the text provides an analysis of the chaos in Chinese that claims it is caused by six elements: the ab­sence of a constitution, the absence of a proper parliament, an unelected presi­dent, an unchecked government, a decentralized army, and dysfunctional (and non-democratic) political parties. 13 One example of the Communist narrative of Chen as a “traitor” can be found in Huang (2003). A rehabilitation of Chen’s federalism, inviting a rediscovery of his “sincere democratic spirit”, is at­ tempted by Duan and Ni (2008). 14 In his book, Leslie Chen presents an accurate analysis of his father’s political blueprint. Chen’s solution to the broken Chinese state is then articulated along the follow­ing lines: unifying the army; creating a political union, for permanent institutional stability (a significant move, by which he tries to conceptually disentangle “fed­eralism” from the idea of division or fragmentation); putting power back into the people’s hands, thus defeating the “two jackals from the same cave” (the Southern one-party policies of Jiang’s GMD and the Northern military cliques, who were both preventing the emergence of a democratic China); and preserving the mul­ti-ethnic nature of the traditional Empire in the new Chinese federation, as the first step to an Asian federation. Chen’s federal China should be based on three principles: the principle of self-gov­ernment (zizhizhuyi .... ), thus fully legitimizing provincial institutions as“institutional actors”; the principle of self-sustainment (zijizhuyi .... ), asthe foundation of a federal economy, through which a significant portion of localresources would be managed on a local level; and the principle of federation (li­anhezhuyi .... ), the political core of the platform, which would provide thecountry with a set of shared institutions embodying the common identity of theChinese people. When elaborating this last point, Chen interestingly presents the possible models through which “federative processes” might be implemented. Here, following Liang’s method, Chen surveys some of the possible models China could look at. After examining presidentialism and the British cabinet-system—both unsuccessfully applied by Republican China, Chen says—he discusses the “committee system” (weiyuanzhi ... ), which he ascribes to Switzerland: The committee system is in vogue now—it was even experimented with bymembers of the Party—and if the results were not noteworthy, this is notdue to the system itself. Switzerland implements it with remarkable suc­cess: a small country with many capable individuals, in which the peoplehave a rich political experience, members of the administration are satisfiedwith their duty and follow the directives of the legislative body, and thereis an appeal system that amends the shortcomings of the legislative body;that is why the system is implemented with full benefits. Let’s look at Chi­na’s circumstances: would it be possible for us to rigorously adopt the Swisssystem? It is not quite suitable, and it would need adjustments which arenot to be discussed now.15 (Chen 1927, 11) (author’s translation) 15.......,.......,........,....................,.....,........,.......,..........,.........,.......,......,......,..................,....,...... Switzerland, once more, is examined, and almost uncritically praised, but ulti­mately discarded as an extremely “exotic” political model, unfit for China. How­ever, it is not federalism itself that is really addressed here by Chen, but the shared type of political leadership exercised by the federal government. Even if not di­rectly related to the issue of local self-administration (which, in contrast, plays an important role in Chen’s plan), the Swiss institutional arrangement is again pre­sented as characterized by the idea of a diffused political legitimacy—shared not just among different territories, but even among different individuals at the cen­tral level, or often distributed among the common citizens. Although discarding the excessively “utopian” Swiss system, Chen’s proposal moves on to describe a federal and democratic plan for China, much closer to the Jeffersonian model than to the Soviet (or Prussian) centralized model, cher­ished both by the Nationalists and the Communists after the mid-1920s. And yet Alexis de Tocqueville—whose praise for the American model as embodying the perfect balance between a central government responsible for the state’s general safety, and a decentralized administration allowing the full participation of the people, is justly celebrated—would perhaps have ironically sided with the GMD,in his conviction that China “provides the most perfect model of a centralized government that exists in the universe” (Tocqueville in Thompson 1988, 192). In this cross-cultural and diachronic game, Chen Jiongming would have found some comfort in the observations handed down by another French intellectual, Evar­iste Huc (1813–1860), who praised instead the richness of China’s “decentralized administration” as a noteworthy feature of the Empire (Thompson 1988, 191). Conclusion: Utopia and Failure Evariste Huc and Chen Jiongming’s admiration for the local dimension of politi­cal power in China would ultimately prove to be delusional. Federalism in gener-al—even in its less utopian forms, as in Chen’s manifesto—missed the window of opportunity that had been opened from the Taiping rebellion (with the pendulum of power moving from the ailing Qing Court to the provincial governor) up to the early years of the Republic. Already in the mid-1920s, a decentralized China ceased to be considered a viable option, politically and conceptually. The closure of this path is confirmed by the fate of the term fengjian: for centuries used by the opponents of centralist authoritarianism as the marker of a more de­centralized and balanced political system, and often used by proponents of mod­ern Chinese federalism to anchor their model in some historical precedent—as it was discussed earlier in this paper—it started being used by Marxist intellectuals to translate the negative concept of “feudalism” (see Dirlik 1996). Consequent­ly, an originally neutral, or even positive historical concept (associated by Con-fucianists with the golden age of the Zhou king and contrasted to the tyran­nical centralization of the Qin), became irreversibly (and negatively) associated with pre-modern values: within the inescapable Marxist teleology, it was precisely “fengjian” (feudalism) that had been obstructing the linear and evolutionary pro­gress of Chinese history for centuries. With this conceptual shift from “decentralization” (as a potentially positive solu­tion to many of the political problems plaguing China) to “feudalization” (as an irredeemably negative historical experience)—a shift facilitated by the traumatic experience of the actual political and territorial division of China in the warlord era—federalism could not be seen as entailing modernity anymore. On the con­trary, it became synonymous to the preservation of those traditional “local loy­alties” that had repeatedly undermined national unity and left China vulnerable to external attacks. In the end, as Prasenjit Duara notes, “the interplay of power politics and authoritative language enabled the hegemonic, centralizing national­ist narrative to destroy and ideologically bury the federalist alternative early in the history of modern China” (Duara 1995, 177–78). Back to Switzerland, then, for our conclusion. If countries can serve as concepts,and can be observed and interpreted as semantic coalescences in which—to fol­low, again, Reinhart Koselleck—historical experiences are accumulated and for­mulated and then projected on time, then the small Alpine country, temporalized and transformed into a “utopian” concept, appears as a counter-concept (Gegen­begriffe) to “traditional China” intended negatively as a hyper-centralized polity.16 As Poland was used in China across the 19th and 20th centuries as a warning on the danger of the “death of the country” (see Wagner 2017), so Switzerland emerged as an example of the utopian experience of an anti-monarchic and an-ti-centralist polity. The fate of this political concept—in its different declensions,as we have briefly sketched above—ultimately reflects the problem for Chinese intellectuals or activists in conceptualizing federalism, or more generally the lack of a precise political/cultural centre. The Erfahrungsraum (“space of experience”) of Switzerland was therefore confined to a utopian dimension: from a Chinese perspective, it represented a fascinating program, unfortunately impossible to some, or potentially dangerous to others. This last connection—between the lack of a clear and unquestioned source of political/cultural authority and the implo­sion of the country—became especially prevalent after the trauma of division and 16 See Koselleck 1979, 349–75. A recent example of conceptual studies focusing on geographical con­cepts is provided by Mishkova and Trencsényi (2017). internal violence experienced during the warlord era, thus strengthening the ide­ological links among feudalism, localism and separatism. Breaking the totem of monarchism and the probably stronger myth of centralism represented a fracture that required some kind of “utopian projection” to be accepted. The “exoticization”of Switzerland and the political (and conceptual) failure of federalism in China thus seem to be connected: elaborating a shared view of sovereignty, substituting the Imperial model of tianxia, by which authority necessarily flows from one un­disputed source at the top of the system, and substituting it with a system that acknowledges polycentrism and institutionalizes the practice of self-government,was a difficult—finally impossible—task. A conceptual difficulty, as noted, both originating from and sustained by the dire historical circumstances of political fragmentation in the “dynastic cycle”. “In a world of disaggregated states”, writes Anne-Marie Slaughter, “the sovereignty that has traditionally attached to unitary states should arguably also be disaggregated. Taking this step, however, requires a different conception of the very nature of sovereignty” (Slaughter 2004, 186). In those countries that successfully embraced it, federalism emerged in parallel to the acceptance of the idea of “fragmenting” the political order of the Empire, shifting the ideal of Unity from the Kingdom of Men to the separated religious dimension of the Kingdom of God. With no way out to a spiritual level separate from Nature (and from Politics), the Chinese concept of Unity/tianxia had to be formulated as pertaining to this world. As Yuri Pines points out, monarchic centralism served as one of the ideological pillars of the “everlasting empire”, whose legacy remains robust (Pines 2012). As the cult of centralism seems to be daily reaffirmed in Xi Jinping’s China, Su Yigong’s paper—with his praise for the Confucian (and an-ti-legalist) Swiss model—provides a contrast that, in its echoing of fascinations with federalism from an exotic Occident, appears as counter-historical and uto­pian as its predecessors. References Ames, Roger, and David Hall. 1999. The Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China. Chicago, IL: Open Court. Brady, Thomas. 1985. Turning Swiss: Cities and Empire, 1450–1550. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Brusadelli, Federico. 2017.“You Don’t Wear a Fur in Summer: Kang Youwei’s Im­ partial Words on Republicanism (1917) and the Fate of Chinese Democracy.” Asiatische Studien 71 (1): 5–30. Chen, Jiongming ... . 1927. Zhongguo tongyi chuyi ...... (Modest Proposal for the Unification of China). Hong Kong. Chen, Leslie. 2000. Chen Jiongming and the Federalist Movement. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Dirlik, Arif. 1996. “Social Formations in Representations of the Past: The Case of “Feudalism” in Twentieth-Century Chinese Historiography.” Review (Fer-nand Braudel Center) 19 (3): 227–67. Duan, Yunzhang, and Ni Junming. 2008. “Chen Jiongming de lixiang he daolu ......... ’ (Chen Jiongmin’s Theories and Trajectory).” Journal of Sun Yat-sen University 48 (5): 64–79. Duara, Prasenjit. 1995. Rescuing History from the Nation. Questioning Narratives of Modern China. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Freeden, Michael, and Andrew Vincent, eds. 2013. Comparative Political Thought: Theorizing Practices. New York, NY: Routledge. Fröhlich, Thomas, and Robert H. Gassmann, eds. 2000. Chinesische Reisen in der Schweiz. Zurich: NZZ Verlag. Fung, Edward. 2010. The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity: Cultural andPolitical Thought in the Republican Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harris, Eirik Lang. 2017. “Xunzi’s Political Philosophy.” In Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Xunzi, edited by Eric L. Hutton, 95–138. Berlin: Springer. Huang, Zhigao ... . 2003. “Gongchan guoji lianhe Chen Jiongming de changshi ji shibai ............... (Attempt and Fail­ure of the National Communists Association to Unite with Chen Jiong-ming).” Journal of Southern Yangtze University 2 (3): 46–50. Huters, Theodore. 2005. Bringing the World Home: Appropriating the West in Late Qing and Early Republican China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Kang, Youwei ... . 2007. Kang Youwei quanji ..... (Complete Works of Kang Youwei). Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe. –––. 2010. Datongshu... (The Book of Great Concord). Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe. Karl, Rebecca, and Peter Zarrow, eds. 2002. Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period.Political and Cultural Change in Late Qing China. Cambridge MA : Harvard University Press. Kim, Sungmoon. 2013. “Between Good and Evil: Xunzi’s Reinterpretation of the Hegemonic Rule as Decent Governance.” Dao 12 (1): 73–92. Kincaid, John. 2011. Federalism. Thousand Oak, CA: SAGE Publications. Koselleck, Reinhart. 1979. Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Liang, Qichao ... . 1999. Liang Qichao quanji ..... (Complete Works of Liang Qichao). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe. Liu, Lydia L. 1995. Translingual Practice. Literature, National Culture, and TranslatedModernity—China, 1900–1937. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Luo, Zhitian. 2017. Shifts of Power. Modern Chinese Thought and Society. Translated by Lane J. Harris, and Mei Chun. Leiden: Brill. Maissen, Thomas. 2019. “The Swiss Confederacy: A Constitutional Model and Anti-Model for the Founding Fathers.” In Theories of Modern Federalism, ed­ited by Kiri Skadi Krause, 49–67. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Mishkova, Diana, and Balazs Trencsényi, eds. 2017. European Regions and Bound­aries. A Conceptual History. New York, NY: Berghan Books. Mitchell, Peter. 1972.“The Limits of Reformism:Wei Yüan’s Reaction to Western Intrusion.” Modern Asian Studies 6 (2): 175–204. Pines, Yuri. 2012. The Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and its Imperial Legacy. Princeton NJ : Princeton University Press. Platt, Steve. 2007. Provincial Patriots: The Hunanese and Modern China. Cam­bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2004. A New World Order: Government Networks and the Disaggregated State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Steinmetz, Willibald, Michael Freeden, and Javier Fernández-Sebastián, eds.2017. Conceptual History in the European Space. Oxford: Berghahn. Su Yigong ... .2010.“Wang bubi da:cong Ruishi lianbangzhi taolun zhongxi gongtong de jiazhiguan ....:................ (Royal is not Necessarily Big: Common Values between China and the West through a Survey of Swiss Federalism).” Bijiaofa yanjiu 1: 118–32. Thompson, Roger. 1988. “Statecraft and Self-Government: Competing Visions of Community and State in Late Imperial China.” Modern China 14 (2): 188–221. Twiss, Sumner B., and Jonathan Chan. 2012. “The Classical Confucian Position on the Legitimate Use of Military Force.” Journal of Religious Ethics 40 (3): 447–72. Wagner, Rudolph. 2017. “Dividing up the [Chinese] Melon, guafen: The Fate of a Transcultural Metaphor in the Formation of National Myth.” Transcultural Studies 1: 9–122. Xu, Jishe ... . 1849. Yinghuan zhilüe .... ( Japanese edition of 1861,“Eikan shiryaku”, consulted at the UBC Library open collection. http://re­solve.library.ubc.ca/cgi-bin/catsearch?bid=2804349. Zarrow, Peter. 2012. After Empire. The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885–1924. Stanford CA : Stanford University Press. Zhang, Longxi. 2002. “The Utopian Vision, East and West.” Utopian Studies 13 (1): 1–20. DOI: 10.4312/as.2021.9.2.165-179 Modernization of Beauty in China: From the “Great Debate on Aesthetics” to the “Aesthetic Fever” and Beyond1 Téa SERNELJ* Abstract The article explores the socio-political and historical development of the great debate on aesthetics and the aesthetic fever in China during the 20th century. It introduces the main figures of the aesthetic movement and their aesthetic theories. It introduces the period of appropriation of the aesthetic debates to Marxist ideology that prevailed in China after 1949 and lasted until the end of 1970s. The 1980s and 1990s represent a shift in the Chinese aesthetic debate which focused on the adoption of Western aesthetic concepts and paradigms in a more scientific way.The article tackles the problem of Chinese society on the verge of the millennium, and problematizes the consumerism of art and attitudes towards aesthetics in general. Keywords: great debate on aesthetics in China, the aesthetic fever, the aesthetization of everyday life Modernizacija lepote na Kitajskem: od »velike razprave o estetiki« do »estetske vrocice« in naprej Izvlecek Clanek raziskuje družbeno-politicni in zgodovinski razvoj velike razprave o estetiki in estetski vrocici na Kitajskem v 20. stoletju. Predstavi glavne osebnosti estetskega gibanja in njihove estetske teorije. Obravnava obdobje prilagajanja estetskih razprav marksisticni ideologiji, ki je na Kitajskem prevladovala po letu 1949 in trajala do konca sedemdesetih let. Osemdeseta in devetdeseta leta pomenijo premik v kitajski estetski razpravi, ki se je na znanstven nacin osredotocila na prevzemanje zahodnih estetskih konceptov in paradigem. The author acknowledges the financial support from the ARRS (Slovenian Research Agency; re­search core funding No. P6–0243 and No. N6-0161) and from the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange in the framework of the research project Modern and Con­temporary Taiwanese Philosophy ......... (No. RG004-U-17). * Téa SERNELJ, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana.Email address: tea.sernelj@ff.uni-lj.si Clanek se loteva problema kitajske družbe na prelomu tisocletja ter problematizira po­trošništvo umetnosti in odnos do estetike nasploh. Kljucne besede: velika razprava o estetiki na Kitajskem, estetska vrocica, estetizacija vsak­danjega življenja Introduction The development of aesthetic theory in China at the beginning of the 20th centu­ry was characterized by the multifaceted adoption of Western ideas and thought,with aesthetics playing an extremely important role as an academic discipline. On theone hand, aesthetic theory was an academic field free from political encumbrances;on the other, the philosophy of art, as part of aesthetics, provided a platform for a rec­ognition and reassessment of China’s long and rich cultural heritage. It is therefore byno means coincidental that in the last two decades of the 20th century, which weremarked by economic, cultural and to a certain level also political liberalization, led tonumerous heated debates about Chinese aesthetics. In the 1980s, these discourses blossomed under the fashionable label “aesthetic fever”,which represented a kind of ideological liberation movement that could also be calledan enlightenment or renaissance in China (Li and Cauvel 2006, 23). In order to better understand the socio-political context in which aesthetics emerged asan academic discipline, we will therefore first briefly present the principal stages of de­velopment that led to the Chinese “aesthetic fever” and point out its later implications. The Birth of Aesthetics as an Academic Discipline Chinese aesthetics as an academic discipline started to form at the beginning of the 20th century. While Confucianism (and traditionalism in general)—to­gether with all the conservative ideologies it brought along—was completely re­jected and discredited as a result of the May Fourth Movement,2 many Chinese I am referring here to the long period that exceeds the narrow time frame of mere demonstrations, i.e. to the so-called “May Fourth New Cultural Movement” (wu si xin wenhua yundong....... ) which was sparked by these protests and took place between 1919 and 1923. Although many scholars claim that it was carried out under the banner of “total Westernization” (Pohl 2009,95), this view should be somehow relativized, since, at