

## Anthology Metelkova – Volume II

The second part of the Anthology of Metelkova Cultural center includes documents displaying the context of the initiative for demilitarization of Slovenia during the 1980ies, at the peak of the Slovene spring, while the peace and human rights movements were flourishing. The anthology displays the conflict of Slovenia with the Yugoslav regime and the Yugoslav Army and the beginnings of the Wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia in 1990ies. A number of items in Volume II of the Anthology is in English, please consult the Content index - the items in English are clearly indicated.

## Antologija Metelkova - II zvezek

Drugi Sveženj v Antologiji vsebuje faksimile člankov in dokumentov iz domačih in tujih virov, ki pričajo o ozadju, energijah in kontekstu iz katerih je nastala Metelkova (1988-2008).

Marko Hren, 2008

*Antologija Metelkova* predstavlja sveženj večidel avtorskih tekstov, objavljenih v letih 1989 -2003, in s tem z avtorjevega zornega kota dokumentira skoraj 15 letno obdobje nastajanja kulturnega centra v nekdanji vojašnici JLA. Dokumentacija predstavlja subjektiven pogled na kronološko nanizane dogodke in na širši zgodovinski kontekst. Zato tudi črpa predvsem iz osebnih arhivov avtorja in na ta način nima ambicij odslikavati objektivni ali znanstveni pogled na obravnavane fenomene. Sveženj je v elektronski obliki urejen v dveh pdf datotekah in sicer:

**Antologija Metelkova 1** :Uvodna poglavja, Razvojni načrt, analiza , kooperative, partnerstva, študije, dialogi, mednarodna promocija, kronologija, retrospektivni pogled.

**Antologija Metelkova 2**: Faksimile virov in dokumentov s komentarjem

Sveženj sem – kot arhiv, ki odslikava zgolj moj osebni vpogled v zgodbo - pripravil v več verzijah v izvornikih, ki sem jih v minulih letih podaril določenim osebam, mojim intimnim najbližjim. Sredi leta 2008 me je Nataša Serec iz društva KUD-mreža prosila za izvod v elektronski verziji in del tekstov iz antologije sem ji odstopil za objavo na spletni strani KUD: <http://www.kudmreza.org/arhiv.html>. Iskrena hvala vsem, ki so v opisanih časih prispevali dobre energije in krojili izkušnje ter vpoglede.

Dopolnjena izdaja urejena v dveh zvezkih je namenjena sistemu elektronskega shranjevanja publikacij Narodne in univerzitetne knjižnice SVAROG in DLIB <http://www.dlib.si/> in arhivom.

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Viri so večinoma del osebne arhiva. Publikacija ni imela ambicije, da bi predstavljala znanstven ali objektivni prispevek k analizi obravnavanega časa. Nasprotno, publikacija prinaša namenoma izrazito subjektiven in enostranski, tudi mestoma izrazito s čustvi obarvan pogled na obravnavane fenomene. Dva svežnja antologije sta tako namenjena prenosu arhiva iz zasebne v javno sfero.

Avtor prosi za razumevanje!

## Dokumenti neposredno povezani z Metelkovo

Projekt Metelkova in njegovi protagonisti smo imeli veliko podporo v domači in mednarodni javnosti. To nas je tudi zavedlo. Spominjam se, kako mi je Ervin Milharčič Hladnik ob zasedbi leta 1993 zelo natančno in preroško razložil, da je medijska podpora Metelkovi absolutno nesorazmerna in da se bo obrnila v kontra-produktiven proces. Ervin je že vedel kaj govori! Imel je prav. Kako je kotirala Metelkova v javnosti kaže med drugim tudi primerek teksta, ki sem ga izbral za to antologijo - zapis v DELU v rubriki portret tedna.

Tako kot doma je imela Metelkova veliko podporo tudi drugod po svetu; že v začetni fazi smo se povezali s sorodnimi urbanimi centri v Evropi in kmalu tudi v mrežo Trans Europe Halles; s to mrežo smo izvedli vrsto odmevnih projektov, med drugim sodelovali tudi pri pripravi publikacije *Factories of Imagination* – v nadaljevanju objavljam prispevek iz te knjige in se ob tem zahvaljujem legendarni **Fazette Bordage**, prijateljici in soborki, izjemni ženski, »poussier d'etoile«! Ob Fazette, kleni Pariški skvoterki, samohranilki, izjemni menedžerki z naravnim talentom za mreženje, človeku, ki se je prebil iz dejanskega roba pariške družbe in ki zna ceniti vsak meter površine .... Motorju Trans Europe Halles v časih, ko smo najmočneje sodelovali ...« merci Fazette«, hvala!

Zahvaljujem se tudi **Theodorju Hermanu**, profesorju mirovništva, mojemu dolgoletnemu mentorju pri mirovnih študijah in pri ustanavljanju Mirovnega inštituta. Theodor je bil en redkih ljudi, ki je v celoti razumel, zakaj sem se raje odločil, da investiram leta v razvoj Metelkove, kot pa da bi investiral v akademsko kariero. Theodor me je pri tem spodbujal in večkrat je prišel v Ljubljano v najtežjih časih Metelkove. S svojo karizmo in avtoriteto dolgoletnega mirovnega posrednika na vseh kontinentih, človeka, ki je izdatno pomagal pri izgradnji mirovnih inštitucij na Balkanu, je Theodor omogočil, da sva ob njegovih obiskih brez težav prišla na obiske k paleti najrazličnejših političnih osebnosti tistega časa – k predsedniku države, županji, nadškofu, da omenim samo nekatere. Mislim, da je Theodor, ki je imel ob obiskih v Sloveniji že preko 80 let, tudi človek, ki je iskreno užival, ko je v sobici za posebne goste na Metelkovi večkrat prespal v sklopu projekta 1001 noč na Metelkovi. Še pomnite, tovariši: v lično opremljeni sobici v stavbi Pešci, za katero so opremo prispevali Ljubljanski antikvariati, smo prenočili osebe iz javnega življenja, ki so na večer prispevali k program, noč v tedaj največjem skvotu v Evropi pa so na Metelkovi preživel v znak podpore in s tem manifestiral poziv domači politični javnosti. Na Theodorjevo željo so najini sogovorniki zapisali svoje poglede na Metelkovo tudi na papir. Ti lističi predstavljajo zanimiv niz v mozaiku, saj nedvoumno kažejo, kako široka je bila mreža razumevanja in podpore projektu Metelkove. Theodor Herman je bil v času skvota gotovo največji ambasador Metelkove. To Antologijo posvečam vsem iskrenim pionirjem mirovnih študij, in vsem, ki so nam trdno stali ob strani v časih ekstenzivnih poskusov preprečavanja vojne

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162.163

LJUBLJANA/METELKOVA

TWO WORLDS  
CALLED  
METELKOVA

# MARKO HREN

gazes out over the park

## Marko Hren gazes out over the park

In the northern part, which calls itself Metelkova City (Metelkova Mesto), Dragan Rajkovic, who runs the women's centre (Zenski Center), talks about how ambivalent it feels to be occupying the first building that was renovated by the city: "We had to move out for a year while it was being renovated. And since then we've had to pay rent." Rajkovic views the proposed integration of the two parts with scepticism: "They have different ways of running things, and they have money." But Metelkova Mesto is more like a laboratory: "The art being created here is unfettered, even autonomous. It would be a pity to lose that."



Marko Hren works in a building that straddles the border between the northern and southern parts of the complex and enjoys a view over the overgrown park belonging to the Ministry of Culture. He gets slightly irritated when asked about the northern part: "What we have here is organisational chaos. The northern part of The Metelkova is supposed to represent alternative, independent culture. But this is not the case, because there are no consistent policies underlying it. They have fourteen organisations and twenty-two artists, some of whom have contracts with the municipality, but we have no common structure. This makes for a weak position with regard to lobbying. The year 2 000 represents a challenge for all artists and organisations in The Metelkova to begin once again from the start with talks about the structure. It will be hard, because everything here is very heterogeneous. We have a lot of different social groups, and a range of generations and political orientations. Some of these people prefer disorder because it's the only way they can survive. But we're not going to create true independence that way. There's no solidarity in the North."

- ENTRANCE FROM MASARYKOVA STREET TO THE GALA CONCERT HALL

- MARKO HREN





**WITH THE HEAT OF CREATIVITY  
THE CHARISMATIC MARKO HREN**

"I AM AN ANARCHIST" SAYS MARKO HREN. "MANY PEOPLE CALL THEMSELVES ANARCHISTS. AND MANY PEOPLE WOULD CALL WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE METELKOVA ANARCHY. I DON'T AGREE WITH THAT. TRUE ANARCHY IS WHEN PEOPLE CREATE AN AUTONOMOUS SPACE, ADMINISTER IT THEMSELVES AND THUS CREATE TRUE INDEPENDENCE. AND THAT IS NOT HAPPENING HERE." HREN HAS A TALENT FOR BEING IN ON EVERYTHING RIGHT FROM THE BEGINNING.

IN THE 1970s HE FOUNDED A SMALL PACIFIST GROUP WHILE STILL AT SCHOOL, READING HIS WAY THROUGH THE RADICAL LITERATURE. LATER ON HE WORKED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE MOVEMENT. "THAT BROUGHT ME INTO THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. I WAS INVOLVED IN GROUPS PROMOTING DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, IN CHARTA 77 IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, IN POLAND AND SO ON." IN ADDITION HE STUDIED MATHEMATICS, FOLLOWED LATER BY ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY. HE HAS NOT YET FINISHED HIS DOCTORAL THESIS, FINDING THE WORK WITH LIVING MATERIAL MORE INTERESTING. "I DEVELOPED THE METELKOVA PROJECT TEN YEARS AGO. AS ONE OF THE SPOKESPERSONS OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT, I SUGGESTED THIS LOCATION. THE MAIN IDEA WAS THAT WE WANTED TO INVOLVE ARTISTS AND WORKERS IN THE CULTURAL SECTOR IN A DEMILITARISATION CAMPAIGN. ONE OF OUR SLOGANS WAS: WITH THE HEAT OF CREATIVITY WE CAN MELT THE IRON OF THE MILITARY."

HE BECAME ONE OF THE BRAINS BEHIND THE SLOVENIAN DEMILITARISATION CAMPAIGN. THE NETWORK FOR THE METELKOVA FOUNDED IN 1990 SOON HAD A MEMBERSHIP OF OVER TWO HUNDRED INSTITUTIONS, WHICH VOTED FOR MARKO HREN AS THEIR PRESIDENT. "FIRST I HELD NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARMY" HE REMINISCES, "THEN WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CITY AUTHORITIES." HE ALSO FOUNDED AND RAN A PEACE STUDIES INSTITUTE UNTIL 1993.

IN 1994, TOGETHER WITH BRATKO BIBIC, HE FOUNDED RETINA, A FORM OF ORGANISATION FOR THE METELKOVA, WHICH WAS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR FIGHTING THE LAWSUITS THAT WERE BEING BROUGHT AGAINST THE METELKOVA. "AND WE WON THE LOT" HREN REMEMBERS WITH A SMILE AND A GRATEFUL MENTION OF HIS LAWYER. EVEN MORE GRATIFYING IS THE MEMORY OF A TEN-MINUTE OCCUPATION OF CITY HALL WHICH WAS AIMED AT DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEMS BEING EXPERIENCED BY THE METELKOVA. "WE'D LEFT BEFORE THE POLICE COULD EVEN REACT."

BORN IN LJUBLJANA IN 1959, THE ELOQUENT, CHARISMATIC HREN WAS ARRESTED AND INTERROGATED SEVERAL TIMES ON ACCOUNT OF HIS STANCE ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE. LATER HE COULD HAVE CHOSEN A UNIVERSITY CAREER. "WHY DIDN'T I DO THAT? THE METELKOVA IS A VERY CONCRETE PROJECT INVOLVING URBAN REALITY AND YOUNG PEOPLE. I RAN IT FOR EIGHT YEARS." SINCE THERE ARE NO LONGER ANY OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS AT THE METELKOVA, MARK HREN HAS TURNED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROJECTS AND PROGRAMMES. AND IF A MULTI-CULTURAL CENTRE DOES EVENTUALLY EMERGE OUT OF THE FORMER BARRACKS, THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS MAN WILL SURELY BE REMEMBERED.

PORTRET TEDNA

# Marko Hren

Na gimnaziji ni maral institucij in je bil do njih anarhistično razpoložen. Kasneje je v njih deloval, jih ustanavljal... Bile pa so po pravilu drugačne, nove, alternativne in predvsem so šle v nos oblastnikom. Marko Hren, diplomiran matematik, sicer pa mirovnik, pacifist, kandidat z neodvisne liste novih družbenih gibanj, že tri leta pa tudi predsednik Mreže za Metelkovo, katere člani so pred tednom dni ogorčeni zasedli »svoj« del vojašničnih prostorov na Metelkovi v Ljubljani. Vedno tudi pripadnik civilne družbe.

V osnovni šoli si je nepopisno želel zračno puško. Ne spominja se več, zakaj, ve le, da je dogodek v zvezi z njo pomenil velik preobrat v njegovem življenju. Med igralkanjem z »zračko«, ko je bil na počitnicah pri stricu na deželi, je namreč kar tako pomeril v gnezdo. »Iznenada je izza mojega hrbta prihrumelo 'ti mulci' in nato je na moja ramena padla težka kmečka roka, da sem odletel nekaj metrov stran. To je bilo stričevo jasno sporočilo, da so meje, da se določenih stvari ne dela,« se spominja Marko Hren. Seveda jo je takoj nato prodal, a od takrat naprej je v njem vsajen, tako kot tiste črno-bele pikice v jing jangu, radikalen pacifizem, vendar tudi določena distanca do njega. »Uporaba sile in nasilja da, vendar v minimalni obliki, ki ne sme preseči kritične mase,« kakor to pojasnjuje. Misli, da bi tudi sedanja vojna v predelih bivše Jugoslavije drugače potekala, če bi mednarodna javnost pritisnila akterjem sedanje vojne minimalno kloputo, kakršno je nekoč davno dobil sam.

Na enem od poletnih gimnazijskih potovanj je v Švici naključno spoznal člane mednarodne pacifistične organizacije War Resisters International ter spoznal, da ni kot



Kalimero sam in edini na svetu, da so še ljudje, ki verjamejo v mir in nenasilje. Dali so mu letake, ki so jih potem tudi prevajali – spominja se enega s sloganom Vojna je zločin nad človeštvom. Takoj je začel »delovati« in na takratni Šubičevi gimnaziji zbral majhen krog somišljenikov. Sprva so imeli kot mladi zagreteži blazne ideje, še posebno za tisti čas. Razmišljali so o radikalnem pacifizmu in zavračanju vojske kot sredstva za reševanje konfliktov, skratka, zavračali so vsako silo. Po nosu so jih dobili že v prvi instituciji, v kateri so želeli prijaviti svoje delovanje kot sekcijo. »Za božjo voljo, fantje nikar!« je bil odgovor birokrata, »vse vas bodo zaprli.« Potem so se potegnili vase, njihova prizadevanja in delovanje so bili bolj boemski, letake so delili ilegalno.

Študiral je matematiko, se v študentskih letih še naprej prepuščal boemstvu, igral tamburico v tamburaškem orkestru, pa še ciganske pesmi na kitaro v neki drugi, gledališki skupini. Pisal pesmi, se poglobljal v razna verska in duhovna gibanja... Pesniško zbirko z naslovom Srečanja je sicer



izdal kasneje, leta 1991, njena vsebina pa je nastajala v študentskih letih »mirovanja« in poglobljanja vase. Matematika, logika, filozofija, glasba... Birokracija mu je bila še vedno neznanstvo zoprna, imel je odpor do institucij, prišel pa je do spoznanja, da je krščanstvo povsem relevantna religiozna smer, ki ponuja primerno kontemplacijo. Vzgojen je bil namreč v krščanskem okolju, hodil je v cerkev, pel na koru, a ni mogel razumeti hipokrizije v življenju kristjanov, saj je hotel religijo vedno jemati resno. Razkorak med prakso kristjanov, ki so se trkali po prsih, da to so, in zares krščanskim ravnanjem je bil tako velik, da se je od krščanstva raje umaknil in »se iskal« v drugih duhovnih in filozofskih orientacijah, se približal vzhodnih religioznim praksam, kakršne so taoizem, konfucianstvo, hinduizem ipd. Povrnjena vera v krščanstvo ni pomenila, da je začel ponovno hoditi v cerkev, izoblikoval pa se mu je nekakšen univerzalen duhovni pristop, ki kot relevanten upošteva različne religiozne šole. Takrat je začel tudi razumevati religijo v takem smislu, da povezuje različne aspekte bivanja.

Pomemben premik v njegovem življenju je bilo služenje v JLA. Sprva se je odločil, da ne bo šel, nato ga je premamila ljubezen do dekleta. Dolga leta sedenja v zaporu bi ga zanj prikrajšala. Vendar ni šlo brez »hrena«. Takrat je bil gandijevsko usmerjen, torej je svoje razmišljanje in izpovedovanje podredil radikalni resnici. »Prišel sem, sem fizično in psihično zdrav, inteligen, brhiten in lahko marsikaj naredim, kot vojak pa sem popolnoma neuporaben. Tukaj sem zato, ker moram biti,« je ilustriral svojo odločnost in resnicoljubnost. Bil je poseben, koordinator kulturnega življenja, in ker je bil v takratni jugoslovanski prestolnici, se je domislil, da bi zbral vse knjige, ki so izšle o Titu. Mimogrede, zbral jih je okoli štiristo. Resnicoljuben je bil tudi do obveščevalne službe, ji prevajal publikacije mednarodne pacifistične organizacije. Udeležil pa se je tudi manevrov in šele tam je spoznal vso patološkost vojske kot institucije, spoznal njeno »totalno madness«. Opa-

zovanje avtodestruktivnega delovanja, norega igračkanja z usodo vseh, ga je še bolj utrdilo v prepričanju, da je treba nekaj narediti.

Ko se je vrnil v Ljubljano, se je vse začelo odvijati z bliskovito naglico. Že prvi teden je na Johnny Rotten Square opazil prvo stojnico delovne skupine za družbena gibanja pri RK ZSMS, kateri se je tudi takoj pridružil. Hkrati je bilo to tudi srečanje z institucijo, ki jo je prejšnja leta črtil. Prvi nežen poskus delovanja je bila akcija »Dajte otroku možnosti, s katero so želeli starše poučiti o vseh negativnih vplivih, ki jih imajo vojaške igrače na otroke. Kmalu so se začeli ukvarjati tudi z ugovorom vesti, človekovimi pravicami in mirovno vzgojo. Po njegovih besedah je bila to vaja za prihodnost, ko je po sedmih letih nastal projekt konverzije vojaškega aparata, demilitarizacija Slovenije. Kako je šel v nos šele s to demilitarizacijo! Sploh pred začetkom vojne v Sloveniji.

Tudi njegov štiriinpolletni sin prime za palico in dela ždeng, dengž, čeprav je zrasel v okolju, v katerem so bila jasna nenasilna stališča... Mej mu ne postavlja veliko, a tiste, ki mu jih postavi, so jasne, transparentne in nadvse razumljive. Ena teh je, da se ne meri z orožjem, tudi če gre za igračko. O tem sta se veliko pogovarjala in vrednotno obravnavala. Vedno ga vpraša, kaj pomeni ždeng, dengž. Enkrat mu je odgovoril, da smuča, drugič, da s palico »šprica« zdravje ali da z njo strelja seme v zemljo. »Tudi če se zlaže, važno je, da si zna izmisliti tako nemogočo varianto,« meni oče Marko Hren. Sin je tudi prvo, čemur se posveča v prostem času, ki pa ga zdaj skorajda nima.

Večino svojega časa preživlja na Metelkovi, kjer kot predsednik Mreže koordinira, zbira informacije, skupaj z vsemi drugimi pripravlja programe in delovne osnutke. Prepričan je, da gre pri dejanju Mreže za manifestacijo petnajstletnega vzpostavljanja civilne družbe. Simbolni zaključek dekade in pol, v kateri so si skupine, zdaj priključene

Mreži, prizadevale priti do svojih prostorov in dobiti družbeno legitimnost. Zasedba prostorov je bila po njegovem mnenju preizkus vrednot, kakršne so solidarnost, toleranca, multikulturalnost... Bojazen, da je vse zbledelo, da sta ostali le še apatija in brezbriznost, je bila neupravičena. Zdaj izražajo moč, ki je pravzaprav ves čas bivala v KUD France Prešeren, v Škucu, v K4 ali na Radiu Student, ki so bili kot nekakšni agitpropovski pobudniki akcije. Teze, da je civilna družba zaspala oz. se prelevila v politično družbo, so postale prah in pepel. Marko Hren točno ve, da so nenehno delali, od tistega začetnega sestanka na Škucu naprej, ko jih je prvič seznanil z idejo o nekakšni Mreži (takrat so se delovno imenovali Celica), ki naj bi bila močna podpora njegovemu projektu o demilitarizaciji. Pomembna je bila vsebina, česar se je že takrat dobro zavedal, in prav v Škucu je bila zasnovana tako močna baza raznih družbenih gibanj kot tudi ustvarjalcev. Multikulturalnost je zdaj končno pod eno streho. Zaspala princeska, imenovana civilna družba, se je prebudila iz spanca in v razmislek ponuja vzporednico: Slovenija se je osamosvojila zato, ker se je morala, ker ji je takratna Jugoslavija delala silo. Prisiljena je bila potegniti enostranske odločitve, uporabiti celo delček sile. Ponujala je dialog, a je niso upoštevali. »Podobno smo bili tudi mi prisiljeni v enostranske korake nenasilne intervencije zaščite objektov,« je odločen Marko Hren. »In tako kot za Slovenijo ni bilo koraka nazaj v Jugoslavijo, ga tudi za nas ni ven iz Mertelkove. Mi smo svoje naredili, zdaj se morajo domeniti in izreči institucije, ki si nasprotujejo.«

Marko Hren torej ostaja na pozicijah civilne družbe in okrog sebe ima veliko somišljenikov. Še vedno gre tudi v nos. In bo šel verjetno tako dolgo, dokler ne bo država, zdaj deklarativno pravna, demokratična in pluralistična, vseeno spregledala pobud in zahteve civilne družbe. Ta pa mora seveda obstati, za kar si bo Marko Hren verjetno še naprej prizadeval.

Jelka Šutej Adamič

## Letter of the President of Slovenia, Mr. Milana Kučana

P R E D S E D N I K  
R E P U B L I K E  
S L O V E N I J E

Milan Kučan

Ljubljana, March 19, 1999

### To Whom It May Concern

With this letter I would like to support the nomination of Mr. Marko Hren for the Jannalal Bajaj International Award for promoting Gandhian values outside of India for the Year 1999.

Mr. Hren was an outstanding and active promotor of the Metelkova project defending human rights, pluralism and freedom at the crucial moment of Slovenia's struggle for independence and forming of a new sovereign state.

The Metelkova project was outstanding and successful also due to Mr. Hren's ability to meet the needs of talented young men on the edges of the society and to prove that a cultural center could be created in a former military post and prison.

Sincerely yours,

Milan Kučan  


Professor Emeritus  
Theodore Herman  
Consultant Balkan Peace Studies Center

Fax: 001717 174 8052



Erjavčeva 17, 61 000 Ljubljana, Slovenija

Tel.: +386 (0)61 178 12 22; Fax: +386 (0)61 178 13 57



## Letter of the Mayor of Ljubljana, Mme Viktorija Potočnik

CITY OF LJUBLJANA

VIKTORIJA POTOČNIK MAYOR

MESTNI TRG 1  
1000 LJUBLJANA, SLOVENIA  
TEL: +386 61 306 10 10  
FAX: +386 61 306 12 14

St. Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje  
Centre for Pacifist Studies of the Balkans

Mr. Theodore Herman  
FYRM

Ljubljana, 17 March 1999

Dear Mr. Theodore Herman,

Thank you for your proposal to support the nomination of Mr. Marko Hren for the international award of the Jamnalal Bajaj Foundation.

The Metelkova project was initiated in a time, when Slovenia was struggling to establish an independent country based on the principles of a democratic society, and as such it represented a vivid intersection of ideas and aims to exemplify these principles through various artistic and social activities. Through the past five years, Metelkova has been through better and worse and eventually evolved into one of the most important and recognisable centres of creativity not only in Ljubljana in Slovenia, but in a wider context as well. With a mature and responsible attitude the leaders and participants of the Metelkova project have succeeded in setting up a constructive dialogue with the managing bodies on the state and local levels. Consequently, this contributed to the fact that large scale planning is now taking place to develop the entire Metelkova area into a cultural centre, which would serve as a distinctive symbol of Ljubljana on the international scale and would present an example of successful and creative revitalisation of abandoned military or industrial objects.

I am well familiar with the work of Mr. Marko Hren and therefore agree with your assessment that the development of the Metelkova project and its success resulted to a great extent from his efforts.

I support your proposal to nominate Mr. Marko Hren for the Jamnalal Bajaj Foundation Award and I sincerely hope that he will find recognition also among other distinguished members of the Foundation.

With best wishes and kind regards,



## Pismo nadškofa in metropolita Alojzija Šuštarja



LJUBLJANSKI  
NADŠKOF IN  
METROPOLIT

61001 LJUBLJANA  
P.P. 121-III

K O P I J A

Gospod  
Dimitrij KOVAČIČ  
predsednik Mestnega sveta  
p. p. 25  
61001 LJUBLJANA


Spoštovani gospod predsednik,

pri meni se je ponovno oglasil gospod Marko Hren, predsednik sveta Zavoda Retina, ki si prizadeva za multikulturalni center v bivši vojašnici na Metelkovi ulici. Želel je, da bi podprl njegovo vlogo na Mestno skupščino Ljubljana, ki naj bi obravnavala problematiko še pred poletnimi počitnicami.

Čeprav mi niso znane vse podrobnosti in se spominjam, da je pred časom prišlo do hudih sporov, Vas vendar vljudno prosim, da bi ugodili želji g. Hrena. Kolikor morem sam presoditi, gre za pomemben kulturni načrt.

Zahvaljujem se Vam za Vaše razumevanje in Vas lepo pozdravljam

Ljubljana, 10. julija 1995

  
Alojz Šuštar  
nadškof

V vednost: Marko Hren

## Introduction of Metelkova Network, Intruder, 1991

# M E T E L K O V A   N E T W O R K

### *How to introduce METELKOVA NETWORK?*

First it was only the idea, today it is the real project.

Metelkova is an association, which includes about seventy known and unknown groups and over two hundred fifty individuals. Our members are painters, musicians, designers, the people who are working in different socialization/ education groups, photographers, dancers, actors...

The main aim of Metelkova network is to acquire the army building on Metelkova street in Ljubljana for our intentions, which are:

□  
that many artists, social movements, alternative groups, that have not places for their work now at last get them

□  
to connect, organize and represent culture in Ljubljana

□  
to contribute by a larger demilitarisation activities in Slovenia

□  
change a black and dull building such as barracks on Metelkova street in a colourful centre of culture. This centre will be a reflection of Slovene culture and subculture today and tomorrow.

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We are working from September 1990, formally formed at 22.12.1990. At that time we organized ourselves in eleven sections:

social-education section, New age section, musical section, paint sections, photo sections, section for dance, film, theatre, section of gainfully activity...

Each section has its own representative in working groups. which are occupied with different problems on many fields ( public relation, economy, internal organization, political lobby...)

On the way to get that barracks we want that people in Ljubljana, Slovenija and other countries know what we are struggling for, who we are and what we are doing. So, we perform the members and our project with happenings, the catalogue pictures of our artists, video-project and also with publishing our own magazine - M-ZIN.

Nobody knows, how long the way to our culture centre will takes, because the circumstances in Yugoslavia are very complicated, but anyway our country will be richer with METELKOVA NETWORK then without it.

So wish us luck!

Thank you!

**Contact:**Mreža za Metelkovo, Mestni trg 13, Ljubljana.tel 06122466.



obramba

## Pot nazaj

26. julij

Mladina  
1999

Marko Hren je slovenski mirovnik, ki se ga spominjamo predvsem iz osemdesetih, ko mu je s svojimi kampanjami uspelo prepričati slovensko javnost in pozneje slovenski parlament, da puške niso edini odgovor za neuspele politične dialoge. Tudi po njegovi zaslugi imamo v Sloveniji, vsaj za zdaj, še možnost civilnega služenja po najvišjih evropskih standardih



**Kako je v resnici s civilnim služenjem v tujini, saj se nanj sklicujejo predvsem zagovorniki daljšega služenja?**

Ko je bil v pripravi zakon o vojaški službi, ki je priznaval pravico do ugovora vesti, sem bil med pripravljalci strokovnih podlag novega zakona. Govorimo o letu 1990. Takrat smo v skupini za mirovno politiko, ki jo je vodila Viktorija Potočnik, pripravili te strokovne podlage, kjer smo upoštevali takrat pravzaprav najvišja obstoječa merila po evropskih zakonodajah.

**Katere države so to bile?**

Vzor so nam bile Nizozemska, Danska ... Glavno merilo je bilo, da je dolžina civilnega roka enaka kot dolžina vojaškega roka. Večina

primerljivih držav ima dolžino zdaj že uravnoteženo. Takrat pa je bil to velik dosežek celo v zahodnoevropskem merilu. Rezultat je bil vzoren, čeprav niso upoštevali nekaterih bistvenih elementov, ki smo jih predlagali, in sicer da bi bilo možno odslužiti obveznost do države tudi v tujini, se pravi v okviru humanitarnih in drugih organizacij.

**To je v evropskih državah možno ...**

To je možno na Nizozemskem, v Franciji ..., nimam povsem natančnega pregleda nad tem. Takrat je bil predvsem bistven problem, da je bila civilna služba postavljena kot alternativa vojaški obveznosti in je tudi opredeljena v zakonu

o vojaški obveznosti. Predlagali smo, da se opredeli obveznost služenja državi v določenem terminu in da imata civilna in vojaška služba enakovreden status. O služenjih bi imeli dva zakona ali dve poglavji v enem zakonu. Rezultat na žalost ni bil takšen in temu primerno je status civilne službe tudi zakonsko opredeljen. Dosežki pa so bili vendarle takrat na visoki evropski ravni. Komisija je civilna, ne vojaška, bila je na ministrstvu za pravosodje in ne na ministrstvu za obrambo. Vsi ti elementi civilnosti so bili upoštevani. Poleg tega so tudi razlogi za ugovor vesti dovolj pluralistični, da se v njih najde vsakdo, ki noče služiti s puško.

**Če bi primerjali, kar je bilo**

**doseženo, z drugimi državami, se je na zahodu ta situacija v teh devetih letih izboljševala in so po standardih pred Slovenijo...**

Za Slovenijo zagotovo velja, da ima enega najkrajših vojaških rokov. Torej ima eno najkrajših civilnih služb. Druga zadeva, ki jo je treba omeniti v tej točki, pa je, da na zahodu obstajajo skupine, ki se ukvarjajo s pritiski lobiranja za civilno službo, se pravi nekakšni sindikati oporečnikov, ki obstajajo že precej dolgo. Poleg tega so tam institucije, ki spremljajo izvajanje civilnega služenja, ki spremljajo informiranje rekrutov o civilnem služenju in ki lobirajo za način in procedure za izvajanje civilne službe. Tega pri nas ni. To se pri

**77 Na zahodu obstajajo skupine, ki se ukvarjajo s pritiski lobiranja za civilno službo, se pravi nekakšni sindikati oporečnikov, ki obstajajo že precej dolgo. Tega pri nas ni.**

nas v devetih letih ni razvilo in temu dejstvu pripisujem večji delež v razpravi, zakaj je po skoraj desetletju prišlo do možnosti razprav v parlamentu o zaostrenosti pogojev tega služenja. Ključni negativni moment pa je ta, da je zelo malo nevladnih in paradržavnih organizacij, ki sploh izvajajo civilno služenje. Kriteriji za organizacije, ki bi sprejele oporečnike, so za večino nevladnih organizacij neizvedljivi. Civilniku je treba zagotoviti stanovanje in možnost za bivanje. Ne vidim razloga, zakaj nevladna organizacija za pogoj za oporečnika ne bi navedla, da bi si sam poiskal kraj bivanja ali pa bi rok služil v kraju svojega bivanja. Zakaj ne bi ljubljanski oporečniki služili, recimo, na Metelkovi in se vozili domov? Vendar ni bilo nobene skupine, ki bi vršila takšen pritisk in v prvi vrsti informirala rekrute o možnosti izbire.

**Smo pa ena redkih držav, če ne edina v Evropi, ki poskuša ubrati drugačno pot oziroma iti nazaj?**

To je najbrž res, vendar je to obenem pravi trenutek, da se javno spregovori o pomanjkljivostih pri izvajanju civilnega služenja, zlasti o neenakovrednem obveščanju rekrutov o obeh možnostih služenja, doseči pa je treba tudi ugodnejše razmere za sprejem oporečnikov na delovno mesto v nevladni organizaciji.

Ta moment krize je priložnost, da mi ali tisti, ki nameravajo postati oporečniki, zahtevamo izboljšanje statusa ne pa poslabšanje

**Ali so sploh potrebne kakšne spremembe znotraj civilnega služenja?**

Seveda so potrebne spremembe. Ena je tista, ki sem jo že opisal, dostopnost ponudbe nevladnim organizacijam za delovna mesta za oporečnike. Razpisi za tovrstne organizacije so redki, odprti pa bi morali biti nenehno. Nevladne in tudi vladne organizacije bi morale imeti možnost, da se lahko kadar koli prijavijo v register organizacij, ki lahko izvajajo civilno službo. Treba bi bilo omiliti pogoje, da organizacija lahko sprejme oporečnike na delovno mesto. Doseči je treba tudi, da oporečniki lahko služijo pri mednarodnih organizacijah, kot sta Amnesty International ali UNHCR, izven ozemlja Slovenije. Ne vem, s kakšnimi regulativami je bilo doseženo, da lahko slovenski vojniki služijo tudi izven ozem-

lja Slovenije, čeprav je bilo določilo; to, da slovenski vojniki lahko služijo samo na ozemlju Slovenije, so morali nekje korigirati. Verjetno v aranžmaju z enotami Združenih narodov.

**Trenutno je ravno obratno: v slovenski vojski in v parlamentu obstajajo zahteve, da se kriteriji za organizacije še poostrijo.**

Ne vem, če je bila narejena resna analiza razlogov, ki jih navajajo oporečniki v svojih vlogah za služenje civilne službe, prav tako mi ni znano, da bi kdo strokovno spremljal delo komisije. V javnosti se zato pojavljajo ugibanja in ocene brez resnih podatkov o številu bleferjev in oporečnikov s "pravimi" razlogi. To je morda lahko odgovor na vprašanje, kako povečati kvoto tistih, ki naj bi služili vojaški rok. Ne smemo dopustiti dodatnega oteževanja zaposlovanja oporečnikov. Ministrstvo za obrambo se mora pač potruditi, da bo v vojsko pritegnilo dovolj oseb.

Če je res, da je eden od problemov visoka starostna meja rekrutov, naj se vojska potruži pritegniti fante na služenje pred študijem.

**Ali bi bil eden izmed razlogov za povečanje oporečništva tudi vedno višja starost vpoklicanih na služenje vojaškega roka? Starost, do katere je treba odslužiti vojaški rok, je precej visoka.**

Uradne analize oziroma uradnih podatkov, koliko se je starostna meja pri rekrutiranju premaknila, ni. Je pa to dober argument na vprašanje, kako povečati kvoto tistih, ki naj bi služili vojaški rok. Ni problem zaostreni kriteriji za oporečnike, temveč v tem, da se ta masa, ki bi se rekrutirala v zgodnjih dvajsetih letih, na neki način doseže. Treba je stimulirati fante, da gredo v vojsko pred fakulteto.

**Kljub vsemu pa ima Nemčija, denimo, 40 odstotkov oporečnikov, podobno tudi druge države. Pri nas jih je le 14 odstotkov. Ali je potem sploh kaj narobe? Tudi če odstotek oporečnikov narašča, je do 40 odstotkov še dolga pot.**

V dosedaj objavljenih tekstih nisem zasledil resne osnove za trditev, da nabornikov manjka, resne analize, kako je do tega prišlo, zakaj jih manjka, kako je potekalo mešanje teh generacij ob tranziciji, ko je prišlo do večje mase oporeč-

nikov. Eno od vprašanj je bilo, če je na morebitne zaostritve vplival Nato. Verjamem, da so specialisti iz držav Nata, ki so bili tu kot opazovalci ali svetovalci, opazili šibkosti v rekrutnem sistemu, zlasti na področju civilne službe so pomanjkljivosti. Govorimo seveda o kakovosti izvajanja civilne službe, o pluralizmu znotraj tega sistema, razvejanosti organizacij, ki to izvajajo. Tu je gotovo lahko prišlo do določenih kritik. Zagotovo pa bi bili znani podatki, če bi bilo ugotovljeno, da je res ogrožena naborna masa. Takšnih podatkov pa v relevantni obliki nisem nikjer zasledil. Ena prvih nalog ministru bi bila, naj opravi raziskavo o tem, kaj je z naborno maso.

**Pri vsej stvari je samo en relevanten podatek, in sicer da imajo rekruti po vpoklicu v vojsko še nekaj tednov do začetka služenja. V tem času uveljavljajo pravico do ugovora, vojska pa zanje nima domačnega kadra.**

Prvič, ni relevantne analize, koliko vojakov mora Slovenija letno zagotoviti glede na število v generaciji, kaj to pomeni v celotnem nabornem sistemu, katere napake izhajajo iz časovnih parametrov, ali v vojsko po gimnaziji ali po fakulteti, na kakšen način stimulirati ... Teh podatkov ni, proceduralno pa se prav gotovo lovijo na ta način.

**Zdi se, da je deloma kriva tudi vojska, saj se naborniki sprva odločajo za vojsko, nato pa se premislijo. Torej jih tudi res premalo opozarjajo na civilno služenje.**

Informacij o civilni službi ni, vsaj ne v zadostni obliki. Ni niti brošur niti oddaj, ki bi enakovredno propagirale civilno služenje. Ni stalnega obveščanja srednješolcev, ni zgodb o opravljanju civilnega služenja. Ni reklame. Ni pa je zato, ker imajo te organizacije, ki imajo možnost zaposlovanja civilnih nabornikov, Rdeči križ, Klinični center, gasilci..., utečene mehanizma, imajo svojo kvoto oporečnikov. Majhne progresivne organizacije pa nimajo dostopa do civilnikov. Te bi bile namreč pripravljene oglaševati, saj bi tako dobile dober kader. Amnesty International in druge podobne organizacije potrebujejo svojevrsten kader in morajo oglaševati po srednjih šolah ...

—MIHA ŠTAMCAR, GREGOR CERAR



## A letter addressed to the recipients of **Independent Voices**, January 1991

A copy of my Letter addressed to international community at the beginning of 1991, shortly before the wars have started in former Yugoslavia, is published for the first time in its entire version here. The letter consists of five sections originally printed on colored paper – each section on corresponding color depending on the nature of information given in the section. The letter was sent to all recipients of the **Independent Voices**, a newsletter of the Slovene Peace Movement and to a number of friends abroad Slovenia, all together, to - roughly speaking - 500 recipients. In the letter I open-heartedly speak about personal affairs, friends in Ljubljana, projects of peace Movements and present comments concerning the events in former Yugoslavia. In this letter, Metelkova projects is described and promoted in its original, prime Vision and context.

Na listi prejemnikov mirovniških glasil v 80ih letih smo zbrali preko 500 naslovov s celega sveta. Revije **Peace Movement Information Bulletin** (sredina 80ih let), **Independent Voices** (konec 80ih let), in nazadnje **Intruder** (1991-1993), ki so izhajale redno, 2-5 krat letno v angleškem jeziku, so predstavljale pomemben kanal za neposredne informacije scene v Ljubljani navzven. Revije so prejemale na svoje naslove aktivistične organizacije na področju okolja, miru, človekovih pravic, prejemala so jih številna uredništva, tako marginalnih omrežij kot mainstream progresivnih novinarskih tokov, prejemale so jih številne progresivne politične grupacije v Evropi in širše ter seveda fundacije, ki so tiste čase financirale civilnodružbene podvige v Jugo vzhodni Evropi. V novoletnem času, med decembrom 1990 in januarjem 1991, sem za prejemnike naše pošte napisal obširno cirkularno pismo, s katerim sem jih v času med dvema številka naše revije obvestil o dogajanju v Ljubljani. Sledi faksimile celotnega pisma. Kot boste bralci in bralke opazili, je pismo izrazito osebno in subjektivno ter v celoti odkrito in iskreno. Razlog za to so posebne energije, ki so nas prežemale v času 1988-1990. Pluli smo na vibracijah solidarnosti in brezpogojnega medsebojnega zavezništva. Srečevali smo se pogosto v težkih okoliščinah, na demonstracijah, pogosto aretirani, neprestano na poti, spali

smo večidel na improviziranih, a vedno prijetnih bivališčih, praviloma pri znancih, prijateljih, aktivistih. Sam sem bil na poti tudi več kot tretjino časa v letu. Tako so se stkale posebne vrste vezi, ki so ustvarile vzdušje iskrenosti, prijateljstva, ljubezni.

Hvaležen sem vsem prijateljem, odkritosrčnim ljudem, ki sem jih imel priliko in radost srečati v tistem času. Takrat smo zagotovo verjeli, da bodo naša prijateljstva in globina odnosa večni. Žal smo vezi ohranili z redkimi in danes je jasno, da nas je povezovala takratna energija časa in prostora, energija, ki je imela poseben namen in pomen in tudi svoj rok trajanja. Pogosto mi misli potujejo v domove tisočernih prijateljev, ki sem jih tista leta imel veselje obiskati na vseh kontinentih sveta. Misli se mi vedno ustavijo pri osebi, s katero sem prepotoval največ poti, in presedel v premišljevanju največ časa, prijatelju in mentorju, Tomažu Mastnaku. Tomaž ... saj veš, čas in geografska razdalja nimajo pri globokem zavezništvu nobene veljave! Ti utrinki mi še danes polnijo zalogo pozitivne energije in optimizma. Hvala vam, vsem vam, ki sem vam nemara premalo jasno uspel povedati, kako zelo zelo cenim vsak vaš droben prispevek in vsak vaš trenutek dobre volje. Z nekaterimi smo se komajda poznali, pa smo imeli hipoma občutek, da si lahko popolnoma zaupamo – kajti poznali in čutili smo skupne cilje in vrednote. Zato ... smo si lahko pisali odkritosrčna pisma, kakršno je objavljeno tukaj.

*Marko Hren*

Ljubeljska 25, 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, Yu  
Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence,  
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*Ljubljana, January 1991*

*To: Dearest*

*friends and  
people who  
are  
somehow in  
touch with  
peace and  
nonviolence  
activity here  
in  
Ljubljana.*



*This letter will be written (hope so) in most quiet and peaceful moments I can find. It is Christmas time, the end of the year, few days after Slovenian people have decided for independence, voting for an independent state during Sundays plebiscite (referendum). (And while I finish the letter it is already the 10th of January 1991). Many things to say and it has been a long time since I wrote to you. And it has been a year, since we have send you the Independent Voices for the last time. I'm sorry about that, I have been thinking a lot about some (maybe even most) of you. Enough to say, that so many of you are so deeply close to me. Thank you so much for your thoughts, energy, feelings, consideration, letters, magazines etc.(even smuggling computers from USA to Europe, thank you again A.) that you have been sending over the year -*



*and I did physically not manage to answer. But believe me - we were in touch all over the period. Sometimes I felt quite bad about not answering the mail - have mercy and please keep in touch. Some of the mail did not arrive to me, this specially applies to the period between January and May. It doesn't mean that I did not receive some of your bills; I did, but some I didn't pay yet and will do it now - have mercy again. Now, all addresses are equally good:*

*home - with Biljana and Ram: Iga Grudna 13, 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, Yu, tel. +38-61-273121. This one will change very soon and this is why I also give here my fathers home address, where I can still receive some of the mail: family Hren, Ljubeljska 25, 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, Yu,tel +38-61-551360,*

*But please, use the following address as much as possible:*

*The Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence  
Mestni trg 13, 61000 Ljubljana,  
Slovenia, Yu, tel: +38-61-224666.*

*Please find enclosed some updates, commentaries and information describing the changes within the peace group within and around myself and description of some processes we have gone through over the past year.*

*Most of you have been receiving The Independent Voices over past few (five) years and let this mailing be a supplement also for this paper. More about The Independent Voices you can read in the "green section" of this mailing, but just to say that in the peace group, we have found a new editor for the paper and he is promising to prepare a first issue for the mid-February 1991.*

There we are with colors. Namely, the mailing is divided in several sections, indicated by the color of paper on which the information is copied:

PINKY section,

- a hart section -

describes the changes in my life and in life of some of our friends you might know.

GREEN section,

-a throat section -

describes activities and priorities of the group and of myself

. In this section you can find information about the projects of the peace group: Conscientious objection, Slovenia Without an Army, Peace Education, Documentation Center, Helsinki Citizens Assembly Conversion of Metelkova, coordination of socialization groups, subculture....., Independent Voices....

BLUE section,

-a brain section -

presents a view on current political situation

YELLOW section

meditation/a little excursion into the (good) future

## PINKY section

- a hart section -describes the changes in my life and in life of some of our friends you might know.

### RAM

Well, life is changing in so many ways. Where to start then. Ram was born in April 1989 and is now 20 months old. His mother is Biljana, a medical doctor, she comes from Belgrade and we have been living together for about 4 years. Our relationship is too silent too simple and too complicated to talk about it. At the moment I'm going through some changes in my personal relations and hopefully I can tell you more in the next letter or next time we meet. This is also one of the reasons why I will I'm moving from Iga Grudna 13 shortly.

Ram is a good friend and a healthy, strong person. I learned incredibly lot living with him. But one of the important things is that he is a good partner for me to learn about nonviolence. His strong Will, aggressivity and determination are one of his outstanding aspects. Some hundreds of challenges every day: authority and autonomy, power of a parent and a power of a new born life, a difference between aggressivity and violence, exploring enthusiasm on one hand and norms and thought patterns on the other one... regrets I had a few but than again to few I mention. I did what I had to do, ... but more, much more than this I did it my way... I have a little manuscript about the method of a male pacifist (Taurus) living with a male new born human (Aries). Lots of experiences and it might be of some value also for some of the others. The method is titled NO NO APPROACH, since that was a core of the approach - not using the word NO and not using orders until a child understands alternatives. A great deal of help using this method was that I decided to use English language in communication with Ram. This made me think twice before I have used a word. Each word is important - as we all know. Ancient cultures did not talk much - Mayi in Guatemala as an outstanding example. We had some good times with Ram and Steven from Toronto, Veronica (London) and Serge (Bruxelles), Andrea (New York), Radha (Delhi), Peggy and Magy (Canada) and many others during their stay (holidays) in Yugoslavia and it was really high time of this year. After Biljana has finished her maternity leaf in April 1990 (Ram was one year old) I have quit my job in Mikro Ada and started as a free lance publicist and as a - parent. There is no kindergarten yet in Ljubljana which would satisfy expectations of libertarian and spiritual up-bringing as I imagine. On the other hand, we want to spend as much time with Ram as possible by ourselves. We are happy and "happy" was one of the first words Ram could pronounce. I can not make him say "peace" in English, since he would always say "pax" like in Latin. Ram is three-lingual: Serbian, English and Slovene and it makes a lot of fun now, when he is trying to make his first sentences. Anyway, family life is centered around Ram. Dragče, our English Setter is still alive, but tired and low energy. We, together with some other friends are dreaming of moving to more warm and less polluted places - some islands maybe. Biljana is a medical doctor and we have been thinking of applying for jobs in India or somewhere else after 1993. If you have any idea about that, we would appreciate if you let us know about it. It is anyway too early to speak about 1993 now.

### JOB

Coming to jobs now. So I quit my job in April. Parent, business manager, social activist, peace researcher and alternative politician - it was a bit too much and I decided to abolish the role of business manager and then I spent a year building up infrastructure (institutions) for peace activity in the country. But this is already politics and you can read more about that in green section. Sufficient to say, that it was busy time, time of great opportunity to make one state better, building it from beginning and having some possibility to influence its growth. Briefly, I contributed quite some energy in constitution of the Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence (February 1990), was running for elections (March 1990), co-founded Parliamentary Commission for Peace Politics (Jun 1990), initiated The association of 70 groups in Ljubljana for conversion of military barracks in the town for civilian use, and finally, we are constituting a Peace Institute in Ljubljana and I got a job at the University of Philosophy in Ljubljana (December 1990), to do my peace research. At the same time, this is my Phd. program. The subject is Nonviolence in European thought from Humanism to Anarchism. If you have any suggestions or papers in this direction, here there is an opportunity to use them. So you see, writing about personal things overlap with political and social engagement quite much. Sorry about that, but this was 1990. I feel tired and worn-out, as Radha would say, but at the same time very happy and joyful. Things go on somehow and there is so much love and joy around. The last thing here, love and joy are to be written twice. There are so many incredibly beautiful people I met during past few years. New deep friendships swimming in the sea of Love. This makes one



enthusiastic and optimist. The more love around, the more beautiful people one recognizes and meets. Life is becoming more and more tender and subtle. More love brings also more pain deriving from the openness enabling the understanding of grief and fears. On the other hand, more love, more power to process thought patterns, emotions, problems...

