MIROV NI INS TITUT L JUBLJANA K 32 YUGOSLAV I A ... 1~1/i1~1111/i1/J1~1[~1/i11111l 1i11 C12[1C1L.1~.::J4 7b Ministarstvo za znanost in tehnologijo izdaja na osnovi 13. tocke tarifne stevilke 3 tarif e davka od prometa proizvodov in storitev v zvezi z Zakonom o prometnem davku (Ur. 1. RS, st. 4-92) mnenje, da steje Zbornik referatov med proizvode, za katere se placuje 5% davek od prometa proizvodov. Datum, 17. 4. 1992, stevilka 415-19-92. Ministrstvo za znanost in tehnologijo Republike Slovenije CIP - Katalozni zapis o publikaciji Narodna in univerzitetna knjiinica, Ljubljana 327.36< 497 .1X082) 323\ 497 .1)(082) YUGOSLAVIA, WAR/ edited by T. Kuzmanic, A. Truger. Ljubljana: Peace Institute; Schlaining: Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 1992 1. Kuzmanic, TonCi 2. Truger, Arno 30264064 _M i~QVN l l~isnrnr·· L. l u D 11 o. n a I Copyright © 1992, by Peace Institute Ljubljana, Slovenia and Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Schlaining, Austria. Reproduction or translation of any part of this work without the permission of the copyright owner is unlawful.. Published by Peace Institute Ljubljana, Slovenia and Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Schlaining, Austria. Second Edition, 1993 Designja~na Rajh, DTP & cover page DVuga, printed.in Ljubljana, 1993, by Atelje Sustarsic Pance. · _-r--- 1 I I i. I Yugo sla • via .r Edited by Tonci Kuzmanic & Arno Truger Second Edition ustrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution Schlaining · , Peace Institute Ljubljana Ljubljana, Schlalning, 1993 ~ · . ~K~fE~, P\- 1 '£.G J . o~ Y~lE" fsr . . (M ~~ ! .. ~\~ ~UT . ~1' /51 IN f e ~''\ ~1\¥ D > 'oMMt.~L,\ t.J Tn /\~G~M ~T • . .. ~, . ~ . ~ At~c ~' _ IEb l I : -- ~ - --~------------------------------, Preface The present book is the result of close scientific cooperation between those Central Europeariresearchinstitutes which have joined together in a "Consortium for the Study of European Transition" (CS1E). This comprises the following - institutes: The Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (Stadtschlaining), the Peace Institute in qubljana, the Institute for European Studies (Belgrade), the Centre for European Studies (Budapest), and the European University Institute (Florence). The Consortium was formed with the aim of studying the relationship between European integration and national identity within the context of the (West) European integration process on the. one hand, and the East (Central) European transformation on the other. The situation in Yugoslavia was selected as the first "case study" even before it had escalated into a war. Three conferences organized by the Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolu­ tion in Stadtschlaining and by the Peace Institute in Ljubljana formed the "backbone" of the study. The most significant results of the "case study" are p~esented in this publication. Tonti Kuzmanic Arno Truger Ljubljana, Schlaining, April '1992 7 l t I YUGOSLA WA, WAR ... ' . YUGOSLAV7A, WAR ... Contents Preface · Part 3: Conflict Resolution Contents '. The Yugoslav Case: What Can Conflict and Dispute Resolution Models Off er? · Bania M. Fedorowicz ....................................................................... 83 Introduction Psychology and Conflict Resolution: Toward a New Diplomacy ~ula Gutlove ........................... ~ ....................................................... 107 The Contribution of Peace and Conflict Research to a Current Conflict Arno Truger ···············································~······································ 11 A European Lebanon in Making or a Replica of Pakistan/India Drama? Srdjan Vrcan ................................... ~................................................. 117 Part 1: Conflict Genesis The Need for Unofficial Diplomacy in Identity Conflicts Reflections on the Peace Prospects for Yugoslavia Johan Galtung ................................................................................. 19 A New Challenge for Conflict Resolution: The Case of Yugoslavia Vesna Pesic, Julie Mostov ........................•...................................... 35 Stalinism as a Problem of Methodology Tonci Kuzmanic .............................................................................. 45 Regulation of Ind~trial Relations in Post-self management Soci.ety Miroslav Stanojevic ·············~·····························:............................. 53 Part 2: Nationalism Sociological Dimension of Conflicts Between Ethnonationalisms Rudi Rizman ....................................................... ~............................. 63 Reflections Concerning a Typology of the New Nationalisms in Yugoslavia and South-Eastern Europe Wilfried Graf ....... ......................................... ..................................... 69 Conditions and Circumstances of Peace Keeping in Bosnia andHer.zegovina Mu~med Filipovic ......................................................................... 77 Mats Friberg .................................................................................... 131 Part 4: Peace Process The Yugoslav Crisis: Back to Sarajevo Hylke Tromp ···············································································~··· 141 Can the War be Stopped and Yugoslavia Survive? DusanJanjic ............................. _ ....................................................... 147. Peacekeeping Force / David Atwood ..... : ............................................................ ................. 161 Conditions and Elements of a Peace Process . JosefBinter ........................... _ .......................................................... 169 Ceasefire as theReal Problem Zarko Puhovski ............................................................................... 179 APPENDIX: Understafzding the War in Former Yugoslavia Tona Kuzmanic .............................................................................. 183 Contributors ........................................................................... 201 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... Arno Truger The Contribution of Peace and Conflict Research to a Current Conflict Report on the international conference on No~-Violent Conflict Resolution in Yugoslavia held at Stadtschlaining from 13th - 17th November 1991 · The developments in Yugoslavia, like those in other Eastern (Central) Euro- ,pean countries, represent both a threat and a challenge. The country's far- reachkigeconomic, political, ecological and military interdependence demands 11 a great amount of responsibility not only of the Yugoslav people and their political representatives, but also on the part of people outside Yugoslavia and from the intema.1tional community. It is up to all them to strive for a peaceful ' solution of those conflicts that lead to acts of war. The satisfaction of the Yugoslav people's basic needs, such as survival, economic prosperity, democracy, an.d cultural development should be the point · of departure and the goal of any such endeavours. And since these people, regardless of their nationality or religious b~liefs, will continue to depend on go deal with an issue on its own merits as a deed of necessity. The objection to the UN and the CSCE is that these bodies are not quick at acting. But look at the EC: it acted quickly, and wrongly, first neglecting the recognition issue, then jumping into it prematurely, all the time using sticks and carrots, getting nowhere. Also, it is much more beneficial for Europe as a whole to strengthen the conflict resolution capacity of these universal organizations (seeing the CSCE, then, as linked to the UN) than to use a conflict to build a hegemonic system in the old European tradition. In addition, the hegeQ.10n is now entirely'Westem European, unlike the Vienna Congress system form 1815 with Austria and Russia as members (in addition to Britain, Prussia, France and the Papacy). There is also the crucial difference that Yugoslavia is a member of these organizations and not of the EC; a difference the Serbs would do well not to exploit too much to their advantage lest it would drive the Croats even more toward the EC. (6) There is obvia'usly a need for peacekeeping in Yugoslavia preferably as a Chapter 6 UN operation and delegated to CSCE as regional body. One problem is the nationality of the blue helmets to be deployed in Yugoslavia. Any country that has occupied parts of Yugoslavia in the past, like Austria-Hungary, Italy and above all Germany (and Russia!) should be ruled out lest freedom fighters like Gavrilo Princip (the shot in Sarajevo) and Josip Broz (Tito)reemerge, and not only on the soil of former Yugoslavia. To insist on total cease-fire before any troops can be deployed will probably be counterproductive given the complex combination of the Serb-dominated Federal army forces, the Croatian National Guard the Serbian territorial defense forces and Serbian (and Croatian) irregu:... lars. R~ther, that desirable state has to be created through the, mainly moral, presence oflightly armed forces in (parts of) Slavonia and K.ra:jina, with.observers REFLECTIONS ON lliE PEACE PROSPECTS FOR YUGOSIAVL4 on the spot, not in hotel rooms in Zagreb, etc., depriving EC observers of legitimacy. 14 The CSCE has disappeared from this process possibly because it iS neither in the interest of the EC/ Britain/Lord Carrington nor' the UN/U.S./Cyrus. Vance. More will probably be known about this later. In the meantime this is to be regretted since third party experience in peacemaking and peacekeeping would then have been deposited right in the heart of Europe, not with a Westem European coming superpower, nor with the UN in New York. The linkage to the UN could have been obtained through Article 52 of the UN Charter. Any stationing of UN peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia is going to be costly, among other reasons because of the duration factor .The healing and negotiation processes will be time consuming; hopefully to be handled better than for the Cyprus case. The funds should come from general UN funding, already in the red where peacekeeping is concerned. Heavy EC contributions might be counter­ productive for the many reasons mentioned above. One possibility would be for Yugoslavia to pay for much of the operation of being "peace kept". Given the ambivalence of the governments an interesting 31 possibility could be for municipalities to come forward, offering board and --- accommodation. Civil society in general could offer hospitality and helpfulness in ways not too, incompatible with government interests. (7) The role of the media has been mainly counterproductive during the entire conflict, and must be improved for peace to have a chance. The sensationalist aspects of a cruel war are obvious, whether the media have the partisan interest of showing the cruelty of the other side and the suffering of one' s own, or the nonpartisan interest of simply showing high drama. The pattem of war as TV pomo, of CNN Gulf War fame, has been reproduced. Of analysis there is little, of debates about the conflict and the diagnosis-prognosis-therapy triangle even less. Little attention is paid to peace forces. The heroic work of civil society in bridge-building, normalizip.g relations has been given very little prominence, both abroad arid in Yugoslavia. The anti-Serbian bias has set the tone and the discourse. · 14 A frequently made point in Yugpslavia. On the other hand, ~e excerpt from the diary ofa Danish observation team member, Georg Petersen, in Politiken, 15 December 1991, certainly indicates that they have been very dose to the horrors of war, and at their own considerable risk. 32 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... (8) The process of peacebuilding in former Yugoslavia will essentially have to be the work of the peoples themselves; what outsiders can do is very limited. Let one thousand conferences blossom, at the level of governmental organiza­ tions and governments, at the level of people's organizations and people; above all between the two levels. A permanent conference modeled after the Helsinki Conference with all issues on the table and all parties around the table, with much time at their disposal, would be excellent. Another model would be the roundtable of governmental and opposition forces'form all over, already tried. Outsiders can ask questions, suggest inputs to the diagnosis-prognosis­ therapy triangle, serve as catalysts and media within which the concerned parties can meet and feel welcome. But they cannot impose any solution, backing it up ~ith threats and promises. And outsiders would do great damage to the peoples of Yugoslavia by treating them differently. More partic':1larly, the EC should give them the same status, e.g., as "associate member", not treating some as more "European" than others because they prefer Catholics to Orthodox, and Latin writing to Cyrillic (which actually, from the EC point of view, constitutes a bridge between the two alphabets already used, Latin and Greek). But much better would be a Balkan federation. One condition for peace is that the images the parties to the conflict have of the future coincide. There is a negative version to this: they agree on the outcome of a violent conflict; A wins, in which case B submits; B wins, in which case A submits; there is a stalemate, in which case they both stop fighting. The positive version is a view of the future that both or all parties find acceptable; in other words, they can cohabit the future. We might even add a version which is neither negative,nor positive: both parties get equally tired of the conflict and withdraw from it. But this conflict is too important to permit that to happen. (9) The rest of Europe should reflect more on why the Balkan countries are so "unquiet", blame them less and blame their own interventions more, and above all the failure to build adequate pan-European institutions. Solutioi1s are located in the future, not in distributing blame for the past. But to detach what happens in the Balkans from centuries of Central Western European meddling in the region can only lead to distorted perspectives. The same applies to Turkey, although their interests may be more in the direction of the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union than toward the Ottoman part of the former Yugoslavia. In other words the track record of the outsiders leaves much to be desired. Is there any reaso~ to believe that the. present generation of rulers in those countries have developed more sense of diversity and equity, enjoying differ­ ences rather than wanting themselves reproduced through submissive accept­ ance by other countries of Western values and patterns, particularly the 19th REFLECflONS ON THE PEACE PROSPECTS FOR YUGOSIA VIA century values of liberalism and nationalism? The German/EC rush into the conflict, handling it badly and then exacerbating it through premature recogni­ tion does not bode well for the future. {10) The peoples of Yugoslavia should not reject their own recent past since the present and possibly also the future are not that much better. To use the div~rce metaphor again: neglecting the good aspects of the past partnership is to kill a ~art o~ oneself. They can build on a tradition of n6nalignment and multi­ culturalism with c. ontacts all over the world, and a relatively healthy and well educated population. The country is rich. The· Yugoslav system was not func­ tion. ing th~t badly in the 1%0s, 1970s and 1980s. Relative to· today the absence of direct v10lence, the economic growth, the roads, and the railroads, the cars and the buses, the PIT, all that worked bear witness to the. potential also of a confederation. The country was a one party state, but the League of C~nununists was in itself a relatively pluralistic body. True,. the issue of nationalities, with the class aspects of at least potential repre~sion and exploitation, and the horrible memories from the past, were loommg over the country. Nobody woulq belittle its real significance. And those who talk disparagingly about the Balkans should have a look at their own history 33 an? ~ompare . the nationalities maps of Western and Eastern Europe: near comcidence with the borders so many places in the West, a patched quilt in the ~ast. How do the critics of the Balkans think that nation-state map came about m the West? The bloodshed in Britain, France and Germany, to mention the three most arrogant countries in the West, was unspeakable, possibly much more so than has ever been the case for the Balkans.Tolerance was an unknown commodity; tolerance in the vacuum produced by centuries of intolerance is more easily practiced. What can and should be regretted, however, is the lack of foresight when the leaders of former Yugoslavia built politics only on the negative and not on the positive aspect of the Yugoslavia of yesterday. To see this much more of the conflict energy has to go into visioning the future. The richer the visions and the more options, the higher the chances that the conflict energy will turn to~ard the future, away from the counterprodu(:tive concern with guilt.distribution. A first version of this paper was presented at the international conference "Non-violent Conflict Resolution in Yugoslavia: Domestic and International Concepts and Strategies'~ Austrian Institute for Peace Research and Peace ~duc_:ation, ~tadtschlaining, November 13-17, 1991. I am grateful to participants 111 the meetmg for their comments, particularly Stipe Me sic, Zarko Puhovski and YUGOSLAVIA, WAR .. . ' · d t meeting at the Institute for S ·a Licht. A second version was presente a a . . E~~~ an Studies, Beograd, December 13-14, 1991, where I am particularly grateful to Mihajlo Markovic, Radmila Nakara. da and all the members of the , Institute for European Studies for comments. 34 Vesna Pesic andJulie Mostov A New Challenge for Conflict Resolution: The Case of Yugoslavia The challenges to peaceful conflict resolution presented by the disintegration of Yugoslavia have been particularly difficult because of the very nature of the conflict. That is, the conflict is both about the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a political subject and a signal of its immanent breakdown as a federal state. It is a conflict over the very nature of dissolution compounded because . of the absence of crucial common reference points. Elements of this process of dissolution are present in other Eastern European countries and past coriununist federations, including the USSR; thus, analysis of the nature of this conflict and its escalation to armed confrontation is particularly important. While, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of such conflict and the conditions under which dissolution leads to violence, the breakdown of such multiethnic states poses an additional threat, particularly, when justified by claims to national or ethnic self-determination and that is the further dissolution of newly constituted states into ethnically "pure" communities, endless local wars and social di­ sintegration. These disintegrative conflicts are not comparable to the b(eakdown of old colonial empires, to international conflicts between different states, or to internal state conflicts over competing group or class interests. Because of this we can not easily apply existing models of conflict resolution. As this process of disintegration has emerged as an armed conflict in Yugosla­ via, it is instructive to examine the specific features of this case as a contribution to the understanding of this new challenge to peaceful conflict resolution. To this end we outline three major elements of the conflict as it developed in Yugoslavia and off er possible avenues of response that could create the space for peaceful rather than violent resolution of such conflict. The major elements ofconflict as .we see it in the Yugoslav case are: 1) the effects and consequences of communist rule and its sudden breakdown in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia; 2) the specific nature and history of multinational states in the Balkans or the "Balkan paradigm"; and 3) conflict in the absence of any viable common inst~tutions or frameworks for cooperation. 35 36 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... The Effects and Consequences of Communist Rule and Its Breakdown The institutional frameworks established by the ruling communist regime in Yugoslavia created a quasifederation in which joint interests were not developed · f. the ill . terests of each federal unit from below but were as an expression o · f · d from above. There were no· real avenues for the free expression o ~;~~~can (national), regional, or individual inter~sts by the citizens dire~tly or through freely elected republican assemblies, des?ite the declared promotl~n of collective national and working class interests ill the federal a~d rep~bhcan constitutions. Thus, we could say that this type of union or federation, typi~al for the former regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ~reated a killd of "bad togetherness". Here the bases for union were not def~ed by the real interests of the separate entities, but by the ruling party and, as ill the Yugoslav . case federal and republican based elites. ' Under such conditions, each territorial or federal unit and each c?rrespondin~ national and minority (ethnic) group felt that its interests were beillg systemati­ call neglected to the advantage of others and often und~ri:n~ed by the federal org;nization of the state. At the same time, political and civil, nghts and the legal institutions that formally guarantee their exercise under the rule of law were undermined or deformed by quasidemocratic stru~~ures an.d . proces~~s (for l th delegate system constructed for political decision-makillg) or examp e, e . 't' l arties) entirely repressed (for example, freedom of association ill oppo~i iona P. · There was ah absence of real opportunities for the expre~sio~ of diff~re~t interests or the development of democratic practices and social linkages (mstl- tutions of civil society). With the breakdown of the federal communist party and ~epubl~can conunu­ nist regimes, people responded to their frustrated expre~sion of ~terests and their sense of having been denied the opportunity to defme these illte.rests for themselves by rejecting the institutions and values of ~~ former reg~e. and 1 lffi . ill. g their national pride through nationally identified myths, religions, rec a th · 1 . · 1 r and values. 1 Regional political leaders eager to consolidate eir po itica p~we layed on these national feelings, encouraging the development of .nat~o~al p h · · ing ethniC conflicts and old fears from World War II, and illStilling eup ona, rev1v . fulfill f t' 1 hatred of "others" as past or potential obstacles to the ment o na iona goals. · 1 For a discussion of this aspect of the reemergence of i:ationa~m, see, Nathan G~delsf "Two Concepts of Nationalism: An Interview with Isaiah Berlin," New York Review o Books (November 21, 1991): 19-23. A NEW CHAILENGE FOR CONFIJCT RESOLW10N lliE CASE OF YUGOSL.A VIA Under the rule of the communist party or "real existing socialism", the working class was designated as the political constituency. With the breakdown of these systems and the formation of nationalist-oriented governments, national identity came to define the constituency. The working class was replaced by an ethnically or nationally defined community, for example, the Serbian or Croatian people and working class interests were replaced by national interests. A leader's success in getting votes and establishing power would depend on his ability to realize nationally defined interests or his ability to convince the voters and other . elites that he (his party) best represents these interests. This is the process that unfolded in Yugoslavia, particularly in Croatia and Serbia. The victory of these national leaders and nationally defined parties and interests . in the various republics then immediately posed the question of minority rights and interests within these territories. Given that there were no effective mechanisms in place for the protection of individual rights as essential components of a democratic system, minorities felt they'Were left entirely at the will of the majority and its nationally defined interests. This fear provided an opportunity for ethnic/national groups in other republics to expand their political agenda to the protection of national interests beyond existing federally defined borders. . At the. same time, the particular type of socialist system that existed in Yugoslavia allowed room for some forms of social decision making and individual expression of interests, particularly in cultural and intellectual spheres. Few people came into direct conflict with the state. So that while the political system did not allow for the development of a recognized, legal political opposition, the "soft" nature of the regime did not stimulate the development of organized resistance. The breakdown of the communist regime in Yugoslavia was in some ways more a by-product of the breakdown of similar regimes throughout Eastern Europe than of domestic democratic struggles. The little civil opposition that existed in small oppositional groups was not strong enough to offer a real alternative to the nationalist political elites in Serbia and Croatia. Leaders were chosen because of the nationalist ideologies which they promoted. Thus, instead of a new kind of political leadership, the governments that emerged from the first round of multiparty elections in Croatia and Serbia were still. headed by authoritarian leaders. They changed their rhetoric .and their political platforms, but did not relinquished the old techniques f6r consolidating power. 37 38 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... The Balkan Paradigm The second element of this specific form of challenge to conflict resolution is the particular nature and history of multinat~onal communities in the Balkans. Here we are talking about a part of Europe in which numerous small national groups live in mixed communities. Their relationships have often been charac­ terized by their attempts to gain dominance over one another and all of these groups have at one time been dominated by larger powers. These relationships of domination have been distinguished by acts of cruelty and even genocide, particularly in those cases where ?omination was achieved by depending on strop.ger third parties. The different historical experiences of the individual nations of this region also· created different nationai goals and interests. The peoples who lived for longer . periods under the domination of empires, for example, Slovenia and Croatia, asserted their independence as nation-states only after they had been part of Yugoslavia. Serbia, on the other hand, entered Yugoslavia as a sovereign state, seeing in Yugoslavia a way in which all Serbs could finally live together under one state. At the moment at which Slovenia and Croatia felt that the time had come to establish the sovereignty of their respective states outside of the Yugoslav framework, their interests came into direct conflict with the Serbian interest in maintaining the existing state as the common home to all Serbs. Serbian nationalism appeared later on the scene. Within the context of the breakdown of the federal regin1e, it developed dramatically insisting on only two possibilities for the country: either the federal arrangement as defined by the Serbian leade~ship or the incorporation of all Serbs within a Greater Serbia. This either or standpoint implied, as much as did the Croatian declaration of independence, the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a state. On one hand, the Croatian project called for the complete independence of Croatia without considering the position of the Serbian minority in Croatia and, on the other hand, the Serbian project posed the creation of an expanded Serbian state uniting all Serbs under one roof. The clash of these two projects directly brought about the armed struggle. That is, both sides threatened to redefine internal and external borders and exacerbated existing conflicts between the two republics. These conflicts reopened old animosities and wounds with the help, in particu­ lar, of the inass media and created the conditions under which the interests of one nation (people) were seen directly to undermine the interests of the other. In gaining support for these positions, both sides heavily relied upon old histories and unsettled accounts from the past, undermining all positive achievements that had been developed in the interim between Serbs and Croats under the post- war regime . . - -------,-- - - - -----------·- -- - - -- - - ----- A NEW CHAILENGE FOR CONFIJCT RESOLUflON . THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA In order to consolidate their positions, nationalist leaders insisted on the incompatibility of their respective nation' s interests and on the impossibility of fu~er comm~n life: 2 . Each used a variety of means to assert the moral and legal legi~lllla~y o~ ~ts position. The mutual exclusivity of national interests explained the inevitability of war. National goals could only be realized by defeating the "other" through force. Thus, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the creation of n_c:;w states was to be achieved through military force and war. Conflict in the Absence of Common Frameworks The nature and eff~cts of the . communist system and the peculiar history and development of ethnic and national relations in Yugoslavia underpin the third e~e~en~ chara.cteristic of this crisis, which has significantly contributed to the' difficulties of its peaceful resolution. This is the readiness of each side in the conflict to rej. ect any common values or frameworks for resolving the conflict and to take as given the fact of the federal community's dissolution. "Norms are relevant to conflict because th~y specify the outcomes to which one is entitled and hence the aspirations to which one has a right." 3 When social norms are weak and changing, conflicts increase in number and intensity. "In low-conflict communities one typically finds a broad normative consensus involving wide 3_9 __ a _cc~~tance of certain goals, rules of conduct, role definitions, procedures for decision-makin~ and auiliority and status systems ... By contrast, many conflicts are often ~ound m communities whose norms are breaking down, because some commurnty members begin to aspire to outcomes that others are not willing to let them have ... " 4 The breakdown of a community presupposes iliat for at least ~~me of the members there .is n~ l?nger any basis for normative consensus or any JOillt frameworks worth mamtammg. Rejection of common goals, procedures, or rules of conduct has been a very part of the process of dissolution in the Yugoslav case. . 2 This~ what P1:°itt and Rubin refer to as rigidity of aspirations. When aspirati~ns seem mc~n:ip.att~le co~1~ts are more profound. According to them, there are two main sources ?f ng1d1ty m ~sp1:1"3-t1o~s : l. Very important values underlie these aspirations. Examples mclude secunty, 1d~nt1ty, and recognition for most people and probably for all nations. 2. The values underlymg the aspiratiohS are of the either-or variety; one either achieves them or o~e do~s .not. Such values produce rigid aspirations, because making any concession requir~s givmg ~p the value altogether. Dean G. Pruitt and Jeffrey z. Rubin, Social Conflict: Iiscalation, Stalemate, and Settlement(NewYork: RandomHouse, 1986), p. 12. 3 "When rightful aspirations seem incompatible with another party' s apparent goals the result is often quite explosive." Ibid., p.15. · ' 4 Ibid., p. 19. -----;::=====:=i::===,.,.....,,,,...-~~=~=~~-----------.~--------;----------------·--------- 40 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... As we noted above (under section I), the conflicts emerged under conditions in which democratic institutions had not yet been sufficiently introduce~ .or developed and in which the ruling elites were neither c. ommitted. to nor f~miliar with the application of democratic principles of conflict resolution. While, the existence of democratic institutions would not have prevented the process of dissolution a commitment to democratic principles would have been a common reference ~oint for peaceful conflict resolution. That is, a commitment to v.~l~es that support tolerance, while recognizing compet~g a.nd . even conflict111g interests may have prevented these conflicts from eruptmg 111 v10lence. ~ut these values were not available as part of the existing political culture or practice. If the newly forming states had stressed their foundation in the individual rights of citizens, rather than purely national interests, they may have been able t~ ~esol~e the dissolution of Yugoslavia in a peaceful way by creating the conditions 111 which people could feel se~ure in the exercise of political and civil rights and the appreciation of cultural differences -and similarities. Recognizing the importance of common reference points .and com~nuni­ cation as the basis for peaceful resolution of conflicts, democratically motivated activists in Yugoslavia first sought to introd1= 1ce some democratic f~ai:ieworks - common institutions _on the federal level in order to destroy the existmg central organs of power and to create a space for further peaceful an? ~onstructive negotiations. Here the idea was to reconstitute the federal parha.ment.on the basis of free democratic elections, if only for the purpose of dissolv111g the existing federal association. None of the sides in the conflict, however, saw their interest in protecting or maintaining institutions or spaces . that could ~e seen as a common framework for cooperation. Slovenia and Croatia were not mterested in attempting to establish democratic relations in the existing federal instit~tions, because they saw their interests in establishing independent states .. Serbia '. the last to introduce free elections, was not prepared to accept democratic solutions to the federal crisis. Thus those common institutions that did exist, for example, federal institu­ tions, ..:ere rejected along with the idea of Yugoslavia. The rep~blics began to withdraw from these common institutions: the-federal parliament, federal government offices, the presidency, and finally, the aimy. With the dissol~tion of the presidency as the civil authority over the arm~d forc~s, the ~rmy rema~ed practically free of any civilian control. The arm~ ahgn~d itself with the Serbian ruling party, in part, for ideological reasons, and m part 111 order to ~ecure a ho~e for itself. so in the conflict between the various national interests 111 Yugoslavia, the army became a third party to the conflict particularly escalating the war. As new conditions for cooperation or communication were not created to replace the old ones being destroyed, there were no internal frameworks for the peaceful resolution of conflict. A NEW CHALLENGE FOR CONFIJCT RESOLUITON THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA In the absence of such frameworks, outside parties including the European Community, the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia, and the United Nations and its special envoy Cyrus Vance, have attempted to create a minimal set of principles and alternative frameworks for conflict resolution. But these must be c~mplemented by some internal processes and reference points. Efforts such as those of the Round Table of Authorities and Opposition seated in Sarajevo are a step in this direction. Conclusion "Escalated conflict often weakens a community' s capacity to deal effectively with further conflict." 5 Once armed conflict has broken out, the immediate task is to achieve a stable cease fire. This has been particularly difficult to achieve in the Yugoslav case because of a lack of adequate political solutions to the crisis or even a baseline for negotiating minimally acceptable temporary solutions. The community' s already weak foundation for conflict resolution was shattered by the "aggressor-defender" interpretation of conflict, unwillingness to recog­ nize common values, and readiness to reject any existirlg institutions for communication, and~ thus, by the escalation of conflict to armed c_ ombat. The danger of such intractable conflict has forced both outside communities and leaders of the former federal units of Yugoslavia to seek a truce and some grounds for diminishing, if not resolving conflict. This task has been made much harder because the dissolution of any foundation for conflict resolution has itself been both the goal and result of the conflict. Recognition of the inherent dangers of this type of conflict, which could potentially break out in other multinational communities in Eastern Europe and the past Soviet Republics, makes the above analysis of the Yugoslav challenge to conflict resolution particularly important. On the basis of this analysis, we offer the following points for consideration:. (1) The process of dissolution is complex and long-term and, thus, those involved in this process must s, ecure a suitable framework within which io carry out negotiations and dialo~e. Destroying frameworks for decisionmaking without creating new ones leads to e:x.1.remely dangerous conflicts and violent confrontation. The Yugoslav example shows. this dearly. The withdrawal of republican elites from federal institutions and their unwillingness or inability to retain some lines of communication resulted in 'a kind of anarchy and left the military free of ~ivilian control. The military then turned to the side closest to its own national composition and interests. 5 Ibid., p. 94. 41 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... (2) Unilateral decisions absolutize ones own interests and display a desire to realize them at any cost - even force. Strategies that see conflict resolution on one's own terms and that consist in making threats, imposing penalties, taking preemtive actions, making demands that far- exceed what is actually acceptabk, committing oneself to an "unalterable" position, 6 inevitably result in war in mul­ tinational communities. That is, such strategies force an actual showdown, a demonstration of the actual relationship of power between the sides in conflict. Attempts to dominate one's opponent by force do not provide solutions to . conflicts, but further undermine the capacities of the conflictillg sides to realize their interests and ~chieve some understanding as neighbors who will need to have regular contacts in the future. Peaceful resolution of future conflicts must stem from strategies that recognize the interests of the contending parties and attempt to provide solutions that allow the minimal satisfaction of crucial interests on both sides. (3) In the dissolution.of multinational states, conflicts about boundaries are almost impossible to avoid. In order to deal with these conflict.sthrough peaceful methods, it is important to engage in theoretical and practical attempts to define the notion of self-determination and the right of secession before further 42 conflicts arise. This is particularly important because of the number of different ---- ethnic and national communities living within the territories of these multina- tional federal states and within the newly forming states. In order to avoid further fragmentation of the newly formed states, which could lead to years of warfare · and block the economic and political development of these regions, the terms under which the right to secession is applicable need to be fixed as general principles. Otherwise, responses appear as arbitrary or ad hoe reactions to group demands. (4) Common grounds for conflict resolution must be created and nurtured. In whatever bodies are established for short and long-term cooperation the terms of association must be such that each me ..... mber state' could envision itself negotiating on equal footing and on the basis of mutual trust. This perception must be supported by the terms of association. established within the newly formed states for their own citizens, particularly, because of the probability that among these citizens will be members of the neighboring nations. Common grounds for peaceful conflict resolution can been seen in the · following: a) guaranteed individual civil and political rights for all inhabitants, guaranteed rights and opportunities for the cultural and political expression of all people in minority positions, and protections against any form of discrimination (this suggests that cooperation is best promoted through the establishment of civil constitutions, in which citizenship and corresponding rights belong to individu- / 6 Ibid., pp. 25-26. , .