Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen
EXPERIENCE, POETRY AND TRUTH: 
ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
ERNST JÜNGER’S THE 
ADVENTUROUS HEART
This essay is dedicated to Dr. Chiara De Franco in appreciation of 
her love and support.
Ernst Jünger (1895–1998) was a German writer, entomologist and soldier 
mostly known for his literary masterpiece Storm of Steel (1920); an autobio�
graphical account on his experiences in the trenches during the First World War. 
Several commentators have emphasized the philosophical qualities of Jünger’s 
works. Most notably, Martin Heidegger engaged with Jünger’s writings and cor�
responded with him personally on topics including nihilism, modernity and 
technology.1 Nevertheless, Jünger’s works yet have to be fully recognized by in�
ternational phenomenologists.2 This essay is an attempt to, uncover some of the 
phenomenological themes present in Jünger’s The Adventurous Heart (1938), a 
work of poetry that offers sophisticated insights hidden under a colorful and 
imaginative prose.
The Adventurous Heart is thematically dense and bears resemblance to a 
maze in that it lacks an apparent logical structure. It is polycentric and frag�
mented with numerous entry points, meaning that it is open to different – and 
1 Vincent Blok, »An indication of being – Reflections on Heidegger›s Engagement with 
Ernst Jünger«, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 42 (2011), p. 194–208.
2 For some of the exceptions, see: Günter Figal, For a Philosophy of Freedom and 
Strife, trans. Wayne Klein, SUNY Press: Albany 1998; Thomas Sheehan, »Nihilism: 
Heidegger/Jünger/Aristotle«, in: Burt Hopkins (ed.), Phenomenology: Japanese and 
American Perspectives, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrect 1998, p. 273–316.
61
possibly even conflicting – interpretations. I have not written this essay under 
the illusion of offering an exhaustive investigation of every phenomenological 
theme of this particular work. Rather, the purpose of my analysis is to show 
that The Adventurous Heart, despite its poetic and esoteric character, ought to 
be regarded as a work of phenomenology. Seeking to substantiate this claim, 
I consider Jünger’s views on truth, subjective experience and poetry. In fact, 
Jünger not only uses poetry to convey his philosophical ideas, but also to show 
how we as human beings come to a deeper understanding of the world. Jünger 
holds poetic language in high regard, calling it “true language.”3 Poetry is spe�
cial, he argues, because it synthesizes two of our cognitive faculties, namely 
embodied perception and disembodied understanding. 
I
Before taking a closer look at Jünger’s view on poetry, however, we must first 
clarify his notion of truth in relation to other phenomenological contributions. 
For Jünger, truth is irreducible to the factual truth of the natural scientist and 
the realist philosopher. Rather, truth is more profound in that it does not merely 
concern empirical facts. Truth is synonymous with extra�sensuous facts that are 
hidden from – but nevertheless connected with – our everyday experiences. He 
writes that the world’s “secrets lie exposed on the surface” and that “only a mini�
mal adjustment of the eye is required to view its wealth of treasures and won�
ders,” thus acknowledging that subjective experience is linked to truth.4
Jünger tacitly counters traditional metaphysics and the idea that the phe�
nomenal world exists independently of our experiences. On his view, the sub�
ject and the world are mutually constitutive, meaning that the individual has 
decisive influence on things perceived. He underlines this in the following 
lengthy quote as he recounts his experiences of a city during a sunset:
3 Ernst Jünger, The Adventurous Heart – Figures and Capriccios, Telos Press Publish�
ing, Candor  2012, p. 17.
4 Ibid., p. 73.
62
PHAINOMENA XXVI/100�101
Shortly before sunset, a startling game of colors transfigured the city. 
All things red and yellow began to stir and awaken; they took on the 
hues characteristic of nasturtium flowers. The old tiled roofs in partic�
ular resembled bolsters of red chalk–overflowing reservoirs radiating 
their surplus light energy […] Incidentally, this lighting seemed so ex�
traordinary to me that in observing the faces of people on the streets, I 
was surprised to see that they were not alarmed by it.5
Evidently, knowledge influences our perceptual experiences, thus render�
ing neutral observations impossible. This is evident from the associations to 
‘nasturtium flowers’ and ‘red chalk�overflowing reservoirs’ which are deeply 
subjective and, in the case of the former, reflects Jünger’s personal interest in 
botany. Also, they underline the subject�relative dimension of perceptual ex�
periences which, consequently, are affected by the perceiver’s personal history. 