the time, this movement showed some ten­dencies to preserve certain traditional concepts and values, as well as to create syntheses between traditional Chinese and Western thought. intellectuals still perceived their culture as an essentially aesthetic one. This posi­tion was of utmost importance, especially considering the entire anti-traditional atmosphere that prevailed in China during the process of exposure to Western ideas and appropriation of Western knowledge (Pohl 2015). Therefore, it is not surprising that aesthetics as the academic study of beauty3 (meixue.. ) began to flourish at this time. Moreover, aesthetics represented the intellectual field in which scholars attempted to redefine the essence of Chinese culture and establish a new Chinese identity after the end of imperial China (Woei 1999). In the process of adopting Western concepts, skills and knowledge, Chinese in­tellectuals were not only the passive and unreflective recipients, but also critically engaged with their own cultural tradition in the new socio-political context. In doing so, they were initially strongly influenced by the Western intellectual tradi­tion (especially German idealism and Marxist materialism), but at the same time they were also influenced by numerous elements of traditional Chinese culture.While aesthetics as a “theoretical discipline” was imported from the West, many modern and contemporary academics attempted to create a synthesis with certain Western concepts on the one hand, and some key concepts founded in the course of Chinese aesthetic history on the other. The assimilation of Western ideas led to the formation of various intellectual currents within Chinese aesthetics. They were determined on the basis of differ­ent views on whether beauty is subjective, objective, or both, or how to developChinese aesthetics as a discipline. In defining Chinese aesthetics, they eithersought a synthesis with Western aesthetics or tried to find its unprecedent­ed uniqueness. In discussing these problems, Chinese aestheticians referred to18th- and 19th-century German philosophy as well as to the Confucian, Dao­ist, and Buddhist philosophical traditions. The pioneers of this early phase ofthe establishment of aesthetics in China were Wang Guowei ... and Cai Yuanpei ... . Wang Guowei’s (1877–1927) concept of jingjie as an aesthetic state and aesthetic idea is a typical attempt to synthesize the Chinese tradition with Western ideas. The term was introduced in China by Chinese students studying in Japan. Before World War II, Japan represented a mirror image of Europe to the Chinese. Many modern Chi­nese words are derived from the Japanese (and thus, actually European) system, such as philosophy, aesthetics, literature, art, etc. (Gao 2006a, 107). Li Zehou believes that the translation of aesthetics as meixue.. (lit.: the study of beauty) is not appropriate and accurate, since the Western term aesthetics derives from the Greek term referring to per­ception. Li Zehou thus suggests that shenmeixue... would be a far better and more suitable translation of the meaning, because it actually refers to the study of the process of recognizing and perceiving beauty (Li and Cauvel 2006, 19). Wang interpreted this Chinese Buddhist concept of jingjie through Kant’s “aes­thetic idea” creating a new and very significant concept within a new and uniqueChinese aesthetics.4 The encounter with Western thought and new and incredi­bly interesting ideas led, inter alia, to the search for comparable concepts withinthe Chinese cultural tradition. Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940), the dean of BeijingUniversity during the May Fourth Movement, was the first to outline the ideaof a cultural and aesthetic self-understanding of the Chinese. When studying inGermany, he became acquainted with Western philosophy, especially Kant. Herecognized Westerners as a people who were decisively influenced by religion,and claimed that aesthetics, as a combination of rituals, art, beauty and ethics inChina, was a practical “spiritual” equivalent to religion in the West (Pohl 2007,425). In this context, he emphasized the importance of aesthetic education ofChinese youth. Such education was supposed to replace religious education asconducted in the West (ibid., 91). In the Chinese tradition, aesthetic experiencewas always considered the highest state of the human heart-mind (xin), whichenabled people to experience a higher level of life or the transcendental, withcomparable effects and meaning to the experience and function of religion inthe West. At this time, there were two intellectual currents concerning the developmentof Chinese aesthetics. The first maintained that, since aesthetics as a disciplinehas Western roots, it would be unnecessary to develop a special discipline called“Chinese aesthetics”, just as it would be superfluous to establish “Chinese math­ematics” or “Chinese logic”. The second current held that it would be useful andnecessary to re-examine Chinese literature and art (as well as literary and arttheory), with an appropriate methodology because of its long tradition. Thiskind of theoretical investigation and research would then lead to the establish­ment of a new academic discipline, namely Chinese aesthetics, which could thusprovide a good and valuable explanatory tool for the development of traditionalChinese thought (Gao 2006a, 28). Gao Jianping ... 5 specifically singled out Zhu Guangqian ... , Zong Baihua ... , Cai Yi .. and Li Zehou ... as the most influential aca­demics in the field of aesthetics of that time. According to Gao, Zhu Guangqianwas a typical representative of the so-called “Western aesthetics in China”. He 4 Jingjie.. is one of the most fundamental and very complex concepts in Chinese aesthetics. It refers to perfect aesthetic fusion of the artistic idea (or feeling) with a concrete (external) scene. It later gained a general aesthetic meaning that signified the aesthetic idea as well as the most sublime state of human consciousness (Pohl 2015, 91). Yijian .. , however, has a similar meaning. 5 Gao Jianping (1955–) is one of the leading Chinese aestheticians of the 21st century, along with Li Zehou (1930–) and Wang Keping (1955–). translated numerous classics of Western aesthetics (Plato, Croce, Vico, Hegel,etc.) into Chinese and introduced the scientific method of combining West­ern thought and Chinese substance (or material). Zong Baihua was the first totranslate Kant’s Critique of Judgment into Chinese. He researched the arts in great detail, studied the theory of painting and uncovered a great difference be­tween the Chinese and Western spirit of art, and thus between the two kinds ofaesthetics. He claimed that Western painting originated from architecture andtherefore contained many scientific implications, while Chinese painting origi­nated from calligraphy and contained similar aesthetic elements to those foundin music and dance. For Zong, Western aesthetics is based on spatial-temporalconsciousness, and on the dichotomy between subjective and objective, whileChinese aesthetics implies understanding of the world through the identifica­tion with nature (ibid., 26). According to Gao Jianping, Zong Baihua sought tocomplement the model of Western theories through the originality of uniquedetails from Chinese art (ibid.). The Great Debate on Aesthetics Based on Marxist Ideology However, the polemic on the development of Chinese aesthetics is considered to be the first phase of the whole discourse on aesthetics, since the main concern in the aesthetic debate in the mid-20th century was establishment of Marxist aes­thetics in China as part of the spread of Marxist ideology6 after 1949. Among all the so-called “open debates” on various problems, where the political elite of Chi­nese Communist Party actually decided which discussants were right and which were wrong (with the latter punished accordingly), the aesthetic debate was actu­ally the only exception within these debates that was truly open, thanks to the in­trinsic connexion between art and society on the one hand, and to the established Marxist ideology on the other. In the famous Yan’an Forum On Literature and Art in May 1942, Mao Zedong made the clear demand that the role of art is to serve the people and socialism in the spirit of class struggle and the needs of the revolution (Li and Cauvel 2006,32). With the onset of the Cultural Revolution, aesthetics suffered a decline, but the results of the debate came to the fore again during the “aesthetic fever” soon after Mao’s death. The 1950s and 1960s were thus marked by a major discussion According to Amighini and Jia (2019, 271), the Sinicized Marxist theory emphasizes Marx’s phi­losophy of history rather than any version of Marxist egalitarian political philosophy; this is doubt­less not a coincidence and this also seems to be a main reason because of which it can be called ideology. on aesthetics between Zhu Guangqian, Cai Yi and Li Zehou,7 whose political background was the Chinese Communist Party’s striving for a national ideolog­ical re-education of intellectuals, in which idealism was to be replaced by dialec­tical materialism in order to strengthen the spread of Marxist ideology in China (Rošker 2017, 3). While Zhu Guangqian and Zong Baihua belonged to the first phase of the de­velopment of Chinese aesthetics, which at the beginning of the 20th century was characterized by a multifaceted engagement with Western thought, Cai Yi and Li Zehou represented the second phase, which took place in the second half of the century and in which leftist ideas came to the fore. In the first years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese aestheticians were under a strong influence of Soviet theories and ideologies.They attempted to establish a Marxist aesthetics by applying a materialist epistemol­ogy and emphasizing that beauty is objective and “typical”. At the same time, as leftist intellectuals they also strove for artistic intervention in the realm of social reality (Gao 2006a, 109). Although this theory of art did not completely oppose emotions or feelings, and although it argued that every “type” of art must be typ­ical, that is, defined by specific and unique qualities in addition to its aesthetic el­ement, both Cai and Li essentially advocated the transcendence of individuality and feelings in the realm of art. As leftist intellectuals, they also strove for artistic intervention in the realm of social reality (ibid.). Another important issue in this debate was whether beauty is subjective or ob­jective, or in other words, whether it is the result of an idealistic or materialistic worldview. Zhu Guangqian argued that beauty is a combination of the subjective and objective, Cai Yi claimed that beauty is objective, while Li Zehou insisted that it is social, objective, and intuitive (Woei 1999, 50). As a materialist philos­opher, Li believed that beauty must be objective because it is socially preformed Li Zehou began to develop his aesthetic thought in the 1950s; at that time, he was strongly influ­enced by Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in which Marx developed the theory of alienation. Li became acquainted with Marx during his regular studies of philosophy at Beijing University. Soon after graduation, he started to participate in academic discussions regard­ing various interpretations of certain Marxist notions. In this respect, he gained a lot of attention in intellectual circles as early as 1956 (when he was 26 years old) with the publication of his first ma­ture theoretical essay, entitled “On the Aesthetic Feeling, Beauty, and Art (Lun meigan, mei he yishu...,.... )”. Later on, he further developed his own interpretations (Rošker 2019, 206).In addition to Marx, Li Zehou also sought great inspiration in Kant’s philosophy. He endeavoured to reconstruct Kant’s epistemology through Marx’s ideas about social life and practice, namely, the material production activities, such as the making and using of tools. On this basis, he also exam­ined the various concepts of human nature found in both original Confucianism and early Marx (Pohl 1999, XIV). and as such must be independent of the psychology of the individual. In this as­pect, he referred to Marx’s theory that nothing in the external world possesses beauty per se, and that it is only through the objectification of the human being that it becomes “socialized” and thus acquires beauty. This, he argued, is a collec­tive rather than an individual psychological process (ibid., 62). In this regard, Li claimed that idealist aestheticians reduced beauty to the individual’s subjective sense of beauty and regarded it as the result of certain pre-empirical, subjective “psychological functions”, which they believed were common to all human beings.In this respect, idealists denied the objective existence of beauty, which should be seen as the result of social and historical conditions (ibid., 60). After relations between China and the Soviet Union cooled down in 1956, Chi­nese aestheticians attempted to establish their own aesthetic system. Unfortu­nately, this attempt was interrupted again, this time by the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”, which lasted from 1966 to 1976 (Gao 2006b, 109). However, the debate had another important focus. It had laid the theoretical foun­dations that emphasized the theoretical concepts of art and refuted the concep­tualization of its so-called “sloganization” (i.e., ideological propaganda). On the one hand, there was a strong attempt in the field of art and literature to bring art into social reality; on the other hand, the aesthetic world emphasized the notion of pure art. Against this background, it is certainly no coincidence that China was swept by the wave of “aesthetic fever” shortly after the death of Mao Zedong. At this point a period of constant, increasingly turbulent, controversial debate began in the world of academic, artistic and literary discourse. The Aesthetic Fever (Meixue re... ) The so-called aesthetic fever became extremely popular throughout the country and caused a huge wave of translations of various western authors of aesthetics,which indicated that aesthetics has become a leading discipline in the humanities in China. Schools and universities started teaching aesthetics, and books on the subject became bestsellers. The return of aesthetic thought was the result of ex­haustion and boredom of previous omnipresent ideological constraints and revo­lutionary asceticism. People wanted to explore new ways of expressing their own individuality, and in this regard they also dealt with the question of what beauty is (Zhou 2005, 105). All the aforementioned ideas led to a wider debate about aesthetics, which also in­cluded politics and culture, and resulted in what was called cultural fever (wenhua re ... ). In the 1990s, a new standpoint emerged among some Chinese literary theorists, emphasizing that Western influences on the study of Chinese literatureand art in the 20th century were very problematic, and that the existing Chinese lit­erary and art theories were not fit for purpose. They argued that Chinese literaturehas its own tradition and that there are special systems and categories in Chineseliterary criticism that were not taken into account by their predecessors. There werealso many academics who idealized the West and wanted to apply Western conceptsof literary theory to Chinese art and literature. In contrast, some literary theoristsargued that it was essential to thoroughly study ancient Chinese works on art andliterature and, and on such basis establish and develop new aesthetic theories, basedon comparative study of Chinese and Western aesthetic theory. Most Chinese aes­theticians then adopted this position and began to explore certain traditional Chi­nese concepts such as qi. (“vitality, creativity”) and qiyun.. (“rhythm of qi”), comparing them with concepts from Western aesthetics. The period of aesthetic and cultural fever is considered as a very complex and im­portant “movement” in Chinese modern aesthetics, which had a remarkable in­fluence on contemporary Chinese aesthetics, as well as to the formation of more autochthonous theories. The Significance and Implications of Aesthetic Fever in the 1980s and 1990s In the search for the most appropriate strategies for China’s successful entry into the third millennium, we cannot overlook the political or ideological role that aes­thetics has played. On the one hand, as a latent rebellion against the society of the prevailing pragmatism and as a manifested pursuit of beauty, or as a kind of emo­tional emancipation; and on the other, as a discourse that has always been close­ly linked to politics in China, with the possibility of reinterpreting or upgrading Marxist theories.8 However, we should not forget the fact that Chinese aesthetics and literary theory focused primarily on rationality and the social dimension un­til the beginning of the 1980s. As already mentioned, the aesthetic fever gained an exceptional dimension in Chinese society at that time, spreading like a kind of theoretical epidemic; already in the early 1980s, the bookshelves were full of The further development and upgrading of Marxists theories was perhaps most visible in the field of Marxist dialectics, for many Chinese scholars aimed to complement or synthesize it with the basic tenets of traditional Chinese correlative dialectical models that were based on the principle of complementary and rooted in the so-called tongbian dialectics (see for instance Heubel 2019; Rockmore 2019; Tian 2019). translations of Western authors who wrote about aesthetics. The entire decade were therefore defined by the systematic translation and presentation of Western formalistic literary theories.Thus, during this period, all the most important works of the Russian formalists, Anglo-American New Criticism, Chicago School, ar­chetypical criticism and structuralist poetics were translated into Chinese. Undoubtedly, the 1942 work of Wellek and Warren, Theory of Literature, in which the authors clearly distinguished between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” literary stud­ies that form the basis of formalistic literary theory, had a major influence on the development of contemporary Chinese literary theories. Particularly popular be­came related ideas about the “intrinsic laws” of literature and its aesthetic laws,discussed by Jakobson in his discourses of “literariness” (Zhou 2005, 105). These debates were at the core of intellectual attention until 1981, when a trans­lation of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts from 1844 was published.This document was also given great attention, and many theorists saw it as the ba­sis of modern Marxist aesthetics. As for the autochthonous discourse on Chinese aesthetics, Li Zehou attracted immense interest and respect in academic circles during this period, not only in China, but also abroad. Following the experience of ten years of chaos and catastrophes caused by radical left politics, the Chinese Communist Party slowly turned away from ideas such as the class struggle and began to introduce the slogan “finding the truth in facts” (shishi qiushi.... ). Li Zehou’s idea of “practice” in the field of aesthetics contributed to the new re­search atmosphere. In addition, Li Zehou’s coinages for his other concepts, such as “sedimentation” (jidian .. ) and “subjectality” (zhuguanxing ... ), the fu­sion of the social with an individual in the historical process, enriched the aes­thetic debate of that time. Li Zehou is considered to be the greatest personality in the field of aesthetics during those years. On the one hand, he presented new concepts such as subjectivity and practice, derived from the fusion of Kant’s and Marx’s ideas, and on the other, he produced innovative interpretations of Chinese aesthetic and art traditions (see mei de licheng.... ). Related theories were also represented in the same period by a number of lessknown and less influential but equally interesting theorists, such as the afore­mentioned art historian Zhu Guangqian or the philosopher Hu Jun .. , who advocated a sinicized version of the Western concept of “aestheticization of everyday life”. This aestheticization was perceived primarily as an emancipationand the everyday space of freedom, a space in which professional politics, withits dictates of pragmatic functionality, cannot interfere. This emancipation car­ried within itself a revolt against the world of a strict political hierarchy and theunconditional authority of individual political positions within that hierarchy. The “subjective” negation of politics, which was the essence of the aesthetic feverof the 1980s, was constantly imbued with a charge of civil society politics. Thusthe seemingly ivory tower of aesthetics was erected right in the realm politics;but this was not a policy of hierarchical relations of power and unquestionableauthority, but a policy