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Institute for Contemporary Social and Political Studies





NATION–STATES  
AND XENOPHOBIAS:  
IN THE RUINS OF  
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

EDITED BY MOJCA PAJNIK AND TONČI KUZMANIĆ

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## FOREWORD

It seems that after many years of suppression under post-socialism, the xenophobic tendencies in the post-war Yugoslav situation, fostered by a re-traditionalization of post-socialist life, erupted in force. Rising inequalities coupled with political, social, economic and class stratification, unemployment and poverty, and phenomena such as nationalism, xenophobia and racism provide fertile soil for the growth of radical, basically cultural, racist exclusions. Post-socialist systems in the period after 1989 brought innovations primarily in the field of new neoliberal economic and political technology: that is, they created circumstances that treat democracy primarily as an explicit technological innovation aimed at a change of elites. Today we can say with certainty that most of the political potential of post-socialism has been exhausted with the introduction of this narrow technological change. One of the basic flaws shared equally by the (new) post-socialist systems and the (old) capitalist systems is their equation of democracy with political technology, with institutional matters that do not involve citizens.

The nation-state as a topic has been extensively addressed in recent years and has gained even greater currency since the war in ex-Yugoslavia. Numerous researchers treat the subject of new formations using the concepts of the national state, nation-state, nationalism, and xenophobia. At the same time, the terms chauvinism, racism and cultural racism are increasingly present and are being related to current processes of state management. It is becoming obvious that today's current xenophobia exists in relationship to the xenophobic attitude of a contemporary modern state. Nation-states are increasingly criticized as formations that solidify the grounds of fictive ethnicity, and produce signs and emblematic behavioral patterns of the nation, using state and media technology. The formation reducing citizenship practice includes the *ethnos* as the identifica-

tion ground of the nation-state, its national corpus as a unified body and the nation placed in the foremost position.

Over the last fifteen years we have witnessed the emergence of a new generation of thinkers and new frames of conceptualisation. This book gathers papers presented at the international seminar "Nation-States and Xenophobias: In the Ruins of Former Yugoslavia," which aimed to address contemporary debates on the post-war situation, this time not within the predominant narrow frame of war but in a larger context of deeper social, cultural, and political factors. Bringing new ideas into focus turned out to be a fruitful attempt to interpret past events, and to stimulate thinking beyond the borders and boundaries of nation-states.

Articles from the book demonstrate that post-socialist difficulties with xenophobia are not connected solely with the sphere to which we usually refer as the social sphere, a society. Instead, they are related to the sphere of political management and/or the state. Therefore these articles explore the very results, and consequences of war in the region in the direction of thinking about new entities and phenomena, that are the outcome of war. The ideas therefore focus on the debate about the relation between the nation and the state, together with xenophobia, which is an aspect often neglected or missing in the attempts aimed at reconsidering the present situation of everyday life.

The region has come a long way since the beginning of the war, and younger thinkers, exploring new concepts of understanding, offer a set of new possibilities not just for interpretation and understanding of past, current as well as future events on post-socialist Yugoslav territory, but simultaneously for problem solving. What stimulated us to choose this seminar topic and subsequently to gather the papers into a book was precisely the idea of bringing new perspectives of thought and action into a focus in an attempt to interpret past events in a new light.

MOJCA PAJNIK  
TONČI KUZMANIĆ



**AN ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH  
NATIONALIST FROM VOLKISH POPULIST  
MOVEMENTS, PRACTICES AND IDEOLOGIES—  
THE YUGOSLAV CASE**

TONČI KUZMANIĆ

Over the last fifteen years, an extremely simplified mass-media stereotype of “events in the Balkans” was very aggressively imposed.<sup>1</sup> It suggests that, first, we had half a century of socialism, and then when it fell, its place was taken by nationalism; therefore, nationalism broke socialism. The form of this expressive non-thinking reminds us of what Aristotle (in *Physics*) rejects as thinking in predetermined categories, “containers” that change their contents based on certain external causes, while they remain as they always (a priori) were. On the basis of such a fabricated (not reflective) reflex, Miloševićism, Tuđmanism, Janšism (cf. Kuzmanić 2003) and other volkish phenomena would thus represent something like “nationalism in its essence.”

**THE STATE AND ITS “PEOPLE”**

That is precisely the questionable matrix, since it disallows a more accurate understanding of events that need to be faced. In order to clarify the working area of this paper, it is first necessary to discard the quasi-nationalist construction a priori. If we really want to talk about Janšism (in Slovenia), Tuđmanism (in Croatia), Miloševićism

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<sup>1</sup> The paper is a part of the larger research project (Nation-State and Xenophobia in Post-socialism) at the Peace Institute, Ljubljana.

Volkish populist movement is just one possible translation for the phenomena we used to call in our languages *narodnjaštvo* (see Kuzmanić 2003).

An integral part of the stereotype is the expression Balkan wars, which has decidedly cultural-racist connotations (Malik 1996) derived from the depths of the past century. For orientation only, I would like to point to Schevill (1991), and to the language abuse of the verb *to balkanize*, which became not only part of Anglo-Saxon speech, but also an important quasi analytical category.

(in Serbia), and personalities such as Jelinčič in Slovenia, Đapić in Croatia, Šešelj in Serbia and many similar post-fascist creatures, then we should not confuse them, or equate them with nationalism, or classify them unthinkingly under nationalism. They represent a specific phenomenon that can not be reduced to nationalism. Therefore, it is first necessary to open our thinking channels and at least generally to allow for the possibility that in our post-socialist scenarios—apart from nationalism, with it, under it or beyond it—there was and still is something else, additional, different and deeper, more complex to understand than a “self-evident” nationalism. What is it that should be pointed out as *differentia specifica* of these new forms against nationalism? They were populist structured movements with specific goals and modes of acting that in no way correspond solely to nationalism; furthermore, they are qualitatively different from nationalism.

In the case of the wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the issue, above all, was not nationalism or nationalisms. The issue was—and still is (although in some environments it has in the meantime evolved towards nationalism)—something similar to nationalism, that is true, but also different (and more dangerous), something at once more and less than nationalism. That and such hypothetical comprehension we call the hypothesis on something which could be termed “Volkish populist movements.” We do not mean to imply that there were no nationalisms too, some kind of inclination towards the state; we rather want to issue a warning that nationalism was more or less (in different cases) in the shadow of “Volkish populist movements.” Volkish populist movements (and not nationalism) were (and remained) the dominant process that dictated the tempo and aim of events.

In “our” region, Volkish populist movements did not appear until the end of the 20th century (the first more or less naive appearance took place at the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies), so it is even less something that once existed but has now become a dead letter. Furthermore, it could even be said that populism was the predecessor of nationalism, perhaps even something that might appear after nationalism. In the Balkans and related areas, we know it in a rather developed form, as a pre-nationalist

syndrome. This expressed itself in the form of quite fierce behaviour among collective revolutionary subjects—for example in Russia, in the middle of the 19th century. We are talking about movements that set the establishment and formation of what they called “People” as a key goal of their activity.

Volkish populist movements act in circumstances in which the “People”—in the conservative jargon of the 19th century that has been revived in our time—as a “Subject of the past” that has not yet been modelled, was in the phase of its “creation.” Therefore it needed (re)modelling—certainly, according to Volkish populist receipts and principles—into something that afterwards came to be called *die Volks Gemeinschaft*.<sup>2</sup> So, the issue is not that Volkish populists tried to establish a Nation (and through it or over it to establish a modern state); it is rather the “People” as a basic, or even natural principle of life in a certain area and time. Nation is a concept from which and through which nationalism starts, and a movement that has “People” for its aim and in a sphere in which Volkish populists move, is of a qualitatively different nature. The difference can possibly be demonstrated in the following simplified way: populists of the Volkish kind want to establish neither a Nation nor a state;<sup>3</sup> they want “People”

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<sup>2</sup> The normal, uncritical equation of fascism and national-socialism (nazi-fascism) prevents us from understanding an analytically usable difference between fascist insistence on the ethical idea (Gentile’s radicalisation of Hegel) of state, on the one hand, and the national-socialist concept based on the “state” connected with the expression Volkish. The most explicit and most brutal expression of the Volkish orientation can still be found in the first volume of Hitler’s book *Mein Kampf* (cf. Hitler 1999). Volkish is precisely that which is the very inner essence of Volkish populist movements, but not necessarily of nationalism. One of the most important features of Volkish populist movement is cultural racism, since from the Volkish point of view, all other People and their members appear as something at least less valid, if not entirely dehumanised on the basis of “us” as a kind of higher civilization and culture.

<sup>3</sup> It is not superfluous to warn that all Volkish populist movements in the area of the former Yugoslavia towards tragedy start not from the position of independent states but from an extremely defensive concept of protection and imperilment of their own People. The idea of “state” in all those Volkish populist groups and movements appeared mainly in the nineties, amidst hasty and even forced conflict events, not in the eighties when there was still enough time for sober thinking and planning. More accurate analysis of, for example, appropriate Slovenian, Croatian and other literature, as well as the literature about Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and so on would confirm this easily. Furthermore, it would show that Volkish populist movements were very limited, owing to the lack of any serious abstract comprehension that is an elementary condition for the possibility of “state comprehension.”

and a Volkish community. Compared to nationalism, populism is simultaneously, in a sense, one step backwards. It happens after a delay, but at the same time—if we look at today's numerous events—it is something that could follow nationalism and that relates well to globalization and various anti-state aspirations of post-modern times (more in Kuzmanić 2002).

In other words, populists are not interested in People as part of the existing, available matter and material they process. Populist movements mainly derive from settings and circumstances where People are not yet there, or where People's cohesion is not there (not as the One/Unique People). Populists, in comparison to nationalists, are more thorough; they deal with some fundamental sense, they make steps into depth, steps backward and dig in something that even precedes People, that has to do with its preconditions and assumptions. More concretely expressed, they deal with something that can be called folk, some kind of gathered, undifferentiated mass of what are potentially Our People (by language, history, blood, culture, tradition, mythology and so on), that has not yet become integral, united, and that is not singular. Populists deal with something called *puk* (the commons) by Tuđman in Croatia. Out of that unstructured matter, from the perspective of the Volkish populists, one has to create (produce) something that may in the future be called "self-conscious People," something that will become a "single body" and thus "united." Only this (self)conscious, (self)structured—so to speak integral product, the People (das Volk)—may serve as the first and central lego cube in the construction of (a long-term goal), a *Volks Gemeinschaft*.

#### STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS FROM THE 19TH CENTURY

It seems that this kind of Volkish populism from Eastern and Central Europe in the nineties (immediately after the civil society movements of the eighties) has nothing to do with what has been happening in the West, since it was an explicitly Eastern (often bloody) story. However, links between the West and the East exist, since even this kind of Volkish populism has been strongly influenced by Western views. However, let us suppose that it is a product of the European

East (not only Russia),<sup>4</sup> and originated as a more complex movement in environments that were structured rather differently from the Western ones. Probably Russia,<sup>5</sup> a prime example of an “underdeveloped” part of the Eastern and Central Europe could be seen as the place where this kind of movement first appeared in the East.

What is specific to the Volkish populist behaviour is not its direct relation to the state issue, but rather its relation to the people issue. Volkish populists mainly act in circumstances in which the state becomes something that should be left for later, or where the state as a realistic possibility has become too distant.

Volkish populists’ discursive apparatus is exclusively related to People in a specific and impeccable way: by revolutionary cancellation of the difference between (poor) folk and the elite; thus establishing the People as the ideal/goal of the first phase of the revolution.<sup>6</sup> In circumstances in which People still have not been formed, the substitute role of the ideal/goal is replaced by the people’s elite—Volkish populists themselves (with their leader).<sup>7</sup> Volkish populists do not deal and cannot deal with the external problems of the People. Even if they do, then they see the state exclusively as a means to serve the function of People in establishing and creating People (construction metaphors are most convenient for understanding this kind of populism).<sup>8</sup> If they ever talk about inter-state relations, then they talk, in fact, about international relations, or relations

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<sup>4</sup> One prominent Volkish populist was, let us say, F. M. Dostoyevsky, for part of his life, and also Lenin’s brother, as well as many other well-known personalities from the nineteenth century.

<sup>5</sup> Populism is known to all Western democracies, except for the fact that in some of them, populism was not always the winning party, but an oppressed, limited and marginalized occurrence, tamed by modern state/statehood.

<sup>6</sup> Today, Janez Janša of Slovenia talks overtly about the unfinished revolution and the second phase of changes. From post-war standing point that mental attitude could be also an excellent foundation for neoconservative revolution(s) in the future.

<sup>7</sup> The Volkish populist movement is more expressive and more fundamentalist to the extent in which the role of its leader is larger. Populism of that kind without the function of a Führer cannot be efficient (cf. Schmitt 1994).

<sup>8</sup> This issue can be understood through an expressive counter of the well known Western position. For example, in the Italian situation in the 19th century, it was valid when in 1861, after territorial reunification and establishment of statehood, the first Italian Foreign Minister said the famous sentence: “Here it is, we have Italy, now we have to create Italians!” Any similarity with the utterance by Tudman, “We have Croatia” and its silent continuation is, of course, anything but accidental.

among peoples,<sup>9</sup> not among states. A basic unit of their thinking is neither the state, nor the citizen; it is the People or the member of the people.

The People's elite in the given position sees itself as a seed (*prima causa*) of the People, as those that are aware of what and how it should be done (they are the people's midwives, doctors and shepherds at the same time).<sup>10</sup> In Russian and numerous other cases from the middle and the end of the 19th century, there was an elite educated in the West.<sup>11</sup> During their studies, its members became acquainted with the German and French People (nation), meaning something that could not yet have been found in Russia and other places in undeveloped (not only Slav) Europe—that is, at home, in their home lands. Comparing two different situations, they wanted for their homes the same thing others already had, and called that thing the People (rarely nation). However, what was available to them, was too small. They mainly had their own knowledge (people's self-consciousness in the form of a cell) and knowledge of the West (Peoples from the west), but they needed something more. For the construction of their own People at home, they needed more material. The idea/cell needed matter, which would be added through a turbulent process of populist awakening of the People by the already existing folk, Tuđman's commons, or whatever it is called in different languages.

<sup>9</sup> At this point it is evident that even western concepts of the state are to a great extent populist in origin. The only difference is that this has somehow been forgotten during the last two centuries. The talk about organization of the United Nations is the obvious proof that even in the Anglo-American tradition there is a tendency to equate the People and the state, or even—which is more precise, in our opinion—a lack of concepts of state and politics.

<sup>10</sup> At this point I will risk an analogy, and risk possible complaints: It would perhaps be the easiest way to understand the relation of populists towards People through Heidegger's fundamental construction *Der Mensch ist der Hirt des Seins* (Heidegger 1976).

<sup>11</sup> To take seriously the 80s and the 90s of the 20th century in the former SFRY implies taking seriously the role, sometimes decisive (most clearly in Croatia, then in Slovenia, and less in other areas) role of those returnees living abroad (Diaspora), who—contrary to the situation that I am trying to schematise here—were not educated at elite universities; most often they were not educated at all. They were trainees, students of “practical universities” such as “pizzeria management,” “waiting tables” or “transportation.” Very rarely will you find among them people who have degrees in humanities or social sciences. It appears that the less they knew about politics and the state, the more successful they were in building their own People.

In that context, populism is, above all, a violently modelled wish, of more or less educated returnees and future people's revolutionaries. Upon return, the populist elite quite clearly see first their own alienation<sup>12</sup> from the "miserable, poor folk." The folk, directed towards the heights of the People, is understood by Volkish populists (as by Marxists) generally, through the simple formula of distinction—the haves/the have-nots; that is, through poverty. That raw material (poverty) is the dough from which populists bake. People in their revolutionary condition, were, in their own eyes, comprehended as something *in nuce*, very healthy, in fact extremely potent.<sup>13</sup> Commoners were the raw material that is a potential at the same time, something that will underlie, that brings tradition and therefore, the future itself. Volkish populists relate to People as a possible product/child on whose creation/birth there remains more to be done, as "fathers," but also as midwives/shepherds.<sup>14</sup> In such an environment, there will be no mercy for those who keep "our folk" in poverty, sickness and ignorance. The task of the populists is, of course, to free People from all the bloodsuckers. Thence arises the strong pathos of emancipation, which sometimes also reminds us of socialism. All that is possible for Volkish populists under the condition that they literally go "at People." Nevertheless, one real long-term task of populists is to cancel the distinction between the com-

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<sup>12</sup>This category was, as with their contemporaries, the social revolutionaries, frequently used by people's revolutionaries. The issue was often, at least in the East, the two sides of one phenomenon. One had the working class for the central figure (worker), the others had People (mainly peasants). The common factors were the violent revolutionary spirit, the methods of and approaches to construction, and the extreme anti-political and anti-state attitude.

<sup>13</sup>Potential multi-meaning (including the importance of natality), which was much discussed in past years in all fields colonized with the ideologies of the Volkish populist revolutions and which different churches handle very efficiently. All of these are mainly joined not only by anti-communism, as is usually mistakenly assumed, but also by anti-statehood—as a struggle against the secularised state; and related to this, a struggle for quite a determined type of non-state, which must be identical to the People's (above all antipolitical) community (*Volksgemeinschaft*). The role of the church and religion in these bloody and even genocidal processes was enormous. No Volkish populist movement could function at all without the fundamental support on the part of the catholic or orthodox churches.

