TEORIJA IN PRAKSA Družboslovna revija Let. LVIII, št. 2, str. 245–506 Ljubljana, april–junij 2021 UDK 4, ISSN 0040-3598 USTANOVITELJ IN IZDAJATELJ Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani GLAVNI UREDNIK Anton GRIZOLD SEKRETARKA REVIJE Tina CERNCIC TOMAŽEVIC UREDNIKI Anton GRIZOLD, Tina KOGOVŠEK, Marko LAH, Igor LUKŠIC, Breda LUTHAR, Peter STANKOVIC, Zdenka ŠADL, Tomaž KRPIC (recenzije) UREDNIŠKI SVET Milica ANTIC GABER, Marjan BREZOVŠEK, Ljubica JELUŠIC, Maca JOGAN, Andrej KIRN, Miran KOMAC, Janez KREK, Vlado MIHELJAK, Zdravko MLINAR (predsednik), Klement PODNAR, Rudi RIZMAN, Marjan SVETLICIC, Zlatko ŠABIC, Metka TEKAVCIC, Niko TOŠ, Mirjana ULE MEDNARODNI UREDNIŠKI SOSVET Luigi GRAZIANO (University of Torino, Italija), Philippe MANIGART (Bruselj, Belgija), Helmut WILLKE (University of Bielefeld, Nemcija), Peter DAHLGREN (University of Lund, Švedska) OBLIKOVALEC Ismar MUJEZINOVIC PRELOM Leon BETON TISK Tiskarna CICERO, Begunje, d. o. o. Naklada 250 izvodov REVIJA TEORIJA IN PRAKSA V BIBLIOGRAFSKIH IN BESEDILNIH ZBIRKAH PODATKOV SCOPUS, Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI), DLib, EBSCO, PROQUEST, COBISS.SI/COBIB, COBISS.SI/ODKLJ, International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA), CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstracts (CSA WPSA), CSA Sociological Abstracts (CSA SA, Internationale Bibliographie der Rezensionen geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlicher Literatur / International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR-Online), IBZ-Online, Internationale Bibliographie der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Zeitschriftenliteratur / International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences / Bibliographie internationale de la littérature périodique dans les domaines des sciences humaines et sociales (IBZ-Online), CSA Social Services Abstracts (CSA SSA). 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TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 58, 2/2021 TEORIJA IN PRAKSA Interdisciplinary journal of social science Vol. LVIII, No. 2, pp. 245–506 Ljubljana, April – June 2021 UDK 4, ISSN 0040-3598 FOUNDER AND PUBLISHER Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana EDITOR IN CHIEF Anton GRIZOLD ISSUE MANAGER Tina CERNCIC TOMAŽEVIC ASSOCIATE EDITORS Anton GRIZOLD, Tina KOGOVŠEK, Marko LAH, Igor LUKŠIC, Breda LUTHAR, Peter STANKOVIC, Zdenka ŠADL, Tomaž KRPIC (Book reviews) EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD Milica ANTIC GABER, Marjan BREZOVŠEK, Ljubica JELUŠIC, Maca JOGAN Andrej KIRN, Miran KOMAC, Janez KREK, Vlado MIHELJAK, Zdravko MLINAR (Chairman), Klement PODNAR, Rudi RIZMAN, Marjan SVETLICIC, Zlatko ŠABIC, Metka TEKAVCIC, Niko TOŠ, Mirjana ULE INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD Luigi GRAZIANO (University of Torino, Italy), Philippe MANIGART (Bruxelles, Belgium), Helmut WILLKE (University of Bielefeld, Germany), Peter DAHLGREN (University of Lund, Sweden) GRAPHIC DESIGN Ismar MUJEZINOVIC PAGE LAYOUT Leon BETON PRINT Print run: 250 Printing House CICERO, Begunje, d. o. o. Impression: 250 ABSTRACTING AND INDEXING SERVICE SCOPUS, Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI), DLib, EBSCO, PROQUEST, COBISS.SI/COBIB, COBISS.SI/ODKLJ, International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA), CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstracts (CSA WPSA), CSA Sociological Abstracts (CSA SA, Internationale Bibliographie der Rezensionen geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlicher Literatur / International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR-Online), IBZOnline, Internationale Bibliographie der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Zeitschriftenliteratur / International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences / Bibliographie internationale de la littérature périodique dans les domaines des sciences humaines et sociales (IBZ-Online), CSA Social Services Abstracts (CSA SSA). Address: Kardeljeva pl. 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia; Tel.: 00 386 1/5805-147, E-mail: teorija.praksa@fdv.uni-lj.si. Teorija in praksa is available at http://www.fdv.uni-lj.si/revije/znanstvene-revije/teorija-in-praksa. The annual subscription fee for 2021 is EUR 40.00 for students, EUR 50.00 for other individual sub­scribers, and EUR 100.00 for companies and institutions. The price of an individual issue is EUR 20.00. The journal is subsidised by the Slovenian Research Agency. TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 58, 2/2021 VSEBINA TEMATSKI SKLOP I: ZMOŽNOST DRŽAVE V 21. STOLETJU ANG Žiga VODOVNIK: (PRE)MISLITI DRŽAVO V 21. STOLETJU 249–267 Tihomir CIPEK: POLITICNO PROTI DRŽAVI? RELEVANTNOST KONCEPTA POLITICNEGA CARLA SCHMITTA 268–283 Ladislav CABADA: NATIVISTICNI IN ANTILIBERALNI NARATIVI V KONzERVATIVNI POPULISTICNI AGENDI V SREDNJI EVROPI 284–304 Marko HOCEVAR: KRIzA 2008 IN VzPON SLOVENSKE KONSOLIDIRAJOCE SE DRŽAVE 305–321 Andrej KURNIK, Cirila TOPLAK: O MIGRANTIH z MIGRANTI: MIGRACIJE PET LET PO EVROPSKI MIGRANTSKI »KRIzI« 322–340 Blaž VRECKO ILC: KLIMATSKA KRIzA: CAS zA PONOVNI PREMISLEK EKONOMSKEGA NACRTOVANJA S POMOCJO DEMISTIFIKACIJE KAPITALIzMA 341–360 TEMATSKI SKLOP II: BANALNI NEOLIBERALIZEM MEDIJSKEGA IN POLITICNEGA DISKURZA SLO Breda LUTHAR, Dejan JONTES: UVODNIK 361–369 zdenka ŠADL: EMOCIJE IN AFEKT V POLITICNEM DISKURzU 370–390 Nejc SLUKAN: POLITIKA IRONIJE NA SPLETNIH DRUŽBENIH OMREŽJIH: ORIS MEDIJSKO-TROLOVSKEGA DISPOzITIVA 391–408 Deja CRNOVIC: EVENTIzACIJA IN KOMODIFIKACIJA POLITIKE NA INSTAGRAMU 409–427 Breda LUTHAR: POPULARNA KULTURA IN REGRESIVNI POPULIzEM 428–446 Ksenija VIDMAR HORVAT: POSTIMPERIALNI PATRIARHAT IN KARNEVALESKNA PERIFERIJA: MELANIA TRUMP V TRANSNACIONALNI JAVNOSTI 447–463 Maruša PUŠNIK, Dejan JONTES: MEDIJI IN SPONTANI NACIONALIzEM: PRIMER MELANIE TRUMP 464–480 PRIKAZI, RECENZIJE Joseph Marko and Sergiu Constantin (eds.): Human and Minority Rights Protection by Multiple Diversity Governance (Sanja Vrbek) 481–485 Rado Bohinc: Univerza in država: Pravna analiza družbenega položaja univerze (Ivan Svetlik) 485–487 AVTORSKI POVZETKI 488–494 TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 58, 2/2021 CONTENTS THEMATIC SECTION I: STATE CAPACITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY ENG Žiga VODOVNIK: (RE)THINKING THE STATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 249–267 Tihomir CIPEK: THE POLITICAL VERSUS THE STATE? THE RELEVANCE OF CARL SCHMITT'S CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 268–283 Ladislav CABADA: NATIVIST AND ANTI-LIBERAL NARRATIVES IN CONSERVATIVE POPULIST AGENDA IN CENTRAL EUROPE 284–304 Marko HOCEVAR: THE CRISIS OF 2008 AND THE RISE OF THE SLOVENIAN CONSOLIDATION STATE 305–321 Andrej KURNIK, Cirila TOPLAK: ON MIGRANTS WITH MIGRANTS: MIGRATIONS 5 YEARS AFTER EUROPE’S MIGRATION »CRISIS« 322–340 Blaž VRECKO ILC: CLIMATE CRISIS: TIME TO RETHINK ECONOMIC PLANNING BY DEMYSTIFYING CAPITALISM AND ITS MARKET(S) 341–360 THEMATIC SECTION II: THE BANAL NEOLIBERALISM OF MEDIA AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE SLO Breda LUTHAR, Dejan JONTES: EDITORIAL 361–369 248 zdenka ŠADL: EMOTIONS AND AFFECT IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE 370–390 Nejc SLUKAN: THE POLITICS OF IRONY ON SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS: OUTLINE OF THE TROLLING DISPOSITIF OF SOCIAL MEDIA 391–408 Deja CRNOVIC: THE EVENTISATION AND COMMODIFICATION OF POLITICS ON INSTAGRAM 409–427 Breda LUTHAR: POPULAR CULTURE AND REGRESSIVE POPULISM 428–446 Ksenija VIDMAR HORVAT: POST-IMPERIAL PATRIARCHY AND THE CARNIVALESQUE PERIPHERY: MELANIA TRUMP WITHIN A TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC 447–463 Maruša PUŠNIK, Dejan JONTES: MEDIA AND SPONTANEOUS NATIONALISM: THE CASE OF MELANIA TRUMP 464–480 BOOK REVIEWS Joseph Marko and Sergiu Constantin (eds.): Human and Minority Rights Protection by Multiple Diversity Governance (Sanja Vrbek) 481–485 Rado Bohinc: Univerza in država: Pravna analiza družbenega položaja univerze (Ivan Svetlik) 485–487 AUTHORS’ SYNOPSES 488–494 TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 58, 2/2021 THEMATIC SECTION I: STATE CAPACITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY Žiga VODOVNIK* (RE)THINKING THE STATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY Abstract. In this article, we argue that social sciences gen­erally and political science in particular are faced with a peculiar epistemological challenge while researching the state in the 21st century. Namely, the state has often been either naturalised, seen as a static and ahistorical entity resistant to changes in the environment, or naďve­ly rejected as a form of political organisation that is with neoliberal globalisation withering away. In either instance, the processes of redefining and redistributing of the state, and hence its de-/reterritorialising and res­caling, have largely gone unnoticed. Our analysis reas­sesses the hegemonic theories of state and shows that in the mainstream of political science research on the state is still anchored to the (geographical) assumptions that limit or even define the state and its exercise of power to a geographically demarcated and fixed territory. 249 Drawing on recent approaches to space, scale and terri­tory, this article calls for a heterodox and pluralist meth­odology in further research on state as well as non-state spaces. Keywords: the state, non-state spaces, globalisation, ter­ritory, political geography Introduction Throughout history political science has often suffered from the short­sightedness of statism. Yet, in the last few decades it has witnessed a differ­ent kind of myopia. As globalisation processes have accelerated, political science has, with few exceptions, completely overlooked the state. Political science has disregarded the state due to its apparent withdrawal from the new political geography or, as Kenichi Ohmae (1995) vividly put it, because the state is a dinosaur waiting to die. Still, political science has also disre­garded the state by naturalising it, understanding the state as a static and ahistorical entity resistant to changes in the environment. At best, political scientists’ interest in the state has seen ebbs and flows yet has always been * Guest Editor: Žiga Vodovnik, PhD, Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. DOI: 10.51936/tip.58.2.249-267 buttressed by the use of old, often outdated, theories, methodologies and vocabularies. If we take the title of this article seriously, we soon realise the social sciences generally and political science in particular are faced with a peculiar epistemological challenge while researching the new forms of statehood in the 21st century. Saul Newman notes that political theory must still catch up with this new terrain since it “generally looks for visible, repre­sentative identities situated on an ontological field organized by sovereign power; it is concerned with how we are governed, or with the normative principles or constitutive logics upon which political power is founded” (Newman, 2014: 94). Ever since the Ancient Greeks, issues of politics and political commu­nity have been related to territory and borders (Plato’s Republic) or their relativisation (zeno’s Republic). In particular, this kind of conception was strengthened by the Westphalian arrangements that developed and deep­ened an inside/outside divide as the core of the state and our imagining(s) of it (Jessop, 2009). This article starts by assumption that the few decades of the neoliberal (better the neoconservative) project have significantly rede­fined and redistributed the state.1 In our brief exploration of the hegem­onic theories of the state and especially their limits in detecting processes of redefining and redistributing the state, we address a broader question of the state and the perspectives in studies on the state. This is a relevant and topical issue, even more so when we consider that the state is losing its role as the only centre of sovereignty and an arena in which key political deci­sions are made. In recent decades, the state has encountered fierce competi­tion from the rising power of (global) cities, TNCs, IGOs, NGOs and social movements that according to Saskia Sassen (2012) signal the emergence of “different territorial vectors”, where the place and role of the state is signifi­cantly altered. This means the political science community must face up to the difficult task of (re)thinking and reconceptualising the state in the 21st century. For this purpose, in December 2019 the Slovenian Political Science Association organised a conference that addressed “optical challenges” (Appadurai, 2004) in understanding the Janus-like face of the (post)modern state. We tried to highlight this challenge by modifying Abraham Bosse’s frontispiece for Hobbes’ Leviathan from 1651 in the visuals used for the conference. We could say that by ‘blurring’ the crowned figure we also sought to draw attention to the changed ontological status of the state that often goes unde­tected: if the Westphalian model made the state and its existence conditional We argue that the state did not wither away as the neoliberal project emerged since it is a constitu­tive element of its expansion. It should be clear by now that there is nothing more and nothing less of the state, but it is completely different. on relations vis-ŕ-vis other states, even if they were unable to perform the main state functions, today their (non)existence is a condition of their inter­nal capacity to be a space for autonomous political action. This fissure in the state system is seen in the existence of states that no longer function as states and non-state spaces that are becoming autonomous political entities and are already performing the main state functions. In the introduction to his over 1,600-page work entitled De l’État, Henry Lefebvre asks a simple question: “What is the state?”. He answers: Enumeration of hypotheses. The State? A conscience, the conscious­ness of the nation? A ‘moral’ or ‘legal’ person? A ‘substance’ or a set of relations? A reality? A firm? A ‘subject’? An ‘object’? Or the name for an absence, a simulation? For ‘being’ or collective presence? Would it be the ‘reflection’ or the result of a social structure (classes)? A sum of func­tions? The exercise of Power? Or ‘something’ else, to be discovered and defined? (Lefebvre, 2009: 95) To this end, the article attempts to repoliticise the state and show that the state is first and foremost constituted by political, not economic relations. This means the state must chiefly be understood as a political and not an economic entity, even if in fact it is (anti)political in its drive to eliminate the diversity, autonomy and differences that hinder the creation of the national whole or what James C. Scott terms “synoptic legibility”.2 We analyse how the hegemonic theories of state have responded to the new political land­scape and how up-to-date and relevant they remain in helping to explain what Sassen (2012) calls a “new geography of centrality”, where the place and role of the state is significantly redefined. We explore the thesis that in the mainstream of political science research on the state is anchored to outdated (geographical) assumptions that limit or even define the state and its exercise of power to a geographically demarcated and fixed territory. Drawing on recent approaches to space, scale and territory, we call for a heterodox and pluralist methodology while researching the state. In other words, we show how novel (meta)theoretical, epistemological and method­ological pluralism in analysing the state enables a much broader and deeper understanding of statehood as a process, overcoming the territorial reifica­tion of the state. Political science, then, should be able to understand the state in its respective historical mediations, while avoiding any naďve reification of the state or what Edward W. Soja (1978) and John Agnew (1994) describe as We thus show the contradictions and limits of state politics and call for academic attention to the non-state spaces concept. “spatial fetishism” and a “territorial trap”, respectively. According to Agnew (2005: 441, 456), political science is entrapped by the territorialised under­standings of state that emerged from the traditional Westphalian images of states and were further shaped by the development of mercantilism and industrialist capitalism, along with Enlightenment and Romantic aspirations to popular rule and nationalism. However, since the state is at once globalising and localising, it faces a “multi-scalar meta-governance” challenge (Jessop, 2009) to adapt to the ongoing spatial and scalar restructurings. Put differently, the state continues to function as a form of the territorialisation of capitalism, yet the expansion of capitalist economy and its rescaling of territoriality call for the state’s de-/ reterritorialisation on different levels. These are complex and contradictory processes that should not be misinterpreted as the demise or erosion of the state. Saul Newman thus argues that an alternative theoretical and methodo- logical arsenal is required to fully explore the new terrain of politics that is relocating “the political relationship away from the state and its formal representative structures towards the movements of autonomy that increas­ingly transcend it” (Newman, 2014: 93). This necessitates new, heterodox and post-disciplinary approaches to the state, an area the article explores in the second part. In the final part, we paradoxically shift our gaze to the relevance of non-state spaces and politics constituted beyond or sometimes in opposition to the state as a way to (un)think the state from the outside. The State and New Thinking When John Keane (2009; 2015) was reflecting on the state of democratic theory, he concluded that one very simple thing was missing: new thinking. Keane argues that the development and mutual enrichment of democratic ideas and practices over the last few decades have completely changed the language, institutions and normative ideals of democracy. The old crite­ria, like sovereign state, party pluralism, elections, representation, national identity, market economy etc., are today wholly obsolete categories that no longer have any connection to the current dynamics of democratic innova­tions. This is why an entirely new approach is required, building on a new grammar, metaphors, perspectives, theories and methods themselves. We imagine that Keane would similarly argue for the theories of state and stud­ies of the state; namely, that what is missing is new thinking. The hegem­onic theories of the state continue to be dominated by territorial myopia whereby states are viewed as stable geographical containers of social, eco­nomic, political and cultural relations (Brenner, 1999). In the mainstream of political science, research on the state is still anchored to the (geographical) assumptions that limit or even define the state and its exercise of power to a geographically demarcated and fixed ter­ritory.3 In his elaboration of the “territorial trap”, John Agnew (1994) notes that political science has largely been dominated by reified understandings of the state, that “it has been too geographical and not sufficiently histori­cal”. Conventional state research has relied on three problematic geographi­cal assumptions which are called into question by current developments: a) the ahistorical or naturalised understanding of states as fixed sovereign spaces; b) binary logic delimitating inside/outside or domestic/foreign; and c) regarding states as ‘containers’ of societies. In path-breaking study New State Spaces (2004), Neil Brenner concurs and argues that political science has lost its analytical edge by approach­ing the state “as a preconstituted geographical unit of analysis”. The state is viewed “as the self-enclosed geographical container of socioeconomic and politico-cultural relations” and frequently as the only one, prevent­ing researchers from seeing beyond state-centric modes of inquiry. In his attempt to construct “new modes of analysis”, Brenner combines fragments of heterodox, interdisciplinary and even post-disciplinary methodologies that challenge spatial fetishism, methodological territorialism, methodologi­cal nationalism and, thus, state-centric epistemologies. What is becoming evident is that new territorial constellations, nexi and vectors are producing a new geography of strategic spaces that Sassen (2012) refers to as a “new geography of centrality”, where the place and role of the state is significantly redefined. Here it is useful to paraphrase the important, if not the key, ques­tion Sassen considers in her analysis of the new configurations of territorial­ity and transnational politics: Are we able to see and detect the formation of new political forms among the old political conditions? In fact, many studies have moved beyond the state-centric geographical assumption yet, as Brenner (1999: 41) points out, the old errors have been remedied by introducing a new one: mainly through the state’s conceptual negation. In other words, these new reconceptualisations have been able to perceive the emerging spatial forms and corollary new political geographies, but completely overlooked the state in them – i.e. the state’s new position and, hence, novel forms of its de-/reterritorialisation and rescaling. Brenner acknowledges that the state continues to function as a form of territoriali­sation for capital, yet warns that the expansion of the capitalist economy continues to produce new scalar configurations of territorialisation under capitalism that make the state-centric conceptions outdated. Namely, the expansion of capitalism should be seen as a complex, conflictual process It should be clear that the state, or any political organisation for this reason, can exercise power without a delimited and fixed territory and, even in this case, the state has been “unbundled” (Agnew, 1994: 55) by formal and informal agreements, networks, markets, movements, problems etc. not only transcending regulatory systems on the national scale – that is what we usually see and study – but is simultaneously producing the new sub-and supra-national modes of accumulation and (state) control needed to facilitate and coordinate this process. By referring to “scalar shift”, Brenner indicates that the current wave of globalisation means that the global scale depends on simultaneous reterri­torialisation on a sub-global scale, mostly the new sub- and supra-national scales, and no longer exclusively on the national one (ibid.: 62). Moreover, the capital–state relationship is being inverted since “it is no longer capital that is to be molded into the (territorially integrated) geography of state space, but state space that is to be molded into the (territorially differentiated) geog­raphy of capital” (Brenner, 2004: 14). (Post)modern statehood thus means complex and continuous rescaling “at once upwards, downwards and out­wards”, resulting in polymorphic institutional geographies (ibid.: 67).4 In recent years, an important contribution to studies of the state, which overcomes the theoretical/methodological Scylla and Charybdis mentioned above, has come from scholars who conceive of globalisation processes and the expansion of capitalism as a contradictory socio-spatial dialectic, con­stantly making and remaking new configurations of territoriality. In studies on the emerging spatial and political forms, they observed that the contra­dictions of neoliberalism (short term) on one hand, and the broader project of modernity (long term) on the other, are simultaneously: i) expanding and accelerating movements of goods, services, labour and capital; and ii) creat­ing and imposing a (relatively) fixed socio-territorial infrastructure for ena­bling and controlling these processes: Globalization therefore entails a dialectical interplay between the endemic drive towards space-time compression under capitalism (the moment of deterritorialization) and continual production of relatively fixed, provisionally stabilized configurations of territorial organiza­tion on multiple geographical scales (the moment of reterritorialization). (Brenner, 1999: 43) These processes not only make the Westphalian models of statehood outdated and useless, but the main concepts and metaphors in our categorical apparatus as well. Anderson (in Brenner, 2004: 63), for instance, suggests entirely new imaginings of the emerging political geographies: “A complex set of climbing frames, slides, swings, ropes and rope ladders, complete with weak or broken parts […] might be nearer the mark. The metaphor of adventure playgrounds, with their mixture of constructions, multiple levels and encouragement of movement – up, down, sideways, diagonally, directly from high to low, or low to high – captures the contemporary mixture of forms and processes much better than the ladder metaphor”. It is then unsurprisingly that Brenner’s novel (meta)theoretical, epistemo­logical and methodological pluralism in analysing the state enables a much broader and deeper understanding of the statehood as a process, overcom­ing territorial reification of the state. As mentioned, an alternative theoretical and methodological arsenal is required to explore this new terrain of politics (Newman, 2014: 93). This merely confirms Appadurai’s remark about research imagination (or the lack of it) because it reveals that our task is not simply a unique political and theoretical challenge is but above all an epistemological one. What we then need is not only conceptual clarity and theoretical thor­oughness, but a wider epistemological transformation that will enable inter-sectional research, freely merging previously disciplinary delimitated meth­odological registers and approaches. Namely, many concepts and categories are too elusive for the traditional disciplines, classical theories and Western epistemologies, in turn calling for a new, more flexible epistemology. If previous explorations of the state in political science often resulted in an “escape from reality”, as Ian Shapiro (2008) put it, it is still possible to formulate an alternative research orientation. To fully understand the redistributions and redefinitions of the state, new concepts, methods and even research logics are needed. Instead of addressing the key challenges and problems of (post)modern statehood, political science has fallen into the trap of theoretical and methodological monism in explaining the state. According to Shapiro, contemporary political science is thus largely defined by method- and theory-driven research, which are safe and attractive research orientations, yet also problematic for research itself as they lead to predetermination of the research subject itself. Thus, with method- and theory-driven research Shapiro does not negate the sophisticated use of methods and theories in research, but methodologi­cal and theoretical monism, which necessarily results in a pre-selection of visible or relevant research topics, problems and approaches. These thus limit researchers in their perception of political reality – e.g. what is (ir)rel­evant, what are the problems, what are the possible solutions, what is worth researching, who the subjects are. In other words, Shapiro points out that method- and theory-driven research automatically leads to the establishment of research paradigms (cf. Kuhn, 1962) that not only determine the selec­tion of problems but the selection of the right methods for their research as well. It is a kind of theoretical-methodological self-referentiality that does not acknowledge the possible fallacy of the theory and method itself. The shortcomings of method- and theory-driven research can, accord­ing to Shapiro, be avoided by a different research orientation – problem-driven research. It starts by realising that political science must tackle the critical problems of (post)modern societies, while in its methodological and theoretical approach allows or even demands certain levels of innovation, improvisation and eclecticism, as required by the research into a given prob­lem. In a way, it is a reaffirmation of Paul Feyerabend’s (1975/1993) epis­temological and methodological maxim that anything goes if a particular problem is to be fully explored. In explaining the political reality, detecting and resolving vital challenges, political science must adjust its methods and theories to problems, not vice versa. Problem-driven research thus offers a radical critique of the canon of authority and authorisation which repro­duces the hegemonic political theories, while rejecting the idea of interdisci­plinarity that implicitly still builds on the separation of individual disciplines and methodological registers. It enables and contributes to what Brenner describes as the “postdisciplinary” mode of inquiry, “where conceptual tools and methodological strategies are adopted with reference to the chal­lenges of making sense of particular social phenomena rather than on the basis of traditional disciplinary divisions of labor” (Brenner, 2004: 23). Contradictions of/in the State While the article principally deals with how the state may be reconcep­tualised in the 21st century, we shall make a brief detour by highlighting the need to explore politics that is constituted beyond or in opposition to the state. Our analysis of the state’s de-/reterritorialisation and rescaling should paradoxically also include critique of modernity and its political forms, including the state. These political forms face an irreversible crisis due to their insistence on sovereign territory and the hierarchy of power and peo­ple. As Bookchin (2007: 93–94) argues, politics and the state are not only inherently different, but can be in direct opposition.5 As we have shown elsewhere (cf. Vodovnik, 2011; Vodovnik, 2012), politics has always had a troubled relationship with the state because it has been closer to a philo­sophical concept of praxis as a free and creative activity in fluid polities. Only in our present has politics been integrated into state-making projects and strengthened the belief that there is no distinction between the politi­cal and statist realms, even though the modern state was born exactly as a reactionary response to Renaissance humanism. As a result, according to Richard Day (2005: 38) the struggle to dismantle community through the demutilisation being waged between politics and democracy on one side, and state and corporate forms on the other, is indeed the struggle of the (post)modern condition. We might also argue that political theory often understands politics too literally, especially when we note that the word real comes from the Latin word regal or king’s. This means that for a large part of politi­cal theory only what is ‘royal’ or situated in the ontological field organised by sovereign power is real, while counter-hegemonic and autonomous politics are discredited as a trivial pursuit. Still, we should reiterate that non-state politics should not be under­stood as a rupture from the main forms of political subjectivation, but as an explication of its original intent and meaning. Political membership beyond the state is, according to James C. Scott (2009: 3–4), the regularity of history, despite the nation state’s inscription on the political map and hence the sedentarisation or, in other words, the administrative, economic and cultural standardisation of fluid political entities. The concept of uni­form, homogeneous state politics emerged as a political or depoliticising tool that according to Scott (1998: 32) is a poor abstraction that may be compared to the invention of metre, kilogram and other units of measure­ment, standards and reforms needed for the administrative, economic and cultural standardisation of mixed and fluid political entities. We can thus understand universal state citizenship as a political equivalent to other ‘state simplifications’ as the metre that was introduced with a revolutionary decree stating: “The centuries-old dream of the masses of only one measure has come true! The Revolution has given the people the meter” (ibid.). If the universal metre swept away differences in the units that it measures, then universal state citizenship swept away differences among a heterogenous and plural multitude.6 Scott contends the tension between modern citizen­ship and statecraft should be understood as an “uneasy bargain”, that has led to completely new forms of political membership and legibility – i.e. the modern nation state and an abstract, un-marked citizen: Statecraft proved difficult in these conditions of vernacular measures and vernacular resistance to assessment … It is no exaggeration to claim that the conquest of illegibility is the most momentous achievement of the modern state. This required the standardization of weights and measures against determined local resistance. It required elaborate censuses and population rolls, cadastral surveys of landed property, and, not least, the institution of individual freehold properly adapted to cadastral science. The project of legibility allowed the state to “see” the human activity of interest to it through the simplified approximation of documents, lists, and statistics. (Scott, 2013: 97) Although the etymological origin of the word citizenship – from civitas, civitatus, to the modern citoyen – always linked political membership to smaller and more fluid polities, we still find it difficult to understand the relationship between citizenship and the state in societies where the equating of political membership with national or even ethnical identity results from a linguistic or semantic similarity in the two concepts. We often forget that at the very beginning citizenship was not related to the state but solely meant a specific ‘urban relationship’ between rights and duties in the city (Delanty, 2006: 12). Citizenship therefore meant political membership of a city. It is thus erroneous to talk only about a “citizen of the state” since we can also identify other citizenship types built on different – e.g. territorial or functional – criteria. In a short and very rough sketch of his massive, four-volume work De l-État (1976–78; On the State), Henry Lefebvre writes that the modern State is founded precisely on the “principle of equivalence”, which secures unity, identity and political integration. In his pondering on the state in the mod­ern world, he counters prevailing Marxist theorisations of the state that also in the 1970s perceived the state as a form of “heavenly life” in contrast to the “earthly life” of civil society, where man “regards other men as means, degrades himself to a means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers” (Marx in Lefebvre, 2009: 75). Lefebvre notes: Foundations of the modern State: The (forced) equivalence of non­equivalents: the (forced) equalization of the unequal, the identification of the non-identical … The logic of homogenization and identity as the logic and strategy of State power. The State as reducer (of diversities, autonomies, multiplicities, differences) and as integrator of the so-called national whole. (ibid.: 108) Needless to say, this question calls for another excursus which, unfor­tunately, lies beyond the scope of this article. Still, we can briefly illustrate the paradox of state politics – i.e. the state as reducer et integrator – that should be explored in greater detail elsewhere. In his recapitulation of Plato and Aristotle, Rancičre (1995) points to the important demarcation between the political subjectivities of demos and ochlos, which not only entails a simple divide between the “power of the people” and the “unifi­cation of individual turbulences”. For Rancičre, demos is not and cannot become a singular, delimited subject, which explains, contrary to ochlos or a multitude of individuals in the illusion of the totality of One, why it is able to denaturalise and change the existing. Demos, as the “part of those who have no part”, is not the sum of social partners or even the totality of all dif­ferences, like state polity is often understood, but quite the opposite – the power of revealing the contingency and imperfection of such counting of partners and summing up of differences, since a people is “always more and less than what it is”. Rancičre stresses this idea gives birth to politics, even though politics (la politique) is too often understood as referring to problematic systems of distribution and legitimation, which we might define as state politics and lead to it being simply named the police (la police). As a self-man­aging practice of democracy, politics only emerges when the assumption of intrinsic equality is realised. The “scandal of democracy” is therefore that it no longer involves any a priori justification of one’s adequacy for political life. If we place this alongside Rancičre (2014: 49), democ­racy is neither a form of society nor a form of government, it is precisely the “ungovernable”.7 It follows that, as a practice of democracy, politics appears when the assumption of intrinsic equality is realised. We may understand politics as one of the rare examples when subjects act as sub­jects that do not have the rights they are entitled to and hold rights they do not have an entitlement to and thus disturb the hegemonic (police) order. For Rancičre, a declassification of order and political subjectivation is the sine qua non of politics – that is, the acknowledgement of the political existence of part des sans-part. That is, this is exactly the opposite of the “synoptic legibility” (Scott, 2013; Scott, 1998) the state-making projects are producing and struggle to maintain. Efforts to make state populations leg­ible and that would enable the state effective in performing its main func­tions – e.g. taxation, conscription, monopoly of coercion – have namely always called for diverse strategies and policies aimed at sedentising the unruly demos. Thinking from the Outside Any serious attempt to understand recurring crises of state politics should build on the recent academic attention paid to the non-state spaces. According to Grubac.ic´ and O’Hearn (2016), non-state spaces can be under­stood as exilic spaces because they are inhabited by communities trying to (in)voluntarily escape both state regulation and capitalist accumulation. Exilic spaces may be defined as areas in social and economic life where indi­viduals and groups seek to extricate themselves from capitalist economic processes by either territorial escape or attempting to build structures inde­pendent of capitalist accumulation and social control.8 As we have noted elsewhere (Vodovnik and Grubac.ic´, 2015), we can analyse non-state spaces on the “micro-political” level when we talk about their “infrapolitical” aspects that provide “much of the cultural and structural underpinning of the more visible political action on which our attention has generally been focused” (Scott, 1990: 184). We suggest it is necessary to shift our attention from the most visible – and thus the most mediatised – aspects 7 Hence, in his explanation of democracy, Ranciére follows Plato’s idea of a political regime that is not a political regime since it lacks any foundation. The “scandal of democracy” is manifested in the very idea that the principle of distinction according to birth, wealth and knowledge has no place in the demo­cratic world because democracy is always a matter of the declassification of order, the process of political subjectivation, and the (re)counting of the political community that is “always more or less than it is”. 8 In her account of the occupy movements, Saskia Sassen (2012: 6) emphasises the importance of such projects, albeit limited in time and space, due to their ability to overcome “even if temporarily, terri­tory’s embedded and often deeply undemocratic logics of power, and to redefine the role of citizens, mostly weakened and fatigued after decades of growing inequality and injustice Indeed, the occupations have revealed to what extent the reality of territory goes beyond its dominant meaning throughout the twentieth century, when the term was flattened to denote national sovereign territory”. of institutional, state politics to attempts at redefining democracy and politi­cal membership which may be found in the “immense political terrain … between quiescence and revolt” (ibid.: 200). In its “micropolitical” sense, the concept of infrapolitics can help highlight the overlooked or at best mar-ginalised aspects of non-state spaces, which “like infrared rays” are “beyond the visible end of the spectrum”. These spaces, communities and practices should therefore be understood as “hidden transcripts” since they are “invis­ible … in large part by design – a tactical choice born of a prudent awareness of the balance of power” (ibid.: 201). On the “macropolitical” level, the infrapolitics of non-state spaces should be understood as a process of producing forms of place-based politics within the cracks of the global capitalist system. The infrapolitics of the cap­italist world economy describe the efforts to break off from the systemic processes of the state and capital. It is a process of the (self-)organisation of relatively autonomous and only partially incorporated spaces, which then leads to the antagonistic relationship that emerges between exilic spaces and the hierarchical organisations of the capitalist world economy. It is also a predictable response to the enduring logic of exit and capture inscribed in the longue durée of historical capitalism. Instead of ruptures and breaks, we can see a long-term, large-scale historical process of state making and state breaking, of state formation and state de-formation, of an ongoing and uneven incorporation and exilic re-appropriation and recovery.9 In The Art of Not Being Governed, a book that has changed the way we theorise state-making projects and non-state spaces, Scott develops a provocative thesis: Not so very long ago, however, such self-governing peoples were the majority of humankind. Today, they are seen from the valley kingdoms as ‘our living ancestors,’ ‘what we were like before we discovered wet-rice cultivation, Buddhism and civilization.’ On the contrary, I argue that hill peoples are best understood as runaway, fugitive, maroon com­munities who have, over the course of two millennia, been fleeing the oppressions of state-making projects in the valleys — slavery, conscrip­tion, taxes, corvée labor, epidemics, and warfare. (Scott, 2009: ix) The politics of zones of refuge or, better, exilic spaces, is usually not regarded as relevant to our understanding of politics, capitalist development and change, which is not surprising as these territories are above all spaces of refuge for etceteras of societies. This is an important oversight since exilic Moreover, by paying attention to non-state spaces we can detect and explore what Carolyn Nordstrom (2000) defines as the “shadows”. For Nordstrom, the “shadow powers” remain largely invisible to formal inquiry but enable us to rethink the established theories of state sovereignty and the state system. spaces should be seen as part of the economic structuring and restructur­ing of the capitalist world economy and political power. Exilic spaces are always in the making, they are always being (re)made and (de)composed through a series of, at first glance, unrelated tactics and strategies: Virtually everything about these people’s livelihoods, social organiza­tion, ideologies, and (more controversially) even their largely oral cul­tures, can be read as strategic positionings designed to keep the state at arm’s length. Their physical dispersion in rugged terrain, their mobil­ity, their cropping practices, their kinship structure, their pliable ethnic identities, and their devotion to prophetic, millenarian leaders effec­tively serve to avoid incorporation into states and to prevent states from springing up among them. (ibid.: x) With a Rancičrian reading, we understand these spaces as rare instances of politics. With the inscription of the part that has no part (yet), the “commu­nities of sharing” overcome the “political agoraphobia” (Dupuis-Déri, 2018) that defines and underpins modern representative governments.10 After all, politics arises when a (mis)count – to be more precise, “the gap created by the empty freedom of the people between the arithmetical order and the geometric order” (Rancičre, 2005: 34) – leads to the assertion of equality of anyone with anyone else, reminding us that democracy is nothing but “anar­chic ‘government,’ one based on nothing other than the absence of every title to govern” (Rancičre, 2014: 41). The depoliticisation processes that accompany etatist projects must nevertheless be understood as complex and multidimensional transfor­mations which are not necessarily characterised by a lack of the political. Depoliticisation is hence not merely non-politics, it is instead anti-politics or the marginalisation of politics, especially in the case of a new political becoming that is being constituted in response to the trivialisation of pol­itics in liberal democracies. In this perspective, depoliticisation is seen as an inhibition of politics, which rejects political subjectivities and forms of agency from its ontological register and merely admits the establishment of sovereign power. However, the state can at the same time – and especially in the age of neoliberal or neoconservative triumph – offer the public space in which people can participate, organise themselves and influence politi­cal process, even if in limited ways and scope. Although the state is some­times perceived as Leviathan, current events simply confirm that without its implications for curbing the neoliberal agenda the state could become 10 As Dupuis-Déri argues, republicanism hinges on an understanding of ‘the people’ as irrational, sus­ceptible to demagoguery, factious or unable to support the common good. even more illegitimate, violent and unfair. In the “post-democratic” world (Crouch, 2004), the state can shield from the complete subjection of politics to the interests of capital, which is today manifested in the economisation of all social structures, spheres and practices. Conclusion In the article, we analysed how the hegemonic theories of state are responding to the new political geography and how up-to-date and relevant they remain for helping to explain the “new geography of centrality”, one in which the state’s place and role have been significantly redefined. The anal­ysis confirmed our initial thesis that in mainstream political science research on the state is still anchored to outdated (geographical) assumptions that limit or even define the state and its exercise of power to a geographically demarcated and fixed territory. Drawing on recent approaches to space, scale and territory, we argued for a heterodox and pluralist methodology while researching the state. In other words, we explored how novel (meta) theoretical, epistemological and methodological pluralism in analysing the state enables a much broader and deeper understanding of statehood as a process, overcoming the state’s territorial reification. The critical issue is therefore that any spatial/temporal fix, even if con­venient for research(ers), in fact prevents change being detected. The spa-tio-temporal framing in the mainstream of political science that ties state, politics and citizenship to bounded and generally less fixed territory has become a fait accompli in the field. To evoke Jessop’s musings (2016: 1), these postulates about the state return to the research agenda from time to time, only to be (re)addressed by a new generation of scholars or another epistemic community. Still, the ebbs and flows of scientific interest do not suggest the dilemmas and paradoxes these assumptions open up have been resolved, but often only that over time they go out of style or the scientific community becomes bored with them. As evident, the social sciences generally and political science in particu­lar faced a peculiar epistemological challenge while researching transfor­mations of statehood in the new millennium. Namely, the state has often been either naturalised, analysed as a static and ahistorical entity resistant to changes in the environment, or naďvely rejected as a form of political organi­sation that in the age of globalisation is withering away. In either instance, the processes of redefining and redistributing the state, and hence de-/reter­ritorialising and rescaling it, have gone largely unnoticed. Torn between the myopia of etatism and the naturalisation and/or trivialisation of modern statehood, political science is forced to recalibrate its theoretical and meth­odological registers. In a way, we sought to follow Robert Dahl’s (2004) call to reconsider political science in the 21st century and its “state of the art”. First and fore­most, Dahl argued that political science must overcome physics and eco­nomics envy when reconsidering its own methodologies and epistemolo­gies. Research ethics and goals should also be reconsidered since we must abandon pretentious goals of building a grand theory of politics; mecha­nistic and econometric explanations (and even predictions) of the political in the past have proven not only to be a waste of time but also to hinder better understanding of the paradoxes of the political. Dahl also warned against the risks of theoretical and methodological monism, which typically stems from the belief that the incredible complexity of the field can be over­come precisely by such self-restraint. Finally, we must reject reductionism in understanding of the political or attempts to explain the operation of com­plex systems with a single factor. In my view, Dahl’s account of political science is a useful recapitulation of the biggest deficiencies of the hegemonic approaches to the state and politics. Even more importantly, it can also help us develop new epistemol­ogies that enable a more complex understanding of the state and, finally, a gaze beyond it: in rejecting the economic reductionism and state-centric modes of analysis in political science; in warning against the theories of (state) politics that systematically erase or trivialise vernacular political sub­jectivities, practices and traditions; in repudiating theoretical and methodo­logical monism in exploring the political; and last but not least, in abandon­ing research approaches that regard the unruliness of the political realm as a problem to be resolved and not as a possibility to be seized both academi­cally and politically. Overview The articles in this thematic issue were first presented as papers at the (Re)thinking the State in the 21st Century conference organised in December 2019 by the Slovenian Political Science Association. Although the articles selected and gathered for this issue reflect on the state and stud­ies of the state from different perspectives and in various contexts, they all share the conference’s overall goal of re-examining hegemonic theories of the state in the new millennium. In “The Political Versus the State? The Relevance of Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political”, Tihomir Cipek offers a new reading of Carl Schmitt, focus­ing on his concept of the political and exploring whether it poses a threat to the state and the democratic political order. The article clearly comes at the right time as it should not only be read as a fresh recapitulation of Schmitt, but at least as much as a theoretical deconstruction of the current political regressions and their ideological foundations. In Cipek’s (re)reading of Schmitt in a new context, he considers how Schmitt may be used to explain the ideology of the new “conservative revolutionaries” in Central Europe. His lucid analysis of illiberal democracies in the region shows they seem to follow the ideas of Carl Schmitt. First, their idea of the political reduces it to the antagonist, friend–enemy dichotomy. Second, they claim that liberal and democratic elements of the political order are in an irreconcilable conflict. Third, they imagine the state as a body of an ethnically defined nation. In “Nativist and Anti-liberal Narratives in Conservative Populist Agenda in Central Europe”, Ladislav Cabada ponders nativism as a tool of identity poli­tics and conservative populism in the region. The author offers a detailed theoretical analysis of nativism and inspects the most important expres­sions and characteristics of this phenomenon. In the second part, the article compares conservative populist and/or nativist political actors in six Central European countries. The analysis shows that nativism should be understood as the main ideological edifice of the neoconservative project, promoting a genuinely new way of political mobilisation and collective action. Although not so important in the early years of the political and economic transition, nativism today informs the conservative populist agenda of right-wing par­ties in Central Europe and might even entail the core of their politics. In “The crisis of 2008 and the rise of the Slovenian consolidation state”, Marko Hoc.evar reflects on the Slovenian state’s transformations since 2008. He explores the rise of the debt state in Slovenia after the crisis of 2008 and explains the Slovenian state’s transformation into a consolidation state after 2013, when the consolidation of public finances became the primary objec­tive of the state’s policies. He detects the internal and external factors which influenced these processes. The outcomes of these processes can, inter alia, be observed in the form of the de-democratisation of the Slovenian state. As Hoc.evar argues, these processes coincided with the rise of technocratic regimes, the limitations on the possibilities of a referendum and the limiting of any sort of fiscal democracy following adoption of the ‘golden rule’ in 2013. In “On Migrants with Migrants: Migrations 5 Years after the European Migration ‘Crisis’”, Cirila Toplak and Andrej Kurnik explore theoretical and methodological innovations in the area of migration studies, with the mass migrations to the European Union in 2015, especially migrations along the ‘Balkan Route’, as their chronotope of analysis. The authors illustrate the lim­its state-centred epistemologies impose on migration studies and explore new theoretical and methodological approaches to ‘decoding’ the migrant subjectivity. The ethnographic research employed offers a new understand­ing of diverse processes and subjectivities, while the creative theoretical synthesis, e.g. combining escape route theory, infrapolitics, heterotopias, redefines the position held by border and migration studies. The thematic issue closes with “Climate Crisis: Time to rethink economic planning by demystifying capitalism and its market(s)”, in which Blaž Vrec.ko Ilc explores the possibility of democratic economic planning. He claims that technological determinism and free-market solutions are insuffi­cient to properly confront the climate crisis. Because planning in the global capitalist system is often undemocratic and oppressive, the article examines alternative politico-economic models and possibilities to democratise plan­ning itself. This means that without radical change in the sphere of produc­tion and distribution the problem of ecologically sustainable life on Earth will continue. Vrec.ko Ilc also discusses historical examples of alternative economic planning, only to highlight their failure and/or success that may inform our imaginings of the democratic planning that is so strongly needed to radically transform our societies and make them sustainable. BIBLIOGRAPHY Agnew, John (1994): The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory. Review of International Political Economy 1 (1): 53–80. Agnew, John (2005): Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95 (2): 437–461. Appadurai, Arjun (2004): Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination. In Joan Vincent, The Anthropology of Politics: A Reader in Ethnography, Theory, and a Critique. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. Bookchin, Murray (2007): Social Ecology and Communalism. Oakland, CA: AK Press. Brenner, Neil (1999): Beyond State-centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies. Theory and Society 28 (1): 39–78. Brenner, Neil (2004). New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood. Oxford, New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Clastres, Pierre (1987): Society Against the State. New York, NY: zone Books. Dahl, Robert (2004): What Have We Learned? In Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith and Tarek E. Masoud (eds.), Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Day, Richard J. F. (2005): Gramsci is Dead, Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements. London: Pluto Press. Delanty, Gerard (2006): Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics. New York, NY: Open University Press. Dupuis-Déri, Francis (2018): Who’s Afraid of the People? The Debate between Political Agoraphobia and Political Agoraphilia. Global Discourse 8 (2): 238– 256. Feyerabend, Paul (1975/1993): Against Method. London: Verso. Graeber, David (2015): The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy. Brooklyn/London: Melville House. Grubac.ic´, Andrej and Dennis O’Hearn (2016): Living at the Edges of Capitalism: Studies in Exile and Mutual Aid. Oakland, CA: University of California Press. Jessop, Bob (2009): From Governance to Governance Failure and from Multi­level Governance to Multi-scalar Meta-governance. In Bas Arts et al. (eds.), The Disoriented State: Shifts in Governmentality, Territoriality and Governance. Berlin: Springer. Jessop, Bob (2016): The State: Past, Present, Future. Cambridge: Polity. Keane, John (2009): The Life and Death of Democracy. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. Keane, John (2015): New Thinking. In Benjamin Isakhan and Stephen Stockwell (eds.), The Edinburgh Companion to the History of Democracy: From Pre­history to Future Possibilities. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Kuhn, Thomas (1962): The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Lefebvre, Henri (2009): State, Space, World: Selected Essays. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Newman, Saul (2014): Occupy and Autonomous Political Life. In Alexandros Kioupkiolis and Giorgos Katsambekis (eds.), Radical Democracy and Collective Movements Today: The Biopolitics of the Multitude versus the Hegemony of the People. New York, NY: Routledge. Nordstrom, Carolyn (2000): Shadows and Sovereigns. Theory, Culture & Society 17 (4): 35–54. Ohmae, Kenichi (1995): The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies. New York: Simon and Schuster. Rancičre, Jacques (1995): On the Shores of Politics. London: Verso. Rancičre, Jacques (1998/2010), Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, Bloomsbury/ Continuum, London. Rancičre, Jacques (2014): Hatred of Democracy. London: Verso. Sassen, Saskia (2012): Cities: A Window into Larger and Smaller Worlds. European Educational Research Journal 11 (1): 1–10. Scott, James C. (1990): Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcript. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Scott, James C. (1998): Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Scott, James C. (2010): The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Scott, James C. (2013): Decoding Subaltern Politics Ideology, Disguise, and Resis­tance in Agrarian Politics. New York, NY: Routledge. Shapiro, Ian (2008): The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Soja, Edward W. and Costis Hadjimichalis (1979): Between Geographical Materia­lism and Spatial Fetishism. Antipode 11 (3): 3–11. Vodovnik, Žiga (2011): The Performative Power of Translocal Citizenship. Dve domovini 34: 7–20. Vodovnik, Žiga (2012): Beyond a Construction Site, Beyond National Citizenship. Dve domovini 35: 49–61. Vodovnik, Žiga and Andrej Grubac.ic´ (2015): “Yes, we camp!”: Democracy in the Age of Occupy. Lex Localis 13 (3): 537–557. Tihomir CIPEK* THE POLITICAL VERSUS THE STATE? THE RELEVANCE OF CARL SCHMITT’S CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL Abstract. The aim of the article is to examine the rela­tionship between the state, democracy and the Carl Schimitt’s concept of the political. That is going to be done by reconstructing the concepts of Schmitt’s politi­cal theory and finding out whether they can be used to explain the ideology of the new right-wing populism and illiberal democracy. As it turns out, the Schmitt’s reduction of the political to the friend/enemy antago­nism makes the core of the illiberal democracies’ ruling narrative. The Schimtt’s understanding of the politi­cal doesn’t defend the state as a political space but by cancelling of the liberal elements of democracy ruins the state institutions. The analysis shows that Schmitt’s notion of the political cannot be used to build effective 268 democratic state institutions. Namely, in his definition of the political, politics actually exists only on the out­wards, towards some other nation, some other political unity, but not within the state itself. Keywords: state, the political, Carl Schmitt, illiberal democracy Introduction The interest of social sciences is once again centred on the relation between the state and democracy. The discussion has been prompted by the rise of the right-wing populist parties in Europe and the theses on the cri­sis of democracy. The rise of right-wing populism is explained in two ways. The first approach starts from the socio-economic situation and notes that the ranks of populist protest parties are being swelled by the economic los­ers of globalisation and transition. The second approach takes culture and national identity as its starting point, and believes that right-wing populists are supported by extremely conservative voters who feel like they need to defend their religion and nation, which are in danger. Both approaches con­tain some elements of truth, but the countries where right-wing populism * Tihomir Cipek, PhD, Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb, Croatia. DOI: 10.51936/tip.58.2.268-283 TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 58, 2/2021 Tihomir CIPEK first appeared are still welfare states (France, Austria, the Netherlands), while conflicts in the interpretation of cultural values occur only when the hard right comes to power and starts changing gender policy, as can be seen on the example of Poland (Manow, 2020). Of course, there were also the 2010 Eurozone crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis. All of these interpretations con­tain some truth, but the main reason for the rise of right-wing populist parties seems to be of a structural nature. This is about the political elites’ avoidance of making decisions, of intervening in the sphere of economy with the levers of political power, and at the same time, about neglecting democracy and the state (Streeck and Schäfer, 2013). Citizens demand that politics, or rather the state, protect them, while political elites claim that the market will do that on its own. Thus, the reason for the contemporary crisis of democracy and the emergence of right-wing populism lies in neglecting the functions of politics and the state (Böckenfoerde, 1988; Mouffe, 2004; Brown, 2015, 2019; Streeck, 2020). The functions of the state are taken over by international arbiters of power, which are not democratically elected and are not subject to democratic control, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and various expert commissions and courts. At the same time, the neo-liberal ideology claims that the state is something bad because it prevents the free operation of the market. The argument is that politics is an unnecessary obstacle to the economy and that the state should be reduced to a minimum, because everything will be resolved by the market (Brown, 2019; Rizman, 2020; Cayla, 2021). On the other hand, it is quite clear that democracy is his­torically and institutionally tied to the state (Dharendorf, 2002; Streeck, 2020). We thus find ourselves in a paradoxical situation, in which the political is at the level of the state, but public policies are at a supranational level, or rather at the level of the EU. Essentially, we are talking about a process of depoliti­cization (Mounk, 2018). This text starts from the thesis that neoliberal ideol­ogy puts the interests of corporations before the interests of nation states, and that right-wing populism responds to this process of depoliticization by promising to return the state and democracy to the people. This promise of a return of politics has prompted a discussion of Carl Schmitt’s political the­ory and his understanding of the political (Balakrishnan, 2000; Müller, 2003; Mouffe, 1999, 2013; Petersen, 2018). This poses the question whether is it possible by the means of Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political to hold back the depoliticization, to enhance the dynamics in the political field, that is cru­cial for the state institutions, and thus strengthen the state as the true space of democracy. This question is going to be faced by the method of qualitative analysis of the discourse (Jrgensen and Philips, 2002). The starting thesis will be that the central purpose of political theory’s concepts is to serve the political struggle and to develop the hegemonic model of the interpretation of political phenomena. TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 58, 2/2021 The Crises of the State? The understanding and the concept of the state is one of the most impor­tant phenomena in political science. In its inception, political science devel­oped as and was called the science of the state. Today, mainstream pub­lic discourse is dominated by the thesis that the state is unnecessary, that it has allegedly been transcended, that it should be reduced to the minimum (Brown, 2015, 2019; Cayla, 2020). This is actually a ubiquitous media dissem­ination of the central thesis of neoliberal ideology, which claims that every­thing would be great if all interpersonal relations were reduced to market relations.1 More pointedly, it could be said that neoliberals and US neo­conservatives claim that the state is nothing, while the market is everything (Stiglitz, 2019; Risman, 2020; Streeck, 2021). To be sure, both of these groups hold this principle to be true only until it is failed private banks that need to be bailed out by the state (Hall, 2015). This contempt toward the state has troubling, twofold consequences. The first consequence is for the liberal democracy itself. Namely, as stated by the classic of liberal political theory Ralf Dahrendorf (2002), democratic political order was historically and insti­tutionally designed for nation states, which is why democracy depends on the efficiency of state institutions. The second point is connected to the acceptance of the idea of the social state. The idea of the social state rested on the agreement between people’s and social-democratic parties that was achieved after the Second World War. The social state was the West’s effec­tive answer to the ideological challenges coming from the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist dictatorships that began in 1989 marked the beginning of the degradation of the social state of the European West. By questioning the significance of politics, the dominant media discourse also questioned the state itself in its political and economic function. Thus the predominance of the ideology that celebrated the market and the necessary dominance of financial capital institutions over politics also wreaked havoc on the power of the state (Robison, 2006). It seemed like the state was good for nothing except listening to the dictates of banks and other institutions of financial capital. A classic idea of Hegel’s political philosophy, which was based on the division between the state and society and advo­cated for the supremacy of the state, seemed to become obsolete. The same could be said for the theoretical premises of Max Weber, as well as many other right- and left-wing thinkers who advocated for the idea of a strong, effective state. In this sense, it is interesting that the neoliberal devaluation The way in which the Slovenian media turns essential political phenomena into non-political ones is demonstrated by Pikalo and Trdina (2011). Tihomir CIPEK of the state did not lead to the actualization of Weber’s or Hegel’s theory of the state, but rather put a spotlight on the political theory of Carl Schmitt, a Nazi law theorist. Schmitt has become the favourite theoretician of the radical and extreme right. What is especially popular is his concept of the political, which reduces politics to the friend-enemy relation. That is why I will use Schmitt’s theories to explain the contemporary arguments about the state. I will first point to the perception of Schmitt’s political delibera­tions. Secondly, I will try to reconstruct Schmitt’s notion of the political and his interpretation of the relation between the liberal and the democratic ele­ments of the political order. Finally, I will show how the discourse of the new “conservative revolutionaries”, who pride themselves on establishing “illiberal democracy”, understands the political, the state and democracy. The Perception of Schmitt’s Theory Today, Schmitt’s political theory is the topic of discussion on both ideo­logical poles, the left and the right. This is true despite the fact that Schmitt was a Nazi, and thus completely compromised as a person who was una­ble to distinguish right from wrong. Schmitt was accepted in the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) on the 1st May 1933, the same day as Martin Heidegger, and was banned from university work after the War. Specifically, in his texts published in the legal journals of the Third Reich, Schmitt provided justification for the Nazi totalitarian dictatorship. After the War and the victory of the anti-fascist coalition, he did not renounce his writings that legitimised Nazism, and stayed silent on Nazi crimes and the Holocaust (Mehring, 2017: 123). In spite of this, his attack on liberalism seemed useful to the French left, which brought his theory back into discussion. In this sense, I would single out Chantal Mouffe (1999, 2013), whose theory of agonistic democracy was based on Schmitt’s friend-enemy dichotomy. This allowed her to use the rehabilitation of the political to advocate for a radical change of the socio­economic order. She liked Schmitt’s protest against the disappearance of the political as well as his strong rejection of liberalism. In her theory of democ­racy, Chantal Mouffe tries to mitigate Schmitt’s attack on liberal democracy by replacing his term “enemy” with the word “adversary”. Today, Mouffe (2018) is a decisive proponent of the concept of left populism. She wants to preserve the political, and use this concept to challenge the current capi­talist socio-economic order. In a word, in contrast to the liberal attempt to neutralise the political, the French left used the theory of Carl Schmitt to revitalise this concept in its theoretical discourse and thus maintain the pos­sibility of changing the economic and political order. Tendrils of Schmitt’s theory can also be found in the writing of the hermeneutists Paul Ricoeur. In his theory, he also differentiated between le politique – the political, and la politique – politics, thus trying to preserve authenticity, or rather prevent the latter from compromising the former. The introduction of the notion of the political in the discussion is meant to heighten the tensions in the political and economic order, and thus pre­serve the possibility of change. On the other hand, the radical right considers Carl Schmitt to be a cult author, alongside Ernst Jürgen (Maus, 1980; Müller, 2003; Weiß, 2017). His notion of the political, attack on liberalism and parliamentarism (Holmes, 1993), and especially his linking of nationalism and statism are key battle cries of the meta-politics of the new European right (Weiß, 2017; Salzborn, 2017).2 German radical right magazines – “Junge Freiheit”, “Sezession” – often discuss his ideas. And the leading ideologist of the new French right Alain de Benoist (2003, 2010) uses Schmitt’s political ideas as a theoretical foundation for right-wing cultural revolution. Armin Mohler, whose book “Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918–1932” (1950) brought the nationalist theses of the Weimer Republic’s conservative revolutionar­ies back into public life, did not hide his admiration for Carl Schmitt and his political theory. Schmitt’s ideas are also propagated by the extreme right wing of the AfD, gathered around Björn Höcke and Götz Kubitschek and his Institute for State Policy (Weiß, 2017: 48). Namely, the main enemy of the new extreme right is liberalism. At the centre of their ideology is Schmitt’s notion of the political, founded on the friend-enemy relation. The idea of the political, as well as Schmitt’s linking of nationalism and statism, form the basis of illiberal democracies that are taking form in Hungary and Poland. These countries are trying to suspend liberal principles of the development and protection of individual, as well as minority rights. The ruling elites claim – following Carl Schmitt’s teaching – that the state is a reflection of the spirit, and the form of the body of a nation. On the other hand, Schmitt considers the political to be superordinate to the state (Mehring, 2011; Balakrishnan, 2000; Holmes, 1993; Posavec, 1989). The issue thus lies in the fact that Schmitt’s theory juxtaposes the political and the state. This opposi­tion is especially strong if one understands the state as an array of institu­tions based on liberal-democratic principles.3 However, this contradiction goes unnoticed by the extreme and radical right, which focuses on the con­flict between the liberal and the democratic principles of the political order. 2 In this text, I tried to reveal the political-instrumental usage of Carl Schmitt’s political and legal the­ory. His influence on numerous political theoreticians who partly accepted, but also critiqued his theory, was covered by Reinhard Mehring. In this sense, he listed Schmitt’s students such as Werner Becker, Otto Kirchemer, Ernst Forsthoff etc. (Mehring, 2017: 115–121). 3 An interesting interpretation of Schmitt as a thinker who shares the liberals’ fear of the people is given by Mastnak (2015: 96–132). But before I try to explain, I will attempt to reconstruct Schmitt’s notion of the political. The Political Schmitt considered “Der Begriff des Politischen” (Mehring, 2011: 146) to be his best work. The book appeared in three editions – 1927, 1932 and 1933 – with no major differences between them. The most commonly read and subsequently reprinted is the 1932 edition (Ottman, 2010: 241). The think­ing is that this edition has not been opportunistically adjusted to Nazism and, more importantly, that it highlights the intensity of a social relation that only becomes a political relation through the degree of its intensity, which is important for the interpretation of the political. Schmitt’s theses on the con­cept of the political bring a completely new understanding of politics. Until then, politics was seen as a phenomenon that was essentially tied to the state. The state was the political, it had political monopoly. This was implic­itly understood in the political theory of the 19th and early 20th century, as is observed by Henning Ottmann (2010). The state was on one side, and the society on the other, “here politics, there culture; here the internal, there the external”. And further: “War and peace, military and civilian, neutral and non-neutral were separate. The introduction of the notion of the ‘politi­cal’ meant that those clear divisions no longer exist” (Ottmann, 2010: 242). The political was defined by Schmitt as a friend – enemy relation. “In con­trast to the various relatively independent endeavours of human thought and action, particularly the moral, aesthetic, and economic, the political has its own criteria which express themselves in a characteristic way.… Let us assume that in the realm of morality the final distinctions are between good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable and unprofitable” (Schmitt, 1932: 13–14). “The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” (Schmitt, 1932: 14). It should be emphasised that Schmitt does not use adjectives “friendly” – “antagonistic”, but precisely nouns “friend” – “enemy”. Hence, this is a subject that can be either a friend or an enemy. Schmitt focuses his attention on the enemy. In his theory, the enemy is more important that the friend. Namely, he thinks that it is only with regard to the enemy that a nation can be formed as a homogeneous unit. This raises the question: who is the enemy? Is the enemy an existential category? These are the question that I will try to answer by reconstructing key parts of Schmitt’s theory. It can be said that Schmitt formulated his notion of the political by reha­bilitating Hobbes’ concept of a natural condition. Hobbes claims that the natural condition is a state of war. According to Schmitt’s interpretation, the political is really the natural state. But while Hobbes thinks that the natural state – as the state of war between individuals – should be abandoned, Carl Schmitt on the contrary approves the political, based on the friend-enemy relation, as the natural state. His opinion is that the moral or the normative in liberalism cannot exclude the political (Schmitt, 1932: 15–16). The enemy is simply the Other, and not just any Other, but a Stranger. The enemy is never a private adversary, he is always a public enemy (Schmitt, 1932: 16). Moreover, he is designated as a Stranger, meaning the Enemy, by his very existence. “The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, never­theless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible” (Schmitt, 1932: 16). For Schmitt, a “real enemy” is the one who threatens the existence. Politics is the struggle over “to be or not to be” (Ottmann, 2010: 245). It follows that the political cannot be prevented or diluted by formalism, legal provisions. For Schmitt, the return to the political signifies the abandonment of the status quo, guaranteed by the liberal rule of law. The political is present in particu­larly important cases of the state of emergency, when a particular order is in danger. The threat to the system can come from many directions. A system can be jeopardised by civil war, outside attack, terrorism. Such situations show that the “sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt, 1922: 13). The state of emergency highlights the fact that only the state has the monopoly over legitimate force. The state cannot be broken down into a series of civil society organisations, unions, churches – what we would now call non-governmental organisations. To wit, none of these institutions have the power of the state. Only the state wields the amount of power that can make a decision on war and peace. Within its borders, the state assures peace, while outwardly it can wage war (Schmitt, 1932: 38). “The justification of war does not reside in its being fought for ideals or norms of justice, but in its being fought against a real enemy” (Schmitt, 1932: 38). Interestingly, Schmitt considers politicians to be better schooled for battle than soldiers because, unlike soldiers who only fight occasionally, politicians fight con­stantly for as long as they are in politics (Schmitt, 1932: 22). The state as a system of legal norms thus tries to supress the political, but it cannot destroy it. The point of its existence is to decide who is the friend and who the enemy and, as a last resort, to lead the war against the enemy (Schmitt, 1932: 38). The concept of the political thus has a double mean­ing; it is as if Schmitt cannot conclusively make up his mind. On one hand, “the political assumes the place of the state”. „On the other hand, Schmitt does not support the diagnosis of the total dissolution of a sovereign state” (Ottmann, 2010: 245). For Schmitt, the state is always and solely a nation state. The state and the nation are strongly connected, and no global, univer­sal state is possible, claims Schmitt (1932: 42–47). He corroborates this thesis with history, and claims that there never was a world state, only empires, and that – despite their ambition of constant expansion – no empire ever encompassed the entire world. A world state, thinks Schmitt, would actually be the state of the entire human kind (Schmitt, 1932: 42). This would mean the total destruction of the political, of the friend-enemy relation. Namely, humanity as such, holds Schmitt, has no enemy (Schmitt, 1932: 42). “A world state would therefore be apolitical, an enormous consumer and production community, some kind of a global super-market, but not a state” (Ottmann, 2010: 247). Schmitt’s thesis that humanity does not have an enemy is wrong. It is namely clear that humanity can be its own enemy. Civil war between humanity has not been precluded. But Schmitt never abandoned faith in his definition of the political and the strength of nationalism, which is why he did not believe that a world state of human kind was possible. Anyway, such a state would today probably be understood as a product of market globali­sation, meaning a political result of economic liberalism. And, in Schmitt’s eyes, it was precisely liberalism that was the enemy. Anti-liberalism Schmitt scathingly wielded his political theory against two opponents – liberalism and Soviet communism. He directed his efforts at what he thought was the weaker opponent, and that was liberalism. In his opinion, liberalism is trying to destroy what is important – the political. Liberalism wants to take the conflict, struggle, decision-making and the state, and replace them with economy and ethics (Schmitt, 1932: 15). Through its moralising, which is embodied in the philosophy of human rights, liberalism wants to supress the political. “The negation of the political, which is inherent in every con­sistent individualism, leads necessarily to a political practice of distrust toward all conceivable political forces and forms of state and government, but never produces on its own a positive theory of state, government, and politics” (Schmitt, 1932: 56). Schmitt argues that liberalism is trying to dis­solve the political into morality or the market, because political liberalism does not have a content of its own. It transforms conflict into discussion, constantly invokes morality, and ignores the clash of real powers. It tries to turn every conflict into a competitive bidding on the market. Liberalism runs from the decisions on war or peace that are crucial for the political. Instead, it fools itself by discussion dynamics in spiritual matters, and by the princi­ple of competition in economic matters (Schmitt, 1932: 58). Neither the first, nor the second principle cannot substitute the political as a friend-enemy relation. This relation can only be ended by a proclamation of war, and this right to decide on matters of life and death is under the purview of the state (Schmitt, 1932: 33–34). The state was defined by Schmitt as a homogeneous unity of a nation. In his theory, the nation is not a collective of citizens who abide by the constitution and laws they adopted themselves, but a commu­nity of descent. It is precisely this thesis that makes Schmitt so popular with the new right and right-wing extremists. Namely, the extreme and radical right bases its politics on integral nationalism. The state is a reflection and the body of a unique, ethnically-based nation. This is also one of the key the­sis of the ideology of the so-called illiberal democracy. Liberal understand­ing of the state – which restricts the power of the state through the tripartite division of power, the protection of civil and human rights, investigating journalism and independent media – is completely inacceptable to propo­nents of this ideology. That is why they like Schmitt’s critique of liberalism so much: to recap, Schmitt claims that, although liberalism did not “deny the state”, it has “neither advanced a positive theory of state nor on its own dis­covered how to reform the state, but has attempted only to tie the political to the ethical and to subjugate it to economics. It has produced a doctrine of the separation and balance of powers, i.e., a system of checks and controls of state and government. This cannot be characterized as either a theory of state or a basic political principle” (Schmitt, 1932: 49). Not only does Schmitt deny liberalism’s ability to form the theory of the state, but he proclaims it an anti-national ideology. Namely, in his theory, the state is the supreme expression of a people’s existence. It allows them to determine their own identity. The ultimate consequence of the political is actually a matter of the state, because the state is that body of the peo­ple that decides on matters of war and peace. And though Schmitt does not think that the political can be reduced to the state, it is still connected to it. Liberal teaching on parliamentarism and the tripartite separation of power restricts the power of the state in its effort to establish a purely moral or purely economic state. And this – emphasises Schmitt – is not possible. The political is unavoidable, and the friend-enemy relation is always established. Political decisions on who constitutes the enemy are necessary. The politi­cal is that which makes people – a people. “If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disappear” (Schmitt, 1932: 41). Conflict and nationalism are thus important elements of Schmitt’s political theory. The point is that Schmitt develops the idea of a homogenous people, defined by their ethnic origins (Salzborn, 2017: 66). In its essence, the state is the body of a nation that has been defined in this way. These ideas are exactly the reason why Schmitt has been enthusiastically embraced by the ideologues of the new right and the illiberal democracy. Illiberal Democracy and the State It seems that illiberal