♦	THE FINANCIAL CRISIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CENTRAL BANKS
Franjo Štiblar
♦	NEGOTOV PREHOD V LETO 2010
Velimir Bole, Jože Mencinger, Franjo Štiblar, Robert Volčjak
♦	PRIMERJAVA REFERENČNIH STROŠKOV ELEKTRIČNE ENERGIJE RAZLIČNIH TEHNOLOGIJ OBNOVLJIVIH VIROV ENERGIJE
Alenka Kavkler, Mejra Festić in Sebastijan Repina
♦ STATISTIČNA PRILOGA
ŠT. 419-420 NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2009
EIPF
GOSPODARSKA GIBANJA
419-420
Ljubljana, november-december 2009
UREDNIŠKI ODBOR:
Wilfried Altzinger, Wirtschaftsuniversität, Wien, Avstrija; Jani Beko, Univerza v Mariboru, Maribor; Velimir Bole, EIPF, Ljubljana; Enrico Colombatto, Universita di Torino, Italija; France Križanič, EIPF, Ljubljana; Jože Mencinger, EIPF, Ljubljana - urednik; Steve Pejovich, University of Texas, ZDA; Franjo Štiblar, EIPF, Ljubljana;
GOSPODARSKA GIBANJA objavljajo rezultate raziskovanj EIPF o tekočih gospodarskih dogajanjih. Prva številka je izšla junija 1971, od novembra istega leta pa izhajajo redno vsak mesec (z eno dvojno številko v letu). Do novembra 1974 so objavljala rezultate raziskovanj EIPF za Jugoslavijo in so bila pisana v srbohrvaščini. Od novembra 1974 do oktobra 1991, ko so prenehala izhajati, so rezultate raziskovanj za Jugoslavijo objavljala PRIVREDNA KRETANJA JUGOSLAVIJE, GOSPODARSKA GIBANJA pa so se omejevala na Slovenijo. Publikacijo od 2009 sofinancira Javna agencija za knjigo RS.
Pogoji naročila: Naročilo začenja z dogovorno določenim mesecem, naslednja leta se samodejno podaljšuje, konča pa z decembrom tistega leta, v katerem je bilo pisno odpovedano.
© 2009 EIPF, Ekonomski institut d.o.o., Ljubljana, p.p.1722, Prešernova 21, Tel: (01) 2521688, 2518776, 2518704; Fax: (01) 4256870; Elektronska pošta: INFO@EIPF.SI,
Domača stran: WWW.EIPF.SI ISSN številka: 0351-0360
Zaščita vključuje vsako reproduciranje, kopiranje, mikrofilmanje, ne glede na tehniko, celote in posameznih delov.
Tiskala tiskarna CICERO v 600 izvodih. Oblikovanje in priprava za tisk, Rogač RMV, d.o.o.
KAZALO
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CENTRAL BANKS 6
Franjo Štiblar
1.	Introduction: the financial crisis and economic recession	6
2.	Framework for the central bank activity	9 3 .Central banks in times of crisis	12
4.	Critical assessment of the fed and ecb policies in a crisis	22
5.	Implications for the future of the global financial system	26 5 Literature	29
NEGOTOV PREHOD V LETO 2010	30
Velimir Bole, Jože Mencinger, Franjo Štiblar, Robert Volčjak
1.	Pričakovano povpraševanje še naprej opazno prehiteva dejansko realiziranega	33
2.	Zmanjševanje primanjkljaja v blagovni menjavi se v oktobru nadaljuje	34
3.	Zaupanje v industriji višje, v neindustrijskih dejavnostih pa v glavnem nižje	35
4.	Ponovno nižja industrijska produkcija	36
5.	Nekoliko višja le gradbeništvo in pomorski prevoz blaga	37
6.	Brezposelnih za polovico več, prostih delovnih mest za četrtino manj kot pred letom 38
7.	Kontrolirane cene pognale skupen indeks cen močno navzgor	39
8.	Še dodatno umirjanje stroškov dela	40
9.	Poslabšanje dinamike javnofinančnih prihodkov?	42
10.	Likvidnostna suša se še nadaljuje	42
11.	Tudi po desetih mesecih še pozitiven saldo na tekočem računu	44
PRIMERJAVA REFERENČNIH STROŠKOV ELEKTRIČNE ENERGIJE
RAZLIČNIH TEHNOLOGIJ OBNOVLJIVIH VIROV ENERGIJE	46
Alenka Kavkler, Mejra Festić in Sebastijan Repina
1.	Uvod	48
2.	Kratek opis uporabljene metodologije	49
3.	Predpostavke in podatki	50
4.	Rezultati	53
5.	Zaključek	57 Literatura	58
STATISTIČNA PRILOGA
59
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CENTRAL BANKS
Franjo Štiblar
The roots of the current global financial crisis stem from the excess supply of liquidity in a world pumped to solve the previous dot.com crisis and the consequences of the September 11 attack, as well as from the colossal external imbalances in the form of the American deficit and Chinese/Japanese surpluses. It is nothing new: the history of financial crises is quite abounded (Kindleberger C., Aliber R.Z, 2005).
6
The crisis is in fact a consequence of the lost credibility in the global financial system. Therefore, only the highest authorities in each country and in the world as a whole can lead to appropriate solutions with their decisive action. These are represented by governments (fiscal authorities) and central banks (monetary authorities), acting on their own within their country, but also in cooperation on the world stage. An appropriate approach to the crisis requires - first of all - a clear division of tasks between authorities, and secondly, a choice of appropriate instruments and optimal timing and sequencing in their implementation.
This paper deals with one half of it - the activities of the monetary authorities. More specifically, it compares the activities of two major world players within the monetary field, the Federal Reserve System (FED) and the European Central Bank (ECB).1 After introductory description of crisis, the framework for central bank activities is presented in the second part of paper and their activities in present financial crisis in third part. Critical assessment of central bank activities is given in the part four. Paper concludes with a view into the future of global financial system in the last part.
1. INTRODUCTION: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ECONOMIC RECESSION 1.1. Desccription
According to Trichet (2009) the crisis was initiated by the dramatic shift of focus in large parts of the financial sector from facilitating trade and real investment towards unfettered speculation and financial gambling (Casino capitalism).
1 These two central banks are chosen due to their importance. They cover the two largest economic entities in the world (50% of the world GDP), issue two most important reserve currencies ($ and Euro) and are the leaders in creating the global monetary policy (according to their measures).
Security was implemented in a precarious way: loans were sold by banks as well as non-banks and then they were put off-balance, which resulted in the weak underwriting standards and the lack of an incentive for prudency in screening loans (risk taking increased). The credit boom leading up to the crisis was aggravated by the following three multipliers: 1/ incentives: ill-designed compensation schemes for loan managers and traders reinforced the reduction of their time horizons;
2/ complexity: increasingly complicated and opaque financial instruments made it hard for security holders to assess the quality of the underlying investments, 3/ global macroeconomic imbalances: a chronic shortage of savings in certain industrial economies was made possible by an excess of savings in other parts of the world.
The turmoil erupted in mid-2007, and this was not entirely unexpected. The risk re-pricing occurred suddenly and this triggered turbulences in the inter-bank market. The credit boom was thrown in reverse. The asset cycle turned and numerous missing links within the financial chain were exposed.
The collapse of Lehman Brothers (for more on this see Wessels, 2009) in September 2008 transformed the financial turmoil into a global financial crisis: financial intermediaries restored the liquidity buffer, scaled down their balance sheets, tightened the lending conditions, reduced risk exposure, deleveraged, reduced their loans, the spreads were increased and the loans was squeezed.
7
1.2. Origins
The positive effects of financial liberalization and innovation occurred during the recent decades. In the more recent times managing genuine economic risk gradually ceased to be the main concern of international finance, as the creation and assumption of financial risk became the core activity of the financial industry. The decoupling of financial positions from the underlying flow of goods and services created the conditions for the credit boom, which was reinforced by the asset price boom, which was to a certain degree sustained by loans. Both, the loan and asset price expansion initiated formidable amplifiers within the microeconomics of the financial markets and created global imbalances.
In the financial market, compensation schemes for bank loan managers weakened their incentive to conduct prudent loan screening: executive salaries were defined by the overall volume of loans. At the same time risk could be shed (by banks, not by loan buyers) through the sales of loans to other investors in the secondary markets. Investors failed to assess the quality of the increasingly complicated financial structures, instead they trusted the originators. On the global scale, international mediation of savings to borrowers provided potent fuel for the expansion of the financial industry.
On August 9, 2007, the trust and confidence suddenly started evaporating. The circular interactions between the asset price, biased incentives, excessive complexity and global balances went into reverse. Market liquidity became scarce and investors were extremely afraid of the risks that they had been exposing themselves to for so long. In mid-September, the collapse of the Lehman Brothers turned the risk re-pricing into a major financial panic, as illustrated by the money spreads (chart). With the collapse of confidence, financial intermediaries made every possible attempt to restore the liquidity buffers: the loan spread soared, the financial market activities fell dramatically, and the global financial system almost grinded to a halt. This triggered a freefall in economic activity.
8
1.3.	Panic
According to Bernanke(2009) this financial crisis contained the elements of classic panic (as described by Bagehot). Panic can occur in any situation in which longer-term illiquid assets are financed by short-term liquid liabilities and in which suppliers of short term funding either lose confidence in the borrower or become worried that other short term lenders may lose confidence. Panic may be collectively irrational, but rational on the individual level, as each market participant has a strong initiative to be one of the first to exit. In 2008 panic arose in multiple contexts: the vicious spiral was at work and the line between illiquidity and insolvency was blurred.
1.4.	Indication
The interbank market rate spreads increased significantly from approximately 10 basis points at the onset of the financial crisis in July 2007 to over 250 basis points at the peak of the crisis in November/December 2008. By the summer of 2009 they declined to approximately 100 basis points.
1.5.	Systemic approach to solving the crisis - genaral
Based on the experience gained from the Japanese crisis (1990-2006) Ohmae (2008) proposed a systematic three step approach to the crisis:
1/ accept the systematic approach to the crisis instead of approaching it case-by-case, 2/ choosing the proper sequencing of measures against the crisis by solving, first of all, the liquidity of the banks and other financial institutions (obtaining additional liquidity from the central banks and excess liquidity from other market segments, wherever this is available), secondly, providing solvency for financial institutions (state intervention measures are: state guarantees, state deposits given to banks, state re-capitalization of insolvent banks),
and thirdly, solving the recession in the real sector through monetary measures and fiscal stimulus measures;
3/ dealing with the changes in the financial system or constructing a new financial system.
2. FRAMEWORK FOR THE CENTRAL BANK ACTIVITY
2.1. Globalization and monetary policy
According to P. Moutot and G. Vitale (ECB Occasional paper 106, August 2009) globalization has structural implications on the financial sector and monetary policy. In their opinion, central banks should remain focused on their mandate to preserve price stability even in a globalized environment. The monetary policy needs to take into account four elements of the new financial landscape: the decline of the home bias, (in ownership and institutional setting), the increase of international financial transactions relative to the transactions in goods and services (which helps to intensify the contagion effect during the financial crisis), the increasing number of countries that use inflation targeting and the currency peg, and finally the transformation of the financial market microstructure. In the new environment the monetary policy should 'lean against the wind' of the asset (and stock) price bubbles. Also a macro-financial surveillance on the international level is necessary and the monetary policymakers should extend the information more intensively. When the central banks intervene with extraordinary measures during a crisis, they should clearly communicate that these measures do not indicate a change in the monetary policy stance (separation principle).
The main task of the central bank is to secure sufficient monetary support (flow) to enable the execution of real sector activities without any obstacles (a smooth flow of transactions in the real sector). In order to fulfil this it needs to assure sufficient monetary supply potential and monitor the financial institutions that participate in the money and loan creation. In addition, some other functions are also delegated to them.
9
2.2. Independence of central banks
The central banks gained independence from direct government involvement only at the
end of the 1960s. The central bank independence consists of the following four elements:
•	institutional: interdiction of other institutions to give orders to central banks,
•	personal: the mandate of the central bank Governor exceeds that of the Government, the Governor has an independent personality, the central bank leadership is protected from illegal replacement actions,
•	functional: the basic goal of the central bank should be price or financial stability at which it is free to use any instrument it chooses,
•	financial: the central bank has an independent budget and its own primary financing resources.
10
For EU members the principle of independent national central banks is defined in the EU legislation. In article 107 of the EU Agreement (EEU) the influence on national central banks and their representatives is interdicted, while article 14.2 of the Statue declares replacements of central bank governors and board members for political reasons as invalid. The FED independency is defined in the related FED statues. It is well known that the Bank of England is by statue less independent than the FED which is less independent than the ECB.
An independent central bank has less obstacles on the route to fulfilling its basic tasks and reaching its objectives. However, in times of battering financial crisis a certain coordination of fiscal and monetary authorities is desirable. This might be easier to achieve with a less independent central bank.
2.3. Organization, tasks and environment of central banks
Faced with unprecedented challenges, central banks around the globe demonstrated a remarkable unity of purpose. However, different economies and different transmission channels called for different responses. The different approaches to crisis management of the two major central banks are linked to the differences: 1/ in their institutional arrangements: organization and tasks, 2/ in the structure of their economies.
Ad1/ Differences in the organization and tasks of central banks
Tasks of the ECB and the FED
	FED	ECB
Conduct monetary policy	Yes	Yes
Issue banknotes	Yes	Yes
Conduct foreign exchange operations	Yes	Yes
Hold and manage official reserves	Yes	NCBs
Act as a fiscal agent for the government	Yes	Yes
Promote the stability of the financial system	Yes	Yes
Supervise banks	yes, not alone	some NCBs
Promote the smooth payment of system operations	Yes	Yes
Collect and analyze statistical information	Yes	Yes
Participate in international monetary meetings	Yes	Yes
Source: Gerdesmeier, Mongelli, Roffia: The Fed, the Eurosystem and the Bank of Japan: More similarities than differences ?, mimeograph, 2009, NCB = national central bank
Monetary policy framework
	FED	ECB
Established	1914	1998
Policy decision-making body	FOMC 12	Governing council 22
Appointment	President and Congress	National governments
Independence	Yes, but report to Congress	Yes, in Maastricht treaty
Policy Objectives Goals, Mandate	Numerous objectives: maximal employment, price stability , moderate interest rates	Price stability (below 2%)
Policy instruments	4	4 discount rate
Targets	Federal fund rate (operational)	Money aggregate
Strategy of M policy	Focus on economic forecast; gradualism unless the risk requires aggressive action	Short term price develop., long term inflation
Decision-making	Consensual, dissents infrequent, Chairman first among equals	Consensual, dissents rare, president as moderator
Role of monetary aggregates and asset prices	Neither plays a significant role, independent of their effects on growth and inflation	Both play a significant role
Accountability and transparency	Immediate announcement following FOMC, with voting record, Semi-annual report to Congress, speeches	Immediate press conf. after council meeting; annual report to EU institutions; monthly bulletin; speeches
11
Source: Gerdesmeier, Mongelli, Roffia: The Fed, the Eurosystem and the Bank of Japan: More similarities than differences?, mimeograph, 2009; author
Ad 2/ Differences in the environment: economic strusture
a)	Financial structure: in the EU bank financing accounts for 70% of the companies' total external financing, while in the USA 20% (market-based resources 8%). Thus, the ECB has to primarily focus on the banking sector and the establishment of an appropriate design of the monetary policy.
b)	Economic structures:
•	important size of SMEs without direct credit market availability in the EU,
•	housing market was not the epicentre of the crisis as in the USA, however the euro area was indirectly affected by the toxic assets backed by the mortgage loans originating in the USA. Solving the toxic assets problem will help revive loans and banks should use government recapitalization measures.
•	the economy is not as flexible: wages and prices of goods and services are slower to change in the euro area than in the USA, which offered some protection against extremely bad outcomes, the policy frameworks provide a solid anchor for the private sector expectations. The fiscal policies were geared towards sustainability and the monetary policy towards price stability. However, overly active policies may risk destabilizing expectations, which makes them counterproductive.
c) Political structure: the independence of the central bank is an important issue. A higher degree of independence offers a rise to a more prudent monetary policy and is positively correlated with higher economic development.
3 .CENTRAL BANKS IN TIMES OF CRISIS
12
This chapter analyzes the activities of central banks:
•	on the way (leading up), and at the onset of the crisis: entry, onset (liquidity support of shocks in the global real economy; weak supervision of the banking sector)
•	during the crisis: the appropriateness of the used instruments (monetary and fiscal stimulus coordinated; interest rate policy in the domain of the liquidity trap)
•	at the exit from the crisis (the ability to neutralize the excess liquidity pumped into the system)
The general economic policy mechanism is the following:
instruments measures means		(operational) targets guides		objectives goals final results
The monetary policy measures are qualitative (selective) and quantitative (required reserves ratio, discount rate, open market policy).
3.1. Central bank actions in a crisis
Due to the financial crisis the basic goal of the central banks will be redirected from price stability to protecting a broader financial stability within the country. And, even if the narrow goal of price stability is retained, the question arises whether prices of real estate and securities should also be taken into account. There were already cases in the past in which there was no inflation, but still the vast financial disequilibria led to a financial crisis (in 1990s and 2000s).
In a financial (banking) crisis, Bagehot's dictum from the late 19th century (1873/1897) remains valuable for central bank behaviour: "To avert panic, central banks should lend early and freely (without limit) to solvent firms, against good collateral, and at high rates." This dictum has both, macro and micro aspects:
Macro aspect: provide unlimited liquidity sources in order to prevent fire sales that can lead to a decrease in asset values, reduction of wealth and contraction of economic activities. Enable financial institutions to continue lending.
Micro aspect: provide loans to solvent firms, against a good collateral, at high rates (penalty rates leads back to market funding when made available again), which limits the moral hazard and other distortion effects of special intervention.
In times of crisis the results of the following monetary policy mechanism indicators are observed:
A)	standard monetary policy measures are changes in key interest rates, while non-standard measures include quantitative and qualitative easing.
B)	targets - guides that indicate the transformation channel (pass through) of monetary policy in which market interest rates are standard measures, while financial aggregates of central banks are non-standard measures.
C)	inflation rates were the targeted final goals for both - FED and ECB - and, in addition, FED also had the goals of employment and long-term interest rates.
13
A) Measures
Excessive global liquidity was eliminated through the increase of the key central bank interest rates during the first phase. The hike of the key rates came too late, was insufficient, and remained enforced for too long. However, when the financial crisis arrived, the decreasing interest rates (as a modern standard instrument of the central bank's expansive policy ) proved to be an insufficient instrument . They managed to achieve the liquidity trap levels but failed to sufficiently increase the financial system liquidity. It was time for non-standard measures. A direct intervention with quantitative and qualitative easing was used in an unprecedented degree. Now, the question appears, when, with what instruments and sequencing should the intervention be exited .
A1/ Standard measures
During the first phase of cycle excess liquidity within the system was curbed with the increase of the interest rates. However, the financial turmoil monetary policy became expansive during the second phase of cycle, when it took the form of decreasing key policy rates. The reactions of the monetary authorities were late in both phases.2 Thus, the ECB increased the key rate to 4.25% as late as July 2008, when the financial turmoil was already on the way to a full blown financial crisis.
Key interest rates	FED (federal funds rate)	ECB (discount rate)
Maximum in 2007-2008	5.0%	4.25%
December 2009	0-0.25%	1.0%
Sources: FED data, ECB data
2 As is usually the case the information as regards the liquidity situation in the financial markets came with a delay, was incomplete and sometimes even ignored by monetary authorities.
Interest rates were decreased to historically low levels, but this was not enough. The question of the "liquidity trap" was not even posed. The need for additional monetary stimulus with non-standard measures became eminent.
A2/ Non-standard monetary policy measures: quantitative and qualitative easing
Standard central bank measures operate with interest rates as an instrument. Non-standard measures, introduced at a time of (financial) crisis are defined as quantitative or qualitative easing, but in fact they mean "direct money printing", (or increasing the supply of money). The term quantitative easing was first used by Richard A. Werner (1991)
Quantitative easing means the expansion of the central bank balance sheet through the use of various central bank policies: direct purchases of non-performing loans, direct lending to companies and the government, purchases of commercial paper and other debt and equity instruments. All of these would stimulate credit creation and hence boost the economy (credit easing). This would mean an expansion of the high powered money or bank reserves and the money supply, which in turn would lead to an increase in the monetary liabilities (base money) of the central bank balance through the preservation of constant (average) liquidity and risk of its asset portfolio.
Qualitative easing is the exact opposite: this is a process in which the central bank adds higher risk assets to its balance sheet. This is a shift in the composition of the central bank assets towards less liquid and riskier assets, while holding a constant balance sheet size (the official policy rate and other measures).
A3/ Non-standard specific central bank measures in a crisis
Differences in the role of central banks and environment they are in defined their specific choices of non-standard measures:
•	Japan = quantitative easing: to a large extend outright purchases of government bonds
•	US FED = credit easing: use of direct lending facilities vis-a-vis (all) market participants.
•	ECB = enhanced credit support: primarily focused on banks as the main credit source in the euro area. This is a special and primarily bank-based measure aimed at enhancing /bank/ credit above and beyond what could be achieved through policy interest rate reductions alone.
FED policies are closely tied to the asset side of the balance sheet, while the ECB policies are closer to the liability side.