<sup>14</sup>We should not call it coincidence that the basis of the discourse matrix among Volkish populist revolutionaries includes metaphors from the area of *oikos*, home, family (Father, People, figure) on the one hand, and from construction, building (*poiesis*), on the other.

moners and themselves, the populist elite, and to a lesser extent, another task would be to discard all the exploiters. Cancelling the difference is, in fact, the union of the populists with their “own folk.” To put it more frankly, People as a goal—from the position of populists as people’s initiators/inseminators—is achievable only in the case of actual, but not symbolic copulation with the folk.

That is the point where populists will achieve their goal, and—in the language of psychoanalytical pathos—with their sophisticated mind (they are the active part); they will fertilize the folk (the raw material, matter, the passive female) and in that inspired and truthful, even divine act of creation, they will create/make the People. Occurring beyond ideological and populist self-comprehension, this event of events (the occurrence of the people), which appears as an act of divine (elite) creation is nothing but a brutal rape of (their) commoners (that is why when acting on behalf of People, they do not shrink, no matter what). Consequently, it is a creation point for something godly or divine, the intangible son of God, his majesty (supremacy),<sup>15</sup> the People itself.

#### VOLKISH POPULIST REVOLUTIONS OF THE NINETIES

Populism in the former Yugoslavia functioned in an almost similar way at the end of the 80s and 90s of the last century. After the People started to function according to the given pattern, from our present standpoint we can say without hesitation that the birth of the People was not, in fact, a post-socialist coincidence or a by-product. It was a highly desirable goal, a planned and very efficiently created product. Moreover, the birth of the People, there is no doubt about it, was the birth of the tragedy from the unformed dough in an extremely brutal way.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup>This highest point is the precise place from which to understand the frequent conflicts between newly composed “states,” where it frequently seems that we are on the verge of a priori possible new wars (for example Slovenia and Croatia in last few years). The problem lies in the fact that in such relations we are not dealing with two-sided relations between “states.” Unfortunately, the situation is such that, mostly, we neither have states, nor relations but rather non-relations between two revolutionary leadership structures of Volkish populist movements.

<sup>16</sup>Perhaps the example of Serbia is the most appropriate and obvious for its clear distinction—brutal and literal—between nationalists and populists. The late Zoran Đinđić was a typical nationalist of the nineties, more or less liberal than the others, and his



Our hypothesis is that, at the turn of the 80s into the 90s and through the nineties, on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Volkish populists (not nationalists) contrived the populist revolutions<sup>17</sup> through which they, more or less successfully, established “their People” and successfully sold their populist programs as nationalistic. Broad segments of the populace (including the mass media, intellectuals and scientists) bought the product, believing that they had bought nationalism, and consequently “their state,” so they were accordingly surprised on realizing that what they had bought was, in fact, a highly united (homogenized) People, one that is more or less in conflict, not only with other peoples and surrounding states, but also with their own state and even with the very idea of statehood, not to mention human rights.

To simplify: populists masquerading as nationalists successfully sold the wrong product to “their people.” They have been selling and they still sell quite successfully, the new-social, populist *die Volks Gemeinschaft*, and the population (to a lesser extent) think they have both items and buy political products such as democracy and/or the state. Instead of the political structure that we currently call the state, almost all those on the territory of the former Yugoslavia received sovereign products of social origin, from the People. That People, last but not least, with the aid of masquerading warriors, turned into some kind of quasi independent state, which had very little to do with the state and statehood (for example in their use of

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basic concept/idea focused on the state and citizenship. He was one of the rare ones who appropriately understood a self-managing “state” (state in self-cancellation) as “not-finished.” His wish (as well as the policy he led) was “completion,” establishment of the state and statehood, some kind of normalization and escape from permanent extraordinariness. He was murdered: The answer to the question why he was killed is simple, although to some it might seem a paradox: because he was a nationalist and not a Volkish populist. He was killed because he tried to transcend (to calm down and normalize) the People and to establish the state; because he was “ours,” populist, too little, and linked to the strange side, too much allied to the “western” idea of a legal state and a constitution, because he overemphasized the meaning of *Verfassungspatriotismus* instead of People-patriotismus.

<sup>17</sup>The same could be valid for other post-socialist environments in which there was no single-nation socialist unity. By the way, the former “people’s democracies” of the Eastern block even at the level of their appointments had preserved the tradition of populism from the 19th century, which was—only temporarily—disabled within the circumstances of Yugoslavhood. Temporarily, since Yugoslavhood itself was a part of an older Volkish movement (pan-slavism).

monopolies of power and the exercise of violence)<sup>18</sup> or had nothing in common with these. Instead of a welfare state and a state of law, surplus population in these areas received the radical Volkish populist version of a non-state or even of a *Volks Gemeinschaft*, which, in default of anything better, took on characteristics that could be termed simultaneously pre- and post-modern, as cultural-racist phenomena. In brief, the new Volkish populist construct, that should have been a state, does not function according to principles of citizenship, legal equality, freedom, and human rights. On the contrary, it consistently discriminates, harasses, segregates, excludes, disables, erases, hates and, if necessary, kills. Frequently it kills in an industrial, massive and systematic way. Instead of any industrial production of property, around which a post-modern state is usually organized, and which it serves, here, we are most often faced with no production of things and with a hyperproduction of hostility and hatred, if necessary for (potential) war. When the inhabitants of the region, more or less as a whole started to sober up from the Volkish populist hangover, it was already too late. The purveyors of populist candy were already entrenched. The elitist sellers until yesterday had preached from the television, sent trashy dispatches of heart-breaking, cheap populist rhetoric; today—being a war profiteer or transition tycoon—he has become a creature ethically and in all other ways superior. He has also become—that is also an issue here—the new master.

#### SOBERING UP

After fifteen years of Volkish populist orgies and all the effects that accompanied the epic Volkish populist undertow, millions are slowly coming to their senses. It is becoming clear that what we have received over the last few years of turbulence was not national parties or national states; those were Volkish populist communities, organized as Volkish people-states at best, but most often as Volkish

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<sup>18</sup>The Volkish populist, anti-state attitude usually results in a reduction of the state to an apparatus of naked force and violence. Frequent statements by Milošević from the end of the 80s, on the subject of Kosovo, as a rule called for a “state of law,” while we all knew too well that this meant calling for the exercise of force and violence.

peoples that try unsuccessfully to impersonate states.<sup>19</sup> In the remnants of the previous “unfinished state” (Đinđić), the even less finished Volkish populist communities appeared. Instead of, for example, as an a priori political distinction (left-right, liberal, socialist, conservative) that marks each modern state, a populist (cultural, even racist)<sup>20</sup> division is established not only on blood and territory, but also on the “bones of deceased” Volkish populists.<sup>21</sup> In all those quasi-states, there have also been established quasi-parliamentary democracies, whose essence is—they convince us—the potential to swapping elites. It was precisely this reductive way of speaking about democracy as a mechanism of swapping elites, that was bred in the bones of Volkish populists. That is to say, the whole thing is dependant on the (Volkish) elite. These are exactly the circumstances inscribed by the Volkish populists—in their own image and based on themselves as the elite. In that sense we have societies, people’s communities, or a *Volksgemeinschaft* that functions according to the following matrix: At one side there is—seemingly still existing, but in fact, only newly established—some kind of community of small, common people (commoners), while on the other, there are elites (the Volkish populists themselves, joined by newly formed elites). Now these new elites enlighten the folks, pull them out of poverty and exploitation, mostly from a state of communist darkness, and establish a happy presence called the People. People in this sense are but a unity of re-established, expropriated folk (the more *pau-perised*, the more the folk are open to populism), and an enlightened (in fact benighted) elite, which shows the way to heaven. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the situation required the deprived, dispossessed and humiliated folk on one side, while the

<sup>19</sup>It is clear that Volkish populists pretend to play the role of the state. This is quite visible at the point where, for example, there is no serious distinction between the People’s interest, national interest, state interest, and interest of the state and its citizens. For them, all these are one and the same thing. In the darkness of Volkish ignorance, in which all cows are black, and the People is the same as the state, where there are no citizens and citizenship, not to mention human and civil rights, one should seek the causes of the increasingly dangerous hunting in the dark, that has become by far the most successful and profitable “sport” discipline headed by Volkish populists themselves.

<sup>20</sup>Compare the analysis of cultural racism as an example of populism in Slovenia in Kuzmanić (1999).

<sup>21</sup>It could be instructive to compare the writing of Vuk Drašković, for example, in his novel *The Knife*, with his political engagement during the 80s and 90s.

narrow, ethnic Volkish elite of mighty tycoons and recent quacks who had become elite, occupied the other. These People were, in fact, the main product of Volkish populist revolutions and wars on “our” territories. What drives these newly created societies into ever deeper gaps between those in first place and the rest, can be conceptualised as a kind of glue that is grounded in force and in which are already visible the up-formations of future conflict.

#### CONCLUSION

In the end, one must issue a strong warning that we should avoid an understanding of Volkish populism exclusively as outdatedness, backwardness or the past—words that are too easily applied to such phenomena. The danger is especially serious if we consider this problem from a leftist perspective, which, by default, may over-simplify by valuing everything a priori as positive if it is open, innovative or revolutionary. The problem with Volkish populists is far deeper and more dangerous. Populism is not only a reactionary or revolutionary, conservative or thriving phenomenon. In our case, we are dealing with something that can most accurately be defined as a neo-conservative revolution, with ingredients that are conservative or even neo-conservative but simultaneously revolutionary. Regardless, Volkish populism as the ideology of a popular revolutionary movements, goes extremely well with social revolutionary acts. We are facing at least a twofold problem: firstly, it is the fusion of both concepts and mentalities (social and Volkish revolutionary mentality) on the one hand, and simultaneously the third kind of revolution: that which could be called managerial (neoliberal or neoconservative). This extremely dangerous kinship (not only in terms of their programs) among all three (social, Volkish populist and managerial) of revolutionary movements, with their openness towards violence can only produce additional difficulties in attempts to decipher infrequent, historical symbioses.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup>One of these was national-socialism. However, it seems too easy to draw the analogy and say that what happened on the territory of the former state was only national-socialism. We believe that the whole thing is more complex, in the sense of a breakthrough and a mixture of elements of democracy with what had happened in the 30s—a combination that additionally complicates categorisation and labelling. We would only plead that the appropriate label for what happened here is, in fact, post-fascism. A more precise appropriation of the concept of post-fascism can be found in Kuzmanić (2003).

We did not endure total destruction because of these concurrences, as has often been suggested. What is worse: we fell into the feeble future. Our wars were neither medieval nor pre-modern. They were rather, and they will remain—if we do not prevent them by our thinking and acting—post-modern wars that anticipated to a great extent, the wars of the 21st century. We did not (unfortunately?) fall outside this history; we are its sad inheritors. The populist spirit of Milošević, Tuđman and Janša has spread in geometric progression, and not even George Bush Jr. is immune from it. In that sense, our experiences and our problems are not ours alone, they are, unfortunately, universal in nature.

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**THE STATE OF EXCEPTION AND THE  
EMERGENCE OF RACISM: ZORAN ĐINĐIĆ'S  
YUGOSLAVIA, AN UNFINISHED STATE**

PETAR MILAT

In this paper I will formulate some preliminary remarks about two distinct and, at first sight, only loosely related phenomena: (a) the concept of a general state of exception, and (b) the political construction of the socialist Yugoslav state, as it was interpreted by the late Zoran Đinđić.

THE STATE OF EXCEPTION

The state of exception *is not*; the state of exception *is valid*. In this distinction can be found nothing less than the entire enigma of contemporary politics, or at least what we in the 20th century used to call politics. However, the problem is more complex, insofar as the enigma of politics consists in that very unquestioned, enigmatic character of the state of exception, or to quote Agamben: “even nowadays, after all, the public law has no knowledge of the theory of state of exception, and jurists see this problem more as a *questio facti*, rather than a true juridical problem” (2003, 9).

*Es gibt den Ausnahmezustand nicht, der Ausnahmezustand gilt*, could be a paraphrase of an order where something has validity, without having meaning or signification.

The facticity of a state that does not exist, yet is valid is—as biopolitical theory maintains—facticity on a scale beyond any possible or actualised phenomenology of the political. Hence, phenomenologies of a Hegelian, Husserlian, and Heideggerian or, for that matter, Derridian kind become inadequate to analyse the politics of state of exception.

The state of exception is not subject to either knowledge or consciousness (and thus a science of experience of consciousness of the

state of exception is not possible). The state of exception is also not subsumable under the Heideggerian meta-economics of Being, of an event of giving and receiving. And as much as the paradoxical, genuine constitutive logics of the state of exception might be similar to the logics of event, the state of exception is not an event. In the state of exception there is no appropriation of the political (*ereignen* in the Ereignis), nor does the state of exception exist in the domain of perception (*eräugen* in Ereignis, to use this Heideggerian etymological gesture).

The trans-phenomenological distinction between being and validity is the essence of the politics of the state of exception and the state of exception of the politics. And this is, then, the place where, in their mutual implication, politics and exception, politics and exceptionality meet. And that place is—the place of sovereignty.

So sovereignty is not; it is valid. It is valid, without meaning or signifying anything.

For Schmitt, as is well known, the sovereign is one who decides on the state of exception.

The sovereign decision is, thus, a decision that decides on that exception from the rule, which declares the state of exception, and is consequently, in its facticity, outside of the law.

The state of exception as a temporary suspension of the legal domain is a state where facticity and normativeness, life and law overlap. The overlapping of life and law, from the standpoint of the ordered domain of law, is an illegal exception, indeed a true, that is sovereign state of exception of the law. However, although the exceptionality of the state of exception proves everything, and an ordered normative system nothing, the sovereign decision as a supreme act of the political cannot be a lasting one, because the permanency of decision, declaration and validity of the state of exception would, by the same token, entail a complete doing away with the political sphere—which is, in this case, paradoxical—in the very act of total delimitation of the political.

The sovereign decision, in its own singularity as an exceptional act and a supreme exception from the juridically ordered domain of politics, brings about the apocalypse of the political.

Carl Schmitt, in order to avoid such a doing away with the political, has built into the logics of sovereignty and sovereign decision a



dialectic of constitutive and constituted power. This dialectic should make the act of sovereign political decision temporally limited and—if possible—foreseeable by and accountable for the juridico-political system itself. According to Schmitt, the *pouvoir constituant* is another name for the politics on the border: that is, for the political action that—aware of its sovereignty—realizes the full potential of the political, yet at the same time stops at a border, at the limit of the political and does not pursue the apocalypse of the political in the total overlapping of factitious and normative, life and legality.

But, what if the state of exception is a rule, and no longer an exception? What if the apocalypse of the political, in the total identification of life and law, has already taken place?

It is to Walter Benjamin and his theses on the concept of history that we owe the first indications and directions for answering the questions posed. But it was not until the seventies that Foucault provided a minute description of what it means to live in a—now already permanent—state of exception.

Life that has become its own law, its own measure and purpose, is the subject of politics in the state of exception. However, and this is here crucial, the “law” of life in an existing and permanent state of exception is no longer a law in the sense of a juridico-political system; it is rather an act that has the power of law. Thus, in the state of exception a political act par excellence of regulating life becomes a decree, an act that has the power of law, yet is not itself a law.

The logics of sovereignty, which in its radicalization has led to the overlapping of factitious and normative and to the concomitant doing away with the political in conditions of the state of exception, becomes, according to Foucault, a logics of governmentality, that is the logics of discontinued political governance over and decision making on the borders of commonality. Politics is here nothing other than the police, in the strictest sense of that term.

If, as I have said, the policed life in the state of exception governed by decrees represents the apocalypse of the political, its impossible and utopian realization, then one can conclude that politics and reflection on the political as we know it have reached their end and goal.

Political amnesia, the disappearance or death of politics, is thus not only a destructive end to all things, because the political mode of

deciding has been replaced by another, more efficient and “democratic” mode of deciding, that of policing.

A life that has become law through and through also implies a life that is its own absolute legitimation. To the life that seeks its own utopia, the deficit of legitimation is no problem, but rather the surplus thereof.

On the other hand, the supreme definition of the political, according to Schmitt, is doubled in two decisions. One is the decision on the state of exception; the other is the decision on the enemy, that is, a declaration of war.

The state of exception and the state of war are two faces of the political in the precise moment before the dissolution of politics; therefore the state of exception characterizes the internal and that of war the external constitution of community. But when politics becomes police, such a distinction becomes no longer possible, and in consequence the state of exception becomes a state of war. The state of exception becomes a limitless, meaning planetary, war. Since this is a war that knows no limits and, therefore, knows nothing that could be left outside, thus as everything is included in that war, and everything is being counted on—it is a global civil war.

Philosophers following Foucault have tried to deduce the essentially conflictual nature of the global state of exception from the classical dichotomy of relations of production and productive forces. At the very moment when life itself—absolutely legitimised—becomes a singular subject of policing and production, the war zone becomes ubiquitous, both on the psychophysical-biological level and in terms of territoriality.

War fronts now involve countless, limitless, globalized bodies and populations that live a life determined by decrees and norms of the state of exception, living in a permanent state of transformation, a state of permanent loss and gain.

The enemy, from this perspective, is no longer the other (since a state of exception, in accordance with Schmittian intuition, simultaneously means an existing identity of the ruling and the ruled)—it is rather an anonymous police machine that produces lives and living conditions that are insufficient for the attained level of productive forces, so that a multitude of producers is struggling in order to change those relations.

And as much as that struggle might be legitimate, has it not, by recognizing its own legitimacy, already become a part of the state of exception machine, the “democratic” policing machine of absolute legitimacy? Is not the distinction between the relations of production and productive forces insufficient to conceive of the categories of friend and of enemy within the post-apocalyptic community of the state of exception?