Other people will inevitable have different associations, and due to this a “par�
ticular fright lies in the awareness that one is alone in being affected by a sig�
nificant spectacle.”6 Individuals have different experiences of what, objectively 
speaking, is the same phenomenon. This is in line with Merleau�Ponty’s view 
of perception. He argues that the act of perception and the thing perceived are 
mutually constitutive, and that sensuous impressions convey a meaning irre�
ducible to a thing perceived or a given stimulus.7
Truth, Jünger holds, is concealed in the outset, but it may nevertheless be 
revealed by the subject. For instance, he writes about penetrating into “dis�
guised chambers that are less subject to gravity and the assaults of time.” He 
elaborates that thinking “is lighter here–in an incomprehensible instant, the 
mind harvests fruits it would not otherwise gather in years of work. The differ�
ence between present, past, and future also falls away.”8 So although we experi�
ence the world in authentically in our everydayness, we have the latent possi�
bility of experiencing truth by venturing into the world’s extra�sensuous realm. 
5 Ibid., p. 24.
6 Ibid.
7 Maurice Merleau�Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, Routledge, London and New 
York 2002, p. 86.
8 Jünger, op. cit., p. 19.
63
RASMUS GAHRN�ANDERSEN
At this point it makes sense to draw a parallel to Heidegger and his assumption 
that inauthenticity “has possible authenticity as its basis.”9 Thus, although the 
subject has fallen prey to the practical concerns of the world, she has a tran�
scendental relation to it. For Heidegger, this relation enables her to fall prey in 
the first place. But, he argues, one may come to experience authenticity by su�
perseding one’s practical engagements with the world. Consequently, the “self 
is brought to itself.”10 As a matter of fact, Jünger also holds that authentic self�
assessment demands an “extraordinary level of enlightenment.”11 However, he 
explicitly relates this to realizing truth since reality’s extra�sensuous domain 
allows man to find “the right measure by which to assess himself when he 
stands at the crossroads.”12
He introduces an experiential stance called stereoscopic sensibility which, 
according to him, enables the subject to realize truth. Below, I consider this 
stance in further detail. But before doing so, it is important to stress how 
Jünger’s phenomenology differs from that of Husserl although he also assumes 
that truth can be realized on the basis of a special experiential capacity. For 
Husserl, we experience truth by means of a disembodied intellect (i.e. a pure 
ego) that “occupies a completely isolated position as opposed to all that is real” 
and requires a degree of reflection.13 Conversely, stereoscopic sensibility im�
plies that at least some aspects of truth realization are embodied and pre�re�
flective. For instance, the feeling of dizziness is a way for us to know that we are 
in authentic contact with a given phenomenon. In principle, this feeling can be 
experienced by anyone, meaning that one does not need to take a reflective or 
intellectual stance towards the world. The commonality of this kind of sensi�
bility is underlined by the fact that “everyone has at least once felt how people 
and things have been illuminated in certain significant moments, perhaps to 
such a degree that dizziness or even a shudder overcame them. This is true in 
9 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, SUNY Press, Albany 2010, p. 249.
10 Ibid.
11 Jünger, op. cit.,
12 Ibid., p. 19.
13 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomeno-
logical Philosophy – Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1989, p. 107.
64
PHAINOMENA XXVI/100�101
the presence of death, but all significant powers, beauty for instance, elicit this 
effect–and we can ascribe it to truth in particular.”14 Jünger considers the reali�
zation of truth as something that pertains to our existence as human beings. 
The purpose of these brief considerations has been to clarify some of the 
basic similarities and discrepancies between Jünger and key figures in the phe�
nomenological tradition as to how they consider experience and truth. The 
overall aim has been to validate the claim that The Adventurous Heart is a work 
of phenomenology. I continue this thread by clarifying how Jünger considers 
the subject’s relation to truth. In the following, I show that we may come to 
realize truth in a number of ways that differ in terms of how they lend them�
selves to our everyday activities. Here, the stereoscopy mentioned above is of 
significant importance.
II
Stereoscopic sensibility is a kind of experience that limits to cases involv�
ing perception with more than one sensory modality. Jünger provides several 
examples of this including the following: ”In the aquarium, at the coral fish. 
