I
GENERAL ASPECTS
OF TRANSITION
2
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY PROJECT
Ivan Bernik
Abstract Sociology and social sciences in general failed to predict the imminent
collapse of the socialist regimes in Central Europe, but they nevertheless played an
important role in paving the way for these changes. This role cannot be ascribed to
all social sciences but primarily to a "civil society approach" in social sciences This
approach implied that the socialist societies were characterised by a zero-sum game
between the civil society and the authoritarian state ; the broader were the preroga-
tives of the state the more limited or even totally suppressed were the faculties of the
civil society. It provided a cognitiveframework in which the opponents of the regime
defined the motives and aims of their activities; they perceived themselves as advo-
cates of societal potentials in front of authoritarian state . This ideology which was
highly operative in the preparatory stage of democratisation, lost much of its influ-
ence in the period, lost much ofits influence in the period of the institutionalisation
ofdemocracy. Thefall ofcivil society project also signalled the decline of influence of
nonconformist intellectuals, the main proponents of the project . The democratisa-
tion which wasfostered by dissenting intellectuals, as developments in Slovenia show
paradigmatically, thus has not brought the most benefits to its most ardent support-
ers.
civil society, intellectuals, transition from socialism
There is a broad consensus among sociologists that sociology failed to notice and explain the
signs of the imminent collapse of European socialism . The failure has been so profound that,
according to some authors, not only the achievements of the "sociology of socialist societies", but
the achievements of the whole sociological enterprise should be critically examined (see Hol
lander, 1992). Though this profound "self-criticism" may bring certain benefits, it could also
unduly underplay the role of sociology in the process of radical transformation of former social-
ist societies . Instead of speaking of the complete failure of sociology it can be argued that its role
was contradictory; on the one hand it was characterised by the "lack of preparation for the recent
wave of mobilisation in Eastern Europe" (Tarrow, 1991 : 12), but on the other hand sociology
and social sciences in general contributed importantly to the upsurge of the wave of mobilisation
DRUŽBOSLOVNE RAZPRAVE, 1994, No.15-16
Ivan Bernik
which eroded away the socialist regimes . To put it differently, sociology influenced the course of
societal changes which it could not sufficiently explain, let alone predict . From this pojnt of view,
the role of sociology in "recent historical events" was contradictory because of a marked discrep-
ancy between its practical influence and its explanatory and predictive inabilities . In this perspec-
tive, the examination of this discrepancy seems much more productive than a general self-criti-
cism of sociology.
In this paper only one, rather marginal, aspect of this discrepancy will be dealt with . The paper
will focus on one of the ways in which sociology influenced the course of changes of socialist
societies. It will be argued that this role cannot be ascribed to sociology in general but primarily
to a "civil society approach", which in the eighties bacame undoubtedly one of the most prolific
approaches to the study of state socialism . Its importance was especially determined by the fact
that it was widely accepted by the social scientists in socialist societies (see Misztal, 1993 : 452 ;
Stammen, 1993 : 24-29) . After a brief outline of the main assumptions of this approach its prac-
tical influence will be examined . In this context, the agents of change who were constituted by the
civil society approach will also be identified . Most of the supporting evidence will be related to
the transformation of Slovenian society, but it will also be briefly shown that the Slovenian expe-
rience is in many respects comparable to the transformations of other Central European socie-
ties . In the concluding part of the paper the discrepancy between the practical efficiency and
analytical relevance of the civil society approach will be highlighted . It will be argued on the one
hand that its explanatory and predictive achievements fell short of its practical relevance and on
the other that this approach was much more productive in the initial stages of the great transfor-
mation than in the period of stabilisation of the new order.