democracy, both as an idea and a system, emerged primarily as a reaction to neoliberalism. Namely, neoliberalism is also an ideology. It is an ideology that tries to reduce all interpersonal relations to market relations. Such reduction is, of course, not possible; people are not determined only by their interests, but also by their identities (Fukuyama, 2018).4 Politics does not exist just to create a safe operating space for big businesses and financial capital, but also to watch out for the interests of people its represents. However, emboldened by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of real socialism and the communist dictatorships, Western elites concluded that the liberal ideology of market absolutization was the ideology of the future. That is why neoliberal ideology was wholeheartedly accepted by both right- and left-centre parties. The claim was that the state had lost all its functions, that the concern for citizens should be assumed by the invisible hand of the market, and that democracy in a nation state should be replaced by global democracy. In short, it was claimed that the market was everything, that those more capable and stronger always win, and that the rights of individuals were everything while the community was nothing. These theses of neoliberalism were advocated by the global class (Darendorf, 2002; Tooze, 2018). The rule of the global class created a new inequality and thus endangered the functioning of the institutions of the nation state. Thus, while citizens were asking for the state’s protection, mainstream politicians referred them to the market, explaining that it would solve all their problems. People’s parties, but also social-democrats who followed the “third way” showed people that, though it was possible to choose – countries did have parlia­mentary elections – a real choice did not exist. It turned out that policy was on the level of the EU, while politics remained at the level of nation states. Politicians of the conservative nationalist right, first in Hungary and then in Poland, promised to change that – to stand up to the EU and capacitate the state to start taking care of the nation. Viktor Orbán’s government thus introduced a tax on big (foreign) business and financial capital, and saved Hungarian families who had loans in Swiss francs with interest rates that kept increasing so much that, after many years of paying back the loans, they would still owe more to the banks than what they initially took out. This agony was decisively halted. The state abolished loans in Swiss francs, and all liabilities were converted to the Hungarian currency, the forint. These measures, which curtailed the tyranny of the banks, helped Orbán achieve a The basic thesis of liberalism, which states that people can always recognise their best interest, is probingly questioned by Lukšic (Lukšic, 2002). widespread popularity. His propagandistic formula – Us (Hungarians) and Them (foreign bankers) – proved to be effective. It allowed him to posi­tion himself, and not always falsely, as the protector of the “little” Hungarian people. Liberalism was proclaimed to be the real adversary of the people; moreover, Orbán claimed that there would be no true democracy until lib­eralism was rejected. He started to talk about how Hungary was establishing a system of “illiberal democracy” (Orbán, 2014), and this formula became attractive to other national conservatives and radical right-wingers. In their rejection of liberalism, illiberal democrats seem to follow the ideas of Carl Schmitt. First of all, there is the idea of the political that reduces it to the friend-enemy relation. Secondly, the idea that liberal and democratic elements of the political order are in an irreconcilable conflict. According to this idea, liberal principles of the protection of individual and human rights are in conflict with the democratic principle of the rule of the majority. The third idea concerned the state as a body of an ethnically-defined nation; the state was understood as an instrument of integral nationalism. All three ideas form the foundation of the ideology of the ruling elites that support the illiberal democracy. Based on these ideas, liberalism is proclaimed to be the main cause for the collapse of the nation. The radical right claims that liberal principles of the equality of women, gender equality, the right to a same-sex marriage, actually supress the will of the people, meaning democ­racy (Cipek and Lackovic´, 2019: 168–170). Radically-right discourse empha-sises the polarity of liberal and democratic elements of the political order. Furthermore, it is claimed that illiberal democracy is actually real democ­racy, and that it is only with the advent of this type of democracy that the true will of the people will be heard. Namely, the gist of the radical-right position lies in the claim that it is the only one that represents the people. And the will of the people, or rather democracy, is contrasted by Schmitt and illiberal democrats to the legal state. But, are they not still dependent on each other? If a democracy turns into a sphere of identity and the homogeneity of the people, general will becomes an instance that is easy to shape. The people thus become eve­rything, and the rule of law as a form of democracy becomes secondary. It seems that the rise of the radical right allowed the neoliberal neglect of the state and politics, but that does not mean that liberal and democratic princi­ples are necessarily opposed. On the contrary, every political order is neces­sarily based on the liberal principle of moral equality of all people. Liberal Foundations and Democratic States It is indisputable that liberal and democratic elements of contemporary political order can differ one from another. On the one hand, there is the liberal principle of individual rights and autonomy, and on the other, the democratic principle of the right of the people to express their will and to rule (Vodovnik, 2017). However, according to Carl Schmitt’s theory and the theses of the radical right, liberal and democratic principles are necessar­ily opposed. For instance, this means that, when the will of the majority is opposed to the will and rights of minorities, the rights of minorities should be subjugated to the will of the majority. Liberal principles should thus yield before democratic principles. But, is it not the fact that democracy without its liberal foundation is actually impossible? In the critique of Schmitt’s strict separation of liberalism and democracy, I start from the thesis that the dem­ocratic order rests on the idea of moral equality of all men. In this sense, Schmitt’s attack on liberalism is completely misdirected. The basic princi­ple of the democratic order is that all citizens should be treated the same, or rather that the rule of law is applied to everyone equally. Furthermore, in their essence, laws must respect the liberal principle of moral and legal equality of all individuals. Democracy as the rule of majority is based on the principle of civic equality within a state. Individual rights are thus an insepa­rable part of democracy. The majority has an obligation to respect the rights of the minority. Specifically, it should be emphasised that the minority is also a part of the people. “The majority cannot wield a moral authority that would exceed the power of the people in its entirety. The people do not have the jurisdiction to adopt laws that infringe on individual rights, such authority cannot be assumed even by the majority” (Kis, 2019: 82). Human and civil rights based on liberal principles are therefore the foundation of the democratic order. The rule of the majority cannot be equated with the rule of the entire people, because people as a whole are not homogeneous, but divided into a number of different groups – based on gender, national­ity, political affiliation, etc. And every social group deserves the same treat­ment by the legal state. The state, or more precisely state institutions, have a task to assure a just and equal treatment of all its citizens before the law, and that task, once again, stems from the liberal principle of moral equality of citizens. On the other hand, the state needs to develop mechanisms that would guarantee the realisation of the democratic principle of majority rule. Liberal and democratic principles supplement each other, exist in a dialectic connection, and form the basis for establishing balance through democratic political processes. Hence, they are not opposed, but connected. Conclusion This text starts from the assumption that politics and political activity enable the free existence of man. Choosing the political means choosing the process of decision-making, choosing an option. This shows that there is a relative autonomy of the political, because it cannot be reduced to economic tensions in society. The political cannot be reduced to interests coming from the economy, but also cannot escape the dangers that political power can bring. Hence the state is not just an apparatus or an institutional struc­ture, but a social field of power. Similarly, statehood is the terrain that con­nects social and cultural contexts. That is why Schmitt was right in showing that the political cannot be dissolved in the law, which makes his theory suit­able for attacking liberalism both from the left and the right. From the left, it is used by Chantal Mouffe who bases her theory of agonistic democracy on Schmitt’s friend-enemy dichotomy. In her theory, she strongly defends the political, although she has replaced Schmitt’s notion of the “enemy” with the notion of the “adversary”. In this way, she wants to revive democracy as a discussion and conflict over the fundamental features of the capitalist order. On the other hand, right-wing populists also accept Schmitt’s thesis that the political cannot be dissolved in the law. But the right does not have an issue with capitalism, and believes that capitalists can somehow be forced to serve the nation. To this end, the thinkers of the new right have affirmed Carl Schmitt’s theory of the political. Although the neoliberal neglect of poli­tics and the state has enabled the rise of right-wing populists in Hungary and Poland, this does not mean that liberal and democratic principles are necessarily opposed. Namely, the liberal principle of individual rights is the foundation of the order of democratic states. It is therefore obvious that, in its attempt to revive the political, right-wing populism is destroying the purpose of democratic politics, which is to reach a compromise between opposing interests and different cultural values. Hence, Schmitt’s notion of the political cannot be used to build effective democratic state institutions. In his definition of the political, politics actually exists only on the outwards, towards some other nation, some other political unity, but not within the state itself. Finally, it should be noted that the state is proving to be the only effec­tive entity in which democracy has a chance to function. The state is also the only entity that can effectively oppose economic chaos. Analysis has shown that the state and politics are autonomous areas of human activity, which means that democracy’s chances are still good. Any kind of liberation of the individual and the market from the evil state, as advocated by neoliberalism, can bring nothing but the collapse of liberal democracy and the rise of right-wing populism. Therefore, I believe that we need to raise awareness of the importance of the state as a true space of democracy, and thus also affirm the autonomous space of politics. Namely, it is politics – and not the politi­cal as defined by Schmitt – that is the only known space of human freedom. BIBLIOGRAPHY Adam, Armin (1992): Rekonstruktion des Politischen. Carl Schmitt und die Krise der Staatlichkeit 1912–1933. Weinheim: Acta humaniora. 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Die Neue Rechte und der Untergang des Abendlandes. Stuttgart: Klett-Cota. zielonka, Jan (2018): Counter-Revolution. Liberal Europe in Retreat. Oxford: Oxford University Press. SOURCES Orban, Viktor (2014): Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp. Accessible at https://www. kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-min-ister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and­student-camp, 16. 3. 2020. Schmitt, Carl (1922): Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souve­ränität. Berlin: Duncker&Humblot. Schmitt, Carl (1932): Der Begriff des Politischen. München: Duncker & Humblot. Schmitt, Carl (1938): Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes: Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politischen Symbols. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt. Ladislav CABADA* NATIVIST ANd ANTI-LIbERAL NARRATIVES IN CONSERVATIVE POPULIST AGENdA IN CENTRAL EUROPE** Abstract. Nativism does not only present a concept, but also an ideological framework as well as a politi­cal practice related to identity politics. In the article we firstly present the theoretical reflection of nativism and operationalise the most important terms and charac­teristics of this phenomenon. Later, we apply the con­cept of nativism to the analysis of conservative populist and/or nativist political actors in the Central European region. The analysis shows how nativism, as a relatively peripheral issue in the first 10–15 years after the dem­ocratic transition, became stronger in the next period characterised by a set of crises after 2008. The analysis demonstrates how the mainstream parties in Central Europe adopted the nativist and conservative populist agenda and implemented it into mainstream politics. Furthermore, the analysis shows how Central European nativism correlates with the long-term existence of anti-liberal streams that were revitalised after the fall of Communist regimes. These anti-modern societal groups were reformulated as the counter-cosmopolitan camp within the polarisation process that is clearly visible in the political arena. Keywords: nativism; national conservatism; identity politics; Central Europe Introduction On 29 November 2017 Cambridge Dictionary’s Word of the Year 2017 was declared – populism. In the commentary to this choice, the inaugura­ tion of the 45th President of the United States, Donald Trump, is mentioned * Ladislav Cabada, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Politics and Humanities, Metropolitan University Prague, Czech Republic. ** This article is the result of Andrássy Gyula Deutschspracihgen Universität Budapest and Pallas Athéné Domus Educationis Stiftung research project DonAUB (2020). DOI: 10.51936/tip.58.2.284-304 Ladislav CABADA as one of the key events and symbols for such a decision. In the short com­mentary it was stressed that populism ‘represents a phenomenon that’s both truly local and truly global, as populations and their leaders across the world wrestle with issues of immigration and trade, resurgent nationalism, and economic discontent’ (Cambridge Words, 2017). Reflecting upon this decision, Cas Mudde (2017) proposed that nativism, not populism, should be declared because the arguments Cambridge Words used for populism are not in scope with the basic definition of the term – separation of socie­ties into two antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ vs ‘the corrupt elite’ – but perfectly fit the definitions of the far right and even more the definition of nativism. Nativism, historically associated with the premodern period, has become an important component of contemporary politics. Similarly, as in the cases of previous waves of nativism, the contemporary situation also has the char­acteristics of a revitalisation movement against openness, modernity and more general globalisation. Nativist actors stress the necessity to promote the interests of native inhabitants and tend to prefer social chauvinism prac­tices, economic protectionism and even autarky, successfully securitise the migration issue and develop the historical narratives based on national pop­ulism, traditionalism, anti-modernity and anti-liberalism. The proponents of nativism also skilfully include the traditional instruments of populist and far right actors such as anti-EU stances, invoking ‘normality’ regarding gender and family issues, etc. The West seems to be undergoing a strong wave of traditionalism, under­mining important narratives and structural parts of its (post)modern situa­tion such as individual freedom, general equality, free market etc. Alongside other impulses (regarding the EU, especially the institutional crisis and enlargement incapability since the mid-2000s), the fiscal and economic cri­sis after 2008 changed the situation dramatically. As Klíma (2020) shows, this juncture was provided by electoral earthquakes and the establishment of second post-transitive party systems. Next to the anti-corruption rhetoric the new actors also used anti-European and nationalist narratives based on criticising the catching up process as a failure. This period was already accompanied by the politics of emotions, above all fear from the renewal/consolidation of a peripheral position of East-Central Europe (ECE) in the European architecture. Contrarily, in Western Europe the economic crisis strengthened the doubts about the prospects of the all-European Integration Project (Ágh, 2019: 44–46). Furthermore, the next juncture – the migration crisis in 2015 and beyond – further strength­ened these feelings and brought a new wave of patriotism, nationalism and xenophobia into politics and societies. As Klíma (2020: 158) stressed: ‘The immigration issue indeed covers a cultural identity conflict, or a Ladislav CABADA fundamental security dimension, incorporating a highly emotional compo­nent in the form of fear’. Especially since 2015, national populist actors have been strengthening and, in many cases, we can observe their important electoral successes. Next to the election of D. Trump we have to mention the success of J. Bolsonaro in Brazil, the Brexit issue, the electoral success of national populist parties in the United Kingdom, France or Italy, as well as the stabilisation of these par­ties in some ECE states. The former pariahs of European politics – V. Orbán and J. Kaczynski – present themselves as ‘authentic Europeans’ criticising the ‘weak, (ultra)liberal Brussels’ and appealing for a cultural counter-revo­lution in Europe. The polarisation of Europe and Western societies contin­ues and almost any new electoral campaign and result brings a new round of debates about this polarisation and clashes between two distinctively dif­ferent political camps promoting (and growing from) distinctively different and competing political cultures. Rationale of the article The aim of this article has to be reduced from general debate and analy­sis of nativist restoration in the world to less extensive goals. Firstly, I will reduce my analysis spatially and focus on the development in Central Europe. Nations of the Visegrad group and Slovenia are usually included in Central Europe by contemporary political scientists (cf. Ágh, 1998; Ágh, 2019; Cabada and Walsch, 2019; Fink-Hafner and Hac.ek, 2000). Despite dif­ferent development after WWII, Austria is also often included in Central European comparisons (Cabada and Walsch, 2019; Hloušek and Kopec.ek, 2004). For the group of the six mentioned nations I will apply the concept of nativism searching for manifestations of a nativist approach and policies. I will search for actors using nativist rhetoric and strategies as well as for the most important themes and paroles used by Central European nativists. Furthermore, I will analyse the overlap in Central European nativist perfor­mance and also their cooperation. I assume that nativism in Central Europe is strongly related to the unfinished and deformed modernisation processes. From this presumption I derive the first thesis: The cultural conflict (clash of cultures) that arose in Central Europe during the process of modernisation, lasted out the period of the non-democratic regime after WWII and was revi­talised after 1989. Based on this thesis I ask the first research question: Does the contemporary nativism in Central Europe grow from visible and shared anti-liberal legacies? In the first 10–15 years of democratic consolidation the anti-modern and/or nativist actors were marginalised within the processes of socialisation, Westernisation and Europeanisation. The grand narrative of the ‘Return to Europe’ raised ‘general’ optimism in Central European societies and the proponents of ‘counter-cosmopolitanism’ were relatively weak in this period. Nevertheless, after the mid-2000s the nativist ideology and national populism as a political strategy has been revitalised and trans­formed from being relatively peripheral in politics and society to being the political mainstream. On one hand, I presuppose that the small parties usually located outside the mainstream used the nativist and conservative populist agendas which existed before the important junctures of 2010 (earthquake election) and 2015 (migration crisis as a new impulse for the poly-crisis situation). On the other hand, I presuppose that the mainstream parties started to use similar strategies and rhetoric only after 2015 due to tactical reasons. The situation might differ in individual countries, but in all cases I assume the combination of ideology and strategy by the mainstream actors while the ‘original’ nativ­ists were gained by these new mainstream nativist actors, or pushed again to the margin of the political arena. From these presumptions I derive the second thesis: After 2004, the mainstream parties in Central Europe often labelled as national-conservative marginalised the traditional nativist for­mations and/or adopted their ideology, programme and strategies. Based on this thesis I ask the second research question: Are we observing the general mainstreamisation of the nativist issues and strategies in Central European political arenas? In the first part of the analysis, I will operationalise the gen­eral terms such as nativism, national populism, xenophobia, autarky, etc, and frame this terminology with two big concepts. From the best described case of nativism (United States/North America) I will derive the main terms and concepts into the more general framework for political science analy­sis. Secondly, in the case of ECE I will present the process of unfinished or deformed modernisation and the revitalisation and re-modification of the clash of cultures (Kulturkampf) in the last 30 years. In the second part I will apply this theoretical framework to the Central European case. The article is rooted in comparative analysis, combining the synchronic and diachronic approach and focusing on the development of political par­ties with nativist tendencies in ECE. Based on the two theses or assumptions presented above I focus on the development of party politics and those par­ties that advance the nativist attitudes. In the political discourse of individ­ual countries, I search for typical strategies, signs and terms of the nativist narrative such as the systematic criticisms of minorities, cultural and other types of racism, moral disqualification of ‘the other’, idealisation of peas­antry, peasant life and common sense, support of majoritarian democracy tools, above all plebiscites, the concept of naturalness, emphasis on patriot­ism and ‘correct’ European values and ‘Christian Europe’, etc. Behind the national discourses I then search for similarities and shared strategies of nativist actors, as well as mutual reasons for their strengthening. Nativism as concept, social phenomenon and program of identity politics As already mentioned, the phenomenon of nativism is strongly inter­connected with the development in North America and ethnogenesis1 of the ‘native’ (North) American nation. Katerberg (1995: 495) describes nativ-ism as an ‘umbrella term traditionally used by North American scholars to describe anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant, racist and antiradical agitation … Like nationalism, it originates in common customs religion and ethnicity’ (Katerberg, 1995: 495). As the symbolic and general expression of North American nativism, the abbreviation ‘WASP’ is usually mentioned, stressing the exclusive position of the English language and predominance of Anglo-Saxon or protestant cultural values and institutions (Simcox, 1997: 132). Barša and Císar (2006: 417–419) describe the development of the nativist-rooted American nation as the ethnicisation of a folk community of settlers that led to the ‘nativist’ image of America as the country of the descendants of the original immigrants in the 17th and 18th centuries, but not the land of contemporary and future immigrants. As an important political actor rooted in this conviction, they mention the seventh U.S. President Andrew Jackson. ‘Jacksonians’ are rooted in evangelical Christianity stressing their own root to God. They regard the human being as limited and prone to ‘sin’. Often, they consider the world endangered by dark powers – the Catholic Church, global Communism and recently the global ‘Islam’. Particularism and isola­tionism are typical segments of their thinking. Let us stress two important facets in this basic definition of nativists – xen­ophobia and the idealisation of the traditional pre-modern society rooted in agrarian and a rural/small town lifestyle. Simcox (1997: 30) stresses that ‘xenophobia and racism are concepts often subsumed in the general con­cept of nativism’. Together with anti-Catholicism2, xenophobia and racism are usually reflected as the most important patterns of American nativism (Friedman, 1967: 408–409). As Sundstrom (2013: 80) underlines, ‘xeno­phobia is conceptually prior to nativism’ and nativism ‘indicates a positive political project to actively exclude or expel those judged to be too foreign to belong, or to hoard the national community’s resources and keep them from being exploited by foreigners’ (Sundstrom, 2013: 72). Nativism is cen­tred on the ‘us first’ idea, it is rooted in the fear that strangers will undermine 1 We understand the ethnogenesis as the ‘individual seek to achieve a measure of belonging and ter­restrial immortality through identification with a group rooted in land and kinship’ (Kaufmann, 1999: 444–445). 2 Catholicism was depicted as a false religion and danger to the United States. ‘From 1820 onward, the notion of Americans as genealogical descendants of Englishmen also gained in currency’ (Kaufmann, 1999: 446). the traditional way of life (Crepaz et al., 2014: 943). Nativism is most often associated with anti-immigrant sentiments motivated by ethnic or racial bias (Bosniak, 1994: 442–443). Let us acknowledge the second above-mentioned aspect – traditionalism and idealisation of the pre-modern societal structure. Nativists prefer and force a ‘traditional version of American culture’ (Knoll, 2013: 153). Nativism evinces typical conservative positions stressing the degressive development of humankind. Often, we can observe the idealisation of the ‘Golden Age’, idealisation of peasantry and rurality, and rejection of modernisation. Here we have to stress the paradox that nativism grew out of roots similar to that of communitarianism, both stressing the importance of Gemeinschaft. As Crepaz et al. (2014: 943) stressed: What nativism and civicness both have in common is an emphasis on community: nativists see their own culture and ways of life threatened by foreigners, while others argue that a decline in civic behaviour will undermine the very foundations and working of democracy. If we analyse the contemporary debate about nativism through the lenses of philosophy, we can find an important overlap of this ‘nostalgic’ concept with a selected environmental stream, especially deep ecology and ecopolitics (Mathews, 1999: 253–255). Namely, in many aspects the nativist stance rooted in deep ecology shares the criticism against the (post)modern society. To distinguish the ‘reactionary’ political nativists and the ecopoliti-cal nativist, I use the term ‘eco-nativists’ for the latter. Regarding urbanisa­tion, eco-nativism stresses the negative consequences of rapid urbanisation and industrialised agriculture. Against this development eco-nativists pre­sent the ‘ideal of the native self’ related to small rural or semi-rural sustain­able communities. Furthermore, eco-nativists stress the necessity of spatial identity related to geographically small units, the necessity to belong to a place, ‘to have one’s identity shaped by the place to which one belongs’ (Mathews, 1999: 245). The idealised ‘home’ presenting the small community should develop the eco-nativist self-identity (Storey, 2012: 11) rooted in care and maintenance of nature. Both types of nativism negate the modernity related to the creation of open society (Bergson, 1936; Popper, 2011) in a political but also broader societal and cultural sense. As one of the inherent characteristics of an open society is the opening and removing the borders, nativists defend the juxta­position and promote the ‘ideal’ of a closed society. Next to open borders, mobility is also considered a negative sign of modernity and is attacked. The nativists especially deny ‘immigration’, while the eco-nativists deny mobility, especially tourism, entirely (Mathews, 1999: 247). Nevertheless, both types of nativists negatively regard ‘extensive’ mobility and the blend­ing of (groups of) people with different identities. In their opinion, such ‘openness’ undermines the ‘state of indigeneity’. In this sense the nativists are strongly interconnected with the theories of ‘rise and fall’ (Kennedy, 1987) or theoretical works about the collapse of states or civilisations, more precisely with those who stress the amalgamation of societies as one of the more important or even dominant reasons.3 Indeed, eco-nativists propose the voluntary limitation of mobility accen­tuating that the new communication technologies create the ‘awareness of a larger frame’ and prevent the ecological nativists from ‘narrow-minded parochialism, xenophobia, or exclusionary thinking’ (Mathews, 1999: 267). In contrast, the ‘traditional’ nativists promote (neo)parochial political cul­ture as the ideal. Their negative perception of (post)modernity creates a vital potential for revitalisation programmes and activities with clearly reaction­ary contents. Katerberg (1995: 501) labels the repeated waves of nativism as ‘crusades’ attempting to ‘reassert what are held to be traditional customs, values, and practices’. As an important stimulus for such waves the author observes the fear that ‘heterogeneity would destroy their ability to perpetu­ate their values, traditions, institutions, and laws’ (Katerberg, 1995: 508). Reflecting the North-American development, the first and ‘by far the most important and verbalized expression of nativism was a broad fear that the large mid-century (18 century – quoted by L.C.) influx of Germans would not be assimilated into the dominant English racial culture, and that Pennsylvania therefore might become eventually a German colony’. The fear of Germanisation was even strengthened with the obsession ‘that Germans would convert to Catholicism and then unite with French against the English’ (Friedman, 1967: 411–412). Another wave came in the 1820s and beyond (the already mentioned ‘Jacksonians’ (Kaufmann, 1999: 455/) negatively reflecting the ‘Catholic’ population of the United States. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries the ‘defenders of the Anglo-Saxon roots of Canada and the United States feared that immigrants of inferior racial stock, from southern and eastern Europe, would dilute the quality of American and Canadian blood, corrupt society, and threaten democratic order’ (Katerberg, 1995: 506). As we can observe, the ‘aliens’ change during this time, but the main characteristics of North American nativism were protected. The ‘aliens’ Let us quote from Mathews (1999) who belongs to the eco-nativist authors, but paradoxically shares important positions with the xenophobian political nativists: ‘Being native is an existential condition which imperial civilisations such as Rome, but even more particularly those of Europe in the modern era, tend to render obsolete … The state of indigeneity becomes more and more attenuated amidst the flux of peoples and cultures and economies that imperial regimes, particularly those of modernity, entrain’ (Mathews, 1999: 244). should generally represent two kinds of threats. ‘Immigration usually is said to represent two kinds of threats to this country (the United States – quoted by author). First, there is a threat posed by the identity of the immigrants … Second, immigration is said to cost too much – economically, environmen­tally and socially’ (Bosniak, 1994: 440). In this sense, also theoretical works on nativism differ – while some authors stress the economic competition (Friedman, 1967: 410; Simcox, 1997; Druxes and Simpson, 2016); the other group prioritise the cultural dimension. For example, Kaufmann (1999: 437–438) has doubts about the economic reasons for nativism stressing that the ‘outbreaks of nativism /the 1920s, for example/ have tended not to cor­relate with poor economic times’. Similarly, Katerberg (1995) discusses the search for identity and cultural loyalty as the primary motivation of nativists. The scholars often stress ‘exceptionalism’ as an important component for this concept. America was described by the Puritans as ‘new Canaan, or the promised land’ (Kaufmann, 1999: 441). Among others, millenarian movements and churches used the term ‘New Jerusalem’. After the 1840s the belief that WASP-settlers were destined to expand across all of North America created the platform for the so-called manifest destiny. An impor­tant part of this exceptionalism was the ‘global mission’ the U.S. often stressed, including the role of leading soft power. As recent analysis of the Trumpian period of nativism has stressed, this role was abandoned. Furthermore, the global expansion of English created a situation where ‘aliens’ speak English along with their native languages, while Americans, living in the ‘American glasshouse’, do not learn foreign languages (Krastev and Holmes, 2020: 184–186). To summarise, nativism might be understood as a social phenomenon and political program as well as a concept. Nativism could be understood from very different perspectives – for example philosophy or linguistics could reflect it in a ‘neutral’ manner, while social sciences mostly stress the negative influence of nativism as a political strategy on democratic devel­opment. For my research the most important question is how far – and if – the concept of nativism might be applied in a different environment than North America. As presented, the (North) American nativism was born in a very specific situation and also (some of) its characteristics are unique. Nevertheless, I am convinced that many of these characteristics might be applied as general features observable in other societies including the Central European nations. Anti-modern and nativist legacies in Central Europe Since the beginning of the democratic transition in ECE, scholars have been discussing the question of a specific political culture of the nations in this region. One of the main issues discussed is the limited, partial, unfinished and/or deformed modernisation in comparison with the European West. Sztompka (1993) talked about the ‘fake modernity’ in Eastern Europe after WWII, Bernik (1997) about the ‘submodern society’, both scholars stressing the top-down character of such ‘modernity’ unrooted in civil society. After the fall of Communism, the ‘grand narrative’ of unfinished moder­nity and an anti-liberal notion was challenged by a new narrative of liberal democracy. Anyway, as the ‘alternative’ or ‘parallel’ model in only partially or defectively modernised societies, the traditional anti-modern narratives were developed too. The civil society in ECE often survived the Communist period in the form of a rather ‘bad civil society’ or uncivil society. In times of crisis such an uncivil society becomes a strong supportive vehicle for the populist politicians stressing the ‘glorious past’, ‘national interest’, ‘normal­ity’ or ‘the right and duty to oppose the political correctness of Euro-elites’. As Corbea-Hoisie (2013) stresses, the interconnection of different anti-Com­munist movements and pre-Communist anti-liberal and anti-modern narra­tives might be observed in ECE. He is talking about the ‘camouflaged conti­nuity’ of these movements after the transition. The issue of development and modernity in the formation and identity of different European nations is raised by many scholars and observers. Since the Enlightenment period, two different ideal types – the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ – as the European macro-regions are presented based on differ­ent cultural patterns. Between these two macro-units the ‘in-between’ area is often situated, namely Central Europe playing the role of the ‘Western periphery’ or the transitive region between the West and East. For exam­ple, Hofmannsthal labelled the Central European population and the citi­zens of the Habsburg monarchy ‘semi-European and semi-Asian nations’ (Kozuchowski, 2013: 86). At the end of the 19th century, Hope (1894) took a similar position when introducing the concept of Ruritania: a German-speaking, Catholic land in Central Europe, an absolute monarchy driven by deep social conflicts where the most important tension was between the (almost) western urban elites and the rural ethnics settled as the (semi-) peripheries. Similarly, Gellner (1998, 2008) places the Habsburg monarchy at the epicentre of the decisive modernisation conflict between the cos­mopolitan liberals (‘the Viennese’) and the representatives of ‘post-feudal obscurantism and authoritarianism’. I assume that this phenomenon of a ‘clash of cultures’ is still present in Central Europe, or – in other words – that the totalitarian period as well as three decades of democracy building did not surmount or erase the anti-lib­eral political culture rooted in nativism and (ultra)conservatism. Despite the revolutionary rhetoric, the Communist regimes were often rooted in con­servative postures, especially regarding the issues related to postmodern values (one example is the very restrictive policies regarding the LGBT communities and/or induced abortion in many states of the Soviet bloc). Also, nationalism was very strong in Eastern Europe, based on the violent homogenisation of local populations during and immediately after WWII, as well as the almost impermeable borders and lack of contact with the rep­resentatives of other ethnicities, nations or cultures. Such ‘mental introver­sion’ became even stronger with the demolition of liberal streams and mass emigration from the region. As depicted by Kitschelt (2003) in his typology of Communist regimes, Central European Communism also did not consti­tute the modernisation factor, or if so, only partly. In 1989, a juncture came with the fall of the Communist regimes and the beginning of the democratic transition. EU-membership as the second juncture presents the symbolic end of the ‘accommodative’ period when the new democracies in ECE underwent important changes in economic, political and institutional sectors. Nevertheless, these changes also restored the internal divisions in the societies – usually we label the two ideal typi­cal societal groups as ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.4 Specifically, ‘the boundaries between the rural and urban have remained porous in Eastern Europe, as they were under socialism’ (Buzalka, 2008: 760). The reason is the mas­sive influx of rural populations to the cities after WWII that preserved the ‘rural’ narratives, morality, imagery and ideology that might be more or less equated with Hope’s or Gellner’s concept of Ruritania. With the exception of Czechia, such a ‘rural’ narrative is also strongly interconnected with religi­osity (Buzalka, 2008: 762–768). I assume that the anti-modernists, facing new challenges in the form of the postmodern European community and globalisation, were relatively passive during the 1990s, suppressed by the new (neo-)liberal political actors pragmatically bringing their nations into the EU. Nevertheless, in the beginning of the 2000s we already saw the anti-European streams in ECE nations, often also using anti-modern and nativist rhetoric. Usually these actors were relatively weak and positioned outside the political mainstream, but some of the mainstream parties capitalised on such a narrative (Czech Civic Democratic Party /ODS/ under the leadership of V. Klaus might be a good example). Some of these actors achieved success in the second-order elections (League of Polish families in 2004 EP-elections), and some of them were invited into the governments. The wave of the so-called earthquake elections at the turn of the 2000s and 2010s changed the situation. Many newcomer parties presented the national populist rhetoric, and also some of the established mainstream For example, Ther (2014: 20) presents the dichotomy rich cities vs. poor countryside, while Ágh (2020) speaks about the well-developed ‘European’ cities and backward countryside. parties developed the nativist segment in their policies. If we analyse the important social cleavages related to the above-mentioned segmentation of societies into the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ camps, at least three important cleav­ages should be mentioned, playing important and even decisive roles in the polarisation of these societies. Table 1: STRUCTURING CLEAVAGES IN CEE DEMOCRACIES support of post-national political institutions (for example, EU) opposition to post-national political institutions (for example, EU) free (global) market allocation economic redistribution or protectionism liberal-cosmopolitan values and recognition of cultural diversity (secularism) authoritarian conformism, social cohesion and cultural homogeneity (including clericalism) Source: Rensmann, 2012: 77. All these cleavages are directly related to the nativist question. While the proponents of the stances presented in the first column might be under­stood as ‘cosmopolitan liberals’, the defenders of positions described in the second column tend to national or even nativist postures. Rensmann (2012) suggests labelling them as ‘counter-cosmopolitan’. In his opinion, this term better describes the basic position of anti-modernist societal groups in Central Europe and also opens the possibility of reflecting the nativist ten­dencies outside of a concrete ethnical/national environment. As he stresses, both the ‘nativism and counter-cosmopolitanism are generally non-inclu­sive orientation’, but there exist some differences. While nativism is ‘limited to territorial substrates’, counter-cosmopolitanism ‘can also be grounded in religious … or broader cultural references’ (Rensmann, 2012: 75). Counter-cosmopolitanism refers to the general opposition to all social processes