

## EVOLUTION, GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL HYBRIDS

*Abstract.* Globalization represents a challenge to evolutionary theories of development. In this paper two theoretical paradigms of evolution are examined, transformational (Spencerian) and variational (Darwinian) paradigms, and their social theoretical counterparts respectively. Most social theories are entangled with different evolutionary paradigms. Also, most developmental policies are polarized between globalism, i. e. irrevocable integration into the global market, and autocentrism prone to replace import with exports and to political authoritarianism. Alternatives to such polarizing perspectives in terms of sustainable development, although principally more suitable to most countries, are not entirely or consequently implemented. Basically, sustainable development implicates a combination of the two evolutionary paradigms. More specifically, author expounds the concept of a culturally oriented sustainable development. Further on, he argues that intersections of transformation and variation processes, that produce mixed modalities of the modern development, i. e. societal "hybrids", are more suitable for decent survival than globalization based exclusively on the free market principles. Finally, he presumes that an array of the "hybrids" of socioeconomic and socio-cultural development would be easier to manage over by a responsible world government than by the means of current laissez-faire policy, close to Darwinian or selectionist paradigm of evolution protruded mostly by developed countries.

**Keywords:** *evolution, selection, variation, development, globalization, culturally sustainable development, developmental hybrids*

---

\* Vjeran Katunarić, PhD., Department of Sociology, University of Zadar, Croatia.

\*\* Izvirni znanstveni članek.

## Introduction

“A businessman is a hybrid of a dancer and a calculator”. (Paul Valéry)

Valéry's aphorism on businessman, frequently cited (with over one million citations in English in the Internet), was published in 1927 (Valéry, 1934). At that time the business was an economic activity with awareness that it works in close connection with society, sharing its cycles of hope and despair with the rest of society, ultimately determined by the economic upside-downs. Eventually, the Great Depression in the national economies in Europe facilitated the rise of Fascism. At any rate, a businessman was situated in his corporation less comfortably than today when corporations, mostly banks and financial agencies, operate in a virtual sphere and are fairly irresponsible and insensitive to the fates of the mainstream of the corporeal society (cf. Castells, 1998). In this regard, the French society was much more a hybrid of tradition and modernity, of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* respectively, than nowadays when a globalised *Gesellschaft*, a proxy for the market place expansion to global proportions, penetrates almost every place of inhabited world. Traditionally, the economy of the *Gesellschaft* shared fates of agriculture as the economic backbone of the *Gemeinschaft*, i.e. a society composed mostly of peasants and artisans. As Karl Polanyi put in, for thousand years economy was embedded into social tissue and “the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark Utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness” (Polanyi, 2001: 2). Hence, when the economic and the social sphere, in a later phase of modernization, were separated from each other, the economic sphere via market economy started to behave as a self-propelling system. Hence social/societal cum economic catastrophes ensued.

Valéry's metaphors may also be taken for to illustrate two different assumptions of general evolutionary process, which will be discussed in this paper. Although usually taken as an art form, “dancing” may also be taken as a random, free and non-prescribed and basically unpredictable movement Darwinian evolutionary process alike. “Calculator”, on the other hand, may be taken for to illustrate an opposite, programmed movement with a fixed purpose – Spencer's and other teleological schemes of evolution alike. However, neither of the assumptions taken alone is sufficient for to explain the socio-cultural evolution of mankind. Yet, sustainable development may in principle, as a “hybrid” of the two paradigms of evolution, be more suitable for accounting the need for balancing between different evolutionary tendencies as well as long-term different, and often opposed, interests of various (collective and individual) actors in the modern societies.

To further articulate specific advantages of sustainable development of an economy-society, and culture in particular, i.e. a culturally oriented sustainable development (see below), it is necessary beforehand to clarify the key terms, since they are generated in different contexts, in the first place *evolution* and *development*. Although they literally mean the same, the two concepts have different backgrounds (cf. Wuketits and Antweiler, 2004). *Development* originates from the Western Enlightenment and is proximate to the idea of “progress” as basically a teleological concept. “Progressist” evolutionists were, for example, Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx, regardless their different visions of the ends of societal development. As a liberal, Spencer believed that the free market economy, eliciting both competition and cooperation, is most suitable a mechanism of a just allocation of goods and people in the industrial society (Spencer, 1896). On the other hand, as a communist Marx believed that state (re)distribution of goods, dictated by the proletariat, is the most proper mechanism for a just industrial society (Marx/Engels, 1970).

Today, *development* is mainly a policy concept. It was born in the United States in the aftermath of the Second World War. The American administration launched a project of international economic assistance to underdeveloped countries. Today’s worldwide development elicits a permanent gap between developed and underdeveloped. As such the development is useful mostly to business elites in developed countries and attendant elites in underdeveloped countries (cf. Fine, 2002).

In its most popular and scientifically mostly accepted version, the idea of *evolution* originates from the work of Charles Darwin. Unlike Spencer and Marx, Darwin rejected progress and similar teleological assumptions applied to the evolution of human society.<sup>1</sup> His central argument about the survival of the fittest via selection constitutes (neo)evolutionistic social theory. In the contemporary sociological theory Darwin’s paradigm is most meticulously elaborated by Walter G. Runciman (Runciman, 1989).

Next, the term *globalization* designates mostly the worldwide expansion

---

<sup>1</sup> “For my own part I would as soon be descended from that heroic little monkey, who braved his dreaded enemy in order to save the life of his keeper, or from that old baboon, who descending from the mountains, carried away in triumph his young comrade from a crowd of astonished dogs – as from a savage who delights to torture his enemies, offers up bloody sacrifices, practices infanticide without remorse, treats his wives like slaves, knows no decency, and is haunted by the grossest superstitions” (Darwin, /1882/ 2002: 619). Obviously, for Darwin, only morality of the modern man, which our barbaric ancestor allegedly lacked, especially because the contemporary morality is hypocritical, does not provide the proof that our cultural modernity represents a progress in this regard nor that the modernity has any other developmental goal that could not be found, as a behavioral pattern, among our pre-human ancestors. Although in the end of his work Darwin concludes that “/m/an still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin”, he does not maintain that Christian or any other “supra-natural” moral belief can evade human bodily predicament.

of economic markets and large corporations operations worldwide respectively, from 1980s onward. This expansion entails some new political, military, demographic (migrations in the first place) and cultural processes (e.g. the growth of cultural industries) (cf. Held and McGrew, 2007). These processes challenge explanatory potentials of the both paradigms of socio-cultural evolution, i.e. the transformational (Spencer's) and the selectionist (Darwin's).

Finally, the *sustainable development* is the youngest and least consistent policy concept crafted in the UN (cf. <http://www.uncsd2012.org/history.html>). Documents written on the basis of the acclamation of principles of sustainable development are accorded to interests of the whole variety of governments of the member-countries as well as to different cultural contexts (Duxbury and Gillette, 2007). Nevertheless, many governments, although they do not explicitly opt for sustainable development as their policy objective, manifest tendencies toward balancing between "dancing", i.e. thorough deregulation, and "calculating", i.e. complete regulation.

