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original scientifi c article                 DOI 10.19233/ASHS.2017.50
received: 2017-05-10
“WE TOLD THE TRUTH ABOUT YUGOSLAVIA …”: SLOVENIAN 
(PARA)DIPLOMATS IN 1990–1992
Boštjan UDOVIČ
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: bostjan.udovic@fdv.uni-lj.si
ABSTRACT
The article delves into the process of setting up an independent diplomatic apparatus of the Republic of Slovenia. 
It aims to shed light on the role of Slovenian paradiplomats (particularly business representatives) in the country’s 
independence process, as well as highlight the importance of diplomats who worked in the Yugoslav service and 
helped lay the foundations for the diplomacy of independent Slovenia. The article brings three fi ndings. First, business 
representations abroad played an extremely important role in the outset of forming Slovenia’s diplomacy. Second, 
Slovenians in the federal foreign ministry provided great support by working hard to provide Slovenia with as much 
information as possible for shaping its position in the independence process and the mustering of international 
support for recognition. Third, the beginning of independent Slovenia’s diplomacy required much enthusiasm and 
diplomatic innovation, which faded into history when they were limited by the framework of the entire system, once 
the diplomatic apparatus was formed.
Keywords: diplomacy, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, paradiplomacy
“SULLA JUGOSLAVIA DICEVAMO LA VERITÀ ...”: LA (PARA)DIPLOMAZIA 
SLOVENA (1990–1992)
SINTESI
L’articolo si occupa della questione dello sviluppo del sistema diplomatico della Repubblica di Slovenia. Scopo 
principale della ricerca è fare luce sul ruolo svolto dai paradiplomatici sloveni (soprattutto dai rappresentanti del 
settore industriale) nel processo di indipendenza della Slovenia. L’articolo si propone al contempo di mettere in 
rilievo il contributo di quei diplomatici sloveni impiegati presso gli uffi ci federali che, tramite il proprio operato in 
seno alla compagine federale, hanno concorso alla fondazione delle basi di un apparato diplomatico sloveno che 
fosse autonomo. Dalla ricerca è emerso quanto segue. In primo luogo è stato riscontrato che nella fase iniziale della 
formazione della diplomazia slovena, le rappresentanze delle imprese slovene hanno svolto un ruolo di spicco nel 
modellare una piattaforma propedeutica per lo sviluppo del sistema diplomatico. Dall’analisi è stato possibile inoltre 
evincere che gli sloveni impiegati presso il Ministero federale per gli Affari Esteri furono forti sostenitori dell’indipen-
denza e si impegnarono con grande intensità per cercare di garantire alla Slovenia il maggior numero possibile di 
informazioni che fossero utili al consolidamento delle sue posizioni – sia durante l’indipendenza che nella fase di 
ricerca dell’appoggio internazionale per ottenerne il riconoscimento. Trova infi ne conferma la tesi secondo cui dopo 
la formazione del sistema diplomatico sloveno, il forte entusiasmo, le innovazioni e invenzioni diplomatiche, sorte 
nella fase embrionale del confi gurarsi della diplomazia della Slovenia indipendente, furono imbrigliati nell’infrastrut-
tura diplomatica e conseguentemente confi nati all’ambito della (sola) memoria storica.
Parole chiave: diplomazia, Repubblica Federativa Socialista di Jugoslavia, Slovenia, paradiplomazia
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INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
When researching the history of diplomatic activi-
ties of representatives of the Republic of Slovenia, we 
always come across the basic question: when did Slo-
venia’s diplomacy really start?1 Rupel (2011, 62) points 
out that the beginnings of offi cial Slovenian diplomacy 
can be traced to the Brioni Declaration of 7 July 1991. 
However, Bebler (2011) disagrees, claiming that offi cial 
Slovenian diplomacy – in the framework of Yugoslav 
diplomacy, of course – can be observed as early as 
1943 and 1944, and especially in the peace talks fol-
lowing WWII, where Slovenian diplomats played a key 
role. The dilemma between “Slovenian diplomats” and 
“diplomats of Slovenia” is also opened by Rahten (2011; 
2014), who shows in which diplomatic structures (of 
Austria-Hungary, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, socialist 
Yugoslavia, and in the end Slovenia) Slovenes took the 
most responsible diplomatic posts. Regardless of all of 
this, pinpointing the starting point of the diplomacy 
of a particular country and of Slovenes is not the only 
problem facing a researcher in the context of diplomatic 
studies. Many other questions can be posed, such as 
what constitutes diplomatic activity (Udovič, 2013; Jaz-
bec, 2011; Pirjevec, Ramšak, 2014), does the fragmen-
tation of diplomatic activity vary according to the size 
of a state (Jazbec, 2001), where, if at all, is it possible 
to draw the lines between the tasks of diplomacy, the 
political and economic system, and international rela-
tions and security (Udovič, 2009; 2011; 2016; Ramšak, 
2014; 2015), and fi nally, is it even possible to analyse 
diplomatic activities comparatively, considering that the 
political systems and positions of states in international 
relations differ substantially. All these questions also 
arise in the context of establishing Slovenia’s diplomacy. 
But no defi nitive answer has been reached, despite sev-
eral attempts by various researchers and experts in this 
fi eld (Rupel, 1992; 1993; 2001; 2011; Čačinovič, 1985; 
1994; Kosin, 2000; Kunič, 2004; Cerar, 2000; 2011; 
Volk, 2013; Grobovšek, 2000; 2007; 2014; Osolnik, 
1992; Pirjevec, Ramšak, 2014; Capuder, 1999; Bučar, 
1994; 2007; Bonutti, 2015; Žmuc Kušar, Golob, 1992; 
Jazbec, 2001; 2009; Udovič, Brglez, 2011). 
The reasons for this have partly already been listed, 
but we believe the main reason making it impossible 
to defi ne the starting point (Mal, 2009) is that it always 
depends on the ideological interpretation of each re-
searcher what this starting point actually means. This 
can be seen very clearly in the example of the Baltic 
states where the political and ideological postulate is 
that diplomatic relations were “renewed” after 1990, 
and only rarely “established”.2 This may be accurate 
de iure,3 but in practice their renewal of diplomatic 
relations went through the same process as with newly 
established states. Unlike the Baltic states, Central 
European states (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary) 
had a different system and their own foreign policy and 
diplomacy. Although formally independent, they were 
designed by political decision makers in accordance 
with the demands of the Soviet Union. For instance, 
this is confi rmed by Czechoslovakia’s candidacy for a 
non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council against 
Yugoslavia in 1949, with ardent support of the USSR, 
which opposed Yugoslavia’s bid—mostly by ignoring 
it at fi rst, but later also by stressing that Yugoslavia’s 
membership of the UNSC would not stand legal 
scrutiny4 (Udovič, 2016). Pirjevec (2011, 292–293)5 
likewise confi rms that the foreign policies of Central 
European countries were in line with the Soviet Union, 
saying that 
On 28 September 1949, A. A. Gromyko revoked 
the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and 
Cooperation, signed by Tito and Molotov in April 
1945. End of October [1949 – A/N] Yugoslav 
Ambassador Karlo Mrazović was banished from 
Moscow for “espionage”, followed by the chargé 
d’affaires a month later, although formally diplo-
matic relations were not cut. Naturally, all the 
satellite states followed this example, except for 
Albania, with which Yugoslavia cut ties itself.
In this context, these countries gained an independ-
ent foreign policy after the collapse of the USSR, but 
they did not need to establish diplomatic relations from 
nothing. Consequently, they did not need to face the 
diffi culties of diplomacy beginners, nor questions like 
that of their diplomacies’ zero hour.
The countries that emerged from the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia faced a different situation. Firstly 
because most of the infl uential countries were against 
the independence aspirations of Slovenia and Croatia, 
as illustrated by the famous nyet of US Secretary of State 
James Baker (Glaudrić, 2011; Zupančič, 2016; Pirjevec, 
1995; 2003; Rupel, 2011); and secondly because the 
newly established states were not recognised immedi-
1 This research is part of the Slovene Research Agency Programme P5-0177 “Slovenia and its actors in international relations and European 
integrations”.
2 For an illustration of this, see documents of the foreign ministries of Lithuania (2016) and Estonia (2016).
3 The Baltic states consistently claim that they were occupied by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which means that their 
statehood ceased to exist due to a foreign force and was simply restored after the USSR collapsed. For more on objections to the legiti-
macy of Soviet occupation, see Huseynov (2017).
4 According to the USSR, giving Yugoslavia one of the non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council would go against the 1946 gentle-
men’s agreement on distribution of the rotating seats according to spheres of interest (i.e. geographic regions).
