

ANNALES

Anali za istrske in mediteranske študije
Annali di Studi istriani e mediterranee
Annals for Istrian and Mediterranean Studies
Series Historia et Sociologia, 30, 2020, 3





ANNALES

Anali za istrske in mediteranske študije
Annali di Studi istriani e mediterranei
Annals for Istrian and Mediterranean Studies

Series Historia et Sociologia, 30, 2020, 3

ISSN 1408-5348
e-ISSN 2591-1775

UDK 009

Letnik 30, leto 2020, številka 3

**UREDNIŠKI ODBOR/
COMITATO DI REDAZIONE/
BOARD OF EDITORS:**

Roderick Bailey (UK), Simona Bergoč, Furio Bianco (IT), Alexander Cherkasov (RUS), Lucija Čok, Lovorka Čoralčić (HR), Darko Darovec, Goran Filipi (HR), Devan Jagodic (IT), Vesna Mikolič, Luciano Monzali (IT), Aleksej Kalc, Avgust Lešnik, John Martin (USA), Robert Matijašič (HR), Darja Mihelič, Edward Muir (USA), Vojislav Pavlović (SRB), Peter Pirker (AUT), Claudio Povolò (IT), Marijan Premović (ME), Andrej Rahten, Vida Rožac Darovec, Mateja Sedmak, Lenart Škof, Marta Verginella, Špela Verovšek, Tomislav Vignjević, Paolo Wulzer (IT), Salvator Žitko

**Glavni urednik/Redattore capo/
Editor in chief:**

Darko Darovec

**Odgovorni urednik/Redattore
responsabile/Responsible Editor:**

Salvator Žitko

Urednika/Redattori/Editors:

Urška Lampe, Gorazd Bajc

Prevajalci/Traduttori/Translators:

Gorazd Bajc (it.)

**Oblikovalec/Progetto grafico/
Graphic design:**

Dušan Podgornik, Darko Darovec

Tisk/Stampa/Print:

Založništvo PADRE d.o.o.

Založnika/Editori/Published by:

Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko - Koper / Società storica del Litorale - Capodistria© / Inštitut IRRIS za raziskave, razvoj in strategije družbe, kulture in okolja / Institute IRRIS for Research, Development and Strategies of Society, Culture and Environment / Istituto IRRIS di ricerca, sviluppo e strategie della società, cultura e ambiente©

**Sedež uredništva/Sede della redazione/
Address of Editorial Board:**SI-6000 Koper/Capodistria, Garibaldijeva/Via Garibaldi 18
e-mail: annaleszdjp@gmail.com, **internet:** https://zdjp.si

Redakcija te številke je bila zaključena 30. 09. 2020.

**Sofinancirajo/Supporto finanziario/
Financially supported by:**

Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije (ARRS), Mestna občina Koper

Annales - Series Historia et Sociologia izhaja štirikrat letno.

Maloprodajna cena tega zvezka je 11 EUR.

Naklada/Tiratura/Circulation: 300 izvodov/copie/copies

Revija *Annales, Series Historia et Sociologia* je vključena v naslednje podatkovne baze / *La rivista Annales, Series Historia et Sociologia* è inserita nei seguenti data base / *Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in:* Clarivate Analytics (USA); Arts and Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI) in/and Current Contents / Arts & Humanities; IBZ, Internationale Bibliographie der Zeitschriftenliteratur (GER); Sociological Abstracts (USA); Referativnyi Zhurnal Viniti (RUS); European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences (ERIH PLUS); Elsevier B. V.: SCOPUS (NL); Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ).

To delo je objavljeno pod licenco / *Quest'opera è distribuita con Licenza* / *This work is licensed under a Creative Commons BY-NC 4.0.*



Navodila avtorjem in vsi članki v barvni verziji so prosto dostopni na spletni strani: <https://zdjp.si>.
Le norme redazionali e tutti gli articoli nella versione a colori sono disponibili gratuitamente sul sito: https://zdjp.si/it/.
The submission guidelines and all articles are freely available in color via website <http://zdjp.si/en/>.



VSEBINA / INDICE GENERALE / CONTENTS

- Nadja Furlan Štante:** Strengths and Weaknesses of Women's Religious Peacebuilding (in Slovenia) 343
I punti di forza e di debolezza degli sforzi religiosi delle donne nella costruzione della pace (in Slovenia)
Prednosti in pasti ženske religijske izgradnje miru (v Sloveniji)
- Anja Zalta:** The Problem of Islamophobia and its Consequences as Obstacles to Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina 355
Il problema dell'islamofobia e le sue conseguenze come ostacolo nella costruzione della pace in Bosnia-Erzegovina
Islamofobija in njene posledice kot prepreka pri izgradnji miru v Bosni in Hercegovini
- Maja Bjelica:** Listening to Otherness. The Case of the Turkish Alevi 367
Ascoltare l'alterità: l'esempio degli Alevi della Turchia
Poslušanje drugosti: primer turških Alevijev
- Bojan Žalec:** Fair Cooperation and Dialogue with the Other as a Rational Attitude: The Gramscian Account of Authenticity 383
Equa cooperazione e dialogo con l'altro come atteggiamento razionale: la considerazione grammaticale dell'autenticità
Pošteno sodelovanje in dialog z drugim kot racionalna drža: slovnična pojasnitev avtentičnosti
- Mateja Centa & Vojko Strahovnik:** Epistemic Virtues and Interreligious Dialogue: A Case for Humility 395
Virtù epistemiche e dialogo interreligioso: il caso dell'umiltà
Spoznavne vrline in medreligijski dialog: primer ponižnosti
- Rok Svetlič:** The Realm of Abstract Worship – Hegel's Interpretation of Islam 405
Il regno dell'adorazione astratta – l'interpretazione di Hegel dell'islam
Kraljestvo abstraktnega bogoslužja – Heglova interpretacija islama
- Gašper Mithans:** Religious Communities and the Change of Worldviews in Slovenia (1918–1991): Historical and Political Perspectives 415
Le comunità religiose e il cambiamento della visione del mondo in Slovenia (1918–1991): prospettive storiche e politiche
Religijske skupnosti in spremembe svetovnega nazora na Slovenskem (1918–1991) v zgodovinsko-politični perspektivi
- Aleš Maver:** Državlanske vojne v »krščanskih časih« 435
Le guerre civili in «tempi cristiani»
The Role of Civil Wars in «Christian Times»
- Martin Bele:** Rodbina Hompoških 447
La stirpe di Hompoš
The Noble Family of Hompoš