1 . The Civil Society Approach as an ideology of Nonconformist Intellectuals
In the eightjes . most East European sociological analyses of socialist systems agreed . despite
differences between theoretical approaches and differences between socialist societies, at
least on one important point . The consensus related to the claim that the functioning of
socialist systems was primarily characterised by the domination of politics over other spheres
of society, especially the economy. This broad idea was elaborated in different theoretical
contexts . As already indicated, the most innovative and productive among them seemed to
be the approach according to which the growing tensions in socialist societies could be
explained by a contradictory relation between politics (i .e . the socialist party-state) and
civil society. The proponents of this idea argued that the nature of this contradiction started
to change significantly in the eighties : the once omnipotent socialist state was facing an
increasingly dynamic and powerful society. The most important indicator of society's in-
creasing dynamism was the growth of the "second society" (Hankiss, 1988) . This concept
refered to the emergence of those parts of society which were relatively independent of po-
litical control and were self-organised . It was stressed that the emergence of the -- second
society" was not limited to the economic sphere (the grey and black economy) but also
gradually emerged in the sphere of politics (in various forms of political dissent) and cul-
ture (as underground culture, samizdat, etc .). The emergence and growth of civil society
10
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CIVIL
SOCIETY PROJECT
was seen as a clear sign of the failure of the socialist state's attempts to organise the whole of
society as "a big office and a big factory" . On this basis the proponents of the civil society ap-
proach also predicted future developments - the state would, under the pressure of self-organ-
ised society, sooner or later retreat to its "natural borders" . This would enable all spheres of
society to reorganise themselves and to develop fully their intrinsic potentials . Thus the emer-
gence of civil society was seen as a sign that socialist societies were facing far-reaching transfor-
mations .
To put it in rather simplistic terms, the civil society approach implied that the socialist
societies were characterised by a zero-sum game between civil society and the authoritarian
state ; the broader were the prerogatives of the state, the more limited, even to the point of
total suppression were the faculties of civil society . The maintenance of the relative stability
of socialist regimes was to a high degree due to the mortification of civil society. That was
why the troublesome "slow growth of civil society under repression" (Nowak, 1991 : 61) in at
least some socialist societies in the eighties, epitomised especially by the growing political
and cultural nonconformism, was seen as a decisive sign of the imminent transformation
of the socialist regime . From this perspective, the exit from the "cul-de-sac" of real socialism
was possible only through a revival of civil society and the demise of the socialist state . This
process implied the awakening of various collective agents (not only political, but also cul-
tural, economic, etc .) and broadening of the scope of their potentials for action, which were
limited or even annihilated by the socialist state . The growing potentials for action of new
collective agents should transform the society mortified by the socialist state into an active
society .
The aim of the civil society approach was not only to explain the tensions in socialist socie-
ties and to predict their developmental tendencies, but also to provide a cognitive basis for
actions which should strengthen the civil society. This approach was not and did not want to
be a disinterested analysis of socialist societies, but a "guide for action" . This does not mean
that it was more successful in explaining and predicting the course of events in former
socialist societies than other theories; its distinctiveness was in the fact that it "assumed a
more voluntarist perspective" (Misztal, 1993 : 453) towards the socialist reality. Thus the
abstract concept of "'civil society' . . . had been the democratic (and revolutionary) password
of the opposition since the mid-1970s" (Ost, 1993 : 455) and many of its theorists came to
power after the collapse of the old regime .
Obviously, the civil society approach did not provide only a "theoretical background" for politi-
cal nonconformism and opposition, but also enabled the formation of collective agents who
played the crucial role at least in the initial stages of the great transformation . Despite great
differences in the pace and intensity of changes in individual Central European countries, one
may convincingly argue that the protagonists of these changes were intellectuals. Although widely
accepted, this claim needs some important clarifications . if we leave aside for a moment the
vagueness of the concept of intellectuals, the role of the "masses" should be mentioned . These
played different roles in individual Central European societies, but without their at least latent
support the overt dissent would have not produced such far-reaching consequences . To para-
11
Ivan Bernik
phrase Marx (1969/1844 : 208) one may say that the head of the process of dismantling of so-
cialism was "philosophy', whereas its heart were the "masses" . The masses paved the way for
efficient political dissent by gradually withdrawing their compliance with the ruling elite because
of the latters inability to fulfil their minimal expectations (see Rychard, 1989) . With the exception
of Poland, the erosion of mass consent did not lead to immediate mass protests . For their part,
the intellectuals with their nonconformist political activities created a free space in which the
broad masses could manifestly express their grievances and thus accelerated the collapse of the
old regime. There is no doubt that the motives of intellectuals and masses for the rejection of the
old regime differed in many respects, but they nevertheless reinforced each other . This implies
that the intellectuals can be considered as the "vanguard" of the opposition to the old regime and
not as the sole agent of historical transformation of the former socialist societies.
