International Journal
Euro-Mediterranean
Studies
VOLUME 2 I 2009 I NUMBER 2
Unité et diversité des identités euro-méditerranéennes Marwa Ibrahim
Islam Between the Past and the Present Dragan Potočnik
Unity and Diversity in Euro-Mediterranean Identities: Euro-European and Arabo-Mediterranean Dimensions Affaya Rim
Influence of Tourism on the Regional Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina Rahman Nurković
City Branding of Bratislava: History and the Present Kvetoshva Matlovičova, Barbora Némethycrvâ, and René Mathvič
Israeli War Perception from the Six Days War to the Operation Cast Lead: An Analysis of the Israeli Siege-Mentality Claudia De Martino
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International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies
issn 1855-3362
The aim of the International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies is to promote intercultural dialogue and exchanges between societies, develop human resources, and to assure greater mutual understanding in the Euro-Mediterranean region.
L'objectif de la Revue Internationale dEtudes Euro-Méditerranéennes est de promouvoir le dialogue interculturel et les échanges entre les sociétés, développer les ressources humaines et assurer une compréhension mutuelle de qualité au sein de la région euro-méditerranéenne.
Namen Mednarodne revije za evro-mediteranske študije je spodbujanje medkulturnega dialoga in izmenjav, razvoj človeških virov in zagotavljanje boljšega medsebojnega razumevanja v evro-mediteranski regiji.
editor-in-chief
Lučka Lorber, University of Maribor, Slovenia
associate editors Touhami Abdouli, University of Sousse, Tunisia
Montserrat Duch, Rovira i Virgili
University, Spain Albert Marouani, Nice Sophia Antipolis
University, France Mohamed Abdel Aziz Salama, Alexandria University, Egypt
managing editor Alen Ježovnik, Folio Publishing Services, Slovenia
editorial board
Nabil Mahmoud Alawi, An-Najah
University, Palestine Nadia Al-Bagdadi, Central European
University, Hungary Ahmad M. Atawneh, Hebron University, Palestine
Pamela Ballinger, Bowdoin College, usa Klemen Bergant, University of Nova Gorica, Slovenia
Roberto Biloslavo, University of Primorska, Slovenia
Rémi Brague, Panthéon-Sorbonne University, France
Holger Briel, University of Nicosia, Cyprus Donna Buchanan, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, usa Costas M. Constantinou, University of
Nicosia, Cyprus Claudio Cressati, University of Udine, Italy
Yamina El Kirat El Allame, University
Mohammed V, Morocco Julia Elyachar Mastnak, Scientific Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts
Said Ennahid, Al Akhawayn University
in Ifrane, Morocco Nejat Erk, Cukurova University, Turkey Carlos Fraenkel, McGill University, Canada
Mladen Franko, University of Nova
Gorica, Slovenia Giacomarra Mario Gandolfo, University
of Palermo, Italy Anton Gosar, University of Primorska, Slovenia
Rune Gulev, University of Primorska, Slovenia
Mitja Guštin, University of Primorska, Slovenia
Hassan Hanafi, Cairo University, Egypt Continued on the back inside cover
International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies
151 Unité et diversité des identités euro-méditerranéennes Marwa Ibrahim
171 Islam Between the Past and the Present Dragan Potočnik
187 Unity and Diversity in Euro-Mediterranean Identities: Euro-European and Arabo-Mediterranean Dimensions Affaya Rim
201 Influence of Tourism on the Regional Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina Rahman Nurković
215 City Branding of Bratislava: History and the Present Kvetoslava Matlovicovâ, Barbora Némethyovâ, and René Matlovič
235 Israeli War Perception from the Six Days War to the Operation Cast Lead: An Analysis of the Israeli Siege-Mentality Claudia De Martino
253 Résumés/Abstracts
257 Povzetki
Unité et diversité des identités euro-méditerranéennes
MARWA IBRAHIM
Alexandria University, Egypt
le projet dont nous allons traiter ici porte pour titre « unité et diversité des identités euro-méditerranéennes », il paraît cependant nécessaire de présenter une définition des termes « identités » et « Méditerranée » avant toute chose. Les identités euro-méditerranéennes, aussi diversifiées soient-elles, partagent pourtant un territoire commun. Le bassin méditerranéen représenterait à la fois un lieu géographique mais aussi un espace nourri de souvenirs et de nostalgie. Cette diversité territoriale engendre ce qu'on appelle l' « homme géographiquement pluriel », celui qui fait siens plusieurs territoires en même temps. L'identité ne serait-elle pas le produit des interactions avec autrui, un résultat de la diversité ? L'identité émanerait de la diversité et la diversité, elle, serait méditerranéenne. Très peu s'accordent sur une définition exacte de la « Méditerranée » ; elle se définit pourtant par une interaction constante entre le réel et l'émotionnel, le tangible et l'imaginaire : la Méditerranée est bien un lieu mythique. Le mythe méditerranéen existe certes dans les pensées, mais se discerne aussi sérieusement dans les faits : on le retrouve dans le quotidien, le vécu, l'expérience. Il est indispensable aujourd'hui de repenser la Méditerranée, de la concevoir comme une interface dynamique et tangible, susceptible d'assurer la connexion et la mise en relation de différents territoires car justement, elle rend possible la rencontre des diversités.
notion de territoire À l'occasion d'une étude effectuée en 2003 à l'initiative de l'Insee (Institut national de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques), l'Inserm (Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale), du Ministère des Affaires sociales, du Ministère de la Culture et de la Délégation interministérielle à la ville, intitulée « Enquête sur la construction des identités », plus de 8000 personnes ont été interrogées sur les sen-
timents d'identité qui pouvaient ou non les animer. Parmi les trois premiers critères de définition de l'identité, 35% des personnes interrogées évoquent leur lieu d'origine, c'est-à-dire l'appartenance spatiale liée à un territoire défini. Notons que la cellule familiale ne tient pas lieu [152] de premier critère dans la définition de l'identité des individus, chose pouvant surprendre plus d'un d'entre nous. Ainsi, l'attachement à une personne ou à une collectivité ne semble pas définir l'identité humaine, il s'agit plutôt de l'appartenance à un espace. Le territoire est avant tout un espace de vie. On peut distinguer deux types de territoire : l'un réel, objectif et matériel, donc concret ; et l'autre imaginaire, affectif et idéalisé, donc rêvé. Le territoire est finalement l'association de ces deux aspects : c'est un espace délimité où l'on pratique une activité, c'est le cadre spatial dans lequel se déroulent nos activités quotidiennes, mais également le territoire est un espace de nostalgie et associé à un passé. Résultat : le territoire devient le « chez soi » approprié, le lieu d'attachement sentimental mais aussi pratique et professionnel. Sur un même territoire, ce sont les rapports entre les individus qui façonnent une communauté. Ces individus partagent non seulement un territoire commun mais également des valeurs et des traditions communes. Un territoire donc, c'est du commun partagé. Pour beaucoup d'anthropologues, un territoire peut déjà se caractériser par des individus utilisant un même langage, ce qui d'ailleurs, ne représente pas forcément une seule langue. En effet, depuis toujours les populations des côtes maritimes pratiquent un langage particulier découlant de leur mode de vie. Il n'est donc pas étonnant de constater que la gestuelle constitue une des composantes essentielles du langage de ces populations. Alors que le territoire n'acquiert de valeur que par référence à autrui, et qu'il ne se construit qu'au sein de l'altérité, l'identité, elle, ne pourrait s'envisager qu'en fonction des rapports que les individus entretiennent avec les autres.
DÉFINITION DE l' IDENTITÉ En tentant de définir l'identité de l'individu, on pourrait dire qu'elle représente la reconnaissance d'un individu par lui-même ou par les autres, reconnaissance qui dépend en grande partie d'aspects objectifs tels que le sexe, la profession, le statut et l'affiliation familiale,
mais également d'aspects subjectifs tels que les valeurs, les principes et les idéologies. Que ce soit l'identité individuelle ou de groupe, elle est nécessairement liée à la notion de différence ou d'altérité. C'est d'abord par référence à autrui que l'on arrive à « se construire » une identité, à exister, à être. Dans La Méthode, Edgar Morin con- [153] sacre tout un sous-chapitre à ce concept qui relie l'identité humaine à l'autre : « La relation avec autrui est inscrite virtuellement dans la relation avec soi-même : le thème archaïque du double, si profondément enraciné dans notre psyché, montre que chacun porte en lui un alter ego (moi-même autre), à la fois étranger à nous-mêmes et identique à soi [...] C'est parce que nous portons en nous cette dualité où 'je est un autre' que nous pouvons, dans la sympathie, l'amitié, l'amour, introduire et intégrer l'autre en notre Je » (Morin 2001, 69). Julien Gracq marie l'homme au monde. Marc Augé souligne à ce propos que « c'est toujours une réflexion sur l'altérité qui précède et permet toute définition identitaire » (Augé 1994, 84). Dans l'Etre et le Néant, Sartre considère, dans un long chapitre consacré au regard, que c'est l'œil de l'autre qui fait notre essence, ce que nous sommes (Sartre 1943, 292—345).
DOUBLE TERRITOIRE — DOUBLE IDENTITÉ Mais le territoire revêt également une dimension temporelle. En effet, le sentiment identitaire associé à un territoire a une dynamique évolutive ; il est un processus et non un état, et qui dit « évolution » dit nécessairement « temps ». Le territoire est donc une sorte d'entre-deux, un endroit où s'établit un patrimoine, un espace avec une Histoire, mais il est également un lieu de projets, où se construit un avenir.
Pourtant, avec un territoire que l'on qualifiera de géographique, matériel, il s'agira plutôt d'un temps subjectif, virtuel. C'est dans un cadre temporel que se construit et se développe l'identité de chacun. En effet, l'identité est un produit qui, né sous une forme brute, ne cesse de se transformer et de s'enrichir grâce aux influences exercées par les autres. L'identité serait finalement un moule dans lequel les autres versent leurs ingrédients ; un modèle constamment façonné par les expériences acquises.
Ce rapport complexe entre le territoire et le temps exerce une pro-
fonde influence aussi bien sur nos sentiments d'identité que sur notre perception du territoire. D'une part, le rapprochement des individus dû aux nouvelles technologies engendre un processus nouveau de « fabrication » de l'identité : cette dernière ne serait qu'un produit des in-[154] teractions avec les autres. D'autre part, la proximité virtuelle donne naissance à des « hommes géographiquement pluriels ». Cette notion marque le passage, dans l'Histoire, d'une norme de stabilité à une norme de mobilité. L'ère de la fidélité entre les populations et les lieux est terminée, de même que l'époque où l'individu était encore attaché à un territoire, à son territoire. Commence alors l'âge du divorce entre l'individu et le territoire : l'homme n'est plus assigné à l'espace qui l'encadre ; il vit, certes, sur un territoire mais peut aussi appartenir à plusieurs autres en même temps. Ce processus connaît forcément son essor à une époque où la globalisation vient abolir les espaces réels pour instaurer à leur place des liens virtuels. L'Internet n'est q'un exemple.
Rappelons que toute dynamique d'échange, toute conscience, dans la pensée phénoménologique de Sartre, est par définition une « conscience de ». Le culturalisme est un courant de l'anthropologie qui, empruntant la notion de culture aux anthropologues, cherche à rendre compte de l'intégration sociale. Selon l'approche culturaliste, il ne peut y avoir de culture sans interaction avec autrui. Une culture se définit avant tout par un dialogue.
Nous aboutissons donc à l'équation suivante : Si l'identité est « dialogue », elle est donc « culture » et par conséquent « diversité ».
Notons bien que la notion de diversité ne va pas forcément à l'en-contre de la notion d'unité, que l'altérité et la richesse qui en découlent n'entrent pas en contradiction avec les particularités des nations et des individus.
Cette perspective fait en quelques sortes écho à la définition du terme de cosmopolitisme, à savoir la possibilité d'être natif d'un lieu et de toucher à l'universalité, sans renier pour autant sa singularité.
Edgar Morin insiste sur le fait que les humains ont en commun leur humanité qu'ils doivent respecter et reconnaître. Dans un monde envahi par la globalisation, mouvement valorisant le rassemblement, on peut se demander où en est l'identité individuelle. L'uniformisation,
est-elle un risque ou un fantasme ? Certains anthropologues s'attèlent à répondre à cette question : Jean-Loup Amselle, anthropologue africaniste, ne craint pas une homogénéisation culturelle. En revanche, il cite des exemples montrant que les progrès techniques, fruit de la globalisation, voire même de l'américanisation, aident souvent à promouvoir [155] les cultures locales. Citons à titre d'exemple le système d'exploitation Ubuntu financé par la société Canonical du Sud-Africain Mark Shuttleworth. Ce système, contrairement au système américain Microsoft, n'est pas connu du grand public, mais son existence nous prouve que la globalisation n'a pas et ne pourra pas abolir des systèmes nationaux déjà mis en place.
En définitive, si le dialogue ne peut se faire qu'au sein de l'altérité, on peut facilement aboutir à l'équation suivante : l'identité est diversité.
Et qui dit diversité, dira forcément Méditerranée.
DÉFINITION DE LA MEDITERRANEE Étrange Méditerranée. Paradoxale, énigmatique, fascinante, voire inquiétante. Le bassin, cet espace continue à animer beaucoup de débats. Très peu s'accordent à une définition exacte de la Méditerranée et très peu s'entendent sur une délimitation claire et stable de cette région. Fernand Braudel, historien et grand spécialiste de la Méditerranée, la définit à la fois comme un espace d'immensité et de limite. Cette définition montre bien les paradoxes qui pèsent sur ce bassin et qui rendent encore plus difficile une définition claire et précise de cette région.
Le recours à l'étymologie du terme est intéressant : le mot Méditerranée a pour racine le terme « medium » qui signifie « centre ». En effet, beaucoup d'historiens la considèrent comme le « centre du monde » (Carpentier et Lebrun 1998, 9). Carpentier et Lebrun (1998, 9) vont même jusqu'à parler d'un « méditerranéocentrisme » ! Les deux historiens se rapportent à une étude de leur grand prédécesseur Ibn Khaldoun, historien méditerranéen, qui situe la Méditerranée sur la liste des « mers et grands fleuves du monde » (1998, 10). Vision arrogante ? Ou peut-être une grande fierté de la part de ses peuples, anciens et modernes ? A l'époque des Romains, la Méditerranée s'est souvent faite appelée Mare Nostrum, « notre mer », ou plus occasionnellement, Mare Internum, « mer intérieure » (cf.
http ://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Méditerranée). Les Grecs de l'époque, de Platon à Aristote, évoquaient la Méditerranée comme « la mer de chez nous » (Horden et Purcell 2000,11).
Un peu plus loin dans notre étude, il sera question de la « mater-[156] nité » de la Méditerranée par rapport à l'Europe. Dominique Fernandez est l'auteur d'un ouvrage qu'elle a intitulé Mère Méditerranée dans lequel elle déclare son amour à la « Grande Bleue » et nous rapporte des témoignages d'auteurs tombés amoureux de régions et villes méditerranéennes telles que Naples, Gênes ou la Sardaigne (Fernandez 1965, 99—126). La pensée politique « voyait dans la Méditerranée [même] la base d'un européocentrisme avoué » (Mollat du Jourdin 1997, 169). Morin (1998, 31—39) va jusqu'à parler d'une « méditer-ranéisation de la pensée européenne ». Ces appellations attestent du très fort attachement des populations côtières à leur région méditerranéenne. Jamais une mer n'aura connu autant d'appellations et de désignations que la Grande Bleue! Ces populations côtières se distinguent par un sentiment de patriotisme, d'appartenance spatiale précédemment évoquée. Les peuples méditerranéens se montrent ainsi être fidèles à leur civilisation.
Unis par un amour incontestable pour la Grande Mer, ces peuples éprouvent pourtant une grande difficulté à la cerner (Carpentier et Lebrun 1998,11) :
Qu'on la considère comme centre du monde ou bien périphérie d'autres lieux centraux, qu'on la voie morcelée en mers distinctes ou comme un pion sur un échiquier mondial, la Méditerranée n'en est pas moins là, dans sa réalité, telle que nous la voyons dans l'immédiat et telle qu'elle s'installe aussi dans les mouvements lents de la terre, des hommes et des paysages.
Cette difficulté peut venir de la nature même de cette mer constamment en changement, de cet espace en perpétuel mouvement. Ce changement découlerait, entre autres, de l'usage qu'en font les hommes à travers les siècles (Carpentier et Lebrun 1998,15) :
Et au milieu, il y a la mer, espace immense et multiple aux yeux des
Anciens, simple élément de la circulation transocéanique aux yeux
des Modernes.
La « diversité » de la nature méditerranéenne rend ses « observateurs » unanimes sur sa beauté et sa richesse. Mais avant de nous [157] pencher sur la question de l'unanimité des opinions, rappelons les faits : pour beaucoup d'entre nous, la Méditerranée est un nom commun désignant un climat, un mode de vie et une structure géopolitique. On tend souvent à considérer que ces trois aspects font de la Grande Mer plutôt une unité : on trouve des climats méditerranéens, africains et européens, comparables sous plusieurs aspects. Remarquons par exemple un phénomène dont on oublie souvent de souligner l'originalité : les climats breton et méditerranéen sont les seuls à ne pas enregistrer un taux de précipitations maximum pendant les mois d'été ! Quant au mode de vie, il ne serait pas étonnant de trouver des « cellules méditerranéennes », dont les influences viendraient d'un climat et d'une géographie similaires. On dit souvent qu'il existe un lien étroit entre le climat et les terres d'une part et les caractéristiques d'une nation d'autre part : « les pays « doux » donnent naissance à des hommes doux », rapporte le roi perse Cyrus 11 (Grant 1969, 310). Concernant la géopolitique, on dit qu'est méditerranéen « tout espace marin dit de deuxième grandeur » (3000 à 4000 kilomètres de longueur) (Carpen-tier et Lebrun 1998,11).
Si la géopolitique, le mode de vie et le climat méditerranéens semblent plus ou moins unifiés, la Grande Bleue reste cependant très variée dans ses profondeurs : entre la Sicile, Malte et la Tunisie, les profondeurs se limitent à 200 mètres, alors que les bassins de l'Ouest et de l'Est connaissent des profondeurs qui atteignent les 5000 mètres ! Concernant la diversité méditerranéenne, la profondeur n'est qu'un exemple parmi beaucoup d'autres.
Il serait intéressant de se poser la question de la raison de cette « variété-dans-l'unité » comme l'appelle Grant (1969, 311) dans l'Appendice de son ouvrage intitulé The Ancient Mediterranean : « La solution est qu'une région donnée présente des possibilités plus ou moins limitées et que ses occupants choisissent parmi celles-ci en fonction de leurs besoins et leurs forces... » Cette réflexion explique mieux l'orig-
ine de l'unité (mêmes possibilités offertes à une nation donnée) ainsi que la provenance de la diversité (ce que chaque nation, voire chaque individu, en fait).
Alors que certains défendent la spécificité méditerranéenne, d'autres [158] soutiennent l'idée que la Méditerranée, en tant q'unité, est un espace réel visant à combler les vides relationnels. D'autres clivages en découlent : si le dialogue interculturel méditerranéen naturel et irréversible est la clé pour certains, d'autres croient à la confrontation, prétextant qu'en raison de leur grande diversité, les cultures et les civilisations méditerranéennes finissent par se heurter. Peut-on alors parler de la Méditerranée sous une forme plurielle plutôt que singulière ?
Il est important de souligner que le but de notre étude n'est pas de défendre l'espace méditerranéen mais de mieux le situer dans le contexte de l'Histoire mondiale, sans omettre d'évoquer ses points forts ainsi que ses points faibles, à savoir les conflits, les conquêtes et les tensions dont il a fait l'objet.
De tout temps, le bassin a subi des invasions et a été la proie d'anciennes puissances mondiales : tantôt la France, tantôt la GrandeBretagne. Si Paris investit le Maghreb, Londres se tourne vers la partie orientale du bassin. Après la Première Guerre Mondiale, les deux puissances se partagent les restes de l'Empire Ottoman. Il faut attendre la fin de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale pour que l'heure de l'indépendance sonne dans les pays colonisés. Pourtant, durant la Guerre Froide, l'espace méditerranéen, du fait de l'importance géopolitique qu'il représente (carrefour commercial entre l'Orient et l'Occident, transit du pétrole, lieu de contact entre le monde occidental et le monde arabe), constitue un enjeu stratégique majeur entre les deux nouvelles superpuissances que sont les Etats-Unis et l'Union Soviétique.
TRAIT d'UNION ENTRE LES TERRITOIRES En dépit des innombrables ruptures qui imprègnent la région, un passé plein de luttes et de combats et un avenir parsemé de doutes, des ponts et des canaux pour les transactions existent encore aujourd'hui et, qui plus est, se développent. La Méditerranée se définit par une interaction constante entre le réel et l'émotionnel, le tangible et l'imaginaire. Ce qui rend le bassin méditerranéen si particulier, c'est bien son Histoire,
sa mémoire, son avenir, son projet. C'est pourquoi il est indispensable aujourd'hui de repenser la Méditerranée et de la concevoir comme une interface dynamique et tangible forte d'assurer la connexion et la mise en relation des territoires qui l'entourent et ceux plus éloignés. D'ailleurs, d'un point de vue étymologique, le terme « Méditerranée » [159] contient l'idée de connexion (le terme de Méditerranée vient du latin mediterraneus qui veut dire « au milieu des terres », sous-entendu « du monde connu » ; medius pour milieu et terra pour terre).
Ce qui fait de la Méditerranée un espace si particulier, c'est bien sa situation à la charnière de trois continents : L'Europe, l'Afrique et l'Asie. Cette convergence tricontinentale a toujours été favorable aux échanges humains et économiques et a rendu les côtes méditerranéennes interdépendantes. Celles-ci constituent un carrefour à la fois naturel, historique et culturel.
Outre la proximité géographique, notons les similitudes culturelles dont sont composées les côtes méditerranéennes. Il est plus aisé de trouver une ressemblance entre un Espagnol et un Maghrébin, un Italien et en Egyptien, plutôt qu'entre un Espagnol et un Chinois, un Italien et un Danois.
Il existe toute une gamme de codes entre les individus méditerranéens qui leur facilitent les échanges, la communication et la compréhension. Il serait malheureux de réfuter l'existence de ces éléments de convergence, qui font que l'on retrouve, où que l'on aille en Méditerranée, des règles et des coutumes familières. Cette chose commune entre les habitants du bassin méditerranéen est souvent ce que l'on appelle « l'atmosphère », qui fusionne les mentalités et converge les modes de vie.
Si l'on remonte loin dans l'Histoire, nous serons plus à même de comprendre l'arrière-plan de cette proximité culturelle. La référence à Al Andalus se rapporte à tout un art de vivre. Depuis le vuième siècle et pendant sept autres longs siècles, la conquête et la colonisation de l'Espagne concordent avec l'essor du monde musulman. Al-Andalus devient alors la zone la plus dynamique du monde connu, attirant grand nombre de savants et d'intellectuels occidentaux tant son rayonnement dépasse ses frontières.
L'Histoire de la Méditerranée et son influence dépassent ses fron-
tières géographiques, et ses tourments culturels affectent ses trois continents. Les traces du temps et les patrimoines du passé s'enracinent sur les côtes et forment une mémoire méditerranéenne commune. Faite d'une multitude d'Histoires, la Méditerranée est avant tout un puissant [160] carrefour de civilisations : les civilisations occidentale et islamique sont déjà en soi deux bons exemples. Paul Valéry définit la Méditerranée comme un « espace matriciel, une machine à faire de la civilisation » (Liauzu 2002, 68).
Mer de passages et de voyages, elle offre un cadre idéal pour les fantasmes et les allégories de la race humaine. Elle nourrit les représentations et les images les plus originales. La Méditerranée est bien un lieu mythique, fictif et fantaisiste. Toutes les convictions s'articulant par exemple autour de la mort, de la renaissance et du jugement de l'âme ont été conçues en Egypte antique, pays du bassin méditerranéen. Des personnages tels qu'Apollon, Œdipe, Zeus, Héraclès et d'autres, figures fondamentales d'un héritage culturel, nous viennent de la mythologie grecque. Cupidon, Diane, Vénus, Mercure, Saturne, et Jupiter sont autant de noms que l'on retrouve dans la mythologie romaine. Notons que les mythes, sources qui façonnent la pensée des peuples et les inspirent dans leur vie, nous viennent principalement des pays méditerranéens, comme si cette mer jouait le rôle de Muse. Si nous parlons ici de mythes, il s'agit bien par là d'évoquer un aspect de la culture qui englobe aussi bien les arts, les lettres, les modes de vie que les droits fondamentaux de l'être humain, les systèmes de valeurs et les connaissances.
