A Comparative Study of the Poetics 
of Plato and Qurā˒n
Massih Zekavat
Department of Translation Studies, Jahrom University, Jahrom, Fars, Iran
massihzekavat@gmail.com
This article aims to comparatively investigate the poetics of Plato and Qurʾ ān and 
explicate the reasons behind their ambivalent denunciations of poets and poetry in an 
attempt to open a ground for the meeting of their descendent literary traditions, and to 
suggest that literature and poetry can proffer worldly outlooks to transcend mundane 
boundaries.
Keywords: Plato / Qur āʾn / comparative poetics / literature / poetrry / truth / inspiration
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Primerjalna književnost (Ljubljana) 38.3 (2015)
We have just Religion enough to make us hate, but not 
enough to make us love one another.
Reflect on Things past, as Wars, Negotiations, Factions, 
and the like; we enter so little into those Interests, that 
we wonder how Men could possibly be so busy, and 
concerned for Things so transitory: Look at the present 
Times, we find the same Humour, yet wonder not at all. 
(Swift 241)
Appreciating literary creations across linguistic and cultural boundaries 
is among the primary goals of comparative and world literature studies. 
This can facilitate reciprocal understanding, celebration of diversity, hence 
tolerance and peace. But the prerequisite of such an appreciation is to 
know what any specific culture considers as literature during a particular 
epoch. The enterprises of comparative and world literature, therefore, are 
incomplete without comparative poetics.
Earl Miner implies that the study of comparative poetics is even more 
important than the comparative case studies that focus on two or more 
literary works belonging to different literatures. He quotes James J. Y. Liu 
who maintains,
comparative studies of historically unrelated critical traditions […] will be more 
fruitful if conducted on the theoretical rather than practical level […] comparisons 
of what writers and critics belonging to different cultural traditions have thought 
about literature may reveal what critical concepts are universal, what concepts are 
confined to certain cultural traditions, and what concepts are unique to a particu-
PKn, letnik 38, št 3, Ljubljana, december 2015
40
lar tradition […] Thus a comparative study of theories of literature may lead to a 
better understanding of all literature. (5–6)
Poetics, according to Miner, can either be “implicit in practice,” that 
could be found in any culture that distinguishes literature from other 
realms of practice and knowledge, or “originative poetics” which is in-
duced according to the literary system’s most esteemed genre at a particu-
lar epoch (7, 216). Accordingly, the social standing of literature, literary 
genres and writers as well as the public attitude towards them are the 
main determinants of originative poetics. The study of status of poetry 
and poets in a society, and people’s opinion about them, therefore, can 
lead to an epistemological understanding of poetics.
This article aims to comparatively investigate Plato’s and Qur āʾn’s at-
titudes towards poetry and poets. Plato’s impact on western philosophy 
and literature is seminal, and his views about poetry have been contended 
over centuries. Similarly, Qur āʾn has also exerted a considerable influence 
on the philosophy, literature and culture of numerous countries. I will 
argue that while Plato and Qur āʾn are similar in their charges against poets 
and poetry, there are still discrepancies in their attitudes and in the reasons 
behind their concerns. This will hopefully open a common ground for 
the meeting of the descendent literary traditions influenced by Plato and 
Qur āʾn. I hope to suggest that literature and poetry can proffer worldly out-
looks to transcend mundane boundaries in the end. Plato’s works, where 
he attempts to reach the truth, are secular, and of human origins. On 
the contrary, Muslims attribute Qur āʾn to divine origins as a sacred text 
that reveals the infallible and eternal truth. Moreover, they belong to two 
different social, political, and historical contexts as well as cultural and 
linguistic traditions. These might raise questions about their commensu-
rability. However, the point is not to compare these texts, but to compare 
the similarities and differences in their attitudes towards poets and poetry, 
to explain them, and to suggest their impact on their successors and their 
contemporary implications. I should also clarify that my limited linguistic 
skills—I only know Persian and English, with a smattering understanding 
of Arabic—made me resort to translations, and “distant reading,” to bor-
row Moretti’s term.
Poets and poetry are strictly repudiated in both Plato and Qur āʾn. Plato 
famously banishes poets from his ideal state. In his Republic, he demands 
strict censorship on what poets say about gods (377e–383c), death and 
Hades (386a–387c), “lamentations of men of repute” (387d–388d), vio-
lent laughter (388e–389a), truth (389b–c), self-control, greed, bribery, evil 
Massih Zekavat:     Comparative Study of the Poetics of Plato and Qur ā˒n
41
originated by gods, and justice (389d–392b), as well as poetry’s diction 
and imitation (392c–397b). Habib concludes that Plato condemns poetry 
for its mendacity, defiling effect and “its ‘disorderly’ complexity and en-
couragement of individualism in the sphere of sensibility and feeling” (28). 
However, Plato's concern for the truth is also among the reasons that 
explain his repudiation of poetry.
Plato believes that it is not “wisdom that enable[s] them [i.e. poets] to 
write their poetry, but a kind of instinct and inspiration.” He goes on to 
add that, “the very fact that they were poets made them think that they 
had a perfect understanding of all other subjects, of which they were to-
tally ignorant” (Apology 22c). As Hamilton and Cairns write,
Art, he [i.e. Socrates in Ion] says, is not dependent upon the emotions; it belongs 
to the realm of knowledge. “Each separate art has had assigned to it by the deity 
the power of knowing a particular occupation,” […] but poetry is not art; it is not 
guided by rule as art is. It is inspiration, not knowledge. Poets and their interpret-
ers like Ion are “not in their senses,” but “a poet is a light and winged thing, and 
holy, and never able to compose until he has become inspired, and is beside him-
self, and reason is no longer in him.” (Plato 215)
Plato objects to the fact that poets imitate different kinds of arts with-
out being experts, hence poetry cannot be considered an art itself (also see 
Republic 398a–b). He, therefore, admonishes poets and poetry because of 
the innate opposition he sees between knowledge and understanding, on 
the one hand, and inspiration and possession, on the other hand.