in the original sense, that is, a policy of people as a priori political beings (zoon politicum). The aesthetic fever that prevailed in China inthe 1980s therefore stemmed precisely from the tendency to realize this kindof “subjective” political freedom. And yet the reality of the conditions of therapidly changing Chinese society and its economic “liberalization” downplayedall such ideals, sadly drowned out in a flood of new, commercialized aestheticsthat it is characteristic of all capitalist societies. Thus, it soon became clear thattheories of aesthetic fever no longer fit the conditions of the rapidly changingChinese social reality. The Third Millennium and the New Culture of the Consumer Society At the end of the 1980s, the role of aesthetics in China has been greatly trans­formed; aesthetics as an academic discipline relatively quickly (and for most intel­lectuals, unexpectedly) lost its revolutionary and emancipatory function. Already in the mid-1990s, it represented only a marginal academic discipline that dealt with abstract theoretical problems on the outskirts of social reality. Aesthetics nowadays no longer have any revolutionary and emancipatory functions. The enlightenment and humanistic significance it once had has been transformed. Since the expansion of capital included our every­day factors in the processes of the market, the way of our aesthetic expe­rience radically changed. If you can easily buy any artistic object, activity,or even experience on the market, as if they were goods, then how can aesthetic values arouse utopian impulses? When the executive director of the advertisement company explicitly declares that “beauty can of course be ordered”, how can we speak of aesthetic activities in the same way as in the past? (Zhou 2005, 110–11) As elsewhere in the world, also in China, where the general sale and megalo­maniac marketing of aesthetics has necessarily led to its devaluation. The for­mer leading, emancipatory voice of aesthetics died, and the aesthetics of free­dom sadly became silent: The “subjectivity of aesthetics”, which Li Zehou, ZhuGuangqian and other theoreticians were advocating for, could not really face thelarge-scale turn of aesthetics as a factor in the commercialization of everyday life. The aesthetics of emancipation could never solve the acute contradictionbetween its primary tendency for liberalization of subjectivity on one hand, andthe aesthetization of everyday life in terms of commodity culture on the oth­er. Its theoretical framework was never able to encompass this completely newaesthetic phenomenon, one that includes the complete negation of humanityin which human sensitivity is reduced to the mediator of economic functions(Haug 1971, 17), and in which aesthetics as such is only a part of the “cosmeticsof everyday life” (Welsh 1997, 3).The notion of consumer society mainly refersto post-industrial societies in which consumerism has become one of the centralmotives of social life and production. In a consumer society, aesthetics and cul­ture, including aesthetic and cultural production, are closely linked to economicvalues or economism. While in traditional societies the fundamental purposeof production is linked to the basic needs of members of society and their sat­isfaction, production itself in consumer societies far outweighs the principle of existence or survival. When dealing with the question of whether today’s Chinese society is alreadya completely consumer one we must be rather cautious, because the natureof China’s transitional society encompasses specific historical, regional andother social elements that limit the possibility of establishing a single defin­itive definition that could relate to all aspects of society. Differences betweenrural and urban regions (centre and periphery), and imbalances in political,economic and cultural aspects, lead to the conclusion that China should betreated only as a society with extremely diverse connotations. If we considerit from the aspect of certain characteristics that are at the forefront in the de­veloped regions and major cities, we can also refer to it as a society that hasalready entered the post-industrial and capitalist stage, especially if we takeinto account the vitality of its development and its economic boom, which wasmost clearly demonstrated in the last years of the 20th century after economicliberalization took hold. Regardless of whether we admit it or not, a successful consumer society is spreading in China. Producers and consumers of cultural symbols are so deeply involved in it, that they are subordinate to it, or they try to resist it and regain its power through confrontation. The consumer society’s at­tack on literature is so unprecedented that no matter to which historical concepts we cling to, we must admit the profound changes that modern culture has suffered. (Chen 2005, 118) The Aesthetization of Everyday Life and its Expression in Culture The consumer society introduced a number of new lifestyles in China. The lives ofmodern, especially urban Chinese people are intertwined with new aesthetic inter­ests and values. While in traditional and industrial societies aesthetic activities have been separated from production and everyday life, the everyday experiences of in­dividuals in the consumer society of urban China are most closely related to the el­ements of art and its aesthetic characteristics. The feelings of modern people livingin a consumer society are exposed to constant stimulation and are therefore moresensitive and colourful; aesthetic requirements have replaced only material needs,and all this is reflected in the external environment as well as in the inner worlds of individuals. The aesthetic interpretation of everyday life and the transfer of realityinto an aesthetized illusion are two extremely important cultural mechanisms: Today, the everyday, political, historical, economic and other reality already includes the hyper realistic dimension of the simulation, so that we are now fully living in the “aesthetic” hallucination of reality. (Chen 2005, 127) Since the 1990s, literary and visual art as well as the art of music have been con­fronted with the problems of commercialization, excessive simulation and uni-versalization, which pose a challenge to traditional understanding of culture and aesthetics. This situation cannot be avoided, which is why we hope that contem­porary artists will be able to confront these challenges in a constructive way. The challenges of a new, global culture also offer the possibility to reshape concepts and conceptual paradigms that were not present in traditional Chinese culture,such as individualism, free will, self-determination and active participation. In any given period, the function of a particular culture and its impact on social reality are closely related to the conceptual elements existing in this culture. The sudden development of modern China has completely changed the image of all of its major cities: the huge flows of internal migration of the population, the megalomaniac number of new ring roads, motorways and four-way avenues, the demolition of traditional houses and the construction of new, ever-higher glass skyscrapers, all this confronts us with previously unimaginable visual contrasts in China. The unstoppable development of urbanization that modern Chinese are exposed to, and the rapidly changing rhythms of everyday life, are also reflected in the new culture and its aesthetic creations. This does not apply only to the West­ernized popular culture, but also to a large-scale billboards present everywhere,which create new criteria of popular aesthetics adapted to the contemporary so­ciety. The imaginary division between life and art has also been erased in contem­porary Chinese society: art has become life itself, just as commercial capitalist activities are regarded as a kind of artistic imagination (Chen 2005, 128). Con­temporary Chinese art (both visual and literary) is mostly created for the masses,to whom it sells well. This art is quickly popularized and also quickly forgotten,since its primary goal is to facilitate the survival of individuals within the rapidly changing contemporary world, marked by the consumer culture. Similar dilem­mas and problems of expressing and conveying the contradictions of modern so­ciety are also reflected in other spheres of artistic or aesthetic creation in contem­porary Chinese culture. It comes from the past and lasts until now; and would have the possi­bility of expanding further—it can eternally exist in the struggle of re­sistance and absorption of aesthetic hegemony of the consumer society.(ibid., 136) Moreover, Chinese art is confronted with the ubiquitous influence of electronic and digital media on a daily basis, but it also contains a culture of past periods and a memory of them. In this sense, it is firmly anchored in the consciousness of society and its individuals, so it must be understood as one of the central, still existing milestones of history. Conclusion As we have seen, aesthetic debates in China during the 20th century provided an important platform for dialogue with Western discourses on the one hand, and recognition of the profound value and significance of the Chinese cultural and philosophical tradition on the other. However, although the development of aes­thetics as an academic discipline was initially intertwined with the appropriation of Western knowledge which was later more or less reduced to sinicized Marxist ideology, its foundations are deeply rooted in the unique Chinese aesthetic tra­dition. In light of the global development of capitalist consumerism in the 21st century, art and aesthetics (like many other cultural aspects of societies, such as education and the value of knowledge as such) are constantly confronted with new (and not necessarily meaningful) challenges. To what extent the market will define or even destroy the aesthetic and artistic influence on the value and mean­ing of our lives remains an open question, not only in China, but globally. Indeed, in recent decades we can observe a revival of traditional Chinese art and aesthetics in Chinese academic circles. In their restoration, however, many Chi­nese intellectuals one-dimensionally and uncritically emphasize the allegedly un­paralleled brilliance of Chinese art and aesthetics. Such attempts are problematic, in my view, because they are constructed upon the basis of inverted or reverse Orientalism and from Sinocentric perspectives. On the other hand, they can nev­ertheless also be seen as reactions to the to some extent still prevailing, overconfi­dent dominance of Eurocentric discourses that exclude the importance and value of the ideational traditions developed by Other, non-Western cultures. But nonetheless, the recognition of the profound, but subtle realms of Chinese aesthetics in general is of great importance for the eventual establishment of an intercultural aesthetics that could contribute greatly to the recognition of a true “unity in diversity”, and hence transcend the static singularity of cultures. This is all the more important in light of our present human condition, which desperately needs new, fresh and inspiring views upon our perception of life and being.  References Amighini, Alessia A., and Peitao Jia. 2019. “Equ(al)ity and Community in China after Forty Years of Economic Reform.” Asian Studies 7 (1): 269–90. https:// doi.org/10.4312/as.2019.7.1.269-290. Chen, Xiaoming. 2005. “Appropriation, Resistance and Reconstruction: The Aes­thetic Connection between Consumer Culture and Literature.” In Cultural Studies in China, edited by Tao Dongfang, and Jin Yuanpu, 115–37. Singa­pore: Marshall Cavendish Academic. Gao, Jianping. 2006a. “What is Chinese Aesthetics.” In Aesthetics and Culture— East and West edited by Gao Jianping, and Wang, Keping, 24–40. Anhui: An-hui jiaoyu chubanshe. –––. 2006b. “Sto let kitajske estetike – oris (Hundred years of Chinese Aesthet­ics—An Outline).” Filozofski vestnik 17 (1): 103–12. Haug, Wolfgang Fritz. 1971. Critique of Commodity Aesthetics. Translated by Bock Robert. London: Routledge, Polity Press.Heubel, Fabian. 2019. “Beyond Murderous Dialectics.” Asian Studies 7 (1): 37–54. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2019.7.1.37-54. Li, Zehou. 1999. “Modernization and the Confucian World.” Paper at Colorado College’s 125th Anniversary Symposium Cultures in the 21st Century: Con­flicts and Convergences, CC. Colorado Springs. Accessed January 20, 2014.http://www.colorado.edu/academics/anniversary/Transcripts. –––. 2002. Zou wo zijide lu...... (Walking my Own Path). Beijing: Zhongguo mangwen chuban she.Li, Zehou, and Jane Cauvel. 2006. Four Essays on Aesthetics, toward Global View. Oxford: Lexington books. Pohl, Karl-Heinz, ed. 1999. “Introduction.” In Chinese Thought in a Global Con­text. A Dialogue between Chinese and Western Philosophical Approaches, edited by Karl-Heinz Pohl, 1–20. Leiden-Boston-Köln: Brill. –––. 2007. Ästhetik und Literaturtheorie in China. Von der Tradition bis zur Mod-erne. München: K.G. Saur. –––. 2009. “Identity and Hybridity—Chinese Culture and Aesthetics in the Age of Globalization.” In Intercultural Aesthetics: A Worldview Perspective, edited by Antoon Van den Braembussche, Heinz Kimmerle, and Nicole Note, 87–103.Springer: Netherlands. –––. 2015. An Intercultural Perspective on Chinese Aesthetics. Trier: Trier University.Accessed September 1, 2020. https://www.uni-trier.de/fileadmin/fb2/SIN/Pohl_Publikation/Interculural_ perspective_on_chinese_Aesthetics.pdf. Rockmore,Tom. 2019.“Hegel and Chinese Marxism.” Asian Studies 7 (1): 55–73. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2019.7.1.55-73. Rošker, Jana S. 2006. Iskanje poti. Spoznavna teorija v kitajski tradiciji, drugi del – Zaton tradicije in obdobje moderne. Ljubljana: Razprave, Filozofska fakulteta. –––. 2017. “Chinese Modernization and the Sinification of Marxism through the Lens of Li Zehou’s Philosophy.” Asian Philosophy 27 (1): 69–84. –––. 2019. “Li Zehou and His Rocky Relationship with Marx: Class Struggle as a Form of Kantian Transcendental Illusion.” Asian Studies 7 (1): 201–15. Tian, Chenshan. 2019.“Mao Zedong, Sinization of Marxism, and Traditional Chi­nese Thought Culture.” Asian Studies 7 (1): 13–37. https://doi.org/10.4312/ as.2019.7.1.13-37. Welsh, Wolfgang. 1997. Undoing Aesthetics. London: Sage. Woei, Lien Chong. 1999. “Kant and Marx in Post—Mao China: The Intellectual Path of Li Zehou.” PhD diss., Amsterdam. Zhou, Xiaoyi. 2005. “The Ideological Function of Western Aesthetics in 1980’s China.” In Cultural Studies in China, edited by Tao Dongfang and Jin Yuanpu,98–115. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic. OTHER TOPICS DOI: 10.4312/as.2021.9.2.183-208 Japanese Reinterpretations of Confucianism:Ito Jinsai and His Project1 Marko OGRIZEK* Abstract This article aims to introduce the study of Ito Jinsai from the point of view of the value of his Confucian interpretations within the context of the project of Confucian ethics—in other words, trying to ascertain in what ways Jinsai’s project can help facilitate the study of Confucian ethics beyond the realm of intellectual history in the global context of the 21st century. It is imperative to allow Jinsai’s notions, as much as possible, to speak for themselves; but it is also of great importance to first place Jinsai within his own time and inside the intellectual space in which he formulated his ideas. A number of scholarly sources will be considered, with the intention of illuminating Jinsai’s work from a few different angles. Keywords: Ito Jinsai, Japanese Confucianism, traditional Japanese philosophy, ethics Japonske reinterpretacije konfucijanstva: Ito Jinsai in njegov projekt Izvlecek Clanek je uvod v študij Itoja Jinsaija z vidika vrednosti njegovih konfucijanskih inter-pretacij v kontekstu projekta konfucijanske etike – z drugimi besedami, ugotoviti poskuša,kako lahko Jinsaijev projekt pripomore k študiju konfucijanske etike onkraj intelektualne zgodovine, v globalnem kontekstu 21. stoletja. Jinsaijevim pojmom moramo nujno do-voliti, da spregovorijo sami zase; vendar pa je zelo pomembno, da Jinsaija najprej umes­timo v njegov cas in intelektualni prostor, v katerem je osnoval svoje ideje. Upoštevani so razlicni akademski viri, s katerimi avtor Jinsaijevo delo osvetli z vec razlicnih zornih kotov. Kljucne besede: Ito Jinsai, japonski konfucianizem, tradicionalna japonska filozofija, etika The author acknowledges the support of the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS) in the framework of the research core funding Asian Languages and Cultures (P6-0243). * Marko OGRIZEK, PhD student, Department of Asian Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana.Email address: marko.ogrizek@ff.uni-lj.si Introduction As will be developed in the present article, a study of Jinsai’s life and works shows that Jinsai’s views on the Analects and the Confucian Way, though sometimes pre­sented in a radical fashion, did not come about abruptly and were not based solely in doctrinal objections. Jinsai in fact worked his way diligently as a student—from studying the Neo-Confucian thought of the Cheng-Zhu School, to trying to find solutions to his personal crisis in both Buddhism and Daoism; through a slow disillusionment with Neo-Confucian concepts of both the Cheng-Zhu as well as the Yang Wangming School, and in the end settling on thoroughly analyzing the Four Books themselves, especially the Analects and Mencius. The present article therefore aims to argue that while Jinsai’s position may have first been based on certain textual concerns, his attitudes towards the “heterodox­ies” of Buddhism and Daoism were developed both concurrently with his philo­sophical ideas as well as his ideas on proper ethical practice; and that while the lat­ter was perhaps his more enduring motivation for the critique of Neo-Confucian thought, it may actually have been necessitated by his search for a universally valid Confucian ethics, based on the secular and every-day experience of the people. As different scholars of Jinsai also stress different features of his work, a study of different scholarly sources should help illuminate as many aspects of Jinsai’s thought as possible. Ito Jinsai as Kogakuha ... (The School of Ancient Learning) It is usual in Japanese historiography to categorize the scholars of the Edo period,who identified themselves as Confucians, into three factions: Shushigaku... (Zhu Xi Learning), Yo¯meigaku... (Wang Yangming Learning) and Kogaku .. (Ancient Learning). In this triad Jinsai is seen as belonging to the Ancient Learning faction of Japanese Confucian scholars—a group, whose best-known members also include Yamaga Soko .... (1622–1685) and Ogyu Sorai .... (1666–1728). Kiri Paramore notes that these categories were seldom applied strictly in the his­torical reality of the Tokugawa period, but that they became reified by historians of the 20th century, notably Inoue Tetsujiro and Maruyama Masao (Paramore 2016, 194, note 2)—by focusing mostly on the ideas of different Confucian-iden­tified figures of the time. He also notes that while there is some utility to such an approach as a means of linking different trends in Japanese Confucianism to continental trends, analyzing the relationships between different interpretations of Tokugawa Confucianism only through these kinds of categorizations occludes many of the most socially and culturally significant aspects of Confucianism’s leg­acy in Japan (ibid., 43). Maruyama Masao .... , who as mentioned above helped popularize such categorizations, admits in his “Author’s Introduction” to Mikiso Hane’s transla­tion of Studies in Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan (1974) that his original essays were flawed in many ways, especially in not taking into account important distinctions between the Japanese and the Chinese schools, as well as ignoring important influences like Korean Neo-Confucianism2 (Maruyama 1974, xxxiv–xxxv). Another problem of categorization for this thesis comes from the criteria used. While Soko, Jinsai and Sorai might all have been critical of what they per­ceived as the Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy through the lens of returning to the classi­cal Chinese texts, their ideas were hardly identical in their intentions and conse­quences; nor where the texts to which they ascribed authority the same. Jinsai, for example, never wrote of Soko’s work and while Sorai did write of Jinsai’s, it was mostly to criticize him harshly. Another approach, taken by Paramore himself, is also possible: that instead of focusing on the differences of thought of the different factions, he tries to identify similarities in practice. He argues that “despite coming from a range of different intellectual schools of Confucianism, and disagreeing with each other on many theoretical issues, in terms of practice, context, and sociality, the Way of Heaven teachings, and the Confucianism of all these figures shared (…) similarities” (Par-amore 2016, 44)3. But among the figures Paramore goes on to discuss in more de­tail, Ito Jinsai is notably absent. As Jinsai was not a samurai and did not write directly of or to the samurai class,his ethics are presented in universal terms, with indirect political messages. John Allen Tucker sees this as being representative of a worldview belonging to the Edo period townspeople (cho¯nin.. ) class, which was by necessity more inclusive and more diverse (Tucker 1998). Jinsai also does not overtly connect Confucian 2 This is also remarked upon by Tucker in Tucker (1997b, 529). 