· I A NEW CHAILENGE FOR CONFIJCT RESOLUllON lliE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA / als as such); b) inclusion of generally accepted principles and procedures of democratic decision-making and international conventions in the new state­ constitutions; c) and cooperation between the new states based on their rights as independent nations and the iridividual rights of citizens living within them and compatible with their respective economic interests. Cooperation should promote possibilities for individuals divided by old or new boundaries to retain their relationships, to maintain and develop cultural bonds, and to express their cultural identity and unity with others of their same ethnic group or nation and, at the same time, promote possibilities for entry into the broader European integrative process. We have in mind a two-directional process of communica­ tion: inward looking, that is, to the old federal space, and outward looking, toward th> broader integrative process in Europe. (5) In order to create the atmosphere for 1 such cooperation, governmental leaders and political parties in these states must realize that using nationalist ideology to gain power leads to dangerous conflicts. Stirring up hatred for other nations and peoples, turning to the past, nurturing national myths, recreating national histories, and closing up within national boundaries all undermine the capaci~y for peaceful resolution of conflicts and block the possibility for any stable peace, economic and social growth. ·43 'I I 44 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... 1 Tonci Kuzmanic Stalinisnt as a Probletn of Methodology The aim of this pa per is an attempt to call into question the structure of existing conflicts in former Yugoslavia which have culminated in the War.in Croatia and Bosnia also to question the dominant picture which oversimplifies a very heterogeneous and complex conflict situation at the matrix of the "national" or. the so calred "ethnic" strif es and battles. There will be an attempt to off er a different interpretation of a "conflict net" which has risen in this country by putting forward some kind of explanation which would be more or less deduced from the position of the structural ele­ ments of the Yugoslav situation. My intention is to reduce the blown up picture of the so-called ethnic problems to a more realistic value. There is no motive to search for an exclusive and an appropriate explanation, hence I will try to work . I out some analytical el~ments which will challenge the predominant Yugoslav ethnic matrix 1 . · Questioning Stallnism First of all I would like to make a remark concerning the methodology of understanding the current Yugoslavia's problems, or, more precisely, the dis­ tinction between the situation in Yugoslavia and thatof the other so-called post­ socialist or post-communist countries. It seems to be possible to work out at least a part of this distinction at the conceptual level 1 Perpetuating interpretation of the current conflict situation in categories of democracy vs. totalitarianism is becoming more and more inadequate, yet it is apparently an obvious wishful thinking especially in Croatia and Slovenia. ~5 46 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... Different attempts to explain the so-called post-socialist situation(s) 2 most frequently begin with a very conventional assumption, namely, the concept of Socialism which is more or less a. unique term and that it is possible by and from this term to extract a sort of "general understanding" of the different post-socialist constitutions and structures. The very inherent part of this assumpti<;mis also a belief (usually suppressed and more or less looked over in silence) that the proper way to comprehend what Socialism is (was), basically leads to.the concept of Stalinism. In brief, the most decisive point of understanding is that: the post-sqcialism(s) is firstly, an ideological reduction of different kinds of socialism (concepts and practice) to the "Socialism'~ and secondly reduction of the latter to the concept of Stalin ism. This is, of course, a very old and well known ideological (in fact, a religious) operation, which belongs to the past. However, in the nineties this very reduction became the corner stone of the revolutionary changes in East Europe and of the self-understanding of the revolutionary movements which have appeared iri this part of the world under the name of post-socialism. Stalinism, by definition, means the worst social and political system. It is also a dictatorship of the Communist Party, with very low living standards, oppression of the human: rights (e.g. personal, sexual, religious, national, etc.). In brief, Stalinism means the worst possible system a mind could imagine. However, it is obvious that the concept of Stalinism was constructed around diabolization of the enemy, rather than that of strict analytical assumptions. This is somewhat an emotional concept rather than an empirical or an analytical one, which belongs to the satanology and not to the corpus of the so-called social sciences. However, observing this problem from the other (Yugoslav) side of the coin, it is evident that the prevailing way of thoughts and observations and, even more so, the dominant model of understandings and actions (!), was deduced from an extremely concrete situation. In other words, one concrete situation (rela:­ tively and absolutely bounded by time and space) has become the content of the concept which today plays an extremely delicate and important role: the one which explains all different sorts of socialism, in all various countries; situations, structures, etc. 2 The designation "post-socialism" is 'ratheracerta:inmask,asortof statement enclosing a question with no answer: post-socialism is functioning as a kind of a "floating signifier" through which it is possible to invest various analytical desires, metaphysical assumptions, or, in other words, as an essence of the very pre-µieoretic move. Perhaps it is not appropriate to discuss the concept of post-socialism in this text, nevertheless I would like to introduce the plural form (post-socialisms) which - if nothing else - furthermore ' complicates the matter. STAIJNISM AS A PROBLEM OF METHODOLOGY In order to clear up the cloudy (war!) picture of the situation in former · Yugoslavia perhaps it is necessary to make a clear-cut distinction between the general concept of Socialism/Stalinism and that of the system of self-manage­ ment which was experienced in the former state. My hypothesis is that, in practical terms, the self-management was not the same as Stalinism. and any serious attempt to grasp "what's going on in Yugoslavia", based on Stalinism as a conceptual mirror of explanation, will imply failure. . The distinction between Stalinism and self-management was somehow an identity card for Yugoslav self-management system especially in the period from 1950to 1980. Meanwhile, inordertocarryout the post-socialist system, this very distinction was destroyed in the 80s. What Yugoslavia experienced from post­ socialism in the last two years requires a rec;valuation of the reinterpreted (by post-socialists) system of self-management. Bearing in mind that I neither wish to bring back the self-management system to action, nor to "defend" it, but somehow to search for ways and means of understand, unmask and reveal the ideology of the so-called post-socialism, wbich is the very basic step towards grasping the situation, not only in the Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, but also for recognizing the "spirit of the time" in the nineties as such. _ Self-management and Stallnism The problem which rises from the above perspecJive is related to the ways of determining the differences betwe~n self-management and Stalinism, or making room for explanation of the differentia specifica of self-management in Yugo­ slavia, and of the present conflict net in this country. A possible paradoxical answer may be that: self-management was (forat least thirty years) an attempt to abolish Stalinism without giving up the leading role of the Communist Party: Some of the results of that 1 1 mad project" are as following: 1. at the level of the system as such the presence of some rudimentary distinction between the state and society, between two "corporative entities" which were connected and forced to cooperation by the role of the so-called "subjective factors" (the Communist Party organisations or by communists as individuals); - 2. from the end of the fifties also the presence of some rudimentary distinction between the realm of "politics" (political space reduced to the Communist Party activities) and "economy", which was regarded as a strUcture with "its own, 47 f , YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... relatively autonomous logic" on which revolutionary subject(s) by definition had limited guiding possibilities; ' 3. at the level of the federal state organization, not only the equality of different nations but also the equality of nations that mattered and national minorities. The self-managing form of the leading communist role was productive even in forming "new nations". Not only in the meaning of creation, or better, re-creation of so-called Yugoslav-nation (Yugoslavhood, Yugoslavism as a concrete form of patriotism)' but most of all in the creation of the two rtew (nation-)republic entities. After the second World War these new (nation-)republics had emerged: Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. The emergence of two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Voivodina) was also part of this Communist creativity; 4. on the basis of communists leading role in Yugoslavia we must also specify not only the equality among the three main religious communities (Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim) but also those of the tolerant relations of other numerous - religious communities and groups; 5. for a while, there existed some kind of Welfare state (civil services, social 48 security ... ) with a relatively high standard of living; particularly in the seventies; ---- I ' 6. Yugoslavia had a s< ,:m1ehow successful economic system (in comparison with the other socialist countries) with a relatively small but, symbolically important role of the workers' participation (self-management in concrete enterprises); 7. at the level of the so-called day-to-day life Yugoslavia had (from the beginntng of the ~ixties), wide open borders with legal possibilities of traveling and working outside the country. Bearing in mind that Yugoslavia was also an important tourist country in Europe; 8. last but not least (from the begiru1ing of the seventies) Yugoslavia had quite liberal laws in relation to some indicative matters, as for example on abortion rights for women, etc In brlef, throughout the lasting period of the "mad project" (about thirty years) self-management manifested an array of features and details which, at the level of the definition, made any kind of identificatiorz, or ''standardization" of that system with Stalinism quite impossible, hence self-management was something more or less quite similar to Stalinism. However it worked out some new structures, which made it impossible to' explain when using the concept of the Stalin ism. ST AIJMSM AS A PROBIEM OF METHODOLOGY Before the emergence of post-socialism in Yugoslavia it was common to think about the above mentioned development_ of self-management as if they had been achieved in spite of the communist leading role. But today in the so-called post-socialist circumstances it is more and more obvious that (at least in the case of Yugoslav history), it is b_ ecoming a necessity to question and think more deeply about the "creative and progressive role" of the communists. In order to ., slot-in the theory of modernization in perspective, the questions of reevaluation of the elements of (re)traditionalization which were imposed on the position of communist rule, and simultaneously about the modernization potentials of the former communist system in concrete Balkan circumstances can be risen. Self-management and Communism On the basis of previous assumptions and explanation I am intentionally talking about communism and self-management as two different concepts. It was true, oi course, that self-management was "discovered", imposed and controlled (yet not fully) directly by communists and indirectly by central Communist Party I state. As a matter of fact, during the years of development, self-management "escaped" the communist coritroland became what was particularly important for poor classes 3 , and what was more than communism or just a product of communism. In other words, self-management outgrew, and "transcended" communism as well as communistf'. In addition, it is possible to claim that self­ managernent was a wider concept than communism and a concept which was accepted on a wider basis than communism. If the Communist regime or conununism (as a project for the future) was by definition the "property" of the Communist Party as a state-organisation, than self-management would be the "property" of not only the communists, but also of a relatively wider scale of ordinary, working people, of the "nondifferentiated population". Only a small part of this relatively simplified picture of "divided properties" can be explained in terms of structuralist concept of interpellation, with the influence of the propaganda and communist ideology (media, etc). The very first problem regarding this topic still exists as that: self-management at the same time brought in relatively and absolutely wide benefits to the "working masses". Of course, not solely in positive terms (for example by the high material standard, although this moment was important too, especially with respect to the standards of living in 3 While self-management was a sort of forced "one-class society" or "Organic Labour State", using Neil Harding terms, post-socialism is enforcing the development of class society! 4 It is not a joke if the outside world observed the War in Croatia and Bosnia in terms of a "self-managing War" or if some of them categorise he process ' of disintegration of the state as self-managing disintegration. 49 50 YUGOSLA WA, WAR ... other socialist countries), but firstly with the concept and reality which stand on the grounds of equality (in the meaning of revolutionary egalite, egalitarisme). The other side of self-managing egalite was ref ered to £\S blocking any serious kind of differentiation, stratification, or else, discrimination. Namely, the very inherent and the most important part of the self-managing equality (egalite) was precisely that of blockade of all possible discriminations be it national, religious, sexual, and even "standard discrimination", which was carried out by the imposition of The Discrimination. This Discrimination be­ tween Communists and Non-communists was also that of self-managing population by communists. "Transcendence" of discrin1ination was not only applied in a "positive way", for example by the "abolition of discrimination as such", using Marx language , but also with the in1position of new discrimination which oppressed all previous, "less important" discriminations. A. relatively surprising fact and result was that: the New, Communist discrimination was not only recognised as a discrimination as · such, but also (for numerous strata of inhabitants) it was a certain ''step forwards" or even a sign of development­ especially on the basis of the so-called day-to-day life. Furthermore it could be said that with the inauguration of the post-socialist constitutions and structures in various parts of the former state, at the present, w~ have the opportunity to observe the interesting situation which reveals that it is untrue if only some strata of the previous regime (army, party and police staff, leading people from the "communist enterprises" ... ) deprived. Actually, there is also problem of deprivation among large parts of this population, especially with the majority of the mixture between workers and peasants who were and still are the dominant strata of ex-Yugoslav "global society". And just this vast population became the origin of the general conflict and war! . · Post-stalinism? With the transition from communism/socialism to post-socialism, instead of the Society of The communist deprivation, which contained numerous small privileges for exceptionally large parts of that population, we arrived to One­ nation societies of national liberation containing numerouS small deprivations of vast share of population! For the post-socialist governments in different parts of the former state, · destroying the communism was equivalent to the abolition of self-management. Since self-management in their eyes is the same as communism, communism is the same as Stalinism, and Stalinism is - from the religious point of view- a pure form of Evil. Post-socialist opposition believe that it is possible to argue that the STAllMSM AS A PROBLEM OF METHODOLOGY abolition of communism is the same as abolition of the self-management at the level of the "macro-project" (integral system of self-management), but not at different "lower levels", (eg. indu~trial democracy, civil services, etc.). This is _ also true for the public opinion. For less developed parts of the former state the impacts and Jhe expectations from the previous system were more important. Not at the "integral" level of self-managment but as a system of small, everyday privileges and most important of all as a system of ''smallsecuritieS'. Yet, the self-management wstem in public eyes initially works as a verified model of security and stability, and, in the past few months, it was regarded as a sign of good old times when everything was safe. In conclusion one of the most in1portant conflicts in Yugoslavia can be derived from the distinction which is directly a part of the everyday existence, :vhich is that between self management and communism, or more precisely, neglecting - this distinction. Lack of respect to this distinction is the foundation of post­ socialist ideologies in former Yugoslavia and the corner stone of self-under­ standing, and a part of self-legitimization of the new power structures. It is not accidental at all that post-socialist power structures are composed of the ex­ communists who cannot understand the fall of socialism as a result of differ- - entiation between a limited and suppressing system producing a structure which has surpassed and transcended itself, but th~ decline of socialism viewed in a typically communist manner, that is: as a product of their own revolutionary activity. Referihg to the theory of diabolisation of the enemy, it seems that post-so­ cialism could bbzorja, Maribor, 1986. REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN POST-SlfLFMANAGEMENT SOCIETY (self)protection, and the labour sphere without the mechanism of industrial conflict regulation. This is a quite specific problem resulting iri disintegration of the "real-socialist" structure of societies in Yugoslavia: in the "post­ selfmanagement" variant of "post-socialism", a proble- m of vacuum at the level of factory social syste~1s appeared .Because the deterioration of self management was not followed by the "set-up" of trade unions, such constellations were emerging which were opening.space for he formati9n of new despotic regimes 4 in the sphere-of labour. If we add the dramatic decline of the economic situation 0989-1991) to the above, a considerable lowering of wages, etc., then it becomes clear that in Yugoslavia such circumstances were created in which masses of working population (in the ambience of an authoritarian culture and egalitaria~ values ~evitably looked for any type of protection: the fear of poverty and mass frustrations were resulting in quick polltical and global authoritarian solutions. · On the basis of data collected during the research conducted in 1991s it can be concluded tha, t the situation in Slovenia does not vary much from the general "post-socialist" Yu go-trend. The level of wages in Slovenia is (also) dramatically low: one third (32.2 %) of all respondents in the beginning of 1991 were paid up to 5500 dinars, another third (33.7 %) received wages betwe~n 5500 and 8000 55 dinars, and less than one fifth were paid between 8000 to 11000 dinars a month.6 4 The author of the factoiy regime concept is M. Burawoy, see The Politics of Pro~· duction, Verso, London, 1985. - 5 We are referring to a poll-that, betweenJw1e 25 andjuly29, 1991, encompassed 262 responde?ts fr?m five work org~nizations located in five different regions of the Republic of Slovema. With reg~rd to the tlffie of the survey, it is understandable that the polling in each of the enterpnses from our sample was adjusted to the current ''war-political situation": despite such adjustments the attempted polling in one case failed because pait of respondents were mobilized by the Territorial Defense. In the menioned case the polling was repeated after the "ten-daywar", of course. ' The enterprises in which our survey was conducted were from diverse industrial branches various sizes of performances, one half (51.0 %) of our respondents were born in the town of their present residence one third (34. 0 %) were born elsewhere in Slovenia and 15 % in other Yugosiav republics. One fifth(21.5 %) of the sample were unskilled and semiskilled workers, one third (32.0 %) skilled and less than one third (27.8 %) workers wi:11 se~ondar~ professional education. The smallest share had high school (8.2 %) and _ uruversity studies ( 4 .3 %) . One half of respondents ( 47 .8 %) were production workers. This percentage coincides roµghly with the total munber of W1skilled, semiskilled and skilled workers reffered to in our poll. 6 In order to express the approximate amounts of monthly pay in AS, for instance, each of the quoted sums should be divided by 3. ·I · ,;, I· . ! 56 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... Respondents ref ered to this situation as considerable worsening when com­ pared this with "the past": almost one half of respondents ( 4 7. 7 %) stated that the material and social status of the workers in an enterprise (in comparison with the time before the so-called Markovic's reform), is considerably worse, and a good third (37.9 %) believed that it is worse (total 85 .6 %). Table 1: Assessment of the present material and social status of workers in comparison with the time before the begiJ.ming of the "Markovic's reform" (in %). 1 2 37 total 1. much worse 63.6 53.7 41.9 47.7 2. worse 20.0 28.0 48.6 37.9 3. unchanged 9.1 7.3 4.1 6.6 4. better 3.7 2.3 5. much better 6. no opinion 7.3 7.3 5.4 5.5 A sign of an iIKreasing fear among workers is also the change in the perception of basic reasons of conflicts in working organizations: the new basic reason is "the danger to lose one's job". The ranking of reasons for conflicts in u 1 dustrial organizations (Slovenia) is now the following: (1) allocation of means for personal incomes, (2) organization of work, (3) danger to lose one' s job; those of lesser importance are: ( 4) work conditions and (5) other violations of workers' rights. The most significant ways of conflict resolution are: (1) negotia­ tion, (2) involvement of wider trade union in the dispute, and (3) enquiring for help from the republic agents. Less frequently the respondents chose the option of strikes as the method of conflict resolution. In four out of five enterprises in which we conducted our research, the Free Trade Union (the so-called "old regime trade union") is the majority trade union (68.4 % of respondents are members of Free Trade Union). Table 2: Dissemination and structure of trade-union members (in%). 1 2 3 total 1. non members 10.9 15.9 12.2 17.6 2. Free Trade Union 74.5 69.5 74.3 68.4 3. other trade unions 14.5 . 14.6 13.5 14.1 · 7 In all the tabl~s the numbers 1 - 3 (horizontal) denote: unskilled/s<;!miskilled, skilled workers and seco~daryschool education. . REGULA 110N OF INDUSTRIAL RELA 110NS IN POST-SELFMANAGEMENT SOCIETY Among respondents the conviction about solidarity of workers in a trade­ union action was very frequent: nearly one half ( 46.1 %) of respondents thought that a shop-steward might have succeeded in negotiations if he had support from oilier workers. Since an absolute majority of respondents were members . of Free Trade Union, these data expressed quite an advanced stage of develop­ ment of the power (which is otherwise hard to measure) in the trade union. A considerable number of Slovene workers trusted the trade unions. This is supported by the fact that - in case of the problems concerning the-workers in the largest group of respondents (39.6 %) - would seek help from the trade union. Slightly less than a third (29.2 %), would not react at all since, according to them, complains never changed anything. Table 3: The following results were the data collected when this question was put forward to t~e workers. In case you feel that your superiors assign working tasks improperly to tl1eir friends, you would turn for help first of all to: 1 2 3 total 1. co-workers 14.8 14.8 9.9 14.0 2. director 3.7 4.9 8.5 8.0 3. trade.. union 37.0 48.1 36.6 39.6 4. worker council 13.0 8.6 7.0 9.2 5. no reaction 31.5 23.5 38.0 29.2 ! The orientation of workers towards a "strong leadership" and distrust in a "democratic procedure" (eyen when their own interest is endangered) can be observed in t,he answers to the question through which we have tried to determine the leadership qualities of the trade unions. 57 .iii I· ll, 58 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... Table 4: What can assure the workers that the trade union would work in the the trade-union (t-u) leadership? (in %) interest of the workers and not 1 2 3 total 1. honesty of (t-u) leadership 50.0 42.7 25.7 34.4 2. possibility to express member- ship interests 5.6 4.9 9.5 5.9 3. expertise of trade-union functionaries 16.6 23 ~2 27.0 26.1 4. possibility to change t-u leadership 1.9 4.9 5.4 3.6 5. protection of workers, not "democracy training" 25.9 24.4 32.4 29.6 Data from Table 4 indicate that, according to respondents, the viable mechanisms of internal trade-union democracy are not adequate o secure the work of trade unions in the interest of the workers. In other words, respondents thought that the trade union can work in their interest even if the common members within the trade union do not express their views and interests .. . In their eyes, the most efficient trade union, which regards the worker~ interests as the most important factor, lies in the hands of honest and expert trade union officials. The representative data suggest that the workers interest in Slovene society has been, quite successfully consolidated after the disintegration of selfmanageinent. On the other hand, the transitional nature of the trade union is quite clear. Namely, the union president at the enterprise leNel) is paid by the enterprise management. A major political implication of the illustrated strength of the transitional trade union is in the fact that the trade union in question is (for the time being) not 11 regime related", hence it re presents a equilibrating force balancing the relationships between the forc~s in Slovenia's political life somewhat indirectly. · REGULA 110N OF INDUS1RJAL RELA110NS IN POST-SELFMANAGEMENT SOCIEIY m . Even in the pos.t-selfr:iana~e~ent variant of a post-socialist society, it is very l~ely that. despotic reg11nes m mdustrial organizations may reform. Since such micro reg~es gener~te authoritarian valu~ orientations in society and prevent ~ prod~ct1ve res?~ut1on of everyday conflicts in the sphere of labour, these mdustr1al regulation inevitably induce "waves of authoritarianism from below" Generation of a~th?ri~rianism from the labour sphere increases the probabilit; of global authontanan solutions" and, hence, the probability of violent conflict "resolution" in society. The da~1ger of the spreading of "authoritarianism from below" seems to be . (at least m the case of Slovene society) somehow modified. Since trade­ unionism has (relatively successfully for now) filled up the imminent vacuum that occurred after the disintegration of selfmanagement, we may hope that less dangerous constellations may be created. In the sphere of industrial relations of Slovene society, the possibility of setting up the classic relationship "trade union vs e~pl .oyer" stil.l exists. The implementation of this possibility depends on the abohshmg of u111on le~ders' attachment to the management. Only an entirely auton~m~us trade union can considerably hinder the synchronization of the authontanan wave; and 01i.ly such trade-unionismt>f workers can stop appear­ ance of global social conflicts, and thus decrease the possibility of "resolving" them in a violent manner. · 59 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR · · · Part 2: N ationalisni . \ RudiRizman Sociological Dimension of Conflicts · Between Ethnonationalistns What - is happening these days in what was geographically . and politically for more than 70 years called Yugoslavia is certainly not easy to translate into sociological language._ In the last two decades researchers have had to modify many assumptions that for too long had maintained that ethnic sentiments in general, and nationalisms in particular, are destined to wither away. Since this 63 was evidently not the 'case, they direct their attention toward identifying the --- deeper roots of ethnic revival and self-identification. Thus they were trying to correct by intellectual means their previous ignorance of this social problem. It is significant to note, however, that all prevailing orientations or "isms" in the social sciences failed to acknowledge in time the manifest emergence of etlmic demands on the planetary scale- the fact that itself questions some of the capital premises of modernity and its "real-civilizational" pattern of development. Dogmatic belief in progress has led not only to ecological disasters but has failed to offer tolerable perspectives to those etlmic/national groups which did not acquire for themselves the privilege of a nation-state. Discussing the crisis of modernity would lead us too far and can be left for some other opportunity. Suffice it to say that the ethnic dimension of conflicts in Yugoslavia belongs to a much wider disruptive process in the world and not just to the unique dialectic of "Balkanization". The question of why so little attention has been paid both in theory and political practice to violent "resolution" of etlmic conflicts is quite justified and even more the follow-up question of how to manage and resolve this very sensitive sort of conflict? To respond properly and in time, one has first to understand the complex nature of ethnic conflicts with the help of already available sociological concepts ("tools") and those that have to be yet produced. · John Stuart Mill already in 1861 in one of his main works argued in favor of the - still widespread view that democracy is somewhat-incompatible with ethnlcally 64 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... complex societies. Can we, according to Mill, speak at all about democracy in the world when we know that only 14 states are more or less ethnically homogeneous in composition. To "~ranslate" this figure fu~er, .w_e a~e 1 ~on­ fronted with the fact that the proportion of the world population hv111g 111 self­ determined" states does not surpass four percent. And if we remove Japan from the list, the share is hardly one percent. Thus, the nation-state function as an ideal-type which exists almost nowhere in reality. However, we are well aware that the whole international order operates under this "false" - or, to put it more properly, self-constructed ideological - assumption wi~h really existing powers and privileges. The pattern of historical development 111 the last 200 years was many times more pleasing to states than to e~c nations, its . organizational principle cares exclusively for the former and only 111 the sec?nd 111stance ~or the purposes of ideological legitimation for the latter. There is no o~er f iel? as spread with misnomers as is the field of our present ~once~n: the U.nited Nations is actually an organization of states. The same applies to mternatlonal law and almost all uses of the concepts "internation~l" or (to a slightly lesser extent) "national". The conceptual confusion is only the logical result of-be it intentional or accidental - legitimating the present state subdivisions of mankind. Until recently, the field of ethnic conflicts seemed to social scientists ra~~r ~ tran~itory phenomena.functioning against modernization. T 6 unde~stand it 111 its .entirety, it was argued, demands the application of those analytical tools. which ha~e already been tested in confronting other similar irrationally-motivat~d social problems. On the political level ethnic conflicts were t~ed to the colo~ial world and thus isolated from developed industrial states which have, especially after the experience of World War II, resented any expression of explicitly nationalist claims. On the other side, many sociologists considered ethnic conflicts to be of an episodic nature, something that comes and goes and which ?ne. cannot predict with precise certainty. In short, ethnic affiliations have been 111 disrepute for many different reasons -some of them based on historical grounds a~d othe.rs of a different intellectual sort, that is dogmatic acceptance of purely universahst and linear development in the tradition of Enlightenment thinkers. While surpassing all these lin1itations,. sociologists still had . to fight against many other dogma: take, for example, the dogma of the inevitabilit_Y of e~ic subordination or the passion to dig out the very first causes of the ethmc conflicts. We consider as more fruitful efforts to try to solve ethnic problems on the basis · of their motivation by rational calculation of gains (or losses for that matter). Th~s approach can help policymakers to organize rewards in such a way that ethnrc individuals and collectives can expect certain and increasing gains. It can lead to a positive result if it can identify the rationalistic and materialistic motives in the ~xisting ethnic conflicts. If th'.e motives are much less visibl:, or if they ·~re even irrational, then the resolution and the very understand111g of :onflicts demand not only more time; but also sustainable mtellectual innovation. In order S,OCIOLOGJCAL DIMENSION OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN E1HNONA170NALISMS to accumulate new knowledge, sociologists do not suffer so much from lack of data: in order to categorize, synthesize and to discriminate, they need enough discriminating power to be able to class the cases and thus produce what some researchers in the field call "data containers". This can be only a general rule since we should keep in mind that theories often explain ethnic conflicts on opposite ·assumptions. If the theory of cultural pluralism sees in ethnic conflict the clash of incompatible values, the other -modernization and economic-interest theories - conceive of conflict as the struggle for limited reso~rces and opportunities. It is obvious therefore that theories with such diverse appro~ches stress different features of ethnic conflict. On the other hand it is quite transparent that both mentioned theories fail to address the significance of symbolic issues in ethnic conflicts. Neither deals with the important role of ethnic-group anxiety on one side or the intensity and violent character of ethnic conflict. Needless ·to add . that this dimension of.conflicts plays an extremely important role not only in more recent clashes in Yugoslavia but also much earlier - during World War II. Efforts to ameliorate ethnic conflicts obviously do not depend ollly oi1· good or weak theory. Ethnic leaders may represent the main obstacle. Some of them build their role and even charisma on maintaining ethnic conflicts. It would therefore be very naive if well-intentioned researchers projected their peaceful aims onto policymakers who are themselves very much interested and influen­ tial participants in their societies. Not very rarely, they show more or less passively or more or less actively hostile attitudes toward member~ of other groups. There are 'not many rewards., if any, for those policymakers who really care for ethnic harmony, or for that matter for those who are trying to correct historical injustices to underprivileged ethnic groups. Even if we are witnessing sound pro-ethnic ideology, its-execution may take a long time and stubborn resistances both in the political realm and in civil society. Ethnic divisions ofla bor and more general cultural differences have reproduced divergent principles of stratification for different ethnic groups. To change these patterns of discrimi­ nation only at this level may no doubt take time and the work of at least more than one generation. After understanding the nature of ethnic conflicts - a job that still awaits generations of sociologists - there comes to the fore the not less demanding goal of finding out the policies of positive ~iscrimination, both generally and for individual cases, to reduce ethnic-conflicts. We are not starting here froin point zero. Accumulation of various positive experiences as well as learning from them must have top priority. There are direct and indirect ways to affect the fate of inter-ethnic relation­ . ships. The former makes itself visible through evolution and modifications of federal and confederal institutionalization of ethnic subjects. More indirect ways of ·affecting ethnicity are exemplified through the use of this or that electoral 65 66 YUGOSLA V7A, WAR ... system, that is something which is too often absent in both intellectual discourse · and in concrete and everyday politics. In any case, a balanced use of direct and indirect means requires close study of their inunediate effects ahd only then, if needed, corrections rather than risky further experimentation. Sociologists have so far identified the following five mechanisms of conflict reduction, all of them appropriate not for all but for carefully selected inter-ethnic cases in Yugoslavia. First, the inter'"ethnic conflict may be reduced by dispersing it, that is by dispersing the main segments of power so as to take away a single focal point. · One lesson from this mechanism teaches us that conflict in one region is generally less dangerous than conflict that engages the whole of the country. Second, inter-ethnic conflict may be reduced by arrangements that emphasize inter-ethnic conflicts which are less dangerous and violent. Third, inter-ethnic conflict may be reduced . by policies that create incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation. Fourth, inter-~tlu1ic conflicts may be reduced by 1':>olicies that encourage alignments based on interests other than ethnicity. And fifth," inter­ ethnic conflicts may be reduced by reducing concrete disparities between groups so that dissatisfaction to a larger extent declines. In this last case, the emphasis lies on the restructuring the incentives for conflict. behaviour. The main aim of these five mechanisms of conflict reduction is not to eradicate conflict, but rather to contain, limit, channel, and manage its capacity to persist on the social scene. We should warn against expecting too much from political engineering in . this frequently unpredictable sphere of unique social relation­ ships. One can expect also unintended consequences ~hich require new strategies and mechanisms Of conflict resolution, and which might go beyond anything identified in the cases from 1to.5. Sometimes costs might be too high and sometimes the distributive policies might create a new class of ethnic leaders that can.fuel the existing ethnic conflicts even more. There are also many other intervening variables that can alter our expectations when in1plementing one of the mentioned mechanisms. There are some cases, inde~d very rate (Slovenia) where all possible modes of accommodation show as unwork4ble:· Here applies the separation of antagonisms, very much a recommended solution where groups are territorially concentrated and histori­ cally distinct. However, there is rarely a regime that will not fight against this type of solution. There are also many cases when the assumption that partition will lead toward a more homogeneous state proves wrong because the vast majority . of secessionist regions are ethnically pluralistic. The international community in most cases questions partition because of the fear that it can destabilise a much larger region or serve as an example (chain reaction) for other dissatisfied ethnic groups in the area ,. Some also fear that the previous state will some time in future try to revanche to the parting side and thus create even a larger and more critical international problem. The prospect of independence may be threatening to many due to the historically verifiable fact that some of the ethnic group(s) within the partitioning region may side with the central government and against their new and more local authority. · Governmental responses to ethnic conflicts and in general to the challenges posed by ethnonationalisms have been quite varied. We have listed simply a few · of the major alternatives. Some insist on favoring the policy of either hard or soft assimilation or are pursuing a policy of group autonomy. Some of them are even combining assimilation and autonomy hoping thus to achieve the immediate stability of inter-ethnic relations and a possible merger in the future. If the inunediate goal of the government is assimilation, the dominant ethnic group is imposed as a model for all (the Hans in China, Castilians in Spain and sin1ilar attempts in the past and today in Yugoslavia). The next step in this directio~ might be enforced population transfers, the outlawing of the use of languages and other vital symbols of ethnic survival and identity. On the other side; political autonomy can approximate actual independence only if the loosest type of . political relationship is established between the central and peripheral authori­ ties. As the case of Soviet Union proves, ostensibly confederal and federal · political structures can be largely a facade for the domination of the mightiest and numerically greatest national group (Russians). In some cases cultural autonomy with its pragmatic "hands off' policy toward cultural and symbolic rights of a minority nation offers much more than in the aforementioned case (for example in the millet system of the Ottoman Empire). Despite the great variety in approaches and techniques to reduce inter-ethnic cataclysms, one hardly shares optin1ism that the vast complex of etlu1onationalism can. be managed . or accommodated within the exist~1g political structures and values. The depth of etlu1ic cleavages is much more profound than are other cleavages, based upon religion, social class and thus not susceptible to Madisonian concepts of the balancing of cross-cutting interests under the rubric of cultural pluralism. Contemporary sociological literatvre lists many other and additional reasons for rather pessin1istic forecasts as far as the future of ethnonationalism is concerned. Intergroup contracts are at le~st as apt to increase discord as t11ey are to foster mutual understanding, and already a quick review of ethnopolitical history and what we see before our eyes today ~trongly suggests that discord is the more likely.