### Failures of the global development without centrally coordinated regulatory mechanisms

*Development* was as a policy concept devised by the United States government in 1949. Accordingly, the Third world countries have been entitled to the American assistance in order to move away from their backwardness. From that time, "development has been the organizing and guiding principle of economic, social and even political policies of most underdeveloped and developing nations... Throughout this period, a host of financial and political supporting institutions, professionals, scholarships and doctrines were mobilised to assist parts of the world population as they embark on an ineluctable march towards the achievement of the universally desirable goal of economic growth" (Omar, 2012: 42).

Meanwhile, the whole enterprise of international assistance in development has been largely compromised. Following data exemplify some global developments failures so far (compiled from the *UN Global Poverty Statistics*, 2006):

- Every year more than 10 million children die of hunger and preventable diseases – that is over 30,000 per day and one every 3 seconds.
- One third of deaths – about 18 million people a year or 50,000 per day – are due to poverty-related causes; that is 270 million people since 1990, the majority are women and children, roughly equal to the population of the US.
- Forty six per cent of girls in the world's poorest countries have no access to primary education

- 2.5 billion people do not have access to improved sanitation and some 1.2 billion do not have access to clean source of water – Most of the world's mega-slums have grown since 1960s as a result of market forces and speculation on land.
- In 1970, 22 of the world's richest countries pledged to spend 0.7% of their national income on aid. Thirty-four years later, only five countries have kept that promise.
- Forty six per cent of girls in the world's poorest countries have no access to primary education.
- About 2.5 billion people do not have access to improved sanitation and some 1.2 billion people do not have access to a clean source of water.

Very often, this grim picture of the global economy-society is concealed behind standardized presentation of data in the terms of methodological nationalism. For instance, developmental gaps within the USA or within Burkina Faso are not as big as the simultaneous global gaps between the two countries (see *Human Development Report*, 2012). Nevertheless, global developmental failures cannot be alleviated only by nation-state interventions or long-term policies. On the other hand, there is no global government or an equivalent world organization which policies would be aimed to close the global gaps. On the contrary, policy-makers in most countries framed by the “shock therapy” doctrine impose the free-market policies allegedly as the only cure for economies exhausted by liberalization (cf. Klein, 2007). Thus, the contemporary global economy is looking like a huge marketplace ultimately protected by the Western military forces as a substitute for the lacking of regulatory and intervening mechanisms on the global level.

Still, the global malfunctions fit Darwin's selectionist paradigm. In this regard, outcomes of (long-term) development are products of merciless selections in incessant struggle for survival and hegemony. Concomitantly, neoclassical social science, and economics in particular, do not provide solutions for the market failures. Instead, they advocate permanent injections of the free-market incentives that are supposed to remove market failures. In such doctrine, market failures are proxy to natural disasters – hurricanes, earthquakes or tsunamis alike – for which laissez-faire driven national governments are ill-equipped due to their relegations of public or common goods in favor of private goods.

In 19<sup>th</sup> century, fathers of sociology were both skeptical and optimistic vis-à-vis the industrial capitalism as supposedly the final sequel of societal evolution. Anyway, the idea of evolution has remained most appealing among modern ideas, gathering authors as different as Malthus (who, like Darwin, studied theology), Comte, Spencer, Darwin, Marx, Engels, Morgan,

Durkheim, etc. In 20<sup>th</sup> century the idea of evolution similarly brought together authors from different backgrounds, such as Parsons, Habermas, Luhmann, Runciman, Lenski, Wallerstein, etc. Their different visions of the evolution notwithstanding, the authors were/are eager to instill their best hopes into the idea of evolution. Why was the idea of evolution such appealing? Although most theoreticians were/are not sympathetic with ruling regimes and ideologies in their countries, their interest into the evolution basically corresponds to interests of elites of the core societies to expand their power and influence far behind their state borders and into the peripheries. A common denominator of the theoretical enterprise of evolutionism, with some exemptions (e.g. Wallerstein), is Eurocentrism or Westernism. Even Marx was hoping that allegedly pending proletarian revolution would have been taking place in the core countries, i.e. within the nation-states (Marx and Engels, 1848), and later on perhaps into colonies such as India (Marx, 1853). In such vision, nations and the world on the whole may either be capitalistic or socialistic/communistic, i.e. thoroughly transformed. Other authors with more technocratic predilections – such as Comte, Durkheim and Luhmann – have envisioned a world managed over by knowledge elites. Both ways, radical and technocratic, certain hegemony of the West has been assumed by the theoretical arguments. Furthermore, no evolution theorist, including Wallerstein and other center-periphery critical theorists, has envisaged an alternative path of development for peripheral countries or regions. To be sure, such apologetic or centralistic vision can be justified *via facti*, historically, for peripheries that succeeded to resist centers or to become a new central power, made their *tour de force* by the means proverbially used by the imperial centers, primarily by military force (Münkler, 2007).

The strategy of cultural expansion of the core areas toward peripheries includes science as an increasingly important source of power. State alone was and continues to be the major or the only provider of funds for scientific research. Thereby, research can be regarded as an extension of the state power, at least of the most powerful states (Wallerstein, 2001). Through the eyes of science state is eager to analyze nature and society by and large. In this sense Auguste Comte formulated the mission of sociology as a Queen of sciences (cf. Katunarić, 2009). According to his design, sociology would be able to predict future and thus spare society of major unpredicted, yet disturbing events, primarily revolutions.

Presently, sociology is not among leading sciences neither in the core nor peripheral countries. Still, science in the core countries, as a state agent, is eager to prevent possible turnovers from below, this time from the world periphery. On the other hand, scientists both in the core and in the periphery do not expect that the peripheries would be able to establish their own

“cerebral centers” for solving their development problems, for the mastermind is located in the West (cf. Kiossev, 1999).

It is interesting to note also that both functionalistic authors, such as Shills, and Marxist authors, such as Amin, see periphery in a negative way, as a bad copy of the center. For them, periphery lacks any major resource of power, from economic wealth to know-how. The notorious international gap in development of natural sciences and high tech production (cf. Bürkner & Matthiesen, 2007: 57ff) is replicated in social sciences as well. For example, in research literature on the wars of the former Yugoslavia, among titles in prestigious international journals and book publishers, there is hardly any author from research communities in the post-Yugoslavian countries (Katunarić, 2011: 112).

This situation creates center-peripheral landscape in virtually every sector of development, from economy (capitalism) to science, so that they become more and more meritocratic. Also, it is questionable, whether the “last bastion” of (representative) democracy, i.e. Parliament, can work on democratic or pluralistic principles, when the major corporative actors in society, i.e. corporations, state bureaucracy, media and science, are ruled non-democratically, by particular groups (e.g. boards) or individuals (e.g. owners).