3 “1. A clear focus on Neo-Confucian practice as outlined in key texts edited by Zhu Xi in the Song, and developed through practice in Ming dynasty China: notably the “Method of the Heart” (xin- fa). 2. A syncretist tendency to present Neo-Confucian practice in relation to, or even as, Shin­ toism, Military Thought, or other indigenous-Japanese non-Buddhist traditions. 3. A vision of post-Han contemporary imperial Chinese society as a completely separate and ruptured society from the ideal historic Confucian age of Yao and Shun. 4. A related capacity to create a space for Japanese nationalist sensibilities and to criticize contemporary imperial China from a Confucian perspective. 5. Use of Neo-Confucianism to give meaning to the life of samurai in the new peaceful Tokugawa order. 6. Criticized by others as potentially or actually politically subversive.” (ibid.) practice to Shintoism or other indigenous-Japanese traditions—as Huang Chun­chieh notes, Jinsai’s descriptions of the Confucian dao are turned to the everyday and the secular (Huang 2008). As Maruyama notes, Jinsai sees Dao as universal­ly human, but also sees the world as historically evolved—he does not see it in a post-Golden Age time of the decline of the Way (Maruyama 1974); and it is true that Jinsai did himself keep a fairly low profile, possibly in fear of being criticized by others as potentially or actually politically subversive (Tucker 1998). I would therefore argue that Jinsai does not fit as easily into Paramore’s analysis of the commonalities of Confucian-identified thinkers in Japan.The value of both of these kinds of categorizations is thus limited in this context, and the approach I propose to take is more in line with analyzing internal similarities and differences of Jinsai’s thought with the thought of those predecessors whose works he him­self had engaged with, without prejudging the outcome. I also do not intend to discount different interpretations of Jinsai’s own work out of hand, as they might each present important aspects of his project. I therefore merely propose to re-ex­amine and try to synthesize these different views on Jinsai as they pertain to his philosophical work, while holding an open-minded stance on the different gener­alizations and categorizations already offered. The views presented above need to be examined one by one, not to judge which of them may have had a greater influence on Jinsai, but to show that in fact Jinsai’s project does in certain ways evade strict delineation. Certain aspects of Jinsai’s work could thus even be called contradictory, but his project as a whole exhibits a high level of integrity. Jinsai’s Project as Facilitating the Dissolution of the Zhu Xi Mode of Thought Maruyama Masao is widely considered as one of the most influential post-World War II Japanese scholars associated with the history of Japanese Confucianism.He was a University of Tokyo professor of political science and of history of polit­ical thought who idealized Western liberalism (Paramore 2016, 168). One of his two most famous works, Nihon seiji shiso¯ kennkyu........ , published in the form of short essays in the years before the war, then as a book in Japanese in 1952, later again translated as the Studies in Intellectual History of Tokugawa Ja­pan by Mikiso Hane in 1974, describes the history of the political and philosoph­ical role of Confucianism in early modern Japan. Paramore notes: Although presented (…) as a history of Confucian thought, the book’s points were deeply political and present (ibid.). As Maruyama himself wrote in an introduction to a later printing, the book was his answer and resistance to the ‘overcoming modernity’ and ‘national morality’ ideolo­gies of the wartime fascist state (Maruyama 1974, ix, xxx, xxxi). He thus used the history of Confucianism in Japan as the central plank in his argument against the fascist nationalism. (ibid.) Maruyama’s book, understood within this context, may have lost much of its orig­inal interpretative power, but even if its main premise has been shown to be based on flawed assumptions (and as already pointed out, Maruyama himself has ad­mitted to this to a certain extent), the book can still offer insight into the specif­ic nature of the work of different scholars presented in it. The infamous schema in which a pure version of the Zhu Xi mode of thought is transplanted to Ja­pan, where the eventual changes in political reality bring about its dissolution—as completed by the formation of the Sorai School, its antithesis—remains always in the background of any study of Maruyama’s views on the kogaku scholars, but I would still follow Maruyama’s own line of thinking, when he writes: From the perspective of the present day, there is room for a good deal of doubt how far the evolutionary schema implicit in the first two essays—of universal Zhu Xi type Neo-Confucian mode of thought followed by its gradual disintegration, or of a transition in emphasis from “nature” to “invention”—will actually stand up to the historical evidence. However,I like immodestly to think even if one totally discards the whole schema,several individual pieces of analysis (…) still have value as providing a basis for further research. (Maruyama 1974, xxxv) Bearing the above in mind, I would like to set out Maruyama’s specific obser­vations of Jinsai’s work.4 I do not argue here either for or against Maruyama’s observations. a) Jinsai sought to purify Confucian ethical philosophy by emphasizing the normative aspects of the system (ibid., 51). His stated aim was to rescue Confu­cianism from its decline into a merely contemplative philosophy by reinforcing its practico-ethical character (ibid., 52). b) Jinsai made clear distinctions between categories such as the Way of Heaven (tendo¯.. ), the Way of Humanity (rendao/jindo¯.. ), the Decree of Heaven (tainming/tenmei.. ), structural coherence (li/ri. ), humaneness (ren/ jin. ), appropriateness (yi/gi . ), ritual propriety (li/rei. ), wisdom (zhi/chi. ) and the “suchness” of things (xing/sei. ). He confined yin. and yang . , as cat­egories of the natural world, exclusively to the Way of Heaven, and humaneness and appropriateness, as moral categories, exclusively to the Way of Humanity (ibid., ed.). c) Compared with the quiescent, rational view of nature held by the Song scholars, Jinsai’s cosmology is strongly vitalistic. Such a view inevitably led Jinsai to the denial of the supremacy of li. over qi. . For Jinsai, li no longer provides the link between Heaven and man; it is no more than a “physical principle” (ibid.).However, Jinsai’s criticisms of Song philosophers’ theory of li and qi did not, as is often argued, confuse the logical priority they claimed for li over qi with a tempo­ral priority. Rather, he feared that the supremacy accorded li by the Zhu Xi School might go beyond a logical supremacy and become a supremacy of value (ibid., 53). d) Only a small part of Jinsai’s overall philosophical system is concerned with his theory of the Decree of Heaven, but its importance in the intellectual structure of his philosophy cannot be ignored, as the logical origin of Jinsai’s ag­nostic tendencies can be traced to it (ibid., 54). e) By insisting that “there is no way outside of the people, and no people out­side of the way” (“............... ”) (Ito in Shimizu 2017,26), Jinsai hoped to strengthen the ethical side of the Song School’s Way, which had been weakened by its extension to cover the natural world (Maruyama 1974,55). Having broken the continuity between the Way in general and the Way of Heaven, he now made it transcend suchness (xing/sei . ) as well. In Jinsai’s opin­ion, humaneness, appropriateness, ritual propriety, and wisdom are not principles endowed upon man by birth, constituting his Original Humanness; they are ideal characteristics that men must strive to realize (ibid.). f ) However, because he respected Mencius just as much as Confucius and could not but support the former’s belief in the goodness of humanness, Jinsai,while insisting on regarding humaneness, appropriateness, ritual propriety, and wisdom as transcendental ideas, placed the “four sprouts” (si duan.. ) i.e., the senses of commiseration (.... ), shame (.... ), compliance (.... ), and moral judgement (.... ), in the realm of humanness. The four sprouts are endowed in humanness as predispositions toward the realization of the way,which has an objective and autonomous existence (ibid., 55,56; see also Hu 2021). g) Although Jinsai emphasized the imperative character of Confucian ethics,he was not intolerant of man’s natural desires. For instance, he said, “if we were to judge things in terms of ritual propriety and appropriateness, we would find that feelings (jo¯. ) conform to the way and desires (yoku. ) to appropriateness.There is nothing wrong with them.” (trans. Hane in Maruyama 1974, 57, ed.) (“................................................... ” (Ito in Shimizu 2017, 98)) And, though happy to remain in abject poverty all his life, also remarked: Mikiso Hane’s translation is lightly edited to better reflect my own use of the different philosoph­ical terms in the text. Confucians pride themselves on showing little interest in monetary com­pensations and holding wealth and rank to be worth no more that dust and dirt. Society in general also respects those who hold mundane af­fairs in disdain and maintain an attitude of transcendence and aloofness. Both show that they are extremely ignorant of the Way. (trans. Hane in Maruyama 1974, 57) ..................................................................... (Ito in Shimizu 2017, 45–46) h) Jinsai said: “If the sages were born in the present age, they would rely on the common ways of today and employ methods of today” (trans. Hane in Maruyama 1974, 59) (“................................... ” (Ito in Shimizu 2017, 109)). The emphasis on the importance of the historical development of the rites and music shows that the quiescent immobile rationalism of the Zhu Xi School had lost its hold on Jinsai’s mind. Just as Jinsai the “moralist” was not moralistic, so Jinsai of the School of Ancient Learning did not believe that civilization had steadily declined since the days of the sages and that it was approaching its demise (Maruyama 1974, 59–60). i) There are clear signs in Jinsai’s thought of the disintegration of individual morality and government. For example, Jinsai said: A scholar must of course regulate his life in terms of these ideals, but the ruler must have as his basic principle a willingness to share the good and the bad with his subjects. Of what advantage would it be for the art of government if he aimlessly studied the principle of the upright mind and sincere intentions but was unable to share the good and the bad with his subjects? (trans. Hane in Maruyama 1974, 60) .................................................................................... ...................... (Ito in Shimizu 2017, 106) As has been remarked, and can now be seen, Maruyama traces Jinsai’s thought from the point of view of opposition to what Maruyama himself calls “the Zhu Xi mode of thought”. In all these different instances he tries to show ways in which to present Jinsai as a stepping stone between the Zhu Xi School and Sorai School—between the consciousness of the “natural” and the consciousness of the “artificial”, the consciousness of the “public” and the consciousness of the “person­al”. While these interpretations do not seem to represent wrong readings of Jinsai per se, the underlying thread does seem to finally overreach; and at the same time,to limit the interpretative range (as has been established). I would also argue that reading Jinsai too strongly in relation to Sorai, while use­ful in certain ways, may conceal important distinctions of Jinsai’s own thought in many others. As Jinsai could never answer Sorai’s aggressive critique (having passed away before he could respond to the famous letter), it is hard to say how the dialogue between the two scholars would go and how the main points of dis­agreement would be hashed out in person. I do contend that perhaps some of the most important parts of Jinsai’s work—his own brand of humanism, agnosticism,and even liberalism—cannot be given adequate attention and value by trying to show him strictly in the same intellectual movement as Sorai. In this sense, I follow John Allen Tucker’s more grounded and nuanced study. Jinsai’s Project as a Philosophical Lexicography John Allen Tucker points out that even if it is still useful to see Jinsai as one of the Kogaku scholars, Maruyama’s formulations of the school are in many ways over­burdened and there are many links missing between different Kogaku scholars as presented by traditional Kogaku scholarship.The most persuasive link between the different Kogaku scholars, Tucker argues, might therefore be found in a different place: the genre of philosophical lexicography. Tucker points out the two important figures of Chinese Neo-Confucianism, who might have had the greatest influence upon the genre as well as Kogaku scholars in general: The impact of two Song Neo-Confucians, Chen Beixi ... (1159– 1223) and Lu Xiangshan ... (1139–1192), seems to account for the more salient characteristics of the Japanese School of Ancient Learning. (Tucker 1993, 701) Rather than simply following the ideas of the Ancient Learning schools as a sort of a true anti-thesis to the Cheng-Zhu mode of thought in Japan, Tucker points to an often overlooked relationship between the works and ideas of the Kogaku scholars and tries to show that the Kogaku schools, instead of representing a real critical break with the Neo-Confucian tradition, in fact represent a sort of radical Neo-Confucian revisionism—a critical development of certain Neo-Confucian methods and ideas, which, though widely used and fitting to the circumstances of Tokugawa Japan, were not originally conceived there, but can be traced all the way back to China and to Zhu Xi’s own contemporaries. Tucker argues that philosophical lexicography, connecting the likes of Yamaga Soko, Kaibara Ekken .... (1630–1714), Ito Jinsai and Ogyu Sorai, origi­nated with an important disciple of Zhu Xi, Chen Beixi ... (1159–1223) and his most important work, the Xingli ziyi .... (The Meaning of Neo-Confu­cian Terms). Tucker argues that: (While) Neo-Confucian texts, such as Zhu Xi’s Sishu jizhu .... (Commentaries on the Four Books), had appeared in Japan several centuriesbefore the Tokugawa period, Beixi’s Ziyi, a brief, conceptually organizedprimer explaining some-twenty-five philosophical terms and/or groups ofterms crucial to an elementary understanding of Neo-Confucianism, onlyreached Japan in the 1590s, presumably following Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s (1536–1598) first Korean invasion (1592–1593). (Tucker 1993, 683–84) By then, the Ziyi had been through eight different Chinese editions (ibid., 684),but the relevant version of the work, which had the most influence in Edo Japan,is the 1553 Korean edition of the text5.This gained widespread popularity through the work of Hayashi Razan ... (1583–1657), one of the most influential Confucian teachers in the early Edo period, who also worked on providing a ver­nacular translation, titled Seiri jigi genkai ...... (Vernacular Explanation of the Meaning of Neo-Confucian Terms). By the time the latter was published, Beixi’s Ziyi had become one of the most influential Neo-Confucian texts in early Tokugawa Japan (ibid.). Tucker argues that without the Ziyi it would be impossible to imagine works such as Yamaga Soko’s Seikyo¯ yo¯roku .... (Essential Lexicography of Sagely This was itself apparently a reprint of one of the earliest (if not the earliest) editions, the so-called Yuan period . (1279–1368) edition (ibid.). Confucian Teachings), Ito Jinsai’s Gomo¯ jigi or Ogyu Sorai’s Benmei.. (Distin­guishing Names) (ibid., 686) and shows how the structure, methodology and cer­tain ideas are developed within these works. Tucker also points out that even cer­tain factual mistakes which crop up in Razan’s Genkai can be seen reproduced in both Jinsai’s as well as in Sorai’s work (Tucker 1994, 76). These similarities are not coincidental. Nor can they be explained by any other Neo-Confucian text, not to mention one with a publication record comparable to that of Beixi’s Ziyi in seventeenth-century Tokugawa Ja­pan. Zhu Xi’s Commentaries on the Four Books are not arranged around the orderly, systematic discussion of the semantics of exclusively philosophi­cal terms. Rather, Zhu’s Commentaries follow the order of the texts—the Great Learning, the Analects, the Mencius, and the Doctrine of the Mean— which they explicate. Of course, the terms that Beixi discusses do crop up, here and there, in Zhu’s Commentaries, but their various appearances provide no systematic model for the kind of ordered, lexicographical dis­cussions found in the terminologically arranged works of Soko, Jinsai,and Sorai. (Tucker 1993, 689) The second thing Tucker points out about the genre of philosophical lexicography in Tokugawa Japan is that while Hayashi Razan popularized the Xingli ziyi, he also did it in a critical manner. His Seiri jigi genkai thus also contains Lu Xiang­shan’s critique of the notion of wuji er taiji / mukyoku ji taikyoku ..... (“the ultimate of non-being and the great ultimate”) as a Daoist (and not a Confucian) concept. Razan presents Zhu Xi’s answer to Lu Xiangshan’s critique, but does not give an indication as to which of these two interpretations he thinks is the correct one, leaving it up to the reader. As neither Lu Xiangshan’s critique, nor Zhu Xi’s answer to it are found in Beixi’s Ziyi, Tucker argues that: (F)rom the start, then, Razan’s brand of Neo-Confucianism (in large part expressed for the first time systematically and conceptually in the Gen-kai) projected an ambivalence wavering toward criticism of notions like the ultimate of nonbeing, notions which even in the Song had sparked debate, being deemed by thinkers like Lu as dubitable due to their heter­odox origins. (ibid., 629) Tucker demonstrates how Jinsai’s own critique of Neo-Confucian terms in the Gomo¯ jigi systematically appropriates both Beixi’s ordering of meaning with­in a philosophical lexicon as well as Lu Xiangshan’s critical analysis of certain Neo-Confucian notions. I therefore follow his assertion that both Chen Beixi and Lu Xiangshan can be taken as proper influences for Jinsai and his work and so place Jinsai within a line of scholars, who—though they may not all be connected in a simple linear fashion—still share in common the methodology as well as the influence of certain ideas found in the genre of philosophical lexicography that Hayashi Razan helped to popularize. Because of the specific juxtaposition of these influences, Tucker also does not be­lieve that the genre was itself something limiting to the scholars working with it.He rather points out: Conventional wisdom of course holds that lexicons limit meaning by leg­islating a rigid version of semantics. Yet in the first flush of unrestrained lexicography,Tokugawa philosophers revealed that through lexicography,meaning could be endlessly legislated and relegislated, established and fractured, defined and then differentiated in an asymptotic quest for fi­nal, definitive meaning. They showed that lexicography could be easily utilized by opponents of a given semantics to establish their own, oppos­ing estimates of the meanings of words. (Tucker 1994, 77) Tucker sees the genre itself as an inherently political Confucian project, and as the reason why in the Tokugawa period it ended up becoming a sort of an un­derground movement (ibid., 78). After writing his Seikyo¯ yoroku, Yamaga Soko,“who had never evinced, except in the realm of ideas, the slightest disloyalty to the Tokugawa shogunate” (ibid., 71), was exiled from the capital of Edo to the Ako domain on the orders of Hoshina Masayuki .... (1611–1673), the guardian of the shogun Ietsuna .... (1641–1680). Hoshina subscribed to the funda­mentalist school of Yamazaki Ansai .... (1619–1682), whose views were antithetic to those of the Kogaku scholars. Ansai was considered the guardian of Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy, and had by this time managed to supplant even the fa­mous Hayashi School itself (ibid.). It is probably for this reason that Jinsai, while he himself never did fall afoul of Tokugawa shogunate’s censors like Soko did, did in fact refrain from publishing his most critical works while he was still alive.6 Jinsai’s relationship with the pol­itics of the day for all intents and purposes remains intellectual, but it is also very clear from his writings that he had strong political views, especially supporting the politically more liberal ideas of Mencius.7 Jinsai’s ideas might have gotten him in trouble, if he was not such a non-openly polemic scholar and if his project had 6 Though a pirated version of the Gomo¯ jigi did make the rounds and was the version studied by Ogyu Sorai. 