## **MEETING FRIENDS**

Back to the letter again. It has been a lot of work you can imagine, and the priorities were for local activity during this year more than for international work. This is also a reason why The Independent Voices was not out this year and I did not write to you much. Nevertheless I did travel quite a lot and met some of you fortunately somewhere in Budapest (January), Prague, Amsterdam (February, thanks to Marry Caldor), Canada (March, thanks to Hania Fedorowich and Steven Dankowicz, who organized a speakers tour, Plugshares who payed a part of the travel), England (April, thanks to WRI), Prague (Jun), Helsinki&Tallin (Jully, thanks to Committee of 100), Berlin (Jully, WRI again), Sweden (October, cant believe it, but WRI - Jorgen, again), Prague again (October), Zurich (November, thanks to Andi Gross and GSoA) or some other places, couple of them in Austria (thanks to Werner Wintersteiner and Andreas Rabl). Thank you all for organizing all these meetings. It is always giving me lots of power, light and love. Again, there were so many new wonderful people I met around the world this year, it is like we new each other for ages. You are all here with me, when I write this words and I wish we would have had quiet moments together, as quiet as they are now, at the moment I write to you. You know, love is an unifying agent - and that's what is important. For us to join our efforts. Without love it just won't work. It makes one cry and laugh.

## **YOUR FRIENDS IN LJUBLJANA ...?**

About my beloved friends you might know. Tomaž Mastnak has finished his Phd., married with Lyn Jones (from Great Britain) and has got a job in Oxford - congratulations, I'm so happy about that, though I miss him very much here in Ljubljana. I have learned so much from him and we were a good "tandem"; well I still have to learn from him, namely, after finishing his Phd. he became my post graduate studie's professor and I'm proud to be his first student. Ingrid Bakše became a manager and is just to constitute an independent business TV Channel in Ljubljana - she is too busy to be involved in political or social movements, but we still get drunk from time to time and have long, long talks than. Vlasta Jalušič and Tonči Kuzmanič, they are happy couple (that is my personal observation, though they might complain) with their daughter Maria. They are both involved in Peace Institute project. Vlasta is just to finish her Ma. thesis and Tonči is on a mid-way to the same thing. They spend more than three months on their little exotic gulf in the island Vis, where they run a little restaurant and some guest-rooms. If you need a good rest, do not hesitate to apply for room. Ask Veronika, Serge, Werner, Andrea, or myself to persuade you. Highly recommended holidays. Janez Juvan is now working for a press agency in Ljubljana and is still studying- as always; always the same, always young. Janez Janša - this guy is most problematic. He became a defence minister, and you wont believe it, a person, we have been struggling so much to get him out of military jail where he was for antimilitaristic writings and campaigns, the very same person and our good friend, is now constituting Slovenian army. What a sheet, ah. Another victim of "Eppelman effect". We are still friends, of course, I love him, but the whole thing is a bit shysophrenic, isn't it. I just don't know what to do with him. I'm abolishing the army and he is constituting one. When we meet, we can do nothing but smile. Business is business one could say. But it is not so simple. If I look it from a distance, then I only see this as a good opportunity. Two friends defining a space between the axis of militarization and the axis of peace politics and demilitarization. More I think about that, more I see we have to remain good friends in first place. Than something good can come out. It is in a way a special experience to be able to observe a whole set of people coming from opposition into the government - friends, comrades, colleagues. Power corrupts, said Jorgen and David and worn me if I would ever be elected. It is definitely true, but Havel said something more precise, when we have been listening to him in Prague: "entering the cosmos of the state gives one a new insight and new perspective - it is impossible to see cosmos the same from civil society or from the state ... new priorities, new parameters, new angle, everything changes, but the soul remains".

Ignac Krivec has moved to Braslovče and we almost don't see each other, he is busy in his profession - constructions, and is no more active in politics. Gregor Tomc was happy to move finally into his new flat, he just started a new rock revue GROM and ... is still a first rocker in Slovenia. Hopefully, he will be a research director of the Peace Institute. He is just to finish his Phd.



## GREEN section,

-a throat section -

describes activities and priorities of the group and of myself

. In this section you can find information about the projects of the peace group: Conscientious objection, Slovenia Without an Army, Documentation Center, Conversion of Metelkova, coordination of socialization groups, subculture. ...

## The Center for Culture of Peace and Nonviolence

In February 1990, I managed to find funds and rooms for the Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence. And this is now a meeting point for the peace movement and also for some other groups. You can read more about the center on special information sheet. Sufficient to say, that we have a little reference library there, rooms for discussion and - lots of financial problems for the next year. Attention please, this is the only grass roots peace movement office in Balkans (not counting Greece, of course). Many new people have appeared after this in the peace movement and hopefully you will get in touch with them slowly. We were so happy to get a computer smuggled from USA (thanks to A., N.Y.) which made us save couple thousand of \$. We are inquiring for an international volunteer who would work in our peace center for a year or so. He or she (preferably she) would work on international communications and should currently speak at least Spanish and English. If you have any suggestions, please let us know. Sašo Gazdić is a first person who is regularly employed in the Center, and he will answer your phone call most probably.

## Elections and New Social Movements

As you might know, Slovenia has gone through political transformation process in April 1990. Multiparty system, friends in government, new ways of political action, and new opportunities. I was running during the elections as an independent candidate of the New Social Movements (pacifist, feminist, emancipator, gay, lesbian, rock, subculture, drugs, alternative approaches concerning psychiatry, medicine, healing... etc...). It was a lot of fun, and the basic achievement was, that we did promote our issues in political arena. If we would not have been there at that time, the alternative scene would have been even more marginalized as it is now. On the other hand, the joint project of social movements during elections time, gave us skills and connections for future cooperation. We were actually thinking that success would be if we have got one person into the (Slovenian) parliament. Since I was a head of the list, the campaign was actually to promote Marko Hren. It was good that we did not get into the parliament, but the promotion was definitely successful. After being elected, the president of Slovenia, Milan Kučan has invited me to be his consuler for security issue and that is an excellent opportunity to promote peace politics on the state level. The nomination for a consuler of the president was a first sign, that they take us seriously. Without the elections campaign, this would not be the case, I believe. We had some tension during that time with the former Youth organization (which turned Liberal Party than). They were a sort offended because we (above mentioned social movements) wanted to run on elections independently from parties. You might know that Youth organization (ZSMS) was a sort of umbrella organization and political cover for the new social movements in Slovenia. During elections, the movements entirely emancipated and that gave us more room to negotiate also with other parties. Tomaž Mastnak was not sure about our move and kept at that time quite a distance. He thought it would be more wise for the movements to join somehow Liberal party during elections, so that we would have representative in the parliament for sure. I still think, that our decision was a good one.

## Parliamentary Commission for Peace Politics

Than we were lobbying for constitution of parliamentary commission for peace politics. The commission was established in July 1990 and has couple of professionals working for it, one of them is a very prominent and well experienced woman, Vika Potočnik, which gives a lot of hope for this commission to be a strong tool for political action. Some of us are consultative members of the commission. After more then half a year of its existence the comission has not done as much as it hopefully will in the future. Parliamentarians are just too busy with many other things (forming an independent state and changing all laws...) and the government is yet too rigid in its reactions to the



initiatives passed by the commission. Time is needed and this is an excellent point for transmission of ideas into parliamentary world.

## Peace Institute Ljubljana, Peace Research

During the last few months we are trying to get funds for a Peace Institute in Ljubljana, together with Gregor Tomc, Tonči Kuzmanič and Vlasta Jalušič, and hopefully we will start our work in February 1991. We have got a lot of promises for money and now we wait for promises to manifest. For this purpose mainly I started my post graduate studies at the University of Ljubljana (Philosophy, Sociology of Culture) and my research is about the Heritage of nonviolence in European Thought from Humanism to Anarchism). In December I have got a job at the University for this research and that's it. I'm employed again - this time as a peace researcher - for the next 6 years hopefully. Since the University can not offer me any good conditions for my work, I only use their library, but work at home and in the Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence. In spring, hopefully, I will move my office to Peace Institute. It sounds quite optimistic, doesn't it. We are promised to get money for some research projects that we proposed to the government. Namely, we want government to give us money to start the work and for them to take seriously our results, too. This is very important, because it makes them put peace issue on their agenda regularly. We also have a joint research proposal with Ferenc and Jody from Budapest, Arno from Schling, Austria, Sonja from Belgrade and some other researchers from Poland and hopefully also Czechoslovakia. We will try to concentrate our work on Conflict resolution and education in the field of conversion, education programs etc.. If you have any idea about possible cooperations, specially in view of our researchers visiting other research units and about possible collaborative research projects, please, let us know.

## Slovenia Without an Army

The most joyful thing was certainly the campaign for the abolition of the army in Slovenia, which we started in autumn 1989. That was the main issue of my elections campaign. Liberal party (which is in opposition) had fully adopted our program and supports fully the concept already from November 1989 on. The Greens (which form governmental coalition) had joint the support in October 1990 and than Communists and partially Socialist party. So, we have relatively good political support. Some important names, fully supporting the idea: Dr. Dušan Plut, vice president of Slovenia and former president of the Greens, Tomaž Košir, president of Slovenian Economy Chamber, Jožef Školč, president of Liberal party, Vika Potočnik, the president of the parliamentary commission for peace politics ect.. President Kučan Milan is taking this concept with all sympathies and takes both options (with and without army) as relevant and necessary to be taken into consideration. We want Slovenia not to establish its own army, while on the other hand, Janez Janša (defence minister) and majority of people in government think that Slovenia needs an army for transition period until the situation on Balkans gets settled, and then, they agree with demilitarization. The problem (the difference amongst us) is timing, they say, but in fact the difference is in general attitude - whether it is peaceful or militaristic.

We will try to make the new slovenian constitution not to constitute an army. This is why we have proposed a so-called "peace paragraph", stating that "Slovenian security policy is based on global peace politics.". During transition period when Yugoslav army should withdraw, Slovenia could keep territorial defence troops also, and would finally abolish them with referendum. .

The government is more problematic. They want to form a new Slovenian army. This I understand extremely dangerous. The nation of 2.2 million people can not avoid high grade militarization and big economic problems if it wants to create and support its own military. On the other hand, it can never secure itself with the army and at the same time creates conflicts with a simple fact, that it builds relations on mistrust and fear, constitutes enemy images and does not have time and focus for peace activity and negotiations. Regardless the fact there are at least 4 ministers, who were my friends before elections (prime minister, defence, inner and foreign minister) and who are all directly responsible for security policy (what a magic coincidence, a), I have very little power to influence them. The inertia of military thought pattern is just too strong. We still have little time and we will do our best for Slovenia not to be one more weapons dealer on the black list, one more military force in Europe.



Concerning CO's (Conscientious Objectors) we were successful. The new law is in preparation now and it seems that it will be quite liberal. Until the laws are adopted, we have a gentleman agreement that no CO will be conscripted if they apply to the peace group or directly to the ministry. Until now, we were successful. Our attitude toward new law is of course clear - we want no army and we will reject any law based on compulsory conscription.

## Conversion Network "Metelkova"

This summer, our group initiated a project in Ljubljana, for conversion of military barracks in the town for cultural, social, etc. purposes. Until now, we have joint about 70 (seventy) groups, movements, initiatives, clubs, associations etc. which struggle together now for demilitarization of Ljubljana (which has about 7 military barracks). Few days ago, we constituted an Association "THE NETWORK FOR METELKOVA" (Metelkova is a street, where the central military barracks and military headquarters are situated) to satisfy this goal, and I was elected chairman. This is a crazy thing - such a mixture of people and their activities joining one goal. It is a real pleasure to work with this new team of people. If you phone or come to the peace center, two wonderful women are constantly there for this project, Irena and Nataša.



## International communication

We have finally strengthen our communication with Austrian peace movements, specially stimulated with Abolition of the Army projects. We had some joint events, like peace seminar "Trust against fear" in November 1990. Next year our Summer peace camp will be again an international one, after two local camps that we had in the past two years. Write to us, to get more information. As well, I'm happy to have more contacts in research field. We engaged a lot in Helsinki Citizens Assembly, which ended (or started) in the first assembly in Prague, October 1990. I must say that I have mixed feelings about this assembly. It should serve as a good network for social activities and initiatives, as a tool for local activists to plug into planetary circuit. I'm afraid not enough committed people work on the project for it to be successful. Anyhow, this project is important and worth trying. One of the outstanding effects of HCA was, that it stimulated many national cooperations, specially in France, England and Canada.

Last but not least, I would like to repeat at this point, that we are inquiring for an international volunteer who would work in our peace center for a year or so. He or she (preferably she) would work on international communications and should currently speak at least Spanish and English. If you have any suggestions, please let us know.



## **BLUE section,**

-a brain section - presents a view on current political situation (local and global),

### **Slovenia - independent state, new state, new enemies**

On 23. of December, Slovenia declared independence with a national plebiscite (referendum about independence). About 90% voted for independence of Slovenia. I did not go to vote. My anarchist blood was too strong. It is frustrating to be put into position to vote for new State. If it would not be too risky that this would at the same time be a vote also for new military, one would maybe vote. But it was too risky this time. State is sheet, you know this slogan. Slovenian state will be again just a state. Even worse: lots of emotion is linked with egoism, superiority and rejection of poor South. My feelings are mixed. On the one hand, I think individualization of this nation is a necessary process, on the other hand I can not support separation because of those feelings and motivations of egoism, narcissism, rejection and even militarism. Anyway, in six months all jurisdiction must be put in place. And we expect that the Slovenian Constitution will be the first legal act adopted somewhere in March 1991. Hope there will be no army mentioned in it.

The slovenian state gets constituted in national euphoria in Yugoslavia. It was a game of acceleration of national conflicts in the power-competition. Bloody game on the cost of peoples fears and anger. You certainly have heard a lot about national conflicts in yugoslavia, about civil war in Kosovo, about dangerous of serious conflicts all over the country. It is a right place for peace activist, believe me. And join the prayer for this region. In Serbia Milošević is still in power and it seems he is the only hard-liner in the states of real-socialism who managed to get legitimacy also after "democratic" elections. His politics was built on deepening the gap between Albanians and Serbs, and on creation of conflict with Slovenians. His politics is based on national identity and heatherice. And I see Milošević as extremely dangerous factor in relations between Serbia and Albania. In this regards I also see a possible split between Slovenia and Yugoslavia as a loss of potential balance of Serbian hard line against albanians. If Serbs remain alone with albanians it is going to be bad.

The remaining serbian hard line is also a justification for those, who constitute Slovenian army. Therefore, I see the only solution in negotiations between Slovenia and Serbia. If not by other means, then with international pressure. A peace plan for Balkans should be drawn as soon as possible, otherwise, the conflict might evolve into severe crisis, since we have to know, that economic situation is worse and worse and people therefore more and more nervous. Democratization in Balkans definitely mean a potential escalation of national conflicts.

Balkans and Yugoslavia are a good opportunity for international community to exercise its means and ways of influencing nonviolent conflict resolution. The involvement of international community in Yugoslavia would be a good test for what is awaiting it - the problem of dissolution of Soviet Union. We have to build up mechanisms for internationalization of resolution of conflicts. The president of Slovenia is repeating that. If Slovenia gets international guarantees for support, than it has no need to create an army. If international community is ignorant, than Slovenia will have its army and will also perform a foreign politics based on deterrence with military means. The same model applies for Baltic states and it will really be a missed opportunity if we will not be successful to offer enough international support to those countries, which have good will to disarm.

The gulf crisis and Sadam's case must be taken as a last warning for international community always acting too late. It is too late for Chinese students, if all planetary community accuses regime after these people were killed. But international community knows where certain developments and dynamics can lead too. If Yugoslavia has exported 230 tanks in 1988 to Kuwait and has built several military bases in Iraq, than it sounds quite sick if they accuse any military conflict in the area. They contributed and co-created the war. International community always has time to intervene beforehand. Soviet Union is one such a case, Yugoslavia and Balkans are the other one. We all know, that these are two boiling pots in Europe itself, but international community take it as a "local affair", until it gets exploded.. And than, as in case of Kuwait, the only method is again a military threat. International community should make Gorbačev agree to seek solutions for Soviet Union (specially concerning security) on international level. The same applies for Yugoslavia. Security should be internationalized, until it is time to base it and act on/with peaceful and non-military means.

## What can happen in Yugoslavia?

That is the question. And this question has been probably asked the most often during 1990. Politicians, public figures, journalists, and also pacifists and nonviolent activists tried to give all kind of self-assured answers. Most of them expected much faster development as had actually happened. And this makes me optimistic. The process of transformation of Yugoslavia goes step by step and slowly, which makes it possible to end up peacefully. Let this be the most important assumption.

The year 1990 was the year of political, national, economic, and ideological disintegration of Yugoslav realm. Politically the most important republics (Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia) declared autonomy in the last few months after they had performed democratic elections. The country now shows and manifests all its diversities after some decades of mud. Each republic has its own political chart, different parties are in power, most of them nationalist. Religion became "de nouveaux" an underlying and identification momentum all over the country.

There is no more centralism, no more ideological monolitism. There is chaos. If anybody grows illusions that democratization means by default also more human rights and more security, one has only to come to Yugoslavia or Romania. Democratization can also be very dangerous, when it is let to nationalists and crazy people.

Yugoslavia is impossible to rule any more as one country. The last day of 1990 this was also an assumption of Prime minister Marković, who was acting as "the last Yugoslav" and is making his best to run the country in this difficult transition period. This is Shisifs task. Separate republics are violating federal laws, after they adopt their own constitutions and laws. Poverty, unemployment, extremely inefficient economy, coilapse of political, economic, social, juridical, military etc. system. That's what Yugoslavia is now. A geographical term for a peace of chaos. Multinational, multireligion, multiethnic society, of 23 million people, who have been living in different histories, in different cultures, then in 20 century have been artificially unified under one economic, one political and one social system, deprived from their culture, religion and production traditions. This society was something between the West and the East, between the North and the South. Yugoslavia could never become a real tuff socialist country - they always kept a part of private property and private enterprising. Farmers still have their land. The system was somewhere between both - capitalism and socialism. This is also why society is divided in polarity between the reach and the poor. This is the well known North- South division which manifests in Yugoslavia itself. Yugoslavia is a world in itself. Islam, Orthodox and Catholic, reach and poor, white and of color.

Nobody dares to answer any more, what will happen. Nothing special, couple of new states on Balkans, a war? Everything is possible, this is the most usual answer of all politicians. And they are getting ready for all options. For the war too. Separate republics are organizing their own national armies. Slovenia the northern most republic, the most reach one, and the one, which was leading the path of democratization, performing free elections as the first amongst Yugoslav republics in April 1990, is the first republic which declared independency by people voting for it on the plebiscite on 23. December 1990. Slovenian government is organizing its own army under the governance of their defence minister Janez Janša, former antimilitaristic activist and free journalist, who had been imprisoned for his antimilitaristic writings in 1998. Slovenia is therefore the first republic, preparing to form an independent state, and the first republic, preparing also its defence system - against Southern republics. Slovenes see no enemy in the West (Italy, Nato), North (Austria, neutral), or East (Hungary, still Warsaw Pact), they see enemies in those, with whom they have been peacefully living throughout the history. Nevertheless, Slovenia, concerning security, is the less problematic area. Much more problems there are in Serbia and in Croatia. The whole world knows already about Kosovo, the area within the republic Serbia, where Albanians form majority of the population. The conflict is difficult to explain and even more difficult to solve. Like Ireland. There was repression all over past years, many of victims and a number of human rights violations. The hard liner of Serbian politics, who made the gap between Serbs and Albanians even wider, Mr. Slobodan Milošević, was recently elected president of Serbian state after campaigning for years on the basis of national identity, haterice against Albanians and Slovenes and repressive policy. Serbs, regaining their national pride, have organized themselves also in Croatia, mainly in the province, where they, as minoritarian nation, form majority. This is the area around the town Knin in Croatia. Serbs declared there a new autonomy. Tourists, who must pass Knin on their way from Split, Dubrovnik and other central and South Dalmatia coast line, have witnessed street repression earlier this autumn. Armed civilians on streets, forming village night guards, had already hurt some people, bombed some railways and had shot to cars. Little Ireland again. Civil war in Kosovo, terrorism in Croatia - these are only two possible scenarios amongst those optimistic ones, excluding war in Balkans. Problem of albanians in Serbia is



namely much more serious since it is not limited to Kosovo, but is linked a lot with future development in Albania itself. Democratization in Albania will certainly lead to a new building of albanian identity which will necessarily lead to requests for unification of albanian land. This will even more be a case if Albanians in Serbia will be more repressed then they are in Albania proper. Mr. Milošević is certainly not a guarantee for this not to happen. Albanians in Serbia did not go to vote during elections in December. They simply had no right to organize themselves in pre-elections period. Their papers were confiscated, their journals could not be published, their activists were under police surveillance and often arrested.

What can a nonviolence activist answer then when asked, what will happen. He or she would certainly answer, that it is not to dream, what can happen, but it is to work in the direction which will make it possible to solve the complicated situation in a peaceful way. What does that mean for Yugoslavia. I think that Yugoslavia is a good opportunity for international community to exercises the concept of internationalisation of security issue. Security of Yugoslavia is not the problem of Yugoslavia only. Slovenian politicians are repeatedly answering the question, why they need their own army, with the following answer: "If we would have had international guaranties for our security against Serbs, we would not need an army". Of course they are wrong, since the only guarantee for ones security is ones peaceful behavior and policy, but partially they are right. International community can not just sit and wait repeating - "lets see what will happen over there, we wont support any independency movement, any new divisions". International community should take it seriously the fact, that new divisions are taking into place, that there are new gaps and new problems. International community should be able, if not to predict the conflicts, to at least hear and take seriously the warnings. The sooner it takes it seriously, the more time it has for action. Local mutual agreements are of course necessary, but when politicians on local level have no good will to sit and negotiate, then international community should exercise its economic and political powers to intervene and to make these people sit around the table and come to a peace plan, to a peaceful agreement. I'm sure it might work when it is done in enough early stage of the conflict. On the other hand it is not only the local politicians not having good will to negotiate, but we have to know, that these politicians are largely new in political arena, and they do not have skills, knowledge and wisdom for international peace talks. That is the other role in which international politics should play a great part.

Internationalisation of the conflict is therefore requested. Yugoslavia can turn, if we do it fast, as a good training for bigger problems which are on the way in Soviet Union. Gulf crisis must be taken as the last warning for international community to intervene until it is time for talks and not only when there is immediate dangerous for a large part of the world to blow up.

It is of course not only politics deciding the world. In the case of Yugoslavia, there is immediate need for grass roots, community action. Nationaly and religiously mixed communities need healing. Experience of peace brigades, peace researchers, conflict resolution management are needed. The conflicts in kosovo and Knin can not be resolved by good will of politicians any more since haterice has got roots too deep in the society. It is to say, that politics had created the conflict and when it escalates in the society, the conflict can no more be handled by good will of politicians, though this is of vital importance.

To conclude let us come back to the beginning. Nobody dares any more to give answers to the question in the title. Fortunately the changes are not as rapid as they could be. Hopefully we still have time for international and local political action and for long term social action, with which we could reconcile people in this country and make it possible, that nations in Balkans will integrate amongst each other and with rest of Europe on new basis, respecting each others identity and creating a peace and security order for them not to be necessary to build new armies to defend against each other. Military question is probably the most important one. If security in Balkans will not be provided with other means then these regions will a) remain poor, investing into military industry, b) polluted, not having resources for ecological sanations, c) in constant war dangerous. There are some signs which can make us optimists. Croatian president Tudjman, Slovenian president Kučan and prime minister of Yugoslavia Marković have been recently speaking about the necessity of peace plan to be drawn for transition period. Even more in Slovenia there is a serious discussion also in the government, about abolition of the army. President Kučan says: "both options are opened". A common answer for Yugoslavia at this time, but this time also a promising one..

Ljubljana, 1. January 1991

## YELLOW section meditation



### Abolish the army - a key to survival

Abolition of the army and radical disarmament are not only realistic options but a necessity. The internationalization of peace order on the planet should be a priority of international community. For the simple reason that this would release enough resources to redistribute them to the areas of education, health (including food) and pollution as three crucial cancer tissues of the planet. A big dream of many souls in history was to create a world peace order. I'm sure that the time is coming for such a concept to manifest. It needed a long period of national and international movements and institutions to constitute themselves. World peace order should be based on existing networks, it is not much new to create, it is to link existing potentials: international networks in the field of education, research, movements, politics, diplomacy. We have to unite and push for establishment of such an order based on existing frameworks (UN, CSCE, HCA, Red Cross, all kind of international peace and human rights and emancipation movements etc.) and see what peaces are missing.

### Peace zones - global project on local plane

The experience for International peace order could be generated on the cases of small states, which are willing to become a peace zone. These areas should serve as an experiment for conversion (industry, jobs, re-education) of an area too. We have to support strongly those countries in which there is political will for radical disarmament and for peace politics. Abolition of the army in particular state must be a local and global project at the same time. Peace zones can not be created by international decision only and neither can be created by local civil society request only.



Examples of such states are Switzerland and Austria (both neutral) and Slovenia and Baltic states. The former have one good starting point, which is that they constitute their states yet and define their (security and other) systems from scratch.

## Universal religion

Reconciliation projects -islam-christianity play a genuine role in international peace order and in this regards also the old idea of universal religion. Want we or not E+W will unite against 3rd world and mainly against far east, against Islam. It started with gulf crisis, will continue with some of the soviet republics and with Albania. We in peace movement have to take religions seriously in our thinking about peace order. The sense of universality of religious teachings and of their relevancy *par definition*, is crucial not only for understanding the differences but also for building bridges and little sparks of communication between these differences. This is important for European conflicts (N Ireland, Corse, Ciper, Kosovo and Knin in Yugoslavia), as well as for Middle east and for conflicts with native people in central and north America. There is so much knowledge in the teachings, which are treated as religious (religion, re-ligare, to link again, to link spirit with the matter, to link God and The Manifested, to join Yin and Yang in one dance etc.) that it is absolutely necessary to make all effort to put the peaces together, not for these peaces to compete, but to complement. The time is coming, again, for such a move. And if we are successful in linking (complementing) religions, then we are both, successful in establishing grounds for World Peace Order and gaining a puzzle picture of planetary knowledge. Then, maybe also knowledge of cultures which were much more developed than humanity is now, will become accessible - like the wisdom of Mayi- and many secrets, that we do not understand in the dimension of one religion, will reveal..

## Communication

All knowledge is relevant. Communications should not be left to power elites. Grass roots people should use facilities. This letter should be sent out on mailboxes. You see, I still don't have one, that really is a shame. There is no excuse for this. It makes the whole thing so much easier. We should profit much more from computer networks.

## Life style

"Struggle against multinationals, don't buy in supermarkets, reduce the consumers rate", that is what sbdy. from Africa said on one of the international meetings somewhere and Dilip, from India he answered to the question, how can we in the first world, help you in the third world: "we need no other help but for you to cut your consumption as most of the goods are consumed by a little percent of people living in your countries. There truly is no other way, but to change the life style of us, who live in a rich world.

## Love style

Iron can be only melted with heat, military patterns can only be destroyed by joy.

A joyful New Year then, dear friends,

and please, keep in touch in this wonderful future that is awaiting us

Yours in Peace and Love

Marko Hren

## Slovenska pomlad, arhivski portal;

<http://www.slovenskapomlad.si/>



S pojmom »slovenska pomlad« poenostavljeno označujemo obdobje, ko se je začela zbirati kritična masa **civilno-družbenih pobud**, ki je spremenila politično podobo Slovenije. Eno od vprašanj, ki si ga zastavljajo udeleženci tega prelomnega zgodovinskega obdobja, je, katera pobuda je bila ključna? Tednik Mladina ali Nova revija? Slovenska demokratična zveza ali Slovenska kmečka zveza? Mirovno gibanje ali morda kar delovanje liberalnega krila ZKS?

**Portal Slovenska pomlad** izhaja iz druge perspektive. Ključni dogodki so se zgodili v kompleksnem **omrežju**, ki je povezovalo posameznice in posameznike ter različne iniciative, dogodke.

Ambicija tega portala je vsaj zasilna **rekonstrukcija kompleksnega omrežja**, v katerem so bili posamezniki in posameznice medij povezav različnih skupin. In obratno: različne iniciative so bile medij povezovanj posameznic in posameznikov. Teza, ki jo ponujamo, je torej obratna od običajnih odgovorov na vprašanje, katera pobuda je bila ključna: šele ko so se posamezne iniciative povezale v **gosto preprejeno omrežje**, je to omogočilo globoke **zgodovinske spremembe**.

## Mednarodna dejavnost Odbora

Člani kolegija Odbor za varstvo človekovih pravic so z obveščanjem mednarodne javnosti o dogajanjih v Sloveniji začeli takoj po aretacijah 31. maja 1988. V času aretacij je bil Marko Hren v New Yorku in je priložnost izkoristil za prvo mednarodno informiranje in lobiranje. Poleti 1988 je mednarodna dejavnost Odbora postala načrtna. Septembra 1988 je delegacija Odbora, ki so jo sestavljali Igor Bavčar, Drago Demšar, Marko Hren in Tomaž Mastnak v dunajskem parlamentu obiskali predsednika parlamenta Heinza Fischerja in predstavnike ljudske stranke, socialistične stranke in avstrijskih Zelenih, hkrati pa so obiskali tudi sedež Mednarodne helsinške federacije na Dunaju.

V drugi polovici septembra 1988 so Marko Hren, Tomaž Mastnak in Braco Rotar odrinili na tritedensko evropsko turnejo. Najprej so se udeležili mednarodnega srečanja Evropskega omrežja za Dialog med vzhodom in zahodom v Nijmegenu na Nizozemskem. Potem pa so potovali po ZRN, Franciji, Belgiji in Avstriji ter srečevali ljudi, ki so po Evropi ustanavljali iniciative, ki so podpirale slovensko demokratično gibanje. Hkrati so se navezali stike z diplomati belgijskega in francoskega zunanjega ministrstva, predstavniki političnih strank v

Parizu, Bruslju, Amsterdamu, Bonnu, Kölnu, Mainzu, Stuttgartu, Berlinu in Frankfurtu. V Bruslju pa so se sestali s poslanci iz Evropskega parlamenta.

V naslednjih tednih je ekipa, ki so jo sestavljali Mojca Drčar-Murko, Braco Rotar in Franco Juri, odpotovala v Rim. Dr. Dušan Keber je pot v Avstralijo, kjer se je udeležil strokovnega kongresa, izkoristil za sestanek z večjo skupino slovenskih izseljencev.

Člani kolegija Odbora so sodelovali pri snovanju publikacije Independent Voices from Yugoslavia. Že junija 1988 sta Marko Hren in Tomaž Mastnak pripravila poseben zvezek Neodvisnih glasov, povezan z afero JBTZ. Oktobra 1988 je izšla posebna brošura »Slovenian spring, Centralism or Democracy«, v Parizu je bila ustanovljena podružnica Odbora, ki je združevala v lobiranju predstavnike več progresivnih skupin iz Evrope.

Ena od točk, od koder se je širila mednarodna dejavnost Odbora, je bila v Tübingenu, dejavnost pa je koordiniral Maruša Krese.

Mednarodna dejavnost Odbora predstavlja enega od zametkov samostojne slovenske zunanje politike.

### Osebe

- [Bavčar Igor](#)
  - [Bučar France](#)
  - [Demšar Drago](#)
  - [Drčar Murko Mojca](#)
  - [Hren Marko](#)
  - [Juri Franco](#)
  - [Keber Dušan](#)
  - [Krese Maruša](#)
  - [Mastnak Tomaž](#)
  - [Rotar Braco](#)
- 

## Predragi Tomaž Mastnak

Kaj naj zapišem o Tomažu, človeku, ki mu dolgujem veliko. Preživela sva stotine ur pogovorov na poti po Evropi in doma ob nočnih aktivističnih razpravah in piljenju tekstov, konceptov, akcij. Zapisal bom samo to, da nemara najbolj od vsega, pogrešam danes v odnosu do 80ih let prav Tomaža, oziroma duha razprave, intelektualnega krožka, ki ga je znal ustvariti okrog sebe, tiste njegove zdrave mešanice akademika in aktivista. Predvsem pa, pogrešam njegove skromnosti; Tomaž je med vsemi aktivisti in protagonisti civilne družbe gotovo med tistimi z najbolj umirjenim egom in z najmanjšimi nagnjenji k samopromociji. Raje, kot da bi sam govoril o mojem ljubem prijatelju, se mu poklonim in zahvalim, ter na tem mestu objavim spodnji zapis ob njegovem imenovanju na mesto direktorja

pogona Alliance of civilizations v OZN. Ta informacija bi skoraj ostala prezrta – na srečo jo je dokumentiral Ali. V spodnjem članku.

Naš človek v Združenih narodih, Mladina 2005, št. 48

Tomaž Mastnak, direktor Urada zavezništva za civilizacije  
Ali H. Žerdin

Bolj malo ljudi iz teh krajev se lahko pohvali, da se je pod odlok o njihovi zaposlitvi podpisal generalni sekretar Združenih narodov. **Dr. Danilo Tuerk**, uglašeni in ugledni diplomat, sicer profesor mednarodnega prava, ki je do nedavnega služboval kot eden najtesnejših sodelavcev generalnega sekretarja **Kofija Anana**, je eden od njih. 14. novembra letos pa se je generalni sekretar Združenih narodov podpisal pod odlok, s katerim je bil Tomaž Mastnak imenovan na položaj direktorja *Urada zavezništva za civilizacije*.

Tomaž Mastnak gre torej v Združene narode. Kaj je Urad zavezništva za civilizacije? Gre za nov urad Združenih narodov, ki je nastal na pobudo Španije in Turčije. V tem, da sta pobudo za ustanovitev urada dali Španija in Turčija, je nekaj simbolike. Španija je država dveh morij, država, ki Evropo tradicionalno povezuje z ZDA. Turčija je most med Evropo in Azijo. Španija je danes sicer krščanska država, vendar je to hkrati država, ki je bila stoletja zaznamovana z islamom. Turčija je danes pretežno muslimanska država, vendar je bil eden od centrov krščanstva stoletja v Carigradu.

Ime Urada zavezništva za civilizacije sproža zanimive asociacije. Knjiga *Spopad civilizacij* Samuela P. Huntingtona, objavljena leta 1996, letos pa je bila prevedena tudi v Slovenščino, zadnje desetletje velja za enega največjih akademskih best sellerjev. Teza je enostavna: islamska civilizacija je trčila ob zahodno in jo ogroža. Če besedno zvezo "Spopad civilizacij" postavimo na glavo, dobimo besedno zvezo "Zavezništvo za civilizacije". Sedež Urada zavezništva za civilizacije bo v New Yorku, v eni od stavb, ki stojijo v neposredni bližini Palače narodov. Čez vikend pa je v Španiji potekalo prvo srečanje predstavnikov Urada, ki sta se ga udeležila tudi predsednika španske in turške vlade.

OK, kdo je Tomaž Mastnak? Občinstvo srednjih let se spominja, da je bil v osemdesetih letih stalni kolumnist Mladine. Posebno pozornost represivnih organov je vzbudil leta 1986, ko je **Branko Mikulić**, močni človek iz Bosne, kandidiral za predsednika zvezne jugoslovanske vlade. Mastnak je takrat napisal komentar *Korak naprej k demokratizaciji*, v katerem je Mikuliću očital represivno ravnanje, ko je bil Mikulić še pomemben funkcionar v Bosni in Hercegovini. Branko Mikulić je sicer tedaj v javnosti veljal za sposobnega organizatorja, saj je vodil organizacijo sarajevske zimske olimpijade. Manj znano pa je bilo, da so na začetku osemdesetih v Bosni in Hercegovini potekali montirani politični procesi proti domnevnim islamskim fundamentalistom. Žrtve teh procesov so bile obsojene na drakonske zaporne kazni. Mladina je bila zaradi Mastnakovega komentarja zaplenjena. Ker pa je bil komentar pred tem objavljen na Radiu Študent, so organi pregona zoper Mastnaka sprožili kazenski postopek. Mastnak je na ljubljanskem temeljnem sodišču sedel na zatožno klop, vendar je tožilce gladko povozil, zato so ti na koncu ugotovili, da je Mastnak povzročil le nezatno družbeno nevarnost. Proces je dobil dodatno dimenzijo, ker se je izkazalo, da je sam Branko Mikulić, tarča Mastnakove kritike, tožilstvu sporočil, da ne zahteva Mastnakovega pregona. Mimogrede, tožilstvo je Mastnaka preganjalo zaradi sramotitve predstavnikov najvišjih državnih organov, slovenski kazenski zakon pa je to podlo dejanje opredeljeval v 112. členu.

Je bil Mastnak v osemdesetih letih, v času samoupravnega socializma, res zgolj neznatna družbena nevarnost? Bolj natančen pregled njegovega početja bi dokazal, da je bil Mastnak v resnici velika družbena nevarnost. Recimo: leta 1988, ko je služba državne varnosti aretirala Janšo, je **Igor Bavčar** med prvimi obiskal Tomaža Mastnaka in se dal podučiti, kako se organizira civilno-družbeno akcijo. Četudi Mastnak velja predvsem za akademika, je v osemdesetih letih deloval tudi kot zagnan in iznajdljiv praktik. Pred letom 1988 se je namreč le nekaj ljudi suvereno gibalo po civilno-družbeni sceni in je brez težav nastopalo v različnih okoljih. Mastnak je veljal za človeka, ki je imel sicer svojo bazo na Mladini, hkrati je objavljaj v Problemih, dobrodošel pisec pa je bil tudi v Novi reviji. Po eni strani je bil eden ključnih analitikov novih družbenih gibanj - Mastnak sodi med tiste avtorje, zaradi katerih ima pojem "civilna družba" še danes zelo pozitiven prizvok -, po drugi strani pa je kot praktik sodeloval z mirovnim gibanjem. Mastnakovo sodelovanje s civilno-družbenimi iniciativami se ni omejevalo zgolj na delovanje v Sloveniji ali SFRJ. V osemdesetih je napletel spodobno mrežo znanstev, ki so segala tja do Poljske ali Češke. Če bi si morali izmisliti, kdo je bil v osemdesetih *zunanj minister* slovenske civilne družbe, bi lahko omenili nekaj pisateljev, aktivnih v mednarodnem združenju PEN, mirovnika **Marka Hrena**, Tomaža Mastnaka in morda še koga. Med letoma 1984 je tako sodeloval v evropskem omrežju za dialog med vzhodom in zahodom, kasneje pa v helsinški državljanski skupščini. Ko je leta 1989 Odbor za varstvo človekovih pravic začel s svojo zunanjepolitično aktivnostjo - zlasti sogovornike na zahodu je bilo potrebno seznaniti z dogajanjem v Sloveniji in SFRJ -, je bil prav Mastnak eden tistih, ki so odprli največ vrat v tujini. Odveč bi bilo razlagati, da je bil Mastnak med ustanovnimi člani *Bavčarjevega* Odbora za varstvo človekovih pravic. Bolj zanimivo je, da je imel kot teoretik to nenavadno lastnost, da je nastopal z zelo praktičnimi sugestijami. In četudi Mastnak ni bil nikdar velik retorik, je med sestanki kolegija Odbora za varstvo človekovih pravic formuliral nekaj ključnih gesel - recimo geslo, da bo vsaka sodba vojaškega sodišča, sprejeta brez navzočnosti javnosti - ne glede na izid sojenja proti četverici - nelegitima. Zgolj spotoma - Mastnak in Bavčar sta sodelovala že na začetku osemdesetih let, ko je nastala knjižna zbirka KRT. Bavčar je bil glavni, Mastnak pa odgovorni urednik. Delovanje knjižne zbirke KRT, ustanovljene leta 1981, sicer ni tako razvpito kot nekateri drugi založniški projekti. Dodati pa velja, da knjižna zbirka KRT predstavlja enega prvih avtonomnih založniških projektov in da gre za intelektualni podvig, ki je pustil globoke sledi. Mimogrede še to: v času, ko je nastajala knjižna zbirka KRT, je Mastnak tedanje funkcionarje vodstva mladinske organizacije (ZSMS) z Bavčarjem na čelu uspešno prepričal, naj med punkerji ne iščejo nacistov - služba državne varnosti je namreč leta 1981 med punkerji iskala nacistične in nekaj mladeničev tudi priprla. Vodstvo ZSMS je ob novici, da so med punkerji nacisti, izgubilo kompas, Mastnak pa je poskrbel, da so se mladinci vendarle spet znašli v času in prostoru.

V osemdesetih letih je bil zraven še pri enem zanimivem incidentu, štorija pa je aktualna tudi v teh dneh. Ko so se kosovski rudarji odločili za stavko v rudniku Stari trg, se je pri tedanjem Mladininem novinarju **Ervinu Hladniku Milharčiču** pripetil sestanek, na katerem je padla odločitev, da bi veljalo kosovske rudarje podpreti s solidarnostno gesto. Ker je teoretik Mastnak praktičen človek, je vrtil telefon in zbobnal ljudi, ki so potem operativno izpeljali znamenito zborovanje v Cankarjevem domu. Februarja 1989 sta tedanja slovenska uradna politika in alternativna scena v Cankarjevem domu prvič nastopili skupaj in se solidarizirali s kosovskimi rudarji. Mastnak na zborovanju sicer ni nastopil kot govornik, je pa pomagal pisati govor, ki ga je prebral **Franco Juri**, govornik italijanske manjšinske politične alternativne scene. Ironično - govornik manjšine Franco Juri je po Mastnakovem nasvetu v

govoru učinkovito uporabil Prešerna - kot da bi Prešeren v Krstu pri Savici pisal o rudarjih: "*Manj strašna noč je v črne zemlje krili, kot so pod svetlim soncem sužnji dnovi.*"

Četudi ima Tomaž Mastnak vse potrebne lastnosti disidenta, zanj velja, da v novem režimu disidentskega statusa ni skušal kapitalizirati. Skeptičen je bil do starega režima, skeptičen je ostal tudi poletu 1990. Kot aktivist mednarodnih civilno-družbenih omrežij je tako ali tako lahko osebno ugotovil, kakšni so mentalni horizonti novih političnih elit na vzhodu. Nekaj mesecev zatem, ko je na Poljskem Solidarnost že prevzela oblast, pri nas pa smo na volitve še čakali, se je udeležil ustanovnega sestanka Helsinške državljanske skupščine, ki je potekal v Krakovu. Ko je ekipa iz Slovenije (ob Mastnaku sta bila v njej še **Bogdan Lešnik** in Marko Hren) predlagala, da bi sklepni dokument govoril o enakopravnosti, ne glede na spol ali spolno usmerjenost, je formulacija med zaključno reakcijo gladko letela iz dokumenta. Herojem demokratične revolucije v vzhodni Evropi so se namreč domislice, da naj bi lezbijkam in gejem zagotavljali enakopravnost, zdele povsem nepotrebne, nesmiselne, grozne, skratka heretične. Mimogrede, odgovornosti za dejstvo, da ima pojem "civilna družba" še danes neskončno pozitiven pomen, Mastnaku ne moremo pripisati. Že sredi druge polovice osemdesetih je pisal tudi o "totalitarizmu od spodaj", torej o totalitarnih potencialih civilne družbe.

Recimo, da ima Mastnakov teoretski opus tri obdobja. Sprva se je intenzivno ukvarjal z marksizmom, vendar je s knjižnim prvencem *H kritiki stalinizma*, objavljenim pri založni KRT, poskrbel, da v času socialističnega samoupravljanja ni veljal za perspektiven kader. V osemdesetih se je ukvarjal zlasti z novimi družbenimi gibanji in civilno družbo, leta 1989 pa je doktoriral s tezo *Človekove pravice ter konstitucija državljanstva in civilne družbe*. Mimogrede - Mastnak ni bil le eden ključnih članov *Bavčarjevega* Odbora za varstvo človekovih pravic. Deloval je tudi v *Bavconovem* Svetu za varstvo ustavnih svoboščin. V devetdesetih se je ukvarjal z vprašanji nastanka Evrope ter z razmerjem med krščanskim in muslimanskim svetom. Evrope ni konstituiral le humanizem, ugotavlja Mastnak, pač pa tudi etnično čiščenje, križarske vojne proti muslimanom in vojne proti Turkom. Nastanek Evrope, ki ga navadno povezujemo s plemenitostjo humanizma, ima torej svojo temno plat.

Mastnak je zadnje desetletje preživel med Kairom, New Yorkom in Ljubljano. Redno službo je imel na ZRC SAZU, pisal pa je tudi za izvoz - knjiga o krščanskem svetu, muslimanskem svetu in zahodnem političnem redu, denimo, je izšla pri University of California Press, par objav pa ima tudi v arabskem jeziku.

Tomaž Mastnak torej odhaja v Združene narode. Urad zavezništva za civilizacije naj bi vodil leto dni. Glede na to, da je med raziskovanjem razmerij med muslimanskim in krščanskim svetom preučeval tudi tiste zamolčane točke, ki govorijo o zločinskem ravnanju zahodne civilizacije, se zna zgoditi, da na zahodu njegovim idejam ne bodo ploskali. Ampak tega, da mu tisti, ki imajo največ moči, ne ploskajo, je vaje.

## Mreže in obveščevalne službe UDBA, KOS

Igor Omerza je leta 2007 začel zbirati gradivo iz časa Mikro Ade in Odbora za varstvo človekovih pravic. Ob pogovorih in v korespondenci mi je razkril, kako povsem jasno je, da smo bili glavna tarča



obveščevalnih dejavnosti v Sloveniji koncem 80ih let. Najbolj sva bila opazovana midva z Janezom Janšo, o najinih korakih so vodili osebne dosjeje, ki pa so bili kasneje uničeni. However; sledi in pričevanja o poročanju političnemu vodstvu na osnovi zapisov v dosjejih, v arhivih obstajajo. Pričakujemo lahko, da bodo nekega lepega dne zbrani, urejeni in objavljeni. Na tem mestu samo nakazujemo na pomembno točko, ki zahteva dodatna raziskovanja.

Igor Bavčar je že v svojem poročilu Državnemu zboru o procesu JBTZ namignil, da so obveščevalne službe vodstvu poročale predvsem o dejavnostih mirovnikov in da so bile preiskave v Mirkoadi osredotočene na dokument, poziv k civilni neposlušnosti. To je moj članek, ki sem ga pripravil za objavo v Teleksu, a so članek cenzurirali. Ker gre za močan programski tekst, ki je leta 1988 v obveščevalnih službah in kontraobveščevalni službi JLA očitno močno odmeval, ga tu objavljamo v celoti.

Ali Žerdin je leta 2008 v Dnevniku objavil tekst o mrežah in lobijih – v par korakih do papeža.

Prosil me je za intervju, saj je sam večkrat ocenil, da sva z Mastnakom v 80ih letih spletla odločilno mrežo. Kot vsem novinarjem sem ob tisti priliki tudi Aliju odgovoril, da ne želim nastopati v medijih, in v članku je nato korektno kodiral moje misli – predvsem pa objavil mojo tajno šifro: V SRCU STRAHU JE NEPOVEZANOST ;-). Aliju nisem pustil, da omenja moje ime. Moja želja, ostati desetletje anonimen, je bila tudi tokrat izpolnjena.

Obstajajo ljudje, ki zbirajo metulje. Pa zbiralci znamk. In nalepk. Najdemo pa tudi ljudi, ki zbirajo osebna poznanstva. Gre za ljudi posebnega kova. Pomembni zgodovinski dogodki se ne pripetijo sami od sebe. Zgodijo se zato, ker v njih sodelujejo ljudje, ki poznajo veliko drugih ljudi. Natančneje, poznajo ljudi, ki prav tako poznajo veliko ljudi. Prek tega omrežja poznanstev dosežejo, da se ideje in dejanja nenavadno hitro širijo od centra proti obrobju. Zaradi njih Zemlja ni nepregledno velik planet, pač pa je v resnici majhen svet.

Ali žerard, Dnevnik 6.10.2007

Začimo na začetku našega štetja: na trgu religiozne ponudbe je tedaj obstajalo ogromno zanimivih idej. A le Jezus Kristus je imel učenca, ki je bil hkrati tudi odlični trgovski potnik. Sveti Pavel je na dvanajstletni turneji, med katero je širil Jezusov nauk, iskal ljudi, ki poznajo veliko ljudi. Krščanstvo se ni širilo zgolj zato, ker bi bile ideje Jezusa Kristusa toliko boljše od drugih idej na trgu religiozne ponudbe. Širilo se je zato, ker je imelo Pavla, tkalca omrežja ljudi, ki so ideje širili naprej.