Histoire et mythe, cette mer vit donc en partie de ses souvenirs. La nostalgie et les réminiscences évoquées contribuent à créer un imaginaire. Selon Fernand Braudel, avoir été constitue, pour la Méditerranée, une condition pour être.
carrefour de civilisations « La Méditerranée est un patrimoine commun, la source de trois grandes religions, la mère de plusieurs cultures, qui se sont enchaînées dans le temps et dans l'espace. Mais derrière cette unité des 'profondeurs', régulièrement célébrée, la Méditerranée est aussi le lieu de profonds clivages, un front quasi-permanent de conflits, un fossé entre
des mondes hostiles ou supposés tels, » écrit Jean-Robert Henry (1991, 191). Par ses propos, on touche de nouveau au caractère paradoxal de la Méditerranée. Zone de conflits, carrefour d'échanges et de migrations, lieu incomparable d'esclavage, du patriarcat et de l'expansion coloniale de l'Occident, la Méditerranée fut tout de même un espace [161] stratégique qui a été le berceau de civilisations prodigieuses qui se sont mutuellement influencées. C'est dans cette optique que l'auteur poursuit : « plutôt que de réduire la réalité méditerranéenne à l'une de ses dimensions : zone de tempêtes ou au contraire 'lac de paix', frontière ou à l'inverse carrefour de civilisations, il paraît utile pour les observateurs et acteurs que nous sommes de tenter d'embrasser dans un seul mouvement toute cette unité éclatée, toute cette diversité contradictoire de la référence méditerranéenne et d'apprendre à la reconnaître dans nos esprits pour mieux vivre le paradoxe méditerranéen » (Henry 1991,191).
Civilisation occidentale Suite à l'ère des invasions de la Méditerranée au ixème siècle, les pouvoirs se stabilisent en Occident, principalement sur le modèle de la monarchie féodale. Commence alors l'ère des grands progrès des pays euro-méditerranéens. En effet, la France, l'Italie et la péninsule ibérique connaissent un essor sur tous les plans : économique, agricole, hygiénique, culturel, démographique et, petit à petit, technique. Le commerce interrégional se développe, les marchés prennent de l'importance, la monnaie retrouve son rôle. De nouvelles crises ont lieu avec l'explosion des deux guerres mondiales mais, de nouveau, la Méditerranée a su non seulement s'en sortir, mais rapidement se reconstruire.
Civilisation islamique Le premier point fort du monde islamique réside dans son architecture. La ville de Grenade en est l'exemple illustre. Il suffit de voir le palais de l'Alhambra (palais fortifié des califes, xii ième—x i vème siècle), vaste enceinte située sur une colline, comprenant les bâtiments de l'Alcazar (xivème siècle) et les vestiges de l'Alcazaba (xiiième siècle), pour le reconnaître. De tout temps, la Méditerranée a constitué un lieu de mélange de civilisations : le style arabe des palais de Grenade, le style
gothique (chapelle royale qui abrite les tombeaux des souverains Ferdinand II d'Aragon et Isabelle la Catholique) et le style baroque (l'église Saint-Jean-de-Dieu et la chapelle de la Chartreuse) se côtoient.
Notons surtout que les relations entre ces civilisations ne se limi-[162] tent pas aux guerres et aux conquêtes. Elles sont également faites d'influences réciproques mais également de la considération de l'Autre. Prenons pour exemples la péninsule ibérique et la Sicile normande.
C'est à travers l'Espagne omeyyade du xiième siècle que l'Europe établit des rapports étroits avec le monde musulman. On commence à étudier les livres musulmans dans les monastères de Catalogne. La traduction entre les langues latine et arabe connaît un essor extraordinaire. Ceci révèle le vif intérêt que portent les unes pour les autres les diverses civilisations. Grâce à la traduction, le savoir arabe et tout l'intellect oriental furent transmis au monde occidental : récits historiques, poésie, philosophie, médecine, agronomie, astronomie et jusqu'aux régimes alimentaires. Pourtant, si le Nord accepte de se laisser influencer par la civilisation orientale, le Sud, lui, convaincu de sa supériorité intellectuelle et matérielle de l'époque, ne commence à s'intéresser à l'Europe chrétienne que plus de cinq siècles plus tard.
Quant à la Sicile, elle figure parmi les lieux de symbiose privilégiés entre les civilisations du bassin méditerranéen. On distingue même une Sicile musulmane et une Sicile normande. Quand Ibn Jobaïr décrit, à la fin du xiième siècle, les longues avenues de la ville de Palerme, quand il pénètre jusque dans les maisons pour parler de parure, de vêtements, de bijoux et de parfums des femmes, il fait sans aucun doute allusion à l'influence musulmane sur une ville qui deviendra, par la suite, chrétienne. Rien d'étonnant de la part du berceau des trois religions monothéistes. Entre l'émergence, la propagation et la confrontation des trois religions monothéistes, l'espace méditerranéen s'est établi autour de lieux saints (Rome, Jérusalem). Les croisades de l'époque médiévale, à très forte ambition religieuse, ont contribué à façonner le bassin méditerranéen. En ce sens-là, la mer Méditerranée représente véritablement la « Mère » des trois religions du Livre.
Si nous avons cité Grenade et la Sicile, deux lieux phares de la coexistence arabo-européenne, on ne peut passer sous silence Venise, qui se situe au xi ième siècle au contact de plusieurs aires de production et
de consommation, au carrefour du monde occidental, byzantin, slave et musulman, à la rencontre des routes maritimes et des routes terrestres. L'Occident accroît fortement sa consommation de produits orientaux et les arsenaux de Venise construisent des navires à un rythme jusqu'alors encore inconnu.	[163]
Joseph Maïla (1997, 207—208) conclut ainsi à propos de cette pluralité culturelle, cette richesse des civilisations :
La vie de l'esprit s'est déroulée en Méditerranée sur les tréteaux d'une culture plurielle, rebelle à toute simplification et à toute réduction à un unique principe qui la résumerait et qu'elle donnerait à voir. Comme si chaque vague surgie de la même mer apportait son lot d'universalité et comme si la mémoire dépositaire du génie s'était appliquée à retenir en couches sédimentées la richesse diaprée d'une mer renouvelée ; comme si la Méditerranée était une image-monde du monde où vivraient juxtaposés des particularismes d'exception érigés sur le terreau d'une commune humanité. Car la Méditerranée est à l'image même de l'universel : impensable sans de persistantes différences, impossible sans une secrète ressemblance.
appel au voyage De tout temps, la Méditerranée a été un lieu de mixité socioculturelle, une région pour laquelle la première caractéristique serait le cosmopolitisme. On peut aisément attribuer cela à l'attrait que représente la région : elle est la première destination touristique du monde : chaque année, elle représenterait près de 35% du tourisme mondial ! L'héliotropisme (pour la « Grande Bleue ») et le tourisme sont donc des traits caractéristiques de cette région. La popularité touristique du bassin est un premier record. Le second vient du fait que le bassin détient la plus importante biodiversité animale et végétale du monde.
Cette pluralité vient aussi du principe qui consiste à aller à la rencontre de l'Autre. Deux caractéristiques sont fondamentales : d'une part le besoin de communiquer qui enracine le personnage, le plaisir du langage et le rythme de vie expliquent l'abondance des personnages au caractère extraverti. On peut parler de tout un art de communiquer, de nouer des relations, chose pouvant expliquer pourquoi les civilisa-
tions méditerranéennes ont d'abord été orales avant de passer à l'écrit. Autre phénomène communicatif : le recours fréquent des populations du bassin méditerranéen à la gestuelle. D'autre part, on retrouve dans ces populations une grande importance accordée à la communauté et [164] à la famille faisant de l'individu méditerranéen une entité existante par la participation et le partage. Un Méditerranéen, si on peut l'évoquer comme une sorte de « nationalité », n'existe qu'au sein d'un groupe. Même un Méditerranéen expatrié sera rappelé par ses racines et son origine. Cette constance, serait-elle à l'image de l'infini des vagues déferlantes de la Grande Bleue ?
C'est aussi pour cela que la Méditerranée, loin d'exclure, embrasse et fascine (Millet 1999,16) :
L'étrangeté, l'altérité, l'ailleurs, c'est dans cette mer commune, dont en bien des endroits, on aperçoit l'autre rive, la porte à côté. Entre l'exiguïté du littoral et l'au-delà côtier insulaire ou continental à l'horizon qui donne envie d'aller y voir de plus près, il y a un appel au voyage.
la Méditerranée — bassin mythique Déjà les prémices de l'Histoire de la Méditerranée montrent sa nature mythique (Mollat du Jourdin 1997,167) :
La jeune fille Europe est née sur les rives orientales de la Mer Intérieure. Elle y cueillait des fleurs quand elle fut enlevée par le maître des espaces marins, Poséidon, qui l'offrit à son frère Zeus. De l'union d'Europe et du premier des dieux naquit celui qui devait, en régnant sur la Crète, dominer la Méditerranée orientale, Minos.
Mais qu'en est-il du rapport actuel entre l'Europe et la Méditerranée ? Du Jourdin soutient que la Méditerranée n'est plus une mer de l'Europe et que « de Mer Intérieure, [elle] reste une mer internationale, d'où l'Europe, dominant tous les rivages nord, continue à tirer une grande partie de ses raisons d'être et de vivre » (1997,172). Comme Horden et Purcell le soutiennent, c'est la mer qui donne forme à la terre et non l'inverse (2000, 11). Or, cette supériorité de la mer n'est
pas sans raison ; elle découle du rôle communicatif qu'elle joue depuis très longtemps : qui dit mer dit nécessairement véhicule, transport, navigation et communication.
Face à la Méditerranée, on hésite entre méditation et excitation. Le mythe méditerranéen existe certes dans les pensées, mais se discerne [165] également très sérieusement dans les faits : c'est un quotidien, un vécu, une expérience (Morin 1995,12) :
Mes gènes vous diraient que toutes ces identités méditerranéennes successives se sont unies, symbiotisées en moi, et, au cours de ce périple bimillénaire, la Méditerranée est devenue une patrie très profonde. Les papilles de ma langue sont méditerranéennes, elles appellent l'huile d'olive, elles s'exaltent d'aubergines et de poivrons grilles, elles désirent tapas ou mézés. Mes oreilles adorent le flamenco et les mélopées orientales. Et dans mon âme il y a ce je ne sais quoi qui me met en résonance filiale avec son ciel, ses îles, ses côtes, ses aridités, ses fertilités [...]. Méditerranée! Notion trop évidente pour ne pas être mystérieuse ! Mer qui fut le monde et qui demeure, pour nous Méditerranéens, notre monde !
Si les peuples méditerranéens sont régis par un même climat, s'ils mangent les mêmes mets, s'ils adoptent les mêmes danses, c'est qu'ils parlent un peu aussi la même langue.
La Méditerranée permet donc la rencontre des diversités, les différences et les altérités qui font d'elle une interface de brassage et de mélanges. Bénédicte de Saint-Laurent (2008) parle d'un « bazar méditerranéen » ! Un premier coup d'œil montrerait déjà l'existence de deux Méditerranées économiques : l'une des riches au nord, l'autre des pauvres au sud. L'on ne peut voir dans cette démarcation un état, mais plutôt un processus : la rive nord n'a cessé de glisser vers le sud et le Mezzogiorno italien ou l'Andalousie espagnole connaissent depuis quelque temps un niveau de développement proche de celui que connaît la région du nord. Il serait donc plus approprié de parler de « Nords » et de « Suds » pour signifier que la Méditerranée rassemble des situations économiques disparates tant au Nord qu'au Sud. L'historien Paul Balta est allé jusqu' à étudier six rives de la Méditer-
ranée ! Il s'agit de La rive du nord-est ou Méditerranée balkanique, La rive nord-ouest, La rive est ou eurasiatique, La rive est, La rive sud-est et La rive sud-ouest. Dans une seconde tentative de trouver un système de découpage de la Méditerranée, Balta la divise la en cinq [166] régions : Méditerranée occidentale, Méditerranée orientale, Méditerranée arabique, Méditerranée extérieure et Méditerranée caucasienne (Balta 2000, 69—72). La Méditerranée est donc plurielle et riche en diversités. Fernand Braudel (1985, 77) le soulignait d'ailleurs régulièrement dans ses écrits : « Qu'est ce que la Méditerranée ? Mille choses à la fois. Non pas un paysage, mais d'innombrables paysages. Non pas une mer, mais une succession de mers ».
Ainsi, notre hypothèse de départ selon laquelle il est difficile de « cerner » le bassin méditerranéen afin de le définir s'avère pertinente. Cependant, l'étroitesse du bassin, sa géographie, son Histoire et sa faculté à faire converger les différences ont progressivement mené à l'unification de l'espace. C'est ainsi que Braudel reprend la plume pour constater finalement qu' «[...] aujourd'hui en 1972, six ans après la seconde édition française, [...] je puis dire que deux grandes réalités sont restées indéniables. La première est celle de l'unité et de la cohérence de la région méditerranéenne. Je retiens toujours encore la ferme conviction que les Turcs méditerranéens ont vécu et respiré avec le même rythme que les chrétiens, que la mer entière a partagé une seule et même destinée... Et la seconde, c'est la grandeur de la Méditerranée, qui a survécu après l'âge de Columbus et de Vasco da Gama. » (Braudel 1972,14.)
Ainsi unité et diversité du bassin ne s'excluent pas l'une l'autre ; et la diversité ne constitue pas, ou ne devrait pas constituer un obstacle à l'unité. La Méditerranée rassemble plus qu'elle ne dissemble ; elle fait converger plus qu'elle ne fait diverger.
C'est ce qui fit voir à Burckhardt (1959, 23) dans la Méditerranée un continuum : « Le continuum est magnifique. Les peuples autour de la Méditerranée et jusqu'au Golfe Perse représentent un véritable être animé. »
Il suffit de traverser la Sicile ou de s'arrêter à Grenoble pour sentir que l'interculturel n'est pas une notion abstraite. Il suffit de lire Cavafis ou d'écouter Moustaki pour comprendre que l'interaction entre les
cultures est une mission possible. Et si l'on cite ces deux poètes, c'est précisément parce que la poésie est l'art par excellence qui nous offre une ouverture sur cet autre qui est en nous et que l'on ignore.
L'actuel président français se prononce à propos de la diversité : « J'abhorre le racisme. Je déteste la xénophobie. Je crois dans la force [167] et la richesse de la diversité. » En effet, non seulement la France fait de la diversité sa devise, mais la diversité est aussi l'emblème de beaucoup d'autres nations. Une note d'espoir s'en dégage : le besoin d'être ensemble qu'éprouvent beaucoup de nations, ce sentiment de partager et d'avoir en commun ne serait-ce que l'humanité, engendre un essor associatif, un désir d'aller au-delà des limites du territoire sur lequel on vit, mais également de ses propres limites. Les multiples échanges entre les diverses associations culturelles le prouvent. Dans la perspective du processus politique engagé à Barcelone en 1995, la Fondation Anna Lindh pour le dialogue entre les cultures se donne pour mission principale de promouvoir la paix dans le bassin méditerranéen et de rapprocher ses deux rives ; d'aboutir ainsi à une collaboration à grande échelle entre les mondes européen et méditerranéen. La Fondation regroupe 37 pays signataires du partenariat Euromed. Ces pays ont témoigné de la nécessité d'envisager la Méditerranée comme ce qu'elle a toujours été, malgré les aléas de l'Histoire, un espace d'échange et de circulation.
Cambarau (2008,18—19) mélange insistance et désir de voir les gouvernements euro-méditerranéens coopérer pour le bien d'un espace commun : « [...] optimiser la gouvernance politique, économique et sociale en Méditerranée, dans un vaste projet de coopération privilégiée et progressivement approfondie entre l'u e et ses voisins méridionaux, constitue un impératif au demeurant stratégique pour peser efficacement sur l'échiquier international. Un pôle euro-méditerranéen agrégé, qui regroupera près d'un milliard d'habitants à l'horizon 2025, et qui compte aujourd'hui pour près du tiers du pib mondial, peut être façonné si le volontarisme politique se conjugue à la sagesse diplomatique nécessaire. » Paul Balta (1997, 28) met l'accent, dans cet éventuel projet, sur la dimension culturelle, point de rassemblement des peuples méditerranéens : « il convient de réaffirmer que, sans une mise en œuvre ample et résolue de sa dimension culturelle,
le projet euro-méditerranéen perdrait ce qui, précisément, fait son originalité ».
ETONNANTE ciVILISATION MéDITERRANEéENNE [168] Nous voyons donc bien qu'une interactivité entre les diverses identités du bassin méditerranéen est possible. Il semble évident que la dimension culturelle prévue par le processus politique de Barcelone et reprise par le partenariat euro-méditerranéen est loin d'avoir été à la hauteur des ambitions de ce dernier et n'a pas tenu toutes ses promesses. Il reste donc beaucoup plus à faire que ce qui a déjà été fait. Parmi les objectifs que s'est fixé la Fondation Anna Lindh figure celui de promouvoir la mobilité des artistes et des penseurs, chose qui favoriserait l'activité de réseau, les échanges d'expériences, la coopération culturelle et artistique, la naissance de projets culturels ; toutes ces activités qui donnent âme et corps à la notion de « dialogue des peuples et des cultures ». De plus, Anna Lindh lance un grand programme de rencontres publiques afin que les peuples concernés puissent repenser la Méditerranée. La Bibliotheca Alexandrina, partenaire de ce réseau, joue un grand rôle dans ce domaine. Aussi, la Fondation propose une cartographie des dynamiques culturelles, artistiques, éducatives, sociales (pratiques, échanges, lieux) afin de fonder l'action culturelle et artistique sur une connaissance fine des conditions réelles de l'échange en Méditerranée. Sur le plan pratique, il s'agit d'obtenir un « état des lieux » du bassin sur la production culturelle (livres, traductions, disques, pièces,...) et leur circulation, la mobilité des personnes (voyages d'étude, circulation des étudiants et chercheurs, tourisme culturel, jumelages), les formations (première et professionnelle) aux métiers culturels, les financements (publics et privés). Ce travail d'analyse constituerait la base d'une approche plus fondée et plus solide de la coopération culturelle en Méditerranée et de l'action publique et privée en faveur du dialogue euro-méditerranéen. Mais une chose s'impose avant tout : il s'agit de « balayer » tous les préjugés et les stéréotypes qui ne font que bloquer les possibilités d'une coopération heureuse. Mohammed Fouad Ammor l'exprime quand il soutient que « [...] le défi culturel majeur auquel se trouvent confrontés tous les habitants du pourtour de la Méditerranée réside dans la persistance de
clichés et de stéréotypes entretenus par certains médias en quête de sensationnel. Ces représentations donnent corps à des images fallacieuses du type : le sud est vecteur de terrorisme et de fondamentalisme, le nord une forteresse bancale jalouse de ses richesses et excluant le reste du monde. » (Ammor 1997, 40.) Une autre initiative dans le but de [169] favoriser le partage des connaissances serait d'avoir recours aux nouvelles pratiques et aux nouveaux usages liés aux Tic qui constituent des points importants d'action et d'expérimentation dans le domaine culturel, qu'il soit plus particulièrement appliqué aux secteurs des arts, de l'éducation, de l'édition, des échanges ou du développement. Dans un milieu qui privilégie l'oral, qui connaît et reconnaît la valeur de l'autre, l'ambition de vouloir se rapprocher par le dialogue, ne serait-elle pas une ambition réalisable ? En définitive, les composantes de chacune des civilisations sont bien représentées : religions, sciences, modes de vie, concepts intellectuels et jusqu' à la psychologie et le « culte des émotions ». Voici les « ingrédients » d'une civilisation méditerranéenne ancienne, riche, exhaustive même, à la fois unifiée et diversifiée, bref paradoxale (Maïla 1997, 207) :
Etonnante civilisation méditerranéenne qui, au fur et à mesure de son déploiement, balisa les trajectoires de notre culture, fixant l'un après l'autre les repères majeurs de notre Histoire et faisant de nous les dépositaires d'un héritage où l'alphabet fut phénicien, le concept grec, le droit romain, le monothéisme sémite, l'ingéniosité punique, la munificence byzantine, la science arabe, la puissance ottomane, la coexistence andalouse, la sensibilité italienne, l'aventure catalane, la liberté française et l'éternité égyptienne.
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Islam Between the Past and the Present
DRAGAN POTOČNIK University of Maribor, Slovenia
The contribution of the Islamic civilisation to the treasury of the world's arts and sciences is invaluable. The Islamic civilisation reached its peak under the great Umayyad Caliphate and Abbasid Caliphate, and later in the khanates which emerged after the collapse of the Mongol Empire. Its days of glory came in the time of Safavid Persia, Mogul India and Osman Turkey. During this almost a thousand-year long period, the Islamic world represented, together with China, the leading civilisation in the world. The relations between Europe and the Islamic world were often marked with violence and conflicts. The latter began shortly after the emergence of Islam, when the Arabs conquered the Pyrenean peninsula. They increased during the Crusades and reached the climax in the 19th century, with the discovery of oil in Western Asia. The crisis deepened in the 20th century, with the collapse of Osman Turkey. What are the reasons for these conflicts? Is the fear of the Muslims' otherness justified? How will these relations continue in the future?
The history of Islam extends over more than 1400 years and it has more than a billion believers in the world today. The beginnings of Islam date back to the 7th century, when the prophet of God Muhammad was active in the area of Mecca and Medina as a messenger of God, teaching and governing in the name of God. The founder of Islam had, unlike Jesus, spiritual and secular authority. In Muhammad's lifetime, Muslims became a religious and political community in which the Prophet was the head of the state. His authority allowed him to manage the territory and the nation, pass justice, collect taxes, lead the army and make peace. After the death of the Prophet it was necessary to find a suitable successor in order to preserve the unity of the Islamic world and to spread the word of God (Allah). His first successor was the Prophet's father-in-law Abu Bakr. Almost half a century later, the
eagerness which was ignited by the new religion made the Arabs set out to conquer the world, which started one of the most important chapters in the history of the humankind.
Then came the period which is known in Europe as the time of the [172] Middle Ages. During that period, which was almost a thousand years long, Islam and Chine were the leading civilizations in the world. That was the time of the mighty Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphate (caliph was the title of the Muhammad's successor, hence the term caliphate), khanates, which appeared after the fall of the Mongol empire, and the powerful states of Safavid Persia, Mogul India and Ottoman Turkey.
BAGHDAD, THE center OF THE wORLD
FOR half A CENTURY Baghdad was for almost for half a century one of the greatest cultural centers of the ancient world, the place where the Greek and Persian-Arabic worlds got closer again and where scientists and scholars from all over the world gathered. As early as 754, a center for the translation of Greek manuscripts into Arabic was founded in Baghdad. They translated the works of the Greek philosophers Aristotle and Plato, the writings of Neo-Platonists, the writings of Euclid, Archimedes and Ptolemy in the field of natural science, and Hippocrates' textbook in the field of medicine. With the help of the Arabs, Europe became familiar with the works of ancient philosophers, but also with Islamic findings and inventions, as well as with the science and art of ancient India and China. Moreover, the Islamic world gave great scientists, such as Ibn Sina, better known in Europe as Avicenna (980—1037), who wrote a number of works in all the areas of natural sciences. In medicine there was Al-Razi, who was one of the most important Islamic doctors and the author of the book collecting all the medical knowledge of that time entitled Al Hawi (The Perfect Book). He also wrote several dissertations about alchemy. There were also important findings in the area of mathematics, most notably by Al-Khwarizmi, who belonged to the most important Muslim mathematicians and founders of algebra. It was Al-Khwarizmi who adapted the decimal number system of the Indian scholars. Indian numbers including the number zero have since then been named Arabic numbers. In the area
of geography and history, there was Al-Masudi, who is also known as the Herodotus of the Arabs. He wrote a monumental work in 30 volumes entitled The History of Time. One of the most important scientists of the Islamic Middle Ages was Al Biruni (around 973—1048), who was a Persian. His book about astronomy Canon Masudicus was the [173] most complete work of its kind. In his work The Remaining Signs of Past Centuries he left us an invaluable collection of historical, ethnographic and cultural information (Lunde 2003, 48—64).
