Paper received: 00.00.200x Paper accepted: 00.00.200x Risk Assessment and Managing Technical Systems in case of Mining Industry Slobodan Radosavljevic1*- Nikola Lilič2 - Srečko Curčič3 - Milan Radosavljevic4 1 Mining Basin R.B. "Kolubara", Lazarevac, Serbia 2 Faculty of Mining and Geology, Belgrade, Serbia 3 Technical Faculty, Čačak, Serbia 4 Township "Lazarevac", Lazarevac, Serbia Global dynamics of the technological changes creates a need for modern approaches while evaluating and analyzing the risk in the mining industry. Analyzing and managing technical systems in the mining industry is a key factor concerning the quality of their functioning. Dependability, safety, and maintenance management based on the risk analysis can contribute substantially to the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the mining technological systems. Besides applying adequate technology, organizing and harmonizing the system links among various structures and standardization is of the great importance in achieving business goals. The choice and use of the optimal solutions in the analysis ought to recognize, anticipate, forestall, reduce, and minimize the risk and possible destructive applications. Practical knowledge indicates the application of major discrepancy and difference when identifying analytical and methodological approaches to this problem in. The outcome of such a situation is real statements of typical and non-typical critical states through destructive potentialities. Either directly or indirectly, they cause a considerable disturbance to the parts of the system as well as to the technological process functioning on the whole. The chances of a proper control and technical systems and processes risk management are offered in reality and can be easily realized. The mining industry of production practice recognizes the need for the strategy of organizational and process redesigning as well as raising this issue to the level of the other managing functions of the company. A realistic view of the present state in the risk analysis shows the need for the rapid transformation in the mining industry of. The study puts forward a proposal for the possible approaches and improvement relating to the following and implementing modern, standardized world trends, (models and methods) concerning the analysis of the technical aspect risk in some of the basic processes in the mining industry. This work was created as a result of research which was conducted during 2004 to 2008. in process of surface exploitation and coil refinement in Serbian mining industry. © 2009 Journal of Mechanical Engineering. All rights reserved. Keywords: mining, mining industry, safety, risk, analysis, management 0 INTRODUCTION The completion of the planned production activities in the mining industry means satisfying complex requirements of reliability and safety of both parts of the system and a whole technological process completely. This is of particular importance for big companies and it also places a special responsibility on them. The control and management of the work position risk becomes a central category of the logistic operability of the top management. The general context of the problem is the need for coming to wise strategic decisions while doing some long-term planning. While pursuing business excellence the companies' ultimate goal is completing safe, dependable, and profitable work, [1]. Within the technological systems of the mining industry there is a real need for the correct positioning of the problem concerning the management of the risk. The analytical and methodological approach to the problem includes: correct and complete risk identification, reduction of the critical potentials to the level of acceptable limits and constant monitoring. A practical problem is to find the way of minimizing typical and atypical states of a failure optimally, as well as detecting accurately the destruction levels with the full critical potentials for technician and technological systems in the mining industry. In the mining industry analytical and methodological approaches to this problem are both partial and different. Concerning that *Corr. Author's Address: RB "Kolubara", Svetog Save 1, 11550 Lazarevac, Serbia, slobodanr@hotmail.com context, production practice recognizes a lot of concrete incompatibility and irrationality. The outcome of such a state is considerable disturbance to the parts of the system or to the whole system functioning. Process management, risk management, and risk managers are factors that can acknowledge and establish the need, regularity, and quality of the risk positioning for the focused technological processes. The realization implies the implementation of the standardized organizational forms, methods, and models. At the same time, overall intergradibility and compatibility of the process at the level of all management functions of the company must be taken into consideration [2]. 