In the same time, large corporations cooperate with a palette of non-democratic regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, to communist, such as China. The varied political landscape is not, of course, result of the revolutionary forces which Comte hesitated mostly, namely Babeuf and other egalitarians. Unlike those, today’s global forces, whether economic or political, are rather counter-revolutionary. They commonly advocate deepening socio-economic inequalities as the motor of the economic development. Particularly in the peripheral countries, the new elites discard state intervention in the economic affairs. Instead, there is a growing tendency to replace state with a network of military-police outposts controlled by big corporations. Corporations represent today the *avatars* of feudal lords from pre-absolutist era, when the central power (of kings as forerunners of the modern state) was rather weak.<sup>2</sup>

Data presented in the beginning of the paper, indicating the global economic failures, give an impression of the rise of a global neo-feudal society. Unlike the modern-nation states in the West which succeeded to establish

---

<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, for the new corporate lords the most part of social sciences and humanities are not acceptable anymore either. Instead, corporations are eager to cooperate with kind of expertise that would facilitate merchandizing of their products, from aircrafts to pharmaceuticals. Particularly, the new lords do not like sciences with a critical edge on the free-market, for those counter the ruling tendency of transforming citizens into passive consumers and, eventually, into subjects of the coming power with anti-democratic predilections.

some democratic political standards in their nation-states, the global “freak” is not created by the means of (pro)democratic movements, but by contingencies of the free-market globalization without accompanying regulative mechanisms on the global level, that are traditionally operated by governments in nation-states. Thus the global world consists of a large set of entities, from networked companies to competitive markets of goods and jobs, produced by (Darwinian) forces of selections with unexpected outlooks for survival for most of them.

### The two paradigms of socio-cultural evolution

The idea of evolution has been taken as a paradigm of societal development decades before the appearance of Darwin’s *Origin of Species*, for example in Adam Smith’s laudations to the market economy as the playground of selection of best qualities of commodities<sup>3</sup>. Besides, a few years before Darwin, Spencer argued that everything in the living world evolves and that the process of evolution unfolds from simple to complex entities. He understood what most physicists until Darwin believed and it is that each individual entity passes through a process of *transformation*: from the origin to the end, from the birth to the death. This assumption also fits Spencer’s assumption of the linear process of social evolution by which the military society, as a less complex and basically despotic society, turns into a peaceful and liberal industrial society. Thus, he sets forth that the new society replaces the old society in complete. This understanding marks the “transformational paradigm” of the evolution: development means literally “unrolling/unfolding”, “desarrollo” (in Spanish), “Entwicklung” (in German) (Fracchia & Lewontin, 1999).

Darwin, on the other hand, introduced the *variational* paradigm of the evolution. In this paradigm individuals have different properties and the population bearing these properties along with their uneven distribution does not depend on individual change or transformation. As Fracchia and Lewontin put in, for Darwin developmental changes in individual organism with all its variations, including birth, maturing and death, are not mirrored in the ensemble, i.e. on the level of population: “/I/t is that the forces of change internal to organism, leading to production of variant individuals, are causally random with respect to the external forces that influence the maintenance and spread of those variants in the population. Many are called, but few are chosen” (Fracchia & Lewontin, 1999: 61)<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Smith’s book *The Wealth of Nations* was published in 1776. As Friedrich Hayek pointed out, Darwin introduced in the Anglo-Saxon world theories of evolution which were formed already (Hayek, 1979).

<sup>4</sup> Unlike Fracchia’s and Lewontin’s approach, which is focused on the relevance of Darwinism in cultural anthropology, this paper is focused on sociological relevance of Darwinism and Spencerianism



I maintain that Marx' theory is ultimately closer to Spencer's than Darwin's paradigm of evolution.<sup>5</sup> For instance, Marx takes that capitalism replaces feudalism virtually in complete, which also reminds to Weber's *ideal type* method. By analogy, for Marx socialism should replace all elements of capitalism (with an exception of science & technology progress). Figuratively speaking, socialism is to capitalism or capitalism is to feudalism what airplane is to car and bicycle, respectively. This basically accords Spencer's assumption of social evolution in the terms of *transformation*.

Before continuing with the interpretation of differences between the two paradigms of evolution in terms of sociological theory, I will delineate two remarkable works in social theory which apply Darwinian rather than Spencerian approach to evolutionary development. First one is the work of anthropologist Marshal Sahlins's. He argues against transformational and unilineal evolution. Thereby, he sees diversity in the evolution of life spread out into different branches: protozoa, invertebrates, fish, amphibians, birds, reptiles, mammals... In a similar vein, the evolution of the human social world, according to Sahlins, has been diversified into cultures. As much as the author recognizes developmental differences between traditional and modern societies, and also among modern societies (some of which are less developed than the others), he warns against a modernistic bias. Sahlins argues that failure of a culture is most probably the result of its success. A polished, well adapted culture is biased, its design is smoothed in a specific way, its environment is narrowly specialized: "Therefore, more adapted a culture is, less capable of change it is" (cited in: Kaplan and Manners, 1972: 51). Besides, Sahlins remarks that most developed societies consume most part of the total energy.<sup>6</sup> Today it is clear that most developed countries behave ancestral gods alike. They hardly change their habits. In turn, they expect from less developed to continually change their habits. Accordingly, the most developed are, according to Sahlins, least capable of change. Thus,

---

as regards post-Second World War developments in the West and the East, that are featured with, to use Giambattista Vico's terms, *corsi* of global integration and *ricorsi* of global disintegration (Vico, /1774/2011).

<sup>5</sup> There is an anecdote about failed communication between Karl Marx and Charles Darwin. Marx sent his *Capital* (the 1st volume) to Darwin, who at that time was famous. Eventually, Marx has never received a response from Darwin. Although Marx appreciated Darwin's work, his regard of Darwin was a bit ambiguous. On the one hand, he admired Darwin's scientific rigor, on the other he expressed his reservation, saying (in a letter to Engels) that Darwin seems to apply the logic of stock-exchange on the world of nature (cf. Varoufakis, 2008).

<sup>6</sup> This has to do with bias of "higher cultures" as more adaptable: "No one culture has a monopoly on or even necessarily more kinds of adaptive improvements, and what is selectively advantageous for one may be simply ruinous for another. Nor are those cultures that we might consider in general evolutionary standing necessarily more perfectly adapted to their environments than lower. Many great civilizations have fallen in the last 2,000 years, even in the midst of material plenty, while the Eskimos tenaciously maintained themselves in an incomparably more difficult habitat" (Sahlins, 1970: 26-27).

Sahlin's work, although based on selectionism and variation, i.e. Darwin's principles, represents a rare case of a "humanistic" social Darwinism in the form of cultural relativism, i.e. an understanding that there is no higher and lower cultures and that most successful cultures are those capable of continuous change.