· Cultural autonomy is e:x.'tremely difficult to implement in the era of advances ih the state-wide and interstate communications and transportation facilities which significantly diminish·the opportunity for cultural isolation. The seemingly inevitable, uneven economic development of ethnic regions triggers animosities among both th 1 e benefitted groups (Basques, Croats, Slovenes) and the unfavored ones (Slovaks, the Irish nationalists (Cathqlics) of Northern Ireland). Even the progeny of ethnically mixed marriages do not necessarily 67 68 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR .. . exhibit less radical national consciousness than do either of their parents - they often exhibit more. Growing manifestations of ethnic dissonance in the world and as well growing elusiveness of a viable solutions led Singapore's President Lee Kuan Yew to thefollowingthought: "I used to believe that when Singaporeans (he had in mind bitter relations between Malay and Chinese, RR) become more sophisticated, with higher standards of education, these problems would dimin­ ish. But watching Belfast, Brussels, and Montreal rioting over religion and language, I wonder whether such phenomena can ever disappear". LITERATURE: P. Alter, Nationalismus, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1985. B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso, London 1983. W. Connor, "The politics of Ethnonationalism " ,Journal oflnternational Affairs, vol. 27, no. 1, 1973, pp. 1-21. E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1983. A. Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, University of California Press, Los Angeles 1985 D.L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, 1985. J. Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, Cambridge University Press, Cam­ bridge and New York 1990. R. Rizman, "Etnie e Stato post-moderno", La Battana 93-94, Fiume 1989, pp. 52-57]. Rothschild, Ethnopolitics-A Conceptual Framework, Columbia University Press, New York 1981. · A.O. Smith, National Identity, Penguin Books, London 1991. P.L van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon, Elsevier 1981. Wilfried Graf Reflestions Concerning a Typology of the New Nationalistns in Yugoslavia and South-Eastern Europe The modernization processes which have been taking place in Eastern Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe since ~989 have exacerbated collective and individual identity conflicts, frequently in coru:iection with problems of an ethno­ linguistic, national-cultural and religious nature. At present, it is difficult to assess the consequences. On the one hand, they are dramatizations of what appear to be collective, "pre-modern" identity conflicts of nationalities or peripheral regions which were suppressed by administrative and violent means for too long - this applies particularly to regions with poorly developed and, in some cases, pre-industrial structures and cultures, such as the Caucasus and the Kosovo. On the other hand, they are "post-modern" identity conflicts characterized by the individualism and consumerism of more developed and privileged social strata and geographical regions or the radical sections of a new "intelligentsia", and the generally" impatient" youriger generations e. g. of Slovenia and the Baltics. These "poles" of historical and cultural identities create polarization in some conflicts and facilitate coalition-building mothers. They also reflect the different historical experiences of "(Eastern) Central Europe" on the one hand and "(South)-Eastern Europe" on the other. Any reductionist approaches operating with sweeping concepts such as "(post)-Stalinism" or . "(neo)-nationalism" will be of no use; indeed, they will only pave the way for new labels and stereotypic interpreta­ tions. Today Central Europe is above all an area dominated by political imagination and historical memories , generating regressive collective myths, although perhaps also some forward-looking collective fantasies. In a socio-political sense, the term Eastern Central Europe mainly refers to the "rebellious" reformist 69 70 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... countries in the 11 west" of Eastern Europe, i.e. Poland, The CSFR, and Hungary. "The so~io-political nature of this Central Europe is militantly anti-communist or refonn-communist and multi-national rather than internationaL It is a Europe of nations, not a s. upra-national Europe". 1 Historically speaking, Eastern Central Europe refers to the "Central Europe of Versailles" extendin~ from Germany to Russia and including parts of t):le Baltic states and the South-Eastern European Carpathian and Balkan states. On more latent, historically deeper socio-cultural levels it refers to the Eastern, Slavic-Hungarian "Danubian Central Europe", and · to the Polish, Czechoslovakian and Hungarian urban cultures within the tradi­ tions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, above all, tho'se of Budapest, Prague, Kracow and indeed also Ljubljana. These cities developed their national and political identitie~ in the process of their struggle for differentiation, separation and liberation from the Habsburg Empire, although their political in1agination continues to bear the mark of Habsburg Central Europeanism. When this process of finding a national-cultural identity was brought to a halt by the military and structural violence of "Sovietization" after 1945, these countries developed various methods of resistance or adaptation in the form of Reform Communism, ~adical democracy, or by bureaucratic and technocratic means. However, there also arose a longing for that imaginary Central Europe; and this has become considerably stronger in recent years. Along with Austria and northern Italy, it was above all those Eastern Central European countries which felt themselves being driven east by Sovi~tization, that the new importance attached to "Mitteleuropa", originated. This longing for the status quo ante reflects, on the one hand, the actual experience of decades of alienation and powerlessness, and of regional conflicts which seemed to be insoluable within,the framework of the geopolitical "constraints" of a bipolar security policy; and it indicates that there has always been this notion of (or even fascination with) the possibility of violent uprisings. On the other hand, there is a revival of long-standing nationalist and deeply-rooted Euro-centrist stereotypes of an "undeveloped" and "uncivilized" Eastern Ewopa (i.e. mainly Russia) and South-Eastern Europe (the Balkans). These areas have been (and are) frequently regarded as essentially ahistorical and oriental or Asian in character, and their historical ties to Europe denied. In geographical terms, South.,.Eastem Europe includes Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and the European part of Turkey. Hun­ gary can be viewed as a link between the historical-cultural division into Eastern Central . Europe (the Danubian Central Europe) and South-Eastern Europe (the Balkan states), not least because of the issues concerning the Hungarians living in neighboring countries, above all in Romania. In a more. latent, historically deeper, cultural se:nse: South-Eastern Europe refers to those states whose 1 E.Jahn, Zur Debatte uber ''Mitteleuropa" in den we;tlichen Staaten. In: Dialo-g 15, pp. 40-50 TYPOLOGY OF TI-!E NEW NAT70NALISMS national identity derived from the process of their struggle for differentiation, separation and liberation from the Ottoman Empire rather than the Habsburg Empire, as in the case of Eastern Central Europe. The political inlagination of' these countries remains therefore characterized by orientalism rather than Central Europeanism. Nevertheless, traditions of Habsburg (Danubian) Central Europe can be discerned in the Balkan states (Transylvania in Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, and Voivodina inYugoslavia). · Withip the cultural conglomeration of Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Europe represents an area with a particularly pronounced cultural and ethnic diversity, harboring major nationalities without "nations". In Eastern and especially in South-Eastern Europe, the way in which states were historically forme9 gener­ ally did npt produce linguistically homogeneous nations. In this region, violence ;rnd counter-violence between the Versailles and Yalta systems have created more unresolved national problems, violent conflicts and attempts at resolution than anywhere else. The results of the Second War also failed to bring about _largely homogeneous national states. The forced economic integration of the "cathing-up" development strategies before and after the war did not succeed in the long run in creating a common western-type national consciousness amc:mg 1 etlmic communities; they were modelled on development processes that took . several centuries in the central capitalist countries of Western Europe. The Romanian Magyars, the Bulgarian Turks, the Yugoslav Albanians are all ' so-called "minorities" - although, since the term "minority 11 is probl, ematic, we shall speak of nationalities instead - numbering between one and t~o .millions, each with its respective "mother countryil. The 2 - 3.5 'n1illion Magyars living in Hungary's neighboring countries make them the largest nationality of Europe, while the Albanians, 35 % of whom live abroad, represent the largest divided nation in Europe. At present, states iri.creasingly complain a.bout the oppression of their nationalities in neighboringcountries - for various reasons of domestic social policy or for reasons of opportunism in foreign or security policy - while the nationalities' efforts for more autonomy and/or clos~r ties to the "mother country" are gathering momentum. Any territorial dain1S along nationalistic lines could trigger off regional crises reaching beyond South-Eastern Europe. If attempts to the re-establish a lasting peace in Yugoslavia fail, there is a real danger of these nationalities being once again drawn into a Balkan war. Stalfuism, Titoism and the National Factor One of the ·aims of the uquilding of socionalism" in Eastern Europe was to overcome the painful experience of the nationalist policies of the inter-war period, although the spell of Stalinist power politics was present from the very 71 72 YUGOSLA1'1A, WAR. ,. outset. In 1947, the collapse of the Allies' post-war cooperation following introduction of the Marshall plan and the severing of relations between Stalin and Tito - largely due to the plans of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to form a Balkan Federation - provided a motive for the exclusion and oppression of all non­ Communist forces, as well as all "nationalists" and Titoists within the Communist parties. The forced "Sovietization" which then followed put a violent and to the eastern European peoples' searches for identities. It ran into manifold structural and cultural obstacles and eventually triggered off the revolts in the GDR (1953) ·and Poland (1956) and led to the military crushing of the popular uprising in Hungary in 1956. As opposed to this, the period of "de .. Stalinization" which began under Krushchev in 1956, and particularly the schisms concerning ideology, security, development and reform which occured in the World Communist Movement after 1961 (once the non-recognition of national and cultural identities within the Socialist camp had led to the severing of relations with Chma) led the post­ Stalinist bureaucracies to accommodate the national factor in various ways. From ·the late 1960 s onwards, increased socio-economic, socio-cultural and military vulnerability required specific forms of bureaucratic policies OI). nationality, such as partial identification processes and partisanship in historical identity conflicts - policies that later revived conventional inter-state conflicts among Socialist / states. In this bureaucratic partial identification with the "national factor" in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, two main ideal types of policy could be identified: - a bureaucratic Socialist state-nation policy (the myth of those identitydramas of "Central Europe" which tended more tow_ ards the.state-nation of "Versailles" or the "Danube Monarchy") ill the countries of Eastern· Centra.1 Europe (Poland, CSFR, Hungary), and a bureaucratic Socialist culture-nation policy (the myth of cultural-national and ethno-national. identity dramas, mainly in opposition to the Ottoman Empi.ve) in the Socialist Balkan sates (Romania, Bulgaria). By contrast, the Yugoslav model led to an early separation from tl;ie "Socialist camp 11 ; for a long time this model of an a-national state ideology in a multi­ national state represented an alternative to the a-national Stalinist state.As in the Soviet Union, however, its collapse is causing the cultural nationalism which had . previously been in a latent state break out with all the more force. The different ways in which the power elites deal with national identity can explained by the development of the contradictions in the post-Stalinist political economy. Stalin's Sovietization of the. eastern European peoples' democracies implied a gradual embracing of the Soviet development model of "socialism in TYPOLOGY OF THE NEW NATJONAllSMS one country", which was primarily based on heavy industry and collectivization. The autocentrist tendencies of this type of economic development was in · - . contradiction to the hegemonic dependence on the USSR within the Socialist camp. In the long term, this contradiction had to be solved in one way or another by the Eastern European countries. In the Eastern Central European countries - the GDR, Poland, and the CSFR, which were located at the center of Soviet power and security interests, and where historical, national and cultural experiences with western and central European ideas, models and institutions eroded the loyalty to the Soviet system and produced frictions within these societies, solving this contradiction meant primarily that the self-centred national economies were adjusted to the systems of "socialist division of labour" and "limited sovereignty" in the course of the- - Stalinization. By contrast, the problems of smaller nationalities remained latent and, excepting the Magyar nationalities, did not lead to any international controver­ sies between neighbouring Eastern _ European states. It was above allthe human rights movement and the opposition that wanted to develop and radicalize national and cultural identities and initiate a policy of national independence. However, in these countries, bureaucratic national policies were also linked to providing formerly persecuted Communist elites with an access to power and aimed at compensating the system' s deficit in ideology and legitimation created by the military suppression of loyalty crises within these societies (Hungary 1956, CSFR 1968, Poland 1980/81). In addition to the bureaucratic national policies from "above", there emerged an authentic, emancipatory, but often also ambivalent and backward-looking longing for sovereignization from "below", for the return of suppressed regional and national identity models on a historical-cultural level. Nourished by memo­ ries of the "civil" society before "Sovietization", this phenomenon was further strengthened by bureaucratic policies and was more pronounced (or perhaps only earlier?) than in Western Europe. For example, the Solidarnosc movement soon began to romantidze prewar Polish nationalism. The peoples in the undeveloped Balkan states of South-Eastern Europe at the periphery of the sphere of Soviet influence had no contact with Western Europe. That could have made a lasting impression. Problems of loyalty to the system of etatism were less pronounced, the civilizing influence of the Christian Ortodox church and Islam was stronger than that of the Roman Catholic church, and there was continuing political oppression and material need as well as national resistance to Turkish rule. All this meant that the solution of the contradiction was µsually an adjustment of state policies to the requirements of a more self- 73 74 _ _ ______ _,__!11!1"""" ____________________ ___ ____ ·· - YUGOSLAVIA, WAR .. . centred.national economy (Senghaas). Large nationalities were subject to partly repressive policies of assimilation aimed at subordinating them to the myth of an ideologically and administratively promoted "national culture", thus adding to the usual subordination to party centralism. Given South-Eastern Europe's great nationality problems, lack of a national­ bourgeois "civil society" and location at the periphery of the Soviet sphere of influence, it was surely no coincidence that when the "Socialist camp" became more heterogeneous, this lead to "national Communism" there, whereas in Eastern Central Europe "national identity" developed into a latent "Reform Communism". In recent years, a tendency towards traditional ethno-nationalistic and inter-: state conflict patterns became manifest in the Romanian-Hungarian conflict about the Magyars in Romania, the Bulgarian-Turkish conflict about the Turks in Bulgaria and the intra~Yugoslav and Yugoslav-Albanian conflicts about the Albanians in Yugoslavia, particularly Kosovo. Different Types of Nationalism in the Post-Tito Period In the search for a solution of the crises of bureaucratic socialism in Yugoslavia the Slovenes, and to some extent also the Croats, represent the "spearhead" of modernization occupying the position of a periphery that is relatively privileged vis-a-vis the centralist federal state, and seeking to consolidate their special status as "Central European" and westward-looking. The standard of living in Slovenia is twice the Yugoslav average. It was there that the willingness to reform and develop a democratic public has been most advanced. In this way, an historical national identity, frequently religious and anti-modern in the past, functions as a strategic resource for the process of modernization, and increasingly takes on the characteristic of a centrifugal nationalism. In the contrast to this, the Serbs are located at the opposite, bureaucratic­ centralist pole: on the one-hand, the history of the Serbs as the dominant nation in the interwarperiod, as well as during the antifascist liberation struggle, made it seem as if equality with its "brother nations" within the socialist multinational state was a withdrawal of privileges. On the other hand, the Serbs seek to compensate their present, economically peripheral position vis-a-vis the more developed northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia by emphasiZing their historical identification with the center and the centralist interests of the federal state and the army. There is also the fear of further loss of pri.vileges that could 7YPOLOGY OF lliE NEW NAT10NAIJSMS result from the regional separation of their own periphery, the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Voivodina. It is for this reason that the Serbian leadership has fought for strengthening of the central federal authorities, the annulment of the decentralization of the 197 4 constitution, limitations on the consensus principle in fundamental issues, and the political unification ~f Serbia by nullifying the autonomy of the Kosovo and Voivodina provinces. In a memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences of November 1987, the decentraliZation laid down in the 1974 constitution is even evaluated as estab- lishing a "Croatian-Slovenian dictate over Serbia". . Within this Slovenian-Serbian conflict, Kosovo Albanians represent a third · position: the position of a periphery within the periphery. Their "emancipating" nationalism is aimed at compensating their historical lack of identity, their loyalty to the Albanian mother country, and their unequal development and unsuccess­ ful modernization. They want to overcome their underprivileged status, escape from the economically and culturally incoherent pressure for modernization being applied by federal or Serbian centralism, leave the Serbian Republic, membership t~ which they perceive as art_ ificial, and develop their own regional identity, and also their relations with the "motherland". While the Slavic ilations have all been trying to slow down. the Albanian struggle for emancipation ever since 1981 by means of the inunanent amendment to the constitution, the Albanians themselves at last see an opportunity to establish themselves as i republic like those of the Slavic nations. In the present economic circumstances in Yugoslavia - with great differences in development and an all but complete economic isolation for the individual republic - an independent republic is seen by many of the young elite as a prerequisite for catching up with more developed regions. Albanians are also · struggling for independerit economic development and not only for an etlmi­ cally pure Kosov.-0; or the right to special relations or indeed unification with the neighboring "motherland". However, there is also the dramatization of their fear that the balance of power between the Slavic nations might tilt towards the Serbs, a fear that stems from their historical experience of Serbian assimilation policies even as late as the 1960s. The violent suppression of the revolts, the imposition of state of emergency and draconian court sentence· s passed on, activists, most of vyhom are still young, amounted to a profound humiliati~n of an entire, accentuated by fact that their collective identity remains embedded in pre-national and, in part, even in tribal cultural traditions. Many Serbs by now rightly fear the re-emergence of the historical ambitions of Kosovo Albanians to re-unite with Albania, which were once skilfully 75 76 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR .. . exploited by Fascism and National Socialism. It is neither the simple structural "constraints" of modernization policies, nor the creation of a mythical status for cultural reminiscences that have caused nationality conflicts to flare up; both of these are only being used as traditional and symbolic means of expression by the political elites at a tinie when the integration force of modern ideologies has failed to produce the ·desired effect. Behind this, one can detect political power interests, familial group processes and psychological factors. The economic crisis has increased the fear of the individual states and republics that they will be left standing in the cold, particularly in view of the developments in western and eastern Europe. However, what has triggered off nationalistically oriented action is the final collapse of the system of bureaucratic Socialism both as an ideology and as a political system. This system of govern­ ment, usually centered around powerful personalities, had a consistent, widely accepted ideology which defined its goals and political strategies and, above all, provided the ~litical cultures of south-eastern Europe with quasi charismatic leaders that were either widely accepted or else feared. Ethno-nationalism, therefore, is being used by the Communist leaders of the republics and au­ tonompus provinces in order to compensate for the degeneration or loss ideology and to create political loyalty and legitimation. The production of nationalist guidelines for politiqal action seems to have a different function now to the one that it had during the interwar period. Nationalism is no longer simply the driving force behind a generally anti-modern, agrarian policy aimed at delaying or stopping time and history, nor is it simply a vehicle of modernization. Instead, it seems that it is something like a "postmodern" relapse, a bloodily staged simulation. Nationalist policies and rhetoric no longer promote homoge- · neity and integration;-they seek to compensate the collapse of an outdated ideology and its politics. ' The war in Yugoslavia cannot be explained either as a civil war or as a conflict betweeri nationalities; instead, it should be viewed as a complex war about new state-building, centered arom1d ethno-political and socio-economic lines of conflict. Neither can it be understood simply as a war between Croatia and Serbia, because the Croatian Serbs play a part of their own: while the Croatian nationalists struggle against Serbian post-Titoist centralism, the Serbs of Croatia fight Croatian neo-fascism. Again, it is not "Stalinism", "Titoism 11 , or new "nation­ alism11 that is causing the multinational Yugoslav state to disintegrate, but mutual autisms and self-fulfilling prophecies. Muhamed Filipovic Conditions and Circum.stances of Peace Keeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina According to judgments of most observers and analysts of the politic~! situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the possibility of conflict in that country 1s ever increasing. That judgment is based on the following facts: t. Democratic govenunent in Bosnia and Herzegovina that came into power after the elections in November of 1990, did not manage to stabilize any of the aspects of political, economic and general situation in the country. Moreover, all aspects of iimer relations and conditions Have e_ normously worsen, and espe- · cially relations between various nations. 2. The formula of three-party-rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina is founded on the theory of three constitutiv~ peoples ,and their right to establish ethnically founded power on the territories where they represent majority, proved co~­ trary to the expectations. It did not lead ~o the appeasement an~ de~rease.111 tension. The appetites of the representatives of the so-called people s parties only grew, and their rule became the main source of conflict , escalations and rivalry. Dissolution tendencies and processes sprung out of it, :"h~ch is refle~ted in implemented division of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the pnnc1ple of nation­ ally domiI1atiI1g territories which are being shap~d as ethnical states thus producing the tendency oflegalizatioh of such division in the for~ of request f~r canto-nization and confederalization of Bosnia and Herzegovma o~ ethnic principle. 3. Due to the given political situation, the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not function as an undivided political and administr~tive body. Thus it is paralyzed and it does not realize its power on the whole ternt~ry of Bosnia and l-I erze govina. One third of its territory is exempt from the authority of the Bosnia and Herzegovina government, while on one part its power is 77 78 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR reduced to minimum. This process is intensified by the fact that the Presidency itself became, in this situation and contrary to the constitutional rights, a parallel center of the executive power in relation to the government. The Home Office (Ministry of Inner Affairs) also functions as an independent political subject, beyond influence and control of the government. All this contributes to increase 1. in illegal actions, strengthens particular interests and stimulates dissolution ·processes which are threatening the territorial unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, unity of power and legality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 4. Divided ethnic groups lead by national parties armed their followers on the criterion of paramilitary formations in order to strengthen its own positions in the fight for power and control over territories. Thus separatism and illegal actions are ever increasing, being supported by the" real armed force beyond the control of legal organs of the government producing additional tensions and menacing by the excalation of conflicts. 5. Yielding attitude of the Presidency and goverrunent of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the ambitions of Yugoslav army to concentrate its troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina for fights in Croatia lead to the enom10us concentra­ tion of men and weapons of Yygoslav army in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 5 corpses of Yugoslav army, each with three divisions, two separate grupations of army and three strong air formations are concentrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina. ~osnian territory is occupied by Yugoslav army troops on the scheme of possible division of Bosnian and Herzegovinian territory between Serbia and Croatia, so it is obvious that Yugoslav army has political and not defensive function here. Since Yugoslav army has identified itself with the policy of Serbia, S.lobodan Milosevic and incomplete Presidency of Yugoslavia, it does not have a role of the conu11on army and it functions a part fonn the will and intentions of Presidency, Parliament and goverrunent of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and apart from the will and interests of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yugoslav anny became a source of permanent conflicts, tensions and illegal actions, which is reflected in forced mobilizations and persecutions of those who refuse to be mobilized. 6. The situation and relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina are worsened by the aspirations of Serbia and Croatia, expressed on niany occasions in numerous ways to solve Serbocroatian conflict by division of Bosnia. Such division would, according to the intentions of its protagonists, be a chance to correct the boundaries between Serbia and Croatia a~d complete the uniting of Serbian and Croatian people within ethnic countries. Bosnian Muslims are viewed .as reli­ gious group which makes a part of a total Serbian or Croat ethnic corpus. This tendency is· getting stronger not only outside Bosnia and Herzegqvina, i.e. in Croatia and Serbia, but also within Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is expressed in negotiations and requests for transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order . CONDITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF PEACE KEEPING IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA to secure the particularities of Serbian and Croatian ethnic territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 7. Even though Bosnia and Herzegovina was a genuine historical creation, a country that originated the 1 Oth century and existed as sovereign and independ­ ent country until the mid 15th century, keeping its territorial integrity and political identity through Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian period, recently it became a battle-field of Serbian and Croatian nationalism. Ev~rything that happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina was coru1ected or under the influence of Serbia and Croatia. The present war between Serbia and Croatia, especially the fact that Yugoslav army is involved in the war and is executing its operations from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina is seriously involving this country in warfare threatening to make this land a battle-field. Furthermore, there is a real danger that this conflict which could not be resolved on the territory of Croatia, gets transferred to be resolved in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 8. Finally, one of the elements which implicitly and independently on the will of today's forces in power in Bosnia and Herzegovina can lead to the conflict is a lack of a clear strategy of the development of democratic life in Bosnia and Herzegovina and aims conunon _ to all democratic forces in this area. For example, Mr. IzetbegoviC, whose party is in power in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has changed six different concepts on solution of Bosnian and Herzegovinian and Yugoslav crisis. He s~rted with the idea of Federation, correcting it by requesting that Federation gets transformed with the,needs of the tin1e, express­ ing it by the notion of "rational federation", suggesting afterwards "stair" federation, the idea that Bosnia and Herzegovina enters into federal relation with Serbia and Monte Negro, while with Croatia and Slovenia it would h~ve a confederal relation. After thathe proposed a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, only to replace it by total ip.dependence, and in the meantime he also put forward a concept of a loose link between former republics of Yugosl;via. All these concepts he transformed into an official policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina without the consent of his partners from the coalition which lead to doubts, tensions, mistrust, and in the end, open conflicts. This produced confusion in the view of intentions of the governing parties, and on the other hand these ain1s were beyond range of real political practice. Thus the gap between the govern­ ment goals and practical possibilities of its realization became deeper. and deeper. The above-mentioned situation is full of tensions and threats which could lead to grave conflicts. All elements are ready for the conflict: the unsurmountable gap in political concept sand aims, concentration of manpower and weapons which could be used in reaching the goals in a viol~nt way. Moreover, there is no policy nor mechanisms which could enable an efficient removal of this danger. Only a policy of consensus and coordination of all forces involved within the plan of peaceful action could remove the threats of conflicts 79 80 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR .. . in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mere maintenance of status quo expressed through the policy of "let us avoid the war" with persistence of all other negative elements cannot prevent the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such a state is favourable for the negative elements. In addition to that, the economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is on verge of collapse, menacing with social riots and hunger. These riots were always the basis for violent leftist or rightist adventures, and that situation is acute in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina produces only 160/oof food necessary for its population. Since its industry is not functioning, there are no funds, no exchange, Bosnia and Herzegovina is blocked from all sides, except via Zvornik with Belgrade, it is clear to what extent is Bosnia and Herzegovina dependent on the will of Croatian and Serbian government. Peacemaking actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina are very complex requiring great attention, clear policy and energy in realization .. The foundation of this action must be a clear request of international community towards Yugoslav army, Serbia, Croatia and Monte Negro in the view of territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and peace in this country. Another h1oment of this policy would be a maximum of awareness of the real situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by European and international factors. The third moment would be the active role of the international factors in securing the main routes between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the world and in urgent and large humanitarian help to the people of this country. Finally, it would be of utmost in1portance for the international public to respect all the factors of the political relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ones in power and the ones in opposition, and to help the negotiations in_ constitutional identity and relations within Bosnia and Herzegovina and betw~en Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries of former YJgoslavia. Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Yugoslavia cannot be maintained -if only poiitical 'ideas and practice of the forces in power are recognized, for they are responsible for the present state of affairs. For a permanent peace and opening of the perspectives of political solution it is necessary to mak~ a communication between the government and the opposi­ tion, so that the real political opinion, and not the one originated under pressure, could become a basis for creating a realistic image and realistic policy in this area. The international factor became the prime factor in resolving the total crisis in our country. Therefore it is of vital importance that this factor sees the real causes and solutions to the crisis. It would be wrong to agree to temporary solutions. If extorted ideas and solutions caused by war become permanent and internation­ ally recognized, the area of former Yugoslavia will once again ~ecome a crisis ·area. Therefore it is important to look for the permanent solutions on the basis \ of wide consultations of all relevant political, cultural and other factors which are active on this territory. Part 3: Conflict Resolution Hania M. Fedorowicz The Yugoslav Case: What Can Conflict and Dispute Resolution Models Offer?*. Introduction Social conflicts of a nationalist, ethnic, religious, economic or resource nature are a major potential source of insecurity in a post-Yalta, post-bipolar Europe. 1 Legal and constitutional measures, however, are not enough to guarantee a democratic and pluralist Europe. Social awareness of broadly shared democratic 83 values and norms and the evolution of a civil society are a necessary complement to a political transition to democracy, The key to the expansion of fledgling . civil societies in post-conununist countries is the development of informal as well as institutionalized procedures for conununicating and negotiating about differences. Such procedures are a prerequisite for deescalatuig, managing and resolving both loc:al disputes and · broader social-political conflicts and as such present an essential tool . for learning to live w~th pluralism. Historian Drago Roksandic has noted that "the meaning of democracy is certainly also the assurance of the possibility of living with differences - from the differences between individuals upwards" 2 . RoksandiC characterizes this soci:;il • The author wishes to acknowledge the use of the library and kind bibliographic assistance of Susan Connell and Vesna KnezeviC at the Canadian Institute for International · Peace and Security. 1 . See conclusions of Times Mirror Center poll regarding Central European attitudes towards ethnic minorities and discussion in Stephen s. Rosenfeld, II Western Europe Owes th~ East a Family Reunion", International Her~/d Tribune (hereon IHI) October 19-20, · 1991, p. 8. . 2 Interview with Drago Roksandic, Falter40 and 41/91 . 84 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR .. . challenge in post-communist countries as a project of "modernization", that is, a catching up with or reintegration of values developed in western Europe during the ,enlightenment and embodied in modern liberal democracies. He fails to note, however, that "modernity" and the limitations inherent in representative democracy are bemg questioned in the west. As one advocate of alternative dispute resolution (AD R) put it, the legislative and judicial institutions of liberal, representative democracy are unable to regulate public life in other· than adversarial ways: "our existing system ... must change in order to continue to serve us ... we are each responsible to play a part in a solution which empowers individuals to deal with conflict constructively 113 • Indeed, the role of civil society is being reconsidered. · Thus a discontinuity emerges between eastern efforts to "catch up 11 ·with a process which is itself in the west at a new point of departure. The repeated failure of western European efforts to create a "Yugoslav" solution underscore the fact that the Yugoslav war is a microcosm oflarger historical processes taking place in the whole of Europe both east and west, whose outcome will determine the future shape of Europe 4 • In the view of this paper, the "east" must seek its own way to what could be called a challenged modernity, based on universal values of the enlightenment, while also drawing assistance ornourishment from citizens' efforts to problematize and rethink democracy "from below 115 • . . . The democratic modern state plays a fundamental role in the settling of disputes and the enactment of justice, both domestically and internationally. A necessary component, however, in the building and renewal of a post-bipolar democratic world is the roie played by self-organised citizens, in spreading new political and social values and methods of co-operative or creative disputing, which have evolved in the last twenty years ou~ of an ethnic of peace, "authentic 3 Gregory D. Kells, 11 A Common Objective' in a Tribute to Conflict Resolution Day of Ottawa-Carleton, edited by J.M. Tannis, Captus Press, York University, 1990, p. 2. 4 Joscha Schmiere.r, 11 Ein Drama mit offenem Ende, lmjugos/awischen Konflikt ist 'Europa' nicht mehr Tribune, sondern Schauplat:i', Der Standard. (OS) 9/ 10. November 1991, s . 31. 5 Hania M. Fedorowicz, East-west Dialogue: Detente from Below, Peace Research Reviews, vol. XI, n. 6, Peace Research Institute-Dundas, June 1991. A combined analysis of democratization in post-communist countries and in 11 real existing 11 democracies can be found in the-work of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly. See News Bulletin, n. 1 and ff, 1991. l • "coNFLICT AND DISPUTE RESOLUITON MODELS . ·. pluralism 116 • humanism, and personal empowerment. At both state and citizen . levels of action, a historic turn towards non-violent and further, non-coercive, : methods can be observed. Conventional means of settling disputes, like litigation or arbitration, operate on the assumption of a "fixed-pie" or winlose outcome. Gains made by the one , · side entail a commensurate loss by the other side, and thus often require ; .. · ' c oercion or the threat of force to impose a s~lution. Traditional political methods of conflict resolution between states, insofar as they define international conflict as objectively perceived conflicts of scarcity and us~ power tactics to manage them (i.e. with threat or the withholding of benefits), often end in a self-defeating spiral of stalemates/ escalations or un­ solved, protracted conflicts. Solutions often tend to favour those with greater political clout or legally recognized rights, thus leaving some parties to the conflict dissatisfied and likely to revive the conflict at some future point7. In contrast, alternative, inter-active, problem-solving, consensus-building or win-win approaches see conflict as a shared problem to be solved by the face­ to-face participation of the parties to the dispute or conflict, with or without the · assistance of an impartial or neutral third party. All of these approaches focus on the relationship or communicative basis of the dispute or conflict and assume an outcome of mutual (not necessarily the same) benefit. Using this form of logic, my success (peace, security, power) depends on the success of the other side and not on their loss or insecurity. Alternative approaches display an interest to enhance democratic practice, to provide people with more choices and with the possibility of directly participat­ ing in the processes which shape their lives. The development of options for mutual gain leads to jointly determiried outcomes which are more likely to be . considered legitimate. It must be sfressed that a view to co-operation does not presuppose avoiding disagreement, but rather seeks outcomes which will satisfy one's own interests without destroying the other party. Such practices, produce· better outcomes than power bargaining or imposed solutions, in that they seek greater satisfaction of underlying needs and/ or short 6 Douglas Wurtele and Ken Melchin, 11 Conflict resolution: a new field of study' in This Week a( Carleton, Carleton University, July 13, 1989, vol. 10, n . 20, p. 4. 7 RonaldJ. Fisher, 11 Third Party Consultation, A Problem-solving Approach for De­ esca/ating International Conflict', in Towards a World of Peace, People Create Alterna­ tives, edited by Jeannette P. Maas and RobertA.C. Stewart, Th~ University ofthe-5outh Pacific, Suva, Fiji, 1986, pp. 18-32. 85 86 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... and long-term interests for both sides. They are also more efficient than con­ ventional procedures such as litigation and usually take much less time, wiser (fact-finding through collaborative inquiry),fair(according to the process cre­ ated by the disputants and by virtue of values held in common, i.e. belonging to the community, which disputants seek to uncover) and ultimately more stable, inasmuch as they are based on realistic 'expectations and feasible goals 8 . Above all, by separating the substantive issues of the conflict from the relational/ communicative basis of the resolution process, procedures for talking about differences can be developed which improve or possibly even heal shattered or adversarial relationships, which are at the source of all conflicts, but also provide the entry for change or healing 9 . Limits to liberal, representative democracy and its ability to deal equitably with disputes between competing levels of government jurisdiction, business, citizens' groups and other interests, have propelled the search over the last two decades for new means of achieving consensus 10 . The rational spirit of modernity and . its implicit drive to domination has produced European-derived cultures addicted to wirrning. Coupled with a competitive theory of evolution, modem thinking . has considered conflict, violence and the survival of the fittest as "natural". However, new studies in ecology and the social sciences have noted a relation between co-operative evolutionary principles in biological systems and co-operative ·strategies in human history 11 • 8 Criteria of a good negotiate doutcome developed by Roger Fisher and William Ury with Bruce Patton, editor, Getting to Yes, Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, Business Books, London 1981. German edition, Das Harvard-Konzept, Sach-gerecht verhandeln-erfolgreich verhandeln, Campus Verlag, 1984. 9 The terms "conflict" and "dispute" are often used intercp.angeable. In thi.5 paper, ''conflict" refers to deep-rooted, complex or systemic social-political disagreements, while "dispute" refers to a single-instance, local or limited disagreement. Roger F_ isher, Scott K. Brown, Getting Together, Building Relationships As We Negotiate, Penguin Books, 1989. In German, Cute Beziehungen. Die Kunst der Konjliktvenneidung, Konjliktloesung und Kooperation" Campus Verlag, 1989. 10 Lawrence Susskind andJeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse, Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes, Basic.Books, New York, 1987. See especially pp. 35-79. . 11 Wurtele and Melchin (footnote 6). CONFLICT AND DISPUTE RESOLUllON MODELS The need to rethink democracy and the cultural, not natural, basi~ of conflict, ' brings together people, "sharing a common urge that the world be made safe for diversity" 12 • Differences, whether objective or subjective, are not the source of conflict; rather a cultural predisposition to fight over differences has prevented the seeking of discursive means and procedures to manage, settle or fundamentally 1 reconcile differences in building consensus and accepting pluralism. Emerging inter-disciplinary theory and practice This paperdoes not aim to provide an integrated overview of a subject which is characterized by tremendous diversity in terminology and perspectives and has emerged as the confluence of many social and political trends: ' One important impetus is to be found in the American law reforms of the seventies and the work of professors at Harvard Law School to develop "mutually respectful problem-solving" with applications in family, neighbour­ hood, intra-institutional, consumer, enviromnental, inter-governmental and even international conflicts. ' The field of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has evolved in the legal and social-psychological professions, with extensive applications in the educational and corporate sectors. Over two dozen uses of third parties have been identified to assist in the process of non-litigated dispute settlement, containment or management, as an adjunct range of procedures alongside the American court system 13 Diverse organizations have been formed in the U.S., such as the National Institute for Conflict Resolution, the National Association for Mediation in Education, the National Institute for Citizen Participation and Negotiation (NICPAN), the Children's Creative Response to Conflict Program, as well as 12 "Proclamation" in Alternative Dispute Resolution That Works, by E.G. Tannis, Captus Press, York Univ., 1989, p. 140. 13 "Origins of ADR' in Tannis (footnote 14), pp. 7-22 and p. 29, 44, 68. 87 88 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... numerous neighbourhood justice centres or professional dispute resolution consultant firms, to name but a few 14 • More recently, efforts have begun to set up a unitary professional field, dispute systems design 1 s. In the corporate sector, AD R is increasingly recognised as a necessary part of management and organizational development and as a cheaper, less time­ consuming way to settle claims with customers, for instance in the insurance or tourism businesses. Consensus-building approaches to negotiation are a successful tool for solving intractable, multi-party public disputes, which involve confrontation over policy-making, setting of standards or allocation of public resources 1 6. Consensus-building approaches also lead to solutions which are more satisfying for all parties than is the case with partisan lobbying and court action and has been directly or indirectly utilized in policy development at all three levels of jurisdiction. · · In Canada, where a number of neighbourhood, commercial and legal/ consultant initiatives have developed in the last ten years, some ADR enthusiasts note that the introduction of ADR has been less explosive in "a society ... mor. e inclined to negotiate and co-operate than to fight" 17 . This brief glimpse should serve to give a sense of the broad range of practices which have by no means developed in a linear way. Theyar· e part of a social trend to change existing social patterns of behaviour as well as belief systems about how to deal with conflict. In addition to professional input, another key stimulus· has been the ethical impulse arising out of various inter-related forms of social activism such as social justice (anti-discrimination, anti-systemic violence), peace (anti~nuclearism, anti-militarism) social faith (particularly originating with Quaker and Mennonite coillinuriities, but also Christian ecumenism), ecology, local or participatory 14 See Directory, AppendixF in Tannis (footnote 14), pp. 145-150) and "Resources for Conflict Resolution Education", CICR. 15 Tony Shllons, "Practitioners of a New Profession? AD iscussion Summary of the First Dispute Systems Design Conference" in NegotiationJoumal vol. 5, n. 4, October 1989. 16 Susskind and Cruikshank (footnote 10), introduction. 17 Mr. Justice Allen M. Linden, "In Praise of Settlement: The Need for Co-operation", Canadian Community Law Journal, vol. 7, n. 1, 1984, quoted in Tarinis (footnote 14), p. 124. CONFLICT AND DISPUTE RESOLUllON MODELS · democracy and minority rights (especially native North Americans, cultural ·minorities and gay rights) 18 • . The ethical impulse raises the value of participation over paternalism, plural- , · •\ ., ism over conformity and holds that individuals (particularly non-experts) as well · · · as the communities to which they belong (in other words, non-state institutions) have a pivotal role to play in both local and global peace and justice and in the functioning of democratic societies. The corollary is that peace is not the absence · of violence, but a positive condition which is actively created by both agencies . of the state and by citizens themselves. In turn, democracy is seen less as solely the delegation of decision-making to periodically chosen representatives, as it is the building of consensus, the cornerstone of democracy so to speak. Consensus is seen as a self-renewing process spanning the tension.between agreement and difference, between the constitutional order of the state and the pluralist diversity of its citizens. While conflict resolution as a field of academic study has existed for ap­ proximately three decades, early approaches tended to assume competitive over co-operative solutions 19 • It was pointed out by pioneers such as Anatol Rapport that expectations about adversity may unnecessarily limit the range of alterna­ tives available to conflicting parties. Recent· win-win approaches which see conflict resolution in terms of a process of negotiation, emphasize either interest­ based distributive negotiatio'ns involving trade-offs or need-based integrative negotiations, joint problem-solving and attention to underlying needs, or a mixture of both 20 • Approximately eight American.universities carry inter-disciplinary programs dedicated to conflict resolution and/ or negotiation. In Canada, the Inter-univer­ sity Consortium on Dispute Resolution has recently been formE:d 21 • 18 I am indebted forthe first three examples of the "ethical" stream to an interviewwith Gerald Pottery, executive director, Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution, ( CI CR) July 19, 1991. For background on second three examples see Susskind and Cruikshank (footnote 12), pp. 249-253. 19 For breakdown of the fields of conflict ~esolution, international negotiation, game theoretical approaches and third party roles, see Conflict Resolution and Negotiation, Studies in International Relations: A Bibliography, compiled by Stev'en P. Douville, Michael Pearson, Bradley Feasey, ed. by Vivian Cummins, Bibliography Series, 8, ·Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1986. ' 20 John H. Sigler, "Intro." Bibliography (footnote 21) p.v. 21 Director is Prof. Brian Mandell, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa. 89 90 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR .. . It has been noted that how one deals with difference is rooted in culture and in one's belief system 22 . Attempts to export ADR or other techniques for dealing with conflict without concern for their cultural boundedness may hinder local "ownersh_ ip". In 1990, conflict resolution training was extended into eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, with the Center on Applied Conflictology being founded in Moscow and the Centre on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution created at the University of Warsaw. Raymond Shonholtz, president of San Francisco-based NI CP AN, sees negotiating models and collaborative problem-solving processes as a new way of "promoting citizen dialogue" during a period of rapid social, political and economic change in post-Communist countries. Some of the first trainees have included educators, trade unionists and others considered to be key players in the processes of shaping democracy, including members of social movements. Plans for training programs are underlay in Hungary and Bulgaria. The European Civic Centre for Conflict Resolution has .been founded in Su botica in Voivodina 23 • A variety of techniques may be implemented to solve what appear to be very specific, even temporary disputes, such as may arise in schoolyards or neigh­ bourhoods, as well as to address deep-rooted, systemic conflicts such as inter­ ethnic strife or racial discrimination, which require expert intervention. All cases reflect a broader social and political challenge: to affirm non-adversarial discur­ sive ways of dealing with difference and co-operative consensus-building as a legitimate part of our post-Cold War democratic culture. The Yugoslav Case The recognition by the international community that the Yugoslav union will not hold in its hitherto existing constitutional form, indeed, that no federal 22 Neal Milner and Vicki Shook, 11 Thinking About Inter-disciplinary Inquiry On Culture and Disputing", in Negotiation Journal, vol. 5, n . 2, April, 1989, pp. 133-147. 23 Raymond Shonholtz, "Teaching Conflict Resolution in Poland and the Soviet Union", U.S. Institute of Peace Journal, III (3) August 1990, p. 67; "Conflict Resolution in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe", U.S. loPJ, III (4) October, 1990, p. 13; HCA News Bulletin, n . 3 winter, 1992, p . 9. \ . . (; ·-....: .· ~· ' CONFLICT AND DISPUTE RESOLUllON MODELS institution is any longer functional, has been a long time in coming 24 • Indeed, the view that the war is a symptom of the dissolution of the Yugoslav state, rather than its cause has come to prevail. Historical resentments, political manipulation and instrumentalization of the desire for self-determination, nationalist self-pity and self-aggrandizement and a profound disrespect for minority and civic rights both within and across republican borders have led to a spiral of violence and vengeance which at times escapes rational understanding. It is not the intention of this paper to explain the origins of the conflict. To determine which conflict resolution method might be of relevance, however, some highlights of the conflict need to be outlined. Many players in the multiple sets of dyadic conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia display a fatalisti\_3cceptance of military conflict, and violence and force as the arbiters of right. The new Croatian defence minister ~aid last August of the impending battle: "We have been waiting for this moment for eight centuries" 25 . Yet the broader significance of the war on Slovenian and Croatian territory which threatens to spread to other republics and other peoples, must also be noted: "it is a war which puts in doubt not only some recognition or other of national rights, not only the principles of self-determination, sovereignty and territorial identity, but all fundamental human values 11 26 • As the conflict between Serbs and Croats first escalated into protracted fighting, suggestions were made for adjudication procedures in order to settle the dispute over sovereignty and territory without arms. One early proposal by · Robert Badinter, head of the French constitutional court, saw the creation of a new European court 27 . Another suggestiqn, first introduced by Austrian Foreign 24 Compare reactions in June ("The ·U.S. and the European Community .. . will not support the breakup of Yugoslavia ... 11 in Flora Lewis, 11 Europe should prevent Civil War in Yugoslavia'~ IHT, Jw1e 1, 1991) and mid-October, when the EC attempted to broker a plan to transform the Yugoslav state into six independent republics ina common economic space, the first western recognition that Yu~oslavia's dissolution was W1avoidable, "Konjliktparteien ordneten zum zelmtenmal Waffenruhe an", Salzburger Nachrichten, (SN) 19. Okt. '91, p. 4. 25 Blaine Harde~, "Croatia and Serbia: Good Guys vs. Bad Guys, but Who's Who?' IHT, JW1e 19, 1991, p. 6 and William Ffaff, "foland is Providing a Lesson in Forgiving the Unforgettable", IH,T, October 10, 1991, p. 6. 26 Roksandic (footnote 2). -27 William Ffaff, 11 Settle the Yugoslav Dispute in an International Court'; IHT, July 3, 1991. 91 92 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR .. . Minister Alois Mock, saw the creation of a mediating commission of "wise persons" made up of eminent people experienced in statecraft, perhaps con­ vened by the CSCE 28 . However, any court's role is limited to interpreting the law and cannot resolve deep-seated psycho-social disagreements between the opposed sides. In addi­ tion, not all "stakeholders" in the conflict may be part of international, legal procedures. Some 18 disparate militias carry arms in Croatia, putting the lie to western assumptions about verticality of command structures 2 9. Furthermore, the Serbo-Croatian conflict is only the tip of the iceberg. As Ervin Hladnik MilharCic has noted there is no single all-Yugoslav conflict. All conflicts are primarily of a local nature despite the attempt by political elites to construct themes part of overarching national struggles 3 ~ . Thus many more talks in addi­ tion to high-level government talks between republican and/or federal leaders must be instituted, to reach aU local stakeholders. This point could perhaps be met by the second suggestion, a body of eminent ex-politicians whowould "listen to all sides". However, inclusivityof stakeholders is by itself insufficient. Unless attention is paid to the dynamics of the relationship between the disputants, quite apart from the substantive issues, negotiations will be unable to go beyond staking out the polarized and uncompromising positions which have already been articulated and which aim for unacceptable conces­ sions or capitulation of the other side. Statements such as "we will fight, - regardless of the cost, and we will win", or "the holding of the cease-fire will depend on the other side'' 31 exemplify win-lose, scar~ity assumptions. Given such a constellation, the use of outside coerciv~ force to "settle" the conflict, that is, to impose in outcome, is inevitable and inevitably unstable. Any such imposed settlement, even if sanctioned by international law, inasmuch as it addresses only surface ~ymptoms of the conflict, as in the respective positions 28 "]ugoslawien-Vermittler UdSSR', DS, 5 16 Okt. 1991, p. 3. 29 Vlastajalusic', "Es gab nie wirkliche Multikulturalitaet'~ Der Kranich, Dezember, 1991, pp. 11-14. 30 Quoted in TomazMastnak, "]ugosla'wien-ein Sammelbegri.ff fuer Konflikte" inAlpe Adria, Informationsblatt der Alpe-Adria Friedensbewegung, .h. 4 Herbst 1991, pp. 9-10. 31 Croatian foreign minister Separovic, echoing opinion of "man-the-street", in "Die , Kroatenfuehlen sich van der ganzen Welt in Stich gelassen", SN, 21. Sept. 1991, p. 4. Federal deputy defence minister Negovanovic in" Das Eroberte steht nich zur Diskussion" in SN, 19. Sept. 1991, p. 4. CONFLICT AND D!Sf!UTE RESOLU770N MODELS and interests of the sides involved, would leave out some festering resentment or unaddressed needs, i.e. the underlying subjective sources of the conflict. Given the unsuccessful record ofEC and UN attempts to mediate in the fighting in Yugoslavia, the question must be posed: how to sequence outside interven­ tion to: a) stop the fighting and b) assist the development of workingrelationship(s) between political elites which will allow the warring sides to perceive negotia­ tion not as defeat but as a viable option? However, working on the relationship at the highest level, is not enough. Even a cursory look at recent events suggests that the military conflict over territory and sovereignty between the Serbs and the Croats is embedded in a larger, historical conflict. As one Serb justified military action: "we must first have justic. e for the crimes the Croatians committed against us in the (Second World) War 1132 • Reports of wanton violence and revenge on both sides suggest a situation which fits Deutsch's model of a malignant social process; i.e. an anarchic social situation with no regard for the welfare of the other side, irreconcilable compe­ tition and hostility, cognitive rigidity including stereotypes which are not matched by reality, self-fulfilling prophecies, vicious, escalating spirals and a gamesmanship orientation or abstract conflict over images of power 33 . While many Croats do not feel responsible-for "Tudjman's" war and are reluctant to put on the shirt of Croatian extreme nationalism (mirrored by similar responses among Serbs to "Milosevic's" war), others take up the nationalist parsing of the situation. Fuelling the war is the destructive form of nationalist group identity fanned by political leaders on both sides. Gyorgy Konrad describes the nationalist atmos:­ phere as a kind of deja vu of the passions of the Second World War: "What is now being played out is not politics, but a vendetta all over again" 34 . 32 William pfaff (footnote 27). 33 "Deutsch 's Social Psychological .Approach" adapted from M. Deutsch, "The Pre­ vention of World War Ill· A Psychological. Perspective" (1983) in Ronald J .Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly, "T6ward a Contingency AjJproach to Third-Party Intervention in Regional Conflict", Managing Regional Conflict: Regimes and Third-party Mediators, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security Working Paper, n. 12, May 1988, PP· 47, s o-i. 34 Gyoergy Konrad quoted in Alpe/Adria 4191, p. 11. 93 94 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... According to needs theory, the need for identity is considered to be the first and most fundamental need 35 . While basically a positive force, it can also seek negative satisfaction by escalating conflict given certain external conditions. In I • order to interrelate positively in the social and also international context, each group must receive the necessary recognition and experience the security necessary to support its unique identity. ~ Nationalism, according to social psychologists 36 , is thus the distortion of the legitimate need for group identity and the normal tendency to see one's own group in a favourable way, into a competitive evaluatiori of one's own group as unique and superior to others. Thus etlmocentrism compensates for a threat­ ened group identity by in group glorification and selective solidarity, re­ enforced by negative attitudes towards other groups. In situations where the conflict evolves over time or escalates (see Glasl's four stages of conflict escalation)3 7 , the image or perception of the other moves from respect and accuracy to stereotype to attribution o'f evil to disqualification of the other as inhuman. In such a polarized relationship, dominated by a total lack of communication and the impulse to attack or hurt the other, negotiation itself may be perceived with a sense of danger. Consider Kelman's analysis of the decades­ old conflict between Israelis and Palestinians: "the psychological essence of the conflict is a zero-sum clash between two nationalist movements each struggling for national identity and existence a· nd making claims on the same territory"3 8 . The parallels with the relationship between those Serbs and Croats who are at war are obvious. In the Yugosla_ v context, Tudjman and MiloseviC are partly fannil:)g the fires of nationalism and partly responding to the public mood. The margin of people in all republics who resist the pressure of interpreting the conflict along ethnic lines of "us" vs. "them" and who see the need to enlarge the. space for citizens' anti-war activities in a common, though not necessarily identical, democratic struggle, is preciously slim. 35 Ronald]. Fisher, "Needs Theory, Social Identity and an Eclectic Model of Conflict', Conflict: Human Needs Theory, ed. by John Burton, St. Martin' s Press New York, pp. 89- 112. 36 R.J. Fisher, "Prenegotiationproblem-solving discussions: enhancing the potential for successful negotiation", International Journal, Qj), XLIV spring 1989, p. 452. 37 See Fisher and Keashley (footnote 35), pp. 48, 54 and Loraleigh Keashly and Ronald J. Fisher, "Towards a contingency approach to third party intervention in regional conflict: A Cyprus illustr:(Jtion'~ I], XLV spring 1990, p. 435. 38 Summarized in Keashly and Fisher (footn'ote 39), p. 460. .CONFLICT AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION MODELS Facilitative conditions can be created for inter-group contact to reduce prejudice and hatred, i.e. to de-escalate conflict. The problem-solving workshop developed for international conflicts (Fisher following Burton, Doob, Cohen and Kelman) 39 in order to influence political decision-makers can only be a partial 'initiative. As authors of this approach all agree, the key question is how to transfer the perceptual and other positive effects experienced by the partici­ pants of the problem-solving workshop to the broader social relationship. Kelman, Fisher and others largely operate out of a conventional paradigm of international relations which concentrates on processes engaging politicians, diplomatic officials and "influentials". Thus they have concentrated on transfer­ ring these effects to foreign policy decision-makers and have designed the workshops and selected "influentials" with this impact in mind. I would argue that a complementary tack must be taken to attempt to transfer these effects, especially the improvement of the inter-ethnic relationship, onto the public at large. In an open society where freedom of information and the press is guarantied, it would be relatively easy to select problem-solving workshop participants, such as journalists, scholars, writers, artists, who play a role in forming public opinion. In societies where nationalist conflict intersects with an interrupted or halting process of democratization, press freedom has been severely curtailed 40 • A sensitive selection of opinion-forming representa­ tives engaged in anti-war activities could strengthen the mdependent, demo- cratic forces of civil society4 1 . · What is urgently needed is skill-training which will empower ordinary citizens to integrate discursive, non-adversarial conflict resolution into their daily lives. 39 Fisher (footnote 9). 40 For restrictions against journalists and press on both sides: "News aus dem Lautsprecher", OS, 20. Sept. 1991 and "Kroatien: journalisten sprechen von 'Mediensaeuberung 41 , OS, 22. Okt. 1991. See also" Warby,forand on the media'~ Yugofax, n. 3, 21. Sept: 1991. For role of media in conflict resolution and training of "CR journalists" see "The media as mediator" in The Australian Conflict Resolution Network news, vol. 18, April 1991, p. l. . 41 Substantive disagreements between Yugoslav participants at the Schlaining meeting (Nov. 13-17, 1991) at times suggested ethnic partisanship was getting in the way of rational argument. Lacking a psycho-social framework for reflecting on these dynamics, the meeting ignored them. Such frictions suggest, however, that intellectuals cannot merely dismiss the question of nationalism as irrational. It is uncanny how nationalist claims creep in thrqugh the back door the more one denies them. Third-party consultation could accommodate the need of intellectuals to reflect on their national bias in a safe context. For insight into what many intellectuals fear see ~lavenka DrakuliC, "The Smothering Pull of Nationhood', Yugofax, October 31, 1991, p. 3. 95 96 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... Fisher's social-psychological model has also been used to create facilitative conditions for inter-group contact in a multi-ethnic, majority/minority situa­ tion42. A comprehensive programme should be considered for those regions where no amount of constitutional or border "fixing" will alter the fact that diverse cultural or religious groups must live side by side. Based on socio­ psychological principles, activities stressing intercultural dialogue, action re­ search projects and the creation oflocal joint-committees, could help each group maintain and strengthen its own identity, autonomy and security, while reducing ignorance and prejudice on all sides and promoting inter-relationship and collaboration on matters of common concern. However, conflict resolution measures at the inter~oup level will not have a lasting effect without changes at the policy level. Intercultural understanding, as Fisher points out, also requires comprehensive and integrated policies of bi­ or multi-lingualism and bi-or multi-culturalism, inter-cultural education and training programs to encourage the development of a multicultural society founded on integration (acceptance) and equality anchored in constitutionally recognized rights. The advantage of Fis. er's eclectic model of third-party consultation derives from its concentration on the s1,1bjective, underlying causes of conflict with a view to improving the relationship between the parties and preparing them for functional co-operation 43 • A limitation to this approach is that it requires the involvement of trained, specialized social scientists/practitioners. They must be adequately funded to accompany an extended programme of workshops and a range of supplementary activities, including recruiting and training. The institu­ tionalization of interactive conflict resoluti~n for use in international corlflicts must be urgently addressed 44 . Given the extensive requirements of the social- psychological approach, other activities should also be considered, utilizing a complementary but distinct methodology which can be learned in relatively short training workshops by non-specialists. In contrast to approaches which focus on the relational, subjec­ tive aspects of conflict, ·these methods concentrate on the substantive, objective, interest based aspect,s of conflict (without disregarding the former). Some form 42 Fisher (footnote 37), p. 94-100. 43 Fisher (footnote 38), p, 447. 44 Ronald). Fisher, "Developing the Field of Interactive Conflict Resolution: Issues in Training, Funding and Institutionalization", paper for International Society of Political Psychology, Jul, 1991. CONFLICTNVD DISPUTE RESOLUllON MODELS of AD R, consensus-building, principled negotiation or peer mediation, could be taught on a community basis by experienced mediators and negotiation practi­ tioners. · Models popularized by the "Getting to Yes" approach of the Harvard Project on Negotiation, which highlights unassisted negotiation, as well as forms of assi~ted negotiation which emphasize community peacemaking would be appropriate 45 . Some of these approaches will be briefly outlined' in the next section. A corollary to this effort would be the introduction of conflict resolution skills curriculum and peer mediation training into schools, if the heritage of hatred, distrust, violence and revenge is to be replaced with a culture of co-operation and enhanced self-esteem 46 . Finally, the issue of cross-cultural transfer of knowledge should be raised. Some highlights follow of conflict resolution training on the Mohawk Akwesasne ReserVe in May, 1990. Their experience has shown that no amount of well­ intentioned outside meddling can be effective, unless the process of conflict resolution is "fully owned" by the people who engage in it and who are ultimately to benefit from it. Matching the Conflict to a Process 47 1. A Social-psychological Approach From the brief analysis of the Yugoslav case given, it would appear that the complexities and diversity of conflicts in Yugoslavia require approaches which are flexible, have potential for profound social healing or integration, address social needs quite apart from interests and are based in an articulated ethos of 45 See Jennifer E. Beer, Peacemaking in your Neighborhood: Reflections on an fuperiment in Community Mediation, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1986; M. Scott Peck, The Different Drum-Community Making and Peace, Touchstone, New York, 1987; Christopher C. Mitchell, Peacemaking and the consultant's role, Nicholas, New York, ' 1981. ' 46 For example, workshop entitled "Classroom Management and cultural diversity" recommended by CICR. 47 Matching a dispute to a process was first set out by Frank E. A. Sander in "Varieties of Dispute Processing"(l976), cited in Tarinis (footnote 14), p. 44. 