The possibility of an absolute enmity that would not be exhausted in the dichotomy and thinking of the relations of production and productive forces, the possibility of enmity and the refusal of the existing state of affairs is, *stricto sensu*, no longer a possibility that might be provided by the reflection of the political or the police concept of the state of exception.

That is the possibility which, as with the state exception, escapes all phenomenological determination, and which is, for that reason, governed by a different mode of thinking as practice and of practice as thinking.

The possibility of not accepting the state of exception might be conceptualised by starting from the problem that I said characterizes life in the state of exception: that is, a surplus of legitimacy.

By using Franz Rosenzweig’s distinction, one could say: that which makes it possible not to accept and to refuse, that which makes possible an enmity within and towards the state of exception as such is not an issue of legitimacy or lack thereof, but is rather the absolute deficit of truth of the state of exception.

Thus I have circumscribed the domain of the normative that results from the dichotomy of “war” and “democracy” and that reflects the deficit of truth of the state of exception: that is the domain of the intellectual, and no longer of the narrowly conceived epistemic. However, when I say “intellectuality,” I do not think there that the “state of exception” as such would be a certain kind of idealization, where normativity and facticity would continue to compete for historical or structural primacy. Because, as I have already said, the state of exception already is a solution, and a real existing one, to the distinction between the normative and the factitious, so that “intellectuality” in this context denotes something completely different from all possible idealistic schemes.

But let me sum up: the urgency and exceptionality of the state of exception are primarily a thing of the structure of intellectuality, the structure of thinking. Thinking is thus not only a marginal epiphenomenon of a “real existing” (political, economical or any other) state of exception, but is rather the motor of that exceptionality. This seems to be the tradition of thinking the state of exception, but also the tradition of thinking *as* a state of exception, inaugurated by Benjamin and Adorno. That is a singular reduction of intellectuality to the aphoristic or sentential. However, this reduction here does not have to be necessarily understood in the binary opposition of fragmentariness and systematisation (which is of course a traditional topos of political romanticism), but rather in the opening up of the intellectual for its inherent normativity—one which is contained in itself, but substantially questions the exceptionality of (its own) state of exception. To quote a recent reflection on Adorno’s “*Minima Moralia*”: “Aphorism, as a form of the permanently declared state of exception of the philosophy, which questions the sovereignty of philosophizing, is a gaze, enabled by a ‘fragment’ in the eye, a ‘So it is’ that is not the final consequence of a sequence of conclusions, and that therefore should not be confused with epistemic judgments. Aphorism makes ‘us’ be in the truth, and not ‘possess’ it” (Garcia-Düttmann 2004).

There, the crucial question is as follows: what about if in the first place there could be a possible normativity to such aphoristic thinking, a “So it is,” that does not exhaust itself in the taxonomic description of social phenomena? What kind of “So it is” would it be if it were not the banal, final result of a reflection that only affirms what is already presumed or known anyhow?

If there is any sense in speaking of such a normativity of the intellectual, one which would, with its stripped down sententiousness, suspend the general suspension itself (which is just another name for the state of exception), the intellectuality should be understood in the sense Adorno ascribes to it—namely, as something that we “are” in, as a social environment of our existence. This assumption relates the Adornian meditation back to biopolitical theory, insofar as biopolitical theory truly understand intellectuality as a general framework of sociality—under the name of “anthropogenesis.”

Intellectuality as anthropogenesis; it is not only a question of singularity or the genesis of human kind (no matter whether we do or do not fix a moment of “becoming human”), it is not even a question of the destiny of “humanity,” but it is rather a genetic index of human kind, insofar as intellectuality manifests the collective and cooperative potential of sociality.

But I have said that it is intellectuality that is the motor of exceptionality of the state of exception, and this, taking into consideration the anthropogenic character of intellectuality, means that—strictly speaking—the anthropogenic complex (or, to put it in other words, the question of “becoming human”) is not just an idealistic or ideological supplement for totalitarian or repressive political systems, but rather that it emerges as a constellation of the state of exception, and concomitantly as a possibility of leaving it behind—in the name of (an absolute) democracy, and against war.

It is perhaps now, with the constellation of questions and problems posited in this way, that the entire “monstrosity” of biopolitical theory and its normative claims after Foucault comes to light. How to think the social with regard to the exceptional state of exception that emanates from the very core of the social, that is intellectuality as the potential to communicate and cooperate? And no longer is intellectuality understood as an ideological-idealistic supplement for material relations, but it is rather the intellectuality that is an index of the problematic character of anthropogenesis itself.

So, what are biopolitical productivity and normativity, beyond all eugenic projects of modernity?

#### EMERGENCE OF YUGOSLAV RACISM

The state that is known as Yugoslavia exists. It is easy to reach an intersubjective consensus about its external dimensions. We can point to the clearly demarcated territory and to the name reserved for that state. Yet, what about its internal dimension, its own “identity?” Will this identity emerge—like some ontological “surplus-value”—by simple addition of its objective elements, that is the territory and the name? What kind of “subjective factor” would we get if we look at the internal dimension of the territory we call Yugoslavia? Yugoslavs? Can we say that Yugoslavia represents a territory where Yugoslavs live? We all know that this tautology is not true. Defining Yugoslavia as a country where Yugoslavs live would itself be polemical and therefore unsuitable as an argumentative starting point. However, the occasion

where the identity of our country is already being disrupted by the tautology of its proper name, helps us to formulate the problem more clearly (Zoran Đinđić, *Yugoslavia, an unfinished state*).

Is it possible to overlook the irony, or better, all modes of irony or just *all* ironies, in a title such as “Yugoslavia, an unfinished state”?

Đinđić’s volume including his scholarly essays from the mid-80s has again come to light (by way of an intensive reception), and now “enriched” with a prophetic halo, shortly following his assassination in March 2003. The title has suddenly begun to function in a messianic way, in all cases in the tragic mode, showing how that which occurred during Yugoslav (state) formation during the 90s was somehow prefigured and overdetermined by the title of a single book: *Yugoslavia, an unfinished state*.

As if “unfinishedness” (in its double sense: as non-completion and as imperfection) could be a privileged access-point to the understanding of historical processes related to a particular state-formation, even more, as if “unfinishedness” is the reason for its (bloody) dissolution. Notwithstanding how we relate to this, in each case we have in advance overlooked the irony of Đinđić’s title and his entire enterprise.

“Yugoslavia, an unfinished state” is an ironic echo of another, more famous title, “Modernity, an unfinished project”—the title of Jürgen Habermas’ well-known lecture.

Alas, disregarding that subtle academic and intellectual irony whose combinatorics indicates a play of simultaneous approaching and distancing in regard to the broader and outlined epistemic context, Đinđić’s “Yugoslavia” is also something more, something other.

Of course, it is a volume by an author who, without any effort and *Besserwisserei*, accurately and astutely draws a referential map whose, more or less explicit, key figures are such names as Habermas, Luhmann and Schmitt etc. This had not gone unnoticed, but the turning point in Đinđić’s text is that interpretive surplus that “Yugoslavia” or the Yugoslav state of exception produces.

So, instead of reading the title “Yugoslavia, an unfinished state” within the set of interpretive possibilities that are being offered in Đinđić’s reference to Habermas’ lecture, or from today’s perspective, which seems to emphasize the prophetic abilities of a congenial

analyst, I am interested here in irony as that classical topos of the impossibility of interpretation. Impossibility of interpretation—not as something that infinitely would exceed interpretation or something that would be totally external to interpretation, but impossibility or the surplus of interpretation that is produced by the same interpretive action. Or, formulated otherwise, this becomes: the inevitable end and failure of interpretation precisely because of the impossibility of ceasing to interpret—this is the highest form of irony, an ambivalence that radiates from Đinđić’s “Yugoslavia” and that makes that volume so modern and to some extent quite unavoidable.

“Unfinishedness” by that token is not a univocal key to an understanding of the tragic historical process, but an index of the ironic, that is, the essentially ambivalent nature of intellectual labour. Things get even more complicated: in the title “Yugoslavia, an unfinished state,” *all* elements are meant ironically; moreover, all of them are interchangeable, so that there is little chance of finding an end to interpretive complications, not to mention interpretive failures. “Yugoslavia” is a domain, actually, of infinite effort and the defeat of interpretation, or put alternatively, “Yugoslavia” is a permanent, intellectual state of exception.

While in Milovan Đilas’ *New Class*, the intellectuality of the state of exception is still criss-crossed by unbridgeable chasms and imperceptible antagonisms, in Đinđić there is a multiplication of the domains of the state of exception. Social dynamics in Đilas are determined by (relatively) few parameters (be it the specific case of the genealogy of the “new class” or its mobilization, or the somewhat more general question of a relation between the rulers and the rest of the population, which Đilas foremost understands economically and the question of basic affective tonalities), in Đinđić’s analysis it is necessary to refer to a (relatively) huge set of institutional parameters if you want to define the Yugoslav situation (most prominently the legal domain). Though at first sight it seems as if an interpretation of the Yugoslav state is immensely complicated and difficult to provide, precisely because Yugoslav socialist society itself has reached (genetically) a higher stage of complexity and differentiation, Đinđić leaves no doubt that such an assumption would be false. It is rather the case, if we follow the author, that the social complexity of Yugoslav society is a result of a kind of interpretive interven-

tion, a result of thinking as a state of exception, while the actual development is far more rudimentary and far less attractive. The Yugoslav state of exception as determined by its multiplication is, above all, kind of transference of intellectuality into a multitude of heterogeneous spheres. Or to put it in even more abstract terms, that which characterizes the late Yugoslav state is neither production, nor consumption of the social product (the sole product of the socialist state for Đilas is exactly the state of exception), but the focus on the process of (pure, simple) transference (of the state of exception).

What we have is no more a closed off, static and criss-crossed economy of a divide/rupture in perception and rationality, but an open, dynamic and multiplied economy of a infinite transfer of thinking as a state of exception.

In Đilas' case, it was teleology within the exposition of the communist state that made it impossible to reach an alternative, geneticaly higher state of social organisation, whereas in Đinđić it is the author's own inscription into the acts of (ironic) transference that renders unlikely a configuration alternative to "Yugoslavia, an unfinished state." At the end, Yugoslavia is always something more.

From the global perspective, I will claim the following: the transference or transferability whose Yugoslav economy Đinđić has detected exceeds both the socialist construct of a transitory state (towards a classless, communist society), and the post-socialist transitional integration of the East into globalized capitalism. It is partly correct that such a claim sounds almost fatalistic, but this involves a heuristically efficient gesture of detecting and analysing a pure state of exception, which in its Yugoslav form has shown, in a completely stripped down manner, the inner functioning of its own dynamic, that is, its intellectuality (or the intellectual—not ideological!— intervention).

Since the permanency of the state of exception has been systematically stabilized, the difference between a "normal" and an "exceptional state" has lost its evidence. Instead of legitimizing political action in a situation where some of the members of the community are in danger, that evidence itself becomes the object of political non-action. . . . Because normality as an unambiguous criterion is lacking, everything becomes a matter of interpretation—everything becomes arbitrary (Zoran Đinđić, *Yugoslavia, an unfinished state*).



The point where imperial racism emerges is the moment when discourse about the state of exception becomes the driving force behind the exceptionality of a state of exception. And this is a kind of racism, if we follow Foucault, which has nothing in common with any classical form of racism. While classical racism functions according to the formula *make die/let live*, the new kind of racism reverses the order: *make live/let die*. This is a mechanism whereby the state reaches its governmental modernity, that is the threshold where the state, on the one hand, has achieved its systematic and permanent stabilization, and, on the other hand, the necessary form of social dynamism has been brought about in a state of exception.

But my concern would now be what happens when the state is no longer the primary medium of political and social regulation? What happens to racism when the state withers away or is simply absent?

In Foucault there is ambivalence relating to that question because the modern state (or the State as such) in the first place is not a sovereign state, but a governmental one. Though the temporal, spatial and systematic interdependencies between sovereignty and governmentality are complex, state racism is nevertheless governmental. But, what to say, if even this kind of (governmental) state disappears?

I posit that this is the perspective through which one should read Đinđić's volume—a perspective where modern racism, to cite Balibar, is a “conflictual relationship towards the state, which is being experienced in a perverted guise, projected as a relation towards the Other” (Balibar 2003).

Modern racism, understood in that way, is a precarious relationship towards the state—at each moment intensified by the insecurity of that relationship itself, which exceeds its elements and is unstable. How much more is this valid for a state that is withering away or has already been dissolved?

“Discussions,” arbitrary interpretations or just chatter as a state of exception: this seems to be the quintessence of Đinđić's analysis of socialist Yugoslavia. But this is simultaneously the description of a post-etatist social state, whose dominant driving force is infinite, omnipresent and parasitical communication, that is arbitrary talk.

For Đinđić itself that talk is necessarily negative, a kind of *bad infinitude* that endlessly postpones political action. But, what if that

talk—beyond any control—possesses the potential to open up new domains of the political, beyond classical and the modern racism, and even beyond that form of racism that is related to the withering away of the state, which I have called imperial racism?

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**XENOPHOBIA AS POLITICAL FACT:  
CONTEMPLATING XENOPHOBIA IN A  
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY FRAMEWORK**

HALIMA SOFRADŽIJA

Xenophobia, whose etymology has an important determination—fear,<sup>1</sup> as a phenomenon follows man through all historical periods; the connection between the existential and the political throughout history shows the extreme presence of fear. Xenophobia manifests itself as an important follower of public life, especially the political life of people during the dramatic social events at the time of the dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia, during and after war in this area. The first issue that preoccupies us here is a certain reality where xenophobia, it seems, is not only a follower, but becomes a part of political action and the means, the instrument, but also the political goal.

One of the guiding questions in this text is how xenophobia becomes a political fact. Interest in this problem is not coincidental; it is a result of terrible political events. When xenophobia, as a phenomenon, wants to be concrete and related to the present state of society and matters of politics that are dominant in these areas, then we can see that it is an expression of that exact political opinion and act. Some authors consider that the beginning of the 1990s in ex-Yugoslavia has a certain analogy with events that took place in the early 1930s, when nationalism, chauvinism and xenophobia celebrated a renaissance (Altermatt 1997, 117). The term “absurd”, which A. Camus (1987) tried to clarify a long time ago, is reopened before us with these processes. The political processes we talk about here, but at the same time the complete history of the 20th century—the century of fear and anxiety—once again remind us that man historically has been a carrier of the mindful, but also of the mindless, of illogical thought in action.

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<sup>1</sup> Xenophobia: (Greek) *ksenos*—foreign, alien; *phobos*—fear.

Politics, which should have freedom as its essence, is often followed by violence. The superiority of some over others has been throughout history the main instrument for the realization of many rules; therefore its place here evokes the words of E. Fink: “the essence of rule is in the neighbourhood of death” (Fink 1984, 259), because, wherever power is established, and there are centres of power, there arises a demand for inferiority. Concrete human existence is hedged with relations of power and domination and is directly submerged in political surroundings; the relations of power have direct effects on existence; they permeate it and mark it—that ruling is what Foucault (1994, 26) calls the “political technology of body.” Politics as the art of organizing social life and common living, often, as we can see, goes outside the ethical sphere in its practice.

Politics has a place in practical philosophy; Aristotle (1988) determined man as a *zoon politikon*, as a political, social being who lives in community with others—politics itself appears as an assumption of the common life of people, as an activity of man by which he regulates his human life in community. But the politics that is discussed here and that is examined by this seminar “Nation-States and Xenophobias: In the Ruins of Former Yugoslavia,” is the form of political opinion and acting that has become a source of existential drama for people in these areas. Xenophobic politics forges the world; it changes perceptions of reality, and the image of the world that is given is a reduced one.

The fundamental elements of this ideological politics are taken from the arsenal of civil society, where power, nation and race are developed to their final limits; they are absolute. To produce this situation, it is necessary to stigmatise and incriminate groups that are proclaimed enemies; the hatred felt towards them is being provoked, organised and cherished, and fear is its consequence. Here, fear appears as an intentional effect, not just as a side result. In the functioning of this kind of politics, fear is counted as an eternal phenomenon, primarily because fear is one of the most important emotions; it is both philogenetically and ontogenetically the oldest, and finally it is used to pressure the existence of the other, in a familiar political technique.

If we are talking about xenophobia as a *fear of the Other*, in its political relevance, then it is used *to mark the Other as an enemy*; it

is necessary to realize the homogeneity of its own collective, apropos “self-identification.” The project of creating homogeneous national states sets off many mechanisms, and induces new rhetoric, values and rules; this proves evident in the case of the dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia. At the first stage, there arises the question of national identity, ethnic homogeneity and ethno genesis. This leads to special states; it permeates people and determines their interpersonal relationships. Individuality and peculiarity are raised to a general measure of all that is existent; they are taken as prior values, and then, as Hegel would say “humanity is stepped on,” because, in fact, the “nature of humanity is to aspire to compliance with others.”<sup>2</sup>

#### THE EXISTENCE OF THE OTHER / FRAGMENTED COMMUNICATION / POLITICAL VIOLENCE

In any situation of human co-existence, being a fundamental situation of human existence itself, we always encounter the existence of the Other. Referring to Heidegger’s philosophy, we share his reflection that existence is always “existence with other” (Heidegger 1988).

The dialectic of relation Me-Other, as a primal relation of community, first of all speaks about communication. But, what happens if we put xenophobia into the phenomenological field here? I am already talking about fragmented communication, and this communication, in a political sense, sets out to “appropriate,” “exclude” and “eliminate” the Other in its secondariness, its appearance. The number of victims of politically motivated killing testifies to a shocking moral depravity, where it seems that from some point history were not real, as if reality suddenly abandoned some places—because illogicality has become the measure of everything. E. Fink brings us to the question of whether politics is bound when one man gains power over other people.