Equally important was the contribution of Islam to the treasure chest of world art. Art from the time of the Umayyad dynasty laid the foundation for the development of most of the artistic styles. Under the influence of Hellenist and Persian art, first mosques were built. They were inspired by the old Christian basilica and developed in line with the original prayer room of the Prophet. Those foundations resulted in important masterpieces such as the Dome of the Rock, the Grand Mosque of Damascus (Umayyad Mosque), and the mosques in Kufa and Basra which no longer exist (Stierlin 1996, 65—82).
An especially important place in art was held by literature. Of course the holy books of QQuran and Hadith occupied a special significance in literature. QQuran was a rich source for Arabic literature, not only because of its holiness but also as an expression of literary brilliance. One of the greatest writers of prose in Arabic literature was the Persian writer Ibn al-Muquaffa. His greatest work was an adapted translation of the Persian version of the Indian fable with the Arabic title Kakila and Dimna. There were also Arabic fairly tales, the best of which are exemplified by the collection of fairy tales A Thousand and One Nights, which is well-known all over the world.
During the period which is called Arabic renaissance, during the rule of Abbasids, it was poetry which flourished. Poets praised the love of life and sang about love and wine. One such poet was Omar Khayyam, who was the author of 600 quatrains, known under the title Rubaiyat. His poetry shows his love of freedom and is targeted against the religious dogmas while exalting pleasure, sometimes even touching on mysticism. An important poet was also the epic poet Firdausi, who was the author of the most famous Persian book, the Book of Kings (Shahnamah), a national epic which depicts the history of Persia from
its mythic beginnings to the Arabic conquest. Other great poets of that time include Rudaki (Abu Abdullah Jafar), Nizami, Abu Nuwas, Attar (Farid ad-Din). The greatest poets from the time of the Mongol invasion (13th century) were Saadi and Hafez. Saadi is famous for his [174] masterpieces Gullistan (The Rose Garden) in prose and Bustan (The Orchard), expressing morality and teachings which are considered as the classical expression of Persian popular wisdom. Saadi lived in Shi-raz, the city which a century later was also the place of Hafez, another great Persian poet. Hafez wrote masterful gazelles in which he praised wine, love, the joys of life and the beauty of nature. This was also the time of Jelaluddin Rumi, a mystical poet who is considered to be the founder of the order of the whirling dervishes. (Lewis 1976,117—200).
Literary art was also closely linked to the art of miniature, which was for a long time developed only in manuscripts. At first Arabs did not have a painting tradition. The first examples of such art were probably the work of Christians (Byzantines and Copts).
The rich tradition of the caliphate was continued by Ottoman Turks and also the Persians. Thanks to the great Turkish architect Sinan, we can admire numerous mosques (Suleyman Mosque in Istanbul, Selimiye Mosque in Edirn), madrasah and hamams. He was also active in the Balkans, where he built the bridge on the River Drina in Visegrad (Stierlin 1998, 65—82).
The contribution of Persian civilization into the treasure chest of world art was also great. Islamic Persia reached its peak during the rule of the shah Abbas. This was the period when philosophy, theology and the fine arts flourished. It was the time of philosophy which originated from Aristotle's principles, from classical Islamic and Persian philosophy. This was also the time of architecture. The most beautiful buildings can be found in Isfahan, which turned into one of the architecturally most beautiful cities under the Shah Abbas (Potočnik 2006, 70—3).
anterior AsIA in the 19TH and 20TH centuries
From the beginning of the 19th century onward, the Islamic world came under the pressure of imperialist and colonial interests from Eu-
ropean countries, especially Great Britain, France and Russia. At the end of the i8th century, the Quadschari dynasty came into power in Persia. At that time, Persia was faced with great internal and external political problems. Russia used the opportunity and took regions in Caucasus away from helpless Persia. After the Russian victories, Persia [175] was forced to accept the loss of even more land in Caucasus with two peace treaties (in 1813 and 1828). It also had to give up the building of a naval fleet in the Caspian sea.
The discovery of oil in the 19th century brought western companies to Persia. The British Anglo-Persian oil company soon appropriated itself of the oil fields in the Persian Gulf. The systematic reforms and the modernization of the country started during the rule of the Shah Nasir ad Dino (rule from 1848 to 1896). Following the efforts in modernization of the state in the Ottoman Empire, Persia also developed its own constitutional movement in 1900. In 1906 the Shiite priests became associated with some of the most progressive members of the middle class and they forced the Quadschari ruler Musafar ad Dino to give the country a constitution, which remained in effect till 1979. But due to strong internal resistance, the constitution could not be really implemented. Already in 1911, the parliament was violently disassembled.
In i907, Persia became more and more dependent on Great Britan and Russia because of its debts. Even though Persia did not actively participate in the World War i, it came under an even stronger British influence after the war. It was the renewal of the movement for the constitution which protected Persia from coming under the British protectorate.
In 1924, Reza Khan, an officer of Persian Cossacks, brought down the Quadschari dynasty and established the Pahlavi dynasty, which remained in power till i979. In order to modernize the country, the new shah ruled without the influential Shiite clergy. He also used violence in trying to abolish old customs in traditions. Persia was protected by treaties with its neighbors, but this did not prevent its involvement in the World War ii. In 1941, the country was occupied by Russian and British troops and the ruler had to step down. The same year he was succeeded by his son Mohamed Reza Pahlavi.
In 1951, the prime minister Mohamed Mosadik nationalized the oil industry and forced the shah to step down. But Iran was badly affected by the decrease in world oil prices together with the British boycott of Iranian oil. After the coup in 1953, the shah regained his power and [176] the foreigners again retained the central role in the oil industry. In the period from 1979 on, the shah tried to develop the country following western countries as role models. His neglectful treatment of religion and the violence of the secret police provoked hatred from members of different strata of society. In 1979, the unrest and uprisings in the cities forced the shah to flee the country. The same year, the Shiite spiritual leader ayatollah Khomeini, returned from his exile. On 30 March 1979, the Islamic republic was proclaimed. This ended the period of Iranian monarchy. The leadership of the country was assumed by the ayatollahs, the highest Muslim priests in the country. Khomeini was the political and spiritual leader of the country till 1989.
At the end of 1979, the rising inner political tension became even worse after the occupation of the American Embassy. The crisis was further intensified by the Iraqi-Iranian War, which out in 1980, when the Iraqi troops invaded Iran. This was the beginning of the 8-year Iraqi-Iranian War, also known as the Gulf War. The consequences of the war were detrimental to both countries. Iran was affected by inflation, unemployment and general economic misery. The conflict with the usa flared up again in 1987/1988, when there came to a series of fights between the Iranian naval forces and the usa battleships. The relationship with the usa again worsened after the American occupation of Iraq in 2003.
From the beginning of the 16th century, Afghanistan was also ruled by the Safavid dynasty. When the shah Ahmed Durani attained the unity of Afghan tribes in 1747, he created a monarchy which was based on successful wars against Persia and India and which persisted almost without interruption till 1973. In the 19th century, Afghanistan became the victim of imperialistic tensions between Russia and Great Britain. This caused several wars. With the second Afghan War (1878—1880), the British managed to create in Afghanistan a buffer state against Russian imperialistic tendencies towards Afghanistan. It was the third Afghan War from 1921 which brought independence to Afghanistan,
but it stayed under a strong British influence. In 1973 the monarchy ended with a military coup which deposed the king Mohamed Zahir. Soon after that, in 1978 there was a communist coup supported by the Soviet military and a civil war broke. The communist rule was endangered by the revolt from the traditionalistic Islamic Mujahedin, but [177] it managed to stay in power through the military intervention by the Soviet Union in 1978. Several years later, in 1989, the Soviet soldiers left the country, but the conditions in Afghanistan remained unstable. Fierce internal fights for power among individual political groups in the country continued. In 1992, the pro-soviet government fell. The Mujahedin proclaimed the Islamic republic of Afghanistan. In 1996, they were removed from power by the Taliban militia. The Taliban renewed tribal institutions. In 2001, the usa ended the terror of the Taliban rule with a military action.
In the modern age, a major power in this area was the Ottoman empire, which by that time had experienced several decades of decline. In the period between the beginning of the 19th century and the end of the World War i, they tried to renew and modernize the country, but the trade and colonial inroads that the European countries made into the Near East and northern Africa undermined their fragile economy. The consequences of the long crisis were the increasing demands for independence from the peoples oppressed by the empire and the subsequent loss of extensive territories due to secession. The fight for freedom from 1821 to 1829 led to the Greek uprising and the Turkish-Egyptian War in the year 1839. After the Crimean War (1854—1856) the country became destabilized by internal wars and revolutions. In 1908, the uprising of the Young Turks took place. This was followed by new uprisings and new losses of extensive territory (Romany, Serbia, Bulgaria, the Balkan Wars). Parts of the territory were taken over by other countries. Austria, for example, annexed Bosnia in 1908. The worst consequences followed from Turkey's defeat by Russia in the 1870s.
In the second half of the 19th century, the European influence on the Ottoman empire increased, which resulted in the monopolization of the infrastructure for land connections between Western and Southern Asia. In 1895, the German empire gained the concession for building the Baghdad railroad, the works on which began in 1903 and were
finished much later in 1940. The European influence could also be seen in the British conquest of the south of Yemen, which allowed the British to control the way into the Red Sea. The rest of Yemen was lost to the Ottoman empire much later in 1918. In the 19th century, [178] the British also made protection agreements with Oman and individual shaikhates in the Persian gulf and on the Bahrain island. Under the French-British leadership, the Suez Canal was completed by 1869.
In the World War I, Turkey was part of the Central Axis (Germany). The decisive defeat of the Ottoman was achieved when the British gained the support of the Arabic Bedouin army with the help of the colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia).
After the World War i, Turkey lost the islands in the Aegean sea, Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Arabia and Thrace due to the peace treaty of Sevres in 1920. Turkey was left only with Anatolia, the sea passes and Istanbul. The treaty was fought against by the nationally minded Turks under the leadership of Atatürk, who chased the Greeks from Asia Minor (from Izmir and its surroundings) and achieved a new peace treaty in Lausanne in 1923, which established the borders of Turkey which still exist today. The last sultan Mehmed VI had to leave his throne. Under the leadership of Atatürk the country was modernized through western style reformation. In the World War II it remained neutral till the end in 1945, when it declared war to Germany. In the following period its relationship with the Soviet Union worsened, and it became more dependent on the economic and military help from the usa. Turkey has been a member of nato since 1952.
Due to the problem of Cyprus, their relationship with Greece has experienced several lows. In 1974, the Turkish army occupied the northern part of Cyprus and established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This was followed by inner political conflicts between left and right extremists. The state coup in 1980 was a consequence of these circumstances. It was only in 1990s that the situation became more stable. This was the beginning of the process of gradual democratization and modernization of economy.
The Turks also ruled over the territory of Palestine during a 400-year period (from 1516/1517 to 1917/1918). During the World War I,
Palestine was occupied by the English. In the second half of the 19the century, this area became more heavily populated with Jews, mainly due to their emigration from Russia, where they suffered the pogroms.
In 1897, the first Zionist congress in Basel laid the foundations for the sionistic movement: the foundation of the Jewish state. After the [179] World War I, The League of Nations accepted the British decision and gave Syria and Lebanon to France, and Iraq and Palestine (Transjordan) as a mandate territory to Great Britain. Transjordan gained partial independence in 1923, but it remained financially and politically dependent on the Great Britain. In 1946 it was proclaimed a sovereign state and became the Kingdom of Jordan.
When it seemed that the question of the Near East would be solved with the independence gained by most of the Arabic countries in the 1930s and 1940s, the immigration of Jews into Palestine created a new crisis point. In the period from 1882 to 1939, the number of Jewish immigrants increased to 425,000, which amounted to 30% of the population of Palestine. The Arabs were strongly opposed the Jewish immigration, but to no avail. In the period between 1928 and 1939, there were five big uprisings, but London completely stifled all of them. The Arabic opposition to Jewish colonization forced the mandate authorities to restrict Jewish immigration from 1939 onward.
One of the first international decisions adopted by the UNO after 1945 was the decision about the division of Palestine between the Jews and the Arabs. This led to the foundation of the state of Israel, which was proclaimed in 1948, immediately after the English moved out of Palestine. The Arabs rejected the plan and the first war between the Jews and the Palestinians broke. Despite of the support that the Palestinians received from the Arabic countries, the war ended with the Arabic defeat. Israel was weaker economically and in terms of population, but after the war it managed to extend its territory by 30% more than what was originally determined by the division plan.
Most of Palestine thus became incorporated into the Jewish state of Israel, while the rest was united with Transjordan into the state of Jordan. The land strip along Gaza was occupied by Egypt. After 1948, there were three more wars, which were caused by the wish of Arabic refugees to return home and the demands of the Palestinians to have
their own state. In order to realize these demands, the Palestinian Liberation Organization was founded in 1964. It soon organized military and political activities for the liberation of Palestine and started to launch guerilla attacks. The usa tried early on to secure its influence [180] in that region, which resulted in the Baghdad treaty in 1955. The treaty was signed under American pressure by Great Britain, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey with the purpose of minimizing the influence of the Soviet Union in this area.
In 1978, South Lebanon became another crisis point, as it was attacked by Israel targeting the plo. Lebanon developed intense internal tensions after the World War ii, because it was divided into several Christian and Muslim religions, while its internal affairs were under the influence of other Arabic countries. In 1958, a civil war out and it continued with interruptions the following 20 years. As a consequence, Lebanon was divided into the Christian part and the Muslim part which were ruled by different militias.
In the beginning of the 16th century, the Turks occupied the territory of Syria. The Turkish authority persisted in this country until the end of the World War i. Soon after the territory was abandoned by the Turks, European powers returned to the Syrian shores. The hope of independence was destroyed by the Sykes—Picot agreement in 1916, which planned the division of the Ottoman empire into several interest spheres. According to this agreement, France would get Syria, Great Britain would keep Iraq, and Russia tried to secure its influence in the area of Bosporus. The involvement of European powers in the area of Western Asia was later recognized by the Balfour declaration, which stressed the British support for the political meaning of the Zionist movement. This movement later, when the Jewish state was created in Palestine, served as a protection for the British influence in the eastern Mediterranean.
Syria came under the French authority and was occupied by the French troops. In 1920 there was already a strong resistance against the French. After fierce fighting between the French and the independence movement, Syria gained independence in 1946. After the declaration of independence, they set out to build a country based on Islamic and socialist foundations. From 1958 and 1961, Syria was part of the United
Arab Republic. It got involved in several Israeli-Arab wars, and in 1976 also in the Lebanon Civil War.
In the middle of the 16th century, the Turks conquered the northern and eastern parts of the Arabic peninsula. In the 18th century, they founded the state of Wahabites in the land of Najd, which in 1806 also [181] took over the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The Wahabites then established an alliance with Mohamed Ibn Saud, the patriarch of the military Bedouin tribe of Saud. The connection between QQuran and fighting has to this day been the motive on the flag of the kingdom: on the green banner of the Prophet, the curved sword underlines the Islamic faith. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Bedouin family Saud was strengthened with the British support, and the Turks had to leave the Arabic peninsula. In 1926, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud proclaimed himself the king of Najd, Hedjas and dependent territories, and in 1932 he became the king of Saudi Arabia. The country was ruled in the manner of an absolute theocracy. In the 1930s, they started to pump oil and modernize the country western-style. The power of the royal family has remained unchanged to this day despite of the increasing demands for political reformation.
One of the countries of the Near East which were created from the Ottoman Empire was also Iraq. During the World War I, the British took Mesopotamia from the Turks, and after the war it came under the British authority. Under the British authority, the Mesopotamian leaders named the country Iraq in 1921, and they founded a kingdom with the king Faisal I in power. Iraq became independent in 1931, with the British retaining their right to participate in political decisions. Soon after its foundation, Iraq became riddled with inner political problems, which were caused by the fact that the country consisted of Arabic, Kurdish, partly Shiite and partly Sunni groups of population. In 1958 the revolutionary military officers murdered the king Faisal 11 and declared Iraq a republic. This was followed by a decade of unrest and uprisings, until the party Baas came into power in 1968. In 1973, the government nationalized the oil industry. When Iraq attacked Iran in 1980, the crisis worsened. The renewal after the end of the war was again stopped by the sudden Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, which caused another war crisis. The Iraqi crisis reached its climax in 2003 with the
invasion of American forces and the fall of Sadam Husein's regime.
At the beginning of the 1960s, a civil war broke out in Yemen, which ended with the fall of the monarchy of North Yemen. In 1970, the Arab Republic of Yemen (North Yemen) was founded, while the [182] British protectorate of the South-Arabic federation became an independent state of South Yemen in 1967. Three years later South Yemen turned into a Socialist Democratic Republic of Yemen. In the 1980s, it suffered a severe economic crisis. In the northern part of the country, the central government was influenced more and more by the tribal communities, which caused concern that it might lose authority completely. The situation was solved when the two countries were gradually united into one country. In 1990 both countries were formally united (Yapp 1987,179—373).
THE ROOT OF confliots The Islamic world was several centuries ahead of the West. The relationship between Europe and the Islamic world was often marked by violence and fighting. Where are the roots of these conflicts? The beginnings date back to the years after the foundation of Islam. As early as 711, the Arabs came across the Gibraltar and in a few years conquered almost the whole of the Iberian peninsula. Despite the fact that Spain experienced an economic and cultural development under the Arabs, the Moors (the Muslims) were considered as the main enemies of Spain (Lewis 2004, 20—53).
This conflict between western (Christian) Europe and Islam grew even more intense during the period of the Crusades. After the defeat of the Crusaders and their expulsion, it was not until the 18th century that the European countries threatened the Arabic world again, during the time of the imperial politics of European countries in South and Southeastern Asia. It was mainly Portuguese ships, and occasionally English and Dutch ships, which stopped on the shores of Islamic states and first started trading and then continued by conquering the strategic places (Krieger 2003,122—148).
This was the time of the worst invasions by the Turks (15th to 18th centuries) into the territory of Europe. However, wars in the name of God in religion were not waged only by the Muslims, but also by the
Christians. This was a time of wars, a time in which a nation who did not conquer was conquered. It is wrong to believe that it is written in Quran that Islam should be spread by the sword. The very opposite is true: (Quran says that conversion into a different religion should not be forced. It also forbids the destruction of religious buildings (Quran [183] 2:56).
During the rise of European states in the 19th century, Great Britain, France and Russia started gradually to occupy areas of Anterior and Central Asia. There were several reasons why the Islamic world was such an easy prey for the European states, turning into a mere shadow of its former self. The most significant of these reasons were corruption, incompetent rulers, disunity of the Islamic world (Sunnites and Shiites), political instability, slow reforms and general technical underdevelopment.
oil as an introduction to humiliation The situation worsened for the Muslims even more when oil was discovered in Anterior Asia in the 19th century and their exploitation began. The discovery of oil brought many western companies to Anterior Asia. One such example was the British Anglo-Persian oil company which soon took over the management of the oil fields along the Persian Golf. Foreigners thus gained a central role in oil industry.
Foreign, western European companies and increasingly also American companies started to endanger even the holy Islamic places (Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem and Baghdad), which irritated the Muslims even more than the economic exploitation.
The relationship between both civilizations deteriorated even more due to the crisis in Turkey after the end of the World War I. In 1920, Ottoman Turkey was completely defeated as the last of the great Islamic empires. The Turks themselves abolished the sultanate, which also meant the end of the caliphate. Many Muslims had trouble accepting the fact that the force of imperialist countries and domestic (Turkish) modernizers brought to a sorry end the period of almost thirteen centuries of caliphate. Caliphate was the symbol of Muslim unity, progress and identity.
Another strike for Islam came with the foundation of the Jewish
state in i948, which triggered several wars between the Jews and Palestinians and indirectly caused a conflict between the usa and Islam. The above facts also figure as the main reproaches in the statements of the first enemy of the usa Osama bin Laden. He exploits the feelings [184] of humiliation and shame that the Islamic world has experienced in the past hundred years to wage his war against the usa.
In the west, Islamic civilization is often seen as an opposition to Christianity, especially as a religion which is undemocratic and hostile to women Here it has to be noted that both religions originate from the same roots and that often the reason for intolerance lies in the lack of knowledge in the West about Islam. In all its aspects, Islam is closer to Judeo-Christian tradition than to any other religion. It could be even said that Judaism, Christianity and Islam represent the variants of the same religious tradition. Christianity and Islam are both essentially successors of the Jewish law, and also of Greek philosophy and science. Of course there are considerable differences between the two religions (Lewis 1995,305—86).
The reason why Islamic civilization is often marked as undemocratic and uncivilized can also be attributed to the fact that many Islamic countries do not have a democratic tradition. The influence of Islamic clergy together with the local traditions often result in the lack of human rights, most notably the rights of women.
quran is not opposed to human rights Living according to the teaching of Quran is a duty for every Muslim. The teaching of life according to (Quran is acceptable for any society and is not opposed to any ethical norms of civilized society. Sometimes it is difficult to assess Islamic society according to the standards of European society. (Quran teaches that the woman is the pillar of the family and has to be respected. In practice I have often experienced the opposite in my travels, notably in Pakistan, where the situation of women is rooted in the tradition which is not directly connected to Islam. On the other hand, the covering of women is in accordance with the (Quran, which says that the woman should be covered in public in order not to excite men with her appearance.
Another legal and cultural phenomenon of Islam is polygamy. Dur-
ing the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad, polygamy with an unlimited number of wives was something ordinary. Polygamy also used to exist or still exists today in some non-Islamic countries. However, the ideal of the matrimonial union in Islamic countries is a monogamous marriage. The following quote from the Quran clearly shows this: 'If [185] ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, marry women of your choice. Two or three or four, but if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly (with them), then only one.' (Quran 4:3.)
Polygamy is thus more an exception rather than a rule. In some Islamic countries, polygamy is prohibited, e. g. in Tunisia and Turkey. It more commonly appears only in the upper classes of Saudi Arabia, in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and in the sub-Saharan Africa.
Islam should be regarded with respect which is accorded to those who have a different religion and not with fear of what is considered as an aggressive religion threatening world peace. The greatest problem of tolerance in Europe is its lack of knowledge about Islam. Many of those who are the most hostile towards Islam have never read the Quran. Distorted information has caused a distorted understanding of the essence of Islam. It is not correct to make generalizations about Islam on the basis of terrorist attacks in New York or London. If we had read the Quran, we would know that it says that killing one person is like killing the whole world, and saving the life of one person is like saving the whole people. The fear of Muslims is unfounded, since they enrich the world with their customs and traditions, and also teach us about love and respect of fellow human beings.
references
Krieger, M. 2003. Geschichte Asiens. Köln: Böhlau.
Lewis, B. 1995. The Middle East: 2000 years of history from the rise of Christianity to the present day. London: Phoenix.
-. 2004. The Muslim discovery of Europe. New York: Norton.
-. 1976. Welt des Islam: Geschichte und Kultur im Zeichen des Propheten.
München: Orbis.
Lunde, P. 2003. Islam: A brief history. London: Penguin.
Stierlin, H. 1996. Islam, early architecture from Baghdad to Cordoba. Köln: Taschen.
Stierlin, H. 1998. Turkey: From the Selçuks to the Otomans. Köln: Taschen.
Potočnik, D. 2006. Azija med preteklostjo in sedanjostjo. Maribor: Pivec. Yapp, M. E. 1987. The making of the modern Near East 1792—1923. London and New York: Longman.
Unity and Diversity in Euro-Mediterranean Identities: Euro-European and Arabo-Mediterranean Dimensions
AFFAYA RIM
Al-Akhawayn University, Morocco
it is widely recognized that the historical interactions between the peoples surrounding the Mediterranean Sea have largely contributed to the drawing of the cultural, political and religious civilization of the region and affected the itineraries of several other movements occurring in other regions of the world. The Romans, the Islamic golden age, the Middle Ages, and the Modern Era testify to an original history that is indispensable to consider in order to comprehend the renaissance of the Euro-Mediterranean identity as a central issue to decorticate the present situation. This research is a reflection on the distinction to be made when approaching the Euro-Mediterranean identity as composed of diverse and multiple characteristics. The implications of such a dichotomized identity in a globalized world need to be examined by revisiting its history through their common bonds that rely on their past collective memories, but also through what makes them distinct from one another today. The paper begins by highlighting the importance of reflecting on national identities as a concept that is changing over time, places and the introduction of new actors on the international scene. Next, it stresses the common European identity in the light of the history of Europe and the European Union, and contrasts it with the Arab Mediterranean identity. It then calls for an essential Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in the light of a common identity in order to reflect on a common future.