In addition, it should be considered that not all intellectuals took a critical stance towards
the old regime. Even if a rather restrictive definition of intellectuals is employed, according
to which they are individuals engaged in the creation, elaboration and dissemination of
theoretical knowledge, ideas and symbols (see Geiger, 1949 : 12), they are still a broad social
grouping whlch is internally differentiated in many respects . With this in mind, it would be
empirically untenable to argue that the whole intellectual stratum opposed the socialist
regime ; from this stratum both loyal supporters and opponents of the old regime were re-
cruited. That is why the question cannot be avoided of which parts of this stratum dared to
voice their dissent. A stimulating analytical basis for this answer was developed already in
the seventies by two Hungarian social scientists writing under the pseudonym of M . Rakovski
(1988) . They argued that in the intellectual stratum in socialist countries there was a small
group of intellectuals who tried and to a large extent managed, despite the strict control of
political authorities over intellectual activities, to create and reproduce their own ideology
and culture . Though they possessed no power which could amplify their dissenting voices,
this group of intellectuals was closely surveyed and penalised by the political authorities . For
this reason the authors called the members of this group "marginalised nonconformist jn-
tellectuals" (Rakovski, 1988 : 77) .
Though a relatively small group, the nonconformist intellectuals had only a few "common
denominators" . They were engaged in different intellectual activities, though the activities
of the majority of them were related to different spheres of cultural creativity, such as art,
science or journalism . Because of their internal differentiation, they could not be defined in
structural terms, but chiefly by their "mentality" ; i .e . the marginal nonconformist intellec-
tuals consisted of those individuals who "made their position very clear in word and deed,
rejecting the policy of the party establishment" (Šiklova, 1990 : 349) .
This characterisation of the agents of the "civil society project" facilitates an understanding
of the content and function of this project . In this context, the claim advanced by Polish
sociologist J . Szacki (and regarding Polish society) seems especially pertinent ; in his view
civil society theory could at best be described as "only an ideology exerting influence over a
small group of people who possess some kind of vision of our future and future social insti-
tutions" (quoted in Misztal, 1993 : 454). The phrase "only an ideology" should not be con-
strued as disparaging; in the perspective proposed in this paper it actually stresses the prac-
12
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CIVIL
SOCIETY PROJECT
tical relevance of the civil society project . This project enabled the nonconformist intellectuals to
establish minimal internal group integration and to uphold their common identity . They were not
just individuals opposing the same "enemy", but a proto-group integrated by a common project .
Though this project ("vision") was vaguely defined and open to different interpretations, certain
central ideas stood out. As already indicated, at the centre of the civil society project was the idea
that its proponents were voicing the interests of society at large . In other words, the marginal
intellectuals did not see themselves as "organic intellectuals" of only one class, stratum or pro-
fessional group but as representatives of the society before the authoritarian state or, at least, as
the rousers of civil society's suppressed potentials (see Ash, 1990 : 31) . Due to the notion of the
universality of their interests, the project contained pronounced moral undertones . Political non-
conformism was not perceived as a means to achieve certain pragmatic political aims, but as a
value in itself. That is why they did not perceive their activities as political, but rather as "anti-
politics" (see Mastnak, 1990 : 440) .
In accordance with their "anti-political" stance they did not envisage just a change of power
elite, but a substantial reconstruction of the whole of society, which would enable it to
develop all its intrinsic forces. This transformation would have, as the theorists of civil soci-
ety believed, a paradigmatic value for the Western societies, where the autonomy and self-
organising abilities of society also needed revival . With this in mind, one may argue that the
civil society project was a kind of "scientific anti-communism" . It relied on science as a
primary source of its cognitive consistency and legitimacy, but it entirely discarded the idea
that a "good society" could be established in accordance with a preconceived plan . Society
should generate a "good society" spontaneously .
Although the proponents of the civil society project were limited to a small group, their activities
generally provoked sharp reactions from the ruling elite. This was a sign that political noncon-
formism was perceived by socialist regimes as a serious threat to their stability. Nevertheless,
political nonconformism was treated differently in different Central European socialist societies .