Paul Revere ima v ameriški zgodovini prav posebno mesto. Pozna ga vsak ameriški osnovnošolec. Ko se je v Bostonu začel spopad z Angleži, je šel na dolgo ježo in pozival ljudi k upor. Poznal je ljudi, ki so poznali veliko ljudi. Ideja, da je upor proti Angležem nujnost, se je pretakala v številnih glavah. A Paul Revere je bil tisti, ki je sedel na konja in stkal uporniško omrežje. Z njegovo ježo se je začel ameriški boj za neodvisnost izpod angleškega kolonialnega jarma.

Tudi slovenska zgodovina ima podobne junake. Enega od njih dobro poznam. Nobene publicitete si ne želi. Ne pričakuje, da bo kdaj dobil častni znak svobode. Niti tega noče, da bi se njegovo ime znašlo v tisku. A v osemdesetih letih je dneve, mesce in leta preživel v avtu, se vozil po Vzhodni

dogovora in objevil samo geslo

Evropi in čas porabil za tkanje omrežja, prek katerega so se pretakale plemenite pobude. Pobude so imele dva skupna imenovalca - človekove pravice in mir. Civilna družba, kakor poenostavljeno imenujemo strukturo, ki je obstajala ob koncu osemdesetih let, je bila v resnici gosto sitkano omrežje osebnih poznanstev. Naj ne zameri, če znanca, ki noče nobene publicitete, citiram: »Delovali smo na etični pogon.« Zgodovinske spremembe se niso začele zato, ker bi bila zbrana kritična masa. Kritična masa sama po sebi ne zadošča. Zgodile so se zato, ker so bili ljudje med seboj gosto povezani.

### Od malega Strojana do velikega Benedikta

GESLO

»V srcu strahu prebiva nepovezanost.« je pred leti na eno od šišenskih sten s sprejem zapisal neznani avtor. Grafit govori tudi o avtoritarnih režimih.

»Sovražno združevanje« je bilo v starem režimu eno od resnejših kaznivih dejanj. Ko se je nepovezanost spremenila v povezanost, je tudi strah zbledel. Povezanost, temelječa na etiki, je bila tedaj ob koncu osemdesetih, neverjetno gosta. Prebijala je državne meje. Do prvega svetovnega nemškega kanclerja sta bila potrebna dva telefonska klica. Do dunajskega državnega zbora prav tako. Zaradi

Ali se je držal samo geslo



REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA  
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Številka: 62531-444/2008/2

Datum: 29.04.2008

Hren Marko  
Vodnikova 195 b  
1000 Ljubljana - dostava

ZADEVA: Hren Marko, 26. 4. 1959 - gradivo SDV  
ZVEZA: vaš dopis z dne 15. 4. 2008

Pregledali smo gradivo v fondu AS 1931 Republiški sekretariat za notranje zadeve in nismo našli gradiva, ki bi se nanašalo na Vas. V popisih dosjejev, ki ga je do leta 1990 vodila Služba državne varnosti je pod zaporedno številko 17225 vpisan vaš osebni dosje z naslednimi podatki: Hren Marko, roj. 26. 4. 1959, leto uvedbe OD 1987, opomba: črtan. Ker je bil torej Vaš osebni dosje črtan ga ne hranimo v okviru prevzetega gradiva od SOVE in njenih predhodnikov.

Glede drugega dela Vašega vprašanja Vam sporočamo, da hranimo v a.š. 1147 - 1149 gradiva o procesu proti četverici 1988-1989, v katerem so podatki o ukrepih SDV in organov vojske pred, med in po procesu ter podatki skupine delegatov za proučitev okoliščin in posledic procesa proti četverici. V tem gradivu je tudi gradivo, ki se nanaša na delovanje Odbora za varstvo človekovih pravic. Posebnega gradiva o spremljanju mednarodne dejavnosti Gibanja za kulturo miru in nenasilja ali spremljanja delovanja v podjetju MikroAda ne hranimo. V a.š. 1463 pa so indikativni bilteni in informativni bilteni SDV za leta 1988, 1989 in 1990, v katerih so morda tudi omembe teh dejavnosti.

V kolikor bi si želeli ogledati ta gradiva je naša čitalnica na Kongresnem trgu 1/I :nadstropje odprta vsak delovni dan med 8. in 13. uro. Ker gradiv ne hranimo v čitalnici ampak v depoju, Vas prosimo, da Vaš obisk in želeno gradivo v naprej naročite.

S spoštovanjem,

Pripravila: *Ljuba Dornik*  
mag. Ljuba Dornik-Šubelj  
višja svetovalka - arhivistka



*dr. Matevž Košir*  
dr. Matevž Košir  
direktor

## **Poziv k civilni neposlušnosti in generalnemu štrajku 1988 – razlog za obračun obveščevalne službe z MikroAdo in za začetek afere JBTZ?**

**Komentar k tekstu, MH 2008): Tu je nikoli objavljen tekst, ki ga je obveščevalne služba iskala in našla na Mikroadi. Po nekaterih trditvah (glej magnetograme t.i. Bavčerjeve komisije) je bil to en ključnih corpus delicti tekstov ob aretacijah na Mikroadi. V času aretacij sem bil v ZDA. Ozadje aretacij in razlogov zanje ni ne raziskano in ne ustrezno dokumentirano. A to ni predmet te Antologije – zadevo je leta 2008 začel sistematično dokumentirati Igor Omerza, Ali Žerdin pa je postavil portal Slovenske pomladi. To nalogo jima prepuščam! Omerza (Omi) mi je ob svojem kopanju po arhivih dal dovolj namigov za sklep, da so se obveščevalne službe prednostno angažirale na aktivnostih in akterjih mirovnikov. Nenazadnje je že samo dejstvo, da so za spremljanje mojega dela odprli osebni dosje in redno poročali partijskemu vodstvu dovolj zgovoren dokaz. Nekega lepega dne bo treba sestaviti mozaik.**

### **Civilna neposlušnost in nenasilni odpor**

V zadnjih tednih se v javnosti in v medijih obveščanja veliko govori o specialni vojni in o možnostih za vojaški udar. Misel je ena močnejših energij s katerimi razpolaga človek, zato je misli vredno jemati zares. Z mislimi o vojni se je potrebno toliko bolj ukvarjati, saj je vojna globoko ukoreninjen način za "razreševanje" iz napetega stanja v nekem okolju in hkrati sredstvo, ki postavlja pod vprašaj obstoj segmenta ali celotne človeške civilizacije, ki tačas naseljuje zemljo. "Razreševanje" postavljam med navednice zato, ker se na ta način opravi z različnostmi (ki niso uspele priti med seboj v dialog), na represiven in zanikajoč način. Objektivno in dolgoročno pa tako "reševanje" za človeštvo pomeni zgolj nove rane.

Agresija, represija, vojne in pretnje z vojaško oblastjo so ustoličeni načini komunikacije med različnostmi, ki se boje sprejeti ena drugo. Zato se tudi država lahko brani samo tako, kot se je pač doslej braniti naučila - z vojno in z agresivnim bojevanjem proti vsemu, kar se obnaša drugače kot država predvideva.

Vseskozi v zgodovini pa se pojavljajo tudi drugačni načini ravnanja v položaju, ko se dve stranki ne zmoreta sporazumeti. Med najbolj znanimi in najbolj odmevnimi je Gauthama Gandhi in njegova šola Satja Grahe ( Moè Resnice). Gandhi je v praksi povezal raznovrstne niti pacifistične, anarhistične in socialistične misli devetnajstega stoletja (od Bakunina do Tolstoja) z religioznimi nitmi krščanstva in hinduizma. Kasneje so se različni načini nenasilnega odpora in civilne neposlušnosti udeleževali tako med obema vojnoma, kot ob represivnih ravnanjih totalitarnih režimov dvajsetega stoletja (okupirane dežele vzhodnega bloka, južna Amerika itd.). Tej tradiciji bi bilo vredno posvetiti posebno pozornost, saj jo militarizirani učbeniki zgodovine praviloma sploh ne omenjajo. Zgodovina nam je bila predstavljena kot zgodovina vojn, zato bi bilo ob priliki toliko bolj pomembno

predstaviti izkušnje, ki jih je prineslo nenasilno ravnanje različnih družb v najrazličnejših okoliščinah soočanja z represijo oblastnikov.

če je jasno, da vojska vrši priprave na vojno v popolni tajnosti (celo v tajnosti pred CK ZKJ), potem je tudi povsem jasno, da mora ljudstvo (civilna družba) izvajati svoje priprave javno, oziroma, da so uèinkovite priprave ravno v javnem delovanju civilne družbe. Za to imamo vsaj dva razloga. Prvi je ta, da je javnost delovanja eden konstitutivnih elementov civilne družbe in tudi tradicionalna metoda dela civilnih iniciativ v zadnjih letih pri nas. Drugi je ta, da moramo izkoristiti èas prostosti in relativno liberalne scene, ko se še da vršiti javni dialog o alternativnih programih, izkušnjah in pobudah.

Osvetljevanje številnih primerov nenasilnega odpora in civilne neposlušnosti v bližnji in tudi daljni preteklosti bi bilo sicer zelo pouèno, a tokrat bi na kratko nakazal le nekaj možnosti, ki jih lahko po svoji vesti upoštevamo v primeru, da bi prišlo do represij, ki smo jim tokrat izgleda za las umaknili. Miroljubni aktivni odpor zoper represijo je lahko pri pogoju, da ga vodi vest vsakega posameznika (moè resnice) zanesljivi, predvsem pa, po mojem mnenju, edini konstruktivni in evolutivni naèin razreševanja konfliktnih situacij v katerih je dialog zaradi kakršnegakoli vzroka izkljuèen. Zdi se mi namreè enako nevarno èe v svojem ravnanju izgubi razsodnost oblast, kot èe v reakcijah podivja ljudstvo. Oboje je delovanje iz reaktivnosti, iz nasprotovanja in se oddaljuje od ravnanja (agiranja) po notranji svobodni vesti. Ravnanje po svoji vesti je precej bolj naporno in smo ga malo vajeni, saj smo bili bolj ali manj celo □življenje podvrženi manipulacijam. Sedaj imamo precej vspodbude, da se z vprašanjem ravnanja po vesti toliko bolj ukvarjamo in za miselno vajo lahko razmislimo o naèinu ravnanja v primeru, da bi oblast nastopila proti ljudstvu represivno. Meni pridejo na misel naslednje možnosti:

1. generalni štrajk v DO, šolah, inštitutih, medijih itd. Generalni štrajk je temeljna oblika nenasilnega odpora in nesodelovanja z agresorjem. V pogojih generalnega štrajka na vseh podroèjih lahko zdr□i diktatura (pa naj si bo vojaška, paravojaška ali civilna) samo izredno omejen èas, še posebej, èe se ta diktatura odvija sredi Evrope. Metode nesodelovanja z agresorjem lahko inovativno in po svoji vesti razvija vsak posameznik in hkrati za to angažira in vspodbuja tudi svoje okolje. Vsporedno z generalnimi štrajki se samoorganizirajo alternativne dejavnosti - neodvisne šolske ure, neodvisne manufakture, pridelava hrane, solidarnostna pomoè itd.

2. vsakodnevni miroljubni shodi ljudi na ulicah, kar bi nadomestilo medije obveščanja z prenašanjem informacij po naèelu "od ust do ust". Bojkotira se zmanipulirane uradne časopise in poročila. Upoštevamo lahko na primer Poljsko šolo vsakodnevnega bojkota večernih radijskih in televizijskih manipulacijskih poroèil, ki so jih nadomestili večerni shodi na ulicah;

3. vspodbujati slovenske vojake naj po svoji vesti odpovedo pokorščino in poslušnost v oboro□enih silah, ki bi bile v tem primeru naperjene proti prebivalcem ;



4.vspodbujati vojake ostalih narodov in narodnosti, ki služijo vojaški rok v Sloveniji ali pa so v Slovenijo poslani v posebnih enotah, naj po svoji vesti store v znak solidarnosti z prebivalci Slovenije enako;

5.vspodbujati miličnike naj po svoji vesti odpovedo službo v policijskih odredih, ki bi bili namenjeni represiji nad lastnim narodom;

6.vspodbujati osebje zaporov in sodišč naj po svoji vesti bojkotira zapiranje tistih, ki bi bili sojeni zaradi "specialne vojne";

7.vsak posameznik po svojih močeh poskrbi, da bo vsaka informacija o represiji dosegla čim širši krog ljudi v Sloveniji, Jugoslaviji in v svetu.

Ljubljana, 12. maj 1988

marko hren

## **Pismo Bavčarju, Omerzi, Zavrlu in Žerdinu ob 20 obletnici Odbora, 2008**

**Komentar MH 2008. Spodnja korespondenca predstavlja komentar, ki sem ga ključnim organizatorjem prireditev ob 20 letnici delovanja Odbora za varstvo človekovih pravic poslal pred sklepno prireditvijo Junija 2008. Zanimivo, da se sklepne slovesnosti leta 2008 nisem mogel udeležiti iz istega razloga kot sem se izmaknil aretacijam leta 1988 - bil sem v ZDA. Anekdotično torej lahko zapišem, da so me vsaj dvakrat rešili Američani.**

**From:** Marko.Hren@gov.si [mailto:Marko.Hren@gov.si]

**Sent:** Tuesday, June 03, 2008 7:51 PM

**To:** Igor.Bavcar@istrabenz.si; omerza@siol.net; franci.zavrl@pristop.si

**Cc:** ali.zerdin@dnevnik.si; tomaz.mastnak@mac.com

**Subject:** lekcije ob nekorektnih zapisih v brošuri "sporočilo za javnost 1988-2008"

Igorju Bavčarju, Igorju Omerzi in Franciju Zavrlu

V vednost Tomažu Mastnaku in Aliju Žerdinu

Fantje sorči - ne bi rad pokvaril zabave ....ampak ....

Spodaj zapisanega mnenja (identično besedilo je v prilogi) ne bom artikuliral javno (tudi ne ob načrtovani javni seji, za katero smo dobili vabilo danes), ker to (vsaj zadnjih 7 let) ni v moji navadi in medijev dosledno ne uporabljam – komuniciram izključno neposredno s tistimi, ki jih sporočilo zadeva! Upam si verjeti, da prejemniki tega kritičnega pisma ne boste vsebine uporabili za nič drugega kot za svoje razumevanje stvari same. Tukaj nismo zato, da bi obsojali, temveč zato, da bi razumeli!

Včeraj zvečer sem po daljši odsotnosti v ZDA prebral brošuro, ki mi je včeraj prišla v roke in nosi naslov »**Sporočilo za javnost ... 1988-2008**«; brošura je bila pripravljena ob otvoritvi Stojkove razstave fotografij.

Moram napisati vtise ob branju **spremnega teksta v »Sporočilo za javnost«**, predvsem zato ker vem, da **Igor Omerza** vestno dela na dokumentaciji o Odboru in mu s tem želim sporočiti, **naj ne ponavlja grobih napak**, ki so se primerile ob pripravi navedene brošure. **Tomažu** pošiljam pismo v vednost, v znak dobrodošlice (včeraj se je vrnil iz ZDA) in z občutki hvaležnosti za vso energijo, ki jo je v 80ih prispeval v naš prostor, meni osebno pa enako tudi kasneje! **Tomaž**, iz vsega srca: wellcome back!

**Igor (O.)** kar v samem uvodu ti predlagam, da uvodnik v knjigo v formatu »Sporočila za javnost« uskladiš z vsemi člani Odbora! Tako se boš izognil težkim očitkom, ki jih v nadaljevanju argumentiram v zvezi z zadevno brošuro kjer avtor:

1. po nepotrebem in brez meril vzpostavlja hierarhijo (prioritietnost) pomembnosti posameznih kolektivnih članov odbora;
2. neutemeljeno izreka sodbe o učinkih posameznih področij delovanja Odbora;
3. in zanemarja evidentna zgodovinska dejstva!

Namreč, besedna zveza »**sporočilo za javnost**« replicira metodo komuniciranja Odbora, ki predstavlja nekakšno zaščitno znamko našega tedanjega podjetja, kar so oblikovalci in snovalci zadevne brošure tudi uporabili kot izhodišče. A prezrli in zanemarili so ključno kvaliteto »sporočil za javnost« iz 80ih let: **timsko delo in oblikovanje konsenza pri odločanju o vsebini in stilu besedila!** Vsi, ki smo bili zraven pri kovanju besedil Sporočil za javnost vemo, da smo tekste usklajevali v nedogled, posamezne dikcije pazljivo in pozorno tehtali ter besede izbirali s pinceto! Ne samo zaradi politične občutljivosti vsega, kar smo sporočali, temveč tudi zaradi samega »esprita«, atmosfere, duha, .... kulture, če hočete!

Nobenega razloga ni, da snovalci brošure »sporočila za javnost 1988-2008« ne bi bili uskladili z vsemi preživeli člani odbora. Vemo, da gre za avtorsko razstavo, a spremni tekst predstavlja prvo komunikacijo ob 20 obletnici, prevzema formo in format »sporočila za javnost«, kar namiguje na reprezentativnost in repliko metodološkega prijema, ki je determiniral sporočila za javnost Odbora!

Slovenska ekspertna in uradniška javnost se je v minulih letih v EU in posebej letos ob predsedovanju, dodobra privadila konsenzualnemu odločanju z vsemi članicami EU.

V mesecu maju sem na primer preživel večji del časa v NY na zasedanju Komisije združenih narodov za trajnostni razvoj in kot predsedujoči Evropskemu Svetu smo dnevno usklajevali z vsemi članicami EU prav vsako besedo, ki smo jo izrekli kot predsedujoči.

Avtorja spremnega besedila zadevni brošuri ne poznam – ker ni podpisan tudi ne vem njegovega ali njenega imena - vem pa zagotovo, da osnutka besedila nekdanji člani Odbora nismo mogli komentirati pred izidom in torej ne more na noben način odražati stališč nekdanjih članov.

**Vse bi bilo lepo in prav, če si avtor uvodnika v »Sporočilu za javnost -... 1988-2008« ne bi privoščil sodb in selekcij oziroma prioritizacij.**

Ne gre le za zgodovino-pisno nekorektnost, gre za t.i. »deep-craft«, za globoke vzorce neprimerne ravnanja, za kulturo, če hočete!

Izbral sem tri točke, kjer je avtor nekorekten in sicer:

1. v prvi po nepotrebem in brez meril vzpostavlja hierarhijo (prioritetnost) pomembnosti posameznih kolektivnih članov odbora
2. v drugi neutemeljeno izreka sodbe o učinkih posameznih področij delovanja Odbora
3. in v tretji zanemarja zgodovinska dejstva!

Vse tri napake se ne bi mogle primeriti, če bi snovalci brošure »Sporočilo za javnost« pred objavo poslali v usklajevanje članom odbora!

**Ad. 1. avtor po nepotrebem in brez meril vzpostavlja hierarhijo (prioritetnost) pomembnosti posameznih kolektivnih članov odbora**

*Citat 1.»21. junija je Odbor skupaj z Društvom slovenskih pisateljev in ZSMS, ki sta bila njegova najpomembnejša zaveznika, saj sta mu nudila določeno infrastrukturo in omogočala poseg v institucije oblasti...:«*

Citat 2. »Že pregled preko petdesetih ustanovnih kolektivnih prikaže svetovnonazorsko in tudi siceršnjo različnost članstva, ki se je povezala ob pomenu človekovih pravic: Mladina, Nova revija, predsedstvo RKZSMS, Komisija pravičnost in mir, Cirilsko društvo slovenskih bogoslovcev, uredništvo Cankarjeve založbe itd.«

Komentar: nobene potrebe ni po presojanju o najpomembnejših zaveznikih Odbora!!! Če bi sedli za mizo in ugotavljali, kateri »zavezniki« odbora so omogočali »vitalno infrastrukturo« in vitalne »posege v institucije oblasti«, bi morali naštetih še marsikoga, začenši z Mikroado, in z mirovnim gibanjem nekje vmes! Tudi naštevanje in izpostavljanje posameznih kolektivitet, ki naj bi odlikale različnost, v tem primeru ni potrebno, predvsem pa jih ni smiselno nizati v linearnem oziroma dualističnem kognitivnem polju, ki diskurz determinira na osi »komsomolstvo <-> cerkev! Enako kot Tone Stres in RKC, so pomembna duhovna gibanja. Naj vam dokažem z dejstvi, ki jih precej dobro poznam, saj sem stike med RKC in odborom v veliki meri opravljal jaz. Oba Igorja se bosta gotovo spomnila naših tajnih dopisovanj prek macovega monitorja v Mikroadi, ko smo si ob vsesplošnem prisluškovanju SDV informacije izmenjevali samo prek ekrana; kar smo vtipkali smo sproti tudi brisali. Ko sem Igorju B. napisal sporočilo »**Igor, nadškof Alojzij Šuštar se je pripravljn srečati s tabo ...**« .... se je sklonil čezme in na tipkovnico odpisal epohalno anekdoto, ki me še danes nasmeji: »**Za Janeza grem tudi k hudiču...**«. Z Antonom Stresom in nadškofom Alojzijem Šuštarjem smo imeli tesne stike a za ta zapis so pomembne podrobnosti: akcije kot so molitve za mir v frančiškanski cerkvi in pa izredno zvonjenje v Cerkvi srca Jezusovega na Taboru (ob vojašnici na Metelkovi, kjer so bili fantje tačas zaprti), so bile inkubirane v krogih duhovnega gibanja in nadškofu sem jih prenesel osebno. Metropolit Alojzij Šuštar je bil velik človek in izjemen aktivist; hipoma je prevzel pobude in prepoznal globlji in tudi površinski (beri P Rovski) pomen predlaganih akcij, pa četudi te niso prihajale iz vrst »bogoslovcev« in uradnih RKCjevih združenj.

Da sklenem prvo točko: Odbor je bil uravnoteženo pluralen in ga ne moremo obravnavati v nobenem primeru v dualističnem kognitivnem svetu. Proti taki obravnavi početja v 80ih odločno protestiram in zahtevam, da se v prihodnjih obravnavah zavežemo k doslednemu upoštevanju večplastnosti, raznolikosti in nehierarhičnosti.

## **Ad. 2. avtor neutemeljeno izreka sodbe o učinkih posameznih področij delovanja Odbora**

Citat: »poleti 1988, še v času procesa, je Odbor svoje dejavnosti razširil še na zunanja igrišča. Njegovi predstavniki so potovali po Evropi in javnost ter institucije seznanjali s potekom dogodkov v Jugoslaviji. Posebna učinka ta internacionalizacija ni imela.«

Komentar. Mednarodna dejavnost odbora se ni začela poleti 1988 temveč v samem trenutku aretacij. Če nič drugega, sem bil ob aretacijah v ZDA in sem prve lobistične akcije vključno s tiskovno konferenco izvajal iz NY ob samih aretacijah. Mednarodne dejavnosti odbora sva vodila s **Tomažem Mastnakom** in v okviru Gibanja za kulturo miru in nenasilja, ki je aktiviralo vso potrebno relacijsko mrežo. Tematski Bilteni »**Independant Voices**« so izhajali takoj od začetka procesa! Oktobra 1988 je izšla posebna brošura »**Slovenian spring, Centralism or Democracy**«, v **Parizu je bila ustanovljena podružnica Odbora**, ki je združevala v lobiranju predstavnike večih progresivnih skupin iz Evrope.



Delo na področju zunanje politike je bilo sistematično in akterji smo ga razumeli kot konstitutivni steber delovanja Odbora. Znano je, da smo predlagali ustanovitev samostojne tiskovne agencije, spričo pristranskosti Tanjuga. Znano je, da smo kasneje prve sestanke koordinacij zunanje politike v političnih strankah, spodbudili prav iz zaledja, ki je nastalo ob dejavnostih Odbora. Za tiste, ki se ne spominjate: **prvo srečanje kontaktov odgovornih za mednarodno politiko v nastajajočih političnih grupacijah je bilo 30. novembra 1989 v prostorih MikroAde** na Cankarjevi 10. Vabilo je bilo poslano z glavo Gibanja za kulturo miru in nenasilja naslednjim pravnim osebam: ZSMS, Zeleni Slovenije, Slovenska kmečka zveza, Slovenska demokratska zveza, Slovenska social demokratska zveza, Krščansko socialno gibanje, Odbor za varstvo človekovih pravic, ŠKUC in Klub 89. Sestanek smo na pripravljalnem srečanju, ki je bilo 7. novembra 1989 pripravili **Peter Jambreč, France Bučar, Tone Tomažič, Matjaž Šinkovec, Lojze Peterle in Marko Hren.**

Da široka paleta mednarodnih dejavnosti Odbora in njegovih članov, vključno z formalnimi obiski predstavnikov odbora pri parlamentarcih, vladah in opinon-makerjih v Štrasburu, Bonu, Dunaju, Parizu, Bruslju, Londonu, Rimu itd. itd., ni imela »posebnega učinka« je preprosto amaterska subjektivna izjava, ki se avtorju v takem kontekstu ne bi smela zapisati!

Moje mnenje je nasprotno: mislim, da je **Odbor vzpostavil izhodišče slovenske zunanje politike**, s tem, da je:

- vzpostavil dialog in sodelovanje med akterji tedanjih zametkov posameznih struktur, ki so delovale in lobirale v mednarodnem polju,
- v svet pošiljal prve formalne delegacije slovenske demokratične opozicije
- izdajal »sporočila za javnost« v obliki biltena »Independant voices«
- vzpostavil prvo »ambasado« (pariški odbor) in
- predlagal ustanovitev neodvisne tiskovne agencije!

### **Ad. 3. avtor brošure zanemarija zgodovinska dejstva!**

Citat: »Poleg tega se je odbor jeseni leta 1988 začel ukvarjati z nekaterimi temami, ki so ga umeščale v središče politične sfere. Zahteval je razpis referendumu o ustavnih dopolnilih ....«

Komentar: razpis referendumu o osnutkih amandmajev za spremembo zvezne in republiške ustave so zahteval civilno-družbene skupine pomladi 1988, pred aretacijami. Odbor je bil eden od akterjev, ki je to pobudo kasneje nadaljeval. Zadeva je dobro dokumentirana! Akcija z zahtevo po referendumu je bila na pobudo foruma neodvisnih družbenih gibanj od pomladi 1988 koordinirana iz Mikroade! Ker sem proces koordiniral, doma hranim vse verzije osnutkov v izvornikih! Prvi osnutek je ubesedil **Gregor Tomc** 5. februarja 1988, redakcijo druge verzije je imel v rokah **Janez Janša** in je v mojem arhivu z datumom 29.2. 1988, tretjo **Matevž Krivic**, četrto **France Bučar**, 9. marca pa smo že imeli čistopis, ki so ga nato podpisali prvi kolektivni podpisniki. Večji del posla oz. političnih potez na tej zadevi, v katere jedru so bila družbena gibanja, je bil torej opravljen pred samimi aretacijami in pred konstituiranjem Odbora!!!

Dragi kolegi!

Zahtevam korektnost tako pri metodi kot pri vsebini nadaljnjih aktivnosti ob obeleževanju 20 obletnice. Na portalu Slovenske pomladi je mednarodna dejavnost Odbora še vedno zanemarjena, kljub temu, da so bila vsa gradiva dana na voljo urednikom!

Ko smo se v Mikroadu leta 1989 razšli je bil eden od razlogov ( ki se je pojavil kasneje tudi v časopisnih člankih) tudi ta, da Odbor iz sredstev, ki smo jih (Odbor) prejeli iz tujine, ni hotel refundirati stroškov, ki smo jih imeli posamezniki z mednarodno dejavnostjo, s številnimi potovanji in lobiranjem v tujini in s tiskom neodvisnih informativnih glasil v angleškem jeziku. Dovolj časa je minilo in lahko bi - tako kot je zastavil Omi – vso stvar zastavili zelo z distanco, uravnoteženo in faktografsko ter izogibajoč se dodeljevanju prednosti in sodb, ne da bi to poprej uskladili z vsemi akterji! Pa naj nikar kdo ne reče, da je usklajevanje tekstov preveč zapletena naloga – kos ji je te dni vsak izmed uradnikov, ki v teh mesecih usklajujejo tekste ob predsedovanju Slovenije Svetu EU. Mačji kašelj proti vsemu, kar smo delali pred 20 leti ;-)

Naj zaključim enako kot je bil to moj običaj v pismih pred 20 leti


Želim vam radostnih dni in čiste resnice

Satya graha

Vaš Marko Pogled, 3. junij 2008 Epilog korespondence: v nekaj dneh je Ali Žerdin, urednik portala Slovenska pomlad, objavil podatke o mednarodni dejavnosti odbora (natančno. 5. junija 2008). Glej portal [www.slovenskapomlad.si](http://www.slovenskapomlad.si)

## **1989: A Carnival of Revolution – Slovenia, Padraic Kenney**

A history of the peace movement in Slovenia in 1980ies has not been sufficiently documented. Only a couple of authors and scholars from abroad Slovenia have provided for a serious analysis. Padraic has visited Slovenia several times and made in-depth interviews as well as extensive copying of the archives. Italian scholar Andrea Licata is – as far as I am aware – the only researcher that dedicated a phd and published a consistent study concerning the Slovenian Peace Movement! But Padraic creatively framed Slovenian movement into a comparative study. It is worth recalling parts of his book here! Thanx Padraic!!!



new life into Ukrainian culture. Though in the end the Soviet context limited what the Lion Society could accomplish, its style and politics was essentially Central European, though Koliushko felt this strongly when, in the summer of 1989, he could finally meet Polish activists. The conversation, he found, flowed on two levels. On one, senior dissident intellectuals talked about the "blank spots" in Polish-Ukrainian history, and how to resolve mutual misunderstandings. This was important, Koliushko knew, but more important for him were the young Polish Ukrainians like Miroslaw Czech. They talked about how to publish samizdat, and how to organize demonstrations. Both conversations were important, but only one looked toward the future.

#### SLOVENIA'S PEOPLE FOR PEACE CULTURE

Beyond Berlin, the birthplace of the Network for East-West Dialogue, there was one other city where paths leading east and west in search of peace actually crossed: Ljubljana, in Slovenia. Yugoslavia was the only major communist country in Europe not in the Warsaw Pact and had the most open borders as well. Contacts with the West lacked the official stigma that they always had elsewhere. Indeed, the position between two camps was a central tenet of Yugoslav socialism. General Secretary Josip Tito was one of the leaders of the organization of nonaligned states in 1970s. A dialogue between East and West would logically begin here.

But there were deep contradictions between the appearance of relative openness and reality. Nonalignment meant, for Tito and his successors, constant vigilance. A primal fear of Soviet invasion haunted Yugoslavia—which had already endured terrible destruction in World War II—for the better part of a decade after Yugoslavia left the Soviet bloc in 1948, and it never really faded from memory. Departure from the bloc meant a perceived need for greater military preparedness, not less. Only in East Germany did citizens face a comparable barrage of exhortations to vigilance and battle-readiness. Sociologist Gregor Tomc compiled some examples of militaristic propaganda, in a report he sent to the 1986 END Convention: "peace" in Yugoslavia was "the peace of a bullet in a barrel of a gun"; "to go to work is . . . to go to war"; "all actions against self-management are a diversion and sabotage," conducted by traitors.<sup>13</sup>

This language reached a crescendo in the years after Tito's death in 1980, as Yugoslavia celebrated the fortieth anniversary of landmarks in the partisan victory over the Nazis. An impressive military parade in Belgrade in May 1985 completed this commemorative season. For the generations that had grown up after the war, this aggressive neutrality had begun to seem both irrational and unnecessary. "So we began," writes

Slovenka Drakulić, "to assume an ironic attitude towards the War, to the partisans and the communist revolution—to our history as represented in such caricature."<sup>14</sup>

This was the kind of terrain, of obvious contradictions and worn-out propaganda, ripe for exploitation by the *konkretny* generation. In Yugoslavia that task would fall to the Slovenes. For Yugoslav communism had another weakness: the tension between the status of the six individual republics and the unity of the state, dominated from Belgrade. The problem was not that nationalist friction was inevitable, but that Yugoslavia was a federal state without democracy. This lack was felt most deeply in Slovenia, where traditions of democracy and civic activism were strongest. Beginning with the problem of peace, Slovene activists would eventually move on to the contradictions of Yugoslav nationalism.

Slovenia is a difficult place for the student of anticomunist opposition, schooled in the world of samizdat and tamizdat, to understand: there were no underground journals, nor even an "underground" in the usual sense. Instead, opposition emerged from within the League of Communists and the League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia (ZSMS). The latter gave birth to the Peace Movement Working Group in early 1983. Its members were students and young intellectuals in Ljubljana. Some were active in the youth organizations; all recognized that the ZSMS could be a foundation for civic activism. Tomaž Mastnak, a social scientist, put it this way: "To me, it was of rather secondary importance that the group was a peace group; I was interested in what we then (rather uncritically) called developing civil society."<sup>15</sup>

We have encountered this instrumental voice before, but here the emphasis is less on delecting communism than on building society. "Civil society," as Mastnak and the others understood it, was both a goal—the creation of autonomous civic activity, fully independent of the state—and the practice of being autonomous. What one actually did was in a way not so important. Though it masqueraded as an exploration of a particular issue, the Peace Group was even more an experiment in reinventing Slovene politics.

The ZSMS actually spawned quite a number of other interest groups, of which the most significant was the Women's Working Group. In 1983 Vlasta Jalusič and Mojca Dobnikar visited West Berlin. The sheer variety of women's clubs, libraries, and organizations amazed them, and they resolved that the same should be possible in Ljubljana. They began with a working group, which in 1985 led to Lilith, one of the few activist women's groups anywhere in the communist world.<sup>16</sup> Lilith's first action

<sup>13</sup> There were several identity movements in Ljubljana at that time. Another was Magnum, which, beginning in 1984, ran the only gay magazine in all of Central Europe.



was a women-only disco. Like the Peace Group, Lilith understood civil society in the broadest sense and would be an engine behind some of the important protests of the last half of the 1980s.

Like movements in Hungary or Poland, the Peace Group was marked by its internal pluralism. Its guiding spirit, and first editor of its semi-samizdat, English-language *Information Booklet*, was Marko Hren, a mathematician and pacifist. In high school Hren had traveled to Switzerland to learn about the movement there to abolish the army. In 1981 he refused to bear arms during his military service. He was joined in the movement by Mastnak, who did not consider himself a pacifist; Gregor Tomc, who was not only a sociologist but a member of and the songwriter for Slovenia's pioneering punk band *Pankrti* (Bastards); Janez Janša, at the time something of an anarchist, who specialized in studying the Yugoslav military system; Jalušič; and others.

In tiny Slovenia, which already in the 1980s found its relationship with the rest of Yugoslavia increasingly uncomfortable, the Peace Group had to cross borders to make any sense at all of its ideals. Beginning in 1984 the Peace Group sponsored annual peace camps, bringing together activists from Slovenia and neighboring provinces in Italy and Austria. One could visit the West with ease, and even hope to bring Western ideas home, as Lilith had done. But Yugoslavia was not the West, the Slovenes knew; at least not as long as Tito's version of socialism was in power. They knew they had more in common with their counterparts in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Poland, and they found Western attitudes toward communism (of which the Yugoslav version was often supposed to be the most palatable) naïve. Thus Mastnak and Hren were among the authors of a strident critique of early drafts of the Helsinki Memorandum. After "five years of dialogue," they wrote, "easterners" had earned the right to push their concerns about human rights to the forefront, ahead of the talk about disarmament that the Western activists appeared to prefer.<sup>16</sup>

The Slovene search for models of civil society and human rights activism led them straight to Poland. A thick volume of documents on Solidarity was published in 1985. Mastnak, meanwhile, began traveling to Poland. By 1987, when Mastnak was attending the Freedom and Peace seminar in Warsaw, the *Information Booklet* had shed some of its idealism for aggressive stands on human rights and on communism in general.

The basic agenda of the Peace Group—demilitarization of society, the evolution of a peace-based culture, and international understanding—was rather like that of Hungary's Dialogue. Like Dialogue, the Peace Group activists hoped to encourage popular self-awareness, and to discuss the problems that concerned them, more than they sought to change the regime. This reflected the movement's semi-official sponsorship. But unlike Dialogue, the Slovene Peace Group would choose a path leading

to greater engagement in politics and confrontation with the regime. To do so, the movement replicated itself: People for Peace Culture, a group that emerged in 1986, was in fact the Peace Group, under another name and affiliated with the student organization at the university. This was, says Marko Hren, simply insurance in case the whims of either bureaucracy (the ZSMS or the university) would change.

But what the Peace Group really needed was independence. It did not even have the meager independent resources that other Central European movements enjoyed; there was no senior opposition or émigré publishing house that might want to help an alternative social movement. So some in the movement decided to create their own umbrella: a private computer firm, Mikro Ada. This company was the creation of four men: Marko Hren, Janez Janša, Igor Bavčar (who, like Janša, had recently been expelled from the ZSMS leadership), and Igor Omerza. "As individuals," Hren explained, "we wanted to be independent . . . and to equip ourselves." They imported and sold computers and software and used some of the profit to launch desktop publishing projects. The first issue of *Information Booklet* (the title later changed to *Independent Voices from Yugoslavia*) came in 1985.

Mikro Ada's biggest publishing venture, in the spring of 1988, was the memoirs of Stane Kavčič, a voice of liberalism among Slovene communists in the Tito era. The first edition sold out in a matter of hours, from sidewalk kiosks the Peace Group set up. It was both a political sensation, raising once again the specter of Slovene separatism, and a great money-maker for the opposition at what would prove to be a crucial moment. For renting halls or nightclubs, for hiring speakers, or for printing materials, Mikro Ada would be an essential resource.

The Peace Group began with information booths on the streets of Ljubljana—"peace street shops," they called them—that distributed peace literature, posters, and peace sign badges. Then, during the December 1984 "peace street" action, the movement collected signatures on a petition protesting the production of military toys. The idea resonated with a society tired of living the last war; in the essay quoted earlier, Slavenka Drakulić describes the look of horror on her father's face when he saw her hold the gun he had used in World War II. As Christmas 1985 approached, the Peace Group set up a stall offering educational, peaceful toys, in exchange for "unsuitable" military toys. The stall collected some 250 toy guns, which they turned over to a recycling plant, enacting military conversion on a tiny scale.<sup>17</sup>

The conversations that these actions (which took place in Maribor as well) provoked opened up more subversive questions about how the Yugoslav state shaped its citizens' attitude toward the military. Again, the commemoration of war brought the intentions of the state into sharper

focus. To celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the partisan victory—in which women fighters had played an important role—the army proposed extending obligatory military training to women. This plan, drafted in secret by army leaders, was leaked to the Slovene peace activists. Together, Liliith and the Peace Group organized a public discussion of this still-secret proposal, followed by a petition protesting this “further militarization of society.” They wondered at this antiquated need for vigilance against unknown aggressors; surely it was enough that women could volunteer for military training if they so chose.<sup>18</sup>

At first, the generals rallied against Slovene troublemakers; to Belgrade, any protest from Slovenia smelled of secessionist tendencies. But by the end of the summer of 1985, the proposal had quietly disappeared. Quite reluctantly, the Yugoslav authorities had found they could not ignore social protest. Perhaps the most telling argument the peace activists and feminists made was that such obligatory service did not exist in the advanced countries of Western Europe, which Yugoslavia in some ways emulated. It was contradictions like these that made Titoist ideology so easy to undermine.

The campaign for conscientious objectors would be much more difficult. Perhaps only nationalist opposition aroused the anger of leaders of the partisan generation more than an attack on obligatory military service. In Slovenia, Ivan Čeko, a Jehovah's Witness from Maribor, most likely held the modern European record, with a total of fifteen years in prison for refusal to serve. But Čeko was, unlike other Jehovah's Witnesses, willing to talk about his experiences. Upon his release from prison in 1986, he was immediately sentenced to a new term, a practice that no other country in Central Europe employed. When he was briefly released again in 1987, Čeko gave talks on his experiences in both Maribor and Ljubljana. Without Čeko, it would have been difficult to make the conscientious objector issue real for many Slovenes. An issue that had naturally been part of the Peace Group's portfolio from the outset now had a name and a face.

The Yugoslav regime's first response was to allow conscientious objection based upon religious belief. But as the Peace Group pointed out, this was in conflict with the Yugoslav Constitution, which promoted equality of believers and nonbelievers. An atheist, in this communist country, would now have fewer rights than a Catholic or a Jehovah's Witness. Once again, communist rhetoric had provided the Peace Group with a neat irony.

The Yugoslav regime would not budge; military service was still a duty for all young men, and alternative service would “violate the principles of socialist norms.” Still, the campaign left its mark. Two years of “peace street” actions and the Čeko case had thrust the problem into the pub-

lic eye. “Almost every day,” the *Information Booklet* reported in 1987, “there are articles on [the] CO issue appearing in all kinds of newspapers. Well, usually in the negative way, but in any case, people [can now] think about it, and that is what is most important.”<sup>19</sup>

With the CO issue, the Peace Group became an opposition movement almost in spite of itself. Their powerful opponents labeled the peace activists enemies of socialism and power-hungry national separatists. Evaluating the CO campaign as a participant and an observer, Gregor Tomc saw how ties to the ZSMS limited the movement's autonomy. He foresaw that any real success of an “alternative” movement (in Yugoslavia, the term “opposition” was still taboo) would require both more “concrete” actions like the CO campaign and political action, directed against the system itself.<sup>20</sup>

Politics would come soon enough. But first came a campaign that, unexpectedly, mobilized onto the streets more people than had been seen in decades. As in Poland, the issue was nuclear power. There was only one nuclear power station in Yugoslavia, at Krško in Slovenia. While the fallout from Chernobyl did not affect Slovenia itself very much, and the Krško plant was not of the same suspect model as that in Ukraine, the incident nevertheless aggravated anti-Belgrade, anticommunist instincts. It also awakened environmental fears in a republic whose identity was tied closely to nature.

On May 10, 1986 (two weeks after the accident), some two thousand came out to listen to a declaration written by peace and environmental activists. The crowd then “spontaneously decided” to march to Parliament.<sup>21</sup> Shielded from fallout by Marko Hren's battered umbrella, Juvan Jancaz read out the Peace Group's declaration; Hren wore a surgical mask. Signs in the crowd called for “More Light in the Heads of Slovene Energy Planners!” and exclaimed “You Praise Nuclear Energy and Harm Our Health.”

One year later, Liliith and the Peace and Environmental working groups staged an anniversary march. Vlasta Jalušič's idea was to use the occasion to question also the regime's commitment to women's emancipation. In communist tradition, women were recognized as they passively received bouquets on International Women's Day (March 8). Jalušič proposed an anticombination of women's political activism, linked to a health issue that, as in Poland, mobilized women in particular.

The crowd on April 23, 1987, was several times larger than the year before as it marched from the university to the Parliament. This was in fact the biggest crowd in Slovenia in at least fifteen years. Ljubljana had woken up, thanks to the Peace Group's campaign, and to the youth weekly *Mladina*, which published a series of provocative articles on ecology and on the Krško plant. The patient wait for information about the

accident, and about plans for nuclear energy in Yugoslavia, had been exhausted, and rumor had taken hold. It was easy, for example, to believe that the cheap imported food, suddenly appearing in stores stripped bare by a prolonged debt crisis, were actually radioactive goods—priced for dumping on unsuspecting consumers.

The demonstration lasted for hours. Jalušič and other speakers called for the closing of Ksško and of Slovenia's uranium mines, and they challenged the government to release information about nuclear energy. Huge banners denounced nuclear energy; one read, in English, "Nuclear Energy—Fuck Off!"

There were more public demonstrations in Yugoslavia by this time. In the spring of 1987, for example, Serbs in Kosovo began demonstrating against Albanians' demands for ethnic rights—a movement that Slobodan Milošević would seize upon to grab power in Yugoslavia. But the organized, peaceful, civic demonstrations of Slovenia were different. The Chernobyl demonstration of 1987 would prove to be a dress rehearsal for the Slovene Spring of 1988.

#### HUNGARIAN ORANGE APPEAL

At least since 1956, when Polish and Hungarian students followed, and shouted their support for, the revolutionary events in each other's country closely, a real affection developed between dissent in the two countries.\* In the decades after the 1956 defeat, the influence was almost entirely in one direction. In the 1960s and 1970s, young Hungarians traveled to the jazz clubs of Warsaw to hear what they could not at home. The late 1970s and early 1980s brought the powerful influence of KOR and Solidarity. Gábor Demészky went to Poland to study Solidarity's samizdat techniques; upon his return, he started what became Hungary's premier underground publishing house on the Polish model.

Tamás Fellegi and István Stumpf were just a few years younger than Demészky. In 1983 Stumpf was a young teacher, finishing a study of the establishment of communism in Poland. Fellegi had recently graduated from law school, with an interest in the political history of the Soviet Bloc. That May they and their wives traveled by car to witness Pope John Paul II's second pilgrimage to Poland. They had a contact, a Polish-Hungarian translator in Warsaw, who introduced them to the peculiarities of martial law Poland.

\* The roots go back much further; actually, to the leadership of Polish General Józef Bem during the revolution of 1848 in Budapest. The statue of Bem, near the Buda side of the Margit Bridge, has been an important spot on the political map of Budapest, a touchstone for many demonstrations.

To Hungarian visitors, Poland made no sense. On the one hand, the repressive state was a lot more evident on the Warsaw streets than it had been in Hungary for twenty-five years—though Budapest dissidents were living through a crackdown at the time. But on the other hand, Polish society was freer than anything imaginable in Hungary. Samizdat was everywhere, and Solidarity seemed to have survived. Fellegi and Stumpf attended a papal mass in Warsaw and were deeply impressed by the sight of hundreds of thousands of worshippers, some carrying Solidarity signs or singing forbidden songs. It was not just the level of freedom or the audacity of the people they met: it was the capacity for self-organization that struck them, and stayed with them as they drove back to Budapest.

Stumpf had been given permission, by the rector of Eötvös Loránd University, to form a residential college for law students from beyond Budapest. The idea (as with another older college, the László Rajk College at the Economic Institute) was to integrate the student community and give small-town students the advantages that native Budapesters enjoyed. Innocuous enough—but Stumpf had other ideas. For the Special Juristic Sociological College—later named the István Bibó Special College, after a political thinker and member of the 1956 government who had died in 1979—he designed a program of courses oriented around political questions.

Fellegi was the first official lecturer at the college. He signaled the direction the college would take by offering, in October 1983, a full-year course on the Revolution of 1956. He arrived for the first class to find a line a half-mile long in front of the college on Ménesi Street. Few in the crowd were students (the college itself housed only forty at the time); most were, Fellegi quickly realized, either opposition activists looking for some kind of sensational breakthrough, or police sensing a subversive situation. Perhaps both sides imagined the Bibó College could spawn a youth wing for the established opposition. But as Fellegi understood its role, the college should help a new generation of students to find their own answers to the problems facing Hungary, and not just follow what their elders had discovered. This would be impossible if the college became a cause célèbre and ran afoul of the regime. So Fellegi gave an especially dull opening lecture, and within a few weeks the class was down to manageable size.

Over the next few years, Fellegi presented courses on "The Crises of Communism" and on Marxism. Others offered courses on the culture of Hungarian Transylvania, on contemporary Hungarian society, and so forth. In each course, professors and students tried to unhinge anticommunist opposition from any ideological standpoints. Was Marxism a good idea, badly implemented, they asked, or a bad idea that had somehow managed to survive? What could Adam Michnik, or his Hungarian



(revived in 1986 after a half-decade dormancy), young runners carried a baton across the country for many weeks, arriving in Belgrade on May 25, Tito's birthday. In 1986 Ljubljana students marked the event with their own ceremony in the city center: while some carved a four-foot baton out of a tree trunk, others circulated a petition against the relay. That same evening, the elaborately painted baton was given funeral rites and discarded.

The next year, according to the complex rotations of the Yugoslav calendar, the relay was scheduled to begin in Slovenia. A competition was announced for a poster to celebrate this honor. The winning design was submitted by NSK: a strapping youth bounds forward with a huge Yugoslav flag in hand, surrounded by a dove and six torches symbolizing the Yugoslav republics. Only after the competition results were announced did the truth leak out: NSK had taken a famous Nazi poster from 1936 and simply switched flags, substituted a dove for an eagle, and replaced "The Third Reich" with "Youth Day."

Who, exactly, were the Nazis here: the authors of the poster, or those who had awarded it first prize? Of course, the former were blamed. Amidst the scandal, however, the relay was quietly shelved. This was the Laibach idea: a strong dose of totalitarian imagery would inoculate society against this disease and make ostensibly antitotalitarian versions of Nazi pageantry impossible.