In the modern concept of the nation-state, tools such as education, myths, legends, and fantasies along with other things have been used to strengthen the sense of community, to unite and reproduce, and also to reinforce, transmit and spread what is conceptualized as a 'na-
tional culture.' Quite often, definite borders constituting the narratives around the national identity, or what characterizes 'the otherness,' are constructed upon trivial prejudices and stereotypes.
Today, although nation-states still remain the dominant socio-[188] political organization in the international sphere, they are increasingly challenged by core changes that alter and redefine their conventional roles. The internationalization of the economy and culture, the deliberate transfer of sovereignty from nation-states to supranational structures (such as the European Union), can be considered as factors which have resulted in the appearance of new kinds of identities and the introduction of new aspects of 'the other' in cultural, economic and political terms.
Indeed, our present is an era in which the world is seriously interrelated and in which the international scene witnesses other important actors such as civil society, multinationals, or non-governmental associations. Thus, the renaissance of the Euro-Mediterranean identity, as a central issue on the political scene and among academics, suggests revisiting its history with new eyes. One should rediscover its potential as an essential bridge between other regions and different cultures. Indeed, although for centuries the Mediterranean symbolized a crossroads between the actors of both sides — the Northern shore (Christian Civilization) and the Southern part (Islamic Civilization) —, acting as a historic viaduct for a variety of ethnic, religious and cultural traditions, today the Euro-Mediterranean as a united and diverse land-related identity does not necessarily suggest a vivid and vibrant entity. Rather, if one assumes that a Euro-Mediterranean identity truly exists, one should draw attention to the importance of distinguishing between its root elements. The distinction to be made concerns the Euro-European identity as an outcome of its shared history and culture on the one hand, and the Mediterranean identity as a distinguishable historical links and joint memories on the other. Accordingly, the idea behind the existence of a common Euro-Mediterranean identity relies on what European countries as whole, including the North East ones (not only the Mediterranean ones), and North African and Middle Eastern have and still share together. Their common bond would be their past collective memories and what came up from them.
a common european identity
iN THE LiGHT of THE HiSTORY of europe
and the european union The complexity of national identities is illustrious; they are the product of a combination and a synthesis of various social, political and [189] cultural stories. They are needed for a nation to be. As such, 'nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist' (Gellner 1983,35). Rather, community identities are related to several constituents such as the history, the accomplishments achieved together, the common vision of the future, etc. but the most essential element is, unquestionably, the territorial dimension because the communities 'derive their distinctiveness from it' (Anderson 1998, 18). In this perspective, Europe today consists of nation-states, all of which had a particular genre of territorial sociabi-lization that came up with well-established national identities.
Yet, the idea to unite all the different people of Europe under the same unit goes beyond the geographical dimension. Indeed, one of the first robust connections that bonded Europeans was initially the will to introduce and maintain peace on the continent. The Pan European Movement, created by Coudenhove Kalergi in 1923, was the outcome of a common wish to create an independent block due to the emergence of new global superpowers (usa, Bolshevik Russia). The appearance of such movements was not explained only by the need for political and geo-strategic prevention due to a loss of influence and strength at the international level; it was more of an expression of a common will to create a continental driving force that would lead to a common strategy towards 'foreigners.' Thus, since then, 'the other' has been defined from the European perspective as everything that is not geographically included between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains, the Arctic Ocean and the Mediterranean.
Another reason to unite Europeans under the same entity would be their common Judeo-Christian religious history. In fact, in addition to their Judaic origins, Europeans have been linked to Christianity for centuries, through the Holy Roman Empire, from the 'Frankish king and emperor Charlemagne (742—814) and the authority of the pope.' This religious connection represents for Europeans an important di-
mension of a common identity in the sense that religion, as a social and political regulator, has been for a very long time a way to bond Europeans together by common sacred roots of identity. In spiritual terms, 'European political thinking is inspired by the teachings of Au-[190] gustine and the School of Salamanca' (European values and identity 2005).
Nevertheless, it is worth recalling here that non-European influences cannot be ignored. In reality, Judaism and Christianity have both emerged outside of Europe, and have developed within contexts that happened to be absolutely not European. In this sense, Europeans have throughout history shared common features with other populations that live outside their borders. In fact, their relationship with, and the influence of other continents which have practised the same or a different religion such as Africa or the Middle East is incontestable. In this regard, 'in the construction of the Turkish peril the Hapsburg monar-chs and their population saw themselves in the front line. They were the Christian bulwark against the expanding Islam under the Osmanic Empire' (Strâth 2003). In this sense, historic rivalry over religion has contributed to reinforcing a certain sense of Euro-Christian identity, as for example, 'the victory over the Turks in Vienna in 1683 became in the self-reflection Austria's salvation of European Christian unity.' But before that time, the interactions with other religions had greater meaning and interest for Europeans than only rivalry. Indeed, the crusades (1095—1291) have allowed them to discover a very civilized world in the Muslim Oriental states. For the Muslims at that time, God was one part and science and reasoning was another — two clear and separated areas; while Christian Europeans were still referring to the idea that 'I think, so God is.'
Further, the creation of a school of translation of Arab and Hebrew manuscripts played a significant role in permitting the discovery of precious writings belonging to the Greek antiquity. Up until that time, the Greek philosophy such as Aristotle's was completely unknown to Europeans and this era of history, in addition to the legacy of the Roman law, has been one of most important bases of European unification around common principles such as humanism, secularism, democracy and other notions that will emerge from later movements.
From the heritage of Ancient Greece and Rome emerged the Enlightenment, which has in its turn become one of the cornerstones of a common European identity. Jointly, the main historical roots of European identity are 'a combination of Greek philosophy, Roman law, Christianity, humanism and the Enlightment' (European values and [191] identity 2005).
So, yes there is a European identity in the form of a European heritage. At the risk of oversimplifying, democracy, human rights, equality, the rule of law, etc., are principles which constitute the moral base of a European identity. From the East to the West and with a broad and diverse Europe, such principles enable Europeans to unite under the same bonding agent.
European social and cultural identities as a historical development have later on taken additional dimensions. The present situation of Euro-European identities has acquired further aspects, especially with worldwide phenomena such as globalization and cosmopolitanism and more specifically, the European Union integration. On 14 September 1999, Romano Prodi in his speech at the European Parliament emphasized the idea that the Europeans need to create a kind of 'union of hearts and minds, underpinned by a strong shared sentiment of a common destiny.' Indeed, since the creation of the European Union, advocates of integration and analysts of European public opinion have come to refer increasingly to the notion of European Identity. European attitudes began to be investigated and the sense of the European community emerged in academic and scientific research. This is because the decisions of the European Union started to have an important and direct hold on European citizens. Now, Europeans can travel easily across the continent, they can work in countries other than their own, students can effortlessly spend time abroad, and more and more national norms are now the meager application of European decisions. Howewer, we need to make a distinction here between the institutional establishment of identities and collective bargaining, and how European people internalize them. In fact, we know little about how a Spanish person came to consider himself/herself in terms of identity after the establishment of the European Union. With the complexity and the diversity inside Europe, the references of identity
are multiple. Indeed, considering this Spanish person as first, 'Spanish' then as 'European,' and then whatever may be his/her personal reference of identity, can be wrong. If this same person comes to be living in a small village in Cataluna, his/her sense of identity would be [192] completely different. Indeed, the majority of Spanish people identify themselves with Spain as well as with the region where they belong. Someone from Cataluna may feel at the first level as a Catalonian, then Spanish, European and maybe at the last level, Mediterranean. Contrary to frequent beliefs, the development of European identities does not necessarily mean the decline of national and local identities. In fact, it seems that Europeans acquire their identities by level of importance.
With the enlargement of the European Union to twenty-seven member states, the issue of identity and diversity became complex and fragile in a Europe where different languages, cultures and customs coexist. Today, after devastating wars that ended up with a regional integration, Europeans do unite under the same political identity, but the diversity of their identities makes it harder to speak about unity. In reality, there are in many European countries minorities living side by side peacefully or not, who do not necessarily indentify themselves with aspects of the so-called European identity. Indeed, we can find Romanians, Bulgarians, and even Russians in Greece; Portugal is full of people from Angola, Brazil, Mozambique, and Ukraine. Many Albanians are in Macedonia, and there are thousands of migrants from China, South America and North Africa in Spain. London, Paris and Rome, three main European capitals are known to be full of migrants coming from all over the world. Thus, the sense of European identity varies and depends a lot on the historical roots of each group making Europe. For example, a Moroccan Muslim family living inside the border of a European state may certainly adapt to all of its realities. However, this same family may also feel more related to its state of origins than to the European country in which it lives since most of Muslim families are issued from the phenomenon of immigration.
So, during the debates over the creation of the 'European Union' in the 1950s — a European continent economically, politically and 'culturally' united — the attempt of policy makers to propose values and
establish a collective identity was under the slogan of 'united in diversity.' As stated above, Europeans had already respectively their own cultures and identity references; and they had to adapt and assimilate new constituent features of what it is to be European. The question that arises here is whether it is possible to apply this notion of'united [193] in diversity' to the peoples of the Mediterranean?
Today it is easier to find commonalities between Europeans and to define the characteristics of their common sense of being a European, than to determine who is and who feels being a Mediterranean. Further, the fragmentation of the geo-political reality of the Mediterranean region and the break-down of communication between its inhabitants does not allow for the existence of a positive and cheerful model as 'united in diversity.' For its part, the wounds caused by the wars in Europe had the time to heal; and today we can witness the realization of a continental peaceful coexistence.
the arab mediterranean identity 'In both the physical and human sphere, the Mediterranean is a crossroads, the Mediterranean is a heteroclite and coherent image into which everything emerges and settles back into an original unit.' Fernand Braudel in this statement (quoted in Lonni 2003) gives a broader sense to the Mediterranean as both a local bridge and an area where human exchanges have been intense during the past and where diversity emerges from unity. The people living in the Mediterranean do have a shared ancient culture and established relations. However today, the sea has been transformed from a spiral of prosperity, full of life and tolerance to a sea representing a block between inter-continental conflicts and contrasts.
The presence of national identities in the Mediterranean is full of controversy because of the doubt around their authenticity. Some of them are, indeed, the result of a long historical and cultural homogeneity; others are the product of imagination and are far from the local history. In fact, many of the Mediterranean nation-states are born from the decolonization process that had massively occurred during the second half of the nineteenth century. The way in which the process had developed came from a new international phenomenon
which advocated control of the people's movements by fixing barriers and frontiers. Rather than tolerating and encouraging the fluidity of groups and their unpredictability, the international scenario demanded more management and control. In the meantime, the European con-[194] cept of national identity has been well-articulated, evoking similarity and shared values, but also suggesting separation and differences from 'the other.'
The breakings off in the Mediterranean basin have been provoked by national separations and the emergence of ideas such as civilizations in conflict. The present political landscape together with the emphasis on cultural and industrial inferiority, tend to separate the Mediterranean basin into two parts. The North side is characterized by development, modernization and Western ideas while the South shore is portrayed as the Oriental part, weak and where we find the discomfort of the diversity and the underdeveloped condition. In this regard, the European identity is based on what is common to its citizens, but also what differentiates them from the others, as if the role of identity is to make the distinction between the self and the others. They tend to emphasize their differences from people inside their borders such as the migrants and especially the Muslims living within Europe and outside such as people of the South Mediterranean. In this sense, the Mediterranean seems to be severely split into two distinct parts, and centuries of common history seems to have disappeared from memories.
It is worth here to mention that the Mediterranean is not composed of a single and static identity. Indeed, we need to think in terms of multiple belongings, as a person from the Mediterranean can enjoy different belongings to social groups without losing his or her own specificity. In fact, many identities can develop and expand especially if one works on breaking down this dominant North-South dichotomy and the Christian-Muslim opposition. With the purpose of reinventing a common identity, one should look at the reasons behind such a separation and try to solve it by learning from past-mistakes as well as giving new dynamics to the region by emphasizing the foundations of a common society. The Barcelona process has tried to put into practice this movement but without any concrete results. The reasons behind the deep hole separating the two sides of the Mediterranean have not
been sufficiently investigated by the persons concerned and this makes conflict inevitable.
In many respects, European and Arabo-Islamic societies are characterized by different cultures, religions and norms, but this does not imply that they cannot get along with each other. These differences have [195] to be examined in order to break down stereotypes and to improve the different understanding of each other. Indeed, 'Far from thinking of Islam as alien then, the West cannot help but share the understanding of Islam as anything but time-honored and a way of life of peace. Indeed as the Holy (Quran (49:12) says: O people! We created you from a single pair of a male and female and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other, not that you may despise each other.'
The question that arises here concerns exclusively the Mediterranean identity. Indeed, beyond the stereotypes and the constructed ideas around this region, what are the components of the Mediterranean identity? As the distinction has already been made at the present, we will have to examine it in terms of the North-South dichotomy, but with great attention not to fall into the trap of caricature. The common memories of the people from the Mediterranean have to be taken into consideration in order to understand past dynamics, but it is also important for building future strategies that would unite the region with respect for people's mind of both sides.
In this regard, the dominance of Arabo-Muslim culture had begun under the Umayyad caliphate from the mid 7th to the mid 8th Gregorian centuries. During this era, the conquests of the lands stretched from Egypt to Morocco, bringing to nomadic and settled indigenous people the Arabic language, the Arab religion (Islam) and the Arab culture. Today, the Arab majority in North Africa and the Middle East has resulted from past substantial movements of people in this area. Berbers and Copts, who existed there long before the arrival of Arabs, are now considered as minority groups inside the borders of official Arab nations. They have, in some respects, resisted and attempted to impose themselves, but their numeric inferiority has pushed them to adopt some of the dominant aspects of the Arabo-Islamic culture. Indeed, 'the Copts, who reside in Egypt, are characterized as having adopted the Arabic language while resisting Islam, while the Berbers
who reside in the Maghreb did the opposite by maintaining the Berber language while adopting the Muslim faith' (Dellolio 2008). However, it is well-known that in the Mediterranean region, no religion has ever managed to prevail over another. Indeed, the Mediterranean Sea is a [196] frontier between three continents and a bridge between three monotheistic religions, and its position has always made it a privileged place of intercultural dialogue. In fact, the Mediterranean has always been 'the place where, in spite of Catholic and Islamic holy wars, crusades, the reconquista, the two Ottoman sieges of Vienna, the sad history of colonialism and the bloody wars of colonial liberation, no universalism or fundamentalism was ever permanently established' (Zolo 2005).
The Mediterranean is usually associated with the Arab world; but who are really the Arabs? In a time when movies and media dominate the world's perceptions of the others, the Arabs are, in reality, little understood. The classical images of the rich Sheikh, the belly dancers, and the scaring terrorist do absolutely not reflect the diversity of the present Arab society and the richness of Arab history.
Arabs are the people who are, first, united by the Arabic language as their mother tongue and who consider themselves as Arabs. The strategic ethnic designation developed by the British during the hegemony of their empire was to associate the Arab world with the Middle East, which includes also some non-Arab countries such as Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Israel. Howewer, the Arab history is closely related with Muslim history, while the Arabs can also be Christians or Jews, as well as most Muslims are in reality from non-Arab countries such as Indonesia and other countries from sub-Saharan Africa.
Language and literature, and especially poetry, are essential to the understanding of the emergence of a common Arab identity. In fact, before the arrival of Islam, a common poetic language which was Arabic appeared as evidence to a shared culture among the different tribes of the Arabic Peninsula. The poets who illustrate this pre-Islamic age were the political representatives of rivalry in each tribe. They have been composing lyrical poems 'Qasida' to praise the values of their style of life such as honor, generosity, courage, solidarity, loyalty, etc. In this regard, a great proportion of this past common history has
been the basis of a common Arab consciousness and a shared sense of identity.
Under European colonialism, the Arab world had cautiously maintained its identity by preserving its hereditary traditions and virtues through a passive resistance which, in reality, has made the Arabs some- [197] how rigid and inflexible in the domains of ideas and education. The foreigners were both admired and feared, their systems, ideas and behaviors were imposed on a population who had already its own cultural identity. Their resistance took the form of returning to original ideas and ceasing to question traditional concepts. Thus, the process of liberation from the outsiders took place by resisting against their values which were intended to dominate people's minds.
an essential euro-mediterranean dialogue in the light of a common identity What does the Mediterranean symbolizes in terms of spirit, habits and thinking? One should think about what is common to both sides of the Mediterranean in order to look at a common future with optimism and confidence. In fact, we can think about many representations that would make a person from both Morocco and Italy identify with it. As is well-known, 'Europe was born in the South, growing from Mediterranean roots. Like a sheet of blotting paper placed over a large blue ink blot, Europe has nurtured itself by absorbing the blue of the Mediterranean, the blue of the philosophers and the prophets' (Stetié 1999).
One of the major aspects that both shores of the Mediterranean share is obviously the climate. The Mediterranean climate is known to be sweet and rainy in the winter and sunny and hot during the summer. Throughout history, the climate has shown that it has a direct influence over the people's habits and customs. In fact, even though nature and climate does not represent a strong unifying factor, it still constitutes a joint landscape culture.
Further, the fusion between different cultures of the Mediterranean has made people advance in several domains. For example, the contact between Spanish and Arabs has produced a mutual influence which encouraged cooperative studies and a prosperous civilization. Later on,
we will find that the Spanish people and Moroccans or Algerians have many shared habits, such as being joyful persons who like chatting and partying. Food customs could also be a symbol of the Mediterranean. Indeed, the people 'in the Mediterranean basin whether Turk-[198] ish, Greek, southern Italian or Spanish, share in a common Mediterranean civilization of olive trees, bay leaves and the fish' (Toprak 1996). Here, by thinking of the commonalities, even though they are insufficient, not important and irrelevant to the contemporary political scene, we start breaking down barriers and imagine a possible reconciliation based on simple things of life such as food tables where a Moroccan, a Libyan, an Italian, a French person and a Turk can share food. As Duhamel once said 'the Mediterranean ends where the olive tree no more grows'. In addition to that, the people of the Mediterranean can possibly agree on many personal issues such as the importance of the family and how they commonly refer to it in the same way. The sense of honor and shame is shared by all the people of the world, but the way a Greek father acts within its family seems to be very close to how another father from Tunisia would behave. Without a doubt, patriarchy is very common to the people of the Mediterranean, taking its origins from a shared past where families were much interconnected.
What unites the Euro-Mediterranean people goes beyond faiths based on religions: Islam, Judaism or Christianity. The Europeans have their own identity; they can choose not to be Mediterranean. The fact that the Southern part of the Mediterranean has not yet reached the level of development of the North makes it harder for its people to not wish to attain the advancements of Europeans. Indeed, it seems obvious for a population to identify with what is considered as the best. It seems obvious that the political discourses today towards the Mediterranean are full of euro-centricity; the modernity as well as all the values they convey are seductive and place them in a superior position. Yesterday, people from the Mediterranean were one single family; that is not to say that they were one single entity, they were not and never will be. The Mediterranean is rich and diverse, full of differences in all terms. Today, this family is broken into two distinct parts, one is inferior, and the other is advanced and powerful. People from
the southern part struggle between the will to import the successful model of the Europeans, and the hope of seeing their past civilization resurrecting. The sad party of the story is that the population of the Maghreb and a part of the Middle East does identify itself with the European lifestyle and habits. They do listen to the same music, [199] wear the same clothes and even sometimes, speak the same language. It is arguable that this it is due to phenomena like globalization, migration or colonialism. But it is also because they consider that one part of themselves have succeeded and the other have not. It is incorrect to believe that the people of the South-Mediterranean refuse to apply values such as democracy and the respect for human rights in their countries because they are culturally different and they did not manage to create a model of their own, while the Mediterranean was once the vehicle of such ideas and philosophies. The European part of the Mediterranean on the contrary does not identify with its south, it rather searches to resemble these more advanced than them, such as the u S.
However, if we notice the travels that occur in one year between the two parts, one would be astonished by the important flow of people from Europe going searching for diversity elsewhere; and people coming from North Africa or the Middle East, ready to die to reach Europe. Is it only a question of escaping from poverty? Or is it only a question of tourism for Europeans? No, I don't think so; I rather believe it is for both parts a quest for the reconciliation of past memories and an unconscious common will to retie the links in order to work together on a common future.
references
Anderson, J., 1988. Nationalist ideology and territory. 1988. In Nationalism, self-determination and political geography, ed. R. J. Johnston, D. B. Knight, and E. Kofman, 18—39. London: Helm.
Lonni, A. 2003. Mediterranean identity: Lessons from comparative experiences. Paper presented at the International Conference on the Convergence of Knowledge, Culture, Language and Information Technologies, Alexandria. Http://www.cfilt.iitb.ac.in/ convergence03/all%20data/paper% 20031-11.pdf.
Dellolio, R. 2008. North African ethnic minorities, on identity lan-
guage: A comparative analysis of the Berbers and the Copts. Http://www2.yanaboo.com:88i/filez/scholarly/ northAfricanMinorities-5.pdf. European values and identity: A reflection for an indispensable discussion. 2005. Http://tt.europeanideasnetwork.com/files/European %20Values% 20and%20Identity%20Revised%20March.pdf Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and nationalism. Ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press.
Stetié, S. 1999. Europe and the Arab world: An essential dialogue. Http://www.coe.int/t/e/northsouth_centre/programmes/ 6_transmediterranean_dialogue/c_publications/ InterculturalDialogue_Euro-Mediterranean_Partnership.pdf Strâth, B. 2003. The meanings of Europe. Http://www.helsinki.fi/
nes/the%20meanings%20of%20europe%20helsinki.pdf Toprak, B . 1996. Prejudice as social science theory. Perceptions 1 (1). Http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volumei/March-Mayi996/ prejudičeassočialsčienčetheo RY.pdf Zolo, D. 2005. Towards a dialogue between the mediterranean cultures. Jura Gentium 1 (1). Http://www.juragentium.unifi.it/en/surveys/ med/tunis/zolo.htm.
In memory of my dear mother, Houria Boussejra and to the inspirational presence of my father, Dr Noureddine Affaya. There is no doubt that without his continued love and support, I would not be what I am today.
Influence of Tourism on the Regional Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina
RAHMAN nurković
University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
BOSNIA and Herzegovina is a very interesting tourist destination owing to its geographic location, exceptional natural beauties, cultural-historical inheritance and suitable climatic conditions. By 1992, significant tourist facilities, infrastructure and transport network were constructed and the organizing abilities were proved in the 1984 Winter Olympic Games in Sarajevo, as well as in many other manifestations. In the period from 1992 to 1995, many tourist facilities were destroyed and ruined. Today, however, most of them have been reconstructed and new facilities have also been constructed. In the paper, the influence of tourism on the regional development of Bosnia and Herzegovina is shown through parameters of the tourist resources distributed in tourist regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the light of actual trends of world tourism and tourist potentials of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an effort has been made in considering its influence on the overall economic development.
introduction Most countries in the world develop tourism, and its basic characteristic and a goal is a large number of participants in tourist travelling, i. e. massiveness. According to its economic, sociological, psycological, political and other connotations and many expert opinions, tourism as a phenomenon has no match in any other occurrence or phenomenon in the modern world. Similarly, many experts think that the tourist industry will, in a couple of decades, be behind the oil and car manufacturing industry.
Actual economic flows see in tourism one of the most important activities. Positive effects of tourism are bigger and bigger from day to day, not only for the regions but also for entire countries. Tourism
has a big and strong influences on the regional development and social development in general (Pak 1996). Economically underdeveloped regions and countries have, in particular, a big chance for its development. This human activity largely influence the structure of economic [202] development and increasingly gains in social importance. Tourism influences, with its development, the development of new economic activities, in particular those in which the population makes an extra profit. Tourism development affects the regional development and is interconnected with other activities. Firstly, new jobs are created in tourism, furthermore, it influences the traffic development and higher prices of land, as well as its transformation from agricultural to building land, and alike (Horvat 2005).