97 - 98 WGOSLAV7A, WAR .. . democratization. The third party consultation approach developed by R 'onald Fisher meets all three requirements 48 . Fisher. constructs his scientific inquiry -within the broader philosophy of humanism, which stresses participatory democracy, democratization of institu­ tions and individual freedom with responsibility in realizing one's full potential 49 • In a recent comprehensive volume on the social psychology of intergroup and international conflict 50 , Fisher presents a new paradigm for linking theory development· and empirical research in natural settings: the social scientist/ practitioner. His obj~ctive is to explicate high intensity, protracted conflicts and to present methods of tbird-party intervention which can facilitate their resolu­ tion. A key to Fisher's "eclectic model of conflict" is the interaction of variables at multiple levels of analysis: individual-level var~ables (perceptions, attitudes, cognition), group-level variables (norms, identity, cohesion) and the inter­ group level (communication, interaction, cultural distance). The conte:x.1. for inter-group conflict may be organizational, communal, societal or international. The model is dynamic, identifying when these variables gain prominence (antecedents, orientations, processes, outcomes) and stresses the process rather than the content of conflict. Fisher's model further provides ten inter-group, five . group and five individual "principles or laws of interaction" 51 . Using Fisher's eclectic model of conflict, Keashly and Fisher have developed the contingency approach to third-party intervention, according to which the analysis of the symptoms, sources and stages of escalation of the conflict provide a rationale for the type and sequencing of intervention required 52 . States of low­ intensity conflict, according to this approach, are amenable to traditional forms of dispute management, such as negotiation, mediation or ·arbitration, which emphasize objective or substantive. aspects of conflict. _ 48 Fisher (footnote 9). Space does not permit listing all of Fisher's publications since 1972, beginning with" Third party consultation: A method for the study and resolution of conflict"~ Journal of Coriflict Resolution, 1~, pp. 67-94. 49 Fisher (footnote 37), p. 90. 50 R.J. Fisher, The Socia/ Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict ResO­ lution, Springer Verlag, N.Y., 1990. 51 Fisher (footnote 37), p. 103. 52 Keashly and Fisher (footnote 39}. I . ';_ .. CONFLICT AND DISPUTE RES0Ll!I10N MODELS High-intensity conflicts consist of threats to fundamental needs which are not met by interest-based settlements. Third-party consultation broadens the range of experiences which are open to analysis, including an analysis of underlying social needs. This form of intervention concentrates on controlling the process of interaction, rather-than controlling the contents or outcome. Third-party consultation ain1S to: a) transform attitudes in the direction of mutual positive motivation for problem-solving, b) increase ope1mess and accuracy of communication, and c) improve the relationship as a prerequisite for de-escalating the conflict to the point where the substantive issues of the · conflict can be addressed by traditional dispute management 53 . Using the contingency approach to third . party interven\ion, · Keashly and Fisher have analyzed the evolution of the Cyprus conflict and the history of outside interventions which included third-party consultation workshops on several occasions 54 . They match historical events against Glasl's conflict escala~ tion sequence: debate, polarization, segregation, destruction. Each stage is typified by changes in four dimensions: interaction, images/ perceptions of the other, main issue, possible outcome. One of the reasons for "failure" of third party intervention in the Cyprus case was that its application was inappropriate 99 to the stage of escalation in which it was attempted. From the model, it is evident that attempts to negotiate substantive issues cannot be effective at the fourth stage, when communication between the parties­ is non-existent, national images have eroded to non-human form and the relationship is characterized by hopeles~ness . This is confirmed by a~ analysis of the protracted Cyprus conflict. While other hurdles also impeded a resolution of the Cyprus conflict, a "lack of co-ordination and sequencing of third party efforts combined with the under-utilisation of consultation may have rendered a whole host of efforts impotent". Ke;:ishly and Fisher further suggest that intervention based on the interests of outside powers, instead of on an analysis of the conflict, was not only unsuccessful but possibly contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Applied to the Serbo-Croatian case, which by all accounts has reached the stage of destruction, it is not difficult to assess why attempts to mediate negotiations have been unsuccessful. At the fourth level of conflict escalation the nature of communication is too distorted, commitment to the relationship i~ lacking, and belief in joint possible gain is replaced by a tendency to think that 53 Ibid., p. 439. / 54 Keashly and Fisher (footnote 39). Quote at pp. 452-3. 100 YUGOSLA V7A, WAR .. . there can be no winner and that survival must be defended at the cost of the opponent's destruction. Working from Fisher et al. models, the primary aim at the moment should be to de-escalate the conflict back down through the stages of escalation, beginning with a power intervention to separate the warring sides and to control the violence. This step could be followed by arbitration if acceptable to the parties , or mediation with muscle, i.e., a mediator with the power to influence the parties by providing rewards or inducing costs. The outcome of such interventions is a temporary settlement to control hostility long enough to undertake consultation in order to establish functional co-operation and to pave the way for negotiations on substantive issues. - Third-party consultation is seen as crucial to re-establishing communication, improving the relationship and reaching a commitment to joint problem-solving. Onlythen can the parties to the conflict productively begin to identify the key issues. Strategies such as negotiation, are dependent on this stage. The third-party refrains from offering solutions to the conflict, but rather assists the parties in jointly identifying the key issues and possible solutions themselves. Given what is known about complex, intense and intractable conflicts, of which some main lines have been given here, failure to actively sequence and co-ordinate third party interventions can have disastrous and long-term conse­ quences. 2. "We Can Work itOut" - the Community Approach The promise of personal empowerment and enhancement of justice has lead to the popular spread of basic dispute resolution concepts and skills (ADR) in North America. By ADR, I mean non-adversarial, discursive means and proce­ dures for resolving disputes (as opposed to conflicts), including both unassisted and assisted forms of negotiation, conciliation, mediation or simply peacemak­ ing. The approach popularized by Roger Fisher and William Ury in Getting to Ye5 is particularly useful in the community and neighbourhood setting. The text is a classic which is required reading in· ADR training and forms the basis for applications in diverse settings, wherever people want to handle their differ­ ences discursively rather than with force, while seeking mutual gain. Without presenting the method in detail, I would like to suggest some of its _ advantages, appropriate contexts for application, as well as some limitati~. . · ~ · ._ .. - v'N' \Ns1rrt1 - . ; 1~Q; _ __ _ \. 1u b1l • " a . ' - . ·-~ ; CONFLICT AND DISP[ffE RESOLUflON MODELS Principled negotiation presupposes a communicative or discursive commit­ ment, regardless of the distribution of power as defined by social standing, affluence or political influence. For Fisher and Ury, negotiation "is back-and­ forth:communication designed to teach agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed" 55 . Haggling over the price of antique furniture, discussions to avert a workers strike or arguments between landlords and tenants are all circumscribed by a commitment to talk. Since this competence lies within the reach of every person above the age of 3 or 4, it has potentially universal application. ·Key notions in this method include the separation of the people from the problem, treating the latter as a shared task which both sides address side-by­ side. Secondly, the separation of the process or negotiation procedures from the substantive issues to be discussed, allows for an articulation of the process itself, an essential task in so far as social or cultural differences affect each party's communicative competence. Identifying the process allows it to be altered or improved, even unilaterally. Developing options for mutual gain is the essence of principled negotiation. A win-win posture which concentrates on satisfying the broader intere5ts of both sides rather than on splitting the difference between their entrenched positions or "bottom line" is perhaps culturally the most challenging idea of principled negotiation. It assumes that non-adversarial postures can release the creative inventiveness necessary to bridge, resolve, combine, but not compromise, apparent differences. Interests here are defined very broadly to include needs, concerns, fears and hopes. In looking beyond positions, both sides may discover some interests which are shared or compatible in addition to those which are opposed. Deciding the issues on their merits, that is, according to some objective standard of fairness or justice which both sides subscribe to, not only settles the dispute but allows both sides to leave the negotiation with their relationship intact, while building community at the same time. In appealing to standards independent of the will of either side, principled negotiation serves to uncover and affirm what we hold in common as members of the same neighbourhood, 55 Fisher and Ury (footnote 10), p. xi. 101 102 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... region, country or planet, that is, the "overarching framew~rk of shared values" 56 . Broadening the context within which we define the common good is a key. element. Principled negotiation implies a theory of conununication which holds that the source of conflict is not an objective reality per se as much as it is in the way we think and talk about our differences. The communicative basis of principled negotiation aims to allow each side to . see the problem as the other sees it. Due to factors which can impede or constrain conununication between the sides, outside mediators are sometilnes required to control the dialogue, slow down its pace, encourage active listening, exchange roles or restate intended meanings. Different approaches to mediation very the extent to which the mediator controls the process, the content and even the outcome. The elaboration of Fisher and Ury's basic method by Fisher and Brown in Getting Togethe1~ focuses on the relational aspects of negotiation captured with the term, "a working relationship". The latter requires: rationality, understand­ ing, communicativeness, trust, persuasion and existential acceptance. Relation­ ships in which these qualities are developed ~e better able, it is argued, to deal with disagreement. At the same time, a method is provided for improving the relationship through unilateral action or unconditional constructivity. Principled negotiation and rdationship-building, while compatible with the use of a neutral third party, build upon unassisted negotiation. They are thus useful in community settings by providing a general model for the non-expert. The methods are presented in accessible, colloquial language and integrate common sense notions in a popular psychology. I Versions of this negotiation strategy for mutual gain have been adapted for children of all ages, as young as kindergarten level. The teaching of affirmation, co-operation, communication and peaceful resolution of conflict, especially in multi-ethnic communities, represents a cultural shift of values 57 • Several limitations affect the application of principled negotiation and derived ADR approaches in Yugoslavia. These approaches assume a cultµre of talking 56 For "framework of shared value. s" and the concept of cultural democracy see J.J. Smolicz, Who is an Australicm?, Identity, Core Values and Resilience of Culture, Univ. of Adelaide, Multicultural Education <:oordinating Committee, July 1989. 57 Elmwood area school Conflict Resolution Project, objective no. 8: "to prepare students better for life in a multicultural world by emphasizing listening to others' point of view and the peaceful resolution of differences" in Common Ground, vol. 1, n. 2 (spring) 1 1991, p. 10, published by CICR. . , CONFLICT AND DISPl}TE RESOLUllON MODELS out disagreements, a predisposition to discursive contention. As the Beatles , once sang: "life is very short, and there is no time for fussing and fighting my friend ... we can work it out". They assume relationships which are clearly ., demarcated by a specific .context: the merchant and buyer, the boss and employee; the divorcing couple, the hijacker and the police. A situation ~uch as . civil war, where the "sides" are less clearly defined, is more difficult. Part of the task faced by nationalist forces in the Yugoslav conflict is to convi,nce the population to "line up" on either one side or the other. War propaganda plays a particularly vital role in this regard. AD Ra pplied in multi-ethnic neighbourhoods could help uncover the conunon standard of fairness and justice which qnce allowed these conununities to live peacefully side-by-side. ADR assumes that interests (needs, concerns, hopes) can be articulated. What if these are contradictory or unknown? Separate procedures are needed for uncovering interests. In the case of negotiations between representatives of organizations, intra-group communication and consensus-building procedures are required for authorized representation during negotiations, as well as to ensure that the community is not left behind in the educational and transformative process which takes place during negotiations. In cases where a neutral third party is required, problems arise in cultural settings where neutrality is viewed with suspicion. Mediators who enjoy the trust of all parties or carry undisputed moral authority may be preferable, even if they are not neutral. These problems may not apply in limited settings such as neighbourhoods or · communities. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that no single method of ADR, principled negotiation or plan for a working relationship will work for everybody. In this field, eclecticism may be of great advantage. 3. Conflict resolution at the Mohawk Akwesasne Reserve In May of 1990, the G:anadian Institute for Conflict Resolution (CICR) was asked to assist the 10,000 member Mohawk community of Akwesasne in finding alternative~ to the prevailing method of settling disputes, which was to call in the police 58 • 58 "Summary of the Report to ~he Mohawk Council of Akwesasne Concerning a f!eacemaking Process'~ CICR, Sept. 12, 1990. · 104 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... Two consultants from the CICR 59 arrived along with dozens of other people, many of them expert professionals in conflict resolution. In the end, the experts were sent away and the CICR self-acknowledged "dedicated amateurs" re­ mained as process consultants or conveners. Central to their "success" was · sensitivity to the question of "ownership" or legitimacy of the process in the . eyes of the community. First and foremost, this involved setting up a process perceived as independent of any entrenched interests at the reserve, which ~ould in rum set up the process of conflict resolution to be operated and used by the community. This two stage-procedure was called "a process to set up a process". Together with the community's spiritual elders, the one institution invested with unchallenged respect, the conveners designed a process for peacemaking, which retrieved traditional native values rooted in non-violence and embedded -in the ancestral Great Law of Peace_ of the Iroquois Confederacy. Community ownership would not have been possible if the conveners did not "hook up" with native traditions. Interestingly, these values lay dormant, even if they had fallen into disuse after centuries of colonization and dispossession and more recent crises of identity in the community. In contrast to other experts, the CICR conveners did not arrive with precon­ ceived notions, but rather worked to develop credibility by offering to create a process together with the community, indeed to" grow" into it together. Likewise ownership within the native community could not be imposed from the top. Continuous efforts were made to avoid marginalization, to seek balance and . acceptance by all, even by extreme "factions". It is difficult to assess what "model" of conflict resolution was adopted in this community. One convener called it a "model which is not a model", more like an eclectic framework of options whose elements could be adapted by the community: Sken,.nen-kowa, or an "organization for peace" was the name given to a new community service, including native mediators trained in 2-3 day courses. The process of adaptation of conflict resolution methods, such as mediation or consultation, had much in common with translation or mapping of certain notions onto the native experience. "Spirirual healing" or "reconciliation" might be a more pertinent way of contextualizing these processes'in native culture 60 . 59 Interview with Gerald Pottery (footnote 18). \ 60 Interview with Prof. Brian Mandell, October 1, 1991. CONFLICT AND DISPUTE RESOLUflON MODELS The question of community ownership and acceptance is a fragile one. The need for time so that such a process can be fully integrated by the community was emphasized over and over, bearing in mind that "not all people are at the same stage of readiness for the process". By one estimate, it could take 10-20 years for the peacemaking process to be fully owned by.the community. The CICR conveners resisted the temptation to be regarded as "experts" (so describeq by natives) who are distinguished by their professional status or formal certification. Approaching those who need assistance from this perspec­ tive induces permanent dependency, possibly jeopardizing the goal of commu­ nity ownership. Conflict resolution, as one nonvenor emphasized, is easy. "Anyone can do it". The Akwesasne example not only illustrates the many factors affecting community ownership of Ar>R and related methods. It also suggests that 11 pre­ modern11 societies cannot hope to live peacefully with pluralism simply by applying social, political or judicial structures fashioned · according to liberal democratic principles. Democracy, irisofar as it means not only a political practice but the day-to-day experience of "living with difference", requires a cultural shift towards authentic pluralism. Dialogue-enhancing, d~pute-resolv­ ing techniques can empower ordinary citizens non-violently, while the consti­ tutional and legal infrastructure of representative democracy evolves. Conclusion A brief overview of conflict and dispute resolution from a North American perspective has be~n given, in particular as it offers a possibility for rethinking the cultural and social foundations of democracy. 'Recognizing the diversity of alternative approaches, two models for applica­ tion in complementary settings in the Yugoslav case are discussed. The Ronald Fisher et al. social-psychological contingency approach to third-party consulta­ tion would be appropriate at the political or diplomatic level for decision-makers and influentials, as well as for opinion-leaders within civil society. A precondi­ tion is an end to the fighting, which according to theories of conflict escalation will not occur without outside peacekeeping intervention. The Roger Fisher et al. method of principle negotiation and relatiortship­ building is appropriate to community-based efforts at loc:_al dispute resolution. / .:·; 105 106 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... One form of application might be in the post-war reconstruction period when multi-ethnic neighbourhoods seek means of healing. Probiems connected with cross-cultural transf erente of conflict and dispute resolution methods, especially the importance of community ownership, have · been discussed in the third case. One of the most eloquent spokesman for living peacefully with difference is the Polish politician, editor and moralist Adam Miehnik. On the occasion of receiving the Shofar award, in April, 1991, he said: "I accept this award as one of those who are for a tolerant state, a state in which there is room for many cultures, many different personal histories, and many points of view. I am for a country that will create a stable democracy; for an <;>pen society that will be able to protect itself against the invasion of barbaric hatred ... I speak for a therapy that will emerge from the effort to understand the disease. Such therapy, a permanent therapy, is what all countries need t6day" 61 . In reflecting on how to achieve such a goal in Yugoslavia, we may also consider how far our own societies have yet to travel. 61 Adam Michnik, "Poland and the Jews'~ The New York Review of Books, vol. 38, n . 10, ~ay 30, 1991, pp. 11-12. Paula Gutlove Psychology and Conflict- Resolution: Toward a New Diploinacy Protracted, violent conflicts rooted in etlmic; religious, racial, cultural or ideological . differences beset the world and appear immune to traditional atte~pts at resolution. Such ethno-national enmity is complex and derives fr~m the interaction of psychological, economic and cultural forces. Psychiatrist John Mack has described these forc_ es as including "individual and group fear and hostility (which are often intin1ately related); competition over scarce resOl,irces (or resources which appear to ~e limited); the need of individuals to identify with a larger group or cause that gives their lives transcendent meaning; a human tendency to externalize responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions; and a peculiar susceptibility, more dangerous and easily exploited in this age of mass communications, to being manipulated emotionally by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. 111 '--. Unresolved ethnic and sectarian conflict may surge to the surface when authoritarian or totalitarian re.gimes dissolve. Such is the case in Yugoslavia, which held together peacefully under the authoritarian rule of Tito. Conflict now / · rends the fabric of life within Yugoslavia, with ramifications felt beyond its borders. Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek of the Netherlands (host of Sep~ember 's European Community peace conference) has asserted that the: Yugoslavian crisis not only threatens the security of the Balkan region but that of Europe as a whole. Moreover, the struggles being waged in Yugoslavia may foreshadow ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the disintegrating Soviet Union and elsewhere. As we see in Yugoslavia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, deeply ingrained belief systems are extremely resistant to attempted change by politi~al leaders · . 1 Mack,J. E. 0990). "The Enemy System", In Volkan, Julius and Montville (Eds.), The Psychodynamics of International Relationships. Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass. 107 I . 108 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... especially if beliefs are reinforced by intense feelings of victimhood by the parties involved. The bitter conflict in Yugoslavia is characterized by intense enmity and violence among ethnic groups, rooted in each group's historic experience of traumatic loss and its perception of victimhood. Under such circumstances, communication among parties in conflict is ne_ arly impossible because they see, across the bargaining table, not the faces of other human beings but the embodiment of a feared or hated stereotype. Thus, the search for peaceful, sustainable solutions depends on the ability of conflicting parties to correct misperceptions, break down stereotypes, establish constructive avenues of communication, arid adopt a problem-solving approach to the substantial differences in values and needs that exist between them. Is such ' a transformation of public consciousness possible? Mass communica­ tion can help to create knowledge about new ideas, but it doesn't necessarily cause people . to adopt them. Attitudes tend to change when interpersonal communication networks are crea~ed whereby respected opinion leaders at a variety of levels gradually accept new information as valid. Communications studies show that once an innovative idea is accepted by 15-20% of a population, the idea can take hold and spread throughout the population by informal networks. 2 Changing the attitudes and belief systems of parties in conflict demands interactions among parties that reverse the processes which have fed, escalated and perpetuated the conflict. Psychologically sensitive intervention by a neutral party can facilitate such interactions and can address the emotional distancing, negative stereotyping and dehumanizing that typically exist between adversar­ ies. Intervention is likely to be minimally effective in the midst of acute violent conflict, because the nec(;!ssary process of gradual confidence building between representatives of groups in conflict will be overwhelmed by the passions of the moment. · However, intervention can be enormously productive when applied after violent conflict or during a break in the violence, such as a cease-fire, and can help parties engage in negotiations toward a lasting peace. It has not been in the purview of traditional diplomacy to address the underlying psychological sources of conflict nor to use psyehologicall y sensitive techniques to promote communication among adversaries. An alternative to traditional diplomacy, called multi-track, or track two diplomacy, has evolved to fill this gap. Track two diplomacy, as defined by U.S. Foreign Service officer Joseph Montville in 1981 ,. is "unofficial, informal interaction between members 2 Montville, J. V., (1991) The Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution, in Sandole, and H. van der Merwe (Eds) Conflict Theory and Practice: Integration and Application. Manchester University P f ess, PSYCHOLOGY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION TOWARD A NEW DIPLOMACY of adversarial groups or nations which aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that resolve their conflict. " 3 This intermediate form of diplomacy is more structured and goal­ directed than is most citizen diplomacy. It is also more oriented toward rela­ tionship-building than are traditional diplomacy and mediation. Recently, the term multi-track diplomacy4 has been used to describe a wide range of activities · that contribute to peacemaking, including with track one and track two diplo­ macy, peacemaking initiatives made through the business community, religious community, citizen groups and others. Track two diplomacy serves as a complement to traditional diplomatic efforts Sitions. The "third party" is charged with bringing the conflicting parties together and facilitating constructive communication be- , tween them. This is done by providing the participants ~ith an appropriate context in which to interact, by providing an alternative set of "nomis" to go~ern the parties' interactions, and by judicious interventions. These interventions might be theoretical inputs (which could provide tools for analysis of the conflict), content observations (providing interpretation or pointing out impli­ cations of what is actually being said), or process observations (relating the behavior of the parties in the workshop to the conflict within the communities they represent). Throughout th~ workshop, an effort is· made to preserve a 1 ° Kehnan, Herbert, C. 0986) "Interactive Problem Solving, A Social Psychological Approach to Conflict Resolution" In W. Klassen (Eds.~ , Dialogue Toward Inteifaith Un­ ders,tanding, Tantur/Jerusalem: Ecumenical Institute for Theological Research. 112 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... balance between having the participants engage as individuals and having them interact as representatives of their community. Participants discuss their views . of the underlying forces that sustain the conflict, the spectrum of opinion within their communities; and where they place themselves within that spectrum. The last is very important as it helps the participants understand to whom they are talking and what their political affiliations are. The central function of the workshop is 'to put on the ta~le the fundamental fears, needs and concerns of each group so that each side will better understand what motivates the other. In this way the solutions the group designs together can be responsive to t.1;1e concerns of each party. The group also discusses the political and psychological constraints each group works under and explores ways to overcome these constraints, with emphasis on shared actions. Ultimately the goal is to create an environment of mutual reassurance and cooperation, in which collaborative efforts can be made to create mutually acceptable, sustainable solutions to join, tly held problems. The goal is not limited to fostering individual change in the participants; in fact it is usually a crucially important feature of . this work that individuals re-enter their conununities empowered to promote change in the larger political system. Conflict resolution in this model requires changes in individual attitudes and stereotypes as a conduit for changes in societal actions and official policies. There are other processes that utilize a therapeutic model to set alternative norms and create a forum in which to promote constructive interaction and effective communication among parties who are distanced by ·hostility or ideological differences. Such processes are now being considered for incorpo­ ration into interactive problem-solvin~ work. One such process has been developed by the Project on Promoting Effective Dialogue Across Ideologies, a project of the Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age, which has, since 1986, led workshops on cultural and ideologi­ cal stereotyping in a variety of international settings.11 This project utilizes techniques from family systems therapy .to help people express curiosity and compassion in their exchanges with one a.Q.other, while gently challenging rigidly held belief systems. The project was initiated by Dr. Richard Chasin, a 11 For more detailed discussion of modes of analysis and intervention utilizing family systems therapy please see Chasin, Richard, and Herzig, Margaret, ( 1988) Family Systems Therapy and Soviet-American Relations, In The Project on Promoting Effective Dialogue Across Ideologies, Compendium of Project Reports, 1987-1991, Center for Psychological Studies in Tue-Nuclear Age, Cambridge, MA. . PSYCHOLOGY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: TOWARD A NEW DIPLOMACY psychiatrist and family therapist who sought ways in which the systems thinking of family therapists might help open doors to the new thinking so clearly need~d for human survival. Family systems theory emphasizes relationships, interactive patterns and context. Although their original application was to · families, many of the techniques have suitable application to large group contexts. Nations, just like family members, have complex relationships in which all elements are interconnected and influenced by one another. In order to achieve new thinking, both nations and families must be able to recognize when their belief systems are based on obsolete and constricted habits of thought that lead to undesirable actions and outcomes. Family systems therapy strives to foster an openness to new information and the creation of fresh solutions. A fundamental concept in systems thinking is circular causality. A systems view looks at a whole system, not at any one individual. Problems are not attributed to any single entity, be that a person or nation state, but are assumed . to occur in a broad context, embedded in complex systems of beliefs and behaviors. In individuals, families and larger groups, there are belief systems which once may have been highly adaptive but which now are restrictive, hampering growth and leading to obstructive or even destructive behaviors. While these belief systems may have become obsolete, their obsolescence may be hard to recognize and harder to leave behind. New thinking in international relations will involve recognition of such obsolescence and the construction of more adaptive patterns of thought and behavior. In family therapy, the therapist tries to disrupt and transform old patterns of belief and behavior. The intervention typically involyes questioning family members in ways that bring their conflicting perspectives and assumptions to the surface. Family therapists have a repertoire of techniques that they use to reveal and shake loose rigidly held, maladaptive belief systems. One particularly fruitful technique is called "circular questioning". (It was nicknamed "organized gossip" by its inventor, Mara Selvini Palazzoli.) A therapist using this technique does not ask anyone directly what he or she thinks or feels, but rather, asks each person what another person feels or thinks about a particular relationship or behavior in the group. For example, "What assumptions do you think your wife has about your values and goals regarding family discipline assumptions that may interfere with family harmony?" In an international setting, the question might be, "What assumptions do you think a particular adversarial country may hold of your own country's' goals and values that may interfere with world peace' (whether those assumptions are true or not)?" When such questions are posed in a group, everyone pays rapt attention to the answers, because everybody is being talked about. The sheer quantity of new information that is generated by this process is really quite striking. This flood 113 114 'rVGOSLA VIA, WAR ... of confusing, stimulating information, that challenges existing belief systems can open a space for the creation of new ways of thinking. New thinking is most likely to be fostered in an atmosphere of this kind, which features curiosity and low defensiveness, without accusations. Participants do not tend to become defensive, as they are not engaged in an exchange of accusations about good and bad behavior. They are exploring aspects of thinking and relationships never before discussed or even considered. The participants also have the opportunity to see how much their behavior might be influenced by what they assume others think or believe, and how often these assumptions are flawed. They are tfi a position to appreciate the role of circular causality among different behaviors and perceptions. The technique of circular questioning in experiential workshops has been used by the Project on Promoting Effective Dialogue in workshops in Moscow, Montreal, Australia, Stockholm and Hiroshima. At the 1987 Congress of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, in Moscow, the project ran a workshop with people representing both superpowers and their allies. Within their own national groups they had been asked to list assumptions they thought others held about their own group. Assunrptions and perceptions were revealed with compassion and good humor. At one point, a Russian participant reported to the whole group on the discussion his group of com­ patriots had just had about assumptions they thought Americans had about Russians. He said, "We think Americans think Russians have a low level of culture. We think Americans think the Soviet Union seeks world domination by force. We think Americans think we have no mind of our own." Althqugh instructed not to interrupt, one American rose, hypnotized by the responses, and called out in spite of himself, I amamazed to hear you saying these things. This is exactly what I am thinking. But I can't help but tell you that I feel like someone told you to say these things. The Russian looked at him and smiled: "Yes, in our group we discussed that you would also have that thought." The laughter was resounding and healing. At these workshops, participants have safely raised concerns about how they are perceived by others and have seen the impact of their beliefs and behaviors on others. They have had ·an opportunity to engage in dialogue with people representing other cultures and ideologies and to do this without either risking hostile confrontation or engaging in a shallow unfulfilled exercise. In conclusion, the end of the second millennium brings with it a challenge to rethink the ways that nations relate and to look for new diplomatic tools. Traditional diplomacy was not designed to address the psychological basis for ethnic conflict, including the unmet basic human needs (i.e. identity, recogni- 1~ ·. '·· . \ ' - -----------------·--- - - - PSYCHOLOGY AND CONFIJCT RESOLUllON TOWARD A NEW DIPLOMACY tion, security and equity) of the parties involved. Track two diplomacy offers an opportunity for a wider range of players to become involved in the peacemaking process. A track two process that has a ' particular sensitivity to social and psychological dimension .§. of conflict and utilizes a third party intervener is called ~ interactive problem solving, or interactive conflict resolution. Interactive con­ flict resolution emphasizes transforming relationships between conflicting- par­ ties and promoting collaborative problem-solving. Lessons have been drawn from family systems therapy, whose techniques and theories have been adapted to promote effective dialogue among parties whose perceptions of each other may be distorted by hostility and/or ideological differences. These innovative alternatives to traditional diplomacy are among the most promising lights on the diplomatic horizon and should be seriously considered by the global community. Alternative ways to resolve conflict could help to transform combative stand-offs into cooperative relationships. lpey can create the opportunity for both influential leaders and ordinary citizens to rethink basic assumptions about social conflict and its roots, transform tpeir confrontation mentality, and empower them to take effective action to achieve a peaceful, sustainable future:. 115 YUGOSLA VL4, WAR ... 116 Srdjan Vrcan A European Lebanon in Making or a Replica of Pakistan/India Dram.a? I There is nothing in the recent turn of events in Yugoslavia which should have come as a surprise to an attentive observer. In substance, there is nothing unexpected or unpredictable in the course of events which have recently led Yugoslavia to the very brink of a large-scale war conflict, which has already taken thousands of human lives, made several hundred thousand of wounded and has driven hundreds of thousands away from their homes. Certainly, no superior intelligence, nor exceptional wisdom were needed to predict long ago that events in Yugoslavia would go the way they have indeed gone lately. An attentive and unbiased observer with a modest sociological imagination could have easily predicted such a development some time ago, but obviously under three critical conditions. First, by not being taken in by vociferous official propaganda, denying publicly up to a very recent time that there has been any realistic possibility of a tum to war in order to improve the selling potential.of their political programmes and to obtain the maximum support. Second, by approaching events in Yugoslavia not as isolated and discrete episodes, but as moments in a chain of events which has its own logic, easily to be identified. And, third, under the most difficult condition of being able to resist to pressures analogous to pressures in the case of many Lebanese intellectuals, described by Alunad Beydoun in such words: "De retoursoccasional au bercail communautaire ont permis a certains intellectuels, habituellement sereins, de contribuer a l'alimentation du conflft en images voyantes et en slogans incendiaires" 1 • Toil­ lustrate this, one should remember that a far-seeing and famous Croatian sociologist did predict almost two years ago that there was a civil war already . ! 