219 Bilten Slovenske vojske STRUKTURIRANI INTERVJU Z JAMIEJEM SHEO, DIREKTORJEM URADA ZA NAČRTOVANJE POLITIK PRI GENERALNEM SEKRETARJU NATA STRUCTURED INTERVIEW WITH JAMIE SHEA, DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING SECTOR AT THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO Priloga/Annex Telefonski intervju opravil Rok Zupančič, 28. aprila 2009 The telephone interview was conducted by Rok Zupančič on 28 April 2009 1 Which are the new security challenges NATO is facing today? Should they be incorporated into the new Strategic concept (SC)? There are three groups of challenges, obviously: first, the so called »Article 5 challen- ges«; these are perhaps less urgent now, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, than in the times of the Cold War. However, »Article 5 challenges« are still very important for the allies in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states or for those allies that have witnessed an increase of Russian activities in their vicinity recently, like the High North or the Norwegians, Icelanders, the Baltics or those who saw what happened in Georgia last year. I think one of the big challenges of the SC is having to ask ourselves what we need to do to be able to implement Article 5 credibly, because that is the issue we simply have to address. We have to look at issues such as contingency planning, exercises, the need for new forces specifically tailored for Article 5 missions. We have to tackle the practical issues: what we need in military terms to be able to shape contingency planning, because member states, such as the Baltic states, want to know which forces are designated to protect them if the need arises. The second category includes issues that we still have on the table, the same as in the previous SC: issues like failed states, terrorism, proliferation. These are not really new challenges but there is a question of whether NATO has been successful in adressing them. The third group includes the issues we have not had on the agenda so far – the question is whether we have to put them on the agenda – issues like climate change, migration, organised crime, cyberterrorism. However, it is the question of NATO's need to raise the priority of these issue regarding their profiles. 2 What will be the »added value« of the new Strategic concept of the Alliance? The SC has an external and an internal function: externally, we have to answer the question of what NATO is for, we have to ask what its core mission is or if it is just looking for something to do. So I think we all have public and clear mission statements to link what we are today doing better for the security of citizens. So this is what NATO is doing - protecting citizens - and not only keeping itself busy. Internally, we need a 220 Bilten Slovenske vojske 221 Bilten Slovenske vojske document to drive the planning. So far, we have lacked a clear definition of the threats, we have lacked a definition of priority of the threats – is it more important to deal with proliferation or terrorism? Third, we have lacked a clear sense of which military capa- bilities and other instruments we need in order to be able to deal with those threats. We obvioulsy live in a very difficult financial environment, so we cannot do everything. We have to narrow the scope of NATO's required contribution, rather than emphasize what may be better done by the European union, the World bank, the UN or other organisations. 3 Should the new Strategic concept define some substantial new challenges, such as global warming, cyber-terrorism or other specific forms of terrorism? We need to reach a compromise between, on the one hand, the most threatening threats, that is the threats that are posing existential risk, and, on the other hand, the threats that are serious but do not pose an existential threat to the society. The second aspect is NATO's added value - e. g. one can argue that swine flu outbreak in Mexico is a major threat to our population, but obviously NATO does not deal with this kind of pandemics. NATO is not WHO, so one cannot define NATO's role as purely linked to existential threats because, as I have said, some of the threats are simply not NATO's issues, we do not have expertise for them etc. So the second part is chosing the exi- stential threats that affect military capabilities, trans-Atlantic solidarity. This is a com- promise we have to find: important threats for which NATO is an important responder. 4 Is it neccessary for terrorism to be the central focal point of the Alliance and / or the Strategic concept? No, definitely not. Because, if I repeat again, NATO lacks many instruments for dealing with terrorism; we are not the police, judiciary etc., we do not deal with airline passenger lists, we do not deal with social programmes for the integration of Muslims or for tackling the sources of radicalism or integration in schools, we do not provide the development aid, for example, for the Pakistani school children to no longer attend madrassas but regular schools etc. So NATO's added value is limited to dealing with terrorism; yes, it (terrorism, added by R. Z.) will be on the list (of the SC, added by R. Z.) because there is much that NATO can do, but I do not believe it will be the central focal point. There are issues like cyberattacks, dealing with failed states, proliferation etc. that are probably more significant than dealing with terrorism. The new SC has to be a disciplined intellectual exercise in distinguishing between issues in which NATO is in the lead and issues in which NATO can support others. 