One of these creatures was superlatively colored, a deep dark�red, striped with 
velvety�black bands, of a hue only possible on this planet at those places where 
the flesh is produced in islands. Its creamy body seemed so thoroughly tender, 
so thoroughly color, that I felt I could push through it with a very gentle poke 
of my finger.”15 The stereoscopy differs from our perceptions in general since 
it allows us to extract two different sensuous qualities with the same sense 
organ.16 For instance, one might come to sense a color as also having a tactile 
14 Ibid., p. 4.
15 Ibid., p. 15.
16 Ibid., p. 16. By introducing this kind of sensibility, Jünger implicitly contrasts his 
phenomenology with the standard view on perception in philosophy. In Being and 
Time, Heidegger posits that the philosophical tradition has been obsessed with giving 
unjustified priority to visual perception. As a consequence, other sensory modalities 
and cognitive functions have been neglected (Heidegger, op. cit., p. 164–166). Con�
trary to what the aquarium�example suggests, Jünger does not prioritize vision. In fact, 
he explicitly states that all of our senses are ultimately grounded in tactility: “Generally 
speaking, the sense of touch, from which all other senses derive, seems to play a special 
65
RASMUS GAHRN�ANDERSEN
value. Jünger’s example with the aquarium suggests that truth can be realized 
in relation to what some might call ‘mundane’ everyday activities like seeing a 
beautiful fish or an outstanding piece of art.17 So although stereoscopic experi�
ence comprises a special kind of perception, it occurs in our everyday life.
Specifically, this kind of experience constitutes the point of contact be�
tween, on the one hand, our embodied cognitive comportment towards the 
world and, on the other hand, the world’s extra�sensuous structures. For 
Jünger, it is by means of stereoscopic sensibility that we acquire a deep and 
nuanced impression of a given phenomenon. Epistemologically, however, the 
relation between stereoscopic experiences and the realization of truth is far 
from clear: In fact, it is a paradox that stereoscopy not only reveals the world’s 
extra�sensuous dimension, but also conceals it. This is evident from the follow�
ing observations:
Stereoscopic sensibility is a mediate – rather than an immediate – expe�
rience. Jünger underlines this by stating that the stereoscopy makes us feel 
the play of our senses moving as “a mysterious veil, like a curtain on the 
marvelous.”18 The veil metaphor shows that stereoscopic sensibility conceals 
parts of reality. One reason for this may be the fluctuating nature of our sensu�
ous experience; a fluctuation that Hegel explores in the first part of his Phenom-
enology of Spirit where he considers sense�certainty and perception.19 Jünger 
posits that it is difficult for us to retain our authentic perceptual engagement 
with things. For instance, he states that: “Alongside the shaping and cultivating 
done by institutions, there exists a direct relationship to the world, from which 
primal power accrues to us. Our eyes must retain the power, if only for a mo�
ment, to see the works of this earth as if on their first day, that is, in their divine 
magnificence.”20 However, our experience remains to be affected by the world 
because our perception continuously changes due to novel sensuous impres�
sions and because the stereoscopy occurs only in a particular instant.
role in perception” (Jünger, op. cit., p. 17).
17 Ibid., p. 40.
18 Ibid., p. 18.
19 G. W. F. Hegel,  Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1977, p. 
58–79.
20 Jünger, op. cit., p. 59.
66
PHAINOMENA XXVI/100�101
Also, Jünger introduces a more fundamental notion of truth by arguing 
that we must steer clear of empirical facts in order to gain access to “spiritual 
centers” that are “unapproachable by ordinary senses and more unknown than 
the dark side of the moon.”21 As the stereoscopic sensibility is enabled by our 
senses it is evident that these ‘spiritual centers’ are closed off from this experi�
ential stance and, thus, cannot be disclosed by means of it.
For these reasons, the stereoscopic sensibility is dialectical and furthermore, 
it fails to reveal truth once and for all. Rather, it oscillates between revealing 
and concealing truth, meaning that the emergent glimpses of truth are insuffi�
cient for bringing about a stable truth realization. On my reading, stereoscopic 
sensibility involves a continuous experiential flow that gives us a brief but far 
from exhaustive sense of the world’s extra�sensuous dimension. The dialectical 
nature of this kind of sensibility suggests that we have to progress beyond our 
sensuous experience in order have the necessary stability.