The only and definitive force that one man has over another is the death threat; his power derives from willingness to kill the other (Fink 1984, 258). This is the situation when one man “brings the other man close to death” and when that other man knows that his life may be unnaturally and prematurely destroyed through human force,

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<sup>2</sup> It is M. Kangrga’s remark; see more in Kangrga (2002).

because of his belonging to something that is discriminated against, something that is marked as an insubstantial race, class or nation. This act of violence over the other is among the most hopeless of man's experiences, because violent death by human hand is something man resists by the nature of his being; this is very different from the situation where man is aware of the finality of his being, and he acknowledges death's inevitability as natural. The right to kill someone, based on a nation's rights, indites the most spectral pages in human history; it shows how force is turned into violence. Political violence, being political, is always conscious and does not have the determination of blind action, or as Brzezinsky would say—"premeditation is the bloodiest contribution of the 20th century to political history" (Brzezinsky 1994, 5). This is especially pertinent to and is most intensively expressed in that form of political action that the classical Clausewitz formula identified as the "continuation of politics by guns" meaning war. If we place this problem in the place that forms the subject of this seminar, then we are talking about the war that happened here. The concept of making homogeneous national states found its promoters of homogeneity in the persons of Milošević and Tuđman—the envisaged homogenous national states in these areas were blocked out right over Bosnia and Herzegovina. These two projects took Bosnia and Herzegovina as the main object of their negotiations, a country which, it seems, has always been part of the big projects of its neighbours, and yet never turned that sort of ambition in their direction. The destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not possible without big projects as well as political, and, unfortunately, spiritual elites and national ideologies, which in the end lead to outbreaks on the ground: politically motivated killing, ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, the worst forms of destructiveness. National ideologies were the matrix of destruction. Why is nationalism destructive?—It has to destroy the other.

Xenophobic politics once again evokes that which is induced by C. Schmitt's political philosophy, namely, defining in terms of the familiar *friend-enemy* rhetoric. Because, ultimately, the way to gain complete identification of a people with authority, to activate the masses in war, to organize and mobilize people against one another can only be by hate for the enemy. Declarations of the permanent danger embodied by the enemy create feelings of endangerment and

become important determinations, because without an enemy the internal monolith of these ideologies would be endangered; the enemy represents cohesive strength, a technique of system maintenance. The stigmatization and incrimination of individuals and groups that are proclaimed enemies and towards which organized bigotry and hate are provoked, keeps the masses on standby and in a state of fear by creating a feeling of common endangerment. The enemy is the confronted other. The direct purpose of determination of the others as enemies is, clearly, in the service of elimination, rejection and excommunication—the “persecution of enemies”—this syntagma is not unknown. In C. Schmitt’s theory, differentiation of the enemy as a specific political category is always a clear and concrete act: “The true sense to terms friend–enemy is given by realistic possibility of physical killing. War comes out of enmity, because it represents essential negation of some other existence. War is negation of enemy’s existence” (Schmitt 1996, 33). Xenophobia, in its political relevance, serves to mark the Other as an enemy. No doubt, the place of this problem is visible in political opinion; it has a permanent political actuality.

Political manipulation is found in and based on an artificially created atmosphere of irrationality—it is expressed by mystifying social reality; the nonexistent is shown as existent—the ideology pretends to embrace reality. It does not appeal to reason and demands no critical consideration.

Ideological opinion is emancipated in relation to reality; here already a space for *political myth* has been created, and recent events have clearly shown that the myth is more than a function of archaic man. In his analysis of political myth’s technique, Cassirer affirms that if we try to expound actual political myths in their components, we will see that they do not contain any completely new ideas—only new techniques (see Cassirer 1972).

In those events under discussion, mystifying appearances turned the social course backwards and reduced the whole population affected by these changes to a state of deep tension. Today, we cannot more say that this tension has vanished; it just takes new forms. Affected by changes, mainly closely related to the consequences of extreme crisis situations, which took place on this ground, but indisputably not separate from general world events, this region has

undergone a period of expressed social anxiety and uncertainty. All negative processes, the feeling of a “historical gap,” as Christopher Lash would say, has entailed consequences, the level of which is dependent on which of today’s states of ex-Yugoslavia is indicated. The question remains, what happens to the individual man, in this Kafka-esque situation, of semi solved and complicated social relations?

THE HERMENEUTIC APPLICATION /  
 ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY

Today, in this our relatively restricted space, for the same events there are “special truths,” different truths, which present themselves as the only truths. What kind of future can be projected out of this state? How can one establish something on the other side of national ideology, prejudice and the unknown? How can ethnic national reductionism be excluded? In this character of social relations, where national feeling affected almost all states and human relations, where people still vote for this kind of monstrous politics, it is clear that they, themselves, create assumptions of their own inferiority, endanger themselves in real existence. It seems that many are not yet aware of or do not understand the centuries-old mechanisms of this kind of politics, and the same image is constantly recycled. It is interesting that those who have committed crimes do not admit to being criminals; this is a phenomenon evident from Eichman to Milošević. My experience of war in besieged Sarajevo, destruction, grenades, snipers, persecutions, and killings—all inspired by the idea of ethnically clean states (such an absurd idea for the end of the 20th century) showed me that human rights and freedoms can suddenly disappear and become the objects of mere declarations. At the beginning of the 21st century, our world is still a world created around the prejudices that inform politics. It is worth mentioning Predrag Matvejević, who often reminds us that even after the horrors of the Second World War, there were intellectuals, such as Günter Grass and Jürgen Habermas, who wanted to place mirrors before the nation’s face and openly say, “Look at what we have done.” That means taking responsibility for the future, not giving in to ideologies, not letting down the foundations of humanism.



Therefore, we cannot put national being in front of a human being's rights. Here I want to point to ontological security, which is defined as a very important form of the sense of security in the broad way in which Giddens applies it; the phrase refers to basic trust as a central element in the common measure of relations towards the social and natural environment (Giddens 1998, 95–101). But if ontological security is violated, which can be said of the contingent framework of any population in such complicated social relations, the result can be a state which is best expressed as that of existential fear. It is clear, as Vesna Pusić says, that poor rulings did not produce good societies, and that “democracy, is most of all obstructed by a dominant political culture and one kind of artificial retraditionalisation of society” (Pusić 1998, 37). This kind of politics speaks of the collective frustration that seems to be cherished and is like an imperative: not to allow civilians to free themselves from prejudice.

Held's truthful and divine thought that “the world as a dimension of openness is not a thing someone can present to someone else” finds its place here. Because, “what makes the political world a world, apropos, a space that gives place to many horizons, is a multitude of special worlds, thanks to which many opinions are possible” (Held 2000, 37). It is rebellion against a reduced image of the world, reduced only to one dimension, to a closed horizon. The hermeneutic application—as Gadamer affirms—has its important dimension in encountering the Other as Other. Finally, the real world exists only in the plural, when “we find out that we are just others among others” (Ricoeur 1965).

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# CONTEMPORARY SLOVENIA AND THE “OTHER”

VERONIKA BAJT

## INTRODUCTION

The modernist theory of nationalism, concerned predominantly with the political aspect of the phenomenon, has long been expecting its demise. In the post-war Yugoslav context of the 1990s, this implied the appeasement of nationalist claims and feelings once the political goal of independent statehood has been achieved. Contrary to such expectations, nationalism does not die out once the state is formed, as the goal of elevating the nation above all other criteria does not necessarily cease once the national state is achieved. This paper thus addresses xenophobic tendencies in the post-war Yugoslav situation through the prism of theories of nation and nationalism.

Xenophobia is psychological fear or contempt that a person feels towards other people because of their otherness. It means disliking strangers, the “Others” who are seen as outsiders, and it relates to the unwillingness to admit such people into one’s own group, the in-group. Recognised as outsiders, members of various out-groups are often perceived as a threat to one’s own social position, be it due to a tangible threat of taking “our” jobs, or to more irrational fears of “over-running” “our” land. Xenophobia as a political force constructs foreigners (e.g., immigrants) as scapegoats who are held responsible for whatever problems a given state or community is facing.

The illusion of Slovenian national homogeneity that was forged in response to the need for mass public support for the 1991 independence could not be sustained in the long run. Once the independence euphoria died out, Slovenia’s internal problems again became salient. It is not uncommon to employ survival tactics such as looking for scapegoats to ease social insecurities. In such guise, the xeno-

phobic bias is not limited to Slovenia but represents a general shift to the right that has been noted across transitional post-communist Europe. Moreover, these kinds of nationalistic phenomena are present in the so-called democratic West as well. As a post-communist new state, Slovenia is no exception in a world where no state is “free” from (nationalistic) prejudice. In this sense, Slovenia is comparable to the extremist developments in the “West” (Kuzmanić 2003).

In spite of Slovenia’s relatively peaceful detachment from Yugoslavia and notwithstanding its success as a new state, the lack of visible nationalistic discourse is deceptive. Intolerant public discourse has developed, and its impact has not diminished after the first decade of independence. This paper analyses the contemporary exclusionary nationalistic bias. Questions about the reasons for its presence are not easily answered; nevertheless, possible explanations are offered that approach an understanding of why people stigmatise the “Others.”<sup>1</sup> The paper proposes that post-1991 Slovenia tends to put the nation above other criteria, which raises the question of state-building policies. Once the Slovenian national memory was redefined as the new state’s dominant memory, the danger of conflating the nation and the state occurred. Thus the new national state tends to “forget” that not all of its citizens share the Slovenian cultural identity; hence its state-building practices are often nationalising.

The theoretical part of the present paper has a threefold focus. Firstly, I aim to dismantle the concept of “nation-state” that has long complicated our understanding of nationalism. Secondly, I address the elusive question of Slovenian nationalism. And thirdly, I touch upon the topical debate about whether the post-communist states are specifically “nationalizing” or no different in their practices from the nation-building processes of the “civic” nations of the “West.”

#### “NATION-STATE”

Since “nationalising” states are conceived by their dominant elites as “nation-states,” I want to address the problematic nature of the term “nation-state.” The modern “nation-state” owes its current pre-

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<sup>1</sup> For more on the construction of national identity and the “Other,” see Triandafyllidou (1998).

dominance to the historical fact that its Western European antecedents were militarily and economically so successful. They served as an example that others followed. The predominance and ongoing persistence of the term is indebted to the two hundred year-long state-building process of Western Europe (McCrone 1998). Understanding a nation as a "body of citizens whose collective sovereignty constituted them a state" resulted in equating nation with state and (sovereign) people, and linking it to a specific delimited territory (Hobsbawm 1995, 18).

The debate within nationalism studies has long revolved around several interrelated issues. On the one hand, the questions accompanying the definition of the terms "nation" and "nationalism" go hand in hand with attempts to identify the historical point when nations first emerged. Although the so-called "primordialists" (e.g., the eighteenth-century German romantics) see nations as natural, "forever there" entities, the majority of authors either believe nations to be thoroughly modern (the "modernists"), or see them as being present for a long time, yet changing their shape through history (the "ethnicists").<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the ongoing question remains how nations and nationalism developed and how and why they are a part of our existence.

The existence of the state is instrumental to the modernist theory of nationalism (Gellner 1992). However, if one is to assume an ethnocist idea of nation (Hutchinson 1994; Smith 1995), the "nation-state" is almost a fiction because most of the world's states are ethnically or nationally heterogeneous. According to Connor (1994), only 12 of 132 states he examined were sufficiently ethnically and culturally homogeneous to be "justifiably" described as "nation-states"; as states "made up almost exclusively of a single nation" (van den Berghe 1987, 61). I regard the state as a political and legal concept, bound to a delimited territory (Smith 1999), while "nation-state" needs to be

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<sup>2</sup> The most general divide runs between the *constructionist* and *anti-constructionist* perceptions of nation-formation; or the *modernist* versus the *primordial* or *perennial* accounts. It should be noted that each of these categories is internally differentiated and encompasses a range of positions. Yet, since there are fundamental differences in their theoretical understanding of nations and nationalism, the prevalent dichotomy between the "modernists" and the "ethnicists" is here adopted. As Nikolas (1999) points out, however, both of the competing perspectives operate within the framework of modernity.

understood as an ideal-type. In most cases states and nations do not coincide. The term “nation-state” should therefore only be used to describe states that are nationally homogeneous. In other words, “those relatively rare situations, characterized by an extremely homogeneous population, where a nation has its own state” (Connor 1994, 77). Or, in line with this paper; “nation-states” are “states claiming to be nations” (Smith 1991, 143).

#### NATIONALISM

For the purpose of this paper, nation is understood as a cultural (ethnic) and/or political (civic) “imagined” community. Owing to the lack of independent statehood, the Slovenian national experience has traditionally been connected to what is called the ethnic, or cultural form of nationhood (*narod*). Since presumed shared cultural features (especially language) have contributed to the Slovenian national identity, the ethnicist understanding of nation that objects to the complete construction of nations, proves valuable. National movement is perceived, according to Hroch (2000), as incorporating both the initial stages of a specific community consciousness in terms of “cultural distinctiveness,” as well as the national identity that stems from such growing national awareness. The importance of social agency in these processes culminates in the final stages of national movement, when specific national goals are defined, and it becomes fitting to speak of nationalism. In this respect, nationalism is seen as an organising political principle that requires national homogenisation and gives absolute priority to national values and “interests” in aiming to achieve “national goals.”

I argue that nationalism should not be restrictively perceived as solely a political movement for independence, for the goal of elevating the nation above all other criteria does not necessarily cease once a national state is achieved. Nationalism should be viewed as a concept that encompasses both the nationalising practices of an established state, and those of national elites still striving to achieve national sovereignty. Such an understanding allows one to discuss Slovenian nationalism in terms of a national movement for autonomy and independence *before* the establishment of the state, as well as in terms of the nationalising state practices employed in order to

foster and perpetuate national identity that take place *after* independence. Moreover, prejudice aimed against selected ethnic or national groups that are perceived as different and hence categorised as the "Other" also signals nationalism (though it may be termed chauvinism or xenophobia).

Looking at the historical path of the Slovenian national movement, "nationalism" had two aspects. The first was connected to the concept of "cultural nationalism" and the emergence of Slovenian national consciousness through language and culture; the second related to the quest for a Slovenian state, a kind of national "independentism." The difference should be made explicit between these forms of nationalism and the present discussion of nationalism as xenophobia, as "negative" and intolerant attitudes. This raises the question of how widespread these sentiments are. Whereas a great majority of Slovenians endorsed independence (according to the 1990 plebiscite), xenophobia is predominantly portrayed as the political programme or ideology of a (nationalistic, right-wing) minority. Yet some of the intolerant attitudes, such as hostility to immigrants and asylum seekers, are found more widely in the population.

#### "NATIONALISING" OR "NATION-BUILDING"

Drawing on Brubaker's (1996) argument, Slovenia may be viewed as a "nationalizing" state, though its policies may not be openly nationalistic and ethnocentric. Brubaker developed a framework for the analysis of nationalising states, which he defines as states "conceived by their dominant elites as nation-states, as the states of and for particular nations" (412). Almost all new states are, in his view, "nationalizing states to *some* degree and in *some* form" (433). Slovenia, as one of Yugoslavia's socialist republics, has been constructed as a "nation-state" or, rather, a republic *of* the Slovenian nation. In this sense, Slovenia has been a nationalising state that worked *for* its nation for decades before it achieved independence. The Slovenian language was the official language in Slovenia. The practical situation may indeed have been that Serbo-Croatian was the language of communication in Yugoslavia, yet Slovenia institutionalised the use of Slovenian well before 1991. Post-independence

Slovenia could therefore draw from its socialist political predecessor in many fruitful ways.

Kuzio's (2001) critique of Brubaker's concept is by no means being disregarded here. I concur with Kuzio's doubts of any significant difference between the concept of "nationalizing" post-communist states and the "nation-building" processes that took place in the "civic West" during earlier periods of history. The Slovenian example needs to be understood as a case of "stateless" national development, and it is therefore more fitting to speak of Slovenian nation-building and state-building separately. The Slovenian case cannot be explained by the popular modernist *state-to-nation* argument that it is states who create "nation-ness" (e.g., France), for something more like a *nation-to-state* development took place instead. Slovenian nation-building processes took place long before state-building became relevant. Kuzio is correct in arguing that the concept of "nationalizing" states should not be selectively applied only to former communist countries. Although the Slovenian example fits the so-called Eastern nation-to-state model of national development (e.g., Germany), which differs from the formation of the "old, continuous nations" of the West, contemporary Slovenian nationalising practices may nevertheless be fitted into the classical "top-down" homogenisation of peoples connected with the rise of the modern state. Since our current topic concerns contemporary Slovenian nationalistic xenophobia, Brubaker's term is adopted because of its explanatory contribution. This, however, does not imply any adherence to a dual understanding of the artificial divide—"East" (ethnic) versus the "West" (civic)—that theories of nationalism still cannot seem to fully discard.

It is difficult to "pinpoint what is specifically 'nationalist' about politics" in post-communist nationalising states because they usually do not involve "distinct movements with clear and specific goals" (Brubaker 1996, 416). Nevertheless, within the new Slovenian state we are witnessing increasingly salient social divisions and nationalistic attitudes towards the "Other." Soon after the watershed year of 1991, research showed that two forms of nationalism were present in Slovenia:



The first massive nationalistic phenomenon relates to positive nationalism, connected to Slovenia's independence movement and the establishment of a national state; the second form of the non-dominant negative nationalism is associated with the intolerant views of the autochthonous population towards the immigrants from the other former Yugoslav republics (Klinar 1992, 89–90).