1 RISK TECHNICAL SYSTEM During its life cycle technological systems and processes are under the various destructive influences which can considerably reduce the quality of their performance. The chances of unwanted events and anticipated consequences of the events in the even cycle are considered to be a risk in the system analysis during the established length of time or a certain process (the combination of frequency and chances of appearing, as well as the result of a specific prejudicial event), [3] and [4]. The identification of the critical points of the technical systems in the mining industry which can generate risks and risky events is a professional problem. This proves the need for a management approach in both analytical and methodological sense. The risk aspects in the mining industry can be various and are mainly connected with all the influences within/and near the system/process itself: design, [5] redesign, technical, technological, maintaining, ecological, technical protection, sociological, economic, and the other. The risk research carried out on fundamental processes shows that safety, dependability, and security of the systems and processes in the mining industry can be hardly achieved without identifying all the aspects or at least, a large number of them, without expert processing and proposals concerning complete solutions, the ways of following particular suppositions at an expert level and the upper limits of the professional plausibility, [6]. The project focuses on the technical aspect of the risk analysis. The risk can and must be managed. The chances of a risky event occurrence can be reduced to the acceptable level by establishing the adequate control. A high-quality analysis, risk assessment, reduction and monitoring are prerequisites for the prevention of the critical potentials destruction planning. The next step is developing the strategy of a reaction to a failure concerning the recovery from the consequences. The aim and need for the research concerning the risk analysis, reduction, and monitoring, the production practice of the mining industry of recognizes through: • Development of methodology for the system analysis of the process and the system; • Development of criteria and processes for implementation of standards which is of help to the assessment of technical systems risk; • Development of methodology for the assessment of the influences of all identified aspects of the technological complex destructive potentials; • Assessment of the system/process current conditions, as well as the assessment of the real needs for the partial or complete redesign and improvement; • Defining conditions and choosing modes of management of the risk technical system in the mining industry. We can conclude that formulating the adequate strategy for analysis, monitoring and management of a risk is a very complex issue. It is at the very beginning of the professional interest. It requires considering a large number of aspects and parameters of a technological and non-technological kind. The influence of the external and internal environment, organization, studying previous data, as well as the mandatory forecast in the near and distant future are always present. The research done the world wide proves the need for rapider development, standardization of both present and new modes and methods for risk analysis, assessment, reduction, and monitoring. Determinative strategies for the risk assessment and reduction in the technical system of the mining industry can be recognized through the generic powers that form the development of the process by the strategic actions and integration powers created in an organizational and industrial context. Fig. 1. Presentation of relations and bonds in coal processing process, customers' demands and aspects of technical systems of mining industry [2] Fig. 1 shows important variables with generated relations and bonds in the coal processing process. The fundamentals of the process are: accomplishment of planned projections, satisfying the demands of customers, as well as ensuring technical systems in the micro - and macro - context. The starting points in generating a lot of relations and bonds are the quality of coal processing, time as the existing technology life cycle parameter, flexibility of processing and cost analysis. The above named issues become complex when reliability modes are included, but also when viewing the real area of immediate and distant surroundings. When any of the categories mentioned above are excluded, the system compatibility is disturbed in a direct or indirect way, and safe and dependable work is brought in question. The choice between the best possible options in the mining industry includes the balance between the expenditures which have been incurred and the use of the selected technology, according to the realization of the selected technology best results. The explicit role of the expenditure in reducing the risk is noticeable. Negative outcomes and effects concerning the management of the risk are something that is trying to be avoided at all costs. The management of the risk will be more transparent by using the standardization procedure, prescribing standards of management of the risk ISO 31000, which is expected to be prescribed in 2008 [7] and [8]. 