Poetry’s imitative nature, Plato believes, is its next defect. Imitative art, 
for him, is the “art that manages to be compelling and realistic by copying 
the way things appear, at the cost of misrepresenting the way things are” 
(Moss 422). According to Plato, “there are some three arts concerned with 
everything, the user’s art, the maker’s, and the imitator’s” (Republic 601d). 
But “the mimetic art,” he argues, “is far removed from truth, and this, it 
seems, is the reason why it can produce everything, because it touches or 
lays hold of only a small part of the object and that a phantom” (598b). 
The poet’s art is that of the imitator, hence his knowledge is the most in-
ferior one (601d–602b). Although “imitation is a form of play, not to be 
taken seriously” (602b), the poet still persists in imitating. Therefore, as 
illustrated in the famous cave allegory (Republic 514–517), poetry is three 
steps removed from the truth. This takes us to the “old […] quarrel be-
tween philosophy and poetry” (607b).
But are these ample reasons to banish poets and poetry from an ideal 
state after all? Habib enumerates five reasons to explain Plato’s castigation 
of poetry: “(1) its intrinsic expression of falsehood, (2) its intrinsic opera-
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42
tion in the realm of imitation, (3) its combination of a variety of functions, 
(4) its appeal to the lower aspects of the soul such as emotion and appetite, 
and (5) its expression of irreducible particularity and multiplicity rather 
than unity” (36). But he downplays the main concern of Plato who be-
lieves that poets are possessed by divine powers, hence out of their mind. 
Talking about poets, Socrates maintains,
their making is not by art, when they utter many things and fine about the deeds 
of men […] but is by lot divine […] Herein lies the reason why the deity has be-
reft them of their senses, and uses them as ministers, along with soothsayers and 
godly seers; it is in order that we listeners [my emphasis] may know that it is not they 
who utter these precious revelations while their mind is not within them, but that 
it is the god himself who speaks, and through them becomes articulate to us. (Ion 
534c–d; also see Timaeus 71–72)
So he is mostly concerned about the influence of poetry on its audi-
ence. Accordingly, poets are denigrated to the sixth order of merit—only 
above artisan or farmer, Sophist or demagogue, and tyrant—in the hierar-
chical classification of the kinds of lives Socrates offers (Republic 248d–e). 
Yet, this effect needs not always be pernicious, that is why Plato also adds 
an exception where poetry can be employed to reinforce law and reason: 
“we can admit no poetry into our city save only hymns to the gods and 
the praises of good men. For if you grant admission to the honeyed Muse 
in lyric or epic, pleasure and pain will be lords of your city instead of law 
and that which shall from time to time have approved itself to the general 
reason as the best” (Republic 607a; also see 397d). Plato, thus, has ambiva-
lent feelings about poetry. On the one hand, he reprimands it as false, im-
moral, corruptive, and banishes it from his ideal State. On the other hand, 
he deems it honeyed, godly, divine, and acknowledges its superb impact 
on citizens.
Unlike Plato’s writings, a sustained set of philosophical reflections does 
not constitute Qur āʾn: Plato attempts to exit the cave, ascend the mountain, 
and reach the light of truth, while Qur āʾn already claims absolute and iner-
rant truth originated in divine wisdom. Qur āʾn is the sacred text of Islam 
which provides its main tenets , and contains, among other things, a di-
versity of narratives, allegories, and catechetical instructions. It includes a 
sūra (i.e. chapter) entitled “shuʿarā” (i.e. the poets, plural form of shāʿir), 
that dedicates its concluding seven verses to poets and poetry. Shiʿr means 
poem/poetry and knowledge in Arabic (Wehr 473). Although, as Heinrichs 
notes, “By far the most prevalent conception of poetry was to classify it as 
a craft or a science; technical and scholarly competence were considered 
Massih Zekavat:     Comparative Study of the Poetics of Plato and Qur ā˒n
43
indispensible for the poet and became the major focus of attention,” (122) 
Qur āʾn actually deprecates poetry and scorns poets.
In Qur āʾn also poetry is put against the truth. Since it comprises divine 
revelation, absolute verity is manifested in Qur āʾn. Skepticism towards po-
etry’s truth was justified on three grounds: first, truth demanded objectiv-
ity and accuracy of description, while poetry was not necessarily sincere 
and consistent. This is especially obvious in its employment of such fig-
ures of speech as hyperbole. Second, decorum excluded false appraisals, 
while panegyric—in the idealization of its subject—and invective poetry 
allowed for extensive use of exaggerations. Third, figurative uses of lan-
guage were regarded as untrue or false (Meisami 781–782).
In the sūra of “The Prophets,” for instance, the verity of revelation is 
opposed to the falsehood of poesy. After warning against the impending 
Day of Judgment, the unbelievers’ reason in rejecting the Prophet 
Muh.ammad and his divine miracle, Qur āʾn, is expounded.
THE DAY of Reckoning for mankind is drawing near, yet they blithely persist 
in unbelief. They listen with ridicule to each fresh warning that their Lord gives 
them: their hearts are set on pleasure.
In private the wrongdoers say to each other: ‘Is this man not a mortal like your-
selves? Would you follow witchcraft with your eyes open?’
Say: ‘My Lord has knowledge of whatever is said in heaven and earth. He hears 
all and knows all.’