1 Beydoun, Ahmad, Les civils, leurs communautaires et I' Etat dans la guerre comme system social en Liban, Social Compass, 35(1988) 4, p . 600. - 117 118 J:VGOSLAVTA, WAR .. . looming on the horizon 2 . The author of these lines also asserted in a paper, written in October 1990, that some events having happened up to that time may be reasonably interpreted as the first moves in the coming civil war (for instance, arming one section of the population and disarming the other), or even as the first skirmishes in the war just around the comer (for instance such as the first incidents with shooting). 3 To be more precise, there is absolutely nothing surprising in the fact that exacerbated controversies, leading to armed conflicts, have been essentially running and are going to be running in the near future along national and ethnic lines of divisions and that they would be practically conducted under national flags and with national political slogans. Furthermore, there is almost nothing surprising~ the fact that initially a creeping and then an open war is going to be characterized by unusual cruelty and brutality, which- as history demonstrates abundantly - are hardly to be avoided in armed conflicts along national and ethnic lines in a territory inhabited by ethnically and religiously mixed populations where the front line divides family from family, neighbourhood from neighbour­ hood and village from village, turning them into military outposts and strong­ holds. And such cruelty and brutality are hard to avoid in such a territory where a strong narcissism of small differences and distinctions has become culturally and politically dominant. It is certainly necessary to raise the question why such a turn in recent events in Yugoslavia has been so easily predictable. First, it seems evident that there are some long-term trends operating in Yugoslavia, which have become dominant recently. And it is such trends that have primarily brought about a rapidly progressing deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in Yugoslavia at all the levels of social life. And they hav~ been responsible for an ev~r-increasing social and political conflictuality. With such trends in operation in the near future, one may paraphrase an assertion referring to Lebanon saying that the war is going to be "a well-orchestrated, controlled and mana. ged busmess". 4 2 It is professor josip Zupanov from Zagreb University who since his prevision in summer 1990 has become from a widely quoted public personality an unperson never again to appear in the mass media. 3 Paper entitled "Election in Croatia: an Analysis and Prospects'~ presented at the in­ ternational conference "Renewal of Political Dialectics in Central and Eastern Europe", held in Milan November 27 - 29, 1990, to be published in the acts of the conference. 4 Chaoul, Melhem, 'The !Ayout of War in Lebanon: Political and Confessional Aspects of a Function of Reduction, Social Compass, 35Cl988), 4,p.608. A EUROPEAN LEBANON IN MAKING OR A REPLICA OF PAKISTAN/INDIA DRAMA? With such trends persisting and retaining a crucial role in shaping actual - situation, all - even the most sincere - appeals to dialogue and negotiations are doomed to failure even when formally welcomed by all the parties concerned. Therefore, there is another similarity to Lebanon in· this particular respect. Namely, even "those who do not wish the war remain hostile to the precondi­ tions of peace". 5 In substance, they are not willing to negotiate about their political objectives' having led to armed conflicts, but they would simply prefer to have them realized without recourse to war, if possible. It is possible but not very realistic to claim that the trends, which are referred here to are a quasi-necessary consequence of an essentially non-intended, purely casual and uncontrollable convergence of some very unfavorable social, political, economic and cultural events of a purely random nature. There is, of course, something random in the course of events, but their matrix is not random. _ It seems also very unrealistic to believe that the trends in action are a purely natural or quasi-natural consequence of a historically prepared natural happen­ ing. It is more realistic to realise that they have been so far closely associated to some long4erm political strategies, consciously elaborated and promoted. Such political strategies have succeeded in becoming dominant political strategies and they succeeded in eliminating from the politicaf scene all the other alternative strategies. It is the fundamental political options, induced by such strategies, that are responsible for the actual turn of events in Yugoslavia. The crueial feature of such political strategies, in spite of all differences, is, that they all have been artic~lated in exclusivistic national terms, sometimes adorned with democratic verbiage. They are formulated in such a way that their main and long-term political objectives are best expressed in the well-known formula: "One nation, one state, one faith, one language, one flag, one national political philosophy, one national television and broadcasting network, raised to a cathedral of the national spirit, one national truth, one true national political party, one leader or father of the nation etc.". Consequently, everything that in a complex ethnic reality is not in accordance or deviates from the political ideal is considered to be politically either illegitimate, or at best a shortcoming to- be only temporarily tolerated as a necessity, but to be eliminated as soon as possible in this or that way. And such political strategies exist and persist under different national flags and using different national symbolism, but follow essentially the same pattern. And they are most easily identified in action in regard to some very critical situations and specific ethnic groups. For instance in Serbia in regard to Kosovo 5 Beydoun, Ahmad, op. cit. p. 600. 119 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... and the Albanian ethnic group; in Croatia in regard to Krajina and the Serbian ethnic group living in Croatia; in Macedonia in regard to the western parts of the country and the Albanian ethnic group living there etc. The fundamental fact about such political strategies has been evident: they have been moving in substance along collision courses, owing primarily to their long,..range objectives to be realized in as complex a national, ethnic and religious area as the present-day Yugoslav area certainly is with the only exception of Slovenia. And they are moving necessarily along collision courses in spite of all peaceloving declarations. In the final analysis they reckon with the use of force and include the willingness to recourse to war or to use the threat of war to realise their main political objectives if such a recourse to arms and an armed conflict is deemed to be promising. Therefore, increasing hostility and exacerbating. conflictuality are to be considered a necessary consequence of the impact of such political strategies upon the social and political life in general. And such hostility and conflictuality cannot but be constantly renewed and reinforced. And support and legitimacy to such political strategies depend to a degree primarily upon the persistence of the hostility and conflictuality. Since . each of such political strategies calculates that its political victory presupposes 120 the total defeat of the opposing national strategies, which seems rather unlikely · ·---- under present circumstances, it is very realistic to expect the perpetuation of the existing conflicts and a continued walk along the very brink of war. There is no doubt that the logic inherent to such political strategies has so far led from conflict to conflict, each subsequent one being more widespread and more exacerbated. There is no doubt that there has been a gradual radicalization and totalization of all the conflicts generated by such political strategies. And it is difficult to presume that the same logic would not be operating tomorrow and in the near future. A conclusion is to be drawn: the existing conflicts, having led the country to the very brink of a major war, have not been either purely random, or simply natural, or clearly spontaneous and blind. They have had their idealizers, planners, promoters, servants, propagandists etc. pursuing mutually contradic­ tory political objectives and playing consciously a risky game with force, arms . and war and peace. II It seems rather realistic to assert that no exceptional intellectual effort is needed to identify and describe some significant trends in current politics and in current political discourse. And such trend_ s are indicative from another crucial standpoint, i.e. not only from the standpoint of a durable pacification of life in A EUROPEAN LEBANON IN MAKING OR A REPLICA OF PAKISTAN/INDIA DRAMA? the area, but from the standpoint of democratic developments. There is no need to produce an elaborated argumentation to prove that there is a very strong tendency in political life to creation of so-called fatherland fronts (Heimatsfront) as the only legitimate and acting political orgflnizations, absorbing in their ranks all possible political groups. It is evident that such fatherland fronts are essen­ tially based upon well-known dichotomous political distinction: "friend I or foe", "true sons of fatherland I or a traitor". Consequently, all mediating political forces and orientations are practically eliminated or are going to be eliminated. And there is no legitimate place for any kind of political mediation. Political pluralism is being reduced and political opposition is turned into a purely symbolic or token opposition. And, what is more important, the principle of division of power does not function any more as well as the traditional mechanism of "checks and balances". In the final analysis the civil society is blocked or is in peril of losing its autonomy and of being colonized by state politics. Closely associ­ ated with such a trend there is an inclination in political discourse, particularly . the official one, to operate with a so-called conspiratorial theory of society: And some of the current political events are primarily interpreted in terms· of some grand conspiracy. In fact some crucial political events with negative politicai effects are interpreted as results of an almost century-long grand conspiracy against this or that nation or state. The suggested image of politiql life is the 121 following: there is a small group of evil people, hidden somewhere, who never get tired of conspiring against this or that nation and of planning dishonest and evil acts. They allegedly decide what to do and then have nothing else to do, but to pull some strings to activate inunediately some distant people to do inimical acts of violence and fraud. In that way the people acting politically in this or that part of the country in a way which is opposed to official politics are presented at best either as dupes or as mindless marionettes playing prescribed roles in a theater of dolls arranged by conspirators, or as evil people themselves. On the other side of the coin there reappears the theory of treason to explain all defeats. There is obviously no need to prove here that it is the very matrix of official political discourse which abounds with assertions to some kind of grand conspiracy against Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Yugosla­ via e'tc. respectively as well as with hints at some kind of treason in operation here and there. Furthermore, there is a visible tendency in political discourse to dehumanize and stigmatize political opponents and political dissenters. In substance, there is an almost permanent dehumanisation and satanization in official discourse in Yugoslavia today of something and someone: some political personalities, some political organizations, some places and regions, some ethnic groups and nations etc. are being almost constantly demoniz~d and satanised by different ideological apparatuses in operation in the country. There is also an inclination 122 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR '·· to consider all the dissenting, oppositional and opposing political groups and initiatives as substantially identical and belonging to the same political family, best represented by the e:x.'t.remists. Therefore, all the dissenting, truly oppositional political groups and personalities are quickly stigmatized as traitors, potential traitors, fifth column or as dangerous extremists. They are all put in the same political bag labelled as a rule with the political label "extremist". This is the ideological and propaganda pattern historically best exemplified in Germany in the 30s when Social Democracy was labelled by the Third International as twin­ brothers to Nazism or as social fascism. As a consequence a political situation has been induced in which there seems to be no possibility but to be politically either an ustasha or a chetnik. Finally, there are some indicative tendencies in the current political discourse, prin1arily the official one, at least in some of the republics. Firstly, there is a visible inclination to introduce some kind of religization of the political discourse. The religization, of course, is not to be identified with the well-known' confessionalization of politics which has been present in modem Europe since the end of the last century and whi~h became visible particularly in the formation of confessional political parties such as the so-called popular or Christian Democratic parties. The religization in this case is to be identified as an tnclination to give essentially religious connotations to some important political ideas and. use them as religious ones, inununized by sacralization from question­ ing and contestation in spite of their mundane and secular origin and content. This is best to be seen in official speeches referring for instance . to "sacred Croatia" and to "eternal Croatia" as well as to "sacred Serbia" and to "celestial Serbia" which is to be a ~odel for earthly Serbia. The same reappears in referring to the "sacred land of the fatherland" as well as to the "sacred frontiers of the fatherland", but also to the "sacred political will of the people"etc. Therefore, it may be argued that there is a visible de-laicisation of political discourse in some parts of Yugoslavia. And no doubt such de-laicisation is a function of political mobilization and exacerbation of political conflicts and not a function of developing an autonomous, competef)t and critical public opinion. · Closely connected to the religization of political discourse, there is some kind of ontologisation of the existing social, political and cultural diffe~ences. The persisting political conflicts have been constantly taken out of their actual social, political, ideological and cultural context and intentionally projected to an overarching ontological and metaphysical background. Therefore, the current conflicts about precise political issues here and now and with concrete political interests at stake are transformed into conflicts quasi sub specie aeternitatis or sub specie grand history between opposing human, cultural and civilizalional types of almost suprasocial, quasi-metaphysical nature. In that way the current A EUROPEAN LEBANON IN MAKING OR A REPllCA OF PAKISTAN/INDIA DRAMA? etlmic conflicts are interpreted, for instance, as new examples of the century­ long conflict between a quasi-metaphysical grounded West European - Roman Catholic - Modern democratic - Enlightened rational - Peaceful - cultural and civilization typ~ , on one side, and a Eastern - Orthodox - Byzantine -Non­ European - Pre-modern - Non-Enlightened irrational - Undemocratic - Uncivi­ lized cultural type, on the other. The same is being done in another way: dramatis personae then are: an Orthodox - Christian - Peaceful - Democratic cultural and civilizational type and an aggressive Islamic type, fundamentalist, irrational, pre- . modern, untouched by Enlightenment aria rationalism etc. type, engaged in penetration to the West and allegedly waging a sacred war (jihad) on Yugoslav soil. m Parallel to this ontologization of current conflicts, there is a visible inclination to Manichaean interpretation. Namely, some of the parties engaged fu the current conflicts are presented and depicted as personifications or quasi of the absolute Good and their side as the side of absolute Good in operation, while the opposing party or parties are stigmatized as personifications of the Evil and their side ·is depicted as the side of Evil as such. There is no doubt that the ontologization of current conflicts and their parallel Manichaeisation mean that there are no realistic chances for their possible negotiated resolutions: conflicts are turned into allegedly life or death conflicts and the living people, engaged or involved in conflicts, are transformed somehow into organs or instruments of some superior supra-social entities and instances, they serve consciously and willingly or they are practically forced to serve. It is an undeniable fact that the implosion of the communist system has opened the gate for important steps in direction of democracy in the area. And some initial steps have been made, in some parts more important than in others. However, with such tendencies and inclinations, dominating the political scene, it may be reasonably argued that the chances for genuine democracy to be established soon are rather modest. Namely, it seems rather obvious that such tendencies and inclinations are not in substance consonant with the development of a coherent democratic culture and democratic practice. The crucial sore point in such political strategies and tendencies is their inability to consistent recognition in theory and practice of the universality of human rights and freedoms, both individual and collective, regardless of all particul~rities characterizing citizens. Such political strategies and tendencies may hardly serve to reconcile their crucial political objectives with universal democratic rights which means, for instance, that the same rights-individual and collective - that are enjoyed or ought to be enjoyed by all the citizens of the 123 124 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... republic of Serbia of Serbian nationality should be enjoyed in the same manner by all the citizens of the same republic of Albanian, Hungarian etc. nationality. The same is valid for human rights in the republic of Croatia in regard to the citizens of Croatian, Serbian, Italian etc. nationality. There is in fact a fundamental discriminatory momentum in such political strategies and tendencies, regardless of the colors of national flags they wave. Some citizens are treated as citizens iri the modern democratic sense, but others are treated in some way as subjects according to their nationality. Therefore, it is not exaggerated to be very sceptical about llieir coherent democratic orientations or about the range of such an orientation. It seems that at best a kind of plebiscitarian democracy in M. Weber' s term, or a populistic caudillismo are developing and not a parliamentary democracy with strong opposition, consistent division of power, an effectively functioning system of checks and balances, an autonomous, competent and critical public upinion (Offentlich.keit in J. Habermas' term) and advanced autonomous civil society etc. This is probably not as valid for Slovenia as for other parts of the country. IV If this diagnosis of the present-day situation is valid or highly plausible, what are the prospects for the near future? There are some crucial points to be emphasized. First, the existing hostility, enmity and hatred along national and ethnic lines, caused by recent events, have certainly reached such an extent and · intensity that they make an explosive mixture hardly to be dismantled or substantially reduced in a short time by some miraculous political arrangement or gesture and move. The Lebanese experience is very instructive in this respect. It shows that "civil war is a system of hatred 116 , but also indicates that a s)'stem of hatred leads to war, feeds the war and feeds on the war. There is a circulus vitiosus which is hard to break: a system of hatred leads to a systei:n of war and a system of war reinforces a system of hatred. Unfortunately, it is very realistic to assume today that with the dominant tfends remaining in force and with the political strategies having their present impact, very high levels of the existing and persisting hostility, hatred and conflictuality will remain dominant political and cultural facts for the next ten year ,s or so. Even if the optimal solutions - democratic, peaceful, mutually . agreed and freely \ . consented to - were reached in a week or a month, the consequences and the tales of hostility, hatred and conflictuality would remain present for years to come. That means that there is no prospect at hand for final normalization and 6Jbidem, p.604. Beydoun writes that the war 11 is ti.ot feeding itself on the dead it brings about, but also on what it imposes upon the living people". A EUROPEAN LEBANON IN MAKING OR A REPLICA OF PAKISTAN/INDIA DRAMA? durable pacification either at the institutional or everyday levels of social life. Least of all, a final normalization and durable pacification is not to be expected by any solutions imposed and enforced upon any conflicting party. Second, there is little hope with the dominant trends remaining in operation and the political strategies retaining their present impact that any of the constitutional · solutions proposed for the present crisis so far would effectively bring a stable peace and the flourishing of genuine democracy to the area either immediately or in the near future. Under the present circumstances, there is no constitutional solution which would be workable and which would eliminate or reduce substantially the persisting conflictuality, exacerbated hostility and widespread hatred and would lead to an immediate diminution of conflicts and clashes, or slow down the arms race, or, finally, push far away the danger of war by making highly improbable a recourse to arms by any of the parties involved. Nor even to eliminate persistent war-mongering. Any proposal if adopted tomorrow would a~ best redefine the legal statu~es of the major actors in conflict and would relocate some of major foci of their controversies and confrontations, as well as at best assuring shorter or longer periods of precarious armistices, but not permanent peace and durable pacification of the a- re. a and of inter-ethnic relations. One may venture to say that under present circumstances, there is no permanent peace to be reasonably expected at the instifutional, intergroup and interpersonal levels of social life whichever constitutional solution would be adopted either by mutual agreement or by enforcement and constraint upon all the parties involved in conflict or upon just one party. It means, to be more precise, that it is not realistic to expect a durable · normalization and stable pacification in the area - either by the creation of a new federation, as proposed by some, or by a new, very loose confederacy as suggested by others, or by establishing a new Commonwealth of Nations similar to the British Commonwealth as hinted by thirds, or by partition into several, totally independent states as dreamed of by many, or by a replica of the Cypriot green lines imposed by the international community and protected by their armed forces. Some of the solutions, mentioned here, offer at best - with the persisting trends remaining dqminant - shorter or longer periods of armistices and precarious peace, based almost exclusively upon a precarious equilibrium of fear, or upon an equally unstable balance of forces, supported essentially by the quality and quantity of arms and manpower at the disposal of the parties in conflict and/ or by possible alliances to be activated on their behalf by each party in conflict. Paraphrasing the famous von Clausewit:Z saying that war is the continuation of politics by other means, one may say that politics in this case and this area in the near future is bound fo be a contilluation of war by other means. Consequently, there is no easy, durable and peaceful political reorganization of the present-day Yugoslav area. This area would certainly remain a critical arid highly conflictual area in Europe in the years to come. It seems hlghly paradoxi- 125 126 YUGOSL4VTA, WAR ... cal but realistic to assume that this area ia getting ready to join the Europe of 1992 by the tragic way of resurrecting at least to some degree the Europe of the late 30s or a situation similar to the Europe of that time. v There is no doubt that there have recently been some highly optimistic dreams about the transition from a communlst. society to a post-communist one. And particuiarly in the case of Yugoslavia, which not so long ago seemed to be the first one to make such a transition in the easiest and quickest way. Primarily as a transition from the old collectivism, already eroded, to a new individualism, already growing up, as well as a transition from weakened and weakening authoritarianism to a new democratic anti-authoritarianism. Or the first one to make a rather easy transition from a not rigid state-controlled economy, gener­ ating a society of scarcity, to a free market economy which produce by a short cut a society of prosperity and affluence just around the corner. More particularly, there is an over-optimistic dream of a solution to the Yugoslav crisis along the lines of the so-called Scandinavian model. The recent turn of events has made the Sc~ndinavian solution highly improbable. And that for some major reasons. · First, owing to the fact that the existing hostility and hatred along national and ethnic lines have already attained such an e:A'tent and intensity that a peaceful solution along the Scandinavian model - mutually agreed and freely consented to - has become an illusion. An in1posed and enforced solution comes to be the only feasible one, but it remains very precarious, projecting the existing conflicts into lie future and generating new conflicts. Second, owing to the specific position of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it seems very clear tlut any partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be as difficult as the partitionof a leopard' s skin and certainly would create more conflicts and lead to widespread hostility rather ilian eliminate and resolve them. At the same time an independent republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would hardly be a durable peaceful solution if the whole area was characterized by lie perpetuation of exacerbated conflicts between Croatia and Serbia and if Serbians and Croatians would act as each oilier' s arch-enemies, not being able to live peacefully in any kind of common association or good neighbourhood. It is highly improbable that a political consensus could function effectively in Bosnia and Herzegovina, assuming that Muslims, Serbs and Croats may live peacefully side by side in a Bosnian state as equal and free citizens, while the whole ex-Yugoslav area is being politically . reorganized upon the contrary political philosophy of the formula "One nation, one state etc." and assuming t,hat there is no possibility of living togeilier in a A EUROPEAN LEBANON IN MAKING OR A REPIJCA OF PAKISTAN/INDIA DRAMA? democratic, peaceful and equal way in any kind of political community or any kind of association of Croats and Serbs. Consequently, the explosive charge of inter-etlmic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not going to be dismantled or substantially reduced in lie near ~re . It seems more realistic to fear iliat lie eventual solution of lie Yugoslav crisis by partition would follow at least partially another well-known model witl1 contrary connotations, i.e. lie model exhibited on lie Indian sub-continent in dismantling the British Dominion of India. 7 It is a model which led to the creation of two new independent states of Pakistan and India, both obtaining quick universal international recognition as independent states, both entering into the UNO and both becoming members of the British Commonwealtl1. Unfortu­ nately, all this did not stop lie two new independent states waging at least two major wars in the meantime witl1 hundreds of iliousands dead and wounded with a ~ass of. people fleeing from one side of lie border to lie other, many of iliem bemg dnven by force from ilieir native homes, witl1 occasional massacres of civilians on a religious and ethnic basis, and, finally, with lie new state line, dividing lie new states, turned practically into a front line on some sections of which guns have never been silent since partition and with specific regions becoming areas of permanent interstate'crisis and of perpetual armed clashes and conflicts. Consequently, developments on lie indian sub-continent since partition indicate more about lie probable consequences of the Yugoslav crisis than developments on the Scandinavian peninsula more than a century ago. It seems.very realistic to predict that a solution along the Indian model could be applied, but it would result ii1 recourse to arms and in perpetuation of hostility and con.tlictuality witl1 almost permanent walking on the very brink of war for years to come. There is another historical experience which ought to be taken into considera­ tion. It is the Lebanese experience. Let us underline only some crucially relevant points in that experience. · · First, the Lebanese-experience demonstrates that "a state of things which persists has a tendency by generalizing to establish itself in a system". Therefore "civil war is not synonymous witl1 death, but by establishing itself it may becom~ a way oflife and even to organize itself in a social system". 8 It is evident mat me same is valid for a prolonged movement in lie direction of a war, or for a 7 The writer of these lines formulated such ideas in September 1990 in a public debate on the book "Cetvrta Yugoslavia"(Fourth Yugoslavia), written by Slaven Letica, later reported by the weekly ''Nedjeljna Da/rriacija": f 8 Beydoun, Ahmad, op. cit., p. 604. 1.27 128 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... protracted walk upon the very brink of war in an ethnically and religiously mixed territory. Namely, in such a case, events leading to the walking upon the very brink of war or preparing for a war have their own logic and it turns the war, being prepared or being waged, into a functioning social system or a way of life overlaying the whole society. Therefore, playing a political game with war and peace is not an innocent political game which may be abandoned at any chosen moment without con~equence. Second, the Lebanese experience, which is the longest modern experience of a civil war in an ethnically and religiously mixed area, indicates that preparing to wage a war and /or walking a long time upon the very brink of a major war makes the end of war and establishing durable peace becomes a very compli­ cated and difficult affair. In substance, peace under such circumstances is not simply the end of the war and least of all the end of the shooting and of open hostility. Ahmad Beydoun concludes that "elevating itself to the dignity of a social system, war becomes less and less comparable to different ruins it has produced or to anomalies it has imposed upon thousands. A consequence of this transformation is the fact that peace could not be any more a pure end of war. It has to be no less and no more but replacing - complex and progressing - of a system by another one. ' 9 Third, the Lebanese experience shows that it is wrong to expect that "peace, whatever its formula may be, would bring immunity against a return to war. This is evidently a nons~nse: the system of war should be patiently dismantled since it is nothing else but a way of the actual organiZation of the Lebanese society. Another system ought to replace .it.!.!. 10 Therefore, it is not rational and promising to expect that "establishing peace is to be a matter of belligerents 11 • Moreover, A. Beydoun warns that it is erroneous to suppose that the "belligerent forces are those which should supyrvise the.imposition of a new system". 11 . Finally, the Lebanese experience shows that political strategies oriented to wage -a civil war or to prepare for such a war and in fact making the war a way of organization of social life, are at the same time doomed to be self-fulfilling ~nd self-defeating. Namely, preparation for a civil war in an ethnic and religious mixed territory usually ends with enhancing the chances of war and leads to actual war conflict, and it does not in the long run reduce or eliminate the danger of war or armed conflicts. At the same time, such political strategies easily lead to a state of things which is to a high degree contrary to initial expectations. A. 9Ibidem, p.588. 10 Ibidem, p. 602. 11 Ibigem. A EUROPEAN LEBANON IN MAKING OR A REPIJCA OF PAKISTAN/INDIA DRAMA? Beydoun, analysing the Lebanese situation, concludes instructively: "The Leba­ nese are today very far from all the mirages which have led them to the war. They are far from the national dignity and sovereignty of the State. The are distant also from an equal participation of all in govenunent and from justice in prosperity. They are far from enjoying an authentic citizenship in the context of a democratic regime of freedom of their "retrograde 11 traditions. They have even lost a large part of their old liberties" .12 Only a freely agreed arid consented to solution by all the parties involved would offer a perspective for a durable peace and stable pacification and normalization of social life as well as for genuine democratic developments in the area, but such a solutiop is very unrealistic to expect under current circum­ stances. An imposed and enforced solution-which seems more likely- upon any party in conflict would not eliminate the roots of the conflicts and, therefore, such a solution would remain essentially unstable and precarious with a new round of recourses to arms being prepared behind the curtain. Written in August 1991. 12 Ibidem, p. 604 . 129 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR .. . 130 Mats Friberg The Need for Unofficial Diplomacy in Identity Conflicts Introduction The Yugoslav conflict has some unique features but it also shares some characteristics with other conflicts, such as those in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, N orthem Ireland, Cyprus, Israel-Palestine etc. This family of conflicts can be described as conflicts over deep-rooted social identities. There are more than seventy actual cases in the world today (Azar 1990a:2). Such conflicts share most of the following characteristics: -ethnic, religious or cultural cleavages, -protracted conflicts with a long history of conflict cycles, -irrational and violent behavior motivated by very deep emotions, -underdevelopment, economic disruption and disparities between groups, -breakdown of centralized state agencies, -external interventions usually reinforcing the crisis. The sources of the conflict are mainly internal to the region, not systemic or international. The conflict ultimately springs from unsatisfied basic human needs in the population involved, particularly the needs for security, identity, recognition, autonomy, participation and material development (Azar 1990b: 146; Burton 1990: 25-47). Such needs are basic in the sense that they are not within the ability of the individual to control. When peqple perceive that they are denied a separate identity, physical and material security and effective political partici­ pation they must protest, at least when this occurs under modem conditions. The key explanatory concept is social identity which refers to an individuals self­ image as it is derived from the social categories to which he or she belongs. The social identity is a very significant driving force because people are deeply attached to their self-concept and the need to increase or maintain self-esteem. 