Faris Kočan & Boštjan Udovič: Diplomacija s (kolektivnim) spominom: kako preteklost vpliva na izvajanje diplomacije?..... 457 <i>Diplomazia con la memoria (colletiva): in che modo il passato incide sull'attuazione della diplomazia?</i> <i>Diplomacy with (Collective) Memory: How the Past Influences the Diplomatic Intercourse?</i>	Cvijeta Brajičić: Words of Italian Origin in the Written Legacy of Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša 499 <i>Parole di origine italiana nell'eredità scritta di Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša</i> <i>Besede italijanskega izvora v pisni zapuščini Stefana Mitrova Ljubiše</i>
Andrej Kirbiš: The Impact of Educational Habitus on Subjective Health and Substance Use and the Moderating Effect of Gender: Findings from a Nationally Representative Study of Slovenian Youth 469 <i>L'influenza dell'habitus educativo sulla salute soggettiva e l'uso delle sostanze e il ruolo di moderazione del genere: analisi di indagine rappresentativa della gioventù slovena</i> <i>Vpliv izobraževalnega habitusa na subjektivno zdravje in uporabo substanc ter moderatorska vloga spola: analiza reprezentativne raziskave slovenske mladine</i>	OCENE/RECENSIONI/REVIEWS <i>Gerhard Giesemann:</i> Teologija reformatorja Primoža Trubarja (Žiga Oman) 513 <i>Roland Kaltenegger:</i> Die Operationszone 'Adriatisches küstenland'. Der Kampf um Triest, Istrien und Fiume 1944–1945 (Klemen Kocjančič) 514 Kazalo k slikam na ovitku 516 <i>Indice delle foto di copertina</i> 516 <i>Index to images on the cover</i> 516
Nives Lenassi & Sandro Paolucci: Italijanski in slovenski jezik ekonomije in poslovanja: anglicizmi med citatnimi zapisi in pomenskimi kalki 485 <i>Italian and Slovenian Economics and Business Vocabulary: Anglicisms as Citation Loans and Semantic Calques</i> <i>L'italiano e lo sloveno dell'economia e degli affari: anglicismi tra prestiti integrali e calchi semantici</i>	

THE PROBLEM OF ISLAMOPHOBIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES AS OBSTACLES TO PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Anja ZALTA

University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: anja.zalta@ff.uni-lj.si

ABSTRACT

The article focuses on the question of Islamophobia or “Turkophobia” in specific historical contexts and dynamics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The article discusses the definition of Islamophobia in combination with the Eurocentric compression of racism that can be recognized in Orientalist discourses. It also emphasizes that Islamophobia and/as Muslim hatred in the south Slavic area has deep historic roots. An in-depth understanding of the special socio-cultural, historical, political and religious characteristics of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a precondition for imagining possibilities of ensuring peace and for consistent application of new models and methods for peacebuilding and peaceful coexistence.

Keywords: Islamophobia, Racism, Orientalism, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Neo-Ottomanism, Muslims, Turkey, Turkophobia, Inter-religious Dialogue

IL PROBLEMA DELL'ISLAMOFobia E LE SUE CONSEGUENZE COME OSTACOLO NELLA COSTRUZIONE DELLA PACE IN BOSNIA-ERZEGOVINA

SINTESI

L'articolo si concentra sulla questione dell'islamofobia o “turcofobia” in specifici contesti storici e nelle dinamiche in Bosnia ed Erzegovina. L'articolo discute la definizione di islamofobia in combinazione con la comprensione eurocentrica del razzismo che può e deve essere riconosciuta nei discorsi orientalistici e mostra che l'islamofobia e / o l'odio per i musulmani nell'area degli slavi meridionali ha profonde radici storiche. Una comprensione approfondita delle specifiche caratteristiche socio-culturali, storiche, politiche e religiose della Bosnia-Erzegovina presentate nell'articolo è un prerequisito per l'avviamento di nuovi modelli e metodi, sia per la costruzione della pace che per una convivenza pacifica.

Parole chiave: Islamofobia, razzismo, orientalismo, Bosnia ed Erzegovina, neo-ottomanismo, musulmani, Turchia, Turkofobia, Dialogo interreligioso

INTRODUCTION: ISLAMOPHOBIA AS RACISM –
DEFINITION OF THE TERM

The paper seeks to offer an understanding of how and whether it is possible to create a fruitful interreligious and interethnic dialogue that would foster long-lasting peace in the region. There are many studies and scientific approaches that have addressed this topic based on historical, political, economic, etc., perspectives. The contribution of this article is to explicitly expose the issue of Islamophobic and Turkophobic (political) discourses in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the construction of the “Other” in the specific socio-cultural and historical context. It is on the basis of the deconstruction of the racist notion of the “Other” that (new) methods for fruitful interreligious dialogue and peaceful coexistence could be applied. Therefore, the first task is to understand the issue of Islamophobia and then relate it to the specific case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There are many definitions of Islamophobia, influenced by different theoretical approaches. Farid Hafez and Enes Bayrakli, the editors of the most comprehensive annual Islamophobia report in Europe since 2015, with the intention to encourage politicians and the general public to discuss Islamophobia on the basis of qualitative data, are proposing the use of the following working definition of Islamophobia:

Islamophobia is about dominant group of people aiming at seizing, stabilizing and widening their power by means of defining a scapegoat – real or invented – and excluding this scapegoat from the resources/rights/definition of constructed ‘we’. Islamophobia operates by constructing a static ‘Muslim’ identity, which is attributed in negative terms and generalized for all Muslims. At the same time, Islamophobic images are fluid and vary in different contexts, because Islamophobia tells us more about the Islamophobe than it tells us about Muslim/ Islam (Bayraklı & Hafez, 2020, 8).