The major work in the historical sociology of the evolution, based on Darwinian selectionism, is the work of Walter G. Runciman (second volume of his *A Treatise on Social Theory*, published in 1989<sup>7</sup>). Like Darwin, he rejects teleological assumption of the societal evolution. Accordingly, he defines social evolution as *moving away* and not *toward* (something). By adopting Darwin's concept of variation, he recognizes in mankind history qua evolution many different processes without meaningful ends. For him, history is marked equally with stagnations, revolutions, rebellions, turning-points, catastrophes, dead-ends, etc. These are contingent and random rather than determined processes. In his words, "evolution is an incessant competition... (often very violent) ... between rival armies, classes and beliefs"... This concurs with Darwin's thesis: "From the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted objects which we are capable of conceiving, namely the production of higher animals, directly follows" (both quotations are from Runciman, 1989: 449).

Actually, Runciman's approach corresponds to the rejection of the state-driven development, for the latter implicates that it is possible by intention – for example by planning – to redirect the paths of development. In contrast, and in accordance with the selectionist paradigm, there is nothing in the world of nature that resembles governance. Because of this tenet the selectionist paradigm is closer to neoliberalism than statism and any other policy of external control of the market and similar "forces of nature".<sup>8</sup>

Third remarkable work in sociological theory in the terms of Darwinian paradigm – although author has not declared himself as a Darwinist – is Shmuel Eisenstadt's seminal essay "Multiple modernities" (Eisenstadt, 2002). He puts forward the idea of plural modernism, which means that Western, Chinese, Indian, Muslim, Japanese and other regions of development, including ideologies and institutions of the Islamic fundamentalism, follow different paths of development, although they represent different types of basically modern social and cultural development. In Darwin's terms their

<sup>7</sup> In 2006 Runciman published a book entitled *The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection* (Runciman, 2006) in which he presented his Darwinian approach systematically and explicitly as the selectionist paradigm.

<sup>8</sup> Note that advocates of theory and politics of post-development (e.g. Douglas Lummis, Gilbert Rist, Deepak Lal) are opposed to social engineering and managerialism of the welfare-state policies. In sum, as Nederveen Pieterse points out, "there is an elective affinity between neo-liberalism and development agnosticism of post-development" (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010: 120)

forms of development are “variations” within a general or dominant type of development, i. e. the modernity as such. Yet, Eisenstadt does not explain which variety fits more or overwhelms other varieties. Still, he does not see his concept of “multiple modernities” akin to Huntington’s “clash of civilizations”. Still, Eisenstadt’s meaning of modernity is as much relativistic as Huntington’s notion of cultures / civilizations with their parallel rather than converging paths of development. This aspect is especially important as it concerns human rights. Eisenstadt interprets human rights as cultural rather than universal, i. e. trans-cultural, phenomenon and he sees modern development as a multi-linear process with no convergence in the long run. On the other hand, he admits that every different path of modernity is capable of *self-correction* (Eisenstadt, 2002: 24). Yet, he did not elaborate the meaning of his remark. For example, may corrections be made in a way that plural developments lead to convergence rather than divergence of different types of modern societies?

There seems that Darwinian account of the modern development is faced more with ethical than analytic controversies. For instance, can discarding human rights rhetoric and legislation in some non-Western countries, under pretext that the rights are derived exclusively from the Western culture, be justified as a variety of modernity rather than an anti- or pre-modern position. It is interesting to note here that Spencer was faced with a similar paradox as regards the nascent liberal democracy in the United Kingdom, when concerning its colonial violence against native peoples. Nevertheless, Spencer, unlike Eisenstadt, did not consider Western colonialism as an evidence of the victory of the fittest in the struggle of survival, but as an evidence of the Western barbarism, thus indulging his transformationist account<sup>9</sup>.

### Contemporary development in light of the two evolutionary paradigms

Patterns of development fostered from the end of 1940s correspond to the two paradigms of evolution. In the aftermath of the Second World War to the beginning of 1980s two versions of welfare-state and mass industrial production were brandished, one in the West (Fordism) and other in the East (statist socialism). Both parties demonstrated at that time varieties of the transformational evolution. They represented themselves as secular substitutes for Heavens. An eschatological implication of such self-portraying is that further development of society cannot give birth to a new epoch

<sup>9</sup> As Crane Brinton remarks, *Spencer’s account of evolution is somewhat contradictory because he could not reconnect anymore his initial assumption of organic evolution with his ethics of individual freedom and individual choice (Brinton, 1937). Rather similar contradiction affects Eisenstadt’s concept of the multiple modernities: how “modern” is a society in which rights of women are systematically denied?*

anymore. Hence no surprises are possible in the future. Instead, the existing social orders would be recycled or expanded. In such context, science is considered, similarly to Comte's vision, as the compass of development, where state represented a ship of welfare which perpetuates redistribution of goods in favor to whole society.

In 1980s begins another era based on neoliberalism which represents a doctrinal version of the neo-classical economy closer to Darwin than Spencer. (Neo)liberal capitalism coexists with a variety of political-economic systems, such as crony capitalism, patrimonialism and other systems that have preserved some characteristics of pre-modern societies. For example, the increasing economic gaps between upper and lower social classes, incurable occurrences of poverty and unemployment with hyper-production of everything, on the other hand (cf. Ziegler, 2005); also, a mass culture imageries appears that celebrates heroes and narratives based on medieval traditions.<sup>10</sup>

When considering trends in development theories today – from neoclassical to postmodern theories, primarily post-colonial, and among the latter especially alternative and sustainable development theories – we may notice certain melancholy as well as a double-bind, particularly among radical authors who criticize capitalism, but at the same time acknowledge that they do not have a vision of society on the large scale that could outweigh capitalism. Instead, the imagery of anti-capitalism is being reduced to local communities preoccupied with environmental issues. Thus, it seems that Communist idea turns back to its cradle, that is communities resembling to what Ferdinand Tönnies described as Community vis-à-vis Society (Tönnies, 2005), or what Manuel Castells emulated as the *Communal Havens* in contrast to the *Network Society* (Castells, 1998).<sup>11</sup>

The imagination of the (future) socialism among the bulk of the critics of capitalism (Amin, Therborn, Habermas, Wallerstein, and postmodernists like Touraine and Žižek) is particularly inadequate developmentally as

<sup>10</sup> *A greater part of popular fiction is impregnated with non- or anti-egalitarian subjects – from varieties of the masters of the universe in science fiction to historical figures of emperors, kings and nobles, more or less idealized, in the popular fiction, from fantasy to gothic genres. In general, imagery of the future, as reflected in the Western fiction, reproduces contemporary or some older patterns of social structure and mentality (cf. Swin, 2010). In the terms of the evolutionary paradigms, i. e. that of transformation and that of variation, both are exhausted and consequently our social world has come to the end. In other words, both free market and state deepen social inequalities, thus leading the world into older, pre-modern modes of social, economic and cultural life. Since history repeats itself, though in different versions of the past, people should abandon egalitarian projects once forever.*