•	FED specific instruments include:
TAF = Term Action Facility = short term lending program for financial institutions PDCF = Primary Dealer Credit Facility = short-term collaterized loans for primary dealers CPFF = Commercial Paper Funding Facility = for a high-quality commercial paper issuer TALF = Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility = loans for non-commercial borrowers
ABMBS = Agency Backed MBS = high quality market securities
•	ECB
The ECB's enhanced credit support includes a set of primarily bank-based measures aimed at enhancing the credit flow beyond the standard interest rate channel. They are:
•	Fixed-rate full-allotment
•	Expansion of the collateral
•	Longer-term liquidity provision
•	Liquidity provision in foreign currencies
•	Financial market support through purchases of covered bonds
15
Comparison of non-standard FED and ECB measures
	FED	ECB
Maturity	Outright purchase	From ^ to1,6 or12 months
Collateral	Extended	Extended
Additional facilities	Many: TAF, PDCF, CPFF TALF, ABMBS	One: covered bonds
Counterparties	Many: banks, primary dealers, Investment banks, mutual funds, Commercial paper issuers, Investors in asset backed securities	Banks and saving institutions
Source: author
B. Pass though of monetary policy:
B1/ Standard measures: key rate - market rates - money growth
Selected monetary indicators, June 2009
	USA	Euro Area	Difference USA - Euro Area
Policy rate	0-0.25	1	< -0.75
Interest rate			
- unsecured rate	1.73	1.64	> 0.09
- unsecured-secured spread	1.24	0.70	> 0.54
Bank rates (long term)	3.52	3.99	< -0.47
Credit premium (BBB spread)	2.59	2.22	> 0.37
Source: The ECB's Enhanced Credit Support, speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, Munich, July 13, 2009
16
The higher key rates that lead to lower financial market rates indicate that the interest rate pass though (channel) is stronger in the EU (for ECB) than in the USA (for FED).
Standard measures in the form of interest rate changes:
The view that the lower the key policy interest rate the more effective the monetary policy is in response to a downturn is over simplistic. The resulting market rates (and other economic variables) should be looked into. At 1% the euro rate of refinancing is higher than the US federal funds rate target of 0 - 0.25%. However, due to the relatively low level of credit and liquidity premiums observed in the euro money market, this difference in policy rates does not translate into equivalent differences in the money market rates (for May-June 2009): In the euro area inter-bank rates were used by banks to grant floating rate loans to households and companies.
Merely comparing policy rates provides limited information as regards the effective credit conditions in individual markets.
B2/ Non-standard measures: central bank balance - credit growth (crunch) M growth
The monetary easing can be seen through the central bank balance sheet expansion that serves as a guide (target) for the monetary policy.
Expansion of central banks* balance sheets
Total assets	July 2007	Growth	December 2008	Growth	September 2009
FED (billion $)	869		2250		2144
% change		+ 160%		-5%	
ECB (billion €)	1212		2021		1844
(billion $)		+67%		-8%	
% change					
Source: FED balance reports, ECB balance reports
The balance sheet of both central banks increased significantly from the onset of the liquidity crisis in July 2007 to its peak in December 2008 (160% for FED, 67% for ECB). In 2009 both balances started to shrink,(even if it was slowly), which indicates that the worst is over. The FED's balance sheet declined in the nine months of 2009 by 5%, while the ECB's balance sheet by 8%.
The effect of the qualitative easing measures can be observed through the changes in the balance structures.
It is clear that the US (FED) exceeds EMU (ECB) in the intensity of the used standard and non-standard monetary policy measures (amplitudes or differences between the maximum and minimum values are larger).As is the case in their regular economic policy, the US actively leads the policy, while the EU reacts with stabilizing measures.
One indicator of success for both, i.e. the standard interest rate policy and the non-standard monetary easing, is bank credit growth. In the year up leading up to September/October 2009 the volume of bank credits in the USA declined by 10%, and in the EU by 2%. At this it should be taken into account that the actual amount of disbursed loans depends on the supply and demand of loans, and even on the supply side it depends on the decisions of the banks, not only on the central bank policies. Also, in the USA the central bank intervention was not carried out merely through the bank channel, but also directly to other financial market players, thus the greater decline in the outstanding bank loans in the USA (compared to the Eurozone in 2009) does not automatically also mean a greater credit crunch.
17
C. Final results: goal achievement by FED and ECB, end of 2009
	FED/US	ECB/EMU
Inflation	-0.2 Oct	+0.6 Nov
Unemployment	- 10.0 Nov	(9.8) Oct*
Interest rates LT	3.42 Dec	(3.09) Dec*
*Employment and long term interest rates are not explicit ECB goals Source: The Economist, December 2009
At the end of 2009 the inflation and long-term interest rate goals were fulfilled, but this was not the case with the employment goal. This indicates that stability is preferred to growth. However, the final goals are not merely the result of the monetary policy measures.
3.2. The exit strategy
The exit strategy issue becomes important as the global economy shows signs of recovery. On the global level the exit strategy includes the choices of the policy-making authorities regarding the time, sequencing and type of instruments used. Their choice will define who (countries, sectors, individual economic agents) will carry the heaviest burden of the crisis. This is a question of the crisis burden overturn. Non-systematic interventions carried out in order to save individual large banks and other financial institutions gave an unjust advantage to the financial sector and the too-large-to-fail financial institutions in comparison to the real sector and small economy units (argued with the systemic risk danger).
Decisions:
• fiscal versus monetary policy: in theory the fiscal exit should proceed the monetary one, however the social and political constraints indicate that the opposite is the case in practice. The budget deficit and increasing public debt are becoming the seeds planted for the next financial crisis, similar to the role the excessive liquidity created in order to solve the previous crisis (caused by dot.com, September 11 events) had on the current financial crisis.
18
The coordination between the fiscal and monetary authorities during the exit is equally as important as during the onset of the crisis. The questions are when and how (pace and sequence).
•	The judgment as to when will be based on the forecast of economic developments, for it takes people time to adjust their spending and pricing decisions as a response to a change in the interest rate and other aspects of financial conditions determined by the monetary policy decisions.
The forecast will use all sources of information at its disposal.
•	The judgment as to how depends on the peculiarities of each central bank and its economic environment. As banks will become increasingly confident with the capital levels, they will be more willing to undertake the arbitrage that will tighten the link between the rate on deposits and short-term market interest rates.
Each central bank adapts its exit strategy according to its special policy features. However, the unusual nature of FED/ECB actions and the uncertainty as regards when and how required greater clarity of communication with the public. In December 2009 both central banks announced their intention to exit from the non-standard measures, although they also announced that this would take place gradually. The improved conditions were indicated by: low resource utilization, subdued inflation and continuing restrains on loans, which constrained the speed of recovery.
1/ The exit strategy - FED
The accommodative FED policies will be warranted for an extended period. During the exit, the tightening monetary policy represents a reduction of excess reserves or, if they remain, the neutralisation of their potential effects on the broader measures of money and loans and thus aggregate the demand and inflation. In detail:
•	Excess reserves will automatically shrink as the improving financial conditions will reduce the use of special lending facilities and ultimately lead to their closure;
•	The reserves will be reduced by 100-200 billion $ in each of the following few years as the securities held by the FED are matured or prepaid;
•	Additional means of tightening monetary policy are: increasing the interest paid on reserve balances (now it is at 0.25%, if increased, this would discourage the growth of money and loans);
• Taking actions that would reduce the reserves. There are three ways of achieving this: 1/ the FED can arrange large scale reverse repurchase agreements with financial market participants = reverse repos,
2/ offer time deposits to the banks, which would be roughly analogous to the certificates of
deposits that the banks offered to their customers,
3/ selling a portion of the long-term securities on the open market.
Each of these actions would raise the short-term interest rates and limit the broad money
and credit.
When conditions are no longer unusual and demanding, those programs that are not focused on depository institutions will be terminated, and with the exception of the Term Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility (TABSLF), they will leave no residual on the FED balance sheet.
The long-term securities that are currently being bought by the FED will not run off so rapidly (however, the sales of these assets could be decided by FOMC).
2/ The exit strategy - ECB
19
Enhanced loan support policies have boosted the market liquidity. Additional liquidity will not lead to inflation, because:
1/ The broader monetary aggregates are decelerating, as additional liquidity is primarily taking the form of precautionary balances that the banks are deliberately holding with ECB. This will not result in a higher inflation.
2/ The conditions for unwinding non-standard policies are good, except for covered bonds.
Long-term refinancing operations provide liquidity over a fixed time horizon and run-off in a totally predictable way. By contrast, the unwinding of outright purchases typically requires an additional decision whether to hold the securities until their maturity and if not, when to sell. In the ECB such decisions are limited to the covered bond purchases, while the rest relies on the built-in mechanism for the re-absorption of liquidity.
Cornerstones in the exit strategy:
1/ The monetary policy strategy shapes the exit: the primary ECB objective is price stability = priority
2/ the design of the enhanced credit support facilitates the exit: a number of measures will phase out naturally by design (as repo), while the scope of outright purchases was calibrated (covered purchases up to 60 billion €).
3/ The ability to act: independence and technical capability: not to interfere with the fiscal policy.
4/ Credible alertness: reputation to act when appropriate.
20
The ECB's steady-handed approach to conventional monetary policy actions strengthened the swift transmission of policy changes to market rates and loan conditions. The fall in inflation acted as an automatic stabilizer and price expectations remain stable (chart).
Key elements in the monetary policy phasing out measures include:
•	Operational goal - the re-establishment of the key operational framework features
•	Decision parameters
•	the level of key interest rates will be based exclusively on the assessment of the risks to price stability
•	the size and maturity of the liquidity that provides the operations also depend on the evolution of the funding risks
3/ The fiscal exit strategy as condition for successful recovery
The coordination of the fiscal and monetary policy measures is sine qua non for a successful exit strategy from the crisis. In its nature the fiscal policy lacks a similarly strong built in mechanism when it comes to the unwinding of the stimulus. The discretionary policy needs to be invoked for this would engineer an exit from the current degree of fiscal expansion. The euro area governments should prepare a plan for the fiscal exit and consolidation strategies within the Stability and Growth Pact.
The importance of the fiscal exit strategies is emphasized by the following:
•	Unsustainable fiscal policies represent an upside risk to price stability
•	Exit strategies may reduce market concerns as regards fiscal sustainability
•	The government role within the economy should not be on a permanent increase
•	The challenging fiscal positions in most countries
•	Considerable fiscal cost of the crisis measures are to be expected, and this poses a high risk to the fiscal sustainability.
The general principles for the fiscal exit strategies should take into account that:
•	The banking sector consolidation is a primary criterion for phasing out the support of the financial sector
•	The fiscal exit should start no later than the economic recovery and if possible it should precede the monetary exit,
•	The consolidation efforts should also take into account the growth prospects, the size of the budget deficits as well as debt and long-term sustainability
•	the consolidation strategies should be in line with the US Congress rules and the EU Stability and Growth Pact
•	The consolidation pace has to be maintained and stepped up in the prosperous times.
4/ Comparison of the fiscal and the monetary exit strategy
The rules used by the authorities should be transparent and the decision-making bodies have to be independent.
The financial support measures, which potentially involve a significant transfer of credit risk from financial institutions to the taxpayer, fall within the realm of the fiscal policy. In the euro area the structural consolidation efforts will need to significantly exceed the benchmark of 0.5% of GDP per annum as set by the Stability and Growth pact (at least 1%).
Over the next few years the economic policy makers are going to face two delicate balancing acts, both, in the monetary and in the fiscal policy.
a) As the monetary authority central bankers have to keep their balance sheets large and the interest rates low for a period that will be long enough to prevent deflation from setting in. On the other hand they also have to be prepared for quick changes in order to prevent inflation from taking off. Over the past decades a powerful consensus has emerged that economies perform better when the monetary policy is left to an independent group of experts with a clear mandate (usually inflation target) and that the transparency around central bankers' assumptions and actions helps anchor the people's expectations as regards future inflation. However, as Alan Greenspan shows, they can be wrong.
21
b) As a fiscal authority politicians need to increase public expenditure in order to replace the slump in the short term private demand, however they also need to balance the budgets in a longer term, before the public debt rises out of proportion and thus becomes a source of instability in its own. The weight of the public debt (in rich large economies over 100% of GDP and still growing) will push up interest rates, crowd out the private investment and sap the economic growth, with possible nastier outcomes in the form of out-of control inflation and country default on debt servicing.
The fiscal balancing act is tougher than the monetary one: besides timing it is also important to find the best mix of increasing taxes and cuts in the spending. Politicians also lack the credibility that the central bankers have obtained over the recent decades (appropriately or not). A similar focus on the rules and transparency as in the monetary policy also appears in the fiscal policy: limiting deficits, transparent budgeting and independent bodies (fiscal council) that assess the budget decisions adopted by politicians' (like Congress CBO in the USA, the Stability and Growth Pact in the EU).
However, the tools for fiscal credibility are less widely adopted and less effective. The way to improve this is by introducing fiscal rules and independent budgeting monitors.
22
4. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE FED AND ECB POLICIES IN A CRISIS
The critical assessment is firstly based on Ohmae's (2008) requests for a systemic approach and in the sequencing of measures that first of all tackle liquidity and then solvency of the financial institutions and, thirdly helping the real sector, especially the real estate market.
When the financial crisis first exploded in the American and British financial sector in September 2008 (collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank), the approach of their authorities was selective and thus wrong. FED and the Bank of England attempted to solve the solvency of banks, insurance companies and the housing market (Paulson in the USA) before solving their liquidity. Undertaking the task that is supposed to be delegated to the government budget, they performed a case-by-case rescue plan instead of implementing a systemic approach. Their mistakes were corrected only through trial and error were , however in this time the wrong start of the rescue operation contributed to the increase in the depth and the length of the present financial crisis.
As regards liquidity the central banks should play the role of liquidity stations that are open 24x7 for a sufficiently long term (1 year- to 2 years). For monetarists, the permanent danger of such central bank generosity lies in the inflation that could appear once credibility returns to the market. For fiscalists the immediate danger is deflation, while the central banks are of the opinion that they have sufficient instruments to suck the excess liquidity from the system when this is needed.3 In order to be credible, the central bank liquidity injection should be unlimited. In fact, this represents merely a potential liquidity supply of the central banks to the banking sector.
b) The present central banks' attempts at resolving the credit crunch is to the greatest extent inappropriate. The fact is that banks are unwilling to extend their loans to the non-financial sectors (enterprises, households) due to their fear that they will not be repaid and their own need to repay their foreign loans.4 The bank's ability and willingness to extend loans to the non-financial sectors depends on the existence of liquidity inflow received by the banks (in the form of deposits from non-financial clients, loans from other financial institutions or from the central bank) and on the credibility/probability of the repayment of the banking loans by the real sector. Both, inflows and outflows should be insured for banks so that they will be willing to engage in lending activities.
3	In the beginning of May 2009, in the same issue of New York Times and on the same page, two recognized economists, Alan Meltzer for conservatives (Republicans??) and Paul Krugman for the Democrats stated these two entirely opposing views on the issue of price stability. The view of the former was shared a few days before this by Martin Feldstein, th economic adviser to Ronald Reagan, despite the fact that the USA are currently experiencing deflation on a year-to-year basis, for the first time in 50 years.
4	Three conditions need to be fullfilled for a country, financial institution, enterprise or individual to be able
to sail through the current crisis with least possible problems: de-leveraging, in order to be protected against the inability of repayment = bankruptcy; accumulation of liquid assets, in order to be able to cover all current expenditures and obligations; and a countinous stream of income, in order to survive the bad times.
As regards the inflow of financial resources to banks, the banks' deposit base has shrunk as inter-bank liquidity drained out, and depositors from non-financial sectors (enterprises, households) frequently conducted net withdrawals of deposits instead of returning the financial resources from the collapsed stock exchange investments into the banks. The remaining source for the inflow is central bank liquidity. However, this was offered with the wrong instrument and an inappropriate intensity. All major central banks decreased their interest rates almost to zero, hoping that this will encourage banks to undertake additional liquidity from them as well as decrease their active interest rates and thus make it cheaper for the real sector to take out loans. However, the problem is not primarily the price of the primary emission, which was already close to zero. This means that the "liquidity trap" has already been achieved and a further decrease in the interest rates would not increase the demand for central bank liquidity. However, even without the problem of the neglected liquidity trap the reason that banks did not want the central bank liquidity did not lie in its price (enterprises in distress are willing to pay even higher interest rates just to get banking loans for at least the working capital), but in the time scale in which the central banks made these liquidity resources available. They offered an undefined short term central bank liquidity. In the fear of the potential inflationary effect of the supplied liquidity the European Central Bank (ECB) was unwilling to extend the liquidity resources for a period exceeding 6 months and even then it wanted to keep the possibility to close its "liquidity pump" in an instance, if the occasion required such action. Only in May 2009, the ECB extended the available liquidity to 12 months, and even this was not enough. The ECB did not wish to make liquidity available for a longer period not because it was not aware of this problem, but because it feared that with such commitment to a longer term supply of liquidity it would give up the possibility to quickly withdraw excessive liquidity from the system in the event the inflation returned . Apparently, in the considerations of the ECB the fear of inflation prevailed over the fear of deflation caused by a prolonged credit crunch.
As regards the disbursement of loans to the non-financial sectors (enterprises and households) the critical obstacle lies in the ability of repaying these loans. The collapse of the market in the current crisis eliminated all "information capital" that the banks collected on their clients. They became uncertain as to which company will survive, which individuals will keep their jobs, how much individuals and institutions lost in the stock exchange or in the collapse of the prices of the financial derivatives. In such a situation, the only way to support banks in offering new loans is for the Government to give guarantees that they will repay the enterprises' (or, to a lesser extent the households') debts to banks if they were unable to repay them. A similar strong commitment of the Government, means that the Governments undertook the basic credit risk banks are supposed to carry.5
23
5 If fact, similarly to the unlimited guarantees given by the governments for the deposits in banks, which helped to stop »run on banks«, the state guarantees for the repayment of bank loans to enterprises constitutes merely a potential obligation. In the event that everything goes as it is supposed to, these potential guarantees need not be activated, and thus will not cause any cost for the Government. At the same time, their positive effect could be enormous in the form of returning credibility to the system and thus helping the banks and their clients return to business as usual.
At the beginning of the financial crisis (in the autumn of 2008), central banks became not merely "the last resort lenders" but rather "the only resort lenders". The American FED was much more aggressive in pumping liquidity into the system than its European counterpart the ECB. At the same time, the European countries outside of the EMU did not have sufficient reserves to support their domestic currency and as a result the national currencies were placed under attack on a number of occasions. Even strongholds, such as the UK, Sweden and Denmark started considering the option of joining "Euroland". Many smaller and less developed countries found themselves in need of external financial support in order to defend their currencies which depreciated substantially during the crisis.6 During the crisis ECB supported certain non-Eurozone members, and the EU helped certain non-EU members.
c) The final solution to the toxic assets will come from the government budget, forming bad banks (good and bad) and solving the primary cause, i.e. the incapability of house owners to serve their mortgages.
4.1. Mistakes
Mistakes in policy actions include:
•	FED was to quick of the mark at helping the large banks, at a time when the prices of bad loans were still above 0 (the dispute between insiders and outsiders). This not only aided the liquidity but also the solvency and thus rescued the bank owners.
•	The initial FED measures were clearly against the Bagehot dictum: discretion in the bail-out, relaxation of the collateral, cheap liquidity.
•	The monetary stimulus for the non-bank financial institutions in the USA was (until now) not accompanied by an improved regulation and supervision (moral hazard).
•	ECB limited the maturity of repurchasing agreements too much, and this was performed despite their extension from 14 to 90 and from 180 to 360 days; instead they should have opted for a two year maturity with a gradual fade-out.
•	FED's use of outright purchase makes the exit discretionary and harder, while ECB's use of repurchasing facilities enabled an automatic phasing-out of the excess liquidity. Thus, the FED made the exit easier for the banks, but harder for itself; ECB applied an opposite strategy: making it easier for itself, and harder for the banks (credit crunch).
6 The European countries in question are Hungary, Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic States, Serbia, as well as Island and Ireland, which all obtained IMF financial support under the new stand-by arrangement and with it strong support from the G-20 April 2009 meeting in London. Outside of Europe, the story was similar in Asia, Africa and South America. However, despite the request from the G-20 Summit that the IMF should relax its overly hard and anti-social conditionality for these loans, it seems that the IMF staff is unable to change the anti-social criteria it has used until now. The result is either a very strict request of the socially non-sustainable nature for the Government signing the arrangement with the IMF, or reluctance or even rejection of the arrangement with the IMF if the Government is currently able of rejecting external financial support.
• Returning to fiscal soundness: vast amounts of government securities could crowd-out the private lower rated securities, increase the interest rates and decrease investments which will slow the economic activity; at the same time this could prove to be a seed for the next financial crisis.
4.2. Recapitulation
The active approach of the FED was complemented by the somewhat more reactive ECB approach. The monetary and fiscal authorities should coordinate their exit strategies in the same way they coordinated their intervention strategies at the peak of the crisis. However, the centrifugal forces are likely to become stronger than the centripetal forces in the exit, as the immediate danger is avoided. This means that the cooperation across sectors and countries could weaken and become less coordinated in the exit than it was at the height of the crisis.