Some say: ‘It [i.e. The Qur āʾn] is but a medley of dreams.’ Others: ‘He has invented 
it himself.’ And yet others: ‘He is a poet: let him show us some sign, as did the 
apostles in days gone by.’ (21:1–5)
Because the unbelievers find Muh.ammad to be a fellow human being, 
they suspect him of witchcraft and poesy, and the Qur āʾn of being merely 
his fantasy or his invention. Its reliance on absolute, divine wisdom is 
summoned by Qur āʾn to defend these charges. It is allegedly Muh.ammad’s 
sole prophetic miracle (hence, the use of word ‘witchcraft,’ because both 
miracle and witchcraft are understood as supernatural interventions in 
normal life), yet the unbelievers still demand some evidence (‘sign’) that 
could prove his prophethood and divine inspiration. Poetry, witchcraft, 
dream, and human invention are, therefore, put against Godly and abso-
lute knowledge as well as divine inspiration granted to the prophet.
Elsewhere, the accusation of Muh. ammad being a poet is strongly re-
jected and it is maintained that divine prophecy and poesy are not compat-
ible. Contrary to poesy, a divine book demands solemnity and eloquence. 
“We [i.e. God] have taught him [i.e. Muh. ammad] no poetry, nor does it 
become him to be a poet. This is but an admonition: an eloquent Koran 
[sic] to exhort the living and to pass judgment on the unbelievers” (36:69–
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44
70). When the “evil-doers” again accuse Muh. ammad of being a “mad 
poet,” Qur āʾn insists on his expression of the truth.
On that day they will all share in the scourge. Thus shall We [i.e. God] deal with 
the evil-doers, for when they were told: ‘There is no deity but God,’ they replied 
with scorn: ‘Are we to renounce our gods for the sake of a mad poet?’
Surely he [i.e. Muh.  ammad] has brought the truth, confirming those who were sent 
before. You shall all taste the grievous scourge: you shall be rewarded according 
only to your deeds. (37:33–39)
Here again poetry and junūn (possession/madness) are identified. As 
we have already seen, Plato also repeatedly utters the same accusation 
against poets but on very different grounds. He believes that poets are 
mad because they are divinely inspired; whereas Qur āʾn maintains that 
poets are mad because they are profanely inspired. But the end result of 
both attitudes is similar: truth is not to be found in poetry (also see 52:29–
34; 69:38–43).
But the harshest condemnation of poets is found in the sūra named 
after them, i.e. “The Poets.” One of this chapter’s main themes is to show 
how Muh. ammad’s preceding prophets, being accused of mantic preten-
sions, also suffered like him. Verse 221 asks a question: to whom the 
Shayāt. īn (plural form of Shayt. ān, or daemon/devil) descend? The answer 
is on any liar and evil-doer, those who tell what they have heard, but these 
are mostly lies (26:221–223). Then, it is immediately added that, “Poets are 
followed by erring men. Behold how aimlessly they rove in every valley, 
preaching what they never practice” (26:224–226). So poets are liars and 
wicked. They hypocritically preach what they do not practice. Therefore, 
they must not be followed. These charges have been made by Plato, too, 
and as he adds exceptions, Qur āʾn also excludes those true believers who 
are motivated by self-defense. “Not so the true believers, who do good 
works and remember God with fervour and defend themselves only when 
wronged. The wrongdoers will then learn what a welcome awaits them” 
(26:227). So, the unbelievers accuse Muh. ammad of being a shāʾir (poet), 
kāhin (the priest-like figure whose supernatural connections allowed him/
her to predict future, among other things), or majnūn (one possessed by 
jinn, hence out of one’s right mind) all of which are denied in Qur āʾn.
Therefore, poets and poetry are denounced in Plato and Qur āʾn, al-
though exceptions are also allowed at the same time. As explicated above, 
they both justify their renunciations by appealing to reasons like their 
moral concerns, poetry’s infidelity to truth, and its origins. These reasons 
can be understood in the context of the historically contingent conceptions 
Massih Zekavat:     Comparative Study of the Poetics of Plato and Qur ā˒n
45
of poetry’s socio-political functions, and its assumed superhuman origins. 
Had it been just for the poets and their creation, however, Plato might have 
left them alone. But what actually concerns Plato is the effect of poetry on 
its audience. Socrates shows that the agential divine possession in poetry 
is contagious. He likens poetic inspiration to magnetic effect: as a magnet 
joins an iron chain by stimulating its effect in each single ring, god also 
inspires a poet, the poet a rhapsodist, and the rhapsodist his/her audience 
(Ion 533d–536). Accordingly, poetry is “dangerous” because “it has the 
power to corrupt even the best of men, and threatens the stability of both 
individual and polis” (Murray 23). Therefore, Plato sets philosophy against 
sophistry and his contemporary uncritical culture (Janaway 388).
Moss also contends that Plato is mainly concerned with the impact 
of poetry on its audience. For Plato, imitative poetry represents things as 
they appear, not as they actually are, while its characters are role models 
for the audience to emulate. Yet, his objection to poetry is not merely 
limited to presenting unworthy models. He maintains that “imitative po-
etry harms us by ‘putting a bad constitution’ into our souls (605b)—that 
is, by strengthening an inferior part of the soul and thereby weakening or 
overthrowing the rule of reason” (438). Moss argues that Plato mainly ob-
jects to the corrupting effects of complex, rather than simple, characters 
in poetry (440–442). Moreover, according to Plato, poetry appeals to the 
gratification of pleasure rather than reason, hence it is corrupting. Moss, 
therefore, argues that Plato condemns poetry because, first, it motivates a 
departure from reason toward irrational passions, and, second, because it 
arouses intense pleasure in its audience. This pleasure is so strong that it 
can upset one’s soul.
Therefore, Plato is mostly concerned for the audience of poetry. But, 
the impact of poetry is not limited to the individual level. As Ferrari says, 
in Plato’s milieu, poetry was a publicly performed event rather than an in-
dividual reflection. Poetry for Plato is actually “a rhetorical public address” 
and “a kind of flattery” (Gorgias 502d). Ferrari contends that poetry’s “theat-
ricality” accounts for Plato’s reaction against it, because he believes that this 
theatricality impedes poetry to render true understanding (92–93). Because 
of poetry’s theatrical nature, it is its immediate effect that is most significant, 
not how this effect is achieved. Plato, as the result, sees the aesthetic and 
ethical aspects of poetry as inseparable (98). Similarly, Murray also refers to 
Havelock who argues that, Plato’s “extreme mistrust not just of bad poetry, 
but of the poetic experience itself, could only be explained […] as a reaction 
to a cultural situation still dominated by oral communication” (24).