<sup>11</sup> *Castells' communal haven is metaphor with which he ironically designates the lack of power of virtually all anti-capitalist movements. For him, their creation of the new world is a fantasy rather reality. As for himself, he acknowledges that he has "exhausted his energy" of imagining a better future. Moreover, he maintains that humankind is "socially underdeveloped", unlike informational technology which, for him, is, overdeveloped! (Castells, 1998: 359).*

far as (semi)peripheral countries are concerned. It seems that authors have neither sufficient knowledge nor interest for the developmental problems in the (semi)periphery. The provinces are rather described again as a bad copy of the core. In this regard, critical theory of capitalism goes hand-in-hand with neoliberal technocracy who maintains that periphery should follow what core is doing, one or the other way, liberal or state intervention, although such imitation has proven to be inadequate for periphery. It seems that periphery always fails in what core succeeds to achieve, whether in terms of economic efficiency or in terms of political democracy. Thus periphery looks like a headless body.<sup>12</sup>

Presumably, one of the first steps in removing obstacles and constraints in development of peripheral areas should be to revise the concept of periphery in light of a more inclusive paradigm of development. In this sense, some concepts of sustainable development, especially culturally sustainable development, may perhaps contribute to peripheral development, which will be expounded in the last sections two of the paper.

### Toward a global disaster or a worldly responsible government?

When taking into account the ongoing processes of development Darwin, Runciman, and even Weber and positivists (those who maintain that their only task is to empirically test hypotheses) would probably say that state of the art with development does not deviate from general evolutionary course as described by Darwin and others. Accordingly, it should not be seen as unusual that different populations struggle for their survival in which only a few are successful. Basically, this way of reasoning is akin to racism. On the other hand, for many non-Darwinists the state of the art with evolutionary thinking is not acceptable. Moreover, it is seen as an intended result of selectionist-oriented scientists and policy-makers inspired by the former. On the contrary, transformation-oriented scientists and policy-makers recognize as normal only those models of development – which are traditionally taken as modernistic – intended to make enough space and opportunities for decent living of different people.

Whereas the modernistic project, which culminates with the welfare state, aspired to certainty and security and thus approached to a solution of the problem of development on the global level, neoliberalism embraces uncertainty and risk as a “creative opportunity” (Sörensen and Söderbaum, 2012: 13 et passim.). This way policy of material protection has been replaced

<sup>12</sup> This reminds on city museums (which I had opportunity to visit), in which traditional dressings of people belonging to nobles and middle class are presented on wooden puppet with heads and faces, whereas puppets which represent dressings of people from rural areas most often were either headless or faceless.

by a politics focused on resilience / flexibility. The resilience represents a euphemism alluding to continuous *global disaster management* in which (military) intervention becomes a normal practice. Even ideas and policies of *sustainable development* are pressured by the imperative of resilience. “/B/uilding resilient subjects presupposes... a world of constant exposure to... catastrophe” (Sörensen and Söderbaum, 2012: 14). The bottom-line of this argument focuses on the growing economic instability in the world as well as proliferation of clashes or wars – for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and so on. Perhaps, the admonitions of a global catastrophe, based still on no too many present-day instances of wars, are exaggerated. One may hope so, but broader picture gives a disturbing outlook. It shows an ongoing paradigm-shift in the Western core countries – primarily in the United States – from state-building societies toward risk-societies in which corporations in cooperation with traditional / re-traditionalized communities (Castells /1998/ would say: the local mafias) break the backbone of the Western democracy based on the relationship between state and civil society, where state serves as a protective shield to its citizens and not as a service for privileged groups. This change reminds to what medievalist Marc Bloch described as a long era predating the establishment of the feudal orders and kingdoms, incessant struggle for survival on everyday basis, where poor people and their families were mostly targeted by bands of robbers, actually the germs of the future nobles (Bloch, 1989).

Still, all this does not mean that capitalism should be demonized and socialism divinized, respectively. Both regimes have their remarkable minuses. A remarkable minus of capitalism is that it glorifies freedom of entrepreneurs, as a natural selection process<sup>13</sup>, at the expense of the socio-economic security, basically equality, of (the rest) of people. A remarkable minus of (historical) socialism is that it glorifies equality (and authoritarianism) at the expense of freedom (and democracy). The same applies to the variation and the transformation paradigms of the evolution as models of secular development. Neither is that society undergoes a complete transformation nor that it is submitted to endless variations. Best theoretical solution should probably reflect real rather than stylized outcomes, mixture rather than pure types. This also calls for a combination of virtues of the two paradigms. Their virtues consist of their preparedness for to allow the opposite principle, i.e. variation or transformation, to take part in the making of development.

Whether or how can the principle of mutual acceptance be implemented

<sup>13</sup> As Joseph Stiglitz emphasizes, “/n/atural selection doesn’t work well, especially when capital markets are imperfect—which they always are” (Stiglitz, 2010: 164, footnote 59).

in international policies exceeds the scope of this paper. The main tenet in this paper is that state must remain the central institution of coordination of major collective actions in the economy and the polity, unless society is left to centrifugal forces of the competitive markets reigned by several big corporations. Nevertheless, state will hardly continue to exist exclusively in the form of nation-state. Today's configuration of international world as a product of interactions of nearly two hundred states interconnected, but also disconnected – it depends on business cycles – mainly by globally circulating capital.<sup>14</sup> In such configuration a number of nation-states are subservient to big corporations, as the new lords would eventually eliminate old post-feudal lords, i. e. nation-states as tax-imposing instances.<sup>15</sup>

To be sure, this is not an argument in favor of dismantling nation-states but against social irresponsibility and ignorance of too many contemporary states as regards social-economic gaps in their societies. In contrast to this, it would be more meaningful to put forward a sense for building up world responsible and democratic government and parliament. Such a world-state would obtain control over financial institutions, such as larger banks, that alone, in their insistence of the independent business-making, i. e. without governmental or civil society control, have become financially damaging to most states and people(s) in the world. A financial power which would be consolidated, e. g. as the central world bank, in the remit of the world democratic government, may significantly contribute to solve the key problem in the human sequel of evolution, namely *the survival of the fittest* or *inclusive fitness*. In the evolutionary biology these terms signify the number of off-springs an organism produces or supports. The *inclusive fitness*, when translated into Darwinian social theory, means the survival of familial circles surrounding the wealthiest or generally most successful individuals in a society. The survivalist “we” is by all means much smaller than mankind. Actually, mankind has never consisted of a single group or community, neither in primitive nor complex societies and civilizations. Although modern societies have significantly extended We-feelings of some parts of populations, behind their ethnic or religious boundaries, the magnitudes of the modern We, such as the EU citizenship, are suspected to turn back to their previous ethnic or religious groupings whenever economic crisis hits the modern societies (cf. Wallerstein, 1990). The world as an object of cosmopolitan identification and empathy, as a mental state, is said to be “hypo-maniacal” (cf. Supek, 1993), or “late Romantic” (cf. Habermas, 1981). And indeed, very often the proclaimed worldwide “inclusiveness” is hypocritical,