Punk, not to mention avant-garde performance art, reaches a small audience. Even the subtleties of the poster controversy were probably lost on many Slovenes, who did not have the Poles' long experience with oppositional codes. But Slovenia also boasted the most daring legal media in the communist world, which translated the irreverent style and the specific political and social agenda of the growing Ljubljana opposition into a national language.

*Mladina*, the youth weekly of ZSMS, had been coming out since 1943 and was once one of the reliable arms of the League of Communists. As of 1981 it was not too different from other youth periodicals in the Communist Bloc (such as *Na prdeli*, where the Polish "I'd Rather Live" movement started): uplifting stories about youth at home and abroad, some profiles of popular rock groups, stories of student life, and a discreet dose of official politics. But the Youth League was looking to become more popular, feeling the pressure of the competition for resources among and within republics in the post-Tito era.

First to go, then, were reverential photos of the recently departed leader. Then there appeared more specifically Slovene articles, like a 1982 issue with Tone Stojko's photos of the demonstrations in Ljubljana in 1970-71. Mile Setine, who became editor in 1983, could push even further as the son of a high communist official. Under his editorship, *Mladina* began to explore military issues, including the problem of military service. The

style also became more daring: nude photos on the cover, racy ca inside. There was a page in each issue for music news from Radio Student, the Youth League's other media outlet. The radio station, a few years ahead of *Mladina*, had publicized (at some risk) the "Nazi punk" effort, even staging a live call-in show during which the regime was subjected to scathing criticism. Radio Student's page switched *Mladina's* soundtrack from the Beatles to punk and new-wave rock.

Under Setine and his successor Miha Kovac, participants in the Peace Group like Mastnak and Hren, or Jalušič of Lilit, became regular correspondents, writing about Slovenia's ecological crisis, about feminism, peace, and the Cold War. Then in the autumn of 1986, a new editor arrived, straight from Radio Student. Unlike his predecessors, Franci Zavrl had no connection with the Youth League or the League of Communists. To the communist leaders, he was an enigma. "I don't understand the relationships inside *Mladina*," complained party leader Milan Kučan during the crisis of the summer of 1988. "What do these guys want? When the editors were [Setine, Kovac, and others] it was OK. But these guys are playing games."<sup>26</sup>

Indeed, the rules of the game had changed. Zavrl and his team—mostly young journalists brought over from the radio, like Ali Žerdin—were willing to try anything. The second issue under Zavrl's editorship featured on the cover a black-and-white photograph of Stalin with a bright yellow egg cracked over his nose, the yolk splattering over his chin. Both Laibach and the NSK were frequent subjects and contributors. One of the most famous *Mladina* covers, designed by NSK, showed Tito, looking thoughtful (or maybe threatening) against a Nazi flag. The message was extremely ambiguous: Tito seemed to be condemning fascism, but his pose hinted at a different interpretation.

*Mladina* pursued serious politics, too: stories on dissident Milovan Djilas, or on the violations of human rights in Kosovo, on strikes in Yugoslavia, or—most famously—a series of articles exposing the corrupt arms deals of Defense Minister Branko Mumula. These are the normal fare of investigative journalism; it is perhaps odd to write about them in the same context as happenings and samizdat. The closest parallel in the communist world was probably the glasnost-era press in the Soviet Union, like the weekly *Ogonyok*. But the context was quite different. *Mladina* was publishing in a provincial capital, far from the centers of real power. Its attacks on Yugoslav corruption had an implicit national tinge, and that is how Belgrade chose to interpret *Mladina's* attacks.

Before, *Mladina* had often been daring; now, it was frankly aggressive. Zavrl experimented with pornography, like a comic strip called "Pornoslavija." Zavrl wanted to "test the borders of the acceptable." Even he admits *Mladina* may have gone too far sometimes, as when it published a

avoided the violent reprisals their Kraków colleagues faced and were able to strike again (as Kraków did not), one reason may have been the style of their strike. The riot police could not easily have attacked workers they had sung along with in self-parody. Indeed, one could not really speak of the "failure" of a strike that continually undermined efforts to take it seriously. Gdańsk in 1988 was as much the city of Wip and the anarchists as it was of Solidarity. This new Gdańsk helped strikers conquer fear.

If new movements, and a new style, were so essential to the success of these strikes, an obvious question arises: Why did Wrocław, the birthplace of Orange Alternative and one of Wip's strongholds, not strike? There are a lot of explanations and excuses to be heard in Wrocław today: some key arrests, divisions in Solidarity, failure of nerve. The most succinct and logical answer is that of Jacek Sachorowski, a Solidarity leader at the Hutmen factory, a member of the Polish Socialist Party since its rebirth in 1987, and an eager participant in Orange happenings: "We had the streets, so we didn't need to strike."

In part, the purpose of the strikes was to make the regime acknowledge the opposition of Polish society, and to encourage Poles to think and act bravely once again. This had already occurred in Wrocław, thanks to the vigor of all the groups whose stories have been told in this book. Of course, Wrocław workers could still have struck, as so many hoped; Sachorowski's explanation is also just another excuse.

In some ways, the pluralism of Wrocław's opposition made a coordinated strike impossible. Solidarity's Władysław Frasymiak tried to organize a strike in one factory, with the help of student leader Paweł Kocięba. At the same time, socialist activists Józef Pinior and Czesław Borowczyk were jumping the fence into another factory to organize there; in a third, strike organization was left to its combative employees' council to organize. The students (led by Kocięba, Orange performer Krzysztof Jakubczak, and Jarosław Obremski, all of the Twelve), in turn, put their energies into organizing a strike at the university. Wrocław was hardly silent in May, but its cacophony of voices was not loud enough to be heard across Poland.

Yet Wrocławians could hear themselves just fine. On June 1, 1988, an estimated ten thousand—the largest crowd in the city since the declaration of martial law—celebrated the first anniversary of Orange Alternative's debut happening. The parade began, in Orange tradition, by the clock on Świdnicka Street. From there, the crowd swarmed to the provincial government offices by the river, then along the Odra River to a massive picnic on Malt Island. The police were helpless to rein in the throng, even when the chanted slogans got a little aggressive. This was more a massive picnic than a demonstration, with thousands of children enjoying the celebration. A countercelebration organized by the city drew anemic attendance.

In late June the Wrocław courts released Pinior and Borowczyk, jailed for their role in the attempted strikes of May. Another Orange Alternative happening (described in chapter 5) welcomed them home. As the happening wore on, the crowd began to notice that something was wrong: the police had not even bothered to show up. They had, in effect, ceded the streets to the people of Wrocław. Almost wistfully, recalling the confrontations that in Wrocław—but not yet in Kraków or Gdańsk—were becoming a thing of the past, the crowd began to chant, "Where are the police? Where are the police? Surely, when a crowd of ordinary citizens can feel compelled to join in such a chant, fear of the state has evaporated and a revolutionary change has begun. In a festive, free (but still somehow thwarted) mood, the crowd celebrated some more, then gradually broke up to wander around what Major Fydrzych declared a "free city." "No one wants to die for Gdańsk, which is not a free city," went a surrealist poem that he read to the crowd. \* Wrocław was now free, and no one would have to die there for just that reason.

## Scene Three

### SLOVENE SPRING

LJUBLJANA, MAY–JULY 1988

"When I grow up, I will be a customs officer on the Kolpa River." Most likely, those who wore this pin on the streets of Ljubljana in 1986 had no intention of growing up, and still less of patrolling a nonexistent Slovene-Croat border. It was a provocation, but also a joke. Two years later, as Belgrade began to treat Slovenia like a breakaway republic, the fantasy began to come true.

Nothing, we have seen, angered the Yugoslav regime more than attacks on the army. The Peace Movement Working Group of Marko Hren, Zdenaž Mastnak, and others had opened the attack gently enough with the push for alternative military service. Through *Mladina*, many of the same people could put the military itself under a microscope. Jancz Janša was indicted in 1985 by the military prosecutor of the Ljubljana Army District for revealing military secrets in his articles for the weekly. The charges were dropped when *Mladina* threatened to publish the text of the indictment.

The early spring of 1988 brought a new attack (again by Janša, among

\* Fydrzych alluded to the famous slogan of French isolationists in 1939, objecting to a new over German occupation of the Free City of Gdańsk (Danzig).



others) on military corruption: the Yugoslav defense minister, Branko Mamula, was shown to be dealing arms to the Ethiopian Army to be used against the Ethiopian people. At home, he forced soldiers to build him a luxury residence, telling them it was an assignment of great importance for national security. *Mladina* was getting dangerous. It also led a successful campaign against a hard-line candidate for the Slovene presidency. Perhaps most galling of all, Janša was running a strong campaign for the candidacy of the League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia, which he promised to turn into an independent organization.

In response to the Mamula articles, the military prosecutor charged editor Franci Zavrl (and the editor of another magazine) with defamation of the Yugoslav Army. *Mladina*'s response was to publish more exposes of military corruption, and to issue a strident call (by the "Counterrevolutionary Editorial Board") for freedom of thought, a market economy, "destruction of the monopoly of the League of Communists," and closer relations with noncommunist countries.<sup>21</sup>

To Belgrade, these were all clear signs of the Slovene intention to break up Yugoslavia; Minister Mamula said as much in a published speech. In April and May rumors of an impending military coup began to circulate in Ljubljana. David Tasič, a *Mladina* reporter, acquired notes of a speech by Slovene League of Communists leader Milian Kučan at a closed-door meeting of the national party's Central Committee. It appeared from the text that Kučan was pleading with his comrades to call off the coup. *Mladina* was prevented from publishing these notes, but they soon appeared in papers in Zagreb and Belgrade.<sup>22</sup> Rumors flew that there was a blacklist of people to be interned, or perhaps executed, during the coup. It was time for a crackdown.

On May 31 security police came to the offices of the Milko Ada company and arrested Janez Janša (one of the firm's four owners) on charges of receiving military secrets. Tone Šopko, *Mladina*'s photographer, slipped away from Milko Ada and took several photographs of the arrest from a building across the courtyard. The photographs, showing Janša accompanied by two anonymous-looking young men with briefcases, appeared almost immediately in the Ljubljana press—surely the first time a political arrest had been on display so quickly.

That same day, noncommissioned army officer Ivan Borštnar was arrested too. He would eventually be charged with passing a secret document outlining military plans to impose order in Slovenia. David Tasič was arrested a few days later, on the basis of a document (which he

<sup>21</sup> Freedom of speech was no greater in the other republics than they could publish Kucan's speech simply reflected the name. Tasič held that one had only to worry about the "national chauvinism" of individual republics. Thus a report about Slovenia published in Croatia might even be seen as a way to put the Slovenes in their place.

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Slovene society responded instantly. The morning after Janša's arrest, eighty-eight intellectuals signed a letter of protest; on June 3, these signers announced the creation of the Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Janez Janša, which later became the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights. Eventually, over one thousand churches, newspapers, social movements, factories, and schools added their collective signatures to the CDHR's declaration, as did over one hundred thousand individuals. Almost all of these were in Slovenia, though there were supporters in Croatia and Serbia, too.

All the activism of the previous five years had come together to create a committee that spoke for all of Slovenia. Igor Barčan, Janša and Hren's colleague at Milko Ada, and Mili Šetina, former editor of *Mladina*, were on the committee's first executive board. The committee shared offices with the People for Peace Culture. The leadership of the committee met almost daily, with larger public meetings every week. It issued national and international appeals for the trial to be held in public, and for respect for the rights of the prisoners, such as access to civilian lawyers.

Radio Student became almost overnight the most listened-to broadcast in Ljubljana, with a daily program called "Tree J." *Mladina* gave close coverage, too; its circulation, around thirty thousand at the beginning of the year, soared to three times that by July—an almost impossible figure in a republic of less than two million. From these media, listeners could not only follow the trial preparations but even learn about where, when, and how to protest for the release of the three journalists and their alleged contact. Slovene activists felt the arrests proved that the rumors of impending martial law were true. Soon, they were certain, they would all be detained, just as Solidarity activists in Poland had been six and a half years earlier. The early consensus was that demonstrations were out of the question. Finally, Alenka Puhar, one of the editors of the journal *Novi revija* (and the sister of punk sociologist Gregor Tomco), and several other women in the committee organized what was purported to be a "spontaneous" demonstration. Every afternoon from four to five o'clock, between twenty and three hundred women gathered in front of the jail (on the far side of Metelkova Street, to avoid the charge of trespassing on military property). Many of them—just as in Wrocław, Kraków, and later in Prague and Nagymoros—brought their children. Breaching the pretense of spontaneity, some brought flowers to toss at the prison guards' feet.

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be a concert. Slovene opposition had in a way begun with punk music. A musical gathering would be the most direct, safest way to stage a massive national protest. The June 21 concert was organized by rock impresario (and Laibach manager) Igor Vidmar. Gregor Tomc's Bastards had broken up the previous winter, but they came back to headline before thirty-five thousand on Congress Square. For those whose tastes were a bit more traditional, there was classical music, a folk choir, and poetry. Farmers brought their pitchforks; there were flags reading simply "Janša" or "A Military Court? No Thanks. We've got a Civilian One!!!"

The trial began on July 18, on a collision course with Slovenia. The Yugoslav Army committed several fatal errors. As Franci Zavrl put it, the fact that he was denied a civilian lawyer, or that the trial was closed to the public, might be of interest only to human-rights activists. But that the trial was conducted in Serbo-Croatian, denying the defendants the right to use their native language within their own republic: this was enough to trigger a national explosion.

Zavrl was the only defendant not imprisoned during the trial. This was the court's second mistake. Every day after the proceedings, Zavrl staged a sidewalk press conference, explaining the day's events. The defendant became an agent of protest, and the energetic Zavrl was perfect for the role. Meanwhile, the crowds gathered before the prison every afternoon. An impromptu guard of honor, relieved every few minutes, stood before the court holding the Yugoslav flag; at least one elderly guard proudly displayed a copy of *Mladina* as well. Passing cars honked their horns to drown out the court's work.

On the eighth day the trial ended, with guilty verdicts and sentences ranging from five months to four years. Released pending appeal, Janša gathered the crowd of some ten thousand from the back of the truck that had taken him from prison: "With this trial all our dreams of a legal state have died."<sup>23</sup> There followed appeals, retrials, and months in prison before the four were finally released in late 1989.

Ljubljana's carnival came to a close, giving way to the emergence of political parties from out of the CDHR in early 1989, as it became clear that the committee was insufficient if the battle for human rights would move from petitions and rallies to Parliament and beyond. The trial had indeed shown the need for a completely different system. The only question was whether that would be in a radically changed Yugoslavia or in an independent Slovenia.

Looking back at the Ljubljana trial of July 1988, and the activism of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, one cannot say that afterward Slovenia's independence (a full three years later) was inevitable. Two things are worth noting, however, and both point to the great importance of the civic movements that them, Marnik, Jalusič, and others had tried to build, and for which *Mladina* had cleared a path.

First, Slovenia was not the only republic to see massive demonstrations in 1988. The Serbs of Kosovo, now joined by the Serbs of Vojvodina, had been protesting what they called discrimination, even genocide, at the hands of Albanians or of Hungarians. These rallies contributed to the triumph of Slobodan Milošević. They could not have been more different from the events in Slovenia. The Slovenes spoke a language of rights and respect cultivated over the previous half-decade. There was no question, for example, of their rights coming at the expense of others. That one hundred thousand individuals signed the declaration of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights indicates a strong commitment not only to human rights, but also to negotiation as a means of achieving those rights. In republics lacking a similar tradition of organized opposition, protest was divisive and maximalist.

The other difference was that Milan Kučan was a very lucky man. His private speech, smuggled from that March 1988 Central Committee meeting, showed him defending Slovenia and, indirectly, the interests of Slovene civil society against hard-line communist aggression. Had his unguarded words been different, it is unlikely he would be the democratically elected president today. That Kučan, and most of the Slovene leadership, spoke in this way in 1988 was no accident. The Slovene League of Communists, which (through its Youth League) had sponsored the early growth of independent movements, was in turn shaped by the language and attitude of those movements. They had long ago discovered that there was political capital to be made from adopting a language differentiating them from their colleagues in Belgrade.

Similar movements were not so tolerated anywhere else in Central Europe, because only in Slovenia did such movements encounter a communist regime willing to place its bets at home rather than in the capital city. Kučan, again, was fortunate, for when the door to society opened, it would not be to a rock-throwing (or yogurt-throwing, as in Vojvodina) mob, but to a community of activists committed to human rights, democracy, and dialogue.

#### Scene Four

##### DAYS THAT SHOOK LVIV

JUNE, 1988

Ihor Melnyk, an engineer at a Lviv construction plant, was by his own description a "passive observer" of the rise of Ukrainian opposition. He ac-



like him, had been looking for. Whether their goal was the complete destruction of the communist system, some kind of genuine total democracy, or an alternative lifestyle based on rejection of traditional authority, many activists refused, or did not seek, participation in the political transformations of 1989. Krzysztof Jakuźczak of Wrocław's happenings felt that the new political process (which he had helped to set in motion) "was not for me," and somehow dirty; he did not even vote in the negotiated election in June. To raise awareness of human rights, or to use music or theater to provoke people into activism, was one thing; to leave the streets for parliamentary offices, or even for the voting booths, was quite another.<sup>4</sup>

Still others, perhaps, had something to contribute but were purposefully ignored as opposition leaders pursued a different agenda. This sense of neglect has hit workers most painfully. Researching the August 1988 strike in the Jastrzębie coal mines was a wrenching experience, each interview an encounter with bitterness and regret. One story in particular still haunts: Two years after the Jastrzębie strike, Krzysztof Zakrzewski, the strike's local leader, hanged himself. Some who knew him saw a link to the disappointments of 1988. Indeed, when I encountered Warsaw politicians and journalists who had come to know Zakrzewski during the strike, I found that not one had been aware of his death. I also found, though, that while one could write of the workers' tragedy, there was another story of success: often, when I went in search of a participant in the employees' councils, I would find him or her now working as a consultant, or running a small business, or immersed in trade union work. The game had changed entirely, and these activists had adapted.

This book is not meant to be a record of paths not taken, but a map of the paths that led to revolutionary change, whether or not they continue on after 1989. Still, it is a difficult task to link the transitional festival of opposition to the formal politics that followed. There are two ways in which the stories join. First, it should be clear by now that negotiations would have been quite unlikely without the active opposition of the previous half-decade. In place of the apathy and resignation of the urban majority, and the hermetic underground militancy of a tiny minority, there arose a much broader social commitment to concrete, open engagement. The regime did not agree to negotiate because this or that opposition leader showed inderogable determination (not, of course, simply due to economic decline and Western pressure, both of which had been the case for a long time). The catalyst to dialogue was the broad social unrest of dozens of stages. Resistance had spread beyond the usual large cities to

places like Miedzyrzecz, Teplice, and Nagymaros, and from workers and young intellectuals to retirees and high school students. It was harder to pin down, too, as the new opposition traveled easily from issue to issue, from city to city, over the fences into striking factories, and across international borders.

There is a second contribution of the carnival as well, if we recall the idea of internal pluralism raised in the introduction. The new opposition moved freely across the activist landscape, devoting less time to programmatic statements and more time to opposing communism by any (nonviolent, mostly) means possible. If there could be a pluralism of issues, there could also be a diversity of paths. Later, some embraced the ordinary politics of postcommunist democracy. Even those who turned away would agree, with few exceptions, that the negotiations and the subsequent transfers of power ushered in an era of normality, in which anyone could do what he or she desired. That, naturally, included the freedom to sell out or to desert politics altogether.

The new movements shared a commitment to concrete goals and could often point to tangible achievements. This orientation could easily be compatible with participation in ordinary parliamentary politics, but also with leaving the stage entirely. Thinking about why she is no longer involved, former Polish high school activist Barbara Widera asserted the privileges of a pioneer: "now there are lots of willing volunteers, so I can take care of myself." That there would one day be many volunteers was not this, in the end, one of the purposes of their activism?

A logical continuation of their drive to awaken society has been, for many, the media. Among Freedom and Peace activists, there are editors of at least two major city dailies, as well as numerous television, magazine, and newspaper reporters. Orange Alternative is, not surprisingly, the background of several web designers. Franci Zavrl of Slovenia's *Mladina* runs a PR firm, whose offices are adorned with a series of large oil paintings depicting the boss's travels in prison in 1988–89. He is not the only one in public relations: Piotr Niemczyk of WRP and Jaromir Piskoř of the Czechoslovak greens are other examples. In Ukraine a Lion Society activist edits a leading political weekly. The 1989 publications of both the Lion Society and Fidesz in Hungary have transformed into important journals of opinion. Public mobilization continues, then, but in a form more adapted to a free society.

For other activists, the causes they championed continued to engage them after 1989. The offices of Amnesty International in each country are home to many participants of the late-communist opposition. Where there has been a campaign against the military draft, as in Poland, or against the war, as in Yugoslavia, it has been a direct outgrowth of the movements of the 1980s. In the former military jail on Metelkova Street

<sup>4</sup> Jakuźczak has since had a change of heart. In 1998 he ran for and won a seat on Wrocław's City Council, currently headed by his old Twelve colleague Jarosław Ojramski.



in Ljubljana, Marko Hren of the Peace Group now holds sway in the Peace Institute, as does Vlasta Jakišič. The entire complex, in fact, has been turned over to alternative movements, underground bands, artists, and museums. Another example is feminist movements across Central Europe, which, like their counterparts in the United States in the 1970s, often draw their energy from women who felt they were pushed to the margins in the anti-regime opposition.

The most visible counterforces have been green movements. In 1989–90 Tomasz Burek of the Gdańsk WIP circle pushed for a regional referendum on the Żarnowiec plant, as it became clear the Solidarity government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki was not going to shelve the project. The referendum was successful, and Poland's nuclear power program, for all practical purposes, was over. Several years later, Jarenia Dubiel of Warsaw's WIP organized a similar referendum against a trash incinerator; he, too, was successful. Both of these campaigns are dwarfed by the ongoing struggle against the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Dam in Hungary. There, it also turned out that the fall of communism was just the beginning of the struggle. It would take years of continued pressure to defeat the dam. While the Hungarian government canceled the dam agreement in 1992, the legal battles with Slovakia, and with the momentum created by the pre-1989 construction, rage on today.\*

What of those who entered politics? Whether the subject is Jan Maria Rokita of WIP, now one of the leaders of the Catholic right in his Conservative People's Party; or Janetz Janša, Defense Minister from 1990 to 1994; or Jana Petrová and Hana Maranová, once of NMS and until 1998 members of the Czech Parliament in Václav Klaus's center-right Civic Democratic Party; or the boys from Fidesz who now head the Hungarian government, it is easy to encounter vituperative accusations of betrayal from former colleagues. Most scandalous of all, to some, have been the careers that several participants in WIP have made in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Bureau for State Defense. Their activism in the communist era, some say, was just a cynical mask to be discarded as soon as political power was in sight. At best, their *naïveté* led them to be co-opted into the very corridors of power they once opposed.

The politicians in question will themselves talk of coincidence, personal decisions, and even patriotic duty. But in the end, they point to the essentially political work they did before 1989. Opposition for them was not antipolitical, but ruthlessly political. Ideology had taken a back seat to goals before 1989, and that would still be so afterward. There is not so

\* While Hungarian opposition to the dam became a matter of national honor, in Slovakia the opposite happened. Most people came to believe that to oppose the dam was to be little Slovakia's capitalists; thus the dam (improbably enough, without Hungary's cooperation) moves forward.

much, really, separating these politicians from their former colleagues. Just as one could be an anarchist, or a hippy, or a performance artist and yet engage in oppositional politics, so too the line between, say, peace activism and peace-based oppositional politics was blurry indeed. To join the new establishment after the old one was defeated was not necessarily a cynical move, but a logical one. "There are many volunteers now," they might say, paraphrasing Barbara Widera, "so now I can be the politician I was meant to be."

As I conducted interviews with those from Freedom and Peace or NMS who had gone into Parliament in 1989 or 1990, I often wondered whether they had formed a caucus of any kind within the Civic Parliamentary Club of Solidarity or the Civic Forum. Each interviewee seemed genuinely perplexed by my question. Of course, they greeted each other in the corridors and occasionally worked together on legislation (for example, rewriting laws on military service), but it had never occurred to any of them that they constituted a faction or pressure group. The peace movements were not so much of the past as they were from a different arena. In the arena of Parliament, there was no place for a movement. Elsewhere, of course, others might continue the movement, and the two might even be in contact with one another. But for them, the era of normal politics had at last arrived, and they could leave the politics of the street behind.

A careful study of postcommunist Central Europe would most likely reveal that the issues of the 1980s have a continuing impact on the rhetoric and practice of politics. Green politics, or feminist politics, or peace issues hardly dominate, but they all have their advocates, probably to a greater extent than might have been otherwise. More generally, the question of political access for disadvantaged groups, and especially of minorities, is a constant source of tension. And surely the average age of parliamentary deputies—and even prime ministers—is much lower than in Western Europe. As the "generation of '88" reaches into its forties over the next decade, it is likely that its styles and ways of thinking will only increase in impact.

#### REMEMBERING 1989

Coming home to Wrocław after the conclusion of the Round Table in April 1989, Władysław Fraszyński knew that Solidarity had scored an impressive victory. Even with the election two months away, he could see that, at the least, communism would never be the same again. This was a moment to show the regime just how powerful and united Polish society was, and to celebrate the end of the underground years. "We should have had a picnic," he said later with regret, "found some orchestra to play,

some beer, and said "OK, pick your dance partner!" But there was so much to be done to prepare for the election. He and others in the opposition were used to working around the clock, producing leaflets, discussing strategy, and taking care of the union. So they buckled down to work again, to try to win the election. Who had time for a picnic?

That picnic could have helped Poles feel that they, too, had participated in the Round Table. Instead, much of society would come to the conclusion that the Round Table, and everything that took place in 1989, was merely an elite affair, to which the nation as a whole was not a party. And as there were no celebrations then, so there are no commemorations today. The participants of the Polish Round Table celebrated the tenth anniversary of that remarkable gathering far from home in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Back in Warsaw, April 5, 1999, passed without much fanfare at all.

The lack of catharsis is one of the reasons 1989 has faded so quickly in people's memories. Among the countries where 1989 marked the actual change, only the Czechs have November 17 to celebrate, and the East Germans, the Wall's fall of November 9. Not only the Poles, but also the Hungarians do not celebrate 1989 at all. For Slovaks and Ukrainians, independence in 1991 is a far more commemorable moment. For the same reason, Western observers have also had a hard time calling 1989 a revolution, unless there is an adjective like "negotiated" attached. Revolutions are supposed to have dramatic confrontations where people are tossed out of windows or have their heads stuck on pikes. The negotiations of 1989 are indeed moments that lack vivid imagery, until we widen our vision just a bit. Then we can see that these revolutions were made up of a long series of smaller confrontations, over a period of several years, even a decade, before they culminate in the negotiations and commences that bring about the actual fall of communism. It is difficult now to find the moment of revolution, and thus to know what to celebrate. An opportunity was lost, in 1989, to create such a moment.

For individual activists, the uncertainty is no less. At the end of an intense, two-hour interview with an old friend, an underground journalist in Wrocław, I reluctantly turned off the tape recorder and prepared to pack up. Suddenly our conversation changed; there was something unspoken nagging my friend, brought to the surface by these reminiscences. She was just finishing her law degree, had a nice apartment in the center of the city, and could afford to travel all over the world. But had her position been worth it? It had taken her years of study to make up the time lost to underground pursuits. She thought of her friends from high school (three of whom, for example, started a very successful computer firm): "While we were busy with leaflets and other foolish stuff," she complained, "they were studying." This was true. I met a number of college

dropouts, and even high school dropouts, during my travels. Some were happy on the fringes of society; others were not so sure. They wondered whether the excitement of the carnival had been worth the price of admission.

In some ways, it is too early to realize just how important those years were. Most of the participants are even now still at the beginning of their professional careers. The cities and towns where they live and where they created new forms of opposition are today, almost without exception, teeming with civic life. As they shape the media, the civic organizations, the more radical opposition, and politics both local and national, the imprint of the carnival will be ever more visible.

And what of the revolution itself? One of the most common criticisms of the revolutions of 1989—even of the very idea that these were revolutions—is that 1989 produced no great new idea or form of government (unlike, say, the American, Russian, or French revolutions). Instead, it simply produced states whose leaders and citizens aspire to be like Western free-market democracies.<sup>4</sup> This fact has made the changes after 1989 seem rather inevitable, and the excitement before 1989 a bit unnecessary.

But let me propose an alternative definition of revolution, one perhaps more suited to a revolutionary age quite unlike those that have come before. A revolution is a relatively sudden rupture in the normal or familiar practices of politics and society. I have called that rupture a carnival, which destroys the regime's monologue and lays the foundation for a later dialogue. During that rupture, an infinite number of possibilities open up, and imaginations are set loose. These might be ideas about radical political change—a "third way" or a "Europe without borders," or radical democracy. But they might also be more fundamental and personal than this: people can perform on the streets, or design their own protests, or write what they please, or retreat from society, or negotiate with leaders and sit in Parliament. They can embrace socialism, or deep ecology, or reinvent national traditions. The Church will change, the old opposition will change, people's mindsets and prejudices will change, the very nature of politics will change.

Much, maybe even most, of this comes to pass only briefly, if at all. The inertia of tradition and example, and the pressures of everyday concerns, turn revolutionaries back into ordinary people with jobs and families. The threat of defeat or annihilation—so important in earlier revolutions, but in 1989 relevant mainly in the Slovene case with the specter of Beijing also ever present—pushes more unusual ideas to the margins. This may be cause for regret, but it seems to be natural. What is more, it does not destroy that moment when all of the imaginings of a society (or its most active core) were laid bare. This is the more so when those ideas belong

## Prispevek o novih družbenih gibanjih 80-ta in Listi NDG 91

Ob prvih demokratičnih volitvah smo akterji civilnodružbenih gibanj zgradili neodvisno listo in nastopili v volilni areni predvsem s ciljem, da prostor impregniramo z našimi vsebinami. Če se prav spominjam, nihče od nas ni imel popolnoma resnih ambicij vstopiti v parlament. Kar se mene tiče, sem bil kot nosilec liste pripravljen na vse izide; v igro sem šel z vso energijo. A treba je povedati, da smo kampanjo vodili premalo načrtno, da bi lahko uspeli. Sam sem bil v času kampanje velik del na poti v tujini – kot vedno tista leta. V resnici preboja v parlament nismo mogli pričakovati. A v naši volilni kampanji sem dal eno samo predvolilno obljubo: da bomo ob naslednjih volitvah proslavljali, žurirali in kampanjo vodili v osvobojenih in javnosti odprtih kasarnah. Projekt Metelkova je bila moja edina predvolilna obljuba in lahko torej zapišem, da nisem prelomil še nobene predvolilne obljube ;-)

### Hren gre v nos, Marko Hren pa namerava v novo skupščino

Na velikem predvolilnem rock'n'roll žuru Neodvisne liste novih družbenih gibanj so se predstavili kandidati

LJUBLJANA, 28. marca – »Nič drugega ne bomo počeli, kot smo počeli doslej pod firmo novih družbenih gibanj,« je dejal Marko Hren, nosilec Neodvisne liste novih družbenih gibanj, na včerajšnjem velikem rock'n'roll žuru te liste v KUD France Prešeren v Trnovem. Za rock'n'roll so bili odgovorni Sokoli s kandidatom Petrom Lovšinom, za žur pa še drugi kandidati liste, ki so se predstavili hvaležnemu občinstvu pod geslom: Hren gre v nos.

Priznati vsem pravico do različnosti; to je moto, za katerega se bo zavzemala Zdenka Šimonovič, številka dva na njihovi nacionalni listi in tista, na katero, poleg Marka Hrena, resno računajo, da bo prišla v novo slovensko skupščino. Njen moto pa morda tudi najbolje ponazarja zahteve te liste:

Projekti liste so gesla, vprašanja, odgovori, zahteve. Med njimi so: za ženske v politiki, za moške v gospodinjstvu, za več časa, za manj delovnega časa, za neodvisne sindikate, za pravico do štrajkov, za zemljo brez norišnic, za normalizacijo odnosa do drog, za pravice otrok, za Slovenijo z mirovno politiko in brez vojske in tajne policije, za konverzijo vojaške industrije in vojaške lastnine v civilne namene, za kulturo miru in nenasilja, za preprečevanje diskriminacije zaradi seksualnih usmeritev, za svet različnosti, za kozmopolitizem.

Tisti, ki bo izvoljen, bo v skupščini zato, da bo postavljaj neprijetna vprašanja, da bo opozarjal na na videz obrobne probleme, da bo skrbel, da skupščina ne bo sprejela zakonov, ki bi bili v škodo marginalnih družbenih skupin.

»Neodvisna lista novih družbenih gibanj pravzaprav ne potrebuje reklame,« je včeraj dejal Jože Vogrinc in to dokazal s statističnim izračunom. »Zastopamo interese žensk, torej 50 odstotkov prebivalstva, homoseksualcev (10 odstotkov), otrok (50 odstotkov), norcev (90 odstotkov); skupaj torej 200 odstotkov. Samo zaradi ljubezni do različnosti bomo v parlament spustili še druge,« je rekel in požel odobravanje nasmejanega občinstva.

MARKO PEČAUER

#### KANDIDATI NEODVISNE LISTE NOVIH DRUŽBENIH GIBANJ ZA DPZ REPUBLIŠKE SKUPŠČINE

1. volilna enota: Marko Hren, Zoja Skušek-Močnik, Brane Mozetič, Srečo Zaje
2. volilna enota: Vlasta Jalušič, Vitold Flaker, Peter Lovšin
3. volilna enota: Bogdan Lešnik, Gregor Tomc
4. volilna enota: Ingrid Bakše, Alenka Arko
5. volilna enota: Zdenka Šimonovič, Tonči Kuzmanič
7. volilna enota: Iztok Saksida, Milka Emilija Pance
9. volilna enota: Darka Zvonar, Peter-Tomaž Dobrila
13. volilna enota: Ignac Krivec, Jože Vogrinc



## Walk-the-talk: Odločba zoper Marka Hrena - ugovor vesti

Odločbo objavljam zgolj kot arhivsko ilustracijo o prizadevanjih za legalizacijo Ugovora Vesti.

Številka: II P 5385/86-M

**ODLOČBA O PREKRŠKU**

Organ za postopek o prekrških v Ljubljani, je po sodniku za prekrške Marinček Marjanu  
v postopku zoper obdolženca Hren Marka zaradi storitve  
prekrška po členu 77 Zakona o vojaški obveznosti  
v zvezi s predlogom MS za LO Ljubljana št. 830-2/269  
z dne 20.6.1986 na podlagi členov 163 in 258 zakona o prekrških (Ur. l. SRS 25/83 in 42/85) oziroma 1. čle-  
na 2. odstavka zakona o prekrških s katerimi se kršijo zvezni predpisi (Ur. l. SFRJ št. 4/77 in 14/85).

odločil:

Obdolženec HREN MARKO, roj. 26.4.1959 v Ljubljani, dip. ing.  
strojništva, stan. Ljubljana, Ljubeljska 25

je odgovoren:

**da se kot vojaški obveznik na pismeni poziv vojaškega organa ni udeležil dvodnevni vojaških vaj dne 1.2.1986, ne da bi imel za to opravičljiv razlog.**

S tem je kršil določilo člena ..... in storil prekršek po členu 77 Zakona  
o vojaški obveznosti /Ur. l. SFRJ 64/85/  
.....  
in se na podlagi člena 77/I cit. zakona  
z uporabo člena .....

kaznuje:

**z denarno kaznijo din 12.000,- /dvanajesttisoč/**

V smislu člena 175 zakona o prekrških mora(jo) obd. plačati povprečnino v znesku 1.500,-  
in druge stroške postopka .....



Denarno kazen, ki je dohodek republike in povprečnino, ki je dohodek družbenopolitične skupnosti ter ostale stroške postopka, je treba plačati v roku 15 dni po pravnomočnosti odločbe na tekoči račun po priloženih položnicah. Če denarne kazni in stroškov postopka ne plača(jo) v določenem roku, se na podlagi člena 27 in 256 zakona o prekrških prisilno izterjajo. Če pa kazni ni mogoče prisilno izterjati, se ta, oziroma njen neizterjan ostanek po določili 27. in 28. člena ZP spremeni v zaporno kazen razen pravni in odgovorni osebi.

Ohranilo:

Dejanski stan prekrška je obd. dokazan v zvezi z ugotovitvami Mestnega sekretariata za ljudsko obrambo v Ljubljani v cit. predlogu za uvedbo postopka, kakor tudi s priznanjem obd.

Obd. se zagovarja, da je vsekakor potrebno za vzdrževanje miru in varnosti polno sodelovanje posameznikov, skupin in organizacij. Zal je za to potrebna tudi armija, toda vojaščina je nezdružljiva tako z njegovo duševnostjo kot z njegovimi načeli, zato se ji ne more prilagoditi. Smatra, da vključevanje v armijo ni in ne sme biti edini in za vsakogar nujni način za vzdrževanje miru v sami domovini in v mednarodnih odnosih. Zaradi teh razlogov ne more sodelovati pri vojaških obveznostih, na katere ga vpokliče pristojni vojaški organ.

Tuk, sodnik ocenjuje obd. zagovor za povsem nesprejemljiv. Po podatkih spisa je bil kot vojaški obveznik vpoklican na dvednevno vojaško vajo z iskazanim pozivom, vendar na vojaški vaji ni sodeloval. Tako je treba obd. opozoriti na znano dejstvo, da predstavlja izpolnjevanje vojaških nalog splošno državljansko dolžnost, ustavne kategorije, katerim se morajo državljani SFRJ nujno podrediti, tako da je subjektivno gledanja in naziranje posameznih vojaških obveznikov do naše armije in izpolnjevanja obveznosti te armije docela drugotnega pomena. V tej zvezi je obd. spozniti na znano zakonsko zapoved, vsaj za vojaške obveznike, iz 1. odst. 65. čl. Zakona o vojaški obveznosti, v smislu katere vojaški obveznik, ki ga pristojni organ pokliče v zvezi z izvrševanjem vojaške obveznosti, se mora priglasiti določenemu organu v kraju in v času, ki sta navedena v pozivu.

Tako je obd. obravnavani prekršek dokazan ter krivdorek utemeljen.

V smislu kazenske določbe iz 1. odst. 77. čl. cit. zakona je za ugotovljeni prekršek predpisana denarna kazen od 10.000 do 100.000 din ali zaporna do 30 dni.

Ob upoštevanju obd. premoženjskih razmerij da še ni bil kaznovan za prekršek, težini kršitve in stopnji odgovornosti obd., je sledila denarna kazen kot spredej.

Pričakovati je, da bo že takšna kazen na obd. že pozitivno vplivala, kar pomeni, da bo v prihodnje kot vojaški obveznik v redu in dosledno izpolnjeval vse dolžnosti, na katere bo vpoklican s pozivom vojaškega organa.

Stroški postopka - povprečnina, je bila odmerjena gledex na obd. gnotno stanje, trajanje ter zamotanost postopka.

S tem je odločba utemeljena.

PRAVNI POUK: Proti odločbi je dopustna pritožba v roku 8 (osem) dni po prejemu odločbe. Pritožbo je treba <sup>2</sup>ložiti pisno ali ustno na zapisnik pri tem sodniku za prekrške v 2. izvodih, če je pritožnik obdoženeec, oziroma v ..... izvodih, če je pritožnik predlagatelj. Pritožba bo predložena Republiškememu senatu za prekrške v Ljubljani.

8.1.1987

Ljubljana, dne .....

Odločbo prejmejo:

1. obdoženeec
2. predlagatelj
3. arhiv

SODNIK ZA PREKRŠKE  
Marinček Marjan

## Demilitarizacija

V prvem delu Antologije so zbrani številni prispevki, ki jasno kažejo na kontekst, v katerem je nastala ideja o Metelkovi in na energije, v katerih se je zamisel inkubirala, nato rodila in se razvila.

V tem delu pa želim posebej pokazati in ilustrirati, kako močno in neposredno je bil projekt za Metelkovo vgnuzden v projekt demilitarizacije in nenasilnega reševanja konfliktov, ki ga je Mirovno gibanje promoviralo koncem 80ih let.

Zdi se potrebno, da del kontekstualne argumentacije (p)ostane opremljen s pričevanji in dokumenti. Sledi izbor objavljenih pamfletov in avtorskih člankov, ki vodijo k eni sklepni ugotovitvi: koncem 80ih let je v Ljubljani obstajala močna, če že ne mogočna, kampanja, celosten projekt širokega konsenza, za uveljavljanje mirovne kulture v časih nore militarizacije Balkana in sveta. Brez te neizmerne energije, projekt Metelkova ne bi mogel nastati, kaj šele se udejaniti.

## Pobuda Gibanja za kulturo miru in nenasilja, november 1989

*Gibanje za kulturo miru in nenasilja  
Delovna skupina za mirovna gibanja pri RK ZSMS, Dalmatinova 4, 61000 Ljubljana,  
Sekcija za kulturo miru, Kersnikova 4, 61000 Ljubljana.*

### SLOVENIJA - DEMILITARIZIRANA DEŽELA

Domači in mednarodni javnosti;  
državnim institucijam: Predsedstvu SR Slovenije, Skupščini SR Slovenije;  
političnim organizacijam: Zelenim Slovenije, Meščanski zvezi zelenih, Slovenski kmečki zvezi,  
Slovenski demokratični zvezi, Slovenski social demokratični zvezi, Krščanskemu socialnemu gibanju,  
Zvezi komunistov Slovenije, Socialistični zvezi delovnega ljudstva, Zvezi borcev, ZSM Slovenije,  
medškofijski komisiji Pravičnost in mir, Univerzi v Ljubljani in Mariboru, Teološki fakulteti.

### POBUDA

Ob kongresu ZSMS v Portorožu, 3. novembra 1989.

Naslovníkom predlagamo, da se s svojimi programskimi smernicami zavežejo k prizadevanju, da se kot prvo fazo preučevanja področij, posledic in potrebnih stopenj demilitarizacije Slovenije, v skupščini SR Slovenije osnuje neodvisna komisija in zagotovi sredstva za preučitev področij in posledic militarizacije Slovenije.

Komisija naj pri svojem delu preuči in poda javnosti transparentne podatke vsaj za naslednja področja:

- I.1. Kolikšna sredstva je dajala oziroma daje republika v vojaške namene v zvezni proračun; razišče naj vire ter transparentno predstavi porabo teh sredstev.
- I.2. Kolikšen in kateri deli slovenske industrije (prehrambene, lahke, težke...) so kakor koli vezani na proizvodnjo v vojaške namene tako za domače tržišče kot za izvoz. Pri tem je treba opraviti podrobno analizo vseh sektorjev v gospodarstvu, tudi tistih, ki so z domačim izvozom včlenjene v proizvodne verige za vojaške namene drugot v Jugoslaviji.
- I.3. Kolikšen in kateri del raziskovalnih programov je namenjen raziskavam, ki so kadrovske, finančno ali kako drugače povezane z vojaškimi nameni.
- I.4. Natančen pregled vseh kadrov, ki so kakorkoli povezani z vojaškimi nameni. S tem v zvezi je potrebno opraviti tako analizo zaposlenih v armadi (aktivne vojaške starešine in vojaki na služenju vojaškega roka), v vojaških šolah, bolnišnicah, vojašnicah, zaporih, sodiščih in drugih vojaških objektih kot analizo zaposlenih v vseh sektorjih industrije pod točko I.2. Upoštevati je treba tako strukture armade (JLA), kot strukture teritorialne obrambe.
- I.5. Natančen popis vseh objektov in zemljišč ter druge imovine (vozila, itd), ki jih uporabljajo armada, teritorialna obramba ali druge vojaške strukture.
- I.6. Študijo elementov zakonodaje, ki so kakor koli povezani z vojaškimi zadevami (ustava in vsi podzakonski akti, tako republiški kot zvezni).
- I.7. Študijo koncepta SLO in DS in analiza vseh tistih točk, ki dovoljujejo militarizacijo.

Obenem predlagamo, da naslovníki podprejo iniciativo madžarske vlade za vspostavljanje demilitarizirane cone v obmejnem področju. Iniciativo je že podprla avstrijska vlada, naslovníke pa pozivamo, da podpora in implementacijo tega projektu izposlušajo tudi pri slovenski in jugoslovanski vladi.

### II. Posledice demilitarizacije in konverzije - Slovenija brez pušk in bajonetov

Na osnovi izsledkov komisije bo možno v naslednji fazi preučiti posledice, ki bi sledile demilitarizaciji Slovenije in konverziji ekonomske, socialne, notranje in zunanje politike na vseh področjih, ki jih prizadeva militarizacija. Konverzija narekuje izoblikovanje novega koncepta varnosti, iz tistega, ki temelji na oboroženem odporu in obrambi in se udejanja v konceptu SLO in DS, v koncept, ki bo



temeljlil na varnosti kot ekološki, ekonomski, socialni in duhovni kategoriji in ki se bo udejanjal v spoštovanju človekovih pravic, konceptu kulture miru in nenasilja v odnosu do ljudi in v odnosu do okolja, in ki bo upošteval univerzalni - planetarni značaj ekološke, socialne in vojne ogroženosti. V tem dokumentu bomo tak koncept delovno imenovali koncept univerzalne varnosti.

Pri demilitarizaciji je treba upoštevati vsaj naslednje posege:

- II.1. Opustitev konceptov oboroženega boja in obrambe, v skladu z ugotovitvami pod I.7.
- II.2. Ukinitev prispevkov v vojaške namene
- II.3. Ukinitev vojaških šol in vzgajanja, izobraževanja ali urjenja za vojno
- II.4. Ukinitev vojaških in obrambnih obveznosti, tako za moške kot za ženske, neglede na starost. Ukinitev delovnih mest, ki izhajajo iz točke I.4.
- II.5. Osvoboditev zemljišč, objektov in imovine pod točko I.5.
- II.6. Ustavitev proizvodnih načrtov, ki izhajajo iz ugotovitev pod točko I.2., ter razvojnih projektov in programov iz točke I.3.
- II.7. Črtanje tistih delov ustave in podzakonskih aktov (na republiški in zvezni ravni), ki nalagajo obveznosti, pravice in dolžnosti, ki bi podlegle spremembam iz prejšnjih točk.

### III. Alternative

#### Tanke v kotalke, oficirje v pastirje, karavle turistom, topove v zvonove, Slovenijo Evropi...

Istočasno z delom komisije naslovnike pozivamo, da pripravljajo predloge alternativ, ki bi sledile sprostivam iz točke II.

- III.1. Razvijanje konceptov vzgoje za mir in "koncepta univerzalne varnosti".
- III.2. Konverzija vseh celic sistema SLO in DS v smislu konceptov pod III.1.
- III.3. Opcije za konverzijo zemljišč in objektov pod točko I.5. v civilne namene v skladu z III.1.
- III.4. Konverzija vseh panog vojaške industrije pod točko I.2. v civilne namene v skladu z III.1.
- III.5. Predvidi naj se načrt za zaposlovanja kadrov, ki bi se sprostili zaradi posledic točke II.
- III.6. Predvidi naj se načrt razporejanja sredstev, ki bi se sprostila pod točko II.2.
- III.7. Predvidijo naj se možnosti in načini za sklenitev mirovnih pogodb s sosedskimi državami in za zagotovitev statusa mirovne cone v Sloveniji z mednarodnimi akti. Kot prva faza naj se podpre projekt demilitarizirane cone v obmejnem pasu madžarske in avstrije.

### IV. Etape - izredno stanje v mirovno gibanje

Po ustanovitvi naj si skupščinska komisija zada rok za dokončanje študije, ki ne sme biti daljši od dveh let. V tem času naslovnike pozivamo, da se zavzemajo za izpolnitev tistih elementov demilitarizacije, ki so že bili v razpravi, predvsem pa:

- IV.1. Razvijanje konceptov vzgoje za mir in koncepta univerzalne varnosti.
- IV.2. Odpiranje katedre na Univerzi - Mirovne univerze - za proučevanje in študij alternativnih konceptov varnosti, kulture miru in nenasilja ter konverzije.
- IV.3. Zagotavljanje transparentnosti podatkov o distribuciji zveznega vojaškega proračuna in takojšnje zmanjšanje tega za tisto vsoto, ki gre v nakup ali posodabljanje orožja ali v razširitev vojaških kapacitet. Ustavitev trgovine z orožjem.
- IV.4. Depolitizacija vojske in demilitarizacija političnega sistema.
- IV.5. Takojšnje priznavanje ugovora vesti zoper sodelovanje v kakršnekoli vojaške namene, kot temeljne človekove pravice in izpustitev vseh zapornikov, ki so zaradi ugovora vesti zaprti.
- IV.6. Ukinitev vojaških sodišč in vojaškega sodstva.
- IV.7. Formalno je treba opredeliti in zagotoviti mehanizme za kasnejše odločanje o transformaciji Slovenije v demilitarizirano cono in za konverzijo vojaškega stroja v civilne in miroljubne namene.