associated with existing globalization. Counter-cosmopolitanism is neither limited to welfare protectionism nor “single-issues” such as anti-immigrant policy; rather, it combines opposition to: 1) socioeconomic globalization and the global capitalist market economy; 2) cosmopolitan cultural transfor­mations, signified by increasing cultural diversity and hybridity …; and 3) political transformations associated with global and post-national governance. (Rensmann, 2012: 74) In fact, the author reflects counter-cosmopolitanism as the contemporary position, but one rooted in historical legacies with clear nativist features. Nativist politicians are able to flexibly change the ‘enemies’ as well as com­bine them and squeeze them under one constructed label. So, the Hungarian Fidesz and Polish PiS share irreconcilable positions against the Left, liberals, intellectuals, ‘old networks’, the EU and other transnational activities and structures including the general principle of globalisation (Fehr, 2016: 25). One of the symbols of the nativist attack against open society equated with globalisation became the Hungaro-American philanthrope George Soros, attacked not only by the national conservative actors in Central Europe, but also by the declaratively left oriented populist actors such as Slovakian Prime Minister R. Fico and Czech President M. zeman (Matulík, 2019). The nativists successfully addressed the societal groups that were – objec­tively or subjectively – negatively economically affected during the transfor­mation process. Usually they presented the minor and ‘radical’ actor next to the mainstream populist party or parties that also stressed the ‘protection of the poor’ – let us stress the co-existence of PiS and LPR in the Polish gov­ernment in 2005–2007 or the repeated cooperation of the Slovakian party Direction – Social Democrats (Smer) with the Slovak National Party, as well as the cooperation of the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) with the NSi. Similarly, Liehbart (2020) also comments on the government cooperation of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and FPÖ. Often, the government and the mainstream party (partly) adopted the rhetoric and strategy of such minor actors, in some cases erasing them as the relevant party. Nevertheless, what is more important for my analysis is the fact that during this period, the national populist actors reformulated and ‘completed’ their programme. As Ágh (2020) shows, these actors champion the politics of past and historical memory, including the (re)construction of historical narratives. The nativists formulated the ‘traditionalization’ narrative about the ‘glorious past that never was’, remembering the ‘Golden Age’ of national history. Let us mention here that the ‘pre-communist past of these countries often coin­cides with ultranationalist or fascist experiences that emphasized national unity, both spiritual and territorial’ (Pirro, 2014: 604). The interwar political regimes in Austria, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, the Baltic states or Romania developed in a strictly anti-liberal course and were not capable of develop­ing more than a temporary ‘façade democracy’. Historical reflection of inter-war regimes in many Central European nations led to the ‘resurgence of neo-romantic, populist, anti-modern forces in the region … In all these societies, movements and parties have emerged that romanticize the past and idealize authoritarian traditions’ (Tismaneanu, 1998: 3; cf. Pirro, 2014: 603). An impor­tant part of this construct is also the mythicisation of the pre-Communist state of affairs, associated with the exile – this narrative plays an important role in Slovenia (Šori, 2015), Croatia and also Bulgaria and the Baltic states. Analysing the most important legacies influencing this process of (re) construction of historical narratives, Pirro (2014) presents a set of pre-com­munist, communist and post-communist issues. In the first group he stresses the predominant role of irredentism and clericalism. The ‘combination of nativism and Christianity generally tends to reinforce the “us versus them” contraposition’ (Pirro, 2014: 606). Presenting the history of the American nativist, we mentioned the key role of anti-Catholicism. Let us stress that the construct of Judeo-Christian society presents one of the keystones of WASP-nativism (Cainkar, 2007: 10), as well as an important part of the European narrative. Despite the partial changes regarding the North American devel­opment5, the development in the last decade shows that Huntington’s ‘American Creed’ that ‘is impregnated with Protestant rather than univer­sally Christian morals’ (Weidinger, 2017: 60) still presents the main ideologi­cal frame for the activities of such movements as the Tea Party, combining traditionalism, localism and racism. In Europe, a similar process of combining nativism with orthodox Catholicism might be observed, as Buzalka (2008) stressed analysing the LPR, and its activities within the government led by PiS after 2005. Doubtless, the nativist groups in contemporary Europe stress the ‘Christian Europe’ concept, while this group of ‘defenders’ of Christian roots of Europe often includes such divergent actors as the ultraconservative ‘mystic’ J. Kaczynski and the former Social Democrat M. zeman that developed after 2013 as the President of Czechia into the new ‘national-conservative’ role of ‘defender of Christian Europe’. As Weidinger (2017: 63–65) stresses while analysing the switch of the Austrian FPÖ from liberal-national towards ‘belonging without believing’ and ‘Christendom above Christianity’ positions, zeman and similar politicians (mis)use the rhetoric of defending the Christian val­ues to win the support of nativist-minded voter groups. Naturally, churches often present themselves as important institutions defending ‘traditions’ and present important actors in politics. Nevertheless, in the case of Central Europe we can also observe another important tradi­tion that is similar to the development in the U.S., namely the nationalisa­tion of the church/es. It is more than clear that the Polish Catholic clergy strongly oppose the ‘modernisation’ of the contemporary Pope Francis; the same might be said about the tendencies in the Slovenian and Croatian Catholic clergy. We can similarly evaluate Czech Catholic officials, also sup­plemented by the existence of the national ‘Hussite Church’ with strong nativist tendencies (Cabada, 2019: 126–130). The church/es are playing an important role also in political decisions regarding family issues (marriages of same sex persons), perception of the LGBT community members and gender issues in all of ECE. Nativist actors in Bulgaria (Ataka) propose the ‘While earlier waves of American nativism featured strong anti-Catholic sentiment, combining reli­gious and racist (White nationalists) motives, the explicitly anti-Catholic ticket is not available to nativists anymore: Catholicism is now the biggest single congregation in the United States, and Catholics hold key positions within the Christian Right. However, the equation of “Protestant religious identity with being American” is still championed by relevant actors’ (Weidinger, 2017: 56). endorsement of Christianity as the state religion, both Fidesz and the Jobbik Party present Hungary as a country based on Christian moral principles, the Slovak National Party as well as LSNS promote the national, Christian and social principles (Pirro, 2014: 612). As regards the communist issues, Pirro (2014: 608) stresses two important legacies – social national economics and anti-Communism. As regards the first, he stresses the ‘buy national’ movements as well as domestic produc­tion and agriculture (Pirro, 2014: 615). The contemporary Covid19-crisis even strengthened such tendencies including the calls for ‘food autarky’ declared by the Czech government and generally the tendencies towards economic protectionism. The process of constructing the new national bourgeoisie in Hungary is also well described (Ágh, 2019). Nevertheless, for nativist politi­cians the most important issue seems to be the media. In Hungary, the pro­cess of nationalising the media scene is almost completed. Immediately after the second round of presidential elections in Poland, the leader of PiS J. Kaczynski declared the next main goal to be the ‘repolonization’ of the media market, including the preparedness of the government to buy the media from foreign owners. Furthermore, we can also observe in Central Europe an important switch from ‘public’ towards ‘national’ media that could broadcast patriotic news. It’s not only in the case of the media that we observe among the Central European nativists hostility towards foreign capitals and anti-EU, anti-Western or anti-German6 sentiments (Rensmann, 2012: 86). As regards the anti-Communist legacy, it became one of the key instru­ments of nativist actors to delegitimise their political opponents. Usually, anti-Communism is combined with anti-intellectualism and anti-liberalism, i.e. the intellectuals and liberals are generally presented as leftist and the left is presented as post-Communist (issue of continuity) and even collabo­rating (Fehr, 2016: 24–27). Kaczynski, Orbán, Janša as well as the leaders of Slovakian nativist parties invented de-Communisation as an important theme of conflict and framed this theme with the paradigm of a national conservative counter-revolutionas Kaczynski and Orbán labelled their goal in 2016 at their meeting in Krynica (Anderson, 2016) – rooted in moral revo­lution, re-traditionalisation and anti-modernisation (Fehr, 2016). As the most important post-Communist legacy, Pirro (2014: 608) depicts the minority issues as the ‘variant of nativism in post-communist countries’. During and after WWII Central Europe underwent dramatic demographic As Fehr painstakingly shows in the analysis of the 2012/13 Czech presidential campaign, the national conservative actors can also team up effectively with leftist populists or radicals in some countries – in Czechia with the Communist Party. Throughout the campaign, M. Zeman was billed as a ‘genuine Czech’ in a showdown with the ‘non-Czech’ K. Schwarzenberg. National conservatives, Fehr stresses, here play the same cards that the Communists relied on before the transition: ‘In both Poland and the Czech lands, hatred of the Germans was the Communists’ last hope’ (Fehr, 2016: 114). changes and both absolute and relative ethnic homogenisation. The situa­tion of closed or semi-closed borders even strengthened the ‘ethnic isola­tion’ by including the mistrust and fear of other nations. The fear caused by otherness remains an important feature in the region. In domestic poli­tics we often observe anti-Romani rhetoric, as well as repeated anti-Semitic postures. While in the case of an anti-Communist legacy Austria cannot be included into the comparison, in the minority issues the FPÖ might be understood as a trend-setter for the Central European nativists, especially after 2015. Similar to the case of the FPÖ, the nativist actors in ECE devel­oped the combination of anti-migrant and Islamophobic rhetoric stressing the need to protect the ‘Christian character’ of Europe (Weidinger, 2017: 42). An important additive in the nativist discourse became Christian allusions combined with the conviction that Central European nations historically saved the Christian West from the menace from the East (Turks, Russians) (Weidinger, 2017: 41). Furthermore, the populist and nativist actors from ECE present themselves as the saviours of European ‘Christian’ / traditional values before the ‘ultraliberal’ and declining West (‘Brussels’). V. Orbán and J. Kaczynski repeatedly stress that if the West wants to survive, it has to imi­tate the ‘East’, i.e. them, the Visegrad Group and in general the ECE populist nativists (Krastev and Holmes, 2020: 59). Next to religious and/or national minorities, the nativist actors also assault other minorities – typically the LGBT community and women, often using the strategy of moral disqualification. As Šori (2015) demonstrated in the example of the New Slovenia (NSi) party, the nativist and (ultra)con­servative arguments are usually mixed. The LGBT community is accused of diminishing the normality and negatively contributing to the demographic decrease in Europe that immediately provokes the next negative issue – immigration. As regards the ‘female issue’, nativists often stress the ‘natural’ role of woman as mother and criticise the (post)modern individualism that leads to the abandonment of this ‘natural’ role. Discussion As our analysis shows, in the last decade we have observed a dynamic development in ECE. Firstly, newcomer parties and actors have arisen with nativist features, usually taking a more radical approach than the ‘histori­cal’ parties from the period before the electoral earthquakes. Examples of such parties are both parties established by the Czech nativist T. Okamura, the extreme and clerofascist party of M. Kotleba (LSNS) in Slovakia or the Polish party KORWiN. In some cases we have observed the programmatic transformation from (ultra)conservative positions towards a combination of populist and nativist stances (NSi). Nevertheless, as a more alarming trend we are observing the ‘main-streamisation’ of nativism in ECE. Here, the Hungarian Fidesz and Polish PiS are the clear trend-setters not only in the region, but also in the EU. The Austrian case and the presence and role of the FPÖ in the government also demonstrates these trends. As Mudde (2014) emphasises, in situations where the mainstream political parties adopt extreme right themes includ­ing nativist attitudes, fewer opportunities are given to the small ‘single-issue’ radical parties. In this sense V. Orbán and J. Kaczynski have monopolised the nativist camp in their countries, utilising the salient counter-cosmopoli­tan preferences (Rensmann, 2012: 64–65). It’s not only in Central Europe that we can observe the negative conse­quences of poly-crisis and growing disillusionment in the last decade. Such development seems to be similar to the notion of anti-modernity in the sec­ond half of the 19th century that grew primarily out of disillusionment with Europe’s industrial revolution. Nowadays, we observe similar processes regarding the globalisation, negative consequences of neoliberal reforms and the transition toward an information society (Industry 4.0 etc.). In such a poly-crisis the return of traditionalism, anti-modern and anti-liberal narra­tives is logical despite the question of whether we face and observe the new anti-modern revolution or a new version of traditional conservative (coun-ter-)revolutions. We are definitely witnessing the ‘return’ of traditionalism in Central Europe with regional aspects but also national ‘specifics’ – in Czechia and Slovakia we repeatedly observe a ‘coalition’ of (former) Communists and pan-Slavic conservative streams (geopolitically oriented on Russia and partly also China, cf. Waisová, 2020); in Hungary and Poland the situation is different regarding the strong actors stressing the important role of history, Christianity/Catholicism and also presenting specific reflections of the inter-war period. Nevertheless, a common feature of Central European ‘tradition­alist’ belief is the criticism of the ‘ultraliberal’ West Europe/EU presented as overall disillusionment with European values – again the typical manifesta­tion of nativism. This brings us back to the Ruritania concept and to the conflict between two different cultures and societal groups in this region. In my opinion, there exists in ECE a tendency to accept only the ‘technical’ part of mod-ernisation (industrialisation, welfare), but not the ‘ideological’ part (liberal democracy). In Ágh’s (2019) terminology, the Europeanisation was success­ful regarding the creation of formal institutions, but failed in its socialisation part. Similarly, Krastev and Holmes (2020) reason that the imitation failed because of the absence of genuine liberal democrats both in the political elite and societies of ECE. Furthermore, the assertive anti-liberal or illiberal actors in the region enforce the turn in the process – the West has to imitate the ECE nativists, if it wants to survive. Nativists, labelling themselves patriots, are balancing between national­ism and xenophobia using social chauvinistic rhetoric. They create a world in which it is presumed that ‘compatriots take priority’ (Bosniak, 1994: 445), and this was also fully proven during the contemporary pandemic. Furthermore, the ECE nativists, often very successful in the domestic political arena, contin­ually strengthen and radicalise their rhetoric and political praxis. This might also be documented in one of the newest examples of such nativist rhetoric, namely the speech of V. Orbán on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Trianon Treaty. The analysis of this document would require a separate article, but to summarise the main ideas, Orbán described the Hungarian nation as the steppe tribe that created a Christian state in the Carpathian basin. This state was strong and independent, but under permanent danger from both the East and West. Trianon is presented as the betrayal of the West and an attempt to destroy the Hungarian nation. In his opinion, in 1918 ‘the thousand-year-old historical Hungary was stabbed in the back by the conspir­acies in Budapest’ – such rhetoric commemorates the radical ultraconserva­tive and nativist position of German generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff after WWI. Repeatedly, Orbán stresses the Hungarian nation as the mani­festation of ‘blood and land’ (Orbán, 2020). In my opinion, the speech from Sátoraljaújhely presents the peak of nativism in Central Europe so far. Conclusion Nativism and radial right-wing populism are not limited to ECE, but above all the Polish and Hungarian primer make this region kind of a trend­setter. Nevertheless, these parties ‘demonstrate some similarities across Europe, displaying a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and pop­ulism’ (Pirro, 2014: 601). They focus on ‘sources of identity such as the eth­nic community, they are anti-establishment and thus anti-corruption by defi­nition and they champion anti-Western orientations’ (Pirro, 2014: 606). My first research question asked whether the contemporary nativism in Central Europe grows from visible anti-liberal legacies? As our analysis of the general development of Central European nativist actors demonstrated we can reflect important legacies related with the pre-Communist parochial political culture, as well as the legacies developed within the national-accom­modative types of Communist regimes. Naturally, each case study also pre­sents a specific set of ‘domestic’ characteristic; still, we can distinguish some general regional specifics – especially salient specific ideological cleavages and political preference. Shaped by specific postcommunist legacies, the conflict axes that these cleavages generate on the demand side can be distinguished from Western European contexts. Those legacies engender a significant counter-cosmopolitan segment of the electorate that opposes economic market liberalism, cosmopolitan cultural diversity, and postnational European political integration. (Rensmann, 2012: 68) The most important negative legacies that might be detected are ‘com­munist-authoritarian and ethnically exclusive societies … authoritarian conformism, strong support of social cohesion, and ethnic exclusivism’ (Rensmann, 2012: 73). 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Accessible at http://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/primeminis-ter-viktor-orbans-commemoration-speech-trianon/, 20. 7. 2020. Marko HOCEVAR* THE CRISIS OF 2008 ANd THE RISE OF THE SLOVENIAN CONSOLIdATION STATE Abstract. The purpose of the article is to explain the cre­ation of the Slovenian debt state and its transformation into a consolidation state after the crisis of 2008. When the crisis struck Slovenia in 2009, the banking system was near collapse. Through the recapitalisations of the banking system the public debt began to grow. After a couple of years and under the structural pressures of rat­ing agencies and pressures from the EU, the Slovenian state had to adopt austerity measures to consolidate its public finances, while limiting the scope of democracy. The main finding of the article is that the crisis of 2008 fundamentally changed the Slovenian state. Keywords: capitalist state, consolidation state, debt, Slovenia, democracy Introduction In the EU context, the crisis of capitalist accumulation in 2008–2009 quickly became a crisis of sovereign debt (see Streeck, 2012; 2016; 2017; Lapavitsas, 2018; Varoufakis and Holland, 2012). The reason was simple – the deep recession of the entire capitalist economy meant the capital­ist states were forced to step in to save capitalism from itself. States thus took over the debt of banks and large companies since they were allegedly ‘too big to fail’ by borrowing money by issuing government bonds. Streeck explains this process as the rise of the debt state (Streeck, 2015). This led to a rapid rise of public debt and fiscal deficits that were problematic in the context of the EU and EMU. Namely, the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact are strict concerning the highest ratio of deficit and debt to GDP permissible. Namely, the deficit-to-GDP ratio should not exceed 3% while the debt-to-GDP ratio is set at 60% (Treaty on European Union, 1992; European Council, 1997). Most states were exceeding these limits (Streeck, 2015; 2016; 2017). The states were accumulating debt to prevent their economies collaps­ing. However, this “made ‘financial markets’ suspicious about states’ capacity * Marko Hocevar, PhD, Teaching Assistant, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. DOI: 10.51936/tip.58.2.305-321 Marko HOCEVAR to live up to their obligations as debtors” (Streeck, 2015: 7–8). Hence, the ‘financial markets’ together with the rating agencies began to lower the credit ratings of states, leading to rise in premiums on state bonds. This pushed many states into a very difficult position (Streeck, 2015; 2016; 2017). States wished to avoid bankruptcy and restore the confidence of financial institutions and financial markets in their ability to repay their debt. If they wanted to obtain help from the ECB, IMF and EC they had to accept very tough policies oriented at fiscal consolidation. The most important goal of policies in European countries therefore became fiscal consolidation via austerity. Accordingly, these processes led to transformation of the capi­talist state, its policy objectives, scopes of action, and rationality. The con­solidation state began to emerge (Streeck, 2015; 2017) in which the central banks became ever more independent of democratic influence, they “rise to become the principal agents of economic policy, political decisions with far-reaching social consequences move out of the purview of parliaments and elected governments” (Streeck, 2015: 25). Debt limits were inscribed in national constitutions as well as laws prescribing a balanced budget. Markets became the main political actors, leaving almost no space for any kind of democracy (Streeck, 2015: 25). We argue that this trajectory is also visible in Slovenia, which was seen for long time as having a transition distinct from other post-socialist countries (Stanojevic´, 2014). However, Janša’s first government (2004–2008) started to introduce radical neoliberal measures while also enabling many compa­nies and managers to obtain cheap loans. When the crisis hit the Slovenian economy, it was soon clear that these debts could not be repaid, requiring multiple recapitalisations of the banking sector which, in turn, radically increased the state’s public debt. Moreover, from 2008 to 2013 the Slovenian economy twice experienced a deep recession. Every crisis and post-crisis government in Slovenia was determined to curtail public debt in order to prevent the Troika intervening. The only way to lower public debt accept­able to the capitalist class, financial markets and European institutions was to cut public expenditures by launching radical neoliberal reforms. Thus, the Slovenian consolidation state began to emerge. The article focuses on two main research questions: 1) What were the main causes for the rise of the Slovenian debt state? 2) How was the Slovenian debt state transformed into a consolidation state? To explain how the Slovenian debt state was created and transformed into a consolidation state, we combine various statistical data with detailed analysis of strategic state documents from 2004 onwards. The analysis is based on: 1) Foucault’s methods of archaeology and genealogy (Foucault, 1984; 2011) for explain­ing various acts, strategic documents etc.; 2) Wolfgang Streeck’s (2015; 2016; 2015) theoretical and methodological approach for explaining different Marko HOCEVAR policy measures; and 3) Marxist political theory. In this context, the article makes two original scientific contributions: first, it explains the specific cir­cumstances making Slovenia become a debt state; second, it explains the rise of the Slovenian consolidation state in the context of the 2008 finan­cial crisis and the EU framework by presenting statistical data as well as an interpretative analysis of various strategic documents, public policies and measures. The article initially explains the rise of the debt state in Slovenia due to both the neoliberal policies adopted by Janša’s first government and European integration processes. After that we analyse the fiscal consolida­tion policies and the public-debt-reduction attempts of the three crisis gov­ernments led by Borut Pahor, Janez Janša and Alenka Bratušek and the post-crisis government of Miro Cerar by considering policy measures, statistical data and analysis of strategic documents. In the fourth section we discuss the impact of the transformation of the Slovenian state on liberal democracy in Slovenia. In the conclusion we answer the two research questions and highlight the possible impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the Slovenian state. The crisis of capitalism and the rise of the Slovenian debt state After the downfall of socialist Yugoslavia, Slovenia was considered a suc­cess story in its transition from socialism to capitalism, within the context of state’s transformation and introduction of liberal democracy. The specific gradualist approach to the transition adopted in Slovenia was the crucial element for avoiding the “economic shock doctrine” (Klein, 2010). A strong neo-corporatist system emerged that was led by a centre-left political party LDS, which held power almost continuously from 1992 till 2004. This neo-corporatist model was based on the state playing a strong role in regulating economic relations, very strong trade unions, and a consensus between the political and economic elites and trade unions regarding the main goal of the state – to become an EU member state. Slovenia joined the EU in 2004 and had no problems fulfilling the Maastricht criteria because it had a very low deficit and a low public debt to GDP ratio, both below the EU aver­age (Crowley and Stanojevic´, 2011; Stanojevic´, 2014; Stanojevic´ and Furlan, 2018). However, everything changed in 2004 when Slovenia became an EU member state. The left-centre LDS lost the elections and a new government was formed under the neoliberal and neoconservative SDS. Janez Janša was appointed prime minister. During Janša’s first term in office, the overriding rationale behind all policies was to make a break from gradualism and intro­duce neoliberal reforms (Stanojevic´, 2014; Stanojevic´ and Furlan, 2018). The policies of Janša’s government from 2004 until 2008, such as tax cuts, huge public spending and the attempt to create a economic elite by way of “accu­mulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003), are the biggest reasons Slovenia became a debt state after 2008. During Janša’s first term, economic growth was high, the unemployment level really low, and the public debt to GDP ratio was also low. Yet, this was a consequence of the high public expenditure, low taxes, and extremely high debt levels of the economy and the banks (Mramor, 2018: 22–23). Janša’s first government adopted various tax reforms that in fact were ‘tax gifts’ to company owners and to the richest: by lowering the tax rates on capital gains, abolishing the payroll tax and in 2007 reducing the progres­sion of personal income tax (Drenovec, 2015: 155). Moreover, during his entire first term Janša opposed the idea of increasing public sector wages, only to do precisely that before the 2008 elections in a pre-election attempt to garner more support. This all happened just before the outbreak of 2008 crisis and created many problems in the following years (Mramor, 2018: 22; Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 181–182; Mencinger, 2012: 66; Drenovec, 2015: 155). The tax gifts to the richest amounted to almost EUR 600 million, mean­ing the budget lost EUR 600 million in revenue per year; before the crisis 1.5% of GDP and after the crisis 2.3% of GDP. This deficit was a direct con­sequence of the neoliberal policies and the tax gifts for the richest. The tax gifts handed out by the first Janša government until 2015 were estimated at around EUR 5.1 billion (Drenovec, 2015: 159). The key reason for the higher public debt in Slovenia after 2008 was the banking sector’s recapitalisation from 2011 until 20141 needed due to the ‘bad loans’ of the banks related to attempts to create a new economic elite during Janša’s first government. Janša’s goal had been to establish a new economic elite close to his right-wing political party through various buy outs and takeovers by company managers2. Since these managers did not have enough money, this process was only enabled by the banks engag­ing in extensive lending. These processes of privatising state-owned compa­nies are examples of “selective privatisation” (Stanojevic´, 2014: 107; see also Stanojevic´ and Furlan, 2018: 15). 1 Due to the dispute between the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Slovenia over the recapitalisa­tion of the banks, the recapitalisation was at the beginning too small and also too late. Many EU member states recapitalised their banking system already in 2009–2010, yet Slovenia only did so in 2013–2014. If the recapitalisation had occurred earlier, it would have required less funds for the recapitalisation and the state would also have avoided the new “bail-in” rules of the EC, in turn also meaning that the country would not have sold all of its banks (Mramor, 2018: 23–24). 2 The two most notorious stories are those of Igor Bavcar, the head of Istrabenz, and Boško Šrot, the head of Pivovarna Laško. Istrabenz took over the companies Droga and Kolinska, which were merged, and also many hotels along the Slovenian coast. Pivovarna Laško took over the Delo newspaper, the companies Radenska and Fructal. Together, they took over shares of Mercator (Žerdin, 2012; Cirman and Vukovic, 2017; Modic and Vukovic, 2019). However, the banks did not possess sufficient funds for these operations since deposits in the banks were only growing as much as nominal GDP. When the European financial markets were opened up, Slovenian banks obtained access to cheap money. The banks’ high borrowing was the sole way to secure the money needed for the buy outs and takeovers, in later years explaining the huge rise in public debt3 (Mencinger, 2012: 74–75; Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 174–177; Drenovec, 2015: 160–163). Table 1: GDP COMPONENTS AND GROWTH IN SLOVENIA, 2008–2018 Source: SORS, 2020a. When the crisis started, the recession in Slovenia was one of the deepest in the EU. The real-estate bubble burst and the stock market also suffered a huge blow. Loans had been secured through stocks and real estate, which were both extremely overrated. A problem occurred when the markets col­lapsed, with Slovenian banks having to repay their debts but being unable to do so because most loans they had granted for the mentioned buy outs and takeovers were bad loans. Bad debt soon accumulated and the burden fell on banks. The only possible solution was to recapitalise the banking sector multiple times. From 2011 to 2014, the state spent approximately EUR 5.9 billion to rescue the banking sector. Between 2013 and 2014, on the recapi­talisation of four banks (Abanka, NLB, NKBM, Banka Celje) the state spent EUR 3.2 billion, or 8.7% of GDP; and a further EUR 1.6 billion was taken by the DUTB, the ‘bad bank’ established for the purpose of buying bad loans and risk assets from the Slovenian banks, and an additional EUR 600 went to ‘help’ Greece and the ESM. An important factor was also the multiplier effect of these measures and policies (Drenovec, 2015: 155–159; MF, 2015). Moreover, Pahor’s government, which succeeded Janša’s first government, increased wages in the public sector, pensions and the minimum wage. The government did not increase its spending on invest­ments and did not recapitalise the banking system. As a result, the deficit rose to 6% of GDP and the govern­ment had to borrow more than EUR 7 billion to finance its deficit (Damijan, 2013). Table 2: DEFICIT AND PUBLIC DEBT, SLOVENIA, ANNUALLY Source: SORS, 2020b. Thus, the combination of internal and external factors and policies was the prime cause of the rise of the country’s public debt before and after 2008. The Slovenian debt crisis was the outcome of the banks’ huge foreign debt created in the period 2004–2008 as part of financing the creation of a (right-leaning) capitalist elite and which became nationalised and social-ised via the banking sector’s recapitalisation and the creation of the DUTB (Drenovec, 2015: 161). Crucially, in the period of the Bratušek and Cerar governments these banks were all sold off to foreign capitalist investors well below market value (see Hoc.evar, 2020). The tax reforms of Janša’s first government and the socialisation of the banking sector’s losses, mostly a consequence of the policies of Janša’s first, led to serious threats of intervention by the infamous Troika. By January 2012, three critical rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moodys, Fitch) had lowered their credit ratings for Slovenian government bonds, creating big structural pressure on the state. The international markets were keen to send the Troika to Slovenia and to establish a technocratic government (Breznik and Furlan, 2015). There was huge pressure to cut the deficit and balance the state budget so as to meet the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. Austerity and consolidation were to be implemented at any cost in order to satisfy both the international financial markets and the EU institutions. This was said to be the only way to save the country from bankruptcy. In this context, changes in the Slovenian capitalist state became visible and the Slovenian consolidation state began to emerge. Neoliberalism and the rise of the Slovenian consolidation state To explain the rise of the Slovenian consolidation state, we now explain the essential policies and measures imposed by various governments to lower public debt and balance the budget. This analysis is complemented by a concise review of crucial strategic documents of the Slovenian state between 2008 and 2018 and statistical data4. In 2010, the government of Borut Pahor approved certain measures aimed at fiscal consolidation, including restrictions on pensions, social transfers and public-sector wages. The government also introduced guar­antees for liquidity deposits, bank guarantees, and aid to export-oriented companies. These initial measures already expanded public debt, although it should be noted that the crisis was not so deep and radical because wages had just been increased before the crisis and consumer patterns remained unchanged until 2011. Yet, by 2011 real GDP had fallen sharply and the unemployment level was very high, especially among youth, which was partly a result of the lower exports (Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 193; Drenovec, 2015: 156). In the wake of the crisis, the Pahor government started to prepare meas­ures to reduce long-term spending. Various measures were in the spotlight: pension reform, social system reform and reform of the labour market, especially “mini jobs”5. The trade unions were opposed to both the pension and labour market reforms because they had not been coordinated with the social partners through the social dialogue. In April 2011 a referendum was held where the labour markets reforms were rejected. After that, a tri­ple referendum was held in June 2011 in which the government suffered a defeat, with the opposition and trade unions successfully stopping the implementation of the reforms6. At the same time, there was a huge drop in GDP, youth unemployment reached almost 21%, wages fell and unemploy­ment doubled (Bembic., 2013: 89; Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 193; Mramor, 2018; Brezovšek, Hac.ek and Kukovic., 2016: 281). Interest rates on bonds issued by Slovenia had risen sharply, pushing the state ever closer to the edge of a cliff. It seemed that only one option was left if the Slovenian state wished to avoid the Greek scenario – to implement 4 Using the critical discourse analysis and Foucault’s archaeology we analysed the strategic docu­ments adopted by Slovenian governments from 2008 onwards: GRS, 2010; 2017; ME, 2013; MPA, 2015. 5 Mini job is a temporary or occasional work or more permanent short-time work. 6 Pahor’s government claimed in the Slovenian exit strategy that the government’s primary goal was to formulate a “a medium-term strategy for reducing the structural deficit, and more importantly ensuring the sustainability of public debt” (GRS, 2010: 5). Even more importantly, the “guiding principle for the formula­tion of economic policy measures is the consolidation of public finances, which will be achieved by reducing expenditure rather than increasing tax burdens” (GRS, 2010: 2). austerity measures and to create a consolidation state. This was the context in which fiscal consolidation policies were introduced and Slovenia became a consolidation state via privatisations and austerity measures that favoured the rich and the wealthy. First, the class character of the emergence of the consolidation state is visible in the nature of the tax reforms adopted to ensure a balanced budget and to cut the level of public debt. Namely, a decline in tax revenue can be seen after 2008. Although, as explained above, the crisis was caused pri­marily internally by the attempt to create a new class of capitalists and the tax gifts for the richest, in fact the tax reforms did not take more from the richest but were dispersed in such a way as to affect the entire population. The tax reforms were mostly focused on increases in indirect taxes such as value-added tax (normal rate from 20% to 22%; lower rate from 8.5% to 9.5%); excise duties on fuel, liquor and cigarettes; a tax on financial services was adopted in 2012 and amended in 2014. However, a property tax that would have affected the wealthiest was never adopted and the corporate income tax was reduced and has remained low (Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 193; Drenovec, 2015: 159; Verbic. et al., 2016: 213–216). Second, the external pressures and the threat of the Troika’s intervention created great pressure to implement austerity measures through cuts in pub­lic spending. During Janša’s second government, which was short-lived, pub­lic debt began to grow and the new coalition planned to reduce public debt to below 45% of GDP (Coalition agreement, 2012). The government’s expla­nation was that the Troika could otherwise take over the management of the state and that it was necessary to begin with public spending cuts to regain the confidence of international financial markets and institutions. From 2011 to 2012, the funds for social assistance and child allowance were lowered sig­nificantly. To reduce public debt, Janša’s second government acted in a pro-cyclical manner and adopted the Fiscal Balance Act (FBA), which introduced radical austerity measures. FBA brought a lowering of the public sector wage scale by 8%, a radical cut in social spending by reducing social rights, lower child and parental benefits, and unconstitutionally decreased the pensions of some 28,000 pensioners (Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 211). Moreover, FBA proved to be catastrophic for the nation’s capitalist economy and the state’s GDP with a direct consequence of FBA being a massive drop in the internal aggregate demand of households (Mencinger, 2014: 19). Thus, in 2012 state expenditures were cut by EUR 985 million and revenues fell by EUR 105 million. Public sector spending decreased by EUR 151 million, spending on social transfers by EUR 171 million and on investments by EUR 624 million (Damijan, 2013). In 2013, the government of Alenka Bratušek selectively lowered certain wages in the public sector by up to 4.5%7 (Furl The National Assembly The National Assembly an and Breznik, 2015: 212). These public-sector wage reductions slashed “govern­ment consumption and thus the production of public sector services, lead­ing to a decline in total GDP” (Verbic. et al., 2016: 219). Despite FBA, the bank recapitalisations and the other austerity measures, the international organisations were still not satisfied. In response to the rise in the premiums on national bonds and the internal and external pressures, in 2013 the ‘fiscal rule’ was inscribed in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia and in 2015 later also codified in the Fiscal Rule Act, both being a consequence of the Stability and Growth Pact. This should be viewed as the third dimension leading to the rise of the consolidation state in Slovenia. During the mandate of the Bratušek government, in May 2013 and with a two-thirds majority Article 148 of the Constitution was amended in order to limit the country’s deficit and public debt. The National Assembly thereby approved an amendment to the article in the Constitution which provides that the goal of the state is a balanced budget, without borrowing, and the goal is that revenues exceed budget expenditures. Now, it is a constitutional norm that the budget must be balanced and that all revenues and expen­ditures “of the budgets of the state must be balanced in the medium-term without borrowing, or revenues must exceed expenditures. Temporary devi­ation from this principle is only allowed when exceptional circumstances affect the state”. In addition, the government of Miro Cerar adopted the Fiscal Rule Act in 2015 as a more concrete definition of the fiscal rule in order to balance the budget. Article 3 of the Fiscal Rule Act states that the budget of the state shall be balanced in the medium term without borrowing, if the structural balance of the general government sector in an indi­vidual year is not lower than the minimum value as defined in the rati­fied international treaty on stability, coordination and governance in economic and monetary union, and in the medium term is at least in balance or in surplus. Changes to the Public Finance Act in 2009 also led to the Fiscal Council being established, a technocratic institution without any democratic legiti­macy. The Fiscal Council is “an independent and autonomous state author­ity supervising the management of the fiscal policy. Its fundamental task is to monitor the compliance with the fiscal rule, the medium-term balance The government of Alenka Bratušek stressed the need to consolidate public finances through two crucial measures: rationalisation of public spending, mostly via lowering wages in the public sector, and, if necessary, by raising value-added tax (Coalition agreement 2013, 2013: 2). between revenue and expenditure without borrowing, except in excep­tional circumstances”8 (Fiscal Council, 2020). The fourth dimension in these processes is the project of privatisation of the nation’s companies and banks. Until 2008, as already explained, the con­cept was to create a national bourgeoisie. In this context, the national banks gave very cheap loans to ‘tycoons’ to assist them in buying out and taking over as many companies as they wanted. The two most notorious exam­ples are Igor Bavc.ar and Istrabenz and Boško Šrot and Pivovarna Laško. In order to finance these takeovers, the banks also had to take out loans from other banks. When the crisis hit Slovenia and these managers and newly established owners of many companies were unable to repay these debts, the entire project of the national economic bourgeoisie collapsed and the state was forced to take over the bad loans from the banks9. In order to regain the confidence of the EU and financial markets, under the leadership of Alenka Bratušek the Slovenian government adopted the National Reform Programme 2013–2014 in which it proposed the privatisation of 3–5 state-owned companies. Yet, in June 2013 the National Assembly adopted a list of 15 state-owned companies due for privatisation. The list included the following companies: Adria Airways, Aero, Elan, Fotona, Helios, Aerodrom Ljubljana, Adria Airways Tehnika, NKBM, Telekom Slovenija, Cinkarna Celje, Gospodarsko razstavišc.e, Paloma, Terme Olimia Bazeni, Unior, Žito (Delo, 2013). Today, most of these companies are privatised, including NLB, the biggest national bank, which had to be privatised because of the EU’s new ‘bail-in’ rules. All of these measures proved to be counterproductive and in fact merely perpetuated the crisis and the recession in 2012–2013. That is, while the first drop in GDP in 2009 was due to the global crisis, the second was due to the austerity measures and fiscal consolidation policies in an attempt to fulfil the Maastricht criteria. Only after 2013 did the Slovenian economy begin to grow again, propelled by its export orientation. Public debt was rising until 2015, when it amounted to 82.6% of GDP, and only after then did the public debt to GDP ratio start to drop. Crucially, these trends were not the result of fiscal consolidation, despite the temptation to so argue, but more a consequence of the growth seen in other EU and non-EU countries since 8 This comes not as a surprise but as a clear sign of a new rationality, best seen in the Strategy of Development of Slovenia 2030. It is argued that the crucial goal of Cerar’s government was to improve the country’s competitiveness. The best way to do that was to balance the budget “and the sustainable reduc­tion of public debt” (GRS, 2017: 32). Hence, the government’s main goal was “fiscal sustainability” (GRS, 2017: 32). 