While trying to explain the term Islamophobia, one realizes that the complexity and diversity of the Muslim identity are many times insufficiently presented even in the reports on Islamophobia, which can generate discourse used in censuses where Muslims are presented as a monolithic block, thus disregarding the diversity and complexity of Muslim communities. The diversity of these communities involves not only differences in terms of languages and ethnicity but also socio-political characteristics. All these elements together mirror the complexity of the Muslim world and are characterized by a number of cultural, political and economic factors,

which are involved in the construction of collective and individual identity. Muslims have always been divided into several branches on the basis of their different understanding of Islamic teachings and practices. The knowledge of these branches and their characteristics is a prerequisite for the establishment of both interreligious and intrareligious dialogue.

Various reports on Islamophobia may – totally unintentionally heat up discussions on “us” against “them”. Maybe it would be a better strategy to pay attention to issues of the rule of law, human rights and social justice rather than focusing on what is Islamophobia and who is Islamophobic. In either way, the contextualization of the issue cannot avoid questioning and analysing the dark stains in European history, such as racism and orientalism.

According to Salman Sayyid, the Eurocentric understanding of the concept of racism is associated (only) with the Nazi regime. It sees Nazism as first and foremost an extremist ideology related exclusively to Nazis of the 20th century and neo-Nazis reviving the Nazi ideology. As a result of such conceptualization, Nazism is regarded as an “exceptional moment”. As such it cannot be recognized in European colonial rules, Orientalist notions and other forms of segregation, submission, degradation, etc., carried out by colonial rulers and enabled by racial laws. It is very difficult to imagine racism when it comes to periods that have nothing to do with the Nazi regime. However, according to Sayyid it is possible to think about the Eurocentric concept of racism without recognizable racists, especially if we introduce the notion of Islamophobia and think of the affirmation that in view of Islamized practices it is justifiable to be Islamophobic (Sayyid, 2010, 12–13). For instance while dealing with the question of Islam and Muslims (in Bosnia and Herzegovina or in Europe in general), one often comes across interpretations of Islam as an alternative to secular politics and a so-called “civilizational threat” posed by either activists of political Islam who would like to destroy the secular state on the one side, or the conservative and “uncivilized nature of the Muslim religion, culture and civilization” that undermines the standards of the Western civilization on the other.

Among other studies, Esra Ozyurek in her article *The politics of cultural unification, secularism, and the place of Islam in the new Europe* is analyzing two positions dominating discussions of the role of Muslims and Islam in the European Union: the right, which argues that Islam is external and even antithetical to the culture of the European Union, and the so-called the humanist-left position, discussing the role of Muslims in Europe, arguing that only secularism allows religious minorities to live safely in the nation-state system (Ozyurek, 2005). For more updated examples it is recommended to read Eu-

ropean Islamophobia reports, especially section analyzing political discourses on Islam in different European Countries (Bayraklı & Hafez, 2020).

Regarding the context of islamophobia and racism, one should not forget that the argument separating “race” from religion does not hold water. Vlasta Jalušič is referring to the so called “new racism”. According to her, the new racism differs from the “old” one in that the former is no longer based on

given biological research foundations or, in other words, on the concept of race, but above all on cultural dimensions of various groups and characteristics ascribed to their ‘members’: e.g. nationality, traditional customs, religion, eating habits, dress codes and culture of (everyday) life. The allegedly fixed and unalterable biological basis of racism is thus pushed into the background, and what comes to the fore is a relatively evasive and fluid set of culturally grounded ‘characteristics’ that can be ascribed to individuals and groups fairly randomly (Jalušič, 2015, 30).

While biological racism implies rejection, exclusion and unequal treatment of people on the basis of their physical appearance and other physical characteristics, cultural racism also entails discourse based on cultural differences and on differences between various types of *nomos* or *sacred cosmos*, between value systems that distinguish arbitrarily between “civilized” values and “inferior barbarian, undemocratic, etc.” values. Such types of racism can be recognized in Orientalist discourses, and is enough to rummage through the “treasure trove” of stereotypical “European images” of Bosnians and/or Muslims to find a number of examples. They will be presented further below. At this point, it is well-worth pointing out that Edward Said introduces the term Orientalism to designate a constructed prism through which the West gets acquainted with the East and dominates it. Orientalist discourse creates the image of the barbarian, uncivilized, primitive and irrational Other, portraying it as a passive object, which is – just like the Orient – fixed in its own Otherness; it is a passive, inactive, non-autonomous and unsovereign being (Said, 1978).

If we reintroduce Sayyid’s thought at this point, his understanding of racism comes as no surprise. According to him,

racialised bodies were never exclusively biological; they were marked at the same time as religion, culture, history, and territories were marked and used to group socially fabricated distinction between Europeaness and non-Europeaness. The idea that an individual

can simply choose a different cultural context ignores the fact that individuals are formed by immersion into specific cultural contexts and that it is not possible to step outside all contexts. These cultural contexts are themselves products of overlapping networks of relations, and the boundaries of one context from another are never clear-cut (Sayyid, 2010, 13).

Racism is therefore a consequence of the construction of collective identities that are dependent on special social features and contextualization. As mentioned, Muslims cannot be reduced to only one monolithic or heterogeneous group or ethnic community. Another very problematic aspect appears when religious identification prevails over other forms of identification (e.g. ethnic, sexual, class-related, occupational, etc.). Such stereotyping and portraying of a monolithic Muslim community suits and is successfully practiced by Orientalist discourse and racism, with both being based on identity antagonism that makes a sharp distinction between “us” and “them”. Islamophobia is part of such processes.

