UDK: 32(4) COBISS: 1 08 The Geopolitical Importance of Eastern Europe for the European Union and Italy Eva Fabrizio Instituto de Geografía Umana. University di Milano. Via Festa del Perdono 7. 1-20122 Milano. Italia Abstract The paper focuses on two major geopolitical topics at the dawn of the 21. Century and in the eyes of the Italian state: (1) the enlargement of the European Union and (2) the boiling pot in the »Balkans« Italy's strategic position relative to the Balkan Peninsular makes Italy NATO's »aircraft carrier« in the Mediterranean and a potential watchdog of the Balkans. During the Serbian-Croatian conflict and the long Bosnian crisis, NATO bases in Italy played a key military role The Italian air force also provided logistical support, although this support was discreet, mainly to avoid a political backlash within Italy given Catholic pacifism and opposition from the ex-communist voters Italy might be tempted (and the signs are present at the political level) to cast itself in the unusual role of a medium regional power This would, however, force it to tag along with the USA's influential geostrategies in Eastern Europe: it is paradoxical that this line should be followed by the first Italian government guided and supported by the descendants of the Communist party. If these predictions should come to pass, the inter-Mediterranean dialogue would be sidelined to declarations, tourism and commerce Keywords: political geography, geostrategy, Eastern Europe, Italy. The Balkans Introduction Over the last ten years the term international community has gained currency—at least in the media and international relations—in the context of finding solutions for international problems and crises. Within a phase of geopolitical transition, the period between the war against Iraq in 1991 and the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 saw a shift away from the need to legitimize international military operations through the UN stamp of approval to their justification on »humanitarian grounds,«. Some have detected in this shift a confirmation that the declared equality of the states in the Westphalia System is merely a »functional fiction«'—in reality there exists a pyramidal hierarchical structure,' governed by a »holy alliance« of powerful nations and international organizations,' which operates as a world government. The geopolitical dynamics of crisis situations reveal four essential elements in the operation of the current world order: stability, the territorial containment of conflicts, economic globalization, and Western-style democracy* In the hierarchy of the world hegemony, the USA occupies the apex of the pyramid. It is the world political and economic leader It controls the skies and possesses most of the military force used in international police actions. In world politics and in military operations, the United States can almost always rely on unconditional support from Great Britain, and together the two play a preeminent role within NATO France has also taken on a role on the political world stage as a permanent member of the Secunty Council with veto rights, but it has greater margins for geopolitical maneuvering within the European Union. In this context France's strategies overlap those of Germany, a country that is still forced to operate essentially at the economic level and only cautiously on the political level The dynamics of post-Iron Curtain Europe have, F. Eva, »International boundaries, geopolitics and the (postmodern territorial discourse: The tutu /muni fiction.« in Boundaries, Territory and Poumodenutv. ed D. Sen-man (llford. UK: Frank Cass. 1999). J. Agnew and S Corhridge. Mastering Space: Hegemony. Territory and International Political Economy I London Routledge. 199$) S. Strange. »Territory, stale, authority and economy: a new realist ontology of global political economy.« in The Mew Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order, ed. R W. Cox (London: Macmillan and United Nations University Press. 1997). J. Agnen. Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics (London: Routledge. 1998/. ' O. Zolo, Cosmopohs La prmpettiva delgoverno mondiale (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1995/. R Falk, Per un governo umano (Trieste: Asterios Editore, / 999) 4 Eva, op. cit. however, shown the beginnings of an independent German foreign policy (with occasionally worrying outcomes, such as the hasty and autonomous recognition of Croatia in 1991). In terms of geostrategy. geographic position is still relevant. In a world that has been sped up by the media and computers, the exchange of goods and the movement of people still take place in »real« time. In addition. Kosovo demonstrated that airborne military technology is insufficient to control territory and that troops on the ground are still needed. The Role of the European Union and Italy In developing their geopolitical strategies, states take into account their location and draw upon their own cultural values, viewed as lifestyles and symbolic points of reference In conceiving its strategy for Eastern Europe, Germany sees itself in a central position As regards the southern banks of the Mediterranean. Italy and other southern European nations occupy a special position. It is no exaggeration to say that the Nordic countries do not entirely manage to fit in with the Mediterranean's, and this can be seen as one of the many elements that contributed to the stall in the integration process outlined in 1995's Barcelona Declaration This declaration was a significant and ambitious statement of political will that could have had major socio-political consequences in the signatory countries of the southern Mediterranean and at the level of international relations.5 It should be pointed out, however, that the differences in wealth between the northern and southern banks of the Mediterranean show no signs of diminishing and that this difference is expected to increase from 1:10 to 1:20 by 2010.6 From the geopolitical standpoint, since 1995 the Mediterranean situation has remained substantially at a standstill, with no feasible way of implementing the process called for in the Barcelona Declaration having been found—the reason partly being that it relies too heavily on senior officials, experts, and ministers for its implementation. Other European countries have, however, seen greater dynamism and/or a greater need to get involved. An event of great geopolitical importance for Europe occurred in 1997, with the acceptance of the