2 PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE CONCERNING RISK ANALYSIS IN THE MINING INDUSTRY The research done worldwide indicates the need for the rapid development, standardization of both existing and new models and methods for the risk analysis, assessment, reduction and monitoring. The results of the domestic practice experience can be characterized as follows: There are good regulations which create favorable conditions for the change of the existing state concerning positioning, handling, and monitoring the risk for the focused aspects in the mining industry. The use of standardized methods and models, together with the good practical experience worldwide, is at it the very beginning of the professional possibilities and interests. There are considerable efforts of the scientific public to create positive trends and broaden the experience of the subject matter. Domestic practical experience is typical of its lack of the experts concerning significant and qualitative changes. There are not licensed risk managers who would join the project teams. There are not any institution in charge of schooling and licensing this type of personnel. There is either no implementation of modern standardized models and methods for analysis, reduction, monitoring and managing the risk in the production practice of the mining industry or it is rare. There is a real problem concerning the competence while analyzing the risk. The improvisations and inadequate treatment are frequent in recognizing the risk in the production practice. In companies' organizational models, units of risk management are not provided for. The risk analysis and assessment are not given enough attention in the strategies of top management of companies. The lack of financial and other logistics for rapid transformations and changes of the existing practice and state of affairs is evident. 3 FORMALIZATION OF THE PROBLEM OF RISK ANALYSIS CONCERNING COAL PROCESSING Modern multi-aspect approaches to the occupational safety problems impose the requirements for great degrees of reliability and safety of the process on project and engineering teams. Such requirements are justified by the fact that there is the need for reducing risk. Mining industry is an area of particular interest concerning the use of scientific knowledge within the sphere of risk. Previous requirements strain the relations in the process of system projecting and the need for redesigning the existing ones which have been functioning for a long time. The question is whether engineering teams are able to recognize new requirements and approaches? Some surveys show that one part of project teams accepts and recognizes new requirements concerning the process/system design and redesign with difficulty or does not accept and recognize them at all. The reasons for this can be: consciousness, culture, educational problem, training for new methods and techniques which are in the function of new approaches. Selecting basic events of technological processes in coal processing is an important and responsible task for the risk analyst or a multi-disciplinary team. Proposed events basically close the continued technological process flow. Being like that, they have to be both representative and respectable enough. The omission of any of the events while selecting, even those that seem to be less important, is basically a major fault of analysts. A fault can influence the final outcome to greater or lesser extent, in a direct or indirect way, while positioning system within the context of risk limits/possibility of risky events occurrence. As a final outcome, it can cause the use of the unplanned financial resources. A safe, secure, and dependable functioning of the system is threatened. Such faults need to be completely avoided/eliminated. The chosen technological process, coal processing within the third phase of Dry Separation of the Mining Basin "Kolubara" Lazarevac, is fully defined and closed by the following events 7 Fig. 2. Distribution station: (1.1. Belt conveyor C-11; 1.2. Distribution bunker; 1.3. Belt conveyor T-240). Run of mine coal bunker: (2.1. Run of mine coal bunker; 2.2. Coal shoveling machine A-131 and B- 131; Belt conveyor T-132), Crusher plant: (3.1. Sieve grate 242 A and 242 B; 3.2. Hammer mill 243 A and 243; 3.3. Belt conveyor T-312; 3.4. Belt conveyor T-244) and Loading station: (4.1. Belt conveyor T-350; 4.2. Re-distribution loading coal bunker). Further course of work on the problem analysis implies an in-depth analysis of each defined event, together with the positioning the risk limit in two directions: the risk system aspect as the variable that influences of the base process. What follows is a presentation of a detailed decomposition for the chosen event. The stem decomposing is accomplished to the third level. Further decomposition is unnecessary because all structure modes are detected. According to them, the characterization of all critical potential with influences is possible. During the decomposition process the method Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is employed. The examined interaction of events and faults in the project gives a rank order/combination of critical elements. A systematic approach is provided and at the sometimes a considerable flexibility as well, in consideration of the advantages of a multi-variation analysis. Then there is a stem of events production, which is accomplished by using standardized logical symbols. Repeating the steps until the required amount, and according to real limitations, primary and secondary faults are identified, and the stem is completed to the lower level of identification of the fundamental fault/another starting event. The completed stem has enabled the evaluation of the system/process including the cross-sectional cluster (minimum of sequence which has resulted in upper event occurrence or critical way). In the FTA has determined probability of events by using logical relations and bonds for calculating a relative risk while redesigning the existing system [9] and [10]. 