25
The execution of the exit strategy in the current crisis could plant the seeds for the next financial crisis (as the solution of the dot.com crisis in 2000 planted the seeds for this crisis). In order to avoid this:
•	The monetary institutions should regulate and supervise all financial institutions that were helped by the monetary stimulus.
•	the fiscal authorities should carefully plan the deficit financing, as well as the return to fiscal soundness: the explosion.
The recovery could be slow due to: the remaining strains in numerous financial markets, significant additional losses that are still faced by many financial institutions, and the difficulty in obtaining loans faced by many businesses and households.
The US, EMU and UK provisions for capital, loans and guarantees amount to 1/6 of their GDP.
Following the crisis many will assume that banks and other large financial institutions will always be bailed out. The measures against this moral hazard are:
•	bolstering (at least doubling) the banks' capital, and using higher standards for provisioning,
•	a concerted effort to reduce implicit state guarantees,
•	"living wills" that force banks to plan their own collapse,
•	forcing banks to finance themselves with the slice of the hybrid debt (retain credit risk).
26
4.3. Lessons to be learned
1/ The Bagehot dictum continues to provide a useful framework for designing central bank actions to combat crisis,
2/ The problem of the discount window stigma is serious, as it is used by the IMF funds for developing economies in a crisis,
3/ Organise important financial institutions as well as smaller institutions into a group, that will behave like banks (short term liabilities, long term assets); however this requires their extended supervision by the central bank,
4/ A system-wide or macro-prudential regulation and supervision should be implemented within and between countries,
5/ The pro-cyclicality of the financial system needs to be mitigated by a mechanism of built-in stabilizers: one way to achieve this is to increase the capital and reservations in the prosperous times (known as dynamic provisioning and used in Spain), 6/ the transparency of the financial structures needs to be enhanced: the financial innovation cannot be built on or exploit the information asymmetry; enhanced risk disclosures are required,
7/ The short-term of the financial contracts needs to be corrected: a reform of the executive compensation schemes is necessary. An asymmetric risk-award scheme should be replaced by a symmetric one: if high bonuses are paid to managers in the event of profits, high penalties should be repaid by them in case of losses.
8/ Separation principle could be applied in banks, where only the standard commercial banking activities (drawing deposits and extending loans) should be guaranteed by the highest authorities in the last instance, but not the bank activities on capital markets.
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Following Ohmae (2008) a systemic approach was finally introduced in developed countries instead of the case-by-case approach (step1), the central bank liquidity measures and government solvency measures solved the financial institutions and the real sector was supported in the exit from the crisis (step 2), thus the final step means dealing with the financial system (step 3).
The final goal of the changes is the creation of a level playing field for all financial and other economic agents around the world. Partial regulation (and supervision) reforms in merely certain parts of the world will last only temporarily, because they will give an unfair advantage to the free riders. Regulation and supervision arbitrage of financial institutions between countries and sectors are bound to make partial interventions unacceptable in the long run. This is why time and time again cries are heard for a global instead of partial solutions in the various fields of financial sector regulation, as was most recently the case, for instance, regarding compensation schemes, hedge funds, etc.
According to Trichet (2009) the new economic paradigm should be based on the following notions:
•	Medium and long-term instead of short term sustainability in macroeconomic policies and financial strategies,
•	Constant monitoring and resilience within the financial sector instead of complacency,
•	A holistic approach: rethinking links between financial behaviour and macroeconomic policies. This would imply a new institutional framework in domestic (unified regulators and supervisors) as well as international macro governance (G-20).
The structural reforms that are necessary in dysfunctional areas relate to: risk management and credit assessment of banks (increasing capital), accounting standards, audit quality, supervision, regulation of tax heavens, supervision of non-bank financial institutions that behave like banks (investment banks), regulation and supervision of hedge and private equity management funds.
Different people have different views on extending the necessary structural changes in the financial system, for example Kashyap and all (2009). However, with a fast recovery from the crisis, enabled by an unprecedented fiscal and monetary intervention, the chances to establish a new system or substantially change the existing one have gone. All that the world authorities (decision makers) are willing to accept is an improvement of the existent system that would be reached through the reformation of the regulation and an increased supervision. But even these corrections are hard to introduce. Now, as the catastrophe has been averted, the opposition to changes from the financial agents (and capital) is strong and the motto "business as usual" prevails within the financial community.
For instance, the proposal of a small systemic change in the form of a global introduction of the Tobin tax, as proposed by Gordon Brown on November 9, was immediately rejected by the USA and other liberal economies. The EU tries to keep this proposal alive.
27
Regarding regulation, even partial improvements in the existing financial system are difficult to achieve. The reformed regulation that deals with compensation schemes and hedge funds/private funds encountered strong opposition in the USA, as well as in London's City (in their opinion, the introduction of restrictive measures within the EU would divert financial agents from London to the USA or Switzerland). But, where is the regulation of most financial market gate-keepers (such as for instance tax heavens, rating agencies, audit firms, etc.) which in fact became market mis-users?
In order to improve the supervision, the EU is introducing supra-country supervisors, one for assessing the macroeconomic risks, and one for each of the three financial sub-sectors, i.e. banking, insurance and institutions in the capital market. In the USA the situation is the opposite, for in the States banking - as one of sub-sectors - is supervised by four different agencies. An intense discussion as regards the future role of the FED is currently
underway within the USA legislative bodies. While the Administration backed by the House proposed the strengthening of its role, the Senate wants to take away even the current FED's supervisory competencies, leaving it merely with monetary policy tasks.
28
In the preparation report for the Istanbul meeting in October 2009 the IMF required that the central banks implement a more complex approach as regards their objectives. Instead of the current focus on price stability, their objective should be on financial stability. The broadening of goals (objectives) is closer to the FED than the ECB approach and this request represents an indirect criticism of the ECB policy. The fact is that broader goals require a broader regulatory and supervisory mandate of the central banks for all financial institutions the behaviour of which is relevant for the stability of the financial system. With this regard, the financial institutions in the USA (especially) strongly object to such intensified control, while the EU is already introducing four new supervisory and regulatory bodies, one responsible for the entire financial system and three for each of its parts: banking, insurance and capital market institutions.
The fact is that at the end of 2009, banks are still going bust (123 so far in the USA alone), or need an additional solvency injection by the Government (for instance in the UK, Austria, Germany). The credit crunch is still present in most of the developed countries, including the USA and the EU. Especially SMEs are cut from the bank credit support while they are unable to raise money directly on the capital markets. State guarantees are needed for bank loans that were given to the enterprise sector. At the same time, the recovery of the real sector is slow at which the lagging labour markets suffer the most.
Both the USA and the EU have introduced proposals for system reforms, however the strong opposition from actors within the financial sector offers little hope that even the proposed moderate reforms will be adopted. In addition to the increasing fiscal "black hole" problem and the newly appearing real estate market bubbles in some parts of the world (China), the rejection of the necessary reforms in the financial sector indicate the next financial (and economic) crisis in making.
LITERATURE
Bagehot W.(1873/1897): Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (New York: Charles Scriber's Sons)
Bernanke B.: Reflections on a Year of Crisis, 21.8.2009; Lecture at Jackson Hole, USA ECB Monthly Bulletin, several issues
ECB Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, Annexed to the treaty establishing the European Community 1992)
29
FED: Purposes and Functions, Board of Governors of the FED, Washington DC, June 2005 The Economist, several issues , 2009, Financial Times, several issues, 2008 and 2009
Gerdesmeier M., Mongelli, Roffia: The Fed, the Eurosystem and the Bank of Japan: More similarities than differences?, mimeograph, 2009
Kashyap A., Rajan R., Stein J.: The Global Roots of the Current Financial Crisis and its Implications for Regulation, University of Chicago, Mimeograph, 2009
Kindleberger C.P, Aliber R.Z.: Manias, Panics and crashes - A History of Financial Crises, Palgrave, Great Britain, 2005
Kohn D.L.: Central Bank Exit Policies, Cato Institute, Lecture, September 30, 2009 Madigan Brian F.: FED Kansas City: Jackson Hole, 21.8.2009 Lecture:
Bagehot's Dictum in Practice: Formulating and Implementing Policies to Combat the Financial Crisis Moutot P. and Vitale G.: Financial System in Globalization, ECB Occasional paper 106,2009 Shiller R.: The Subprime Solution, Princeton, USA, 2008
Štiblar F: The Role of Central Banks in a Crisis, Lecture, LINK Meeting, Bangkok, October 2009, and Slovene Banking Conference, Brdo, November 2009
Trichet, J.C: The ECB'S Enhanced Credit Support, Munich, July 9, 2009
Trichet J.C.: The Crisis and its Lessons, Venice, October 9, 2009
Werner R.A.: The Great Yen Illusion: Japanese Foreign Investment and the Role of Land Related Credit Creation, 1991, Oxford Institute of Economics, Discussion Paper series 129.
Wessel David: In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke 's War on the Great Panic, Crown Business, 2009
NEGOTOV PREHOD V LETO 2010
Velimir Bole, Jože Mencinger, Franjo Štiblar, Robert Volčjak
30
Gospodarski agregati na koncu 2009 se gibljejo v povsem različne smeri, kar povečuje negotovost. Pričakovano povpraševanje opazno prehiteva dejansko realiziranega, izboljševanje domačega trošenja pojema, možnosti za krepitev povpraševanja so najslabše v gradbeništvu. Dejansko izvozno povpraševanje ostaja petino nižje kot lani, pričakovano pa se krepi bolj od dejanskega, v menjalnih sektorjih pa bolj kot v storitvenih. Zmanjševanje primanjkljaja v blagovni menjavi se je oktobra nadaljevalo, medletna dinamika je bila tako po velikosti menjave kot po zmanjšanju primanjkljaja ugodnejša od povprečja desetih mesecev. Gospodarska klima se je v zadnjem mesecu popravila, a je bila njena rast zelo pičla. Zaupanje v industriji je višje, v neindustrijskih dejavnostih pa v glavnem nižje. Po oktobrski ustalitvi v storitvenih dejavnostih se je zaupanje novembra spet znižalo, še posebej v trgovini na drobno, ki jo tarejo premajhno povpraševanje, velika konkurenca in visoki stroški dela. Gospodarska klima v EU27 se je nekoliko popravila.
Industrijska produkcija se je v oktobru ponovno znižala; zaloge pri proizvajalcih so bile manjše kot v mesecu prej in precej manjše kot oktobra 2008. Med neindustrijskimi dejavnostmi je bila oktobra aktivnost nekoliko višja le v gradbeništvo in pomorskem prevozu blaga. Število turističnih prenočitev se je tudi v jesenskih mesecih rahlo manjšalo. Javni cestni in zračni promet sta bila za desetino manjša, pomorski prevoz pa za devetino večji kot lani. Kriza na avtomobilskem trgu se je spet zaostrila; oktobra je bilo registriranih skoraj za petino manj novih cestnih motornih vozil kot lani. Število delovno aktivnih se je septembra sicer povečalo, a jih je bilo kar 3.6 odstotka manj kot leto prej; najbolj se je zmanjšalo število zaposlenih pri samozaposlenih, nekoliko manj v družbah, povečalo pa se je število samozaposlenih. Novembru je bilo registriranih več kot 95000 iskalcev zaposlitve, kar je za 50 odstotkov več kot leto prej, novih delovnih mest je bilo za četrtino manj. Močno se je zvišala tudi anketna stopnja brezposelnosti.
Novembrsko opazno povečanje cen ni bilo le sezonsko. Koncentrirano je bilo na blago, cene storitev so se celo znižale; indeks so navzgor pognale predvsem kontrolirane cene. Tudi povečanje harmoniziranega indeksa cen (ki omogoča primerjavo z indeksom v evro območju) je bilo precejšnje; Slovenija je imela med gospodarstvi evro območja drugo najvišjo medletno inflacijo. Cenovna pričakovanja pri blagu so se že prej dvignila nad, pri storitvah pa ostajajo precej pod dolgoletnim povprečjem. Proizvajalčeve cene so ostale nespremenjene, rast pričakovanih cen se je novembra zaustavila. Cene surovin na svetovnem trgu se vztrajno vzpenjajo. Stroški dela v Sloveniji se umirjajo, v tretjem četrtletju celo pod rast v evro območju. Nizka medletna povečanja plač se delno posledica zniževanja števila delovnih ur.
Dinamika javnofinančnih prihodkov kaže poslabšanje, posebno posrednih davkov Likvidnostna suša se nadaljuje; skupni krediti so nespremenjeni, krediti podjetjem so padli, krediti prebivalstvu so se povečali, depoziti obeh pa so se zmanjšali. Razmerje med krediti in depoziti ostaja nespremenjeno. Osnovna obrestna mera ECB se tudi v novembru ni spremenila, obresti na trgu denarja se še naprej počasi znižujejo; obresti za kredite in depozite stagnirajo. Potrošniški krediti v Sloveniji ostajajo cenejši kot v evro območju, ostali krediti pa dražji; za depozite, posebej dolgoročnejše, ponujajo banke v Sloveniji več kot banke v evro območju. Saldo tekočega računa tudi po desetih mesecih ostaja pozitiven. Neto obveznosti so se oktobra povečale, v desetih mesecih pa zmanjšale. Priliv prek naložb v vrednostne papirje se je močno povečal, odliv prek računa ostalih naložb (odplačevanje dolgov) je presegel 4 milijarde evrov.
31
UNCERTAIN ENTRY INTO 2010
Velimir Bole, Jože Mencinger Franjo Štiblar Robert Volčjak
Macroeconomic aggregates at the end of2009 move in different directions which increases uncertainty. Expected demand considerably surpasses realized demand. Improvement of domestic expenditures is fading. The chances for a turn around are the worst in construction. Actual foreign demand remains twenty percent lower than a year ago while expectedforeign demand grows much faster; expectation in tradable sectors are better than in non-tradable. The decline of trade account deficit continued in October, yearly dynamics of foreign trade and balance in October was better than in the ten months average. Business climate improved modestly; the confidence in manufacturing strengthened while the confidence in most non-industrial sectors weakened, particularly in retail trade concerned with too low demand, too high competition and too high labor costs. Business climate in EU27 improved slightly.
In October, industrial production decreased again; the inventories of finished goods dropped slightly and they were considerably lower than a year ago. Among non-industrial sectors activity was slightly higher in construction and maritime transportation. The number of tourist overnights was falling slowly also in autumn. Road and air transportation were ten percent lower than a year ago, while maritime transport twelve percent higher. The crisis on
32
the car market aggravated again; twenty percent less road vehicles were sold in 0ctober2009 than in October 2008. The number of active population increased in September but it was for 3.6 percent lower than a year ago. A reduction ofjobs was the greatest for those working with small entrepreneurs but considerable also in large companies. The number of small entrepreneurs however increased. In November, there were more than 95000 registered job seekers, 50 percent more than a year ago, while there were 25 percent less vacancies. Harmonized unemployment rate increased considerably.
Increase of prices in November was not only seasonal. It was concentrated in goods, prices of services decreased. The price index was pushed up mainly by increases of controlled prices. The growth of harmonized price index (which enables comparison within Euro area) was considerable; Slovenia had the second highest inflation in the euro area. Price expectation for commodities increased beyond long term average, while price expectation for services remained bellow long term average. Producers prices stayed unaltered in October and expected prices ceased to increase. World commodity prices grow persistently. Labor costs calmed; their growth in the third quarter even lagged behind growth in the euro area. Low yearly increases of wages are partly due to the reduction of working hours.
The dynamics of public revenues worsened, particularly the revenues of indirect taxes. Liquidity dryness continued. Total credits remained unaltered with credits to businesses decreasing and credits to households increasing slightly. The deposits of both sectors decreased and the loan/deposit ratio stagnated. The interest rate of ECB did not change, the interest rates on the money market are slowly decreasing, the interest rate on the retail market for credits and deposits are stagnating. Consumers' credits in Slovenia are cheaper than in the Euro area while other credits are more expensive. The banks in Slovenia offer higher interest rates for deposits, particularly long term, than the bank in the Euro area. Current account balance in October remained positive. Net liabilities increased in October while they lowered in the last tem months. The inflow of capital through portfolio investments increased, the outflow through other investments (debt repayments) decreased by 4 billion €.
AGREGATNO POVPRAŠEVANJE IN PRIČAKOVANJA
1. Pričakovano povpraševanje še naprej opazno prehiteva dejansko realiziranega
Mesečni podatki o realiziranem končnem povpraševanju so do septembra, o pričakovanem pa do novembra. Domače končno povpraševanje je septembra poraslo za 4.4%. Vendar povečanje ni doseglo niti sezonskega, saj se je zmanjšala tako medletna stopnja rasti kakor tudi stopnja rasti impulznega trenda .
Septembra se je povpraševanje povečalo pri prebivalstvu in investicijah, padlo pa je tekoče 33 trošenje za blago in storitve države. Istočasno se je trendna dinamika (rast impulznega trenda) zmanjšala pri državi in pri investicijah (pri obeh je postala negativna). Le pri prebivalstvu je bila trenda rast malo višja od 0 (in večja kot avgusta).
Izboljševanje domačega končnega trošenja (če ga ocenjujemo s pričakovanji trgovine na drobno in storitvenih dejavnosti) zadnja dva meseca (oktobra in novembra) pojema. Pri trgovini na drobno namreč pričakovano povpraševanje narašča počasneje (novembra je presežek anketiranih, ki so pričakovali rast povpraševanja v nadaljnjih treh mesecih, dosegel 15% vseh), v storitvenih dejavnostih pa pričakovano povpraševanje stagnira (presežek anketiranih, ki v naslednjih treh mesecih pričakuje padec povpraševanja je na ravni 5% vseh anketiranih).
Število transakcij z rabljenimi stanovanji
Vir: SURS; lastni izračuni
Možnosti za povečanje povpraševanja so še naprej najslabše v gradbeništvu, čeprav se je tudi tam padanje konec tretjega četrtletja zaustavilo. Novembra je bilo v gradbeništvu
v povprečju za približno tri in pol mesece zagotovljenega dela. Tudi na trgu rabljenih stanovanj se je hitro krčenje obsega realiziranih transakcij zaustavilo v drugem četrtletju in dodatno poraslo še v tretjem četrtletju, tako v Ljubljani (na katero odpade slaba četrtina vseh transakcij) kot v ostalem delu Slovenije.
34
Izvozno povpraševanje je septembra močno poraslo, tudi trendno, vendar je bilo nominalno za približno 20% nižje kot v istem obdobju 2008. Izvozna naročila še naprej naraščajo, vendar presežek anketiranih podjetij v predelovalni dejavnosti s krčenjem izvoznih naročil še vedno dosega 40% vseh.
Pričakovano izvozno povpraševanje se še naprej krepi bistveno bolj od dejanske rasti naročil, novembra je presežek anketiranih, ki pričakuje rast izvoznega povpraševanja v naslednjih treh mesecih, zaostajal za dolgoletnim povprečjem za manj kot 5 odstotnih točk.
V menjalnih sektorjih se (celotno) pričakovano povpraševanje krepi opazno hitreje kot v storitvenih. Pričakovano skupno povpraševanje pri predelovalni dejavnosti je novembra, na primer, že doseglo dolgoletno povprečje, medtem ko je v storitvenih sektorjih še močno zaostajalo. Tudi pričakovano povpraševanje v gradbeništvu se je do novembra sicer precej popravilo, vendar je novembra stagniralo na nizki ravni; presežek anketiranih, ki je v naslednjih treh mesecih pričakoval zmanjšanje naročil, je še naprej 10%, torej je bil še vedno znatno (približno 35 odstotnih točk) pod dolgoletno intenzivnostjo pričakovanega povpraševanja.
2. Zmanjševanje primanjkljaja v blagovni menjavi se v oktobru nadaljuje
Medletna dinamika blagovne menjave je oktobra ugodnejša od povprečja desetih mesecev tako po velikosti izvoza in uvoza kot po zmanjšanju primanjkljajev.
Skupni slovenski izvoz je bil oktobra 1492 milijonov € (18.0% manj kot oktobra 2008), uvoz 1528 milijonov € (28.7% manj kot oktobra lani), kar pomeni primanjkljaj 35 milijonov € oziroma 97.7% pokritje uvoza z izvozom. V menjavi z EU je bil izvoz 1045 milijonov € (padec za 15.6% glede na oktober 2008), uvoz 1232 milijonov € (26.0% manj), kar da primanjkljaj 187 milijonov €. V menjavi z nečlanicami EU pa je bil oktobra izvoz 447 milijonov € (23.1% manj kot enak mesec lani), uvoz 295 milijonov € (38.1% manj), kar pomeni presežek 152 milijonov € oziroma 151.3% pokritje uvoza z izvozom.
V desetih mesecih 2009 je bil skupni izvoz 13373 milijonov € (21.8% manj kot v enakem obdobju lani), uvoz 13986 milijonov € (29.3% manj), kar pomeni primanjkljaj 613 milijonov € oziroma 95.6% pokritje izvoza z uvozom. V menjavi z EU je bil izvoz v desetih mesecih 9364 milijonov € (20.9% manj kot v enakem obdobju lani), uvoz 10954 milijonov € (29.2% manj), kar pomeni primanjkljaj 1590 milijonov € ali 85.5% pokritje uvoza z izvozom. V
menjavi z nečlanicami EU je bil izvoz v tem obdobju 4009 milijonov € (23.8% manj kot v desetih mesecih 2008), uvoz 3032 milijonov € (29.6% manj), kar da presežek 977 milijonov € oziroma 132.2% pokritje uvoza z izvozom.