5 For more on selected analyses of foreign policies of communist states, see Andromeit et al. (1979).
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ately and had to struggle for almost a year6 to become full 
members of the international community.7 Under these 
conditions, they resorted to inventing different instru-
ments to justify their right to be (part of the international 
community), and at the same time to be granted all the 
elements that internationally recognised sovereign states 
are entitled to. In diplomatic studies, such cases of inter-
regnum are often called paradiplomacy or unoffi cial di-
plomacy (cf. Udovič, 2013; Jazbec, 2011 etc.), because 
they indicate diplomacy of (unrecognised) entities that 
do not (yet) have the status of states.8
The trouble with states being the main institutions of 
diplomacy is no new thing. It started in the 17th century 
with the process of Westphalisation of the international 
community (Arbeiter, 2016; Benko, 2000a),9 which is 
characterised by the merging of all fragmented entities 
of the international community into unifi ed ones, i.e. 
states, which became the crucial and only (later just 
the crucial) players in international relations (Udovič, 
2013). The herald of this process of Westphalisation 
came from no other area than diplomacy itself, with 
the invention of resident agents to replace ad hoc 
envoys. The fi rst permanent representations were sup-
posedly set up by Luigi Gonzaga, Captain of the People 
of Mantua, before 1341. Forty years later, the Gonzaga 
family already had a network of resident agents around 
the Italian peninsula (Mattingly, 2010, 71–74).10 This 
diplomatic innovation was soon adopted by other 
sovereigns on the peninsula and further,11 although it 
should be stressed that it was fi rst approached with 
great scepticism and little understanding. A century 
later, the situation was already different. Temporary/ad 
hoc agents were being replaced by permanent ones, but 
at the same time ad hoc envoys were still widely used 
until the mid-19th century. This is still refl ected in the 
offi cial ambassadorial title – ambassador extraordinary 
and plenipotentiary, where the term “extraordinary” 
means an ad hoc ambassador, while “plenipotentiary” 
means a permanent, resident one.
The etatisation of diplomacy continued and evolved 
through centuries and culminated at the Vienna Con-
gress, where the countries of the Holy Alliance cut the 
Gordian knot of the precedence of representatives of 
sovereigns (and sovereign states). The extent of the con-
tribution of the Vienna rules of 1815 is illustrated already 
by the fact that their framework was fully transferred 
into the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
(1961/1964), and is still valid today, not only through 
the provisions of international contract law but also 
through international common law. The etatisation pro-
cess continued until the end of WWI, when the League 
of Nations was established, with the main purpose to 
set limits and a framework to four rights of any inde-
pendent state: ius ad bellum (the right to declare war); 
ius tractandi or ius contrahendi (the right to conclude 
international agreements); ius legationis (the right to 
legation) and ius representationis (the right to establish 
a representation) (Udovič et al., 2015; Udovič, Brglez, 
2016). This limiting of rights meant that states would 
be free to exercise them as long as they did not confl ict 
with the interests of the international community as a 
sui generis subject (Benko, 2000b). This would give the 
international community the possibility to limit or even 
abolish certain rights if states exercised them beyond the 
set framework.
Two world wars and the creation of the United 
Nations (Šabič, 2016; Udovič, 2016) cemented the 
understanding that etatism and the etatisation process 
were not and could not be unlimited. Although, within 
the system of the United Nations, states remain the key 
players, they are no longer the only ones. A completely 
different defi nition of the diplomatic development 
and functioning of states can be found in the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations,12 which states in 
Article 2 that: “The establishment of diplomatic relations 
between States, and of permanent diplomatic missions, 
takes place by mutual consent” (Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations, 1961/2017). This document, 
6 There are a number of theories as to the reasons for the long delay in the recognition of the newly established states. Udovič (2015), for 
instance, claims that the reason is to be sought in the changes in the international community and the failure of the main actors (includ-
ing the European Communities) to adapt to the new reality. Others, such as Bebler (2011), explain that the main reason for the delay in 
recognition and admission into the United Nations was the expectation of the international community that the situation in Yugoslavia 
would be resolved by itself. The international community arguably only saw in March 1992, when war broke out in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, that there was no way of keeping Yugoslavia together. This was ostensibly also the reason that Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were quickly granted membership in the United Nations on the same day.
7 Full membership in the international community is related to membership in the United Nations. Slovenia became a member on 22 May 
1992, which the country celebrates as the Day of Slovenian Diplomacy.
8 The terms paradiplomacy and paradiplomats relate to the activities and diplomats of states or other entities that have not been recog-
nised. For the sake of consistency, this article also uses these terms.
9 The Westphalisation of the international community can also be called the process of etatisation of diplomacy, and it lasted until the end 
of WWI.
10 A similar exchange of resident agents can be observed in 1425–1432.
11 In 1455, the Duke of Milan had a resident agent in Naples and Genoa, in 1458 in Rome and Venice. The French sent their fi rst resident 
agents to Florence (1495), Scotland (1498) and Turkey (1536); the Spanish to England (1487), France (1501) and Venice (1512); the Aus-
trians to England (1483), France (1509) and Turkey (1542); and the English introduced their fi rst resident agent almost 50 years after the 
fi rst recorded Italian one, in 1515 in France (Mitić, 1978, 13; Anderson, 1993, 2–11; Mattingly, 2010, 102–107).
12 The Convention’s code is 500 UNTS 95. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations has 60 original signatories, and had 191 parties 
to the Convention on 25 April 2017.
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which (still) shapes the international legal framework for 
establishing diplomatic relations and diplomatic activi-
ties, fi nally set down the state as ad fontes a subject in 
diplomacy. Although this may not have been the case 
through history (Udovič, 2013; Mattingly, 2010; Ander-
son, 1993; Potemkin, 1948; Black, 2010), this is how 
the international community understands things and 
functions today.
Taking into account that diplomatic relations are 
only established between (sovereign and internation-
ally recognised) states, we come to the main research 
problem we wish to address in this article. It concerns 
three interrelated questions referring to the independ-
ence and international recognition of Slovenia. The 
fi rst question is how the Socialist Republic of Slovenia 
(SRS) became a state actor within the diplomatic system 
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).13 
This refers not only to the foreign-policy tradition and 
the historical independence process, but also the set-
ting up of its own diplomatic apparatus and activities. 
The second research question refers to the role of 
Slovenian diplomats at Yugoslav missions, as well as 
agents of Slovenian companies abroad, in Slovenia’s 
independence process and in the shaping of Slovenia’s 
independent diplomatic system. We fi nd this particu-
larly important from the perspective that today, 25 
years later, the independence process is mostly seen as 
only the activities of the political powers in Ljubljana, 
while the broader Yugoslav and international picture 
is neglected. The third question this article attempts 
to answer focuses especially on the challenges fac-
ing Slovenes in federal bodies and those representing 
Slovenian enterprises abroad. These challenges are all 
too often overlooked, and what is more, the failure to 
recognise them blurs the real picture of the processes 
behind Slovenian independence, and the ups and 
downs of the political, diplomatic and business elites 
of the time, which were in a way the protagonists of 
Slovenia’s independence.
We will attempt to answer these research questions 
using critical analysis of primary and secondary sources, 
while the gaps in the available information will be fi lled 
with the help of four semi-structured interviews: (a) with 
Dr Boris Frlec, the last Yugoslav Ambassador to Bonn;14 
(b) with Dr Jožef Kunič, a representative of Ljubljanska 
banka d.d. in Abidjan and later in Tehran;15 (c) with 
Borut Meršak, a former correspondent for newspaper 
Delo and public broadcaster RTVSLO, and later a rep-
resentative of the company Kovintrade in Slovakia;16 
and (d) Dr Lojze Sočan, the fi rst unoffi cial Slovenian 
representative with the European Community.17 All the 
acquired information will be compiled to allow new 
revelations through synthesis.
AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
OF THE CREATION OF INDEPENDENT SLOVENIAN 
DIPLOMACY 1990–1992
In independent states, diplomacy is always subject 
to the same pattern of thinking as the military (or the 
fi nancial system)—it is an activity that must be subju-
gated to the central power, and above all synchronised 
with the wishes of the ruler, and at the same time in 
the ruler’s service. The situation in the SFRY was no 
different. According to Ramšak (2014, 734), the federa-
tion highlighted its primacy in foreign policy in all key 
constitutional frameworks: in the 1946 Constitution, 
the 1953 constitutional act, the 1963 Constitution, in 
the amendments of 1971 and the 1974 Constitution. 