7 See for example, Tucker (1997, 244–45). been happening anywhere nearer to the capital city. As it was, Jinsai never ven­tured far outside the City of Kyoto in his life, and his political views remained in the realm of his philosophical ideas. But Tucker argues Jinsai could not have been ignorant of the political realities of his time, and that his project also expresses his political views, which are those of a Kyoto cho¯nin. Jinsai as a Kyoto chonin Scholar Setting out Jinsai’s project as less a polemical rejection of Neo-Confucian ideas and more a critical revision of them, Tucker explores the possible socio-political and biographical elements, which may have influenced Jinsai’s work. He writes: More than any other teacher or book, Jinsai’s path as a scholar-philosopher was influenced by the socio-political environment into which he was born, that of Kyoto cho¯nin in early-Tokugawa Japan. (Tucker 1998, 39) Ito Jinsai .... was born as Ito Genshichi .... on the 20th day of the seventh lunar month of Kannei .. 4 (August 30, 1627) in Kyoto, Japan, as the eldest son of Ito Ryoshitsu .... (1599–1674) and Satomura Nabe .... in his family’s residence, on the east side of the Horikawa Street. The family residence stood not far from the imperial palace grounds in north central Kyo­to and would later become the place of Jinsai’s own school, the Kogido ... (Tucker 1998, 29). As John Allen Tucker notes: (T)he proximity to the palace and the aristocratic community surround­ing it facilitated for Jinsai’s Kogido (…) a following among Kyoto’s social elite that few if any other Tokugawa schools, before or after, enjoyed.The Ito family was not, however, part of the old stock of Kyoto; rather they were newcomers as of the late sixteenth century. (ibid., 29) Jinsai’s grandfather, Ito Ryokei .... (1561–1615), brought scholarship into the family home, but could not interest his own children in it (Ishida 1960,11). Ryokei was interested in both the arts and religion, he associated with Zen Buddhists, practiced linked verse (renga .. ) and pursued studies in Confu­cian thought. The texts that he supposedly owned included copies of important Cheng-Zhu texts, such as Zhu Xi’s Sishu.. (Commentaries to the Four Books), Zhu Xi and Lü Zuqian’s ... (1137–1181) Jinsilu... (Reflections of Things at Hand) and the imperially-sponsored Ming dynasty compilation, the Xingli daquan .... (The Great Compendium on Humanness and Principle). These were allegedly among the first works Jinsai perused in his own studies of Confu­cian thought (Tucker 1998, 12). When Jinsai was born the family fortune was already declining, and Jinsai’s father wanted his son to pursue medicine, which at the time was a more lucrative profes­sion, but Jinsai’s own interests lay in other areas. Tucker writes: As a child and adolescent, Jinsai apparently circulated among Kyoto’s cultural elite. Despite the low status of cho¯nin within a social system dominated by samurai, Kyoto cho¯nin were exceptions, enjoying relatively higher prestige and social standing as preservers of traditional arts, crafts,and cultural enterprises in the ancient imperial capital. Their standing was realized, however, provided that they remained in Kyoto, a world somewhat apart from the one that samurai otherwise were prone to rule more arrogantly and ruthlessly. (ibid., 32) When he was ten years old, Jinsai began his formal education under his maternal uncle, Osuka Kaian ..... , a noted physician, and was said to be impressed when introduced to the Daxue.. (The Great Learning) (Yamashita 1983, 456). At eighteen years old he obtained a copy of Yanping Dawen .... (Dialogues with Yanping) and is reported to have read and reread it until its pages disintegrat­ed (ibid.). This brief work, edited by Zhu Xi, advocates the meditative practice of “quiet sitting” (seiza .. ), taught to Zhu Xi by Li Yanping.8 It is quite clear that Jinsai was at this time a student of the Cheng-Zhu School Neo-Confucianism. Tucker also delves into other possible early textual influences. He offers specula­tion on Jinsai’s own descriptions in the Do¯shikai hikki ..... (Records of the Society of the Like-Minded Scholars), where Jinsai describes having read theGreat Compendium on Humanness and Structural Coherence and the Zhuzi Yulei.... (Classified Conversations of Master Zhu) at the age of 27. Tucker alsowonders whether some of those books were not in fact too hard for a beginnerand whether some of the titles Jinsai describes might not be copies of other ti­tles, including Beixi’s Xingli Ziyi (Tucker 1998, 37). Unfortunately, Tucker hasto in the end admit that the question of when Jinsai first read the Ziyi remains unresolved (ibid.). John Jorgensen discusses Li Yanping as having “taught a method for the realization of the singular pattern or coherence inherent in all divergent particulars, thus underscoring the value and worth of phenomenal reality. (…) Li advocated that students could gradually come to empathize with other things (and perceive coherence thereby) in the daily functions of life via quiet sitting and cleansing the mind” ( Jorgensen 2018, 44). Some biographers speculate that Jinsai attended lectures by Matsunaga Sekigo .... (1592–1657), the Kyoto-based Neo-Confucian successor of Fujiwara Seika .... (1561–1619) and at one time the teacher of Jinsai’s cousin, Ito Masatomo .... , but there is no actual historical proof of this (Tucker 1998,38). Other possibilities include Jinsai studying with a fairly obscure and unknown teacher or being largely self-taught (ibid.). Yamashita, on the other hand, writes that Jinsai did indeed briefly study with Matsunaga, but stopped going to his school after only one or two lectures for some unknown reason (Yamashita 1983,457). In any case, Jinsai in all probability did not have a very influential figure in his early life to study with, and this kind of independence might have also had a not insignificant influence on his thought and work. Jinsai’s pursuit of scholarship was not supported by his family, and in 1655, at the age of 29, this drove him into seclusion at the Kyoto Matsushita Ward. It also brought upon him a certain illness called, using modern terminology, “a neurosis”,one which perhaps worsened by a heart condition or tuberculosis (Tucker 1998,41). It is known that at this time, when he was by himself, Jinsai would communi­cate with people very rarely and barely leave his residence. His illness did not how­ever stop him from further study, and in those years Jinsai would explore Daoist and Buddhist texts, as well as the Neo-Confucian teachings of Wang Yangming ... (1472–1559) (ibid., 42). He also established his first study group there, the Do¯shikai ... (Society of the Like-Minded Scholars). In 1662, and after a devastating earthquake, Jinsai—now 35 years of age and with a firmly renewed faith in the ethical teachings of classical Confucianism—re­turned to his family residence, where the Do¯shikai then began to meet. Out of this Jinsai’s School, the Kogido¯, would be born, as well as his kogaku philosophy (ibid., 46).The inspiration for establishing the school might actually have been the Yamazaki Ansai School (Kimonha ... ), which stood across the street from the Ito family home (ibid.). As Jinsai’s philosophy is often considered as the answer to Ansai’s strict Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy, it is interesting to note the differences in the two scholar’s teaching methods. Tucker writes: Unlike Ansai, a demanding teacher who supposedly criticized his studentsfor not memorizing Zhu Xi’s writing precisely, Jinsai was more deferential,tolerant, and gentle in teaching, emulating Confucius’ more liberal and hu­manistic pedagogical demeanor. The Do¯shikai did not emphasize, withinthe classroom at least, differences between students and their teacher. Dis­tinctions in relative social status were not stressed either. (ibid., 47) He also notes: To some extent, the differences between Jinsai and Ansai reflected their social backgrounds and those of their students. Ansai was the son of a ro¯nin, and his students were mostly bushi, while Jinsai’s school included representatives from wealthy cho¯nin families, prominent lines of Kyoto physicians, the cultural elite of the ancient capital, and members of the imperial aristocracy from distinguished lines such as the Fujiwara. Per­haps naturally, a strict and demanding atmosphere more prevailed within Ansai’s school than in Jinsai’s. (Tucker 1998, 47–48) Even though the Kyoto cho¯nin were afforded some measure of independence, and Jinsai himself maintained scholarly independence from samurai patronage (ibid.,50), the bakufu power was quite evident even in Kyoto. Jinsai, living for a long time in the shadow of the imperial castle, could not be unaware of it, nor the wid­er political situation in the country. It is therefore interesting to note again that while Jinsai never directly engaged with the politics of the day, but his project,Tucker argues, as a proper Confucian one, must be seen as political and as cham­pioning the specific cho¯nin worldview. Jinsai also never wrote any political treatise,but his thinking is evident from some of his writings—most especially in his fo­cusing on the people and his adoption, as has already been mentioned, of the more politically liberal ideas of Mencius. Jinsai is thus a Kogaku scholar, influenced by his life as a cho¯nin in the ancient im­perial capital of Kyoto. But it seems that to describe his project primarily in thoseterms might again be an overreach in itself, with the mistake being not taking intoaccount Jinsai’s own avowed positions. Jinsai himself never described his project inthose terms, and it is doubtful that he would have seen it as such, as his ethical phi­losophy is in his works repeatedly presented in inclusive and universalistic terms,while maintaining a quite radical apologia of Confucius and Mencius’s thought. Jinsai as a Confucian Radical Koyasu Nobukuni notes Ito Jinsai’s Confucian radicalism in his belief that the Analects is the most perfect book in the universe (see Koyasu 2015), and this does have a bearing on Jinsai’s project as a whole. In the Gomo¯ jigi Jinsai describes his project thusly: I teach students to scrutinize the Analects and the Mencius thorough­ly so that they can rightly discern, with their mind’s eye, the semantic lineage of the teachings of the sage Confucius. When so trained, stu­dents will readily recognize the semantic lineage of Confucian-Mencian philosophical notions, and thereby fathom their meanings without error.(trans. Tucker in Tucker 1998, 69) ........................................................................................................... (Ito in Yoshi-kawa and Shimizu 1971, 14) But Jinsai’s project also had wider implications. Huang Chun-chieh describes it in the following fashion: The book9 (…) represents a type of Confucian hermeneutics in East-Asia, a forceful apologia for Confucius against “heresies” of Daoism,Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism. Jinsai re-interprets Confucius by of­fering meticulous textual exegesis with fresh intratextual annotations of the Analects and faithful definitions of such key notions as dao. and ren. as Confucius himself meant them, on the one hand, and intertextual collations of the Analects and the other Classical writings to show their mutual coherence, on the other. (Huang 2008, 248) Jinsai shows himself in many ways to be a radical Confucian, and as an aggressive opponent of the notions which he believed were developed in the Buddhist and Daoist traditions and which he held to have corrupted the proper Confucian Way.But his view of what might be considered properly Confucian is also grounded in his own project and methodology. Jinsai found in the Analects and Mencius the textual authority to counter the teaching of the Cheng-Zhu School10, but it is not that his objections stem from his Confucian radicalism; it is rather that his Con­fucian radicalism might have stemmed from his objections and search for univer­sally applicable ethical teaching. Jinsai went so far as to attack one of the four books—the Great Learning—as a non-Confucian text, writing a supplementary essay in the Gomo¯ jigi, titled “Dai­gaku wa Koshi no isho ni arazaru”......... (The Great Learning is 9 The book mentioned here is the Rongo kogi.... (Ancient Meanings in the Analects) (see Ito in Koyasu 2017; Ito in Koyasu 2018), which together with the Gomo¯ jigi represents Jinsai’s most valuable work. 10 As has been discussed, this might follow Lu Xiangshan’s method. Not a Confucian Text)11. In the introduction to the essay Jinsai writes the words most closely associated with his radical Confucian stance: The words of the Analects are plain and honest (heisei .. ), but its prin­ciples are deep and profound (shin’on .. ). Adding even one word would be excessive. Taking away one would leave it imperfect. The Analects is the most perfect work in literature in the entire world (tenka no gen koko ni oite ka kiwamaru ......... ). It exhaustively explains the principles of the world (tenka no ri koko ni oite ka tsuku ......... ). It truly is the greatest book in the universe (jitsu ni uchu daiichi no sho nari ....... ). (trans. Tucker in Tucker 1998, 234) ..................................................................................................... (Ito in Yoshikawa and Shimi­zu 1971, 99 & 160–61) But Koyasu Nobukuni explains Jinsai’s radicalism in different terms, as Jinsai dis­covering in the Analects a confirmation of his own views on everyday ethics and a tool to challenge the Neo-Confucian doctrine (Koyasu 2015, 21–22). Jinsai say­ing that “to speak of filial piety, brotherly deference, loyalty and trustworthiness suffices”12, that “where there are not people, the Way will not be seen”13 shows that in exhaustively reading the Analects (and the Mencius), Jinsai not only came to possess the language and textual authority to criticize the accounts of Cheng-Zhu School thought and practice (especially as put forth by the already discussed Kimon School of Yamazaki Ansai), but also that his preoccupation, rather than doctrinal, remained always with proper everyday ethical life of the people. Jinsai’s “ten proofs” why the Great Learning is not a Confucian text thus begins with his criticism of it as a book that aims at being too lofty and setting out too hard a road for the practice of the Confucian Way. Jinsai writes: But the Great Learning suggests that progress along the moral way is as difficult as climbing a nine-story pagoda.14 We mount story after story,until finally reaching its pinnacle. Yet the Confucian way is nothing other 11 This essay was not in the Edo edition of the text, showing how Jinsai’s radicalism might have sub­sequently been downplayed by his son, Ito Togai. 12............. 13................... (See Ito in Shimizu 2017, 27) 14 See Daodejing, ch. 64. than the Way of Humanity (hito no michi ... )! Because it was meant to be cultivated, how could it be so remote? Confucius himself remarked,“Is humaneness far away? As soon as I want it, there it is.”15 Mencius added, “The way is close, but can be sought even in distant places.”16 These passages imply that the way is very close by! Why must we climb a tall pagoda to reach it? (trans. Tucker in Tucker 1998, 236) ............................................................................................................................................................................................. (Ito in Yoshika­wa and Shimizu 1971, 101, 161) Jinsai’s semantic project then connects to his radicalism concerning the ancient meaning of terms found in the Analects and Mencius. But this project comes from Jinsai’s own striving for an ethical position which was not exclusive, lofty or hard to either understand or achieve; which was not turned to quietism and was not built in a way that demanded gradualism or some sort of ultimate attainment: it simply demanded the effort of sincerity. It demanded sincere practice. To Jinsai,the proper Way is the Way of the human condition itself. It is so fundamentally bound to the basic relations of life that going against it would be impossible to do and remain recognizably human. If Jinsai’s stated project is then first and foremost to discover the ancient meanings of terms—as opposed to the meanings that have become misunderstood through philosophically original interpretations of the Cheng-Zhu School—on the other hand, his work (as has been discussed previously) shows that he never lost sight of philosophical integrity and also conducted his teachings in a philosophically lib­eral way. In his striving to formulate coherent philosophical positions, supported by the textual authority of the Analects and Mencius, he also seems to be in line with his ethical project, much more than it being simply a semantic one. Huang Chun-chieh also affirms this: Ito Jinsai thought that the Analects is “the loftiest, the greatest Primal Book in the whole universe” precisely because what it conveys are the 15........,.... Lunyu, 7/30. 16....... Mengzi, 4A/11. principles of ordinary daily living. Such a Dao bears its inevitable univer­sality and universal effectiveness. (Huang 2008, 260) Jinsai’s project should therefore not be seen as strictly doctrinal and based solely on textual objections, aimed at purifying Confucian orthodoxy of the influences of Buddhism and Daoism (as he himself sees them), but more as a project which combines textual, philosophical and practical objections to the kind of ethical ideals that each of these traditions might have developed—a project, then, that is multi-faceted and complex. Jinsai here is a moralist and an ethicist, trying to fathom the teachings he believed to be true to life but also formulate philosoph­ical answers against developments which he believed damaged the true Dao of humanity. Jinsai’s Project as Centered on the Practice of Virtue Samuel Hideo Yamashita argues that to understand Jinsai, one has to firmly grasp Jinsai’s views on the practice of virtue. He writes: Although it is commonly believed that Jinsai’s philological studies in­spired his criticisms of contemporary Neo-Confucian scholars, most of whom subscribed to one variety or another of the philosophy of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, what has not been recognized is the part played by his new method of ethical practice, which he called, following Mencius, “nourishment” (yang / yashinau. ). Herein lies the value of studying Jinsai’s early life and his preoccupation with the practice of vir­tue. (Yamashita 1983, 454) It would be safe to say that Jinsai, as Yamashita points out, was convinced that performing acts of virtue was superior to explicating virtue through the study of the Confucian classics (ibid., 453), but Yamashita also shows that while Jinsai’s enduring motivation for studying Confucian thought and engaging in his phil­ological work was his attempt to pursue ancient meaning and achieve the prop­er practice of virtue, it was his inner need first to object to improper practice on ethical grounds, defend his objections on textual grounds, and then to finally for­mulate proper philosophical solutions to the problems that were facing him, that formed the core of his project. The first expressions of Jinsai’s thought are his early essays. Jinsai wrote four short essays between 1653 and 1655. They are the “Keisaiki ... (Keisai’s Testa­ment)”, the “Taikyokuron ... (The Doctrine of the Great Ultimate)”, the “Shingakuron ... (The Doctrine of the Learning of the Heart-Mind)”, and the “Seizenron ... (The Doctrine of a Felicitous Humanness)”. The essays show Jinsai’s knowledge and his interest—in this time still strong—in the Cheng-Zhu School; but they also show Jinsai’s own preoccupations at the time were mainly with finding answers to the problems he was facing in his own life: aliena­tion from his family and not being ready to follow their wishes for him as a son.17 Jinsai’s anguish enhanced the appeal of Cheng-Zhu philosophy, and Cheng-Zhu philosophy, as he interpreted it, salved his loneliness by sanctioning his interest in himself. Jinsai’s separation from family and friends and his enormous self-absorption are the keys to his earliest writ­ings. (Yamashita 1983, 458) It would be during this time that Jinsai would slowly become more and more dis­illusioned with the Cheng-Zhu School, and he now tried to find answers further afield—in both Daoist and Buddhist texts and practices as well as in the teach­ings of Wang Yangming. Furthermore, Jinsai also sought personal healing in dif­ferent kinds of meditation, as he seemed to recognize its power to bring peace to his troubled mind; but he also slowly recognized in meditative practices a deep antisocial streak, which he finally grew to reject. Jinsai’s own description of medi­tation in quite striking, as it shows how he thought about it later in his life. Jinsai would describe his memories of the so-called “skeleton meditation” in the follow­ing fashion: The Zen Buddhists have a practice of meditating on skeletons. In this method, the devotee first sits quietly, reflecting on himself. When his concentration is complete, he sees himself as a skeleton, stripped of all flesh, and for that moment he is above lamenting his unenlightened state.In my youth, I tried this technique. Sure enough, when I had achieved complete concentration, I saw the skeleton in myself. I also imagined that when I spoke to anyone, I was conversing with another skeleton, and passersby appeared to be walking puppets, and everything seemed to be a dream: there was neither Heaven nor Earth, neither life nor death; and everything, even mountains, rivers and palatial mansions, appeared phan­tasmal.This is what the Buddhists call clarifying the mind and glimpsing one’s humanness. I recall too that filial piety and loyalty seemed shallow and barely worth discussing. After I had practiced quiet sitting for some time, I regained my lucidity, and my views came naturally. (I know now 17 This might be said to represent a true Confucian crisis of identity. that) these were not the ‘real principles of Heaven and Earth’ and that it is because of practices such as this that Buddhists sever all ties with society and withdraw from daily affairs. (trans. Yamashita in Yamashita 1983, 460–61, ed.) .