4 EXPERIMENTAL PART AND THE ADOPTED METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND THE STARTING POINTS Design safe is a tool for the users who are familiar with modern demands of the designing and redesigning processes. They must be provided with a complete and quality knowledge of technological processes which are the subject of the analysis. They must be able to take the results of the analysis and expertly develop the engineering solutions to the risk reduction. The analyst of the safety analysis is responsible for solving all the problems emerging within that context. Design safe is a guide and an engineering tool, where the user's skills, experience and expertise make a crucial component while creating results. The quality and selection of the data that the analyst enters in the programme is an essential component. Inferior/incomplete data reduce the validity of the output results. With such options, errors are treated as subjective ones. The tools used in the analysis pay a particular attention to the remaining part of the reduced risk while assessing it, before they are focused on the risk levels. The same have been implemented in the subject analysis and assessment (MIL STD 882, ANSI B11, EN 1050, TR3 etc.). One of the most impressive and progressive models was developed by Manuele [4]. At the same time, this is a quantitative model for assessing the most progressive models using the matrix of the dimension 4-4-5 and three factors in developing the general assessment and evaluation of the selected top event as a critical potential for the origin of a failure/incident, (accuracy, exposure and probability), (Table 1). In the analysis it is Design safe tools for which it is necessary to define the sources of information as well as limitations. The sources of information for the subject analysis are the following: • The experience of following the process of the coal processing functioning, • Interviews with subjects who are either direct or indirect participants within the working process, • Testing the collected data, • The history of failure connected with the process of coal processing at the Dry Separation, - the available database of RB (Coal Mining Basin) Kolubara, Kolubara Prerada (Kolubara Processing), • Management expert meetings, (the available data), • Notes from scientific gatherings and symposiums whose subject was the risks and safety in mining/the process of coal processing and. • Experts' assessments and suggestions connected with the problems of the risk analysis. The facts that the analysis of the single decomposed technical units, which are a part of the process of coal processing, are considered to be a limitation. Within that context the analysis may be considered to be partial. There is a resistance of the operative management and the employees to this approach as a result of not recognizing the needs for the analysis. There are no organizational units for the multidisciplinary approach to the risk problems on the platform of the company's managing functions. According to the collected data, the general constitution of the participants in the process (directly or indirectly connected with the hammer mill 243A) has been presented. The structure of their work/failure addressed/delegated. Fig. 2. Presentation of decomposition bases of the first stage ofprocess - coal processing at Mining Basin "Kolubara"[2] Table 1. The display of the original values of the Quantitative model for the assessment of the risk and the matrix of the dimension 4-4-5 [4] Manuele Three Factor risk model: assessment severity-exposure frequency-probability_ Assessment severity Index Exposure Index Probability Index Risk level Index Catastrophic 50 Frequently 13 Frequent 15 High > 800 Critical 40 Occasionally 10 Possible 9 Serious 500-800 Moderate 25 Seldom 7 Occasional 4 Moderate 200-500 Low 10 Minimal 4 Minor 1 Low 0-200 Impossible 0,5 Chart 2 displays risk analysis with suggested methods for reduction of every mod failure in partial Rotor crusher 1.1. Following methods of risk reduction are offered: • Prevention negativism failure model,1.1, • Replacement of critical parts for each failure model, 1.2., • Isolation of every failure model as specific risk, 1.3. Detailed display of reasons for failure models is presented as and resolving technical modes for risk reduction. At a same time risk addressing is executed in context of delegating authority and responsibility for implementation of suggested technical modes with constantmonitoring. Chart also displays final exploitation of risk by using corrective modes and categorizing risk levels [11] and [12]. " 2. Tape Transport T-240 Technical analysis - designsafe File Edit View Reports Library Help d i? y X gl sa p m »i|t Hazard Analysis Risk Assessment Sub-process User Task Hazard Wear construction function Failure Overcharge Sub-process I User Task Hazard Severity Frequency o | Probability |Risk Level Risk V Risk Reduction Method(s) | Severity | Frequency Probability | Risk Level Risk v(| Status 1 Wear construction function ure Overcharge Critical • Occasional Frequent High 1000 prevent energy buildup Medium Infrequent Occasion Moderate 275 :: On-going 2 Wear construction function ure Vibrationimpact Critical Often Frequent High 1120 separate hazard / people in ti Medium Infrequent Occasion Moderate 275 ;; On-going 3 Wear construction function ure Fatigue material Critical Often Frequent High 1120 substitute less hazardous mat Medium Infrequent Occasion Moderate 275 ii On-going 4 Wear construction function ure Defeat Critical Occasional Frequent High 1000 slow down energy release Medium Infrequent Remote Low 200 •Complete 5 Wear construction function ure Tear Critical Occasional Frequent High 1000 slow down energy release Medium Infrequent Occasion Moderate 275 ;; On-going 6 Wear construction function ure ;Breakage Critical Often Frequent High 1120 orevent energy release ; Medium Seldom Occasion Low 200 N Complete 7 Wear construction function ure Deformation Medium Infrequent Remote ;Low 200 slow down energy release ; Medium Infrequent Remote Low 200 ;; Complete S Wear construction i function ure Abrasion Critical Occasional Frequent High 1000 slow down energy release i Medium Seldom Occasion Low 200 ii Complete 9 Wear construction function ure Bevel Critical Occasional Frequent High 1000 prevent energy release Medium Infrequent Remote Low 200 ;; Complete 10 Wear construction ; function ure Quality Catastrophic Often Frequent High 1400 separate hazard / people in ti ; Medium Infrequent Remote Low 200 ii Complete 11 Wear construction function ure Kontrol Critical Often Frequent High 1120 other design change I Medium Infrequent Remote Low 200 i; Complete 12 Wear construction function ure Rest Catastrophic Often Frequent High 1400 prevent energy buildup Medium Infrequent Remote Low 200 ii Complete < II Severity Frequency of Exposure Probability F Catastrophic (SO) T Often (13) P Frequent (15) P Critical (4«) P Occasional (10) T Likely (9) T Medium (25) I- Infrequent (7) I-Occasional (4) r Minimal (10) T Seldom (4) rRemote(1) I-Improbable (0.50) Fig. 3. Displays input data of starting risk evaluation, suggested measures for reduction, final evaluation and addressing risk for partial HammerCcrusher 243A Fig. 4. Displays documenting and report selection of executed risk evaluation with graphic state positioning for part-piece Hammer Crusher 243A Table 2. Displays risk analysis with method for reduction for Rotor Crusher (1.1), (OG/On-going) Hammer crusher 243A: 1.1. Rotor crusher Fred A. Manuele "Three Factor risk model": severity estimate /frequency exposure - Nature/ mod Hazard/wa y failure Default appraisal Risk level Risk reduction method Final assessment Risk level Stat us Function Breakage 1120 Prevent energy buildup 1.1., Substitute less hazardous material 1.2. 400 OG C O F higt M I L moder ate Function Deformati on 760 Prevent energy buildup 1.1. 350 OG C O L seriou M O O moder ate Function Fatigue materijal 1400 Substitute less hazardous material 1.2. 475 OG C O F higt M O L moder ate Function Damage 1000 Prevent energy buildup 1.1. 275 OG C O F higt M I O moder ate Function Wear 1400 Prevent energy buildup 1.1. 475 OG C O F higt M I O moder ate Function Heating 1400 Prevent energy buildup 1.1. 475 OG C O F higt M O L moder ate Function Skew 760 Prevent energy buildup 1.1. 350 OG C O L seriou M O O moder ate Function Overcharg e 1400 Separate hazard 1.5. 440 OG C O F higt K I O moder ate Function Vibration/ blow 1120 Separate hazard 1.5. 350 OG C O F higt M O O moder ate Function Blockade 1120 Prevent energy buildup 1.1., Separate hazard 1.5. 350 OG C O F higt M I O moder ate Function Pluck 760 Prevent energy buildup 1.1. 275 OG C O L seriou M I O moder ate Function Rest C O L 880 Prevent energy buildup 1.1. M I O 275 moder ate OG higt 5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION It is by the decomposition of the essential process of coal processing that six sub-processes and twenty sub-process functions have been identified. Each of the sub-process functions has realistically a high level of critical potentials as well as potentials of extremely high destruction level, if the total and complicated operation is concerned. Of all the sub-processes an extremely high risk level has been addressed at the place of coal grinding/crushing, (the index value 1400). The risk level within the range of high threshold (800 to 1400) has been delegated by other sub-processes. This is completely in accordance with the performed partial risk analysis for the complete process of coal processing. The technical and technological aspect of the problem in analytical terms, confirms the real positioning of high risk thresholds in almost all parts of the process. The analysis of individual events of the system for coal processing in over 95 % of the cases delegates