For example, paragraph 7 of Article 281 of the 1974 
Constitution set down the main premises of Yugoslav 
foreign policy, stating that the federation shall through 
its agencies
determine the foreign policy of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and ensure its 
implementation; maintain political, economic 
and other relations with other countries and in-
ternational organisations; foster cooperation with 
developing countries and provide the resources 
for development of economic relations with these 
countries and for the realisation of solidarity 
with liberation movements; conclude and ratify 
international treaties and ensure their implemen-
tation; ensure that the international obligations of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are 
met; protect the citizens of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and their interests, as well 
as the interests of its legal entities abroad; manage 
the realisation of international relations; manage 
the organisation and activities of the federation’s 
foreign services.
At the same time, the second paragraph of Article 
271 of the 1974 Constitution allowed the republics to 
“work together with bodies and organisations of other 
countries and with international organisations within the 
framework of the adopted foreign policy of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and international treaties”, 
which meant that the 1974 Constitution also inherently 
gave the individual republics some foreign-policy and 
paradiplomatic jurisdiction. Thus, paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
13 This article does not deal with the diplomacy of Yugoslavia (regardless of its political forms). For more on this topic, see Selinić (2014); 
Rahten (2013; 2014); Petrović (2014); Režek (2014); Čavoški (2014); Radić (2014); Nećak (2013; 2014).
14 The interview was conducted on 24 February 2017 in Ljubljana.
15 The interview was conducted on 22 February 2017 in Ljubljana.
16 The interview was conducted on 25 February 2017 in Bratislava.
17 The interview was conducted on 23 February 2017 in Ljubljana.
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Article 317 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic 
of Slovenia (1974) stated:
The Socialist Republic of Slovenia may establish, 
maintain and develop political, economic, cultu-
ral and other relations with agencies and organi-
sations of other countries and with international 
agencies and organisations in accordance with 
the adopted foreign policy of the of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and international 
treaties.
The Socialist Republic of Slovenia may develop 
political, economic, cultural and other relations 
with other countries and international agencies 
and organisations that are important for the posi-
tion and development of the Slovene nation, the 
Italian and Hungarian ethnic minorities and the 
Slovene communities abroad, and to guarantee 
the rights and interests of the working people 
temporarily working abroad and for the expatria-
tes from its territory (Ustava SRS, 1974).
Both paragraphs therefore allowed the SRS to start 
engaging in international relations on its own. This was 
done in two ways. The fi rst was through “engagement 
for minorities, expatriates and emigrants”, where Slo-
venia – mainly due to its geographic position – had a 
relatively free hand;18 while the second was by joining 
macroeconomic regions (this name was not yet used at 
the time), where we should highlight the Alps-Adriatic 
Working Group (Working Community of Cantons, Prov-
inces, Counties, Regions and Republics of East Alpine 
Region), founded in 1978 (Klabjan, 2013; Jurić Pahor, 
2013). The main body in these activities was the State 
Secretariat for International Cooperation (SSIC),19 at the 
heart of which stood Marjan Osolnik (Ramšak, 2014; Pi-
rjevec, Ramšak, 2014). But Osolnik’s work for Slovenia’s 
engagement in international relations went even further: 
as a Slovene, he pushed for delegates of the SRS to chair 
mixed commissions20 that dealt with issues concerning 
Slovenia. As he has said himself,
Kraigher also managed to achieve this in most 
cases through Kardelj. At the very least, we got 
representatives of the local communities on 
the commissions. This led the neighbouring 
countries to also appoint representatives of local 
government, who were grateful for this (Pirjevec, 
Ramšak, 2014, 183).
For fi ve years, the SSIC was independent, but in 1980 
it was merged with the State Committee for Economic 
Cooperation into a new body called the State Committee 
for International Cooperation (SCIC).21 Under this name, 
it remained operational all the way to the plebiscite on 
Slovenia’s independence at the end of 1990 and the 
adoption of a new (Slovenian) Constitution at the end 
of 1991.22 
Along with the offi cial communication channels, 
Slovenia also worked extensively on unoffi cial chan-
nels, which included the representations of the most 
important Slovenian companies abroad, such as Lju-
bljanska banka, Slovenijales, Emona, Iskra, Metalka and 
Kovintrade. Naturally, their fi rst task was representing the 
Slovenian economy, but at the same time they were an 
ideal communication channel for the political powers, 
which proved to be very welcome in the milestone years 
1990–1992. Their rise was made possible by the 1972 
federal Establishment of Companies Abroad Act23 and the 
1973 Amendments to the Establishment of Companies 
Abroad Act,24 allowing companies to set up branches in 
other countries, especially due to Yugoslavia’s low foreign 
currency liquidity. In this context, Slovenian companies, 
which were the most competitive within the Yugoslav 
economy, started their process of internationalisation 
relatively quickly. Particularly noteworthy among them is 
Ljubljanska banka,25 which increased the number of its 
representations abroad between 1977 and 1981 from 13 
to 21 (Lazarević, Prinčič, 2000, 404), and thus became an 
18  On how Slovenia engaged for its minority in the Austrian province of Carinthia, cf. Mikša (2014). 
19 The decree on its establishment can be found in the Uradni list SRS 39/1974. The SSIC became operational in February 1975.
20 Intergovernmental commissions dealing with bilateral issues.
21 Based on the Act on the Organisation and Areas of Work of State Administrative Bodies and State Organisations and Independent Profes-
sional Services (Uradni list SFRJ 5/1980).
22 An interesting account of the importance of the SCIC for the DEMOS coalition, which won the fi rst multi-party election in 1990, can be 
found in Rupel’s book Skrivnost države. There he explains on page 49 that he expected four DEMOS parties to vie for the position of 
SCIC president, namely the Slovenian Democratic Union, the Slovenian Christian Democrats, the Social-Democratic Union of Slovenia 
and the Greens. And on page 51 he writes: “There was great interest for the position of foreign minister (who was then still the president 
of the State Committee for International Cooperation). But this was the only position I was willing to accept, although I was also offered 
culture and the vice-presidency for societal activities. Here, my wife was very clever and decisive: In societal activities you would only 
make enemies, it is only hard work and never enough money, and so forth. And as for culture, I would prefer to work in it than manage it 
[…] Well, foreign affairs intrigued me as a challenge: as the area where we had to start ab ovo and where Slovenian statehood would be 
decided. […] Other candidates for this position were (Matjaž) Šinkovec, (Leo) Šešerko and (Marjan) Majcen […]” (Rupel, 1992, 48–52).
23 Published in the Uradni list SFRJ 39/1972.
24 Published in the Uradni list DFRJ 17/1973.
25 In 1965 the management of Splošna gospodarska banka established that the bank met the criteria to be transformed into an investment 
bank, which was done in February 1966. But because this was a time of poor economic conditions in Yugoslavia, the bank’s liquidity 
was low and it could not service the needs of the economy, so the decision was made to increase its solvency by merging it with Kreditna 
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important platform not only for representing the interests 
of the Slovenian economy26 but also for interpreting the 
events in Yugoslavia after 1980 (Kunič, 2017).27
The deterioration of relations within the federation, 
the clash over the proposed common core curricula in 
1984, tensions in Kosovo and above all the rise of nation-
alisms – set in the context of the collapse of the Eastern 
bloc and the geopolitical shifts within the international 
community – allowed Slovenia to consider embarking 
on its own path within the international community. An 
additional boost came from the constitutional amend-
ments of 1989 and the fi rst democratic election on 8 April 
1990. The election was won by the DEMOS coalition, 
which formed a government just over a month later and 
took full power in the state. In the area of foreign policy 
of what was then still a state without an actual foreign 
policy, Rupel, as the new president of the SCIC, and later 
as secretary and later still as foreign minister, made quick 
and bold steps, especially to obtain as much knowledge 
about foreign policy as possible.28 But despite the quick 
(and audacious) moves, the setting up of Slovenia’s 
foreign policy and diplomacy after 1990 encountered 
many problems. The fi rst was certainly that Slovenia’s 
aspirations towards greater foreign-policy independence 
caused tensions between Ljubljana and Belgrade, even to 
the extent that the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs 
(FSFA) often made its decisions just to counter proposals 
from Slovenia. Rupel describes this most vividly: 
I met with Budimir Lončar in Belgrade, and we 
stated very clearly what we wanted in the fi rst 
round. Especially European orientation, meaning, 
we want diplomatic and representative posts in 
Europe, and we decline posts in, for example, Peru 
and the United Arab Emirates. And what happens 
then? I get a phone call from our secretariat on 
Friday that the federal government has confi rmed 
Rado Bohinc as Ambassador to the Emirates […]. 