9 In the years after 2010, the “comprador bourgeoisie” (Poulantzas 2008: 200) emerged, later playing a crucial role in numerous cases of foreign direct investment and the entry of foreign capital in Slovenia. This was best seen in the many cases of privatisation from 2011–2012 onwards. the Slovenian economy and its companies are mostly export oriented10 (Mencinger, 2014; Mramor, 2018; Verbic. et al., 2016: 223). In order to rescue capitalism and stabilise the reproduction of capital­ist accumulation in the competitive world system, Slovenia underwent a transition from being a debt to a consolidation state. Under the pressure of EU institutions, the capitalist class and financial markets, the political and economic elite pursued policies of fiscal consolidation in order to main­tain the state’s competitive level and attract new foreign investments. While the Slovenian state wanted to avoid the Troika, in the changed structural and cultural circumstances it had to start with strict austerity programmes, pass the FBA, adopt the fiscal rule, alter the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, and engage in accumulation by dispossession. The above-men­tioned demonstrates that all governments – from right to left – ensured the costs of establishing the new capitalist class and “other costs of rejoicing the newly transitioned elites” were recovered “through taxes and spending on the weakest in society” (Drenovec, 2015: 159). Transformation of liberal democracy in Slovenia Slovenia is considered to be a consolidated democracy (see Fink Hafner, 2012: 208; Brezovšek, Hac.ek and Kukovic., 2016). However, during the crisis, there were certain important changes, especially as regards the fiscal rule and the rise of technocracy. In May 2013, together with the fiscal rule, the National Assembly passed an amendment to Article 90 of the Constitution, which is about a legislative referendum. The Constitution forbids referendums “on laws on taxes, customs duties, and other compulsory charges, and on the law adopted for the implementation of the state budget”. Thus, anything that is concerned with public finances is in the scope of technocracy while the peo­ple have no say in these matters: “With this constitutional change, the people lost access to political decision-making and the state became a machine for executing the instructions of international organizations whose most impor­tant goal is the privatization of state property” (Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 195). This measure was undertaken to provide a shield for the policies of privatisation and austerity. Therefore, Streeck’s argument that the rise of the consolidation state “involves the insertion of a Chinese wall between the economy and politics /…/ which will permit the markets to assert their ver­sion of justice undisturbed by discretionary political intervention” (Streeck, 2017: 117) seems to be correct in the case of Slovenia. The fiscal rule and the changes of the Constitution regarding the 10 This is not surprising at all since, as Blyth (2013) empirically showed, the austerity measures and fiscal consolidation never produced the promised results but instead prolonged the period of recession. possibility of a legislative referendum prevent any kind of democracy with respect to fiscal policies and public finances11. The fiscal rule is essentially a technocratic measure directed against the possible revolt of the people against austerity and fiscal consolidation. In this context the fiscal rule pre­vents the autonomous decision-making of any government: On the international scene, Slovenian politics has taken the side of a hard line, which advocates the unconditional repayment of debts of deb­tor countries, regardless of the price that their citizens have to pay. The citizens here have faithfully accepted the recommendation of internati­onal organizations that democracy is harmful and that all we need is a ‘technical government’. (Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 169) The fiscal rule in all its dimensions also means that the Slovenian capitalist state in practice became a tool in the hands of the international financial mar­kets and that is directly fulfilling tasks set by international financial capital, most importantly pledging itself to repaying its debts and ensuring a strong framework for the stability of capitalist accumulation, chiefly by creating a favourable tax environment for investments of domestic and foreign capital by not raising tax levels (see Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 195; Hoc.evar, 2020). It is not surprising that in the crisis years the political parties more or less had the same programmes and all met the requirements and interests of the EU and financial markets. In this regard, it may be said that “the differences between the socio-economic policies of the various parties in power are diminishing, elections seem to be becoming less and less important” (Fink-Hafner, 2012: 209). Crucially, instead of the demos, a new concept of democ­racy and of the subject of democracy emerged. Stakeholders became the principal actors addressed by the state and government (see: GRS, 2017; ME, 2013; MPA, 2015) and liberal democracy became a stakeholder democracy (Hoc.evar, 2020). Thus, although all important democratic practices remain stable – elec­tions, parties etc. – there is a clear sign that the democracy has transformed. These important structural changes may also explain the dramatic drop in voter turnout at national elections – both parliamentary and presidential – and the great distrust shown towards political parties and democracy in Slovenia (Hoc.evar, 2020; see also: ESS, 2008; 2010; 2012; 2016; SEC, 2020a; SEC, 2020b). It seems that in Slovenia we can observe “a secular implosion of the social contract of capitalist democracy, in the transition to /…/ [a] con­solidation state committed to fiscal discipline” (Streeck, 2017: 117). 11 Fiscal democracy “is essentially about the flexibility of fiscal resources /…/ that is, the proportion of tax revenue available in principle to be allocated to newly chosen, current purposes” (Streeck and Mertens, 2010: 6). Conclusion In the article we have examined the transformation of the Slovenian state within the framework of the 2008 crisis. Our research confirms that the cri­sis of 2008 fundamentally changed the Slovenian state, which first became a debt state and was later transformed into a consolidation state. In the con­clusion we outline the answers to the two research questions and highlight the possible impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the Slovenian state. First, in the article we have explained the policies and measures that led to the creation of the Slovenian debt state and its transformation into a consolidation state. The main causes for the rise of the Slovenian debt state were primarily internal processes: 1) tax reforms and the tax gifts for the rich implemented during Janša’s first government; 2) the attempt to cre­ate the national bourgeoisie during Janša’s first government, which led to the accumulation of bad loans which resulted in the recapitalisation of the banking sector in the years after the crisis. These are the crucial reasons for the enormous rise of public debt after the crisis of 2008. Second, regarding the transformation of the debt state into a consolida­tion state, we have identified four dimensions and sets of policies which acted as the cornerstone for regaining the confidence of EU institutions and financial markets: 1) tax reforms that have affected the entire population; 2) radical austerity measures and the adoption of the Fiscal Balance Act in order to decrease public spending; 3) the inscription of the fiscal rule in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia; 4) privatisation of state owned companies and banks in order to regain the confidence of financial mar­kets. The vital goal was to establish a consolidation state, which was seen to be the only entity that could preserve the competitiveness of the Slovenian capitalist state12 and economy. The Slovenian state has become a peripheral state in the EU whose role is to secure the concentration of capital and wealth in the core states of the capitalist world system (Hoc.evar, 2020). In this way, the financial markets and global capital have forced the Slovenian state to act in a “depoliticised” way through technocratic regimes of governance and “relatively independ­ent of formalized political institutions and decision-making processes” (Hirsch, 2014: 150). The Slovenian consolidation state has become devoted to ‘market justice’, which creates “a situation where political institutions [are] economically neutralized” (Streeck, 2017: 172). Still, for a brief moment, these processes were at least partly reversed in Slovenia between 2018 and 2020. The minimum wage was raised mainly 12 As Cerny points out, fiscal consolidation is essentially the foundation of pursuing the competitive­ness of the capitalist state in a time of neoliberal hegemony (Cerny, 1997). following the exclusion of additions from it. More importantly, the National Assembly almost adopted new act on medical security which could have brought an end to privatised medical insurance. The downfall of this act was one of the biggest reasons that the prime minister and the entire govern­ment resigned in February 2020. Since then, the new crisis and recession in the context of Covid-19 hold the potential to again turn things upside-down due to the rising public debt and deficit in order to prevent an even deeper recession. As Poulantzas (2014: 129) argued, if the state in capitalism is “the specific material condensation of a relationship of forces among classes and class fractions”, then it is clear that the functioning of the Slovenian state, its apparatuses and the content of its policies depends primarily on class power relations and the political power of specific classes. How this per­manent conflict and contradiction of capitalist society and politics is to be resolved in Slovenia under the third government of Janez Janša during the Covid-19 crisis has yet to be seen. We should not be surprised if the end result is “the completion of a Hayekian social dictatorship, in which the capi­talist market economy was protected from democratic correction” (Streeck, 2017: 172). BIBLIOGRAPHY Bembic., Branko (2013): Kolikšna je bojna pripravljenost socialnih partnerjev? In Branko Bembic., Simon Hajdini, Martin Hergouth, Primož Krašovec, Boštjan Remic, Anita Tolic´, Lilijana Burcar, Lev Centrih and Vasja Lebaric. (eds.), Prvotna akumulacija med zgodovino in konceptom, 82–95. Ljubljana: Inštitut za delav­ske študije. Blyth, Mark (2013): Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brezovšek, Marjan, Miro Hac.ek, Simona Kukovic. (2016): Slovenska država in poli­tika. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Cerny, G. Philip (1997): Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization. Government and Opposition 32 (2): 251–274. 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The cases of Hungary and Slovenia. European Journal of Industrial Relations 20 (2): 1–16. Stanojevic´, Miroslav and Sašo Furlan (2018): Uvod: Dostojno delo za vse? In Miroslav Stanojevic´ and Sašo Furlan (eds), (Ne)dostojno delo. Prekarizacija stan­dardnega in nestandardnega zaposlovanja v Sloveniji, 5–24. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, založba FDV. Streeck, Wolfgang (2012): Markets and peoples. Democratic Capitalism and Euro­pean Integration. New Left Review 73 (Jan-Feb): 63–71. Streeck, Wolfgang (2015): The Rise of the European Consolidation State. MPIfG Discussion Paper 15/1. Köln: Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung. Streeck, Wolfgang (2016): How will capitalism end? Essays on a Failing System. London, New York: Verso. Streeck, Wolfgang (2017): Buying Time. The delayed crisis of democratic capital­ism. London, New York: Verso. Streeck, Wolfgang and Daniel Mertens (2010): An Index of Fiscal Democracy. MPFiG Working Paper 10/3. 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Government of the Republic of Slovenia [GRS] (2010): Slovenian exit strategy 2010–2013. Author’s private archive. Government of the Republic of Slovenia [GRS] (2017): Strategy of development of Slovenia 2030. Ljubljana: Office of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for Development and European Cohesion. Accessible at https://www.gov.si/ assets/vladne-sluzbe/SVRK/Strategija-razvoja-Slovenije-2030/Strategija_raz­voja_Slovenije_2030.pdf, 4. 5. 2020. Ministry of Economy [ME] (2013): Draft of the Strategy of Development of Slovenia 2014–2020. Accessible at http://www.eu-skladi.si/kohezija-do-2013/ostalo/ operativni-programi/strategija-razvoja-slovenije, 14. 8. 2020. Ministry of Finance [MF] (2015): Strategy of the Slovenian banking sector (pro­posal). Accessible at https://beta1.finance.si/files/2015-03-03/STRATEGIJA­BANKE-predlog-24-2-2015.pdf, 15. 9. 200. Ministry of public administration [MPA] (2015): Strategy of Development of the Slovenian public administration. Accessible at https://www.gov.si/assets/minis­trstva/MJU/Kakovost-in-inovativnost-v-javni-upravi/Strategija/Strategija-razvoja­javne-uprave-2015-2020.pdf, 5. 8. 2020. Modic, Tomaž and Vesna Vukovic´ (2019): Boško Šrot mora plac.ati vec.desetmili­jonsko odškodnino. Siol. net. Accessible at https://siol.net/posel-danes/novice/ bosko-srot-mora-placati-vecdesetmilijonsko-odskodnino-488361, 17. 7. 2020. State Election Commission [SEC] (2020a): Elections of the President of the Republic of Slovenia. Accessible at https://www.dvk-rs.si/index.php/si/volitve/predsed-nika-rs, 7. 9. 2020. State Election Commission [SEC] (2020b): Elections to the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia. Accessible at https://www.dvk-rs.si/index.php/si/volitve/ drzavni-zbor-rs, 7. 9. 2020. Statistical Office of Republic of Slovenia [SORS] (2020a): GDP and economic growth. SI-STAT Database. Accessible at http://pxweb.stat.si/pxweb/dialog/ statfile2.asp, 25. 7. 2020. Statistical Office of Republic of Slovenia [SORS] (2020b): Deficit and public debt. SI-STAT Database. Accessible at http://pxweb.stat.si/pxweb/dialog/statfile2.asp, 21. 7. 2020. Andrej KURNIK, Cirila TOPLAK* ON MIGRANTS WITH MIGRANTS: MIGRATIONS 5 YEARS AFTER EUROPE’S MIGRATION »CRISIS« Abstract. In which ways can we theorise the recent ille­galised migrations in Europe? This article considers theoretical novelties in the field of migration studies that have emerged since the mass migration into the European Union seen in 2015. Methodologically, the authors combine critical (discursive) analysis with the testing of certain still relevant theoretical concepts that have yet to be applied in migration studies, based on fieldwork along the Balkan Route over the last 5 years. The analysis has shown that the defining and decisive feature of the recent illegalised migrations, insufficient­ly considered by migrations scholarship, is the political subjectivity and agency of the migrants. Recognition of such agency makes migration the site of the critique of global inequalities and the site of inclusive social trans­formation. Keywords: Migrations; Europe; Political Theory; State; Balkan Migrant Route Introduction Throughout 2015, migrations into the European Union were a major focus of the media, politicians and the public, whereas social scientists were still searching for and designing theoretical tools to grasp this migra­tion of such massive scope and dimensions. Migrations are far from a novel research topic, yet the research challenge created by this very recent phe­nomenon in global migration processes is multi-layered and complex and, above all, is an emergency at the present moment. This challenge includes the need to establish an objectivising distance from the day-to-day developments in which researchers and theorists have engaged as witnesses, actors and active participants in the sense of »experts« who simply provide arguments that justify contentious political decisions for the public. Simultaneously, it is expected that researchers will not seek * Andrej Kurnik, PhD, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia; Cirila Toplak, PhD, Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. DOI: 10.51936/tip.58.2.322-340 Andrej KURNIK, Cirila TOPLAK to objectivise the migration process to the point of forgetting that at its core there are living people, worthy and in need of assistance and empathy. This challenge also risks falling into the trap of dealing with migrants as a simple monolith, stirring up generally black-and-white reactions and responses and then justifying the reduction of people on the move to numbers and statis­tics, without registering or considering the individuality of the individuals involved. On the opposite end of the spectrum of possible reactions, objec­tivisation and demonisation have been countered by romanticising and ide­alising tendencies that have equally concealed the reality of migrations. In attempts to rise above the perspective of migrants as amorphous Others, researchers have not been helped by the official interventions made along the routes taken by migrants. States did their most to separate migrants from the rest of the population by establishing sanitary refugee corridors, a term that in itself suggests migration is a disease that one needs to be isolated from, so as not to become infected by some nasty virus. Sanitary corridor is not the only terminological issue arising from the ‘migration crisis’. The latter phrase has been useful for establishing a social climate that has viewed the mass migrations as almost uniformly negative, like an economic or political crisis. In the post-socialist countries of Europe, we only encountered the first true crisis of the capitalist production cycle in 2008; by 2015, the term was still recent enough to arouse apprehensive asso­ciations. The term »crisis« also suggested that migrations would be a phe­nomenon limited by time since every crisis first occurs but then ends in this way or another, eventually becoming resolved. In practice, the media and politicians have largely concealed and ignored the fact that migrations have always been and are/will be everywhere; that those seen in 2015 were but an episode within a global social process of a Braudelian longue durée. We were all migrants at one time. Further demonstrating how language shapes reality, the word »migrant« has come to dominate and do away with the more precise distinction between refugees, fugitives, defectors, displaced people, asylum-seekers, posted workers, seasonal workers etc. This variety of terms also implies vari­ous reasons for migrating, based on which a hierarchy has been established and maintained concerning the right of migrants to our assistance and hos­pitality. »Migrant« has turned into an empty vessel into which we may pour and then mix various meanings. Political decision-makers and monitors of media contents have endeavoured to fill this vessel with doubt, which acts to smother the public’s sympathy for people on the move who may have needed to renounce their home/homeland overnight to save their very lives or had other pressing and valid reasons to emigrate. If borders (and thus states) simply did not exist, migrations anywhere and at any time would not be seen as a problem, but merely the natural, unhindered, free flow of people. States, borders and the concepts of citizen­ship are therefore, and not migrations per se, the principal issue here. That migrations in themselves are not a problem does not imply they are not associated with any issues; on the contrary, they are far more numerous than the ones briefly described above. Real and urgent issues relating to migra­tions that have recently also surfaced as research challenges are, for exam­ple, the acceptance of systemic violence against people on the move as self-evident in the name of »safety«; the normalisation of otherwise inacceptable cruelty in the case of Others; the paradox between conceiving migrations as a threat to human rights and the human right to migrate; migrants’ traumatic homesickness pointing to the irreversible loss of rich local cultures, which host societies’ ‘integration’ efforts only intensify; the selective, declarative openness and yet actual closedness of the EU’s borders where everything flows freely except for people; the Balkan states, and especially Bosnia and Herzegovina as a migration filter, a sink hole and a buffer for migrations into Europe – to list just a few examples. Below, we address the implications for states and the issues and limita­tions of the state-supported production of scientific knowledge on migra­tion, by analysing theoretical insights pertinent to the Balkan Migration Route together with the aim of demonstrating the spectrum and deficiencies of theorising in migration studies. The research question we aim to answer in this text is how the turbulent events on Balkan Route since 2015 chal­lenged the scholarship on migration and how the insistence on the agency of the migrants epistemologically affects the research on migration route. The text as it is is based on, first, a series of academic debates on the topic in 2019 and then combined with extensive ethnographic material1 gathered after 2015 along the Balkan migrant route on official migration policies, facilities and measures, NGO actions in the field and, primarily, many inter­views with migrants themselves that provided them with an opportunity to think about and tell (and, importantly, choose not to tell) their experience. In the introduction, we explain specific challenges to be met by researchers in theory as well as in fieldwork pertaining to migrations, and summarise This text is based on ethnographic research conducted by the authors on the Balkan route since 2015. The research took the form of volunteering during the existence of a formalised refugee corridor in 2015–2016 in either in the framework of an official humanitarian NGO or of an autonomous solidarity collective. After the official corridor was closed, the newly established solidarity structures in the Balkan region (in Northern Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia) have become the focus of research. Such par­ticipatory research allowed us to witness the suffering and struggle of the people on the move after they had again been forced into clandestine practices. Following the change in direction taken by the route in the early 2018, Bosnia and Herzegovina has become the main site of our research interest and in spring 2019 the ethnographic research that lasted for several months was conducted there. Its focus was the local autonomous solidarity structures, the attitude of public authorities and various sectors of civil society, and the plight of people on the move and their social practices. the current situation of the case study presented of the Balkan migrant route. In the core part of the text, fundamental concepts of critical border and migration studies are introduced and discussed, such as competing dis­courses on (state) power, sovereignty and human rights, and the subjectiv­ity of migrants. Results of empirical research on the Balkan migrant route are outlined with respect to the phenomenon of “assemblages of mobil­ity”. Our conclusions are thus founded on relevant fieldwork and critical examinations of migrations scholarship, which we attempt to broaden by introducing concepts that allow new perspectives on migrations and their scholarship today. Migrant Agency and Europeanisation along the Balkan Route: Moving from Political to Epistemological The various challenges and issues in migration studies stemming from the ongoing European ‘migrant crisis’ may be overcome and many researchers have sought to tackle them by not speaking and thinking about migrants but with them. Despite the obstacles and genuine danger on migrant routes, sev­eral academic studies (for example, see Holmes: 2013) have been produced in recent years that are a result of temporary embedment in migrants’ exist­ence. Informed and insightful communication with migrants is possible, despite the linguistic and bureaucratic barriers. Researchers who attempted to empower and subjectivise migrants by inviting them to articulate their self-reflections have had to step outside of the academic confines, but for the good reason of refusing to limit knowledge production exclusively to the modern Western, state-oriented scientific research format. Although the events of 2015 do not mark the start of a migrant route through the Balkans (Bojadžijev and Mezzadra, 2015), they certainly trig­gered its notoriety and the beginning of what was initially called a refu­gee crisis and, more recently, a migration crisis (De Genova, 2017), which has sent seismic waves into the fragile European political construction. The discord in the acting together of European states that was already vis­ible during the recent global financial crisis was further accentuated in 2015, especially the discord between the ‘core’ EU member states and the peripheral post-socialist member states. The somewhat prevailing narra­tive of those events seemingly contrasted the more welcoming and human rights-oriented approach of the former and the unwelcoming and repres­sive approach adopted by the latter. German Chancellor Angela Merkel was accused of making a serious error that would destabilise societies across Europe by opening Germany’s borders to asylum-seekers stranded on the route in Budapest. Yet, at the same time, Hungary had built a wall along its border to stop people on the move trying to reach Germany and other western and northern EU member states and was accused of being repres­sive and neglecting human rights, the Geneva Convention on Refugees, and international law. Since then, this rift has only grown, creating two political camps with a considerable impact on current European political dynamics: a liberal camp represented by the ‘core’ EU member states and an illiberal authoritarian camp that includes the Višegrad group countries and various versions of populist right-wing political movements and parties. While our intention is not to dive deeper into this liberal–illiberal chasm that has emerged following the events on and around the Balkan Route, there is one aspect of it that should be elaborated. In the approaches of both the liberal and illiberal camps, with one claiming to manage migration based on respect for human rights and the other demanding the closure and fortification of the EU’s borders, the existence of the migrants’ agency is ignored (Kurnik, 2019). While the latter approach appeals to the sovereign prerogatives of states that supposedly have an unlimited right to decide who has access to the national territory, the former approach recognises that such a right is limited by the universal character of human rights and international law. Still, recognition of the plurality of norms that one must comply with does not lead to recognition that the border and migration regime is constantly being negotiated and that migrant subjectivity, i.e. the set of practices, knowledges, behaviours of people on the move, constitutes such a regime (ibid.). Both approaches therefore consider people who are crossing borders regardless of their entitlement to do so as simple objects of state policies. However, we argue that people on the move remain political subjects wherever they may find themselves. In ethnography-based scholarship in particular, one can find accounts of the agency of people who tried and are still trying to reach their destina­tion by traversing migrant routes (Papadopoulus, Stephenson and Tsianos, 2008) like the Balkan Route (El-Shaarawi and Razsa, 2019). Researchers who witnessed the drama unfold at the Kelety train station in Budapest in the late summer of 2015 called those events the Summer of Migration (Kasparek and Speer, 2015). They thereby emphasised that it is impossible to interpret the events that led to the humanitarian corridor being established prior to the EU’s deal with Turkey in March 2016 without taking the collective agency of people on the move into consideration. The temporary suspension of the EU’s borders and the migration regime based on the Schengen and Dublin agreements for which Chancellor Merkel was so harshly criticised would not have happened without the insistent protest march in the direction of the Austrian border by a determined multitude of migrants (ibid.). Moreover, this agency cannot be understood without taking account of the forms of collective struggle and organising that characterised the mass protest move­ments during the ‘Arab Spring’, later suppressed by an authoritarian and violent backlash that forced so many into exile (Fargues, 2017). Likewise, the social practices or what is sometimes referred to as the migrant subjec­tivity of transnational migrants needs to be considered to fully understand how events like the Summer of Migration and mobility struggles on migrant routes were made possible. As critical migration scholars highlight, transna­tional migrant routes are complex and ambiguous environments as a result of the social practices of people on the move (Hess, 2018). They carve out migrant itineraries superimposed by state practices of control over mobil­ity that attempt to keep those itineraries within manageable routes (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickles, 2015). By considering and acknowledging migrant subjectivity we can write another history of migrant routes from the perspective of mobility strug­gles. Since the humanitarian corridor was established in the late summer of 2015 and its later closure in spring 2016, extensive ethnographic research on the Balkan Route has been conducted by various authors.2 Those eth­nographies that often refer to the tradition of militant research mainly focus on the ways the different state and non-state agencies co-constitute regimes of mobility along the route and how migrant agency is constitutive of the European migration and border regime. According to their narrative of the Balkan Route, the opening of the official humanitarian corridor and thereby the temporary suspension of the EU’s border and migration regime was not a hospitable gesture but a concession to mobility which the EU powers were forced to grant to the migrant multitudes (El-Shaarawi and Razsa, 2019). The temporary opening of state borders along the route and simultane­ous suspension of the Schengen and Dublin regulations, together with the organisation of state-sponsored transport to allow the fast transit of hun­dreds of thousands of refugees to Europe’s north, were needed to eventu­ally suppress excessive mobility on the route, to impose control over the unruly migrant itineraries and to reintroduce the regime of mobility control. Subsequent closure – albeit never fully successful – of the route would not have been possible without its temporary legalisation (Kurnik and Razsa, 2020). The formalisation of the humanitarian corridor between September 2015 and March 2016 was therefore simply an effort by the member states to reimpose total control over the migrant route (ibid.). To achieve this aim, member states made use of (bio)political technologies intended to make the population easily controlled and manageable, such as the categorisation and segmentation of what may be referred to as an irreducible multiplicity into ‘legitimate’ migrants (initially refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, See Beznec, Speer and Stojic Mitrovic, 2016; Beznec and Kurnik, 2020; El-Shaarawi and Razsa, 2019; Hameršak and Pleše, 2017; Kasparek and Speer, 2015; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020; Lunacek Brumen and Meh, 2016; Pistotnik, Lipovec Cebron and Kozinc, 2016; Stojic Mitrovic, Ahmetaševic, Beznec and Kurnik, 2020; Župaric-Iljic and Valenta, 2019. later only Syrians) and ‘illegitimate’ economic migrants (all the rest) as well as the prohibition of all forms of involvement in mitigation of the humani­tarian crisis along the migrant route that are not sponsored and authorised by the state (ibid.). This attack on what may be called the autonomy of migration (De Genova, 2017; Papadopoulus, Stephenson and Tsianos, 2008) was occurring against the backdrop of the European integration processes (Beznec and Kurnik, 2020; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020). Obviously, states along the Balkan route had different views on their role in the restoration of Europe’s border and migration regime. Some were relentlessly repressive (besides Hungary, Slovenia) while others were more permissive, at least initially (such as Serbia). Some immediately imposed the state monopoly over management of the route (Slovenia and Croatia), while others (Serbia again) even after the official corridor was closed continued to tolerate informal migrant itin­eraries with autonomously managed shelters and camps. These differences may be explained by the different structural positions in the processes of European integration held by the states along the route (ibid.). In part, they were also due to the different historical traditions and mentalities in deal­ing with migration in these societies. Ethnographic research conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ahmetaševic´ and Mlinarevic´, 2019; Beznec and Kurnik, 2020; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020) in particular, which has lately been transformed into a buffer zone for migrants or what some describe as a “dumping ground” (Stojic´ Mitrovic´; Ahmetaševic´; Beznec and Kurnik, 2020), shows that Europeanisation relative to introduction of the EU’s border and migration regime in the region should be understood in more than one way: as the harmonisation of legislation and norms according to the EU’s standards and as the acceptance/imposition of the very notions of ‘being in common’ that were coined during Europe’s colonial modernity. The drama on the Balkan migrant route may thus be interpreted as yet another aspect of the re-imposition and reconfiguration of colonial power relations in the Balkans which Europeanisation as a whole has come to stand for (Beznec and Kurnik, 2020; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020; Stojic´ Mitrovic´ et al., 2020). The decisive, although tacit and almost invisible role of the EU and the ‘core’ member states in repressing the freedom of movement, the pivotal role of global migration management agencies like the International Organization of Migration (IOM) in the restoration of mobility control, the subordinate role of nation states whose constitutions are based on a colonial imaginary (such as the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also elsewhere), endog­enous forms of ethno-national exclusivism and racism, the persistence of counter-hegemonic political legacies and traditions that are mobilised in solidarity with struggles for the freedom of movement – all of the above insights produced by ongoing ethnographic research reveal not only how the coloniality of power affects the making and remaking of migrant routes but also the potential held by mobility struggles to generate a postcolonial critique in the borderlands which are crossed and co-constituted by the migrant routes (ibid.). Critical Border and Migration Studies Migrants have dignity. It is essential to acknowledge and respect this fact to be able to understand migration. Yet, this simple postulate is com­pletely overlooked in official attempts to manage migration. As mentioned, the two opposing approaches to the ‘migrant crisis’ – one that claims it is possible to manage migration and human mobility while acknowledging human rights and the rule of law, and the other that claims absolute rights of the state over deciding who may enter its territory – share in common a disregard for migrant agency (Kurnik, 2019). Such disregard is also seen in the dominant scientific approaches to migration which insist on push-and-pull theories that reduce migrating people to passive objects. We therefore argue that this ignorance is not merely politically driven but has its roots in the dominant epistemology. The modern Western way of producing knowl­edge is to silence its objects. De Castro refers to objectifying triangulation as a procedure in which those who produce knowledge impose terms on the object of knowing (De Castro, 2009: 53). Further, according to De Castro, such knowledge production is analogous to the ways the establishment of modern sovereignty is conceived (ibid.) The sovereign, as the proponents of the exceptionalist theory argue, exempts itself from the relationship with its subjects and imposes terms of interaction onto the ruled subjects. This means that modern epistemology is developing parallel to the modern sov­ereign nation state. Due to this parallel development, modern state and sci­ence tend to homogenise human collectivities and conceive of a border as an exclusivist separator. Both focus on fixed identities and establish a tax­onomy, i.e. a hierarchical classification by category and identity. If migration is an irreducible multiplicity as the proponents of the theory of autonomy of migration (Bojadžijev, 2009; Pajnik, 2019) argue, the current situation on the Balkan Route and other migrant routes then highlights the gap between state and non-state subjectivity. Migrants as a non-state subjectivity reject the very essence of the modern statist epistemology, namely taxonomy, i.e. the hierarchical integration of non-state subjectivity. The repression and vio­lence along the route are about the categorisation and identification that is enforced on migrants as a transnational, non-state subjectivity. Influenced by migrant movements and reflections on the crisis of the modern concept of political subject, critical border and migration studies started to challenge the established and objectifying approaches to migration (Hess, 2011; Hess, 2012; Hess, 2016; Hess, 2018; Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickles, 2015). The change in the conception of power that is the hallmark of poststructur­alism considerably informed this challenge. Power is immanent; there is no unique centre of its rationality, no transcendent source and therefore no monopoly of the state over the articulation of power relations. This posi­tion implies that the articulation of a border and migration regime is to be interpreted as a result of various agencies that span from supranational instances, nation states, NGOs as well as migrants’ practices of mobility. The border and migration regime is hence not an expression of the absolute power held by nation states, but evolves through incessant negotiations involving multiple agents, comprising mobility struggles that also constitute this regime (Beznec and Kurnik, 2020; Kurnik, 2019). What we are actually dealing with is a strategy shaped by various agencies that possess different degrees of power not only in quantitative terms but in qualitative terms as well. Excessive and unauthorised practices of mobility that subvert attempts to bridle and subjugate it are therefore an expression of the other power that gives a potential basis for an a(nti)-hegemonic3 political project (ibid.). Critical migration and border studies therefore engage in an ascending anal­ysis similar to the one suggested by Foucault (Foucault, 2008). Such analysis grasps the ways power relations are being articulated from below, in capil­laries and on the margins, and enables the overall