So the (ethical) impact of poetry on its audience is foregrounded. But 
to manage this influence, Plato does not warn the audience as a critic might 
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46
do. On the contrary, he solves the problem by removing it: he prohibits 
poetry altogether. This actually clarifies his attitude towards the audience 
of poetry: he does not trust their wisdom and discernment. In Ferrari’s 
words, “Plato believes that some—most—adults remain in an important 
sense children throughout their lives” (114). Plato’s major objective is to 
establish a perfect State; that is why he concentrates on the youth and 
their education. He prefers to remove all he finds pernicious, like poetry, 
and instead assign guardians for citizens whom they shall precisely follow. 
This will reduce the probability of transgressions. But we shall not forget 
that he is writing instructions for the establishment of his Utopia; that is to 
say, these premonitions are applicable at the stage before the actual estab-
lishment of the Republic, not as an indispensible article of its constitution.
Similar to Plato, it is poesy’s dramatic, societal impact that explains 
Qur āʾn’s concerns about and distrust of poets and poetry. Clarification of 
this point requires a brief survey of the functions of poetry in Arabic liter-
ary tradition. Poets occupied a very significant status in pre-Islamic and 
early Islamic periods. The poet functioned as the spokesperson of his tribe 
or clan. He articulated and defended the claims and rights of his people, 
attacked the enemy, and diffused the reports of contemporary events. 
Moreover, as Arazi also maintains, “aesthetic pleasure” was the primary 
goal of poetry for philosophers, and it was considered to be “a school for 
the improvement of the soul” (459). Since it was accessible to a wide range 
of audiences, it was employed for didactic purposes, too. However, poetry 
was also arrogantly manipulated to censure and offend people in invec-
tives and lampoons, to eulogize and support unworthy figures, and explic-
itly discuss excessive carnal pleasures in the Arab world. Jones mentions 
this as one of the reasons behind Muh. ammad’s attitude towards poetry. 
Muh. ammad believed that there is “a short step from lampoon to obscen-
ity or, much worse, to the uttering of curses […] Poets’ invective was 
common and caused much ill will” (112). As some tribes used poetry to 
attack their rivals, its power could be compared to war machinery. Some 
were even driven to suicide because of the public shame that satiric poetry 
had imposed upon them. Yet, although the manipulation of poetry to-
wards such aims is condemned, even satire is allowed if it serves the cause 
of Islam (Shahīd “Final” 196). Classical satire was also employed toward 
similar goals. Iambic verses of Archilochos and Hipponax, for instance, 
drove their victims to suicide (Keane 35). Accordingly, Plato also express-
es similar concerns over satire and eulogy in his Laws (Book VII, 801e–
802a and Book XI, 935e–936b).
The function of poetry and the status of poets fell and later rose again 
with the advent of Islam. Initially, poets rivaled Islam and challenged the 
Massih Zekavat:     Comparative Study of the Poetics of Plato and Qur ā˒n
47
Qur āʾnic assertions regarding the discontinuity of revelation after 
Muh. ammad. Muh. ammad was so concerned about satiric verses which 
took him and his cause as their object of satire that he had some of their 
writers murdered among whom murdered among whom one can mention 
Kaʿab ibn al-Ashraf, Abū ʿAfak, and ʿAsmāʾ ibnat Marwān (a woman). 
This clearly underlines the significant status of poets and poetry. Muta-
nabbī, a poet who claimed prophecy, and whose nickname means one 
“who acts like a prophet,” (Heinrichs 122) and Musaylima the Liar are two 
more examples. Their cases are more interesting because they partly rep-
resent coalescence between the two categories of Muh. ammad’s rivals: 
prophets and poets. But after Muh. ammad’s immigration from Mecca to 
Madina, and the establishment of an Islamic government, and in the tradi-
tion of tribe poets, he actually employs poet laureates, including H.  assān b. 
Thābit, in order to reinforce his political position and further his cause. 
Other poets also followed to perform their socio-political functions by 
taking parts either for or against the prophet.
Besides the socio-political, performative function of poetry, both Plato 
and Qur āʾn state their concern for poetry’s fidelity to truth as another rea-
son behind their objection to poetry. This skepticism is rooted in their 
idea that poets are mad and possessed by some frenzy. In Plato, however, 
this madness is divine; that is to say, poets are out of their mind as the 
result of divine inspiration. His magnetism analogy, in Ion, in which di-
vine possession and inspiration respectively stirs the poet, the rhapsodist 
and their audiences parallels the way God inspires the prophet by divine 
revelation, and the prophet, in his turn, herds his flock. On the contrary, 
Qur āʾn posits an opposition between the divine cause and mundane poetry. 
The divine is what does not resemble the human, and poetry is attributed 
not to divine but rather to the wicked cause.
But how can the similarities between these two traditions be explained? 
In his “Poets and Prophets: an Overview,” Kugel investigates the long 
relationship between poetry and prophecy. He demonstrates the Greek 
influence on Jewish poetry and prophecy, and also shows how Islam’s 
anxiety over the distinction between poetry and prophecy has influenced 
Judaism and Christianity (12–20). Similarly, Dols also repeatedly under-
lines the influence of the Judeo-Christian tradition on Islam. According 
to such assertions of mutual influence, and since the Jewish tradition has 
exerted considerable influence on Christian and Muslim traditions, one 
might be tempted to conclude that the similarities of Islamic and Greek 
traditions are due to mediated influence. However, such a claim demands 
more evidence and an autonomous study. Here, I do not intend to study 
the influence of one tradition on another, but to explicate the similarities 
PKn, letnik 38, št 3, Ljubljana, december 2015
48
and differences of Greek and Arabic-Islamic poetics in order to suggest 
how this has influenced (the understanding of) later generations of writers 
and critics. Accordingly, I will attempt to trace the reasons behind some 
of these similarities in the (nature of the) relationship between poetry and 
prophecy in these two cultures.