The accelerated tourism development in Bosnia and Herzegovina is mostly reflected in development of the peripheral rural areas which are, according to their underdevelopment, far behind the developed urbanized centres of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja Luka, Mostar and other. Underdeveloped regions lag in every aspect behind the developed centres, which results in economic migration, drain of labour force from agricultural areas and impoverishment of villages. Tourism development in these areas enables development of the periphery, retaining the population in the homeland; infrastructure is improved as well as all other activities which contribute to the prosperity of the region and a country. The objective of this paper is to show the influence of tourism on the regional development of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the grounds of the existing tourist resources, the number of tourists and overnight stays in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This refers to tourists from the leading countries of Europe and the world, in the period from 2006 to February 2010, according to the number of people employed in tourism.
tourist regions and tourist resources of
BOSNIA AND herzegovina In order to consider the tourist valorisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is indispensable to present the tourist resources distributed across the tourist regions. Tourism of Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on natural and anthropogenic resources. The overview of the tourist
resources shows that most of the tourist areas and attractions have been little valorised so far. Bosnia and Herzegovina abounds in both natural and anthropogenic tourist resources. Relief morphosculpture and morphostructure, respectively richness in surface and underground forms, has a considerable role in forming the tourist supply. There are three [203] clearly differentiated tourist regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Peripanonnian Bosnia, the Mountainous Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Lowland Herzegovina.
Biogeographic resources in Bosnia and Herzegovina are represented, first of all, by forests and by the possibility of arrangement of picnic grounds, performance of expert excursions, organizing hunting tourism and other recreational opportunities. It should be mentioned that in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina there exist more than 400 types of endemic plants, some of which have a broader area, while around 40 types are real endemic species from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Within the fauna of Bosnia and Herzegovina a large number of endemic types can also be distinguished. The abundance of game in the forests, and fish in the waters, favours the development of hunting and fishing. Bullfights or corridas, which are traditionally organized in our country, are also one of the characteristics.
Its dense forests, endemic types of trees, variety of crystal-clear mountain rivers and springs, lakes, exciting landscapes, and, first of all, the healthy environment make the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina very promising and attractive for the development of adventure tourism. Adventurous trips and arrangements in the area of the mountains of Treskavica, Prenj, Cvrsnica, Zelengora, Velež and Vranica comprise different forms of active recreation for the tourists offered through: rafting, kayaking, canoeing, rock climbing, walking, cycling, mountain biking, organized jeeps excursions, paragliding and parachuting. In this region, there is also the Sutjeska National Park (17,500 hectares) in which there is the last, thousand-year-old European forest of Pe-rucica. In the south is Hutovo Blato, a natural reserve and bird habitat which was proclaimed a Ramser destination by the Ramser International Convention on swamps.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has 0.5% of protected territory in the form of national parks, and that territory is fully located in the area of Re-
publika Srpska. It is known that the international community as a precondition for inclusion into the European integrations, demands a considerably higher percentage ranging between 10% and 15%. The earlier initiative for proclamation of the areas of Treskavica, Bjelašnica [204] and Rakitnica the areas of special interest for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is already under procedure. The National park would include an entire area of Prenj mountain (with Boračko lake and the Neretva canyon), a larger part of Cvrsnica Mountain and parts of Cab-ulja and Vran Mountains.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has always been a crossroads of many cultures and civilizations, which was a very good basis for the appearance and development of different cultural-historical, ethno-social, artistic and environmental resources. Remainders of determined agglomerations and other traces prove that this area was inhabited around 4,000 years ago. In the course of history, different civilization flows were passing through these areas, and barbarian, Byzantine, Frankish, Venetian, Hungarian, Turkish and Habsburg influences left their mark by creating a natural inheritance which is actually a unity of opposites. This is why numerous achievements and objects of movable and immovable cultural inheritance can be found in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Starting from the locality of primitive man's habitat, the Vučjak cave near Ugljevik, and the largest paleolithic localities: Londža at Doboj, Badanj-Stolac, the Rastuša cave near Teslic and Pavlička cave near Grude, through the pile dwelling settlements in Tuzla, Ripča at Bihac, Butmir near Sarajevo, Brajkovici at Travnik, Obra at Kakanj and Donja dolina at Bosanska Gradiška, in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina there are numerous localities of the settlements from the ancient times, such as those near Stolac, Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Capljina, Ljubuški, Trebinje, Žitomislic, Mostar and Kakanj.
In the period of the Middle Ages in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina there were five types of fortresses: towns, provinces, towers, enclosed porches and 'šarampovi.' The oldest towns are those from the 13th century such as Sokolac, Jezerski, Podzvizd and Šturlici, while the most famous old towns and fortresses in Bosnia and Herzegovina were Bobovac (the state capital of Medieval Bosnia) Ostrožac, Blagaj, Velika Kladuša, Travnik, Prusac, Vidoški grad-Stolac, Doboj, Gradacčac,
Srebrenik, Kreševo, Počitelj, Mostar, Ključ, Banja Luka, Maglaj, Jajce, Sarajevo, Vranduk, Ljubuški town, Tešanj and Srebrenica. An interesting aspect of the potential for development of cultural tourism is the fact that the riches and diversity of culture cannot be found exhibited in museums but in 'live museums' — houses, bridges, architecture and [205] traditional life in the major part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Religious tourism in Bosnia and Herzegovina has unusually significant potentials (Pepeonik 1995).
It is here where the three great world religions have met, and each has its great shrines. For the time being, the Catholic shrine in Medu-gorje is the strongest attarction, but we should not neglect the potential of the Orthodox monastery complexes and 'dovišta' of the Muslims. These are so-called cult places or the areas of spiritual values of the monotheistic religions. Let us mention, among others, the St. Ivo Church in Podmilačje at Jajce for the Catholics, Ajvatovica near Prusac, Tekija on the Buna near Mostar and 'Djevojačka pećina' at Kladanj for the Muslims, for members of the Ortodox church the monastery of Žitomislići, and for the Jews the Grob and Havra of Moša Danon in Stolac.
In the past twenty years, Međugorje has become one of the most famous Catholic shrines in the world and a modern centre of religious tourism. Pilgrim groups come every day from all over the world, and the rough statistics indicate that Međugorje is visited every year by a million believers, who have around 15,000 beds at their disposal, in family hotels and boarding houses adjusted to the contemporary demands of religious tourism. Ajvatovica is the best known 'dovište' in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and tens of thousands of Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the world come to Ajvatovica in order to say the prayer 'kišna dova.'
Bosnia and Herzegovina is abundant in many objects of religious and cultural importance for members of the orthodox religion. Distinguished for their fame, are the monasteries dating back to 14th and 15th centuries such as: Tvrdoš, Dobričevo, Ozren, Gomionica, Liplje, Moštanci, Dobrim and the Church of'Uznesenje Hristovo' in Cajniče, in which a miraculous icon of 'Presveta Bogorodica' is kept, which was, according to tradition from Trojeručica, painted by the apostle Luke
himself. The monasteries in Bijeljina, Banja Luka, Drvar, Šekovici and Teslic are also significant. Of the Catholic sacral objects we can set aside, according to their importance, the convents and churches, such as those in: Banja Luka, Derventa, Fojnica, Konjic, Kaknju, Kreševo, [206] Livno, Ljubuški, Prozor, Ravno, Široki Brijeg, Orašje (Tolis), Trebinje and Visoko. Construction of the Islamic sacral objects started in the first half of the 15th century with the arrival of Turks in these areas. The most significant Islamic sacral objects in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina are in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Foča, Mostar, Počitelj, Ca-jniče, Maglaj, Livno, Travnik, Cazin, Trebinje, Tešanj and Donji Vakuf (Kurtovic 2005).
Very valuable parts of the inheritance of Bosnia and Herzegovina are necropolises, whether they be 'stecci' or old cemeteries. Radimlja near Stolac is the most famous necropolis of 'stecci' in our country, and apart from this one, there are around 24 more necropolises. Let us mention the necropolises in Banovici, Bugojno, Citluk, Konjic, Kupres, Neum, Trebinje and Višegrad. For the time being, Bosnia and Herzegovina still has a well preserved cultural inheritance. The factor of protection, which represents a legislative requirements, is weak and we should bear in mind that the surrounding countries have between 9 and 15% of protected areas. In our country this percentage is very low, and potential protection should be given to numerous landscapes, hy-drographic structures, relief forms, caves, abysses etc. The traffic factor is part of the precondition in tourism development and is insufficiently developed. At the beginning of the 21st century there were only 10 km of highways in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The best example of the non-functioning of this community are the failed agreements about construction of the highway in Vc corridor. The nonreconstructing and nonfunctioning of the railways is a consequence of big commercial truck lobbies. The nonexistence of highways, bad local and regional roads on our traffic routes is disastrous for tourism development.
Supplies and personnel are relatively positive elements, because our overall commerce is based on imports, so that potential tourists will not be nostalgic for their products. Safety in our country in terms of the minefields is a factor which will certainly not attract either domestic or foreign tourists. Yet we mustn't be late with development and
investments into tourism, not only to prevent domestic destroyers of assets, but also to avoid sinking into oblivion by potential visitors.
tourist flows in bosnia and Herzegovina Tourist flows in Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly indicate that in terms [207] of tourism, Bosnia and Herzegovina is traditionally oriented toward the foreign market. In the past fifty years, the European countries had a leading role in world tourism, which was even more strengthened by the European integration process. The European tourist industry employs more than 45 million workers, which represents more than 14% of the labour force (Eurostat 2009). The decrease in the tourist turnover, which started in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the second half of the 1990s, due to economic disturbances , started to lessen after 1995 and later to increase. Foreign guests still record high visits in all tourist destinations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The level of visits is high, first of all, due to natural geographic features and anthropogenic contents in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It is shown by data from 2009, when 17,813 tourists arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina from Germany, 15,443 from Italy and 13,005 tourists from Austria. With regard to overnight stays of the foreign tourists, the first place belongs to Germany with 40,944 overnight stays, then followed Italy with 32,685, and Austria with 22,734 overnight stays. Of non-European countries, according to the number of tourists, Americans are the first, of whom 6,664 arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2009, and made over 19,000 overnight stays. Of the countries from ex-Yugoslavia the highest number of tourists in the mentioned period came from Croatia, with 50,838 tourists coming to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2009, recording 93,601 overnight stays, which is 13.9% in relation to overall overnight stays (table 1). Regarding total income, a moderate growth of both state and private income from tourism is noticeable (table 2).
In the analysed period, the state revenues had a larger share only in 1996, amounting respectively to 41,904 million km or 69.4% of total income. Since 1998, the private income has assumed domination in total income and this trend continues further. In 2008, total income amounted to 68,899 million km of which private income made up
table i Number of tourists and overnight stays in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Countries Tourists	Overnight stays
2007	2008	2009	1/2010	2007	2008	2009	1/2010
Total	306,452	321,511	310,942	16,452	694,507 718,750	671,128	38,566
[208] Croatia	50,208	53,512	50,838	4,005	108,142	108,233	93,601	8,531
Slovenia	36,353	36,596	34,580	1,861	68,308	68,493	60,762	3,207
Serbia	56,936	60,481	56,221	4,096	131,537	142,811	120,850	10,607
Austria	11,741	12,163	13,005	646	22,544	21,920	22,734	1,049
France	9,629	9,576	9,291	134	19,515	25,881	24,835	264
Holland	4,348	4,703	5,124	126	10,685	10,607	11,840	260
Italy	17,599	16,090	15,443	672	33,122	31,826	32,685	1,634
Hungary	4,038	4,193	5,124	126	8,086	7,293	11,404	207
Germany	17,761	17,201	17,813	680	39,635	35,493	40,944	1,474
England	6,213	5,593	5,077	161	14,910	13,536	11,877	320
usa	8,465	7,389	6,664	381	21,852	19,846	19,544	1,059
Turkey	11,276	12,091	13,660	540	29,119	31,081	31,937	1,073
Macedonia	3,792	4,551	4,810	157	7,452	9,256	9,533 335
Montenegro	6,613	8,129	7,848	1,125	13,041	21,123	19,506	4,564
notes Source: http://www.bhas.ba.
56% of total income. The ratio between the private and state revenues was maintained in 2008 as well, and amounted to 58.5% of private and 41.4% of state revenue, although the total income was lower by 13.4%. Domestic tourist turnover in the mentioned period accounted for somewhat more than 40% of total overnight stays.
Today, tourist movements toward our country have increased and have become more dynamical. With the establishment of a series of service activities, the roads toward the seaside were opened up. We must consider these facts, as well as the trends of tourism in the world, when discussing the previous, current and future tourism development in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It is necessary to research and determine the main factors that would influence, for the most part, the future tourism development in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the indicators of tourism influence on the regional development of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also the number of people employed in the tourist activities. According to data on the number of people employed in hotels and restaurants, it
table 2 Incomes from tourism
1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2008
(0 (b) (a) (b) (a) (b~ (a) (b) ~a) (b) (a) (b)
notes Column headings are as follows: (a) thousands of km, (b) percentage. Row headings are as follows: (1) state revenues, (2) private income, (3) total. Source: Statistical yearbook of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008.
table 3 Number of people employed in hotels and restaurants
in Bosnia and Herzegovina
2006	2007	2008	2009	2/2010
(0 (b)	(0 (b)	(0 (b)	(0 (b)	(0 (b)
(1) 654,252 100	687,445 100	706,088 100	686,044 100	699,710 100
(2) 26,649 4.1	34,880 5.1	32,408 4.6	32,844 4.8	34,072 4.9
notes Column headings are as follows: (a) thousands of km, (b) percentage. Row headings are as follows: (1) total number of emoployed people, (2) employed in hotels and restaurants. Source: http://www.bhas.ba.
is noticeable that tourism is still insufficiently developed and, as such, has no major influence on the overall economic development of Bosnia and Herzegovina (table 3).
The number of people employed in hotels and restaurants as leading activities of tourism has varied very often since 2066 to date. The total number of the people employed in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 654,252 in 2006, while in February 2010 it reached 699,710 of people employed, or 45,458 more, respectively 6.9%. However, the employment level in tourism is below that level, respectively it ranged from 4.1% in 2006 to 4.9% in February 2010.
It is necessary to consider this from several aspects — multidis-ciplinary — with a further developmental, spatial and processing approach. This means that we should provide exact and relevant data by means of the relevant quantitative and statistical methods and determine the level of tourism development (Cigale 2004). Special attention should be paid to studying the development of this branch in the future regional development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Contemporary
(1)	41,904 69.4 31,591 46.6 30,054 43.6
(2)	18,416 30.5 36,116 53.3 38,778 56.3
(3)	60,320 100 67,707 100 68,823 100
28,387 42.4 30,294 43.9 25,173 41.4 38,407 57.5 38,588 56.0 35,611 58.5 66,794 100 68,899 100 60,784 100
economic changes in the world are the most obvious, particulary in this branch, and are expressed through the inevitable process of economic restructuring in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well.
[210]	INFLUENCE OF TOURISM ON OTHER SECTORS OF
ECONOMY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Tourism is rightly considered as a branch which in the best way is to ensure a specific offer and economic valorization of the domestic tourist product, which is made up of the elements of the tradition and culture, natural inheritance and the built material culture, as well as service and production components of the local tourist supply. Today, it is a rapidly growing industry with a growing share of knowledge and high value added, which contributes to social prosperity, growth of gdp, employment and investments (Lorber 2005).
In current conditions, tourism in Bosnia and Herzegovina has a significant place as a factor of development and restructuring of the associated activities. Tourism has a particular developmental influence through external effects on numerous activities in the economy and society, starting from production of food and drinks, road, railway and air traffic, development of infrastructure and investments into destination capacities, through development of hotel management, commerce and the entertainment industry, to initiating the development of financial, marketing and educational services and the changes in rural, environmental and spatial development of the country, and raising the standard of living.
On this occasion, we have evaluated the level of tourism influence on the sectors in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Of 19 activities, 13 of them were given the highest grade, while only railway transportation got grade 1, which means that this aspect of traffic is the sector which is not strongly affected by tourism development. On the other hand, five activities were given grade 2, respectively retail trade, banking services, insurance services, car manufacturing industry and electroener-getics. Activities that were best graded, among others, are: agriculture, production of food and drinks, telecommunications, catering industry etc.
Despite its enormous potentials, tourism in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina is still in an initial phase of development. According to estimations given in the report on competitiveness in tourism for 2009, it has been estimated that thr industry achieved 461 million dollars of gdp from tourism, (i. e. it contributed 2.9% to the gdp of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It employed 26,000 workers and participated in total employment [2ii] with 2.3% (Strategija razvoja turizma Bosne i Hercegovine 2009).
perspectives of tourism in bosnia and
Herzegovina
Many have realised the role and significance of tourism on regional development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, starting from the employees, through the institutes and governments. In this regard, the appropriate strategy for tourism development was determined, which anticipated an enhanced development of tourist capacities and an increased number of domestic and foreign tourists. The need for restructuring the existing aspects and development of new aspects of tourism is one of the preferential requirements for tourism development in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The number of beds should increase with simultaneous improvement in the quality of accommodation in hotels, villas and boarding houses. Total investment into tourism development should reach about 1.5 billion eur.
According to estimations of the World Tourist Organisation (unwto), activities of travelling and tourism in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period from 2006 to 2015 are expected to have a real annual growth of 5.2%. Tourism in Bosnia and Herzegovina depends on four groups of factors: global, European, regional environment and the environment made by the system in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as market factors in the country and targeted markets, entrepreneurial factors and their strength and motivation for acting in the tourism sector and the government. None of these factors can be isolated because all the mentioned factors can only jointly contribute to tourism development.
Traffic is one of the key factors which influence the tourism development. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a significant position in the transportation-communication system of the Balkans and south Europe. According to its position, it is trying to join, as soon as possi-
figure 1 Factors of tourism development in Bosnia and Herzegovina (adapted from Economic Institute of Sarajevo 2009)
ble, the developed European and world's countries, in the domain of transport and communications, in which it has already achieved certain results. More recently, considerable funds have been invested into reconstruction of war-damaged and destroyed transport capacities, facilities and traffic lines, and the construction of new road and railway lines has been planned.
The existing traffic infrastructure in Bosnia and Herzegovina is located mainly around the central axis north-south along the Bosna and Neretva Rivers, and in the direction west-east, parallel to the Sava River. On these directions the majority of economic and natural resources is located, including the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Evident efforts have been made lately by Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the international community in order to normalize international transport gradually, but surely.
conclusion
From the mentioned data it can be seen that tourist resources in the [213] area of Bosnia and Herzegovina are still insufficiently used. The reason for this lies mostly in the nonexistence of a tradition of tourism development, poor development of the traffic network and the lack of modern hotel accommodation. There are few geographic areas in the world which were so strongly affected by location factors in tourism development. This is the first factor that makes Bosnia and Herzegovina so different from others. The past has continuously been retaining the anthropogenic resources of human wishes, needs and habits.
In the past fifteen years, the number of foreign tourist arrivals and overnight stays has been increasing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Foreign tourists mostly come from the European countries, predominantly the West European countries. The reason for their arrival is still the very well preserved and clean environment, the large number of cultural-historical monuments, as well as religious tourism, first of all, paying visits to Međugorje. These are followed by visits to the high, winter Olympic mountains, which still do not have the capacities they used to have before 1991. A larger number of foreign tourists stay in the spas primarily for sports-recreational needs, the need for active resting and preventive reasons. For the above mentioned reasons, the guests are very mobile in space, which has stimulated intensive tourism development in the surroundings of the spas (a diverse additional tourist supply, renting separate tourist rooms. or even the construction of new boarding houses and hotels), as well as the appearance of smaller, secondary tourist areas.
It is clear to those employed in tourism and all others dealing with it, that tourism is a branch of the economy that has a significant position in the state developmental strategy, and within the regional programmes it has been defined as a key opportunity for development.
The strategy of development of Bosnia and Herzegovina considers tourism to be one of the leading branches of the economy. Priorities of fundamental developmental orientations are: entrepreneural innova-
tion, connecting the tourist products within the destination management, preservation of the cultural-historical and natural inheritance, and promotion of the state. These activities are the basis for development of a new concept of tourism, which relies on the local values of [214] Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the European marketing, aiming at promotion of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a new, undiscovered destination for the European tourists.
references
Cigale, D. 2004. Posledična navzkrižja in obremenitve slovenskega alpskega sveta zaradi turistične in rekreativne dejavnosti. PhD diss., University of Ljubljana.
Eurostat. 2009. Europe in figures: Eurostat yearbook 2009. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Horvat, U. 2005. Influence of tourism on the regional development on the example of resort places in Slovenia. Paper presented at the international seminar Tourism as a Factor of Regional Development, Tuzla.
Kurtovic, H. 2005. Banjska mjesta u Bosni i Hercegovini — centar zdrastvenog Turizma. Paper presented at the international seminar Tourism as a Factor of Regional Development, Tuzla.
Lorber, L. 2005. The role of tourism in Slovenia from its admission to the Europe Union. Paper presented at the international seminar Tourism as a Factor of Regional Development, Tuzla.
Pak, M. 1996, Geografski elementi regionalnega razvoja Spodnjega Po-dravja s Prlekijo. Geografski vestnik 68:161—174.
Pepeonik, Z. 1995. Tourism as a bearer of Croatia's development. Paper presented at the First Croatian Geographical Congress, Zagreb.
Statistical yearbook of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2008. Sarajevo: State Institute for Statistics.
Strategija razvoja turizma Bosne i Hercegovine. 2010. Sarajevo: Ekonomski institut Sarajevo.
City Branding of Bratislava: History and the Present
kvetoslava matloyicoya
BARBORA NÉMETHYOYA
RENÉ MATLOVic
University ofPresov in Presov, Slovakia
the increasing competition of cities has caused the implementation of marketing principles in local development strategies. A very important segment of territorial marketing is the city branding. This term could refer to a country, region, tourist destination or a city. The city branding is based on a strategic approach to public relations, stating that a change of the image is an ongoing, holistic, interactive and wide-scale process (Avraham and Ketter 2008; Hospers 2004). The paper will focus on the implementation of city branding principles in local development (Case Study of the City of Bratislava). Bratislava, the largest city in Slovakia (427,000 inhabitants), became the capital city of the autonomous Slovak Republic on January, 1st, 1993 (after the agreement on Czechoslovakia's dissolution). The biggest challenge of the city is represented by the permanent trailing away behind the competitive metropolises (Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest) in most of the indicators. The aim to create a modern metropolis of Central-European importance is realised in Bratislava by several investments into the city infrastructure, making it the most attractive city for current foreign investments in Slovakia.
national legislative framework Transformation processes after 1989 associated with the transition towards the market economy in Slovakia and the quest for integration into the European Union, have raised the urgent need to change the existing, or create new legislative and institutional rules of society functioning. The need for a complex system of regional development support at all the scale levels had led to the formation of the still lacking legal regulation in 2001.
The new law imposes on cities and towns the necessity of elabo-
ration, approval and periodic evaluation of the development strategy of their territory (The Economic and Social Development Program phsr). This document is a supplement to land-planning documents and should be consistent with them. The legislation in force does not [216] determine the need for using marketing tools in the process of regional development, and therefore the marketing plan of a municipality is considered a soft Planning Document.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CITY Despite its settlement history reaching as far back as 5000 b c, Bratislava is regarded to be one of the youngest metropolises in Europe. It became the capital city of the autonomous Slovak Republic on 1 January, 1993 (after the agreement on Czechoslovakia dissolution). At the same time it is the largest city in Slovakia (427,000 inhabitants) with a very favorable macro-location and excellent accessibility by all means of transport within Central Europe. It lies between Vienna and Budapest on the navigable Danube river emptying into the Black Sea and by means of the Main and Rhine connected to the North Sea. Near by the city there are several gates — straits (Devin Gate, Carnunt Gate) located on the middle section of the Danube river attracting all the routes of the region into the strategically narrow area between the Litavske Mountains and the Little Carpathians, representing a barrier between the Vienna Basin and the Small Danube Basin (Buček 1995, 146). However, the mezo-location of Bratislava in relation to the territory of Slovakia is rather disadvantageous, extremely eccentric, on the south-west of the state. The micro-location of the city is characterized by the junction of the Danube lowland, the Little Carpathians and Za-horska lowland, creating a picturesque character of the city spreading over the terraces and alluvium of the Danube river and on adjacent slopes of the Little Carpathians, having a southern and south-eastern exposition suitable for the development of viniculture.