These differences became particularly obvious as the socialist regimes became increasingly un-
able to fulfil the expectations of the masses, i .e . in the time of their decreasing legitimacy . On the
one hand, there were regimes, as in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, which tried to minimise
the influence of nonconformist ideas by more or less overt repression . On the other, there were
attempts by some regimes, as in Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (as opposed to the other Yugoslav
republics), to establish certain forms of dialogue with nonconformist intellectuals and even to
implement some of their ideas . In the following part of this paper it will be shown that the re-
sponse of the political elite to political nonconformism importantly influenced the initial phases
of the transition towards democracy. But in the concluding section it will be argued that in both
cases the expectations of the proponents of civil society were largely disappointed .
2. The Slovenian Case : A Paradigmatic Career of the Civil Society Project
As indicated in the previous section, Slovenia belonged to those societies where the conditions
for political nonconformism were relatively favourable. The first signs of its resurgence appeared
13
Ivan Bernik
in Slovenia in the early eighties. This indicated that the attempts of the political elite to eliminate
almost any form of dissent, which characterised political life in the seventies, were losing momen-
tum. The repressive measures had not been directed only at overt political dissent ; even "devia-
tions" in art and social sciences had been carefully enclosed within small enclaves and thus
marginalised . The first change was felt precisely in this field : "The distinction between 'alternative
culture' and the 'generally acceptable' or 'official' one became soft, . . . whereas the situation in
the forties, seventies and also the sixties was much harder, exclusivistic and conflict-ridden ."
(Rupel, 1987: 243). The growing autonomy of cultural activities created possibilities for rela-
tively free and public discussion in which subjects which were not strictly "cultural" were also
addressed. It is not surprising that the first forms of political dissent, such as criticism of some
aspects of the dominant ideology and of certain political decisions, were couched in "cultural"
terms.
One important sign of the growing autonomy of cultural activity was the ability of some
forms of youth subculture to withstand repression. This subculture created the space for
"autonomous social action" which, in the middle of the eighties, was filled up by new social
movements, especially by peace, ecological, feminist and gay movements (see Mastnak, 1990 :
440-442) . In these movements younger intellectuals played an important role . These intel-
lectuals gradually "took over" the weekly magazine "Mladina" (Youth) which in the mid-
eighties became an influential disseminator of alternative ideas and bitter social criticism .
Although perceived by their protagonists as non-political or as "anti-political", these ideas
and activities exerted an inconspicuous, but nevertheless far-reaching political influence .
By bringing new subjects and problems into public discussion, they gradually changed the
political scene. A good example of such influence was the initiative for non-military service
for conscientious objectors, initiated by the Slovenian peace movement in the mid-eighties
(see Tomc, 1987) . Although the initiative was rejected by the "official" organisations (the
rejection by the federal authorities and the Yugoslav army was harsher than by the Slovenian
authorities), the topic could not be banned from the political scene and it influenced subse-
quent discussions. At the same time, the rejection demonstrated the sterility of the political
elite and the inability of the "official" political system to generate innovations or to adopt
them .
These experiences directed mainstream political nonconformism towards more active - or more
"political" - actions . This gradual shift of interests can be well illustrated by the case of "Nova
revija" (New Review), a monthly founded by a group of writers, philosophers and social scientists
in 1982 . The foundation of the journal was approved by the political authorities after long hesita-
tion and discussions . Thus the foundation of the journal was itself an important success of intel-
lectual nonconformism. The founders defined the main aim of the journal as fostering autono-
mous cultural production, but the emphasis on autonomy left the selection of topics wide open .
Among the many topics which emerged in the first two volumes, the "Slovenian national ques-
tion" deserves special attention . The mainstream approach to this question was determined by
the thesis that there existed no Slovenian national programme (S . Hribar, 1983 : 2044) . This
thesis, which was initially meant as a critique addressed to the political elite, gradually stimulated
14
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CIVIL
SOCIETY PROJECT
the collaborators of the journal to adopt a more active approach to the "national question" .
These endeavours culminated in the publication of an issue (1987) devoted exclusively to this
topic ; it consisted of analyses of various aspects of Slovenia's "present situation" and its perspec-
tives.
The publication of these analyses provoked a sharp reaction on the part of the political authori-
ties in Slovenia and Yugoslavia . Nevertheless, attempts to discipline the journal failed . These
attempts revealed the decreasing ability of the political elite to suppress overt political noncon-
formism; at the same time their failure encouraged the collaborators of "Nova revija" to formu-
late their political dissent in an even more overt and active way. This course was most clearly
manifested in the publication in 1988 of "Theses For a New Slovenian Constitution" and in 1990
of an issue on Slovenia as an independent state . The last two publications clearly indicated the
gradual transformation of relatively diffuse alternative ideas into a more consistent political pro-
gramme aiming primarily at Slovenian political independence from the Yugoslav state .