Bohinc spoke to me before that and told me 
he was not at all interested in the Emirates […] 
(Lorenci, 1990, 35ff).
However, the problems were not limited to Slovenian 
top politicians, but were also encountered by diplomats 
working in the federal services. Zvone Dragan (n.d.) 
recalls:
The fi rst notable discrepancies in the assessments 
of the political and economic situation in Yugo-
slavia started appearing among diplomats already 
during my term in Beijing [in 1988—A/N]. The 
biggest differences were regarding the situation 
in Kosovo and the relations in Serbia, the reasons 
for the economic crisis, the relations between the 
republics and autonomous provinces, the so-cal-
led separatist activities of Slovenia, the relations 
between the more and the less developed parts of 
Yugoslavia, the role of the Yugoslav People’s Army, 
etc. I also felt this in the diplomatic staffi ng of the 
Embassy in Beijing, which was mostly manned by 
Serbs, one Hungarian, one Montenegrin and two 
Slovenes, including me. I encountered differences 
even more openly, sometimes even sharply and 
directly, after I returned from Beijing in December 
1989. This was the strongest at meetings of the 
college of the federal secretary and his meetings 
with the foreign cooperation secretaries of the 
individual republics.
This is also confi rmed by Cerar (2000, 44), who has 
the following to say about the attitude towards Slovenes 
in the FSFA after DEMOS won the election and presen-
ted its demands to the federal authorities:
At the meeting of the college of the federal sec-
retary, (Zvone) Dragan and (Ivo) Vajgl remain 
isolated. As usual, Lončar is joggling, theorising 
and talking to himself. But we all know that the 
decisions have already been made by the Presi-
dent of the Federal Executive Council, Marković, 
or by the Chairman of the Presidency, Jović.
But the clash on what foreign policy should look like 
and when a state should establish it was not only between 
Ljubljana and Belgrade, as tensions also often arose 
within Slovenia itself. Immediately after taking over the 
SCIC, Rupel formed a Foreign Policy Council29 to provide 
him with advice and support in taking decisions. As he 
banka in hranilnica Ljubljana. Splošna gospodarska banka and Zajednička komercialna banka Novi Sad were merged with Kreditna 
banka in hranilnica Ljubljana on 31 December 1967. Three years later the merged bank was renamed into Ljubljanska banka (Udovič, 
2009, 266).
26 For an insight in socialist banking, which the authorities wanted to implement in Ljubljanska banka to fi nance above all politically fa-
voured projects, see Kavčič (2001, 233–254).
27 The Annual Report of Ljubljanska banka d.d. for 1990 states that Ljubljanska banka d.d. had 22 representations abroad, six subsidiaries 
and 14 info offi ces; in 1991 it had 21 representations, four subsidiaries and ten info offi ces (Annual Reports of Ljubljanska banka d.d. for 
1990 and 1991).
28 According to his own words, his knowledge in this fi eld was limited. As he writes in Skrivnost države (1992, 55), the difference between 
the Council of Europe (an institution in its own right) and the European Council (a political instrument of the European Communities, 
which only became an institution with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009) was explained to him by his “college Iztok Simoniti”, who also ex-
plained to him the “difference between the Assembly of European Regions […] and its competitor Europe of the Regions […]”.
29 This council was composed of (Rudi) Čačinovič, (Bogdan) Osolnik, Bojko Bučar, (Anton) Bebler, (Vlado) Benko, (Boris) Šnuderl, (Jurij) 
Gustinčič, (Miran) Mejak and some other foreign desk editors (Rupel, 1992, 59).
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himself states, the orientations within this Council were 
also diverse – some advocated greater integration with 
the federation, others more independent activities (Rupel, 
1992, 59). The next difference was with the appointment 
of emissaries. Between August 1990 and June 1991, the 
Executive Council appointed its fi rst envoys abroad, who 
could represent Slovenia, but not as a country in line 
with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. At 
the same time, the Slovenian authorities maintained that 
Slovenian ambassadors in the Yugoslav services should 
stay in their posts and work for the benefi t of Slovenia 
as much as possible (Frlec, 2012; Rupel 1992; MFA, 
2000). The fi rst ten emissaries of the Executive Council 
were Dr Lojze Sočan, the head of Ljubljanska banka’s 
representative offi ce in Brussels;30 Ivan Gole, the head of 
Slovenijales in Moscow; Dr Štefan Loncnar, the director 
of Ljubljanska banka in Prague; Borut Meršak, a repre-
sentative of Kovintrade in Slovakia; Dr Peter Millonig, an 
entrepreneur in the US; Dr Karl Smolle, a representative 
of Slovenes in Vienna; Franc Zlatko Dreu, the head of the 
Representative Information Bureau in Luxembourg; Dr 
Jožef Kunič, the head of Ljubljanska banka in Abidjan; 
Keith Charles Miles, the head of the information offi ce 
in London; and Dr Štefan Falež, the representative at 
the Holy See. Along with the emissaries of the Executive 
Council, the international cooperation secretary (Rupel) 
also appointed his own representatives: Jožko Štrukelj 
and Marjan Fratnik (Italy); Herman Rigelnik (Bavaria, 
Germany), Peter Ilgo (Singapore); Zlatko Aurelius Verbič 
(Canada); Božidar Fink and Dr Marko Kremžar (Argen-
tina); Milan Smolej (Finland), Anton Kovič (Sweden) and 
Beno Lukman (France) (MFA, 2000).
Of course, the appointments did not go unnoticed, 
and above all not without parties jostling.31 The trouble 
in appointments arose mainly between Rupel and Prime 
Minister Lojze Peterle, because each of them had his 
own vision who would be appropriate for which post. 
Partly, the discord also came from the tense relations 
between DEMOS and Milan Kučan, who as Chairman 
of the Presidency of the SRS surely wanted to know who 
would represent Slovenia abroad (Rupel, 1992). All this 
clearly indicates that in the years of designing an in-
dependent diplomacy Slovenian politicians worked on 
several levels. First, Slovenes in Belgrade were ordered 
to obtain as much information as possible and send it 
to Ljubljana, and at the same time to persist in federal 
government positions. Furthermore, representatives of 
the Executive Council and the international cooperation 
secretary were appointed, and although they did not 
offi cially represent the state, already their presence was 
often unsettling (Sočan, 2017). Finally, in the desire to set 
up its own representations but aware of the limitations to 
the budget of the republic, Slovenian politicians resorted 
to the existing para-state representations, such as those 
of Ljubljanska banka d.d. and the Slovenian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry, which were hybrids – on 
the one hand they were helping Slovenian companies 
abroad, and at the same time they represented the inter-
ests of Slovenia as an emerging state. Together with the 
representatives of the Executive Council and the SCIC, 
as well as Slovenes in the FSFA, these were Slovenian 
paradiplomats in the pivotal years of 1990–1992.
And it was precisely these hybrid forms that were a 
contentious element of the document The Foundations 
of a Strategy for a Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slove-
nia, which was discussed by the Sociopolitical Chamber 
in April 1991. In a relatively lively discussion, deputies 
Jožef Školč and Peter Reberc objected the plan for Slo-
venia to open representations together with Ljubljanska 
banka d.d. and other Slovenian companies, arguing that 
this would mean “preferential treatment for Ljubljanska 
banka, or another selected company in countries where 
it does not have a representation” (Reberc), or that “set-
ting up our representations together with Ljubljanska 
banka would be very unusual and in a way not serious” 
(Školč).32 This consideration was answered by deputy 
secretary of the SCIC: 
Regarding the joint representations with Ljubljanska 
banka d.d., the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
and so forth: it’s true that this may be unusual from 
the abstract perspective, but from the pragmatic 
point of view it’s very useful and quite normal. […] 
Especially in Brussels, for instance, this move has 
proved to be very good […]. But I do agree that the 
two should be separated as soon as possible, and it’ll 
be possible in a year or two.33 
Apart from this dilemma, several other issues were 
opened regarding what Slovenia’s foreign policy should 
30 Kirn (2012) notes that the SCIC already started opening representations with European institutions in mid-1989, which Ljubljana argued 
was possible both under the federal and Slovenian constitutions of 1974. At fi rst, the SCIC managed its relations with Brussels through 
the offi ce of Ljubljanska banka d.d. in Paris, but the bank later opened an offi ce in Brussels, and Dr Lojze Sočan took over as its head as 
soon as September 1990.