131 132 YUGOSL4 VIA, WAR ... What conclusions concerning resolution of identity conflicts can be drawn from this brief analysis? The general conclusion is that sustained conflict resolution can only be achieved by measures that fulfill the basic needs of the people involved. That is to say, only by treating the sources of the conflict, not the symptoms. Otherwise it will only be temporarily settled. Basic human needs can be suppressed but they can't be eradicated. An identity conflict can't be solved by traditional power politics. Real power doesn't lay with external forces, neither with official authorities. It lays with the identity group because it is backed by the energy of the people. A small Catholic minority in Northern Ireland could not be controlled by a large British_ army (Burton 1990:34). A foreign power can only suppress the conflict, not solve it. Neither can the conflict be solved by an internal law and order approach of the relevant state agencies as will be seen below. The coercive machinery of the state is part of the problem rather than of the solution. If the centralized state agencies can't deal with the unmet needs they become sources of the conflict. The empirical facts of this type of conflicts also show that the official representatives of the conflicting groups are unable to solve the conflict by the usual methods of direct bargaining and negotiation. This is particularly so in the initial stages of the violent phase .of the conflict. Even a simple cease-fire is difficult to establish by socalled official diplomacy. One reason for this sad fact is that official diplomacy. is carried out within a power-oriented bargaining framework. Such a framework implies that the rnnflict is about a cake that can be divided - a zero-sum conflict ending in one winner an~ one loser or in a compromise. However, social identity is an indivisible value and no.ta cake that can be cut into slices. Human identity needs can't be traded, exchanged or bargained over. They are.not subject to negotiation. Therefore elite agreements based on negotiations don't last (Burton 1990:39). Another very important reason for the failure of official diplomacy is the tenuous link that exists between the people directly involved in the conflict and their official representatives. Lacking a real understanding of the sources of the conflict the a__uthorities are prepared to use coercive power to contain the situation, believing that there is an obligation on the part of the minority to obey. The result of using coercion is resistance and a loss of legitimation on the part of the authorities. In most identity conflicts people have very little trust in the established authorities. Cynicism is widespread. They trust only people they know personally or people belonging to their own conununity. Thus, even if the authorities were able to devise adequate policies catering to t.Q.e needs of the people, th.ey would no longer have the power to implement them. 7HE NEED FOR UNOFFICIAL DIPLOMACY IN IDENTITY CONFLICTS To summarize the argument so far, the main points are the following: · - the conflict must be solved at the level of its source, that is to say the solution must deal with basic human identity and security needs as they are perceived by the people directly involved in the conflict, - the conflict must be solved by a decentralized and cooperative process among the people and not by power-oriented negotiations or decrees by the elite. The solution, then, has to come through so called unofficial diplomacy. Unofficial diplomacy · Unofficial diplomacy is a communication process in which participants from the warring parties meet face-to-face in a safe space to explore the needs of both parties and the ways and means to satisfy them. It requires the presence of an independent third party acting as a facilitator in the communication process. The most important task of the third party is to control or frame the communication between the parties in such a way that it does not revert back to a zero-sum bargaining situation. The participants have to agree beforehand that the explo­ ration of the conflict and its solution has to be carried out as a common task and not as an adversarial process. The conflict should not be seen as something to · be won or lost qr compromised about, but as something which must be solve~ to the full satisfaction of all parties - the win-win-concept (Burton 1987, Crum 1987 & Cornelius & Faire 1989, Fischer & Ury 1983, Parry 1991). The third party should not enter the resolution process as a traditional mediator making proposals or putting pressures on the parties to accept an agreement. The responsibility for solving the conflict rests rully with the warring parties themselves. The parties are the only ones who know the deepest sources of the conflict. Therefore they are the ones who have the ea pa city to redefine the conflict and to find new ways to satisfy all the relevant human needs involved in the conflict. To impose a solution from the outside would be to rob them of this very important learning experience. The conflict should be seen as the property of the parties and this property should not be taken away from them (Christie 1977). The idea that everybody can win may seem utopian to some people. How­ ever, · it is the only garantee that the conflict will not erupt again. Furthermore, a basic hypothesis is that a conflict may be unsolvable on the level of declared elite interests and positions, but when they are translated into basic human needs of people, they are not necessarily incompatible with each other. For example, if the conflict is over possession of territory it is certainly a zero-sum game. But if the parties find out that the underlaying human need is security and that 133 134 YUGOSLA WA, WAR .. . possession of territory is just one way to obtain security the door is open to a win­ win solution. Security is not a scarce resource which is diminished by consump­ tion. It is possible to think of many situations in which an increase in the security of one party leads to an increases in the security of the other. The same holds for many other basic human needs such as social identity, recognition and partici­ pation. They are basically positivesum values. Another objection is that the warring parties ~ee each other as enemies. They are not willing to cooperate with their adversaries in exploring the sources of the conflict and its possible solutions. Cooperation with the enemy would be seen as an act of treachery. But no conflict is all out. Even in a war there are always persons and groups who have a cooperative and long-term perspective on the situation. They will look for possibilities to solve the conflict on a deeper level. They are willing to rµeet the other side provided certain conditions are fulfilled. It has to be done in an unofficial way so as not to risk condemnation from their own group. A safe space must be found, that is to say a place where the participants feel free to share their vulnerabilities without risking attack or criticism. And the participants must have trust in a third party to provide neutral leadership and facilitation of the conununication process. Unofficial diplomacy is b~sed on the idea that everybody in a warring group is responsible for ·· solving the conflict - not just the official leaders. Thus it is sometimes called citizen diplomacy. There is an unfortunate tendency to think of a conflict as one big object that has-to be solved in one stroke by the official representatives of the parties. This is to put to much faith in the power of the leaders. If their domestic constituencies are mobilized in an all out war against an enemy they don't have the necessary political space to explore cooperative solutions. But if there are a number of links between influential people ii1 both camps, skills in dialoguing are widespread and a measure of understanding of the other party has been established in a significant segment of the population, the political conditions are ripe for official moves towards a cooperative solution of the conflict. The more intensive and violent the conflict, the more likely that official diplomacy will fail to solve the conflict'. Positional bargaining may even aggravate the conflict by adding new elements of contention to an already very tense relationship. Unofficial diplomacy could be tJ:ie only viable alternative in such a situation. The ideajs that numerous initiatives ii1 unofficial diplomacy will change the political culture towards a peace culture. At some point in time this peace culture will penetrate the commanding· heights. From then on official diplomacy will have a chance to be successful and lead to a sustainable resolution of the conflict. Thus we are thinking about a trickle up process from the grassroot level to the intermediary . level of opinion-leaders ultimately 1HE NF.f?J FOR UNOFFICIAL DIPLOMACY IN IDEN111Y CONFLICTS reaching the political leaders. In this sense unofficial diplomacy can be seen as a necessary step preparing the ground for official agreements (Fisher &Keashly 1991). .There are two main appr~aches to unofficial diplomacy; the analytical problemsolving workshop and the process-promoting workshop (See figure 1). Both types have very active and articulated spokesmen (See below!) The first approach is modelled on the academic seminar. The facilitators are most often university professors from different social science disciplines. It is usually aimed at directly influencing official opii1ion and therefore invite participants who are close to the key decision-makers. The idea is to deal directly with the substantive _issues oft. he conflict in an analytical and rational way with the intention to reach an agreement that can be conununicated to the political leaders. The second approach is modelled on the therapeutic session. The facilitators have a background as psychotherapists, clinicians or communication specialists . . Here the idea is to h~al the relation between the parties before any substantive issues can be treated. Intellectual analysis can't be successfully engaged in until _, the emotional problems are processed and an adequate communication process established between the parties. For this reason the partieipants are trained in 135 communication and conflict resolution techniques as well as involved in joint work projects such as tree planting or desert reclamation.The participants are often recruited from local conununities with a long history of violent conflict. The process-promoting workshop influences leadership indirectly by contributing to the buildii1g of a peace culture at the grassroot'level. . 136 YUGOSLA V'IA, WAR .. . Figure 1. Three types of conflict resolution and diplomacy compared. Official diplomacy Unofficial diplomacy Citizen diplomacy Process bargaining analytical problem promotion of solving improved communication and healing Focus on power relationship substantive issues emotional relationship Goal formal agreement informal agreement reconciliation, (compromise) (win-win) change of heart (win-win) Participants official · inofficial represen- · people at the grass- representatives tatives close to the root level decision-makers Typical 3:d politician or university professional party diplomat pro-fessor therapist Role of 3:d mediation with facilitation and facilitation party muscle diagnosis connecting the participants at the heart level Spokesmen Henry Kissinger John Burton Danaan Parry Edward Azar Marshall Rosenberg 1 1 Henry Kissinger was US Secretary of State 1973-77. John Burton is the founder of the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict, University College London, and presently associated with the University of Maryland Center for Development and Conflict Resolution directed by Edward Azar. Danaan Parry is the founder of the Earthstewords Network which sponsors citizen diplomacy in various conflict areas all over the world. Marshall Rosenberg coordinates the Center for Nonviolent Communication, a network with similar activities. 7HE NEED FOR UNOFFICIAL DIPLOMACY IN IDENllTY CONFLICTS Conclusio1! History teaches us that it is eh.'tremely difficult to solve conflicts over deep­ rooted social.identities. At best such conflicts can be contained by security forces but only for a while. Typically they erupt again like a volcano that never dies completely. Traditional power policies, law and order approaches as well as power-oriented negotiations and mediations more often than not aggravate the conflict. These methods do not fake the real motivating force - unmet human needs - into account. Therefore official diplomacy has to be supplemented by alternative methods of conflict resolution, if a sustainable solution is sought. Courageous people belonging to the different sides of the conflict have to meet face to face in an unofficial context to explore of the deep roots of the conflict, find creative solutions in a spirit of cooperation and spread their proposals in ever widening circles. ,·\ We have distinguished between two types of unofficial diplomacy: the problem-solving workshop, which is analytical-rational-objective, and the proc­ ess-promoting workshop, which is emotional-therapeutic-subjective. A main point is that the different methods have to be matched to the hierarchy of 13 7 authority and put to work in a particular sequence for positive results to occur. Process-promoting citizen diplomacy at the grassroot level is a · 1ong-term process of conflict resolution, which improves the conditions for problem- solving workshops at the intermediate level. Together they will generate a trickle up effect and finally a sustainable solution might be implemented or confirmed by the official authorities. list of references: Azar, E., 1990a: The management of protracted social c0nflict. Theory and cases. Dartmouth. Azar, E., 1990b: Protracted international conflicts: ten propositions. Burton, J. & Dukes, F. (editors), 1990, Conflict: readings in management & resolution. Macmillan. Burton, J., 1987: Resolving deep-rooted conflict. University Press of America. Burton, J., 1990: Conflict: Resolution and Provention. Macmillan. Christie, N., 1977: Conflicts as property. British Journal of Criminology 17(1): 1-15. Cornelius, H. & FAire, S.: 1989: Everyone can win. How to resolve conflict. Simon& Schuster, Australia. Crum, T., 1987: The Magic of Conflict. Simon & Schuster New York. Fisher, R. & Ury, W., 1983: Getting to yes, Penguin Books. Fisher, R., J. & Keashly, L, 1991: The potential complementarity of mediation and consultation within a contingency model of third party intervention, Journal of Peace Research, Vol 28 No. 1, February 1991 (p. 29-42). Friberg, M., 1990: Towards a theory of conflict and conflict resolution. Working Paper No. 2, Centre for East and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Goeteborg. Parry, D., 1991: Warrion of the heart. Sunstone Publications. Rosenberg, M., 1983: A model for non-violent communication. New Society Pub- lishers. · Part 4: Peace Process HylkeTromp The Yugoslav Crisis: Back to Sarajevo The civil war in Yugoslavia is usually described as the result of a struggle for independence between several of the Yugoslav republics, which is aggravated by ethnic conflicts and border disputes. It is more correct to describe the civil war as a struggle for power, which was the inevitable result of the end of the cold _ war. During the cold war, Yugoslavia received substantial financial and military support from both sides to prevent it from joining the Warsaw Pact or NA TO. The end of the cold war meant tf:ie end of this kind of support. The consequence was a gradually increasing budget deficit. However, none of the six autonomous republics and two-autonomous provinces in Yugoslavia, nor the federal army, was willing to decrease its level of expenditures. This left the feder. al government with no other option then to print money to cover the.deficit, which resulted in hyperinflation, up to 2600 % in one year. The austerity measures subsequently - taken by the federal government came to a deadlock, since some of the republics and in particular Serbia, used their legal rights to print money. 1 Therefore, in­ flation started to spiral again. At the same time, the end of the cold war led to the collapse of communist parties all c>Ver Europe. That started a general struggle for power, in which the members of the former communist parties tried to keep their positions while at 1 According to BogQmil Ferflla, following the collapse of the Serbian economy, the Serbian Parliament adopted three secret resolutions by which the National Bank of Serbia and the National Bank of Vojvodina credited from their printing of money the purchase of 9 billion dinars worth of hard currency in Serbian banks, payment of pensions to Serbian pensioners of 5 billion dinars, and the subsidizing of agricultural production to an amount 'of 5.2 billion dinars. The t0tal amounted to 18.2 billion dinars, which was at the time the equivalent of 1.5 billion dollars. This was the "robbery of the century" which according to this author, completed the destruction of Yugoslavia: "··· the assault on Yugoslavia's 'financial and credit system, which was engineered by Serbia in December 1990, may have destroyed the last chance for negotiations among the republics over a new confederal structure. It left seces5ion as the only alternative for republics seeking to distance themselves from the chaos and disorder in, Yugoslavia." 141 142 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... the same time, a division of power, democratization and decentralization was inevitable. In Yugoslavia, this struggle ~as seriously aggr~vated by the eco­ nomic collapse. The real issue was to decide who had to pay the bill, i.e. to cover the federal deficit. If Yugoslavia would have invested the financial support earned by staying neutral during the cold war, the same way as Western Europe did, i.e. by investing the billions of dollars of the Marshall Plan, the inevitable conflicts in Yugoslavia would not have resulted in a civil War. In that case, a transition period of gradual transformation into a more democratic and decentralized system of political decision-making would certainly have led to turmoil and disturbances but necessarily to the massive use of violence. But at the end of the cold war' Yugoslavia turned out to be still a poor, developing country, with a centralized command-economy that was as inefficient and corrupt as all other communist command economies. Yugoslavia in 1990 was therefore inhabited by millions of people who had nothing to lose and everything to earn - which is a recipe for criminal behavior, as well as war. The· billions of dollars given to Yugoslavia during almost four decades of the cold war -probably 100 billion -were not invested, but consumed. · They were, in other words, not used to increase the production capacity, but they were spent in distributing favours and grants, almost as bribes to keep everybody . content, especially the members of the Yugoslav nomenclature -the "new class" already described by Djilas in 1958. The federal army was favoured too, not only because much of the foreign support was in.military hardware, but because the federal army was regarded to be an essential instrument for keeping Yugoslavia together. Military expenditures, however, are not economically productive. . \ During the cold war Yugoslavia appeared to be economically strong, thanks to the foreign aid. The dinar belonged to the hard currencies. Yugoslavs us~d to go shopping in Italy. Expensive western cars were imported (even if the road system remained underdeveloped). Therefore, its system of "workers' self­ management" was believed to be working· efficiently. After the cold war and the decrease of foreign aid, the system collapsed. What remained was a society dependent on Western dollars and a societal structure based on their distribution, dominated by a federal army and a communist nomenclature, both eager to keep their power and their level of expenditures, in total disregard of the collapse of the economy. Under these circumstances, the dl.ssolution of Yugoslavia became inevitable when the members of the communist nomencla~ure started to change- horses in order to keep their political power. They exchanged communism for national- · WE YUGOSLAV CRISIS· BACK TO SARAJEVO · ism, were formally elected, and found themselves subsequently on a collision course. Since only Slovenia had developed an economic infrastructure which came close to Western standards, and since the only profitable investments had been made in the tourist trade along the long Croatian coastline, the newly converted nationalists in the poorer parts of Yugoslavia - especially Serbia - wanted Slovenia and · Cro'atia to cover most of the federal deficit. This was politically made possible, when Serbia in 1990 ended the autonomy of the "autonomous provinces" Kosovo and the Vojvodina. The representatives of these provinces were subsequently appointed by the Serbian authorities, and this destroyed the balance of power between republics and provinces, which was Tito's remarkable inhefitance. It gave Serbia and Montenegro the power to block all decisions with the votes of Kosovo and Vojvodina, against Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. This made Serbia the dominant, he gemonial power. It left Slovenia and Croatia with the prospect of having to pay for the old nomenclature and the federal army until the final economic collapse of Yugoslavia. Instead, they sought a more decentralized political system. Their attempts to achieve a more decentralized Yugoslavia in a "confederation", however, failed because it was urnrcceptable to the Serbian part of the former ·· nomenclatur~, now in charge in Belgrade. Their subsequent threat to declare independence did not change the Serbian position. 143 The attempt to get more independence within a confederation was doomed to fail because.it would have left Serbia and other, underdeveloped parts of the country in a hopeless situation, Even more important, it would have meant the end of the federal army, because it could not survive in its present strength without the financial support of Slovenia and Croatia. Therefore, a civil war became inevitable when Slovenia and Croatia finally declared independence on June 25th, 1991. Communism in all its variations - from Pyongyang to Havana, from Tirana to Belgrade - meant fundamentally a total centralization of all _ political and eco­ nomic power. After the cold .war, a necessary process of decentralization, however' is often misunderstood and mispresented as a struggle for sovereignty and independence, which is out-of-date as it is impossible. This is demonstrated in Western Europe, where developments since 1945 have gone in exactly the · opposite direction. Formally independent states have step by step given up parts of their sovereignty and their (formal) .independence in favor of centralized political decision-making in the European Community. In the long term, East and West will probably meet in the way their political systems distribute power, that is, in their adoption of political structures to political realities and necessities. In the immediate future, however, changing the political systems will lead to severe political conflicts in the former Soviet empire. In Eastern and Central European countries, there is no tradition or. experience in dealing with conflict .in a 144 YUGOSLAVL4, WAR ... democratic way, which presupposes that both parties are conscious of the fact that they need each other, that they are mutually dependent and therefore vulnerable, and that·they cannot win a conflict by defeating or destroying the other side. There exists for that reason to find a compromise, and they tend to continue to manage conflicts as if they could be decided by the use of violence. Therefore, all forms of political violence known from history are bound to reappear in Eastern and· Central Europe: inter-national war, intra-state (civil) wars, revolutions, coups d'etats, political assassinations and all other forms of political· terrorism that have been developed in the recent years: such as · hijacking, bomb-throwing, bank-robbing. Even nuclear blackmail is not to be excluded, as has been demonstrated already by one Serbian leader (Seselj) who threatened to blow up the nuclear energy reactor at Krsko in Slovenia, if Slovenia declared independence (the government of Slovenia closed it down after declaring independence). All of this will be seriously aggravated by the mobili­ zation of the consciousness of ethnic differences, of economic discrimination, and of historical antagonisms for the power struggle, and it will not be neutral­ ised by some awareness of the sober lessons of recent history, because these lessons hav~ never been taught. The solution for the crisis in Yugoslavia could have been the granting of more regional political and economic autonomy within a (con)federation with a central government, followed by economic liberalization and the encouraging of foreign investments, and accompanied by a radical reduction of the size of the federal army. What had to be guaranteed simultaneously in· order to prevent ethnic conflict, would not have been the one or other line of demarcation between regions, but the same basic rights and possibilities to all wherever they live. This is not utopian: it is even normal, and much can be learned from the experiences in the United States. Moreover, this is the situation that is coming into existence within the European Community, whose member-states have decided to abandon their internal borders. Instead, the newly elected communists-recycled-into-pationalists buried the real problems under purposefully mobilized feelings of ethnic separatism and antagonism. The mobilisation of such feelings, however, is not easily undone. It created new problems, first about minority rights, then about borders, and the war is now seen by most participants as a war to conquer or to defend territory. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the attempts made by the European Community (Lord Carrington) and on behalf of the United Nations (Cyrus Vance) have only resulted in making clear that it has become impossible to reach a peaceful solution. The war in Yugoslavia has now esl=alated into several wars simultaneously'. It has the characteristics of an international war, fought between official armies for 11-lE YUGOSLAV CRISIS: BACK TO SARAJEVO Croatia and Serbia. At the same time, it is a war of independence, fought by irregular militias. It is civil war resembling the Spanish civil war, because the regular army seems to be the dominant force on one side. It is a civil war resembling the Lebane. se civil war, because there are many different irregular groups and militias, fighting each other ·for no clear purpose at all, except revenge, and willing to use all means available, including the murder of unarmed civilians. Moreover, it is a war which threatens to escalate outside the Yugoslavia borders, because it involves minorities of its neighboring countries, in particular in Kosovo and Voivodina, while the Islamic population in Yugoslavia eventually looks for help from Turkey. Finally, it is a war which might easily escalate into mass-murder and genocide, not only because of the awakened reminiscences of the second world war, but because all kinds of weaponry have been piled up already and are easily available from the stockpiles accumulated during the cold war, Since "peaceful nuclear explosions" might be offered on the free market as a result of the collapse of Soviet empire, this civil war might become a nuclear war too. 2 2 International Herald Tribune, November6, 1991: "For Sale: Soviet Nuclear Blast' (p.3) and commentary by William C. Potter 11 Psst, Wanna Buy a Nuclear Bomb or Two?' 145 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR .. . 146 I Dusan ]anjic Can the War be Stopped and Yugoslavia Survive Today' s Yugoslavia is living under the shadow of total civil war. In fact, hidden within Yugoslavia are processes of democracy, free economy, and the action of citizens, groups or ethnic communities, but the tendencies of nationalist totali­ tarianism, belligerent chauvinism and militarization are strong. Viewed in this light, the latest escalation of the nationalist armed conflicts in Yugoslavia and strong commitment to secede by resorting to arms, if necessary (in case of Slovenia and Croatia) or by preserving the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia by arms, can be considered at two levels. The first and more relevant level at this stage is the internal one. A lasting and devastating crisis has caused social collapse, imposing at the same tin1e a nationalist-chauvinist option to enable the denouement of a deep crisis or agony of a society. The second level is placed in the European context. Strong, conservative impulses and trends from Europe threaten to ove.rWhelm European support for the modernization of Yugoslavia as a state. But, there is no doubt-that the attempts to divide and fragment Yugoslavia are linked to siffiilar efforts inside Yugoslavia. The strong disintegra-. tion and chauvinist processes in Yugoslavia inspire similar conservative proc­ esses and movements in Europe: Therefore, Yugo· slayia has become a priority - concern and issue in Europe. Yugoslavia furnishes an example of how to perceive and resolve many previously,suppressed, issues, doubts and hesitations concerning the latest European developments. For that, establishing the new security order in Europe or, the best, demilitarizing Europe is one of those primary issues a part of their activities should focus on. The arms concentration in Yugoslavia (a gravely sick patient in the he~rt of Central Europe and Balkans) imposes anobligation on all relevant actors in Europe to voice their concern and responsibility for this ·situation. Therefore, the disarmament of Yugoslavia is one of the primary questions, related to a future, peaceful and democratic development. At the same time, this means that European public opinion and governments should refrain from extending support to any of the ruling nationalist elites in Yugoslavia.' They should promote peace and other initiative. s to reduce further 147 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR .. . militarisation in these areas. A c9mprehensive study of all peaceful ways to resolve conflicts through the system of CSCE, EC, th¥ Council of Europe, the European Parliament and UN should be made. This implies the ability to "consume" all feasible consequences, induding disintegration, in the aftermath of the East-European collapse. Europe must exploit all means to prevent its return into a pre-political state where the "ethnic" - the call of blood and soil, irrationality and emotions - overwhelms reason, tolerance and Demos. Over the past twenty years, Yugoslavia has hesitated regarding the moderni­ satron road, although it was faced with the - prolonged crisis and the breakdown of the state-socialist model. Unfortunately, Yugoslavia has irrevocably taken the path of nationalism leading ultimately to civil war. National interests, allegiance to national' leaders an<;l the call of blood have become the guiding ideas of most political parties and citizens in present day Yugoslavia. The political jargon has become permeated with words such as readiness to sacrifice, retaliation, defence, war and victory, while simultaneously, words like,Peace, community, socialism, solidarity, man and love, have silently disappeared from the language, in large part unnoticed. There is an upsurge of ethnic controversies, intolerance and detachment. With the triumph of nationalism in the absence of genuine 148 democracy, the.outcome is familiar. The conflicts have been sharpened at all ,___ __ levels: (a) The first level implies conflicts among federal units that because of their stat'!JS as nation-states necessarily assume the properties of ethnic conflicts. (b) The second level of the problem is reflected in the conflicts between particular national/ethnic collectivities. This issue is pending.in all multi-e. thnic 1 _ communities. The question posed is how to avoid polarisation and grouping into , the opposed blocks in a situation of fear of the hegemony of the most populous and influential ethnic community, like the Serbian nation. At this level, the Serbian-Albanian and the Serbian-Croatian conflicts are manifested most dras­ tically. The deterioration in inter-ethnic relations, especially between Serbs and Croats, hampers the final denouement of the crisis. The impact of Serbian­ Croatian relations is directly devastating for the very survival of Yugoslavia :.- (c) Escalation of conflicts, inter-ethnic as well, is manifested at all levels of daily life and communications (at work, in family, socializing etc.). At this level, the preval~nce .~f collective-' andnational - ethnic consciousness and identification is visible. There is a pronounced politicization of everyday life, too. Unfortunately, a lot of people are ready tO go to war for the protection ~ting, there might be many victims in Yugoslavia's civil war. Arid it is just CAN THE WAR BE sTOPPED AND YUGOSIA VIA SURVIVE no~ that it has to demonstrate thatcivil war is a game with a nil to nil score. Civil war brings casualties, not the solution to any problem. Therefore, I look towards the activity and all democratic and peace-loving forces in their commitment to a peaceful and democratic settlement of all conflicts. Can Yugoslavia Survive? In the situation of extremely· sharp ethnic and other political tensions and conflicts with the shadow of total civil war enveloping all parts of Yugoslavia, it seems that Yugoslavia exists on the map, but no longer in reality. A long process of fragmentation and overall disintegration is coming to an end. The question raised at this moment is the following one: Can Yugoslavia survive, at all? Or, after Yugoslavia, what? The political will to preserve Yugoslavia has almbst vanished. The dominant political will is manifested in a wide range of options, starting with the idea that Yugoslavia as a state is untenable (this attitude is notably supported by the authorities and public opinion in Slovenia) to the prevalent stance in Croatia ·where Yugoslavia is viewed as a "prison of nations" and as such it should be buried since it is no longer capable of surviving. The third option favours the maintenance of Yugo~lavia on new foundations, one of these being the creation of sovereign nation-states that would arrange interrefations on an equal footing (the attitude supported at the latest referendum in Macedonia and favoured by most people and parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Yugoslavia. should be de­ fended as long as it can "serve" the purpose of one's own nation-state building in compliance with the international law provisions in this respect (the position . held by the incumbent authorities in Serbia anq a large segment of public opinion, but also by the political parties of Serbs both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia). However, there is also a significant portion 0f public opinion hopeful that there is a chance to modernise Yugoslavia and establish an entirely new state anq social order in its present geopolitical space. Of course, this new state would . respect European integration standards. But, with civil war raging in Yugoslavia, this segment has turned into a _ "silent majority", deprived of a chance to accomplish its own objectives. Hence, in the domain of political will, the hithe~o Yugoslavia has beert dead for some time now. At the same time, the will to preserve Yugoslavia and reconstruct it on new grounds is not voiced strongly enough. 149 150 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... Nevertheless, this does not imply the absence of the necessity for a gradual transition into some new relationships. This need is substantiated by the very fact of Yugoslavia' s existence and it should be taken into account by all means. At this stage, the question "What is Yugoslavia today?" remains open. The answers to this question have become less certain or definite, particularly with the nationalistic rejection of Yugoslavia, both as a state and as a social conununity. Contrary to the view which perceives Yugoslavia as a mere sum of self-sufficient nation-states, it can also be seen as an embodiment of Europeanism in terms of plurality and the necessity for regional integrations. Yugoslavia is a pluralist society, heterogeneous ethnically. Generally speak­ ing, not a single Yugoslav nation (not even the Serbian nation which had a "classical" national movement and, as a consequence,-its own nation state) has been organised into a state along ethnic and national boundaries, not even at the time of "national burgeoningf'. Some of the nations- if we are to neglect the often unreliable historic memory of medieval states - had gained their statehood only in the postwar Yugoslavia. Against this, only . strong nationalistic political bureaucracies were developed. There was a marked polarisation_ in all nations between the social strata strongly in support of chauvinist aspirations in their own nation, and thqse strata that genuinely fought for the emancipation of their nation, promoting at the same time the idea of conununal living with all other · nations. All these circumstances will make the . political factors, especially states, a "value" worth attaining, and capable of acting as a significant "promoter" of historic and national development. Consequently, the political aspects of the current ethnic conflicts are still dominant, blurring at the time being the social background of these conflicts. · A complex national structure, and the different historic conditions in which the Yugoslav nations have developed, make social and political life in Yugoslavia rather complicated and disputable, and Yugoslavia itself a very heterogeneous and potentially a conflict-ridden society. Therefore, the solution is not in any violent disruption of national plurality. This is one of the major counterarguments to increasingly strong attempts to resolve the crisis by abolishing every form of plurality and individuality with the exception of one's own national particularity. _ This can only aggravate existing problems; ultimately resylting in an atmosphere of widespread fear for one's own national survival, and Jx>tentially at the same time the national isolation within national-state boundaries, and potentially provoking some riew conflicts. All this implies the need to grasp the conflicting · nature of our social reality, and also to. underuike efforts so as to direct and control conflicts, instead of resorting to violent suppression as a means to resolve them. CAN THE WAR BE STOPPED AND YUGOSIA WA SURVIVE In addition to a danger provoked by nationalism and nationalistic totalitarian­ ism, and in the light of historio experience, there is no doubt that no collapse of any state in history has occurre_ d without major armed conflicts. The division of Yugoslavia under present circumstances is the safest way of dividing Europe into East and West again. One should bear in mind that Yugoslavia represents a sort of European microcosm. If Yugoslavia fails to attain the cooperation and co­ existence of various nations and the most influential religions ov~r the globe (i.e. Islam and Christianity) and different Christian Faiths (Catholic and Orthodox), and the integration of the undeveloped South and the developed North, it is less likely that Europe itself will be successful in attaining its goals. Because of all this, the question of whether Yugoslavia i~· capable of making a new start, liberal-democratic and federalist by nature, is at the same tin1e a test of whether the united Europe is feasible at this moment. It is also well-known that no war waged after 1945 has brought about the final settlement of any . conflict. Besides the arguments expounded above, there exist genuine r· easons to preserve all sorts of links established in Yugoslavia so far. This pertains not o_nly to economic reasons (such as common market, interlinkage of economic structures, regional integrations, but also the enormous costs related to setting 151 up new economic subjects and independent markets, especially in view of the imminent economic-financial collapse in Yugoslavia). B~sides, all kinds of social and human links have been established, comprising all levels of commu- . nication, especially, inter-ethnic and inter-cultural, mixed marriages and over two. million "international" individuals, claiming to have a multi-ethnic self­ identity. In this context, there is a growing need for a lasting, democratic · settlement of controversial issues in order to avoid the 'vicious circle of continued irredentist aspirations ori the one hand, and unification wars, on the other hand. In present circumstances, with only two options at stake - the nationalist one and civil war - there is no chance of fulfilling the need for a peaceful settle!llent. The imposition of the rule of law is the only way to disrupt the vicious circle of political voluntarism, war and senseless bloodshed, all this in order to create the conditions where a reliable answer to whether a new beginning is possible, . could be given. At this point, the emphasis should be placed on resolving the key questions in order to prevent further escalation of war conflicts. Simultaneously, problems in the domain of the protection of human and civil rights and the rights of minorities, should also be addressed. To my mind, the current situation in Yugoslavia is like a shock.,.phase ~ith many primitive and aggressive traits and Yugoslavia's tribal war is only a bloody transitional period. Compromise be­ tween peoples must be reached and oniy democracy should be the_ future for Yugoslavia. In fact, democracy is the main long-term goal in Yugoslavia. The present ethnic animosities and struggles are an historical cul-de-sac; which will, unfortunately, take many victims. --- 152 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... In fact, at the present moment, Yugoslavia is facing the same problems as at the time of its constitution. These problems are as follows: first, how to arrange relations among particular parts of a state community. Very sharply opposed views are offered as an answer to this question. In fact, the major question posed in Yugoslavia today does not concern the matter of federal or confederative order, but the question whether there is the readiness, strength and relevant social and political interest in making a new start. The second problem is a fear of the danger of hegemony of the most numerops (Serbian) nation and the greatest nation state (Serbia). This fear is spreading, strengthening at the sa~e time a kind of anti-Serbian block. Thus, society as a whole and each ethmc co~unity is directing an enormous and unproductive waste of energy in permanent conflicts that even result in human casualties. In the present circumstances, a model that could avoid the most drastic outcome of the conflicts, which would naturally affect the security in the Balkans, Central-Eastern Europe and Europe as a whole, is one which would quit the narrow optic of extreme nationalism but also the optic that understands Yugoslavia as a melting pot for all ethnic and other peculiarities and differences. But, at the deepest level, radical reform must be carried out, primarily in the economic sphere. Economic revival and the transfer of state property should lead us to a market-oriented economy, free competition and communication. This should be accompanied by the instruments and procedures of "complicated democracy" '\\'."hich is 'the only feasible democracy in multi-ethnic and pluralist societies. One step in this direction is the establishment ofa powerful civil society and democratic public. To begin with, there has to be consensus about the legitimacy of all national interests that have emerged. Upon this, we should s~rt realising the above interests differently from the steps undertaken so far. First, we should revive the economy and solve the pressing life and social problems of citizens. A break should be made with a political role of the military and police apparatus by placing them under the control of Parliament and the democratic public. Then, a consensus that is binding on all parties, about a limited moratorium should be reached until finding a final solution with regard to Yugoslavia's future. In this manner, we could ensure the indispensable transitional period. In which the relations could be regulated by a Constitutional Charter or {l Peace Treaty. Ev~ry problem could be solved by negotiation. But a big Yugoslav problem is the lack of people who are good at negotiation. The Yugoslav pol~tical scene is full of belligerent figures and democratic and peace-loving opinion is undevel­ oped. Apart from various monitoring missions, threats and cease-fires to impose the blockade and sanctions,itshould support all p1pjects, social strata, politicians CAN lliE WAR BE STOPPED AND YUGOSIA VIA SURVIVE and individuals competent and ready to accomplish democracy and modernisa­ tion. There is no doubt that the ruling political elites do not fall into this category. In fact, escalating the violence and waging war area sign of their failure, not of success. It's a sign that effective problem-solving and conflict-resolution have failed too. In the long-term process of peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building and, finally, conflict-resolution, there have been many concrete steps to stop the war in Croatia; to develop a new order with peace-keeping and reconciliation; to demilitarize and to develop common security; to re-democratize and build a long-term social justice etc. All that needs the new internal and international concepts and strategies of no easy ways o)lt of past and the current Yugoslav turbulent times to a better future .. How can the War be Stopped? The starting point of the strategy for a peaceful and democratic settlement of a grave political, social, economic and cultural crisis in Yugoslavia must take into account the true situation. This is primarily the recognition of the raging civil war in Yugoslavia. With this in mind, the first question is how to get out of this war. At stake is first, the refusal of war and second, the termination of war and res­ toration of peace. I The refusal of the actual civil war can be understood as a moral, political and intellectual position corresponding to the appropriate cognition. The gist of this knowledge lies in the refusal of chauvinist culture and the dominant state of awareness on the political and public scene in Yugoslavia at this moment. The refusal of war is a logical consequence of an awareness and recognition of the character of the war itself - it is viewed as a bloody cul-de-sac in historic terms. The intensification of war substantiates the thesis that conflicts are no longer controlled, especially in the domain of inter-ethnic relations. In essence, the indispensa_ ble and long-awaited liberation from the totalitarian rule and (Com­ munist-Socialist) collectivism can on no account be achieved through the ideas of nationalistic totalitarianism, national homogenisation and mobilisation of masses on these grounds. However, the truth is that the above figure as the guiding principles in the programmes of the incumbent national-republic authorities. Consequently, the fulfillment of individuality and individual's iden­ tity and his "ego" have been hampered together with the disruption of the process of creating an open society. With the collapse of the former system of values and the then legitimate power and its institutions, people have embraced what has been left to them, i.e. deeply 1 rooted tradition, culture and communal. 