candidature of five Eastern European countries (Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and ' R Gillespie. The Eurxt-\hdtierranean Partnership tllford. UK: Frank Cass. 1997). ' World Bank. 1992. Slovenia) and Cyprus for admission to the European Union. Turkey, which has now been on the waiting list since 1964. only managed to have its agreement on customs union with the EU renewed Besides yet another rejection for Turkey, this time there was the added insult of Cyprus s acceptance as a candidate, which it sees as (geo)political interference in a contentious and yet-to-be-resolved situation. Since then relations between the European Union and Turkey have been heading in uncertain and uncharted directions. When the cold war ended. Turkey's role in the strategy game of the eastern Mediterranean might have appeared less important, since the danger of a Russian attack decreased significantly However, the presence of oil reserves in the Caspian Sea and in several republics of ex-Soviet central Asia has brought to the fore the need for the transportation (by means of pipelines) of methane and oil to the shores of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The entire area has, however, proven to be geopolitically unstable and even a powder keg for armed independent uprisings. Turkey's geographic position therefore once again makes the country vital for both NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, in the absence of a major military threat, such as that once posed by the USSR, good relations between Europe and Turkey are less crucial; on the one hand Turkey's stability and military reliability are held in high regard, but on the other, relations between the two are less courteous because of Turkish violations of human rights and the methods it used in dealing with the Kurds. Current geopolitical conditions and the different relationships that individual EU countries have with Turkey mean that European diplomatic strategy pulls in different directions, but moves towards the future admission of Turkey to the EU nevertheless have become significant. The United States appears to have a clear political and military geostra-tegy as regards Europe and the Mediterranean—that is, extend its own and NATO's influence eastward to fill in the gaps left by the collapse of the former Soviet Union as quickly as possible. To achieve this the US must rely on support from Europe. Eastern European countries are not all equally dependable, however Each is facing the transition from a state-controlled economy to capitalism with varying degrees of success. Their acceptance into the EU must, therefore, be a gradual process. Candidates must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, as has been demonstrated by the long drawn out talks over the years of admissions to both the EU and NATO. S Ifawir. »Ankaraguard,! ulgreggio asiatkv.« IISole 24 Ore. 4 August l9Wi There are basically two criteria for evaluating and accepting new member states (these are expected to be formalized by 2000-02) plus one tacit condition: 1. an irreversible commitment to capitalist economics, guaranteed by regulations and laws and demonstrated by the existence of specific economic indicators 2 the established operation of Western-style parliamentary democracy, demonstrated by the tension-free change of governments There can, however, be no mistaking the tendency of the EU to favor relations with countries whose social and cultural practices (and per capita incomes) are comparable to those of its existing members. The third (tacit) criterion appears to be »border stability.« None of the countries whose candidacy has been accepted (Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia) have, or potentially have, dangerous border conflicts that could involve the rest of the EU. Cyprus may be a real geopolitical problem, but geographically it is far from mainland Europe and also an island, a feature that simplifies the territorial containment of conflicts. The inclusion of Cyprus in the European Union could also be a source of some satisfaction for Greece, given its opposition to certain ideas, such as the inclusion of Turkey and relations with the areas of Macedonia in the ex-Yugoslavia. It should also be mentioned that there have been some important developments in relations between Greece and Turkey. Reciprocal offers of aid after the recent earthquakes and the exchange of visits by ministers both indicate that something is in the air. Greece has certainly not failed to notice its secondary strategic importance compared with Turkey. Likewise, it has had to come to terms with the substantial inefficacy of its opposition to the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. From the point of view of the territorial containment of conflict, the EU does not look favorably on the fact that if Turkey were to become a member state, the Kurdistan problem would automatically become an »internal« matter, obliging it to assume diplomatic responsibility for it Added to this, if the Kurds became European citizens it would be necessary to ensure their freedom of movement within the EU Germany would not be overly happy about this, but for Italy and Greece it would mean a significant fall in the arrival of clandestine immigrants to their shores Added to this is the fact that such an extended Europe would border directly onto the hottest areas of the Near and Middle East (Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the former Soviet Caucasian Republics) and place it in the immediate vicinity of Jordan and Israel/Palestine. These potential dangers would slow down the process of integration, but it would seem that this path has already been taken. The more active relations between Turkey and Israel dunng the second half of the nineties might act as a further element to favor broader cooperation with Europe The five countries whose admission has been temporarily postponed (Lithuania. Latvia. Slovakia. Romania, and Bulgaria) complete the picture of Western Europe's obvious push eastward. This push is given impetus by the NATO-Ukraine military agreement and the opening of the so-called »partnership for peace« to Croatia in May 2000. Russia does not see this expansion in a particularly favorable light, and it is no longer possible to ignore Russia's views, President Putin's firm grasp on the reins promises greater internal economic and political stability for Russia But it also points to the recovery of the country's international role, the geopolitical fallout of which remains to be seen. If the ability to resist international pressure is any measure of power, Russia's military action in Chechnya and its substantial imperviousness to the outcry of the international community demonstrated a significant recovery of strength. A further sign of Eastern Europe's importance can be found in the decisions made at the Madrid Summit of 8-9 July 1997, when NATO was expanded through the inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, while Slovenia and Romania were placed on a waiting list for inclusion. President Clinton, dunng a visit to Bucharest, stated that »Romania is one of the strongest candidates «8 The disagreement between the nine countries in favor of the immediate inclusion of Romania and Slovenia, and the five opposed (three are undecided) was resolved by the United States exerting its role as the undisputed leading nation and objecting. »In a military alliance, discipline prevails.