5 How will the so called »group of experts / thinkers« that will prepare the new SC be formed? When and how are members of this group going to be confirmed? It has been decided in Strasbourg: the Secretary-General (SG) has to nominate a group of experts. However, there is no sacred number or anything like that, it is really up to the new SG to decide on the matter. Basically, he will have to take a decision on his Rok Zupančič 221 Bilten Slovenske vojske own authority. But I think he will want to make sure there is a military expert in the group; he has to have various experts. However, there is no need to have ten experts on terrorism, two experts on proliferation and nobody who knows about cyberdefence, climate change or similar issues. Therefore, the SG has to make sure to have a range of skills in the group. And of course, he has to make sure that large regions are repre- sented – there has to be an American representative, several people from large NATO countries, and of course representatives of small countries. I do not think he will have one expert from each country, that would be too much, but he has to make sure the ge- ographical balance is preserved. 6 How can a member state contribute to the new concept? Is the group of thinkers going to consult member states on the new concept? Absolutely. The thinkers cannot provide all ideas themselves, there will be facilitators. If the new SC is to be accepted by capitals, then of course the capitals have to be very carefully integrated into the proccess. They cannot be asked at the end or on the basis of logical thinking of »here is the concept« - they have to be familiar and comfortable with the concept, they must not be shocked. So experts will come up with good ideas, but they will speak to the capitals, national parliaments,; it will be a kind of a two-way procces in which also NGOs and think tanks will be included, otherwise it will not be successful. 7 When is it expected for the new concept to be officially presented? At the next Nato Summit in Lisbon, to NATO Heads of State, at the end of 2010; so we still have 18 months to do the exercise. 8 Military Capabilities of Member States and the new Strategic concept – any hints or requests, especially for or from the European countries on that? It is not good to come up with too high ambitions that exceed NATO's abilities. We have to do things. Ambitions and capabilities have to be in conformity with one another. We have to define which capabilities we need. Of course, military will take the position of »we need everything«: aircraft carriers, special forces, transport carriers etc. This will not be possible. We have to define the capabilities which can fulfil multiple roles, e. g. capabilities which can be used for »Article 5 missions« as well as for peacekeeping. Which innovative solutions do we need for capabilities to be more deployable? For example, common funding, sharing of transport aircraft. The SC shall be the instru- ment which can drive the process of transformation of the Alliance. It should not be neutral, but must drive the process. 9 Shall the new SC define some strategic geographic priorities of the Alliance, such as Afghanistan or maybe the Middle East? I think Afghanistan will be defined as a priority, because the lifespan of the SC will be approximately 10 years. NATO usually defines generic problems, not geographic STRUKTURIRANI INTERVJU Z JAMIEJEM SHEO, DIREKTORJEM URADA ZA NAČRTOVANJE POLITIK PRI GENERALNEM SEKRETARJU NATA 222 Bilten Slovenske vojske 223 Bilten Slovenske vojske positions: it talks about terrorism, not terrorists; about proliferation, not prolifera- tors. I do not have an actual answer to this question; generic problems may be linked to some specific areas. We have partners and challenges in the Middle East, we have the Mediterranean dialogue, the Istanbul Initiative etc., but I am not sure to what extent we will link the challenges to specific areas. 10 The relation between »hard« and »soft« power of NATO – is the new Strategic concept going to elaborate on that? For example, in terms of promoting more soft power, such as NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan? I do not believe NATO will develop civilian capabilities in the SC; there is quite some resistance to that among the allies, particularly in France which believes NATO's role is defence, the defence side of security, the hard-core military side. Of course, the SC also has to include soft power, a comprehensive approach, like education, police or similar, so that we get lasting solutions. However, I do not believe nations will see that NATO's contribution is more in terms of upgrading the »hard elements« than of diversifying into soft power; we have to find a better way of connecting a compre- hensive approach to better integration, better joint planning, better relations between NATO and the EU as well as the UN, better way of integrating hard power elements into a more comprehensive soft power concept. I think the PRTs in Afghanistan are an exception on a temporary basis, until things are handed over to civilian authority. 11 Will the new Strategic concept reaffirm the openness towards new members, such as Ukraine or Georgia? Yes, absolutely, no doubt. But I do not think we will see a timetable regarding the admission of Ukraine and Georgia 12 But do you think the two countries will be mentioned? That is a good question. I believe they probably will be mentioned because we have made a distinctive promise on that at the Bucharest Summit. But without a date! I think there will be some kind of reaffirmation of NATO's Study on Enlargement from 1997. 13 Do you think it is neccessary to define a new framework of cooperation with the Russian Federation? Will it be reflected in the new Strategic concept? I think that when the new SC is finalised, things with Russia will move forward. If there is still a feeling of the relations with Russia being at a standstill, of Russia not being particularly interested, then of course Russia will be mentioned in the new SC, probably in a rather short generic form. So it very much depends on the sense that we are gently moving forward since the events in Georgia. Rok Zupančič