As mentioned, at the core of Islamophobia there lies the “civilizational threat” from Islam, whose alleged barbarian and undemocratic nature is thought to endanger European democracy, secularization and modernity. As a result, Islamophobia maintains a “violent hierarchy,” as Sayyid puts it, between the notions of the West (and everything that it represents) and Islam (and everything that it stands for) (Sayyid, 2010, 16). Such colonial hierarchy has much in common with the hierarchy that constitutes racism itself, i.e. the distinction between “Europeaness” and “non-Europeaness,” or between modernity and backwardness. Such dynamics of identity antagonism, which establishes imaginary boundaries between subjects, results from a complex mental process that involves the identification and stigmatization of the Other and wants to change or even to destroy the Other. The form of “elimination” of the Other depends on cultural specifics and, fortunately, only rarely is turned into action: action requires a combination of complex social circumstances and political measures. Nevertheless, there always exists the possibility of physical “cleansing” as we could observe in relation to Islam and Muslims during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Unfortunately, the smouldering cauldron of the Bosnian tragedy has not been extinguished and is waiting for new sparks that could easily re-ignite the fire of interethnic and interreligious dimensions, which Bosnia and Herzegovina had witnessed in the bloody war of the 1990s. Therefore, it is of vital importance that one analyses the causes of atrocities and reflects on possibilities of bringing about peace and preventing further conflicts.

HOW TO RECOGNIZE AN ORIENTALIST DISCOURSE?

In the Balkans, European Muslims were (and still are) associated with the Ottoman conquest of Europe. A very negative perception of Islam derives from the term *osmanli*, which means Turkish or Ottoman. The racist Orientalist discourse understands it as Oriental, backward, reactionary, treacherous, inferior and as something that needs to be changed, even exterminated and annihilated. It is very important to understand where such attitude comes from in order to be able to interpret local prejudices in former Yugoslavia (as well as in the wider region) that many Christians hold against Muslims. In the first years of the war in Bosnia, many observers and commentators depicted the conflict between Muslims and Christians as the clash between the “western” and “eastern” civilizations, having been inspired by Samuel Huntington’s book *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996, 174–187), which was originally published in 1996. Huntington introduced the notion of “civilization identity” and saw it as something stable and unchanging, which holds true neither in the Islamic world nor anywhere else. Huntington has borrowed the phrase “clash of civilizations” from Bernard Lewis’s essay *The Roots of Muslim Rage* (Lewis, 1990), in which Lewis argues that Islam has never modernized itself nor separated church and state, and has been unable to understand other civilizations. Said (2003, 71) also claims that Huntington has adopted Lewis’s ideas of civilizations being monolithic, homogenous and desirous of a distinction between “us” and “them”. By employing metaphors distinguishing between “our” world, that is a normal, acceptable, domestic and logical world, and the world of Islam presented as an antipode of all this, Huntington uses Orientalist discourse, thus ignoring cultural diversity and complexity of Islamic societies and Muslim communities. In Said’s opinion, both Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington are reductive authors: their definition of the Islamic civilization is limited to the anti-western sentiment, and their rhetoric is not only based on arguments stemming from the clash; they also generate such a clash (Said, 2003, 71).

The division to the “West” and “Islam” is a manipulation enabling the reduction of religions, cultures, ethnicities, etc., to ideologies that spring up particularly in times of deep insecurity (resulting from war, imperialism, migrations or some other sudden change (Said, 2003, 75). According to Ziauddin Sardar, the western Huntingtonian fear of Islam is nothing but fear of diversity and plurality and the Western secularism is nothing more than a monolithic ideology that diminishes all diversity, all plurality, and focuses them on the singularity of the European vision. “*It’s humanism is not universal,*

but stops at the borders of Europe: it is buried in mass graves of the innocent people killed in Bosnia” (Sardar, 1995, 8).

One could presume that Sayyid agrees with Sardar:

In the last sixty years the two communities in Europe which have been subjected to some of the most intense forms of racist genocidal violence were the German Jews and the Bosnian Muslims. In both cases being Jewish or being a Muslim was not about endorsing a set of beliefs or engaging in a set of practices. When the Nazis and Serbian ultra-nationalists called, it was not just the practice but the population that they targeted (Sayyid, 2010, 10).

Therefore, it is of key importance to analyse the attitude that generates racist genocidal violence. This is the only way to understand how and on what basis collective memories are transmitted from one generation to another and how racist and/or Islamophobic discourses provoke conflicts in the region and beyond.

BOSNIAN CAULDRON – EXPULSION OF THE “TURK”

If one looks deep enough into the collective historical memory in the south Slavic area, one can find a typical example of such (Serbian and Montenegrin) attitude towards Islam and Bosnians in Petar II Petrović-Njegoš’s poem *The Mountain Wreath* published in 1847. According to Mustafa Spahić, as early as 1703 when Danilo Šćepčević, the ruler and founding father of the Petrović dynasty, convened a meeting of family leaders, a platform for genocide was formed: “*It is in the interest of the preservation of the Orthodox state that all Muslims be baptized, exiled or killed*” (Spahić, 1996, 7). Such a decision was adopted in line with the motto “*Find all poturicas!*” (i.e. all those who became “Turks” or Muslims by rejecting or, more precisely, betraying their Christian religion). Stoked by nationalism, such ideology “*culminated in Serbian and Montenegrin neo-Nazism and Orthodox fundamentalism*” (Spahić, 1996, 7).

The hostility towards the “Turk” or Muslim that can be recognized in the south Slavic area is not unknown to Europe, as it was of key importance in Europe’s formation as a political community. According to Tomaž Mastnak, it was the antagonism between Europe and Muslims that facilitated the shaping of European identity and encouraged the construction of the Muslim world as an antithesis of western Christianity (Mastnak, 1993 16–32). Truth be told, European history witnessed a num-



Image 1: Battle of Kosovo by Adam Stefanović (1870) (Wikimedia Commons).

ber of exposed “Others” who helped to shape and consolidate European identity. “Infidels” or “barbarians” were searched for and found not only beyond European borders but also among European ethnic and cultural minorities, be they Jewish or heretical. Nevertheless, it is very likely that the hostility to Muslims played a crucial role in the formation of Europe as a socio-political entity: the perception of Europe as a political idea sprang up in particular after the fall of Constantinople resulting from the Ottoman conquest in 1453 (more: Cardini, 2003, 181). The idea of war against Turks eventually ended under the common denominator “the expulsion of the Turk from Europe” (Mastnak, 2003, 208). The fear of or hostility to Muslims overwhelms the European political imagination even centuries later when Turkish incursions no longer pose a real threat. By analysing the Bosnian war, Tone Bringa points out anti-Muslim and above anti-Turkish prejudices held by Europe: “The presence of Islam in Europe was understood as something that belongs to the past, as a historical remnant of the Ottoman Empire [...] They thought of Islam as a foreign body on the European soil which needs to be (or rather needed to be) eliminated by defeating the Ottomans” (Bringa, 2002, 25). European Muslims living in the Balkans were associated with Ottoman conquests of Europe and

perceived as an anachronism. According to Bringa, the very word *Muslim* brought up such associations as “fundamentalism,” “violence,” “backwardness” and “hostility to Christians,” which was misused by the Serbian propaganda according to which Bosnian Muslims were Turkish conquerors of land that did not belong to them (Bringa, 2002, 26).