<sup>14</sup> *The global capital represents, as Jacques Bidet put in, “a form of state centrality” (Bidet, 1999).*

<sup>15</sup> *Accordingly, the capital evades higher taxes and prefers corporate tax havens such as Maldives, Kuwait, Ireland, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, Hong-Kong-China, Singapore, U.A.E., etc.*

while the “real” (only possible?) world operates antagonistically. It is based on the mechanisms of inclusion of “ours” and exclusion of the others, both being defined in an essentialist sense. On the other hand, for a government responsible to the whole world, Africa or any major underdeveloped area could not be anymore an extraneous area or issue, i. e. some other people(s) nightmare. In a cosmopolitan state all issues become common issues, the matter of internal affairs of the world responsible government. Accordingly, companies may operate on the basis of an open-ended purposive rationality, inclusively in broadest sense, as defined ideal-typically by Weber which definition of purposive rationality merges with Kant’s *categorical imperative*, unlike *homo economicus* of the /neo/classical economy. This means that corporate actors, such as companies, should take into account broader consequences of their (trans)actions, to take care of interests of the others. Indeed, the purposive rationality is always particular, but in Max Weber’s sense it is generically close to the *value rationality* (actually, the former is the descendant of the latter and value inherent to democracy is what Habermas calls “generable interests” tending to universalism). This way more social and more humane forms of markets and competitiveness on the whole can possibly be established.

Last, but not least, the new public sector may be created in place of the old one which was a residual place in the (Hegelian) triangle between Family, Market as place of exchange between self-interested citizens, and State. In place of the “tunnel” through which we pass everyday while departing from home on the way to workplace and the same way back. The new public space and place thus may become areas of meeting between different people on their ways to home or workplace (cf. Katunarić, 2004). And of course, instead of the rise of new poverty, of the “bottom billion” up to bottom second billion (of homeless and jobless people), a bunch of new policies is needed which would knit a global safety-net for all those who drop-out, i. e. temporary losers, in competitive games, to make them capable of to be included back again in the competition games, of course if they want to do so.

### Culturally oriented sustainable development

Within a variety of concepts of sustainable development (cf. Needervan Pietrsee, 2010; Kassel, 2012), in particular culturally sustainable development (cf. Bornshier, 2005; Radcliffe, 2006; Sacco, Blessi, Nuccio, 2009), the concept of culturally oriented sustainable development, as presented in the document *Croatia in 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Strategy of Cultural Development* (Cvjetičanin, Katunarić, 2003) published by the Croatian Ministry of culture, although not implemented in cultural and other current policies, is nearest



to the assumption presented in the previous section, i.e. that evolution creates hybrids rather than pure types. The following quotation is taken from the Strategy document (Cvjetičanin, Katunarić, 2003: 165) to illustrate meanings of a culturally oriented sustainable development:

“Assuming that further development in the world, including new investments, will prioritize environments capable of striking a balance between global circulation and local needs, as well as between economic growth, state influence and control, civil society and the natural environment, cultural development in Croatia should focus on principles of sustainable development. To that end it is necessary to mobilize cultural heritage resources and new forms of artistic expression; initiate domestic cultural industries; raise the level of art education; step out from a strictly delineated cultural space into everyday cultural life; open up numerous channels of inter-sector cooperation; enhance relations towards other cultures; etc. The long-term goal of such activities is sustainable cultural development, which implies:

- a. increasing the interest of the population in quality products of elite, traditional, and alternative cultures,
- b. developing needs, the meeting of which will alleviate the strain on natural resources and existing capacities of infrastructure and inhabited areas,
- c. strengthening social cohesion and communication outside the traditional frameworks of social identity and defusing social-Darwinist aspirations.“

Such meaning(s) of cultural development are holistic rather than sectoral. A memorandum on the meanings of culture in a holistic sense, titled “Croatian Culture in the European Union“, written by the editors of the aforementioned Strategy (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 2012), was published in the eve of the Croatian referendum on its membership in the EU. Here is a fragment of the document:

*“When culture and creativity are the top priority, then the harsh and often brutal arguments about the development so far can be easily put aside. The one-sided understanding and practice of economy grants an indefinite advantage to the rich over the poor, profit over use-value, financial capital over capital created by work, stereotype over variations, North over South, West over East, “eternal” metropolis over “eternal” outskirts, marketing, commercials and commodities over life experience and human values that do not have a price tag on them... In a culture in which (even) “small is beautiful”, where everyone is in the minority until the time they become the majority through the strength of their charm instead of muscles, where strength of the mind and heart*

*are not measured by inventions of heavy industry and armaments, in such a culture Croatia has a chance to be the first among equals...”*  
(Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 2012)

The evolutionary aspect of the concept of culturally oriented sustainable development concerns a broad selection of diverse elements of cultural institutions and practices that fit a post-neoliberal and a post-statist era in cultural and other policies (education, health, housing, employment...). A sustainable economy-society combines elements of market and state regulation in different portions adapted to conditions of individual countries, regions, and people. A sustainable society combines elements of association and solidarity with individual independence and competition. A sustainable (democratic) politics consists of the triangle of representative democracy, meritocracy (parliamentary houses with experts for different areas), and basic democracy (as a corrective mechanism of decision-making on local level). Such a politics forwards soft rather than hard power (resources), that is using persuasion rather than coercion. A sustainable cultural and scientific policy combines quality products of different cultural and scientific styles and propounds them through education and media as well as popular public places.

### **Why hybrids are more sustainable than pure entities or ideal types?**

In the next and in lieu of conclusion, a theoretical aspect of the sustainable development, which may be applied both to local and to global level, will be discussed. In this regard hybridization, instead of polarization between the free market and the state-planning system, that leads to exclusion one or the other, some elements of the both policies may be combined for the sake of societal balance on different levels of the globalizing world.<sup>16</sup> On the ground of such understanding of development and policies it is possible to create a sustainable development as a set of different points or intervals on the scale of developmental policies (cf. Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 2013: 187-190). Basically, such a strategy respects both diversities in society and dynamics of change. Sustainability is by no means a fixed, immovable end-point of development. It must be a policy process which adequately responds to different interests and capabilities of various actors, whether individual or organizational. Some individuals or organizations have more

---

<sup>16</sup> *This theoretical aspect is congruent with what Johan Galtung claims as likelihood of viable developmental logic of societal economies, which opting neither for Smithism, i. e. the free-market, nor Marxism, i. e. statism and bureaucratic control over economy (and society) (Galtung, 1989).*

inclinations to competition and uncertainty, while the other are more inclined to solidarity and certainty; it is similar with different cultures (cf. Hofstede, 2002). Hence, both tendencies may find their place in the scale of the policy of development. Also, provided that changes will be introduced in such policy for to improve balance of different preferences, a hybrid policy would be needed to meet different preferences. The socio-cultural balance through hybrid policies also corresponds to the need of personal balance between basic, yet contradictory, human inclinations which Rousseau described as *amour proper* and *amour de soi* (cf. Kolodny, 2010), i. e. other-oriented and inner-oriented tendencies, to use the sociological typology of Riesman (Riesman, 1950).