The turbulent period of Slovenia's secession from Yugoslavia, together with the consequent war and the struggles for international recognition, has consolidated the ambivalent Slovenian nationalism that predominantly strove for a national state, yet also includes a strong national identity with an ethnic component. The lack of prolonged armed conflict and the absence of ethnic strife in the early 1990s do not mean that Slovenia experienced no nationalistic upsurge. Apart from being a political movement that mobilised people in order to materialise the sovereign Slovenian state, Slovenian nationalism has also included negative attitudes towards the "Other"; these have been mainly members of the Yugoslav nations living in Slovenia, especially those from nations whose political leaderships were in conflict with Slovenian "national interests" (e.g., Serbians).

Although the new state did not need to construct a shared national identity, for it was there before the state was established, it has been necessary to nurture feelings of national affiliation and establish an allegiance to the new state. Nationalism in Slovenia is far from having had its final word. The "Other" is defined predominantly as any newcomer arriving from the south or east of Slovenia. Intolerance towards the "Other" has lately also turned against illegal immigrants and asylum seekers.<sup>3</sup>

#### CONSTRUCTION OF THE "OTHER"

Analysing ethnic intermarriage in the former Yugoslavia, Botev (1994) came to the conclusion that Yugoslavia was never fully integrated. In fact, cultural barriers hindered interactions, and numerous differences ran counter to Tito's "brotherhood and unity" ideal. In Slovenia the cultural boundaries were least permeable, since eth-

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<sup>3</sup> See selected publications of the Peace Institute, such as *MediaWatch Journal*, but especially the annual *Intolerance Monitor Reports* (Petković 2001; Kuhar and Trplan 2003; Trplan, Autor and Kuhar 2004).

nic homogeneity was the highest in the federation. In the last few decades Slovenia's fast economic development together with industrialisation and urbanisation have changed its ethnic composition. "From 1962 to 1990, some 270,000 immigrants from other Yugoslav republics moved into Slovenia in search of work, mainly unskilled and semiskilled workers" (Rizman 1999, 157). Slovenia was still the most homogenous among the Yugoslav republics, yet its ethnic composition has been changing. The share of "ethnic" Slovenians decreased from 96 to 83 percent within the last four decades.<sup>4</sup>

The actual proportion of people who do not consider themselves of Slovenian ethnic "origin" is low, albeit increasing. Yet with only two million inhabitants, Slovenia's 39,000 Serbians and almost 36,000 Croatians, let alone more than 40,000 people that declare themselves as either Bosniaks, Muslims or Bosnians, can become quite visible in certain social contexts.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, the term "Non-Slovenians" has been coined. It represents people from the former Yugoslav republics who live in Slovenia, but it is not used for any other "foreigners" and not applied to the national minorities. Only the Italian and Hungarian minorities in Slovenia have special status and special rights. Their numbers are small, for combined they account for less than half of a percent of the entire population. People with other countries of origin that live in Slovenia possess no such special guaranteed provisions, apart from the general rights and freedoms they enjoy as residents or citizens of the Slovenian state. The only other "special status" group are the roughly three thousand Roma, who do not enjoy the constitutional status of a minority, yet are considered a "community."<sup>6</sup> The two recognised national minorities have long

<sup>4</sup> The numbers in this paper are taken from the Slovenian statistical yearbooks and the 1991 and 2002 censuses (cf. Vertot et al. 2001; Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia 2002), unless stated otherwise. These particular numbers represent the share of people who categorized themselves as "Slovenians" in various censuses (between 1961 and 2002).

<sup>5</sup> The declaration of "Bosniak" as a national category was enforced by the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994 and is thus a new category, chosen by 1.10 percent of respondents. 0.53 percent declared themselves to be "Muslims" and 0.41 percent to be "Bosnians," together forming slightly over two percent, or forty thousand, of Slovenia's population. Since 2.4 percent of the inhabitants declared their religion to be Islam, I should here point out that the national category "Muslim" includes only people who consider themselves Muslim in the sense of ethnic and not religious affiliation.

<sup>6</sup> For more on the specific status of the Slovenian Roma community and the ongoing intolerant and racist debates regarding their position in the society, see Petković (2003).

lived in compact settlements and are defined as "indigenous" populations, whereas the fact that the Croatian or Serbian and other minority groups have mostly arrived within the last few decades as economic migrants and are scattered around the country is used as an argument against their claim for minority status.

The former compatriots do not have a constitutionally defined special status. They are not considered to be "autochthonous" population, yet they are hardly "foreigners" either. Their place seems to be somewhere "in between." Hence, the problematic expression "Non-Slovenians" has been invented for people who are not (ethnically) Slovenians, but belong to nations of the former Yugoslavia and live on Slovenia's territory. In the era of Yugoslavia, when the migrational flow was visibly changing Slovenia's ethnic composition, all-inclusive pejorative terms such as *Bosanci* (Bosnians) or the untranslatable *Čefurji* preceded the slightly less offensive "Non-Slovenians." *Čefurji* is an insulting term for people of "non-Slovenian origin" living in Slovenia, again aimed specifically at former Yugoslav co-nationals. Such characterisations, however, demand an assumption that what "real" Slovenians are like is a widely known and accepted fact.

National identity "very often means ethnic identity," and to be a Slovenian it is imperative not only to speak the language and have lived in Slovenia for a long time, but also to be Slovenian "by birth" (Hafner-Fink 1997, 265). This suggests that Slovenia is still struggling with the imbedded organic perception of the nation. As Gil-White (1999) observes, most people seem to think of (their) ethnic group in "primordial" terms. In other words, "ethnic actors conceive membership in terms of categorical descent: biological descent from those possessing a label implying a given cultural 'essence' or 'peoplehood'" (814). His is not a claim that ethnic, or indeed national, groups are "*objectively* primordial," but rather an attempt to "distinguish between what an ethnic group is to its members *psychologically*, and the objective reasons why such groups may form. . . . To insist that actors perceive co-ethnics as sharing biological descent is to describe the manner in which individuals *cognize* the ethnies they participate in" (803). The fact that a nation is *perceived* by its members in terms of common origin, shared history or, indeed, shared descent may have little to do with the actual situation of nation-formation.

Slovenians perceive the Slovenian nation as a real entity, a community of people who are in certain aspects similar to them, who are the “us” in opposition to “them” when social categorisation of national differences is employed. In a sense, this is what Anderson (1991) had in mind when describing imagined communities. The social realities of people’s everyday lives are not preoccupied with speculation about the origins of nations; people simply “know” whom to categorise as members of their own nation and who to view as an outsider. In the Slovenian case, language is the key characteristic identifying members of their nation. This suggests that “outsiders” can *become* Slovenians, for the definition of a Slovenian is also drawn in civic terms.<sup>7</sup> The lack of significance given to one’s religious affiliation means that people of different religious beliefs who were not born in Slovenia can still “become” Slovenians if they feel Slovenian, are willing to respect the state’s institutions and, most importantly, learn the language. The fact that one can learn, *acquire*, the language reflects the main ambivalence about the Slovenian national identity; speaking a language is a way of gaining membership in a national community through the process of learning, acculturation or assimilation.

Yet the term “Non-Slovenian” signals that people are not perceived as “Slovenians” even if they speak Slovenian and have Slovenian citizenship, and here lies the core of xenophobia and nationalistic prejudice. On the one hand, one can only be a “real” member if one is “born Slovenian.” On the other hand, ties of shared history and common descent can be replaced by common destiny; or rather, it is possible to become Slovenian based on adopting the language and culture through a sort of “naturalization” process. Anyone can therefore “become Slovenian” in theory, yet whether all co-nationals will accept this person’s membership in the Slovenian nation is not certain. Judging by the current state of affairs, certain national elites

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<sup>7</sup> Slovenian public opinion shows that the most prominent indicator of “Slovenianness” is the Slovenian language. Well over 90 percent of respondents in the 1994 and 2003 polls agreed that language is the most important characteristic of a “true” Slovenian. Respondents also assign great significance to “feeling Slovenian”; respect for Slovenian political institutions and laws also scored highly, while being Catholic is perceived to be of minor importance for the Slovenian national identity (Toš 1999, 2004), even though seventy percent of Slovenians in 1991 and sixty percent in the 2002 census declared themselves as Catholics.

and segments of the population will continue the trend of excluding the "Others."

One of the possible reasons for the negative emotions that Slovenians express about immigrants is that such immigrants have traditionally come from the southern republics of Yugoslavia. Thus, the pejorative term "southerners" (*južnjaki, jugoviči*) is also used to signify immigrants from the former-Yugoslav republics. The "south" is often perceived depreciatively, being associated with the Balkans as a backward place where people are lazy, prone to ethnic feuds and culturally different from "us," the Slovenians.<sup>8</sup> The reasons for such prejudice are multifarious, most significantly connected to the shared Yugoslav past. Rupel suggests that often people coming to Slovenia from other Yugoslav republics have behaved as members of a "stronger" nation, as "representatives of a state coming to some province" (1992, 19). Slovenian intolerance has been aggravated because it often seemed that the immigrants refused to make any effort to "fit in" (i.e., to assimilate). Many never learned Slovenian, for it has always been feasible to live in Slovenia without speaking the language. Since no language was official in Yugoslavia, linguistic tolerance used to be quite high. Slovenian sensitivity to the language question intensified in the mid-1980s. The difficult path to independence and especially the military aggression that followed, have fortified and elevated people's allegiance to the Slovenian nation.

"Slovenianness" begins and ends with the Slovenian language. Historically, this can be understood. Slovenians did not have a state to protect their national interests and guard their national identity. Threats of Germanisation and Italianisation were prominent, especially in the first half of the twentieth century, while the Hungarianisation of north-eastern regions and recent attempts at Serbianisation within crisis-stricken Yugoslavia have all contributed to the special position of the Slovenian language within the Slovenian national identity. After independence, Slovenian confidence became more prominent, and almost half of the respondents

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<sup>8</sup> The pejorative stigmatisation of the "south" can be found globally and is, for example, also an important mechanism of group categorisation in Italy, where the *Legia Nord* has skilfully appealed to "northern dislike of anything and anyone farther south than Rome" (D'Amato and Schieder 1997, 273–74).

in a 1994 poll admitted that they stick to Slovenian when talking to Croatians or Serbians and never switch to the other language (Toš 1999, 326), even though such switching used to be a prevalent practice. Around 88 percent of Slovenia's population claims Slovenian as their mother tongue, while the national minorities' languages are spoken by fewer people than the languages of immigrants.<sup>9</sup> Speakers of "Serbo-Croatian" amount to 8 percent. I use "Serbo-Croatian" as a summary term for several recently (re)recognised (or constructed as separate) languages. The 2002 census reflects how what used to be referred to as "Serbo-Croatian" has undergone several changes, and its variants have been redefined and re-codified as different languages in Yugoslavia's successor states.<sup>10</sup>

Writing about nationalistic attitudes in Slovenia, I do so with the awareness that no such large-scale chauvinist and racist practices have emerged as in Serbia or Croatia, to compare two ex-Yugoslav compatriots. Still, the fact that Slovenia has not sunk into violent nationalism and militant ethnonational prejudice does not mean that the same kind of exclusivist logic has not been lurking behind its many less obvious displays of nationalist prejudice.<sup>11</sup> As Klinar (1992) asserted, nationalism in Slovenia was predominantly concerned with the attainment of the state. Once this goal was accomplished, the other, less prominent yet no less powerful, "negative" side became more salient. Nationalistic attitudes towards the "Other" are always present among certain segments of any given population, and the new Slovenian state has not been immune to their presence.

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<sup>9</sup> Italian, Hungarian and the Romany language are recognised as minority languages in Slovenia. All three together are spoken by less than one percent of the population.

<sup>10</sup> In the 1991 census, 4.2 percent of respondents listed "Serbo-Croatian" as their mother tongue, 2.6 percent listed "Croatian," 0.9 percent "Serbian" and 0.2 percent "Croatian-Serbian." 0.2 percent spoke Macedonian and 0.2 percent Albanian. In the 2002 census 2.8 percent listed "Croatian," 1.8 percent "Serbo-Croatian," 1.6 percent "Serbian" and 1.6 percent "Bosnian," 0.4 percent listed "Albanian" and 0.2 percent "Macedonian" as their mother tongue.

<sup>11</sup> Owing to space limitations, I here refrain from discussing particular cases of contemporary Slovenian intolerance. Several authors have published detailed analyses of these phenomena (e.g., racist discrimination against the Roma, continued opposition to a mosque, ongoing refusal to resolve the citizenship status of the so-called "erased" etc.); see especially *Intolerance Monitor Reports 1-3* (Petković 2001; Kuhar and Trplan 2003; Trplan, Autor and Kuhar 2004).

Slovenian Public Opinion surveys in the early 1980s demonstrated positive attitudes towards minorities and very low levels of ethnic intolerance (Rizman 1999). Yugoslavia’s inner tensions towards the end of the decade changed that, and Slovenians became wary of their “southern” neighbours. The changes in public opinion were sudden and significant. As growing socio-economic pressures and the difficulties of transitional readjustment began to affect people, feelings of ethnic distance were soon accompanied by a rising intolerance towards “outsiders.”<sup>12</sup> Once multiparty rule was introduced and the new state established, the so-called radical right also emerged. It filled a socio-political and psychological gap left after the fall of communism. Nationalistic feelings are closely related to Slovenian xenophobia. Slovenians primarily fear immigration, thinking that the influx of “outsiders” will exceed the absorption capacity of the nation.

In contemporary Slovenia nationalistic discourse is present in several different socio-political contexts. On the level of policymaking and general political debates, nationalism can be detected in exclusivist practices and in attempts at legislative measures with ethnocentric undertones. On the level of popular public opinion, nationalism is most visibly reflected in the attitudes towards Non-Slovenians, varying from open-minded pluralistic views to utterly intolerant calls for national purity.

## CONCLUSION

The collapse of communism in Central-Eastern Europe has been accompanied by an upsurge in intolerance, which takes forms such as racism, nationalism, sexism and homophobia. Such negative attitudes are not limited to the post-communist countries; intolerant nationalistic views, especially about immigrants, can also be observed in the “West.” While these exclusivist emotions have often been portrayed as arising like Phoenix from under the “lid” of communism, academic interest should focus on how such intolerances operate, what purpose they serve and how they are mobilised. An

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<sup>12</sup>See Petković (2001), Kuhar and Trplan (2003), and Trplan, Autor and Kuhar (2004) for more information on Slovenian racism, homophobia, nationalistic hate speech and xenophobic attacks on outsiders.

important conclusion is that the socio-economic and political uncertainties of the post-communist transition have not been as acute in Slovenia as in other post-communist states. Its nationalism and xenophobia, while no doubt present and worrying, have not reached extreme chauvinist forms.

Slovenians may not have had their state for most of their existence, yet a separate national consciousness was established early on. More autonomy was added, especially in the years of Tito's Yugoslavia, until Slovenia finally gained independence in 1991. This particular historical path is, I believe, an important reason why Slovenian nationalism never sank to extremes and was more of an "independentist" movement than an ethnically exclusivist campaign. Slovenia's high ethnic homogeneity was never in need of mass expulsions of the "Other," such as were seen in the case of intensely ethnically mixed Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet, recurrent calls for a "pure" Slovenia can be heard, and that is why it is necessary to further examine the contemporary Slovenian construction of the "Other."

I argued that Slovenia is a "nationalizing" state that has worked *for* the Slovenian nation, and this paper offered an explanation of the "inherently more diffuse" phenomenon of post-independence nationalism. I claimed that Slovenia, a new state still experiencing transitional problems, exhibits nationalistic prejudice against the stigmatised "Non-Slovenians." I also stated, however, that these contemporary state-building "nationalizing" processes can be compared to state homogenisations of the "old" nations of the democratic "West." After Slovenia achieved independence, when feelings of national cohesiveness reached the apogee of national homogenisation in 1991, the internal disparities within the Slovenian nation again became salient. The fall of the egalitarian socialist ideology accentuated the social, national, gender, economic and other differences that now came to the fore. A highly homogeneous state in terms of its ethnic composition, Slovenia represents a classic example of how a majority population (i.e., the core nation) "forgets" that the citizenry does not comprise solely the "ethnoculturally" defined "state-owning" nation.

Slovenia is a post-communist state still far from a consolidated democracy, yet its unique politics of transition offer hope for its further steady development. In comparison to other much more unsta-



ble post-communist countries, it can be seen as an example of an established nation, perpetuated in its "banal nationalism" (Billig 1995) through processes of daily national identity building. As shown here, this may occasionally produce strong feelings of intolerance towards "Others"—such as the continually stigmatised "Non-Slovenians," who are constructed as threatening the "purity" of the Slovenian nation. Yet the ubiquitous "threat" to the Slovenian national identity comes in many forms, one of which also stems from the "West," as Slovenia's membership in the European Union and NATO is now only beginning to show.

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**WE ARE NOT LIKE THEM:  
DENIAL OF THE OTHER IN SERBIA,  
CROATIA AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**

SLAVIŠA RAKOVIĆ

INTRODUCTION

Does national identity actually exist, or it is more a construction? Social constructivists claim that every identity is a construct bound to be changed when social circumstances change. However, all nationalists argue that the group to which they belong is “given,” so it has traits which are not changeable and which are rooted in the soul of the group.