31 Addressing the Socipolitical Chamber of the tricameral assembly (22 April 1991), Jožef Školč said: “Here, I simply can’t avoid mentioning 
the infamous complications between Mr Peterle and Mr Rupel concerning the envoys of the Executive Council of the Assembly of the 
Republic of Slovenia in the United States. We may talk here [referring to a document on the foundations of a foreign policy strategy for 
Slovenia – A/N] about – and I fi nd this reasonable – this job [ambassadorial service – A/N] normally being performed by Slovenian citi-
zens, but the practice of the Executive Council at the moment is completely different. It is normally performed by Austrian citizens, and 
this is a big problem [referring to Millonig in Washington and Smolle in Vienna, both members of the Slovene minority in Austria – A/N]” 
(Družbenopolitični zbor, 1991, item 4 on the agenda).
32 Družbenopolitični zbor, 1991, item 4 on the agenda.
33 Družbenopolitični zbor, 1991, item 4 on the agenda.
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look like. On behalf of the Slovenian Socialist Party, 
Dušan Semolič demanded that Slovenia declare perma-
nent neutrality. Jože Smole of the League of Communists 
of Slovenia-the Party of Democratic Reform (ZKS-SDP) 
backed this, saying that the presented document “smells 
of fl irting with membership in NATO”, adding that “Slo-
venia’s foreign policy is not being built from scratch, but 
can be linked to the positive experience from Yugosla-
via’s international orientation”. Borut Pahor (ZKS-SDP) 
stressed that in the document the government “unaccept-
ably underestimated the economy and the economic 
dimension of international activities”. Mojmir Ocvirk 
(Liberal Democratic Party) warned that “the bill ignored 
the parliament in foreign policy decisions […] in key 
issues, like opening diplomatic missions and appointing 
heads of missions”.34 Peter Reberc (Christian Democrats) 
responded to the planned integration of Slovenes from 
the federal foreign services into Slovenian diplomacy,35 
which he opposed in principle.36 He believed that the 
same conditions should apply to Slovenian diplomats 
serving Belgrade as to others who had not held previous 
diplomatic jobs. This view was against what the Execu-
tive Council had been doing, intensively incorporating 
Slovenian staff in Belgrade in the emerging diplomacy of 
the state on its way to independence. What is more, in 
1990 Dimitrij Rupel appointed Zvone Dragan coordina-
tor of all Slovenian diplomats in the FSFA since, as head 
of the sector for Western countries, he “got to see most 
of the important dispatches from Yugoslav diplomatic 
and consular missions in Western countries. Even the top 
secret ones. [Since] there was no e-mail then, I would 
take the most important dispatches to Ljubljana during 
the weekend, and return them to my safe in Belgrade 
on Mondays. In Ljubljana, I only showed them to two 
people, usually at separate meetings, to Milan Kučan 
and Dimitrij Rupel” (Dragan, n.d.).
In all this chaos of demands and calls for consid-
eration and independence-related legislation, time 
started running short for actually setting up a system of 
Slovenian diplomacy.37 Adding to this the silent view of 
many that, as the then Defence Minister Janez Janša told 
Rupel, “fi rst there must be independence in the military 
and economic areas, and only then foreign policy” 
(Rupel, 1992, 61), we can see that Slovenian diplomacy 
was still undeveloped. But above all it depended on the 
engagement of individuals – in the domestic services, 
the FSFA and Yugoslav diplomacy, the external services, 
as well as the economy. All these four levels had a 
parallel effect on the activities of Slovenian diplomacy, 
and particularly its formation. And some of the fl aws in 
the process took place mainly because of the pressures 
on the emerging Slovenian diplomacy from within and 
without.
Slovenia declared independence on 25 June 1991; 
three days later, Dimitrij Rupel sent Slovenian diplomats 
in the FSFA an invitation to join the newly established 
diplomatic apparatus of independent Slovenia. Archive 
documents38 show there were around 60 people working 
for the federal services, of which 36 were posted abroad 
just before Slovenia declared independence,39 while the 
rest worked internally. Rupel (1992, 142) lists that the 
ones to join the Slovenian service immediately after the 
declaration of independence were “(Zvone) Dragan, 
(Ivo) Vajgl, (Andrej) Logar, (Mitja) Štrukelj, (Božo) Cerar, 
(Samuel) Žbogar, (Ivan) Seničar, (Štefan) Cigoj, (Marko) 
Kosin, […] the rest came from abroad. If that was what 
we agreed, of course. We wanted to leave (Boris) Frlec 
(Bonn) and (Borut) Bohte (Haag) in their posts as 
long as possible”. Slovenian foreign policy thus started 
taking shape. At the end of 1991, the foreign ministry 
employed 136 people (MFA, 1992), half of which were 
former employees of the federal Yugoslav diplomacy. 
Rupel posted these to the most important positions in 
the new foreign ministry’s system; Roman Kirn, Božo 
Cerar and Zvone Dragan became key advisors as part 
of political diplomacy, Marko Kosin led the analytical 
sector, and Ivo Vajgl took over public relations.40
All of this shows that the diplomacy of independ-
ent Slovenia at zero hour had three characteristics that 
not only affected its establishment but substantially 
characterised its development: (a) an explicitly strong 
economic component, (b) a strong mix between the 
“old” and “new” staff, and (c) a high level of openness 
and pragmatism.
THE RELATION BETWEEN ECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL DIPLOMACY
The relation between economic and political diplo-
macy is a basic issue that anyone exploring the history 
of a state’s diplomatic activities must face. According 
to Udovič (2013), economic diplomacy was the main 
34 Družbenopolitični zbor, 1991, item 4 on the agenda.
35 Reberc also stressed that a Mediterranean dimension should be added to the Slovenian foreign policy (Družbenopolitični zbor, 1991, 
item 4 on the agenda).
36 Družbenopolitični zbor, 1991, item 4 on the agenda.
37 This lack of time for a constructive debate on what should make the foundations of Slovenian foreign policy and how the diplomatic 
apparatus should be formed was brought forward by Peter Glavič at a meeting of the Chamber of Municipalities, another of the three 
chambers of parliament. He pointed out that there was no real discussion on the Foreign Affairs Bill (based on the abovementioned 
strategic document) because delegates no longer managed to read all the bills (Zbor občin, 1991).
38 AS, AS–2167, 3, 137.
39 Eleven were ambassadors (Mexico, Nicaragua, the Netherlands, Australia, India, the Federal Republic of Germany, Tanzania, Zaire, 
Libya, Kenia and Portugal), and four were consuls general (Cleveland, Strasbourg, Trieste and Klagenfurt; ibid.).
40 AS, AS–2167, 3, 136.
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task of diplomatic activity until the institutionalisa-
tion of diplomacy in the 14th century, only then did 
diplomacy start taking on a political dimension, and 
it only became a political tool of foreign policy after 
the French Revolution. A similar example (ibid.) can be 
identifi ed in the outset of Slovenian diplomacy, when 
economic diplomacy was an extremely important part 
of diplomatic activity. In practice, this means that in the 
fi rst stage Slovenia performed much of its diplomacy in 
the branches of companies, most commonly Ljubljanska 
banka d.d., while the symbolical effect was that interna-
tional cooperation with foreign countries (as economic 
diplomacy was named at the time) was a constituent 
part of the foreign ministry from 1980 (when the two 
secretariats were merged into the SCIC) and all the way 
to the fragmentation of the system in 1993.41 
Kunič (2017) confi rms that the roles of business 
representative and representative of the state in the 
host country often overlapped, saying that he “was 
then a representative of Ljubljanska banka d.d., but I 
was considered [by Iranians – A/N] a representative of 
Slovenia in Iran [… despite] only having the authorisa-
tion that I already had from before, from Abidjan”. He 
further comments on the overlapping of political and 
economic diplomacy: “This way it was already funny, 
almost paradoxical that we had a bank in Frankfurt, 
but at the same time also a representative offi ce of Lju-
bljanska banka d.d., which served as a representation 
for the Slovenian economy.” Meršak (2017), who was 
a representative for Kovintrade in Bratislava, also con-
fi rms this. In the company’s premises, Slovenia set up 
its fi rst embassy in Slovakia in 1993, and he also helped 
Slovenian diplomats (fi rst Dragan and Kirn in Prague, 
then Ada Filip Slivnik and Jožef Drofenik in Bratislava) 
set up contacts with companies and authorities, since 
he had been in Slovakia since 1988 and had a network 
covering both politicians and businesses. Yet another to 
confi rm this is Frlec (2017), who explains clearly that 
economic diplomacy was a key element of diplomacy. 