3. Zaupanje v industriji višje, v neindustrijskih dejavnostih pa v glavnem nižje
V splošnem se je gospodarska klima v zadnjem mesecu popravila, a je bila njena rast zelo pičla. Po anketi Statističnega urada Republike Slovenije (SURS) se je kazalnik gospodarske klime v novembru zvišal za odstotno točko glede na oktober, od novembra lani pa je višji za 3 odstotne točke, hkrati pa je njegova vrednost še za 22 odstotnih točk nižja od dolgoletnega povprečja.
35
Vrednost kazalnika zaupanja v predelovalnih dejavnostih je bila v novembru za odstotno točko višja kot mesec prej, glede na november lani je bila za 17 odstotnih točk višja, glede na dolgoletno povprečje pa za 16 odstotnih točk nižja. Pričakovanja za naslednje tri mesece so večinoma ugodna, razen pričakovanih cen. Glede na oktober se je najbolj, za devet točk, zvišala vrednost kazalnika pričakovani izvoz.
Naročila
Po oktobrski ustalitvi zaupanja v storitvenih dejavnostih, se je to nekoliko znižalo, saj je bila vrednost kazalnika zaupanja v teh sektorjih v novembru glede na oktober nižja za odstotno točko, hkrati pa za 35 odstotnih točk nižja od dolgoletnega povprečja. V primerjavi z novembrom lani pa je bila njegova vrednost nižja za 13 odstotnih točk.
Zaupanje pa se v zadnjem mesecu krepi v gradbeništvu, saj je bila vrednost kazalnika zaupanja v tem sektorju v novembru v primerjavi s preteklim mesecem višja za 7 odstotnih
36
točk, v primerjavi z lanskim novembrom pa je bila še naprej nižja za 30 odstotnih točk, hkrati pa za 45 odstotnih točk nižja od dolgoletnega povprečja. Pričakovanja za naslednje tri mesece so večinoma ugodna. Glede na pretekli mesec se je v novembru najbolj zvišala vrednost kazalnika obseg gradbenih del, tehnične zmogljivosti glede na pričakovano povpraševanje pa so po mnenju vprašanih več kot zadostne, medtem pa se je tudi tu najbolj zvišala vrednost kazalnika pričakovane cene.
Vrednost kazalnika zaupanja v trgovini na drobno se je v novembru glede na mesec prej znižala za 1 odstotno točko, glede na november lani pa je bil kazalnik nižji za 17 odstotnih točk. V novembru je bil delež tistih podjetij v sektorju, ki pravijo, da je povpraševanje nizko, 40%, kar 45% podjetij je kot omejitveni dejavnik navedlo konkurenco v panogi, za 37% podjetij v trgovini na drobno pa so omejitev pomenili visoki stroški dela.
Gospodarska klima v celotni EU27 se je nekoliko popravila. Po podatkih Eurostata so se v novembru naročila v predelovalni dejavnosti glede na mesec poprej zvišala za 1,2 odstotne točke, glede na november lani pa so nižja za dobrih 9 odstotnih točk. Glede na oktober so se v novembru za 2,2 odstotni točki zvišala naročila v gradbeništvu, medtem ko so se pričakovanja v trgovini na drobno izboljšala za 6,7 odstotne točke, hkrati pa so tudi dobrih 22 točk višja kot novembra lani. Splošni poslovni optimizem je v novembru 2009 v celotni sedemindvajseterici nekoliko padel in sicer za slabo odstotno točko, v primerjavi z lanskim novembrom pa je le-ta višji za dobrih 10 odstotnih točk.
GOSPODARSKA AKTIVNOST IN ZAPOSLENOST
4. Ponovno nižja industrijska produkcija
Industrijska produkcija se je v oktobru ponovno znižala. Po podatkih SURS-a je bila v desetem mesecu letos za dobre 3 odstotke nižja kot mesec prej, hkrati pa za dobrih 18% manjša kot v enakem mesecu lanskega leta, produkcija v prvih desetih mesecih letošnjega leta pa je bila skoraj za dobrih 16% nižja kot v enakem obdobju lanskega leta. Impulzni trend kaže, da se je v oktobru industrijska produkcija zviševala in sicer po stopnji 1,4% letno. Zaloge industrijskih produktov pri proizvajalcih so bile v oktobru 2009 za slab odstotek manjše kot v mesecu prej, v primerjavi z lanskim oktobrom pa za slabih 7% manjše.
Dejavnost rudarstva se je v oktobru znižala za o,4% glede na september, v primerjavi z oktobrom 2008 pa se je rudarstvo prav tako zmanjšalo in sicer za skoraj 5%. V prvih desetih mesecih letošnjega leta je bila dejavnost rudarstva za dober odstotek višja kot v enakem obdobju lanskega leta.
Krizne razmere v predelovalnih dejavnostih so se ponovno nekoliko okrepile, saj se je njihova aktivnost glede na mesec poprej v oktobru letos znižala za skoraj 4%, glede na
oktober 2008 pa so se predelovalne dejavnosti skrčile za skoraj petino. Prav tako se je dejavnost v predelovalni industriji zmanjšala prvih desetih mesecih letošnjega leta glede na enako obdobje lani in sicer za dobrih 17%.
V oktobru se je aktivnost sektorja oskrba z elektriko, plinom in vodo kot edina izmed industrijskih panog glede na predhodni mesec povečala za dobre 3%, glede na lanski oktober pa je bila produkcija tega sektorja manjša za skoraj 6%.
Podatki Eurostata kažejo, da se je v oktobru glede na september industrijska produkcija v EU27 znižala za 0,7%, na območju evra pa za 0,6%. Glede na oktober lani pa se je v letošnjem oktobru industrijska produkcija v EU27 zmanjšala za dobrih 10%, na območju evra pa za dobrih 11%. Med državami članicami, za katere so dostopni podatki, je industrijska produkcija v oktobru glede na mesec poprej padla v devetih in sicer največ v Sloveniji (-3,2%), na Irskem (-2,8%) in v Nemčiji (-1,8%).
37
5. Nekoliko višja le gradbeništvo in pomorski prevoz blaga
Kriza v gradbeništvu je nekoliko popustila. Po podatkih SURS-a je bila vrednost gradbenih del, opravljenih oktobra, za slabe 4% višja od vrednosti gradbenih del, opravljenih v septembru, v primerjavi z oktobrom lani pa se je zmanjšala za več kot 28%.
Število turističnih prenočitev se tudi v jesenskih mesecih še rahlo manjša. Oktobra jih je bilo za 0,2% manj kot v enakem mesecu leta 2008, hkrati pa se je skupno število prenočitev v desetem mesecu letos zviševalo po mesečni stopnji 0,89%. Upad tujega turističnega povpraševanja se še nadaljuje, a z manjšo močjo, saj je v oktobru število turističnih prenočitev tujih gostov upadlo »le« za dobre tri odstotke glede na oktober 2008. Impulzni trend prenočitev tujih gostov v septembru pa kaže pozitivno rast po stopnji 0,68%. Število prenočitev domačih gostov se je v oktobru povečalo in sicer za dobre štiri odstotke glede na enak mesec v lanskem letu.
Podatki o transportu za oktober kažejo, da je bilo v javnem cestnem prevozu prepeljanih za okroglih 10% manj, v zračnem prevozu pa za dobrih 11% manj potnikov kot v oktobru lani, število opravljenih potniških kilometrov je bilo v javnem cestnem prevozu za slabih devet odstotkov manjše, v zračnem prevozu pa za 11,6%. V cestnem mestnem prevozu je bilo oktobra prepeljanih za dobro devetino manj potnikov kot v istem mesecu 2008. Potniški promet na letališčih se je v oktobru glede na oktober lani zmanjšal za slabih 12%. V pomorskem prevozu je bilo v oktobru prepeljanega za dobro devetino več blaga, opravljenih tonskih kilometrov pa je bilo za slabih 9% manjše kot oktobra lani. Kriza na avtomobilskem trgu se je ponovno zaostrila, saj je bilo v oktobru glede na enak mesec lani v register vpisanih za dobrih18% manj prvič registriranih cestnih motornih vozil, med njimi za dobrih 17% manj osebnih avtomobilov.
6. Brezposelnih za polovico več, prostih delovnih mest za četrtino manj kot pred letom
38
Po podatkih SURS-a se je število aktivnih prebivalcev v septembru 2009 zvišalo in sicer na 942131 oziroma za 0,1% glede mesec poprej, a se je glede na september 2008 znižalo za 0,3%. V septembru 2009 je bilo v Sloveniji 853765 delovno aktivnih prebivalcev. Glede na avgust 2009 se je število delovno aktivnih povečalo za 305 oseb, glede na september 2008 pa zmanjšalo za dobrih 31 tisoč oziroma 3,6%. Med zaposlenimi osebami jih je bilo dobrih 91 % zaposlenih pri pravnih osebah, njihovo število pa se je od septembra lani zmanjšalo za 3,8%. Število zaposlenih pri fizičnih osebah se je glede na september lani zmanjšalo za 9,1%. Med samozaposlenimi pa je bilo dobrih 55 % samostojnih podjetnikov posameznikov, katerih število se je v samem mesecu septembru povečalo za 382, od septembra lani pa za 7,7%. Število kmetov se je glede na september 2008 zmanjšalo za 3,6% in je v letošnjem septembru znašalo 32316.
Po podatkih ZRSZ je bilo v novembru v Sloveniji registriranih 95446 brezposelnih oseb, kar je za 855 oseb več kot v oktobru oziroma 50,5% več kot novembra lani leto. Anketna stopnja brezposelnosti je bila septembra 5,7%, oktobra pa se je po podatkih Eurostata zvišala na 6.2%. Po podatkih ZRSZ se je novembra letos na novo zaposlilo nekaj manj kot 4800 ljudi, kar je 48,6% več kot novembra lani. Na ZRSZ se je prijavilo 9,8 tisoč novih brezposelnih oseb, kar je 41,5% več kot v enakem mesecu lani. V letošnjem novembru so delodajalci prijavili slabih 12 tisoč prostih delovnih mest, za dobro četrtino manj kot v novembru 2008.
Iskalci zaposlitve
Po podatkih Eurostata je bila oktobra stopnja brezposelnosti na območju evra (EA16) 9,8%, kar je 1,9 odstotne točke več kot v oktobru 2008. V celotni evropski sedemindvajseterici (EU27) je bila stopnja brezposelnosti v oktobru letos 9,3% in se je glede na enak mesec
lani povečala za 1,9 odstotne točke. Po Eurostatovih ocenah je bilo v oktobru v EU27 22,5 milijona brezposelnih oseb, od tega 15,6 milijona na območju evra. Med posameznimi članicami EU so v oktobru 2009 najnižjo stopnjo brezposelnosti zabeležili na Nizozemskem (3,7%) in v Avstriji (4,7%), najvišjo pa v Španiji (19,3%) in Latviji (20,9%).
Stopnja brezposelnosti se še naprej povečuje tudi v ZDA, kjer je v oktobru 2009 znašala 10,2%, kar je za 0,4 odstotne točke več kot mesec poprej.
CENE IN PLACE	39
7. Kontrolirane cene pognale skupen indeks cen močno navzgor
Novembra so se cene opazno povečale, saj so porasle kar za 0.9%. Povečanje ni bilo le sezonsko, saj sta se precej povečala oba indikatorja bolj dolgoročne dinamike, rast impulznega trenda je poskočila celo na preko 3% letno.
Celotno povečanje življenjskih stroškov je bilo koncentrirano na blago, saj so se cene storitev celo znižale. Opazno so porasle predvsem cene v skupini stanovanja, obleke in obutve, zdravja in brezalkoholnih pijač in hrane. Cene stanovanj so porasle najbolj, k skoku sta levji delež prispevala dviga cen komunalnih storitev in energentov. K skupnemu povečanju cen za 0.9% so višje cene goriv prispevale 0.4 , komunalne storitve 0.3 in hrana 0.2 odstotne točke. Znižanja cen ni bilo v nobeni skupini razen pri gostinskih in nastanitvenih storitvah.
Povečanje harmoniziranega indeksa cen (ki omogoča primerjavo z indeksom v evro območju) je bilo 0.8%, medletno pa se je povečal na 1.8%. V evro območju so se tako merjene cene povečale za 0.1% in so bile za 0.5% višje kot pred letom. Slovenija je imela med gospodarstvi evro območja drugo najvišjo medletno inflacijo (prva je bila Irska).
Cenovna pričakovanja so se pri blagu (v trgovini na drobno) dvignila približno na dolgoletno povprečje že pred časom, medtem pa ko pri storitvah še naprej ostajajo precej pod dolgoletnim povprečjem, saj še vedno presežek anketiranih, ki pričakuje zmanjšanje cen v naslednjih treh mesecih, enak približno 10% vseh.
Cene rabljenih stanovanj so se v tretjem četrtletju v povprečju celotne Slovenije znižale za 0.8% in so bile za 11% nižje kot pred letom (v tretjem četrtletju 2008), ko so dosegle najvišjo raven. Dinamika cen rabljenih stanovanj v Ljubljani (tako kot pri naraščanju) prehiteva. V Ljubljani je namreč že prišlo do povečanja cen, raven cen pa je vseeno nižja (za slabih 12%) od najvišje dosežene ravni cen (v zadnjem četrtletju 2008).
Cene stanovanj
40
:4 09:1 09:2 09:3
: SURS: lastni izračuni Pripomba: Normalizirano na 2007/I (2007/I = 1)
Podatki o proizvajalčevih cenah so do oktobra., ko so proizvajalčeve cene ostale nespremenjene. Bolj dolgoročno pa se je dinamika proizvajalčevih cen malo popravila, saj se je medletna rast z -2.8% v septembru povečala na (sicer še vedno negativnih) -2.4% v oktobru. Proizvajalci, ki prodajajo na domačem trgu, so oktobra povečali cene za 0.2%, tudi bolj dolgoročna dinamika se je povečala (porasla je tako medletna stopnja rasti kot rast impulznega trenda). Po namenu porabe so oktobra porasle cene proizvajalcev surovin in blaga široke potrošnje, vendar je dolgoročnejša dinamika (medletna rast) še naprej najvišja pri proizvajalcih energentov.
Pričakovane cene industrijskih proizvajalcev so vse do oktobra naraščale, novembra se je naraščanje zaustavilo, tako da je presežek anketiranih, ki pričakujejo zmanjšanje cen v naslednjih treh mesecih, še naprej večji od 10%.
Cene surovin se vse bolj vztrajno vzpenjajo. V novembru se je skupni evrski indeks cen surovin povečal za 7.2% in je bil že za 28% višji kot pred letom dni. Tudi spremembe v strukturi cen surovin so v zadnjem času velike. Novembra se je nafta močno pocenila (v evrih za približno 9.6%), cene surovin hrane so porasle za 5.5%, cene zlata za 6.5%, cene kovin za 8%, neprehrambenih kmetijskih surovin pa celo za 12.4%. V letu dni so se najbolj povečale cene kovin (za 73%), najmanj pa cene surovin hrane (za 16%).
8. Še dodatno umirjanje stroškov dela
Povprečne bruto plače so septembra in oktobra naraščale (po 1.2% oziroma 1.7%), vendar se bolj dolgoročna rast ni povečala. Oktobra se je medletna stopnja rasti celo zmanjšala.
Še zlasti oktobra je bilo povečevanje plač prisotno v večini dejavnosti, zmanjšale so se le v gradbeništvu, prometu in ožji državi. Najbolj so poskočile v finančnih in zavarovalniških dejavnostih ter poslovanju z nepremičninami. To sta tudi dejavnosti, v katerih je tudi v bolj dolgoročnih-medletnih primerjavah rast povprečnih plač najvišja (plače so v obeh za preko 4% višje kot pred letom dni). Ker je začetni dvig plač (ki ga je povzročil nov plačni zakon) v državi v lanskem letu narejen v tretjem četrtletju lani, oktobra letos medletne stopnje rasti plač v državi (zaradi letošnje zaustavitve nadaljnjega povečevanja) ne štrlijo več nad stopnjami rasti povprečja plač celotnega gospodarstva - najvišja so medletna povečanja v kulturnih in rekreacijskih dejavnostih.
Stroški dela
41
12-,
10-
2008:1 2008:2 2008:3 2008:4 2009:1 2009:2 2009:3
Vir: Eurostat: lastni izračuni Pripomba: Medletne stopnje rasti
Nizka medletna povečanja plač so delno posledica zniževanja števila plačanih ur. Podatki o plačanih urah so do septembra, ko je bilo, na primer, število plačanih ur ponovno (tako kot avgusta in julija) nekaj nižje (za približno 2 ure) kot v 2008.
Dinamika stroškov dela se še naprej umirja. Po izredno velikem prehitevanju dinamike stroškov dela v evro območju v 2007 in 2008, ki ga je povzročilo pregrevanje gospodarstva, so se stroški dela v Sloveniji v letošnjem letu pospešeno umirjali, v tretjem četrtletju so se spustili celo pod rast v evro območju (v letu dni so porasli samo za 2.7%, v evro območju pa za 3.3%).
FINANČNA GIBANJA
9.	Poslabšanje dinamike javnofinančnih prihodkov?
Javnofinančni prihodki so se novembra zmanjšali za 3%. Bolj dolgoročna dinamika prihodkov se je tudi zmanjšala; impulzni trend je z visokih številk, ki jih je dosegal po maju, novembra padel na rast samo 2.5% letno (medletna stopnja se je sicer povečala, vendar je bilo povečanje posledica premika timinga vplačil v 2008, torej prenizke osnove primerjave).
42
Neposredni davki in ostali prihodki so se novembra povečali za približno 1% (12 milijonov), vendar je bila tudi pri njih bolj dolgoročna dinamika (merjena z impulznim trendom in medletno stopnjo rasti) nižja kot oktobra. Od pomembnih neposrednih davčnih oblik so se novembra nekaj več povečali le prihodki od dohodnine (za 6 milijonov), vsi ostali pa so ostali ali nespremenjeni ali pa so se zmanjšali (od davka na dobiček podjetij se je v javnofinančno blagajno, na primer, nateklo za 5.5 milijonov manj kot oktobra). Tudi izdatnost prispevkov je bila novembra praktično enaka kot oktobra. Tako so glavnino povečanja prinesli, sicer marginalni, prihodki drugih prejemnikov.
Domači davki na blago in storitve so se novembra precej zmanjšali (za 50 milijonov) vendar je zaradi premika timinga vplačil v lanskem novembru medletna stopnja rasti (navidezno) porasla. Zmanjšanje domačih davkov na blago in storitve je posledica manjšega donosa tako davka na dodano vrednost kot trošarin. Ker je donos od davka na dodano vrednost na uvoženo blago celo malo porasel, je lahko krčenje skupnega donosa od davka na dodano vrednost (za 47 milijonov) posledica premika vplačil. Za dokončno oceno bo potrebno počakati še na decembrski podatek. Tudi trošarine so se novembra opazno zmanjšale (za 12 milijonov, torej 8.7%).
10.	Likvidnostna suša se še nadaljuje
Skupni krediti nefinančnim sektorjem so se oktobra neznatno (za 0.03%, 6 milijonov) zmanjšali. Pri tem so krediti podjetjem padli za 70 milijonov (0.3%), krediti prebivalstvu pa so za približno enak znesek porasli. Bolj dolgoročna dinamika (medletna rast) je ostal pozitivna, čeprav je pri podjetjih padla že samo na 1%. Krediti podjetjem dejansko že vse od februarja praktično stagnirajo-
Povečevanje težav z likvidnostjo še bolj kot piškava dinamika kreditov ilustrira dinamika depozitov, saj so se oktobra depoziti zmanjšali tako pri prebivalstvu kot pri podjetjih, skupno so padli za 30 milijonov evrov (0.2%). Neto finančna pozicija se torej po stabilizaciji sredi leta ne premakne nikamor.
Osnovna obrestna mera refinanciranja ECB se tudi v novembru ni spremenila. Obresti na trgu denarja pa se še naprej počasi znižujejo; 1 letni euribor je od septembra do novembra padel z 1.26 na 1.23, trimesečni euribor pa z 0.77 na 0.72.
Neto finančna pozicija
Vir: Bilten Banke Slovenije; lastni izračuni Pripomba: Razmerje kreditov in depozitov nefinančnih sektorjev
Obresti na detajlističnem trgu v Sloveniji so oktobra stagnirale oziroma so se zelo malo spremenile. Pri depozitih so rahlo padle obrestne mere z ročnostmi do enega leta, pri kreditih pa so se rahlo zmanjšale obrestne mere za potrošniške kredite in večje (preko 1 milijona evrov) kredite podjetjem; pri manjših kreditih podjetjem (do enega milijona evrov) so se obrestne mere rahlo povečale.