The formulation of an opposition political programme, i .e . the transformation of political
dissent into an at least loosely organised opposition, signalled not a culmination of the civil
society project, but rather its gradual disintegration . In Slovenia, the idea of civil society
played an important role in the early stages of the formation of political nonconformism
and dissent. It provided a general ideological framework for various activities of noncon-
formist intellectuals. As in other Central European societies, it was employed at once as an
analytical concept and as a means for the integration and legitimation of nonconformist
activities . That is why the concept remained, despite numerous discussions and attempts to
refine it, semantically overburdened and open to different interpretations . At a conference
on civil society and the state held in Ljubljana in 1987, which was one of the culminations of
the long discussion on this topic, E Adam noted that "the concept of civil society as societal
opposition has not been theoretically elaborated and remains merely an attempt at self-
perception and self-interpretation of alternative activities on the part of their actors" (Adam,
1978: 7) . The elasticity of the idea of civil society was, as F. Adam showed, most strikingly
demonstrated by the fact that it was also selectively domesticated by the dominant political
ideology (see also Gantar, 1987 : 43). These observations show that the practical influence of
the civil society project was not directly dependent on its sociological elaboration .
The domestication of the concept of civil society by the dominant ideology was not only a sign of
the concept's elasticity but also a sign of the elasticity of the ruling political elite in Slovenia . After
the beginning of the eighties the elite realised through experience that the dynamics of "society'
(i.e . groups of nonconformist intellectuals, new social movements, first independent mass me-
dia) could not be effectively controlled through repression . Faced with a rapid loss of its legiti-
macy and with an increasingly active "society', the Party had to adopt a more conciliatory attitude
towards political nonconformism . As already indicated, one of the important indicators of this
trend was the fact that as early as 1985 the concept of civil society, which was the hallmark of
dissenting ideology, found its way into the Party ideology (see Mastnak, 1990: 4.44) . Due to
selective and cautious domestification of some aspects of the idea of civil society on the part or
the political elite, this did not imply a convergence of the dominant political ideology and the
15
Ivan Bernik
dissenting ideology. Nevertheless, it was a clear sign that the Party tried to benefit from the discus-
sion on civil society and not to block it . In the following years the political elite tried on the one
hand to "make contact" with some groups and personalities from the alternative scene, and on
the other hand to use limited repression to control certain other alternative activities, as the case
of "Nova revija" showed . This strategy did not lead to the pacification of political dissent, but it
nevertheless accentuated some differences in the ranks of the alternative (see Rupel, 1988 : 279,
who speaks of alternative and "alternative") . The repercussions of these domestication attempts
on the political elite and their organisations were much more profound . The ability to learn from
some of their critics did not strengthen the position of the Communist Party; moreover, it led to its
gradual transformation into a proper political party . In this process the Party also lost control
over the allied organisations ; moreover, one of them - the Youth Organisation - established itself
relatively early as one of the centres of political alternative . In 1988 the Party declared its readi-
ness to "retreat from power" . Thus a necessary consensus between the political opposition and
the representatives of the old regime was established which enabled a relatively smooth transition
to democracy.
The transformation of the Party into a party was an important component of the Slovenian
"Velvet Evolution", which culminated in the parliamentary elections of spring 1990 . This
transformation was complemented by a gradual differentiation in the ranks of political
alternative and its transformation into organised political opposition . Of course, the proc-
ess of democratisation was not prompted by the Party, but by the political alternative . The
changes in the ideology and actions of the Party were primarily prompted by the loss of its
legitimacy. To regain a measure of public support, the internal reform of the Party and other
organisations was not enough; the elite had to dissociate itself from the other Yugoslav po-
litical elites, especially from the those which saw the future of the Yugoslav federation in
increased centralisation. Thus the Party had to accept some new political themes proposed
by the political alternative, including the idea of a radical break with the Yugoslav state . The
protagonists of the mainstream political dissent had good reason to celebrate - they had not
only "arranged" the great political transformation, they had also proved that their "vision"
was correct. Or, as one of the founders of "Nova revija" put it at the tenth anniversary of the
initiative for founding the journal : "Events in Slovenia took a course which was in accord-
ance with our wishes and was anticipated by many of our analyses . We tried to foster this
development with each issue of the journal . . ." (T. Hribar, 1990: 1098) .