Jünger argues that there is a way to secure permanent access to the extra�
sensuous. In order to do so, he holds, we must abandon our sensuous per�
ception and experience the world by means of a particular cognitive faculty 
that is different from our senses, namely spirit [Geist]. Our spiritual capacity 
allows us to bridge the apparent divide between, on the one hand, the domain 
of the sensible, and, on the other hand, the extra�sensuous domain. In this 
connection, Jünger introduces the elusion as a mysterious and vaguely defined 
meta�logical figure that reveals truth. When using this figure the individual 
abstracts from sensuous givens. In contrast to stereoscopic sensibility which 
is commonly occurring, this figure is only available to a small group of indi�
viduals. Jünger underlines this as he refers to the teachings of the imaginary 
philosopher Nigromontanus:
Nigromontanus could tell us of solitary spirits, whose dwellings, 
though they seemed to be in our midst, were in an absolutely inacces�
sible world. Accustomed to the purest, highest grade of fire, they came 
forth only when the proximity of the highest danger made the transition 
21 Ibid., p. 19.
67
RASMUS GAHRN�ANDERSEN
tolerable for them. But he also felt that anyone who moves actively in an 
inverted orientation to the world and is capable of the elusion for just a 
moment should already be considered fortunate.22
This possibility of dwelling suggests that the elusion may bring about a 
more stable and long�lasting experiential relation with the the world’s extra�
sensuous realm than what can be achieved by means of the stereoscopy. Par�
ticularly skilled individuals (i.e. the few of the few) are thus faced with a choice 
when stereoscopic sensibility occurs and they begin to feel dizzy:
They may choose to stick to their perceptual attitude. Consequent�
ly, they would then live through their senses, and experience truth in 
glimpses due to the presence of the so�called veil, or;
They may decide to engage more deeply with truth by using the elu�
sion. Thus they would come to explore the world on the basis of their 
spiritual faculty while neglecting their perception.
Stereoscopic sensibility relates to something more profound than our eve�
ryday experiences, but it is nevertheless enabled by such experiences. As we 
shall see next, the stereoscopy reveals truth to both layman and poet thus com�
prising a source for valuable insights and inspiration.
I have argued that, for Jünger, truth may be realized in at least two ways, 
namely, either by means of stereoscopic sensibility or the elusion. Now, I con�
sider a third option that is available to the skillful poet and relies on poetic ar�
ticulation. In this connection, Jünger also nuances the phenomenon of spirit as 
he explicitly links truth realization to the faculty of understanding. This third 
way of realizing truth does not imply that one has to abandon one’s sensuous 
engagement with the world, meaning that Jünger grants us the possibility of 
realizing truth without, at the same time, losing sight of the sensuous richness 
of our experiences.
22 Ibid.
68
PHAINOMENA XXVI/100�101
III
The faculty of understanding is crucial to Jünger’s view on poetic articula�
tion in that it enables the author to experientially engage with the world. In 
fact, the poet is not only able to realize the extra�sensuous aspects of a particu�
lar phenomenon, but also to communicate these insights to her readers.
Jünger assumes that the poet is informed by means of her stereoscopic 
sensibility. Experientially, to gain access to a phenomenon implies grasping it. 
Jünger indicates this by stating that the poet uses her so�called ‘inner pliers’23 
in order to ‘grasp’ and ‘hold on to’ the truth.24 In doing so, he presents grasp�
ing as an extra�sensuous activity, as he explicitly links it to the individual’s 
ability to uncover truth. Our understanding enables us to transcend the dia�
lectical movement of “ ‘revealing�concealing’ ’’ caused by the stereoscopy, thus 
allowing us to experience a phenomenon’s extra�sensuous aspects. So instead 
of being tied to our sensuous experience which is immediate and relative, our 
ability to grasp is enabled from within. It thus comprises a cognitive activity 
that relies on a spiritual capacity.