Zaradi zagotavljanja nepristranskosti in civilnega odločanja o posameznih fazah, ki bodo sledile pobudi, na tem mestu v zvezi s točko IV.4. ponavljamo predloge za spremembe volilnega zakona in zakona o političnem združevanju, ki smo jih posredovali naslovnikom 12. oktobra 1989, in sicer 1. da se v volilnem zakonu SR Slovenije jasno opredeli, da aktivne vojaške starešine ne morejo biti voljeni na nobeno mesto v državnih organih in političnih organizacijah; 2. da se sprožijo vsi potrebni postopki za uveljavitev opredelitev pod točko 1. za zvezne državne organe; 3. da se v zakonu o političnih združenjih jasno opredeli, da ljudje ne morejo biti člani nobene politične organizacije kot aktivne vojaške osebe. Predlagamo takojšnjo ukinitev in zakonsko prepoved političnih organizacij v vojski. S tem v zvezi pozivamo kongres ZSM Slovenije, da sproži ustrezne postopke za takojšnjo razpustitev mladinske organizacije kot politične organizacije v armadi, delegate slovenskega ZK na kongresu ZKJ pa, da

4  
sprožijo v ZKJ pobudo za razpustitev ZK v JLA.

## V. Namen projekta Slovenija demilitarizirana dežela

Komisija naj bo obvezana, da bo delo opravila v dveh letih. Vsak segment dela naj vodijo in nadzorujejo civilne institucije. Rezultati študije naj vsebujejo podroben posnetek stanja oziroma podrobno analizo vseh točk pod I. točko. Rezultati dela komisije bodo služili širši javni razpravi o predvidevanju posledic demilitarizacije Slovenije in prehoda na politiko miru in o predlogih etap in vsebine uvajanja postopne konverzije (pod točko III).

Komisija se naj ne bi obremenjevala s presojanjem upravičenosti ali možnosti demilitarizacije in naj v prvi fazi tudi ne bi razpravljala o posledicah ukrepov, ki so predvideni pod točko II. O uveljavljanju demilitarizirane cone na ozemlju Slovenije in o odločitvi za mirovno politiko s konverzijo, se bodo v prihodnosti in po podrobnih študijah odločali državljani Slovenije na referendumu (ali kako drugače v skladu s točko IV.7.) in sicer o vsebini ustavne formulacije, ki naj bi tako politiko opredeljevala. Podajamo predlog variante take ustavne formulacije: *"Območje Slovenije je demilitarizirana cona. Slovenija nima vojske in nima vojaške industrije. Na ozemlju Slovenije se ne more zadrževati in ne more trgovati nobena vojaška organizacija. Varnostna politika Slovenije temelji na negovanju miroljubnih mednarodnih odnosov, na spoštovanju človekovih pravic in na vspostavljanju ekoloških, socialnih in duhovnih vrednot."*

## VI. Obrazložitev - kdor nima sovražnikov ne rabi vojske

Vojaški ustroj je primitivna institucija, ki je ni mogoče reformirati, ne posodobiti in ne nadomestiti s kako drugo; svoj odnos do vamosti lahko spremeni le družba sama, se odloči, da vojaškega ustroja ne potrebuje več, in se opredeli za aktivno mirovno in ekološko politiko, za kulturo miru in nenasilja. Armada je institucija, ki s konceptom hierarhije na principu nadvlade, uniformiranja in vzgajanja za poslušnost, po definiciji zavira koncept civilne družbe kot družbe različnosti, pluralizma in svobode posameznika. Vojska in celotni mehanizem, ki jo vzdržuje, je preostanek starih vzorcev sovražnikov onkraj mej. Ti vzorci izginjajo, z njimi pa tudi argumentacija za obstoj armad. Okolja, ki bodo posledice obstoja vojsk odpravila hitreje, bodo imela možnost bolj učinkovito vložiti svoje potenciale v obnovno v smislu ohranjanja okolja, ter socialne, duhovne in ekonomske blaginje ljudi.

Prepričevanje, da so onkraj mej sovražniki, je nesramno opravičevanje vojske zaradi drugih državnih interesov. Celo po nekaterih izjavah iz vojaškega vrha je nevarnost od zunaj minimalizirana, kar samo po sebi narekuje takojšnje in drastično zmanjšanje vojaških kapacitet. Za varnost znotraj države je armada odveč. Potrebna pa je vsaka enota denarja in vsaka enota časa in človeških kapacitet, ki se nameni za vojaško-obrambni koncept, medtem, ko propada okolje, ko razpada vrednostni sistem in ko so ljudje iz dneva v dan bolj obubožani.

Na prelomu v novo tisočletje, ob integracijskih procesih v Evropi in ob silnicah k razpuščanju velikih vojaških blokov, predvsem pa na vrhuncu informacijske dobe (ta je med seboj zblížala različnosti sveta, jim omogočila da se med seboj spoznajo, zmešajo in preženejo nezaupanje, strah in odpor), je treba izoblikovati nov koncept varnosti, ki temelji na dejstvu, da je varnost samo varnost vseh ljudi planeta in je ne moremo omejiti na varnost državljanov posamične države. Z ekološko ogroženostjo planeta in z nepredstavljivim arzenalom nakopičenega kemičnega, jedrskega in biološkega orožja, je ogroženost ljudi predominantno univerzalna, zaradi česar varnosti ljudem posamična država tudi teoretično ne more zagotoviti - ne z vojsko in ne brez nje. Kakšen je odgovor na vprašanje: Ali je tveganje za uničenje naše dežele večje, če imamo vojsko ali če je nimamo? V primeru, da se vojska kakor koli uporabi, je uničenje gotovo, zato je treba storiti vse, da se odpravi in zdravi razloge, ki utegnili voditi v vojno, tako, da si na vsakem koraku in v vsaki točki prizadevamo za dobre odnose z drugimi narodi, za ekološko, ekonomsko, socialno in duhovno varnost državljanov in za spoštovanje človekovih pravic. Za doseg te ciljev pa je demilitarizacija nujna, saj resnična (zunanja in notranja) mirovna politika izključuje proizvodnjo in izvoz orožja in neprestano grožnjo svojemu prebivalstvu, da bo armada držala v deželi red in mir.

## VII. Naj bo razprava strpna in razumna

Politične in državne organizacije ter javnost pozivamo, da pobudo sprejmejo z vso resnostjo, pozornostjo in brez predsodkov ali odvečnega mistificiranja. Do demilitarizacije in potrebe po konverziji bo slej ko prej prišlo in na ta korak se je treba dobro pripraviti. Pobudo naslavljamo na Skupščino SRS kot najvišji državni organ, ki naj jo podrobno in do kraja preuči, kljub temu, da se bo ob svojem delu gotovo večkrat srečala z navidez nepremostljivimi ovirami. Naj bo razprava strpna, razumna, strokovna in dobro argumentirana. Da bi se izognili izgubljanju časa z razpravo o klasičnih očitkih, ki bi želeli zaustaviti pobudo, je treba nekaj najbolj pogostih navesti in demistificirati že na samem začetku.

VII.1. Pravična vojna: vprašanje, katera vojna je pravična, za koga je pravična in po kakšnih kriterijih, je staro, sila relativno (in odgovor za eno stranko vedno krivičen), predvsem pa je to vprašanje, ki gradi na stari paradigmati, ne da bi problematiziralo obstoj vojne. Včasih so se med seboj bojevali (in umirali) v glavnem vojščaki, danes so žrtve večinoma nedolžni in posredno vpleteni prebivalci. Danes je vprašanje "ali je kaka vojna pravična ali ne" (saj je vsaka pogubna, prebivalci pa na nobeno nimajo vpliva), treba nadomestiti z vprašanjem "kako se vsakršni vojni izogniti".

VII.2. Utopija: v naprej je treba zavrniti manipulativna mnenja, ki bi pobudo vrednotila kot nerealno in utopično. To,



da pobuda marsikomu ne bo po volji, še ne pomeni, da je utopična in nerealna. Nasprotno pa prav gotovo velja da je utopijska, da bodo ljudje živeli kaj bolje, če pride do oborožene vojne, pa četudi v njej "zmagajo". Za to je v zgodovini kup dokazov.

VII.3. Tuja ideja, "specifičnost" naše dežele, protiuustavnost: očitek, da je ideja prenešana iz inozemstva je brez vsakršne teže. Vse ideje so na voljo vsem ljudem in nihče si jih ne more ne lasiti ali jih prepovedati. Ideja o demilitarizaciji je seveda planetarna in se v različnih oblikah in časih vedno znova pojavlja v različnih okoljih. Prav tako je odveč ponavljati, da je Jugoslavija nekaj posebnega in da se naj ne bi razorožila zaradi svojega specifičnega strateškega in političnega položaja. Specifične so vse dežele, ene tako, druge drugače. Težiti je treba k pozitivnim specifičnostim; če je treba tudi tistim, za katere je treba spremeniti ustavo. Konec koncev so zakoni narejeni za to, da se jih menja.

VII.4. Nepomembnost Slovenije: ravno male države so tiste, ki lahko in ki morajo demilitarizacijo izpeljati najprej, zato je sodba, da bi zaradi majhnosti Slovenije demilitarizacija le te ne pomenila prispevka k miru v svetu, preveč zanemarljiva. Podobno je treba zavrniti politikantski očitek, češ, da Slovenija tako in tako nikogar ne ogroža in da se ji potemtakem tudi razorožiti ni treba. Razoroži se lahko prav zato, ker je miroljubna, ker nikogar ne ogroža in ker je sposobna z vsemi skleniti mir. Še tako majhna demilitarizirana točka na planetu ima neprecenljiv energetski pomen za planetarni proces demilitarizacije.

VII.5. Pomembnost Jugoslavije: naprej je zavrniti tudi poizkus onemogočanja pobude zaradi umeščenosti Slovenije v SFRJ, saj menimo, da je Slovenija dovolj avtentična enota, da zmore izoblikovati konsenz; vprašanje preseganja vojaških vzorcev v tej republiki pa je bilo v zadnjih letih že tako razdelano, da se je moč o naslovni temi z dodatnimi argumenti mimo in pretehtano odločati. Iskanje konsenza na zveznem nivoju je dandanes tako ali drugače nemogoče tudi za precej bolj preprosta in parcialna vprašanja. Izgovarjati se na kompliciranost odnosov v federaciji bi bilo preprosto izogibanje pobudi in vzdrževanje STATUSA QUO. Ureditev odnosov s federacijo mora biti mogoče, predvsem pa je treba imeti pred očmi dejstvo, da je projekt demilitarizirane Slovenije primarno internacionalnega in ne federalnega značaja.

VII.6. Varnost Evrope: pri tem ko se Evropa združuje, in ob dejstvu nakopičenega arzenala nekonvencionalnega orožja in ostalih borilnih metod (zlasti ekonomsko bojevanje), ni moč več razmišljati v jeziku nevarnosti pred konvencionalnim orožjem. Možnosti za konflikt z konvencionalnim orožjem se ne da več sprejeti kot argument za obstoj ekološko, finančno, prostorsko itd. tako požrešnega ustroja, kot je militarizacija. Menimo, da bi bilo možno z vsemi sosedskimi narodi, zlasti pa z neposrednimi sosedi italijani, avstrijci, madžari in hrvati, skleniti pogodbo o nenapadanju in si z mednarodnimi akti zagotoviti status mirovne in demilitarizirane cone. Slovenija je na meji med Vzhodom in Zahodom, na meji med severom in Jugom, med razvitim in tretjim svetom. Kot križiščna točka bi s cono miru predstavljala stabilizacijski in odpirajoči faktor in bi lahko odigrala veliko vlogo za procese integracije Evrope. Ob tem bi se razrahljalo tudi rigidno strukturo znotraj SFRJ, kar bi dajal večjo možnost za stapljanje celotne Jugoslavije z Evropo.

VII.7. Ne-varnost znotraj: zavajajo tudi strahovi, da bi demilitarizirana cona vodila k policijski državi na eni strani ali k terorizmu na drugi. Vprašanje notranjega miru in reda je tudi po sedaj veljavni ustavi zunaj pristojnosti armade in se ga da reševati z zagotavljanjem in uveljavljanjem elementov pravne države in zagotavljanja človekovih pravic.

## Zakaj predstavljamo pobudo na mladinskem kongresu

Pobuda je namenjena v obravnavo vsem državljanom in vsem političnim organom. Na mladinskem kongresu jo sprožamo simbolično, saj je sodelovanje v vojski predvsem frustracija mladine. Naravnost katastrofalna škoda je, da vsaka mlada generacija celo leto porabi v šolanju za destrukcijo, namesto da bi se šolala in delovala za oživljanje planeta, ko je potrebno radikalne sanacije kmetijstvo, infrastruktura, industrija, drobno gospodarstvo, tehnologija, socialne službe itd.. Menimo tudi, da so ljudje prav zaradi dogajanj v SFRJ v letošnjem letu spoznali absurdnost armade, saj so primeri Kitajske, Češkoslovaške in SFRJ (Slovenije in Kosova) pokazali, da je vojska na prelomu v naslednje tisočletje namenjena izključno notranji kontroli.

### 25. november - vojska v Švici pod vprašajem

Ne nazadnje želimo s pobudo izraziti popolno podporo in identifikacijo z ostalimi skupinami državljanov v svetu, ki si prav tako prizadevajo za popolno demilitarizacijo posameznih dežel, predvsem pa želimo prispevati spodbudno energijo državljanom Švice, ki se po nekaj letih trajajoči kampaniji 25. novembra letos na referendumu odločajo o odpravljanju vojske v Švici in o transformaciji v mirovno politiko Švice na vseh ravneh.

Seveda ni mogoče pričakovati, da bo referendum v Švici uspel. Po dosedanjih ocenah pričakujejo 30% glasov za ukinitve vojske. In to je uspeh, saj je poleg Švedske pred dobrim desetletjem, to prvi takšen poskus v Evropi. V prihodnosti je moč pričakovati precej boljše rezultate, saj se skupine za popolno demilitarizacijo ustanavljajo v vse večih državah.



## Nadstrankarska pobuda

### NADSTRANKARSKA POBUDA

- državljanom in državljanke Republike Slovenije
- skupščini Republike Slovenije
- strankam, združenjem in listam v Republiki Sloveniji

## ZA DEMILITARIZIRANO SLOVENIJO - ZA POLITIKO MIRU

### Državna suverenost

Izhajamo iz ugotovitve, da o nujnosti suverene slovenske države, vlada v naši družbi politični konsenz, in da se je mogoče za suvereno slovensko državo v najkrajšem času tudi pravno formalno in politično avtoritativno odločiti. Ker je suverena le tista država, ki ima monopol nad sredstvi nasilja, bo vzpostavitev suverene slovenske države terjala tudi ponovno opredelitev politike nacionalne varnosti in - ožje - položaja JLA. Ker je JLA vojska, nad katero Republika Slovenija po definiciji ne more imeti "zadnje in absolutne oblasti", slovenska država ne bo suverena, dokler bo ta vojska na njenem ozemlju. Vzpostavljanje suverene slovenske države nujno terja umik JLA z ozemlja Republike Slovenije, ne glede na to, ali bo Republika Slovenija obstajala kot suverena država v okviru jugoslovanske konfederacije ali zunaj nje.

### Politika miru

Umik JLA z ozemlja Republike Slovenije poteka na podlagi nove politike nacionalne varnosti, ki jo takoj po volitvah opredeli in uzakoni slovenska država (nova ustava ali ustrezna ustavna dopolnila; novi zakon o nacionalni varnosti). Pri teh pogojih obstaja realna možnost, da v Sloveniji odpravimo vojsko. Najboljša varnostna politika je tista, ki zagotavlja mir, tega pa ni mogoče graditi na vojaški sili, temveč le s politiko miru. Najzanesljivejša varnostna politika je mirovna politika. Mirovna politika je zaradi demokratičnih sprememb v srednji Evropi, evropskega povezovanja in popuščanja mednarodne napetosti na eni strani in zaradi demokratičnih sprememb v Sloveniji na drugi končno postala realna politika. Republika Slovenija za svojo varnost ne potrebuje vojske. Misliti, da vojska v srednji Evropi lahko zagotavlja varnost je iluzija; nasprotno, njen obstoj kvečjemu vzdržuje in spodbuja potencialne konflikte, gospodarstvu in okolju pa začrtuje smernice, ki v vsakem primeru vodijo k velikim stroškovnim in energetskim izgubam. S pobudo za Slovenijo brez vojske in brez vojaške industrije bi pomembno prispevali k varnosti in sodelovanju ter uveljavljanju novih oblik miroljubnega sožitja v srednji Evropi in širše. Hkrati bi se Slovenija z odločitvijo za politiko miru in popolno odpravo vojaškega aparata svetu predstavila kot država, ki goji kozmopolitsko razumevanje miru v svetu, miru, ki ga ni mogoče doseči z zapiranjem v nacionalne vojaško-obrambne koncepte.

## Umik JLA - prehodno obdobje

Sklep o umiku JLA z ozemlja Republike Slovenije na podlagi načrtane politike miru brez odlašanja sprejme slovenski parlament. Ker gre za kočljivo zadevo, jo je treba izpeljati postopoma, da bi se izognili nepotrebnim pretresom, in ob polnem posluhu za interese vseh prizadetih strani. Zato predlagamo, da takoj ko si Republika Slovenija zagotovi status suverene države:

- s svojo pobudo seznaniti sosednje države in stopiti z njimi v pogajanja o oblikovanju demilitariziranega področja (v tem okviru se pogaja tudi z Jugoslavijo);
- s svojo pobudo seznaniti ustrezna mednarodna telesa, zlasti OZN, Evropsko konferenco o varnosti in sodelovanju in Evropski svet in jih zaprosi za strokovno pomoč in sodelovanje;
- izpelje umik JLA z ozemlja Republike Slovenije pod mednarodnim nadzorom, če pa bi bilo potrebno, naj za varnost v prehodnem obdobju skrbijo mirovne enote OZN.

V prehodnem obdobju, ki naj ne bo daljše od 5 let, je treba sprejeti konkretne ukrepe, ki bodo zanesljivo in neboleče peljali k zastavljenemu cilju. Skupščina Republike Slovenije naj takoj, ko bo sklicana, sprejme sveženj ukrepov in naloži ustreznim državnim telesom njihovo izvajanje. Med temi ukrepi, ki bodo veljali za vse državljane in državljanke Republike Slovenije oziroma na ozemlju Republike Slovenije, morajo biti:

- Republika Slovenija ustanovi mirovno ministrstvo. V prehodnem obdobju do odprave vojske je obrambni minister civilna oseba. Vojsko je treba nemudoma depolitizirati.
- Razpustijo se vsi komiteji za SLO in DS.
- Republika Slovenija podpiše in zagotovi spoštovanje mednarodnih paktov in konvencij v zvezi z varnostjo in razorožitvijo.
- Republika Slovenija ustanovi mirovno univerzo s študiji preusmeritve vojaške industrije v civilne namene (konverzije), nenasilnega razreševanja konfliktov in mirovne vzgoje.
- S pomočjo mednarodnih strokovnjakov se ustanovi inštitut za nenasilno razreševanje konfliktov in nemudoma prične z izdelavo analiz o možnih konfliktih v Sloveniji, Jugoslaviji in širše.
- Pripoznanje ugovora vesti in namesto vojaščine uzakonitev civilne službe, ki ne sme biti daljša od služenja vojske in mora biti pod nadzorom civilnih ustanov.
- Državljan Republike Slovenije naj služijo vojaški rok na ozemlju Republike Slovenije. Državljan Republike Slovenije, ki trenutno služijo vojaški rok v enotah JLA zunaj Slovenije, naj se prerazporedijo v enote v Sloveniji. Poveljevalni jezik je slovenščina (na ozemlju nacionalnih manjšin pa tudi italijanščina in madžarščina).
- Internacionalizacija vseh konfliktnih žarišč v Jugoslaviji.

zadevnimi (ustava in vsi podzakonski akti, tako republiški kot zvezni). I.7. Studija koncepta SLO in DS in analiza vseh tistih točk, ki dovoljujejo militarizacijo.

**Vspodbujamo vse stranke, združenja in liste v Republiki Sloveniji, da podprejo to pobudo in jo vključijo v svoje programe.**

Ljubljana, 22. marca 1990.

Marko Hren, Vlasta Jalušič, Zoja Skušek (Neodvisna lista novih družbenih gibanj),  
Janez Janša (Slovenska Demokratska Zveza),  
Peter Jamnikar (Zeleni Slovenije)  
Tomaž Mastnak (Svet Gibanja za kulturo miru in nenasilja),  
Jožef Školč, Jaša Zlobec, Janez Sodržnik (ZSMS - liberalna stranka)

**Javna predstavitev pobude bo v sredo, 28. marca 1990 v  
Okrogli dvorani Cankarjevega doma v Ljubljani.**





## Pismo političnim akterjem

### **Gibanje za kulturo miru in nenasilja**

*Delovna skupina za mirovna gibanja pri RK ZSMS, Dalmatinova 4, 61000 Ljubljana,  
Sekcija za kulturo miru, Kersnikova 4, 61000 Ljubljana.*

*Domači in mednarodni javnosti,  
Predsedstvu SR Slovenije, Skupščini SR Slovenije,  
Zelenim Slovenije, Meščanski zvezi zelenih, Slovenski  
kmečki zvezi, Zvezi slovenske kmečke mladine,  
Slovenski demokratični zvezi, Slovenski social  
demokratični zvezi, Krščanskemu socialnemu gibanju,  
Zvezi komunistov Slovenije, Socialistični zvezi  
delovnega ljudstva, Zvezi borcev, ZSMS, Medškofijski  
komisiji Pravičnost in mir, Univerzi v Ljubljani in  
Mariboru, Teološki fakulteti., Centru klubov OZN v  
Sloveniji, Novi Reviji, Društvu slovenskih pisateljev.*

*Ljubljana, 15.11.1989*

## **SLOVENIJA - DEMILITARIZIRANA DEŽELA**

Ob kongresu ZSMS v Portorožu je Gibanje za kulturo miru in nenasilja predstavilo pobudo Slovenija - demilitarizirana dežela. Kongres je v zvezi s pobudo sprejel tri sklepe:

1. da se bo ZSMS zavzemala za konkretizacijo projekta Slovenija - demilitarizirana dežela,
2. da si bo ZSMS v smislu pripravljalne faze preučevanja področij, posledic in potrebnih stopenj demilitarizacije Slovenije prizadevala, da se v skupščini SRS osnuje komisija za ugotavljanje področij in posledic militariziranosti Slovenije.
3. da si bo ZSMS prizadevala za podporo in implementacijo projekta Madžarske vlade (za demilitarizacijo obmejnih območij) pri slovenski in jugoslovanski vladi.

Projekt Slovenija - demilitarizirana dežela se je javnosti predstavil in dobil prvo politično potrditev in legitimnost. Odveč je poudarjati, kako ambiciozen je projekt, saj se dotika praktično vsake pore življenja - od vezanosti industrije na vojsko, do konceptov izobraževanja, pravnega sistema in do mednarodnih odnosov. Zato je pobuda tudi naslovljena vsem prebivalcem in prebivalkam Slovenije in vsem telesom, ki državljane in državljanke v tej ali oni obliki združujejo. Demilitarizacija neke dežele je lahko samo mednarodni projekt, zato je informacija naslovljena tudi gibanjem, nevladnim in vladnim organizacijam ter medijem onkraj meja Slovenije, zlasti na Hrvaškem, v Madžarski, Avstriji in Italiji, in seveda v Švico, kjer 25. in 26. novembra poteka referendum o ukinitvi vojske v tej deželi.

Procesi integracije v Evropi in reformni procesi v vzhodni Evropi bodo povzročili - za marsikoga v tem trenutku iluzorne in nepredstavljljive - procese. Zbliževanje doslej umetno razdvojenega sveta bo vodilo med drugim k drastični demilitarizaciji in razorožitvi. Na tako obsežen in globalen projekt kot je demilitarizacija, se je potrebno dobro in čimpreje pripraviti, saj bo to projekt, ki bo reševal življenje marsikateri ekonomiji. Ravno zaradi slednjega, naj na koncu tega dopisa ponovno poudarimo, da je naš osnovni namen vspodbuditi strokovno razpravo in raziskavo o področjih, ki jih bo potrebno upoštevati pri

procesu razorožitve, demilitarizacije in prehoda na politiko miru, sodelovanja in globalne varnosti. Bistvo projekta je prilagajanje koncepta in razumevanja varnosti, ki je doslej temeljil na sliki sovražnikov onkraj mej in se je udeleževal v pripravi na oboroženi boj, na nove okoliščine, na nove odnose med prebivalci planeta in na nove (ekološke, ekonomske, socialne in vojne) nevarnosti, ki človeštvo ogrožajo. Da bi se izognili pogostemu (ne)razumevanju demilitarizacije kot konfrontacije vojski, apeliramo na duhovno razumevanje zgoraj zapisanega bistva.


Prilagam vam besedilo pobude Slovenija - demilitarizirana dežela, kot je bilo predstavljeno na kongresu ZSMS v Portorožu, ter vas vabimo da:

- s projektom seznanite svoje sodelavce oziroma članstvo, ter projekt v skladu z vašo notranjo dinamiko obravnavate;
- s projektom seznanite mednarodno javnost na ravni, na kateri imate možnosti;
- prispevate dodatna mnenja, predloge in refleksije, da odprete vprašanja, ki smo jih v dokumentu Slovenija - demilitarizirana dežela spregledali in da nam jih posredujete;
- da prispevate podrobne razprave zlasti na vašem področju (na primer Zeleni o demilitarizaciji in ekologiji, klubi OZN o demilitariziranih območjih v mednarodnem pravu, itd..)
- da se zavzimate za uresničitev prvega dela projekta in sicer:
  - da se v skupščini SRS osnuje komisija, ki bo odgovorila na vprašanje, koliko, na katerih mestih in kako se je dejstvo, da vojska obstaja (in vse, kar jo spremlja) vlezlo v naše življenje. Skupščinska komisija naj odgovori na vprašanje: "O čem se je potrebno pogovarjati, ko se pogovarjamo o demilitarizaciji in razorožitvi." Skupščinski komisiji naj se določi rok, ki ne bo daljši od dveh let. (Glej priloženo gradivo.)
  - da se podpre predlog madžarske vlade (ki ga je že podprla tudi avstrijska vlada, in o katerem so zunanji ministri Avstrije, Madžarske, Italije in Jugoslavije med drugim razpravljali minule dni v Budimpešti) za demilitarizacijo obmejnega področja med Avstrijo, Madžarsko in Slovenijo.
- da javno izrazite vspodbudo državljanom in državljanke Švice, ko se bodo 25. in 26. novembra na referendumu odločali/ odločale o ukinitvi vojske v Švici.

Veseli bomo vsakega prispevka, predvsem pa vsakršnega glasu dobre volje.

*Želimo vam radostno delo in vas pozdravljamo,  
za Gibanje za kulturo miru in nenasilja*

Marko Hren





## Tanke v kotalke

— Kako je nastala pobuda za Slovenijo brez tankov, pušk in bajonetov? So ji botrovale tudi izkušnje, na primer hapoved švicarskega referenduma?

«Razmišljanje o demilitarizaciji seveda ni novo, vezano na lokalno območje, ampak je univerzalno. Mirovna gibanja v svetu so šla skozi različne valove svojega delovanja in prišla v novih razmerah do faze, ko se je veliko število ljudi osvobodilo miselnih vzorcev, ki vsebujejo brezpogojen obstoj vojske. Ljudje so začeli problematizirati obstoj vojske nasploh. Če so prej uveljavljali pravico do ugovora vesti zoper sodelovanje v vojski, če so zagovarjali politiko postopnih, majhnih korakov (umaknitev jedrskih raket, delno zmanjševanje vojaških kapacitet ipd.), so zadnja leta začeli razmišljati o tem, ali je vojska sploh potrebna. Ne torej koliko vojske, kako in kakšna vojska, ampak, ali v današnjih razmerah v Evropi vojska res služi tistemu namenu, zaradi katerega opravičujejo njen obstoj. Vprašanja se usmerjajo v to, ali zunanji sovražniki res obstajajo, ali nas res ogroža tisto, pred čimer naj bi nas vojska branila.»



Marko Hren: »Tako kot štorolja ne prinaša otrok, tudi vojska ne varuje...«

## MARKO HREN, MIROVNIK — O SLOVENIJI BREZ PUŠK IN BAJONETOV

lo eno referendumskih gesel v Švici.

Sicer pa tudi po sedaj veljavni jugoslovanski ustavi vojska nima kompetenc za reševanje notranjih zadev, tako da je tudi s tega vidika razprava o njeni notranji vlogi nekonsistentna. Vojska seveda obstaja zaradi notranjih razlogov, to je okultna resnica. V vseh državah funkcionira vojska kot zavarovanje države navznoter, kot inkarnirani kontrolni mehanizem, ki se opravičuje s kriznimi situacijami, ki jih producira.»

### O MILIHOLIKIH IN ZDRAVLJENJU

— Pobuda za demilitarizirano Slovenijo je v paketu pobud za portoroškega kongresa že opotovala v slovensko skupščino. Najbrž si ne delate utvar, da se bo izognila očitkom, kakršnih so bila doslej deležna celo manj

# TANKE V KOTALKE, OFICIRJE V PASTIRJE...

— Kako bi komentirali sodanje spremembe v Vzhodni Evropi? Obstaja teza, da je porušeno medbolkovsko ravnotežje lahko nevarno za mir.

«Te nove razmere predvsem govornijo o tem, da obstaja v Evropi določen entuziazem, volja ljudi za spremembe. Seveda je mogoče razmišljati v obeh smereh: da te spremembe stabilizirajo in da destabilizirajo; toda pri tem je treba locirati področje, na katerem stabilizirajo, in področje, na katerem destabilizirajo. Stabilizirajo na področju komunikacij; komunikacija med državami, narodi, prebivalci je bolj odprta, zdaj se je možno spoznavati, se učiti drug od drugega. Po tej plati se stvar politično in vojaško stabilizira, ker obstaja možnost za soočanje, obstaja tudi možnost za harmonizacijo. Destabilizacija pa velja predvsem za ekonomske paradigme. Tipičen primer je Zahodna Nemčija, kjer bo prišlo v prehodnem obdobju do popolnih sprememb, do radikalne destabilizacije na ekonomskem področju. Toda na to je treba gledati kot na dvojice ločenih področij, ne pa zaradi enega od njih opravičevati obstoj vojske. Sodim, da je s temi novimi procesi v Evropi vojaška ogroženost še bolj minimalizirana, še več: reformni procesi v Vzhodni Evropi so eden ključnih faktorjev za bolj harmonično integracijo Evrope.»

— Kaj pa Jugoslavija in njeni notranji spopadi? Nekateri pravijo, da gre prav vojski za slabo, da se tehničarji (še) ni naglana na nepravilno, lahko ji rečemo mitingarsko stran.

«Logike, ki izhaja iz militantnih

... karavle turistom, topove v zvonove, Slovenijo Evropi. To je eno od gesel pobude za Slovenijo brez vojske in vojaške Industrije. Pod naslovom »Slovenija — demilitarizirana dežela« je prišla iz vrst ljubljanskih mirovnikov, dodatno legitimizirano pa ji je dalo sprejetje na portoroškem kongresu ZSMS. Marko Hren, mirovnik, ki je pobudo v Portorožu predstavil, se je prejšnji teden vrnil iz Švice. Tam so 25. novembra po nekaj let trajajoči kampanji državljani na referendumu povedali, kaj si mislijo o (ne)potrebnosti vojske. Rezultat je presenetil obe strani, zagovornike in nasprotnike demilitarizacije: odstotek tistih, ki so se izrekli proti obstoju vojske, je bil namreč nepričakovano visok (več kot tretjina volivcev). To seveda pomeni — po izjavi švicarskega obrambnega ministra —, da bo treba v takšnem obrambnem sistemu marsikaj spremeniti.

Oboje — pobuda, ki jo je posvojil ZSMS, in švicarski referendum, ki je šel v tej jugoblastnici kar nekako mimo nas — je bilo povod za tale pogovor. Z Markom Hrenom sva se o viziji Slovenije, demilitarizirane dežele pogovarjala minuli četrtek sredi Ljubljane v znamenju izrednega stanja, omrtvele spriče mitingarskih napovedi; in to neskladje med vizijo in okoliščinami je bilo samo še dodaten argument za intervju.

struktur, ne bom komentiral. Na vsi stvari je treba pogledati drugače, zelo pragmatično: vprašanje, ki se zastavlja, je, kaj nas ogroža in ali za to potrebujemo vojsko. Treba je redefinirati koncept in kontekst varnosti. Mislim, da ni treba komentirati, kaj vse je v Jugoslaviji narobe, in povsem zavajajoče in nedopustno bi bilo polagati rešitve v roke JLA. Vojska

v vseh primerih ohranja pozicijo status quo; je skratka primitivna institucija, ki se vleče iz zgodovine kot hipoteka in kot miselni vzorec. Pri celotnem prizadevanju za njeno ukinitje gre za osvoboditev od miselnega vzorca, ki vzpostavlja vojsko kot rešiteljico in ki si slika sovražnike onkraj mej. Tako kot štorolja ne prinaša otrok, tudi vojska ne varuje, je bi-

radikalna mirovniška prizadevanja, češ, da gre za lopo, a nerealne, utopične želje.

«Predvsem se je treba zavedati, da je med utopijo in realnostjo samo en korak, listi korak, ko se človek osvobodi miselnega vzorca, da je določen cilj utopija. Ljubiti svojega bližnjega je na primer tudi utopija, pa vendar je mnogo ljudi prestopilo to mejo. Gre skratka za to, da ustvarimo razmere, v katerih bo razmišljanje o sovražnikih preseženo. Komunikacijska doba je omogočila, da so se različnosti začele spoznavati in si podajati roko. Ta komunikacija lahko vzpostavi pogoje za to, da se človeštvo osvobodí miselnih vzorcev o sovražnikih, inkarniranih v drugih ljudeh. Zato je lahko prišlo tudi do tega fenomenalnega zgodovinskega dogodka, da je več kot ena tretjina državljanov Švice — ki so bili edini na svetu doslej povprašani o tem, ali mislijo, da je vojska potrebna — odgovorila, da vojske ne potrebujejo. S tem so v bistvu simbolično za vse človeštvo prebili zid med utopijo in realnostjo, načeli membrano, ki omejuje človeški um.»

— Ta zgodovinski referendum, ki mu je bilo v naših javnih medijih posvečeno veliko premalo pozornosti, ste doživljali na kraju samem, zato bi vas prosila, da o njem poveste kaj več.

«Medtem ko se drugod vztrajno govori o demilitarizaciji, so se Švicarji temu izognili, češ, mi hočemo državljanje samo vprašati, ali imajo vojsko za potrebno, kako se bo vojska uknila, pa je njena stvar in stvar obrambnega ministrstva. Vojski so dali deset let časa, da se ukine — z vsem, kar



sodi zraven, od izobraževanja do industrije. Za začetek naj bi prišlo — če bi bila pobuda sprejeta — do ukinitve izobraževanja za vojsko. Argumentacija je bila zelo slikovita, tako je nekdo na vprašanje, postavljeno iz vojske, čes, kako si pa mehanizem ukiniti, odvrnil, da je to enako vprašanje, kot če alkoholik vpraša treznega človeka: »Kako me boste ozdravili?«. Seveda trezen človek odgovori: »Ozdraviti se boš moral sam, s svojo voljo, s koraki, ki jih boš sam izbral...«. Skratka, pobudniki referendumu so zagovornike vojske prikazali kot — če uporabim njihovo oznako — miliholke, zasvojene z vojaštvom, in ti zasvojenosti se bodo morali pač ozdraviti, torej demilitarizirati sami oziroma s pomočjo tistih, ki jih bodo prosili za pomoč.

**— Za ujetnike tega sistema zveni to vaše pripovedovanje kot znanstvena fantastika. Jugoslavija ni Švica in Slovenija, žal, tudi ne.**

»Kulturni, politični in drugi konteksti posameznih držav se med seboj razlikujejo, zato bomo morali idejo, ki je univerzalna, gotovo uveljavljati na avtentičen na-

## REDLOG

»Območje Slovenije je demilitarizirana cona. Slovenija nima vojske in nima vojaške industrije. Na tleh Slovenije se ne more zavezati in ne more trgovati nobena vojaška organizacija. Varnostna politika Slovenije temelji na govanju miroljubnih mednarodnih odnosov, na spoštovanju človekovih pravic in na vzpostavljanju ekoloških, socialnih in duhovnih vrednot.«

»Predlog variante ustavne formule iz pobude Slovenije — demilitarizirana dežela

čin. Razmišljamo o drugih argumentih za ukinitje vojske kot Švicarji, postavljamo druge prioritete, predvsem pa svoje delovanje precej bolj internacionaliziramo. Mislim predvsem na dejstvo, da na ravni meddržavne diplomacije že obstajajo razmišljanja o demilitariziranih conah v obmejnem področju (Avstrija, Madžarska, Jugoslavija).

**— Kakšni so ti vaši argumenti in prioritete?**

»Začniva z razlikami. Prva temeljna razlika v primerjavi s Švico je v tem, da je pri nas vojska brezpogojno zraščena z državo, z državnimi institucijami, s partijo, da je torej vojska politizirana in ideologizirana, politika in ideologija pa sta militarizirani. Ti trije elementi, ideološkost, političnost in vojaškost so medsebojno zraščeni v nespoznavno maso. Ta masa se počasi diferencira — tudi ali predvsem po zaslugi mirovnega gibanja, ki je vsa leta dosledno vztrajalo, da se politično loči od ideološkega in da se oboje loči od vojaškega. Do leta 1979 se je ta troednost političnega, ideološkega in vojaškega simbolično kazala v skupnem voditelju, Tito je bil poglavar partije, vlade in vojske. Po umiku tega simbola so se začeli ti trije sektorji na pritisk civilne družbe ločevati. Ker pri tem še nismo dosegli sklepne faze, je seveda treba najprej spe-

ljiati to ločevanje do konca, da bi do ukinitve vojske kot ločenega segmenta sploh lahko prišlo. To pa seveda pomeni depolitizacijo in dezideologizacijo vojske, torej umik partijskih struktur iz JLA, ukinitve vojaškega sodstva, ki se meša v civilno sodstvo, ukinitve komitejev za SLO, ki so paravojaške institucije. Vse to so elementi, ki so pri nas specifični in ki so s svojo vojaško noto vraščeni v vsako celico našega življenja. Drugo, kar je treba predhodno urediti, je to, da zagotovimo mehanizme, po katerih se bodo narod, državljanke in državljani sploh lahko odločali o tem, ali vojsko potrebujejo ali ne. V Švici je jasno: zbereš sto tisoč podpisov in potem izpelješ referendum. Pri nas se ta zakonik šele vzpostavlja in upam, da drži to, kar sem izvedel pred nekaj dnevi: da je slovenska skupščina sprejela določeno regulacijo, po kateri se lahko izpelje referendum na pobudo baze.«

## NOBENIH REFORM, ZAČINIMO ZNOVA

**— Ali mislite, da bi čez leto ali dve v Sloveniji že lahko prišlo do takšnega referenduma?**

»Čez leto ali dve ne, to je prekratek čas. Referendum je treba dobro pripraviti, zato smo predlagali, naj si politične instance v Sloveniji prizadevajo za ustanovitev skupščinske komisije, ki bo odgovorila na vprašanje, kaj vojska z vsem, kar sodi zraven, sploh pomeni. Šele potem bodo ljudje sploh vedeli, o čem se pogovarjamo. Izvedeli bodo, da se pogovarjamo o toliko in toliko kvadratnih metrih zemlje, ki jo okupira vojska, o toliko in toliko milijonih dolarjev letno, ki jih porabimo za vojsko. Izvedeli bomo, da je toliko in toliko Industrije — in to najbrž tiste najbolj požrešne in onesnaževalske — vezane na vojsko... Skratka, te podatke hočemo imeti, da bomo vedeli, o čem se pogovarjamo.«

**— Govorili ste o depolitizaciji vojske kot osnovnem pogozu za demilitarizacijo. ZSMS je na kongresu v celoti sprejel vašo pobudo za demilitarizirano Slovenijo, nič pa ni rekla o umaknitvi mladinske organizacije iz vojske.**

»Temu se je kongres spretno izognil, ker ZSMS na njem ni hotel prehudo drezati v ta subtilna vprašanja. Je pa predsednik Školč na plenarnem zasedanju dejal, da se iz vseh usmeritev o depolitizaciji vojske samo po sebi razume, da gre tudi za ukinitve oziroma emancipacijo ZSMS od mladinske organizacije v vojski. Zveza pa je to stvar, ki jo ureja zvezna zakonodaja, zato sam kongres ni imel tovrstnih kompetenc.«

**— Saj ravno za to gre, da Slovenijo, dokler je v Jugoslaviji, veže — tudi ko gre za pobudo o demilitarizaciji — toliko ovir.**

»Razmišljati o prostoru, ki je popolnoma razsut, na komponentah te razsutosti, je absurd. Razmišljati o neki svetli zgradbi, postavljeni iz teh odpadnih materialov, na primer o kakršnihkoli reformah v okviru sedanjih političnih konstelacij, je nesmiselno. Strinjam se z Vzhodnimi Nemci, ki pravijo: nobenih reform partije, nobenih reform države, treba je pospraviti in začeti na novo. Na osnovi majavnih starih parametrov ni mogoče dajati argumentov, argumente je treba postavljati, kot da teh ovir ni. Vežejo nas ustava, zakoni, pravimo, ampak zakoni so zato, da se spreminjajo; in če se državljani za določeno stvar odločimo, da je mogoča, mora biti mogoča, pa čeprav bo vse postavila na glavo. Govoril sem že o tem, kako razmišljajo Švicarji — njih ne zanima, kaj bo pomenilo, če bodo vojsko ukinitli, če se državljani odločijo, naj se ukine, se bo pač morala ukiniti. In če se članstvo ZSMS odloči, da se mladinska organizacija znotraj vojaške organizacije ukine, se bo pač morala ukiniti, kakorkoli že.«

## NE VEČ PROSJAČENJE ZA MAJHNE KORAKE

**Imate kakšno konkretno predstavo, v kakšnih fazah bi pri nas demilitarizacijski proces lahko potekal?**

»Nisem zagovornik prerokovanja. Izogniti se je treba presojanju, ali je demilitarizacija možna ali ne, kje so težave, kdo bo reagiral in kako, kajti to neprestano presojanje samo moti razmisleku o vsebini, o ponovnem premisleku o relevantnosti obstoja vojske, o vlogi vojske v planetarnih gibanjih, s kakršnimi se danes srečujemo. To so osnove, na katerih se je treba pogovarjati. Sprožiti ta vprašanja v prostoru in jih ovrednotiti z ljudmi. Vemo, kakšen absurd je obstoj tega velikega požrešnega mehanizma, in mislim, da je to zgodovinska tema na prelomu v novo tisočletje, kajti drastično zmanjševanje vojaškega arzenala bo reševalo ekonomije in dajalo potenco in sredstva za akutno reševanje ekonomske, ekološke, socialne ogroženosti. Slednje so tiste ogroženosti, s katerimi se danes najbolj srečujemo — precej bolj kot pa z vojaško ogroženostjo.«

**— Ampak najbrž je treba ob projektu radikalne demilitarizacije izvajati tudi politične majhne korake, na primer za civilno služenje vojaškega roka?**

»Švicarji pravijo: »Naveličali smo se prosjačiti za majhne korake, za katere vemo, da so kompromis.« Civilna služba je kompromis, ker je naborniška obveznost še vedno vojaški koncept. Sploh se praktično po vsej Evropi v zadnjih letih usmerjajo k popolnemu oporečnosti, ki zavrača tudi civilno službo samo zato, ker je ta v vojaškem konceptu naborništvu. Gre za to, da se osvobodimo vsega, kar je v zvezi z vojsko in kar izvira iz njenega koncepta.«


**— Ali to pomeni, da boste prizadevanje za civilno služenje opustili?**

»Ne bi rad govoril v imenu vse mirovniške skupine, toda atmosfera v Evropi se spreminja, ustvarja se ozračje spodbudnih in entuziastičnih energij, tako da obstajajo pogoji za miselni preboj vzorca o nepotrebnosti obstoja vojske. In ta preboj je prioriteta. Če bo država sklepala kompromise, dajala vmesne rešitve, je to pač stvar politike, njene modrosti, vizionarstva in drugega. Ljudje pa moramo biti predvsem iskreni: povedati moramo, da razumemo vojsko kot institucijo, ki je ne potrebujemo več, in je zato treba pač najučinkoviteje speljati njen umik.«

**— Če vas imajo nekateri od tistih, ki so ujeti v stare oziroma standardne miselnih vzorce, za sanjača, se zdite drugim, ki se nočejo odreči svoji moči, tudi nevarni. Tako je denimo razkrivanje ozadja procesa proti četverici pokazalo, da ste bili poleg Janeza Janše v žarišču zanimanja varnostne službe. Lahko o tem, milo rečeno, sitnostih, poveste kaj več?**

»O sitnostih ni govoriti. To niso parametri v svobodnem razmišljanju in delovanju, zato s tem tudi ne bi obremenjevali brašev. Treba se je osredotočiti na pozitivne projekte in vanje usmerjati energije dobre volje.«

**DARKA ZVONAR**



## Vojska kot podjetje, ki je šlo v stečaj

Intervju za Večer  
Tfx 062-27736, v roke Gregor Preac

Marko Hren, 1. november 1990

### "Vojsko je treba jemati kot podjetje, ki je šlo v stečaj!"

#### 1. Demilitarizirana Slovenija - DA ali NE? Danes, jutri, čez leto ali... Hiteti ali čakati na boljše čase?

Demilitarizacija ni enosmeren proces, temveč najmanj dvosmeren. V eni smeri pomeni odpravljanje vojske, v drugi pa odpravljanje potreb po vojski, oziroma vzpostavljanje kulture miru in politike miru s poudarjeno komponento krepitev zaupanja. Demilitarizacija je pojem, ki ga zaradi različnega pojmovanja militarizacije razlagajo različno. Zato bodimo bolj jasni. Gre nam za ukinitve vojske in vsega, kar obstoj vojske pogojuje, gre nam za vzpostavljanje takih mehanizmov, ki bodo zagotovili varnost brez pretnje z orožjem. Gre nam za tako politiko, ki bo z vzbujanjem zaupanja in z dialogom vzpostavila pogoje za miroljubno sožitje. Gre nam za vzpostavitev take družbe, ki bo odvrnila vsakršne agresivne apetite sosedov. Vpeljali smo kategorijo varnost nad kategorijo obrambe, če pa želimo še globlje pobrskati po temeljih, moramo iskati vzroke, ki vodijo k razmišljanjem o varnosti, in pridemo do kategorije strahu, ki bi morala biti temeljna kategorija razprave o vojski da ali ne. Odpravljamo strah in odprava strahu odpravlja vojsko.

Mnenja sem, da je za odločitev vojska/nevojska najprej potrebno videti, kakšen varnostni sistem je predlagan z vojsko (formacijsko, stroškovno itd.) in kakšen sistem je predlagan brez da bi bila potrebna vojska. Še pred tem pa je potrebna analiza, zoper katere procese potrebujemo varnostni sistem. Noben problem ali sovražnik in nobeni strahovi niso abstraktni. Varnostni sistem se mora opravilchevati s konkretno potrebo. Iz definirane potrebe po ukrepih, ki naj bi zagotovili varnost, se lahko šele vrši diskusija, kakšni naj ti ukrepi bodo, in se lahko vrši argumentacija in odločanje, koliko naj bodo ti ukrepi podprti z vojaškimi in koliko s civilnimi (mirovnimi) elementi. O slovenski vojski je nemogoče odločati, dokler v javnosti ni nobenega podatka o tem, kakšna naj bi ta vojska bila (ofenzivna, defenzivna, kakšna oborožitev, koliko bi to stalo). Prav tako o tem ni moč odločati pod presijo časa in medijskega ter političnega zaostrovanja kot smo jim priča v Jugoslaviji.

Kot kaže, je za dolgoročno demilitarizacijo moč doseči konsenz. In menim, da bi morala nova ustava odsevati to konsenzualno usmeritev. V ustavo je moč zapisati še bolj precizno formulacijo od tiste, ki jo je vlada zapisala v svoj program - njihova formulacija predvideva razvijanje tistih aktivnosti, ki vodijo k pogojem, ob katerih vojske ne bomo potrebovali. Hkrati je v ustavi potrebno pustiti odprte možnosti za koncepte, ki se razvijajo ta čas v Evropi in ki vodijo k internacionalizaciji varnostnih vprašanj (collective security, common house, international prevention of conflicts itd...).

#### 2. Kako si predstavljaš slovenski militarizem (ali je sploh možen), ali se prav zato slovenske vojske bojimo bolj kot JLA?