CITY BRANDING — HISTORICAL CONTExT Bratislava (since 1919 Prešporok, in German Pressburg, in Hungarian Pozsony) has played a significant role as a settlement centre on the crossroads of the Danube route and the Amber route since the an-
cient times. Already in the first century bc it used to be a centre of the adwancing clerical and warlord central authority of the Celts. Numerous archaeological findings from that period prove the existence of the Danube Empire of Celts with significant trade concentration already in the ist century b c. The most important are silver coins [217] called Biatecs (nowadays it is the symbol of the National Bank of Slovakia) (Navratilova and Hatalova 1996,13). In the following period the territory became a part of the northern edge of the Roman Empire (1st—4th century A d). In this period the Romans had built one of the largest military camps on the central part of the Danube river, known as Gerulata, representing a part of the fortification line called Limes Romanum.
The first Slavs came to the territory of Bratislava during the migration of nations in the 5th century. The territory reached a significant position at the beginning of the 9th century with the formation of an autonomous state — Great Moravia Empire. The existing settlement was an important sacral, administrative, cultural and educational centre (Navratilova and Hatalova 1996,14).
Bratislava had maintained its central function also during the Hungarian State, being an important administrative (the seat of the self-governing region) and ecclesiastical centre of Hungarian frontier. The Castle of Bratislava had continually become one of the best fortified border forts of the Hungarian Empire, being able to resist even the Mongol invasions (1241) (Bratislava Tourist Service 2005; Bratislava v historickej skratke 2010; Navratilova and Hatalova 1996).
The approval of several city privileges by the king Ondrej Iii in 1291 caused the development of trade, crafts and viniculture. 40 years later it received the coin law (1430) and the right to use the coats of arms (1436). One of the most favorable periods of its development was the reign of Matej Korvin, the king who not only confirmed all the privileges of a free royal town, but also established the first university on the territory of present Slovakia — Universitas Istropolitana in 1465, which ceased after his death in 1491 (Bratislava v historickej skratke 2010). The image of the city in the 14th—15th century can be characterized as a centre of crafts, trade and education.
Difficult times after the invasion of the Turks into the centre of
Hungary and the occupation of Buda brought strengthening of the Bratislava position, paradoxically. In 1531 it had become the seat of the Royal chamber of Hungary and the Royal vice governor. In 1536 it was appointed a capital city of the Hungarian empire and became the city [218] of parliament, central offices, archbishop (1543) and coronation ceremonies of the Hungarian kings. By the end of the 18th century, during the reign of Maria Theresia, the reconstruction rush took place in the city, when the fortifications of the city were removed as a result of its wide expansion, and the number of inhabitants tripled. Bratislava became a significant cultural (1776 — establishment of a theatre with a permanent company of actors) and business center (1780 — establishment of the first manufactory) (Bratislava Tourist Service 2005). Wine was the most significant trade article. The city with its population of 33,000 inhabitants was in 1780 in first place out of all the cities in Hungarian Empire, surpassing also Buda, Pest and Debrecen (Lacika 2000,
36).
However, in 1783 it lost its significant status as a social-political centre of Hungary because Josef ii. had directed that all the central offices be moved to Buda. Although it had remained the city of coronation ceremonies and of the Hungarian parliament, the loss of the position of capital city meant a significant change of the city image from a flourishing royal town to a city of provincial importance (Bratislava v historickej skratke 2010). Joseph's reform of the territorial-administrational arrangement, having just a short-term efficiency, degraded the position of the city by integrating it into the district with the seat in Nitra. From the national point of view its importance had not been weakened, however it had become the centre of enlightenment ideas of the Slovak national rebirth. The most important historical event popularizing Bratislava on the international level was the signing of the Prespork (Bratislava) Peace Treaty in 1805 after the Battle of the Three Emperors at Slavkov (Austerlitz), which lead to the formal downfall of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation (Lacika 2000, 38).
In the 19th century Bratislava had a population of 23,000 inhabitants of German nationality, 9500 Slovaks and 300 Hungarians (Navratilova and Hatalova 1996, 16). Bratislava became the centre of
Slovak education mainly due to the establishment of the Department of Czechoslovak language and literature at the Evangelical grammar school. Its most significant period was marked by the personality of Ludovit Stur (1803), one of the most famous figures of Slovak national history (Bratislava v historickej skratke 2010). However it remained [219] dominantly a German town with significant representation of Slovak, Hungarian and Jewish inhabitants. For the Jewish communities, Bratislava became a famous European centre of rabbi education at Jeshivah, in the period between 1807—1839 headed by rabbi and scholar Chatam Sofer (Jeshivah was after its cancellation in i939 renewed again in i950 in Givat Shaul, Jerusalem, and it carries the title of Pressburg Yeshivah).
Regarding the economics, the viniculture was developing very well. From the international point of view and the position of the city, the establishment of the Hubert company in 1825 was very important, being the first company outside France to introduce the technology of sparkling wine. The beginnings of the financial sector (the first Pressburg Savings Bank — 1842) date far back to this period (Lacika 2000, 40). In 1851 the population of Bratislava was 42,178 inhabitants, and within Hungarian Empire it was surpassed only by Pest, Buda and Szeged (Matlovič 2005, 47).
After the dismissal of the last Hungarian Diet and after the relocation of political seats to Pest, the political-administrative importance of Bratislava had decreased significantly. This loss was partly compensated by intensive development of industry and culture. Another important impulse for the economic development was the abolishment of villeinage (1848) and the adwance of industrialization.
The beginning of the first European railway construction (Northern railway of Emperor Ferdinand) in 1837, connecting Vienna through Breclav—Pčerov (Czechia) with Krakow (Poland), meant a potential threat to the agricultural and wood markets from western Slovakia. Therefore, one year later the initial works started on the construction of the first horse-drawn railway in Slovakia leading from Bratislava to 14 km distant Sväty Jur (1840) and later to Trnava (1846) and Sered' (žsr 2008). The excellent position of the city on the navigable Danube river and the closeness of Vienna (60 km) enabled the
development of modern kinds of transport such as a steam-driven boat (steam-navigation on the Danube river had started from 1818). New possibilities for faster transport and pro-exporting interests of Hungary led to the need for construction of the railway connection [220] Vienna—Pest—Debrecen, with possible continuation to the Black Sea. The repeated danger of bypassing Bratislava by the construction of a railway along the right side of the Danube river was removed and the first steam train arrived at Bratislava in 1848 after four years of work (ž S R 2008). The city was growing modern.
Industry was growing fast (gas company was established in 1859, Dynamit Nobel in 1873, the Oil refinery Apollo in 1895, Cotton company Danubius in 1900, Stein beer factory in 1873, Sweets company Stollwerck, rubber company Gumon in 1911) and therefore at the turn of the 19th and 20th century Bratislava became the second most significant industrial centre of Hungary. A bridge over the Danube river and a port were built in 1891, and operation of a power station and a street-car railway started in 1895 (Lacika 2000, 40). In 1914 a street-car connection between Bratislava and Vienna was begun (terminated in 1945). Regarding cultural development, Bratislava had attracted the attention of famous European musicians who used to present here their art and creation (F. Liszt, A. Rubinstein, F. M. Bartholdy, F. Mazas and others) (Navratilova and Hatalova 1996, 17). Its position in the context of Hungarian cities had relatively failed. In 1900 it had 61,537 inhabitants and, considering its size, it trailed away behind Budapest, Szeged, Subotica and Debrecen (Matlovič 2005, 47).
The attachment of Bratislava to the newly formed Czechoslovakia (28 October 1918) encountered resistance from the side of Hungary, and therefore it was rescheduled for three months later (1. January 1919). During this short period of time, when the attachment agreement was about to be signed, the Hungarian and German inhabitants tried to gain the status of a so called a free town (something like a Danubian Singapore or Monaco) entitling it a Wilson town (in honor of then president of the usa in order to ingratiate themselves with the winners of wwi.) Even this short period of time was sufficient for launching the promotion of the city's name. Several postcards, stamps and maps were produced with denotation of Wilson-
stadt (Lacika 2000, 42). However, their efforts ended up in failure. In 1919 the new title of the city (Bratislava) was approved and after its attachment to Czechoslovakia, significant groups of Hungarian and German inhabitants left. Despite this, the population was still growing, mainly due to the immigration from the hinterland and Czech [221] lands (mainly the intelligentsia) (Bratislava v historickej skratke 2010; Navratilova and Hatalova 1996, 18). Bratislava had reached the position of an administration centre of Slovakia, which naturally contributed to the increase of its economic, social and cultural importance. The Comenius University was established in 1919 and the Slovak National Theatre in 1920. The interwar period was typical for the development of all the relevant fields of economy and intensive construction (residential and industrial areas). The newly refurbished port with a public storage became an important transfer centre between the Balkans and Hungary on the one hand, and Poland and Germany on the other (Fabricius 1991, 131). The need for the development of economic relations with the Danube countries as consumers of Czechoslovakian industrial products, led to efforts in the field of promotion in relation to potential trade partners. In 1921 the first Oriental market (originally taking place directly in the harbor) was organized, later (1923—1942) known as the Danube market. For this purpose a new show-room was built in 1931. After the cancellation of the Danube market (after wwii.) its functional use was changed and it was transformed into the Park of culture and leisure (pko) (ko t p 2008). In 1922 a new commodity stock-market commenced its activity, which can be regarded as a demonstration of the economic emancipation and enhancement of its position. It is affirmed also by the fact that several banks, centres of trade and industrial companies settled here. Transport accessibility of the city was improved in 1923 after the implementation of a regular airline connection from Prague to Bratislava airport in Vajnory. The year 1926 meant a significant milestone in the media field, when the radio broadcasting was initiated in Bratislava.
Considering the architectural works of art that became symbols of the city we can mention the first high-rise 11-floor building, known as Manderla, built in 1935, and the residential complex Avion from 1931
(it gained the evaluation of the Building of the century in Slovakia in the category of residential buildings). In 1939—1945 Bratislava was the capital city of the Slovak Republic — autonomous state, formed on the basis of the fascist Germany decision. It was the seat of the president, [222] parliament, government and all the offices of state administration. Part of its territory (Petržalka, Devin) was seized by Germany. The importance of the city had increased. It contributed to the development of educational and research institutions. The Technical University of Slovakia was moved to Bratislava in 1939, the University of Economics was established in 1940 and the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1942.
After the Second World War a dynamic development of the city conditioned by industrialization and further development of nonproductive activities took place. The city became an important centre of the chemical and rubber industry (e. g. Slovnaft), electro-technical (e. g. Bratislava Electro-technical Company), machine industry (e. g. Bratislava Automobile Company), glass, textile and food processing industries. The administrative area of the city expanded between 1946 and 1971. The number of inhabitants tripled (from 138,988 in 1940 to 442,197 in 1991). In spatial development it was represented by the construction of wide residential estates which have become distinctive elements of the urban structure. At the end of the communist period, two thirds of Bratislava's population lived in these blocks of flats. The largest housing estate in Czechoslovakia was built in Bratislava-Petržalka in 1973—1986, having 42,330 flats and 126,000 inhabitants (Mladek 2000, 84). The development of university education, culture and science has continued further. In 1948 the activity of film studios started, in 1949 the activity of the Slovak philharmonic, and in 1951 the Slovak National Gallery was established. In 1953 the Slovak Academy of Sciences on the basis of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Arts was founded. Regarding the mass-media, a qualitative shift took place with the commencement of television broadcasting from the Bratislava studio in 1956. Transport accessability of the city was improved by the initiation of the airport in Ivanka (1951). The completion of the Družba oil pipeline in 1962 from the Russian oil pipeline junction in Samara meant a significant turning-point for the
industry. In 1969 the construction of motorways was initiated from Bratislava to Prague (the first part Bratislava-Malacky was launched in 1973) and in 1972 to Košice (the first part Bratislava-Senec was finished in 1975) (Lenny 2007). The strengthening of trade and the exposition function of Bratislava was caused also by regular expositions [223] of chemical products Incheba (1967) and then by the construction of the exhibition grounds on the right bank of the Danube river. The prestige of the city was to be increased by realization of several remarkable architectonic projects. In 1972 the second bridge over the Danube — the Bridge of the Slovak National Uprising (snp bridge; also called the New Bridge resembling a 'flying saucer' or ufo) was finished. This indisputably unique structure (a one-pylon, steel, road, hanging bridge of a fan type) was listed as a 'building of century' in the category of bridge constructions in 2001. However, during its construction at the end of 1960s the restructuring of the western part of the historical centre of the city (Fish Square, a part Podhradie, Vydlica square) took place, creating a barrier between the castle and the historic centre and losing a significant part of the cultural heritage. The other symbolic objects are the building of Radio in the shape of a converted pyramid from 1983 (being listed as a Building of the century in the category of public buildings), the house of unions Istropolis (1981), a television tower on the top of Kamzik hill (height 194 m) and the television buildin in Mlynska dolina (1975), being the tallest building in Czecho-Slovakia with its 28 floors and a height of 107.5 m (s m e 2004).
Two developmental impulses were important for Bratislava in the last two decades. The first was the fall of the Iron curtain and the continual decrease of the barrier effect of state borders after 1989, ending with Slovakia's entering the Schengen area in 2007. This greatly influenced the geopolitical and geo-economical position of Bratislava. The territory of the so called 'Golden triangle of Europe' (Vienna— Bratislava—Györ) is considered to be extremely perspective from the point of view of the city's further development. The most important impulse and a new challenge for marketing and branding of Bratislava is the fact that on 1 January, 1993 it became the capital city of a newly formed state on the political map of the world.
actual city branding of Bratislava The most significant social changes in the country at the end of 1989 led to the formation of new governmental bodies in the city of Bratislava after 1990. The need to reflect the newly formed social-[224] economical situation had led to the proposal and in 1993 also to the acceptation of a strategic development document — Development strategy of the capital city of Slovakia — Bratislava (Bratislava 2008b). Then by the end of 2004, a new marketing plan of tourism development on the territory of the Slovak metropolis was approved: the Conception of tourism development for the period of 2005—2006. Its main aim was to improve the use of the existing cultural-historical and productive potential of Bratislava, along with modernization and completion of the essential infrastructure for tourism (Bratislava 2004). At the end of 2008 the city carried out a marketing research on the consumer behaviour of visitors to Bratislava, which became a basis for the marketing communication strategy of active tourism for the period 2009—2012 (Sprava 2009).
Nowadays, there is discussion and preparation of the program of economic and social development of the city for the next decade (2010—2020), in which the most relevant priorities in relation to branding are: destination management with orientation towards congress and incentive (motivational) tourism, support for more effective use of the intellectual and creative potential of the city in the formation of knowledge economy, acquirement of the position of a prestige locality for investors in the field of strategic services, enhancement of life quality and quality of the city environment. The main aims and priorities of further orientation of the capital city were concluded in the following six areas:
1	Bratislava — a supra-regional centre — to strengthen the image of Bratislava as a significant and popular central European metropolis and to increase its attractiveness for visitors and tourists and to reinforce the field of tourism.
2	Knowledge economy — to improve the infrastructure and services for the development of knowledge economy in the city, to initiate and assist the development of the domestic and international
network of subjects of knowledge economy and transfer of international experiences, and to attract investments in the field of strategic services.
3	Quality of life — by means of the improvement of life quality, social background and the opportunities for active spending of [225] leisure time, to create an attractive, open and vital city, proposing the perspectives for an active and interesting life.
4	(Quality of the environment and urban territory — to create the conditions for a sustainable rise in the life quality of its inhabitants, leading to the formation of acceptable environment and urban territory.
5	Transport and technical infrastructure — to improve the connection to the foreign transport systems, improve the internal mobility, based on energetically effective and environmentally conscious transport systems and propose a modern, quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient technical infrastructure according to the recent demands and future development.
6	City administration and governance — to govern the city effectively and transparently, move further in the improvement of the quality and availability of services for citizens, to the support positive attitude of the citizens and their active participation in the administration of public matters (Bratislava 2009b; 2009c).
One of the most serious problems of the contemporary metropolis of Slovakia, being a permanent unresolved issue, is the public transport of the city. The implementation of an integrated transport system (since 2010) is expected to bring better coordination of all the systems of public transport in the city. There exist some plans for the subway construction, however they have not yet been realized, and will not be realized in near future as well. Since the largest residential estate (residential zone) in Slovakia is built on the right bank of the Danube river, the only possibility of its transport connection with the city center (located on the left bank of the river) was provided by four bridges. Due to their insufficient transport capacity, construction of the fifth bridge Apollo was initiated. By the beginning of its operation in 2005, the issue of connection between the city centre and
the largest residential zone had been partly solved, and therefore there are new plans for the construction of the sixth, motorway bridge. The Apollo bridge is one of the most outstanding constructions realized in Bratislava recently. It has influenced the overall visual image of the [226] city and become its new symbol, replacing the previous city icon — the Bridge of snp. This new dominant has gained a prestigious international acclaim, being awarded as the best construction work, mainly in the field of infrastructure, by the American society for technical engineering — opal Awards in 2006. The experts have appreciated the modern technology used for the bridge construction, innovation and its contribution to the transport development in Bratislava (Bratislava 2006). Regarding the promotion of the construction, city and country, the process of its realization was also an interesting and awarded event. It was based on continual rotation of the entire bridge, more than 500-metres long (constructed in advance on the bank of the river), to reach construction to its right place. This one week lasting event attracted the attention of domestic and foreign media not only to the construction itself, but also to the city and country as whole.
Another great construction project is the complex of multi-functional buildings under the Bratislava Castle on the riverbank of the Danube — River Park, designed by the famous Dutch architect Er-icka van Egeraat. There are planned to be more than 200 luxurious apartments, a 5-star hotel, superior offices and leisure-time facilities. River Park is one of the projects by which Bratislava is trying to change its image of a provincial metropolis and to communicate the image of a new fashionable metropolis of Central-European importance (j & T 2009b). A similar construction of a new international shopping centre Eurovea, merging the riverbank and the city centre, is also situated in a valuable part of the Danube area (the final stage of its construction has already started). A large part of its space will be taken up by public areas and verdure, providing a pleasant environment for the apartments and offices that will be a part of it.
The new building of the Slovak National Theatre is also an interesting city-designing element. It is a building in post-modern style with technical components, evoking a kind of industrial impression. The construction of this modern complex — according to some au-
thors a so called 'a factory of art' — had lasted for more than 20 years and nowadays it is a part of another new profitable commercial-administrative zone of Bratislava known as Panorama City. It is a poly-functional complex, providing modern office areas and buildings of commercial character, as well as areas for leisure time activities, enter- [227] tainment and night life. The silhouettes of two residential towers, 150 m tall, will become the tallest buildings in Slovakia and will change significantly the panorama of Bratislava (Pokorny 2009; J & T 2009a).
Despite the economic crisis, Bratislava is still regarded as a perspective city for investors, developers and final users. One of its ambitions is to attract the seats of large corporations and thus to strengthen its central-administrative function in the Central-European territory. Several new business centres (e. g. Bratislava Business Centre v, Apollo Business Centre, etc.) were built for this purpose and there are plans for the construction of some others. New industrial parks for technologically aimed small and medium enterprises have been developed on the territory along the borderline with Austria (Bratislava 2007). An important part of the developmental strategy of city knowledge economics should be the cepit Bratislava project (Central European for Innovative Technologies Bratislava), at present in its initial phase. Its main intention is to build a research-technological park in the city, proposing a platform for the cooperation of companies, educational and research institutions, service providers, creating an urban structure with a balanced combination of functions (cepit 2009).
Regarding the industrial production, Bratislava, along with its wider hinterland (western Slovakia), is considered to be a new Detroit. The image is created due to the presence of three automobile companies in Slovakia with increasing production, and despite the economic crisis the expectations are to produce about 900 thousand automobiles by the end of 2011. Taking into consideration the total population of the country (5,421,937 inhabitants: susr 2010), Slovakia is on the first place in the world in automobile production per capita (h n 2008). Bratislava is the seat of the largest Slovak exporter — Volkswagen Slovakia, having the 15% of the total export in Slovakia. It produces 200,000 automobiles per year and employs about 8.5 thousand employees. One of the three most modern refineries in Europe is the
chemical company Slovnaft, producing and distributing oil products. It employs about 2.5 thousand employees (Slovnaft 2008). The majority of investments were directed to production companies and to the sector of high technologies.
[228] From the point of view of sports infrastructure improvement, the right to host the Ice hockey championship in spring 20ii (some of the matches will take place in Kosice) signified an important stimulus for the city. Due to this occasion a complex reconstruction of the original ice-hockey stadium of Ondrej Nepela as a modern purposeful arena with the capacity of 10 thousand seats is planned by the end of 20i0. The investments are estimated at 40 million euro. Modernization of a poly-functional sports centre at Tehelne pole (in the immediate neighborhood of the ice-hockey arena) will be a part of the project including a public swimming pool, national tennis centre and future football stadium (Bratislava 2009a).
Bratislava as the capital is also a national cultural metropolis with the highest concentration of cultural institutions (theatres, cinemas, galleries, museums, etc.). The most important social-cultural event, attracting more than i00 thousand visitors every year, is the Bratislava Cultural summer and Castle festival (ii2 thousand visitors in 2009 with increasing growth tendency). It is an international event lasting for three months, with 4000 artists and performers from 20 countries worldwide. There are various performances of different genres on 20 stages all around Bratislava. One of the most significant and prestigious international festivals in Slovakia, having a long-lasting tradition (since 1964) is the event of the Bratislava music festival, which is also the only Slovak event registered in the European association of festivals efa with its seat in Brussels. During two weeks there are about 25 symphonic and chamber concerts. An important part of this event is the International podium of young performers New Talent, organized by the European Union ebu with its seat in Geneva, under the patronage of unesco and the International Music Committee imc in cooperation with the Slovak broadcasting organization (Slovakia Travel 2005). The film art contributes to the image of the city by means of the popular International Film Festival Bratislava — iffba, also known as the Bratislava film festival. In 2009 the festival, consist-
ing of 175 full-length, medium-length and short films, was attended by almost 20,000 spectators in three cities (Weisenbacher 2009). Since 2003 a cultural performance of Bratislava is crowning ceremony celebrations, attracting about 100 thousands spectators, is organized regularly, with 120 actors in period style costumes performing an authentic [229] ceremony of king crowning, according to real historical events; each year is dedicated to a different king, according to chronological order (tasr 2006; Korunovačne slavnosti 2008). Among the events attracting the largest number of visitors every year are the New Year's Eve Celebrations, also known as Partyslava. The main part of the performances takes place in the historical city centre and attracts tens of thousands of domestic and foreign visitors (almost 100 thousand in 2006) (sita 2007; h N 2010). One of the events, organized by the self-government of the capital city in order to support the development of domestic and foreign tourism in Bratislava, is the two-days Open-door program — Touch the city! During this period several attractions such as museums, galleries, zoo, botanic gardens, city tours, town hall tours, concerts, sport events, including public transport — attractive especially due to the historic street-cars and trolley buses — are available to the public free of charge (Bratislava 2008a).
Despite the fact that Bratislava, in relation to the number of visitors, is the most important tourist destination in the country, its potential according to the city authorities is not utilized at all. The most decisive weakness that has not yet been overcome, is the insufficient promotion of the city in relation to potential visitors, usually attributed to the lack of financial resources. Despite this, in 2004 the city noticed a more than 20% annual increase in the number of foreign tourists in comparison to the previous year (Bratislava 2002). This increase was caused mainly by the development of low-cost air transport, which contributed to the revival of M. R. Stefanik airport, recording an increase of more than 90% in the number of passengers in comparison to the previous year (Horvathova 2010). Having low prices of services in comparison to the states of western Europe, Bratislava has become an attractive place for one-day or weekend shopping or party tourism. This fact was noticed by several influential European print media publishing series of contributions promoting Bratislava as
a cheap foreign city to buy your presents (Moss 2003; Telegraph 2004), and due to the exciting night life as a cheap destination for clubbing tourism. The influence of this kind of transport on tourism in the metropolis of Slovakia will be verified in 2010, the first year after the [230] collapse of the most important low-cost air transport provider SkyEu-rope in the autumn of 2009, because the market space has not been taken over by any other alternative haulier.
Another important event promoting the image of Bratislava and whole country was the three-day Slovakian Summit 2005, a meeting of us and Russian presidents: George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin. It was a media event of the year for Bratislava and for Slovakia, with the participation of 600 print media, 42 television crews and 30 radios (Incheba 2009). Smooth running of the session has contributed to Bratislava is reputation as a city able to organize similar events and therefore in autumn 2009 it was allowed to organize the two-day meeting of ministers of defence of North Atlantic alliance (nato) member countries, with the participation of 800 delegates from 28 member countries and more than 300 journalists (sme 2009). The last from the series of media occasions that contributed to the image of Bratislava was a visit by Queen Elisabeth 11. and the Duke of Edinburgh at the end of 2008.