Dodds maintains that Homeric people, circa eighth century BCE, 
ascribed some actions and behaviors to deities and daemons. One such 
behavior was insanity which Homeric Greeks attributed to “external ‘dae-
monic’ agency” (5). After surveying various instances of “psychic inter-
vention” in Homer, Dodds concludes that “all departures from normal 
human behaviour whose causes are not immediately perceived, whether 
by the subject’s own consciousness or by the observation of others, are 
ascribed to a supernatural agency […]” (13). This, he believes, is because 
they had no concept of unified personality or soul (15). Therefore, they 
projected whatever was the cause of shame for them to some extrinsic 
force (17), mainly because what mattered to them was not guilt or “the 
fear of god” but shame or “public opinion” (18, 31). So insanity, as a cause 
of shame, was not attributed to their own egos but to daemons.
Afterwards, Dodds enumerates and explicates the four types of mad-
ness that Socrates mentions in the Phaedrus:
1) Prophetic madness, whose patron god is Apollo.
2) Telestic or ritual madness, whose patron is Dionysus.
3) Poetic madness, inspired by the Muses.
4) Erotic madness, inspired by Aphrodite and Eros. (64, also see 
Phaedrus 244–245c)
He again reiterates that madness has always been ascribed to super-
natural forces, but here he generalizes his statement to a universal claim 
based on which all primitive people believed in the supernatural cause of 
insanity. The reason behind this is the afflicted people’s claims that testi-
fied to its truth (62–66). This creates an ambivalent social position for 
the insane: on the one hand, they are ostracized; on the other hand, they 
are awesome because of their supernatural connections (68). Discussing 
the first two types of madness, Dodds observes that both Apollo and 
Dionysus were essential to the Archaic Age. While Apollo imposes reason 
and order, Dionysus provides opportunities for psychological purgation 
and carnival freedom (76).
Since the ancient times did not benefit from documented historiogra-
phy, people depended on poets’ “vision of the past” which was denied to 
ordinarily people. It is this very insight to past or present that associates 
Massih Zekavat:     Comparative Study of the Poetics of Plato and Qur ā˒n
49
poets to seers; they both (pretend to) transcend the natural world to at-
tain it. So among Muses’ gifts is “the power of true speech,” (81) which 
contradicts Plato’s major objection against poetry, namely that it is merely 
a body of lies. Of course, the question of poetic ecstasy is not neces-
sarily bound to its claim to truth. Epic poets, for instance, though they 
possessed transcendental knowledge, were not frenzied. In fact, Dodds 
observes that the notion of frenzied poet cannot be traced back before 
the fifth century BCE. He speculates that this notion might be “a by-
product of the Dionysiac movement with its emphasis on the value of 
abnormal mental states, not merely as avenues to knowledge, but for their 
own sake.” The first writer who we actually know has discussed poetic 
ecstasy is Democritus, “who held that the finest poems were those com-
posed, ‘with inspiration and a holy breath,’ and denied that anyone could 
be a great poet sine furore” (82).
Plato is a follower of this thought. As he takes rationality and argu-
mentation as the true tests of knowledge, he denies knowledge to poets 
and seers, “not because he thought them necessarily groundless, but be-
cause their grounds could not be produced.” As the result, he subjects 
poetic creation to censorship. Still, both Socrates and Plato take poetic 
inspiration very seriously as evidenced in Plato’s sustained discussion of 
poetry (216–217). Dodds draws three conclusions from his discussion 
of Plato. First, poetry and madness are supposed to be interrelated and 
caused by inspiration. Second, “the traditional religious explanations of 
these phenomena were […] accepted by him provisionally […] because 
no other language was available to express that mysterious ‘givenness’.” 
Third, though he believes that poets are divinely inspired, he held that they 
should be restrained by the superior faculty of reason (217–218).
Likewise, junūn, possession by jinn and/or madness, is a similar accusa-
tion against the poets in the Arab and Islamic traditions. The more serious 
one of the two reasons Jones mentions for Muh.ammad’s concern for po-
etry is that “From the beginning the Arabs had linked their poets with magic 
or, at least, preternatural, non-human forces […] There is ample evidence 
that poets (and likewise kāhins, soothsayers) were believed to have a preter-
natural driving force, given various names: khalīl (euphemistic “friend, com-
panion” […]), jinn and even shayt. ān — the Greek daimōn” (112). In Arabic, 
majnūn is derived from jinn, the plural form of jānn (Chabbi 46). “Majnūn is 
the passive participle of the verb janna, ‘to cover or to conceal’. The passive 
verb means ‘to be possessed, mad or insane’” (Dols 3). Jinn and Shayt. ān 
were synonyms, especially with regard to poetic inspiration, in the pre-Is-
lamic period. Poets were believed to be inspired by their jinn. “Soothsayers 
and poets were both said to be madjnūn, literally ‘djinn-possessed’ or ‘in-
PKn, letnik 38, št 3, Ljubljana, december 2015
50
spired by the djinn’” (Welch 1101). Besides in junūn, the significance of 
non-human intervention was simultaneously acknowledged in divination, 
i.e. access to knowledge (sometimes about future) through metaphysical 
methods. This is similar to the notion of inspiration by the Muses and ora-
cles in Greek tradition. Prophets have also been accused of being majnūn.
According to Qur āʾn, many prophets have been accused to be majnūn. 