Menim, da je vprašanje vojska/nevojska temeljno razvojno vprašanje, saj opredeljuje splošno naravnost, ki ji bo država sledila. Vojska je največji porabnik državnega proračuna. Praviloma se vojska postavlja kot prioriteta nad potrebami drugih sektorjev. Z vzpostavljanem vojske ne bo denarja za ekološko, socialno in ekonomsko sanacijo. Ne verjamem, da je moč v obdobju naslednjih petih let pričakovati, da bi proces vzpostavljanja lastne vojske pomenil prihranek v razmerju z zneskom, ki ga republika za vojaške zadeve plačuje sedaj. Vzpostavljanje lastne vojske bi nujno vodilo k totalni predelavi strategije, taktike, oborožitve in formacijske strukturiranosti, kar bi v zagonskem obdobju prvih let bržkone pomenilo kvečemu dodatne stroške. Zato je vojska/nevojska temeljna dilema za razvoj države.

Odločitev o tej dilemi bo vodila k splošni naravnosti v razvoju. Ali bodo kapacitete (kadri, industrija, politična dobra volja) šle v vojaško smer ali pa v civilno. Vprašanje militarizacije je izvedeno iz reševanja te dileme. Če bo prišlo do vzpostavljanja vojske, bo pozornost na tej komponenti in ta pozornost nujno vodi k militarizaciji. Dvo milijonski narod ne more vzpostaviti lastne vojske in se ogniti militarizaciji. Brzostrelki Gorenja bodo hipotetično sledili oklopniki TAMA,



protitankovske rakete Iskre, topovi Litostroja itd. Ministri se bodo ubadali z vojaško strategijo, iskanjem financ za oborožitev, mobiliziranjem prebivalstva... za druge procese pa bo zmanjkalo denarja in dobre volje. Temu smo že priče danes, ko vlada na predloge po mirovnem inštitutu (za raziskovanje konverzije, nenasilnega razreševanja konfliktov itd), izdelavi mirovnega načrta (s svetovanji mednarodnih strokovnjakov za pogajanja itd.) vztrajno odgovarja, da za te reči nima denarja, ministri pa odgovarjajo, da za te stvari nimajo časa (Peterle, Rupel, Janša). Eden bistvenih razlogov, da dajejo take odgovore je, da investirajo v vojaško podprt varnostni sistem.

*3. Janša govori o taki slovenski armadi, ki bi se lahko že naslednji dan sama razpustila, kar niti približno ne velja za JLA?*

Za takšno armado, ki bi se lahko sama razpustila v enem dnevu, ni potrebno definirati armade, temveč začasne varnostne sile (po možnosti z mednarodno prisotnostjo, na vsak način pa z mednarodnimi opazovalci oziroma z mednarodnim nadzorom) za prehodno krizno obdobje. Če mislimo z razpustitvijo vojske resno, je treba jugoslovansko krizno situacijo internacionalizirati. Bolj kot zagotovilo, da se bo slovenska armada nekega dne sama razpustila, je potrebno zagotovilo in so potrebni konkretni načrti za procese, ki bodo vodili k odpravljanju strahov in konfliktnih situacij v tem delu sveta. V te procese pa je potrebno obilno vlagati ves čas in od tega trenutka dalje.

*4. Kdo in kako se bo pravzaprav odkrižal JLA? Bodo oljčne vejice in lepe besede zadostovale za njen umik iz Slovenije?*

Kot kaže, je v republiki konsenz o tem, da bo Slovenija suvereno odločala tudi o varnostnih vprašanjih. V osnutku ustave JLA ne obstaja več. Skupščina si je začrtala pot konstitucionalne ločitve od JLA. Dejanski proces umika JLA (in pristojnosti Beograda iz Slovenije), pa se bo moral odvrteti po dobro pripravljenem scenariju, ki bo rezultat potrpežljivih pogajanj. Mnenja sem, da bi pri teh pogajanjih potrebovali pomoč mednarodnih strokovnjakov (OZN itd.) za pogajanja in mediacije. Češkoslovaška je dala Sovjetski zvezi rok enega leta za umik njenih čet. V kolikor se bo Slovenija na tak ali drugačen način osamosvojila, bo tudi umik pristojnosti Beograda moral potekati po dogovorjenem načrtu in časovnih opredelitvah. Beograda za taka pogajanja ne bo mogla prepričati samo trdna volja Slovenije, temveč predvsem mednarodno javno mnenje, ki bo (če bo) voljo Slovenije podprlo. To pa se bo zgodilo samo če bo Slovenija ponudila programe, ki bodo mednarodno skupnost prepričali, da bo v tem delu sveta mir. S cepljenjem Jugoslavije na več armad pa se mednarodno skupnost od kake podpore samo odvrača. Svetu (Jugoslaviji in širše) je potrebno pokazati obilo dobre volje, da bomo sobivanje na Balkanu reševali na miren način. Slovenija se v svetu ne more afirmirati s svojo vojsko, lahko pa se afirmira s svojo dobro voljo in pripravljenostjo da odigra vlogo iniciatorja nenasilnega razreševanja jugoslovanskega konflikta.

*5. Lastna vojska naj bi bila velik strošek, po besedah vike Potočnik naj bi patronat morala prevzeti OZN. Ne bi imeli predstavniki modrih čelad pravico razmišljati, da je obramba Slovenije tudi zanje prevelik strošek?*

Pri vprašanjih vojne in miru je nemoralno postavljati kot glavni kriterij strošek. Treba je storiti vse za to, da se izvede mirovna prizadevanja, pa naj ta zvenijo še tako utopična. Nobena aktivnost za mir ne more škoditi. Prepričan sem, da na vprašanja varnosti tudi OZN gledajo s podobnega vidika in ne skozi denar. Poleg tega sem mnenja, da še tako obilne mirovne aktivnosti ne morejo preseči stroškov (človeških in materialnih) investiranja v vojsko.

*6. Bi bila takojšnja demilitarizacija voda na mlin generalštabu oziroma militarizmu in unitarizmu?*

Slovenija si ne bi mogla izmisliti učinkovitejšega projekta za decentralizacijo Jugoslavije kot je projekt enostranske razorožitve. Menim, da bi na drugi strani izražena dobra volja slovenske države za izvajanje mirovne politike bistveno vplivala tudi na procese drugod po Jugoslaviji. Energija, ki bi jo sprostila enostranska razorožitev in vztrajanje na politiki miru, bi imela neslutene učinke in bi se gotovo dotaknila tudi generalštaba - bolj kot svetilka na podstrehi kot pa voda na mlin.

*7. Po javnomnenjski anketi SPEMA naj bi kar 47.2 % slovencev (najbrž misliš prebivalcev in prebivalk slovenije, op. M.H.) želelo imeti idejo o demilitarizaciji Slovenije že v novi ustavi, večina*



*ostalih pa se tudi ni izrecno izrekla proti tej ideji, "le počakati bi še morali". Kako si razlagaš te podatke?*

Najbrž dajejo ti podatki celo preveč optimistično sliko. Današnja situacija v Jugoslaviji namreč zbuja precej strahov in ko bi se ljudje dejansko odločali, bi ti strahovi na njihovo odločitav brzkone vplivali tako, da bi se odločili za bolj preverjeno varianto - z vojsko. Zato sem mnenja, da bi morali počakati s samo odločitvijo ne pa z odločitvijo za ukinitve vojske. Počakati vsaj dotlej, da se politiziranje ob volitvah v ostalih delih jugoslavije poleže. Sicer pa ti podatki dajejo garancijo, da so prebivalci in prebivalke Slovenije dovolj osveščeni v smeri nenasilja, da naše sprejmejo odgovornost, ki jih čaka, če se bodo odločili da bodo probleme reševali z dialogom, potrpežljivostjo in zaupanjem.

*8. Kje so pravzaprav korenine ideje o demilitariziranih conah? Se je začelo s hipijevstvom kot reakcijo na hladno vojno?*

Kot pri pojmu demilitarizacija, so tudi pri definiciji pojma demilitarizirana cona velike razlike. Nekateri primeri vpečujejo demilitarizirano cono kot cono brez ofenzivnega orožja, ali kot cono, kjer ni vojaških manevrov itd. Nam gre za vzpostavitev cone brez vojske in z aktivno in globalno politiko miru. V zgodovini je o miroljubnem načinu sobivanja, najsibo v teoriji ali praksi, politično ali filozofsko, cela vrsta primerov, ki segajo tja do sumerske in egipčanske kulture ispred treh tisočletij. Nit miroljubne koeksistence se dandanes med drugim močno izraža v zavračanju sodelovanja v vojski (zavračanja plačevanja vojaških taks, zavračanje služenja v vojaških strukturah) in v kampanjah za ukinitve vojske. Le te niso pogruntavščina sončne strani Alp, obstaja precedan Kosta Rike, obstajajo gibanja za ukinitve vojske v Franciji, Nemčiji in Avstriji, za Švicarje pa je dobro znano, da so lansko leto izvedli referendum o ukinitvi vojske, na katerem je preko 1/3 volivcev izrazila mnenje, da je treba v Švici vojsko odpraviti.

*9. Če bi sprejeli to idejo na referendumu in jo tudi uzakonili, bi to pomenilo tudi ukinitve vojaške industrije?*

Seveda, tista proizvodnja, ki je vezana na vojsko, se bo morala preusmeriti. To za Slovenijo ne bo dodaten problem, saj se njene proizvodnje verige, zlasti tiste, vezane na Jugoslavijo tako ali drugače trgajo. Poleg tega pomeni ukinitve vojske možnost za spremembo namembnosti vseh vojaških kapacitet (kasarn, zemljišč itd.) v civilne namene.

*10. So kakšni podatki, koliko ljudi v Sloveniji živi od TO in JLA, vojaške industrije, izobraževanja, kaj bi morala R Slovenija storiti, da le ti ne bi postali svojevrsten balast ali celo peta kolona?*

Pri skupščini R Slovenije je ustanovljena skupščinska komisija, katere ena od nalog je, da odgovori na prvi del vašega vprašanja. Kar se tiče drugega dela vprašanja pa najprej matematična improvizacija. Za vojaške zadeve (brez vezane proizvodnje) Slovenija plačuje (JLA in TO) cca. 800 milijonov dolarjev. Če bi vsakemu, ki bi zaradi ukinitve vojske izgubil službo, dajali dobro (npr. 8000 \$ letno) socialno podporo, bi lahko samo tako preživelo več kot 100.000 delavcev. Vemo, da je v Sloveniji v bankrotu nekaj sto podjetij in da desetine delavcev na dan izgublja službe. Vojsko je treba jemati kot podjetje, ki je šlo v stečaj, s tem da izjemoma vladi pusti ogromno vrečo denarja in posestev. Mislim, da bo večina tistih, ki so bili doslej vezani na vojsko ali vojaško industrijo srečnih, da bodo imeli priložnost preostali del življenja početi kaj bolj optimističnega. In v tem je tudi odgovor na vaše vprašanje - država bi morala ljudem, ki bodo ostali brez dela, ponuditi človeku prijazne programe, oziroma ljudem pomagati, da izpeljejo lastne iniciative in projekte.

Marko Hren, november 1990

## Mirovna pogodba

### MIROVNA POGODBA

S podpisom te pogodbe se zavezujem:

- 1. da ne bom pod nobenim pogojem sodeloval/a v nobenih oboroženih ali kako drugače nasilnih dejavnostih proti pripadnikom drugih narodov oziroma proti drugim ljudem;*
- 2. da ne bom z ničemer sodeloval/a pri pripravah na kakršnokoli represivno, nasilno ali zatiralsko dejavnost usmerjeno zoper druge ljudi;*
- 3. da se bom v primeru, če me bodo lokalne ali zvezne oblasti prisiljevale v kakršnokoli dejavnost, ki se ji v prvih dveh odstavkih odrekam, brezpogojno uprl/a z nenasilnimi metodami civilne neposlušnosti in državljanske nepokorščine;*
- 4. da si bom v vsakodnevnem življenju prizadeval/a, da se vzdržim v besedah, čustvih in dejanjih kakršnegakoli podpihovanja ali podpiranja sovraštva do pripadnikov drugih narodnosti; s tem v zvezi se odrekam pripovedovanju vicev, splošnih obsodb in presojanj na račun soljudi kot pripadnikov drugih narodov;*
- 5. da bom v vsakdanjem življenju v svojem okolju izrabil/a vsako priložnost za preseganje sovraštva do pripadnikov drugih narodov in da bom sadil/a semena sprave, razumevanja in strpnosti.*

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Sledijo imena, priimki, naslovi ter podpisi /posameznikov, družinskih članov ali članov skupine/, ter datum in kraj podpisa pogodbe.

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5. da bom v vsakdanjem življenju v svojem okolju izrazil/a vsako prihkost za presseganje sovrštva do pripadnikov drugih narodov in da bom sadil/a serzna sprav, razumevanja in strpnosti.

Stedijo imena, priimki, naslovi ter podpisni /posameznikov, družinskih članov ali članov skupine/, ter datum in kraj podpisa pogodbe.

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Vabi:

Od ponedeljka do petka vsak dan od 9.00  
do 13.00 ure

-informacije / Sašo

popoldnevi, od 16.00 do 19.00

tematske delavnice in pogovori

-ponedeljek: mirovni tabor, SOVA -  
Slovenija brez vojske - pogovori; Barbara,  
Malcja;

-torek: mirovna vzgoja in vzgoja za mir od  
vrtca do univerze - konzultacije; Pika, Stojan;

-sreda: mednarodne dejavnosti, SOVA -  
Slovenija brez vojske- pogovori, konzultacije  
za nenasilno razreševanje vsakdanjih  
konfliktov; Marko, Janez-Enzo;

-četrek: ugovor vesti zoper služenje  
vojaštine - vabljeni vsi, ki nočejo imeti  
oprnvka z vojsko, SOVA - Slovenija brez  
vojske - konverzija vojaškega v civilno,  
mirovne pogodbe / Nace, Peter.

Za pogovore in konzultacije se predhodno  
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Ljudem dobre volje

## MIROVNA POGODBA

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61000Ljubljana  
Tel. 061-224666



*Ko je pred kakim letom dni sovražstvo in nestrpnost med narodi v Jugoslaviji doseglo vreliščno točko, smo po državi vsposodnili podpisovanje mirovne pogodbe.*

*Pogodba naj bi služila kot skupinska zaobljuba, ki bi nam vsem viliha medsebojnega zaupanja in vere, da drug drugemu za nobeno ceno ne bojno storili žaloga. V nekaj dneh smo zbrali več kot sto podpisov širom Jugoslavije. Tudi danes bi istemu prostoru še vedno in še bolj koristil glas brezpogojne zaobljube tistih, ki niso izgubili človečnosti v viharjih razplametelega*

*mednacionalnegaovrašiva. Hkrati pa razširjamo podpisovanje mirovnih pogodb tudi na sosedske države: Avstrijo, Italijo in Madžarsko, kar razumemo kot enega od gradnikov pogovjev za vzpostavljanje Slovenije brez vojske, kot cone miru in mirovne ter nenasilne naravnosti. Zato ponovno naslavljamo klic vsem ljudem dobre volje: pridružite se mirovni zaobljubi in sodelujte pri vspostavljanju pogovjev za mir na tem delu sveta.*

*Na tem mestu objavljamo eno možnost vsebine mirovne pogodbe. Mirovna pogodba je za vsakega podpisnika/podpisnico zavezujoča v tem smislu, da naj bi bila podpisnik/ica na vsikernem koraku naraavanja k spoštovanju njene vsebine.*

## Nekaj tehničnih možnosti za podpisovanje in širjenje mirovnih pogodb:

### Tipi mirovnih pogodb:

**1. Individualne pogodbe** - med dvema človekoma različnih narodnosti: lahko skleneta pogodbo z vsebino, ki jo sestavita po svoji vesti in prepričanju ali pa individualno - v paru podpiseta kakšno od že objavljenih variant vsebine;

**2. Družinske pogodbe** - med dvema ali večimi družinami; besedilo sestavijo sami ali pa uporabijo kak poznani vzorec, ki jim ustreza; pogodbo podpiše vsak član družine posebej;

**3. Skupinske pogodbe** - eno besedilo pogodbe sklene skupina ljudi; besedilo sestavijo sami, ali pa uporabijo kak poznani vzorec, ki jim ustreza; pogodbo podpiše vsak član skupine posebej;

### Možnosti za širjenje mirovnih pogodb:

Fotokopije vzorca pogodbe in pričujočega spremnega besedila lahko vsak, ki pogodbo prejme, pošlje po pošti svojim prijateljem in ti storijo enako napreji. Ljudje si lahko izbirajo sami svoje partnerje za podpisovanje pogodb, lahko pa se pridružijo s podpisom na že kako znano kolektivno pogodbo. Na primer na besedilo, ki je objavljeno na tem letaku.

## Mirovne pogodbe imajo dvojni funkcije:

**1.** v prostoru, kjer je komunikacija n pripadniki različnih narodov na vse nivojih še vedno in vse bolj otežer zavira, mirovne pogodbe ustvarjaj negujejo drobne niti energijskega pretoka in sporazumevanja;

**2.** v prostoru, ki ga mediji, politika i ljudje v vsakodnevnih pogovornih napolnjujejo z miselnimi vzorci zaviračanja in obsojanja pripadnikov drugih narodov in narodnosti, mirne pogodbe ustvarjajo in negujejo mis vzorce sprejemanja in razumevanja človečnosti v vsakem od nas.

Zato je velikega pomena, da se mirovne pogodbe pojavijo v javnosti in tako oglašajo odločitve in zaobljubo lji za mirno in razumevajoče komunicir;

Kopijo pogodbe pošljite lokal medijem in na naslov :

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61000 Ljubljana

Gibanje bo poskrbelo za objavo i zagotovilo dodatne informacije.

Pogodbo lahko pošljete tudi svoji prijateljem in znancem.

Besedilo pogodbe je dostopno v slovensk hrvatskem, italianskem, madžarskem, nemšk angleškem, francoskem, srbskem, albanski makedonskem jeziku. Na vašo željo vam ga v poljubnem jeziku z veseljem prevedov.

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NENASILNA AKCIJA

# Poslušajmo svojo vest!

Piše: Marko Hren

## Nenasilna akcija

Zakaj uporabljam besedi »nenasilna akcija« in ne »nenasilni odpor«?

Besedo akcija uporabljam zato, ker je **nenasilje aktivno stanje**, ki zahteva napor na vseh nivojih človekove osebnosti in še več, zahteva napor preseganja človekove osebnosti, tega posameznika, napor zlitja z enim, z nasprotnim polom napor komuniciranja z različnostmi. V slednjem naporu tudi tiči razlog, zakaj ne uporabljam besede odpor. Nenasilna akcija namreč nasprotni pol vključuje, z njim išče sintezo in ne nadvlado ali zmago, nenasilna akcija z različnostjo v prvi komunicira in se ji ne upira.

Akcija sama hkrati pomeni tudi ravnanje, ki je nad reakcijo. Reakcija je ravnanje iz jeze, iz upora ali iz drugih notranjih blokad. Reakcija je ravnanje iz frustracije, je ravnanje iz preteklih, neozdravljenih izkušenj. Akcija je ravnanje, neobremenjeno s preteklostjo, je ravnanje po vesti, ravnanje iz čiste zavesti tega trenutka. Akcija je ravnanje iz ljubezni.

## Nenasilje kot drža

Nenasilna akcija zato po definiciji ne more biti zgolj sredstvo za dosegajo cilja. Nenasilna akcija je izraz stanja zavesti in nenasilje je drža. Ta drža zajema vse nivoje komuniciranja in torej predstavlja nenasilno komunikacijo na vseh nivojih. Od komuniciranja s fizično silo, preko komuniciranja z energijami čustev, do komuniciranja z verbaliziranimi oblikami, mislimi in duhovnimi, transcediranimi energijami. Nenasilje je treba torej v tem kontekstu razumeti precej širše, zgolj »to, da ne vržeš kamna v vojaka«. Zato je lahko resnično nenasilno delovanje samo delovanje človeka, ki ravna s celotno svojo osebnostjo, samostojno, po svoji vesti. Povsem mirno lahko verjamemo, da je ravnanje po vesti vedno nenasilno. Vest je glasnik »Enega z«. Dejanje po vesti je zato vsevključujoče in sprejemljivo. Nenasilje lahko izpelje samo ljudje, ki z njimi ne manipulira nihče drug kot njihova lastna vest. Po drugi strani pa je nenasilje samo tista akcija, ki z nikomer ne manipulira. Gandhi je imel pri svojem razglašanju nenasilja in Satja Grahe (Moč Resnice) uspeh prav zato, ker je imel opravka s civilizacijo, katere religija je intenzivno in enoumno usmerjena k povezovanju človeka z dušo, z imanentnim nivojem bivanja, z Enim. Krščanska religija našega prostora je precej bolj dvoumna, saj je namesto Enosti z Bogom precej bolj manipulativno poudarjala bogaboječnost.

## Nasilnost nenasilne akcije

Vprašanje nasilnosti se v tem primeru zavestno stavlja samo od sebe in upravičeno. Odgovor je iskati v namenu in motivu za akcijo. Če ima še tako nenasilna akcija namen nekoga pre-

magati in mu vsiliti svojo voljo, je namreč lahko zanj nasilna, saj ga negira.

Od tod izhaja osnovna značilnost nenasilne akcije, ki je po svojem bistvu dejanje sinteze, gradnja mostu, komunikacije med različnostmi. Že kar simbol za nenasilno akcijo je postala fotografija ženske, ki ponuja namršenim vojakom cvet. Ženska zato, ker je ženski princip sprejemljivosti, princip matere, ki svojega otroka ljubi in sprejema brezpogojno. Ob nenasilni akciji je zato vedno prisotna pripravljenost na dialog z različnostjo in pripravljenost poslušati. Za nenasilno akcijo je torej bistveno, da ima posameznik ali skupina nasprotni pol za sodelavca. Če ta sodelavec ravna povsem drugače, po povsem drugih vedenjskih vzrocih, to še ni razlog, da bi ga imeli za sovražnika. V logiki dojemanja sveta nastane tu odločilni premik, ki zahteva učenje in sprejemanje različnosti. Zahteva komunikacijo. Za ta premik je potrebno doseči zavest o enakopravnosti, saj lahko pravilno komunicirajo le enakopravni partnerji.

## Nenasilna akcija v primeru Janša-Borštner-Tasić

Dogodke pred in po aretacijah lahko že sedaj uvrstimo med čistejšje oblike nenasilne akcije. In upamo lahko, da bomo preizkušnjo opravili, tako vojska, kot politika, država in ljudje. Preizkušnjo bomo opravili samo, če bodo vsi ti segmenti pripravljeni na spremembe v medsebojnih odnosih. S tem moramo biti vsi pripravljeni na destrukcijo določenih miselnih in vedenjskih vzrocev, ki so vladali do sedaj. Celotna zadeva je režirana tako, da bo uničila in na novo vzpostavila dober del odnosov pri nas. Če bo to pozitivna sprememba ali ne, je odvisno predvsem od nasilnosti v ravnanju vseh udeležencev. Zaenkrat gredo stvari dobro in lahko si posamezne elemente nenasilne akcije, ki so opisani v prvih poglavjih, ogledamo kar po vrsti.

Praktično vsi artikulirani segmenti v Sloveniji so se postavili v stanje aktivnosti. Prvič v življenju mi je bilo dano začutiti, da je CK ZKS nekaj drugega kot predsedstvo SRS in to nekaj drugega kot Skupščina SRS in to nekaj drugega od Komiteja za SLO in DS pri SZDL. Priče smo hkratnemu izražanju cerkve, političnih in državnih organov, kulturnih in intelektualnih krogov, gibanj, društev itd. Večina ravna mirno in z razumom, z argumenti in s pripravljenostjo na dialog.

Zaenkrat najbolj reaktivno so ravnali nekateri predstavniki vojske, posebej Višnjič, Tominc in Brovet. Odnos do teh ljudi bo zato toliko bolj potreben komunikacije. Odbor za varstvo človekovih pravic zaenkrat brez uspeha poizkuša z njimi navezati stike. Z ostalimi slovenskimi državnimi organi je komunikacija vzpostavljena in pri tem je bistveno, da se Odbor obnaša in počuti kot enakopraven partner. Formalna legitimnost Odbora tu sploh ni relevantno vprašanje.

Namen Odbora ni merjenje moči za doseg nekega cilja, temveč v prvi vrsti **zagotoviti komunikacijo, legalnost in pravičnost**

v postopku zoper priprte. Vsega tega je pri nas še kako manjkalo.

Ob delu Odbora se pojavlja vrsta oblik nenasilne akcije. V več krajih imajo molitve in meditacije, pojavljajo se grafiti, publikacije, kulturni dogodki, delavnice, ženske so se sprehajale z otroki pred kasarno itd. Hkrati s tem je bilo v zadnjih dneh več poskusov komunikacije z vojaškimi organi, z namenom, da bi se neposredno razčistili strahovi in jeza, ki vejejo iz izjav vojaških predstavnikov. Tako je Vera Vazzaz s svojim možem nekaj dni prihajala pred kasarno 4. julija s šopkom rož in s povabilom na kosilo za družino generala Višnjiča. Zaenkrat nista dobila odgovora. Uspeh celotne preizkušnje visi ravno na zdravljenju tistih komunikacij, ki so najbolj zavrite. In še bolj kot komunikacija z nekaterimi vojaškimi organi, je zatrta komunikacija s tistimi, za katere nekateri domnevamo, da so vso zadevo zakuhal – s trdodokci stare garde slovenske politike, ki je v zadnjih mesecih poniknila, se upokojila ali kako drugače potihnila. Prepričan sem, da bo tudi ta komunikacija še kako potrebna in to najmanj zaradi dveh razlogov. Prvič zato, ker morajo biti v igri čdrpto prisotni vsi, ki igrajo, in drugič zato, ker le neposredna komunikacija lahko pripelje do sinteze.

## Kaj lahko stori vsak posameznik

Kdor sprejme zgoraj povedano kot svojo resnico, mu bo prav lahko ugotoviti, kako in kaj lahko stori dandanes vsak posameznik v smislu nenasilne akcije. Najpreprosteje rečeno: počutimo se enakopravne z vsakomer, poslušajmo svojo vest in po njej ravnamo. Merilo za razločevanje glasu vesti je zelo enostavno. Glas je jasen in miren, v nas sproži dobro počutje in radost. Po drugi strani pa ga spoznamo po tem, da mu sledi plaz misli in čustev, ki po navadi skušajo upravičiti nasprotno ravnanje. Ko na primer v meni notranji glas pravi, da ni Moja resnica in Moj notranji Prav poslušati ukaz ali poziv nadrejenega (v policiji, vojski ali kjerkoli drugje), se bo takoj za tem sprožil cel plaz misli, ki bodo kalkularale, me plašile, sprožale jezo, strahove itd.

Avtonomni duh in svobodna zavest posameznika se pogosto udejanjata v **državlanski neposlušnosti**, ki jo je razumeti kot brezpogojno poslušnost svoji vesti, pa če je ta še tako navzkriž z državnimi ali kakimi drugimi zakoni. Rekrut naj torej ostane doma, če mu le tako veleva vest, policaj naj sleče uniformo, ko ga naženejo nad demonstrante, oficir ali vojak naj odpove poslušnost nadrejenemu, če ga ta sili proti svojemu narodu, pleskar v komunalnem podjetju naj ne očisti sten z grafiti, s katerih vsebino se strinja, itd.

Možnosti je vse polno, predvsem pa se moramo zavedati moči, ki jih tako pogosto zanemarjamo. **To so moči volje, razuma, srca in duha.** Z njimi lahko komuniciramo in vplivamo na razplet dogodkov pogosto precej bolj učinkovito kot z demonstracijo fizične in emotivne sile. Z drugimi besedami, pošiljajmo tistim s katerim imamo težave, veliko ljubezni, luči in entuziazma.



# Kako zdraviti miliholike

*Švica je edina dežela, v kateri so bili prebivalci postavljeni pred vprašanje, »Ali potrebujemo vojsko«.*

Seveda so tudi največji optimisti prerokovali kvečjemu kakšno četrtno za odpravo vojske, kančke skritih misli na presenečenje pa je sem ter tja komu vlivalo navdušenje nad dogodki v Vzhodni Evropi. Presenečenja – da bi odpravili vojsko namreč – ni bilo, a v enaki meri je presenetil rezultat – več kot tretjina volivcev se je izrekla za popolno ukinitve vojske, v nekaterih okoljih pa je število realutopistov, kot sami pravijo, celo presegllo 50 odstotkov.

Švica med referendumom svojega imidža ni spremenila. Ulice so bile kot vedno umirjene, plakati za in proti odpravi vojske so se po matematični natančnosti razvrščali na za to predpisanih mestih in nasploh ni bilo čutili nobene evforije, ki bi na emocionalen način napovedovala zgodovinski dogodek. Švicarji so pač mentalno polarizirana družina in se še tako kočljive teme lotijo s **preračunljivim** razumom. Humor in radost nad iskrenostjo, s katerima je GSoA – (Grupe Schweiz ohne Arme – Skupina za Švico brez vojske) ohne vodila kampanjo ob referendumu, je bilo čutili le na redkih krajih, kjer so GSoA skupine žurirale ob čakanju na rezultate referenduma. Tisti ali tista, ki se jim je pridružil/a za nekaj dni, je lahko dobil/a občutek, da so vojsko razpustili. Vojakov ni bilo videti nikjer na ulicah in celo kasarne so večji del končale s svojim poletnim programom – in se za zimo zaprle. Glavna fešta GSoA je bila v bivši kasarni v Bazlu, v kateri se danes vrstijo kulturne prireditve, na dan referenduma pa se je prelevila v čebelnjak razigranih in dobrovoljnih, mladih in starih Švicarjev in Švicark, ki bi ob vsej svoji neposrednosti, pisani zimski pleteni garderobi in spricho navidez iracionalne ideje, ob kateri so se družili, marsikomu dali varljiv občutek posthipijevskega žura. Podobno se je godilo tudi osrednji kasarni v Zürichu, katere del danes zaseda policija, drugi del so upravne zgradbe pa muzej, v bivši vojaški konjušnici pa je oštarija za subkulturo ter alter teater.

## Začelo se je z mladimi socialisti

Konec 70 let Švice ni zajel val protijedrskoga mirovnega gibanja in iskali so svoje specifične teme. Prve razprave, ki so problematizirale obstoj vojske, so se odvijale v krogih mladih socialistov v začetku tega desetletja. Tedanji predsednik mladih socialistov **Andreas Gross** je kasneje postal prvi

govorec GSoA gibanja. Leta 1982 se je na sestanku nekje visoko v gorah prvič sestala večja skupina kakih 100 ljudi, med katerimi je bila večina iz vrst mladih socialistov, pridružili pa so se jim tudi iz nekaterih mirovniških, pacifističnih in ženskih skupin. Osnovna tema razprave je bilo vprašanje, ali Švica res potrebuje vojsko, in kaj pravzaprav pomeni mirovna politika. Odločili so, da bodo štartali s kampanjo za referendum, ki je v Švici običajna pot odločanja, za katero obstaja preprosta procedura. Pobudo je treba prijaviti, nato pa v enem letu in pol zbrati nad 100.000 (Švica ima približno 6 milijonov prebivalcev) na občini verificiranih podpisov volivcev (starost nad 20 let). Podpise so začeli zbirati leta 1985, potem ko so stvar kar tri leta pripravljali v bolj ali manj ozkih krogih. Zahtevano število podpisov so zbrali samo v nemško govorečih kantonih. Pobuda francosko govorečega dela Švice v začetku ni prišla in večina to komentira s preprostim dejstvom, da se v francoskem delu pač težko prime nekaj, kar je sproduciral nemški del. Pa vendarle se je na referendumu izkazalo, da sta za ukinitve vojske glasovala samo dva kantona in to oba francoska – Jura in Ženeva. Med zbiranjem podpisov je po eni strani kazalo, da vojska peščice radikalov ne jemlje resno, saj kampanje niso niti komentirali, po drugi strani pa so številni aktivisti SoA imeli težave, nekateri so zaradi aktivizma celo izgubili službo. Iz krogov oblasti je bilo še do nedavnega slišati, da so tisti, ki hočejo razpustiti vojsko, sovražniki države. SoA namerava vse, ki so dajali take pavšalne sodbe, poklicati na odgovornost. Predvsem pa namerava problematizirati celotno strukturo parlamenta. Parlament se mora namreč praviloma o pobudi izraziti pred samim referendumom in rezultat je bil porazen – za odpravo vojske sta v parlamentu glasovala samo 2 poslanci, kar pomeni v parlamentu približno 1 odstotek. SoA to komentira zelo jasno: *»Kakšen parlament je to, če se v primerjavi z ljudsko voljo zmoti za faktor 35?«*

## Oporečniki in ženske

Leta 1984 so v Švici izpeljali referendum o priznavanju ugovora vesti in o civilni službi, ki pa je propadel precej huje kot sedanji referendum za odpravo vojske. **Jürg Pleiss**, eden od najbolj aktivnih oporečnikov osemdesetih let (bil zaprt zaradi zavračanja vojske v letu 1981) in eden prvih aktivistov SoA, komentira preskok v razmišljanju po referendumu 1985 takole: *»Po referendumu leta '84 je veliko ljudi izgubilo potrpljenje in voljo, da bi čakali na civilno službo. Poleg tega je videti, da ne bomo nikoli dobili take alternative vojaški službi, ki bi bila za oporečnike kakorkoli sprejemljiva. Civilna služba, ki jo predlagajo sedaj, je hujša od zaporne kazni. Pobuda SoA je bila za marsikoga odrešujoča. Pred vojsko smo morali oporečniki vedno skrivati prave motive in biti neiskreni. S pobudo SoA smo lahko končno povedali po pravici in pošteno: vojska se nam zdi nepotrebna. Razmišljanje SoA je bilo res osvobajajoče, po vsem utrudljivem prerekanju okrog pravice do ugovora vesti.«* Treba je povedati, da je vsako leto v Švici kakih 500 do 600 oporečnikov, prišteti pa jim je treba še neugotovljivo število tistih, ki

se vojski izognejo na podlagi zdravstvenih razlogov.

Zadnje čase poteka v Švici tudi razprava o mobilizaciji žensk v vojske in paravojaške strukture. To je spodbudilo ženska gibanja, od *Žensk za mir do Katoliških feministk*, da so podprla pobudo SoA, in to z istim argumentom, kot smo ga srečali ob uvajanju obveznega vojaškega usposabljanja za ženske pri nas leta 1985 – vojaška služba za ženske ne pomeni enakosti, temveč prisiljevanje v moški koncept.

V času kampanje za odpravo vojske je skupina SoA izdala več kot ducat knjig, 20 brošur, 33 izdaj časopisa GSoA Zitig (GSoA časopis), sedem video filmov, kup majic in druge garderobe (spodnjice, kravate, spalne srajce), priponek, razglednic, posterjev, balonov, torbic, škatic za vžigalice itd. V dveh letih se je po deželi odprlo 41 pisarn gibanja SoA. Vse dejavnosti SoA so po besedah aktivistov samofinancirane – denar naj bi prihajal izključno iz podpornih prispevkov.

### Vojska – nenasitna krava

Ni naključje, da je glavni simbol kampanje krava, ki z vojaško čelado na glavi zleknjena in nažrta leži na silhueti Švice, v gobcu pa prežvekuje bankovec za 1000 frankov. Večina tistih, ki so volili za odpravo vojske, bi rekla, da je vojsko treba razpustiti zato, ker požre neskončne denarje, ne služi pa prav ničemu.

Če se kdo čudi, zakaj so ravno Švicarji prišli prvi na misel, da ukinejo vojsko, potem je tu del odgovora – zato, ker so znani preračunljivci – nočejo zamuditi niti trenutka v razoroževanju in s tem niti franka, ki bi ga lahko privarčevali. Razorožitev bo gotovo posel naslednjega desetletja in bo reševala marsikatero gospodarstvo. Tiste države, ki si bodo upale verčevati pri vojski, ne tvegajo ničesar, dobijo pa lahko nepredstavljivo veliko.

### Ukinitev vojske – radostno opravilo

Imidž sproščenosti in razigranosti privržencev SoA je razložila dolgoletna aktivistka za pravice žensk in moških in ena prvih akterk dialoga med Vzhodom in Zahodom **Stella Jegher** takole: *»SoA so mladi ljudje, ki se hočejo zabavati in nekaj spremeniti, to niso ljudje, ki bi jim bilo kaj za politiko, to niso ljudje, ki bi se spraševali po tem, ali je odprava vojske racionalna ali ne; čutijo, da so potrebne spremembe, in zato spremembe zahtevajo – pošteno, neposredno in direktno. Kar se tiče sprememb na Vzhodu, se dobro zavedamo, da ni dovolj, da jih podpremo v načelih, treba je vztrajati pri spremembah v razmišljanju povsod.«* Očitno je Evropo preplavilo navdušenje za globalne spremembe, ko se na Vzhodu ne zadovoljijo več s politiko majhnih korakov – zahtevajo globalne reforme, in Švicarji so edini, ki zahtevajo globalne reforme tudi na Zahodu.

Referendum je tako izzvenel predvsem kot zabava – odprave vojske so se lotili z dobro voljo in humorjem, ki sta celotni zadevi narekovala razpoloženje. V pogovorih z drugače mislečimi se govorniki SoA niso pustili zavesti v duhamorno brezkončno pre-

## Slovenija brez vojske

Švicarski projekt ni edini evropski projekt, ki se ukvarja z demilitarizacijo določenega prostora. Podobne stvari so se in se dogajajo v Nemčiji, na Švedskem in celo na Madžarskem. Demilitarizacija je Slovenijo napadla na dveh frontah: prvo so odprli Madžari s svojim predlogom demilitarizacije obmejnih pasov z Jugoslavijo in Avstrijo, druga fronta pa se je odprla v Portorožu, kjer je Gibanje za kulturo miru in nenasilja lansiralo svojo pobudo za demilitarizacijo Slovenije.

Temeljna ideja pobude je naslednja: skupščina Slovenije naj ustanovi samostojno komisijo, ki bo raziskala elemente militariziranosti Slovenije, hkrati pa bo že sama uvajala osnovne elemente demilitarizacije (civilna služba, odprava vojaških sodišč, depolitizacija vojske itd.). Rezultat dela komisije naj bi bila obširna študija, na podlagi katere bi se prebivalci Slovenije odločili, ali bodo vojsko obdržali ali ne. (im)

rekanje. Njihov argument je bil preprost: *»Mi imamo vojsko za odvečno in smo za popolno odpravo – če se bo temu pridružilo dovolj ljudi, potem se boste pač morali ukiniti. Kako boste to storili, je vaš in ne naš problem.«*

Skratka, niso se obremenjevali z iskanjem pametnih odgovorov na provokativna vprašanja, ki so na vsak način hotela zagovornike SoA spraviti v zadrego (na primer vprašanje, kako si konkretno predstavljajo razpustitev tako glomaznega aparata kot je vojska). **Andreas Gross**, eden govorcev SoA, je v televizijski oddaji po končanem referendumu, ko so ga soočili v dialogu s predstavnikom obrambnega ministrstva, dejal: *»Zagovorniki vojske ste miliholiki, kar je podobno kot alkoholiki, le da ste zasvojeni z vojsko. Da se alkoholik ozdravi, se mora njegovo okolje odločiti, da ga pošlje v zdravišnice – in okolja ne zanima več, kako in na kakšen način se bo tam pozdravil. Važno je, da se vrne ozdravljen.«*

Za začetek se v Švici niso ozdravili vsi miliholiki, ozdravila pa se je vsaj tretjina volivcev s tem, ko so prebili opno, ki je zapirala ljudsko modrost v prepričanje, da je enostavno samo po sebi razumljivo, da vojska je in mora bit. Temeljna pridobitev švicarske kampanje je tako v tem, da so bili ljudje sploh postavljeni pred vprašanje. *»če je vojska res potrebna«*, in že samo dejstvo, da so si ljudje to vprašanje začeli povsem resno zastavljati, je zgodovinskega pomena. Referendum v Švici je napovedal, da je obstoj vojske pod vprašajem. Predvsem pa se je zamisliti nad vprašanjem – koliko ljudi bi šele bilo za delno in drastično razorožitev, če je že za popolno razorožitev tretjina. To je za Švicarje vprašljivo predvsem ob tem, ko načrtujejo povečanje vojaškega proračuna v enem letu za 8 odstotkov. Takšen je bil tudi odgovor **Andreas Grossa**, ko so ga ob TV oddaji po referendumu oklicali za looserja.

Marko Hron

Fotografija: Metka Kreso-Baskar

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## Marko Hren Mirovna politika

»Območje Slovenije je demilitarizirana cona. Slovenija nima vojske in nima vojaške industrije. Na ozemlju Slovenije se ne more zadrževati in ne trgovati nobena vojaška organizacija ali vojaška industrija. Varnostna politika Slovenije temelji na negovanju miroljubnih medčloveških in mednarodnih odnosov, na spoštovanju človekovih pravic in na zagotavljanju ekoloških, socialnih in duhovnih vrednot.«<sup>1</sup>

Kaj se lahko največ stori za mir, za nenasilne odnose med bitji prirode in za ohranjanje življenja na Zemlji nasploh? Dosedanji koncepti varnosti in obrambe, ki naj bi iskali odgovor na to vprašanje, so temeljili na polarnosti, ki predpostavlja zunanjega sovražnika – tistega, ki varnost ogroža. Na nevarnost od zunaj se je tudi prenašala odgovornost za stanje sovražnosti, ne-miru in disharmonij znotraj. Taka shema obvladuje prostor razdeljenosti in vzdržuje planet med seboj z mejami ločenih nacionalnih držav. **Državne meje so simbol ločevanja.** V taki shemi morajo ostati različnosti med seboj razmejene in v neprestani napetosti. Politika varnosti pa je v njej lahko samo politika ravnotežja moči. Taka politika varnosti temelji na strahu in se udejanja v brezmejnih vložkih v vojaški kompleks in v manipuliranju s prebivalstvom, ki mora neprestano nekoga sovražiti in se ga bati. Eksplozivna moč uničevalnega stroja na Zemlji je dosegla tako raven, da ob morebitnem aktiviranju uniči ne le svoj cilj, temveč tudi samega sebe. Obrambni mehanizem, ki ga je doslej razvijala človeška civilizacija, je prišel do skrajne točke, ko svojo vlogo lahko opravi samo še fatalno – na uvodno vprašanje lahko odgovori samo z vsesplošnim uničenjem.

Vojne v Evropi si preprosto ni več moč dovoliti. Tudi če obstaja še tako izurjena in »bogata« vojska, prebivalstva ne more rešiti, še najmanj pa ne prebivalstva tako male dežele, kot je slovenska. *Ob integracijskih procesih v Evropi na koncu informacijske dobe (ta je med seboj zblížala različnosti sveta, jim omogočila, da se*

*med seboj spoznajo, zmešajo in preženejo nezaupanje, strah in odpor), je treba izoblikovati nov koncept varnosti, ki temelji na dejstvu, da je varnost samo varnost vseh ljudi planeta in je ne moremo omejiti na varnost državljanov posamezne države, ki sama tudi teoretično svojim prebivalcem ne more zagotoviti varnosti – niti z vojsko niti brez nje.*<sup>2</sup>

Na vprašanje, ali smo varnejši z vojsko ali brez nje, odgovarja vojaška strategija sama. Vojaško pomembni objekti (in mednje spada tudi nuklearna) so prve tarče jedrskih konic in drugih uničevalnih aparatov, uperjenih iz Aviana, Comissa in drugih oporišč, ljudje ob njih pa so s tem v najbolj neposredni nevarnosti. Vojaške varnosti ni in je ne more biti, predvsem pa ni moč govoriti o vojaški varnosti znotraj meja posameznih nacionalnih držav. Ob vprašanju varnosti se dandanes odpirajo kot prevladujoče povsem nove dimenzije, ki imajo ravno tako kot vojaška ogroženost univerzalni – planetarni značaj; ekološka, ekonomska in socialna ogroženost človeštva.

Politika, ki je bila doslej razdeljena na notranjo in zunanjo politiko nacionalnih držav, bo spričo univerzalnosti nevarnosti morala preiti v razdelitev na notranjo politiko nacionalnih držav oziroma regij in na notranjo politiko federacije le-teh; zunanja politika nacionalnih držav naj bi se potemtakem ozavestila in uglasila kot notranja politika mednarodne – planetarne skupnosti.<sup>3</sup> Na uvodno zastavljeno vprašanje bo odgovor treba iskati zunaj mačoiistične politike vojevanja, osvajanja in samopotrjevanja ter (introvertirane) politike nasprotovanja, v aktivni in globalni (ekstrovertirani) politiki miru – politiki sodelovanja. Pri tem so osnovne kvalitativne spremembe iz koncepta separacije v koncept združevanja svetovne skupnosti vsaj naslednje:

zaprtost – odprtost;  
upiranje – sprejemljivost;  
maščevalnost – odpuščanje;



diskvalifikacija – komunikacija;  
separatizem – kozmopolitizem.

## Individualizacija

Največ, kar lahko posamezna enota prispeva k skupnosti, je avtentičnost, inovativnost in posebnost. Da bi lahko enota to storila in da bi skupnost lahko prispevek sprejela, morajo biti v skupnosti zagotovljene kvalitete, ki jih lahko preberemo, če že ne drugje, pa na vsakem kovancu francoske republike: priznana mora biti **svoboda** duha in vesti individuuma, vladati mora spoznanje **bratstva in sestrstva** v ekonomiji skupnosti in kraljevati mora pravo **enakosti**. Naštete kvalitete so pogoj za miroljubno in kreativno bivanje v skupnosti. Enota je lahko človek ali skupina ljudi, skupnost je lahko skupina ljudi ali skupnost narodov oziroma nacionalnih držav.

Individualizacija je nujni proces pri spoznavanju lastne avtentičnosti, sprejemanju lastne vesti in udejanjanju svobode duha. Proces individualizacije zajema tako posameznika(-co) kot skupino, in to velja tudi za skupino – narod. Osamosvajanje osebnosti na poti individualizacije nujno spremlja ločevanje v smislu emancipacije od vsega, kar narekuje omejitve, odvisnosti ali navezanosti. Za ceno osamosvojitve mora osebnost zapustiti tudi dom, pa najsi bo dom družina ali internat. Zapuščanje doma je lahko duhovno ali/in fizično, s paleto vmesnih stopenj in kombinacij. Napredovanje osebnosti je, če za dom vzame širši svet (kozmpolitski proces), nazadovanje je, če za dom vzame ožjega (proces separacije). To velja tako za osebnost človeka kot za osebnost ljudi, pri čemer je narod poleg družine najpogostejša skupinsko-osebna identifikacija.

V tej luči je opazovati, doživljati in sodelovati tudi pri novem valu osamosvajanja narodov, ki smo mu priče proti koncu drugega tisočletja v predelu sveta, ki je pol stoletja preživljal izkušnjo totalitarnega socializma. Ta je do skrajnosti udejanjal prav vojaške principe hierarhičnosti na principu moči, poslušnosti, samovoljne manipulacije (s tajnimi zakoni) in kaz-

novanja in je do skrajnosti pripeljal koncept varnosti na predpostavki sovražnikov (notranjih in zunanjih). Spremembe v Vzhodni Evropi in Jugoslaviji so zato sprožile obratni proces, ki se je nujno in povesod moral začeti s človekovimi pravicami versus kaznovanju in se bo v primeru progresivnosti nadaljeval s svobodo vesti versus poslušnosti, pravno državo versus samovolji in sinergičnostjo na principu sodelovanja versus hierarhičnosti na principu moči.

Izkušnja šole militarističnega totalitarizma daje novo nastajajočim državam toliko več možnosti, da se ob procesu osamosvajanja hkrati ozdravijo tudi militarizma in da narekujejo tempo razoroževanja in uvajanja politike miru in sodelovanja.

## Slovenija brez vojske

Slovenija ima poleg izkušenj z militarizmom v Jugoslaviji za tak korak še vrsto drugih razlogov in prednosti.

1. Njena geografska umeščenost, med vzhodom in zahodom, med severom in jugom, med bogatim in revnim svetom, med krščanstvom in islamom, ji daje veliko komunikacijsko vrednost, ki jo lahko ohrani samo z dobrimi odnosi s sosedskimi državami. S tega vidika je velikega pomena sodelovanje v regiji Alpe-Jadran, in ni naključje, da so prve državljanske iniciative za ukinjanje vojske našle tla ravno v tem področju in med nevtralnimi državami.<sup>4</sup>

2. V Evropi, ki bo postajala vse bolj Evropa regij in vse manj Evropa nacionalnih držav, igrajo obmejna območja največjo zblíževalno vlogo in postajajo **simbol združevanja in komunikacije**. Slovenci, katerih dober del jih živi kot manjšina zunaj državnih meja, tako predstavljajo naraven most povezovanja. Slovenija je majhna država, podobno kot Avstrija in Švica, in majhne države imajo po nekaterih prepričljivih argumentacijah<sup>5</sup> največ možnosti, da se odločijo za radikalne korake.