44
Potrošniški krediti so v Sloveniji še naprej cenejši kot v evro območju, vsi ostali krediti pa dražji. V Sloveniji so namreč, v primerjavi z evro območjem, posojilne obrestne mere podjetjem za približno 2.5-3 točke višje, stanovanjski krediti so za približno 0.7 točke dražji, potrošniški krediti pa približno za 2.5 točke cenejši. Za depozite ponujajo banke v Sloveniji v primerjavi s povprečjem evro območja za dolgoročnejše depozite (prek 1. leta) za približno 1.2 točke več, za kratkoročne pa le 0.3 točke več.
11. Tudi po desetih mesecih še pozitiven saldo na tekočem računu
Kljub temu, da je v drugi polovici ekonomska menjava s tujino začela oživljati, plačilnobilančni tekoči saldo ostaja pozitiven. V oktobru je presežek znašal 2.9 milijona €, v desetih mesecih pa 13.8 milijonov €. V primerjavi z istim obdobjem 2008 je saldo ugodnejši kar za 1802.8 milijonov €.
Plačilna bilanca
		januar -	oktober	oktober	
		2008	2009	2008	2009
I.	Tekoči račun	-1.789,0	13,8	-235,9	2,9
1	Blago	-2.173,8	-286,4	-266,3	1,9
2	Storitve	1.444,2	1.072,5	1491	99,8
3	Dohodki	-886.1	-564,2	-83,2	-491
4	Tekoči transferi	-173,3	-2081	-35,6	-49,8
II.	Kapitalski in finančni račun	1.677,5	-561	-129,9	90,9
A.	Kapitalski račun	-9,2	32,2	3,9	0,3
B.	Finančni račun	1.686,6	-88,3	-133,8	90,6
1	Neposredne naložbe	60,6	-564,0	-39,7	-34,0
2	Naložbe v vrednostne papirje	-295,3	4.332,6	386,6	-15,2
3	Finančni derivativi	41,9	6,6	2,0	0,4
4	Ostale naložbe	1.846,5	-4.018,2	-515,8	131,8
5	Mednarodne denarne rezerve	32,9	154,8	331	7,6
III.	Neto napake in izpustitve	111,5	42,4	365,8	-93.8
Saldo blagovne bilance (uvoz FOB) je znašal v oktobru 1.9 milijonov €, v desetih mesecih pa -286.4 milijonov €. V storitveni menjavi je bil oktobrski presežek 899.8 milijonov €, desetmesečni pa 1072.5 milijonov €. Pri dohodkih faktorjev je bi saldo oktobra -49.1 milijonov €, v desetih mesecih pa -564.2 milijonov €. Neto odliv tekočih transferov je bil oktobra 49.8 milijonov €, v desetih mesecih pa 208.1 milijonov €.
Kapitalski in finančni račun v oktobru kaže na neto povečanje obveznosti za 90.9 milijonov €, v desetih mesecih pa je zmanjšanje obveznosti (povečanje terjatev) 56.1 milijonov €. Pri tem je odliv neposrednih tujih investicij 34.0 oziroma 564.0 milijonov €, naložbe v vrednostne papirje so se oktobra zmanjšale za 15.2 milijonov €, v desetih mesecih skupaj pa povečale za 4332.6 milijonov €. Pri ostalih naložbah je bil oktobrski neto priliv 131.8 milijonov €, v desetih mesecih skupaj pa je bil odliv (odplačevanje) kar 4018.2 milijonov €). Mednarodne rezerve pri Banki Slovenije so oktobra porasle za 7.6 milijonov €, v desetih mesecih pa za 154.8 milijonov €. Statistična napaka je bila oktobra -93.8 milijonov €, v desetih mesecih skupaj pa 42.4 milijonov €.
45
PRIMERJAVA REFERENČNIH STROŠKOV ELEKTRIČNE ENERGIJE RAZLIČNIH TEHNOLOGIJ OBNOVLJIVIH VIROV ENERGIJE
46 Alenka Kavkler, Mejra Festić in Sebastijan Repina
»Uredba o podporah električni energiji, proizvedeni iz obnovljivih virov energije« opredeljuje finančno pomoč, ki si jo lahko pridobijo posamezne naprave obnovljivih virov energije ter način izračuna referenčnih stroškov električne energije, kar je osnova za določanje višine podpor. V članku povzemamo metodologijo za določanje referenčnih stroškov, ki so jo razvili na Centru za energetsko učinkovitost Inštituta Jožef Stefan, ter predstavljamo izračun referenčnih stroškov za različne tehnologije obnovljivih virov energije. Po višini referenčnih stroškov izstopajo sončne elektrarne, medtem ko so najugodnejše velike hidroelektrarne in vetrne elektrarne. Analiza občutljivosti kaže, da so referenčni stroški električne energije občutljivi na višino investicije, medtem ko višina obrestne mere kredita ne predstavlja pomembnejšega ekonomskega tveganja.
Ključne besede: obnovljivi viri energije, referenčni stroški električne energije, analiza občutljivosti.
A COMPARISON OF THE REFERENCE COST OF GENERATING ELECTRICITY FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
47
»Uredba o podporah električni energiji, proizvedeni iz obnovljivih virov energije« (The regulation of subventions for electricity which is generated by renewable energy sources) encompasses financial aid that can be obtained by renewable energy power plants, and the calculation of reference costs for generating electricity - a criterion for the amount of the subvention. The paper gives a short overview of the methodology for determining the reference costs, as developed by the "Center za energetsko učinkovitost Inštituta Jožef Stefan" (Centre for Energy Efficiency at the Jožef Stefan Institute), and presents the reference cost calculations for different types of renewable energy plants. Solar plants have the highest reference costs, while large hydroelectric plants and wind power plants are the most cost efficient. A sensitivity analysis shows that the reference cost is sensitive with respect to investment costs, whereas the loan interest rate has only a minor influence on the reference cost.
Key words: renewable energy sources, reference cost of generating electricity, sensitivity analysis.
1. Uvod
48
Glede na ekonomičnost in prispevek posameznih tehnologij obnovljivih virov energije (OVE) k narodnogospodarskim makro kazalnikom je bilo treba oblikovati tudi ustrezen sistem stimuliranja države k OVE investicijam v energetiki. Glavni kriterij davčnih spodbud in olajšav za investicije OVE predstavlja lastna cena električne energije posameznih OVE tehnologij. Finančna pomoč električni energiji iz naprav OVE je opredeljena v »Uredbi o podporah električni energiji, proizvedeni iz obnovljivih virov energije«, ki je bila objavljena v Uradnem listu RS št. 37/09. Uredba med drugim določa tudi (glej 1. člen):
•	vrste proizvodnih naprav OVE, ki lahko prejemajo podpore;
•	razvrstitev proizvodnih naprav OVE v velikostne razrede;
•	podrobnejšo opredelitev podpor;
•	način določanja referenčnih stroškov proizvodnje električne energije iz OVE;
•	način določanja višine podpor ter pogoje za pridobitev podpore.
Podpore lahko prejemajo proizvodne naprave OVE, ki izkoriščajo naslednje obnovljive vire energije (3. člen): (i) energetski potencial vodotokov; (ii) vetrno energijo, ki se izkorišča v proizvodnih napravah na kopnem; (iii) sončno energijo, ki se izkorišča v proizvodnih napravah s fotovoltaiko; (iv) geotermalno energijo; (v) energijo, pridobljeno iz biomase; (vi) energijo, pridobljeno iz bioplina, ki izvira iz biomase ter biološko razgradljivih odpadkov; (vii) energijo, pridobljeno iz odlagališčnega plina; (viii) energijo, pridobljeno iz plina, ki izvira iz blata čistilnih naprav odpadnih voda; (ix) energijo, pridobljeno iz biološko razgradljivih odpadkov. Velikostni razredi proizvodnih naprav OVE, kot so določeni z »Uredbo o podporah električni energiji, proizvedeni iz obnovljivih virov energije«, so v Tabeli 1.
Tabela 1:
Velikostni razredi naprav OVE
Velikostni razredi proizv. naprav OVE		Nazivna moč naprave
1.	Mikro	manj kot 50kW
2.	Male	manj kot 1.000 kW
3.	Srednje	od 1 do 10 MW
4.	Velike	nad 10 do vključno 125 MW
Vir: »Metodologija določanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije proizvedene iz obnovljivih virov energije«, IJS, str. 9, tabela 1.
Podpore so definirane kot finančna pomoč proizvodnji električne energije, ki jo lahko pridobi posamezna naprava OVE, če so stroški proizvodnje električne energije višji od cene, ki jo je zanjo mogoče doseči na trgu. Peti člen »Uredbe o podporah električni energiji, proizvedeni iz obnovljivih virov energije« opredeljuje dve vrsti podpore za proizvodne naprave OVE:
1.	zagotovljeni odkup električne energije;
Center za podpore odkupi vso neto proizvedeno električno energijo po zagotovljenih cenah električne energije, ki so določeni s to uredbo.
2.	finančno pomoč za tekoče poslovanje;
Ta podpora se dodeli neto proizvedeni električni energiji, če so stroški proizvodnje energije višji od cene, ki jo je za to energijo mogoče doseči na trgu.
Ker so izhodišče za določanje podpore za proizvodne naprave OVE referenčni stroški proizvedene električne energije (RSEE), v nadaljevanju članka podajamo kratek opis metodologije RSEE ter predstavljamo izračune RSEE za različne tehnologije OVE. Prikazana je tudi analiza občutljivosti glede na višino investicije ter obrestno mero kredita.
2. Kratek opis uporabljene metodologije
Referenčne stroške električne energije smo izračunali v skladu z napotki iz gradiva »Metodologija določanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije proizvedene iz obnovljivih virov energije«, ki ga je pripravil Center za energetsko učinkovitost Instituta Jožef Stefan. Tveganje investicije smo ocenili s pomočjo analize občutljivosti.
a. Referenčni stroški električne energije
V gradivu »Metodologija določanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije proizvedene iz obnovljivih virov energije« so referenčni stroški električne energije (RSEE) definirani na str. 7 kot:
RSEE predstavljajo celotne letne stroške delovanja tipične proizvodne naprave OVE, zmanjšane za vse prihodke in koristi delovanja (prodaja toplote, idr.) in so izraženi v €/MWhel, po naslednji enačbi:
RSEE = (STROŠKI - PRIHODKI) / ELEKTRIČNA ENERGIJA
Oznake:
STROŠKI = letni investicijski (anuiteta) + obratovalni stroški (€) + stroški goriva (€) PRIHODKI = prodaja toplote (€) + druge koristi (€) ELEKTRIČNA EN. = letna proizvedena električna energija (MWh)
= Instalirana moč (MWel) * letne obratovalne ure (h)
Metoda določanja RSEE temelji na anuitetni metodi vrednotenja investicijskih stroškov, ki upošteva tudi stroške kapitala oz. zahtevan donos na vloženi kapital.
Pri proizvodnih enotah OVE, ki temeljijo na so-proizvodnji toplotne in električne energije (SPTE) ter tistih, ki uporabljajo goriva, na izračun RSEE vplivata tudi naslednja parametra (»Metodologija določanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije proizvedene iz
50
obnovljivih virov energije«, str. 10):
1.	električni izkoristek (IzkEl),
t.j. razmerje med nazivno električno močjo proizvodne naprave SPTE in vhodno močjo goriva;
2.	toplotni izkoristek (IzkT),
t.j. razmerje med nazivno izhodno toplotno močjo (koristna toplota) proizvodne naprave SPTE in vhodno močjo goriva.
Porabo goriva ter proizvodnjo koristne toplote torej lahko izračunamo po naslednjih enačbah (str. 10):
Poraba goriva (MWh) = Nazivna električna moč (MWEl) / IzkEl * Obratovalne ure (h) Koristna toplota (MWh) = Nazivna električna moč (MWEl)* IzkT / IzkEl * Obratovalne ure (h) = Proizvedena električna energija (MWh) * IzkT / IzkEl
b. Analiza občutljivosti
Natančnih neto denarnih tokov investicije ne poznamo, ker so izpostavljeni številnim tveganjem; lahko jih le ocenimo. S pomočjo analize občutljivosti ugotavljamo, kako spremembe določenih spremenljivk vplivajo na višino denarnih tokov ter posledično na kazalnike uspešnosti investicije. Vsakokrat variiramo le eno od spremenljivk ob predpostavki, da ostanejo vrednosti vseh ostalih spremenljivk nespremenjene. Pomembno je izbrati kritične spremenljivke, katerih spremembe najbolj vplivajo na referenčne stroške električne energije (Brigham in Houston, 2001).
3. Predpostavke in podatki
Predpostavke so povzete po gradivu »Metodologija določanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije proizvedene iz obnovljivih virov energije«:
•	Amortizacijska doba: 15 let.
Podatek ustreza povprečni amortizacijski dobi proizvodnih naprav OVE glede na trenutno prakso.
•	Delež lastnih sredstev: 40 % investicije.
•	Kredit: 60 % investicije.
•	Zahtevani donos na lastna vložena sredstva: 20 %.
Zahtevani donos na lastna vložena sredstva v Sloveniji je sorazmerno visok zaradi možnosti selitve proizvodnje v druge države.
•	Stroški kredita: 6,5 %.
Osnova za izračun stroškov kredita je EURIBOR za leto 2008 (4,7%) ter pribitek v višini 1,8%.
•	Diskontna stopnja: 12%.
Diskontna stopnja je definirana kot tehtano povprečje stroškov kapitala (WACC). Za sončne elektrarne je bila (skladno s smernicami iz tujine) uporabljena nižja (8%) diskontna stopnja, ker gre za najdražjo tehnologijo.
•	Letni strošek zaposlitve: 25.000 EUR/zaposlenega.
•	Osnovna cena lesne biomase v letu 2009: 23 EUR/MWh.
•	Povprečna cena mešanice substratov za bioplinarne za leto 2009: 14,98 EUR/MWh.
•	Vrednost koristne toplote za vse velikosti proizvodnih naprav OVE za leto 2009: 26,74 EUR/MWh.
Tabele z osnovnimi podatki za različne tipe elektrarn so vzete iz gradiva »Metodologija določanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije proizvedene iz obnovljivih virov energije«. Za sežigalnice odpadkov žal ni na voljo nobenih podatkov. Uporabili smo podatke o moči elektrarne (MW), številu letnih obratovalnih ur, višini investicije (EUR/ kW), stroških vzdrževanja, obratovanja in zavarovanja (kot % investicije) ter o stroških dela (št. zaposlenih), ki so v Tabelah 2 do 7.
51
Tabela 2:
Osnovni podatki za hidroelektrarne
Velikostni razred	Velikost	Obratov. ure	Specif. investicija	Vzdrževanje	Obratovanje	Zavarov. idr	Delo
	Mwe	h/leto	€/kWel	% inv.	% inv.	% inv.	št. oseb
do 50 kW	0,05	4.000	2.300	0,9%	0,6%	1,5%	0,03%
do 1 MW	1	3.500	1.700	1,5%	0,6%	1,7%	0,4%
do 10 MW	5	3.500	1.500	1,5%	0,6%	1,8%	1,8%
do 125 MW	30	3.500	1.400	1,5%	0,6%	1,8%	9%
Vir: »Metodologija določanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije proizvedene iz obnovljivih virov energije«, IJS, str. 20, tabela 5.
Tabela 3:
Osnovni podatki za vetrne elektrarne
Velikostni razred	Velikost	Obratov. ure	Specif. investicija	Vzdrževanje	Obratovanje	Zavarov. Idr	Delo
	Mwe	h/leto	€/kWel	% inv.	% inv.	% inv.	št. oseb
do 50 kW do 1 MW do 10 MW	5	2100	1.200	0,3%	0,2%	1,3%	0,5
do 125 MW	50	2100	1100	0,3%	0,2%	1,3%	5
Vir: »Metodologija določanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije proizvedene iz obnovljivih virov energije«, IJS, str. 21, tabela 6.
Tabela 4:
Osnovni podatki za sončne elektrarne (kot samostojni objekti)
Velikostni razred	Velikost	Obratov. ure	Specif. investicija	Vzdrževanje	Obratovanje	Zavarov. idr	Delo
	Mwe	h/leto	€/kWel	% inv.	% inv.	% inv.	št. oseb
do 50 kW	0,05	1.050	3.620	0,1%	0,05%	0,4%	0,015
do 1 MW	0,5	1.050	3.330	0,1%	0,05%	0,4%	015
do 10 MW	2	1.050	2.685	01%	0,04%	0,4%	0,5
do 125 MW	10	1.050	2.455	01%	0,04%	0,4%	4
Vir: »Metodologija določanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije proizvedene iz obnovljivih virov energije«, IJS, 52	str. 24, tabela 8.
Tabela 5:
Osnovni podatki za geotermalne elektrarne
Velikostni razred	Velikost	Obratov. ure	Specif. investicija	Vzdrževanje	Obratovanje	Zavarov. idr	Delo
	Mwe	h/leto	€/kWel	% inv.	% inv.	% inv.	št. oseb
do 50 kW do 1 MW do 10 MW	5	6.000	4.600	2,0%	0,7%	1,2%	12
do 125 MW	(D						
(1) Individualna obravnava proizvodnih naprav.
Vir: »Metodologija določanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije proizvedene iz obnovljivih virov energije«, IJS, str. 25, tabela 10.
Tabela 6:
Osnovni podatki za proizvodne naprave na lesno biomaso z več kot 90% deležem energije goriva
Velikostni razred	Velikost	Obratov. ure	Specif. investicija	Vzdrževanje	Obratovanje	Zavarov. idr	Delo
	Mwe	h/leto	€/kWel	% inv.	% inv.	% inv.	št. oseb
do 50 kW do 1 MW	0,5	5.500	4.500	2,0%	0,8%	1,2%	1
do 10 MW do 125 MW	2	5.500	3.200	2,0%	0,8%	1,2%	3
Vir: »Metodologija določanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije proizvedene iz obnovljivih virov energije«, IJS, str. 28, tabela 11.
Električni izkoristek male proizvodne naprave na biomaso z več kot 90% deležem energije goriva je 12%, srednje pa 17% ob zahtevanem 70% skupnem izkoristku obratovanja.
Tabela 7:
Osnovni podatki za biopliname na bioplin proizveden iz biomase
Velikostni razred	Velikost	Obratov. ure	Specif. investicija	Vzdrževanje	Obratovanje	Zavarov. idr	Delo
	Mwe	h/leto	€/kWel	% inv.	% inv.	% inv.	št. oseb
do 50 kW	0,05	6.800	4.000	2,0%	0,8%	1,2%	012
do 1 MW	0,5	6.800	3.800	2,0%	0,8%	1,2%	1
do 10 MW	2	6.800	3.300	2,0%	0,8%	1,2%	3
do 125 MW	(D						
(1) RSEE niso določeni.
Vir: »Metodologija določanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije proizvedene iz obnovljivih virov energije«, IJS,	53
str. 31, tabela 13.
Za bioplinarne je privzet električni izkoristek 34%.
4. Rezultati
a. Referenčni stroški električne energije
Referenčne stroške električne energije (RSEE) za 5 tipov elektrarn smo izračunali po metodologiji, ki jo je razvil Center za energetsko učinkovitost Instituta Jožef Stefan. Pripravili smo izračun za velike ter male hidroelektrarne ločeno, za ostale tipe naprav OVE pa smo izbrali največjo moč, za katero so na voljo potrebni podatki. Za sežigalnice odpadkov podatkov žal nismo uspeli dobiti. Rezultati, ki so podani v Tabeli 8, se ujemajo z RSEE iz »Uredbe o podporah električni energiji, proizvedeni iz obnovljivih virov« (UL RS, št. 37/09) ter iz »Metodologije določanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije proizvedene iz obnovljivih virov energije«.
Tabela 8:
Referenčni stroški električne energije za različne tipe naprav OVE
Tip elektrarne	Moč (MW)	Specif. invest. (EUR/kW)	RSEE (EUR/MWh)
Hidroelektrarna (mala)	1	1.700	9216
Hidroelektrarna (velika)	30	1.400	76,57
Vetrna	50	1100	86,74
Sončna	10	2.455	269,22
Geotermalna	5	4.600	152,47
Biomasa	2	3.200	167,43
Bioplin	2	3.300	140,77
Kot smo že omenili, po višini referenčnih stroškov električne energije izstopajo sončne elektrarne. Najugodnejše so velike hidroelektrarne ter vetrne elektrarne. Rezultate smo prikazali tudi grafično na Sliki 1.
Slika 1:
Grafični prikaz referenčnih stroškov električne energije
REFERENČNI STROŠKI ELEKTRIČNE ENERGIJE
54
✓ ^ J? S * J'
/Z
iRSEE(EUR/MWh)
b. Analiza občutljivosti
Glede na razpoložljive podatke je bilo smiselno narediti predvsem analizo občutljivosti na višino investicije ter na obrestno mero kredita. Pri investicijskih stroških smo upoštevali 20 % in 10 % znižanje ter 10 % in 20 % povišanje. Obrestno mero kredita pa smo variirali kot 4,5 %, 5,5 %, 7,5 % in 8,5 %. Rezultati so podani v Tabelah 9 do 15. Investicije so seveda bolj občutljive na spremembo višine investicijskega vložka.