It is such ideas that are used as a source of national mythologies of south Slavic nations. In order to encapsulate them, Michael Sells (1996) has coined the term Christoslavism. Their intertwined system of myths portrays Slavic Muslims as the betrayers of Christ’s faith (even as his killers – such an idea is related to the Battle of Kosovo in which Prince Lazar takes over the role of Christ, which is discussed further below) and their own nation. The Christoslavism mythology is based on at least two closely intertwined myths formed in the 19th century. The first ascribes the conversion to the Muslim religion to fear and greed (introducing the character of a “*poturica*”), the second tries to present the total depravity of Ottoman authority (introducing the character of an evil Turk). It seems that such mythology resonates with Harry Norris, who argues that the “Serbian” attack on Islam was a result of the fact that Slavic Muslims, whom he sees as *poturicas*, had voluntarily betrayed their nation and religion (Norris, 1993, 295–297).



Image 2: *Srebrenica Genocide Memorial in Potočari (Wikimedia Commons).*

Needless to say, the Ottoman history and its rule over Bosnia and Herzegovina are not only very rich but also extremely complicated. In 1463, Bosnia became the westernmost Ottoman province, called “Bosansko Krajište.” The province was granted the status of *eyalet*, a constituent part or administrative unit of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman rule (1463–1878) brought about a cultural and religious transformation, which led to changes in social and cultural values and to the formation of cultural patterns that shaped a special ethnic identity. According to Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, what makes Bosnia and Herzegovina special in terms of socio-cultural characteristics is the Bosnian Church that even before Islamization of the area formed its religious structure independently from the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christianity (Mahmutćehajić, 2000, 183–190; also: Mulalić, 2014; Fine, 2002; Velikonja, 1998). Having become part of the Ottoman Empire, Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent

gradual Islamization, which was initially only formal and entailed the acceptance of Muslim names. There are differences of opinion whether Islamization was facilitated by economic benefits in the form of lower taxation granted to farmers, merchants and others. Harry Norris (Norris, 1993) believes that the major reason of conversion to Islam was syncretism: vernacular Christianity, which had been present in the region before Islamization, was similar to new, popular Islam, with both of them being different from religious “orthodoxy” of Catholicism and/or the Orthodox Church. “*Together with Islam, the Ottomans introduced new cultural and spiritual opportunities to Bosnia,*” argues Muhidin Mulalić (2014, 56). For many centuries, Bosnia was regarded as a model of religious tolerance in Europe, mostly owing to different forms of syncretism and the fusion of or passing (i.e. converting or reconverting) between various religions. However, the Ottoman period in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be romanticized. On the



Image 3: Srebrenica Genocide Memorial in Potočari (Wikimedia Commons).

basis of conversations with the local population, as well as on the basis of monitoring political rhetoric and discourses, there are differences of interpretation: while Muslims living there mostly see Ottoman period as the “golden age” of Bosnia and Herzegovina during which their religious identity was born, the local Christian population mostly perceives it as a period of Turkish occupation. In the latter case we must certainly take into consideration the influences of modern nationalist rhetoric and the intrusion of so-called religious mythology.

The negative image of the “Turk” sank deeply into the collective memory of especially Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is closely associated with the bitter memory of their defeat in the Battle of Kosovo. With the Serbian collective memory being focused on the defeat, the “Turk” became a synonym for the enemy posing a threat to the Serbian nation. The Battle of Kosovo took place on 15 June 1389 between the army led by the Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović and the invading army

of the Ottoman Empire commanded by the Sultan Murad Hüdavendigâr. Both commanders lost their lives. In the aftermath of the defeat, Serbs became Ottoman vassals. This shared memory of the defeat in the Battle of Kosovo formed the so-called victimized identity of Serbs, who view their shared future in Bosnia and Herzegovina with fear and distrust (Sells, 1996, 2002).

Together with other social factors, the fear that the “Battle of Kosovo” could be repeated created conditions for a new search for *poturicas* – those people whom the collective memory sees as Christians who converted to Islam and betrayed the Slavic identity. And such conditions were indeed created in the recent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995, the words of the general of Bosnian Serbs, Radko Mladić, were that “*the time has come to take revenge on the Turks in this region*” (The Mladic Files, 1995). In the following days, Srebrenica witnessed the genocide of 8372 Bosniaks (Nuhanović, 2007).

TURKISH INFLUENCE AND NEO-OTTOMANISM
AS (ONE OF THE) TRIGGER(S) FOR
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
TODAY?

With the collective memory of historical representations of and sentiments about the “Turk” in Bosnia and Herzegovina being still alive, political moves and discourse have to be well thought-out. What adds fuel to the fire is a reference to the Ottoman past by the most visible Turkish politicians. To provide an example: following the electoral triumph of his conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the June 2011 general election, the re-elected Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, publicly declared that his victory would prove advantageous to Bosnians, too: *“Believe me, Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul”* (Head, 2011). Such a public statement re-kindled discussions about neo-Ottomanism in the region, especially as regards Turkish expansionism, imperialism and Islamization; according to Mehmet Uğurekinci, some Islamic (and) conservative circles in Turkey believe that under Ottoman rule the Balkans lived in peace for centuries and view the Ottoman past as a model for bringing eternal peace and serenity to the region (Uğurekinci, 2013, 25–26).