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... (Ito in Ishida 1960, 37–38). From such experiences Jinsai’s distrust of both the practice of meditation and of the Buddhist interpretations of notions that formed its theoretical background—as well as a distrust of what Jinsai called Zen-Confucian practices, such as the aforementioned “quiet sitting”—would emerge. Jinsai would go on to spend his life fighting quietism in Confucian practice as well as what he perceived as qui­etist principles in Neo-Confucian thought. This is without doubt another major part of his project: a possible starting point. That the experiences were so viscer­al to Jinsai shows that his shift in thinking was not born from simple doctrinal dislike of Cheng-Zhu school’s thought, but from his experiences and his own attempts to come to terms with them. Jinsai struggled with being human and sought solutions both philosophical and practical. In 1658 Jinsai wrote another short essay, the “Jinsetsu .. (Theory of Hu­maneness)”; and in 1661 he wrote the “Shosai shishu .... (A Student’s Pledge)”. In both of them, Jinsai would completely renounce his former self-ob­session as well as his Cheng-Zhu influenced views on individualism and sociabil­ity. He would become a staunch defender of the Confucian values of filial piety and brotherly love and would also radically shift the focus of his studies from the Neo-Confucian notion of seriousness (jing / kei. ) to the study of the Confucian notion of humaneness (ren / jin. ).18 18 This even shows in his choice of a name. Before this time, Jinsai .. took for himself the name of Keisai .. . It would seem that this was also a deep personal shift for Jinsai, the once rebel son, and it formed the backbone of the further development of his thought. Soon after, Jinsai’s family home was struck by disaster and Jinsai returned there, where he, in time, established his famous school, the Kogido¯. And of course, Yamashita demonstrates by looking at both Jinsai’s writings as well as those of his son Togai that the shift in his thinking did not happen all at once, but was developed over many years, most of it between 1662–1677, when returning home he held the many meetings of the Do¯shikai (ibid.) This interim period is important because it was then that Jinsai ques­tioned the adequacy of his earlier textual solution to the problem posed by his affirmation of the emotions and began to search for another, more satisfying solution. His writings from this period, which include his lec­tures, the topics he raised for discussion in the meetings of the [Society of Like-minded Scholars], and the notes of these meetings, chronicle this search. From them we learn that Jinsai first sought philosophical solutions, then practical ones, and also that the former led to and perhaps even necessitated the latter. (Yamashita 1983, 466) In this shift, Jinsai also encountered a problem of Zhu Xi’s formulation of hu­maneness as “the li of love”19 as described through Zhu Xi’s duality of li. and qi . . Jinsai, with his newfound respect for sociality, was afraid that humaneness and human feelings had become too divided by Zhu Xi’s formulation. It was to this concrete question, Yamashita argues, that Jinsai sought his answers and it was this question that in the end led him to abandon important aspects of the established duality (ibid., 462). But Jinsai’s answers, at first, were based more or less on the simple textual authority of the Analects and Mencius. Yamashita argues that Jinsai, having in a strictly ethical sense found himself at oddswith elements of Neo-Confucian practice, which to his mind belonged instead to Bud­dhist and Daoist traditions, found in the Analects and Mencius the textual authorityneeded to support his own philosophical views, and through this tried to resolve hisproblems with Zhu Xi’s formulation of the notion of humaneness. At first, however, hedid this while still trying to preserve the duality found in the teachings of the Cheng-Zhu School. Later he began to question such textual solutions, which he found un­satisfying, and started searching for more complete philosophical ones (ibid., 468–69). I will not be discussing here in what ways Jinsai finally managed to resolve the du­ality between li and qi. For the purposes of the present article, it is more important 19 See, for example, Zhuzi yulei, 6. to note that Jinsai did in fact go on to formulate philosophical solutions which brought together human feelings and the inner disposition of goodness, and therefore in a certain sense achieved a re-valuation of the given duality, by as­serting that “people having the same sense of right and wrong is what was earlier referred to as the feeling of commiseration” (trans. Yamashita in Yamashita 1983,472; Ito 1717, vol. 4). Thus Jinsai, having combined the original humanness and human feeling, came to a more satisfying philosophical solution, which would have both ontological and ethical consequences. But he was still not satisfied with this, as Yamashita writes: Jinsai recognized that although he had found an easy textual solution and then a more satisfying philosophical solution to the problem of reconcil­ing virtue and the emotions, he had not found a practical solution, that is, an appropriate method of actually embodying virtue. What may have drawn him to Wang Yang-ming, then, was the latter’s advocacy of both a monistic ontology20 and an active form of praxis. (ibid., 473) In 1662, Jinsai was busy trying to synthesize the views of Mencius and Wang Yangming and primarily interested in the proper practice of virtue. He would later go on to reject Yangming’s solutions through embarking on his own philological project, and finally accepting Mencius’ notion of nourishment as the one proper practice to settle upon.21 However, while even his rejection of the Great Learningas a Confucian text is based on the exact argument that it stresses introspection above nourishment (Yamashita 1983, 478), Jinsai does not deny the value of in­trospection, but simply argues against any kind of order in which it comes before “nourishment”. Still, it is safe to say that Jinsai’s philological project, while surely driven by his search for classical textual authority and proper practice of virtue,was just as much driven by Jinsai’s need to formulate a proper philosophical re­sponse to the prevailing doctrines of his time. Conclusion Jinsai’s project can thus be traced from his ethical objections, in certain ways influ­enced by his cho¯nin life, to his search for textual authority through which to counter 20 Whether Wang Yangming had indeed formulated a monistic ontology can be disputed. 21 Yamashita writes: “Although it is possible that his decision to emphasize nourishment, albeit aimed at Yang-ming, was influenced by the latter’s glorification of action, Jinsai did not acknowledge this influence but instead cited the Mencius as his locus classicus, as if this were sufficient authority.” (Yamashita 1983, 475) the quietist elements of the Cheng-Zhu School’s interpretations, his attempts toformulate a philosophical solution to the problems posed, and on to practical solu­tions: a search for the proper practice of virtue. His radical views of the Analects and its ethical universality can be seen as no less important than his status as a towns­man of the City of Kyoto and his philosophical work of establishing ancient mean­ing within the genre of philosophical lexicography can be seen as no less importantthan his textual objections to overreaching interpretational and commentarial work.But his final goal is clearly not simply contemplative, it is also decidedly practical. Still, even though the philosophical work of Jinsai might perhaps be seen as nei­ther the starting point, nor the actual goal, it can also be said to be the central ac­tivity that holds his project together. In this sense, philosophy to Jinsai might be seen as the means to an end, but that is also very much in line with the Confucian tradition. As John Allen Tucker has pointed out, Jinsai can certainly be regarded as one of the early-modern Tokugawa philosophers, and his work on Confucian ethics can be seen as important to that project. As his work had thus been shown to represent a specific mix of methods and influences, his own project can be con­sidered as multi-faceted but also as philosophically relevant. Sources and literature Hu, Xiangnong. 2021. “The Relativity of Ren (Humaneness)”. Asian Studies 9 (1), 181–201. Huang, Chun-chieh. 2008. “Ito Jinsai on Confucius’ Analects: A Type of Confu­cian Hermeneutics in East Asia.” In Confucian Ethics in Retrospect and Pros­pect, edited by Shen Qingsong, and Shun Kwong-loi, 247–76. Washington:The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Ishida, Ichiro .... . 1960. Ito¯ Jinsai .... . Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan. Ito, Jinsai .... . 1717. Kogaku sensei bunshu...... (Collected Writ­ings of the Teachers of Ancient Learning). https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/ pid/2540226. –––. 1926. “Rongo kogi .... (Ancient Meaning of Confucius’ Analects).” InNihon meika shisho chushaku zenshu........ (Complete Collected Com­mentaries on the Four Books by Renowned Japanese Scholars), edited by Seki Geiichiro.... .Toyo tosho kankokai. https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/970536. –––. 1971. “Gomo jigi .... (Meanings of Terms in the Analects and the Mencius).” In “Ito Jinsai, Ito¯ To¯gai” Nihon shiso¯ taikei 33.....•........... 33 (“Ito¯ Jinsai, Ito¯ To¯gai” The System of Japanese Thought, vol. 33), edited by Yoshikawa Kojiro, and Shimizu Shigeru .....•... . Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. –––. 2017. Do¯jimon... (Children’s Questions). Edited by Shimizu Shigeru ... . Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. Jorgensen, John. 2018. “The Radiant Mind: Zhu Xi and the Chan Doctrine of Tathagatagarbha.” In The Buddhist Roots of Zhu Xi’s Philosophical Thought, edit­ed by John Makeham, 36–121. New York: Oxford University Press. Koyasu, Nobukuni .... . 2015. Jinsaigaku kougi..... (Lectures on the Jinsai School). Tokyo: Perikansha. –––. 2017. Jinsai Rongo kogi (jo¯): “Rongo kogi” gendaigoyaku to hyo¯shaku......(.)............. (Jinsai’s Ancient Meaning ofthe Analects, vol. 1: Translation into Contemporary Language with Annotations). Tokyo: Perikansha. –––. 2018. Jinsai Rongo kogi (ge): “Rongo kogi” gendaigoyaku to hyo¯shaku......(.)............. (Jinsai’s Ancient Meaning ofthe Analects, vol. 2: Translation into Contemporary Language with Annotations). Tokyo: Perikansha. Lunyu.. (The Analects). Chinese Text Project. http://ctext.org/analects. Maruyama, Masao. 1974. Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan. Translated by Mikiso Hane. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. Mengzi.. (The Mencius). Chinese Text Project. https://ctext.org/mengzi. Paramore, Kiri. 2016. Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Seki, Geiichiro .... , ed. 1926. Nihon meika shisho chushaku zenshu........ (Complete Collected Commentaries on the Four Books by Renowned Japanese Scholars). Toyo tosho kankokai. https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/ pid/970536. Shimizu, Shigeru ... , ed. 2017. Do¯jimon... (Children’s Questions). To­kyo: Iwanami shoten. Tucker, John Allen. 1993. “Chen Beixi, Lu Xiangshan, and Early Tokugawa (1600–1867) Philosophical Lexicography.” Philosophy East and West 43 4: 683–713. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1399209. –––. 1994. “Beixi’s ‘Ziyi’ and Ancient Learning Philosophical Lexicography.”Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Third Series 4 (1): 67–82. https://www. jstor.org/stable/25182830. –––. 1997a. “A Response to Sam Yamashita’s ‘Reading the New Tokugawa Intel­lectual Histories’.” The Journal of Japanese Studies 23 (2): 525–36. –––. 1997b. “Two Mencian Political Notions in Tokugawa Japan.” Philosophy East and West 47 (2): 233–53. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1399876. –––. 1998. Ito¯ Jinsai’s Gomo¯ Jigi and the Philosophical Definition of Early Modern Ja­pan. Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill (Brill’s Japanese Studies Library). Yamashita, Samuel Hideo. 1983. “The Early Life and Thought of Ito Jinsai.”Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 43 (2): 453–80. https://www.jstor.org/ stable/2719107. Yoshikawa, Kojiro ..... , and Shimizu Shigeru ... , eds. 1971. “Ito¯ Jin­sai, Ito¯ To¯gai” Nihon shiso¯ taikei 33.....•........... 33 (“Ito¯ Jinsai, Ito¯ To¯gai” The System of Japanese Thought, vol. 33). Tokyo: Iwa­nami shoten. DISCUSSIONS DOI: 10.4312/as.2021.9.2.211-221 Towards Post-Comparative Philosophy Interview with Ralph WEBER* by Nevad KAHTERAN** Ralph Weber was born to Swiss parents in 1974 in Johannesburg, South Africa.He studied Staatswissenschaften (politics, economics and law) at the University of St. Gallen and at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. He then went on to study at the University of Hawai’i in Manoa and the University of Peking. He obtained his PhD in 2007 at the Univer­sity of St. Gallen, and for a decade taught the history of political ideas and polit­ical theory there. Between 2008 and 2014, Weber was employed as post-doctoral researcher and senior researcher and lecturer at the University Research Priority Program “Asia and Europe” at the University of Zurich. In December 2014, We­ber began his work as an Assistant Professor at the Institute for European Global Studies of the University of Basel. In 2016, he successfully completed his habil­itation in Philosophy (venia legendi: comparative philosophy) at the University of Zurich. At the University of Basel, he holds full examination and promotion rights in Political Science, Philosophy, and European Global Studies, and in 2020 was promoted to Associate Professor. He has been the book review editor (Eu­rope) for Philosophy East and West and since 2017 the President of the European Association for Chinese Philosophy (EACP). Dear Ralph, according to your CV, your interests can be summarized in these three fields: Comparative philosophy and questions concerning philosophy of comparison, as well as programmatic suggestions of a post-comparative philosophy; Chinese philosophy, i.e. classic and modern Confucianism, particularly the sociolog­ical and political aspects, current political philosophy of the People’s Republic of Chi­na and contemporary Chinese politics; and * Ralph WEBER, Professor for European Global Studies / Director of the MA and PhD Programs in European Global Studies, Institute for European Global Studies, University of Basel. Email address: ralph.weber@unibas.ch ** Nevad KAHTERAN, Professor of Eastern and Comparative Philosophy at the University of Sarajevo. Email address: nevad.kahteran@ff.unsa.ba Global political theory and the history of ideas, theoretical and practical questions of text interpretation as well as conceptual and methodological aspects of cross-lin­guistic and cross-cultural research, including discussions around Eurocentrism, area studies, and European global studies. Let us start our conversation with the name for your research area, “Politics and Philosophy in European Global Knowledge Production”, which focuses on Europe and its role in global knowledge production, straddling across the disciplines of Phi­losophy, Political Science and European Global Studies with its five research topics.Can you tell us a bit more about this, and what holds it together as a research focus? Ralph Weber: Sure. Knowledge production is a key factor in our contemporaryworld. Its workings, promises and problems are intimately related to the pertainingsocial, economic and political conditions. The tension between philosophy, whichfashions itself as being exclusively about knowledge, and politics, which understandsknowledge at best as one goal among many and at worst consciously instrumental-izes it, is age-old.Today, in a time when historical legacies meet new global realities,the conditions and possibilities for knowledge production have become increasinglycomplex and entangled.The five research topics that I currently pursue are 1.Com­parison and Comparative Philosophy; 2. European Studies from a Global Perspec­tive; 3. European Global Studies: Concepts, Methods, and Aims; 4. Global His­tory of Political Thought; and 5. Chinese Politics (BRI, China’s Sharp Power andinfluence operations, Swiss-Chinese Relations). At first glance, these might looklike quite disparate topics, but in my mind they add up quite consistently and buildaround the key idea of European Global Studies. This is of course not about mak­ing the global an extension of the European. It advocates a relational approach toEurope, which is a concept so elusive and contingent that it escapes in my view anyattempt to fix it in a philosophical idea, as some previous philosophers have triedto fixate it. This relationality also explains why someone like me, who has researchinterests in “Africa” and “Asia”, particularly “China”, feels completely at home at aninstitute that has “Europe” in its name.The point is more about understanding howdifferent actors and institutions make conceptual use of “European”/“non-Europe­an” and similar concepts, and how these politics inform our own knowledge claimswhen we, for instance, engage in philosophical argument or define disciplines inacademia. One underlying problematic of all this is the problem of Eurocentrism,which is a topic that I’ve been teaching for several years and which continues to behigh on my research agenda.Together with colleagues from Zurich, Edinburgh andBasel, we just launched a four-year research project, funded by the Swiss NationalScience Foundation, on the topic of “Reversing the Gaze: Towards Post-Compara­tive Area Studies”, which has quite a few interlinkages with my work in comparativephilosophy, but is bringing together a variety of disciplines. Comparative Philosophy without Borders (written together with Arindam Chakrabarti, currently at Stony Brook University in New York) speaks about four phases of Comparative Philosophy in a Pluralistic World. According to your best in­sights and knowledge, in which phase are we right now? Ralph Weber: We divide the history of comparative philosophy into roughly three phases and advocate that we are indeed at the beginning of a new, a fourth phase, or at least that this is where we should be. We talk of stages rather than phases, since one phase has not simply replaced an earlier one such as in a pal­impsest, but instead like stages building on each other they continue to co-exist in parallel and crisscrossing fashion. Let me just recall the three stages first, as we lay them out in the book. These are really just more caricatures than solid historical accounts, but they are supposed to bring out a contrast of basic ideas in terms of universalism, localism, and their critical conjuncture. The imperative at the first stage amounted to something like modern Western philosophy has