Especially following any crisis, the nationalist point of view gets more attention than the scientific one. But, there is also the fact that all nationalist ideologies have their own academics who “scientifically” support the nationalist thesis. In Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) nationalist ideologies were strongly supported by *loyal* scholars who struggled to redefine the national identities of the three major ethnic groups (Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats) that live in the area where people used to speak what was then called Serbo-Croatian language.

From today’s perspective, post-war identity reconstruction in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is interesting for comparison because their pre-communist historical experiences overlapped in many points. In communism their intellectuals created a public policy of ethnic blindness of the state which to a certain extent diminished antagonisms that existed in the past. During the communism period many mixed marriages between the individuals belonging to different ethnic groups occurred. This created a space for the inter-cultural exchange of different cultural practices, and made the three groups closer to each other than they used to be before 1945. During the war (1991–1995) many of these ties were shattered.

After the conflict many of the pre-war connections have been reestablished, however there are still issues between these three states to be discussed and solved. This has created a new state of affairs between the elites of Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats, that combines frustrations from the past (refugees, returnees, the succession of the state property, the war criminals/heroes) and the need to work together (prevention of illegal immigration, organized crime, sex-trafficking). Of significant importance is the fact that the products of popular culture from all three sides, Serbian turbo folk, Croatian pop and Bosnian folk music, have already broken the boundaries between three ethnic groups.

In this text Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are not analyzed as states, but as political and symbolical entities where three ethnic groups, thus Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats, live. Bosnia-Herzegovina is specifically interesting because those three ethnic groups constitute constitutionally equal *majorities*, meaning that Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats are the constituent peoples in this country. Since Croats and Serbs are, numerically speaking, minorities orientated towards their “kin states,” inter-ethnic group relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to a large extent depend on what is going on in BH neighbouring countries. Moreover, Bosniak and Croat minority lives in Serbia, and Serb and Bosniak/Muslim minority in Croatia. All this influences the politics in the three states as well as the identity constructions of their dominant ethnic groups.

Taking into account the fact that all three of these ethnic groups were involved in the war of 1991–1995, their post-conflict national identity constructions have been largely forged in relation to their mutual re-definitions of each other. Therefore, in following chapters I argue that construction of post-conflict national identities in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina has been done in a context of re-defining the Other, no matter if it is an ally or an enemy, which process created a new morality of ethnic homogenization and denial of the Other.

The paper is divided into two parts. Part one of the paper is predominantly theoretical and deals with basic concepts of nationalism and identity issues. Part two is more a practical overview of the two currently most obvious ways of redefining and denial of *the Other* in our region: through the question of *language* (actually, naming of the language) and the treatment of war crimes issues.

NATIONALISM, NATION, ETHNICITY, IDENTITY:  
BASIC CONCEPTS

Nationalism: an ideology whose affective driving force is the sense of belonging to and serving a perceived national community. The carriers of this ideology attribute to their nation a distinctive cultural identity which sets it apart from other nations and gives it a special place in the historical process (Griffin 1999, 154).

This is the explanation of nationalism given by the scholar Roger Griffin. This author and many other scholars claim that nationalism takes different forms and that its basic classifications involve distinction between what are called *liberal* and *illiberal nationalisms*. Liberal nationalism, according to Roger Griffin, works on the basis that all permanent residents (of a certain state) fully enjoy the human rights conferred by citizenship, irrespective of ethnic criteria. On the other hand, illiberal nationalism is closely related to “post-traditional societies . . . fulfilled by a particularly intense form of affective attachments to one’s own homeland . . . or people, one often maintain through the demonization of other nations or out-groups, ethnic or otherwise, within the nation” (Griffin 1999, 154–55).

However, both liberal and illiberal nationalisms are related to the creation and maintenance of a nation. One of the main problems concerning the definition of nation is its relation to the state. Here are enumerated some understandings of the concept of nation:

- Nation as synonymous with state.
- Nation as encompassing the state plus other political entities, such as trusts and non-self governing territories, as defined in the UN Charter.
- Nation as representing *a people* (not a population) *belonging to the same ethno-linguistic group, not necessarily inhabiting the same political and territorial space, but possessing the political will or ambition to form a unitary state* (e.g., the Kurds) (emphasis mine).
- Nation as representing *a culturally homogenized population living in an existing state* (e.g., as in the case of the French nation) (emphasis mine).
- Nation as a community of peoples composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a defined territory and government (e.g., USA, Switzerland) (Pamir 2005).

Anthony Smith in his *National Identity* quotes Friedrich Meinecke who distinguished the *Kulturnation* from the *Staatnation*. According to Meinecke, the *Kulturnation* is a political community; the *Staatnation* is a self-determining political nation. The former is largely passive, while the latter is active (Smith 1993, 8). In the above listed *understandings* of the nation, the third and fourth understanding on the list are the most *convenient* for the political tradition of the Western Balkans. This kind of understanding of the nation is labelled as a non-Western, that is, not a civil concept of the nation but one that is ethnically defined (10–11). Ethnicity is, therefore, a very important indicator in the Western Balkans.

Both ethnicity and nation are collective identities. Nation as a political collectivity, by definition, aspires to the state. On the other hand, ethnicity as a cultural community can aspire to the state but not by definition (Krasteva 2005). Thus, in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans particularly, as has been said, the concept of nation is much more “Eastern,” where “the nation is seen as a fictive *super family*, and it boasts pedigrees and genealogies to back up its claims, often tracked down by native intellectuals” (Smith 1993, 12). *Super family* is by its own name connected with the *ethnie* because it takes into account ancestry, affections, common heritage, myths etc., whether or not there has existed a common state. *Ethnie* as a collective identity is closely connected with culture in the broadest sense of its meaning.

Scholar Walker Connor has an interesting understanding of the difference between nation and ethnic group; he points out that an ethnic group exists without self-consciousness thus it is perceived as distinct only by outsiders. However, when that group recognizes itself as such, it becomes a political community, hence nation (Connor 1994, 45–46). So, until its own self-recognition, an *ethnie* is visible only to those who are not insiders.

As can be seen from the above, Griffin’s explanation of nationalism as itself an ideology incorporates delimitations from *the Other*. That “distinctive cultural identity” by definition is “bordering, transitive cross-identity: it is constantly jammed (or rather distorted) in the gap, the straddle between the origin/determinacy, on one hand, and



the projection/aspiration on the other” (Šeleva 2003, 123–37). Belgrade University professor Branimir Stojković, in his book *European Cultural Identity*, gives a definition of cultural identity as the self consciousness of the members of a group that has developed historically depending on criteria that the group builds in relation to other social groups (Stojković 1993, 26). So, we need *the Other* in order to have ourselves recognized and acknowledged as different. If we are not like *the Other*, it means that there are certain features that create a distance between *Us* and *the Other*. Consequently, if there are features that make a group of *Us*, this means that a certain level of homogenisation exists.

Every identity is “a sum of all distinctive features that make us different from others”; however, delimitations from *the Other* can be mild, but when we move to the field of politics, they become more serious. In politics, actually, “the identity category is based on the differential model and the concept of difference, exclusion and elimination of *rival* sides” (Šeleva 2003, 123–37). In the context of the Western Balkans context, a battle for identity is often a battle for territories not only for the recognition by others. However, territories themselves are the part of a certain group’s identity. In the Balkans it is “clear” to whom the territories belong, if we read the programs of actual nationalist parties in the region, especially their programs from the beginning of the 1990s. In this respect, ethnies in the Balkans, as cultural communities, often seek to become *territorially* recognized. Ethnic territory is of concern whatever the constituents of the claim; for example, state, electoral district, language etc. That sort of request is not a problem in itself, since it does not contain exclusion of the other, the outsiders. Unfortunately, in Serbia, BH and Croatia it came about that all three claims for national delimitations after the fall of communism were very exclusive and, understandably, all included “territorial readjustments,” hence separatism, secessions, irredentism. To recap, at the beginning of the 1990s, the boiling pot of already existing nationalism blew up in the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia and the parallel dissolution of ex-Yugoslavian cultural space.

CULTURAL AND POLITICAL BORDERING IN SERBIA,  
CROATIA AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

## THE CASE OF LANGUAGE

As has been established, the (re)construction of post-conflict identities in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina has been done in the context of re-defining the Other, whether ally or enemy. Images of and narratives about geographical and cultural boundaries have been involved in the identity construction processes in these three new states. A preoccupation with small size differences among the three ethnic groups who, in the recent past, spoke one single language, at that time called Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian, caused a high range of xenophobia towards particular *outsiders* and, also, to not so *loyal* insiders. In this sub-chapter several examples of bordering through language disputes are presented.

Language itself has many functions and meanings. The most important features of a language seem to be its communicative and symbolic functions. After the splitting of the Serbo-Croatian language, the inauguration of separate standard language—Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian—reinforced the symbolic function of language and diminished the communicative one. The communicative function of language, which is an integrative one, could not maintain its domination over the symbolic function, which in the final instance is disintegrative outside the ethno-national sphere (Baotić 2002, 157–59). Immediately upon the start of ethnic conflict, language identity reconstructions also began. Going back to and through history, many scholars of all three considered ethnic groups tried to distance their own community from others in the close vicinity. The re-traditionalization of public space in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was especially strong in the field of official language policy.

In Croatia and Croat dominated areas of BH many articles have been published on the topic of the relation between Serbian and Croatian languages. Apart from those based on the scientific point of view written by distinguished Croatian linguists, many of those articles and books are, in reality, orientated more toward nationalistic propaganda than to scientific argumentation. Thus, on the web page <[www.hercegbosna.org](http://www.hercegbosna.org)>, an Internet site from BH created by

the members of the Croatian community, one can find several texts on Croatian language written by various prominent linguists and scholars from Croatia and BH. However, all of these texts are based on political rather than scientific of argumentation. Instead of presenting issues of scientific concerns in regard to the Croatian language, this web site presents historical and linguistic facts about this language but in the cause of differentiating it from Serbian language. Take a look at the titles of selected texts from this web site: *Rana slavistika i srpske krivotvorine* (Early Slavic Studies and Serb forgeries); *Zašto hrvatski nikako ne može biti hrvatskosrpski?* (Why Croatian can never be Croato-Serbian?); *Poslednji mohikanci Serbokroatizma* (The last Mohicans of Serbokroatism); *Sumrak srpske lingvistike* (The twilight of the Serb linguistics). On this web site, those Croatian linguists and philologists who claim that Serbian and Croatian are, to simplify, the same language are pejoratively labelled *hrvatski vukovci* (this can be only descriptively translated into English as: the Croat linguists who were in favour of the Serbian language reformer Vuk Stefanović Karadžić). However, it is not only Serbian language from which Croatian linguists have to distance themselves. In the article entitled *Bosanski jezički karakazan* (Dark pot of the language in Bosnia), the establishment of the name *Bosnian language* is seen by some Croatian scholars as a reaffirmation of the policy of Benyamin Kallay, a well-known governor of BH appointed during the time of Austro-Hungarian Empire who is said to have tried to unify all BH communities into one Bosnian nation. In some sentences of this text and in the text by the academic Dalibor Brozović on language in Bosnia and Herzegovina, originally published in the magazine *Jezik* (Language) in Zagreb in February 2003, a reader can notice a slight but noticeable mockery of the Bosnian language.

In Serbia, language-battles seem to be less contentious, but still to exist. The most frequent language delimitation of the Serbian language is with reference to the newly promoted idea of a Montenegrin language. According to Egon Fekete, a distinguished Serbian scholar, the Montenegrin language is a fiction that has no basis in reality (Fekete 2005). In relation to Bosnian, which is being officially recognized by the Serbian government in the southern-western Serbia, the Sandžak region, Serbia's politicians and schol-

ars are likely either to acknowledge the right of the Bosniak community in Serbia to call their language whatever they want or to make a mockery of the whole issue. In this respect, an “interesting” point of view is that of Ms. Milka Andrić, a high councillor in the Serbian Ministry of Education, who argues that, “We cannot prevent them from calling their language Bosnian, but they cannot impose on us the way they call their language” (Milosavljević 2005). I should reiterate here that the Bosniaks in Serbia are an autochthonous community and Serbia is still a state of all its citizens. The vocabulary used by some state officials, such as that councillor in the Ministry of Education in labelling some minority communities is unconceivable, since Serbia has recognized the Bosniaks as a national minority who has all minority rights prescribed by the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by the Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro.

Regarding the situation of the Bosniak cultural community, it seems that among Bosniak academics there is no such denial of the Other in regard to language policies as in neighbouring countries. However, in the Bosniak controlled media in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one can often find, although not openly, rejection of the possibility that in Bosnia and Herzegovina another language than Bosnian can be spoken. The very last nationalistic rhetoric in regard to language in Bosniak public space was registered after three girls from the pop band *Feminem* won first prize in the Bosnian contest for Eurosong in Kiev. All three singers are Croats (so they speak Croatian); all three live in Croatia, and only two of them have BH passports. For instance, on TV Hayat, viewers could see and hear very exclusivist comments on the fact that Croats were representing BH, and on various Internet forums, many nationalistic statements and passages of hate speech have been published in relation to this issue.

#### THE CASE OF WAR CRIMES

Language as such, as a linguistic system with a strong symbolic function, is surely prone to political misuse. Through the way one uses one’s language, through the words one chooses to describe certain facts from everyday life or from the political and social context, a clear attitude of those who express their opinion can be “read,” even

though that opinion is not explicitly expressed (that is colloquially called reading between the lines). In Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina public discourse is characterized by differences of usage for key words regarding the war in all three countries (aggression or civil war, genocide or massacre, war crime or legitimate war action). Bosnia-Herzegovina is, as always, a separate case because it has three public arenas (Bosniak, Croat and Serb).

Attitudes towards the last war differ from country to country, but all contain certain elements of denial, in different ways. Denial of war crimes is a fact of every day life in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Serbia and Croatia it is ignorance of their official's real role in past wars (who is the attacker and who the defender), in BH (among Bosniaks) it is a kind of victimization because of losses from the war, which give the "right" to some Bosniak scholars to talk about Serb and Croat victims in such a way as to present them as less deserving of attention than Bosniak victims.

But, along with inquiry on war crimes and efforts to establish the truth about the last wars, there is another very interesting phenomenon lying beneath the official story of the crimes against humanity committed between 1991 and 1995. Indeed, observing the political arena in these three states and ethnic communities often gives the impression that the main reason for war crime prosecutions and arrests of those accused before the Hague tribunal is not merely to satisfy justice. War crime discussions in the media and politics are becoming, in a bizarre twist, a tool for disqualifying *the Other*. And, that is not all. In the region, a strategy of disqualification of *the Other* as the best way to define who is with *Us*, even now seems to be in progress. Unfortunately, it seems that identity construction in public discourse in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina often needs a clearly defined enemy in order to be stable and successful. For instance, in May 2004, during the course *War Crimes, Genocide and Memories* in the Centre for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies in Sarajevo, Janja Beč Neumann, a course leader and Nobel Prize Nominee, faced an "interesting" kind of resistance when speaking on Srebrenica. Ms. Beč Neumann is from Serbia, and partly of Serb origin, so some of her Bosniak students found that she had not right to talk about genocide in Srebrenica (Beč Neumann 2004). No matter how banal, this kind of reaction proves that even highly educat-

ed young persons can be very uncritical when war crimes are the issue. This poses a question: what if someone is really insulted by the fact that somebody who is *the Other* talks about *Us* under the authority of a university professor? In this case we have the situation that *the Other* is disqualified without being given a chance to express a personal opinion. Yet, it is true that most of the war crimes committed during the Bosnian war were carried out by either Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces or soldiers. But, at some points during the conflict, Bosnian government forces also violated the laws of war. However, this fact is often neglected by some Bosniak politicians and even scholars. On the other hand, in Republic of Srpska's government, the role of Serb forces during the war from the Serb point of view is downplayed. The most shocking was the counting of Serb victims in Sarajevo, orchestrated by the government of Republic of Srpska (RS). The main idea of the Bosnian Serb politicians headed by the PM of the RS government was to prove that in Sarajevo genocide was committed on Serbs that was even worse than the genocide in Srebrenica, which produced serious grievances among the whole Bosniak community in BH (Suljagić 2005).

Glorifying war leaders is another phenomenon, especially among nationalists in Serbia, Republic of Srpska and Croatia. For instance, we can simply recall what happened a few years ago in the Croatian town of Sinj during the festival of Sinjska Alka, where the war crimes culprit, Mirko Norac, was given wide support by some of distinguished participants at the festival. On the version broadcasted for TV viewers could see even Catholic nuns holding large signs saying *Svi smo mi Norac* (We are all Norac) (Matić 2001). In Serbia, from time to time, citizens of bigger cities can see posters of the war crime culprit Radovan Karadžić with the words *Svaki je Srbin Radovan* (Each Serb is Radovan). In Serbia attitudes toward past wars in the region are very diverse. Because after the murder of pro-Hague reformist Serbia's PM Zoran Đinđić and new elections in 2003, the softer rightists headed by Vojislav Koštunica took power, nationalist discourse returned through small doors into the political arena. This is important because of the fact (of which we should here remind ourselves) that at the very beginning of his rule as President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the current PM of Serbia Vojislav Koštunica, set up a *Commission for Truth and Reconciliation*. That

Commission never actually started to work, but it is interesting that one of the Commission's member's attitudes to war crimes was: "any war crime has its own past." This opinion can be interpreted in different ways. The president of Serbia's Helsinki Committee Sonja Biserko (2005), pointed out that the remark was a weak justification of war crime. Even were it not a justification of war crime, it is indicative that members of Koštunica's *Commission for the Truth and Reconciliation* kept insisting on a so-called "de-ethnification of crimes"—that the ethnic background of victims is not important. This kind of argumentation seems fair, but things are somewhat different when a *Commission for the Truth and Reconciliation* has been organized by the President who is a chief of the state sued by Bosnia and Herzegovina for aggression before an international court.