I will now take a closer look at what grasping truth implies. According to 
Jünger, it is by means of grasping that we come to understand a particular phe�
nomenon while we gain insight into “the secret harmony of things.”25 In other 
words, we come to have a rich intuitive understanding of the interrelatedness 
of certain phenomena. Jünger’s tacit notion of ‘the grasped’ thus differs from 
Plato’s notion of εἶδος. Plato considers εἶδος to be synonymous with the uni�
versality of a concept in the sense that a given concept refers to an atemporal 
essence; an Idea.26 Conversely, Jünger does not see truth as being traceable to 
concepts which represent static ideal types existing in an extra�sensuous do�
main. Instead, he emphasizes the dualistic nature of the content that emerges 
from a grasping: “Every meaningful phenomenon resembles a circle, whose 
23 Thomas Friese translates the German word “Zange” to “claws.” However, I find the 
English term “pliers” to be more accurate.
24 Ibid., p. 17.
25 Ibid.
26 Plato, The Republic, Penguin Books, London 2007, p. 337–338.
69
RASMUS GAHRN�ANDERSEN
periphery can be traced by day in fullest clarity. At night, however, the periph�
ery disappears and the phosphorescent midpoint shines forth […] In the light, 
the form appears, in the darkness, the procreative power. Our understand�
ing is such that it is able to engage from the circumference as well as at the 
midpoint.”27 This distinction between a phenomenon’s surface and depth – or 
its form and procreative power – emphasizes that our experiences are fallible. 
Each of its dimensions hides the others, meaning that our engagement with 
a given thing at hand necessarily involves focusing on either its surface or its 
depth. Also, Jünger states that what is grasped essentially relates to the stereo�
scopic experience and the subject’s dizziness or fear.28 In other words, it is tied 
to a particular situated and embodied encounter.
I have clarified how grasping, considered as a spiritual ability grounded in 
the faculty of understanding, allows us to realize truth without requiring us 
to abstract away from our situated, embodied encounter with the world. I will 
now turn to the role that linguistic concepts play with regards to overcoming 
the apparent duality of the grasping. 
IV
Jünger sees poetic articulation as being different from both stereoscopic sen�
sibility and the elusion. Considered in isolation, however, linguistic concepts 
have no truth value. Nevertheless, he argues, language has the general capacity 
to dissolve the apparent conflict between life’s surface, on the one hand, and its 
depth, on the other.29 In other words, it is by means of poetry that we are able to 
supersede the dialectical movement of the stereoscopy sensibility.
27 Jünger, op. cit., p. 12.
28 Ibid., p. 17.
29 Ibid., p. 3.
70
PHAINOMENA XXVI/100�101
According to Jünger, the creative process of writing is necessary for realiz�
ing truth. For instance, he refers to the imaginary philosopher Nigromontanus 
who has ”said at one point that the world had been given to us in its elements 
like the twenty�six letters of the alphabet – and that the elaboration of its im�
age depended on the texts we wrote. Naturally, one had to be a genuine author 
and not merely a scribe.”30 Articulation is positive and creative. Nevertheless, 
Jünger emphasizes, the poet looks back upon the completed work with the 
feeling of being a forger. He elaborates on this by stating that “precisely this 
reconsideration of already concluded works has special value” since they of�
fer  “a rare opportunity to grasp its language as a whole, to some extent with a 
sculptor’s eye, and to work on it as a single corpus.”31 The literary work emerges 
as the author engages and re�engages with her past experiences. Metaphori�
cally, the literary work is a ‘sculpture’ that is situated in a process of more or 
less constant becoming. Jünger recognizes that articulation skills improve with 
time, meaning that one may come to acquire “a sure hand.”32 
Realizing truth by means of poetic articulation is possible because the poet 
does not only rely on the skill of grasping, but also uses her understanding in a 
combinatorial way. Grasping and combining, Jünger holds, are vital to the crea�
tive process of writing. The skill of combining is important since it allows one to 
obtain a higher insight which “does not live in the separate compartments but in 
the structure of the world.” He continues, stating that this insight “corresponds 
to a mode of thinking that does not move around in isolated and parceled�off 
truths but rather in meaningful connections, whose power to order lies in its 
combinatorial faculty.”33 As the quotes suggest, this faculty is primarily used by 
the poet as she seeks to uncover the extra�sensuous realm. But it is also used by 
the so�called eminent specialist who knows about the genealogy of things and is 
able to distinguish the profound similarities between the world’s phenomena.34 
The faculty of combining also enables the poet to manipulate meanings and ar�
ticulate extra�sensuous insights.”