“Muh.ammad’s opponents in Mecca, seeing the similarity between the 
form of his message and the sadjʿ (rhymed prose) oracles of the soothsay-
ers, argued that his messages were not revealed by God but were inspired 
by the djinn” (Welch 1101). Qur āʾn invariably defends him against these 
accusations in several verses (see 81:19–25 as an example). Most scholars 
consent that such verses were revealed at the earlier Meccan periods, be-
fore Muh.ammad immigrated to Madina. This actually constitutes the in-
cipient stages of his prophethood. As Bauer states, these verses “serve to 
affirm the veracity of the prophet’s mission against the suspicions of his 
adversaries, who would accuse a prophet of being either a liar […], a poet 
[…], a sorcerer […], a diviner […], or a majnūn” (539–540). Yet, although 
they might sound like prophets, they cannot be true prophets, because 
none of them tells the truth.
The charges of possession by jinn or shayāt. īn against Muh.ammad are 
invariably denied in Qur āʾn. One of the most significant cases which also 
binds the question of possession to poetry is that of sūra 26 explained 
above. Yet, the interpretation of the last verses of this sūra has proved to 
be controversial. I will summarize the controversy that broke between 
Irfan Shahīd and Michael Zwettler over the interpretation of these verses 
because it has many implications in understanding the poetics of Qur āʾn. In 
a 1983 article, Shahīd argues that these verses do not accuse poets of being 
liars but they refer to “their inability to fulfill what they had promised to 
do—to ‘deliver the goods’.” The nature of their promise, he maintains, was 
to create something similar to Qur āʾn. So, ʾāya 26:226 maintains the inimi-
tability of Qur āʾn sublimity and the issue of tah.addī/ʿijāz (8). The exceptions 
of ʾāya 26:227, accordingly, would be H. assān b. Thābit, Kaʿb b. Mālik, and 
ʿAbdullāh b. Rawāh.a who promoted the cause of Islam in Madina (17).
In 1986, Zwettler maintains that both kāhin and shāʿir were believed 
to be possessed and just repeated the words they received (“Manifesto” 
77). “But as discourse their [i.e. pre-Islamic poets’] words neither com-
manded what was good and reputable nor forbade what was evil and rep-
rehensible: poems were not framed nor poets fit to be obeyed” (79). 
Accordingly, Zwettler sees the denunciation of poets in the last verses of 
the chapter “Poets” as a denial of their ability for leadership. He argues 
that poets did not do what they preached, while God’s messengers, 
Massih Zekavat:     Comparative Study of the Poetics of Plato and Qur ā˒n
51
Muh.ammad in particular, did follow his own preaching. But he adds an-
other justification as well: obedience (116–119). People are obliged only to 
God and the prophet Muh.ammad and should not obey anyone else, in-
cluding the poets. Zwettler’s refutations of Shahīd’s previous interpreta-
tion of this ʾāya as tah.addī provoked Shahīd’s response where he repeats 
his previous claims while adding new evidence. He reads these verses as a 
contingent response to the tension between Islam and specific poets and 
poetry and maintains that Qur āʾn does not denounce poetry outright, but 
merely condemns Muḥammad’s opponents. In the end, Shahīd concludes 
Qur āʾn was thought of as setting the standards of literary excellence. “The 
religious dogma,” therefore, “has thus impacted literature for the last fif-
teen centuries and continues to do so” (“Final” 219–220).
Zwettler again responded in 2007. He also insists on his previous posi-
tion by contending that it was necessary to distinguish Muh.ammad’s di-
vine message from those of familiar jinn-inspired poets. Rejecting Shahīd’s 
thesis throughout, he maintains,
Sūrat aš-Šuʿarāʾ is a “manifesto” that […] establishes beyond any doubt the le-
gitimacy and propriety of OBEYING a certain kind mantic individual—the Messenger 
who is indeed “directed” by an unseen power (as were jinn-inspired poets and 
kuhhān)—, but of obeying him precisely because for him, as for other messengers 
and prophets before him, the unseen director is God, THE God […] in Whose 
name and by Whose authority Muh.ammad recites and commands! (155–156)
This, in its turn, inspired another response by Shahīd in 2008. But I do 
not intend to argue on either side of the argument. Besides the illuminat-
ing implications of this discussion on poetry, what is important for my 
purpose is that there are two interpretations of poets and poetry in the last 
verses of sūra 26. First, poets are those who lead people astray from obey-
ing God and his true prophet; second, they constitute a Satanic denomina-
tion (rather than erring human beings) and are challenged to create some-
thing as sublime as Qur āʾn (that is to say, ʿijaz and tah.addī).
Also, one should not forget that despite the rest of sūra 26, the last 
verse is Madinan. Muh.ammad faced many challenges from poets at the 
early stages of his mission in Mecca. He lacked the necessary power to 
confront his enemies in Mecca, so he had to immigrate to Madina where 
he gained political and military power. But, after the immigration of 
Muslims to Madina, and the setting up of some establishments and institu-
tions, Muh.ammad employed poetry to further his cause. Many poets who 
had opposed Islam and satirized Muh.ammad were excused by him after 
the conquest of Mecca. Moreover, several poets, including H.  assān b. 
Thābit, Bujayr b. Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā, and Kaʿb b. Zuhayr served the 
PKn, letnik 38, št 3, Ljubljana, december 2015
52
cause of Islam sometime during their lives. Among the implications of this 
shift in the attitude toward poetry and poets is a strategic employment of 
poetry for political ends which again underscores its significant socio-po-
litical status. This can partly account for the fact that in its direct condem-
nations, Qur āʾn aims at poets, not poetry as a genre.
Although their contradictory reasons lead to their similar reprimand of 
poetry in the end, both Plato and Qur āʾn ironically manifest significant po-
etic inclinations themselves. Some critics have gone so far as to call Plato 
a poet. More prudent ones, however, just underscore the poetic quality 
of his works. Ferrari, for instance, declares that “the dialogues are […] a 
poetic and philosophic call to the philosophic life” (148). Likewise, Qur āʾn 
also manifests many poetic properties like narration and narrative tech-
niques, and extensive use of rhetorical devices and tropes (Boullatta 204; 
Kugel 20; Nöldeke et al 28, 63, 98, 117).