scheme of subjugation to be identified. On the other hand, it also allows the grasping of the other power or a(nti)-hegemony that emerges from resistances which are part of power, too. The deconstructivist approach that de-naturalises and de-objectifies the notions of migration and border (Hess, 2012) permits us to detect how the migration and border regime is articulated in times of ‘governance’. One cannot understand the ways a regime is actually being articulated without taking account of the plurality and heterogeneity of the agencies it includes. Moreover, we may thus focus on the political subjectivity of migration, which is obscured by the legal discourse on migrations in both versions, the human rights’ one and the sovereigntist one (Kurnik, 2019; Papadopoulus, Stephenson and Tsianos, 2008). When considering the ways Foucault (2010) rejected the legal discourse and related repressive hypothesis on power, it is not difficult to understand that migration and mobility generally are not a deviation from the canon of sedentariness; instead, they constitute one of the central contemporary social practices upon which power is being articu­lated. One could argue further, paraphrasing Foucault, that power in times of global integrated capitalism does not repress migration and mobility We use the expression a(nti)-hegemonic beyond a simple opposition to hegemony, as the non-hegemonic aggregation and articulation of differences. but encourages it, articulates it from within, directs it and bridles it; by and through all of this power establishes relations of exploitation, hierarchy and discrimination. With respect to the drama on the Balkan Route, i.e. restora­tion of Europe’s border and migration regime in the Balkans, one should keep in mind that the European Union is a political entity that promotes circulation and that its core principle is freedom of movement (of capital, goods, services and labour force). Yet, saying that this entity favours migra­tion and mobility does not mean that there is no repression. Savage repres­sion against excessive and unauthorised mobility is used to limit mobility and to articulate global relations of inequality and domination. The glo­balised world is one of normalised mobility. Mobility is therefore not an excess but a (regulated) norm. It is only when it is excessive in the sense that it challenges the distribution of power, identifications and categorisa­tions that it becomes subject to state repression, but also an act of liberation (Kurnik, 2019). From Migrant Escape Routes to Infrapolitics and Heterotopias Research on transit migration in terms of escape routes (Papadopoulus, Stephenson and Tsianos, 2008) and the role of flight in constitution of the modern labour market (Boutang, 1998) highlights the centrality of escape and excessive mobility in the articulation of modern and postmodern capi­talist power relations. Papadopoulus, Stephenson and Tsianos (2008) con­ceive of escape as constitutive of sovereignty or, better, of transnational and post-liberal sovereignty. The logic of the foundation of sovereign power, its substantiality and transcendent legitimation is now obsolete. Sovereign power is based on the arbitrariness of borders that emerge wherever there is a need to organise the social space and political governance with the aim to control and limit mobility. Its protagonists are both state and non-state institutions that act upon ad hoc normative principles defined in zones of exception, where human rights are deactivated (ibid.). Such zones of excep­tion are conflict zones in which attempts to normalise mobility through identification, characterisation and its refinement are incessantly subverted by practices that re-appropriate the conditions of mobility. The state of exception on migrant routes is the combination of dehumanisation from above – with the aim to enforce control over mobility so that the popula­tion is hierarchised and managed, and de-subjectivisation from below – the myriad practices of de-identification, becoming, the invention of new biog­raphies, i.e. practices that transcend the sovereign subject form (ibid.). The latter practices largely fall into the category of infra-political action. Scott (1990) identified the infra-political as the cultural and structural sub­stratum of those more visible forms of action which attract the most scholarly attention. “So long as we confine our conception of the political to activity that is openly declared”, Scott asserts, “we are driven to conclude that subor­dinate groups essentially lack a political life or that what political life they do have is restricted to those exceptional moments of popular explosion” (Scott, 1990: 199). Infrapolitics is relevant to how migration is conceived because it may predict that a movement, i.e. mass migration, is coming (Worth and Kuhling, 2004: 35–36) or because it allows actors to retain, uphold or per­petuate their capacity for agency when the political context precludes any serious chance of making tangible political gains (Chvasta, 2006: 5–6). Since they are deprived of access to legitimate channels for expression, people on the move cannot and will not articulate their claims via the conventional political channels, but will resort to action ‘below the radar’ to reclaim their dignity, be it individually or collectively. Furthermore, according to Scott, subaltern forms of resistance produce “hidden transcripts,” namely, cri­tiques of power that escape the notice of the dominant and contrast with the “public transcripts” of power relations, which may contain no record of opposition. Such discretion allows the dominated to covertly resist being symbolically appropriated by the dominant. In the case of migrants, such infra-political acts include hunger strikes, the demolition of border barriers, self-management in migrant centres and refugee camps, but also vandal­ism, arson, flights from state-controlled facilities, the voluntary discarding of identity papers, applying for asylum and moving on to another country etc., at the price of counter minimising their material appropriation (Scott, 1990: 188). Infra-political acts thus operate insidiously below the thresh­old of political detectability, making them all the more reliable vehicles of resistance: the less detectable they are, the more efficiently they conceal the resistance they inspire among the dominated (Marche, 2012). The empowerment potential held by migration may also be detectable via another theoretical concept, the Foucauldian heterotopia. The heteroto­pia is a placeless place “in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invent the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect. These spaces … are linked with all the others, yet however contradict all the other sites” (Foucault, 1984: 47) and hold a mirror up to society as a whole. And what are migrant centres and refugee camps, indeed, entire migrant routes interspersed by border regimes, but heterotopias? In line with the Foucauldian heterotopology, migrant facilities and routes can now be found in every European country, yet they may func­tion differently depending on whether they are in the ‘core’ EU states or on the margins of Europe; they are a juxtaposition of several spaces because they exist in facilities and locations previously intended for other purposes; they function in heterochronia or different schedules and time frames than the rest of society (for migrants waiting for their status their time/life is on hold); migration-related spaces presuppose a system of opening and clos­ing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable; and they have a function in relation to all of the space that remains outside them, which in the case of migration is not one of illusion or compensation but of exclu­sion (ibid: 48). Fieldwork-based insight: assemblages of mobility and the ‘Bosnian paradigm’ Ever since the official refugee corridor was closed in March 2016, people on the move have faced increasing state repression. The plight of refugees and migrants might lull us into thinking that violence on the borders con­firms the aforementioned sovereigntist hypothesis whereby the sovereign nation state is back, having regained its monopoly over force and norms in its designated territory. Given the empirical reality on the Balkan Route, we do not argue in favour of such a hypothesis (Beznec and Kurnik, 2020). Although state violence, such as the illegal pushbacks orchestrated by the Slovenian and Croatian police (Info Kolpa, 2019), drastically increase the human and material costs of unauthorised mobility, the borders remain porous, some kind of “asymmetrical membranes” that “produce new hierar­chies of people while categorize and process uncontrolled mobilities as dif­ferent migrant categories” (Hess, 2018). Border violence therefore does not lead to the restoration of the nation state’s sedentariness, but enables the stratification and segmentation of the social space; Mezzadra and Nielsen would refer to this as the “multiplication of labour”, which is an effect of the mobility regime (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013). In an attempt to make an epistemological argument based on such an empirical insight, we claim that migration requires political categories to become immanent, i.e. for the opening of synthetic political categories and introduction of antagonism within them. It requires that essentialist ontology give space for relational ontology. Mignolo (2012) and De Castro (2009) demonstrate the way in which synthesised categories are the out­come of the coloniality of power. According to Mignolo (2012: 49–126), the critique of colonial power dismantles the universal site of enunciation and establishes hybrid sites of enunciation. De Castro (2009: 53–54) con­ceives epistemological decolonisation as the rejection of comparison as an objectifying triangulation (sovereign, state science) and the affirmation of comparison and translation as the mutual implication and transforma­tion (the science of multiplicity). Elaborating on such claims, we might state that migration as excessive mobility evades (colonial) sovereignty and its identification and categorisation procedures and is thus a practical critique of coloniality. Migration co-creates assemblages of mobility, the notion we have been using to narrate the mutual articulation of the mobility struggles and the local a(nti)hegemonic (antimodern and anticolonial) discourses and traditions along the Balkan Route (Beznec and Kurnik, 2020; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020). Assemblages of mobility are hybrid spaces of enunciation in which mutual transformation and contamination allow us to articulate a postcolonial critique in Europe’s borderlands. For this reason, a precondi­tion for reintroducing control over human mobility was to dismantle the assemblages of mobility, i.e. the joint agencies of migrant social practices and local anti-hegemonic social practices that allowed for some sort of self-management of the route. The criminalisation of solidarity such as the increased policing of the people who help migrants (Resoma, 2020) and the mobilisation of nationalist and racist sentiments in society are the two prin­cipal methods used for dismantling the assemblages of mobility. At present, Bosnia and Herzegovina is like a disposal site, a location where the EU drastically decelerates the movement of people in transit after they have left the EU member states of Greece and Bulgaria in an attempt to reach other EU member states. The function of this disposal site is to nor-malise and curtail the excessive mobility of people on the move by using brutal selection mechanisms. The illegal and violent pushbacks are mostly directed against people who cannot afford smugglers and must therefore walk through the hostile territories of Croatia and Slovenia. Such a ‘dumping ground’ cannot be understood without taking account of the neo-colonial relations between the EU and its neighbouring states. The colonial preju­dice that contends Others are incapable of ruling themselves (Heller, de Genova, Stierl, Tazzioli and van Baar, 2015) is clearly visible in the ways the EU is managing the migrant route in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By relying on global agencies such as the IOM, the EU is circumventing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s national and local decision-makers and adding to the fur­ther deterioration of public authorities (Ahmetaševic´ and Mlinarevic´, 2019). Bosnia and Herzegovina is a protectorate of the ‘international community’ and its Dayton Constitution enshrines nationalist aggression against the mul­ticultural and plural Bosnia and Herzegovina by giving exclusive power to the ethno-nationalist oligarchies that paralyse any meaningful functioning of the public authorities. This leads to extreme forms of neglect and related tensions between local populations and people on the move. Another aspect of Europeanisation as a neo-colonial subjugation that is responsible for the plight of the people on the move in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the adop­tion of the European nation form (Balibar, 2004: 11–30) as the exclusive matrix of statehood and constitution of the political community, despite the rich regional history of inclusive conceptions of being in common based on diversity and heterogeneity (Mujkic´, 2019). Europe’s ‘dumping ground’ for the people on the move in Bosnia and Herzegovina thus emerges in the context of the aggressive nationalisation of ethnic and religious belongings and state racism (Bjelic´, 2018), which all contribute to dehumanisation of these people on the move. Regardless of the growing hostility against the people on the move in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ethnographic militant research we conducted in 2019 (Beznec and Kurnik, 2020; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020) reveals mutual articulation between the mobility struggles and the local a(nti)hegemonic political legacies which may be referred to as the “Bosnian paradigm” (Mujkic´, 2019). The solidarity with the people on the move turned out to be inspired by a new wave of politicisation that confronts the ethno-nationalist exclusivism4 and is historically rooted in a(nti)hegemonic discourses and traditions5 that made Bosnia a “corpus separatum of European modernity, as a body that is not uniform, homogeneous, but is made of differences in constant process of differentiation” (ibid.). These are the shared character­istics of political bodies that are shaped by their rejection of the logic of hegemony. Migrant subjectivity may be considered as such a political body. When migrants cross Europe’s borders and form assemblages of mobility with other political bodies that reject the hegemonic, European, Western and colonial conceptions of being in common, they encourage decolonisa­tion processes. Migrant subjectivity may prove to be a formidable power that will physically and conceptually open up Europe. The end of history in which migrants figure as mere objects is the beginning of histories of mobil­ity struggles. Conclusion Our principal intent with this text was to look back at the past 5 years from the current perspective to assess and discuss which developments in border and migration studies have been spurred by the ongoing European migrant situation, particularly the Balkan migrant route. Alliances of local solidarity activists and people on the move, that we together with some other researchers conceptualized as assemblages of mobility (Beznec and Kurnik, 2020; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020), have clearly shown the necessity to consider agency of migrants and assemblages they form with local popu­lation and hidden a(nti)hegemonic political traditions. The necessity to 4 Spanning from revolution in 2013, mass protests in 2014 and solidarity initiatives during the times of floods. 5 This is the history of the Bosnian church, of persistent attitudes of indifference when faced with imperial and hegemonic projects, of the communist idea of B&H statehood that informed the establish­ment of national liberation councils in WWII and thus the self-management and non-alignment ideas and practices, and finally of refugeeism as an escape from the dominant ethno-national matrix during the last nationalist aggression and war. consider centrality of what we also call migrant subjectivity is certainly the first answer to initial research question about the consequences of turbulent events on Balkan Route since 2015 for migration scholarship. Furthermore, the focus on the hybrid sites of enunciation (Mignolo, 2012) that are charac­teristic for such assemblages has led us to explore, referring to critical bor­der and migration studies and ethnographies of migrant routes, epistemo­logical potential of such Copernican turn in migration studies (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickles, 2015). Critical rejection of state centred approach on migration allows us to consider migration not as an object of study but as a perspective, as a hybrid site of articulation that allows us to open up notions used in political science, to make them immanent, to expose une­qual and violent relations that are at their bases, to transform the border between us and Others into shared and common space of articulation and social transformation that seeks inclusive world that is commonly shared. We established the important role played in public perception by the political invention of “migrant” and the associated terminology. This (politi­cal) reality-shaping discourse informs the rise of European populisms by feeding into fears and phantasms about Others on one hand and, on the other, it importantly intervenes in the EU accession process of EU candi­date countries along the Balkan route, thus reaffirming neo-colonial power relations for anachronistic nation states squeezed between two empires, past and present: (Ottoman) Turkey and the European Union. However, as we have demonstrated, this space-between of the Balkan migrant route is a space of permanent crisis as much as an opportunity for a (conceptual) renewal based on local traditions. The events that followed the amazing episode of Europe’s opening up in 2015 with a multitude of people on the move forcing the EU powers to temporarily suspend its border and migration regime may be interpreted as a manifestation of the central contradiction of postcolonial Europe. The status quo of the institution of a “border” of citizenship (Balibar, 2004: 76) that excludes former colonial subjects proves to be untenable, except at the cost of the extreme violence which people on the move are presently facing on the Balkan Route. The common struggle against this violence, for the dig­nity and rights of the people on the move reintroduces the promise of the universal emancipation of citizenship, making active citizens on both sides of a border, dismantling its institution that turned out to only be sustained by force. When we stop observing the Balkan migration route through the lenses of rights and legal foundations and axioms of representation, the political subjectivity of migration that emerges in the space between origin and des­tination via de-identification, invisibility and imperceptibility as the main strategies of excessive mobility becomes detectable. The scandal of the migration routes marked by dehumanisation, blatant racism, and state and para state violence demonstrates more than the declining rule of law or a state of exception that constitutes sovereignty and the rule of law. A sub­jectivity of imperceptible politics (Papadopoulus, Stephenson and Tsianos, 2008) can be identified there that emerges beyond the liberalist horizon and provides a glimpse of an a(nti)hegemonic political project while modern political forms recede irreversibly. Migrant struggles are therefore at the forefront of contemporary anti-capitalist and anti-colonial struggles. Migrant routes such as the Balkan Route may be interpreted as worksites of Europe’s opening (Kurnik, 2015). The assemblages of mobility which form on and along the route have the potential to stimulate the decolonisa­tion of Europe’s borderlands and Europe as a whole. On one hand, they articulate a critique of the coloniality of power that is easily perceived in the externalisation of Europe’s border and migration regime. On the other hand, they point to the historical and latent presence of other (alter) con­ceptions of political community based on difference and heterogeneity and thereby to the alternatives to the modern, Western, European conception that is anchored in the notion of sovereignty and in nation form. The eth­nographic research we conducted along the Balkan Route and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina has led to a narrative on the migrant route that combines the affirmation of migrant subjectivity and affirmation of local a(nti)-hegemonic epistemologies, and therefore combines the dignity of the people on the move and the epistemological dignity of the territory that historically produced inclusive notions of being in common based on dif­ference and heterogeneity. 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Heller, Charles, Nicolas de Genova, Maurice Stierl, Martina Tazzioli and Huub van Baar (2015): Crisis. Accessible at http://nearfuturesonline.org/europecrisis-new­keywords-of-crisis-in-and-of-europe-part-2/, 10. 9. 2019. Info Kolpa (2019): Poroc.ilo o nezakonitih izgonih na slovensko-hrvaški meji. Accessible at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JG3hOBdGKBPbNFzHzzKeL0 46jKgSciYC/view, 1. 9. 2019. Re SOMA (2020): The Criminalisation of Solidarity in Europe. Accessible at https://www.migpolgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ReSoma­criminalisation-.pdf, 22. 11. 2020. Blaž VRECKO ILC* CLIMATE CRISIS: TIME TO RETHINK ECONOMIC PLANNING bY dEMYSTIFYING CAPITALISM ANd ITS MARKET(S) Abstract. The purpose of the article is to open up episte­mological space for revitalising the idea of democratic economic planning as a viable alternative vision. It argues that a proper development of the idea must be preceded by a comprehensive critical interrogation of a hegemonic multidimensional ideological mystification of capitalism and its markets. By utilizing Marxist and eco-socialist insights the article identifies and analyses several central ideological mystifications that enact an epistemic closure. These range from the obfuscation of capitalism’s role in creating the climate crisis as an inherently unsustainable system, to the mystification of its non-evolutionary origins, to the obfuscation of the role economic planning plays in contemporary capital­ism, to the mystification of markets as ideal spaces of freedom and innovation obfuscating the ever present market-related oppression, exploitation and environ­mental devastation, and to silencing concrete histori­cal examples of democratic economic planning such as project Cybersyn that should serve as an inspiration for imagining an alternative order. Keywords: climate change, ideological mystification, democratic economic planning, capitalism, neoliberal-ism Introduction Although the present corona crisis has reduced global economic activity, harmful emissions, natural resource exploitation and various types of pol­lution, this should only be seen as a temporary slowdown of an otherwise unsustainable, ecologically devastating and exploitative economic system. The climate crisis caused by the capitalist global system is becoming more * Blaž Vrecko Ilc, PhD, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. DOI: 10.51936/tip.58.2.341-360 and more critical. Most political and economic elites and the public regard the climate crisis as being in need of globally coordinated solutions. Still, this perception is not universally shared, with far-right populist elites and governments (e.g. Trump’s USA) and their supporters rejecting any type of coordination as an attack on national sovereignty. They perceive climate change itself as a hoax and a left-wing conspiracy. Despite the appearance that these two positions are diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive, they both operate in a shared capitalist framework. More specifically, they operate in the contemporary neoliberal capitalist framework (see Mirowski, 2014). Climate change denialism and the dominant solutions proposed for the climate crisis share a common imaginary characterised by unlimited faith in capitalism. The climate change denialism camp reinforces the exist­ing status quo by doubling down on existing neoliberal policies and prac­tices that exacerbate inequality, poverty and ecological degradation. This is accompanied by nationalistic, racist and chauvinistic rhetoric and policies that strive to harness and refocus people’s anger due to their deteriorating living conditions onto historically discriminated minorities. On the other hand, the hegemonic camp of supporters of global solutions is reinforcing the status quo by viewing climate change as the result of market failures and primarily as an issue of wrong incentives. The solutions formulated in this framework are market and technologically based and elite/technocratically led. Despite it being declared that these solutions will establish a more sus­tainable system, the reality of these imagined and implemented solutions (e.g. emission markets) is their failure to address climate change (see Rogers, 2013). This failure of the dominant solutions is inextricably connected with the hegemony of the neoliberal capitalist ideology that allows no space for an alternative politico-economic order. Hence, the central issues of climate change related to environmental inequality and climate justice, the issue of people’s needs vs. corporate profits, the issue of public goods and the com­mons vs. private property etc. cannot be addressed properly. When political, economic and scientific elites do consider these issues, they address them via an implicit market-driven, top-down, technocratic, status-quo-reproduc­ing framework that gives the appearance of progressiveness while repro­ducing the status quo. Yet, most climate scientists argue that our societies should be radically transformed in view of the climate crisis (Wallace-Wells, 2020). It is understandable that their specific areas of expertise mean they do not offer ideas on how this can be achieved. However, even in the scien­tific fields that should offer and popularize alternative visions there seems to be a predominant silence concerning alternative frameworks for a radical transformation of society. This is disconcerting considering that the present status quo cannot be retained if we wish to respond to the climate crisis and mitigate its most serious consequences. But even if we mitigate these Blaž VRECKO ILC consequences, our societies will still need to adapt to the changed climate as we inevitably face up to the impacts of a warmer planet. The idea of democratic economic planning is potentially one of the most suitable frameworks for imagining, formulating and implementing the radi­cal transformation of existing politico-economic and societal arrangements to make them sustainable in an effort to address the climate crisis. If it is properly developed and implemented, the idea can offer both a vision for reducing the effects of the climate crisis and for adapting societies to the new situation. It removes the need and the logic for the continuous accumu­lation of profits and the continuous intensification of exploitation of natural resources and human labor (see Phillips & Rozworski, 2019). However, the idea of democratic economic planning needs to be revi­talised before we can develop it further. The present context is character­ized by a specific ideological mystification of capitalism and denigration of proper alternatives above all the notion of (democratic) economic plan­ning. This enables the closure of the epistemological space and prevents the popularization of alternative visions of society among the general public, a necessary precondition for the needed radical socio-political and economic transformation (see Patel & Moore, 2017). Hence, the central question that will guide our analysis is how to open up epistemological space to revitalize the idea of democratic economic plan­ning as a viable framework for a radical transformation of society? We argue that the proper development of the idea of democratic economic plan­ning, must be preceded by the identification and interrogation of the spe­cific ideological mystifications of the present capitalist system that enable an epistemic closure. By utilizing and building upon Marxist (e.g. Neurath, 2006; Wood, 2017; Phillips & Rozworski, 2019) and Eco-socialist (e.g. Patel & Moore, 2017; Saito, 2017) analyses, critiques and demystification of capi­talism, its genesis, nature, characteristics and planetary consequences the article addresses several dimension of the contemporary mystification of capitalism to enact an opening of the epistemological space. These dimen­sions range from capitalism’s connection to climate change, its genesis and nature, its central contemporary characteristics, and the capitalist critiques of democratic economic planning in its theoretical and concrete forms. Hence, in the first part the article addresses the most obvious epistemo­logical obstacle namely the lack of understanding by the public concern­ing the severity of the climate crisis and its fundamental cause. It critically interrogates this lack of understanding as a crucial feature of the present ideological mystification of capitalism that is performed by the neoliberal ideology, which also provides the hegemonic framework for most “realistic” solutions for the climate crisis that reaffirm the unsustainable status quo. This is followed by a demystification of the historical genesis of capitalism as the mystification of its origins naturalises capitalism and represents the starting point of capitalist critiques of planning in contemporary elite and popular discourses, thereby establishing a central obstacle for opening up epistemological space. In the third part, we address the actual centrality of planning in contemporary capitalism, thereby demystifying its current func­tioning and problematizing the presumed impossibility of planning in an advanced economy. In part four, we analyse the socialist calculation debate and by utilizing the forgotten insights of Otto Neurath demystify the cen­tral arguments for capitalist markets and the critique of planning offered by von Mises and Hayek, the ‘fathers’ of neoliberalism, thereby addressing the obstacle of the presumed theoretical impossibility of democratic economic planning. Finally, we focus on Cybersyn, the Chilean project of socialist democratic planning implemented in the early 1970s by the Allende govern­ment and crushed by the Pinochet coup, thereby addressing the obstacle of the presumed non-existence of historical precedence of democratic eco­nomic planning. We conclude the article by briefly reflecting on how our analysis opens up epistemological space for a future vision for democratic planning. The misunderstood severity, consequences and nature of the climate crisis as a product of capitalism and its ideology A proper understanding of the climate crisis is a crucial prerequisite in the process of imagining an alternative politico-economic system. Most peo­ple do not understand the serious consequences the climate crisis holds for societies. Various negative trends and process are intensifying, affecting almost every facet of the general functioning and survival of human socie­ties. Although there is considerable uncertainty regarding the climate crisis’ future intensity, it all depends on the extent of global warming. According to IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) scientists, any global rise in temperature beyond 2 degrees by the year 2100 will bring catastrophic consequences (IPCC, 2015). In the context of the existing policies of major states and regional organisations, a 2- to 3-degree rise is a realistic scenario (Wallace-Wells, 2020). If we take this as our starting point, we may predict the intensification of extreme fires, extreme heat waves and long droughts. There will be shorter periods of cold temperatures, sea levels will rise, and floods will increase. Coastal settlements will become unliveable. There will also be shorter, yet extremely intense wet seasons. These changes will cata­strophically affect the living conditions of a substantial part of the human population by lowering access to fresh water and reducing the capacity to produce food, while they will also destroy/limit any economic activity that depends on natural resources, including tourism. Hunger, epidemics and pandemics will reach unprecedented l)evels of intensity and regular­ity (Steffen, Broadgate, Deutsch, Gaffney & Ludwig, 2015). These processes will precipitate fundamental societal, political and economic destabilisation. Such destabilisation will range from socio-political and economic collapse in parts of the world that will bear the brunt of climate change. We will witness an exponential rise in migration from these parts to areas with a milder cli­mate and a still-functioning society. This will then intensify all negative eco­nomic and socio-political trends in countries that are less directly affected. All conflicts over rare resources will intensify. Conflicts among states and especially among regional and global powers and superpowers will grow as these states strive to consolidate their primacy or attain it amidst gen­eral planetary climate chaos. Further intensification of all reactionary, rac­ist, xenophobic and fascist movements, practices and public policies that will inevitably popularise these ideas among the public are to be expected (Wainwright & Mann, 2018; Wallace-Wells, 2020). A proper response to the seriousness of the crisis is lacking. Neither the claims made by most climate scientists that a radical transformation of our way of life is needed, nor the mobilisation of school children by climate media stars like Greta Thunberg seem able to change the situation. There is no substantial societal and political discussion underway concerning the alternative visions for our societies. This is due to the hegemony enjoyed by the neoliberal framework with respect to solving the climate crisis. This framework transforms the older techno-utopian frameworks for solving societal problems via the notions of free markets and competition that will lead to optimal solutions. The hegemony of neoliberalism may be seen in the notions of ‘green capitalism’, ‘green growth’ and sustainable develop­ment. They all propagate a mix of technocratic-technological-financial-mar­ket solutions for all central issues concerning the climate crisis. Various anal­yses of these ‘solutions’ demonstrate that they do not and will not radically alter the existing unsustainable politico-economic arrangements (Rogers, 2013). The dominant solutions for the climate crisis are an obstacle to suc­cessfully addressing the climate crisis. These ideas form part of an operation conducted by economic elites and the professional-managerial class to co-opt the struggle against the climate crisis for the purpose of further accumulation and profits. Climate crisis is a direct outcome of the capitalist system. The genesis of global capitalism and the sharp rise of carbon emissions in the late 18th century coincide. This expresses the causal link between capitalism and the devastation of environment, which is historically unprecedented. Although capitalism is a very recent social formation, no prior formation altered our relationships with each other and the environment in such fundamental ways. Capitalism relies on a permanent drive towards accumulation (Patel & Moore, 2017). It is organised around commodity production and consumption, driven by the imperative of expanding the accumulation of surplus value by realis­ing profits. Aggregate economic growth is the paramount objective of all capitalist nation-states as, without it, there are no profits. Capitalism needs to convert ever growing amounts of natural resources into means of produc­tion and commodities for sale and consumption. It must treat nature as a set of resources to be exploited (Wainwright & Mann, 2018). The ecological crisis is a fundamental contradiction of capitalism because its drive to accu­mulation is eroding its own material conditions, which eventually confronts it with the limits of nature (severely deteriorated climate conditions) (Saito, 2017). In the present neoliberal hegemony, alternative solutions that strive for a radical transformation such as democratic planning are dismissed for being unrealistic. Regardless of the many catastrophic consequences of capital­ism, the explicit and implicit notion that capitalism is the most efficient, fair and natural system which offers the most choice is hegemonic (Fisher, 2009). This notion rests on a multidimensional mystification of capitalism, which centres specifically on the idealised notions of the free and competi­tive market(s) that colonise people’s imaginations. Hence, to remove the obstacle to imagining alternatives like democratic planning, this multidi­mensional mystification of capitalism must be thoroughly dismantled. Demystifying the genesis and foundational characteristics of capitalism The mystification of the genesis of capitalism is one of the biggest obsta­cles to imagining alterative visions like democratic economic planning as viable. The dominant narrative is based on a circular way of thinking that assumes the a priori existence of capitalism whose central characteristics such as profit-maximisation are always-already present in human societies. It appears when the shackles that constrain people’s natural propensity to exchange on the market are enabled by the removal of political, ideologi­cal and religious obstacles and when a never clearly defined extent of com­merce, urbanisation and wealth accumulation is achieved. The narrative posits that capitalism developed in Europe as it was the place where the supposed obstacles were finally lifted, and a certain natural development was reached. The imagining of capitalist markets as a simple mechanism of exchange plays the key part in this narrative since trade and markets have existed for millennia (Wood, 2017). The capitalist market appears by way of evolution and not revolution. This mystification holds a specific ideo­logical function, namely to make capitalism appear like a universal natural progression of human societies and the pinnacle of human evolution. The transhistorical understanding of the market is underpinned by the notion that the market, regardless of its historical form, is a space of opportunity and choice. Market forces that ensure economic rationality are coercive only insofar as they force economic actors to maximise opportunities and choice. Capitalist society can thus be imagined as the most rational, freest and best society for creating opportunities and choice (Slobodian, 2018). Considering the actual origin of capitalism, the hegemonic narrative is implausible. It establishes a teleology that directly supports the existing sta­tus quo by making capitalism appear as an expression of human nature or social and biological evolution. It has a major unacknowledged issue con­cerning the place and time of the origin of capitalism, which makes the com­mercial thesis, the thesis concerning the centrality of the urban economy and the notion that capitalism was the teleological pinnacle of social and technological evolution, very problematic. Capitalism first appeared in the English countryside in the late 16th century (Marx, 2013). England was at that time far less commercially and technologically developed than the Dutch Republic, which was a vastly more logical birthplace of capitalism due to its extensive long-distance trade and its bourgeois dominated government. Capitalism originated in the countryside, not in the English towns and cities, which subverts the urban economy thesis. It did not evolutionarily develop from pre-capitalist market relations and is not the product of universal laws of development but of human decisions in a specific historical geopoliti­cal and socio-political setting. It required a revolutionary transformation of human–human and human–nature relations. The radical transformation of social-property relations in the English countryside is key to understanding this revolution. When the market penetrated the production of food and social reproduction became mediated and determined by the market, capi­talism was born (see Wood, 2017). The origin of this complex process in England and specifically in the English countryside was predicated on a certain political and economic con­text. Compared to other European states, England was the most centralised state in the 16th century when a clear division was established between the extra-economic sovereign power of the monarchy and the extensive eco­nomic power of the elites. This division and the elites’ massive landholdings ushered in the development of a unique agricultural system. In this system, most of the land was rented by tenants. The truly revolutionary nature of this arrangement lay in the transformation of the rent as the rents charged by the elites started to depend on the commercial profits made by their tenants, who began to be dependent on the market. Access would be given to the land to those able to produce competitively and therefore pay higher rents. It is here that market opportunity was transformed into market depend­ence, oppression and an imperative. This stimulated commodification, increased productivity, and self-sustaining economic development. Small farmers were gradually dispossessed and became wage labourers for capi­talist tenants (Marx, 2013). Hence, market dependence led to mass proletari­anization. This radical transformation was not solely the product of economic forces but was accomplished in unison with the judiciary and intellectuals (e.g. John Locke). Together, they established a novel understanding of prop­erty. Property also became inextricably linked with the notion of exclusiv­ity and improvement, understood as increasing the land’s productivity to gain profit. This conception was made central in legitimising not only the colonial dispossession of native lands but also the domestic dispossession of farmers. Only productive labour that realises a profit was established as the basis of property (see Lukšic., 2016). The term producer began to con­note a person who actively uses property for investment. Economic princi­ples took on a moral meaning and expropriation was considered as an act benefitting the common good (Wood, 2017). Despite the centrality of eco­nomic forces, the nation-state was quintessential for consolidating the novel property system and instrumental in establishing favourable conditions for capitalist accumulation not only in England but later all around the world (Parenti, 2020). This novel societal formation proved to be