sophisticated debates about, say, freedom of the will, so let’s find something similar in Indian or African philosophy.This exercise resulted in state­ments such as “we/they had something similar (but something which had to be looked for, retrieved).” Similar to the idea of strategic essentialism, some might have pursued a more strategic motivation in finding various resemblances, over­laps, and anticipations, namely to draw attention to non-Western traditions in the first place. It was thus happily and often apologetically claimed that Chinese thinkers also had philosophy and ethics in the Greek sense, that there was also logic and phenomenology in India! More boldly (with the arrogance of cultural insecurity), some asserted that “we said all of that long ago”, and “we said it much better long before you”. The basic idea at this stage is universalism. At the second stage of comparative philosophy, the impetus was more to find contrasts and context-dependent culture-immanent peculiarities in non-Western philosophies, and to detect specific lacks compared to the Western tradition. The resulting lack-discourse ran a gamut of asserting that there was no possibility, no propositions, no deductive validity, no free will or a priori in Indian philosophy,no ontology, no logic and no truth claims in Chinese philosophy, no formal log­ic in African philosophy, and so on and so forth, or simply no philosophy at all.The moderate version drew the conclusion that these missing elements had to be introduced and adapted into Indian, Chinese or African philosophy. A more strident version of the second stage had it that these philosophies, if they were to retain their unique character, are better off without this Western theoretical stuff. Indian philosophy can easily do without the idea of “possible worlds”, which shows that it is far from being a necessary or compelling topic to discuss. It thus became an intellectual option to assert with confidence the lack of this or that,that there was no notion of correspondence truth or a creator God transcending the empirical world in Chinese philosophy, and no subject-object dichotomy in Latin American philosophy. That was in fact thus not even a lack, but a major strength.The implication was that Western philosophy should question these no­tions because there could be such rich traditions eschewing them altogether. The basic idea here is localism. The third stage comprises some of the best comparative philosophy written today,that is, at the critical conjuncture between universalism and localism. The imper­ative is to re-interpret Indian, Chinese, or Japanese philosophy in terms of West­ern philosophical ideas as much as contributing to English-language philosophy by bringing in elements of Asian or African or Hawaiian philosophy. Such criss­crossing comparative philosophy harks back to the regional or intra-traditional philosophical traditions, the Western analytic, the Continental phenomenologi­cal, the Indian analytic, the Indian sociocultural, the Asian literary, the Feminist European, the historical-political, the literary aesthetic, and enriches them with the lessons of comparison. In this sense, we are approaching a more level and global epistemic playing field, and I would understand much of this in the context of the postcolonial and decolonial critiques of Eurocentrism at the intellectual level, as well as the increased connectivity at the practical level, including the new digital and technological possibilities that have changed our ways of communica­tion and invalidated previous excuses for non-communication. Against this back­ground, there is an immense space to be filled with studies and research deploying a more global vocabulary and trying the cross-cultural enterprise the other way.Importantly, however, many such attempts directly or indirectly remain tied to a comparative setting that operates with notions such as “Chinese”, “European”,“Japanese”, “Islamic” philosophy, and so on. This is where we stand today. Now, in our book, Comparative Philosophy with­out Borders, Arindam Chakrabarti and I wanted to put a spin on the practice ofcomparative philosophy at the third, current stage, which eventually might leadus to a fourth stage. The spin would take us beyond comparative philosophy towhat I prefer to call “post-comparative” philosophy, but others, who work to­wards similar ends like, for example, Jonardon Ganeri, call by various differentnames. It would amount to just doing philosophy as one thinks fit for gettingto the truth about an issue or set of issues, by appropriating elements from allphilosophical views and traditions one knows of but making no claim of “correctexposition”, and instead just addressing hitherto unsolved problems and possi­bly raising issues that have never been considered before, anywhere. The crucialpoint is one about epistemic authority. An argument is not persuasive because it is one made, say, from within Indian philosophy, but it is persuasive becauseit is a good argument. In this fourth stage, comparative philosophy can become truly borderless and eventually drop its epithet “comparative”, although one should anticipate strong resistance against this last phase of dropping the qualifier. Good creative philoso­phy in a globalized world should spontaneously straddle geographical areas, lan­guages and cultures, temperaments and time-periods (mixing classical, medieval,modern, and postmodern), styles and subdisciplines of philosophy, as well as mix methods, sprinkling phenomenology, and political economic analysis into analytic logicolinguistic or hermeneutic, or culture studies or literary or narrative meth-ods—whatever comes handy. The result would be either very flaky mishmash or first-rate original work. Philosophers, especially those who strive for clarity and truth, have to live with more confusion than clear and distinct ideas, when they welcome fusion philosophy as their preferred genre. There is a double movement required for a global post-comparative philosophy along these lines. On the one hand, comparative philosophy should simply be philosophy or, as we say in our book, “just philosophy”, in both senses of the term “just”, but with the distinguishing characteristic of being informed by a more global outlook, of which a variety of styles and conceptualizations is and probably should be advocated. This should not imply, in my view, the more radical stance that all philosophy must be such and only such philosophy. I still find it perfect­ly legitimate for a philosopher to study with, against and beyond Wittgenstein for all his or her professional career, or to work at the exciting space opened up between analytic philosophy and cognitive science, etc. What it implies is a nor­malization, say, to start an essay on Wittgenstein not with a contrasting reference to Plato, but to Al-Farabi, Dharmakirti or Gloria Anzaldúa, that is, approach­ing Wittgenstein from a different positionality, or to work on the space between analytic philosophy and cognitive science by including arguments derived from Tibetan Buddhism. On the other hand, philosophy—regardless of whether com­parative, post-comparative or decidedly not either—must find ways to connect to other disciplines in productive ways. Just as such connections exist with cognitive science or linguistics, it is imperative for philosophy, say, to introduce more up-to-date historiographical approaches when writing the history of philosophy, or to study how the meso-level of philosophical institutions interrelates with phil­osophical debates, thus establishing a sociology of philosophy within philosophy departments. Added to this is the question of interdisciplinarity, transdisciplinar­ity, or, as my colleague in Basel, the global historian Madeleine Herren-Oesch,among others, proposes, post-interdisciplinarity, which I understand as an at­tempt to move beyond the often fruitless and poorly informed controversies of disciplinarity versus interdisciplinarity. In other words, philosophy understood as a distinct but global discipline and a self-critical enterprise, that is aware of its own contingencies, the power-knowledge nexus, and new global realities, should not only be progressive by finding common ground with cognitive science and some select natural sciences, but also by redefining its relationship to disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences and epistemic formations beyond disciplinarity,and by updating its own ways of how to do philosophy in line with new digital and technological possibilities.This is really a point about diversifying philosophy,including current comparative philosophy, precisely in order to ensure its own at­tractive and distinct identity. The need for a philosophy of comparison suggested in your opus poses a series of in­triguing and intricate questions, comparing what with what, and in what respect? What “philosophy” is comparative philosophy comparing? And especially “how to compare?”, or rather can you say a little more on the question of the methodological state of Comparative Philosophy? Ralph Weber: Comparison is still a puzzle to me in many ways. I began with a static and I would think quite consensual view of comparison, which analytical­ly distinguishes four aspects of comparison: 1) A comparison is always made by someone; 2) At least two relata (comparata) are compared; 3) The comparata are compared in some respect (tertium comparationis); and 4) The result of a compar­ison is a relation between the comparata in view of the respect chosen. Obvious­ly, much hinges on the comparer, who for some reason or another has come to believe that, although everything is somehow comparable with everything else,the chosen comparata are particularly worthy of “being thrown together side by side” (pa.aß...e..), i.e. that they ought to be compared. I have claimed that it is useful to distinguish a fifth aspect that needs to be located in the above, roughlychronological characterisation of comparison between the first and second aspects: 5.The two (or more) comparata share a pre-comparative tertium, constituted by at leastone commonality (i.e. being chosen for comparison by the comparer) and usually bymany more commonalities (tertia). Crucially, most of these commonalities are alreadywell established (even if only vaguely, implicitly known to the comparer, who is per­haps also unaware of them) before the comparer sets out to compare them. Thesecommonalities inform the decision to compare and have a huge, but little-understoodimpact on the concrete respects for which one then sets out to compare whatever onecompares. Of course, this touches on a whole lot of hermeneutical issues. In light of this insight, I have then shifted my attention toward a more dynam­ic view of comparison, trying to understand what happens when we compare in terms of the objects of comparison. At this juncture, I introduced another dis­tinction. Before, I indiscriminately referred to comparata, but a finer distinction has comparanda on the one side (that which the comparer sets out to compare),and refers to that which is and comes to have been compared in the course of the comparison as comparata instead. In light of this distinction, the pre-comparative tertium emerges as a privileged vantage point from which to carry out analyses of comparisons.This gives us an opportunity with regard to the comparer (inasmuch as there is any such opportunity) to uncover the reasons and purposes attached to the comparison and to reconstruct some of the presuppositions that guided the comparer’s understanding of the comparanda merely based on the given text that contains the comparison. That a comparer has compared two (or more) comparatawithout having any presupposition whatsoever that has led them to choose these comparanda, and not others, is a rare case, if it is possible at all. In academic com­parison, where the universe of cases is always in one or another way predefined,we can safely rule out the existence of such a case. This means to the extent that the choice of comparanda is not random and motivated by asserted commonalities (beyond the one commonality of each being a comparandum), knowledge of these commonalities is in itself the result of prior comparison. For how else can you come to hold that two objects (or events, or anything else) share a commonality,if you have not put them next to one another and compared them with the aim of discovering a relation of commonality between them? From a broader perspective, the pre-comparative tertia of a given comparison are often drawn from earlier comparisons (they are in this sense post-comparative),while the given comparison will necessarily produce new post-comparative tertia (perhaps in turn used in later comparisons as pre-comparative tertia). Thus emerg­es a dynamic network of a great chain of comparisons. As important as it is to understand this inevitable broader context in a given case of comparison, it is also pertinent to understand the exact workings of the case at hand as much as possi­ble. The distinctions between comparanda and comparata as well as the pre-com­parative tertium, the tertium comparationis and the post-comparative tertium offer an analytically refined take on an artificially isolated given case of a single com­parison. However, examined more closely, it is found to contain just another chain and complex structure of comparisons which informs the resulting relation of the overall comparison.The proposed vocabulary helps highlight (and analyse) the in­ner dynamic of a given case of comparison, as advanced in the many scholarly ar­ticles or research projects announcing a comparative study in their titles, but also in more hidden comparative settings. The inner dynamic in a chosen case of comparison marks an important gap that any comparative inquiry is bound to produce. When choosing to compare two comparanda, the comparer has some presupposition or presumed knowledge of what the comparanda are. When then comparing them in each other’s light, the comparer inevitably through this very effort acquires new knowledge about the comparanda, i.e. knowledge that he or she could not possibly have possessed before the comparison. This is the gap between what the comparanda and the compara­ta are in the understanding or knowledge of the comparer. Still, distinguishing between comparanda and comparata should not mislead us into thinking that the two are clearly distinct. In the process of comparison, comparanda are being trans­formed into comparata. The two terms demarcate an analytic distinction for two different stages in that transformation. But obviously, and without going into the intricate metaphysical problems of the nature of change, alteration, and transfor­mation, the claim must be that the resulting comparata are still in an important way the same as the initial comparanda. In one sense, but not in another, for they are the same and they are different. If they were not the same in any sense, merely different, then the comparison would not have been what it was supposed (and perhaps announced) to be about. Were they the same and no different, then no inquiry and no comparison would have taken place. Against this static and dynamic understanding of comparison, I have then delved into some specific questions, like the role of generalization, vagueness, the rela­tion between comparison and analogy, the presumed problem of one-sidedness (which is not simply hermeneutical pre-judgement), the standard but in my view confused expression of comparison being about “similarities and differences”, etc.All of this I found very rewarding, but, if anything, it increased my sense of puz­zlement. One aspect that I was becoming very interested in concerns the fourth aspect in the static conception of comparison, namely the result of a comparison,which is conventionally understood as “a relation” between the comparanda “in view of the respect chosen”. Actually, reading this carefully would bring one al­ready to the conclusion that the result of a comparison is a relational relation, one in terms of the two comparanda and another one in terms of the respect in which the comparison has been done. I linked this to a closer examination of the tertium comparationis (the respect) aslocated on a ladder of abstraction (an idea that I later learned Giovanni Sartorihad worked on long ago in comparative politics), with maximal particularity atthe one end and maximal abstraction at the other end. The level of abstraction chosen directly determines whether something in the end comes to be viewed asa commonality or a difference. This insight was a revelation for me. It helped mebetter understand what happens in academic group discussions, how disagree­ment more often than not is about the appropriate level of abstraction (special­ists for obvious reasons tend to resist abstraction, while comparatists depend on it), and how the perceived danger of one-sided comparison to some extent relieson a mistaken view of comparison, confusing singularity with particularity. Be­ing as clear and precise as possible about the chosen level of abstraction for one’s tertium comparationis is absolutely crucial for informed comparative discussions.Without it, what is claimed as a difference literally could also be a commonality.It is this sort of issue that has led me to believe that we really still do not quiteknow what we do when we compare things. Discussions across disciplines andcomparative approaches (including law, theology or religious studies) are real­ly important (political science, for instance, is great on selection bias, theologyin turn on incomparability) and I am glad that Mark van Hoecke and MauriceAdams are editing a soon to be published volume (with Edward Elgar) exactlyin this spirit. Obviously, Comparative Philosophy has had its problems for decades and it has to be replaced with a more suitable approach, and I can agree with some of our mu­tual colleagues like Jana Rošker that the notion (and the methods) of comparative philosophy are outdated in the present forms. I have on my mind her new book that has been accepted for publication at Bloomsbury next year: Interpreting Chinese Philosophy: A New Methodology. Which one will be more convenient for you:Comparative or Post-Comparative, Cross-Tradition engagement in philosophy,Cross-Cultural Philosophy, Fusion Philosophy having on my mind Robert E. Al­linson’s contributing article (“The Myth of Comparative Philosophy or the Com­parative Philosophy Malgré Lui”) to Bo Mou’s edited volume Two Roads to Wis-dom?