One reason behind the extensive employment of poetic devices could 
be an attempt to achieve the highest societal and political appeal/impact 
that Plato (with regard to the socio-political order he advocated and in his 
opposition to the performativity of poetry) and Qur āʾn (in winning con-
verts and promoting ethics) sought to obtain. In other words, they stra-
tegically resort to the possibilities offered by what they denounce, i.e. po-
etry, in order to promote their own causes. I have already discussed Plato’s 
concerns with the performative nature of poetry; here I will briefly elabo-
rate on the performative qualities of Qur āʾn. It is replete with imperatives 
that prove it was actually meant as oral communication. As Kermani also 
observes in his discussion of Qur āʾn, “If a text is explicitly composed for 
recitation, fulfilling its poetic purpose only when recited or—more gener-
ally speaking—performed, it should be viewed as a score […] Although a 
score can be read or hummed quietly in private, it is ultimately intended to 
be performed” (qtd. in Neuwirth “Rhetoric” 470).
As evidenced in the discussion of Plato and Qur āʾn, poetry and perfor-
mance (one can also mention ethical concerns) are closely associated in 
both Greek and Arabic traditions. Yet, Qur āʾn does not fear public perfor-
mance and recitation; it is actually made for public performance in order 
to win more converts, and to assure the faithful of their conviction. Even 
the title of Qur āʾn, meaning “recitation” and often “reading aloud,” does 
signal this sense. Although this might sound like contradicting Plato’s at-
titude, one should not forget that, ironically, even he also simultaneously 
resorts to the rhetorical possibilities offered by poetry.
The relationship of poetry and performance inevitably links it with 
prophecy and possession, on the other hand. The possessed also em-
Massih Zekavat:     Comparative Study of the Poetics of Plato and Qur ā˒n
53
ployed poetic language and the prophecies and performed recitations. 
Kāhins (soothsayers), also referred to as “false prophets,” resorted to 
some literary devices including sajʿ. Consequently, Muh.ammad was ac-
cused of being majnūn, a poet, kāhin, and being instructed by someone 
else. His revelations were accordingly renounced as tales and fabrications. 
Jews of the Islamic world, for instance, assaulted Muh.ammad by deroga-
torily calling him a “madman” and “defective.” They had borrowed the 
latter from his Arab opponents who called him majnūn, and associated the 
epithet with Hosea 9:7: “The prophet was distraught, the inspired man 
driven mad by constant harassment” (Cohen 154).
Previous prophets were also called insane and magician, but kāhin and 
poet were exclusively used for Muh.ammad. This shows the importance of 
these two castes during the pre-Islamic period, though their statuses de-
clined after Islam. “Muh.ammad acknowledged that the kāhin received his 
knowledge from a spirit through possession (majnūn), i.e. a personal rela-
tionship with a jinn who observes from the sky events below and relays 
this information to his confidant(s)” (Fahd “Divination” 544). And even 
Qur āʾn does not deny the transmission of messages through kāhins and 
jinns, although both the profession and its customers are condemned. 
Nor did Muh.ammad “deny the superhuman origin of their [i.e. poets’ and 
soothsayers’] utterances” (Heinrichs 121). Fahd, furthermore, emphasizes 
that divination was not condemned outright because Muh.ammad’s pro-
phetic vocation was considered its extension (544–545).
Despite his hostility towards poets, Plato has ironically provided the 
basis of western poetics and literary theory. Likewise, Islam and Qur āʾn 
have drastically changed the course of literature in Islamic cultures so far 
as most poets in these traditions heavily rely on religion and Qur āʾn, and 
frequently emulate, allude to, or react against it. For instance, the Persian 
mystic literary tradition, that is adabīyāt-i ʿirfānī, is founded upon the 
Qur āʾnic heritage, and many Islamic mystics have written poetic works. 
But this only breeds further ambivalence because, as Stepein notes in his 
study of ʿAt. t. ār, a Persian poet who extensively integrates ʿirfān (i.e. mysti-
cism) in his poetry, early Islamic scholars considered poetry to be un-Is-
lamic (78–79). Stepein asserts that while ʿAt. t. ār believed that Muh.ammad 
graded poetry from bad to good (91–92), he still saw religion and poetry 
as incompatible (80–81). But as ʿ At. t. ār was himself a poet, these contradic-
tions drove him to apophasis which he resolved by elevating poetry to the 
level of prophetic revelation. Halman also discerns the ambivalent attitude 
of Islam towards poets and poetry in Qur āʾn and h.adīth. As we have already 
seen, Qur āʾn denounces them, while “the Prophet, who also offered his 
PKn, letnik 38, št 3, Ljubljana, december 2015
54
animadversions, said in a h.adīth considered s.ah. īh. , or authentic, ‘God has 
Treasures beneath his Throne, the Keys of which are the Tongues of the 
Poets.’ The same ambivalence has been true of the attitudes of the ʿ ulamāʾ, 
many of whom approved of verse as an effective medium for the dis-
semination of the faith, but remained wary of its non-religious themes and 
seductive powers” (239).