Analyzing the recent activities of the city, we note that the present efforts of Bratislava are aimed at the creation of a modern metropolis of Central-European importance, proposing excellent conditions for businesses and localization of administrative centres of corporations, with the concentration of demanding research-technology activities and providing the basis for highly qualified specialists in the wide range of economic activities. For the support of communication of this intended city identity, the representatives agreed on the creation of a unified visual style of communication means for Bratislava, including a new logo, symbolizing Bratislava castle as the most popular dominant feature of the town and the slogan — 'Bratislava — little big city,' representing the equivalent of the national slogan — 'Slovakia — little big country.' However, it is necessary to mention that the existing discussion rather supports its critics, opposing the vagueness of the slogan and the fact that it associates with the complex of smallness
rather than with a positive reference to the creation of a cosy country, being the main aim of the city authorities (Capkova 2005).
CONCLUSION
From the complex point of view, Bratislava can be regarded as a suc- [231] cessful example of coping with the transformation development period in the context of transition from a central-bureaucratic economic and totalitarian political regime to the regime of market economy and plural democracy. Its share in the economic aggregate of Slovakia increased in the period 1997—2006 from 20.51% to 27.58% (Korec 2009), affirming its significant position as a dominant national economic centre in the Central-European economic area. The change in the strategy of a city brand mirrors the decline of the role of industry in favour of the tertiary and quarternary economic sectors (services, public administration). No doubt, the biggest challenge of the city remains the permanent trailing behind the competitive metropolises (Warsaw, Prague, Budapest) in most of the indicators. The aim to create a modern metropolis of Central-European importance is being realized in Bratislava by several investments into the city infrastructure, making it the most attractive city for foreign investments in Slovakia (60% of share within sr in 2006) currently. Future city branding will be aimed at still unfulfilled attributes such as attracting the most demanding companies' activities (management, research and development, design, etc.) and success in the competition to attract supra-national corporations' central offices.
acknowledgments
This contribution is part of the solution of the grant project vega no.
1/0611109 'Concept of place in regional-geographic analysis and synthesis and territorial marketing: theoretical-methodological basis and
its application in a chosen model territory' (chief of the project, Prof.
R. Matlovic).
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portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=2434 tas r. 2006. Korunovačm slavnosti 2006: Bratislavu navštivilo 100 tisic divakov! Http://www.gregi.net/vl/article/Korunovacne_slavnosti _2006_Bratislavu_navstivilo_i00_tisic_divakov_i5408/. Telegraph. 2004. Slovakia: Weekend to remember. Http://www.telegraph .co.uk/travel/destinations/europe/slovakia/ 729551/Slovakia -Weekend-to-remember.html#i. Weisenbacher, P. 2009: Filmovy festival Bratislava 2009: Po novom a lepšie. http://www.jetotak.sk/autonomna-zona/filmovy-festival -bratislava-2009-po-novom-a-lepsie. ŽSR. 2008: Historia železnic — Prvé železnice. Http://www.zsr.sk/ slovensky/historia-zeleznic/prve-zeleznice.html?page_id=i273.
Israeli War Perception from the Six Days War to the Operation Cast Lead: An Analysis of the Israeli Siege-Mentality
CLAUDIA DE MARTINO
University Cà Foscari, Italy
the following study addresses from an historical perspective the changes that have occurred in the Israeli perception of war in the last 40 years and the transformation of the conflict itself from an inter-state to a two-people war, in which the two parties are reciprocally hostile but so interdependent that the conflict is about to take on the features of a civil war. The siege-mentality perspective, launched by the pioneer studies combining politics and psychology carried out by Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992), reveals itself to be a useful and overarching hermeneutical category able to order and explain the multifold aspects related to war and peace perception in Israel. A premise to this work is the belief that the siege-mentality is not only a successful academic tool to penetrate the content and summarize some trends of the Israeli internal debate, but also to explain the major shifts in Israeli politics and to reveal the powerful forces active in society's awareness and government decision-making about warmotivation.
Israel is generally self-defining itself as a 'people dwelling alone' (Arian 1989, 603), which stands for the credo of a society strongly believing in itself but not feeling comfortable in eased relations with the outside world. Notwithstanding the long-standing duration of this belief, the feeling of loneliness of Israel among the countries has changed according to the political pressures the Western and Arab world were exerting on it on different occasions, especially in time of conflict or strain.
The year 1967 represents a watershed in Israeli history, as it is marking the transition between two well pin-pointed periods: on one hand, the time of a country founded on international, legitimate borders
sanctioned by the un, and on the other hand, a new epoch where Israeli boundaries are neither marked out, nor internationally agreed upon, nor even officially settled. What is changing dramatically is the relationship with the territory, with what is domestically defined as [236] Eretz Israel, a concept very hard to translate in any Western language due to its plentiful meanings and resonances, too often trivialized in 'country,' which alludes only to its territorial dimension. However, for the Israelis, for the role Zionism has played in the return of the Jews to their mythical-historical motherland and for all the cultural, religious and messianic meanings related to it, the translation with 'country' is just not accurate enough and does not allow one to infer the role this specific notion of the land has played in setting the non-solving character of the Arab—Israeli conflict (Kimmerling 1983).
It is important to underline that only from 1967 on , do there appear movements matching messianic aspirations and political ambitions as Gush Emounim, which convey a militant nationalist message and show an outspoken determination to annex all that is left of the Palestinian territories in order to re-establish the ancient Jewish kingdom of Salomon's time according to the dimensions cited in the Bible. From a cultural and political perspective, a radical change has taken place: what up to that moment had been rejected by classical Zionism as a secular movement and had led to the relative marginalization of religious groups inside the country and the establishment, is turned into an acceptable stance which competes on an equal footing with other political trends. Later, the same message will be conveyed by the National Religious Party, originally founded with totally opposite intents (Ben-Porat et al. 2008).
Initially, the attitude of the Mifleget Havodâ (the Labour Party) is negotiating the return of the occupied Palestinian territories in exchange for peace agreements and security guarantees on boundaries. However, negotiations do not come up with any concrete agreement, whereas the advantages of the Palestinian territories' acquisition are immediately visible to both the military and the government. In terms of strategic depth and removal of close military threats from urban centers, the possession of Palestinian territories proves itself to be a real improvement in global security conditions (Bar-Tal, Jacobson, and Klieman
1998). This will change Israeli internal perception of both the majority of public opinion and the establishment towards the West Bank and Gaza, and will lead soon to a patent will not to give them up as long as stable and comprehensive peace agreements are not reached with the neighbouring countries. The above-mentioned requirement — [237] still not met by 2009 — has been put forward since 1967 as the main reason for justifing the occupation, always perceived as transitory and therefore never made official. In 1967 there then arose the 'Occupied Territories' question:' by then, nobody was going to predict how long it would have lasted and whether it would have marked a second Nakba or just a temporary back fall.
What is relevant for the purpose of this study, is that Israeli mentality in changing according to the new, improved security conditions. For the first time in its short history, Israel holds safe borders and therefore is no longer at the mercy of the events and of the annihilation will of the neighbouring Arab countries. Besides, having re-conquered the Old City, it renews the mythical link between Judaism and the city, and has turned it into its new capital. In the aftermath of 1967, Israel is inebriated and enjoying for the first time regional power: not only has it defeated again all the Arab states allied against it, but has done away with the constant fear of obliteration (Mroz 1980). The army and the country relax, and this attitude will be accounted as the main reason of the temporary defeat for tsahal in 1973.
At the same time, also world perceptions on Israel are modifing themselves: from a little country surrounded by hostile enemies on all sides, Israel's perception turns into a middle regional power, able to change the status quo according to its national interests and without any preliminary authorization from the Superpowers. The Cold War is still stretching out and polarizing any regional conflict. Some officers of the idf, interviewed in the 70s, declared that at that time Israel was mostly frightened by an eventual Soviet intervention and considered all Arab states as Soviet proxies (Mroz 1980, 119). Therefore, Israel never really abbandoned its siege mentality, which was dating back to the difficult conditions of the former Yishuv, and this time more because of the international community than for actual security reasons. Since 1967, indeed, the international community and the Western
countries are no longer universally backing Israel as their regional ally and have started claiming the return of the Palestinian territories to Jordan under the aegis of un Resolution n. 242. Besides, Israel has taught another scary lesson to the same international community: that [238] the outbreak of a war started out of strict defensive reasons — such as a real annihilation threat — could be easily turned into a successful story able to achieve results much superior to any early expectations (Levy 1997).
The Yom Kippur War partially dismantled this image. Only 6 years later, Israel found itself again coping with a new 'annihilation' threat. The theory of territorial guarantees has proved not able to meet the country's security needs, and, despite the small war achievements, Egypt and Syria have been able to restore the respective reputation of their countries. Israel also had reconfirmed its military might, but stepping out of the conflict with a security perception deeply jeopardized. Israel proved not to be able to emancipate itself from a constant alert condition. Nevertheless, the Yom Kippur War stays in the national memory as the last totally defensive war, responding to the very objectives for which tsahal had been established and meeting the consensus and support of the whole population, with the single exception of the ultraorthodox streams not loyal to the State.
what stands for 'security concerns'
IN ISRAEL
It is now fundamental to better define the 'security' concept, as it comprises a multifold condition and aspects related to the military dimension but not exclusively to that. Bar-Tal defined it as a 'mixed perception' (Bar-Tal 1991), which includes past experiences, such as the peculiar history of a people, the interpretation and the collective memory related to them, the actual level of confidence and self-confidence, the intensity of external dangers, the index of internal cohesion, current political and economical stability, demographical features, education attitudes and so on. If it is true that all these elements contribute to the overall security perception of every single State, it is however possible to single out some specific characteristics in the Israeli case. BarTal et al. ( 1988) claimed, upon commenting on data related to a survey
on history teaching and education in Israeli schools both from the first and the secondary cycle, that official teaching material should acquaint students with a highly-ideological recollection of persecutions suffered by the Jews in any epoch and latitude. The Jews are presented as a universal target of violence and discrimination everywhere in the [239] Diaspora they were a minority confronting an hostile majority, thus inferring that Zionism was the only way-out to bring the Jews after 2000 years to regain sovereignty on their land and put an end to their historical suffering (Bar-Tal 2000).
This explains the great relevance attached to the 'Jewish' character of the State, which is regarded by the great majority of Israelis as an unconditional requirement, notwithstanding the ethnical and antidemocratic content it encompasses. The demand to represent a majority in their own State is linked to the power to establish institutions and to pass laws in line with the Jewish tradition and social organization, thus claiming that official and public recognition of their collective rights and freedoms which had been historically denied to them under both Christian- and Muslim-majority States. But the 'Jewish' definition does not only include positive and empowering meanings, as it keeps unchanged from the tradition the antinomy between Jew and non-Jew, between Yehudim and Goyim (Ben Dor 1988), deeply affecting the collective mentality of a country which has always regarded itself as a 'lonely dweller' (Arian 1989). This spreading perception, in constant rise from the 70s, according to domestic surveys, negatively affects the relationship between Israel and its Western allies, the eu and the u S, which are reckoned as 'friendly' only as long as they don't betray the slightest Israeli expectation. Moreover, it affects the domestic political debate, with continuous calls on national unity aimed at leveling down conflicting opinions on the definition of national interests, both on civil and military matters (Bar-Tal 1991). Thus it is no surprise that the surveys of the 70s reveal that the great majority of Israeli public opinion did not foresee any peace agreement with the Arab states in the short term (New York Times polls, 4 April 1979), a firm belief that would have been denied only few years later when Prime Minister Begin would has smoothly reached a compromise with its historical enemy, Egypt. The peace agreement with Egypt has proved
stable in the long run and assured Israel 30 years of peace (2009) on its southern border. In support of a more pragmatic and less ideological attitude towards peace and war issues, a new political movement was born in those years: Shalom Akshav (Peace Now). It had strongly backed [240] the peace negotiations with Egypt and was declaring as the main aim of its political activity the striving for secure and legitimate borders for all the countries involved in the Arab—Israeli conflict.
THE FIRST LEBANON WAR ( 1982) AS A TEST- CASE
of a more aggressive MINDSET The first peace agreement with an Arab State would not have had those revolutionary consequences that might have been initially expected. The conflict in Lebanon, following it only by 3 years, revealed a substantial change in Israel's conflict-management attitude. The country proved highly vulnerable to border violations by Palestinian 'guerrilla' groups and liable to react more actively and impulsively than before. If in 1973 Israel had reacted to a effective land invasion by the Syrian and Egyptian armies, anyhow not aimed at Israel's annihilation, in 1982 the spark which started the war was a single episode of terrorism carried out at the expense of Israel in far-away Great Britain: the killing of Ambassador Shlomo Argov by the Abu Nidal group, related to the PLO. In practice, this episode would constitute the pretext to cease Palestinian guerrillas' incursion over Israeli borders, and, moreover, to uproot the Palestinian p l o's leadership and supporters tout court from Lebanon.
The Israeli establishment came up with the persuasion that the opportunities of war should no longer be awaited passively as unforeseeable events, but considered according to the positive gains and changes they could bring about. Some elements eased the adoption of the new war doctrine: the rise to power of a true nationalist party (the Likud), the safety margin already achieved by the country and military might balance increasingly more favorably to the idf, as testified by the IA f's bombing Iraqi nuclear plants in 1981. This positive trend led Israel leadership to think that the country had already achieved the means and the strategic superiority needed in order to change the status quo and redefine the regional balance according to its security needs. The
overall international context, with the election of Reagan as us President, could have contributed to the idf adoption of a more aggressive strategy, but this choice was essentially rooted in domestic politics trends. The un defamation internal campaigns and labeling the plo merely as a terrorist organization without any legitimacy whatsoever, [241] were already signs of the leadership's intention to promote a change and embed it into the public opinion. The then plo represented a political rather than a military menace, but the idf deemed better to cope with it in military terms, as they were regarded as more effective to achieve results in the short term and more easy to deploy.
idf budget and training methods changed according to the new strategic policy and the new military needs, as the idf, even before the outbreak of the First Intifada, had to confront new situations, such as its military capillary deployment in the West Bank and Gaza, in stable contact with the civilian population. If the occupation of the Palestinian territories and their military administration had already changed the function and aims of the idf from its original strictly defensive motivation, the Lebanon War and some episodes of exceptional violence such as the massacre in Sabra and Chatila, deeply upset Israel's public opinion. The great majority of Israelis basically divided themselves along two lines: on the one hand, the line of those who viewed the support to whatsoever national strategic and security interests a as loyalty test to the State ad Zionism (Ben-Porat et al. 2008); on the other hand, the line of those who still believe in objective criteria to judge upon the necessity and the suitability of a war, whether started by Israel or suffered by it.
The Sabra and Chatila massare, and the revealed connivance of the Israeli army, led to the call of a wide demonstration which took place in Tel Aviv which gathered 400,000 Israelis voicing their contempt for the government. Demonstrations were never really rooted and resorted to as a means of protest in Israel, therefore the event stood out in the national context. However, the inquiry commission did not point to any personal responsibility.
The internal fracture between 'hawks and doves,' already started in 1967, outlined itself more deeply. It is important to say that the most significant change emerged in the civil society and not from an input
by the political leadership (Wistrich and Ohana 1995). The differences between these two 'areas' or 'halves' of the country were to turn even more visible in the 1990s and during the Oslo peace agreement years, only to fade away and totally cease to exist after the Al-Aqsa Intifada [242] in 2000.
The Lebanon War proved to be more aggressive and less grounded than any other previous conflict, but Bar-Tal (2007) points out that the public opinion's general attitude and perception of the idf did not change due to it: tsahal was still ranking as a superior and ethic-inspired army. In all the previous conflict, the idf had run major risks and registered many losses, moreover it was the 'people's army,' in which every single citizen of the State had served, therefore it could not lose its long-standing reputation over a single mistake. Its guiding principles were good and they were going to stay.
THE first intifada REVEALS THE iSRAELi
project on the 'occupied territories' In 1987, the great majority of Israelis were totally shocked by the outbreak of the First Intifada. For over 20 years, Israel had not dared to define the juridical status of the Palestinian territories subjected first to a military and later to a civilian administration. Some public statements in this sense released by the u S administration, the u N and the European States on the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, never materialized in concrete proposals or in political pressure towards Israel. In fact, for 20 years (1967—1987) almost 6,000,000 people were left in a political vacuum and in the powerlessness of defining themselves politically. Still 20 years further on (2009), this situation of collective oblivion looks more like responding to a strategic vision of the Israeli military establishment than being a simple product of accident.
There is no intention to claim that there had ever been a detailed plan of ethnical cleansing (Pappé 2006) or population transfer, as some academics and some sectors of the European Left would allude to, but rather that some long-term vision and approaches had shaped the decisions of the Israeli leadership regarding the Territories. They could be summarized as follows: the Palestinian Territories shall never become a
State in full, that is with all the relevant external trade and communication powers and border control tasks; the Palestinian Territories shall not share a sovereign border with any Arab State and shall never again constitute a military threat to Israel. In order to achieve these overarching goals, three elements were needed: refrain from drawing too [243] much international attention to the fate of the Palestinian Territories; refrain from proclaiming officially their juridical status; ensure slow but steady expansion of Jewish settlement areas in militarily strategic points of the West Bank and Gaza.
In this context, the First Intifada was perceived as a sudden blow to a well-defined plan and as a break in the daily routine management of the Territories, which was able to mark a point. The first shortcoming was that it revealed itself as a phenomenon apt to draw international attention, making the headlines of newspapers and broadcasting news for more than 4 years (1987—1991); the second was that it showed to the world the extension of Jewish settlements already achieved; the third, that it did not consist of a plo initiative, that might have always been disregarded or defamed by the Israeli authorities by recalling plo's terrorist affiliation, but instead consisted of a popular, spontaneous upraising, very difficult to disdain by propaganda means. Thus, it is comprehensible that the First Intifada was able to raise concern and tension in the Israeli establishment, worried at the same time about the increase in violence and the international and domestic public opinions reactions. While the First Intifada was raging, some sectors of Israeli society started considering the 1967 occupation as the turning point that had not only turned upside down the war perception in Israel, but that might be able slowly to turn the whole country into a new-style colonial power. Those Israelis who started fearing the most negative outcomes of occupation, launched a series of protests and campaigns advocating Israeli withdrawal, and would have been the main supporters of the late Oslo agreements. However, only the more educated and open sectors of society acknowledged the risk, with the great majority of the people lagging behind. The majority's attitude in Israel was to show criticism only in on a limited and event-based tendency, as if generally speaking the country, blocked in its siege-mentality, could not look at the choices ahead with the right level of
detachment that a mature democracy should always keep regarding all its deliberations, and particularly in those related to peace and war options.
[244]	the 1990s as a relative breach: the oslo
agreements from the prospective of israel's security Historians love to say that there are as many versions of facts as there are witnesses of them. Surely, the Oslo agreement history is a good example of a historical process which gave rise to many alternative and conflicting narratives. Summarizing, there is a Palestinian official and moderate version, which recalls the Olso agreements as a great opportunity for peace, later withdrawn by the Israelis, who had the feeling of having offered too much, and went back to their dealing-out positions. The second version, always belonging to the Palestinian side, is that of Hamas and other more extreme groups, which had rejected the Oslo agreement's principle since its early beginning, as spoiled in its outlay and unable to deliver those substantial changes Palestinians deserved.
On the Israeli side there also exist two competing versions. They will be analyzed as exemplified through the opinions of two academics, reflecting on them some years later, after their failure, and drawing two opposite conclusions from the same events. Bar-Tal and Vertzberger discussed about this in an article entitled 'Between Hope and Fear' (Bar-Tal and Vertzberger 1997)
Bar-Tal (Bar-Tal and Vertzberger 1997) expresses himself somehow in a nostalgic way, positive about the peace prospective that opened up in the early 1990s, and quoting a survey showing that 55% of the Israelis declared then their acceptance of the principle of the release of territories in exchange for peace. He recalls that there were some difficult points in the negotiations of no immediate agreement, but the ideological adhesion to the 'Great Israel' project had dropped dramatically among the majority of Israelis, who were on the contrary looking at the peace process as a painful but obligatory way to improve the overall security conditions. In this sense, Bar-Tal detected the major strategic mistake of the Labour Party in casting and channeling all public atten-
tion to the security gains the Oslo agreements would have delivered.
In other words, the peace-process would not have been presented by
the authorities other than as a way of stamping out the constant fear
and anxiety of further daily Palestinian attacks, as in the old days of
the First Intifada. The public consensus had ceased once the attacks [245]
would have started again.
Vertzberger (Bar-Tal and Vertzberger 1997) declares himself less optimistic, both about the premises and the consequences of the process. His main point is that public opinion in Israel was not ready to address such a radical change imposed from the top by a political establishment focused only on seizing the opportunity, without paying attention to raise enough support and consensus in the country. In other words, Vertzberger claims that a spread of support for the Oslo agreements in Israel had never been the case, instead there was a generic positive attitude towards the opening of negotiations with the Palestinians which did not envisage concrete proposals and dramatic choices. This would have been the reason explaining all the hatred towards Rabin, but also the fact that his killing did not move public opinion towards broader support for the peace agreements, but rather, to its opposite. An agreement with the plo would have never been able to assure Israelis security and stability guarantees comparable to an inter-State agreement, therefore it would never have met the basic security needs of Israel. The 'intimacy' between Palestinians and Israelis would have also played a negative role: contrary to the assumption that two people closely acquainted with each other should develop some kind of understanding, the daily life violence and mutual incomprehension would have caused Palestinians and Israelis to drift apart.
Whatever version could be assessed as more credible, a right-wing government was elected right after Rabin's murder, an event that for the seriousness of the circumstances among which the killing was carried out, might have led the country to adapt totally opposite choices. To sum up the conclusions, the 'attitude towards conflict,' as analyzed by Bar-Tal in his latest works (Bar-Tal, Ravin, and Dgani-Hirsh 2009), did not recede but rater intensified after 1995 and it was further aggravated by Palestinian petty violence. Perhaps the territorial concessions advanced in Oslo had been really proved over-daring and the Israelis
were just outdistancing themselves from them, not without some sense of relief.
THE LAST DECADE: THE preemptive WAR [246]	AS THE NEW SECURITY PARADIGM
The last decade of years, approximately included between 1996 and 2009, was marked by many major events — the negotiations started by the Israeli Prime Minister Barak, known as the 'Camp David Agreement,' the outbreak of the Second Intifada (Intifada Al-Aqsa), the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon (2000), the building of the Defense Wall (2002), the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip (2005), the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War (2006), and finally the Gaza bombing in 2008, also known as 'Operation Cast Lead.' All these events occurred in a international context deeply changed by the emergence of a militant and over active u S administration that considered the entire world as a stage for possible 'defensive' wars as defined by U S national interests.
The example of preemptive war offered by the Bush administration to Israel is surely not a positive instance, but the Israeli political leadership had generally supported U S initiatives only as long as long as they were meeting Israel's own national security interests (Shur and Nevo 2003). The political scene in Israel is today in ever-moving, with a constant inclination towards the electoral strengthening of right-wing parties since 1996: Barak has maybe been the last Labour politician in power (2000), but his hesitant and fickle attitude has made the country lose the last concrete opportunity for peace.
The Second Intifada was characterized by the highest level of violence ever encountered in the country and adopted the bewildering technique of suicide-attacks, which undermined the international support for the Palestinian cause, at the same time pushing Israelis further into a stronger disenchantment and mistrust. The target of suicide attacks being mostly civilians, it had increased the self-perception of Israelis as vulnerable at every moment, somehow in daily-life conditions bitter and more risky than those prevailing in war times.
Many sources and studies (inss, Israel Democracy Institute, Konrad Adenauer Foundation) confirm that the Al-Aqsa Intifada had
opened up a new vicious circle in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict: first of all, it had contributed to delegitimizing again the anp, denying the results achieved with Oslo and revealing, according to the Israelis, the 'true face' (Ross 2002) of Arafat: that of a man of dubious morality, able to back suicide attacks after having shaken hands [247] with Rabin on the White House lawn; second point, it further weak-end the Labour positions in the country, and all the Doves' campaigns reaching-out strength, accused of 'closing out' the country and its security.