extremely productive, bring­ing two main consequences. First, it meant an exceptionally large popula­tion could be sustained. Second, due to its productivity, it required a rel­atively small part of the population to be engaged in agriculture, which resulted in greater numbers of people without property. This mass was then transformed into wage laborers and consumers of cheap goods, which led to the establishment of an unprecedented national competitive domestic market and formed the foundations of the English industrial revolution. The English domestic market was qualitatively specific as it was centred on cheap consumer goods while also being uniquely limited by the restricted powers of consumption of its main consumers: wage laborers. This cre­ated general pressure to produce cheaply and efficiently and to focus on economies of scale by constantly improving the productivity of labour by introducing novel technologies. The British industrial revolution universal-ised the capitalist mode of production that started in the countryside. It also began to radically influence economic development on the Continent and globally. It gradually universalised the imperatives of capitalism, especially the competitive pressures and capital accumulation while making people’s basic needs and environmental protection secondary to profits, thereby gradually destroying the conditions for its own existence (Saito, 2017; Wood, 2017). Since the advent of industrial capitalism, “economies inserted in the international trading system and depending on it for their material needs, whatever the prevailing social property relations (sic!), would be subject to capitalist imperatives” (Wood, 2017: 145). The character of this transforma­tion and its speed depended on the geopolitical context of each society and state (e.g. a colonial metropole or a colony). While European powers were coerced to adapt so as to be competitive with the UK, the European colo­nies were transformed into spaces as providers of cheap natural resources, cheap labour power and as overall dependent economies whose produc­tive capacities were complementary and not in competition to those of the metropole (Patel & Moore, 2017). It is telling that the global expansion of capitalism resulted in environmental destruction wherever capitalism expanded without being accompanied by the rising living standards that characterised the later phases of industrialisation in Britain, Europe and its (former) settler colonies (e.g. USA, Canada). To reiterate, capitalism is not an evolutionary end state of human devel­opment and an expression of human nature. Hence, a radical politico-eco­nomic transformation of contemporary societies is not contrary to evolu­tion and the iron laws of human development. The neoliberal mystification of the market, the denigration of economic planning, and the silent legacy of the socialist calculation debate The rethinking of democratic economic planning is also obstructed by mystification of the capitalist market. This is one of the core elements of cap­italist ideologies that secure capitalist hegemony in each historical context. The coordinates of the contemporary mystification of the market primarily derive from the neoliberal ideology, which over the last 40 years has come to dominate the existing capitalist hegemony (Mirowski, 2014). The modern neoliberal notion of the capitalist market is the silent legacy of the socialist calculation debate, which originates in Otto Neurath’s paper on a socialised economy presented in 1919 to the Bavarian Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council during the short-lived Munich Soviet Republic (Phillips & Rozworski, 2019). Neurath argued in the paper that a novel kind of planned economy should be established, one that would focus on satisfying basic human needs and not on profitability. This prompted a response from (neo)liberal thinkers that sought to undermine the idea of the socialist planned economy. The debate was never a technical debate concerning the market’s efficiency and the impossibility of planning but a “conflict about political order, economic history, and the possibility of perpetual peace” (Whyte, 2020: 33). The cen­tral issue was whether humans have a choice in submitting themselves to the market and whether an inclusive, emancipatory and deliberate process of collective self-determination is possible and desirable. It is in this context that the contemporary commonsensical notion that there is no rational alternative to the capitalist market was born. This notion was initially elab­orated during a debate involving the neoliberals Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, whose mystification of the market and critique of planning is the core part of today’s hegemonic neoliberal ideology. Their mystifica­tion of the market is multidimensional, although it serves the simple goal of establishing the market as unassailable. From the technical perspective, the presumed superiority of the market price is the starting point. The price is deemed to determine every economic relationship. Von Mises claimed that markets are primary mechanisms for aggregating and calculating infor­mation in a specific economy, while market prices are the aggregates of all information concerning production and consumption (Von Mises, 2008). Hayek went even further by claiming that markets also create knowledge that would not exist without markets. Only the invisible coordination of the market can link the information isolated in the heads of individual eco­nomic actors (Hayek, 1945). The market with its “godly” capacity to create knowledge and support innovation will inevitably produce solutions to all issues. From the political dimension, Von Mises defended the market as the only possible avenue for mutually beneficial, voluntary relations. Markets supposedly foster peace and tolerance as they allow individuals to pursue their own plans. They are necessary for political freedom. But the market itself is imagined as a form of impersonal domination to which everyone must submit for the benefit of an efficient economy. Von Mises imagined the market required international peace for uninterrupted functioning. He acknowledged that capitalism spread not only by commerce but also violent imposition, which he deemed necessary for the development of civilisation (Von Mises, 2008). Neoliberals legitimised violence for imposing capitalist markets globally and internally when the capitalist order was threatened by upheavals. In defending the markets, neoliberals imagined the state as playing a central role. The state’s explicit function was to secure the legiti­macy of the system (of property relations) while simultaneously preventing the masses via democratic politics from regulating the markets (Slobodian, 2018). The neoliberals attacked planning as a collectivist interventionist action as inefficient, wasteful and impossible, and a threat to individual freedom, a road to a totalitarian order, a civilisational regression to a barbaric state, and a recipe for the destruction of peaceful coexistence (Whyte, 2020: 38). Humans do not have a choice concerning submitting themselves to the mar­ket. Hence, neoliberals rejected the notion that an inclusive, emancipatory and deliberate process of collective self-determination was possible and desirable (Hoc.evar, 2018). What is forgotten is that Neurath’s critique of market capitalism funda­mentally obliterates every central neoliberal argument and that he articu­lated his ideas in the context of an experiment with an alternative politico-economic order. He argued that capitalism is systemically irrational since its imperative is profit, not human needs, and that the fundamental question about the central purpose of the economy cannot be reduced to an eco­nomic accounting issue. Neurath rejected the notion that the capitalist mar­ket is the final evolutionary stage of universal progress. By illustrating the ills brought by capitalism whose imperatives necessitate its global expansion and subjugation of non-market relations to the market, he demonstrated the fundamentally destructive, oppressive and unfree nature of capitalism. He argued that capitalism will always lead to war, colonisation and civilis­ing missions due to the general profit motive. He claimed that the capitalist market is a site of oppression and discipline and called for democratic plan­ning as the primary principle regulating the economy. He believed there are no purely technical decisions concerning what to produce or build. Every such decision is ultimately political and cannot be decided by a calculation (Neurath, 2006). To add to Neurath’s argument, in capitalism every invest­ment and every produced good is rationalised based on profit and not from the point of view of a good’s use value, ecological sustainability, and positive social impact. Hence, capitalists invest in useless, unsustainable and socially harmful goods and services if they are profitable and vice versa. The imperative of profit also always leads to a crisis of overproduction. Neurath claimed that planning could provide a space for democratic decision-mak­ing. For him, the main issue in economic planning at the outset was the way it changes the control over economic life. If workers’ power remains lim­ited, we cannot then talk about proper socialist planning and we end up with a soviet command economy (Neurath, 2006). Neurath’s vision has been forgotten even among the socialist left because planning itself became an anathema in contemporary common sense (Whyte, 2020). Today’s hegemonic understanding of the economy is predicated on abhorrence of economic planning and the presupposed dualism and incompatibility of planning and markets. Yet this dualism is an obfuscation of the reality of the omnipresence of planning in capitalism, as we address in the next chapter. Planning in capitalist corporations as subversion of the mystification of market capitalism The text-book illusion of the market is a space populated by economic agents with similar market power and information derived from the market price that have a similar range of choices among which they choose on the grounds of their rational decisions based on risk calculations. In this illu­sion, no space is left for mezzo or macro level planning because all plan­ning takes place on the level of the individual economic actor. The reality of our everyday experience in the present neoliberal capitalist arrangements paints a substantially different picture. Despite the symbolic and material centrality of markets in and for capitalism, its contemporary form is char-acterised by the ubiquity of planning. Although the latter is present almost everywhere, multiple agents of the neoliberal order work tirelessly to obfus­cate and silence this fact for two chief reasons. First, despite its constant fail­ures, “negative externalities” and coercive nature, the idealised market must be preserved as the ideological centre of the commonsensical imaginary of our present system since it symbolises freedom, choice and opportunity, thereby legitimising the whole capitalist system as the best possible arrange­ment that is/can be. Second, the existing forms of planning in the capitalist system pose the problem of illustrating the actual nature of the oppressive­ness and coercion of capitalism. These forms of planning are authoritarian, hierarchical and undemocratic. In neoliberal globalised capitalism, planning is carried out in multiple ways but hidden behind the façade of market relations. Although market relations among economic actors are central to a capitalist society, these rela­tions represent the minority of relations that form the everyday experience of individuals. Most of us spend large parts of our working time in relatively structured, hierarchical authoritarian, non-market relations that characterise modern private and public organisations. Even contemporary markets must be initially planned, established and preserved. State institutions continu­ously intervene in various markets to stabilise and consolidate them (Jones, 2020). The market(s) connects only businesses with businesses and busi­nesses with consumers. Market relations do not regulate the internal organi­sation and functioning of a capitalist firm or other organisational forms of the capitalist system. Most mainstream understandings of capitalism do not focus on the actual internal functioning of firms. The latter exposes the inconvenient fact of the market economy that relies heavily on plan­ning. More precisely, it relies on authoritarian planning which concentrates power in the hands of capitalists and upper management, while simultane­ously disciplining workers (Phillips & Rozworski, 2019). This fact destroys any simple argument about the inevitability of the market price mecha­nism because it presupposes that market relations are a superior form of resource allocation and regulation of the supply and demand of commodi­ties. Firms do not rely on internal markets to achieve efficiency, but rely on planning. They (strategies and bosses) plan the redistribution of resources among certain departments, they plan what each individual worker must do, which tasks must be accomplished, and how and where they should be accomplished. Individual workers do not have any choice and freedom in this regard. Planning in contemporary capitalism in relations with workers is utilised to discipline people to perform specific tasks without having their own input and to suppress their interests (Phillips & Rozworski, 2019). Even beyond large firms, planning is omnipresent in the form of business plans, risk management, and financial projections. Planning is very apparent in the details of capitalist economic activity. Accounting and management sys­tems, strategic management and risk management, logistics and informa­tion systems require and depend on planning (Jones, 2020). But it could easily be claimed that planning in capitalism is only possible at the level of each individual corporation, not at the macro societal level. However, today’s biggest corporations like Walmart and Amazon function not only internally but as planned economies in relation to their vast num­ber of suppliers. These corporations utilise planning to make their opera­tions more efficient, predictable and stable, thereby ensuring a high level of profits and/or a dominant market position. Walmart and Amazon have integrated their suppliers and other actors in their ecosystem into a highly planned arrangement (Phillips & Rozworski, 2019). Walmart as the largest privately-owned company is in many respects a planned economy. Its indi­vidual departments, stores and, most importantly, its suppliers do not com­pete with each other. It was one of the first companies to establish mech­anisms to address the bullwhip effect in supply chains that is caused by fluctuations in consumer demand that can potentially create vast inefficien­cies due to ever growing over- or under-stocking down the supply chain. The bullwhip effect can only be prevented in a situation where consump­tion (and orders) is equal to supply in all temporal intervals. The greater the planning, trust, transparency of information, cooperation, and open­ness there is in a supply chain, the more it resembles the ideal situation. Efficiency in a specific supply chain is not a product of competition but of planning. Walmart’s satellite-based information infrastructure enables real-time planning not according to an initial stable plan concerning consump­tion. It enables a direct link between the planning carried out by Walmart in cooperation with its supplier and real-time information concerning the sale of all the commodities in its stores, thereby substantially improving informa­tion and reducing unpredictability throughout the supply chain (Phillips & Rozworski, 2019: 30–39). Along with Walmart, Amazon directly subverts the common thesis that economic planning is only possible for infrastructure and similar segments and not for consumer goods. Similarly to Walmart, Amazon has integrated its suppliers into a planned system. It has developed a sophisticated planned economy that is based upon the enormous amount of data. It knows more about its customers than any other retailer. It is able to plan consumption based on the past activities of its individual customers. It plans consumption via algorithms that operate based on extremely accurate and segmented data. As the biggest online retailer, it has successfully faced the biggest logis­tical challenges ever encountered by a capitalist company. The challenge is how to deliver the right item in the shortest amount of time, most efficiently, to millions of customers every day. Amazon is faced with an unprecedented optimisation problem (e.g. how to deliver – routes, availability of the means of transport, weather conditions). Concerning planning, this poses an extreme mathematical problem regarding the enormous number of varia­bles that even with today’s computational capabilities would be unsolvable. The revolutionary nature of Amazon’s approach lies in its simplification of issues. Amazon’s planning does not perfectly solve the optimisation prob­lem. Its solution is the best possible approximation that is still substantially better than leaving its solution up to the market. Amazon understands plan­ning as a mechanism that works regardless of its simplifications (Phillips & Rozworski, 2019: 76–99). Given the substantial extent of planning in the mega corporations of con­temporary capitalism, we must not only stress its efficient nature but above all its primary goals. The inherent capitalist logic of the existing planning is inextricably connected with the ever-growing exploitation of workers and natural resources and thus the ever-growing inequality, authoritarianism, and ecological devastation. Planning in capitalism is efficient but relies on the brutal coordinates of the system and its imperatives. This naturally raises the question of whether the organisational and technological capabilities developed by a capitalist mega corporation could be appropriated and co-opted to transform the present unsustainable system into an egalitarian, sus­tainable politico-economic and societal order. Learning from capitalist cor­porations should simultaneously be accompanied by studying the potential of forgotten historical examples of democratic socialist economic planning. The Cybersyn project and the Chilean cybernetic socialist experiment as the forgotten precedence of democratic socialist economic planning The spectre of Soviet planning always hovers above any discussion of economic planning. It is generally presented as the ultimate proof that plan­ning only leads to totalitarianism, inefficiency, economic crisis and ecologi­cal devastation, thereby colonising our understanding of planning (Jones, 2020). This colonization serves a specific political goal of delegitimising macro-economic planning as the potential alternative way of imagining socio-political arrangements. Additionally, it silences historical examples of democratic socialist economic planning from which we could draw our inspiration for a future order. For instance, the short-lived Chilean project Cybersyn (Projecto Synco) represents the biggest experiment ever con­ducted in macro-economic planning based on the principles of democratic socialism. Despite this, it is practically unknown in mainstream social sci­ences (Medina, 2011). Cybersyn was developed in collaboration between Allendes Chilean socialists and the British cybernetic theoretician Stafford Beer. It lasted until the coup d’état by Pinochet on 9/11 1973. The project was one of the most ambitious experiments to develop a system for democratic socialist plan­ning of the economy. Chilean socialists sought to establish a society that would radically differ from western capitalism and the authoritarian plan­ning system of the Soviet Union. They identified the Englishman Stafford Beer as an expert able to help them fulfil their vision. Beer was a cybernetic theoretician who primarily focused on developing systems that would be decentralised but would retain specific, limited centralised strategic con­trol. His goal was to ensure the system’s stability without compromising the autonomy of its constitutive parts. This was analogous to the Chilean gov­ernment’s goal since it wished to expand macro-economic state planning without endangering the people’s liberties and democratic political institu­tions. It wanted to establish a broadly participative, decentralised and anti-bureaucratic form of economic management (Medina, 2011). The general architecture of Cybersyn was based on Beer’s cybernetic notion of continuous feedback loops in the form of the continuous aggre­gation of data from local producers (factories) at a central nodal point (a brain) – the project’s operations room. The key decision-making people of this operations room were key members of the government headed by the prime minister. The design of Cybersyn ensured there would never be an overload of data that would flow to the operations room and that decisions would therefore be possible. The data received would be auto­matically evaluated and there would be an intervention in the production and distribution process only when a substantial deviation would appear in supply and demand. This enabled flexible coordination that was able to solve extremely complex logistical problems. Beer claimed a system for eco­nomic planning could never be non-adaptive and fixed by a predetermined model (Medina, 2011). Flexible coordination preserved the autonomy and democratic self-organisation of factories that was crucial for implementing the principles of democratic socialism. Despite integration that enabled lim­ited yet crucial vertical control to stabilise the system and make strategic decisions, each level of the system remained irreducible, recursive and scal­able. This complex system could synchronise itself without the actions of omnipotent managers. In addition, the human element was central to the system because its goal was not automation but a close symbiosis between technology and the people working on the Cybersyn project (Gardiner, 2020: 6). To deal with the threat of the concentration of power and authority by a technocracy, Beer even imagined a complementary but never imple­mented Cyberfolk project intended to gather ordinary people’s feedback on government policies and actions in relation to their needs in real time via an analogue, completely anonymised system of remote controls attached to the television set of all Chilean families (Medina, 2011). Cybersyn proved its potential during a time of crises when internal and external reactionary forces organised a strike of truck owners, thus threat­ening the functioning of the whole Chilean economy. By utilising Cybersyn, the government was able to maintain economic activity even with substan­tially reduced capacities to transport materials and goods. The project also proved that cybernetic systems can be established with limited cutting-edge technology since the project utilised an existing computer (only 1 cutting-edge computer work station) and communication technology (telex sta­tions) to establish a novel, unprecedented system that was able to foster a radical, economic, political and societal transformation from capitalism to democratic socialism (Medina, 2011). However, the project could not prevent the government’s downfall organised by combined reactionary forces. In the internal and external subversion of Chilean socialism, Cybersyn itself was misrepresented in the Western media as a totalitarian system of centralised economic planning (Medina, 2011). Despite this negative propaganda and the general politico-economic crisis that seriously hampered its full development, Cybersyn also had specific internal issues. Worker participation was severely lacking and was not an integral part of the system’s design. The relations of production did not change as managers and engineers consolidated their class power over workers in the nationalised factories. Gender inequality was also never addressed and the project reaffirmed unequal gender roles via its design, decision-making and organisation of work whereby women could only be implicitly imagined as supporting the work of men (Medina, 2011). Hence, even progressive policies and projects can strongly limit general emancipa­tion if they do not directly address asymmetrical power relations between workers and the managerial-professional classes and genders while also limiting their mobilisation potential and emotional identification. These issues may be attributed to the project’s initial improper design. Yet we must also consider the possibility that these issues reflect the limi­tations of cybernetic thinking. The cybernetic principles of Cybersyn were those of British cybernetics, which emphasised non-representationalism, decentralisation and spontaneity that seem emancipatory and progressive. However, they may also be interpreted as being an expression of a new structure of power and control established in the context of contemporary technocapitalism that to some degree also functions on the basis of fluid­ity and openness and the free participation of individuals who make pre­sumably free choices1 and self-organise into communities (Gardiner, 2020). This relevant critique does not delegitimise Cybersyn as an inspiration for developing and implementing novel socialist planning systems since it fails to acknowledge that technology can be designed and used in a socialist way. It does not acknowledge the role of the state in this process and the role the general political sphere can play as the context in which the ideological strug­gle is most openly fought and where the general coordinates of the design and use of technologies are established, consolidated and transformed. Conclusion In face of the ever more dire consequences of the climate crisis a radi­cal transformation of the present hegemonic neoliberal capitalist order is not only crucial for solving the most central issues precipitating the climate crisis but also for reducing its already inevitable effects on our societies. We proposed that it is time to rethink and develop the notion of democratic economic planning in this search for an alternative order. However, we argued that we firstly need to revitalize the notion of democratic economic planning. We claimed that that could only be achieved by opening up epis­temological space whose closure is precipitated by a multidimensional ide­ological mystification of capitalism and its markets and the denigration of proper alternatives above all democratic economic planning. Hence, the article sought to identify and critically interrogate the various central dimensions of the ideological mystification of the present capital­ist system and denigration of democratic economic planning as a relevant strategy for opening up epistemological space and revitalizing and popular­izing democratic economic planning as a vision of an alternative sustainable order. In this context, we firstly critically interrogated the most pronounced obstacle for imagining an alternative order namely the lack of understand­ing among the general public considering the severity and nature of the climate crisis and its relation to capitalism. The analysis demonstrated that this misunderstanding is the product of the mystification of capitalism per­formed by the hegemonic neoliberal ideology that obfuscates the central role of capitalism in the climate crisis and promotes solutions that are funda­mentally unsustainable. Secondly, we analysed the mystification of the origins of capitalism that represents a less pronounced but fundamental obstacle for imagining This freedom is circumscribed as the major corporations of technocapitalism rely on their market effects that radically reduce choice (Larson, 2020). alternatives. The interrogation demonstrated that capitalism was not a prod­uct of social or biological evolution of humans or human nature but a con­tingent result of a specific structural context and human agency. Thirdly, by revisiting the socialist calculation debate, we demystified the now hegem­onic neoliberal understandings of the market as a space of freedom, rational­ity and innovation that represents another central dimension of contempo­rary mystification of capitalism. Our analysis demonstrates the irrationality, oppressive nature, unsustainability and unspontaneous nature of the mar­ket while also problematising neoliberals’ critique of planning as theoreti­cally impossible and leading to authoritarianism and violence by demon­strating the theoretical possibility and the democratic potential of planning. Fourthly, we further demystified the capitalist market by interrogating the actual functioning of capitalism at the level of corporations. We demon­strated that contrary to ideological denigration of economic planning, plan­ning is omnipresent in contemporary capitalism and that in many ways the largest global corporations resemble planned economies. But because plan­ning is utilised for capitalist ends it is environmentally destructive, undemo­cratic, oppressive and concentrates power in the hands of management. In the final part, we interrogated another central dimension of the contempo­rary mystification of capitalism and an obstacle for imagining alternatives namely the presumed lack of historical examples of democratic economic planning by examining project Cybersyn. The latter was a Chilean demo­cratic socialist experiment for macro-managing the whole economy via cybernetic networks that although short-lived due to Pinochet’s coup d’état proved successful during a national crisis. Its visionary nature should be along with our other central insights considered a crucial element in the central undertaking of our analysis namely a comprehensive critical inter­rogation of the multidimensional ideological mystifications of the present neoliberal capitalist order. As we argued this demystification is a necessary first step in opening up epistemological space that would enable us to col­lectively imagine, popularize and further develop the notion of democratic economic planning as a viable alternative order and to not succumb to the alures of capitalist realism. A further theoretical and practical development of the framework of democratic economic planning must be considered a crucial part of present and future political struggles. To politically mobi­lize societies for the needed transformations, we must have a clear vision of how democratic economic planning could function at the macro level of societies, nationally, regionally and globally. BIBLIOGRAPHY Fisher, Mark (2009): Capitalist realism: Is there no alternative? Ropley: zero Books. Gardiner, Michael. E. (2020): Automatic for the People? Cybernetics and Leftď Accelerationism. Constellations. Hayek, Friedrich (1945): The use of knowledge in society. The American economic review 35 (4): 519–530. Hoc.evar, Marko (2018): Hayekova teorija demokracije: trg proti ljudstvu. In Družba in družbena gibanja 50 let po 1968, 101–105. Ljubljana Slovensko sociološko društvo. Jones, Campbell (2020): Introduction: The Return of Economic Planning. South Atlantic Quarterly 119 (1): 1–10. Larson, Rob (2020): Bit tyrants : the political economy of Silicon Valley. Chicago: Haymarket Books. Lukšic., Igor (2016): Aktualnost in akutnost Lockove koncepcije lastnine. Teorija in praksa 53 (3): 625–644. Marx, Karl (2013): Capital : Volume One. Ware: Wordsworth Editions Ltd. Medina, Eden (2011): Cybernetic revolutionaries: Technology and politics in Allende’s Chile. Cambridge: MIT Press. Mirowski, Philip (2014): Never let a serious crisis go to waste : how neoliberalism survived the financial meltdown. London: Verso. Neurath, Otto (2006): Economic Writings: Selections 1904–1945 (Vol. 23). Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media. Parenti, Christian (2020): Radical Hamilton : economic lessons from a misunder­stood founder. London: Verso. Patel, Raj, & Jason W. Moore (2017): A history of the world in seven cheap things: A guide to capitalism, nature, and the future of the planet. Berkely: University of California Press. Phillips, Leigh, & Michal Rozworski (2019): The people’s republic of Walmart : how the world’s biggest corporations are laying the foundation for socialism. London: Verso. Rogers, Heather (2013): Green gone wrong : dispatches from the front lines of eco-capitalism. London: Verso. Saito, Kohei (2017): Karl Marxs Ecosocialism Capital, Nature, and the Unfinished Critique of Political Economy. New York: Monthly Review Press. Slobodian, Quinn (2018): Globalists : the end of empire and the birth of neoliberal-ism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Steffen, Will, Wendy Broadgate, Lisa Deutsch, Owen Gaffney & Cornelia Ludwig (2015): The trajectory of the Anthropocene: the great acceleration. The Anthropocene Review 2 (1): 81–98. Von Mises, Ludwig (2008): Economic calculation in the socialist commonwealth. Auburn: Ludwig Von Mises Institute. Wainwright, Joel, & Geoff Mann (2018): Climate Leviathan: A political theory of our planetary future. London: Verso Books. Wallace-Wells, David (2020): The Uninhabitable Earth. New York: Tim Duggan Books. Whyte, Jessica (2020): Calculation and Conflict. South Atlantic Quarterly 119 (1): 31–51. Wood, Ellen Meiksins (2017): The origin of capitalism: a longer view. London: Verso. SOURCES IPCC (2015): Climate Change 2014 synthesis report – Summary for Policymakers (9789291691432 9291691437). Accessible at http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/ syr/, 24. 5. 2021. TEMATSKI SKLOP II: BANALNI NEOLIBERALIZEM MEDIJSKEGA IN POLITICNEGA DISKURZA Breda LUTHAR in Dejan JONTES* UVOdNIK Clanki v tematskem sklopu tematizirajo nekatere kljuc.ne družbene in kul­ turne spremembe ter s temi spremembami povezano transformacijo vloge medijev v proizvodnji družbenega védenja in kulturnih ter materialnih praks, povezanih z mediji. Te spremembe, v kontekstu katerih je potrebno brati posamezne c.lanke sklopa, lahko strnemo v pet toc.k. Prvic., spremembe pove­ zane z mediatizacijo in digitalno mediatizacijo. Mediatizacija je strukturni premik tako velikih razsežnosti, da ga po Krotzovem mnenju lahko primer- jamo z globalizacijo in individualizacijo. Gre torej za metaproces modifikacije komuniciranja kot temeljne prakse konstruiranja družbenega in kulturnega sveta. za Krotza (2009; 2017) ni kljuc.en vidik mediatizacije prenos medijske logike na druga družbena polja, npr. na politic.no, temvec. splošneje, »komu­ nikativne prakse, ki jih povezujemo z mediji« (2009: 24).1 Drugic., c.lanki so nastali v kontekstu globalnega vzpona etnic.nega populizma, ne v prvi vrsti kot ideologije, temvec. kot oblike kulturnega dela in javnega oznac.evanja ali signifikacije. Tretjic., v kontekstu specific.ne postsocialistic.ne situacije, v kateri sta neoliberalna tranzicijska sedanjost in »postsocialistic.na« razlastitev v celoti 361 iznic.ili mitološko obljubo emancipacije in pripoznanja, ki naj bi jo prinesla nacionalna država, temeljec.a na etnic.ni pripadnosti (npr. »država Slovencev«) in jasnem izkljuc.evanju »nec.lanov«. V c.asu »postsocialistic.ne« primitivne aku­ mulacije je bil razprodan nacionalni kapital – proces enormnih razsežnosti, ki ga nekateri primerjajo z zgodnejšimi historic.nimi dogajanji privatizacije skup­ nih lovišc. ter obdelovalnih in pašnih površin (angl. commons) na zac.etku industrijske revolucije v Evropi, ki jih obravnava E. P. Thompson v Nastajanju delavskega razreda v Angliji (1963/1966). V tem kontekstu lahko nacionali­ stic.ni populizem v »postsocializmu« interpretiramo kot premestitev razlastitve in izgube pravic na imaginarno nacijo (Kalb, 2011: 1). Cetrtic., v kontekstu perifernega položaja Slovenije in Vzhodne Evrope nasploh na ozadju geo­ politic.ne razcepljenosti med Vzhodom in zahodom in simbolne ekonomije balkanizma in vzhodizma. Velika regresija, ki smo ji pric.a v globalnem merilu z vzponom razlic.nih oblik desnega populizma, je produkt skupnega uc.inka * Gostujoca urednika: Dr. Breda Luthar, redna profesorica, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenije; dr. Dejan Jontes, izredni profesor, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija. DOI: 10.51936/tip.58.2.361-369 1 Jansson (2018: 6) pravi, da sam koncept mediatizacije omogoca reflektiranje vecplastnih družbenih in kulturnih implikacij medijsko zasicenih družb, predvsem kaj pomeni živeti z mediji kot z normaliziranim delom okolja: »Razumevanje mediatizacije kot v osnovi kriticnega koncepta pomeni prepoznati, kako druž­ beni procesi na razlicnih podrocjih in ravneh postanejo nelocljivi od in v koncni fazi odvisni od procesov in virov tehnicne mediacije, ter identificirati obcutenja in izkušnje, ki jih te odvisnosti priklicejo« (prav tam). Breda LUTHAR in Dejan JONTES tveganj globalizacije in neoliberalizma in dobi v »postsocializmu« le svojo posebno in bolj usodno artikulacijo. In petic., v okolišc.inah tesne sinergije med popularno kulturo in politic.nim komuniciranjem, kjer popularna kultura zaseda osrednjo vlogo v legitimaciji neoliberalizma prek inkorporiranja neza­dovoljstva v sam kapitalistic.ni projekt (glej npr. McGuigan, 2009; Schreiner, 2019). Legitimnost sodobnega kapitalizma se namrec. vzdržuje predvsem na ravni medijske popularne kulture in potrošne kulture. Neoliberalne podobe c.loveka in družbe posledic.no ne vkljuc.ujejo le velikih tem ekonomske redi­stribucije, privatizacije javnega premoženja ali davc.ne politike, temvec. delu­jejo, kot ugotavlja P. Schreiner, tudi in prav sredi našega vsakdanjega življe­nja in oblikujejo »naše mišljenje, c.utenje in hotenje, našo bit in naše najstvo« (2019: 30). Delujejo torej kot režim subjektivacije v mikropolitiki vsakdanjega in popularnega. Kot pravi Bröckling (2016: 16), je danes velik del neolibe­ralnega vladovanja in samovladovanja v popularni kulturi koncentriran v modelu t. i. podjetniškega sebstva – stalnega dela na sebi, telesne in psiho­loške samotransformacije, psevdopsihološkega diskurza, nasilja pozitivnega mišljenja in emocionalnega dela, nenehnega merjenja t. i. odlic.nosti in kva­litete v profesionalnih okoljih ter številnih drugih elementov iz »repertoarja antikolektivizma« (Hall, 1979: 17), ki prispevajo k ekonomizaciji vsega družbe­nega.2 Couldry in Meijas (2019) sicer menita, da bo neoliberalizem (v smislu težnje, da bi družbene procese obravnavali kot trge) kmalu postal nepotre­ben zaradi podatkovnega kolonializma in zanašanja kapitalizma na podatke in podatkovne odnose, ki pa po njunem mnenju dobesedno spreminjajo družbene procese v trg. »Namesto da bodo družbeni odnosi vstavljeni v eko­nomski sistem, družbeni odnosi postanejo ekonomski sistem ali vsaj njegov kljuc.en del, s tem ko se c.loveško življenje konvertira v surovino za kapital preko podatkov,« ugotavljata Couldry in Meijas (2019: 117). Omenjena sinergija med politic.nim komuniciranjem in popularno kul­turo, ki nas v sklopu posebej zanima, zadeva vsaj dva vidika. Najprej gre za splošno vprašanje mediatizacije politike, ki medije vzpostavlja kot kon­stitutivni del delovanja drugih družbenih institucij. Predvsem digitalni mediji in nove podatkovno vodene tehnološke infrastrukture ter komuni­kacije moc.no zaznamujejo sodobno družbenost, zato se moramo vprašati, kot pravita Couldry in Hepp (2017: 7), kako je družbeno konstruirano v c.asu globoke mediatizacije, v katerem elementi, na osnovi katerih je kon­struirano obc.utenje družbenega, postajajo sami utemeljeni v tehnoloških procesih medijskega posredovanja. Drugic., sinergija vkljuc.uje dolgotrajne spremembe v medijih, kot je npr. personalizacija, dramatizacija, melodra­matizacija, celebrifikacija, afektivnost komuniciranja in sploh emocionalna Med zgodnejšimi obravnavami sorodnih transformacij glej tudi Hochshild (2003) o »komercializa­ciji intimnega življenja« in obravnavo »emocionalnega kapitalizma« Eve Illouz (2007). Breda LUTHAR in Dejan JONTES politika t. i. »junk« novic. Pred desetletji, ko je bila televizija še nesporno naj­moc.nejši medij, je Neil Postman, ameriški kulturni kritik, dejal, da ni toliko problem v tem, da nam televizija prinaša skoraj samo zabavo, temvec. je kljuc.ni problem, da se praktic.no vsaka tematika predstavlja skozi formo zabavnih žanrov – dramatizacijo, spektakularizacijo, personalizacijo, vizua­lizacijo, simplifikacijo, emocionalizacijo.3 Sinergija med popularno kulturo in drugimi medijskimi žanri, npr. informativnimi žanri in politic.nim dis-kurzom, je v zadnjem desetletju še tesnejša zaradi vstopa novih družabnih platform na podroc.je politic.nega komuniciranja in njihove »emocionalne arhitekture« (Wahl-Jorgensen), tako da bi jih bilo v resnici smiselno poime­novati emocionalni mediji (glej Šadl v tej številki). Döveling in drugi (2018) menijo, da te spremembe ne pomenijo le izmenjave informacij in mnenj, pac. pa pospešujejo globalne mediatizirane izmenjave emocij, ki po njiho­vem vodijo do »digitalnih afektivnih kultur«. Te se nenehno spreminjajo in razvijajo, zato omenjeni avtorji zagovarjajo njihovo longitudinalno prouc.e­vanje. Ko raziskuje strukturo obc.utenja, ki jo podpirajo arhitekture online medijev, posebej formo in teksturo komuniciranja na Twitterju kot sodob­nem mediju – pripovedovalcu zgodb, tudi z. Papacharissi (2015), ugotavlja, da same tehnološke zmožnosti digitalnih platform spodbujajo in omogo-c.ajo politic.no formacijo afektivnega komuniciranja, pred ideološko artiku­lacijo ali namesto nje (glej Slukan v tej številki o t. i. trolanju oz. ironic.ni reto­rološki obliki in govornem aktu, ki je inherentno politic.en). Izhajamo s stališc.a, da neoliberalni kulturni imaginarij mainstream popularne in novinarske kulture ponuja »semiotic.ni okvir konstruiranja sveta«, hkrati pa tudi aktivno prispeva k njegovi konstrukciji (Jessop, 2010: 342). Kultura ima torej osrednjo vlogo v formaciji družbenega in ekonom­skega. En vidik te sinergije se kaže v vlogi emocionalnega in afektivnega v politic.nem diskurzu, v specific.nih komunikativnih praksah kot npr. trolanju v okviru zmožnosti novih medijev in v uprizarjanju politike v tej situaciji (glej Šadl ali Slukan) ali pa v praksi celebritizacije (konstrukcije slavnih) kot metaprocesa. Praksa celebritizacije nima organiziranega središc.a, temvec. se materializira kot rezultat številnih mikropraks, ki se konsolidirajo v sploš­nejši medijski diskurz. Ta je kljuc.en »legitimacijski narativ« in pomemben kulturni mehanizem neoliberalnega konsenza in politike zdravega razuma (glej c.lanke Vidmar-Horvat, Pušnik in Jontes, Luthar, Crnovic´). Clanki so tako vsebinsko uvršc.eni v dva podsklopa: prvi sklop se osredotoc.a na posledice digitalne mediatizacije politic.nega komuniciranja, kot je emocionalizacija politic.nega komuniciranja in artikulacija teh sprememb na prezentacijskih ali emocionalnih medijih – na družbenih platformah. V izvirniku: »The problem is not that tv presents us with entertaining subject matter – but that all subject matter is presented as entertaining.