A similar neo-Ottoman stance was taken by Turkey’s new foreign policy conceived by Ahmet Davutoğlu, who became minister of foreign affairs in 2009. Davutoğlu emphasized the importance of Turkey’s active cooperation in the Balkans region, which was based on what was perceived as shared cultural and historical legacy (Türbedar, 2011). In one of his improvised speeches, he said, *“Sarajevo is ours”* and *“Istanbul is yours,”* adding that *“Ottoman centuries of the Balkans were success stories. Now we have to reinvent this”* (Somun, 2011, 38). However, as pointed out by Hajrudin Somun, his words should not be taken out of context since Davutoğlu underlined that he was not calling for the re-establishment of the Ottoman state, but mostly alluded to the shared Ottoman legacy (Somun, 2011, 38). For Davutoğlu, as analysed by Marija Mitrović, it was only in the Ottoman period that the Balkans played a central role in world politics. From such a perspective, the model of empire is seen as a positive solution to ethnic and religious conflicts (Mitrović, 2014, 46). Needless to say, the memory of the Ottoman Empire does not evoke pleasant feelings in all inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As mentioned above, it is mostly Christian nations living in the Balkans that regard the Ottoman rule as a period of subjugation, and even if today the majority of the Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina supports the growing Turkish influence on their state, there are many other citizens who stress that Bosnia

and Herzegovina should preserve its own identity and are critical of the Turkish influence. Broadcast on 14 May 2015 by the Bosnian national television TV1, the round table entitled *“Šta je za Bosnu in Hercegovino Turčija in Rusija”* (*“What Turkey and Russia Mean for Bosnia in Herzegovina”*; TV1, 2015) placed special emphasis on the issue of Turkish indoctrination. The participants agreed that in Bosnia and Herzegovina the perception of Turkey was mostly *“Ottomanophile”* and that the fondness for Turkey was especially strong among those citizens who expected that Turkey would help them in case of unrest. They also pointed out the Turkish use of *“soft power”* when it came to the funding of universities, newspapers, on-line portals and cultural projects promoting Turkish culture, but turning a deaf ear to autochthonous Bosnian tradition.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkish explanations about common historical and socio-cultural ties is mostly disfavored by the Serbian and Croatian population. The leader of the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika srpska), Milorad Dodik, has accused Turkey of having a *“hidden agenda”* for the Balkans. He is afraid that Turkey will try to turn Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Bosniak country and to undermine the autonomy of Republika Srpska (Strbac, 2010). His strong supporter is the leading Serbian Orientalist scholar Darko Tanasković, who was the Yugoslavian ambassador to Ankara from 1995 to 1999 and who is regarded as one of the main Islamophobes in the region. During the Bosnian war, he was an advisor to the then president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, thus exerting strong influence on the official Serbian policy. Still critical of the Turkish policy in the Balkans, Tanasković believes that Turkey would like to create the so-called *“neo-Ottoman Balkans”* (Tanasković, 2010). In his book *Neootomanizam – Povratak Turske na Balkan* (*“Neo-Ottomanism: Turkey’s return to the Balkans”*), Tanasković argues that Turkey’s current foreign policy could be called *“neo-Ottomanism”* (Yeni Osmanlıcılık). He defines it as an ideological amalgam of Islamism, Turkish imperialism and Ottoman nostalgia.

In the article *“Turska išče nove janičare”* (*“Turkey in Search of New Janissaries”*), the Belgrade newspaper *Politika* reported that the book was published in Banja Luka, the capital city of the Bosnian Serbs, where he promoted it at the conference with the title *“Neo-Ottomanism and Republika Srpska”* and was attended by the leading politician of Bosnian Serbs, Milorad Dodik, who publicly stated that Turkey supported *“exclusively Bosniak and Muslim interests”* and that *“Turkey would like to turn Bosnia and Herzegovina into an Islamic state”* (Marić, 2010). Tanasaković’s negative notions of Muslims as *“a foreign, inferior and dangerous element”* in the Balkans

are quoted in a study of Islamic fundamentalism by Sonja Biserko, a Serbian activist and human right defender. In her opinion, Tanasković interprets the turning of Bosnian Muslims to Turkey as a call, “as their furtive return to the old- time position of poturice [...] for the Serbs, poturice were worse than Turks” (Biserko in: Somun, 2011, 35).

Hikmet Karčić, the writer of the national reports on Islamophobia for Bosnia and Herzegovina, emphasised that although anti-Muslim hatred in Bosnia and Herzegovina has deep historic roots, “the first contemporary Islamophobic statements appeared in the late 1980s and were made by scholars, Orientalists and self-proclaimed Islam experts at the University of Belgrade” (Karčić, 2018, 173). Karčić divided the central figures in spreading Islamophobia in Bosnia and Herzegovina into three categories: the academics and semi-academics circles in Serbia and Republika Srpska; several high-ranking officials from the Serb Orthodox Church (from Patriarch Irinej to Bishops Amfilohije and Kačavenda); and politicians (such as Milorad Dodik among others) which give anti-Muslim and Islamophobic statements (Karčić, 2018, 184). One such example was Dodik’s interview for Serbian Television Happy TV in January 2018 in which he called all Serbs who work in institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Turkifiers (*poturice*) (Karčić, 2018, 179). On 6 January 2019, the Srebrenica Genocide Memorial in Potočari was desecrated with the bag of pork intestines. The next day a local Orthodox priest from Srebrenica can be seen on a video leading a group of people on Orthodox Christmas Eve singing Chetnik songs (Karčić, 2020, 150). The main source of anti-Muslim propaganda in recent years are social media, especially Facebook pages, created mainly by Serbian nationalist groups. One of the most infamous example is “Remove kebab,” by which “kebab” is used as a synonym for Muslims (more: Karčić, 2020, 157).