30 Ibid., p. 74.
31 Ibid., p. 2.
32 Ibid., p. 3.
33 Ibid., p. 13.
34 Ibid., p. 14.
71
RASMUS GAHRN�ANDERSEN
Combining implies a kind of ordering. It entails that the poet orders, or bet�
ter, arranges concepts with the purpose of manipulating their meanings. The 
poet is a kind of skilled technician. Here, we may draw a parallel to Heidegger 
who states that craftsmanship relies on a particular kind of knowledge which 
the ancient Greeks called τέχνη. Heidegger writes that for “Greek thought the 
nature of knowing consists in ἀλήθεια, that is, in the uncovering of beings. 
Τέχνη, understood as knowledge experienced in the Greek manner, is a bring�
ing forth of beings in that it brings forth present beings as such beings out of 
concealedness and specifically into the unconcealedness of their appearance…
”35 The fact that Jünger sees works of poetry as open to revisions also under�
lines that poetic articulation is not a matter of mere presenting insights from 
past experiences. Rather, Jünger’s tacit commitment to anti�intellectualism ex�
tends beyond the basic cognitive aspects of human living as it relates to how 
we express ourselves by means of language and, specifically, how we articulate 
our understanding of past and present experiences. To express truth, he holds, 
the poet must creatively engage with language in the process of articulation. 
This gives evidence to the importance of creativity and skills when combining 
words. For as Jünger writes, every “significant individual work has at least a 
drop of the combinatorial faculty mixed into it–and how inspired we feel when 
we stumble already in the introduction across those simultaneously powerful 
and playful sentences by which sovereignty shows its presence.”36
Importantly, the poet combines words, phrases, tropes etcetera which are 
available to everyone belonging to a particular speech community. As such, 
language is accessible to us as a repertoire and words may have both tacit and 
overt meanings. For Jünger, however, it is by combining words that insights 
emerge in the difference between different meaningful words: “We have count�
less expressions at our disposal in which a plain meaning coexists with a deeply 
concealed one, and what is transparency to the eye is here secret consonance.”37 
It is on the basis of a skillful combination of linguistic units that past insights 
are articulated. Consequently, a transparent structure emerges.
35 Martin Heidegger, »The Origin of The Work of Art«, in Albert Hofstadter (trans.) 
Poetry, Language, Thought, HarperCollins Publishers, New York 1975, p. 57.
36 Jünger, op. cit., p. 14.
37 Ibid., p. 4.
72
PHAINOMENA XXVI/100�101
Jünger sees language as synonymous with “waters that at once stir and are 
transparent” in the sense that language moves and discloses.38 Language is trans�
parent, meaning that it transcends the meanings of individual words and the 
literary work, thus enabling the reader to realize truth. This is possible because 
secret teachings “are concealed in every language of merit.”39 In fact, articula�
tion does not reveal isolated meanings but chains of meanings that emerge as 
a set of intersecting differences. Truth is uncovered as the author poetically 
combines words in novel ways. And it is on the basis of these combinations 
that she reveals truth to her readers.
Language speaks to us, but it also speaks through us as we poetically ar�
ticulate our experiences. And it does so in a spiritual manner due to the fact 
that it is capable of convincing our readers. In fact, Jünger sees conviction as “a 
spiritual act” that should not be confused with simple factual knowing and un�
derstanding.40 Rather, poetic language communicates directly to the reader’s 
intuitive understanding. Also, the “spirit of language does not lie in the words 
and images; it is embedded in the atoms, which an unknown current animates 
and compels into magnetic figures. Only thus is the spirit of language able to 
grasp the unity of the world, beyond day and night, beyond dream and real�
ity, time and place, friend and foe–under all conditions of spirit and matter.”41 
Thus Jünger ascribes a special status to language in that poetic articulation 
makes it possible for the poet to transcend the apparent dichotomy between, 
on the one hand, a phenomenon’s form and, on the other hand, its procreative 
power. Jünger sees poetic articulation as a more viable epistemic alternative to 
perception and pure spirituality because it implies a synthesis that abolishes 
the distinction between perception and understanding. For this reason, poetry 
allows us to experience truth in ways that neither stereoscopic sensibility nor 
the elusion is able to bring about.
38 Ibid., p. 3.
39 Ibid., p. 12.
40 Ibid., p. 11. 
41 Ibid., p. 105.
73
RASMUS GAHRN�ANDERSEN