153 154 YUGOSL4 VIA, WAR ... gathering. In the background of all these deeply-rooted layers there is one common denominator, i.e. nationalism, existent since an earlier date as a personal and political position of people, but also as an adverse position to "others". In reality, we witnessed a controversial process which was at work in Yugoslavia from 1945 to the.late 1980s. On the one hand, national conflicts were suppressed for the sake of the dominant image of a socialist society as a conflict­ , free society. In the sphere of values, priority was given to class, proletarian and the so-called socialist values under the slogan of "Brotherhood and Unity". The authorities helped the suppression process which was also accepted by most citizens who had long considered this ruling order to be legitimate. National conflicts, on the other hand, seem to have been incited with the collapse of the totalitarian system of state socialism. It was at this point that parts of the Communist elites had tilted to nationalistic ideology and its elites in an attempt to maintain p:>wer, without offering anything new. At tin1es, conflicts can have a very stimulating and beneficial effect, particularly when they challenge people to do their best in order to create a new set of values. Adversely, there are conflicts which are destructive by nature, and as such, totally unproductive for the promotion of democracy. Such conflicts tend to bring into question the democratic procedures and institutions themselves, that have basically been built to serve citizen and not any national or some other collectivity. The national conflicts themselves are emotionally loaded and difficult to control. Once control over these conflicts is lost, civil war can e. asily be ignited. This is especially true for a society such as Yugoslavia with an enormous strength of state socialism still at ~ork. This social setting is also convenient for a special type of the authoritarian. personality, strongly oriented towards the state-building concept. In this social milieu, the refusal of involve­ ment in civil war supposes the existence of another· kind of political culture unlike the authoritarian or etatist. This newly-emerging political culture is to rely on the conscious recognition of the inevitability of conflicts in a society. One can live with them, once people are prepared and taught how to resolve conflicts in order to be able to live together. This is quite important for the inte'r-personal level of communication. Ethnic groups make it p:>ssible for us to assert and name the sides in conflicts (such is the example of the Serbian and Croatian ethnic groups that have come into conflict). Unfortunately, not a word is uttered about the cause of this conflict situation. The answer to this could be found in the following elements: first, in the inability to transform the former state-socialist regime into a modern society without undergoing serious and great social, political, inter-ethnic and all other kinds of upheavals; second, in the collapse of the previous system of social CAN THE WAR BE STOPPED AND YUGOSIA VIA SURVIVE organisation and in the absence of the appropriate mechanisms of conflict­ resolution; third, in a deep global and structural crisis that has existed for a long period without a proper solution. Thus, the crisis had been reduced to a political one while later it assumed the form of an inter-ethnic conflict. Furthennore, the reduction of inter-ethnic relations to a Serbian-Croatian conflict has brought into the question the viability of Yugoslavia as a state construct. In tum, this has triggered off the new border claims violating the existent balance of power in this corner of Europe, threatening at the same time global p~ace and security in this region;fourth, in the unresolve'tl past which is primarily mirrored in the historic awareness and memories of one's own ethnic identity and its social develop­ ment, later to turn into a historic perception of the other group which is involved in the curreilt conflicts and the analysis of their communal living since earlier. The fact that the legacy from the past had not been addressed properly is quite evident in the vocabulary people have turned to, but also in respect of the guiding ideas and political demands. Notably, people have returned into the past, first and foremost, into the 1941-45 period. This period was the time of inter­ etlmic war iniprinted in our social memory as "a fratricidal war''. This past appears to be one of the major reasons for total fanaticism in conceiving the overall political or public life. Finally, at work is tl1e excessive fabrication of contemporary history which:is a sign of great political voluntarism that cannot be so easily surpassed. Thus, the dormant national antagonisms have turned into open conflicts, ultimately leading to civil war because of a long-lasting social crisis itl. the conditions of the it1stitutional democratic system. This was aggravated by the fact that the former political elites were determit1ed to maintait1 power, even at the expense of further sharpening of conflicts and acquiescence to chauvit1ism. The incumbent political elites have played a significant'role in the current war conflict and they can equally contribute significantly to the settlement of political and armed conflicts. Although, a great number of political leaders can be labelled as irresponsible, incompetent or even sick, tl1eir most outstanding problem is related to the lack of the correspondit1g political programmes that could promote the democratic model in their respective nation-states. The concept of arranging relations in the space of the hitherto Yugoslavia is also missing. There is pressing need for sound economic programmes, while lll the area of human rights, the prevalent formula and solution is grounded on the Communist doctrine of "equality of all citizens and peoples". In view of the actual armed conflicts, the incumbent leaderships lack a clear-cut conception and they are unable to exert further control over the forces in conflict. At the time being, there is neither the assessment of the toll nor the prediction how long the armed conflict is to last. Nevertheless, the incumbent leaderships share one common p:>int: the desire to gain a high profile and promotion in the current collflict, naturally enough, at the expense of "others", particularly the remnants of the feoeral state. With this- 155 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR ... goal in mind, the leaderships endeavour to improve their position within their own nation-states (republics) or ethnic communities/natio9s. In this, they are confronted with a serious problem, namely, with the obvious social and national heterogeneity (with the exception of Slovenia to some extent). This heterogene­ ity is a specific phenomenon of Yugoslav (and also Soviet) society, which in turn, should imply a greater e>..1.ent of tolerance. Yet, in Yugoslavia today this increased tolerance is to be found among citizenship and not the leaderships (totally opposite to the practice in democratic societies). The leaderships in Yugoslavia have becom~ radical and fanatical, gathered on the grounds of chauvinism and hatred. It is exactly on these grounds that they attempt to mobilize people, provoking simultaneously fresh conflicts that can be hardly controlled. In general, there is an upsurge of the forces of destruction which are by rule more pervasive, efficient and quicker in comparison with gradual building and promotion of new relations. The war crisis is at the same time the period of learning and building of a new order which is, however, unthinkable if the way out of this war is not found promptly. This can be achieved only by the penetration of )'rational forces". The burg~oning civil society can be considered as such a rational force although weak and jeopardized at the present 15 6 moment. Its members are potentially exposed to prosecution and discrimination ·~--- as "national traitors" . Nonetheless, only on the basic principles of civil society can a way out of the war be found. Specific social groups - such as mothers, soldiers, young people and intellectuals - could perform a significant role in a civil society. It is just because of the above said that further support should be extended to the efforts undertaken, so far, by peace movements, independent mass media, groups of intellectuals etc. An awareness about the absurdity of war should further be fostered and encouraged so as to increase anti-war sentiments and halt the war. In opposition to this are extremely strong pro-war Sentiments, officially encouraged by the ruling authorities and mass media expressed in the war propaganda. This is also helped by the support of certain segments of European and the world public opinion in favour of one of the sides in conflict. All this war-mongering is aimed at proving that it is not feasible to back the strategy of peaceful and democratic settlement of the problem of how to live with "others". However, this incites again a new chain of war conflicts and victin1s resulting in hate. Undoubtedly, war is not a means of resolving any problem. On the contrary, it only multiplies them. The problems themselves cannot remain as mere inter­ ethnic conflicts but, due to the logic of international linkage a;:; a method and content of the internationalization . of the Yugoslav· crisis up to now, they · inevitably become the problems of a wider community, especially the European, and of this particular area of Europe. The Yugoslav crisis will most certainly destabilise neighbouring countries. The ethnic principle can be activated but CAN 1HE WAR BE STOPPED AND YUGOSIA VIA SURVIVE there is a danger of possible territorial disputes. This prediction is substantiated by the research of Times Mirror Center For The People and The Press from Washington. According to them, 84% of people polled in Russia, 81 % in Czecho­ Slovakia, 56% in Hungary and 54% in Poland perceive an "enemy" in a neigh­ bouring state. Accordingly, the critical trouble spots are viewed along almost all border points between Yugoslavia and its neighbouring countries (with the exception of the Romanian-Yugoslav border). This research, like other knowledge, indicates the further strengthening of ethnic prejudices, conflicts, xenophobia, chauvinism and even racism throughout Europe. In this context, the current events in Yugoslavia should be viewed as an integral part of the emerging "neoconservaJive chain" in Europe. This war must be halted in order to provide some new forms of communal living. This implies that not all questions are to be left for the "post-war" period. The basic assumption to halt the war is to give an answer to some political issues (such as the principles of the future state order in these regions). At this point, we must bear in mind that people will go on living side by side in this area, if not as "brothers" then, at least, as civilised neighbours. Of course, this will be aggrayated by the historic and the latest experiences of utter hate and blood$_hed too. In spite of everything, it is possible to establish relations among the existing ethnic groups, even in their future nation-states, on the model of co-existence and peaceful living instead of the principle of the domination. It is true that main preconditions for the establishment of such a model are democratic procedures and institutions, but also a new, democratic political culture. This culture presupposes the recognition of the identity of "others", politics pursued on professional lines and living in a multi-ethnic community on good-will principles. Because of this, the principles and founda­ tions of this new order should be established without delay. In order to halt the war flame , it is necessary to establish a force that would mediate between the forces involved in t.Qe war. In the present situation when each of the contending sides estimates that with some "additional effort" it can win the war and, in this way, impose its own conditions, the chances of ensuring a complete cease-fire are very slim. Yet, there is still some hope. As regards the conflict, the current civil war can primarily be r~cognized by violence between two nation-states (Serbia and Croatia) and the remnants of the federal a{ithorit 1 y, represented by the. Yugoslav People's Army. In compliance with the internal balance of power, the Yugoslav Army has taken the side of Serbia. Besides the general escalation of war, there are still areas free from open and violent ethnic conflicts, but there also exist some "islands of tolerance". These.areas can easily be destabilised and destroyed because their present exemption from violence is not an indication that they are conflict-free zones (in support of this we can give the example of the existent conflicts between Macedonia and Serbia, Serbs and Albanians or Serbs and Muslims). However, there is a possibility to avoid violence there. Therefore, the localisation of conflicts and prevention of their spreading to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mac~donia, Kosovo or Sandjak, - appears a priority task. 157 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR·'· Related to this is also the need to stop hostilities in the regions of Croatia that are at war at present. To attain this goal, it is necessary to establish an international rule which can ensure peace and the security of all citizens regardless of their nationality (this in1plies the involvement of peace-keeping forces from the United Nations and Europe but also the engagement of local militia and other armed formations including the Yugoslav People's Army). This rule should help the return of refugees and their adjustm~nt to living in the areas that are ethnically mixed. Furthermore, it is of vital importance to revive economic, political and cultural life on the provisional foundations determined by the Peace Treaty. Normal life should be restored in order to make/ it possible to stage a referendum wh one extent, where it seemstb have alre3;dy far surpassed.its original ·gr;unds (dis<:Jitnm'ation ()f nationalities, mih6rity pmt~cti()ns, 'etc)? It se~J.11S - • . almos(as if the sqi~'ie ."a~celeration of time"whieh we have witness.~d at_ the· end . Of th~ last decac:le, has On one hand §Wept away the top ~fpeaceless·Slru~tUres, . while at tl;l{!,: same tiin~ d(ie to it, s v~fy ,peace ';" malfing it,'imp?ssib,le . t~ i 1 fast ' enough" bujld 'up lpng-term institutions and mechanisn:is that are necessary for .. . a . civilized. h~ndling' bf conflicts, : These institutions and mechariisms woiJld: be · . "com_erstonesi' of a p~~~e. ~ulture; where war. as· a social fustithtiori could be ' br opting 'out altogethe~ (Croats) - . · .. . .· _ · - Somey relatively rich.peoples want to live altogether (Sloven's) :- There are some underdeve~oped M _ uslim parts (Kosovo) , - Boundar~es inside the federation were largely draw11 on the premise that the existence of the federation made their exact location unimportant. ~If the union is dissolved into its iridiv'idual parts, that leaves si_ zable parts of the state,.carrying people outside-its 9wn r~public (more than 3 millions Serbs, more than one 'third of them all) ' ' ' ' ' .:. I_ n · some nation~lly mixed republics (Bosnia), the populations ;ire intermingled thatthere is nopradic;aJ:>le way of dividing them up ip uni-national political units. . - · · . Where the issue of seces~ion and bounda:rie_ s -the cau_se of the corit1ict- is · concerne~, there seem to be two contrasting cases:_ · 1) In Slov~11i~, only a few percent of Sl~vens iive outside Slovenia and only a · few percent of Sloven inhabitants are non-Slovens. Boundar~es should hardly b~come a probl~m, if secession is agreed. · · · · · - 2) In Croatia, by contrast; there is a s~zable Serbian minority.(600.000 pe6-ple, i2 percent of the population in Croatia),~a great part of which f()rms a focal majority in tI?-e part:ofKfajina. _ CONDffiONS AND ELEMENTS OF A PEACE PROCESS Here the issue bf secession becomes almost inseparable from the issue of boundaries, leading to a deadlock situation: . . . . The Croatian goverrunent insists both on an independent Croatia and on that -beihg the present republic of Croatia (or even inclusion of croat-inhabited in Bosnia and in northern Serbia) .. . ..... . ' , It is unpossible to yield on either de.µiand without risking a coup d'etat from even more feiverit nationalists. The local Serbian population in frontier areas insist on not becoming part of an independent' Croatia, asking Ser(Js elsewhete and the gove~nment of Serbia for support. · · The, Croatian gover~ment is in the following dilemma: it cannot get Croati~ out of Yugoslavia without abandoning some predominantly Serbian areas; lfot . it _ · carinot abandon these areas without risking !ts political life (or more)! On the other hand, the government of Serbia must support the local Serbs in Croatia to safeguard its(!) political life; if not, these Serbs are anyhow ~ikely. to resist to the bullet. 1 . - · , - - The notion of "security dilemrna" during the cold war era was an expressi~n for the objective or perceived incapacity of one state 'or 'mil!tary alliance -~o have certainty of the "real" intentions of the other part, and th,us always to have depart 'from a "worst-case" '-thinking. "Security" in that context was perceived as · "holding one's own" by mobilizing proper power-re'somces, wP,ile striving for delimitation-and encapsulation, which in tum-had as consequences a "P_atho- , logical-autodynamics" of fear (Senghaas), fear-projedion, competitive anns- · building and enemy fixation. · · , · · So it seems as if iii Yugoslavia the sa~e kirid ~f p_robl~matic auto-dynamics · takes place, orily this time at ail intersocietal and/or intra.,.state level Maybe it wm,ild be possible therefore to apply certain praxeologies of peace re~earch that '' were elaborated in an inter-state context characterized by the East-West conflict -~uch as confidence building µieastires, "cs>minon ~ecurity"; unilateralism, gradualism, · etc,.? So fa~ peace researchers_ hav~ argued for· an intei-systemi~ co-evolution anq .. ilcommort security") now the .far ~ore complex task would I be to lay theoretical . and practkal foundations for. a "rhulti-nationaf' co-evofotion arid "common security''· There mJght even still be hope that the civil Wat in Yugoslavia would . . le~d to a ''dead end", because more arid more soldiers would just leav~ the armies 1 Hakan Wiberg," Divided Nations and pivideti States'~ Working Paper l 1/199f, Center for Peace · and Conflict Research, Copenhagen. ' ' ' 171 ., I ' 172 ,..· ' .~ ' \ . . YUGOSLAVIA; WAR ... and national guards; or that ~ . .Pe~ce movement would foqnitself as "<;ivil society from1 below" and ~y hund,reds of activities.for non-violent conflict resolution ·enfdrce a ·change in thought~: . policy, an:d action of the peopl~ in charge. _ Nevertheless.if'seems nece~sary,·howev:er, to start thinking apd acting also in a iong~termpetsp'ective. :whichfheories, · c.oncepts and experiences of peace-and conflict research could, be ,made applicaJ:?le _ and. const~di'pe regarding th'e crisis ' in Yug~slavia; orori' th,e'qtherhan(i, whdt could we karnfrom th1scrisisforour goal of a more peaceful Europe? I WilJ try_ here to sketch some basic principles, ; approaches and core elements of such _ a_ pea5e process. . - -. ... Approach ilie prot,I~m without pres~ption .an~ · silli_eiifl.cat~on - '/ . . ' . 1 . ' . . '.' - ' . .· .. Taking' into con~ide _ratl~n the e~periences so far; the comp~ity of the ~~is .. .. would call fOr a diff erentiatecl perspective which avoid any thinking~ Cate go des - of bfack ail<;l 'white anh1ti6ri would be·built within the framework of thes~ comprehensive institutions .. ; . ' ..... " . ' . t .• -. Future orientation ·Even ire' ali;tic;lly a p~ace~plan ~ill - have tq d~part from ·the fact, that "Yugoslavia" as such does µot exiSt any more, any attempt at_ solving_ the issue . _ -will have to take into cqhside:rationthe gi_ven realities of intermingled.populations . ,m, a nationally mjxed ge~giaphical are~ . · Serbs, . Croats, M~cedonians and .. Bosnianswill alsp in the futurehave- ea<;h other as Qeighbo~rs; Any apprqach tq - .peace will have · ro' lie in tfie_J~tun{and Mt.in the past._ Such an orie_ ntation , to~ards · the .future ffi.ight, without "suppressing the past" be capable toa~cept and. "endureii 'diff eren~es; this, attitude being ihe modus vivendi for i'PeacefuJ · 't'oexistence" .. Out 'of~a~y ~nd various _ blueprints fo~a eommon ~turethat .kmd . of - "meta-option'\ might ac~rl1e;, wl1ich Without constitUthig a menac~ to any of the •parts to the ~oflfli<:'t bes~ reflects tot:nmori 'future interests · beyond all · contradi~~~ons:. · J ; · -' _· 'Needs-~rleiitatio~ . ' . - ,' :1 ' .. , ' .. : . ' . .. . ' ~ . ' · \, ' )". ' -Ethno-natio~ali5tmdbilti4fions, as· they have:~merged ie. also ii1 Yugoslavia, . m9st1f becb~e immanerit when µle ;"protection'. .~f po~sessions ~nd posif:ioris", ·, • and:i(ie-tejecti~n arid9efenc~ a:ga~st"fordgn infil~ati<;>f1" ~n4 · 11 coercedass~i,:. ' I '. '; , · · .• " • . "". • I ~ • i • ·, .. • - . . •' . ·.· • . ~ • ' .. • • ., • ' . ·. • "\ • : ' ; • • .\., -,, • • / ," • ! ·, . . ~, . 173 - :;.·, , , '• '.; . \ YUG_OSLA VIA, WAR ... lation" are at stake. 2 However, this mechari~m is in principle based and depend­ ent on basic economic, political and cultural interests. The core of such a conflict is therefore competing strategies to regain and/or secure "life-chances" (ie . . language, economic welfare, self-devdopinent; perspecti'Ves for identity for­ mation and developmerit). These basic n~eds; which certainly. set the criteria for any peace order, have been charaderized as follows by Johan Galtung in his broad notion of violence: surv. ival needs, well-being needs, identity, meaning needs and-freedom needs. 3 . • · ' / . · . Self-deterinination ·~without limi~" in the framework of democracy If it holds true that there·are no "-marxists - concerning the Danube lylonarchy. · Expressed in short: "nationality" should riot be strictly · defined according to a certain territory, but shoul<;I ra,ther be~ome operative more on a personal l~vel ("cling" with constitutionally gliarantied rights to a ·respective person). According to eg. Karl Renner, a far-reaching "de-territoriali- . · zation" of "f1ation" should take place· which could -in turn be replaced by tl;le e: stablishment of"nations" as "personal-associations" and collective legal sub-· jects with quasi state-coinpetences. 4 ' . ' , Peaceful co-existence instead of "autistic escalatlon-dynami~s" Anothet mechanism at the-level.of "iritern~tional politics" that could serve as a model for .peacefully dealing ~ith conflicts would be the pripcipl~s and . experiences orthe CSCE process which could be applied at the "intra-state" or regional level· of Yugoslavia. For the daily growing sec~rity dilemmas can be step-by-step decreased only through the creation of. "r~liabilities of ~pectaiion." (2), a.rid Confidence Building Measures based Ori armed control (this would ill the first place iniply curtailment arid control of the rp.ilitary apparatus .of the conflict-parties. It would have been very desirable to prevent the conflict from turning irito "autistic. escalation..:dynamics" (Senghaas), which becomes almost jjlsoluble frotn inside: this is a major. part unfortunately already seems to have happei1ed iri Yugoslavia. This "autism" is characterized py encapsulation; ' 'fiXation to enemy images, cut off of communicatfon, narrowing of intellectual horiZon$·_ as well as irrational and ·f~arful warding off of 'the "other", which sup~sedly 1night destroy one's own identity. ' 4 Egbert .Jahn, · Die [Jedeutung der oe~terreichischen sozialdemokratische~ . Nationalittentheorie fur;die gegenwartige:Natina(ittenpro~lematikin Europa, ¥ariu.Skript,' .Mai 1991, Frankfurt am Main ' . · . · · · · . '· · - , . . ...·•.i 17$ .. Yi!GQS1A. V7A, WAR ... .. , I . /Transformation of "identity-conflictS" into coriflicts ~of ititerests.. · What WbUld be the.main poiilt ~ :Sl,lCh a.stage, would pe to use the .w~ll- · . . considered support of a third' party (UN, CSCE) to ."empower" .the conflictirig ... parties to liberate themselv~s from the : perceived fixation of non-solu. ble iden:- . • .. tity~conflicts . arn;I regress this aga~ · to the level orriegotiable and reckonable conflicts of bt~res.t. to learn such a "constn.lctlve cultury of deaJing w.ith cohllicts" .. would mean in'the first place to ·atte~pt to see.the co~texi; ill which certain .. prol:?lems find their expression, as one that is ch.arigeabiea.nd capable of ~Jiange, sothatbasic contlict~~ofinterestnot immediately \ead to "autistic blU1dness" and ·emotional self-refer~rice 'characteristic for identity mriflict:S. · · . . ,. . . ·; ,, . ' . : Peace .·Keeping as · a first st~p to'f'ards . "pe~ce , making'; .~nd "peace building'' 176 Of course, all these-ideas andproposaJs have two precon<;:iitions: t.IJ.e will and · ·. 'the possibilitie.sfo engag~ in kmg term; comp~ehensive, ·and'Jair negotiatiops, ... . during which as'a matter of fact the ~ighting muststop.Jiom today'- sperspective; -· . if one wantS to~s~ctire that preconaino!l, military ''Peace keeping ''might ha vetb . . be-t~ken . into '. consid~ration as n~cessary preco-ndtiidn but · not as substitute }Or ·, '•ipeace - making" and " : peace_ building 1 i. If at all_ military measures should play a . role, then. they 'should be ·carried' ou( faher in the framework. of Europe as• fl -whole (CSCE) ahd noi fro~ parts f the · . \ .. · United ·N"auoiis .:are cqncemed, they are .- a,t the . moment .. based< on a: legal- · · "iinprovisati9n'I. somt~where p~tween ·chapte~·6(Pa ~cifit Setdenient 9f Disputes)· .. . ·and .Chapter 7 (~ction'with Respect to Threats- to the Peace. ;).Ther~ is no doubt· -abo~t the neces, slty to ~·~~ w.~ ·m.su:um~rit . in ~ piore flexible . and bro;d -mann~r . . ~lsoq>li.cediihgthe so~called 11 inter:.sfate"·<:oiiflk~ .. ~hkhin the lohgron would_ . make :t).~cessaly tB tmpiOye anq extend the legal an. d political ba.ses 'of this prir\c;ipte .irt the UN ~~:iiter . . · ! · , _ , · · · · . ... ~I: . T<)ward~ _ a con~fedtra,tlon .W:iili. ~ · -~'borcle;~iransfonnano1l'i- ,,._._ 1,· - . . . ' ,;·. . - . . · ' . ·~ .· Rt'.~li~tically sp~ak.~g there ·~t~ · ~~ ;conditl,ssi~l~ · still is a1?.sec6n-.fod~ratioI?-m~el whete:ev~rypart. has'i~s own foreign"" CONDffiONS AND ELEMENTS OF A PEACE PROCESS 'finance-and security policy based on non-offensive structures(the loosest kind of con-federation would _ be the model of the Benelux-states). ·Based on and - departing from a recognition of the status-quo, future border-changes might - become a topic in the negotiation process, while it is to be hoped and expected _ that these future "borders" along with all European borders at that tiffie will become much more open than they are now between many states in _ the wodd. While it still seems necessary to acknowledge the fact of "borders" so to Speak as a "necessary evil", measures of practical politics towards a pan-E~ropean perspective should 0( will at the same. time transcend them to an extent where state, -borders might have lo~t their character as "military borders" in favour of approachillg the status of merely "administrative" borders. ..._ . . . _ ', Nationalism ·~d European Peace Order , What can be concluded after the events of1991 for the perspe~tives of a - uFuture European P~ace Order"; which sh~uld still be on the agenda? Orie of the" · main principles of the.CSCE, to both in principle respect territorial integrity but also agree to the right of self 4etermination (which in this course mostly implies the thange of given borders) seem at first sight to contradict themselves; in any case' .both of these prindples are only executable in a peaceful manner and in the frame of democracy as has last been mentioned ii1the1990 Ch~rter of Paris, . which as · a step further · could be complemented with a special Charter for mino. rities{Group Rights) in Europe. In the spirit of these .above mentioned principles a peaceful Europe should - understand itself as being more than just the sum of terntorial states; ill such a Euro~, which does not totally abolish the traditional nation-state but.rather "stores" i~ within supra~regi0nal structures, new formations and poliµcal units sl:lch as e.g. "autonomou~territories", ·"federations and associations of nationali'" ties" whichwould allow for: the'justifiable national aspirations at hand, would have th~ir p6litical eXistence anci:relev:ance assured . · ..... _ . rh· -.-. . -·-,- . YUGOSLA WA, WAR ... 178 - Zarko Puhovski Cease-f1re as the Real Probletll Peace negotiations are, of course, the most important subject of the present dtscussions, especially among the activists of the peace movement (however weak it is) in the, whole of Yugoslavia. It is of utmost importance for all the · _ inhabitants of the country (and states emerging within), but it iS also already clear · that there is, for weeks, no progress in those negotiations. The reason is, unfortunately seldom discussed even within the groups.of activist,s of the peace movement, inthe fad that there is no realistic p6ssibility to enothose negotia­ tioris with real success. First of all peace treaties h.i've. been very seldom · formulated and signed with the war going on during the discussions about the final agreement. Second, peace treaty presupposes some kind of long term · decision about the political and legal context in whieh the origins of the war ' actually occured, and that is almost certain impossible in a sho~ period in which everyone needs the end of fighting. Third, the parties which make the peace treaty are not always the same which were involved in war (as in the situation after the World war I). Fourth, all the versions of the peace freaty suggested in . The Hague are to ambitious and to long for the real possibility of the iilvolved parties to agree upon Otis well known that with every new word the possibility for misunderstanding and refusing among seven parties rises 1 almo~t with· · ge?metrical progression). Fifth, and most c:oncrete in th~actual Yugoslav situation, the parties which have proven for dozen times that they are unableto formulate the conditions for a cease-fire, are almost certainly unable to reach. agreements needed for even moderately lasting peace. That's why we ha~e to understand that the real goal for the.next period has ' to. be achievement of a cease-fife, but of a cease-fire.which would fulfil some. extremely impor:tant . preconditions. Firstly, it has to be a cease-fire able to provide more Of less stable situation for some years (because thepartfos involved iii the war seems .to ~eed' quite a long period for serious negotiations about the future, that is ab_ out the lasting peace).' Secondly; - it has to be a cease-fire open ' . to all 11 final 11 solutions, possible as content of the future peace-agreement. Thirdly, it haste> be a cease-fire with the elements which all the involved parties 179 - ·-- · 180 YUGOSLAVIA, WAR .. . can regard as the parts of their program, iii order to motivate them to accept it witl).out the military . intervention .. -The beginning of wint~r seasons is, as it is well known, the best period of the yearto stop the fighting, because the weather conditions are going to minimalize the intensity of operations anyway. That's why the discussions about such a agreement have to start (they have not even really started yet) and finish the shortest poss.ible t~e. The elements of such a agreement could be: (a) Withdrawal of the· federal troops tothe barracks from which they have started their actual intervention; beginning of· the demilitarization· of all the republics (including gradual dissolving of the federal army; and of all the e:idstent paramilitary forces - of course with . international help and. monitoring (and - control over the ai:ms left by the troops in withdrawal or dissolving), and with . , necessary.financia~ help for the pensions and requilification found for the army professionals; ' ' (b) Suspension of all the federal Yugoslav institutions. (which would give . freedom of action - even in the international scene - for the republics constituted withiri Yugoslavia, but would also preserve a . possibility to reactivate at least ~ome of those institutions after the agreement, .if all parties agree); · ( c) Agreement thatthe borders within Yugoslavia are de facto borders, but are not to be touched or even discussed in formal way for the next three years (again, ' for one side thatwould ~ean the possibility todaim its right to negotiate in future at least some changes of the borders, for the other 'at least temporal guarantee for the security of the borders); · . {d) Internati~1411 guaranties for all the Yugosl~v republics for the right to legally represent and protect their ethnic minorities in other republics (as it was formul~ements or nation-states in former Yug?slavia it has become natural .. that one could sees only disparate ~national conflicting units'i such as · the Slovenes,· the ?erbs, the Croats, and the Albanians etc. The public and scientific: picture of these "national conflicting parties" operates iri: the synonymous way. What one sees is a series of chaotic strifes taking place among diverse national movements: Throu~t this kind of percep. tion one-type .of nationalism (nation.;;state) operates as the more "realis­ tic"; the othe~ as permissive, while a third version is seen as "aggressive", or a fourth as "dangerous·"~ .. This inatrix offers a pictlire of numerous unrelate9 battles which remind us of strifes among different groups. which can be religious or tribal in natur~. This perception of "µationalism" in former Yugoslavia . reinforced by the mass media, is and was possible above all_ sole1y as a result of . c . 1 The "ir).tervention" (for the tirrie being, not yet µliliiary) came later, when European Community made some efforts in order to stop the "War in Slovenia". ' ' ' ; 184 . YUGOSLAVIA, WAR .. . a misunderstanding of the situation. The very essence of the· multinational, multicultural-set-up informer Yugoslavia was overlooked. As a matter of fact, this 1s dtie precisely to the analytical lack of an examination of the conc~pt/ notion which I will term "Yugoslavhood". · · Namely, all mutu(ll relationships among various nationalities ana national movements in the former state and today among different nation,..states were and are stili mediated · by Yugoslavhood or by the remnants of tha~ hi~torie "phe­ nomenon" (common history!). For example, national confliets (?e~een Slovenes and Serbs were primarily conflicts between "Slovenes" (Slovenhood) and - Yugoslavhood on one side and Serbs (Serbhood) and Yugoslavhood oil the other. Secondly, only as· the mediated conflict, one could discuss about the national "battle" between Slovenes and Serbs. Almost the same thing occurs with all varying "conflict relations" in former Yugoslavia as at national as well at other distinct conflict levels. To put it in.other words, the decisive problem was that mediated sp~ce, the space o{ mediation among the various nation-states movement(s): More exactly, incomprehension of this mediadng sp3:ce is the principai'reason why "everythirig in Yugosfavia" looks a _ mess. Of course it is - p