« stated Clinton, whose position was supported by the British Prime Minister, who said. »NATO is not a political club.« Among its various decisions, the Madnd Summit set up the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, the aim of which is to strengthen dialogue between NATO and countries in the Mediterranean. This underscores the fact that the Mediterranean is regarded as important from the point of view of security, but less so from the point of view of overall political strategy, NATO's determination to ' A.Geroni. »Clinton in Romania: la NATO W aspelta.« II Sole 24 Ore. l2Julyl99? " M. Cerrelelli. »Slownia e Romania, si vedrr net 99.« II Sole 24 Ore. 9 July 1997. push itself eastwards is decidedly stronger than its push to go south. Given the large overlap between NATO and EU members, differences in the priority of objectives might be attributable to the influential presence of the USA in only one of the two bodies. A new development in the field of common defense agreements was the formation in 1998 of the Multinational Peace Force of South-East Europe (MPFSEE) by the ministers of defense of Italy, Greece, Albania, Romania, Turkey. Slovenia, and Macedonia. Once more it is worth noting the predominantly European-Balkan interest in the territory concerned and Turkey's involvement for its military reliability. It is significant that delegations from the USA. NATO, EU, and OSCE were present at the ceremony.10 The Kosovo crisis, however, shows very clearly that this kind of lower-level strategic agreement carries insufficient weight to influence complex geopolitical dynamics. The standstill in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership project, the signing of the expansion of NATO (and the agreements with Ukraine and Croatia), the decision regarding the future admission to the EU of countries interested in military partnership, and the setting up of the peace force in the Balkans (in Bosnia and Kosovo) all underscore the leading role of the USA and its capacity (or power) to direct far-reaching geopolitical strategies in which it has an interest and to wash its hands of (or even obstruct) those in which it does not. Since the end of World War II. the United States' role in the Mediterranean has been supervisory and regulatory. And with the United States now the sole world superpower, this is more the case today than ever. It is directly involved in the southeastern Mediterranean area (the Israel-Palestine issue), but since it greatly fears so-called Islamic fundamentalism, it moves very cautiously where the Islamic world is concerned and views geopolitical initiatives in which it neither plays the leading role nor is directly involved, such as the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, with a degree of distrust. A priority of both the United States and the European Union is the spread of the capitalist economy, through which both are able to maintain their hegemonic role and derive benefits for their own economies. In terms of potential markets, the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe are both of interest to them, but greater familiarity with the cultures and customs of Eastern Europeans makes them preferred partners in plans for the rapid development of trade w II Sole 14 Ore. 27 September 19V« This imbalance may, however, be »neither appropriate, nor justifiable«" if it leads to Europe limiting its own geopolitical action and strategic subjection to the USA. Political stability (in whatsoever form) is a prerequisite for the development of economic systems. Not being a military body, the EU uses agreements and economic understandings to achieve its objectives—it is prepared to formally recognize as equal those countries with which it enters agreements in the belief that the outcome of economic cooperation is democracy and stability. The USA, on the other hand, has always coupled military strategy with economic strategy to guarantee the stability needed for its economic interests World's instability zones Since the capitalist consumption system burns considerable quantities of fuel, it must have guaranteed supplies of oil and methane. To date, the south-em Mediterranean and Arab countries have answered this need but at a price (oil shocks, confrontation with OPEC, fluctuating oil prices, and so on) and of an ongoing involvement in maintaining political stability in the production areas The availability of oil from the Caspian Sea has created new prospects and has reinforced the eastward push of the USA and Europe. Of course, for the moment it cannot be claimed that the so-called stability factor has been satisfied. There are at present conflicts around the Caucasus area (both to the north and south), where present (and projected) oil pipelines pass. But it nevertheless appears that Europe and the USA believe they can obtain more lasting and manageable results in this area than in others. In any case, almost all the existing pipelines are operating and any problems that may emerge will concern those yet to be built, particularly as regards their course. Despite its economic difficulties, Russia is stable Its oil companies were therefore allowed to take part in plans to extract oil from the Caspian and Ka-zaki oilfields, alongside a large contingent of US and EU companies. Since he is a guarantee of authority and decisiveness. Putin must be regarded as a positive element, despite the formal and predictable calls from the international " G. Lizza, iL 'Europa Ira regionalizzazlOlte e globalizzazione.« Geografta della nuova Europa. ed. G. Uzza