From all above mentioned cases, one can conclude that there is really a great variety of possibilities for disqualifying *the Other* and to define who is an enemy. One interpretation of the case involving rejection of professor Janja Beč Neumann (even though it is an isolated case such as does not often happen so openly in the public arena), could be "you Serbs are guilty and you should keep quiet." However, there is another, more dangerous and perhaps more politically incorrect interpretation, that "we have a right to claim benefits because we were the victims." The case in which the Bosnian Serb official tried to prove genocide in Sarajevo can be understood in two ways. One way of understanding is "we do everything just to protect our political positions and to prevent our comrades from believing you (*the Other*) that only the Serbs were bad guys during the war." Another explanation could be a desperate attempt to shift the attention of the international political authorities away from Srebrenica genocide. At any rate, it is a clear case of disqualification of *the Other* (the Bosniaks) through disqualification, even if less overt, of the Bosniak victims in Srebrenica.

War crimes, unfortunately, proved to be very effective in the homogenisation processes of all three ethnic groups. Extraditions of those indicted for war crimes before the Hague tribunal are still hot issues for the governments in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, this whole story about war crimes and their symbolic meaning for ethnic communities who were parties to the war can be explained without further comments but merely by

observing and comparing the “tone” of the news on public broadcasting services in all three states when someone accused of war crimes is about to go to the Hague, from one side, and when somebody from “our part” is extradited to the tribunal, from the other side.

As we have seen, language is a powerful tool for intercultural delimitations. However, languages are not the only means to help us to define ourselves in relation to others, and with those who are not with us. In this chapter I have moved to the field of practical politics where *the Other* is not there only to induce us to notice the differences between Us and Them, but where “the Other is regarded as a rival, an opponent . . . that should be defeated and subjugated (at least suppressed)” (Šeleva 2003, 128), if not by weapon on the battlefield than in the political and academic arena by disqualifications of different kinds.

#### CONCLUSION

Language bordering in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina has shown that different ways of naming a language that once had a name we all accepted, is a powerful means of distancing *Us* from *Them*. Moreover, the differing war crime discourses in these three states show how both insisting on our victims alone, as well as denial of the human losses of the others strengthen the national homogenisation of a certain group. And, finally, both distancing and homogenisation proved to be, unfortunately, the easiest ways of constructing *Ourselves*.

However, the social distance between Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats seems to be decreasing. The myth of a mutual European future for those three ethnic groups seems to be very successful. It seems reasonable to believe that centuries of old ethnocultural antagonisms between these three groups will phase out when external borders of their states vanish into those of the European Union. One thing, however, remains unclear. Since the story that all three states have futures in the European Union comes from the mouths of the Union’s officials, and since politicians from Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina seem ready to do anything just to charm the European Union’s administration, one important question arises:



how can antagonism disappear if we are still not ready to accept our recent past as we should? From the very few examples presented in this paper, it can be seen that the perceptions of those who are, in language and historical development, closest to each other are still based on one strategy: *We are not like them*. Therefore that negative way of defining the group's *Self*, does not appear to be very inclusive. Bearing this in mind, we should ask ourselves: If our identity is all but inclusive and if we need to disqualify *the Others* in order to construct *Us*, what are the perspectives of common existence? After all, are we not currently living in peace with Europe's eyes observing us? What would happen were Europe not there?

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**THE MASS MEDIA  
AND NATIONALISING STATES  
IN THE POST-YUGOSLAV SPACE**

SABINA MIHELJ

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, a substantial body of work has developed tracing the involvement of the Yugoslav mass media in the gradual formation and escalation of inter-ethnic conflicts and finally in conflict-resolution. The role of the media in igniting nationalism in the three war-torn republics—Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina—has received the most extensive study (e.g., Hudelist 1992; Malešić 1993, 1997; Reljić 1998; Thompson 1999; Skopljanac Brunner et al. 2000; Denich 2000; Kurspahić 2003). Another recurring topic has been the relationship between the media and nationalism in Serbia before the outbreak of violent conflicts (e.g., Banac 1992; media-related essays in Popov [1996] 2000; Slapšak et al. 1997; Jovanović 2000 and others), while some authors have examined the role of the media in framing national identities and inter-ethnic relationships among Yugoslav (Croatian, Serbian and Macedonian) diasporas during the wars (Kolar-Panov 1997a; Hockenos 2003). With the war ended, a steady trickle of publications emerged looking at the mass media in the broader context of conflict resolution and democratization in all the Yugoslav successor states, including those that were not seriously affected by war—most notably Slovenia and Macedonia (e.g., Kolar-Panov 1997b; Taylor and Kent 2000; Bašić Hrvatin and Milosavljević 2001; Malović 2001; Sopar, Andreovski, and Kolar-Panov 2001; chapters in Price and Thompson 2002; chapters in Spassov 2004; Brautović 2005; Petković 2005).

Although often addressing the intricate relationships between the media and nationalism and in particular inter-ethnic hatred and violence, these works have—with only a handful of exceptions (e.g., Kolar-Panov 1997a; Denich 2000; Taylor and Kent 2000)—only mar-

ginally engaged with the scholarly literature tackling these issues. When they did, they hardly went beyond recycling well-established theoretical orthodoxies: for example, asserting that the mass media were involved in the construction of imagined communities, or assuming that the mass media, simply by virtue of being omnipresent, have an easily identifiable and largely homogenous effect on their audiences. The aim of this paper is to review a range of relevant theoretical developments in the field of nationalism studies, and propose a set of approaches that can lead to more elaborated insights into the media's involvement in the processes of imagining and daily reproduction of national communities. Although empirically focussing exclusively on states established on the territory of socialist Yugoslavia, the proposals developed below are to a large extent relevant to the analysis of the relationship between the mass media and nationalism elsewhere in the world. Moreover, while the paper looks only at materials related to television, radio and the print media, an important part of its suggestions should also be applicable to internet-based media forms.

#### RECENT THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STUDY OF NATIONALISM

Prior to the late 1990s, nationalism was far from ranking among the high priority issues on the scholarly research agenda. Outbursts of nationalist euphoria or violence were believed to be atavisms limited to the early modern period and to less developed parts of the world, bound to dissipate with the advance of modernisation and globalisation. The post-Cold-War proliferation of overt nationalist sentiment in obviously modernised societies caught social scientists off guard. The "modernist" approach to nationalism, usually associated with names such as Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and John Breuilly, suddenly came into disrepute, and several authors attempted to develop alternative theories. Among these, the ethno-symbolist approach, developed by Anthony Smith, gained the widest following. Although agreeing that nations were to an important extent products of modernisation, industrialisation, the rise of the modern state, education systems and the mass media, proponents of Smith's approach stressed that modern feelings of national belonging and

their incessant appeal cannot be properly understood without taking into account their ties with pre-modern collective identities.

A significant segment of recent theoretical developments in the field, however, is steering away from the confrontation between the proponents of modernist and ethno-symbolist approaches to address new issues: the interplay of gender and nation, the role of everyday practices and popular culture and the multiplicity and heterogeneity of different nationalist discourses (Lawrence 2005, 198–218). Most importantly, while the debate between modernists and ethno-symbolists remains focused largely on the development of nationalisms and nations *before* the rise of nation-states, much recent debate has turned to the examination of nationalisms and nations *after* the formation of nation-states. This included several distinct conceptual and empirical advances, ranging from examinations of “banal nationalism” (Billig 1995), or “everyday ethnicity” (Brubaker 2004), to a growing concern with the tensions between nation-building and ethnic diversity and a renewed interest in nation-building (Brubaker 1996; Barkey and von Hagen 1997; Smith et al. 1998; Kolstø 2000). It is these works that are of most immediate relevance to the analysis of the relationships between the mass media and nationalism in Yugoslav successor states.

In classic works on nationalism published before 1989, nationalism in established nation-states was a somewhat neglected area of study. For John Breuilly, for example, nationalism in established states was simply too omnipresent to be a viable object of analysis: “once nation-states have been established and the rhetoric of national interest generally accepted it is difficult to identify anything specifically as nationalism” ([1985] 1993, 289). It was only with Michael Billig’s *Banal Nationalism* (1995) that nationalism in established nation-states has come to constitute an object of study in its own right. According to Billig, nationalism is not confined to particular social movements preceding the formation of nation-states, nor are its manifestations necessarily violent, emotional, irrational, or in any other way extraordinary. Quite to the contrary: nationalism is also embedded in numerous mindlessly performed social routines through which “established nation-states are daily reproduced as nations,” (39) including, for example, the morning saluting of the flag in schools across the United States of America, the everyday use of

stereotypes of “us” and “them,” the countless references to “our culture,” “our country,” “their sea,” “our mountains” etc.

Overlooking the banal manifestations of nationalism has far-reaching consequences, argued Billig. It leads scholars and the wider public in the established nations to naturalize and thereby neglect their own nationalism, presenting it as “patriotism”—a beneficial and even necessary force, clearly distinct from the dangerously irrational “nationalism” of others (55–59). More recently, a similar argument was proposed by Rogers Brubaker (2004), who warned against the tendency to take ethnic, racial and other groups and their existence for granted, arguing that by doing so, we actually participate in the process of reification of groups. Social analysts, he argued, “should not uncritically adopt *categories of ethno-political practice* as . . . *categories of social analysis*,” but rather try to explain how the process of reification of ethnic groups works in practice (10). One way of doing so consists of examining “everyday ethnicity,” that is, the ways in which ethnicity becomes embedded and expressed in “everyday encounters, practical categories, common-sense knowledge, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, interactional cues, discursive frames, organizational routines, social networks and institutional forms” (2).

The second, fairly recent trend relevant to the aims of this study consists of a growing awareness that the ultimate aim of nationalism, that is, congruence between the political and the national units, is effectively unobtainable. This awareness has entered a variety of study areas and taken an array of different forms, ranging from debates on multiculturalism and the compatibility of democracy and cultural diversity, to examinations of transnationalism and the diasporic forms of belonging and identification. One of the areas affected by this shift was research on nation-building, revived in the 1990s in response to the new wave of nation-building after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. This revived interest went hand-in-hand with a critical revision of classic theories of nation-building developed by Karl Deutsch, Charles Tilly, Reinhart Bendix and Stein Rokkan in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. These theories largely assumed that nation-building eventually leads to “full” national integration, or a total congruence of state and nation, polity and culture.

The first criticisms of post-World-War-II theories of nation-building were voiced in the early 1970s, when Walker Connor accused them of neglecting the issue of ethnic diversity or treating it, at best, “as a somewhat unimportant and ephemeral nuisance that will unquestionably give way to a common identity uniting all inhabitants of the state, regardless of ethnic heritage” ([1972] 1994, 29). His concerns have been reiterated in explorations of post-1989 nation-building, and several scholars have attempted to develop approaches to nation-building that would take into account the salience of ethnic diversity. By far the most influential among these has been Roger Brubaker’s (1996) suggestion that the new states established after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, as well as those that emerged from the ruins of the Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman empires, should be treated as “nationalizing states.” According to Brubaker’s definition, nationalizing states are states conceived as being “*of and for*” a particular ethno-culturally defined “core nation,” “whose language, culture, demographic position, economic welfare, and political hegemony must be protected and promoted by the state” (103). These states are, argued Brubaker, significantly different from the “advanced” states of north-western Europe and North America and the postcolonial states explored by Karl Deutsch and his students, which were “nationalizing” in a territorial rather than an ethnocultural mode (82).

Many scholars dealing with the issues of post-communist or post-socialist states and societies have welcomed Brubaker’s framework and adapted it for a series of case studies ranging from Ukraine to Kazakhstan (Arel 1995; Barkey 1997; King and Melvin 1998; Smith et al. 1998; Kolstø 2000). Nevertheless, this framework has not gone unchallenged. Some critics have pointed out that it lends itself easily to uncritical divisions of Europe into a “civic west” and an “ethnic east,” a division that cannot be empirically sustained (Barkey 1997; Kuzio 2001). Still, the distinction between nationalizing states and alternative nation-building models should not be entirely discarded. Instead, if it is to be analytically useful, this distinction should be, as Pål Kolstø (2000, 27) suggested, regarded as “one of stages and degrees rather than qualitative differences.” This means that virtually all nation-states are more or less explicitly linked to an “ethno-cultural core,” and are thus all, to an extent, nationalizing states. The

exact nation-building and nation-maintaining processes adopted in particular states and in particular periods, will nevertheless vary, and be open in varying degrees to alternative models, including nationalization in a “territorial” or “civic” mode.

Both the investigations of banal nationalism or everyday ethnicity, as well as the growing awareness of the variety of possible relationships between nation and state, provide useful frameworks for an examination of the relationships between the mass media and nationalism. The concept of banal nationalism has often been applied in media analysis and cultural analysis in a wider sense. Prompted by Billig’s own illustrative analysis of banal nationalist discourse in British daily newspapers, several authors have used this concept to examine the periodical press (Yumul and Özkırmılı 2000; Law 2001), while some have also applied it to the analysis of debates over architectural projects (McNeill and Tewdwr Jones 2003), and the analysis of advertisements, national symbols and state-issued money (Foster 2002). Brubaker’s concept of everyday ethnicity, and especially his suggestions for analytical approaches that avoid becoming involved in the reification of ethnic, national and other groups (2004, 11–18), also offer several useful clues that could be taken up in an examination of the relationship between the mass media and nationalism. The media can, for example, be examined as sources and repositories of commonsense categories that are used to classify people into various ethnic or national groups (12), of frames that are used to code events, processes, conflicts as “ethnic” (or “racial” or “nationalist”), and of ethnicized ways of seeing, ignoring, remembering and forgetting, more generally (16–17). Moreover, the media can also be analysed as organizations that speak in the name of particular ethnic, national or other groups (14–15). Much also remains to be done in research on how and to what extent the banal nationalism evident in the mass media enters everyday discourses. Recent anthropological research into the appropriation of mass media discourses on the nation in everyday contexts has demonstrated that these discourses are not reproduced unproblematically (Madianou 2005). At the very least, this raises serious doubts about research that draws firm conclusions about media effects on national belonging solely on the basis of an analysis of a media representations.



The recognition of ethnic difference and acknowledgment of the impossibility of a total congruence between state and nation presents a serious challenge to most canonical conceptualisations of the relationship between the media and nationalism, including those developed by Karl W. Deutsch (1953), Benedict Anderson ([1983] 1991), Ernest Gellner (1983) and Manuel Castells (1997). According to Philip Schlesinger (2000), all these theories are characterized by the overwhelming presence of an “internalist line of argument,” which has two main limitations: “a tendency to think in terms of a close functional fit between communication and the nation; and an overwhelming concern with the interior of the national communicative space, whether this be in respect to its formation or its maintenance” (107). Historically, however, the coincidence of nation, state and communication is an exception rather than the rule. Even in the period when the nation-state monopoly over collective identity and the communication space was strongest, at least some circuits for information exchange and some collective attachments were established at both international as well as sub-national levels.

While many scholars continue to focus on those media, modes of communication and representational strategies that contribute to the establishment or maintenance of titular nations, a growing body of scholarly literature is also addressing those aspects of communication that do not neatly coincide with the nation-state. One strain of academic inquiry that is prone to raising such questions is the research on the new communication technologies. Several authors have argued that with the advent of satellite television and the internet, border-circumventing flows of cultural products became particularly dense, making a close fit between the nation-state, nation and communication virtually impossible (Morley and Robins 1995). Another field of study that often goes beyond the usual accounts of nationalism and the media consists of research into transnational and diasporic communication. Scholars have repeatedly pointed out that transnational communities tend to develop patterns of media production, use and consumption that do not conform to the world map that assumes a close fit between nations, states and communication patterns (Braman and Sreberny-Mohammadi 1996; Karim 2003; Chalaby 2004). Last but not least, such assumptions were also rejected by researchers dealing with communication in multiethnic

or multinational political formations such as Canada or the European Union (Collins 2002).

It is important to note that the shift away from the theoretical model assuming a close fit between nations, states and communication has occurred not only within scholarly discussions, but also within policy debates, perhaps most visibly so in the realm of broadcasting policy. Before the 1980s, that is before the rise of satellite and cable television, most television and radio channels in the world, ranging from those in Western Europe to those in the Soviet block and the former colonies, were *national* channels. In fact, it could be argued that they functioned as instruments of nationalizing states—be it in a predominantly ethnocultural or more territorial mode or (most likely) a specific combination of both. We tend to forget that the famous three-fold mission of the public service—to inform, to educate and to entertain—actually referred to the nation. It was the nation that needed to be informed, educated and entertained by the public service: “The public service had to inform about the nation (especially about its leaders and politicians), educate about national culture, and a big part of its entertainment programmes, games and variety shows promoted the national particularities, artists and festivals” (Bourdon 2003, 71–72).

This widely-adopted mission has been more or less explicitly based on a variation of technological determinism that came to be known under the label of “technological nationalism.” This particular confluence of nationalism and technological determinism “ascribes to technology the capacity to create a nation by enhancing communication” (Charland 1986, 197), and is commonly used to refer to the public policies which support various domestic, high-tech industries with the aim of “strengthen[ing] the competitiveness of domestic industries against foreign rivals in a growing world market” (Yamada 1999, 2). Within the realm of communication technologies, technological nationalism usually leads to the adoption of various policies that enable the state to employ radio and television as instruments of nation-building: provisions that ensure complete state control over the allocation of radio and television frequencies, a requirement that all programmes be broadcast exclusively or at least predominantly in the national language, subsidies and other

forms of support for the production and distribution of programming that promotes national culture, etc.