He believes political and economic diplomacy can-
not be treated separately, so they could also not be 
separated by the newly emerging Slovenian state. In this 
respect, he points out that it should not be neglected 
that the Federal Republic of Germany has always been 
a specifi c market for Slovenian companies and the state, 
so diplomats would also do their best to win deals. 
However, Sočan (2017) does not agree with this shared 
view of Kunič, Frlec and Meršak. This can be attributed 
especially to the fact that the representative offi ce of 
Ljubljanska banka d.d. with the European Commission 
was a front for a political mission that hardly dealt with 
economic issues. Nevertheless, Sočan highlights another 
component, namely that the offi ce in Brussels allowed 
Slovenia’s view of what was happening in Yugoslavia to 
also reach countries that were not in the closest network 
(e.g. Scandinavian countries or Ireland), while precisely 
these countries could have served as a role model for 
the development of the Slovenian economy, but this was 
unfortunately not the case. According to Sočan, the rea-
sons lie in the different political will and the infl exible 
political processes in Slovenia when the country set out 
on its path to independence.
THE INTERTWINING AND CONFRONTATIONS 
BETWEEN THE “OLD” (YUGOSLAV) AND “NEW” 
(SLOVENIAN) DIPLOMACY
It was clear that the established Yugoslav diplomacy 
would not take the increasing positioning of Slovenian 
foreign policy easily, particularly since it considered it-
self the main subject of external sovereignty of the SFRY 
and would not share this position with anyone. This 
became even clearer after the fi rst democratic election 
and when the Slovenian independence process acceler-
ated, which brought tensions on two levels—the federal 
level (FSFA) and at Yugoslav diplomatic and consular 
missions. On the federal level, the rift between Slovenes 
in the FSFA and others in the federal structure refl ected 
mainly in isolation and exclusion of Slovenes from deci-
sion making and other federal activities. This point is 
illustrated colourfully by Dragan (n.d., 98):
At meetings of the college of the federal secretary 
[Budimir Lončar – A/N] or his orthodox deputy 
Milivoj Maksić, discussions on different topics would 
see ever harsher confrontations […]. At college 
meetings, me and [Ivo – A/N] Vajgl would often be 
outnumbered. And Lončar would, as always, navigate 
skilfully between different views, make compromise 
syntheses and postpone conclusions whenever the 
atmosphere was too hot […].
A similar experience, only from abroad, is recalled 
by Boris Frlec (2017), whom intelligence services started 
monitoring closely a year after he took over as ambas-
sador in Bonn.42 At his lectures about the developments 
in Yugoslavia, he was often confronted with provocative 
questions, such as: “Why does Slovenia want to break 
41 The organisation chart from 1991 shows that the foreign minister had two deputies, one for political affairs and one for international 
economic relations. The latter (Vojka Ravbar) was de facto extremely independent in her work and only reported to the minister (Udovič, 
2009). She managed fi ve sectors (there were also fi ve sectors in the political branch): the European Economic Integration Sector, the 
Sector for Relations with International Economic Organisations and Protection Policy, the Sector for Promotion and Higher Forms of Eco-
nomic Cooperation with Foreign Countries, the Sector for Monitoring and Analysis of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, and the 
Sector for Legal Settlement of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries (AS, AS–2167, 3, 154).
42 He was appointed to the post based on a proposal by the Slovenian leadership in 1989, but he was also backed by the democratically 
elected government and remained there until 4 November 1991.
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away from the SFRY, and what will you do as a Yugoslav 
ambassador?” He would answer calmly, and above all 
he would outline the differences emerging in Yugoslavia.
Sočan and Meršak had even more negative experi-
ences with the federal diplomatic missions. Sočan, who 
was formally head of the offi ce of Ljubljanska banka 
d.d. in Brussels, was a thorn in the side of the Yugoslav 
embassy and was seen as competition. This transpired 
on several occasions, but most radically at a diplomatic 
reception marking Yugoslavia’s Republic Day, 29 No-
vember, which he attended together with his spouse. 
Discussions at the reception were not very constructive. 
Around 11, when journalist Aćimović arrived at the 
reception, a Montenegrin diplomat would say to Sočan: 
“[N]ow here’s another Slovene so it won’t be so hard for 
you, and so you Slovenes can talk to each other” (Sočan, 
2017). This refl ects the distinctly negative attitude of the 
Yugoslav embassy in Brussels towards Slovenian views 
and activities.
Unlike Sočan, Meršak only had limited contact with 
the Yugoslav embassy in Prague, related only to his 
residency in Czechoslovakia. He claims that, although 
he has no proof of this, he had a feeling he was being 
watched by the Yugoslav authorities. He recalls there 
were cases when his son “was asked where Meršak was 
staying, where he went and so on”, and that he would 
often receive warnings to “be careful where you go and 
what you do, or phone calls where no one would answer. 
There was quite a lot of that” (Meršak, 2017). Frequent 
threats, especially following the declaration of independ-
ence are also confi rmed by Frlec, who was instructed by 
Slovenian authorities to stay in Bonn after independence 
was declared. Because of the threats, Slovenian authori-
ties sent security experts to his residence in Bonn, and he 
had an arrangement with LHB representative in Frankfurt 
Srečko Jamnišek to call him every hour if pressures 
would become excessive. This way, Jamnišek would 
know something was wrong in Bonn if he got no call 
from Frlec. Nevertheless, it is not clear what Jamnišek 
would do in this case (Frlec, 2012, 2017).
Another question that comes up regarding the estab-
lishing of Slovenian diplomacy in the fi eld is how host 
countries understood Slovenian diplomatic activities or 
its paradiplomatic missions, and how they viewed the 
reports on what was going on in Yugoslavia. To this there 
is no uniform answer (see e.g. Glaurdić, 2011; Radeljić, 
2012; Jović, 2003). While some states maintained that 
the SFRY should be kept in one piece (Petrič, 2012; Ru-
pel, 1992; Kosin, 2000), others had more understanding 
for the developments in Yugoslavia and for Slovenia’s 
independence aspirations. In this sense, Frlec (2012; 
2017) says German authorities showed a favourable 
attitude towards Slovenia’s independence,43 highlight-
ing the activities that the Federal Republic of Germany 
undertook to support Slovenia in this process. He recalls 
German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher invit-
ing him to his home on 24 August 1991 to read him a 
demarche for the Yugoslav government. After fi nishing 
the offi cial message, he added: “The formal part of this 
invitation is now over. I’m sorry you have to listen to this 
shit (Scheisse), because you are a decent and good man, 
and on top of this you are paid too little […]” (Frlec, 
2012/2017). When Frlec returned to Germany as Am-
bassador of the Republic of Slovenia in 1992, Genscher 
told him: “I knew you’d come back!” The attitude of 
the German leadership (the foreign minister and the 
chancellor; see Rupel, 1992) towards the Slovenian 
paradiplomacy was therefore very favourable.
Meršak (2017) talks of a similar attitude in Czecho-
slovakia. “Czechoslovakia was defi nitely in favour of 
Slovenia and took its side”,44 but at the same time there 
were also important Czechoslovak politicians who 
would “appear at the Yugoslav embassy [in Prague – 
A/N] more or less every day, where they would watch 
what was happening and what Slovenes were doing” 
(Meršak, 2017). Czechoslovakia thus greatly supported 
Slovenia’s efforts and understood the Slovenian reality, 
which – according to Meršak – can be attributed to its 
own pondering about dissolution and a creation of two 
separate states. Meršak (2017) fi nds that also the gradual 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia can be attributed to the 
two states’ prime ministers Václav Klaus and Vladimír 
Mečiar, whose strong personalities made it hard for 
them to work together. Václav Havel, who as a moral 
authority was predestined for the position of president, 
did not accept the break-up of the country with open 
hands. Among other things, this can be seen from his 
humorous remark to Zvone Dragan when accepting his 
credentials: “Your excellency, you tore Yugoslavia apart, 
now you’ve come to tear apart Czechoslovakia, too” 
(Udovič, n.d.).
A different and less positive attitude towards the 
establishing of Slovenian diplomacy and Slovenian 
independence in general was experienced by Sočan in 
Brussels.45 In the spring of 1991, he held a lecture at the 
Centre of European Policy Studies (CEPS) where he ex-
43 It is not quite clear when Germany decided to no longer support the so-called Yugoslav exception (Nećak, 2014), nor what drove it to 
do so. There are different views, and Conversi (2004) is one of those highlighting the aspect that the unifi ed Germany wanted to position 
itself in the Balkans. Džananović Miščaršija (2017) begs to differ, claiming that Germany never really understood the Balkans, unlike the 
English and the French. The only thing that matters to them is who delivers.