the zone of high risk threshold, (index 800 to 1400). Although the range of this threshold is realistically wide, all the selected events are over (index 1120). As this zone is one with an unacceptable risk, it is necessary to delegate the best possible reduction option by the choice of adequate methods for independent operation or their combination, which has been done in the analysis. The analysis of the process indicates some influences according to the analytical account of each selected event. They have been detected in technical and technological terms and on the basis of that presented via the modes of possible destructive potentials with the exposition of hazards. The problems that occur most frequently have standard characteristics. Untypical problems are characteristic merely of the selected event or group of events in the sequence of the projected series of the technological line of the process. The field of the risk reduction for the identified aspect is rather large and covers the index from 180 to 1400, (Table 3). Such basis sets a realistically high target threshold for reducing the risk. In such circumstances it is not possible to perform the adequate risk reduction in one attempt and with the application of one method. The reduction has been performed in two or three attempts and two or more methods have been applied. The most frequent forms of critical potentials for the failure conditions of the selected events of the system for coal processing are the following: the overloading of the components, substructures and system, vibrations as well as various kinds of impacts, fatigue, material breaking, various kinds of structural damage, fatigue failure, deformations, the system wear, curvatures resulting from the work instability and unreliability concerning protection, the quality of built-in components, incompetent control - man factor, the operators' incompetence within the system and negligence during the performance of the working activities, the influence of undetected destructive potentials, the influence of the environment and other forms. The most frequent causes of the previously detected forms of the critical conditions are the following: mechanical breaks of substructures and structures, various kinds of typical and untypical deformities, bending, twisting, elongations, shearing, breaking, curvatures, material cleavages, cracks, pipes occurring while casting, hidden material deficiencies, corrosion due to the toxicologically aggressive environment or weather conditions, wearing out during which warming and heating of the components occur at work as a consequence of badly projected conditions, burning at work - rubber, other typical and untypical destructions. As the causes and the manifested failures are directly interdependent, the field thresholds for the system of coal processing can be extended for the following forms: inadequate dimension, inadequate tolerance, thick/thin roughness, oval, eccentricity, wrong choice of material, insufficient strength/hardness, bad quality thermal treatment, corrosion, inadequate/bad quality protection, high temperature, high/low voltage, insufficient/extremely high loading moment, insufficient/excessive force etc. According to the above mentioned, the field of consequences expressed by destructive events can be extended for the following forms: the system does not function, the function is partially reduced, impeded handling and commanding, the system does not realize the working performance, work breaks, reduced comfort during the system operation, the shortening of life expectancy and vibrations during the system operation. The analysis of the technological system for coal processing indicates that some destructions can be completely identified in the bases of the standardized and coded kinds of failures for general technical systems in industry and mining engineering. The methods applied in the project for the risk reduction of the technical aspect are the following: the negativity prevention, the preventive replacement of material, preventing the development of negativity, slowing down negativity, the isolation of destruction as a particular risk and projecting new solutions. The proposed methods for the reduction provide in one, two or three steps, the necessary reduction to the limits of the tolerance risk, i.e. the acceptable risk threshold. For some events of the system the acceptable risk is as far as (the index 570), which in the upper part of the sequences enters the range of the serious risk threshold. The risk level of the whole system for coal processing, after performing the reduction, reaches the maximum (index 275). The obtained index level does not exceed the moderate risk threshold, hence it can be considered satisfactory and acceptable. It has been stated that the essential aim in the project for the identified risk Tab. 3. Presentation of initial and reduced risk level for the complete process ofproduction system of coal processing-Technical aspect, [2] Technological process of the third phase of Risk analysis-technical as coal Dru Separation-pect State and status assessment Initial level of risk- index 1120 Value in the zone of high level risk Unacceptable risk High risk Reduced level