As already indicated, the advent of democratisation was linked to the decline of the practical
relevance of the civil society project . This was not a peculiarity of democratisation in Slovenia,
but a conspicuous trend in all Central European socialist countries . In the next, concluding
section some implications of the "exhaustion" of the project will be highlighted . Special attention
will be paid to the question of the role of the protagonists of the project in the new circumstances
and to the question of the analytical applicability of the concept of civil society.
1 6
THE RISE AND FALL OF TIE CIVIL
SOCIETY PROJECT
3. The Civil Society Project under Real Existing Democracy
The formation of democratic institutions in former socialist societies was a clear sign of the
fruitfulness of the marginal intellectuals' dissent activities, but at the same time confronted them
with new challenges. The main problem for the (former) dissenting intellectuals was how to
retain their "leading role" in the context of emerging democratic institutions. Without taking into
account differences between individual Central European societies, it can be claimed that non-
conformist intellectuals as a group were relatively unsuccessful in coping with the new situation .
Their failure was significantly related to their political "vision", at the centre of which stood the
idea that they voiced the interests of suppressed "society" at large and not particular interests .
This ideology, which played a decisive catalytic role in the "preparatory" period of democra-
tisation, proved to be relatively inefficient in the period in which democratic institutions
were gradually established . This inefficiency was most obviously reflected in the fact that the
(former) nonconformist intellectuals were generally quite unsuccessful, in comparison to
political latecomers and in some cases also to the successors of the old political elite, in
establishing firmly organised and competitive political parties . This failure was not just due
to the fact that they lacked the necessary resources ; in this respect their position was even
better than the position of the latecomers. The main problem for marginal intellectuals was
that a party formation represented the decisive step from "antipolitics" to the sphere of
"realpolitik" . It is not surprising that some nonconformist intellectuals looked with obvious
disappointment at the process of democratisation, in which, in their opinion, those parts of
"civil society" were mobilised which "could be described as politically and democratically
undeveloped" (Mastnak, 1990 : 449) . In their view, these "undeveloped" social forces signifi-
cantly influenced the further process of democratisation and its outcomes . Seeing that "real
existing democracy" was not what, according to their political ideals, democracy should be,
the most active proponents of the civil society project "retired into a corner and at most got
on with some writing" (Šiklova, 1990: 355) .
Parallel to the disintegration of their common ideology, the group which had decisively influ-
enced the course of democratisation disintegrated . while assuming the old "anti-political" stance
a substantial section of the veterans of the "fight for democracy" returned to their original activi-
ties. The rest entered politics as professional politicians and soon experienced that the rules of
the political "fight for democracy' sharply differ from the rules of democratic political fight . One
may argue that this is not just a disintegration of a relatively small group of marginal intellectuals,
but signals a much broader process of disintegration of the intellectual stratum . In socialist
societies this stratum was united by similar privileges "conferred" on the basis of formal educa-
tion . Their actual performance played a relatively unimportant role in determining their social
status. In fact, only those who dared to voice their political dissent risked being denied these
privileges; i .e political loyalty was a price which the majority of intellectuals had to pay and was
ready to pay for a relatively advantageous and stable social status . This can be explained by the
fact that social stratification in socialist societies was largely moulded in accordance with the
interests of the ruling elite (see Bernik, 1992: 69-82) . In the changed situation, the social status
17
Ivan Bernik
of many intellectuals is increasingly determined by the market ; not education per se but educa-
tion as a means to gain a favourable market position determines their social status . Thus creden-
tials no longer automatically guarantee a homogenous position for intellectuals in the stratifica-
tion system. Furthermore, the market "pushes" intellectuals towards increased functional spe-
cialisation ; this specialisation enables intellectuals to find new market niches and to monopolise
certain market positions . In this light, one may argue that in the new circumstances the stratum of
intellectuals is actually "dying out" and will be replaced by different groups of professionals .