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

As we already emphasized in the introduction, the leading question to ponder upon is, how to create fruitful interreligious and interethnic (or any type of) dialogue that would foster long-lasting peace if we are not ready for ontological changes and in-depth questioning of our own epistemology? It is a social fact that a group identity affirms itself by stigmatizing the Otherness of another group, which usually happens as a collective response to a crisis, trauma or some other intense social change. The ethnopsychiatrist George Devereux (1978) argues that even if individuals possess several identities (family, group, political, professional, etc.), it is the collective identity that prevails

over others in a critical situation. Individuals lose their individuality, and the re-composition of “us” occurs, with “us” being defined in contrast to the “Other(s).” What serves as a tool in such a process is the so-called identity discourses? According to the French political anthropologist Denis-Constant Martin, they are used in situations of turmoil and rapid changes, both material and moral, as means of verbalizing and concomitantly mitigating anxiety as they give back meaning to all that seemingly lost meaning long ago, namely, by employing well-known historical, territorial, cultural and religious references (Denis-Constant, 1994, 31–32.). In order for such *imagination* to actually work, the group has to accept a discourse it finds coherent and credible if individuals are to be united in opposition to the “Other.” The aim of such rhetoric is the fixation of anxiety on the “Other,” its projection on a recognizable enemy, a constructed hostile character – in our case, the evil and dangerous “Turk” who has to be destroyed if the group is to survive.

The rhetoric of “our” survival as a result of “their” destruction can culminate in the war in self-defence, as we witnessed in the genocidal massacre of “Turks” in Srebrenica. According to the psychoanalyst Franco Fornari (1969), war is an elaboration of the paranoid process based on the notion that an individual can survive only if he destroys the enemy: “The subject perceives the object as a threat to its existence. The threat itself is psychologically real” (Fornari, 1966 35). Paranoid violence, which breaks out in war, results from a typical psychotic illusion that the subject conquers death by killing the “Other.” In order to be able to see another as an embodiment of absolute evil, we need imagination. Anthony Storr is convinced that in times of crisis, be it personal or collective, some kind of internal mechanism is activated in us, leading to a dualistic distinction between the absolute good and the absolute evil. When we feel seriously threatened, explains Storr, we immediately seek to find out who wishes us good or evil. Dichotomies such as good/evil, good/bad, pure/dirty constitute the imaginary space within which we deposit ideologies that seem credible and reassuring. “These clichés – pure-impure, cleanliness-dirtiness, whiteness-blackness – seem crude to us. Their binary structures mirror however the elementary functioning of the human psyche in times of crisis” (Storr, 1991, 122). The antagonistic process, which may lead to physical violence, therefore begins with the construction of identity based on the stigmatization of differences. Such an identification process is radicalized by perceiving the “Other” as alien, treacherous, impure, inhuman. According to Jacques Semelin, dehumanization of the enemy is an important indicator of potential violence; he provides a number of historical examples in his excellent

study of genocide (Semelin, 2007). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a typical example of such a process can be recognized in the attitude towards the “Turk” and the social dynamic related to it. What makes the situation especially dangerous is lack of awareness or reflection of the Serbian identity of the victim on the one hand and the Turkish soft-power interference in cultural sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which many recognize neo-Ottoman territorial appetites on the other. Political and religious institu-

tions, cultural organizations, civil society and other decision-makers in Bosnia and Herzegovina need to (re-)shape their common socio-cultural models. The respect for and preservation of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of Bosnia and Herzegovina is of vital importance for bringing about long-lasting peace in the region. Project and methods addressing this goal have to be aware of this precondition and to take it into consideration when envisaging practical work.

ISLAMOFBIJA IN NJENE POSLEDICE KOT PREPREKA PRI IZGRADNJI MIRU V BOSNI IN HERCEGOVINI

Anja ZALTA

Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani, Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija
anja.zalta@ff.uni-lj.si

POVZETEK

Islamofobija in/ali sovraštvo do muslimanov na južnoslovanskem območju, zlasti v Bosni in Hercegovini, ima globoke zgodovinske korenine. Negativna podoba "Turka" se je globoko ukoreninila v kolektivni spomin predvsem Srbov iz Bosne in Hercegovine in je tesno povezana z grenkim spominom na njihov poraz v bitki na Kosovem polju (1389). Ker je srbski kolektivni spomin bil in ostaja osredotočen na ta poraz, je izraz "Turk" postal sinonim za sovražnika, ki ogroža srbski narod. Vendar pa sovražnost do "Turka" ali muslimana ni neznana tudi ostali Evropi. V prvem delu članek obravnava definicijo islamofobije v kombinaciji z evrocentričnim razumevanjem rasizma, ki ga je mogoče in mora biti prepoznano v orientalističnih diskurzih. Tovrstni diskurzi ustvarjajo in vzdržujejo podobe barbarskega, neciviliziranega in iracionalnega Drugega, ki ga na eni strani prikazujejo kot pasivni subjekt, po drugi strani pa kot agresivnega in nevarnega. V drugem delu se članek osredotoča na islamofobijo ali "turkofobijo" v posebnih zgodovinskih kontekstih in dinamikah v Bosni in Hercegovini. Avtorica meni, da je poglobljeno razumevanje posebnih družbeno-kulturnih, zgodovinskih, političnih in verskih značilnosti Bosne in Hercegovine predpogoj za predstavljanje možnosti zagotavljanja miru in dosledne uporabe novih modelov in metod za vzpostavljanje miru in miroljubno sobivanje.

Ključne besede: Islamofobija, rasizem, orientalizem, Bosna in Hercegovina, neootomanizem, Turčuja, turkofobija, medreligijski dialog

SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bayraklı, E. & F. Hafez (2020): European Islamophobia Report 2019. SETA, Istanbul.

Bringa, T. (2002): Islam and the Quest for Identity in Post-Communist Bosnia-Herzegovina. In: Shatzmiller, M. (ed.): Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic State. Montreal & Kingston – London – Ithaca, McGill-Queen's University Press, 24–35.

Cardini, F. (2003): Evropa in islam: Zgodovina nekega nesporazuma. Ljubljana, *Cf.

Denis-Constant, M. (1994): Cartes d'identité: comment dit-on 'nous' en politique? Paris, Presses de la FNSP.