3. Marsikdaj je slišati, da so Slovenci miroljuben narod, ki nikomur ni storil žalega, nikdar ni imel lastne vojske in se

nikdar s tujsko vojsko ni identificiral. Ocena o kaki posebni miroljubnosti Slovencev bi bila preveliko poenostavljanje in žal je ni moč izpeljati. Kar je očitno, pa je, da Slovenci v svoji kulturni zakladnici ne hranijo kulta vojaka in da so vojski vse manj naklonjeni.<sup>6</sup>

4. V 80. letih je bila vloga vojske v družbi ena ključnih diskusij. Zlasti nova družbena gibanja, ZSMS in mediji, kot so Mladina, Nova revija in Radio Študent, so v družbi ustvarili ozračje kritičnosti do vojske in detabuizirali vse doslej skrite teme.<sup>7</sup> Vrhunec razkrivanja manipulativne vloge in globoke vraščenosti vojske v civilno življenje je omogočil proces zoper četverico pred vojaškim sodiščem v Ljubljani, ki so mu sledile tudi pravne analize.<sup>8</sup>

5. Tradicija novih družbenih gibanj v Sloveniji je v prostor vnesla element politične participacije civilne družbe, ki igra v konceptu globalne politike miru kot neodvisno in neposredno komuniciranje na ravni civilne družbe odločilno vlogo. Gibanja so tista, ki opravljajo neodvisno komunikacijo s svetom, ki obvladujejo področja ogroženosti, ki se jih država pomanjkljivo loteva, in ki kot taka neposredno gradijo nov pristop k varnosti in aktivno politiko miru.

## Konverzija vojaškega v civilno

Reformni procesi v totalitarnih socializmih so tesno povezani z integracijo Evrope, ki bo slej ko prej vodila v odpravo nacionalnih armad. Z osvobajanjem od armad se vstopa v skupnost z drugimi narodi na principu zaupanja. Hkrati odpravljanje armad pogojuje neslutene posledice, ki jih v kratkih potezah nakazuje spekter področij, ki jih tako korenita sprememba zadane in ki **sprostijo neslutene kapacitete za ekološko in ekonomsko sanacijo obubožanih držav**: opustitev konceptov oboroženega boja in obrambe, ukinitvev nacionalne vojske (vseh pojavnih oblik), ukinitvev proračuna in davkov za nacionalno vojsko, ukinitvev vojaških šol in vzgajanja, izobraževanja in urjenja za vojno, ukinitvev vojaških in obrambnih obveznosti za moške in za

ženske, ne glede na starost, ustavitvev proizvodnih načrtov in razvojnih projektov, ki so kakor koli povezani s proizvodnjo za vojaške namene, konverzija slednjega v civilne namene, osvoboditev in konverzija vseh zemljišč in objektov, ki jih zaseda vojska, črtanje vseh delov ustave in vseh delov podzakonskih aktov, ki nalagajo obveznosti, pravice in dolžnosti do obrambe in ki nalagajo (sodne in druge) pristojnosti nacionalne vojaške hierarhiije. Šele ko ugotovimo, kaj vse bi bilo treba ukiniti ali konvertirati, se lahko prav zavemo, kako globoko obvladuje vojska naše življenje. Grozljiv bo podatek, koliko odstotkov mestnih površin zasedajo kasarne in drugi vojaški objekti – prve tarče morebitnih bombnih napadov, koliko odstotkov prometa na železnici je vezano na vojsko, koliko električne energije gre samo za proizvodnjo za vojsko in tako naprej.

## Globalna politika miru

Začetek zarisanega ukinjanja in konverzije lahko pričakujemo šele vzporedno z uveljavljanjem aktivne in globalne politike miru. Ta ravno tako zadeva širok spekter komunikacijskih ravni: vzgojo za mir in učenje nenasilne komunikacije v vsakdanjem življenju, sklepanje neposrednih vezi med ljudmi v regijah in širše, sklepanje mirovnih pogodb med ljudmi v konfliktnih regijah, iskanje novih komunikacijskih okvirov za državljane in državljanke zunaj meja,<sup>9</sup> sklepanje bilateralnih in multilateralnih meddržavnih pogodb in drugih mirovnih dogovorov, sklepanje dogovorov v okviru mednarodne skupnosti narodov, itd.

Politika miru temelji na možnostih predvidevanja. Izkušnje in analize dosedanjih konfliktnih situacij učijo, kateri odnosi pripeljejo do nasilja. V splošnem do nasilja vodi vsakršno zaostrovanje brez odprtosti za dialog. Ko ni več dialoga, ostane samo še moč. Politika je ali politika moči ali politika dialoga.<sup>10</sup> Formule konfliktov so jasne in delujejo zlasti v prostorih religije, ekonomskih interesov in socialnih okoliščin. Vsakršne nasilne za(raz)plete se da predvideti že daleč

vnaprej in vsak konflikt se začne leta pred krvavimi obračuni. Ključ do miru so zdravi in odprti vsakodnevni odnosi, tako kot je ključ do zdravja zdrava prehrana in zdrav način življenja. Na uživanje zdrave/zdravilne komunikacije je treba začeti misliti v trenutku, ko se začne razmišljati o odpravljanju vojaškega načina vzdrževanja miru. Za Slovenijo je to dobra preizkušnja, tako za novi parlament in njegovo vlado, ki bo krojila odnose na državni ravni, kot za ljudi, ki bodo morali presepati strasti, vzpodbujene s strani vladajočih elit, ki, tako stare, komunistične, kot nove, demokratične, v veliki meri iščejo legitimnost v diskvalifikacijah drugih narodov na račun simpatij slovenskega.

Vsakršna oblika samostojnosti zaradi sebičnosti ali občutka večvrednosti bi bila usmeritev v prid polarizaciji in zaostrovanju in s tem v prid vzdrževanju militantnih konceptov; vsakršna oblika samostojnosti zaradi pridobivanja bolj ekonomičnega položaja v sodelovanju in komunikaciji (dajanja in sprejemanja) z ostalimi narodi pa bi lahko odigrala neprecenljivo vlogo za vzpostavljanje novih, na mirovni politiki zasnovanih odnosov v Evropi.

#### OPOMBE

<sup>1</sup> Ustavna formulacija, ki jo je predlagalo Gibanje za kulturo miru in nenasilja na kongresu ZSMS v Portorožu, 3. novembra 1989. Kongres ZSMS je pobudo za Slovenijo – demilitarizirano deželo v celoti podprl in za začetek zahteval ustanovitev neodvisne komisije v Skupščini SR Slovenije za preučitev področij in posledic, militarizacije Slovenije kot prvo fazo preučevanja področij, posledic in potrebnih stopenj demilitarizacije Slovenije.

<sup>2</sup> Gibanje za kulturo miru in nenasilja, Slovenija – demilitarizirana dežela; Obrazložitev; Ljubljana, 3. november 1989.

<sup>3</sup> Delovni dokument Mednarodne delovne

skupine za globalno mirovno politiko, Salzburg, januar 1990.

<sup>4</sup> Državlanske iniciative za ukinjanje vojske in za uvajanje mirovne politike so najmočnejše v Švici (novembra 1989 je bil v Švici izveden celo referendum za ukinitve vojske in kar 36% volilcev se je izreklo za ukinitve), obeh Nemčijah, Avstriji in Sloveniji, na Madžarskem pa je prišlo celo do iniciative na državni ravni za vzpostavljanje demilitariziranih območij v obmejnih pasovih z Avstrijo in Jugoslavijo.

<sup>5</sup> »Majhnost« je bil eden bistvenih argumentov švicarske iniciative za Švico brez vojske. Zagovorniki ukinitve vojske pravijo, da je v majhni državi laže izoblikovati konsenz za tako pomembno vprašanje ter da razorožitev majhnega predela ne ogroža »ravnotežja« vojaških moči velesil in s tem konsenz o ukinitvi vojske ne vzbuja strahov.

<sup>6</sup> Zadošča pregled medvojne dokumentacije in izrazito militantnega jezika v njej, zadošča pogled na imena šol, ulic itd. po vojni, česar ni moč pripisati samo boljševiski propagandi. Na drugi strani pa v zadnjih letih javnomnenjske raziskave kažejo povečan odpor do vojske, kar se najbolj izraža v odgovorih na vprašanje, če bi se večina Slovencev uprla sovražniku; odstotek pritrdilnih glasov je od leta 1980 (82,1%) vztrajno padal (1982 na 73,3%, 1983 na 64,3%, 1984 na 63,1%) in pristal v letu 1988 na 58,7%, pri mnenjskih voditeljih pa na 42,0%. (N. Toš, ..., Slovenski utrip; Rezultati raziskav javnega mnenja 1988–1989, FSPN Ljubljana.)

<sup>7</sup> Diskusije mirovnikov o vojaških paradah, o ugovoru vesti zoper služenje vojaškega roka, o izvozu in uvozu orožja, o militarizaciji družbe, o vojaški vzgoji v šolah, kritika obrambnega koncepta itd.

<sup>8</sup> Pravni memorandum; Vojaški tožilec versus Borštner, Janša, Tasić, Zavrl, Časopis za kritiko znanosti, 1989.

<sup>9</sup> Eden takih okvirov v nastajanju je Helsinška državljanska skupščina, ki naj bi služila kot komunikacijska platforma civilne družbe v deželah podpisnicah Helsinške listine. Prvi kongres bo oktobra 1990 v Pragi, ustanovna deklaracija (Prague appeal 1990) pa začrtuje temeljne vrednote za vzpostavljanje novega sožitja v Evropi.

<sup>10</sup> Nelson Mandela v pismu Bothi iz zapora, 1989.



## Članki v *Intruder* in Independent Voices

### Letter to the recipients of the last issue of the *INTRUDER*, November 1992

*Dear friends, dear readers, dear subscribers!*

*This is the last issue of **The Intruder**. The reasons why it was decided to put an end to this publication are largely explained in the editorial and in introductory essays. There are some additional reasons influencing the decision.*

*First of all **The Intruder** and the Movement for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence in Ljubljana have lost the frame of relations. It represented a node from "Eastern Europe" in East-West relations and the node from "Yugoslavia" in relation to outer world. There is no more "Eastern Europe" and there is no more "Yugoslavia". At this moment it proves impossible to cover the "Yugoslav" issue from Ljubljana. The communications are cut or very difficult for already a year. The problems in the region are diverse, complex and each one of them enormous. **The Intruder** could either employ an editorial or stop. The financial situation of the paper was insecure and surviving the paper from one issue to another was a frustrating job. **Dominique** was the only staff person and there was no money for her after May. Despite of the fact, that many readers expressed very good feed-back about the paper - particularly thanks to **Dominique** - there was a very small number of subscribers. Some of you subscribed recently. Please accept the apologise for discontinuing the publication. At this point it is to thank to all of those who kept sponsoring **The Intruder** during the tough times. It is not by chance that the sponsor of the last issue is **The Group Switzerland Without an Army (GSoA)**. **GSoA** has inspired and encouraged the activity of Ljubljana peace group for years and it is a right moment and place to express the appreciation. The list of those who should be mentioned here could go on and on. Thank you for your support, for reading the paper, for your feedback....And of course, special thanks to **Dominique**, a french volunteer who kept editing **The Intruder** from June 1991 until May 1992.*

*There were several efforts undertaken during summer in order to provide continuity of the publication. There were plans to get additional volunteers in Ljubljana, or moving the editorial to Zagreb (Croatia), or Sarajevo (Bosnia). The Zagreb group (ARC) was not able to take the responsibility and Sarajevo.....what to say about it. Beside, there are quite some publications produced in different languages now in Europe on the issue, and **The Intruder** can retire without living a whole behind it.*

*It has been almost 10 years since the Ljubljana peace group has been producing "peace" information from the region. Many feelings were shared worldwide. Browsing through the data-base hundreds of names from all over the world appear and some of them even associate with the images of real persons. Many friendships were made also with a help of the paper. It has been often very useful and always a pleasure to get your mail back, to receive your newsletters and magazines. Thank you very much for the exchange and please keep on sending your material to the same address. An info-shop will get opened in Ljubljana soon and your literature concerning "action" could be displayed.*

*The **Peace Institute** continues the work started by the peace movement in quite some aspects, but particularly in peace education, studies of transition, conflict resolution and related issues. **Peace Institute** will publish its own publications in English and will hopefully let you know more about that in Spring 1993.*

*The last issue of **The Intruder** might be challenging your own views. If so, please do not hesitate to write your responses and reflections. If any of the articles will stimulate a dialogue, then the efforts making this publication meet success.*

*Please keep the following address in your data-base:*


***Peace Institute**, Mestni trg 13, 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, Tel. +38-61-210374, fax. +38-61-224666, Email: Mirovniki@uni-lj.ac.mail.sl! Acting director: Vlasta Jalušič, program director: Gregor Tomc, secretary: Karmen Mastnak, researchers: Sašo Gazdič, Dorotea Lešnik, Tonči Kuzmanič.*

*Several other addresses you can use are stated in **The Intruder**. Several were left out - not by any particular reason. But let us here point out two additional addresses from Slovenia: **Peace Group of Greens in Maribor** - East Slovenia, c.o. Andrej Okreša; tel. and fax +38-62-221273. and **Women for Peace in Koper** - West Slovenia, c.o. Dora Battelli, tel. +38-66-31254, +38-66-158062.*

*Wish you joyful and peaceful New Year*

*Ljubljana, 19. November 1992*

*Marko Hren*



# This

is the last issue

of the *Intruder*.

More than that:

in September,

we dissolved

ourselves as

the Ljubljana

Peace Group.

This is the end

of a long story.

Our peace group came into existence a decade ago. From the beginning it was intimately connected to the democratization process in Slovenia and played an important role in it. The democratization in our country was initiated by the new social movements among whom the peace movement was, for some years, the most articulated and publicly exposed. In tandem with environmentalists, gays, feminists, youth subcultures, human rights groups and other civic initiatives that emerged in the mid-eighties, we started gradually to create a democratic civil society and a new political culture.

The other aim of our activity, as a part of this civil society, was to establish a pluralist political society and a legitimate and accountable state, a state respecting and guaranteeing human rights, and bound by law. All this was effected, sometimes in unpredicted ways and often falling short of ideal solutions. As result of the achievements of the democratization process in the eighties, the fall of the communist rule in Slovenia was not a shock but a rather smooth transition. Our activity contributed to such a favourable development.

As a peace movement, we not only struggled for general democratic aims. This is not how it worked. One of the differences between the struggle for democracy in Slovenia and the other Central East European countries was that, in Slovenia, we lacked a general democratic movement, a sort of democratic headquarters, which would then pay attention to particular issues and concerns; we did not deduce our movements and initiatives from a general idea of democracy. On the contrary, it was a plurality of struggles for a number of concrete, everyday, particular, specific issues and concerns which construed the general democratic interest.

As a peace movement, our main concern was to create a culture of peace and nonviolence. First of all, we had to rehabilitate the idea of peace, for "peace" was, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, a word abused by the official ideology. More specifically, we ran lectures and »



discussions, held stalls, wrote petitions, protests and statements, campaigned against war toys, organized workshops for children, demonstrated against the last parade of the Yugoslav People's Army and against the Yugoslav arms trade. The action which attracted most attention, official fury and public support, was our campaign for the recognition of the right to conscientious objection and for the introduction of an alternative to military service. We questioned, without even intending to be radical, the central and most sacred institution of the Yugoslav old regime, the People's Army, which precisely in 1985 began to effectively take over control of power in Yugoslavia. In reply to the Army's most unreasonable reaction, we focused more and more on the problems of militarization and demilitarization of society. Together with feminists, we opposed the plan to extend military service to women. When a show military trial was staged in Ljubljana, in the Summer of 1988, which was understood as an attempt to crush the democratization movement in Slovenia, we helped to organize a successful social resistance which gave the impetus to the transition to a democratic system.

From the beginning of our activity, we participated in the international peace movement. We established contacts with peace groups in the Alpe-Adria region; our representatives were sent to END conventions and we involved ourselves in the European Network for East-West Dialogue. We took advantage of being able to travel freely to Eastern Europe and, in the mid-eighties, started to work on an East-East peace dialogue. Our representatives took part in the "historic" seminars in Warsaw, Budapest and Prague. In this networking, we insisted on the link between peace and human rights and stressed the importance of the creation of a democratic civil society for any lasting and meaningful peace. This of course is history now.

The continuing war in former Yugoslavia has changed our lives. None of us has the illusion that it is possible to continue to work in the ways we used to work. This would not be logical any more. The situation in Slovenia has changed. Many of the aims of our movement have been achieved. However, those forms of action which we developed under communism are of little use today. One cycle of the new social movements has definitively come to an end. Our attempt to get a representative of the social movements elected to the new Parliament

failed. The popularity of the project to demilitarize Slovenia suffered a set back after the short war of independence in Summer 1991. What seemed to have been within reach before the Yugoslav military intervention, can now only be sustained as our long term goal. With the influx of refugees first from Croatia and now from Bosnia, the greater part of nongovernmental social activity has shifted. Its principal aim now is to provide help and support for the refugees. The events in Croatia and Bosnia have had a profound impact on us. The war by far exceeds our worst expectations of what could happen and the boldest imagination of what is possible in human society. However, as horrifying as the war is, for us as a peace movement, an even more shocking thing was the reaction of the international peace movement to it. A couple of exceptions aside, it failed completely. It failed first to recognize and acknowledge the danger of war in Yugoslavia and then to do anything within its power to avert it. We feel all the more bitter about this as we, from the Spring of 1988 on, toured Europe trying to explain what was going on in Yugoslavia and sending warnings, but nobody listened.

When war finally broke out, it was in the nature of things that the peace movement could not do much to stop it. Yet there was, in those years, much hectic activity. While old networks started to dissolve, their remnants continued to be active and some of them formed new organizations. We are afraid that all the work has not brought about much good. We must say that we are concerned that some of these international organizations lack a democratic basis; we question their right to present themselves as representative of international civil society; and we are deeply concerned at what appears to be an inappropriate and wasteful use of resources on actions and conferences that do little to challenge the fundamental basis of this war or relieve humanitarian suffering, but rather generate confusion and misunderstanding, nationally and internationally.

We are convinced that the real problem lies with the ideas that determine the framework of much of Western peace activity. We have begun to be more and more concerned with the insufficiencies of the ideas and ideals, of the conceptual basis of the Cold War peace movement (which are, again, imbedded in the Western peace tradition.) They seem to be conducive to a blind and blinding activism that engulfs us in almost as da-

maging ways as the war. We have resolved not to participate in such an activism any more. We have decided to seriously think through the war and to rethink the ideas and concepts on which our peace movement was based, and the international peace movement of which we were a part. In our view, this is a necessary condition on which alone it may be possible in the future to formulate new strategies for peace. We are not abettors of the idea of "starting anew" for its own sake. New things are not necessarily better than those they have succeeded or replaced. We are convinced, however, that it is time to part with ways which lead nowhere. Just because of the horrors of this war we feel that what is needed is clear thinking and analysis, not the unthinking continuance of a "knee jerk" activist response.

That is why the decision to dissolve our peace movement was complemented by the decision to continue to work as the Ljubljana Peace Institute. Our hope is that in the years to come a network of people will be created who recognize the need to rethink and reevaluate the Western traditions of peace thought and action, and to search for ways in which peace and nonviolence could be conceived of and asserted in the 'new world order.' These are the people we would like to work with.

Ljubljana, October 1, 1992



# THE GREAT FIASCO OF "WESTERN" PEACE THOUGHT "THINK LOCALLY, ACT GLOBALLY"

By Marko Hren

**In** this paper I want to argue the following:

**1-** the principles of sovereignty of states and inviolability of borders must not only seriously be challenged but should be observed as potentially the main bias which contributes largely to conflicts, wars and human suffering.

**2-** in the analysis of the Yugoslav crisis, we seldom find an analysis of military power. Military industry and military institution are main causes of the war itself. Without taking military power - a core institution of a "sovereign" state - seriously in consideration we can not approach any discussion about more peaceful world order. The discourse of nationalisms and national interests in the case of Yugoslavia is not sufficient and is even misleading. The lack of anti-militaristic type of analysis contributed largely to the failor of international diplomacy in Balkans. Yugoslav Army was a 7th republic of Yugoslavia. A power on its own and a main actor in all Yugoslav wars.

**3-** western civilization and "Western peace thought" have to be reconsidered. Europe has to admit that it is not and should not play a leading role in human civilization. Imperialism, military industrial complexes, exploitation, racism, ecological destruction - the main problems of humanity are all children of this very western civilization which pretends to be enlightened and progressive. The 500 years celebration of Columbus, the most perverse wars in southern Europe, growth of racism and apathy concerning the hunger in Somalia are enough reasons to rethink western civilization.

The conclusions that could challenge the minds of the reader would be:

**Ad. 1.** The international law should be based on the principle of sovereignty

(protecting states) only and only until the very sovereign state respects human rights. When human rights are violated, international community should protect the sovereignty of the people.

**Ad. 2.** The drastic demilitarization, abolition of national armies, conversion of military industries and international control over national armies should be most seriously put on the agenda.

**Ad. 3.** Western civilization has to bow before Islamic, Arabic, American - indigenous, African, far-eastern etc. civilizations in order to be able to learn, share, tolerate and cooperate beyond the imperial attitude of "help" and "teach".

## No Comment

"We have probably reached a stage in the ethical and psychological evolution of Western civilization in which the massive and deliberate violations of human rights will no longer be tolerated". This is what at-that-time UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuellar declared only few months before "intolerable" manifested on the crossroad between Bruxelles, Rome, Vienna, Budapest and Athens ... And when "intolerable" already happened, the very same Secretary General declared "I have no comment", when asked about events in former Yugoslavia in August 1991.

"No comment - this is an inner-Yugoslav problem" was a general view during pre-destruction period of Yugoslavia. Yet, there are observers who would vichemently announce that the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia successively led to destruction and wars. They are particularly waried about the role of Germany in this process. It could be argued the contrary - the absence of

the recognition of the right for self-determination triggered wars in Slovenia and Croatia (the case of Bosnia is different for many reasons, since a lot of it has to do with the moment of inertia after the war spread over Croatia and the YA had to "escape" to Bosnia). Today, the principle is challenged on the case of Kosovo - an inner affair of Serbia, or a possible trigger for Balkan wars. The secret principle of state sovereignty has ruled over human rights in the illuminated Western political thought. The attitudes of ignorance and biased support of The Yugoslav State by all international bodies were without doubt amongst key elements leading to wars in former Yugoslavia. When Mr. Egelburger, the author of US policy towards Yugoslavia has recently declared that he "was misled by Belgrade politicians" such confession seems real and honest but yet it tries to mislead a naive reader. Mr. Egelburger was not mislead (confessing would mean that he is not mislead any more). Mr. Egelburger was led very well by the interests of his own and of his state. The principal interest of US and Europe was to keep stability in Balkans. Mr. Marković - a former Yu-prime minister - was offering stability and gradual reform. Mr. Marković was given full trust and support - and all other political options were ignored. When the federal army under the auspices of federal government acted in Slovenia (June 1991) the chain reaction of the involvement of military started. Today the story of "misleading" repeats. Belgrade regime and the associated armies involved in Bosnia and Hercegovina had won additional time to perform in peace their scenarios of ethnic cleansing, just because all hopes are invested into Mr. Panić, a new prime minister of new federal Yugoslavia.

## FORMER YUGO AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

International law grants a right for Self determination for all nations, renounces genocide and apartheid and brings clear standards for human rights. Yet, people in former Yugoslavia suffered denial of the right of self-determination, suffer genocide, suffer apartheid, suffer violations of human rights on largest scale possible. Slovenes were left alone during desperate negotiations with federal government in Spring 1991, Bosnians - the most innocent ones - found locked in genocide and are even deprived the right to defend themselves, Albanians are told today, that nobody would support "sovereignty option". Too often, Western observers - and peace-politicians and peace activists - are locked in neutral stand, deriving from theories of conflict resolution which are supposed to exclude "taking sides". Too often Western observers get self-satisfaction accepting the thesis of "civil war", inter-tribal, inter-ethnic, inter-nationalists warfare. Too often the same people find themselves more concerned about Germany playing a leading role (recognizing republics) then about Belgrade regime performing most terrible crimes. Too often even antimilitarists fail to understand that the most real and most simple-to-describe is the unequal confrontation between militarists (totalitarians, generals, mad-man, criminals from all over the world, war profitters etc.) and powerless people. Finally the fiction of inter-ethnic and inter-religious warfare will become true - after a drill will prove successful - and the real responsible will be hidden away.

While the international law on war crimes is clear, while war crimes have widely been proven in Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Hercegovina, the war criminals - many of their names have been listed by Helsinki Watch - keep being invited to talks in Rome, Paris, London, Bruxelles etc. instead of being put on trial. They have cynically violated dozens of "peace treaties", "cease-fires", promises and agreements and are repeatedly invited to sign new ones. War criminals are - with such attitude - only given time and recognition. This is why a short insight into the role of military institutions will be given in the next part of the paper.

### A Peace of a Story

The conflicts in former Yugo have often been reduced to Serbs- Croats pattern or lately to Serbs - Croats - Muslims pattern. The declaration of independency of Slovenia and the aggression of YA in

Slovenia late June 1991 are important for at least two reasons and since the case of Slovenia is often kept forgotten it might be useful to repeat the following:

1. the declaration of Slovenian independency (after all negotiations with federal institutions and particularly with Serbian leadership failed in Spring 1991) did put the issue of sovereignty of former Yugoslavia most clearly on the agenda.

2. Yugoslav Army (YA) openly became active and could never stop since. The aggression of YA in Slovenia in June 1991 was a result (and the conclusion) of a decade long intense involvement of YA against the democratic movement in Slovenia. Even more. YA was a main mover of anti-Slovenian attitude of the regime in Belgrade.

The collapse of federal institutions (the collapse of Yugoslav sovereignty) and the YA which became wild and on its own, should alarm international community at least after the war in Slovenia. If the freeze of air space would have been agreed in July 1991 most of destruction could have been avoided. It is to stress at this point that the low-intensity warfare and terrorism was inevitable - and this was clear already after elections in Croatia in Summer 1990. But the warfare would be limited and localized if the federal army would be put at least under partial control.

Let us, at this point have a little -telegraphic style - insight into the role of YA during 80ies in Slovenia:

-1980 - military intelligent services follows closely the appearance of youth subculture and alternative movements; they tend to discredit them as fascists;  
-in Slovenia peace movement campaigns against military parades, against recruitment of women, for the right of CO, against war toys and weapons trade etc. gain bigger and bigger public support;  
-1984, 1985 military intelligent services report to their authorities about counterrevolution going on in Slovenia. As protagonists of counter-revolution one can find the antimilitary movement on the top of the list;  
-during those years several authors expressing criticism of YA are threatened to be put on court or even prosecuted. Amongst them Janez Janša (present defence minister of Slovenia) and later Tomaž Mastnak. In both cases the public pressure was strong enough for the verdict to be removed or the investigation interrupted;  
-following the reactions of YA political branches, the movements in Slovenia

lunch discussions including issues of demilitarization, role of civil society versus the state, democracy, demilitarization of political institutions, deideologisation of military and similar;  
-1987, military makes plans to suppress the democratic movement;  
-1988, democratic movement in Slovenia gets into possession of secret plans according to which (estimated about 170) core activists would be executed; YA envisaged large peaceful demonstrations in Slovenia - as a reaction to persecutions - and issued orders to prepare military units to act accordingly in order to "defend constitutional order and the property of the military";  
-at the same time slovenian democratic movement express solidarity with Kosovo Albanians. Particular issue was a request to ban the involvement of Slovenian police troops in Kosovo; this provokes massive anti-Slovenian demonstrations - rallies - in Serbia, led and supported by Milošević companions;  
-Slovenian democratic movement is getting its shape - a network between diverse groups involved is being created through the process of drafting the Declaration for Democracy;  
-May 1988; 4 activists imprisoned in Ljubljana, amongst them Janez Janša, who was a core liaison person of the Declaration. HR movement in Slovenia unifies hundreds of institutions, movements and thousands of individuals. The main point is that the imprisonment was directed from Belgrade and performed with a support of Slovenian hard liners. 4 prisoners were delivered immediately to military authorities and put in solitary confinement in a military barrack in Ljubljana;  
-August 1988- military trial starts in Ljubljana; Slovenian population is homogenised around the issue. The movement is led by Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, where the representatives of cultural, students, social, educational, media and other institutions participated and consciously run a non-violent resistance campaign. The trial "Against Four" proved that the YA is able to violate all basic human rights - even in front of the international public. The trial was under veil of secrecy, no right for civil attorney was granted, civilians were put on military court and under military jurisdiction. A clear cut human rights case;  
-Military trial was held in Serbian language in the middle of Ljubljana (official languages in Slovenia were - and still are - Slovenian, Italian and Hungarian). This triggered a national dimension of the problem. The movement - which until



then was predominantly human rights and democracy oriented - turned instantly to a movement for national liberation;  
 -1989 democratic movement wins; slovenian CP decides to step on the side of local population, they get rid of the hard-liners within Slovenian CP and widen the gap with Belgrade. CP in Slovenia declares democratic elections for 1990 and decides to compete on free elections. CP in Slovenia survived the "between the hammer and the anvil" deciding to identify with the anvil. The reflection of this decision we found today in the person of the president of Slovenia - at-that-time a president of Slovenian CP, Mr. Milan Kučan; CP is the first federal institution to collapse. Yugoslavia is dead. The spirit is disassociated but the flash struggles for survival. Threats are coming mainly from YA officials. In Sarajevo, the group Nadrealists (Surrealists) composes a video about Sarajevo wall (when Berlin wall falls, the Sarajevo wall was simultaneously visualised), in Slovenia, The Mladina journal shows a map of Northern and southern Yugoslavia. Sarajevo is found on the borderline.

The process displayed here is unique in Slovenia. Nothing similar would happen elsewhere in Yugoslavia.  
 -Elections in Slovenia are held in April 1990 and democratic coalition wins the government. But the CP wins a presidential seat on direct elections for the president. The government in Slovenia starts adopting and performing the measures which would enable sovereign governing on the territory of Slovenia. The conflicts with Belgrade are bigger and bigger. Late 1990 Milošević's party wins elections in Serbia. The interests of Milošević (to keep in power), YA (to keep the control over territory in order to feed their privileged needs) and Serbian extremists (to perform a great Serbian plan) come together. The regime in Belgrade - encouraged by international community which keeps a blind eye on developments in Yugoslavia - decides to keep control over Slovenia for any price. It is not willing to negotiate let alone to compromise. A first incident happens in October 1990 when federal troops occupied the headquarters of Slovenian Territorial Defence Units.

The issue of defence was the hot issue in 1990 in Slovenia. There was an absolute agreement that Slovenia should decide about its defence as a sovereign country. On one hand there was a large public and political support (including president

Milan Kučan and several political parties) for the idea of Slovenia Without an Army, on the other hand the Government was getting ready for the final confrontation with Belgrade regime. The first training of Slovenian Territorial Defence troops started in May 1991 and the reaction of federal military which surrounded the Slovenian training center with tanks, led to a first victim - a civilian smashed by a tank. Attention! At that time we still speak of Yugoslav Army (the institution of former Yugoslav state) and nobody would speak of Serbian (national) army.

Hope enough keys were given here to make the reader think about the necessity to think about the wars in former Yugo also from an anti-militaristic perspective.

**What was the Role of UN**

UN is a union of sovereign governments and not a union of nations. It should be renamed to United States or should change radically its structure. Despite of the fact, that the right for self determination can be found in the preamble of all fundamental documents ratified by member states, the one protected is a sovereign state and not the nations. This is symbolised by the already-mentioned "no-comment" made by Mr. Peres de Cuellar as late as in August 1991, after the aggression in Slovenia and after the war in Croatia has already spread.

When even "new" Yugoslavia did change symbols already in May 1992, after not being recognised by any international GO or by any other body, the flag of former Yugoslavia waved in front of the UN palace in NY as long as until late September this year. We can not speak about any active role of UN in Yugoslav crisis. All activities (peace keeping in Slavonia, humanitarian aid in Bosnia, sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro) were a very late reaction to fait-accomplis. It is not possible to accept the very common argument that UN has acted according to its charta - giving priority to regional organization (in this case CSCE and EC). Besides all other arrangements and principles, the Article 14. of The UN Charter allows "General Assembly to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin,..." . CSCE and EC possesses no such provision. The UN has much more power to intervene then any regional interGO institution. To transmit all activities to European institutions was a great mistake of UN.

Daniel Warner; Geneva Institute for International Studies defined a problem during the Conference on The Challenge to Intervene- A New Role of UN" organized by Upsalla Life and Peace Institute: "There is a lack of an effective mechanism to decide when and how to take over certain functions for governments which are unable or unwilling to do them." Elizabeth Ferris from life&Peace Institute in Upsala continues: "The question is not whether intervention is good or bad, or whether it should or should not take place, but rather whether the time has come for interventions to be regularized, codified, monitored, evaluated, and recognized as a perhaps inevitable consequence of living in an interdependent world." Is there any additional story needed to argue such approach besides the story of former Yugo.

The Intruder. did bring quite some articles on interventions. In particular, it was campaigning for an early stage - active - intervention as opposed to "too-late" reactive intervention. What did really make me think during the past months was the banality of discussions about interventions: Most of discussions were locked in polarity between pro and against military intervention. The context of intervention is much wider. Recent Helsinki Watch report on Bosnia provides a good overview on the issue - without even mentioning military intervention. Interventionism of course requests taking sides and this is where most of observers failed. The main problem - as I can see - for undecidedness concerning clear taking-sides is that the problems in former Yugoslavia were interpreted in very subjective language using group-identities (ethnic groups) as a framework. It would be much easier to achieve agreement if military-power holders would be targeted (i.e. Milosevićs regime in Belgrade, paramilitaries of Arčan, Karadžić etc. in Bosnia) as opposed to now-prevailing generalized image of "Serbian" troops.

**About the Role of NGOs**

In general, the attitudes of NGOs abroad were very vague (trying to be neutral), abstract ("we oppose war") and solution-less (because of very low level of understanding the complexity of Yugoslavia). An outstanding positive example is the recent report of Helsinki Watch (American branch of Helsinki federation for human rights) on Bosnia and Hercegovina. This is a detailed analysis of situation, resulting in clear and necessary



"taking sides" and finally in a number of concrete activities to be undertaken. All those who want to lobby, watch-dog and do pressure work should get themselves a copy.

The power of NGOs after the crisis happens is of course very limited and the priority action-field is on GO level for several reasons.

1. GOs are permanently involved in mutual relations (and interventions on different levels; i.e. economy, diplomatic talks...);
2. civil societies in the areas of crisis are usually weak, low-option, desorganized and with little maneuver space. Even if civil societies abroad would mobilize, they would not find a relevant (powerful) partner in the areas of crisis to work with;
3. crisis itself generates a need for specialized NGOs locally and it is normal, that NGOs needed in crisis do not exist or exist in a very weak and insignificant level;
4. The civil population in former Yugo was confronted to strongly armed military institutions; wild and out of any civic control. No peaceful demonstration of force could stop them.

This is why it was not to expect that NGOs could play a major role in order to stop the war in Croatia and Bosnia. The main role NGOs abroad could play would be three-fold:

- 1.- to help the creation and the development of local NGOs appearing as a reaction to the crisis; this is of course very marginal activity which proofs results only in course of time. Many ambitious NGOs do not possess sufficient patience and energy for such involvement.
2. - to lobby and watchdog their own governments; a lot of knowledge is requested for such work and most NGOs did not possess one.
3. - to cooperate in humanitarian aid. NGOs from abroad former Yugo were largely involved in this activity since it allows neutral position. But the fact again is, that the needs are so enormous that GO intervention is absolutely essential in the field of humanitarian help and it would be necessary for NGOs to press their GOs to supply humanitarian aid parallel to the efforts to provide

aid in their own, usually very limited capacities.

### The Great Fiasco

The fiasco of Western peace thought on the case of former Yugoslavia manifests clearly in the fact that there is no sense of unity between "peace" groups. If in reaction to cold war a solidarity slogan "peace and human rights are indivisible" unified movements in the East as well as in the West - there is no single word that would appear as a reflection of common understanding or common attitude towards the crisis in former Yugoslavia. Is it because we used to live in a glamour of 1989 successes? Is it because European thought is far too limited to react to experiences that go beyond its borders? Or is it simply because the analysis in 80-ies was just too weak? Something is clear, we were used to simplify and generalize. The issue of human rights and democracy seemed to us universal. Now it is clear that the human rights norms and the principles of democracy might be universal but the application of both vary due to complexities of particular micro-cosm. In the Yugoslav crisis a great part of "Western" mind could not escape the old habit of "generalizing" and "overall solutions", while understanding a very narrow angle of perception. It seemed as if the good old new age slogan got converted into "think locally act globally". Seminars are held about the New World Order, while the mind got completely stuck on the Balkan case representing a hologramic structure of the World disorder and injustice.

### We are Living, We are Dying

The peace movement in Slovenija collapsed because it could possibly not satisfy the (local and global) demands of time. The expectations were high (locally and globally) our methods and knowledge far too limited. The movement had to dissolve in order to allow necessary change in approach.

Last but not least, the discontinuation of lifes of beloved Petra Kelly and Gert Bastian personalyse the controversies of Western pacifism. The period of creativity and active-enthusiasm of eco-pacifism in Europe is over. Chief Seattle declared once "The real life is over now. The struggle for survival begins!" Petra did not survive the difficult transition between creative (global) mind and painful, patient (local) struggle on the margins of public eye. She did not sur-

vive the transition between articulation and manifestation of the ideas. Spontaneously, we would wish Petra was murdered by racist terrorists. Then we could think it as a heroic, victorious sacrifice of "our" struggle. But there is no "our" struggle at the moment. There is no "Western", no "European" cause. Petra died in privacy, without any public message. No declaration, no final word. Our minds are left free to contemplate and think about what does that mean for all of us. I feel Petra died within each one of us. Petra, great idealist, protagonist of "think globally act locally", Petra trying to get involved a little bit everywhere - finally faced with incredible difficulty to remain active in Germany, in her party, in her very close, local environment... I can feel Petra has died to remind us, what has to be buried in order to survive. Let her soul rest in peace.

Hope many others will survive. Many people come to the region of former Yugo and do a silent, modest, valuable job that hardly some people know about. They don't have neither time nor intention to sell their story to the media or to self-promote themselves. Yet, many people still play the game of media-campaigns and promotion. In the case of former Yugo the difference between the effectivity of both is evident. ■

## Yugoslavia, between militarism and nonviolence, Intruder

### Yugoslavia - Between Militarism and Peace Culture

By Marko Hren

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#### 1. Military and armed formations

##### Past - the creation of Yugoslav Peoples Army

There are several historical facts which should be taken into consideration to better understand the role of the military in Yugoslavia. The first union of South Slavs (Serbs, Croats and Slovenians) was created soon after the first world war. The main if not the only motivation for unification was the one of military security in relation to south as well as to the north (Dalmatian interest to find security in relation to Italy, Serbian in relation to Bulgaria, Slovenian in relation to German influence etc.). The "old" Yugoslav army dissolved at the very beginning of the second world war - offering no resistance to occupiers. Some remainders of it formed or joined to extremist national troops (četniki in Serbia, ustaši in Croatia, bela garda in Slovenia), some joint partisans, some went into exile. Second Yugoslavia was formed after the second world war. Beside security issue a new motivation entered to bring South Slavs together - ideological unity due to socialist revolution and the self-declared victory of communists. The army and communist ideology became one and formed a secret trinity with political system. All politicians were communists, many of them had high rank positions within the army, military had its people in parliaments and in all decision making bodies on all levels. Revolutionaries, communists, soldiers - they were all one. Communists are soldiers of permanent revolution - that was a self-explanatory saying. A cult of the just army of the brotherhood of the south slaves' nations was created, a positive image of the revolutionary army who fought victory during the war was taught in schools, an image of united Yugoslavia prevailed over all. It was necessary for power elites to maintain ideological and military union which degenerated in highly militarised totalitarian and centralised system. The slogan used for the army - Yugoslav Peoples Army illustrated the great pretenders idea very clearly. Split with Stalin soon after the war resulted in creation of total defence system and in implementation of self management socialism. The former to protect against a possible intervention of Soviet Union and the later to make Yugoslavias' policy look different from the socialism in USSR.

##### Limited sovereignty of republics

The doctrine of Total Defence system was elaborated for external enemies and was built on hypothesis of united population cooperating in the defence. All political inner enemies of the state were eliminated at the early stage of their public activity. To structure well the three-fold defence system (permanent army, territorial defence and civilian self-protection) limited sovereignty of particular republics had to be respected and implemented. Federal Army was built of conscripts (all male after 18 years of age were conscripted) and in case of mobilisation also of reservists. Federal army was under centralised authority of Belgrade government and generalstab. The territorial defence system was subordinated to the presidencies of particular republics and was composed of reservists, who accomplished their regular military service and were conscripted into territorial troops which meant they had to answer occasional mobilisations, call ups for additional trainings etc. Civilian self-protection was a large network of civilian organisations, structures within communities, enterprises etc. and was under authority of communities. Due to communist monopoly in all fields and on all levels, communist party was a forum where all three parts of the defence concept were linked and coordinated to finally appear as one centralised system of militarisation of society, but structurally it was designed as decentralised system, respecting sovereignty of particular republics. Slovenian territorial defence was using slovenian language, its budget was from Slovenian government, its commander was a president of Slovenia. It is important to note that police forces were also always under authority of particular republic governments.

The sacred trinity of military-ideology-political system was shaken well for the first time with systematic opening of the issue by democratic and social movements in Slovenia in the early 80-ies. The main requests were: political pluralism, demilitarisation, deideologisation of military, depolitisation of military, demilitarisation of political and social life etc. In other words, the destruction of secret trinity. The military was well aware that such destruction automatically means a destruction of Yugoslavia and this is why they reacted immediately naming our work contra-revolutionary, hostile to the state and anti-Yugoslav. On the other hand we were not aware of the fact laid down above and we couldn't really understand that democratising Yugoslavia means destroying it completely. We were not aware enough that the only thing keeping Yugoslavia together was the military and the ideology.

##### The beginning of an end

The consistent work towards demilitarisation, human rights and pluralisation of life in Slovenia created more and more tension with Yugoslav army and with federal (communist) authorities. The core activists working in this field were more and more exposed to threats and criticism which finally culminated in a plan elaborated by federal military to assist political hard-liners in the final fight with "contra-revolutionaries". Fortunately (or not) the secret military plan arrived in the hands of activists closely associated to the peace movement and information got spread in the society. This pushed hard liners to act quickly and the imprisonment of three activists in May 1988 has followed. The military court had violated all basic principles and human rights, including the constitutional right to use Slovenian language. This made Slovenians make a clear decision - Yugoslav army is no more Slovenian. That was at the same time the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia and federal military became an enemy no. 1 of Slovenia. Slovenians would never accept it again. At the same time, important parallel was going on in Kosovo, a region of Albanians in Serbia. Struggling for their rights, Albanians met harsh repression and Slovenians solidarized with their struggle. This made the conflict between Slovenia and Serbia coming into place. At that time, most of people in the rest of Yugoslavia still believed in Yugoslav army and couldn't understand slovenian frustration.

##### Balkans - a military culture

Second world war and the fight against fascism was as we can observe today, only a camouflage for nations on the territory of Yugoslavia to fight with and within each other. The militarised nature of cultures living there manifested in a most brutal way when great number of people died not of the hand of nazi regime but in civil war type clashes. To prove the revolutionary role of communists the "winners" of the war did simply characterise all other armed groupations fighting second world war as collaborators. Great number of "collaborators" were executed, many emigrated. The totalitarian regime did not allow any discussion about the trauma. The trauma continued in exile and in many private homes. The problems were never approached, they were pushed under surface and were boiling slowly, waiting for the lid to open up. Our generation was not and could not be aware of seriousness of the issue. We all stare open eyes now observing how much hatred there was under the skin of the "brotherhood of the nations". As soon as there was enough room (as soon as quasi democracies were installed) the frustrations exploded to the surface. Yugoslavia is witnessing a big-bang of a regime which arrived to its dead end.



## 1990/91 in Slovenia

Opposition in Slovenia was united for the first time already before the trial against Janša, Tasič, Borštnar and Zavrl (Fall 1989). The first initiative to draft a declaration on democracy and pluralism came from the coordination of social movements in early 1988. The Committee for the protection of human rights had continued this work as a first round table framework for the resistance to Belgrade regime. After the release of all three the round table was joint by Slovenian officials who in the mean-time got rid of hard liners co-responsible for the "trial against the four". Peace movement and in general the ideas of peace education, demilitarisation, right to Conscientious objection were widely supported by Slovenian public and also by politicians.

It is not by chance then that one of the first measures of Slovenian government elected April 1990 was to recognize CO and to put an end to sending recruits to YA. One after another the concrete steps were made to separate territorial defence structures from any rule of Belgrade and to increase the degree of sovereignty of Slovenia also on military/security field. The struggle for the authority over the stocks of military equipment began and late 1990 the supreme commander of territorial defence of Slovenia arrived in conflict with Slovenian authorities because he was loyal to the rule of Belgrade. He was soon replaced but before that - in October 1990 a first military action happened in Ljubljana when the headquarters of Slovenian territorial defence were occupied by federal troops.

The relation between Slovenian and Yugoslav hierarchies were becoming worse and worse to finally manifest in violence in May 1991 in Maribor. The event during which one civilian person died happened after Slovenian territorial defence called the first set of recruits to be trained in a training center in Maribor and federal military had surrounded the training center which provoked large resistance of civilian population. The conflict was successfully negotiated but the accumulated tension on the spot has led to a first victim of "Slovenian Independency". One-sided measures of Slovenian government made military hierarchies nervous and they planned worse possible scenarios. Slovenian authorities were, as it seems now, fully informed about those plans, and prepared well for 26. of June (when they planned some crucial measures of independency) follow-up.

Croatians did also think about their own defence system, but they mainly recruited people into special police forces, forming also units of National Guard. Slovenian authorities have throughout past decades strived to keep territorial defence under authority of Slovenia and were actually conceptually ready to take it into their hands completely. It was not the case with Croatia. Territorial defence had much less structural value elsewhere in Yugoslavia as it had in Slovenia. At the same time in nationally mixed areas in Croatia and specially in regions where Serbs form majority, units led by Serbs were formed. From August 1990 on, starting in the area of Knin (the main communication point between Zagreb and central Dalmatia) more and more paramilitary troops came into existence to protect Serbian minority against Croatian rule. There is no doubt that Croatian policy towards Serbian minorities was if not oppressive at least passive and as such allowing the rising fear of possible discriminations. Most probably nobody has yet counted all different and independent paramilitary forces, police troops, armed civilians, terrorist groups etc. on the territory of Croatia and Bosnia. A full page of such forces could be listed here. Each town can be a case on its own. Yugoslavia is highly militarised on all levels: federal state, each republic separately and civilian population.

### The blame of YA

Intervention of YA in Slovenia after 26. June was a blame. Not only that the military had proved that it is willing to act against its own people, but they did it in such a naive and clumsy way that they met mistrust of large portion of public opinion also outside Slovenia. The "war" in Slovenia was one big mistake of all parties involved. Fortunately they all got soon aware of it and had stopped it. Many people elsewhere in Yugoslavia got aware that their sons and brothers are dying in Slovenia for one only reason - to keep the STATUS QUO in Yugoslavia. Many recognized that the YA was nothing else but an instrument in hands of totalitarian regime - or better saying - is a totalitarian regime by itself.

## Yugoslav army is no more Yugoslav and no more Peoples

Federal army is ideological (antidemocratic) and centralistic (pro-Yugoslav). It was structured under proportional rule - each unit was composed by people of different nationalities. It is a powerful body which struggles for survival of its employees. Its problems are the budget, lack of recruits and strategical miss conception after they have to fight against its own people who are doctrinally a basic part of its system. Now they are only recruiting people on the basis of hatred against Croats, Muslims and Albanians. Slovenians, Croats and Macedonians disobey to get recruited. Many Serbs and Bosnians as well as Montenegrins do as well under a threat of punishment and Court Marshal. Slovenia initiated the final destruction of the Yugoslav army by not sending recruits any more and by putting an end to the budget. During the intervention in Slovenia, federal military largely dissolved - thousands of soldiers and officers quit the army. This was a big test of YA and an experience through which YA learned how to restructure and how to behave in the new conditions, where it is no more Yugoslav and no more Peoples army. It became a military force of pro-Great-Serbian project. *Vuk Stambolović*, an outstanding anti-war activist from Belgrade explains that three biggest forces have joint into war machinery trying to meet their common goal - a creation of new, big empire: Post Communist elites in Serbia and Montenegro who wish not to lose their power, Federal Military personal and lobby which need a big state to feed their needs and Serbian extreme nationalist wing which dreams of Great Serbia.