of risk -index 275 Value in the zone of moderate level risk Acceptable risk -further work on reduction and maintenance of risk in the low level risk zone is necessary Moderate risk Analysis process completed Index established Comment on risk level Final comment on risk analysis aspect has been achieved. By applying the stated instructions the analyzed process can be found within the zone of the acceptable risk, which guarantees the total reliability and safety of the system operating as a whole. The technical modes that should be applied by the chosen methods during the risk reduction are the following: the redesign of the components or of the whole event, the standard and quality while building in, the increased level of control, the adequate supervision, the standard and quality of the purchased material, the replacement of some components by materials of better quality, quality anti-corrosive protection for aggressive environment, preventive and current maintenance, the responsibility/education of operators, the standardization of the system, standard/special procedures for treatments, and other typical and untypical modes [13] and [14]. While addressing the risks, the analysis proves to be multidisciplinary, which can be concluded on the basis of the structure/number of the subjects who have been delegated the authority for the risk reduction. Minimizing the risk turns out to be necessary and possible in the procedure of designing components, substructures, structures, individually selected events as well as the whole technological system. As the technical system that has already been functioning is in question, there is a possibility of the realization of the strategy of the partial redesign in realistic time and space. Addressing the risk after the reduction has been performed according to: the designer of the components, substructures, structures, individually selected events or systems, the designer of the process, the constructor, the static's engineer, the chemical engineer, the chemical engineer for welding, the investor, the contractor - installer, the operator, the tire repairman, the locksmith, the electrician, the electronic engineer, the maintenance engineer, the material manager, the material storekeeper, the quality controller, the control supervisor, the expert on the systems of coal processing, the engineer for fire fighting prevention, the system management and the risk analyst. The analysis with the risk reduction has been documented in the database of Kolubara Prerada (Kolubara Processing) and in the written form via listing delivered to all the interested subjects. It is available for necessary analyses, updating and archiving, [7] and [15]. 6 CONCLUSION The paper focuses on important issues in relation to the treatment, reduction and managing risks, [15]. These are important segments for the successful designing and redesign of the existing technological processes in mining engineering. The aim is to reach the necessary quality for standard relation. In, the problems of assessing the risk through the implementation of modern models and methods in the production practice of mining engineering have been solved rarely so far. The raised questions indicate the following: • A different approach to solving the problems of managing risks in mining engineering. Respecting the requirements which are set before the top management within the context of reliability and safety of the working process. The compatibility of the process in case transfers are rationally possible as well as the implementation of the experience from other sectors; [2] • Raising the questions of standardization of the models and methods which are implanted for the analysis and the risk reduction, • The possibilities of the analytical and methodological approach to the implementation [3] of modern methods and models in practice, [16]; • Redesign of the risk management for the processes of mining engineering; • Redesign of the technical subsystems following the concept of activating the complete logistics of the management resources and [4] reaching the standard quality thresholds characteristic of mining engineering; • Defining the database which is necessary for [5] IS (Information System) of the protection with active involvement of the module (of the Process analysis and risk reduction). The constant risk monitoring for basic processes in mining engineering; • The necessity of redesign and active using the existing IS. Including the risk management on [6] the platform of the process courses within the internal and external environment; • The necessity of staff education, preparation and risk management in mining engineering, • The necessity of standardization and [7] introducing IMS /Integrated Management System of Quality/ in mining engineering [15], and • The necessity of generating the quality of [8] integrative and communicational courses of all structures in n mining engineering [17g and [18]. Risk management, total risk management and risk managers: new resource categories and [9] profiles. New chance within the strategic orientations of companies towards the analysis, reduction, control, monitoring and risk management. 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