Devereux, G. (1978): Ethnopsychanalysis: Psychoanalysis and Anthropology as Complementary Frames of Reference. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Fine, J. V. A. (2002): The Various Faiths in the History of Bosnia: Middle Ages to the Present. In: Shatzmiller, M. (ed.): Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States. Montreal & Kingston – London – Ithaca, McGill-Queen's University Press, 3–24.

Fornari, F. (1966): The Psychoanalysis of War. New York, Garden City, Auction Books.

Fornari, F. (1969): Psychoanalyse de la situation atomique. Paris, Gallimard.

Head, J. (2011): Turkey election, Victorious Erdogan pledges 'consensus'. BBC, 13 June.

Huntington, S. P. (1996): The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York, Simon & Schuster.

Jalušič, V. (2015): Rasizem, ideologija in sovraštvo: Poskus razumevanja sodobnega rasizma in EU antirasističnih politik v luči teze o rasizmu brez rase. In: Pajnik, M. & E. Valenčič (eds.): Rasizem: razrezani svet. Ljubljana, Časopis za kritiko znanosti, domišljijo in novo antropologijo, 28–43.

Karčić, H. (2018): Islamophobia in Bosnia and Herzegovina National Report 2017. In: Enes Bayraklı, E. & F. Hafez (eds.): European Islamophobia Report 2017. Istanbul, SETA, 110–125.

Karčić, H. (2020): Islamophobia in Bosnia and Herzegovina National Report 2019. In: Enes Bayraklı, E. & F. Hafez (eds.): European Islamophobia Report 2019. Istanbul, SETA, 142–160.

- Lewis, B. (1990):** The Roots of Muslim Rage. The Atlantic. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/304643/> (last access: 5. 3. 2020).
- Mahmutčehajić, R. (2000):** Bosnia the Good: Tolerance and Tradition. Budapest, Central European University Press.
- Marić, B. (2010):** Turska traži nove janičare. Politika Online. Available at: <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/region/Turska-trazi-novi-janicare.lt.html> (last access: 3. 5. 2019).
- Mastnak, T. (1993):** Evropa med evolucijo in evtanazijo. Ljubljana, Studia Humanitatis.
- Mastnak, T. (2003):** Europe and the Muslims: The Permanent Crusade? In: Qureshi, E. & M. A. Sells (eds.): The New Crusades; Constructing the Muslim Enemy. New York, Columbia University Press, 205–249.
- Mitrović, M. (2014):** Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: The Influence of Traditional Determinants of Davuto lu's Conception of Turkey-Balkan Relations. GeT MA Working Paper Series, Department of Social Sciences, No. 10. Berlin, Humboldt University. Available at: <http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/series/getmaseries/2014-10/PDF/10.pdf> (last access: 6. 6. 2019).
- Mulalić, M. (2014):** Socio-cultural Diversity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In: Bakar, O. & M. Idriz (eds.): Islam in Southeast Europe: Past Reflections and Future Prospects. Brunei Darussalam, Ubd Press, 55–66.
- Norris, H. T. (1993):** Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society Between Europe and the Arab World. London, Hurst and Company.
- Nuhanović, H. (2007):** Under the UN Flag: The International Community and the Srebrenica Genocide. Sarajevo, Institute for Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks.
- Ozyurek, E. (2005):** The Politics of Cultural Unification, Secularism, and the Place of Islam in the New Europe. *American Ethnologist*, 32, 4, 509–512.
- Said, W. E. (1978):** Orientalism. New York, Pantheon Books.
- Said, W. E. (2003):** The Clash of Definitions? In: Qureshi, E. & M. A. Sells (eds.): The New Crusades; Constructing the Muslim Enemy. New York, Columbia University Press, 68–88.
- Sardar, Z. (1995):** Racism, Identity and Muslims in the West. In: Syed, Z. A. & Z. Sardar (eds.): Muslim Minorities in the West. London, Grey Seal, 1–17.
- Sayyid, S. (2010):** Thinking through Islamophobia. In: Sayyid, S. & A.K. Vakil (eds.): Thinking through Islamophobia, Global Perspective. London, Hurst & Company, 1–55.
- Sells, M. A. (1996):** The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia. Berkley, University of California Press.
- Sells, M. A. (2002):** The Construction of Islam in Serbian Religious Mythology and Its Consequences. In: Shatzmiller, M. (ed.): Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States. Montreal & Kingston – London – Ithaca, McGill-Queen's University Press, 56–86.
- Semelin, J. (2007):** Purify and Destroy, The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide. New York, Columbia University Press.
- Somun, H. (2011):** Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans and "Neo-Ottomanism": A Personal Account. *Insight Turkey*, 13, 3, 33–41.
- Spahić, M. (1996):** Da, mi smo muslimani. Sarajevo, Ljiljan.
- Storr, A. (1991):** Human Destructiveness: The Roots of Genocide and Human Cruelty. New York – London, Routledge.
- Strbac, V. (2010):** Cilj Turske da u BiH Dominiraju Bošnjaci. *Glas srpske*, September 9, 2010, A34.
- Tanasković, D. (2010):** Neoosmanizam: doktrina i spoljnopolitička praksa. Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske. Beograd, Službeni glasnik.
- The Mladic Files (1995):** Mladic Entering Srebrenica, July 11, 1995. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QfInjNoT4Q> (last access: 2. 11. 2020).
- Tübedar, E. (2011):** Turkey's New Activism in the Western Balkans: Ambitions and Obstacles. *Insight Turkey*, 13, 3, 139–158.
- TV1 (2015):** "Šta su za Bosnu i Hercegovinu Turska i Rusija". Sarajevo, May 14, 2015. Available at: <http://www.tv1.ba/produkcija/formati/tema-tv1-dijaloska-emisija/22568-video-tema-tv1-sta-su-za-bih-turska-i-rusija-14-5-2015.html> (last access: 16. 5. 2020).
- Uğurekinci, M. (2013):** Turkey's "Zero Problems" Era in the Balkans. Ankara, SETA.
- Velikonja, M. (1998):** Bosanski religijski mozaik: Religije in nacionalne mitologije v zgodovini Bosne in Hercegovine. Ljubljana, Znanstveno in raziskovalno središče.