Tabela 9:
Rezultati analize občutljivosti RSEE za male hidroelektrarne
VIŠINA INVESTICIJE					
	-20%	-10%		+ 10%	+20%
RSEE (EUR/MWh)	78,19	85,17	9216	9914	10613
OBRESTNA MERA KREDITA					
	4,5%	5,5%		7,5%	8,5%
RSEE (EUR/MWh)	88,30	90,20	9216	9418	96,26
Tabela 10:
Rezultati analize občutljivosti RSEE za velike hidroelektrarne
VIŠINA INVESTICIJE					
	-20%	-10%		+ 10%	+20%
RSEE (EUR/MWh)	65,06	70,82	76,57	82,32	88,07
OBRESTNA MERA KREDITA					
	4,5%	5,5%		7,5%	8,5%
RSEE (EUR/MWh)	73,39	74,95	76,57	78,23	79,94
Tabela 11:
Rezultati analize občutljivosti RSEE za vetrne elektrarne
55
VIŠINA INVESTICIJE					
	-20%	-10%		+ 10%	+20%
RSEE (EUR/MWh)	71,67	79,21	86,74	94,27	101,8
OBRESTNA MERA KREDITA					
	4,5%	5,5%		7,5%	8,5%
RSEE (EUR/MWh)	82,58	84,62	86,74	88,92	9116
Tabela 12:
Rezultati analize občutljivosti RSEE za sončne elektrarne
VIŠINA INVESTICIJE					
	-20%	-10%		+ 10%	+20%
RSEE (EUR/MWh)	219,93	244,58	269,22	293,87	318,51
OBRESTNA MERA KREDITA					
	4,5%	5,5%		7,5%	8,5%
RSEE (EUR/MWh)	264,29	266,76	269,22	271,69	27415
Tabela 13:
Rezultati analize občutljivosti RSEE za geotermalne elektrarne
VIŠINA INVESTICIJE					
	-20%	-10%		+ 10%	+20%
RSEE (EUR/MWh)	130,41	141,44	152,47	163,49	174,52
OBRESTNA MERA KREDITA					
	4,5%	5,5%		7,5%	8,5%
RSEE (EUR/MWh)	146,38	149,37	152,47	155,66	158,94
Tabela 14:
Rezultati analize občutljivosti RSEE za proizvodne naprave na lesno biomaso z več kot 90% deležem energije goriva
VIŠINA INVESTICIJE					
	-20%	-10%		+ 10%	+20%
RSEE (EUR/MWh)	150,69	159,06	167,43	175,79	18416
OBRESTNA MERA KREDITA					
	4,5%	5,5%		7,5%	8,5%
RSEE (EUR/MWh)	162,81	165,08	167,43	169,85	172,34
Tabela 15:
Rezultati analize občutljivosti RSEE za bioplinarne na bioplin proizveden iz biomase
VIŠINA INVESTICIJE					
	-20%	-10%		+ 10%	+20%
RSEE (EUR/MWh)	126,81	133,79	140,77	147,75	154,72
OBRESTNA MERA KREDITA					
	4,5%	5,5%		7,5%	8,5%
RSEE (EUR/MWh)	136,91	138,81	140,77	142,79	144,86
Rezultate analize občutljivosti referenčnih stroškov električne energije za male hidroelektrarne smo tudi grafično prikazali na sliki 2. V modri barvi so prikazani rezultati spremenjene višine investicije, v rdeči barvi pa spremembe obrestne mere. Za ostale tipe naprav OVE vodi primerjava med analizama občutljivosti na spremembi obeh opazovanih vhodnih parametrov do podobnih zaključkov.
Slika 2:
Grafični prikaz analize občutljivosti za male hidroelektrarne
Obrestna mera kredita
Višina investicije
Referenčni stroški so bolj občutljivi na spremembo višine investicije kot na obrestno mero kredita, kar je razvidno iz bolj strmega naklona modre daljice. Presečna točka obeh daljic predstavlja izhodiščno vrednost referenčnih stroškov električne energije za male hidroelektrarne (92,16 EUR), dosežene ob osnovnih predpostavkah glede višine investicije in obrestne mere kredita, ki znašata 1.700 EUR/kW (Tabela 8) in 6,5 %.
Sprememba obrestne mere kredita očitno ne predstavlja pomembnejšega ekonomskega tveganja, saj povišanje efektivne obrestne mere za 1 odstotno točko vodi do zvišanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije od približno 1,5 evra za velike hidroelektrarne do približno 3 evrov za geotermalne hidroelektrarne. Če se investicijski vložek poveča za 10 %, se referenčni stroški električne energije povišajo za od 5 % do 9 %. 5 % dvig lahko opazimo pri bioplinarnah in proizvodnih napravah na lesno biomaso, 9 % dvig RSEE pa je dosežen pri sončnih elektrarnah. Rezultat je seveda odvisen od tega, kolikšen del stroškov predstavljajo investicijski stroški. Pri primerjavi spremembe RSEE je treba upoštevati tudi, da je za bioplinarne in proizvodne naprave na lesno biomaso potrebno plačevati za gorivo, kar pa za ostalih 5 tipov naprav OVE ne velja.
57
5. Zaključek
V	skladu s predlogom direktive Evropskega parlamenta naj bi Slovenija do leta 2020 dosegla 20 % delež energije OVE v celotni porabi energije. Rezultati naše analize kažejo, da so referenčni stroški električne energije OVE visoki ter za večino tehnologij celo višji od tržne cene elektrike. Zato bo v naslednjih letih zelo pomembno vlogo odigrala energetska politika, ki bo morala poskrbeti za zniževanje stroškov kapitala ob vzpostavljanju tržnih pogojev in stimulacijskih shem, ki ustrezajo tehnično pogojeni učinkovitosti in življenjski dobi OVE energetskih objektov.
V	Sloveniji je trenutno v pripravi »Akcijski načrt za doseganje ciljnih deležev končne porabe električne energije iz obnovljivih virov do leta 2020«, ki bo predstavljal osnovo za sprejem nacionalnega akcijskega načrta Slovenije. Cilj nacionalnega akcijskega načrta je v letu 2020 proizvesti dodatnih 3.000 GWh električne energije OVE glede na sedanji obseg. »Akcijski načrt za doseganje ciljnih deležev končne porabe električne energije iz obnovljivih virov do leta 2020« predlaga več različnih možnosti oz. scenarijev za dosego tega cilja.
Literatura
A. Berk, I. Lončarski, P. Zajc: Poslovne finance, Ljubljana: Ekonomska fakulteta, 2004. E. Brigham, J.F. Houston: Fundamentals of financial management, Harcourt College Publishers: Orlando, 2001.
Institut Jozef Stefan, Center za energetsko učinkovitost: Metodologija določanja referenčnih stroškov električne energije proizvedene iz obnovljivih virov energije, Ljubljana: IJS, 2009.
Inštitut za raziskave v energetiki, ekologiji in tehnologiji (IREET): Akcijski načrt za doseganje ciljnih deležev končne porabe električne energije iz obnovljivih virov do leta 2020, Povzetek treh faznih poročil. Ljubljana: IREET, 2009.
Uredba o podporah električni energiji, proizvedeni iz obnovljivih virov, UL RS, št. 37/09.
58
Domače končno trošenje za blago in tržne storitve												
	Prebivalstvo			Investicije v osn. sredstva			Širša država			Skupno		
Leto	mio. €	letni porast	mesečna rast	mio. €	letni porast	mesečna rast	mio. €	letni porast	mesečna rast	mio. €	letni porast	mesečna rast
9009	19966	9.5	0.69	5318	6.3	0.33	1749	8.3	-0.19	19398	8.5	0.51
9003	13358	8.9	0.68	5954	19.0	0.98	1883	8.1	0.45	91196	9.7	0.74
9004	14196	6.3	0.56	6783	13.9	1.11	1793	-4.8	0.19	99774	74	0.68
9005	14967	5.4	0.41	7910	6.3	0.60	1910	6.5	0.57	94088	5.8	0.48
9006	15955	6.6	0.45	7959	10.4	1.37	9073	8.5	0.50	95988	79	0.74
9007	17905	78	0.73	9631	91.0	0.99	9919	6.7	1.16	99048	11.8	0.87
9008	19943	8.8	0.00	10405	9.78	0.87	9596	14.18	1.35	39174	9.50	0.87
9008/4	1663	13.18	1.49	889	90.91	1.86	185	19.16	-9.37	9736	15.98	1.17
5	1719	19.05	1.30	936	11.39	1.99	199	17.66	9.31	9847	19.90	1.34
6	1688	10.85	0.99	915	10.19	-0.98	905	99.76	9.06	9809	11.83	0.14
II	5063	19.01		9740	13.88		589	99.11		8399	13.98	
7	1690	8.01	0.34	993	9.90	-0.18	904	19.86	1.77	9816	9.18	0.35
8	1483	4.19	-0.80	863	4.90	-0.11	186	1.94	-0.10	9531	3.97	-0.43
9	1710	9.76	0.79	1004	13.51	-0.94	196	19.50	9.09	9911	11.64	0.59
III	4883	7.41		9790	9.07		586	13.15		8959	8.36	
10	1719	9.43	-0.08	968	5.64	-0.59	908	10.75	0.44	9888	4.05	-0.13
11	1581	5.89	-0.31	787	-9.81	-3.31	941	13.89	1.00	9609	3.79	-1.09
19	1614	4.99	-1.18	669	-9.96	-6.95	378	17.59	3.80	9661	1.84	-9.38
IV	4907	4.09		9494	-1.89		897	14.71		8158	3.91	
9009/1	1398	0.95	-0.98	561	-94.60	-5.96	179	11.96	-3.93	9139	-707	-9.14
9	1389	-5.68	-0.40	674	-91.91	-3.88	180	6.66	-0.53	9935	-10.18	-1.53
3	1618	9.33	-0.87	760	-15.79	-3.36	197	-1.47	0.05	9575	-4.05	-1.58
I	4398	-0.97		1995	-90.96		549	4.99		6949	-7.09	
4	1589	-5.50	-0.76	664	-9787	-3.37	913	15.35	-0.47	9460	-11.53	-1.54
5	1576	-6.87	-1.50	711	-96.93	-3.17	903	1.77	-0.31	9490	-13.08	-1.97
6	1618	-1.56	-0.47	733	-99.54	-9.94	904	-0.84	0.40	9554	-8.61	-1.93
II	4776	-4.67		9108	-95.77		619	5.19		7503	-11.09	
7	1640	-3.49	0.04	716	-94.44	-1.85	908	1.78	0.57	9563	-10.08	-0.53
8	1493	-1.79	-0.48	689	-99.87	-0.16	913	14.50	0.93	9387	-7.78	-0.34
9	1580	-7.53	0.03	730	-99.93	-0.86	184	-6.33	-0.44	9493	-15.07	-0.43
III	4719	-4.34		9197	-95.68		604	3.09		7443	-11.19	
Izvoz											
	Izvoz Slovenije*			Izvoz Slovenije izven EU97**		lzvozEU97**		Izvozne cene Slovenija* *		Izvozne cene EU97**	
Leto	mil. €	letni porast	mesečna rast	mil. €	medletna stopnja	mil. €	medletna stopnja	indeks	medletna stopnja	indeks	medleta stopnja
9009	10943	5.9	0.76	3439.4	13.9	891899	0.8	109.9	-0.7	100.3	-1.1
9003	11985	3.1	0.34	3590.5	4.4	869936	-9.5	101.9	-0.3	96.4	-3.9
9004	19783	13.3	1.45	4976.0	19.1	959995	9.6	109.0	0.1	96.9	-0.9
9005	14914	11.9	0.83	4997.4	15.9	1053198	10.5	104.5	9.4	99.6	3.5
9006	16760	179	1.35	5848.1	18.7	1159833	10.1	106.4	1.8	103.4	3.8
9007	19387	15.7	0.85	6740.1	15.3	1937951	6.7	105.7	9.1	104.9	1.5
9008	19794	1.74	-0.68	7407	9.90	1308960	5.4	109.3	3.4	108.0	9.9
9008/7	1776	4.47	0.40	716	19.84	191965	19.9	111.1	4.71	108.8	9.84
8	1391	-8.90	-0.71	559	9.96	99999	-1.7	110.8	4.14	108.4	3.14
9	1864	11.48	0.53	710	18.61	114841	11.7	109.6	9.91	109.4	4.09
III	4961	3.19		1978	14.19	336035	75	110.5	3.99	108.9	3.35
10	1808	0.11	-0.31	683	7.63	119973	9.8	109.1	9.63	108.9	3.69
11	1498	-13.99	-3.93	565	-750	100917	-10.7	110.8	5.99	109.5	3.79
12	1189	-14.58	-5.01	505	-5.43	99934	0.1	110.4	4.35	108.5	9.84
IV	4495	-8.97		1753	-1.48	318794	-9.7	110.1	4.06	109.0	3.49
9009/1	1190	-96.99	-5.63	368	-91.90	75468	-95.1	108.0	0.19	106.8	0.19
2	1985	-93.56	-3.91	459	-94.49	85505	-91.6	109.9	9.93	108.4	1.03
3	1394	-18.79	-4.69	590	-90.99	93386	-19.0	107.9	0.37	107.5	0.56
I	3869	-93.09		1340	-99.00	954359	-19.5	108.6	0.93	107.6	0.59
4	1999	-99.44	-9.54	499	-98.67	88090	-94.0	106.7	-1.75	106.3	0.09
5	1390	-91.56	-9.53	469	-93.64	84919	-90.7	108.6	-0.91	106.6	0.00
B	1405	-18.70	-0.99	484	-95.87	99895	-18.6	108.7	0.37	106.7	-1.48
II	4017	-93.37		1445	-96.18	965835	-91.1	108.0	-0.77	106.5	-0.47
7	1388	-91.87	0.66	593	-96.89	101316	-16.9	106.4	-4.93	107.4	-1.99
8	1055	-90.14	-0.97	498	-99.51	79545	-19.8	106.6	-3.79	107.0	-1.99
9	1483	-90.43	3.04	504	-99.09	93106	-18.9	106.4	-9.99	107.4	
III	3996	-90.87		1455	-96.43	973967	-18.5	106.5	-3.65	107.3	
10	1499	-17.46	9.55								
A pod at ki SURS. ** podatki Eurostat
Uvoz											
	Uvoz Slovenije*			Uvoz Slovenije izven EU97**		UvozEU97**		Uvozne cene Slovenija* *		Uvozne cene EU97**	
Leto	mil. €	letni porast	mesečna rast	mil. €	medletna stopnja	mil. €	medletna stopnja	indeks	medletna stopnja	indeks	medletna stopnja
9009	11548	1.9	0.40	9601.9	1.0	936979	-4.3	97.0	-5.0	96.1	-3.4
9003	19938	6.0	0.51	9874.5	10.5	935946	-0.9	94.8	-9.3	91.6	-4.7
9004	14143	15.6	1.60	9569.6	- 10.9	1097536	9.9	97.5	9.9	93.8	9.5
9005	15489	9.5	1.09	3368.1	31.4	1179850	14.8	1079	9.9	109.3	9.0
9006	18313	18.3	1.99	4978.7	970	1351896	14.6	115.7	8.0	111.0	8.5
9007	91936	16.0	0.87	6050.0	41.4	1499911	5.9	190.9	3.9	111.7	0.6
9008	99648	6.65	-0.05	7940.0	19.7	1550976	8.19	198.0	6.8	191.8	8.7
9008/7	9047	13.09	0.99	687	41.04	144106	17.96	130.3	760	198.5	13.19
8	1638	4.87	-0.08	549	19.03	196474	7.61	130.5	9.66	1976	13.59
9	9086	9.69	-0.16	639	8.35	138951	15.71	131.8	759	196.9	11.41
III	5771	9.40		1861	91.97	408830	13.60	130.9	8.97	1977	19.68
10	9104	4.68	-0.90	684	17.80	136851	4.90	134.8	10.95	193.6	8.61
11	1714	-11.33	-5.17	577	7.51	194167	-3.97	133.1	9.64	191.4	4.66
19	1517	-11.08	-5.66	516	6.43	110990	-5.68	196.0	3.36	115.9	-1.45
IV	5335	-5.56		1778	10.91	371938	-1.66	131.3	7.98	190.1	3.89
9009/1	1955	-30.89	-6.59	459	-99.15	103797	-90.94	119.8	-9.60	108.7	-7.79
9	1336	-97.71	-5.79	469	-14.86	96584	-91.04	119.4	-9.85	110.9	-6.61
3	1489	-99.95	-6.03	599	-13.36	103003	-1746	193.4	-1.59	110.1	-756
I	4080	-96.87		1449	-16.78	303314	-19.83	190.9	-9.39	109.7	-730
4	1359	-39.90	-3.97	480	-18.16	96737	-96.09	118.5	-4.74	108.8	-780
5	1349	-33.19	-4.83	499	-30.08	99411	-97.79	116.9	-7.99	109.9	-9.15
B	1376	-99.89	-3.03	417	-37.55	97458	-96.88	190.9	-5.95	110.5	-11.53
II	4070	-31.75		1397	-99.00	986605	-96.87	118.5	-5.98	109.5	-9.53
7	1495	-30.37	-0.47	434	-36.81	100456	-30.99	1170	-10.91	110.3	-14.16
8	1919	-95.57	1.05	397	-96.78	91519	-97.64	115.8	-11.96	1079	-15.44
9	1505	-97.84	9.13	498	-91.11	104979	-94.57	116.5	-11.61	108.6	-14.49
III	4150	-98.09		1399	-98.56	996955	-97.54	116.4	-11.03	108.9	-14.67
10	1598	-97.40	9.47								
A pod at ki SURS. ** podatki Eurostat
Naročila, pričakovanja in poslovni optimizem v EU										
	Poslovna klima		Naročila, predelovalna		Naročila, gradbeništvo		Trgovina na drobno		Poslovni optimizem	
	EU 13		dejavnost EU97		EU97		pričakovanja EU97		EU97	
Leto	ocena	medletna	ocena	medletna	indeks	medletna	ocena	medletna	EU 97	Slovenija
	stanja	sprememba	stanja	sprememba	naročil	sprememba	stanja	sprememba		
9009	-0.61	-0.34	-95.48	-6.99	-99.71	-7.09	-0.45	-3.81	-10.4	-3.7
9003	-0.51	0.1	-96.41	-0.93	-93.08	-0.37	3.98	3.73	-10.9	-4.5
9004	0.95	0.76	-15.48	6.89	-18.85	4.93	5.36	0.96	-4	9
9005	-0.06	-0.31	-18.34	-9.86	-13.7	5.15	9.44	-9.99	-7.9	-1
9006	1.05	1.11	-9.7	15.64	-6.64	7.06	19.01	9.57	1.6	9.8
9007	1.99	0.94	9.96	5.66	-8.07	-1.43	14.11	9.1	3.7	11.6
9008	-0.38	-1.67	-15.51	-18.47	-1794	-9.17	-3.58	-1769	-10.09	-4.98