—Chinese and Analytic Philosophical Tradition (Open Court, 2001), as well as your own work that you co-edited with Arindam Chakrabarti, Compara­tive Philosophy without Borders (Bloomsbury Academic, 2015)? Ralph Weber: Of course, I have some personal preferences for my own approach,but I would not want everyone to accept and adopt it.That would not be helpful. I love seeing a kind of flourishing methodological pluralism, and I’m currently busy putting together an edited volume with Robert Smid and Steven Burik, featuring and discussing very different methodological approaches to comparative philoso­phy (forthcoming with Bloomsbury Academic). And I’d want to reserve the right for myself to use different approaches in different projects. Still, methodological pluralism might sometimes mean as little as that everyone does whatever they want, and method is then looked upon as of less importance. This is not my view.I think we need a healthy and vigorous discussion on method that necessarily and rightly remains inconclusive, and we also need more discussion on methodologi­cal pluralism at the meta-level. I have just finished a book manuscript with Martin Beckstein on this, regarding questions of interpretation in political theory (forth­coming with Routledge). Personally, I have taken great joy in reading early Enlightenment philosophers who tackled the question of how to reconcile dogmatism with scepticism some three hundred years ago. They opted for eclecticism. Their point was not to create a third position, but rather to adopt a philosophical attitude that allowed com­bining the virtues of these philosophical traditions. Meant to serve as a “perma­nent makeshift solution” (Schneiders), philosophical eclecticism can be character­ized as a meta-theoretical disposition vis-à-vis philosophical positions. Following scepticism, eclecticists stressed the importance of doubt. In contrast to Descartes,however, the dubitatio eclectic, as e.g. articulated by Christian Thomasius, aimed at questioning prejudices selectively and successively, rather than systematically—and remained committed to the quest for truth. Eclecticism involves a self-critical disposition. It manifests itself in a commitment to fallibilism, which Thomasius expressed as sticking to his eclectically derived truths only “until somebody else disabuses myself from misconception.” Final­ly, the critical/self-critical selection of elements from philosophical positions is guided by the libertas philosophandi. In other words, the eclecticist’s work does not limit itself to a thoughtless combination of other people’s thoughts, but takes the liberty to balance, interpret and appropriate them for the purpose of original philosophical construction. The eclectic conciliatio is not a harmonizing operation that marginalizes difference. On the contrary, mediation requires recognition of distinctness. To eclecticism, I would add pragmatism. The work of early Enlightenment eclec­ticists included proto-pragmatist ideas. They were perceptive of the need to adapt ideas to the changing circumstances. Thomasius even likened truth to the useful,and the useful in turn to that which promotes welfare. Yet American pragmatism,as especially associated with the work of William James, more consequently en­courages us to grasp theories or approaches as tools to make conscious, selective use of for our specific research projects. American pragmatism thus productively adds to philosophical eclecticism. And it is well-suited for a conceptual marriage because, like philosophical eclecticism, it is a meta-theoretical posture rather than a substantial standpoint, because it cultivates a like-minded distance to both dog­matism and scepticism and is equally committed to fallibilism ( John Dewey).The Italian philosopher Giovanni Papini has given us the metaphor that most aptly captures the kind of methodological pluralism that a pragmatist eclecticism would advocate. As quoted by William James: (Pragmatism) lies in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it. In one you may find a man writing an atheistic volume; in the next someone on his knees praying for faith and strength; in a third a chemist investigating a body’s properties. In a fourth a system of idealistic metaphysics is being excogitated; in a fifth the impossibility of metaphysics is being shown. But they all own the corridor, and all must pass through it if they want a practicable way of getting into or out of their respective rooms. This is how I would like to see practitioners of (post-)comparative philosophy pursue their projects in different rooms, but come together in the corridor where philosophy would also meet politics, economy, and so much more—a meeting that those philosophers would have to endure and successfully pass before they could claim more social relevancy beyond their own discipline. BOOK REVIEW DOI: 10.4312/as.2021.9.2.225-231 Marie GIBERT-FLUTRE, and Heide IMAI, eds. Asian Alleyways: An Urban Vernacular in Times ofGlobalization Reviewed by Daniel BULTMANN* (2020. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 228 pages.ISBN-13: 978-9463729604ISBN-10: 9463729607.) Alleyways in Asian metropoles can be spaces of refuge, vibrant communities, col­lective memory, mosaic-like identity formation, through traffic and shortcuts, and dense, conflict-laden interactions between the established residents and newcom-ers.They can be spaces of transit, territories of daily life, or both.They can be com­modities for gentrification, with fading traditions and architectures, or pathways for reconciling development with community support.They can be marginal plac­es with marginalized people or famous parts of a city, attracting tourists and the affluent. They can be traditional neighbourhoods in decline or sites of constant transformation and top-down or bottom-up reinvention. The only characteristics that seem to unite them—and hence all the case studies in this edited volume— are their narrowness and unclear positions, as many of these often less-known ar­eas have unclear ownership and do not even appear on official maps. The volume edited by Marie Gibert-Flutre and Heide Imai approaches the ever-changing,multi-faceted Asian alleyways as spaces of everyday practice through dense de­scriptions of the quotidian and interviews with urban planners, businesspeople,and the residents of these “liminal places” ( Jones 2007), thus bringing to light these often neglected—in real life as well as in academia—in-between spaces. The volume presents a fascinating kaleidoscope of rich ethnographic detailgathered from metropoles across Asia, such as Ho Chi Minh City, Beijing, To­kyo, Seoul, Bangkok, Shanghai, Taipei, and Hong Kong. It furthers discussionson how spaces create collectives, how collectives create space, and how socialchange, local politics, and recent modes of globalization impact lived realitiesin Asian cities. The volume also shows how private life, public life, and the * Daniel BULTMANN, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany.Email address: daniel.bultmann@hu-berlin.de conflicts within and between them are negotiated in these dense spaces, as wellas how alleyways not only create identities but also put these identities underduress. These insightful, multi-faceted descriptions do not only pertain to therealm of academia. Many contributors are additionally concerned with the con­sequences of and their own policy recommendations for urban planning, andwith bottom-up neighbourhood initiatives or projects emanating from researchthat tests different spatial arrangements and interventions with the aim of im­pacting social behaviour. Gibert-Flutre opens the volume with a chapter that characterizes Ho Chi Minh City’s alleyways as liminal spaces “between ‘network’ and ‘territory’” (p. 33). Since alleyways are related to a “network”, they serve as connectors within the city. An increasing density of motorized circulation turns alleyways into crowded passages for city traffic. However, alleyways are also places of “territory”, meaning spaces in which various facets of social life take place. Gibert-Flutre stresses that when al­leyways are viewed as liminal interfaces, they (unsurprisingly) serve the dual func­tions of “territory” and “network” simultaneously. Using a wide range of data and established methods, such as urban morphology analysis, participative observa­tion, and qualitative interviews within two alleyway neighbourhoods, Gibert-Fl­utre also shows how Ho Chi Minh City’s alleyways result from both planned and spontaneous development, how they are transformed through governmental at­tempts to “civilize” and “modernize” them alongside their residents, how they are commodified as “cultural neighbourhoods”, how their residents challenge trans­formations that occur through urban planning, and how population growth and traffic increasingly threaten their territorial function. In her chapter on post-Olympic Beijing, Judith Audin offers a particularly vi­brant, insightful ethnographic description of hutong society and the micro-poli­tics of control, identity formation, and subalternity in a marginalized, dense space where residents constantly negotiate social and spatial distance. Audin focuses on the microlevel power networks coalescing around the territorial identities of the rich, poor, “established”, and “outsiders”, including “newcomers” (Elias and Scot-son 1965), as well as the processes of distinction among residents who own dif­ferent types of housing. She demonstrates how conflicts over the demarcation of private and public life characterize daily life and must be negotiated among vari­ous resident groups. The chapter also describes how authenticity is commodified as a brand, and thus can be leveraged to restructure the lanes with ventures such as guesthouses, coffee shops, and souvenir shops. During the commodification of the lanes, a strong division develops among residents, business owners, and out­side visitors, which is accompanied by the micropolitics of grassroots party or­ganizations seeking to mediate conflicts, organize community and sociocultural events, and set up local patrols of volunteers to maintain “order”. Like the opening chapter by Gilbert-Flutre, this one describes the attempts of the government to “sanitize”, “reshape”, and “civilize” the alleys along with the marginalized sections of their populations. The chapter analyses the formation of social stratification within a “street corner society” (Whyte 1943), how local identities are constructed distinctly from those of other social groups within a tightly-knit neighbourhood,and how resistance develops against governmental control. Turning to the cases of Tsukuda and Tsukishima in Tokyo and Insadong and Ik­seondong in Seoul, Heide Imai presents everyday narratives in which places serve as common territories for socially fragmented cities where “multiple and hybrid identities coexist” (p. 108). Unsurprisingly, she emphasizes that “it depends on the perspective of the individual as to how an everyday place like the alleyway is per­ceived and valued” (ibid.). Overall, the volume collects a wide range of interesting ethnographic materials that often provide valuable insights into urban placemak­ing. Yet some conclusions remain analytically vague or even commonplace, such as that old structures vanish, that spaces are marked by memories in which the past and present intersect, that spaces are associated with different individual mean­ings, and that different social groups make different use of places. Adding fruitful tension to this volume, some authors take a surprisingly positivestance on gentrification and change. Wimonrart Issarathumnoon, for instance, dis­cusses preservation efforts in the Phra Athit-Phra Sumen area of Bangkok that in­tend to promote cultural and creative sites. The author emphasizes that this area—now filled with coffee shops, restaurants, bookshops, art galleries, and the like—wastransformed from “‘urban ordinaries’ into creative places” (p. 115), mainly due tostate-led preservation efforts and bottom-up grassroot initiatives. While the areaattracted many new residents and visitors, some older residents managed to upscaletheir smaller shops and cafés into larger businesses. The relatively original position-ality of the author is interesting. For her, gentrification is revitalization, a means toharmonize the old with new, while only “some government policies aimed at pro­moting mass tourism and massive urban facilities have demoted charming localsites into characterless, formal, and unnecessarily monumental projects” (p. 134).She views commodification pragmatically and only criticizes state-led interventionsif they create lifeless, meaningless monuments. While she clearly does not reflectupon this, her relatively unique position highlights the lack of consideration forpositionalities in papers that decry the loss of tradition and, coming from differentangles, may romanticize the past. Stronger reflection on positionalities in the field(Berger 2015)—for instance, how locals perceive the researcher and how he or sheperceives the locality—would have deepened the analysis of the chapter’s dense, sometimes overly descriptive ethnographic material. Shanghai lilong residences are the focus of the chapter by Jiayu Ding and Xiaohua Zhong. Building on Henri Lefebvre (1991), they maintain that the lilong have changed from spaces of everyday life into conceived spaces that are gentrified and “dominated by political power and professional elites like scientists, urbanists,and architects” (p. 140). The most interesting aspect of the analysed transforma­tion is how Ding and Zhong emphasize the specific intersection of capitalist in­terests and the legitimacy of central planning in Shanghai. While gentrification in Shanghai may have a similar pattern to that of European or North American cities (e.g., the lived spaces of marginalized populations are turned into art cen­tres and eventually become capital-accumulating tourist attractions), “the mech­anisms are totally different. Besides the state-driven or market-driven mode, the story of Shanghai shows greater eagerness for informal revenue from the bottom and regularization from the top” (p. 154). The result is a similarly conceived and commodified space, yet state intervention and the drivers of transformation with­in the informal revenue market both hold greater legitimacy among the populace. Jeffrey Hou explicitly connects his analysis with his childhood memories of life in a semi-private, semi-public alleyway in Taipei, where the exteriors that multi­ple street vendors frequent also serve as the extensions of cramped homes. Hou views alleyways as potential sites for “commoning”, where residents with various social backgrounds interact and resolve conflicts. As an example, he presents a conflict that occurred in the Shida Night Market, one of Taipei’s most famous market areas. A group of “community workers” ameliorated tensions by staging several spatial and social interventions.They established community hubs,such as the White Hub, an active makerspace resulting from an event involving the col­lection of tools scattered on the streets. Consequently, residents with otherwise socially distant backgrounds began to interact within a non-profit realm in which neighbours with technical skills taught visitors how to repair their household items. Community gardens, storage spaces, and knitting and weaving workshops also fostered community understanding, cohesion, and cooperation. The density of the interactions between different social groups, types of residents, small- and large-scale businesses, private households, and political layers may lead to conflict.However, rephrasing Hou through the words of Emile Durkheim (2013 [1893]),neighbourhood conflicts can be turned into lived “mechanic solidarities” through community interventions. Hou’s chapter, which exemplifies how bottom-up social-engineering solidarity initiatives can ameliorate conflicts, is complemented by Melissa Cate Christ and Hendrik Thieben’s report on social and spatial experiments in laneway spaces in Hong Kong.The chapter is the result of a study on the behavioural effects of social and spatial arrangements. Its aim was to gather data for a case study and apply it in a still-ongoing project entitled “Magic Lanes”, which is taking place in one of the oldest districts, Sai Ying Pun. In essence, the authors sought to “provide more inclusive public open spaces through placemaking and community co-creation” (p.182). The construction of a railway line and governmental revitalization projects negatively impacted the area, resulting in sky-rocketing rents far exceeding the average household incomes of long-time residents. In view of the developments in that area, the authors’ project aimed to democratize placemaking, create more open and inclusive public realms, and empower citizens in the process. The stud­ied lanes within the locality have a unique morphology: they consist of different kinds of stairs. Largely due to these “street stairs” that cover the width of a street,these lanes are not used by traffic.This lack of traffic offers special restrictions and suggests potential usages.The study team began with qualitative research on com­munity engagement, turned their results into a set of community events, and then made changes to the spatial arrangements of the lanes and their wide steps. By using social engineering techniques supported by scientific evidence from previous data collection, the researchers encouraged the residents to socialize through placing furniture throughout the lane and holding a community festival,thereby establishing inter-group trust and fostering their collaborative capacities:“Through temporal interventions, the project team was able to test potential lay­outs for the lane and to document their impact on circulation patterns and so­cial behavior” (p. 201). This fascinating study and its set of interventions into the of spatiality community life reinforce how space interacts with group identities.Nevertheless, in that regard, it is also worth noting that the project in many re­spects falls under the category of a “conceived space”, as discussed in Ding and Zhong’s chapter.That is,it functions as a space that scientists and architects create to yield specific behavioural changes. While the researchers sought to empower the residents, they also used the space as a power technique. In light of the no­tions and critical perspectives on urban development in other papers in the vol­ume, a deeper reflection on that paradox would have enhanced the collection. The scientists and their project are part of a micropolitics of power in which certain interpretations of a “good” society—a sense of community, increased interaction in public realms, and certain varieties of stronger inclusion and cohesion—are “created.” Whether this project actually changes patterns and inequities in so­cial power is questionable. What it certainly does is cushion potential drivers of conflict within the structure. These “improvements” to community life may have unintended side effects that foster gentrification and marginalization for those af­fected by recent spikes in rent. Finally, the conclusion does not systematically compare the different localities,theoretical angles, and empirical approaches contained in the volume. Rather, it primarily meditates on the future of “integrated and diverse alleyways” (p. 211).The diversity of alleyways and their imaginations is at once an analytical and com­parative problem throughout the volume, and diversity is also its biggest strength.Without systematic reflection on positionality and the similarities and differences among cases, many promising perspectives are only expressed as silent conversa­tions among chapters. The concluding discussion by the editors clarifies that they are far more critical of the gentrification, marginalization, and commodification processes occurring within the studied localities than some of their contributors.A more systematic comparison of the chapters would have been a significant asset for the volume. As it stands, the chapters do not speak as much among each oth­er as they could have. While differing in many empirical and theoretical respects,they still communicate with each other. All contributions are, for instance, con­nected by the themes of gentrification and capitalist commodification, social en­gineering and community structures, imaginations of the past and present, sources of solidarity and conflict within the micropolitics of a place, social structures of various localities, state-led and bottom-up developments, and different position-alities and imaginations within the field. However, the one thread that ties all the chapters and recurring themes together and thus remains integral to the volume itself is the spatiality of power, domination, and resistance. Ultimately, each contribution delivers valuable descriptions of the everyday in dif­ferent localities and political contexts. Alleyways are often—but not always—in­visible or unmarked “liminal spaces” for marginalized and, as a consequence of urban development, threatened populations. In Marie Gibert-Flutre and Heide Imai’s volume such alleyways take centre stage in the research, and this is an im­portant achievement in itself. The volume also fosters interdisciplinary discussion on the relationship between constructed environments and human behaviours.The focus on everyday alleyway practices yields ethnographic materials that are so rich that the related systematic and deeper comparative discussions may appear lacking by comparison. Perhaps out of necessity, much of the inter-chapter dia­logue is left to the reader’s imagination. Nonetheless, the volume draws attention to alleyways, which were previously not described in such ethnographic detail,as social spaces affected by transformations within urban “territories of projects”(Goldblum 2015, 374). The volume is highly recommended for a wide range of students and special­ists across disciplines, particularly those in urban planning, architecture, sociolo­gy, anthropology, political sciences, and area studies. Due to its addressing social engineering, human–environmental interaction, solidarity, and conflict, it will be equally interesting to practitioners, members of civil society organizations, and planners from both the private and public sectors. References Berger, Roni. 2015. “Now I See It, Now I don’t: Researcher’s Position and Reflex­ivity in Qualitative Research.” Qualitative Research 15 (1): 219–34. Durkheim, Emile. (1983) 2013. The Division of Labour in Society. London: Pal-grave Macmillan. Elias, Norbert, and John L. Scotson. 1965. The Established and the Outsiders. Lon­don: Franck Cass and Co. Goldblum, Charles. 2015. “Territoires de projets: l’Asie orientale à l’épreuve d’un nouveau ‘régime de production urbaine’?” In Territoires de l’urbain en Asie. Une nouvelle modernité?, edited by Manuelle Franck, and Thierry Sanjuan, 373–96.Paris: CNRS Éditions. Jones, G. A. 2007. “Liminal Cities: Global Spaces, Everyday Lives.” In The Global Challenge and Marginalization, edited by Márcio Moraes Valença, E.L. Nel,and Walter Leimgruber, 209–25. New York: Nova Science. Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. The Production of Space. Malden: Blackwell. Whyte, William Foote. 1943. Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.