After recognizing that it can not be effective in Slovenia since the consensus in population is clearly showing the will of the people not to nurture it any more, the federal military is now living Slovenia. The decision was made soon after the end of aggression in Slovenia (early July 1991) and we were aware that the decision was largely influenced by the rising crisis in Croatia and by the fact that YA could not control such a quantity of problematic regions as are represented by Slovenia, Croatia and Kosovo. The military simply moved from Slovenia because they badly needed all forces to act in Croatia and elsewhere.

The combats in Croatia were going on localised in particular areas throughout the past 12 months.

Most usual pattern of the conflicts at the initial stage was the following: the right wing policy of Croatia created a lot of political tension, Croats even replaced people in some police stations in towns where Serbs form majority. This created resistance and bad feelings, provocators and Serbian extremist used it to make propaganda for violence and sooner or later Serbs decided to occupy the police station, Croatian guard would then intervene, the armed confrontation would begin and YA would enter the conflict as a neutral force. The result would always be, that Serbs would win some territory. Gradually the official corps and the population armed themselves to a high degree, and the political clima got ready for a general confrontation. After the aggression in Slovenia, the atmosphere reached the boiling point and it was not difficult to find an occasion for fights on all territory of Croatia. (editors note: more about the scenarios of war read in the interview with Vasvija Orašćanin).

### Final remarks

Yugoslav army is an army on its own, with strong support from Serbian and Montenegrin leadership. It would be impossible to say that it has popular support in any of the societies. Most of the officers are Serbs with the exception of the navy and aviation where Slovenians and Croats are (were) predominantly recruited. Most probably the assumption that Croatian officers in JA navy forces still fight against Tudjman's army because of aggressive anti-communist attitudes of Croatian authorities during the last year is to be considered important.

Yugoslav army have proved again that each army turns against its own people. When a JA helicopter was shot down in the middle of Ljubljana, a pilot of Slovenian nationality was found dead in it.

The wars in Yugoslavia offer a huge field of references for antimilitarism and abolition of all armies. Its brutality bombing Croatian cities, its open turn on the side of Serbian political line and on the side of Serbian minorities in Croatia confirm that no army can be neutral - neutrality was what Yu army had always claimed. Army is always on one side - on the side



of oppressor, on the side of dictators. Yu military is now playing with those, whom they think they can win with.

Bosnians until very recently could not understand why Slovenians struggle so much against YA. Now they understand and feel betrayed by YA. Also some circles in Belgrade gathering around AntiWar Campaign publicly pointed to the real problem of Yugoslavia lying in the existence of pouchists army which is at the same time strongly supported by Serbian political line. This assumption of Belgrade group was made after one military plane has bombed one village in Serbia near Croatian border apparently lost in the fog and several people were killed. The mere existence of the powerful military lobby is a problem in any state and specially in the state which is more and more poor and under stress. Beside, the YA depend on ideology upon which it has been built and through which all of its members were drilled during past decades. One could even suggest that many officers in YA most sincerely believe, that they are defending brotherhood of YU nations and that they struggle against extreme nationalist regimes in particular republics with all justification.

It is therefore impossible to simply speak about civil war in Yugoslavia. The overlapping of ethnical struggles on nationally mixed areas with interstate conflict (Serbia, Croatia) and with the conflict due to dissolution of The Military/Ideological/Political trinity makes it impossible to apply any general picture on Yugoslavia. This was our basic argument also in communications with some of our friends in Belgrade who tended to make an overall and general judgement about Yugoslavia as a state which is in civil war due to ethnical problems and extreme nationalist regimes installed after the fall of communist regime.

#### Perspectives

Federal military is rapidly becoming a Serbian army. Moving its arsenals from Slovenia and Croatia mainly to Serbia and Bosnia, Serbia with its allies Montenegro and territories that it tends to occupy in Bosnia and in Croatia is becoming the most militarised, and the most well armed (per capita) region in Europe. Milošević can only maintain in power until the wars are faugt.

Long on going low intensity warfare in nationally mixed regions will go on for years. Extreme right wing forces will institutionalise in extremist political parties and in guerilla forces in Croatia as well as in Bosnia and in Kosovo. In Slovenia and in Croatia republic armies already exist and in Macedonia it will most probably be installed soon. No change of borders or of formal political arrangements on the todays territory of Yugoslavia can bring solutions, only the change of relations can - and that is where the opportunities for peace and antimilitarist movements are.

#### Note of a pacifist

When asked for the opinion about different military structures now in Yugoslavia, asked about whether I justify any of it and whether any of struggles can be described as a just war, I often recall a common story of rape - when a man violates a woman after the woman was behaving in provocative way in a bar. Some people argue there is no ground for prosecution in such cases. The only way to deal with such cases is to separate the discussion about the "crime" of the particular side. The crime of a woman who acted or behaved in a provocative way is incomparable to a crime of a violator. The crime of Slovenian government taking unilateral and provocative measures rising its degree of sovereignty is incomparable to a crime of federal army making an aggression. The crime of Croatian authorities lacking active approach towards guaranties for the Serbian minority within Croatia is incomparable to destruction that YA is performing all over the Croatian cities. No violence of a parent against a child can be justified. Even if a child is nutty and provoking it doesn't give a right to a parent to exercise brutality. No brutality can be justified. Of course it is true that all armies are bad - antimilitarists and pacifists should not take sides in any armed conflict - and it is most often true that all sides are at least in some ways responsible for the conflict. But when imperialistic wars are fought or when genocide has been performed the abstention in taking sides is no more relevant. When we tend not to justify any violence we have to - at the same time - differentiate between the attitudes of the different sides and avoid generalizations. We can just not say that both a victim and a violator are guilty for the rape in the above

mentioned story. Federal military and Serbian forces fusing into one force are to be taken as a most serious danger for the Balkans. The problem of Serbian expansionistic policy has to be approached as an isolated phenomena and it doesn't help much if we would say: "well, Croatian side is comiting crimes too". We have to use different words for different cases and violations of human rights. Federal military and Serbian forces are lurching the only imperialistic aggression currently on the planet. The Serbian politics performed cultural genocide in Kosovo during the past few years and is potentially dangerous to continue it also on the physical level.

The biggest problem we will have to deal is how to prevent the creation of highly militarised Serbian empire. Serbian regions in Croatia are only used as a tool and as a motivating item. Croatian authorities made a big mistake not fully and actively promoting democratic principles for the minorities and this way demobilise that tool. The violence comitted by Croatian side has to be approached with different means comparing to the violence lunched by Serbian/military side. This is important to know since we are constantly put under the pressure to justify violence (justify wars) and to take sides. I'm strongly of the opinion, that none of the two is necessary and can be overcome by differentiated approach towards particular sides comiting violence. All sides deserve criticism and need an active approach to change their policy. But all sides are not at all equal.

## 2. Antimilitarism and peace activity

### Past

Civil society in general in Eastern European countries was not structured. Maybe the only exception is Solidarity in Poland. At the same time civil society in these countries created a false image of powerful entity and many observers commented it as "civil society in Eastern Europe is strong". This bias was due to the fact that civil society was relatively united around the idea of a necessity for the change which in other words meant it was united to withdraw the monopoly of the totalitarian regime in power. People will always struggle against authority which doesn't yet mean that they will at the same time struggle to build something new replacing the old authority. To put it more clear. The idea to withdraw party monopoly and install democracy was not enough. Democracy without structures of civil society (independent thinking, movements, independent lobby organisations, NGO's etc) can easily divert into another totalitarianism. Newly installed Democracies in former real-socialist countries have swallowed most of organized civil society (opposition). The rest (the most) of civil society yet remained desorganized and powerless. The non-existence of structures of civil society is the biggest problem keeping alive the regime in Serbia and is the principal obstacle for promotion of peace politics in the areas of crisis. We could not expect the conflicts to be solved in nonviolent way when there was no visible pacifist tradition in Yugoslavia except for the work done in Slovenia in the 80-ies. In the moments of such a stress as we are experiencing in Yugoslavia today, the deeply rooted cultural patterns manifest. The cultural space in Yugoslavia was dominated by military and patriarchal patterns, a kind of macho mentality comparable to Central American one. Slovenia deviated enough from this pattern to be able to go beyond massive use of violence and allow space for negotiation and peace politics. We could risk a following hypothesis here: the conflict between Slovenia and the federal state was resolved relatively peacefully and quickly due to the peace culture developed through years of promotion of the issues of peace education, conscientious objection, demilitarisation and active peace politics. Let us give a little closer view on the peace activities in Slovenia in the past few years.

The peace movement came into appearance in Slovenia in early 80-ies, together with growing (sub)cultural activity, independent media and other social movements. Its projects and activities were from the beginning focused towards consciousness rising and therefore towards formation of the new cultural paradigm. The fields of action were varying from education in kinder gardens through school systems to the relations towards military and political hierarchies. Peace movement demanded democratisation of life, demilitarisation of society and of political structures and deideologisation of the same. Peace movement in Slovenia maintained close contacts and cooperation with Eastern, Western and other peace, human rights and solidarity organizations. It was always cosmopolitan rather than national-state oriented. It met vast support in population. The idea to recognize conscientious objection as a basic

human right was largely supported in the second half of 80-ies by all levels of political and public life in Slovenia though the idea was strongly opposed by regime in Belgrade. In The education system we successfully abolished all military subjects and the project of Slovenia without an army met a large support even early this year. According to public polls made in February, more people supported Slovenia without an army than Slovenia with its own army. With a global strategy of the project for Slovenia without an army we successfully promoted the issue of demilitarisation and active peace policy in public as well as on the level of state diplomacy. The idea was promoted in civil society and more than hundred groups in Ljubljana alone joined in the campaign for reconversion of military barracks for cultural purposes in the town. We did systematic lobby for demilitarisation and promotion of peace policy amongst all political parties which came into appearance in 89/90, we achieved that 5 political parties (one of them forming governmental coalition and two of them in opposition) have joined the idea of Slovenia without an Army and we achieved that an Interparliamentarian Commission for Peace Politics was established in Slovenian parliament. The issue of alternative security concept for the state of Slovenia, including the option of Slovenia without an army was repeatedly discussed in the highest bodies of the republic responsible for defence, but most intensively in the Council for security at the Presidency of Slovenia. In February 1991 a Declaration for Slovenia without an Army has been widely distributed and more than 25000 signatories collected. The Declaration was signed also by president of the state, mr. Kučan, three other members of Slovenian presidency, member of federal presidency Dr. Drnovšek, several ministers of the government of Slovenia and a number of known figures in Slovenia.

Now it is more and more clear that Slovenian pacifist posture was understood mainly in the relation to Yugoslavia. Its antimilitarist notion was understood as anti-Yugoslav army, the peace education was understood as comparative to patriarchal militaristic south, conscientious objection was understood as objection to Yugoslav army. When slovenians now have the opportunity to reflect their own army, the antimilitarist thinking is getting more and more lost behind the veil of national euphoria, ego(nacio)centrism, elitism and run from the poor south (joining the rich). As far as we can see today, Slovenia is loosing rapidly the opportunity to promote itself as an outstandingly peaceful community, though it was successfully promoting its difference in comparison to other Yugoslav states.

#### 1991 - a variety of peace and anti-war movements arise all over the country

Unfortunately the peace minded people in Yugoslavia did not manage to open enough space for their activity before it was too late. There were some movements and initiatives which also included pacifism and antimilitarism on their agenda. In the mid-eighties this was Svarun movement in Croatia (joining environmental, feminist and spiritual issues) and some predominantly environmental movements in Vojvodina. Other movements dealt mainly with the issue of human rights and democracy. In 1988 the peace movement in Ljubljana, which was at that time the only "specialised" pacifist and nonviolent movement in Yugoslavia, initiated a process of signatories to the peace treaty amongst citizens of different nationalities in Yugoslavia and gathered hundreds of people around the country but there was not enough strength for an effective network to manifest. Later on a Peace and Democracy circle appeared in Belgrade and together with some people from old Svarun movement which reappeared as Green Action group we together contributed to the Helsinki Citizens Assembly process. Unfortunately also this connections did not result in any effective activity and did not meet any large support amongst people. Civil society was therefore completely unprepared for the period of crisis. The new democracies installed in particular republics were even less prepared for any constructive approach to the subtle and dangerous transition period before Yugoslavia.

A first popular movement which dealt with the issue of military was initiated by parents of soldiers in Slovenia early 1991. At that time Slovenia already decided not to send recruits any more to Yugoslav army, but a number of recruits from Slovenia were still serving their military duty all over Yugoslavia. Parents were specially worried about the soldiers serving in the areas where the crisis was more and more reaching the point of escalation. The main demand of parents was for their sons to come to

Slovenia and complete their duty in Slovenia. This was not an anti-militarist idea and parents explicitly rejected any discussion about pacifism, nonviolence and peace policy. They said they didn't want to discuss ideologies. After the aggression of federal troops in Slovenia many similar movements appeared all over the country. They expressed themselves in different way but official demands they had in common - soldiers should serve their term in their own republics. This strategy of parents not rising anti-militaristic arguments, made it possible for right wing forces to manipulate the movements and use them to promote national campaigns. Meeting of mothers in Serbian parliament during the aggression in Slovenia for example ended with demands for Serbian soldiers to return from Slovenia and fight for Serbian thing and not get victimized in a war that Serbia has no interest in. Antimilitarists in most cases lost the opportunity to bring their issue into these movements.

A number of initiatives were taken all over the country by women circles and movements, spiritual groups and special profession like medical doctors and psychiatrists. The movements and initiatives are joining together on different basis - groups in Vojvodina and in Belgrade joint for example in Centers for Anti War Activity. The only initiative which is trying to link all groups throughout Yugoslavia is The Anti War Campaign from Zagreb. The first meeting was held in Kumrovec in the mid- August and basic principles for the activities were agreed. Amongst them, the affirmation of nonviolent methods and the emphasis on the process not on political solutions are outstanding. The meeting also agreed to focus activities on long term basis being aware that the conflicts are of long on going nature. There were some actions on all-Yugoslav level already before - like the first Helsinki Citizens Assembly meeting of partners from Yugoslavia in Sarajevo in May 1991 and the meeting for peace upheaval in July 1991 again in Sarajevo, but none of the two provided concrete follow up activities. The problem really lies in the fact that local groups do not have neither a policy nor a good inner structure. A lot of time and resources will be needed to develop local movements in such a way that they will be able to offer continuous work.

At the moment the peace initiatives in Yugoslavia have some symbolic value. Many of them clearly show that we, the people, don't want to play the game of power elites. There is a large number of people who respond to this call and object to conscriptions and mobilisations. People in all republics came to awareness that military is against them: examples of Belgrade spring, Kosovo, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia have clearly shown that military has no other goal but to preserve its interests in the power game. The peace initiatives are in many cases targets of extremists in their own societies, since they are understood as opponents to the main stream national struggles. Specially in nationally mixed areas in Croatia and Bosnia this is the case and a number of moderate people who advocate dialogue and reconciliation had to leave their homes to avoid prosecution.

In the time of escalation it is very difficult to come up with pacifist notion. The power of extreme mainstream is just too strong. Nevertheless there were successful cases of resistance to the military specially in the rows of federal army during the aggression in Slovenia and nowadays amongst mobilized rezervists in Serbia, who rejected to be transported to Croatia and Bosnia. Although it is not to forget to grow resistance as an immediate response to growing violence, it is impossible to grow too much hopes concerning the success of resistance in stopping war. There are just too many different armed groups created in the area and the culture is just too militarised for the violence to be overcome with small number of resisters. We will have to invest much energy to prepare for a long on going work on local level. The peace movements will have to train a number of people for local organizing and actions directed towards trust building, reconciliation and nonviolent conflict resolution. The awareness of possibility of successful negotiations on local levels is essential, since experiences show that developments in different areas largely depend on local authorities (military as well as civil) due to the fact that central authorities do not function effectively neither on federal nor on republic levels. A good example for this was laid down during the conflict in Slovenia, where a large degree of conflict was solved by negotiations between representatives of local communities and the army officials from the barracks in the affected area. The regional approach in conflict resolution is even more to be taken seriously concerning the fact, that Croatia is by its traditional unexistence of homogeneity or central authority, a set of relatively auto-



mous and culturally very diverse units; namely, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Dubrovnik area, Istria and Zagreb area have never in history formed a common, sovereign union.

### Conclusion

The creation of peace culture is the only way for assuring lasting peace. People in Yugoslavia will hopefully learn this after the experience of this year, when there was no external factor drawing them into violence (as it was the case in the past). Hopefully the movements and individuals which appeared during the past few months will systematically continue their work and spread qualities of nonviolence and anti-militarism. A lot of work will be needed to empower and train people for their individual action for peace and reconciliation. The extremely high concentration of weaponry in the area will have to be approached by processes of demilitarisation. Particularly this would be desirable for the areas of most difficult demographic configurations and specially for the areas which request more autonomy (for example the republic of Slovenia, the Knin area, the island Vis, the area of Dubrovnik, Istria etc.). With the help of international mediators this could be put on the agenda of negotiations. On the level of civil society the crucial point is the creation of independent structures through which the movements will articulate and spread their ideas. But all things mentioned above will meet no success until the demands for democratization of life in Serbia are fulfilled and opposition will be prosecuted.

### Footnote

The contribution was written in a lack of time for deep analytical reflection and is therefore to be taken as an essay contributing one angle of the story. It does not pretend at all to cover all crucial arguments about the topic and

it did consciously avoid the ambition to name all initiatives which took place for peace in the territory of Yugoslavia. Many important examples were left out, like the actions of women from Bosanska Dubica organizing a march to Zagreb and to Belgrade, but there will be enough time to make history. Let me only conclude, that we are well aware of the fact, that we were too late in approaching the growing violence in Yugoslavia. We did our best in Slovenia, to create enough peace culture to resist the totalitarian regime with the power of pride and nonviolence. We could prove that we had some success. There was no similar activity elsewhere in Yugoslavia and we know that there is no other way but to start hard work with people. Only a new paradigm determining the culture can replace the patterns of violence and military. There is enough experience, a lot of people of good will and a lot of strength to go for the job. The international peace community can play a great role specially in giving moral support to peace initiatives in Yugoslavia, visiting them and trying to understand the diverse local problems. Yugoslav complexity can not be understood and can not be approached with "digest fast" method. Understanding diversities is of primarily importance. Only then we can discuss what approach and what kind of cooperation we can have in certain region. If not done so even actions of very good purpose can turn contraproductive. The presence of international community is therefore of crucial importance for it gives power to the activists, brings in knowledge and experiences from other parts of the world and (hopefully) makes people come back home with more understanding of something, which is so hard to explain and was for years mysteriously called Balkans.

Ljubljana, 1. October 1991



# Yugoslavia in Pain

By Marko Hren

The word Yugoslavia itself in a title nowadays tells everything. As a word "Gulf" did when it was pronounced some months ago. We hurry with the issue of The Intruder for the WRI Trienal meeting in Belgium, late July. The issue was ready to be printed before the armed conflict in Slovenia. Now we have to include at least some information on the crisis, and please excuse us for the chaotic structure this time. We did not throw out all articles which were written before, for a very simple reason - for readers to be able to follow our way of thinking before the major crisis happened.

*We are not keen to create a thought pattern of "War in Slovenia" or "War in Yugoslavia", or "A little War in Balkans" as Sky News are telling you. Most of the world was speaking about "civil war" which has no ground at all for Slovenia. The very simple reasons are:*

1. In Yugoslavia, there are several different levels of conflicts, interrelated but also separated, on local and on global plane, horizontal (between nationalities) and vertical (between old system and new processes). The conflict in Slovenia has completely another dimension and roots as the conflict between Serbs and Croats in Croatia, the question of Bosnia is again another story, not to speak about Kosovo, Albanians, Macedonia, Montenegrin internal conflict (also armed) between Whites and Greens etc. This conflicts manifest in different ways, which can not be simply described with WAR. We should rather use terms which approach reality more closely: terrorism, civil war, hegemonism, military coup etc. In the case of Slovenia, 26. June, we could speak of intervention of the federal state in combination with soft military coup.
2. The word War implies that there were two parties (good and bad guys). In the case of Slovenia the "other" party was not defined. Sometimes they called it "occupation army" sometimes "enemy", sometimes simply "Yugoslavia", some people even identified the enemy in "sSerbs" in general. It is still not clear, whether the activity against Slovenia was directed by the federal Government or by military itself. The word War implies that there was a beginning and an end. The crisis in Slovenia did not start on 27. and did not end on 7. the July. It is much longer process. And too complicated to be described or understood with generalizations.
3. The word War implies that there is a victory at the end. In Slovenia the development of events is already interpreted as victory of Slovenia, and since the crisis was interpreted as war, the victory is interpreted as victory on military field. This we find false and dangerous. It is not the Slovenian military and police which won, but civil disobedience (several hundred soldiers disobeyed and deserted from the federal troops, several officers in Slovenian territorial defence did not want to obey orders requesting them to attack federal military troops, hundreds of people in Serbia and elsewhere in Yugoslavia objected the mobilisation after the military confrontation escalated etc.), negotiations, and international mediation.
4. Sometimes it seems that Slovenian elites which want to

create a state, needed war, to make a state. Prime minister of Slovenia said during the conflict "we declared the independency, and now we confirmed with blood", president of Slovenian parliament declared "that we have to pay price for the independency" and he noted that "all states until now have been born in wars". East Germany needed no war to separate from Soviet block.

We wont use term War then, regardless the fact that we did use it in our previous documents included in this issue. The problematization of the word War and its importance was discussed during the "war" in the so-called PEACE CIRCLE, a discussion club which was meeting even during the most tough days, when false alarms were driving people in shelters, when military planes were in the air and the roads were empty or filled with military and police.

An armed conflict in Slovenia started during the morning of June 27., the morning after this day of independence and a night of drunk celebration on the streets all over Slovenia. Slovenia declared independence during a session of its parliament exactly six months after a referendum was taking place (26. December 1990) where 92% of citizens of Slovenia voted for independence of the northernmost Yugoslav republic.

The declaration of independence would be an empty phrase without execution of some practical steps. And Slovenian government decided for one practical step that would follow immediately after 26. And this was a question of custom duties and concerning this also a control of international airports located in Slovenia. At the same time they replaced the symbols on the borders of Slovenia (Slovenia is bordering Italy on the West, Austria in the north, Hungary in the East and Croatia in the South). The morning 27., military had sent tanks to a number of border passes and to the airports. What followed was a resistance with largely nonmilitary means. The conflict ended with international involvement of mediators, signing Brioni declaration on 7. July 1991. The Brioni declaration was then confirmed by Yugoslav Presidency and by Slovenian parliament. This was a precondition for the start of talks and for cease fire in Slovenia. Another unpredictable event followed 18. July during a first session of federal presidency, where for the first time after two months period, all members of this supreme body of the federation, were present. The decision is, that federal military will move from Slovenia within the next six months.

The analysis of the conflict in Slovenia will be published in future issues of The Intruder. At the moment of editing this

issue, we can only include the most important parts of the documents of the peace movement issued during the days of crisis.

Since armed confrontations and the dangerous of further escalations are forthcoming throughout Yugoslavia, we will concentrate our efforts in future to be able to present you a wider picture on Yugoslavia. There are anti-war and peace movements arising all over the country. At this time we only include some of the documents from Sarajevo meeting of peace initiatives (20. July) and of initiatives in Belgrade. The whole documentation on peace and antiwar activity will be completed soon.

But for now, here are some useful addresses:

**Knjinski mirovni pokret, Centar za kulturu i društvena gibanja** c/o Dario Seraval,  
Tomšičeva 5, 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia tel. +38-61-215171, fax. +38-61- 215855

**Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence,**  
Mestni trg 13,  
61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, tel. and fax. +38-61- 224666,  
fax.(on line) +38-61- 328887

**GAMA (Citizens Action for Peace),** Miladin Životić,  
Hotel Metropol, Bul. Revolucije 69  
11000 Beograd, Serbia, tel. 011-752244, domicile, Tel.  
011-330911, fax. 011-332991

**ŽEST - Womens party**  
Sv. Markoviča 4 11000 Beograd, Serbia tel. 011-334706

**Center for AntiWar Action,**  
ZoranCerović,VesnaPešić,  
Zmaj Jovina 12, 11000 Beograd, Serbia, Tel. 011-624027, Fax. 011-181471

**Helsinki Citizens Assembly/Slovenia** c.oSašoGazdić  
Mestni Trg 13, 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenija, tel.and fax.  
061-224666

**Helsinki Citizens Assembly/ Serbia** c.o Sonja Licht  
Omladinskih brigada 216/13, Blok 70, 11000 Beograd,  
Serbia,  
tel. 011-154882, fax. 011332940

**Womens Organization,** Savka Todorovska  
Orce Nikolov 164, Skopje, Macedonia Tel. 091-255261

**Djordji Marjanovićm, Ligue for Democracy**  
Ulica 856 br. 72-6, Skopje, Macedonia Tel. 091-518589

**Ibrahim Spahić, Gradjanski forum, Citizens Forum**  
Dobrovoljačka 11, Sarajevo 71000, Bosnia, Tel. 071-214884, 071-38245, fax. 071-216238

**Nermin Butković, Društvo Slobodne Misli, Assotiation of the Freedom of Thought**  
Dobrovoljačka 11, Sarajevo 71000, Bosnia, Tel. 071-214884, fax. 071-216238

**AntiWar Campaign Zelena Akcija**  
Radnička c. 22, p.p. 876, 41000 Zagreb, Croatia, Tel.  
041-610951, Fax. 041-612615

The groups mentioned above did meet on Saturday 20. July in Sarajevo, after the initiative given from coordinating committee of peace and anti war initiatives that was constituted in Ljubljana. Besides the groups given above, also various committees for protection of soldiers serving military service and several other women and parents initiatives were present. At the same time, anti war and peace demonstrations happened in Ljubljana, Maribor and Skopje. A common declaration against war was read during all demonstrations. In Sarajevo, where there was a central meeting, about 30 representatives from all mentioned groups gathered and discussed common project in future. Later during the day, they made a demonstration in the town of Sarajevo, during which a role of 25 meters long paper was enfolded for people to write and draw their feelings and thoughts about the escalated conflict. Several projects were agreed. The basic point we all agree is that we have to say NO to the war and start with civil disobedience. On Tuesday, 23. July, press conferences will take place all over the country and people will be called to join demonstrations on Saturday, 27. July.

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## A story of the Unique opportunity Intruder, July 1991

### A Story of The Unique Opportunity



The idea of Slovenia Without an Army was launched in 1989 by The movement for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence. The movement was of course strongly impressed and encouraged by these fantastic Swiss people, having a referendum on abolition of the army in Switzerland in November 1989 and reaching a hardly believable score of 35.6% of people for the abolition. During the autumn 1989 the idea of Slovenia Without an Army was fully adopted by Liberal Democratic Party, a year later by Green Party of Slovenia, and during this spring also by The Party of Democratic Reform, The Union of Social Democrats, The Party of Grey Panthers and partially by Slovene Socialist Party. The idea for Slovenia Without an Army is supported by more than 80 social groups joining Metelkova Network, the Network, of which the goal is to convert the many military barracks in urban cities for civilian use, mainly for cultural and social activities. The final touch of the campaign was initiated early this spring with the Declaration for peace, which was until now signed by more than 25000 people national-wide. Amongst first signatories of the declaration which we publish herein in a whole, were Dr. Janez Drnovšek, member of presidium of Yugoslavia, four members of Slovenian presidium, Mr. Milan Kučan, Dr. Dušan Plut, Mr. Ciril Zlobec and Mr. Matjaž Kmeč, several ministers of Slovenian government and hundreds of well known figures of several professions and interests.

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This is an identity card of the initiative in a nutshell. The question that is asked most often by domestic and international public is, if Slovenia could afford abolition of the army in this times of crisis accompanying the process of independence. How can idea of abolition of the army grow in the atmosphere of tension? Is non-armed option possible in the case of Slovenian independence?

#### What are the facts?

1. Slovenia decided on the plebiscite, December 1990 for independence and is performing it rapidly. The last event was Jun 26. when independence was formally declared in Slovenia as well as in Croatia.
2. Yugoslav army still controls Slovenian land. Federal Government still controls a series of state functions.
3. As a part of official defence doctrine of Yugoslav total defence, Slovenia had developed a widely structured system of Territorial defence and is now upgrading it in direction of

Slovene national military force. It is based on general conscription as compulsory attribute of male citizenship.

4. International politics does not support independence of particular republics in Yugoslavia.

The idea of the peace movement was, for Slovenia to promote itself by offering to its neighbors a peace zone on its territory. The idea was, to execute all decisions in nonviolent way and in a spirit of consensus with Yugoslav partners. Slovenia has good grounds on which it could base such a strategy - a decade of civilian resistance and social struggle for democracy. It is hard to judge whether the federal institutions were more violent before than they are now. Democracy was won without any repressive force and once achieved, the state decided to defend it with military means. The fact is, that Slovene government did not decide to continue the process of self-determination with nonviolent means.

A further and important fact is that the dialogue in Yugoslavia is hardly possible. Federal institutions do not work, federal presidency (at the same time supreme commander of the Federal military) does not exist any more, there is no frame for the negotiations.

The peace movement suggested several alternative ways for conflict resolution. But the government rejected them. Of course it did, everybody would say. But it was not so obvious for us here in Slovenia. We did grow hopes that the garniture which came into power from "our circles" would be much more brave and decisive and would draw a different line, based on tradition of nonviolent social struggle throughout 80-ies. But this did unfortunately not happen. The peace movement and all political groups, who joined the idea had made a lot to draw the line of the government in the direction of qualities described above, but were not successful. The biggest opportunity was missed by The Green Party of Slovenia, which is a part of the Governmental coalition. They had a chance to block the appearance of the Slovenian Army, but their parliamentarians did not use the chance. They rather voted for repressive measures. The Greens in Slovenia had unique chance to play a decisive role during the process of initiation of the state. But they got lost in uniformity of governing coalition.

The opportunity to abolish the army with a political decision is gone for a time. And so is lost the opportunity for Slovenia to promote itself with the qualities of demilitarization, democracy and human rights. And so is lost the opportunity for Slovenia to contribute a large share of peaceful input into the solution of Yugoslav crisis. On contrary, military lobby is constituted in Slovenia, military mentality is built after the idea of the honorable Slovenian soldier was lunched and promoted, the conflict with Yugoslavia remained unsolved and creates stress and crisis each now and then, and finally, Slovenia promotes its independence by showing muscles, uniforms and new border check points (with the republic of Croatia). The result is (and will perpetuate) in more military mentality, in more violence on streets and in violent nationalism which penetrated in the character of Slovenians. Slovenians are becoming more and more close minded, racist and violent.

The peace movement did its best to change the course. It was of the opinion, that strict loyalty to the idea of nonviolent struggle would enable Slovenia to satisfy its goals. Slovenian government did not buy



## How can idea of abolition of the army grow in the atmosphere of tension? Is non-armed option possible in the case of Slovenian independence?

the idea regardless the fact, that quite

some friends from the democratic opposition came into most crucial power positions (inner minister, Mr. Bavčar, was a head of Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, defence minister, Mr. Janša, was collaborating with the Peace Movements throughout 80-ies, foreign minister, Mr. Rupel, was active in oppositional revue Nova Revija and in other intellectual and cultural movements, etc., all contributing to the publication of the peace movement, that you have been receiving throughout 80-ies - Independent Voices from Slovenia), many of the measures Slovenian government decided for were passed on the basis of one-sided decision, and particularly the issue of the Slovenian army created lots of tension with the federal state. The peace movement was of the opinion that patience and strict insistence on democratic procedures and negotiations could lead to more peaceful results.

The international politics did not help much the nonviolent conflict resolution. Its united reaction "that they (USA, EC, particular states) would not support the independence of particular republics in Yugoslavia, does not help much. International politics did once again loose a chance, to request and assist the process of nonviolent conflict resolution and negotiation. It did not sufficiently offer the services, offices and knowledge for such process and it did not use its powers for Yugoslav republics to sit and negotiate. International politics did fall again. It issued its position instead of giving its assistance into a process of negotiations.

So, everybody actually failed again and

the result will be bad. There will be a series of long-on-going low-intensity conflicts on the land of Yugoslavia (Serbs in Croatia, Albanians in Serbia.), manifesting in terrorism of Northern Ireland type and in large militarization of societies. The peace movement in Slovenia will insist on the abolition of the army in Slovenia, since it believes, that in this way, Slovenia could invest (time, energy, money) into social, political, environmental, cultural etc. sanation of military thinking and military hardware. But at the same time the peace movement is aware, that we will have to deal with much more day-to-day violence, both, state and subversive terrorism, racist nationalisms and reviving of patriarchal structures. This is the reason why we hurry building structures for work which is inevitably in front of us. Structures for peace in a scheme of the Active Global Peace Policy, which includes scientific centres (peace research), education programs (peace education), community organizing (movements), political lobby and relations to state diplomacy.

Since the abolition of military (thinking and hardware) did unfortunately not become a domain of the official policy, the work will have to be done by people themselves. There is an option for direct democracy (referendum requested from below) in Slovenian constitution and we are getting ready to use this option and ask the people to abolish the army by themselves.

By Marko Hren

June 26<sup>th</sup> 1991

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FEATURE

# The way into violence is everywhere — where is the exit?

History never stands still, least of all when you hold a Yugoslav passport and have just gone abroad. Away from Slovenia for a few days, MARKO HREN heard reports of all hell breaking loose in Croatia. On his return, he made for Zagreb, where he continued his travel diary for *Peace News*.

**Itinerary: Ljubljana-Vienna-Toronto-Vienna-Zagreb-Ljubljana (11-19 September)**

You might not think that these towns have anything in common, besides being on the same planet. But they do, and not only that I travelled through them all in just over a week. Thesetowns are linked by many people who seek emigration from Croatia.

The plane I took from Vienna to Toronto — to participate in the International Peace Bureau (IPB) conference — was full of emigrants from Croatia. We all got visas at the Canadian embassy in Vienna. The embassy in Belgrade is too difficult to reach — connections with Belgrade almost don't function and a few days ago telecommunications were also cut.

It is estimated that more than 200,000 people in Croatia have left their homes. Most of them have moved to other parts of Croatia or to Slovenia; many Serbs have flooded into Serbia, and many Serbs as well as Croats have joined their relatives or friends from previous waves of emigration to North America.

## Vienna: making an exception

The Canadian Embassy in Vienna is far from showing sympathy to a Slovenian travelling to Canada. They ask many questions, despite all the documentation showing that I have no intention of staying in Canada. "For four days only?" And my passport is full. I argue that it is difficult to obtain a new passport because of the non-cooperation between ministries at the republic and federal level.

"And who is this Steven Dankowich signing the invitation?" Steven is involved in ACT for Disarmament and has a good record with the Canadian and US intelligence services. One of the best activists — his personality, skills and knowledge are a real example. I love him. But it seems that the Canadian Embassy doesn't.

## Toronto: hot, humid, and bad-tempered

Finally I got the visa with a comment

unlucky having incredibly bad leaders (read "warriors"). In the Soviet Union, a decisive factor was probably that there was a relatively moderate leadership in all the crucial republics and in the personality of the federal president.

## The news gets worse

On my first morning in Toronto, the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* had Croatia on the front page. Stipe Mesic, the current president of Yugoslavia, has declared that the military is carrying out a coup; EC observers have declared their mission failed; the fighting has got heavier; the federal military is openly on the side of Serbian troops.

Whenever I have gone abroad in the past few years, something dramatic has happened in Yugoslavia. When I was in New York three years ago, my friends from Mirkro Ada (a computer cooperative) were put in a military prison, and that was the start of rapid changes. Three years? Is it true, that three years passed so quickly? It must be since my son Ram is two and a half now, and he was not alive at that time.

A year ago, when we were in Kiruna, Sweden, for a War Resisters International social defence conference, the military for the first time seriously intervened with force in Slovenia, occupying the territorial defence headquarters in

that the EC had failed in its mission, they dedicated 10 minutes to draft the resolution.

My additional argument was that it would be a lost opportunity if the peace movement was not among the first calling for the internationalisation of the conflicts. It sounds crazy but a few days after the IPB conference, the Canadian government was the first to demand that the UN should get involved in the Yugoslav crisis. Who knows, perhaps the IPB even inspired the Canadian government — the whole word seems to be under magical influences, why shouldn't the peace movement try some?

## The stampede technique

One Canadian peace researcher I spoke with opposes unconditionally any discussion about independence movements. She could not finish our debate. My view is that basically that we have to take these movements as existing reality, existing social forces. We cannot call their goals illegitimate; we cannot even say their ideas are bad. As long as there are authoritarian structures (like monolithic centralised states), there will be movements for independence — and the less they have the freedom to seek autonomy, the more they will request



KEN SIMONS



Ram and Marko Hren at the WRI Triennial in La Marlagne, Belgium this summer. Ram summited up the Slovenian position on self-determination by announcing to a plenary session "I want to go a little bit outside".

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Finally I got the visa with a comment that they had made a real exception. There was one more check when I passed through Canadian customs at Toronto airport — a half-hour investigation which at the end was said to be an anti-drugs routine. They ask about ACT again, and I'm really proud for them — it seems they have done such a good job that everyone knows them.

The officer asks me if it was bad over there in Yugoslavia. My answer is that it is also bad in Canada — what difference does it make if it is a Canadian or Yugoslav officer investigating you. He answers he was not a militarist but only doing his job. OK, buddy, I get the impression that Canada doesn't want to hear about struggles for independence and one can understand it. Canada has too many of its own: indigenous people and Quebec are all on the list of those seeking more autonomy.

Toronto is hot and humid these days. All the public services seem to be on strike, which makes the city even more hot. I had to ask myself what made me come here. The cost of travel is high, but I thought it might be good to respond to several requests from the organisers for one of our group to join the conference. It is really difficult to choose priorities in these times. There are so many meetings all over the place: people want to understand or at least hear more about what is all of a sudden going on in Yugoslavia. At the same time, there is much to do at home. Everything is burning and the fire is impossible to stop.

I ask myself so often these days why a peaceful "revolution" was possible in the Soviet Union and what has made it impossible in Yugoslavia. There are only two answers I can find. First, Yugoslavia always had a military culture, with strong patriarchal patterns: there was no education for peace and no pacifist tradition. Second, Serbia and (to a lesser extent) Croatia are extremely

territorial defence headquarters in Ljubljana. In May this year, when there was a Helsinki Citizens Assembly seminar in Venice, there was the first military confrontation in Maribor, Slovenia, and the first civilian victim.

It is a strange feeling — being far away for a couple of days and knowing that you are returning to a much more uncertain reality at home. When I think about these conferences abroad, I remember all those warnings and appeals we made — and unfortunately it is all becoming true, more than we could ever have imagined.

The international news reports on heavy battles in the middle of towns all over Croatia. The Croatian government decided to blockade the military barracks of the federal military, after being constantly attacked by the federal military for the past two months. The federal military is now acting openly on the side of Serbian paramilitaries. It is more than clear now: the reactionary forces (federal military, Serbian leadership) united to fight to preserve the Yugoslav empire. They are willing to lose some territory (Slovenia, parts of Croatia) but they are determined to rule over the rest. The Serbian minorities in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo are only referred to in order to use them as a tool to mobilise the masses.

### The UN and the disintegration of the multi-state state

During the IPB conference we passed a resolution recommending UN member states to find ways of activating UN mechanisms in connection with Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (in other words, in the multi-state states which are disintegrating). At first the participants voted against discussing the UN and Yugoslavia as the UN has no mandate to get involved in "internal affairs". But after people heard from the Canadian newspapers that Yugoslav federal institutions no longer work and

autonomy, the more they will request secession — and fight. Whether we want it or not, the borders are changing — qualitatively and geographically. Our role is to bring into the processes of disintegration and liberation the qualities of nonviolence and mutual respect. If we want to save a herd of wild cattle running towards an abyss, it doesn't help to develop theories of how bad it was for the cattle to run in the bad direction. It doesn't help to suggest that they should spread, take it easy and eat grass. It doesn't even help to put ourselves between the herd and the abyss. The well-known way (we can see it in the movies) is to ride faster than the first in the herd, run with it, and try to slowly turn it away from the danger. This could be called the "stampede technique". We used this technique in Slovenia, and with some success.

### Vienna: a long way to Zagreb

It is a long way to go to Zagreb. Landing in Vienna, I buy caviar, salmon and a selection of fine cheese to bring for a little party with beloved friends. For a little party in the midst of a hell. Phone Vesna Jankovic in Zagreb and she tells me they are under constant alert. All towns in Croatia are embattled.

I hope the train for Zagreb will go today and think about possible solutions. Are there any? Can anyone on this planet know? I decided to make a chart of problems in Yugoslavia. The military is on its own and dangerous, losing its dignity and pride. Serbia is under totalitarian rule. The Croatian leadership is bad. Serbs and Croats are in deep anger. There is no positive active policy towards minorities in Croatia. People in Bosnia are in panic, the same in Kosovo.

Pre-conflict, conflict, post-conflict areas. No democracy, no structures of civil society, no pacifist tradition. The way into violence is everywhere. Where is the exit?





# FEATURE


A woman enters the train. We talk about Yugoslavia and about New Age movements. She is very critical of New Age philosophy, especially the idea that people manifest the conditions according to their inner state of being. She is critical about the escapist and detached nature of New Age movements. Nevertheless, I tell her, in Zagreb a good part of the anti-war campaign is formed from the New Age, women's, and green movements.

A man comes in. He is from Istria. He is afraid of being conscripted when he arrives home. He says the federal military is conscripting Serbs, and the Croatian National Guard Croats. He doesn't want to fight but sees no solution. He will have to go. I tell him the solution is for people to object to going to fight and he agrees but says it is impossible to object — "they come and take you away; if you do not go, they kill you".

After the border between Austria and Slovenia, there are only a few of us going to Zagreb. Everybody is deadly silent, contemplating his or her own thoughts and fears. How will it look when we arrive?

## Zagreb: caviar and bombs by candlelight

The train was on time — 8.50 pm. The station in Zagreb is in complete dark-



A Serbian woman weeps as Yugoslav federal artillery — supposedly there to "protect" Croatian Serbs — pound nearby villages from the barracks in Petrinja, eastern Croatia.

After the news, we sit down to have this wonderful party. And as soon as we sit down the battle in the neighbourhood begins. The mortar fire and shooting then last the whole night. Caviar and bombs. We talk, cannot sleep at all. We can only have a little candle on — there is no electricity. The house is trembling with the detonations. Vesna only says: "Sometimes I ask myself which movie I'm in. It can't be true".

This is the most powerful experience in her life, she says. I try to remember mine. And there it was: sitting in a shel-

the budget. We think we should have at least three full-timers to work on a newspaper and on organising workshops for local organisers, media-tion and nonviolent conflict resolution, especially for those people who will return to live in their villages hoping to live again together, Serbs and Croats.

There will be a lot of work after the war. We are all aware of that. The sooner we start the preparations the better. And anyway — it is good to work in the middle of this panic. In the evening we call some more people. Only of them

- revitalising democratic (parliamentary) institutions on the republican as well as regional levels in Croatia
  - revitalising cooperation and communication on parliamentary and governmental levels between Serbia and Croatia
  - Croatian foreign policy and the support of civil initiatives for peace.
- We were all happy with the meeting and at midnight we noticed that we hadn't heard any shooting for a couple of hours. Silence — what a gift! We enjoy

ASSOCIATED PRESS



The train was on time — 8.50 pm. The station in Zagreb is in complete darkness. The whole town is in darkness. Even if Vesna had come to meet me, we could hardly find each other. A policeman says there was an air-raid warning a while ago and there is no public transport. The only way to go is by taxi, or walking. But there are fights in the town and snipers shoot all over the place — they say. The first taxi driver doesn't want to take me there, saying it was near the military barracks where the most severe battles are. I ask him to use CB radio to call another taxi: "CB isn't working, this is a war". Shit. CBs are the only things that always work. After half an hour another taxi comes and the driver is sceptical. "We will never arrive there, the roads are blocked in that direction". I ask him to go as far as he can and he finally agrees. He couldn't believe his eyes when we pass through all the main roads and drive there without any problems — except having to drive with the lights off. In complete darkness I find the right entrance to Vesna's house — pure luck!

After a short warm welcome, we both stare at the TV where Croatian president Franjo Tudjman is holding a press conference. He is talking about the peace treaty with Carrington, Milosevic and military chief Kadijevic. Tudjman's lack of respect for the treaty is shown by the papers he holds folded in his pocket: finally he gets the right one out and reads it. They all agreed to suspend fighting until noon the next day. A journalist asks how long Croatia will go on signing peace treaties when we all know that after each treaty the conflict escalates even more. There was no answer. Tudjman only says that Europe has now confirmed that those responsible for the war are the federal military and the Serbian leadership, he doesn't mention at all the Serbian people in Croatia. How bad. Until negotiations are started with the Serbs living in Croatia, there can be no solution.

This is the most powerful experience in her life, she says. I try to remember in Ljubljana two months ago. Ram had asked me to give him some water. "I have none", I said. He looked at me and repeated, "I want to drink". With his two-year-old eyes and mind, I strongly experienced the feeling of a parent who cannot give their children the basic things they need. What a pain.

Make love not war. It really helps and even gives the impression that the fight had stopped for a while. God knows how many misled young boys have died tonight in the Yugoslav army. I remember all the conscripts who have asked me during the last year what to do. I always answer, "Better to hide some months in a garret than to go to the military". At least some of them are now happy to have done that.

In the middle of the night, an old friend from the Svarnu movement (a group in Zagreb from the mid-70s) phones from New York. He heard the news on CNN and cannot believe that Zagreb itself has become a battlefield. Vesna tells him it was all more than true. He says that Americans have invented a new term — "Yugosecond" — describing a period between a peace treaty being signed and the moment it was first violated.

### Organising between the sirens

Wednesday, 18 September. As soon as we wake up, I phone the WRI office and tell the news, tell we are fine and will try to meet in the evening with the Anti-War Campaign. Howard is wonderful — he is always there, he is always everywhere. He was in Zagreb two weeks ago. In his report he said that Zagreb was not Beirut nor even Belfast. Now it is both. Air raid alarms sound throughout the day. We stay in the flat. Between two air raid warnings Vesna Tetselic, another activist from Green Action, uses the opportunity to come over. We elaborate a project for establishing a Peace Centre in Zagreb. We do

anyway — as good as we can. In the evening we call some more people. Only of them manage to come, both activists in the Anti-War Campaign, Zoran and Ivica. We finish the budget and the concept for the Peace Centre in Zagreb and start a discussion on internal democracy and the structure of the group. The situation is even more subtle since most activists are unemployed and in a difficult financial position.

We work out procedures for the meetings, rules of the game for learning democratic dialogue and decision-making. We agree that internal democracy of the group is a central issue for long term work. The next part of the meeting we dedicate to a set of proposals that we will send to the Croatian authorities. We work out seven headings for developing an active peace policy for the Croatian state:

- the use of language and the creation of enemy images
- attitudes towards minorities
- attitudes towards the federal military

## Army: massive refusal in all republics

Conscripts from every republic have refused the latest call-up to the Yugoslav federal army, including large numbers of Serbs. When Yugoslav President Sipe Meacic denounced the federal army as "out of political control" and called for draft resistance, desertion and disobedience of orders, he was only following what was already happening at the base.

In almost every republic, there is massive draft resistance and desertion. It began in Serbia which normally provides 40 per cent of the army, but — unlike in most other republics — Serbian resisters are going against the republican government and therefore are at risk. As well as the federal army

heard any shooting for a couple of hours. Silence — what a gift! We enjoy it and discover a value of times of peace. Go to sleep and sleep long.

The morning news includes a war anecdote: Croatian authorities have issued a decree in Zagreb that each citizen can demand identity documents from chimney-sweeps. Apparently some snipers were dressing as chimney-sweeps to climb onto roofs and shoot at the streets.

### Ljubljana: leaves are falling

We have one more meeting during the day and then we go to the station. The train leaves for Ljubljana on time. Travelling home I notice it's autumn. Forests are getting yellow. In Ljubljana I already enjoy the chestnut leaves under my feet. My thoughts never move from the people in Croatia. I feel powerful and powerless at the same time.

Green Action Zagreb, Radnička cesta 22, pp876, YU-41000 Zagreb, Croatia (tel +38 41 610 951; fax 612 615)

now consisting largely of Serbians and Montenegrins, many reservists are being sent to the front to make up for the shortfall in conscripts.

In Croatia, some of the young men not reporting for the federal army are instead joining the Croatian National Guard — indeed, this is what the Croatian mothers' group Shield of Love wants them to do. Others are in hiding or going to other countries to avoid military service.

In view of the unsympathetic attitude of most countries' immigration authorities, War Resisters' International appeals to peace movements to work for the right to asylum for Yugoslav (and other) war resisters.