44 Meršak (2017) notes that Slovak Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar was reserved about Slovenia’s independence at fi rst because he feared 
that too much violence would break out in the SFRY if the states tried to break away.
45 Sočan (2017) explains that even before he became the offi cial agent for Slovenia in Brussels, he once asked a former permanent repre-
sentative why Yugoslavia had established a permanent representation in Brussels in the fi rst place. He then said he had been told by his 
predecessor that it was “so that things don’t go too far”, meaning that the SFRY would not get too close to European integrations.
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plained what was going on in the SFRY, and argued from 
different perspectives that “this country had actually been 
falling apart for a long time, and that this was not seces-
sion, but a disintegration of the state and a declaration of 
independence. And the lecture was very well received.” 
After each lecture, the institute would usually prepare a 
resume of conclusions. Sočan received the resume for 
review only days before it was to be published, and it 
contained almost none of what he had said. Instead, it 
contained “[f]ive or six horrible things, falsifi ed. Especially 
glorifi cation of the Yugoslav army, and Slovenian leaders 
being separatists, and things like that.” Sočan reacted by 
entering individual corrections to make the resume “at 
least bearable”. The event continued to trouble him, so 
he took a look in the social network of the institute, and 
found out that “the director of the institute was from Hun-
gary and was a good friend of the Yugoslav ambassador, 
[Mihajlo – A/N] Crnobrnja” (Sočan, 2017). Naturally, 
everything became very clear after this realisation.
Sočan had another “extraordinary” experience in 
Brussels, this time related to the European Commission 
and its attitude towards him as an unoffi cial repre-
sentative of Slovenia. Also in spring 1991, a secretary 
of Commission President Jacques Delors distributed a 
document around the European Commission stating that 
Lojze Sočan was de iure and not de facto a representa-
tive of Ljubljanska banka d.d., but rather a representative 
of a republic that wants to break away from Yugoslavia 
(Fiugure 1). In this memo, the secretary announced that 
any professional, developmental or economic issues 
could be discussed with Sočan, while discussions in 
Brussels on all matters regarding the developments in 
Yugoslavia were in in the jurisdiction of the permanent 
representation of the SFRY (Sočan, 2017).46 But unlike 
his secretary, Delors himself was in favour of Slovenia 
and Croatia, particularly after Janez Drnovšek explained 
to him at a meeting what was happening with the eco-
nomic development in the SFRY (Sočan, 2017).
On the other hand, there was little interest for Yugo-
slavia in Abidjan, which was relatively distant from the 
events in the SFRY, since ambassadors and others mainly 
dealt with African issues. But according to Kunič, things 
were different in Iran, which in principle favoured 
Bosniaks and was anti-Serbian. Moreover, the Yugoslav 
embassy in Iran was run by a Macedonian who also 
intimately favoured Slovenia over federal orders (Kunič, 
2017).47 Although there was interest in Iran for the events 
in the SFRY, they were not on top of the agenda. The in-
terest was thus more in the sense of being informed than 
really delving into Yugoslav issues (Kunič, 2017). They 
had other priorities: Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, America, 
Russia, China – these were the states that diplomats in 
Iran mostly dealt with. Nevertheless, despite the mod-
est interest of Iranian diplomats for the Yugoslav issue, 
Slovenia was relatively popular. This can be attributed 
to the republic and its policies being seen as supportive 
of Muslims in Yugoslavia, unlike Serbian anti-Muslim 
policies (Kunič, 2017).
THE OPENNESS (TO INNOVATION) AND 
PRAGMATISM OF THE EMERGING SLOVENIAN 
DIPLOMACY
For emerging diplomacies, a tendency towards in-
novative approaches is always a precondition for their 
successful establishment.48 One of the more notable in-
novations in the setting up of Slovenian diplomacy was 
the case of Ignac Golob, a Yugoslav diplomat with a long 
career who ran the embassy in Mexico until the declara-
tion of independence, upon which he returned to Slo-
venia. Prior to that, Golob had served as Ambassador to 
the United Nations. Before Slovenia gained recognition 
and membership, it could not be present in the United 
Nations, so this former ambassador offered in October 
1991 to go to New York as a reporter for newspaper 
Dnevnik. He received a press badge and started working 
in the United Nations. When Yugoslav diplomats saw 
him there, they were shocked and demanded from the 
UN staff that Golob be removed. But to no avail, since 
he was formally accredited as a journalist and no one 
could touch him (Udovič, 2016, 761ff; Žmuc-Kušar, 
Golob, 1992, 149ff).
Innovativeness at the outset of Slovenian diplomacy 
fi rst transpired with the use of offi ces of Slovenian compa-
nies as political representations in countries of strategic 
interest. Furthermore, diplomatic innovativeness can be 
seen in the way Slovenian representatives worked: some 
would send messages home through faxes or through 
third persons, others would operate in semi-secret ways, 
with some sort of parallel diplomacy, some would look 
for niche opportunities for Slovenian diplomacy and 
politicians to break through with their ideas or to always 
tell their “truth” about the SFRY in a new way. Extensive 
information about this can be found in the memoirs of 
Slovenian diplomats published on the 20th anniversary 
of the country’s international recognition (MFA, 2012). 
Even more will be revealed in the future in diplomatic 
archives, when they are open to public. Nevertheless, 
we already have at least an outline of how diplomatic 
inventions and pragmatism were formed. Both are re-
fl ected in the fact that all of Slovenian diplomacy was 
distinctly pragmatic at fi rst—from Zvone Dragan car-
rying documents with him from Belgrade to Ljubljana 
to deputy minister Zoran Thaler clearly admitting at the 
46 Sočan received a copy of the memo as a gift when leaving Brussels in 1996.
47 Kunič (2017) links the ambassador’s favourable attitude towards Slovenia to him being married to a Slovene and later even moving to 
Slovenia, while his daughter now works for the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
48 For more on diplomatic innovations of Slovenes in the Yugoslav diplomatic system, see also Udovič (2016).
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18th sitting of the Sociopolitical Chamber that Slovenian 
foreign policy must above all be pragmatic. At the time 
it was not problematic that a representative appointed 
by the Executive Council would reside and work in the 
offi ces of Ljubljanska banka d.d., which is a company 
and is not supposed to pursue state goals (which, as we 
know, it did). The pragmatism of foreign policy and the 
emerging Slovenian diplomacy can further be seen in 
the choice of staff to head the Slovenian foreign affairs 
in the milestone years. Taking a look at the trio at the top 
of the SCIC, we see that it combined extensive experi-
ence and knowledge of international economy (Vojka 
Ravbar), foreign policy expertise, youthful engagement 
and desire for success (Zoran Thaler) with political skill, 
vehemence and fervour (Dimitrij Rupel). According to 
many diplomats, Rupel takes much of the credit for 
Slovenia’s relatively quick international recognition. 
As two diplomats jokingly told the author in a private 
conversation, he was “an elephant in a china store, 
tactless, pushy, and above all a foreign minister that was 
needed at the time. Undiplomatic. With gloves on or 
diplomatically, Rupel would surely achieve much less 
than he did. We’ve got to give him that.”49 Rupel himself 
agrees with such a depiction in his memoirs, particularly 
49 The author’s notes from lunches with two former ambassadors, January 2011 and March 2012. This assessment is also confi rmed by 
Lorenci (1990) and Dragan (2012).
Figure 1: A copy of the memo received by Sočan after leaving Brussels 
in 1996 (Sočan, 2017)
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in some of the parts where he describes his discussions 
with ambassadors or his counterparts.50
And fi nally, with respect to political openness, 
personal engagement and pragmatism of the emerging 
Slovenian diplomacy, we should highlight the words 
of SCIC deputy secretary Vojka Ravbar, who described 
the beginnings of Slovenian diplomacy as “interesting, 
because everything had to be designed anew, since 
Slovenia had no one to copy from”. In this sense, she 
found it important to highlight the decisive contribution 
of “some Slovenian diplomats (then still in the Yugoslav 
services)” to the development of Slovenian (economic) 
diplomacy who “knew how to explain to foreign states 
(and statesmen) what was going on in Slovenia. […] 
It actually happened quite often that we would go 
negotiate in a particular country even before we were 
recognised in order to ensure the survival of the Slo-
venian economy.” Trust was key, since “not much was 
signed, and a lot was agreed. What contributed most to 
this were the atmosphere in society and the consensus 
that much needed to be done in unity for the economy 
to survive, even if views differed.”51 The atmosphere in 
society and the engagement in fact allowed Slovenian 
diplomacy to evolve from its ad hoc beginnings into a 
serious institution of an independent state. Its peak was 
reached on 22 May 1992 when Slovenia became the 
176th member of the United Nations Organisation.