Nowadays in Israel, the perception is widespread that only the right-wing parties may ever deliver peace and run negotiations with the Palestinians and the Arab State without putting security and internal cohesion at stake (Osnos 2006). Besides, the right-wing had campaigned electorally as a more dynamic and pragmatic force: men like Ariel Sharon, founder of the new party Kadima (literally, 'Ahead'), have proposed a new conception of security based on Israeli unilateralism. This new approach is based on the conviction, from the Israeli side, totally backed by public opinion, that there is no real partner for peace on the other side but that a military redeployment is needed. In this sense, the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 over the establishment of a security belt patrolled by un troops and the evacuation of settlers from Gaza in 2005, respond to the same unilateral logic.
It is interesting to point out the outstanding support towards unilateralism coming from different social classes and shuffling the previous political stances. The first consequence to be drawn from this data is that the suicide attacks and their strong support among Palestinians had led the Israelis to a total distrust not easily surmountable. This further led to many practical effects, such as the broad consensus over the building of the Defense Barrier all along the 1967 borders, completely sealing off the West Bank. There were also economical factors concurring to the same decision: part of the liberal and Labour sectors esteem that the State is spending far too much on the military and especially in the defense and guarding of remote settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, inhabited by few, scattered people, which do not bring any concrete benefits to the country and respond only to an ideological-religious attachment to the land. Besides, the mili-
tary itself is facing new challenges: the universal youth conscription is decreasing, and therefore also idf military personnel. This is due to many different factors not likely to disappear in the next decades: religious people's exonerations, reservists' presence abroad, reservists [248] protesting against serving in the Territories, and so on. If the number of checkpoints spread all over the West Bank and around Gaza, and the forces assigned to the protection of small and big settlements all around the Territories, are taken into account, it stands out clearly why the idf is facing its first serious personnel lack in the last 40 years. This condition of strain has led the military authority to resort to private security agencies for guarding at checkpoints, flying checkpoints and other similar functions, with all the related risks.
LAST REMARKS: WHAT TO EXPECT FROM ISRAEL? The Gaza evacuation has reopened a cleavage, that was always lingering between the religious and the secular in the country: the great majority of Gaza settlers belonged to the religious stream or national-religious movements, whereas the Sharon government's attitude — and of all the Kadima leadership — was presenting itself as mostly secular and pragmatic, in opposition to the very same principles of the historical right (Jabotinsky, Herut, Likud) from which it stems. Olmert embraced the same strategy of unilateralism as the late Sharon and advocated, at least initially, further withdrawals (that never took place).
The new logic of the Israeli right-wing parties reveals itself as being far from the myth of the 'Great Israel:' Olmert declared publicly that Israel would go on existing as a Zionist and Jewish State only if the Territories were to be abandoned and the establishment of a Palestinian State alongside Israel would take place (Jerusalem Post, January 3, 2008). The right-wing parties in Israel had never issued this proposal so clearly before. This does not means automatically that all the political area included among Likud, Kadima, Agudat Israel and Israel Beitenu will support this stance and follow soon. Besides, these proposals do not translate themselves automatically into a reduction of violence or into an overall decrease of conflict.
In the last years, a classic confrontation among States, such as occurred in the 1973, is regarded as very unlikely. However, the Arab—
Israeli conflict has not ceased to exist, but is active through other channels.
The first point to take into consideration is that Israel looks at the Arab world, and those States at Israel, as in a mirror: for the Arab States, Israel still remains a 'foreign body' in an otherwise ho- [249] mogeneous region, while Israel thinks of the Arab world as a cohesive pan-nation, a faint region, where a decision taken in Cairo may gain supporters in any other 'brother' State. Thus, the deep reasons for the conflict at the base of the Arab—Israeli wars have not yet been removed.
The second point is that, nowadays, States are active through secondary, alternative channels, as militia or armed groups more or less directly dependent on the State. Those groups are assigned the task of keeping the conflict running, but adjusting it to an average degree of violence which won't automatically lead to a States' confrontation. The Second Lebanon War is exactly displaying these features. It still presents an open problem, whose inner logic eludes external observers: a war that could never have been won (Hizbullah cannot be uprooted from Lebanon as an 'alien' body like the plo in 1982), which didn't exploit sufficient means (only air shelling in order to minimize human losses), and which sets such overarching and impossible goals (the finding of the kidnapped soldiers, the upraising of the Shiite population of the South of Lebanon against Hizbullah) as to turn out incongruous (Inbar 2007).
Reflection is therefore needed upon the principle of deterrence and its practical translation in preemptive wars and unilateral withdrawals, which seems to point to a deep distress of the country in running political relations with other States, especially its Arab neighbours.
The political and economic leadership may have distanced themselves from religious and militaristic perspectives, but only to find shelter in a rather strong ethnocentrism which hinders their perception of the outside world. Israel no longer trusts anybody, considers war the only and more effective option at its disposal, and this not in order to change the regional balance or to achieve a definite victory, but only to hold to the temporary status quo and gain time for further unilateral choices to take place according to its security needs as re-formulated from time to time.
In this perspective also the Gaza War should be interpreted. The citizens of the Southern Negev, exposed to the rocket launches which highly compromise daily life's activities and the security of perception of individual Israeli civilians, have the right to lead a normal life, as [250] do the citizens of whatever other Western country. The Israeli citizens do not look at the whole picture, but only at the detail: the rocket falling in the school yard while the students were only playing a basketball match. They do not think that those rockets represent something, are launched by a country at war which is advancing some request, to which perhaps the Israeli authorities could also give a different response.
Israel in this specific historical moment does not express any political perspective, but rather only a dubious tendency to look inward, a tendency in which the options of peace and war remains constantly open, with all the States, the armed groups and the militias that could prejudice the daily life security of the State through kidnapping a single civilian or injuring a single soldier.
No long-term analyses are worked out by either military or civilian authorities. What is left is a strong bond to survival and defense, drawn from the feeling the State stays always ready to start a war, if individuals' security is jeopardized.
The conclusion might be that, given the factual impossibility of realizing the 2-States solutions according to the u N plan due to the number of settlements in the West Bank, and taking into account the total absence of an internal debate on the follow-up of the Gaza War, the ethnocentric tendency of Israel and the inclination to look only inward is still far from ending.
Yet, the country would have all the required cultural, material and human resources to rouse itself from this oblivion and on the day when a strong political project would emerge again, able to present peace as a positive outcome and not as an external imposition, and to present Israel as a much more complex State than that of the uniform, monolithic image now pushed forward, the actual balance could swiftly shift to more open stances. The current dynamism of Israeli society in all the scientific and cultural fields and all the rich Jewish philosophical tradition show a strong critical inclination, tending towards a constant
reappraisal of both its thinking and its action, open to the outside world and to change.
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Résumés/Abstracts
Unity and Diversity of Euro-Mediterranean Identities marwa ibrahim
The title of the project which will be discussed here is 'Unity and Diversity of Euro-Mediterranean Identities,' however it seems necessary to provide first a definition of the terms 'identity' and 'Mediterranean'. Despite their great diversity, Euro-Mediterranean identities share a common territory. The Mediterranean basin is both a geographical area and a place nourished by memories and nostalgia. This territorial diversity creates what we call the 'geographical plurality of a person,' meaning that a person identifies himself/herself as belonging to several territories. Is identity not a product of interactions with others, a result of diversity? Identity comes from diversity and diversity is Mediterranean. There is little agreement on the precise definition of the 'Mediterranean.' However, it is marked by a constant interaction between the real and the emotional, the tangible and the imaginary. The Mediterranean is in fact a mythical place. The Mediterranean myth exists in the minds, but is also discernible in practice: it is found in everyday life, in the lived experience. Today, it seems indispensable to rethink the Mediterranean, to perceive it as a dynamic and tangible interface, which can assure connection and establishment of relations between different territories, as it enables the encounter of diversities.
Islam entre le passé et le présent dragan potoCnik
La contribution de la civilisation islamique à la richesse des arts et des sciences du monde est inestimable. La civilisation islamique a atteint son apogée à l'époque des grands Califat Omeyyade et Califat Abbasside, et également plus tard dans le domaine des khanats qui ont émergés après l'effondrement de l'Empire mongol. Ses jours de gloire se situent surtout au temps de la Perse safavide, de l'Inde moghole et de la Turquie Osman. Durant cette période s'étalant sur près de 1000 années, le monde islamique représentait, avec la Chine, la civilisation dominante. Les relations entre l'Europe et le monde
islamique ont souvent été marquées par la violence et les conflits. Ceux-ci ont débuté peu après l'émergence de l'islam, quand les Arabes ont conquis la Péninsule ibérique. Ils ont connu une recrudescence au temps des croisades et ont atteint leur apogée au 19ème siècle avec la découverte de pétrole en Asie de l'ouest. La crise s'est aggravée dans le courant du 20ème siècle avec l'effondrement de la Turquie Osman et la création de l'Etat juif. Elle a atteint son paroxysme avec les attentats terroristes. Pourquoi ces conflits ? Est-ce que la peur du musulman perçu comme un être différent est justifiée ? Comment s'établiront les relations à l'avenir ?
Unité et diversité dans les identités euro-méditerranéennes : dimensions euro-européennes arabo-méditerranéennes
AFFAYA RIM
L'histoire nous montre aisément que les interactions entre les peuples qui entourent la mer Méditerranée ont considérablement contribué à l'élaboration de la civilisation culturelle, politique et religieuse de la région et ont affecté les chemins de plusieurs autres mouvements se développant dans d'autres régions du monde. Les Romains, l'âge d'or islamique, le moyen âge et l'époque moderne attestent d'une histoire très spécifique qu'il est nécessaire de prendre en compte si l'on veut concevoir la renaissance de l'identité euro-méditerranéenne comme un point central de l'analyse minutieuse de la situation actuelle. Cette recherche implique une réflexion sur les distinctions à faire quand on se penche sur la question de l'identité euro-méditerranéenne, celle-ci étant façonnée de caractéristiques diverses et multiples. Les composants d'une identité si dichotomique dans un monde globalisé tel que le notre, doivent être examinés en revisitant l'histoire à travers les liens qui les unissent et qui s'appuient sur leurs mémoires collectives, mais aussi à travers ce qui les rend différents les uns des autres aujourd'hui. L'article commence par souligner l'importance de la réflexion sur les identités nationales en tant que concept évoluant au fil du temps, les lieux et l'introduction de nouveaux acteurs sur la scène internationale. Ensuite, il attire l'attention sur une identité européenne commune au vu de l'histoire de l'Europe et de l'Union européenne, et l'oppose à l'identité arabo-méditerranéenne. Il appelle alors à un indispensable dialogue euro-méditerranéen à
la lumière d'une identité commune afin de réfléchir justement à un avenir commun.
L'influence du tourisme sur le développement régional de la Bosnie-Herzégovine
[255]
RAHMAN NURKOVIC
La Bosnie-Herzégovine est une destination touristique très attrayante du fait de sa situation géographique, de ses beautés naturelles exceptionnelles, de son patrimoine culturel et historique et de ses conditions climatiques agréables. Jusqu'en 1992, d'importants aménagements destinés au tourisme ainsi que des réseaux d'infrastructure et de transport ont été construits. De grandes capacités d'organisation ont été révélées pour les Jeux olympiques d'hiver à Sarajevo en 1984, ainsi que pour de nombreuses autres manifestations. Dans la période de 1992 à 1995, parmi les aménagements destinés au tourisme, beaucoup ont été détruits et ruinés. Aujourd'hui, la plupart d'entre eux ont été reconstruits et de nouvelles installations sont également apparues. Cet article traite de l'influence du tourisme sur le développement régional de la Bosnie-Herzégovine au vu du paramètre que représentent les ressources touristiques dans les régions touristiques de la Bosnie-Herzégovine : le nombre d'arrivées de touristes étrangers et des nuitées, les revenus pratiqués dans le domaine du tourisme et le nombre de personnes employées dans les industries touristiques. Au vu des tendances actuelles au niveau du tourisme mondial et du potentiel touristique de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, on est en mesure de constater qu'un effort a été fait pour considérer l'influence du tourisme sur le développement économique global du pays.
Le « city branding » de la ville de Bratislava : histoire et actualité
KVETOSL AVA MATLOVICOVÂ
La concurrence croissante des villes a entraîné l'usage de certains principes de marketing dans les stratégies de développement local. Un segment très important de marketing territorial est le « city branding ». Formule pouvant s'appliquer à un pays, une région, une destination touristique ou une ville. Le « city branding » est basé sur une approche stratégique des relations publiques, pointant le fait qu'un
changement d'image est un processus continu, global, interactif et à grande échelle (Avraham and Ketter 2008 ; Hospers 2004). Cet article met l'accent sur l'introduction des principes du « city branding » dans le développement local (Étude de cas de la ville de Bratislava). Bratislava, la plus grande ville de Slovaquie (427.000 habitants), est devenue la capitale de la République Slovaque indépendante le 1er Janvier 1993 (après l'accord sur la dissolution de la Tchécoslovaquie). Le plus grand défi de la ville se situe dans le fait de vouloir rattraper les métropoles concurrentielles (Varsovie, Prague et Budapest), sur beaucoup de critères. Les nombreux investissements dans le domaine de l'infrastructure permettent de faire de Bratislava une métropole moderne de grande importance dans l'Europe centrale. Bratislava est ainsi devenue la ville la plus attrayante pour les investisseurs étrangers présents en Slovaquie.
Perception israélienne de la guerre de la Guerre de six jours à l'Opération Plomb durci : une analyse de la mentalité d'assiégé israélienne Claudia de martino
L'étude suivante présente, dans une perspective historique, les changements qui ont eu lieu dans la perception que les Israéliens avaient de la guerre au cours des 40 dernières années ainsi que la transformation du conflit lui-même, passant d'un conflit inter-état à une guerre entre deux personnes dans laquelle les deux parties sont réciproquement hostiles, mais tellement interdépendants que ce conflit prend les traits d'une guerre civile. La perspective de la mentalité d'assiégé, insufflée par des études sans précédent menées par Bar-Tal et Antebi (1992), mêlant politique et psychologie, se révèle être un concept utile et globalement herméneutique efficace pour déterminer et expliquer les multiples aspects dans la perception israélienne de la guerre et de la paix. En introduction à ce travail, il est nécessaire de bien comprendre que le concept de mentalité d'assiégé n'est pas qu'un outil théorique de succès permettant de saisir le fond et de faire une synthèse des orientations du débat israélien interne, mais qu'il sert aussi à expliquer les changements majeurs dans la politique israélienne et à discerner les forces actives en puissance agissant sur la conscience collective et dans les décisions gouvernementales concernant les motivations de la guerre.
Povzetki
Enakost in raznolikost evrosredozemskih identitet
MARWA IBRAHIM
Naslov projekta, ki ga obravnava članek, je »Enakost in raznolikost evrosredozemskih identitet«. Kljub temu se zdi potrebno, da najprej podamo definicijo terminov »identiteta« in »Sredozemlje«. Evrosre-dozemske identitete si kljub veliki raznolikosti delijo skupen teritorij. Sredozemski bazen je hkrati geografsko obmocčje in obmocčje, ki ga napajajo spomini in nostalgija. Ta teritorialna raznolikost ustvari tako imenovano geografsko pluralnost oseb, kar pomeni, da se osebe deklarirajo kot pripadniki vecč ozemelj hkrati. Ali ni identiteta produkt interakcij z drugimi, rezultat raznolikosti? Identiteta je posledica raznolikosti in raznolikost je značilnost Sredozemlja. Še vedno je veliko nestrinjanja glede natancčne definicije termina »sredozemski«, vendar pa je zanj znacčilna neprestana interakcija med resnicčnim in cčustvenim, med oprijemljivim in imaginarnim. Sredozemlje je pravzaprav miticčen prostor. Sredozemski mit obstaja v mislih, vendar ga lahko razlocčimo tudi v praksi: najdemo ga v vsakdanjem življenju, v doživetih izkušnjah. Zdi se, da je danes nujno ponovno razmisliti o Sredozemlju kot o dinamičnem in oprijemljivem posredniku, ki lahko zagotovi povezavo in vzpostavitev odnosov med razlicčnimi teritoriji, saj omogocča srecčanje raznolikosti.
Islam med preteklostjo in sedanjostjo
DRAGAN POTOČNIK
Prispevek islamske civilizacije v zakladnico svetovne umetnosti in znanosti je neprecenljiv. Islamska civilizacija je dosegla vrhunec v cčasu mogocčnega omajadskega in abasidskega kalifata ter kasneje na območju kanatov, ki so nastali na razpadlem mongolskem cesarstvu, najlepši sijaj pa je dosegla v casu safavidske Perzije, mogulske Indije in osmanske Turčije. V tem skoraj tisočletnem obdobju je bil islamski svet — skupaj s Kitajsko — vodilna civilizacija na svetu. Odnose med Evropo in islamskim svetom so pogosto zaznamovali nasilje in spopadi. Zacčetki konfliktov segajo v cčas kmalu po nastanku islama, ko so Arabci zavzeli Pirenejski polotok. Še vecčji obseg so dobili v
casu križarskih vojn in dosegli vrhunec v 19. stoletju, ko so na obmo-cčju Prednje Azije odkrili nafto. Kriza se je poglobila v 20. stoletju s propadom osmanske Turcčije in z ustanovitvijo judovske države ter dosegla vrh s terorističnimi napadi. Kje so razlogi konfliktov? Ali je [258]	utemeljen strah pred drugačnostjo muslimanov? Kako se bodo obliko-
vali odnosi v prihodnosti?
Enotnost in raznolikost evrosredozemskih identitiet: evro-evropske in arabsko-sredozemske dimenzije affaya rim
Splošno znano je, da so zgodovinske interakcije med ljudstvi, ki živijo okoli Sredozemskega morja, veliko pripomogle k zasnovi kulturnih, politicčnih in religioznih civilizacij te regije in da so vplivale na potek več drugih gibanj, ki so se pojavila v drugih predelih sveta. Rimljani, zlata doba islama, srednji vek in moderna doba so pricče avtenticčne zgodovine, ki jo je treba upoštevati, če želimo razumeti renesanso evrosredozemske identitete kot kljucčnega vprašanja za vpogled v današnjo situacijo. Pricujoca študija razmišlja o pomenu razlik v razumevanju evrosredozemske identitete, ki je sestavljena iz številnih razlicčnih znacčilnosti. Implikacije tako raznolike identitete v globalizi-ranem svetu je treba raziskati s ponovno preucčitvijo njene zgodovine skozi njihove skupne vezi, ki temeljijo na kolektivnih spominih, vendar tudi glede na razlike med njimi. Cč lanek na zacčetku osvetli pomen razmišljanja o nacionalnih identitetah kot o konceptu, ki se spreminja skozi čas, prostor in vključevanje novih akterjev na mednarodni sceni. Nato poudari skupno evropsko identiteto v lucči zgodovine Evrope in Evropske unije in jo primerja z arabsko sredozemsko identiteto. Na koncu pozove k nujnemu evrosredozemskemu dialogu z vidika skupne identitete in razmišlja o skupni prihodnosti.
Vpliv turizma na regionalni razvoj Bosne in Herzegovine
RAHMAN NURKOViC
Bosna in Hercegovina je zelo zanimiva turisticčna destinacija zaradi svoje geografske lege, izjemnih naravnih lepot, kulturno-zgodovinske dediščine in ugodnih podnebnih pogojev. Pred letom 1992 so bile zgrajene pomembne turisticčne kapacitete, infrastruktura in prometne mreže, svoje organizacijske sposobnosti pa je država dokazala
že v casu olimpijskih iger leta 1984 v Sarajevu in v številnih drugih prireditvah. V obdobju od 1992 do 1995 je bilo uničene precej turistične infrastrukture. Danes je v veliki meri obnovljena, zgrajene pa so tudi nove kapacitete. Cč lanek obravnava vpliv turizma na regionalni razvoj Bosne in Hercegovine skozi parametre prihodkov iz turizma, ki so razporejeni v turističnih regijah Bosne in Hercegovine: število tujih turistov in nocitev, dohodek od turizma in število zaposlenih v turistični industriji. V luči trenutnih tokov svetovnega turizma in turističnega potenciala Bosne in Hercegovine smo preučili njun vpliv na celoten gospodarski razvoj.
»Branding« Bratislave: preteklost in sedanjost
KVETOSL AYA MATLOYiCOYÂ, BARBORA NÉMETHYOVÂ
in rené matloyiC
Zaradi vse vecje konkurenčnosti med mesti so lokalne razvojne strategije zacele upoštevati marketinška načela. Zelo pomemben segment marketinga obmocčja je »city branding« (branding mesta). Termin se lahko nanaša na državo, regijo, turisticčno destinacijo ali mesto. »City branding« temelji na strateškem pristopu k stikom z javnostmi in temelji na postavki, da je spreminjanje podobe celosten, interaktiven, obsežen in dalj časa trajajoč proces (Avraham in Ketter 2008; Hospers 2004). Pričujoci članek se osredotoca na vključitev načel »city brandinga« v lokalni razvoj (študija primera mesta Bratislave). Bratislava, največje slovaško mesto (427.000 prebivalcev), je postala glavno mesto samostojne Republike Slovaške 1. januarja 1993 (po sporazumni delitvi (češkoslovaške). Največji izziv za Bratislavo je dohajanje konkurencnih metropol (Varšave, Prage in Budimpešte) v večini kazalcev. Cilj, da bi Bratislava postala pomembna moderna srednjeevropska metropola, se uresničuje s pomočjo številnih investicij v mestno infrastrukturo, zaradi cesar je mesto postalo najprivlacnejše za trenutne tuje investitorje na Slovaškem.
Izraelska percepcija vojne od šestdnevne vojne do operacije »Cast Lead«: analiza izraelske »siege mentality« (mentalitete obleganih)
Claudia de martino
Pricujoca študija z zgodovinskega vidika obravnava spremembe, ki zadevajo izraelsko percepcijo vojne v zadnjih štiridesetih letih in trans-
formacijo konflikta iz meddržavnega konflikta v medosebno vojno, kjer sta si dve strani enako sovražni, vendar tako odvisni druga od druge, da konflikt skoraj dobi podobo civilne vojne. Perspektiva »siege mentalitity« (mentalitete obleganih), ki sta jo s pionirsko študijo, ki združuje politiko in psihologijo, uvedla Bar-Tal in Antebi (1992), se je izkazala za koristno in vseobsegajočo hermenevticno kategorijo, ki lahko razloži večplastne vidike izraelske percepcije vojne in miru. Premisa tega dela je prepričanje, da »siege mentality« ni samo uspešno akademsko orodje, ki prodre v vsebino in povzame nekatere trende izraelske notranje debate, ampak lahko tudi razloži glavne premike v izraelski politiki in razkrije mocne sile, ki delujejo v zavesti družbe in pri odlocčanju vlade glede vojne motivacije.
Continued from the front inside cover
Joaquina Labajo Valdés, Autonomous
University of Madrid, Spain Senin Latif Sanin, Hacettepe University, Turkey
Binshan Lin, Louisiana State University
in Shreveport, USA Gyozo Lugosi, University of Budapest, Hungary
Salwa Najjar, University of Gabes, Tunisia David Ohana, Ben-Gurion University
of the Negev, Israel Stefania Panebianco, University of Catania, Italy
Rajesh K. Pillania, Management Development
Institute, India Stefano Pivato, University of Urbino, Italy Carmen Popescu, Paris-Sorbonne University, France
Georges Prevelakis, Panthéon-Sorbonne
University, France Andrej Rahten, University of Maribor, Slovenia
Franco Rizzi, Mediterranean Universities Union
Gianluca Sadun Bordoni, University
of Teramo, Italy Tobias Schumacher, Lisbon University
Institute, Portugal Anthony Spiteri, University of Malta, Malta Ivan Sprajc, Scientific Research Centre of the
Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts Petros Stangos, University of Thessaloniki, Greece
Ali Toumi, Université de Tunis, Tunisia Greg Woolf, University of St Andrews, United Kingdom
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The project intends to sustain and support the development of academic mobility, tune the academic accreditation and validation processes of university and professional education within the Union for the Mediterranean and serve as a reference to future cooperation amongst academic and professional bodies within the region for Ministerial and Institutional cooperation in line with the external dimension of the Bologna Process and the parallel initiatives established on the international level in professional qualifications and academic mobility. It should also serve as a platform of possible cooperation with the European Research Area and the ancillary initiatives which bring together the world of work with the world of academia.
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