The preceding paragraphs suggest that the career of the civil society project and its protago-
nists was more or less completed by the establishment of a democratic political order. But it
would nevertheless be premature to claim that the idea of civil society has completely lost its
relevance. As its normative and mobilising function has been exhausted, its analytical func-
tion - which in the time of action was largely neglected - has once again come to the fore. Of
course, the concept is no longer used to predict the future of the post-socialist societies, but
rather to explain the relative failure of the civil society project in the concluding phase of
democratisation. The most straightforward explanation has already been briefly presented
above; according to this explanation the process of democratisation revealed that not all
section of civil society were sufficiently "politically and democratically developed" . But these
sections skilfully used the free space created by representatives of more "developed" civil
society to gain political influence during the definitive demise of the old regime. This expla-
nation suggests that the proponents of the civil society project were wrong in their assess-
ment of society's potentials for democratic transformation . It also acknowledges that they
had too high expectations regarding the outcome of the democratisation process; instead of
an expected new type of democracy they witnessed the formation of "immature" and unsta-
ble democracy. That is why this explanation can also be read as a self-criticism of the propo-
nents of the project and as legitimation of their critical stance towards newborn democracy.
Even much more detached assessments of the fate of civil society under the new circum-
stances are in many respects similar to this one . There is a wide consensus among special-
ists on socialist societies that the democratisation in these societies has not led to the "re-
constitution of civil society", though democratisation presupposes and enables this recon-
stitution . Contrary to expectations, democratisation has revealed the absence of society's
potentials for self-organisation and self-reliance . This is dramatically expressed in the claim
that post-socialist societies are experiencing "a state of anomy" (Marody, 1990: 281 ; see
also Sztompka, 1993: 89) . This claim implies the idea that in socialist societies there exists
a suppressed but dynamic society which would decisively shape the course of democratisa-
tion was wishful thinking . In this perspective, the troubles of post-socialist democracies are
not due to prevalence of "conservatlve civil society" (as suggested above), but due to its
unexpected weakness . Thus the uncertainties of transformation of the former socialist soci-
eties can be explained by the "failure" of civil society, because "so far the organisation of
civil society in the post-communist period has been surprisingly weak . . . the state has maintained
its strong position" (Ost, 1993 : 453) . The same author also observes that the failure of civil
society also explains why "the political liberals who had been leaders of the triumphant opposi-
tion found themselves being pushed aside, denounced and marginalised" (ibidem) .
18
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CIVIL
SOCIETY PROJECT
It is obvious that under the new circumstances the concept of civil society has acquired a new
function; whereas during the "battle for democracy" in socialist societies it expressed the opti-
mism both of the protagonists of democratisation and of many social scientists (as already indi-
cated, in many cases these two roles were merged), it now expresses their disappointment and
unease regarding the new democracies . The content of the concept has changed in many re-
spects, but its status has remained basically the same, i .e . it remains strongly value-ridden . Its
status can be aptly characterised by N . Luhmann's general remark that concepts and theories
which are strongly related to political interests and conflicts are not " . . . scientific theories in the
true sense of the word but, if one may say so, scientifically subsidised theories" (Luhmann, 1981 :
134). As has been shown in the preceeding sections, in the case of the concept of civil society
"political" prevailed over "scientific", which was clearly reflected in the discrepancy between its
practical efficiency and its analytic relevance; the scientifically "subsidised" project of civil soci-
ety played a decisive catalytic role in the process of the demolition of the old regime although the
analytical usefulness of the concept remained controversial .
The new circumstances are generating an obvious tendency towards congruency between
both aspects of the idea of civil society. As already indicated, its political relevance has been
exhausted or is at least declining . At the same time its scientific status remains question-
able. Every attempt to employ the concept of civil society as an analytic tool sooner or later
faces the "translation" problem, i.e . the problem of activating this vague and elusive concept
with the help of more standardized sociological concepts with a structured theoretical back-
ground. This problem was already stressed in Slovenian discussions of civil society by some
sociologists in the eighties (see Adam, 1987: 9-13) . The "translation" problem indicates that
the concept of civil society has been reduced to an incentive for sociological research of
some aspects of societal self-organisation . The decline of both its political relevance and its
inability to establish itself as a sociological concept proper show that the brilliant career of
the idea of civil society is inevitably coming to an end under "real existing democracy" .
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