CONCLUSION
The beginnings of the diplomacy of an independ-
ent state cannot be analysed without their historical 
framework. Although the federal and state constitutions 
allowed Slovenia to start considering its activities be-
yond the boundaries of the SFRY in the fi rst place, they 
also—precisely because of the SFRY’s federal set-up – 
prevented Slovenia from developing its foreign policy 
and diplomatic missions sooner. Consequently, they 
started emerging illegally, mostly under the umbrella of 
Ljubljanska banka d.d., which had been capable of see-
ing beyond (merely) its economic interests already since 
it was strengthened in the late 1960s (Svetličič, Rojec, 
2003; Kavčič, 2001). But the possibility of Slovenian 
paradiplomacy through the offi ces of Slovenian compa-
nies abroad only existed because the federal authorities 
gave such activities a silent approval. It would be naïve 
to think that in a diplomatic system strongly interlinked 
with secret services (Frlec, 2012; Udovič, n.d.)52 the fed-
eral services would be unaware of the exact activities of 
international cooperation secretariats of the individual 
republics and state-owned companies, such as Ljubljan-
ska banka d.d. We could venture to say even more – that 
Ljubljanska banka d.d. formed its foreign policy plat-
form because this was benefi cial for both Slovenian and 
Yugoslav authorities. This is because the latter, in the 
need of diversifi ed access to international fi nance and 
imported goods, set up a sort of a parallel economy (Bi-
zilj, 2009a; 2009b; 2009c), which allowed the SFRY not 
only internal political survival, but also gave political 
elites certain added value. Taking into consideration the 
development of the SFRY after 1945, and especially its 
positioning between the two geopolitical blocs, we can 
conclude that Slovenian paradiplomacy was not created 
ab ovo, but was a result of different forces and processes 
taking place on several levels within the SFRY. Conse-
quently, it is impossible to determine the starting point 
of the etatisation of Slovenia’s paradiplomacy. However, 
we can determine that its development accelerated with 
the liberalisation of international trade in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s (Svetličič, Rojec, 2003; Jaklič, Svetličič, 
2005), and then developed progressively all the way to 
its institutionalisation on 26 June 1991.
Naturally, the SCIC and Slovenian companies abroad 
were not the only ones to contribute to the development 
of Slovenian diplomacy, but largely also Slovenian dip-
lomats in the Yugoslav services, who had an extremely 
important role already from the establishment of these 
services. They held the most responsible positions – from 
foreign ministers to state secretaries, but they also took 
some of the most exposed postings, such as New York, 
Vienna or Bonn. Along with representing the interests 
of federal diplomacy, they would always incorporate 
Slovenian interests, or as Frlec (2012; 2017) puts it “the 
patriotism of Slovenes working for the FSFA at the time 
is therefore unquestionable: it was perfect”.53 This, of 
course, was easier in 1990, and increasingly diffi cult in 
1991. Representatives of Slovenian companies abroad, 
on the other hand, had no need to beat around the 
bush or sugar-coat and tone down their messages, and 
they were able to pass them on directly and clearly. The 
problems they faced in some cases were lack of interest 
(Abidjan) or a default negative attitude (Rome, Brussels). 
However, there were also distinctly positive examples 
(Bratislava Bonn, and Prague) where their work was met 
with support and they were even de facto treated as po-
litical representatives of the newly emerged state – even 
if they had no formal rights. Some personal ties remained 
strong also after this period, and contributed greatly to 
the development of diplomatic and friendly relations with 
particular states. An illustration of the good and tightly 
knit relations is that Borut Meršak was the only foreigner 
who was invited to the 70th birthday of Czechoslovak par-
50 E.g. Rupel’s engagement for the recognition by the US and his discussion with the Vatican’s Cardinal Secretary of State Angelo Sodano 
(Rupel, 1992).
51 Udovič (n.d.).
52 In this case the notes were from a conversation on the functioning of the federal intelligence agency in Yugoslav diplomacy.
53  It is interesting that Slokar (2016) does not share this view that Slovenes in the federal services worked primarily for their compatriots, as 
he describes that, working in Belgrade in those crucial years, he often encountered obstacles set by fellow countrymen.
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liamentary speaker Alexander Dubček (Meršak, 2017). In 
any case, it was these ties and the trust of host countries 
in Slovenian paradiplomats that contributed to a wide 
international recognition and acknowledgement of the 
quality of the emerging Slovenian diplomacy.
The fi nal question, which is rarely presented in dip-
lomatic studies, relates to the personality of diplomats 
and their role in the processes of implementing a state’s 
diplomacy. Harold Nicolson (in Berridge et al., 2001) 
once said that an ideal diplomat was characterised by 
“truth, accuracy, calm, patience, good temper, modesty 
and loyalty”. But with newly emerging diplomacies at 
least one of these is a problem, loyalty. To whom 
should Slovenian diplomats in the federal services be 
loyal—the Slovenian or the federal authorities? And if 
they should be loyal to the Slovenian authorities, does 
that not confl ict with the requirement of being loyal to 
their employer, the federal services? Or even more, what 
if – as in the case of Slovenia – the national authorities 
advise a representative to stay in the federal services in 
order to better serve the interests of the newly emerging 
state? Is this not an even clearer violation of loyalty to 
one’s sovereign? These are extremely diffi cult questions 
that diplomatic representatives had to face, and above 
all decide on when the diplomacy of the Republic of 
Slovenia was being established. And these decisions 
were not easy, and especially, it is much easier to assess 
them now than it was to take them in those pivotal times.
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“GOVORILI SMO RESNICO O JUGOSLAVIJI …”: O SLOVENSKIH (PARA)DIPLOMATIH V LETIH 1990–1992
Boštjan UDOVIČ
Univerza v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija
e-mail: bostjan.udovic@fdv.uni-lj.si
POVZETEK
Članek se ukvarja z vprašanjem oblikovanja paradiplomacije Republike Slovenije in vzpostavljanjem samosto-
jnega diplomatskega aparata Republike Slovenije. Bistvo članka je ugotoviti, kako so delovali posamezniki, ki jih je 
za to, da bi predstavljali »resnico o dogajanju v Jugoslaviji«, kooptirala slovenska novonastajajoča diplomacija. Med 
njimi velja izpostaviti tako diplomate, ki so uradno še delovali v zvezni diplomatski službi, kot tudi podjetnike, ki so 
zastopali interese slovenskega gospodarstva, pa seveda – noviteto v diplomatskih odnosih – predstavnike vlade in 
ministrstva za zunanje zadeve, ki so svoje naloge vršili ne kot je običajno »v imenu države«, ampak (vsaj pravno-
fromalno) v imenu »vlade« oz. »ministra za zunanje zadeve«. Članek, poleg osvetlitve diplomatskih momentov 
1989–1992 prinaša tri ključne ugotovitve. Prvič, v začetkih snovanja slovenske diplomacije so izjemno pomembno 
vlogo imela predstavništva slovenskih podjetij, ki so vzpostavljala platformo za oblikovanje diplomacije Slovenije. 
Drugič, Slovenci v zveznem sekretariatu za zunanje zadeve so bili izjemni podporniki osamosvojitve, tako da so 
močno delovali tudi v smeri tega, da bi Slovenija imela karseda največ informacij za oblikovanje svojih pozicij 
ob osamosvojitvi in v času iskanja mednarodne podpore za mednarodno priznanje. Tretjič, v začetkih nastanka 
diplomacije samostojne slovenske države je bilo potrebnega veliko entuziazma ter diplomatskih invencij in inovacij, 
ki so potem, ko se je oblikoval diplomatski aparat, bile ukalupljene v celoten sistem in posledično izzvenel v (le) 
zgodovinski spomin. Vse te ugotovitve pa nismo pomembne same po sebi, ampak nastavljajo zrcalo poznejšim 
stranpotem vzpostavljanja in oblikovanja diplomacije Republike Slovenije. Zdi se namreč, kar je delno poudarjeno 
tudi v članku, da se je vsaka faza oblikovanja slovenske diplomacije, oblikovala ab ovo, kar pomeni, da imata slov-
enska zunanja politika in diplomacija izredno pomanjkljiv zgodovinski spomin. To pa vodi do tega, da stvari lahko 
postanejo neučinkovite in nejasne ter podvržene vsakemu ministru za zunanje zadeve in njegovim preferencam.
Ključne besede: diplomacija, Socialistična federativna republika Jugoslavija, Slovenija, paradiplomacija
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