At the same time, sustainability must get rid of moral relativism or value neutrality typical of the Darwinist scheme, for sustainability is a contemporary concept which includes the (post)modern idea of how society should look like. It must certainly be organized so that people can be in a nearly equal position and also free. Of course, freedom and equality were not pre-modern values. For instance, feudalism and slavery were technically or in a selectionist sense “sustainable” for centuries, as they were rarely opposed by subordinated or exploited people (slaves, peasants) in such societies. However, such social orders are not sustainable today neither legally nor morally. Hence the selectionist paradigm of evolution must be complemented with some elements of transformational paradigm pertinent to modern theories of industrial and democratic society. Conceptually, the modern society has its teleological core in the ethical universalism. It postulates that humans have capacities of sticking with rules and/or transcend the real existing social order through reforms or revolutions, provided that the social order is perceived unjust by most members of society. Such purposive actions are appropriate to modern societies due to their, in Eisenstadt’s words, capabilities of self-correction. The latter is deduced from the paradigm of transformation.

At any rate, a globally sustainable society cannot consist of uniform units, whether nation-states or world regions. The units vary primarily with regard to different sizes allotted to institutional spaces for market and solidarity. Otherwise, taking into account the appropriate levels of the civic awareness of basic rights and freedoms, societies composed exclusively by the market liberalism or by the state surveillance over the economy would collapse sooner or later due to resistance of majorities with their different inclinations.

To be sure, sustainability through mixed modalities of allocations of power, material goods and decision-making models is not entirely new as an idea. Max Weber, similarly to Machiavelli, already argued that some policy areas and professions are impractical for democracy, whereas some other

areas are impractical for oligarchic or monarchic rule (cf. Maley, 2011). For example, democracy is impractical in science and arts, as these areas are constituted by meritocratic principles. On the other hand, issues of social and economic justice, including distribution of national income, especially state funding, are slant to democratic or parliamentary decision-making. On the other hand, in modern education, mixtures of meritocratic competences (of teachers) and participation (of students) are adequate, and so on. It can generally be argued that more a society is developed – which includes more people with higher education – more mixed modalities combining elitism and broad participation (of citizens, workers, and public) takes place. Furthermore, in countries which make attempt to advance practice of sustainable development, such as Scandinavian countries, class differences in society are relatively smaller when compared with countries, for example the United States and North Korea, which deal solely with liberal and statist policies respectively.

Last, but not least, hybrid patterns of development of the world units would be easier to maintain through coordination by a responsible government on the global level (e.g. the United Nations), than by international contingencies of the laissez-faire economies. Like governments in nation-states, a world government would analogously be faced with diversities and unequal development. Yet, managing over such huge and diversified socio-economic landscape of the world would be easier in a politically unified institutional space, than in the current international space consisting of individual nation-states with unequal power, where the global market economy, run by a bunch of big corporations assisted by governments of developed countries, evades any attempt at establishing world-wide regulation of the global flows. The global policy would have more favorable impact on less developed world areas, for it would protect and stimulate their diversities, including different forms of socioeconomic development, democratic decision-making (including forms of basic democracy), and cultural life, traditional and (post)modern, rather than treating non-economic dimensions of society as indiscriminate effects of the laissez-faire economy.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> *Instead of providing for an elaborated response to remark of an anonymous reviewer, according to which the notion of development in this paper is too much policy-oriented, as it does not respect the objective rules of global development, which allegedly "are independent of our will", I will cite from two sources which prefer "subjective" rather than "objective" dimension of development. One is a polemic article of Fracchia & Lewontin speared against objectivism of the selectionist (Darwinian) paradigm: "It is precisely the combination of discrete systemic logic and contingent actions that shape the texture and contours of history" (Fracchia & Lewontin, 2005: 29). In a similar vein, yet closer to the issue of the global development, another source points out that the role of state/government (as the main policy agent) in contemporary globalization is equally important like in earlier stages of modern globalization: "/G/lobalization and state growth have gone hand in hand precisely because economic interdependence – or the exposure of social relations to international pressures – increases, not decreases, the social utility of the state." (Weiss: 170)*

To paraphrase again Valery's observation from the beginning of the paper, sustainable economies, cultures and societies, which produce a global society in their own right, should neither "dance" without rules nor should they reduce their behavior strictly to rules of calculation that favors one's own interest at the expense of the interests of the others. Instead, what is supposed to be sustainable should balance between multiple interests and actions. This does not mean looking for a permanent still-stand, like in paradise or grave. The culturally oriented sustainable development looks rather as a skillful dancer who has learned how to combine two different rhythms. One rhythm is prescribed by basic rules and is rather monotonous, while the other rhythm is rhapsodic and basically improvised. So, similarly to the dancer described in T. S. Eliot's *Four Quartets*, culturally sustainable development is a self-reliant movement learned as a result of a long history of trials and errors:

*"From wrong to wrong the exasperated spirit  
Proceeds, unless restored by that refining fire  
Where you must move in measure, like a dancer".* (Eliot, 1943)

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Beck, Ulrich (2005): *Power in the Global Age: A New Global Political Economy*. Malden, MA: Polity.
- Bidet, Jacques (1999): *Théorie générale*. Paris: PUF.
- Bloch, Marc (1989): *Feudal Society*. Vol 1: *The Growth and Ties of Dependence*. Routledge.
- Bornschieer, Volker, edited by (2005): *Culture and Politics in Economic Development*. Routledge.
- Brinton, Crane C. (1937): *Spencer's Horrid Vision*. *Foreign Affairs* 15 (4): 695-706.
- Bürkner, Hans Joachim and Ulf Matthiesen (2007): *Territorial Cohesion, Brain Drain and Digital Divide*. In Dietmar Scholich, edited by, *Territorial Cohesion*, 53-62. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.
- Castells, Manuel (1998): *End of Milenium*. Blackwell.
- Cvjetičanin, Biserka and Vjeran Katunarić (eds.) (2003): *Hrvatska u 21. stoljeću: strategija kulturnog razvitka / The Strategy of Cultural Development - Croatia in 21<sup>st</sup> century/*. Zagreb: Ministarstvo kulture Republike Hrvatske.
- Cvjetičanin, Biserka and Vjeran Katunarić (2012): *Croatian Culture in the European Union*. [www.culturelink.org/news/members/2012/members2012-006.html](http://www.culturelink.org/news/members/2012/members2012-006.html) 4.1. 2013.
- Darwin, Charles (/1882/ 2002): *The Descent of Man*, in: Wyhe, John van, editor, *The Complete Work of Charles Darwin Online*. <http://darwin-online.org.uk/> 29. 12. 2012.
- Duxbury, Nancy and Eileen Gillette (2007): *Culture as a Key Dimension of Sustainability: Exploring Concepts, Themes, and Models*. Working Papers No