9008/7	-0.9	-1.5	-11.4	-15.9	-91.8	-17.9	-8.7	-91.7	-8.9	-11.7
8	-0.3	-1.7	-13.7	-17.8	-94.3	-17.7	-11.5	-98.4	-9.8	-14.9
9	-0.8	-1.9	-91.6	-93.7	-99.7	-18.9	-6.8	-17.5	-19.7	-16.6
III	-0.43	-1.7	-15.57	-18.9	-99.93	-18.17	-9	-99.53	-10.5	-14.9
10	-1.3	-9.9	-99.9	-99.0	-31.7	-93.5	-19.8	-96.4	-91.7	-99.0
11	-1.9	-9.9	-37.9	-38.6	-36.9	-98.1	-19.5	-33.4	-99.9	-99.5
19	-9.9	-3.8	-46.4	-46.3	-49.7	-99.7	-30.1	-37.5	-36.9	-35.1
IV	-9.0	-9.9	-378	-38.0	-37.1	-97.0	-90.8	-39.4	-99.0	-98.8
9009/1	-9.8	-3.6	-51.5	-48.8	-43.4	-98.7	-30.6	-34.6	-34.8	-36.9
9	-3.3	-4.0	-58.8	-55.7	-47.6	-30.4	-94.7	-39.0	-35.7	-37.4
3	-3.4	-4.9	-60.8	-59.7	-45.5	-97.1	-91.4	-33.9	-36.5	-38.7
I	-3.9	-3.9	-57.0	-54.7	-45.5	-98.7	-95.6	-35.8	-35.7	-37.5
4	-3.9	-3.6	-57.3	-51.1	-47.3	-98.0	-16.3	-91.9	-39.0	-31.0
5	-3.1	-3.7	-57.5	-51.8	-48.9	-31.9	-11.6	-19.0	-99.3	-97.9
6	-9.9	-3.0	-57.9	-50.1	-45.1	-94.3	-13.1	-15.8	-98.9	-93.4
II	-3.1	-3.4	-57.3	-51.0	-47.1	-97.8	-13.7	-18.9	-99.8	-979
7	-9.7	-9.5	-55.9	-43.8	-41.8	-90.0	-15.9	-6.5	-96.4	-175
8	-9.9	-1.9	-50.4	-36.7	-49.6	-18.3	-9.9	9.3	-90.6	-10.8
9	-9.1	-1.3	-49.4	-97.8	-49.4	-19.7	-6.9	0.6	-19.0	-6.3
III	-9.3	-1.9	-51.7	-36.1	-49.3	-19.3	-10.9	-1.9	-99.0	-11.5
10	-1.8	-0.5	-47.6	-17.7	-47.0	-15.3	-3.9	8.9	-18.4	3.3
11	-1.6	0.3	-46.4	-9.9	-44.8	-7.9	9.8	99.3	-19.1	10.1
Naročila, pričakovanja in poslovni optimizem v Sloveniji
	Gospodarska klima		Naročila, predelovalna dejavnost		Naročila, gradbeništvo		Trgovina na drobno pričakovanja		Poslovni optimizem	
Leto	ocena	medletna	ocena	medletna	indeks	medletna	ocena	medletna	ocena	medletna
	stanja	sprememba	stanja	sprememba	naročil	sprememba	stanja	sprememba	stanja	sprememba
9009	0.3	6.4	-90.1	-0.3	-99.9	-	99.9	-1.4	-3.7	-0.7
9003	9.5	9.9	-94.1	-4.0	-19.0	10.9	97.6	-9.3	-4.5	-0.8
9004	5.8	3.3	-19.7	11.4	-3.0	9.0	30.9	9.6	9.0	6.5
9005	9.6	-3.9	-14.8	-9.1	-15.1	-19.1	35.0	4.8	-1.0	-3.0
9006	10.3	7.7	4.5	19.3	-6.4	8.7	36.1	1.1	9.8	10.8
9007	13.4	3.1	8.3	3.8	13.0	19.4	40.9	4.8	11.6	1.8
9008	9.9	-11.9	-19.3	-976	-6.5	-19.5	30.5	-10.4	-4.3	-15.9
9008/7	5	-10	-13	-93	11	-8	35.3	-9.7	-3.7	-13.0
8	7	-9	-16	-94	7	-16	976	-13.4	-0.7	-13.7
9	6	-7	-91	-98	3	-16	39.0	-91	-9.0	-15.0
III	6.0	-8.7	-16.7	-95.0	7	-13.3	34.0	-19.4	-9.1	-13.9
10	-3	-13	-31	-38	-9	-18	37.0	-7	-16.7	-94.4
11	-19	-96	-49	-57	-19	-39	13.1	-99.9	-33.0	-36.7
19	-96	-34	-63	-66	-36	-53	-4.4	-40.4	-38.7	-49.7
IV	-16.0	-94.3	-47.7	-53.7	-19.0	-34.3	15.9	-95.8	-99.5	-34.6
9009/1	-99	-38	-68	-59	-48	-47	-39.0	-69.0	-36.7	-45.7
9	-98	-38	-73	-69	-69	-47	-14.3	-55.3	-31.7	-41.7
3	-31	-49	-75	-75	-69	-53	4.9	-37.1	-30.6	-40.3
I	-99.3	-39.3	-79.0	-65.3	-59.7	-49.0	-16.1	-53.8	-33.0	-49.6
4	-31	-43	-74	-69	-67	-61	0.3	-33.6	-98.0	-38.7
5	-94	-33	-79	-68	-67	-63	-6.1	-44.8	-94.5	-30.8
6	-99	-97	-68	-59	-66	-66	-91.0	-53.8	-94.5	-99.9
II	-95.7	-34.4	-71.3	-65.3	-66.7	-63.3	-8.9	-44.1	-95.7	-30.5
7	-99	-97	-63	-50	-54	-65	-6.5	-41.8	-96.5	-99.8
8	-18	-95	-58	-49	-63	-70	90.3	-73	-16.6	-15.9
9	-11	-17	-55	-34	-61	-64	13.5	-95.5	-8.5	-6.5
III	-170	-93.0	-58.7	-49.0	-59.3	-66.3	9.1	-94.9	-17.9	-15.1
10	-16	-13	-41	-10	-60	-58	17.7	-19.3	-14.0	9.7
11	-16	3	-47	9	-58	-39	17.7	4.6	-15.8	17.9
CD CJ
Industrijska produkcija												
	Skupno			Rudarstvo			Predelovalna industrija			Oskrba (el„ plin, voda)		
Leto	indeks	letni porast	mesečna rast	indeks	letni porast	mesečna rast	indeks	letni porast	mesečna rast	indeks	letni porast	mesečna rast
9009	105.4	9.4	0.17	99.9	7.7	0.79	104.8	9	0.11	115.3	5.4	0.76
9003	106.9	1.4	0.07	104.9	5.8	0.49	106.5	1.6	0.07	111.3	-3.5	-0.38
9004	119.8	5.5	0.50	97.6	-7	-0.89	111.6	4.7	0.49	139.9	19.4	1.39
9005	116.5	3.3	0.94	104.9	6.7	0.86	115.6	3.7	0.94	130.9	-1.5	-0.09
9006	193.7	6.1	0.59	115.0	10.5	0.59	193.9	6.5	0.53	199.6	-0.9	0.06
9007	131.3	6.9	0.56	119.9	3.6	0.69	139.4	7.5	0.65	115.9	-11.1	-0.96
9008	199.1	-1.7	-0.06	117.3	-1.6	-0.39	130.9	-1.7	-0.03	116.9	0.9	0.00
9008/11	137	3.3	-	193.6	-5.9		139.1	3.6		110.7	6.3	
7	139.6	-9.9	-0.71	105.0	13.5	-9.19	134.7	-9.5	-0.54	113.8	-1	0.95
8	108.9	-7.1	-1.19	89.6	-39.9	-6.15	110	-6.1	-1.91	103.9	-6.6	0.99
9	149.4	5.5	0.11	119.0	4.1	-3.1	145.4	6	0.07	110	0.9	0.43
III	198.0	-1.0	-	99.9	-6.9		130.1	-0.6		109.9	-9.9	
10	143.7	-9.8	0.4	198.7	-3.1	-1.78	145.7	-9.9	0.43	116.4	0.0	-0.99
11	199.9	-13.9	-3.38	191.0	-16.9	-4.05	191.9	-14.8	-3.47	199.1	3.7	-1.95
19	100.1	-14.3	-4.93	119.8	15.3	3.10	973	-16.7	-4.6	199.4	6.6	-9.98
IV	199.0	-10.0		190.8	-3.6		191.6	-11.0		199.6	3.5	
9009/1	99.5	-90.0	-5.18	109.9	-8.5	1.19	97.0	-91.9	-5.57	194.7	-5.7	-1.61
9	109.9	-91.3	-3.71	1175	-5.0	3.61	100.4	-93.9	-4.15	115.5	-9.0	-0.07
3	113.6	-15.4	-3.46	194.6	-10.4	1.33	113.0	-16.4	-3.80	119.6	-3.9	-0.78
I	105.1	-18.8	-	114.8	-8.0	-	103.5	-90.4	-	117.6	-3.7	-
4	99.9	-98.3	-3.37	109.0	-99.1	-1.04	98.8	-99.8	-3.71	109.9	-10.0	-0.66
5	104.8	-91.9	-9.90	109.7	-7.0	-9.96	104.5	-99.7	-3.09	98.8	-5.7	-0.59
B	109.6	-91.0	-1.19	108.9	-4.0	-0.69	110.4	-91.9	-1.95	99.8	-11.8	-0.50
II	104.8	-93.5	-	109.0	-11.8	-	104.6	-94.8	-	100.5	-9.9	-
7	106.0	-90.1	-0.59	106.3	1.9	3.06	106.6	-90.9	-0.31	97.8	-14.1	-9.10
8	90.5	-16.9	-0.01	93.4	13.1	-9.41	89.7	-18.5	0.10	95.6	-8.0	-1.46
9	119.5	-16.1	9.55	115.0	9.7	1.61	191.5	-16.4	3.93	96.3	-19.5	-1.54
III	105.3	-17.7	-	104.9	5.0	-	105.9	-18.6	-	96.6	-11.6	-
10	117.3	-18.4	1.44	199.8	-4.6	-0.93	1173	-19.5	1.66	109.5	-5.9	-0.99
Gradbeništvo in turizem
	Gradbeništvo			Nočitve domačih c		ostov	Nočitve tujih gostov			Skupaj nočitve		
Leto	tisoč ur	letni porast	mesečna rast	v 1000	letni porast	mesečna rast	v 1000	letni porast	mesečna rast	v 1000	letni porast	mesečna rast
9009	30175	-4.5	0.06	3301	-0.5	-0.08	4091	5.5	0.53	7391	9.7	0.94
9003	99653	-9.1	0.06	3305	0.1	0.09	4177	3.9	0.96	7489	9.9	0.90
9004	30509	9.9	0.99	3997	-9.4	-0.99	4364	4.5	0.33	7590	1.4	0.06
9005	33143	8.6	0.99	3171	-1.7	-0.08	4400	0.8	0.07	7579	-0.9	0.00
9006	35599	7.9	0.79	3931	1.9	0.09	4486	9	0.94	7717	1.9	0.18
9007	39383	10.9	0.80	3394	4.9	0.46	4867	8.4	0.74	8961	6.9	0.69
9008	43591	10.7	0.86	3543	4.4	0.39	4809	-1.9	-0.08	8359	1.1	0.11
9008/11	11931	8.5		899	4.6		1195	-1.4		9017	1.0	
7	4181	14.9	1.98	508	1.1	-1.08	769	5.3	0.96	1970	3.6	0.18
8	3868	6.9	-0.05	533	8.9	0.65	834	-0.9	-0.98	1367	3.9	0.11
9	4139	19.3	1.93	971	3.9	-1.38	480	-6.8	-1.83	751	-3.9	-1.65
lil	19181	13.4		1319	4.7		9076	0		3388	1.8	
10	3853	10.4	1.54	949	6.1	0.81	319	-73	-9.55	561	-1.9	-1.17
11	3768	9.8	-0.91	911	3.9	-0.01	910	-11.8	-1.90	491	-4.5	-0.58
19	3487	13.5	0.77	948	11.9	9.79	944	6.6	1.44	499	8.8	9.19
IV	11108	8.6		701	7.9		773	-4.7		1474	0.6	
9009/1	9658	9.9	-0.65	908	5.1	0.91	989	-9.1	-0.86	490	0.8	-0.19
9	9979	-0.5	-0.41	983	-9.1	-1.37	166	-14.0	-4.89	449	-6.8	-9.57
3	3648	5.0	-0.67	934	5.9	-9.14	999	-91.8	-3.19	456	-9.7	-9.50
I	9985	9.4	-	795	9.4	-	670	-19.4	-	1395	-5.3	-
4	3609	0.9	0.34	930	1.8	1.19	993	0.0	-9.60	593	0.8	-1.06
5	3573	-5.8	-9.16	937	-10.9	-1.53	350	-90.8	-1.09	587	-16.9	-1.49
B	3859	0.6	-1.75	333	0.3	-1.19	496	-7.4	-0.70	759	-4.9	-1.09
II	11041	-1.7	-	800	-9.7	-	1069	-10.5	-	1869	-73	-
7	3970	-5.0	-0.37	544	7.1	0.40	666	-19.6	0.91	1910	-4.7	0.50
8	3601	-6.9	-9.04	553	3.8	1.75	810	-9.9	9.70	1363	-0.3	9.01
9	3899	-7.5	-0.13	977	9.9	-0.05	438	-8.8	-0.05	715	-4.8	-0.43
III	11393	-6.5	-	1374	4.7	-	1914	-78	-	3988	-3.0	-
10	-	-	-	959	4.1	1.49	308	-3.4	0.68	560	-0.9	0.89
cn >
čn
Č5<
z
>
"D 3D I— O
cn >
CD CJl
CD CD
	Zaposlene osebe				Samozaposlene osebe		Iskalci zaposlitve		Skupaj	
Leto	v podjetjih in organizacijah	letni porast	pri sam oz. osebah	letni porast	podjetniki in poklici	letni porast	število	letni porast	aktivno prebivalstvo	letni porast
9009	631053	07	66797	-9.3	50413	-0.4	109635	0.8	886134	0.6
9003	639981	0.3	66164	-0.9	49739	-1.4	97674	-4.8	874991	-1.3
9004	638715	0.9	65649	-0.8	49589	-0.3	99896	-5	876909	0.9
9005	666130	4.3	65499	-0.3	50146	1.1	91889	-1	904989	3.9*
9006	675060	1.3	66597	1.7	51519	9.7	85836	-6.6	910675	0.6
9007	696116	3.1	69933	5.1	53303	3.5	71336	-16.9	995334	1.6
9008	717564	3.1	79300	3.4	55449	4.0	63916	-11.4	949473	1.9
9008/1	707773	3.7	70157	5.9	54369	3.7	69938	-13.4	936580	9
9	710506	3.6	70808	5.9	54583	3.9	66997	-13.8	937944	9
3	719987	3.5	71348	4.9	54840	4	64995	-13.4	938590	9
4	715774	3.4	71791	4.9	55009	4.1	69440	-14	939080	1.9
5	718901	3.3	79956	3.5	55093	3.8	61164	-13.5	940780	1.9
6	790167	3.3	79644	9.9	55151	3.8	60710	-19.4	949738	1.9
7	718454	3.9	79670	9.6	55949	3.7	61550	-19.9	941439	1.8
8	718991	3.9	79795	9.5	55365	3.6	60669	-11.5	940489	1.9
9	799608	3.9	73514	9.9	55690	3.7	59303	-11	944694	9
10	794566	9.7	73967	3	56393	4.4	69691	-9.9	950739	1.8
11	793446	9.9	73543	9.1	56730	4.6	63363	-7.3	950967	1.5
19	718060	1.7	79171	1.9	56836	4.9	66939	-3.9	946491	1.5
9009/1	719610	0.7	70394	0.3	57094	4.9	73911	6.7	946157	1.0
9	709743	-0.1	69739	-1.5	57039	4.5	77189	15.9	945914	0.8
3	707980	-0.8	69974	-9.9	57947	4.4	79689	93.9	945701	0.8
4	704955	-1.6	68999	-3.9	57679	4.9	89839	39.7	946050	0.7
5	701739	-9.3	68803	-4.8	57969	5.9	84519	38.9	945308	0.5
6	699890	-9.8	68689	-5.4	58307	5.7	86481	49.4	945589	0.3
7	696533	-3.1	68010	-6.4	58769	6.4	88457	43.7	944085	0.3
8	694639	-3.3	67479	-7.9	59040	6.6	88106	45.9	941566	0.1
9	695936	-3.8	66817	-9.1	59396	6.7	88366	49.0	949131	-0.3
10	-	-	-	-	-	-	94591	51.1	-	-
11	-	-	-	-	-	-	95446	50.6	-	-
Cene na drobno
	Življenjske potrebščine			Osnovna inflac		ja	Blago		Storitve		Goriva	
Leto	indeks	letni porast	mesečna rast	indeks	letni porast	mesečna rast	indeks	letni porast	indeks	letni porast	indeks	letni porast
9009	90.14	75	0.57	89.09	7.7	0.59	90.97	6.3	85.41	10.9	80.89	4.7
9003	95.58	5.6	0.41	94.16	5.6	0.36	95.51	5.0	91.50	71	83.56	3.4
9004	98.85	3.6	0.99	9759	3.4	0.94	97.97	9.6	96.85	5.8	89.40	70
9005	100.00	9.5	0.90	100.00	1.3	0.07	100.00	9.1	100.00	3.3	100.00	11.9
9006	101.55	9.5	0.91	101.55	1.7	0.17	109.06	9.1	103.59	3.5	108.45	8.5
9007	106.39	3.6	0.43	105.07	3.5	0.37	105.99	3.9	108.45	4.8	119.10	3.4
9008	119.33	5.7	0.98	110.19	5.1	0.37	111.98	5.7	114.96	5.3	199.64	9.5
9008/7	114.13	6.9	0.35	110.90	5.1	0.94	113.19	7.7	116.13	5.5	135.81	17.5
8	113.34	6.0	0.17	110.59	4.8	0.91	111.53	6.4	116.91	5.3	199.79	14.9
9	113.34	5.5	-0.05	110.91	4.5	0.14	119.91	5.8	115.58	5.1	197.14	13.3
III	113.60	6.1	-	110.54	4.8	-	119.99	6.6	116.91	5.3	130.91	15.0
10	113.34	4.9	-0.01	111.39	4.1	0.17	119.47	4.7	115.05	5.0	193.95	9.8
11	119.55	3.1	-0.91	111.75	4.1	0.90	110.86	1.9	115.94	4.8	119.93	-3.5
19	111.87	9.1	-0.31	119.04	3.7	0.97	109.43	0.4	115.58	4.3	105.73	-9.6
IV	119.59	3.4	-	111.73	4.0	-	110.99	9.3	115.99	4.7	113.97	-1.1
9009/1	111.19	1.4	-0.91	110.99	3.9	0.13	108.69	-0.1	116.11	4.1	107.93	-9.8
9	111.77	9.0	0.00	111.97	9.7	0.13	109.46	1.0	116.59	4.1	111.98	-3.1
3	119.83	1.6	0.19	119.39	9.8	0.19	110.65	0.4	116.94	4.0	111.93	-6.9
I	111.93	1.7	-	111.55	9.9	-	109.60	0.4	116.55	4.1	110.61	-6.6
4	119.99	1.0	0.01	119.46	9.9	0.01	111.09	-0.1	116.89	3.4	113.49	-6.5
5	113.79	0.5	0.08	113.09	9.3	0.17	111.99	-1.0	117.33	3.5	114.79	-9.4
6	114.30	0.1	0.04	113.46	9.4	0.10	119.19	-1.7	118.56	3.8	118.74	-11.9
II	113.67	0.6	-	119.98	9.3	-	111.73	-0.9	117.57	3.5	115.65	-9.0
7	113.99	-0.8	-0.07	119.31	1.8	0.03	110.07	-9.7	119.97	3.3	119.65	-11.9
8	113.97	-0.1	0.03	119.45	1.7	-0.11	109.91	-1.5	190.46	3.0	190.36	-73
9	113.07	-0.9	0.04	119.96	1.1	-0.06	110.70	-1.3	118.60	9.6	190.86	-4.9
III	113.19	-0.4	-	119.34	1.5	-	110.93	-1.8	119.68	3.0	190.99	-8.0
10	113.91	-0.1	0.09	119.68	1.0	0.06	111.19	-1.1	118.09	9.6	119.30	-3.9
11	114.19	1.5	0.98									
cn >
Č75
n<
z
>
"D 3D I— O
cn >
CD
Harmonizirani indeksi cen v Sloveniji (podatki Eurostata]										
	Skupni indeks		Blago		Storitve		Osnovna inflacija		Energija	
Leto	indeks	letna rast	indeks	letna rast	indeks	letna rast	indeks	letna rast	indeks	letna rast
9009	89.09	19.06	90.97	10.46	85.41	15.84	90.14	19.35	80.89	11.53
9003	94.16	5.69	95.51	4.99	91.50	7.14	95.58	6.03	83.56	3.39
9004	97.60	3.65	97.97	9.58	96.85	5.85	98.86	3.43	89.40	7.00
9005	100.00	9.47	100.00	9.07	100.00	3.96	100.00	1.16	100.00	11.85
9006	109.54	9.54	109.06	9.06	103.59	3.59	101.55	1.55	108.45	8.45
9007	106.39	3.76	105.31	3.19	108.56	4.87	105.07	3.47	119.10	3.36
9008	119.98	5.53	111.98	5.66	114.96	5.95	110.39	4.99	199.64	9.40
9008/1	109.69	6.37	108.76	7.09	111.55	5.15	107.54	5.01	119.69	14.34
9	109.56	6.37	108.34	6.85	111.96	5.40	108.30	5.79	115.59	11.30
3	111.00	6.63	110.96	709	119.49	5.87	109.30	5.89	190.95	11.76
4	111.89	6.99	111.93	6.37	113.01	5.95	110.09	6.90	191.94	8.71
5	113.19	6.95	113.09	6.73	113.37	5.34	110.46	5.74	196.69	10.97
6	114.15	6.84	114.19	763	114.95	5.39	110.76	5.49	133.69	16.11
7	114.13	6.99	113.19	7.68	116.13	5.48	110.34	5.11	135.81	17.59
8	113.34	6.09	111.53	6.36	116.91	5.33	110.60	4.76	199.79	14.93
9	113.34	5.55	119.91	5.77	115.58	5.10	111.00	4.44	197.14	13.97
10	113.33	4.77	119.47	4.65	115.05	4.98	111.56	4.06	193.95	9.77
11	119.33	9.90	110.86	1.91	115.94	4.81	111.90	3.97	119.93	-3.50