Thus, both Plato and Qur āʾn are deeply concerned with poetry’s infidel-
ity to truth and its socio-political impact, on the one hand. On the other 
hand, they are aware that poetry is very influential and highly esteemed in 
their societies. This accounts for their ambivalent attitudes towards poetry 
manifested in their repudiation of it while acknowledging its societal im-
pact and resorting to poetic properties at the same time. This has led to 
comparable similarities and/or differences in the ensuing impact of Plato 
and Qur āʾn as two seminal influences not only in the poetics but also in 
the cultures of many traditions. Moreh, for instance, contrasts Arabic and 
European poetics:
the poetics of Arabic language should conform to the language of the K. urʾān and 
address itself to serious subjects. As such, a fundamental difference exists between 
Arabic and European poetics. The European understanding of poetics as a sys-
tematic science of literature, as art, as communication, as an expression of culture 
in history and as a personal creation, was a concept which was not rediscovered 
by Arab poets until the 20th century. (462)
This is despite Dodds’ suggestion that, “his [Plato’s] general distinction 
between ‘divine’ madness and the ordinary kind which is caused by dis-
ease […] is of course older than Plato” (65). Later on, he declares that, 
“the association of prophecy and madness belongs to the Indo-European 
stock of ideas” (70). This justifies the common notion of poet as pos-
sessed in these two cultures. The disparity between these two traditions, 
however, could be attributed to what Murrin actually implies in his obser-
vation. The ancient Greek world did not feature a religion founded upon 
revealed sacred texts; therefore, poets claimed divine inspiration and re-
layed the oracles they received. Accordingly, there was no absolute distinc-
tion between the poet and the prophet. Yet, this conception was hardly 
ever endorsed in revealed religions. Therefore, after Muh.ammad, the last 
prophet, inspiration must have been discontinued.
I do not intend to identify the origin of these similarities and differenc-
es. I have attempted to expound the similarities and differences in Plato 
and Qur āʾn as the founding texts of different literary traditions which have 
exerted utmost historical, geographical, and cultural impacts, and explain 
the reasons behind their attitudes toward poetry by historicizing and con-
Massih Zekavat:     Comparative Study of the Poetics of Plato and Qur ā˒n
55
textualizing them in order to suggest the possibilities that their poetics 
offer for our contemporary contexts.
According to Plato’s and Qur āʾn’s conceptions, poetry is closely associ-
ated with elation, inspiration, ecstasy, frenzy, and discipline (in Plato), while 
it also performs significant socio-political, ‘worldly’ functions. Therefore, 
poetry (and by extension, literature and hence literary studies) can be seen 
as transcending and reaching beyond material borders without abandon-
ing material territories. Accordingly, literature can function as something 
that transcends the borders of gender, sex, nationality, race, ethnicity, and 
religion (while it does not ignore the long-standing discriminations on these 
axes); it can madly defy and subvert logical rules, regulations, and norms and 
undermine conformity and the logic of domination. I am trying to suggest 
that poetry and literature with their ambivalent status in these two traditions 
might be an alternative to a binary logic (of opposition) and/or to funda-
mentalism which do not embrace and welcome, let alone promote, poetry. 
Poetry can function to circumvent them, and provide alternative grounds. 
I hope this paper has shed a new light on poetics of Plato and Qur āʾn in 
order to facilitate the understanding of how they conceive of poets and 
poetry, and convey the contextual reasons behind their attitudes. Since they 
are they are among the influential predecessors of many ensuing traditions, 
the impact of their poetics extends far beyond their immediate literary, cul-
tural, and historical milieu. A comparative study of their poetics, therefore, 
can hopefully promote cross-cultural understanding, tolerance, and peace. 
Moreover, as witnessed in these literary traditions, the significant socio-
political status of literature which partly arises from its performative nature, 
and from its transgressive and defiant functions that can provide alternative 
grounds to common logic and understanding can be employed to appreci-
ate and promote contingent and liberating acts of identity performance.
Acknowledgments: I thank Liran Yadgar who read and commented 
on one of the drafts. Also, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to 
Dr. Gerhard Wedel; I owe him a lot.
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Primerjalna raziskava Platonove poetike in 
poetike Korana
Ključne besede: Platon / Koran / primerjalna poetika / literatura / poezija / resnica / 
navdih
Poetika lahko prispeva k primerjalnim raziskavam in raziskavam sve-
tovne književnosti ter spodbudi vzajemno razumevanje, ki presega meje. 
V članku avtor primerja Platonovo poetiko in poetiko Korana kot temelj-
nih besedil dveh velikih književnih, kulturnih in zgodovinskih tradicij. 
Oba obsojata pesnike in poezijo zaradi različnih razlogov, med drugim 
zaradi njihove nezvestobe resnici, njihovega odnosa do obsedenosti, 
navdiha in norosti ter zaradi moralnih in družbenopolitičnih vprašanj. 
Toda njuna drža ni absolutno odklonilna, ampak prej ambivalentna. Po 
eni strani pesnike in poezijo obsojata, po drugi pa dopuščata izjeme in se 
celo zatekata k možnostim, ki jih ponujajo, da bi dosegla svoje cilje. Kljub 
podobnim obtožbam pesnikov in poezije so med Platonom in Koranom 
razvidne razlike v njunih stališčih in razlogih za njune pomisleke, ki so 
večinoma posledica njunih zgodovinsko pogojenih predstav o družbeni, 
politični in zgodovinski funkciji poezije ter o njenem domnevno nadčlo-
PKn, letnik 38, št 3, Ljubljana, december 2015
58
veškem izvoru. Izkaže se, da je pri Platonu in v Koranu poezija tesno pove-
zana z vzhičenostjo, navdihom, ekstazo in norostjo, hkrati pa opravlja 
pomembne družbenopolitične ali »svetovljanske« funkcije. Ti dve tradiciji 
torej verjameta, da lahko literatura prestopi materialne meje in seže čeznje, 
ne da bi pri tem zapustila materialne teritorije. Ambivalenten položaj 
poezije in literature jima omogoča, da ponudita alternativo dvojni logiki 
(nasprotja) in/ali fundamentalizmu, od katerih nobeden ne sprejema, kaj 
šele spodbuja, poezije. Poleg spodbujanja medkulturnega razumevanja, 
tolerance in miru lahko primerjalna raziskava Platonove poetike in poetike 
Korana ponudi alternative tradicionalni logiki in razumevanju ter omogoči, 
da se možna in osvobajajoča dejanja performiranja identitete primerno 
cenijo in spodbujajo.
Oktober 2015