The discourse of technological determinism, and with that the deployment of the mass media as instruments of nationalizing states, did not go entirely unchallenged. In Canada, for example, mounting pressure from organisations such as The National Aboriginal Communications Society in the late 1980s have resulted in several amendments to the Canadian Broadcasting Act, and a similar shift has occurred in European policies as well: the discourse of technological nationalism was modified to accommodate regional and cultural diversity (Young 2003, 230–31). Yet as David Young (2003) argues, these shifts were of a limited nature, and did not endanger the hegemonic status of technological determinism, since the challenges and compromises all occurred within technological nationalism's own terrain and on its own terms. Arguably, these terms are ultimately the terms of (nationalizing) nationalism: discourses challenging the use of the mass media as instruments of nationalizing states thus exist, yet the forum within which they are negotiated is still that of the nationalizing state itself, even if nationalization is now partially devolved to the level of regions or cultural/ethnic minorities. This is not to say that every single media text necessarily employs a nationalist frame, or that counter-nationalist or a-nationalist readings of media texts and appropriations of media discourses in everyday life are not possible. Quite to the contrary: every analysis of media texts and even more so every examination of media use in everyday life contexts should also pay attention to the evidence of a-nationalist readings or texts—yet at the same time keeping in mind their limited echo.

THE MEDIA IN YUGOSLAV SUCCESSOR STATES AS  
INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONALIZING STATES

Within the frame of this paper, the application of the above-sketched approaches to the mass media and nationalism in Yugoslav successor states can hardly go beyond a very superficial, merely illustrative overview. Only systematic analyses of empirical materials drawn from various forms of the mass media and mass culture more generally over lengthy periods of time in several countries,

and anthropological examination of media production, media use and appropriation of media discourses in every day life will enable the development of more comprehensive and conclusive insights. For reasons of clarity, the discussion below is broken down into sections addressing the analysis of media regulation, media production and media representations, although this does not preclude cross-cutting approaches.

#### MEDIA REGULATION

Existing research on media regulation in Yugoslav successor states is fairly abundant, yet most of it approaches the issue strictly from the perspectives of democratization and privatisation, hardly ever touching on issues of nationalism (e.g., Bašić Hrvatin and Milosavljević 2001; Petković 2005). If authors address the topic of nationalism, this is limited to issues of free speech and minority access to the media, only marginally relating these to broader debates in the field of nationalism studies (e.g., Kolar-Panov 1997b). One possible way to approach the relationship between nationalism and media regulation in a more systematic way is to look at it as a set of provisions enabling the state to use the media as instruments for nationalization, paying attention to evidence of nationalization in the ethnocultural as well as the territorial or civic mode. As Monroe Price (1995) argues, we can think of the circulation of various types of information and images via the media in terms of a marketplace of loyalties—meaning that these data and images are supportive of a variety of different loyalties or collective identities, from local and national to regional or global ones. The main role of the state in such a context is to regulate this flow, or at least mediate between different competitors within its own market—and media law “is the vehicle for the organisation and regulation of this market” (244). Below follows a series of suggestions based on preliminary examinations of a selection of media acts and broadcasting laws in Yugoslav successor states.

Several media-related laws enacted in Yugoslav successor states since 1991 include explicit provisions mandating the media to contribute to the preservation or promotion of the dominant (“core”) national culture. The Croatian Electronic Media Act, for example,

states that “issuing programmes is of interest to the Republic of Croatia when the contents of the programmes are related to . . . the preservation of Croatian national and cultural identity” (Hrvatski Sabor 2003, Article 9). A virtually identical formulation can be found in the Slovenian Media Act, which clearly links public interest with national interest, stating that the Republic of Slovenia supports the media in spreading programmes “which are important . . . for the preservation of Slovenian national and cultural identity” (Državni zbor Republike Slovenije 2001, Article 4). Furthermore, both laws declare that the state supports the production of programmes that are aimed at the members of respective national minorities living in neighbouring states, and stipulate the minimum amount of the music in respective dominant national languages that should be broadcast on radio channels: 10% of the daily broadcasting time in Slovenia (Article 86) and 20% in Croatia (Article 25). Provisions such as these clearly indicate that the media are meant to function as instruments of nationalizing states in an ethnocultural mode, that is, as instruments of and for the core nation, whose culture must be protected and promoted. Sometimes these provisions are a direct response to globalizing trends, confirming David Young’s claim that “the discourse of technological nationalism is still present in the ‘digital age,’” and used to “justify a role for public broadcasting on the ‘information highway”” (Young 2003, 217–18). The draft new Slovenian law on public broadcasting is a case in point; its introduction states that faced with world-wide globalisation trends, Radio Television Slovenia will “doubtlessly . . . remain the central institution of Slovenianhood and an important factor of social cohesion in the field of culture and information, and as such a central element of the modern Slovenian national identity” (Vlada Republike Slovenije 2005).

However, media policies in Yugoslav successor states are not limited only to fostering “core” national cultures. As a rule, they also include provisions for the protection and promotion of minority cultures, thus indicating that the “technological nationalism” underpinning the media legislation in Yugoslav successor state has been amended to accommodate regional and cultural differences. In both laws quoted above, the very same articles that specify that the state supports the production of programmes which are important for the preservation of national and cultural identity also include claus-

es stipulating that the state supports the production of programmes important for the realisation of the right to information of all national minorities. A similar combination is also to be found in the Serbian Broadcasting Law, which stipulates that the provider of the public broadcasting service is bound to “guarantee the fulfilment of citizens’ needs for programmes which express cultural identity—be it that of the nation or that of the national minorities or ethnic groups” (Narodna skupština Republike Srbije 2002, Article 78). It needs to be noted, however, that the notion of “national minorities” employed in these documents applies only to a limited range of minorities. As a rule, it excludes minorities that are the result of recent migration flows, especially those emerging after 1990, but in some cases (e.g. in Slovenia) even those that have been established as a consequence of inter-republican labour migrations before 1990.

While the accommodation of cultural differences and provisions promoting minority cultures still fall broadly into the same category of nationalizing practices—namely ethnocultural practices—one should also note that virtually all media-related laws in Yugoslav successor states also include clauses underpinned by civic nationalizing practices. These usually include clauses stressing the right to information of *all* citizens, references to human rights and prohibitions of discrimination (e.g., Narodna skupština Republike Srbije 2002, Article 78; Hrvatski Sabor 2003, Article 15). This confirms Karen Barkey’s claim that nation states formed out of imperial peripheries “demonstrate evidence of both ethnic and civic understandings of nationhood” (1997, 107). Still, such evidence needs to be carefully weighed against actual legal practice and actual functioning of the media. It should be borne in mind that the language of civic nationalism may sometimes be consciously used simply to legitimise particular policies or to satisfy the demands of international audiences—particularly in the light of imminent EU accession—without seriously considering its implications. According to Rogers Brubaker, the political elites in independent Ukraine and Kazakhstan “have selfconsciously used the language of civic nationhood to present their states to domestic and especially international audiences as paragons of civic inclusiveness and tolerance, as states of and for their citizens, rather than as states of and for a single ethnocultural group” (2004, 134).

## MEDIA PRODUCTION

Although media institutions play a pivotal role in the orchestration of politics and the economy and even in the routines and rituals of everyday life, they are seldom accorded as much attention as media products themselves and the effects these have on audiences. This is also true of research on the media in Yugoslav successor states. To date, research into the internal workings of media institutions in these states has been limited to a handful of insights provided by means of interviews with journalists and editors (e.g., Thompson 1999; Taylor and Kent 2000), which only marginally touched upon their everyday practices of reporting and attitudes to issues such as national identity or nationalism. There is no research to show, for example, how particular events are selected as worthy of nationwide attention, how the various “gate-keepers” are involved in selecting and hierarchising “national” or “domestic” news, how editors respond to situations that could potentially lead to an escalation of nationalist hatred, whether and how journalists contest national, ethnic and other categories and framings used by their sources or suggested by their editors, etc.

Comprehensive fieldwork focussing on how issues of nationality intervene in news room practices of media institutions in Yugoslav successor states will doubtlessly require considerable time and effort before completion. However, several other, less demanding methods could be employed to gain preliminary insights. Among these, are semi-structured interviews with journalists and editors that would take into account the theoretical arguments presented above. This could, for example, include not only analysing respondents’ claims about their own attitudes towards nationalism or ways in which they strive (or not) to avoid the use of national stereotypes, but also looking at whether or not their responses and actual journalistic contributions show evidence of banal nationalism.

## MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS

Among all existing works addressing the issue of nationalism and the mass media in Yugoslav successor states, most are based on the analysis of media representations. Yet as a rule, they remain limited to the examination of national stereotypes and overtly nationalist or xenophobic statements rather than exploring the more subtle ways

in which national imagination enters media representation. What follows is a list of those aspects of media representations that are seldom considered in research on nationalism and the media, yet may be of crucial importance to the construction and reproduction of nationalist imagery. These aspects are divided into three major groups—aspects contributing to a general sense of common identity and culture, aspects supporting the idea of a common national space (landscape, territory), and aspects fostering the notion of a common national past and future.

*THE MEDIA, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CULTURE*

Besides the use of deixis such as “us,” “them,” “our country,” “our mountains” etc., an often overlooked aspect of media representations contributing to a sense of belonging to “us,” as well as instituting or perpetuating a division into “us” and “them,” is the selection, hierarchisation and categorisation of news items and media programmes. In the print media, this primarily involves the selection and compartmentalization of news into “domestic” and “international,” which largely corresponds to the division of humanity into “us” or “our nation” and “them” or “foreigners.” In this way, the compartmentalisation of news into “domestic” and “international” is also involved in the construction and maintenance of a shared sense of national space—and the closely related sense of the position of this space vis-à-vis other spaces in the global environment. These other spaces are, as a rule, also conceived as national spaces, and the world as a whole is seen as a world of nation-states—disregarding the fact that no state in the world is entirely nationally homogenous, and many do not even have a clear national majority (Connor [1972] 1994).

The selection of news *within* each of the rubrics can also provide several insights into the national imagination. The “domestic news” section may or may not include news about national minorities or immigrants, for example, and if it does, the selection of minorities worth reporting may vary substantially. On the other hand, the selection of countries and international organisations appearing in the “foreign news” section can be used as a good indicator of geopolitical concerns and the accompanying symbolic geographies that govern the (largely implicit) categorization of countries into impor-



tant and unimportant, virtuous or bad, etc. For example, if comparing the selection of items in the “international news” rubrics during the socialist period to that after 1990, one would expect to find more news about the Third World countries and the Soviet block in the first case, and more news about the European countries in the latter.

In the broadcast media, the selection and hierarchisation occurs not only at the level of individual news programmes, but also at the level of all programming broadcast on a certain channel. The decisions about what films, variety shows, talk shows, music, TV series etc. are worthy of broadcast are often governed by considerations related to national identity. Some guidelines for these decisions may—as is the case in Slovenia and Croatia—be laid down in law, specifying that television and radio programme providers include a certain (minimum) amount of national production. Besides quotas for national production, however, the legislation can also specify quotas for programmes imported from specific parts of the world—thus, of course, also limiting the import of programmes from other parts of the world. Both the Slovenian and the Croatian media legislation, for example, demand a minimum of 51% of European production to be broadcast on television (Hrvatski Sabor 2003, Article 29; Državni zbor Republike Slovenije 2001, Article 89). This conforms to the dominant identification of both Slovenia and Croatia as “European”—rather than, for example, “Balkan”—countries (cf. Mihelj 2004a; Lindstrom and Razsa 2004). Moreover, such legislation also participates in the exclusion of that major European “other” in the realm of popular entertainment: the United States of America, which provides a constant supply of competitively priced TV entertainment and fiction.

#### *THE MEDIA, NATION AND SPACE*

National imagery is closely intertwined with representations of national space. The confines of this space may be “territorial and juridico-political givens” (Schlesinger 1991, 173), and therefore coincide with state borders. Images of such national spaces regularly enter the media, usually in the form of symbolic maps accompanying weather forecasts. Sometimes, similar maps may also appear as images associated with other news items or even appear as an element of décor in entertainment programmes. One of the categories

of media representations that often features representations of national space and in particular its borders, consists of representations of undocumented migration. A substantial part of these reports includes shots of border areas (usually patrolled by the border police) and maps indicating the major sources of immigration (Mihelj 2004a, 180–81). Another frequently overlooked feature of media products contributing to the construction of national space includes the various television and radio programmes that show reports from across the state. A notorious example of such a programme was the BBC's *Nationwide*, coordinated by an anchorperson located in London and consisting of a series of link-ups with reporters in regional centres across the United Kingdom, thus enacting a symbolic national integration (Brunsdon and Morley 1999). In Yugoslav successor states, similar programmes are most often produced on election days: coordinated from the studio situated in the capital city, they offer link-ups to regional centres or reporters in various locales across the state.

However, representations of national space can also stretch beyond the state territory to include parts of neighbouring countries with significant minority populations that are seen as members of the same nation as the “core” nation of a particular state. All across the post-Yugoslav space, examples of the latter abound: virtually all nationalizing projects in the region, most notably the Croatian and the Serbian one, were at least to some extent motivated by dreams of a national territory far greater than that enclosed by existing state borders. The particular varieties of such national spaces—for example, images of Greater Serbia, Greater Croatia, Greater Macedonia or Carantania—have subsequently been discredited. Other varieties, however, continue to inform media-distributed collective representations and have even found their way into media legislation. In several states, media are, or at least have been over the course of the 1990s, expected to cater not only for the citizens of the respective states, but also for members of the “core” nations who are citizens and residents of other states (Sobranje Republike Makedonije 1998, Article 6; Hrvatski Sabor 2003, Article 9; Državni zbor Republike Slovenije 2001, Article 4). This effectively means that the national media space was meant to cover not only the territory of the state, but also the territories abroad. Such representations of

the national space occasionally take an explicit form, usually in relation to reports about members of the core nation residing abroad, particularly in neighbouring states.

Another important aspect of spatial imagination closely tied to nationalism and appearing in media representations is landscape. Landscapes or elements of landscapes are often taken as symbols of the nation, as expressions of the national soul (Hooson 1994). Tourist advertisements and web-sites promoting the “natural beauties” and “natural heritage”—such as the Plitvice Lakes, the Triglav National Park or Mount Lovćen with the Njegoš mausoleum—are an obvious source of materials for an analysis of this aspect of media’s contribution to national identity. Others include TV documentaries and print media dedicated to the natural environment (national parks, fauna or flora), tourism or outdoor activities such as hiking.

#### *THE MEDIA, NATION AND TIME*

It has often been acknowledged that the mass media, in particular radio and television with their temporal arrangements, play a paramount role in structuring everyday perception and use of time. “Our sense of days,” argues Paddy Scannell, “is always already in part determined by the ways in which media contribute to the shaping of our sense of days” (1995, 149). Beyond the daily patterning of time, media also contribute to the structuring of time on a weekly, monthly and yearly basis, preparing special programmes for weekends and holidays, thus creating “a horizon of expectations, a mood of anticipation, a directedness towards that which is to come, thereby giving substance and structure . . . to everyday life” (155).

This patterning of time, however, can vary from medium to medium, and even more so from state to state. Yearly broadcasting and publications patterns are particularly strongly affected by various national calendars and their selection of national holidays. Calendars—and indirectly also the media—not only serve as a means of orientation in time, but also regulate symbolic periodical fusions of the present with selected historical events, and thereby contribute to mnemonic socialisation, that is, the initiation of individuals into socially constituted norms of remembering that define what is worth being remembered and how this is to be done (Zerubavel 2004, 4–5, 46–47). By participating in mnemonic socialisation, calendars—and

thus also the media—also indirectly contribute to the construction and confirmation of collective identities, since memory and identity are always tightly intertwined: identity defines what is to be memorised, while memory institutes a sense of unity across time and space (Gillis 1994, 3).

The patterning of broadcasting and publication programmes, as well as the programmes and newspaper editions prepared for national holidays, are therefore obvious candidates for an analysis looking at the media's involvement in the construction of national memory (e.g. Mihelj 2004b). Another, perhaps less obvious source of materials for an analysis of the media's involvement in the construction or national memory are TV series based on historical events and/or national myths, such as the Indian TV series based on religious epics (Mankekar 2002). These need not necessarily be series promoting dominant or "core" national narratives. Quite to the contrary; research should also take into account the TV series and other media forms that promote other kinds of narratives, for example those associated with particular national minorities.

#### CONCLUSIONS

By way of conclusion, two points in particular are worth raising. Firstly, not all the memories evoked in the media are necessarily national memories, and not all the landscapes represented in the media are necessarily national landscapes. When analysing the media's relationships with nationalism, one should not lose sight of representations that assume or promote other types of collective belonging, ranging from local to global. And secondly, notions of nationhood, representations of national space and national memories should not be conceived as homogeneous, stable units. National cultures, argues Philip Schlesinger, "are not simple repositories of shared symbols to which the entire population stands in identical relation. Rather, they are to be approached as sites of contestation in which competition over definitions takes place" (1991, 174). While mass media may be inclined to foster some representations at the expense of others, this does not necessarily directly translate into views shared by the population as a whole. Even if the research does not entail an investigation of audience appropriations of media dis-

courses, one should always strive to take into account various, perhaps even dissenting representations referring to the same nation, the same national space, the same national past. If these are not easily found in the most widely-read, heard or watched media, one needs to look into those media that are more likely to carry dissenting representations: minority media, low-circulation periodicals etc.

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