19	111.51	1.76	109.43	0.41	115.58	4.31	119.09	3.71	105.73	-9.56
9009/1	111.19	1.37	108.69	-0.06	116.11	4.09	110.99	3.91	107.93	-9.77
9	111.87	9.11	109.46	1.03	116.59	4.14	111.97	9.74	111.98	-3.06
3	119.77	1.59	110.65	0.35	116.94	3.96	119.39	9.83	111.93	-6.99
4	113.09	1.07	111.09	-0.13	116.89	3.37	119.46	9.99	113.49	-6.45
5	113.74	0.55	111.99	-0.97	117.33	3.49	113.09	9.39	114.79	-9.39
6	114.34	0.17	119.19	-1.69	118.56	3.77	113.46	9.44	118.74	-11.18
7	113.49	-0.69	110.07	-9.70	119.97	3.31	119.31	1.79	119.65	-11.90
8	113.48	0.19	109.91	-1.45	190.46	3.04	119.45	1.67	190.36	-7.97
9	113.37	0.03	110.70	-1.35	118.60	9.61	119.96	1.14	190.86	-4.94
10	113.51	0.01	111.19	-1.19	118.00	9.56	119.68	0.46	119.30	-3.91
Industrijske cene
	Skupaj			□prema			Repromaterial			Življenjske potrebščine		
Leto	indeks	letni porast	mesečna rast	indeks	letni porast	mesečna rast	indeks	letni porast	mesečna rast	indeks	letni porast	mesečna rast
9009	90.99	4.9	0.33	94.87	4.9	0.50	89.06	3.7	0.99	91.75	7.0	0.40
9003	93.94	9.5	0.18	94.39	-0.6	-0.90	91.14	9.3	0.19	95.36	3.9	0.93
9004	97.39	4.4	0.44	96.53	9.3	0.34	96.56	5.9	0.63	98.14	9.9	0.97
9005	1ÜÜ.ÜÜ	9.8	0.10	100.00	3.6	0.11	100.00	3.6	0.13	100.00	1.9	0.14
9006	109.49	9.4	0.96	100.17	0.9	0.09	103.65	3.6	0.44	101.57	1.6	0.08
9007	108.00	5.5	0.53	101.09	0.9	0.01	111.55	7.6	0.65	104.78	3.9	0.39
9008	114.03	5.6	0.38	104.79	3.6	0.50	117.98	5.8	0.39	110.67	5.6	0.39
8	115.05	6.7	0.47	106.99	5.4	0.67	119.48	6.9	0.40	110.85	6.5	0.99
9	115.34	5.7	0.98	107.17	6.0	0.59	119.66	5.7	0.41	111.07	5.3	0.19
III	115.07	6.9	-	106.48	5.4	-	119.45	6.4	-	110.88	6.0	-
10	115.98	5.0	0.19	106.81	5.4	0.43	119.19	4.6	0.19	111.68	5.1	0.10
11	114.71	4.0	0.15	106.57	5.4	0.97	118.09	3.4	0.09	111.64	3.7	0.01
19	114.99	3.5	-0.90	105.38	4.9	-0.93	11791	9.6	-0.30	111.74	3.7	-0.08
IV	114.74	4.9	-	106.95	5.0	-	118.14	3.5	-	111.69	4.9	-
9009/1	113.80	9.3	-0.18	104.99	3.3	-0.33	117.06	1.9	-0.35	110.96	1.9	-0.40
9	114.01	1.9	-0.47	104.46	3.0	-0.56	117.39	0.6	-0.59	110.07	0.4	-0.44
3	114.04	0.8	-0.45	104.44	1.6	-0.63	11715	0.1	-0.59	110.99	0.1	-0.59
I	113.95	1.5	-	104.61	9.6	-	117.18	0.9	-	110.18	0.6	-
4	114.09	0.9	-0.35	109.84	-1.0	-0.75	11757	-0.3	-0.36	110.16	-0.9	-0.49
5	113.90	-0.7	-0.39	109.71	-0.9	-0.66	115.85	-9.0	-0.59	110.99	-0.3	-0.31
B	113.49	-0.7	-0.34	109.71	-9.9	-0.69	115.99	-9.0	-0.39	111.06	0.4	0.03
II	113.57	-0.4	-	109.75	-1.4	-	116.47	-1.4	-	110.50	0.0	-
7	113.98	-1.3	-0.97	109.63	-3.9	-0.48	116.19	-9.5	-0.31	110.16	-0.5	0.05
8	113.14	-1.7	-0.03	109.65	-3.4	-0.33	116.39	-9.6	-0.10	109.70	-1.0	0.18
9	113.44	-1.6	-0.03	109.34	-4.5	-0.47	116.78	-9.4	0.11	110.03	-0.9	0.17
III	113.99	-1.5	-	109.54	-3.7	-	116.43	-9.5	-	109.96	-0.8	-
10	113.61	-1.4	0.91	109.13	-4.4	-0.34	117.01	-1.8	0.99	110.39	-1.9	0.06
cn >
čn
Č5<
z
>
"D 3D I— O
cn >
CD CD
Cene v evro območju										
	Skupni indeks		Blago		Storitve		Osnovna inflacija		Energija	
Leto	indeks	letna rast	indeks	letna rast	indeks	letna rast	indeks	letna rast	indeks	letna rast
9009	93.9	9.3	94.5	1.9	99.9	9.7	94.7	1.9	84.4	-0.6
9003	95.8	9.1	96.9	1.6	95.3	9.0	96.6	1.5	86.9	3.0
9004	979	9.1	97.9	1.8	978	9.6	98.5	9.0	90.8	4.5
9005	100.0	9.9	100.0	9.1	100.0	9.3	100.0	1.5	100.0	10.1
9006	109.9	9.9	109.3	9.3	109.0	9.0	101.6	1.5	1078	7.8
9007	104.4	9.1	104.9	1.9	104.5	9.5	103.6	9.0	110.5	9.6
9008	107.8	3.4	108.9	4.0	107.9	9.5	106.1	9.5	199.9	11.6
9008/1	105.80	3.91	105.94	3.71	105.60	9.47	104.43	9.38	117.13	10.60
9	106.17	3.97	106.91	3.83	106.19	9.44	104.90	9.49	117.97	10.38
3	107.91	3.58	10768	4.13	106.55	9.81	105.78	9.73	119.98	11.95
4	107.55	3.96	108.37	3.96	106.39	9.97	105.99	9.45	191.19	10.84
5	108.93	3.67	109.99	4.51	106.89	9.47	106.95	9.53	195.51	13.74
B	108.64	3.96	109.70	4.96	107.19	9.53	106.37	9.59	198.83	16.14
7	108.47	4.05	108.76	5.09	108.07	9.57	106.03	9.56	130.53	17.13
8	108.39	3.84	108.98	4.69	108.38	9.71	106.38	9.67	196.61	14.69
9	108.59	3.64	109.19	4.37	107.67	9.59	106.66	9.57	196.16	13.51
10	108.55	3.16	109.13	3.54	10773	9.63	107.04	9.45	199.54	9.61
11	108.09	9.19	108.31	1.78	10769	9.69	107.08	9.99	116.48	0.73
19	10788	1.58	107.43	0.88	108.53	9.58	107.45	9.16	111.01	-3.67
9009/1	106.98	1.19	106.19	0.94	108.13	9.40	106.33	1.89	110.98	-5.95
9	10749	1.18	106.56	0.33	108.66	9.39	106.76	1.77	111.57	-4.86
3	107.89	0.57	107.98	-0.37	108.60	1.99	107.39	1.59	110.96	-8.10
4	108.91	0.61	107.66	-0.66	109.01	9.46	10781	1.79	110.53	-8.80
5	108.97	0.04	107.79	-1.37	109.06	9.10	10789	1.48	110.97	-11.58
B	108.48	-0.15	107.98	-1.57	109.91	1.95	10781	1.35	113.74	-11.71
7	10776	-0.65	106.15	-9.40	110.09	1.87	10739	1.99	111.74	-14.40
8	108.13	-0.18	106.61	-1.54	110.33	1.80	107.64	1.18	113.75	-10.16
9	108.16	-0.33	107.19	-1.77	109.56	1.76	107.81	1.08	119.33	-10.96
10	108.49	-0..19	10759	-1.49	109.61	1.74	108.11	-1.00	119.17	-8.47
Povprečne plače												
	Skupaj bruto			Skupaj neto			Število plačanih ur			BTQ plača za plačano uro		
Leto	€	letni porast	mesečna rast	€	letni porast	mesečna rast	število	letni porast	mesečna rast	€	letni porast	mesečna rast
9009	970.94	9.8	0.77	609.59	9.7	0.78	173	0	0.01	5.69	10	0.76
9003	1044.11	75	0.51	655.38	7.5	0.51	179	-0.6	0.09	6.06	79	0.59
9004	1103.33	5.7	0.48	699.98	5.7	0.51	179	0	-0.03	6.41	5.7	0.5
9005	1156.88	4.9	0.38	735.63	6.9	0.44	170	-1.9	-0.19	6.89	6.4	0.51
9006	1919.41	4.8	0.38	773.19	5.1	0.44	170	0	-0.05	714	3.9	-0.16
9007	1984.90	5.9	0.53	834.17	7.9	0.64	170	0	-0.09	7.55	5.7	0.54
9008	1391.14	8.3	0.67	899.65	7.8	0.63	170	0.0		8.19	8.5	0.56
9008/11	1359.79	8.6	-	881.90	8.1	-	169	-	-	8.09	8.8	-
7	1379.46	8.7	0.89	890.94	8.9	1.00	177	9.9	-	777	5.6	0.44
8	1405.00	9.8	0.74	909.19	9.1	1.09	166	-6.9	-	8.48	17.9	0.31
9	1400.91	11.9	0.73	905.13	10.3	1.19	171	6.9	-	8.9	5.1	-0.03
III	1399.56	9.9	-	901.50	9.9	-	171	-	-	8.15	9.3	-
10	1494.08	9.9	0.61	917.64	8.4	0.93	176	0.0	-	8.08	9.3	0.16
11	1550.99	3.9	-0.95	981.58	3.8	0.10	159	-7.0	-	9.73	11.5	1.85
19	1457.66	8.6	0.99	938.67	7.8	0.31	176	6.0	-	8.99	9.7	-1.66
IV	1477.34	79	-	945.96	6.7	-	170	-	-	8.70	78	-
9009/1	1416.40	6.8	0.08	917.15	6.1	0.05	169	-4.0	-	8.36	11.0	-0.95
9	1381.87	4.9	0.04	898.74	4.0	0.05	158	-4.8	-	8.76	9.6	0.70
3	1495.05	5.3	0.11	991.69	4.9	0.11	169	1.8	-	8.44	3.7	0
I	1407.77	5.5	-	919.53	5.0	-	165	-9.3	-	8.59	8.1	-
4	1493.19	5.1	0.43	990.67	4.7	0.41	169	-1.9	-	8.43	6.3	-0.06
5	1415.38	4.1	-0.09	917.56	3.9	0.95	164	-4.1	-	8.65	9.1	9.63
6	1499.19	4.7	0.35	994.64	4.6	0.34	169	1.8	-	8.45	3.0	-1.33
II	1499.56	4.6	-	990.96	4.4	-	167	-1.9	-	8.51	6.1	-
7	1494.93	3.8	0.39	999.14	3.6	0.3	175	-1.1	-	8.16	5.0	0.09
8	1415.08	0.7	-0.14	918.98	1.0	-0.09	164	-1.9	-	8.69	1.7	9.7
9	1433.93	9.4	0.45	999.36	9.7	0.45	169	-1.9	-	8.46	3.9	-1.96
III	1494.41	9.3	-	993.96	9.4	-	169	-1.9	-	8.41	3.3	-
Prihodki javnega sektorja												
	Skupaj			Neposredni davki in ostali prihodki			□□V in trošarine			Carine		
Leto	mio. €	letni porast	mesečna rast	mio. €	letni porast	mesečna rast	mio. €	letni porast	mesečna rast	mio. €	letni porast	mesečna rast
9009	9179.63	11.8	0.86	6056.97	9.7	0.75	9966.67	15.6	1.03	130.95	5.9	1.39
9003	10089.55	9.9	0.74	677788	11.9	0.89	3167.07	6.8	0.78	144.60	10.4	0.94
9004	10780.90	6.8	0.55	7347.99	8.4	0.74	3365.61	6.3	0.53	80.70	-44.9	-90.57
9005	11498.58	6.7	0.69	776763	5.7	0.43	3691.98	9.7	1.08	39.67	-50.9	10.55
9006	19395.09	78	0.48	8461.10	8.9	0 45	3889.81	5.9	0.60	51.06	98.7	9.80
9007	13491.19	8.3	0.99	8999.07	6.3	0.88	4319.16	11.1	1.09	116.89	198.9	7.95
9008	14689.00	9.4	0.54	9958.59	10.7	0.73	4604.16	6.8	-1.39	190.09	9.77	
9008/7	1307.58	13.4	9.09	846.07	95.3	9.35	451.75	-3.9	1.69	9.76	-15.5	9.33
8	1119.16	-9.9	-1.70	788.41	3.8	-0.31	319.95	-16.8	-4.84	11.50	19.3	9.58
9	1914.19	99.8	9.11	801.38	10.5	0.06	403.11	60.4	7.37	9.70	-19.4	4.18
III	3640.93	11.1	-	9435.86	13.9	-	1174.11	13.5	-	30.96	-5.9	-
10	1300.18	3.9	0.61	814.03	9.5	0.18	475.93	-4.3	1.06	10.93	-1.9	4.97
11	1194.45	-9.9	-9.66	834.60	76	-0.78	350.15	-19.7	-6.99	9.69	6.4	-1.6
19	1348.01	4.6	-1.60	938.93	9.9	-1.87	399.85	9.6	-1.31	9.93	-18.6	-3.43
IV	3849.64	9.1	-	9586.86	6.7	-	1995.93	-4.8	-	99.85	-4.7	-
9009/1	1150.08	0.7	-9.31	768.43	7.1	-1.03	375.33	-10.3	-4.83	6.33	-0.3	-6.79
9	1096.37	-3.1	-1.81	748.91	3.6	-1.39	970.05	-17.6	-3.55	8.10	-13.0	-9.14
3	1078.08	-9.4	-1.79	745.08	-3.5	-9.09	394.99	0.6	-1.06	8.08	-18.5	-9.64
I	3954.53	-1.6	-	9961.79	9.4	-	970.30	-9.1	-	99.51	-10.6	-
4	1137.47	-90.9	-4.39	794.35	-99.9	-7.95	400.74	5.1	5.31	19.37	0.7	1.59
5	1067.77	-14.5	-3.39	755.95	-19.0	-3.49	303.63	-90.0	-3.53	8.19	-99.1	-7.54
6	1148.75	-5.6	9.34	739.79	-11.9	-0.07	407.49	8.8	7.19	8.60	-91.1	-9.47
II	3353.99	-13.5	-	9913.03	-17.9	-	1111.79	-9.0	-	99.17	-14.9	-
7	1968.80	-3.0	9.50	895.47	-9.4	3.64	435.90	-3.5	0.49	7.43	-93.8	-6.89
8	1157.91	3.4	1.07	765.99	-9.9	1.91	386.83	91.9	0.70	5.09	-55.7	-7.41
9	1069.39	-19.5	9.08	730.67	-8.8	1.99	396.99	-18.9	4.17	4.66	-51.9	-10.15
III	3488.39	-4.0	-	9391.49	-4.7	-	1149.71	-0.4	-	17.19	-43.8	-
10	1993.45	-5.9	1.09	763.77	-6.9	9.06	459.97	-5.0	-0.84	7.49	-97.5	-0.99
11	1186.19	-0.7	0.99	775.96	-7.1	1.01	409.74	15.0	-1.69	8.19	-16.9	3.74
Prispevki za socialno varnost												
	Skupno			Zdravstveno zavarovanje			Pokojninsko zavarovanje			Zaposlovanje		
Leto	mio. €	letni porast	mesečna rast	mio. €	letni porast	mesečna rast	mio. €	letni porast	mesečna rast	mio. €	letni porast	mesečna rast
9009	3509.84	10.4	0.75	1390.79	19	0.89	9101.89	9.3	0.71	1716	10.1	0.76
9003	3806.48	8.5	0.69	1513.39	8.8	0.68	9974.69	8.9	0.59	18.54	8.0	0.56
9004	4076.46	7.1	0.63	1690.14	7.1	0.61	9436.45	71	0.64	19.87	7.1	0.73
9005	4350.95	6.7	0.47	1743.90	7.6	0.49	9586.66	6.9	0.50	91.10	6.9	0.49
9006	4588.9	5.5	0.5	1899.79	4.6	0.56	9743.76	6.1	0.47	99.43	6.3	0.98
9007	4979.19	8.4	0.79	1968.69	8.0	0.76	9979.11	8.6	0.81	94.45	9.0	0.95
9008	5496.93	10.5	0.78	9169.86	10.9	0.89	3300.93	10.8	0.77	9711	10.9	1.18
9008/7	456.85	11.6	0.90	179.00	10.8	0.91	975.69	19.0	0.90	9.94	13.9	-0.98
8	447.59	9.5	0.67	176.55	9.9	0.76	968.75	9.7	0.56	9.91	10.8	-0.39
9	464.58	19.5	0.81	189.91	11.5	0.89	980.07	13.9	0.79	9.30	15.9	-0.35
III	1368.95	11.9	-	537.76	10.5	-	894.44	11.6	-	6.75	13.1	-
10	467.94	19.3	0.89	183.40	11.7	0.79	981.41	19.7	0.73	9.49	174	-0.35
11	480.63	10.9	0.77	196.63	13.0	1.47	981.65	9.5	0.98	9.35	13.0	-0.99
19	598.09	5.7	-0.36	905.51	6.3	-0.07	390.00	5.3	-0.54	9.57	4.1	9.84
IV	1475.96	9.6	-	585.54	10.3	-	883.06	9.9	-	7.34	11.5	-
9009/1	468.03	9.9	0.97	185.13	9.8	0.19	980.55	9.9	0.44	9.35	4.5	-0.59
9	460.10	6.1	-0.06	183.17	6.9	-0.09	974.71	6.1	0.00	9.99	0.7	-4.87
3	464.10	5.9	-0.13	183.94	5.7	-0.11	977.86	5.0	-0.15	9.30	4.3	-1.01
I	1399.99	7.1	-	559.94	7.9	-	833.11	7.0	-	6.87	3.9	-
4	469.73	4.9	-0.19	186.54	5.3	-0.07	980.99	3.3	-0.93	9.98	90.6	5.19
5	460.91	9.9	-0.39	183.09	3.6	-0.36	975.59	9.4	-0.30	9.30	1.9	-1.99
B	459.53	1.7	-0.57	189.41	9.6	-0.59	974.79	0.4	-0.64	9.33	5.7	-1.39
II	1390.18	9.9	-	551.97	3.9	-	831.30	9.1	-	6.91	9.4	-
7	461.19	0.9	-0.36	189.96	9.9	-0.96	975.94	0.1	-0.49	9.99	9.9	-1.39
8	454.31	1.5	-0.97	181.11	9.6	-0.18	970.96	0.8	-0.36	9.93	0.9	-1.94
9	455.99	-9.0	-0.49	180.97	-0.7	-0.97	971.81	-3.0	-0.49	9.51	9.1	8.94
III	1370.78	0.9	-	545.04	1.4	-	818.71	-0.7	-	7.03	4.1	-
10	464.70	-0.5	0.90	184.96	0.9	0.98	977.01	-1.6	0.07	9.73	13.0	8.95
11	464.93	-3.4	-0.30	185.34	-5.7	-0.57	976.64	-1.8	-0.13	9.95	-4.4	-1.04
•vi CO
£
Krediti in depoziti
	Krediti podjetjem		Krediti prebivalstvu		Depoziti podjepodjetij		Depoziti prebivalstva	
Leto	mio. €	letni porast	mio. €	letni porast	mio. €	letni porast	mio. €	letni porast
9000	3441	18.1	1779	14.6	2132	2.1	5933	13.4
2001	4497	16.6	2059	3.2	2308	8.3	7055	18.9
2002	5412	11.0	2317	3.7	2605	12.9	8528	20.9
2003	6371	10.3	2602	5.2	2707	3.9	9184	7.7
2004	7788	17.1	3111	14.5	2816	4.0	9605	4.6
2005	9599	22.5	3873	23.7	3085	9.6	10316	7.4
2006	11784	22.8	4871	25.8	3299	6.9	10940	6.0
2007	15292	29.8	6117	25.6	3647	10.5	12003	9.7
2008	19438	28.0	7443	22.4	3735	2.4	13237	10.3
2008/1	17897	35.45	6918	2745	3849	11.0	12668	9.87
2	18100	34.55	7009	2772	3678	7.9	12769	9.58
3	18316	33.10	7133	26.61	3669	1.9	12929	10.92
4	18718	31.86	7235	25.89	3667	4.9	13029	11.74
5	18990	29.12	7318	24.20	3635	2.0	13215	11.46
6	19444	28.84	7409	23.18	3747	4.6	13325	10.38
7	19782	26.79	7521	22.15	3810	2.6	13283	8.74
8	20006	24.59	7603	20.24	3668	-4.4	13393	9.44
9	20296	24.55	7705	19.12	3898	3.5	13541	10.13
10	20577	23.86	7857	18.94	3753	-2.2	13399	9.09
11	20541	20.14	7785	13.98	3658	-1.4	13556	13.05
12	20599	18.30	7827	14.80	3800	0.7	13737	9.18
2009/1	20801	16.23	7831	13.20	3687	-4.2	13867	9.46
2	20885	15.39	7852	12.03	3695	0.5	14044	9.99
3	20863	13.91	7868	10.30	3732	1.7	14046	8.64
4	20907	11.69	7910	9.33	3757	2.5	14016	7.58
5	20874	9.92	7946	8.58	3747	3.1	14178	7.29
6	20832	7.14	7951	732	3780	0.9	14256	6.99
7	20877	5.54	8055	7.10	3710	-2.62	14149	6.52
8	20893	4.43	8135	700	3723	1.50	14177	5.85
9	20856	2.76	8231	6.83	3770	-3.28	14172	4.66
10	20786	1.02	8295	5.57	3758	0.13	14155	5.64