1. Creative City Network of Canada. <http://cultureandcommunities.ca/downloads/WP1-Culture-Sustainability.pdf> 8. 2. 2013.
- Eliot, Thomas S. (1943): Four Quartets. [www.coldbacon.com/poems/fq.html](http://www.coldbacon.com/poems/fq.html) 5. 2. 2013.
- Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. (2002): Multiple Modernities. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
- Fine, Ben (2002): Economics Imperialism and the New Development Economics as Kuhnian Paradigm Shift, *World Development*, 30(12): 2057–70.
- Fracchia, Joseph and Richard C. Lewontin (1999): Does Culture Evolve? *History and Theory* 38 (4): 52–78.
- Fracchia, Joseph and Richard C. Lewontin (2005): The Price of Metaphor. *History and Theory* 44 (February 2005), 14–29
- Galtung, Johan (1989): Theory formation in social science: a plea for pluralism. In: E. yen (ed.), *Comparative Methodology*. London: Sage, 96–112.
- Global Poverty Statistics (2006) [www.banzaid.org.nz/index.php?...63%3Apover...](http://www.banzaid.org.nz/index.php?...63%3Apover...) 28. 12. 2012.
- Hayek, Friedrich A. (1979): *Counter-Revolution of Science*. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
- Habermas, Jürgen (1981): *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*. Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp.
- Held, David and Anthony McGrew, eds. (2007): *Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies*. Oxford: Polity.
- Hofstede, Geert and Geert J. Hofstede (2005): *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival*. McGraw-Hill Companies (UK).
- <http://www.uncsd2012.org/history.html> 10. 1. 2013.
- Human Development Reports (HDR) (2012). [www.hdr.undp.org/](http://www.hdr.undp.org/) 11. 1. 2013.
- Kaplan, David and Robert A. Manners (1972): *Culture Theory*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Kassel, Kerul (2012): The Circle of Inclusion: Sustainability, CSR and the Values that Drive Them. *Journal of Human Values*, 18 (2), 133–146.
- Katunarić, Vjeran (2004): Toward the New Public Culture. In Nada Đokić-Švob (ed.), *Cultural Transitions in Southeastern Europe - Collection of papers from the course Managing Cultural Transitions: Southeastern Europe*. Zagreb: Institute for International Relations.
- Katunarić, Vjeran (2009): Building sociological knowledge within and across disciplinary boundaries: megalomania vs. modesty? *Innovation - The European Journal of Social Science Research* 22 (2): 155–171.
- Katunarić, Vjeran (2011): Causes of parochial status in international knowledge production. In Demyan Belyaev and Zoran Roca, edited by: *Contemporary Croatia: Developmental Challenges in a Socio-Cultural Perspective*. Lisboa: Edições Universitárias Lusófonas.
- Kiossev, Alexander (1999): Notes on Self-Colonising Cultures. In: Bojana Pejić and David Elliott (eds.), *Art and Culture in Post-Communist Europe*. Stockholm: Moderna Musset.

- Klein, Naomi (2007): *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*. New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt.
- Male, Terry (2011): *Demo Political in Max Weber's Thought*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Marx, Karl (1853): *The British Rule in India*. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/06/25.htm> 20. 1. 2013.
- Marx, Karl, Friedrich Engels (1848): *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/> 4. 1. 2013.
- Marx, Karl / Friedrich Engels (1970): *Selected Works, Volume Three*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Münkler, Herfried (2007): *Empires*. Cambridge (UK), Malden (USA): Polity.
- Nederveen Pieterse, Jan (2010): *Development Theory*. Sage.
- Polanyi, Karl (2001): *The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of our Time*. Boston, Ma.: Beacon Press.
- Radcliffe, Sarah A., edited by (2006): *Culture and Development in a Globalising World: Geographies, Actors, and Paradigms*. Routledge.
- Riesman, David (1950): *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Runciman, Walter G. (1989): *A Treatise to Sociological Theory. Vol. II*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Runciman, Walter G. (2006): *The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Pier Luigi Sacco, Giorgio T. Blessi, Massimiliano Nuccio (2009): *Cultural Policies and Local Planning Strategies: What Is the Role of Culture in Local Sustainable Development?*. *The Journal of Arts Management Law and Society* 39 (1): 45–6.
- Sahlins, Marshal D. (1970): *Evolution. Specific and General*. In Marshal D. Sahlins & Elman R. Service, edited by, *Evolution and Culture*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Sörensen. Jens S. and Fredrik Söderbaum (2012): *The End of the Development-Security Nexus?* In: Jens S. Sörensen. and Fredrik Söderbaum, eds., *The End of the Development-Security Nexus? The Rise of Global Disaster Management*. *Development Dialogue (journal)* 58: 7–20.
- Spencer, Herbert (1896): *The Study of Sociology*. New York: D. Appleton and Company.
- Stiglitz, Joseph (2010): *Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy*. London: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Supek, Rudi (1993): *Psihologija modernističke lirike /The Psychology of the Modernist Lyrics*. Zagreb: Barbat & Prova.
- Suvin, Darko (2010): *Defined by a Hollow: Essays on Utopia, Science Fiction and Political Epistemology*. Berlin: Peter Lang Verlagsgruppe.
- Tönnies, Ferdinand (2005): *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Valéry, Paul (1934): *Autres Rhumbs*. Paris: NRF Librairie Galimard.

- Varoufakis, Yanis (2008): Capitalism According to Evolutionary Game Theory: The Impossibility of a Sufficiently Evolutionary Model of Historical Change. *Science & Society* 72 (1): 63–94.
- Vico, Giambattista (/1774/ 2011): *Principi di Scienza Nuova*. Segrate: Mondadori.
- Wallersten, Immanuel (1990): Culture as Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-System. In Mike Featherstone (ed.), *Global Culture*. Sage.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (2011): *The End of the World As We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-First Century*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Weiss, Lynda (2005): Infrastructural power, economic transformation, and globalization. In: John A. Hall, Ralph Schroeder (eds.), *An Anatomy of Power. The Social Theory of Michael Mann*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wuketits Franz M. and Christoph Antweiler, eds. (2004): *The Evolution of Human Societies and Cultures*. Weinheim: Wiley-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co KGaA.
- Ziegler, Jean (2005): *L'empire de la honte*. Paris: Fayard.