« (Postman, 2005: 87) Clanek zdenke Šadl tako izhaja s stališc.a, da populistic.ni obrat sprem­lja premik v emocionalnem karakterju javnega diskurza, vkljuc.no s poli­tic.nim diskurzom v »starih« in »novih« medijih. Te spremembe c.lanek umešc.a v kontekst mediatizacije, predvsem vizualizacije komuniciranja s televizijo in vseprisotnostjo družabnih oziroma t. i. emocionalnih medijev. Emocionalizacija se dogaja v vec. oblikah: od komercializacije intimnega živ­ljenja do emocionalizacije politic.nega jezika. Medtem ko je vloga emocij v oblikovanju politic.ne subjektivitete v zadnjih desetletjih široko pripoznana, pa ni sistematic.ne teoretizacije emocij. Posebej malo je analiz specific.nih »emocionalnih režimov« in normativnih emocij in njihovega uprizarjanja v javnosti, ki bi omogoc.ile natanc.nejšo analizo politic.no performativne vloge emocij, zlasti v desnic.arskem politic.nem diskurzu. Clanek se ukvarja z osnovno pomanjkljivostjo obstojec.ih obravnav emocionalizacije politic.­nega komuniciranja, pri c.emer se naslanja na S. Ahmed in njeno »teorijo lepljivih emocij« ter zavrne konvencionalno razumevanje, po katerem so emocije subjektom inherentni pojav. zagovarja model emocij, ki nas preu­smeri od osredinjenosti izkljuc.no na emocije »v« posamezniku k njihovim kolektivnim dimenzijam, k razumevanju emocij kot, vsaj delno, diskurzivne družbene konstrukcije ter k emocionalnemu drugac.enju v politic.nem in medijskem prostoru. Nejc Slukan v svojem c.lanku oblikuje teoretsko podlago za analizo iro­nic.nih komunikativnih praks, posebej praks t. i. trolanja na spletnih druž­benih omrežjih. Izhaja s stališc.a, da so za sodobno mediatizirano politic.no govorico, posebej za spletno retoriko desnih populizmov, znac.ilne ironic.ne oblike izražanja, ki jih danes navadno imenujemo trolanje. Slukan analizira komunikacijske razmere na spletnih omrežjih, ki po njegovem predstav­ljajo del medijsko-trolovskega dispozitiva. Analizo utemelji na kritic.nem ovrednotenju sodobnih teorij o tehnoloških zmožnostih in Foucaultovem konceptu dispozitiva, kjer zmožnosti novih medijev tvorijo specific.en dis-pozitiv. Trolanje kot retorološka figura in govorno dejanje je po njegovem inherentno politic.ni komunikativni akt, ki zarisuje meje med diskurzivnimi skupnostmi oz. le-te vzpostavlja, v analizi pa definira razmere, v katerih poteka sodobno spletno komuniciranje in ki spodbujajo trolovske komu­nikativne prakse. Deja Crnovic´ analizira »instagramizacijo« politic.nega komuniciranja pri dveh tranzicijskih politikih: slovenskem Pahorju in srbskem Vuc.ic´u. Avtorica pokaže, da je sodobna politika zaradi mediatizacije, vizualizacije, eventizacije in vdiranja tržne logike v politic.no polje vedno bolj personali­zirana, v ospredju pa niso politike, temvec. osebe, ki delujejo v politic.nem polju. Profila obeh predsednikov na Instagramu se sicer razlikujeta v nac.inu oblikovanja predsedniške podobe, obema pa je skupna popolna odsot­nost politic.nih idej; medtem ko Pahor to poc.ne s pomoc.jo objav iz svoje zasebnosti, Vuc.ic´ to poc.ne z objavljanjem fotografij s srec.anj z mednarod­nimi voditelji in voditeljicami, torej z ustvarjanjem podobe zmernega in pre­udarnega kozmopolitskega politika s staturo v mednarodnem politic.nem prostoru, kar izrazito odstopa od njegove podobe v domac.ih, srbskih medi­jih. Personalizacija politike, ki jo kažeta oba primera, ni po definiciji antipoli­tic.na, temvec. rezultat kompleksne artikulacija politike in popularne kulture, pri c.emer se politic.ni performans odvija na križišc.u politic.nega in zabav­njaškega. Politika je v tem kontekstu prevedena v individualne psihološke motive in znac.ilnosti individualnega karakterja, javno življenje pa zreduci­rano na psihološka razmerja. Ali kot je dejal Sennett že pred tremi desetletji (1989/1974: 3), družba sama je v tem kontekstu smiselna in razumljiva le, c.e je preoblikovana v »velikanski psihic.ni sistem«. Trije c.lanki v drugem podsklopu (Luthar, Vidmar-Horvat, Pušnik in Jontes) se osredinijo na medijsko celebrifikacijo in spektakularizacijo. Vsi trije c.lanki se lotevajo analize medijske obravnave Melanije Trump kot spek­takelske medijske drame pred predsedniškimi volitvami 2016 in po njih v slovenskih in ameriških medijih. Celotno medijsko obravnavo Melanije Trump v lokalnih medijih lahko definiramo kot javno dramo, lokalni mul­timedijski dogodek in dramatic.ni portret zamišljenega sveta ter obet nove simbolne osrednjosti Slovenije. Mediji so v številnih intervjujih z obic.aj­nimi ljudmi, novinarji in eksperti ter kvazieksperti za mednarodno politiko (Udovic., Ferfila, Rupel, Lahovnik, takratni veleposlanik v zDA Mirošic. ter vrsto lokalnih sevniških »ekspertov« …) razpravljali o enkratni priložno­sti Slovenije za »vstop v zgodovino« in napovedali nic. manj kot radikalno spremembo slovenskega geopolitic.nega položaja iz periferne tranzicijske nevidnosti ter lamentirali o neštetih (že vnaprej zapravljenih) priložnostih za monetizacijo te enkratne priložnosti. zamišljene skupnosti tudi v postritualnem c.asu (glej Alexander, Giesen in Mast, 2006) še vedno proizvajajo dogodke, ki tematizirajo vprašanje kolektivne identitete in solidarnosti. V lokalnih medijih je ritualna epska proizvodnja persone M. Trump in slavljenje kolektivne nacionalno-družin­ske povezanosti z M. Trump predstavljala prostor fragmentiranega nacional­nega spektakla in jo moramo razumeti v kontekstu komodifikacije medijev in posebej komodifikacije novic. Kot pravi Geertz (1993), skupnostni rituali, tokrat v obliki fragmentirane nacionalistic.ne ceremonialne drame, pogosto artikulirajo metadružbeni komentar, ki slavi in reproducira družbene ideale in konvencije ali vsaj ponuja kontekst za razpravo o skupnih performativnih konvencijah in vrednotah. Ta nekajmesec.ni spektakel torej uteleša komer­cialne novic.arske vrednote in industrijsko proizvodnjo novic in »novosti« kot blaga in hkrati samoorientalizacijsko uprizarjanje postsocialistic.ne peri­ferije ter obet nove geopolitic.ne relevantnosti in morebitne monetizacije ruralnih posebnosti. Manjša ko je ekonomska suverenost države in bolj je ta nepomembno periferna v sistemu globalnega kapitalizma, bolj ta poudarja svojo kulturno suverenost in posebnost in moc.nejši je glas neopopulistic.­nega etnic.nega nacionalizma v govorici politic.nih elit in v medijskem dis-kurzu in vec. je c.ašc.enja »etniciziranega ljudstva« (glej Kalb, 2018). Vzhodna Evropa je tu, v kontekstu apolitic.nega diskurza o uspehu Donalda Trumpa, »slovenskega ženina« in M. Trump, »slovenske neveste« in »naše gore lista«, znova odkrita preko kolonialistic.nih tropov. Skozi diskurz lokalnih medi­jev se torej odvija/proizvaja t. i. diskurzivna samoorientalizacija/vzhodizem kot ponotranjena manjvrednost in kontinuiteta protokolonialne politike ter kot »nadaljevanje reprezentacije razmerja med centrom in periferijo, ki je vzpostavljena/utemeljena na geopolitic.ni razcepljenosti med Vzhodom in zahodom« (Bjelic´, 2009: 488). Clanek Brede Luthar analizira reprezentacije Melanije Trump v sloven-skih medijih v c.asu pred in med Trumpovim predsedovanjem. zanimajo jo diskurzivni repertoarji, ki so uporabljeni v tej konkretni fragmentirani multi-medijski spektakelski dramatizaciji. Analizo utemeljuje na razumevanju dis-kurzivnega režima slave kot dela spopadov okoli oblikovanja razrednosti in spola na podroc.ju popularne kulture, ki je tesno prepleten s sodobnim regresivnim populizmom in bolj specific.no z neoliberalno transformacijo v postsocializmu. Pokaže, kako je diskurz o slavi v komercialni medijski kul­turi pomemben legitimacijski narativ v dani historic.ni konstelaciji. Prispeva k regresivnemu populistic.nemu imaginariju kot sestavljanki tradicionalnih tem, kot so družina, materinstvo, zanašanje nase, osebni uspeh … Ugotavlja, da imata diskurz slave in praksa celebrifikacije performativni znac.aj – ne predstavljata le mistifikacije ali prikrivanja razmerij moc.i, temvec. imata kljuc.no praktic.no vlogo v premestitvi strukturnih razrednih neenakosti v zamišljeno nacionalno »skupnost skupne usode«. Ksenija Vidmar Horvat na drugi strani skozi primer neameriške prve dame iz »postkomunistic.ne« evropske periferije analizira orientalistic.ni pogled ameriških liberalnih medijev na »postkomunistic.ni« svet, ki je na dnu civilizacijskih simbolnih hierarhij liberalne Amerike in »brezupno v zao­stanku za civiliziranim svetom«. Avtorica se ukvarja z medijskim uokvirja­njem in uporabljenimi metaokvirji v tematizaciji M. Trump v ameriški elitni reviji The New Yorker, analizo pa teoretsko umesti v okvir feministic.nih postkolonialnih študij belega patriarhata. Ugotavlja, da je rasno-orienta­listic.ni pogled »na svet tam c.ez,«, ki ga opisuje The New Yorker, prikazan kot oddaljen od ekonomske prosperitete in vrednot zahoda, namenjen vzpostavljanju kulturne razdalje in razlike, ki okrepi hierarhijo civilizacij­ske superiornosti. V tej luc.i je mogoc.e razumeti tudi komic.ne upodobitve M. Trump kot kmec.ke dekline, ki v sevniškem komunistic.nem stanovanj­skem bloku sanja o begu na zahod. M. Trump je obravnavana kot seksualizi­rana »žena trofeja«, utelešenje negativnega stereotipa na novo kolonizirane postsocialistic.ne Vzhodne Evrope. Clanek sklene z obravnavo samokolo­nizirajoc.ih diskurzov, s katerimi so slovenski mediji s pozicije postsociali­stic.ne periferije odgovorili na svojo novo simbolno vidnost. Sklop zakljuc.uje besedilo Maruše Pušnik in Dejana Jontesa, ki na podlagi analize prispevkov o Melaniji Trump v slovenskih tiskanih medijih obrav­nava vzdrževanje in redistribuiranje nacionalnih vezi, idej in tradicije prek medijev in popularne kulture, zato avtorja v nasprotju z literaturo s tega podroc.ja, ki medije vec.inoma obravnava le kot mediatorje, v c.lanku tudi kritic.no naslavljata vprašanje vloge medijev v procesu znamc.enja nacije in jih obravnavata kot neodvisne akterje. Njuna analiza je pokazala, da številne in ponavljajoc.e se medijske reprezentacije »Melanie« potiskajo slovenski nacionalizem v komercialni kontekst in posledic.no transformirajo nacijo v blago. Avtorja zakljuc.ita, da zamišljanje skupnega in enotnega slovenskega naroda, vzbujanje globokih obc.utenj ponosa in prodajanje nacije lokalnim obc.instvom s pomoc.jo medijskih reprezentacij »Melanie« ostajajo kljuc.ne vloge, ki jih zasedajo mediji v komodifikaciji in komercializaciji slovenskega nacionalizma. Obravnava M. Trump v lokalnih medijih je torej prec.ila medijske žanre in medije, tako da je prišlo do zlitja tabloidnega in politic.nega novinarstva v širšem kontekstu kulture komercialnega medijskega prostora. Ravno spek­takelska dramatizacija pa je najbolj oc.itna medijska logika in družbeni in kulturni kontekst, v katerem je potrebno razumeti to fragmentirano mul­timedijsko dramo, povezano z obravnavo M. Trump v medijih. Skupna rdec.a nit c.lankov je torej osredotoc.anje na tisti del politic.nega diskurza, ki se tradicionalno umešc.a zunaj podroc.ja politic.nega na podroc.je medijske popularne kulture, ima pa po našem mnenju pomembne politic.ne posle-dice, med drugim igra tudi pomembno vlogo pri vzponu desnega popu­lizma4 in utrjevanju neoliberalne hegemonije oz. neoliberalnega zdravega razuma (Hall in O’Shea, 2013). Kot ugotavlja tudi Riegert (2007: 4), ne gre le za vprašanje, kako se spreminja koncept »zabave«, ko postane »resnic.no« tudi zabavno, temvec. je bolj pomembno, kako se spreminja nocija resnic.­nega, kadar mora biti »resnic.no« tudi zabavno/dramatic.no/personalizirano/ afektivno. Breda LUTHAR in Dejan JONTES Gostujoc.a urednika Wahl-Jorgensen (2019) pokaže, kako populisticni obrat, ki smo mu prica, spremlja tudi premik v emocionalni klimi javnega diskurza. LITERATURA Alexander, Jeffrey, Giesen Bernhard, Mast L. Jason (ur.) (2006): Social Performance. Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bjelic´, Dušan I. (2009): Immigrants as the Enemy: Psychoanalysis and the Balkans’ Self-Orientalization. The Slavonic and East European Review 87 (3): 488–517. Bröckling, Ulrich (2016): The Entrepreneurial Self. Fabricating a New Type of Subject. London: Sage. Couldry, Nick in Andreas Hepp (2017): The mediated construction of reality. Cambridge: Polity Press. Couldry, Nick in Ulises A. Mejias (2019): The costs of connection: How data is colonizing human life and appropriating it for capitalism. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Döveling, Katrin, Anu A. Harju in Denise Sommer (2018): From mediatized emo­tion to digital affect cultures: New technologies and global flows of emotion. Social media + society, 1–11. Geertz, Clifford (2019): Interpretacija kultur. Maribor: Aristej. Hall, Stuart (1979): The great moving right show. Marxism Today, 14–20. Dostopno prek http://banmarchive.org.uk/collections/mt/pdf/79_01_hall.pdf, 3. 5. 2021. Hall, Stuart in Alan ‘Shea (2013): »Common-sense Neoliberalism«. Dostopno prek http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/journals/soundings/pdfs/Manifesto_common­sense_neoliberalism.pdf, 20. 11. 2020. Hochschild, Arlie Russell (2003): The commercialization of intimate life: Notes from home and work. Berkeley: University of California Press. Illouz, Eva (2007): Cold intimacies: The making of emotional capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. Jansson, Andre (2018): Mediatization and Mobile Lives: A critical approach. London: Routledge. Jessop, Bob (2010): Cultural political economy and critical policy studies. Critical Policy Studies 3 (3–4): 336–356. Kalb, Don (2011): Headlines of Nation, Subtexts of Class: Working-Class Populism and the Return of the Repressed in Neoliberal Europe. In: D. Kalb and G. Halmai, eds. Headlines of Nation, Subtexts of Class. Oxford, New York: Berghahn Books, 1–36. Kalb, Don (2018): Upscaling Illiberalism: Class, Contradiction, and the Rise and Rise of the Populist Right in Post-socialist Central Europe. Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 11 (3): 303–321. Krotz, Friedrich (2009): »Mediatization: A Concept with which to Grasp Media and Societal Change«. In K. Lundby (ur.). V: Mediatization. New York: Peter Lang, 19–38. Krotz, Friedrich (2017): »Mediatisierung: Ein Forschungskonzept«. V: F. Krotz, C. Despotovic´ in Merle-Marie Kruse (ur.). Mediatisierung als Metaprozess. Transformationen, Formen der Entwicklung und die Generierung von Neuem, 13–32. Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag. McGuigan, Jim (2009): Cool Capitalism. London: Pluto Press. Papacharissi, zizi (2015): Affective Publics. Sentiment, Technology, and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Postman, Neil (2005): Amusing ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business. London: Penguin Books. Riegert, Kristina (2007): Politicotainment. Television’s Take on the Real. New York: Peter Lang. Schreiner, Patrick (2019): Podreditev kot svoboda. Življenje v neoliberalizmu. Ljubljana: Krtina. Sennett, Richard (1989/1974): Nestanak javnog c.ovjeka. zagreb: Naprijed. Thompson, E. P. (1963/1966): The making of the English working class. New York: Vintage books. Wahl-Jorgensen, Karin (2018): The emotional architecture of social media. V: z. Papacharissi, ur., Networked self: Platforms, stories, connections. New York: Routledge. Wahl-Jorgensen, Karin (2019): Emotions, Media and Politics. London: Polity. Zdenka ŠADL* EMOCIJE IN AFEKT V POLITICNEM dISKURZU** Povzetek. V clanku se ukvarjamo s sodobno obliko emo-cionalne politicne komunikacije, posebej nas zanima populizem kot oblika politike, ki na ljudi apelira pri­marno na emocionalni ravni. Opozorimo na proble­maticnost emocionalizacije populisticnih diskurzov, ki se kaže v legitimizaciji agresivne retorike, manipulira­nju emocij, emotivizmu in ustvarjanju antagonisticnih kolektivov. Na podlagi kriticne ocene, da razumevanje politicnosti emocij zahteva sistematicno teoretizaci­jo emocij, se v zadnjem delu opremo na konceptualni okvir avtorice Sare Ahmed, s pomocjo katerega prikaže-mo performativno vlogo emocij in njihovo »lepljivost«, zlasti sovražnih emocij. Analiza pokaže, da teorija pre­mikajocih se in »lepljivih« emocij ter afektov omogoca boljše razumevanje vloge emocij v politicnem diskurzu, zlasti desnega populizma. Kljucni pojmi: politicna komunikacija, politicni dis-kurz, emocije, sovraštvo, populizem, Sara Ahmed Uvod Politic.no polje v kontekstu neoliberalne globalizacije, politic.ne in eko­nomske destabilizacije ter migracij zaznamujejo nacionalizmi, ksenofo­bija, populistic.ni diskurz in postresnic.nost. V teh okolišc.inah politike ni mogoc.e misliti brez emocij in njihovih politic.nih uc.inkov v družbenih praksah. Živimo v »dobi emocionalne politike« (Heaney, 2019: 1), v kateri so »odkrit[e] emocij[e] ne le vse bolj sprejemljiv[e], ampak, kot se zdi, potrebn[e] v sodobni politiki« (Irvine, 2007: 2). Politika postaja vse bolj »emo­cionalizirana« (Scherer, 2002 v Sonntag, 2011: 124; Frevert, 2019; Richards, 2004), emocije so postale osrednje v dinamiki politic.ne deliberacije (npr. Hall, 2007) in imajo »omniprezentno vlogo v svetovni politiki« (Bleiker in Hutchison, 2008: 115). Vsenavzoc.nost emocij je v mediatiziranem politic.­nem kontekstu vec. kot oc.itna. Jeza, strah, gnev, sovraštvo, soc.utje, ljubezen, empatija in upanje so osrednji motivi politic.ne komunikacije in kljuc.na * Dr. Zdenka Šadl, izredna profesorica, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija. ** Izvirni znanstveni clanek. DOI: 10.51936/tip.58.2.370-390 Zdenka ŠADL sredstva, ki jih v mobilizaciji podpore ter zbujanju medijske pozornosti upo­rabljajo populistic.ni in mainstream politic.ni akterji iz celotnega politic.nega spektra. Emocije so »osrednjega pomena za celotno politiko, vkljuc.no z vla­dami in mainstream strankami« (Ost, 2004: 240). Emocionalizacija politike, ki jo v c.lanku razumemo kot diskurzivno reto­ric.no strategijo, ki uporablja in razširja emocije (patos) za prepric.evalne namene, (pre)usmerjanje politic.nih stališc., odloc.itev in vedenja, je posebna specifika populizma. Sodobni populizem opazujemo kot politic.en slog, ki ga politic.ni akterji uprizarjajo v razlic.nih kulturnih in politic.nih kontekstih (Moffitt, 2016).1 Moffitt (2016: 77) se pri konceptualizaciji populizma kot politic.nega sloga opre na trditev, da je v mediatizirani politic.ni tekmi slog pomembnejši od nac.el, stranke in policy. Populistic.en slog oznac.ujejo tri znac.ilnosti: apeliranje na ljudstvo nasproti elitam, slabe manire in diskur­zivna konstrukcija krize (Moffitt, 2016: 45).2 Politic.ni slog se kaže skozi reto­riko – uporabo retoric.nih apelov (etos, logos, patos), s katerimi želijo poli­tiki okrepiti prepric.ljivost svojih argumentov. Ceprav populistic.ni politiki nimajo monopola nad retoric.nimi emocionalnimi apeli, kaže populizem specific.no nagnenje k uporabi patosa. V desnem populizmu, na katerega se v c.lanku osredinjamo, se uporaba diskurza emocij kaže v znac.ilnem slogu politic.ne komunikacije: v poudarjeno provokativnem, sramotilnem, oc.ita­joc.em, predvsem pa v konfrontirajoc.em in jeznem nac.inu govorice ter v mobiliziranju negativnih emocij proti »elitam« (ter migrantom, istospolno usmerjenim, prejemnikom socialne pomoc.i itd.), ki »ogrožajo« blaginjo »ljudstva«, varnost in družbeni red. Vec. kot zgled populistic.nega sloga je Trumpov »jezni populizem« (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019). Trumpova retorika je z izkorišc.anjem negativnih emocionalnih refleksov na uc.inke neoliberalne globalizacije in diskurzivno konstrukcijo sovražnikov ustvarjala antagoni­stic.no razmerje »mi-oni« ter polarizirala politic.ni in celoten družbeni pro-stor. zmaga Trumpa na predsedniških volitvah leta 2016 je bila pomemben mejnik v širjenju »jezne sovražnosti« tako v zDA kot v Evropi. V slovenskem prostoru je politic.no mobiliziranje nestrpnosti v desnem politic.nem taboru (npr. Dragoš, 2004; Mekina, 2004), reproducirano z mediji (npr. Pušnik, 2017), že dolgo stalnica. V trenutnih razmerah se najbolj odmevno manife­stira v jeznih in provokativnih izjavah in tvitih aktualnega premierja Janeza Janše, zlasti v njegovih napadih na novinarsko kritiko. z množico diskurzov v javni, medijski domeni (politic.ni govori, spletna mesta, c.asopisni c.lanki) 1 Populizem pa ni zgolj politicen slog oz. slog politicne komunikacije, razumemo ga tudi kot slabo ute­meljeno ali »tanko« ideologijo (thin-centred ideology), ki na osnovi normativnih idej in vrednot omogoca osmislitev sveta, ki ga prikazuje. 2 Po drugi strani t.i. »tehnokratski slog« združuje apeliranje na ekspertizo, lepe manire in zgodbo o stabilnosti ali napredku (Moffitt, 2016: 26, 44). Zdenka ŠADL krožijo tudi emocije in afekti,3 ki igrajo pomembno vlogo v oblikovanju politic.nih stališc., identitete in kolektivov. Izhajajoc. iz predpostavke, da so politic.ni diskurzi v osnovi usmerjeni na nac.in c.utenja, se v c.lanku ukvar­jamo s performativnostjo politic.nih diskurzov iz emocionalne perspektive (diskurzivno konstrukcijo emocij) in performativnostjo emocij (delovanjem in družbenimi uc.inki emocij, njihovo politic.no naravo). Emocionalni naboj politic.nega jezika ni noviteta, ampak kontinuiteta. Politiki – poleg predstavljanja racionalnih argumentov – obc.instvo vselej nagovarjajo tudi na emocionalni ravni. Emocije niso zgolj pojavi, ki izra­žajo dejanske telesne procese, temvec. performirajo doloc.ene družbene pomene, prepric.anja, stališc.a in jih organizirajo v (politic.no) delovanje. Kot ugotavljajo Goodwin in drugi (2001), so emocije moc.ne motivacijske sile za politic.no participacijo in mobilizacijo, kar pojasnjuje njihovo nepogrešlji­vost v politic.nih tehnologijah vodenja sleherne družbe. Politic.ni jezik vse­lej niha med mešanicami strategij prepric.evanja (logosa, patosa in etosa), pomembnost emocij za prepric.ljivost diskurza pa je pri-po-znana že od Aristotela dalje. Ceprav gre za zgodovinsko stalnost, se stil in vsebina emo-cionalne politic.ne komunikacije navezujeta na vsakokraten družbeno-kul­turni kontekst ter zgodovinsko variabilne oblike emocionalnih izkustev. V svoji trenutni obliki se emocionalizacija politic.ne komunikacije kaže kot rezultat procesov, ki se od poznih šestdesetih let 20. stoletja dalje odvi­jajo v evropskem in ameriškem prostoru, in sicer: terapevtske kulture in procesa emocionalizacije družbe (McCharty, 1989; Wounters, 1986; Furedi, 2003), ki sta spodbudila korenit premik k refleksivnemu ukvarjanju z emocijami, podelila legitimnost obc.utenju (ekpresiji) razlic.nih emocij v zasebni in javni sferi ter vodila k brisanju meja med zasebno emocijo in javno komunikacijo; razvoja množic.nih medijev, ki so utrdili z moderniza­cijskimi uc.inki pogojeno personalizacijo politike in personalno politic.no retoriko, posebej razvoja televizije, ki primarno vzbuja emocionalne (in ne kognitivne) odnose med gledalcem in govorcem (Hoggett, 2009: 54–55), ter emocionalizacije celotnih televizijskih programov (Bassols et al., 2013); spreminjajoc.ega politic.nega okolja, ki zahteva ustvarjanje emocionalno pri­vlac.nih naracij, prilagojenih okusu »potrošnikov« in prevzemanje »emocio­nalno usmerjenih tehnik marketinga in oglaševanja« (Richards, 2004: 340; V literaturi glede konceptov ni soglasja, nekateri ju razlikujejo, drugi to razlikovanje zavracajo, njune razlike pa so razlicno opredeljene. Posplošeno vzeto lahko recemo, da »emocije« oznacujejo kogni­tivne pojave, duševna stanja, ki so intencionalno usmerjena na objekte, »afekti« pa nezavedno obcutenje (‘intenzivnost’) v telesu. Afekti so trdneje biološko in fiziološko doloceni, nekognitivni in manj usidrani v diskurz, zato bolj fluidni in manj predvidljivi. Ahmed (2004: 40) je kriticna do cezmerno polarizira­nega modela obcutenja, ki emocije razlikuje od afektov. V clanku ju razumemo kot relacijska koncepta, ki oznacujeta intersubjektivna izkustva in njihovo performativno vlogo v oblikovanju identitet, kolektivov in pripadnosti skozi diskurz (Westberg, 2021: 24). Zdenka ŠADL Hoggett, 2009: 54–55); mediatizacije politic.ne komunikacije, ki preferira in promovira tiste vidike politike, ki so dovolj senzacionalistic.ni, da pritegnejo pozornost obc.instva (Sonntag, 2011: 124); in nenazadnje, razvoja digitalnih tehnologij in novih kanalov komuniciranja, zlasti uporabe družbenih medi­jev (t. i. »emocionalnih medijev«), ki so še posebej primerni za neposreden, takojšen, angažiran in emocionaliziran slog komunikacije (Ernst et al., 2017; Tettegah, 2016; Breeze, 2020; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019). V kontekstu prepleta razlic.nih procesov, ki jo oblikujejo, postaja emocionalna politic.na komuni­kacija bolj poudarjena in intenzivnejša kot kdajkoli prej. To še posebej velja za obdobje po 11. septembru, ko postanejo emocije moc.no politizirane in vpete v politiko strahu in gnusa (Ahmed, 2004a, 2004b), emocionalizacijo »vojne proti terorizmu« (Ahmed, 2015) in »nacionalno sentimentalno poli­tiko (moške) zašc.ite« (Bargetz, 2015: 580). Ali kot je to v svojem govoru kon­gresu izjavil George W. Bush (2001) sam: »[…] Naša žalost se je spremenila v jezo in jeza v resolucijo […] Velika škoda nam je bila storjena. Utrpeli smo veliko izgubo. In v svoji žalosti in jezi smo našli svoje poslanstvo in svoj trenutek.« Intenziteta, s katero populistic.ni politiki posvajajo emocionalno reto­riko, reaktualizira staro zanimanje za emocije v politiki, odpira pa tudi vpra­šanje teoretizacije emocij, ki je pri tem pogosto umanjkala. Clanek zac.e­njamo z nerazdružljivo usodo politike in emocij, racionalistic.no koncepcijo politike in novimi pristopi, ki postavljajo emocije v središc.e politic.nih ana­liz. Nadaljujemo z obravnavo emocionalne dimenzije politic.nih diskurzov, posebej emocionalnega diskurza desnega populizma in politizacijo emocij v njem. zatem se preusmerimo k vprašanju politic.nosti samih emocij. Kaj dela emocije politic.ne oz. kakšno konceptualizacijo emocij potrebujemo za razumevanje njihove vloge v konstrukciji identitet in kolektivnih teles? Schrock in drugi (2017: 6) ugotavljajo, da se preuc.evanje emocij v politiki pogosto opira na razumevanje emocij kot notranjih stanj in individualnih samoizražanj.4 zgolj psihološko razumevanje emocij pa ne pojasni zadovo­ljivo logike delovanja (kolektivnih) emocij. Vprašanje, kako emocije delu­jejo v procesih ustvarjanja kolektivov, zahteva teoretizacijo in koncepte, ki, prvic., pomikajo razumevanje emocij od psiholoških modelov naprej v smeri njihove odnosnosti, performativnosti in kolektivnega znac.aja in dru­gic., raziskujejo kompleksne intersekcije med družbenimi in kulturnimi dejavniki, diskurzivnimi praksami ter individualno izkušanimi, a zgodovin­sko in kulturno situiranimi emocijami. Pri obravnavi teh vprašanj se bomo oprli na konceptualni okvir Sare Ahmed (2004a; 2004b). zastavljamo si dve glavni raziskovalni vprašanji: Kakšna je vloga emocij v politic.nih diskurzih Schrock et al. (2017: 6) še opozarjajo, da je diskurzivna produkcija emocij, kljub stalnim pozivom po raziskovanju emocij v politiki v sociologiji, še vedno premalo raziskana. populizma? Kako nam lahko teorija emocij S. Ahmed pomaga pri razlagi vloge emocij v politic.nem diskurzu? Naš teoretic.ni in metodološki pristop temelji na kombinaciji obstojec.ih teoretizacij in raziskav o emocionalnem stilu komuniciranja desnih politic.nih akterjev s teorijami emocij v družbe­nih vedah, ki temeljijo na konstrukcionistic.nem pristopu. Konceptualizacija politike: od izkljucitve k vkljucitvi emocij Pri razumevanju zveze politika/politic.no-emocije je treba emocije obrav­navati kot »utelešene misli« (Rosaldo, 1984). Emocije niso zgolj telesni, tem­vec. tudi kognitivni (evaluativni) procesi, ki vsebujejo vrednostne (moralne) sodbe (npr. Izard, 2007; Feigenson, 2003), s katerimi subjekti izražajo svoje potrebe, želje, cilje in ideale. Telesno vznemirjenje, ki spremlja presoje in ocene objektov v danem kontekstu, pripravi subjekt za delovanje. Emocije »niso le del naših odzivov na dogodke, ampak – v obliki globokih afektiv­nih predanosti – oblikujejo tudi cilje naših delovanj« (Jasper, 1998: 398). Emocije odražajo naš odnos do sveta; njihovo c.utenje in izražanje kažeta, kaj je za nas pomembno, kaj vpliva na nas, kako ocenjujemo stvari, druge, situacije. Kot take igrajo »vlogo v presojanju o dobrem in pravic.nem ter zato v ocenah politic.nih idej in idealov« (Burkitt, 2005, v Linjakumpu, 2007: 4). Emocije utrjujejo in spreminjajo naša zaznavanja in prepric.anja (Frijda et al., 2000) oz. imajo moc., da (pre)usmerjajo, polarizirajo in intenzivirajo naša politic.na stališc.a. Vgrajene v komunikacijo in interakcijo so emocije osrednjega pomena za družbeno delovanje (Barbalet, 1998) in vse družbene odnose, torej so sestavina normalnega delovanja družbe in politike. Polje »politic.nega«, v katerem se po Szanto in Slaby (2020: 478) »pogajamo o naši pluralnosti in razlikah z namenom svobode, moc.i, individualne avtonomije, kolektivnega priznanja ali naših oblik sobivanja«, je bistveno afektivne narave. Ukvarja se s stvarmi, ki so nam pomembne, si jih želimo ali nas navdajajo s strahom, s stvarmi, ki nas zadevajo – nas kot skupnost. Velja tudi obratno, afektivno je vse­lej politicno. Emocije niso zgolj subjektivni pojavi, ampak jih urejajo »pravila custvovanja« (Hochschild, 1983) in uravnavajo skupne ali konfliktne vrednote. Torej, emocije vselej vkljucujejo pogajanja o tem, kaj, kako in skupaj s kom (ali proti komu) bi morali obcutiti. (Szanto in Slaby, 2020: 478, poud. v orig.) Ceprav so politic.no relevantnost emocij v analizi retorike prepoznali že antic.ni filozofi, so politic.ni filozofi emocije v svojih analizah pogosto spregledali ali marginalizirali. V osrc.ju izkljuc.evanja emocij iz politike in politic.ne analize je ležala tiha predpostavka o dihotomiji emocij/strasti in razuma. Vpeta v teorije, jezik in zaznave je doloc.ala mesto emocijam tako v družbenih in politic.nih vedah kot tudi v družbi in politiki. V politiki so bile opredeljene kot muhaste in neukrotljive sile, v najboljšem primeru so veljale kot irelevantne, v najslabšem pa kot ovira pri doseganju nepristranskih pre­soj, nujnih za izvajanje pravilnih odloc.itev in uc.inkovitih politik (Hutchison, 2018). Prevlada dualistic.nega diskurza je emocije za dolga desetletja poti­snila na rob politic.ne teorije, politic.nih ved in politic.ne sociologije. Nov val zanimanja za emocije in afektivnost je sprožil t.i. emocionalni obrat, kasneje tudi afektivni obrat (Clough in Halley, 2007) v sredini devet­desetih let 20. st. Nova epistemologija v družbenih in politic.nih vedah je emocije povezala z družbenimi, kulturnimi in politic.nimi normami ter kri­tic.no izzvala zgodovinsko dihotomijo razum/emocije ter fetišizem razuma v racionalistic.ni koncepciji politike. Dandanes je prouc.evanje emocij v poli­tiki eno najbolj propulzivnih podroc.ij politic.nih ved in politic.ne sociologije, zlasti na podroc.ju prouc.evanja narave družbenih vezi in družbene kohezije ter politic.ne komunikacije (npr. Hoggett, 2009; Engelken-Jorge idr., 2011). Emocionalno-diskurzivne prakse v politicnem komuniciranju Emocionalizacija politike se kaže tako v vsakdanji uporabi emocional­nega jezika znotraj rutinske politike v parlamentih in politic.nih strankah, kot tudi v dramatic.ni emocionalni retoriki volilne politike in predsedniški reto­riki. Primerov prepric.evanja prek patosa je veliko: od slovite fraze »Cutim vašo bolec.ino« v predsedniški kampanji Billa Clintona do besed »Sem ljubec. c.lovek« v politic.nih govorih Georgea W. Busha po 11. septembru; od dis-kurza upanja (»Yes, we can!«) in empatije Baraka Obame do republikanske »politike strahu« (utemeljeni na grožnji novega teroristic.nega napada ali prihajajoc.i recesiji) ter jezne retorike gibanja c.ajank; od emocionalizirane volilne retorike Donalda Trumpa, Marine Le Pen, Geerta Wildersa do stra­stne retorike kampanje za odhod iz EU pred referendumom o brexitu; od politike jeze, zamere in upanja v obdobju Trumpovega predsedovanja vse do »politike empatije« novoizvoljenega predsednika Johna Bidna. Igranje na emocije je znac.ilno, tako znotraj rutinske kot volilne politike, tudi za slo­venski prostor, posebej pri temah, kot so begunci, tujci in manjšine (npr. Dragoš, 2004; Pušnik, 2017). Politiki z uporabo diskurza emocij stremijo k izgradnji emocionalnih vezi z obc.instvom (volilno bazo) ali priklicujejo emocionalne odzive, ki napeljujejo k prepric.anjem, odloc.anju, vedenju in oblikam politic.ne angažiranosti v duhu posredovanega emocionalnega sporoc.ila. Po Loseke (1993: 207; 2009) javni narativi in diskurzivne izjave vsebujejo in konstruirajo »želeno emocionalno orientiranost in odzive« ter moralno vrednotenje »tipov« ljudi. Politiki s spretno uporabo idej o tem, kako svet deluje, kako bi moral delovati in kakšne so pravice in odgovornosti ljudi v tem svetu (simbolne kode), ter idej o tem, katere emocije je primerno obc.u­titi kdaj, kje in kako (emocionalne kode), izvabljajo ali priklicujejo speci­fic.ne emocije, ki so kljuc.nega pomena za doseganje politic.nih ciljev. Kot ugotavlja Reyes (2011: 789), politic.ni diskurzi sprožajo emocionalna sta­nja, ki so »idealna za legitimiziranje poznejših politic.nih delovanj, osnova­nih na uc.inkih teh emocij«. Emocije namrec. vodijo in pripravijo obc.instvo, da sprejme predloge in smeri delovanja akterjev, ki so te emocije prvotno vzbudili (ibid.: 790). Politic.ni diskurzi torej merijo tako na razumevanje in delovanje kot tudi na emocije državljanov (emocije so pravzaprav del »razumevanja«). Oblikujejo želene nac.ine c.utenja do doloc.enih družbenih skupin, ki so – zlasti v desnih populistic.nih tekstih – naslovljeni kot radikalno drugac.ni (Fortier, 2010; Richards, 2007). Ne predpisujejo le, kako naj se dober, legi­timen državljan obnaša, ampak tudi kaj mora oz. je legitimno (ob)c.utiti do doloc.enih skupin. Tako izvabljene ali priklicane emocije državljanov poli­tiki soc.asno kanalizirajo v politic.no delovanje, skladno z interesi lastnih politic.nih strank ali drugih politic.nih in družbenih grupacij. Normativna konstrukcija dobrih državljanov se tako odvija skozi posebno obliko vla­dnosti v Foucaultovem smislu, tj. skozi mehanizme »afektivne vladnosti« – preko uporabe simbolnih in emocionalnih kod upravlja z javnimi in oseb­nimi emocijami/afekti ter oblikuje stališc.a in vedenje ljudi. Levinger (2017) in Woodward (2002) ugotavljata, da sta izražanje in stra­teška uporaba emocij kljuc.na dejavnika, ki pojasnjujeta privlac.nost in pre­vlado doloc.enih diskurzov. Uporaba emocij v politiki ima, kot kažejo razis­kave (Escobar, 2011: 111; Schrock et al., 2017; Wirz, 2018), moc.an retoric.ni potencial in povec.uje uc.inkovitost politic.nega komuniciranja. Emocionalni odzivi na apele patosa so pomembni za razlic.ne oblike politic.nega uspeha: volilni uspeh, prevzem ali ohranitev oblasti, premik neke politic.ne agende z obrobja v mainstream politic.nega diskurza (Levinger, 2017: 2–3), legitimi­zacijo politic.nih odloc.itev (Reyes, 2011), obrac.anje pozornosti od lastnega poc.etja ali doseganje popularnosti. Bolj uc.inkovito retoriko izkazuje popu­listic.na politika (desnega krila) zaradi strastnega sloga komunikacije, med-tem ko se opiranje na »tehnokratski slog« (Moffitt, 2016) pri »zmerni« poli­tiki (iz)kaže kot manj uc.inkovito in manj medijsko privlac.no (Schrock et al., 2017; Wirz, 2018; Abdell-Fadil, 2019: 17; Szabo, 2020: 7; Villadsen, 2020; Westen, 2007 v Hoggett, 2009: 56, 59). Levinger (2017) ugotavlja, da so bili moc.ni emocionalni odzivi, ki jih je v volilcih vzbudila retorika strahu, jeze in ljubezni, kljuc.ni za nedavni volilni uspeh populistic.nih gibanj v zDA, združenem kraljestvu, Franciji in na Nizozemskem. Ko ostanejo samo še emocije: diskurzivne strategije desnega populizma Emocionalizacija politic.ne komunikacije ni inherentno »dobra« ali »slaba«, ampak je rezultat tega, v kakšnem »duhu«, kontekstu oz. s kakšnimi nameni in cilji politika uporablja emocionalni jezik. Politic.ni akterji lahko svojo »strast« do skupnih zadev združujejo s komunikacijskimi in mobilizacij­skimi strategijami za transformativne družbene povezave in konstruktivno razreševanje družbenih problemov. Lahko pa manipulirajo z emocijami in mobilizirajo razdruževalne strasti za ustvarjanje razklanih, (raz)druž(b)enih družb (neliberalna uporaba emocij). Progresivna politika je lahko nac.elna in obenem »strastna«, utemeljena je na tem, kar Hoggett (2009: 59) poime­nuje »obc.utena premišljenost«. Brez strasti v politiki pravzaprav ni nac.elno­sti. Strast daje politic.nim liberalcem moc. za spoprijem z njihovimi neliberal­nimi nasprotniki ter »pogum za odzivanje s soc.utjem, ko je to primerno, in z agresijo, ko je to nujno« (Hoggett, 2009: 56). »Strastno« politiko so v poznih sedemdesetih in osemdesetih letih 20. sto­letja vpeljali novi politic.ni igralci, ki so na politic.ni trg vstopili organizirani v družbena gibanja (Frevert, 2019). Gibanja državljanov so razvila nov poli­tic.en jezik, zaznamovan s terapevtsko kulturo (Furedi, 2004), ki je emocije povzdignila v osrednje sredstvo komunikacije tako v zasebni kot javni sferi. Družbena gibanja so izhajala iz osebnega, emocionalnega izkustva zatiranih skupin (pod geslom »Osebno je politic.no«) in osebno pripoved uporabila kot osnovo za aktivizem. Gradila so solidarnost, entuziazem in samozavest kot podlago »emocionalne skupnosti« in kot vire moc.i za progresivne spre­membe. Nov emocionalni jezik so pozneje posvojile politic.ne stranke, ki so izšle iz vala neposredne demokracije in radikalne leve skupine, nato je ling­vistic.ne prakse patosa prevzel populizem (Frevert, 2019). V desnem popu­lizmu je emocionalni jezik zapeljal v drugo smer – v razdruževanje, zanic.e­vanje Drugih, krc.enje politike na emocije (emotivizem), geslo »Osebno je politic.no« zamenja geslo »Politic.no je osebno«. Populizem, ki prezentira družbo na podlagi antagonizma elita-ljudstvo, zavrac.a elito in glorificira ljudstvo, pripet na nacionalizem in nativizem pa prezentira in diskreditira tudi druge sovražnike ljudstva (tujce, begunce, manjšine). Politic.ni slog populizma je prepoznaven v uporabi retorike strahu, jeze in sovraštva, s katero razvnema ljudi in stopnjuje emocionalne napetosti, ki jih generirajo prevladujoc.i neoliberalni diskurzivni, ekonomski in politic.ni režimi.5 Odgovornost za družbene probleme vali na osovražene Populizem ne kreira (kolektivnih) emocij »iz nicesar«, ampak crpa iz emocionalne naelektrenosti v družbi. Zajema iz bazena emocij, ki se oblikuje kot rezultat družbenih in ekonomskih razmer neoliberalne globalizacije, ter iz stoletja ustaljenih stereotipov v politicni kulturi (npr. rasizem, ksenofobija). V družbi razširjene negativne emocije (jezo, strah, tesnobo, negotovost, zamere, gnev, obcutke prikrajšanosti) nezado­ skupine, ki jih razmejuje od pravega ljudstva ali »avtentic.ne« nacionalne skupnosti (Levinger, 2017). Primer referiranja na slednjo oz. razmejevanja skupin ljudi najdemo v zapisu poslanca v Dz, ki na blogu v povezavi s t.i. »prišleki iz t. i. balkanskih republik« zapiše, da na ulicah Ljubljane velikokrat »naletimo« na tujo govorico, in nadaljuje: »Pomisliš; verjetno so turisti, ali pa tudi ne. Nekateri ne znajo jezika države, ki jih hrani. […] Iz navedenega se moramo tisti ‘staroselci’ slovenskega naroda vprašati, kaj smo delali narobe. […].« Proti koncu zapisa preberemo še: »Sam sem zato, da damo Slovenijo spet Slovencem« (Lenart, 2021). Populizem obvladuje miselnost, ki daje prednost mejam, fizic.nim/prostorskim in kulturnim/simbolnim, Trumpov populizem je tu znova dober primer (omenimo zgolj predvolilno obljubo gradnje zidu na meji z Mehiko). Populistic.ni diskurzi z retoriko okoli tem globalizacije, vdora migrantov in beguncev ipd. generirajo obc.utke ogrože­nosti in strahu. V kontekstu kroženja afektivnih podob beguncev kot ogro­žajoc.ih, nevarnih je razumeti tudi izjavo Janeza Janše, predsednika SDS, ki je v povezavi z »begunsko problematiko« v Sloveniji leta 2015 zagovarjal posta­vitev ograje na meji in jo v televizijskem intervjuju opredelil kot »[…] ograjo, ki brani svobodo. Je ograja, ki brani red […]« (v Luthar, 2017: 159).6 Ograja v imenu svobode »obljublja« ne le rešitev strahu pred tistimi, ki ogrožajo našo svobodo (oz. svobodo od škode pred drugimi), ampak tudi zašc.ito reda. Konstrukcija oz. ohranjanje mej (reda, nadzora) se odvija skozi diskurzivno produkcijo in upravljanje emocij. Emocionalna energija, ki jo generirajo populistic.ne politike strahu, jeze in sovraštva, ni sila, ki »poziva na in odpira politic.no komunikacijo, ampak jo zapira. Emocije politic.nih odnosov ne gradijo, ampak jih zavirajo« (Frevert, 2019: 7). Retorika, ki jo je Trump uporabljal v c.asu svojega predsedovanja, »ni promovirala razumevanja, ampak distanco, izolacijo in zavrnitev vsega, razen množice pred njim« (Clem, 2017: 11). Na množice pred njim, lojalne podpornike je Trump apeliral z retoriko ljubezni, intenca katere je bila kre­pitev emocionalnih vezi (Trumpovo ponavljajoc.e se sporoc.ilo obc.instvu: »I love you« (»Rad vas imam«)). Kot ugotavlja Levinger (2017: 2), je bilo prav obvladovanje konvencij »jezika ljubezni« en od kljuc.nih dejavnikov Trumpovega politic.nega uspeha. Ljubezen je v Trumpovi politic.ni retoriki delovala kot vezivno tkivo, ki utrjuje vezi med voditeljem in sledilci ter soc.a­sno kot »velika izkljuc.evalka« drugih, drugac.nih. voljnih državljanov populizem artikulira in predeluje skozi politicne diskurze tako, da se prilegajo njegovim politicnim potrebam in ciljem. Ali po Hoggessu (2009: 104): politicni diskurzi obstojecim emocijam podelijo pomen in s tem posebno obliko ter smer. Populizem je ucinkovit, ker je družba že nekako pripravljena nanj. Navajam celoten citat (Luthar, 2017: 159): »[…] To ni ograja, kot je bil berlinski zid, ki je preprece-val, da bi šli ljudje iz Vzhodne Nemcije v svobodo, ampak je ograja, ki brani svobodo. Je ograja, ki brani red, je ograja, ki omogoca, da se obvlada množica brez nasilja. Druga možnost je samo uporaba nasilja, tega si pa nihce ne želi. […].«. Po Frevert (2019) emocije ne služijo sodobni politiki, ampak jo ustvar­jajo. Emocije so same po sebi pretvorjene v politic.ni argument: »Nac.in c.ustvovanja je osnova politic.nega delovanja, spodbuja in usmerja politiko, in to namerno. O emocijah se ni mogoc.e pogajati. Preprosto obstajajo. Tako vsaj pravijo« (2019: 6). Namesto o »emocionalizaciji politike« – v historic.nem poteku vselej prisotnem pojavu – je zato ustrezneje govoriti o »politizaciji emocij«. V desnem populizmu so negativne emocije osrednji atribut, okoli katerega se oblikuje in na katerem je utemeljeno samo politic.no delova­nje. Trump je bolj kot na ideološke volilce igral na strune jeznih volilcev: »Trumpov populizem deluje zaradi jeze, ki jo izraža: jeza je temelj njegovih apelov in njegovega politic.nega projekta« (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019: 126). V c.asu Busha (2001), kot smo že zapisali, je jeza postala resolucija, poslanstvo, trenutek (ko zablesti volja, afekt ljudstva). Politic.nost se torej ne izraža le skozi politic.ne programe, ampak se oblikuje in izraža tudi skozi skupne emocije, ki jih artikulirajo diskurzi oz. skozi skupno emocionalno izkustvo. Po Abdell-Fadil (2019) »emocije utrjujejo politic.ne ideje ali pa so sam mate­rial, iz katerega so oblikovane politic.ne ideje«, so »sile, ki podžigajo proces drugac.enja in zagotavljajo moralno upravic.enje ‘naše’ nastrojenosti do ‘dru-gih’, s katero šc.itimo sebe pred zaznano grožnjo unic.enja« (Abdell-Fadil, 2019: 24). Populizem, kot ugotavlja Arditi (2004: 137), izkorišc.a »napetost med demokratic.nimi institucijami in odtujenostjo, ki jo te neizogibno ustvarjajo, oz. med romantic.nostjo spontanega izražanja volje ljudstva na eni strani in na drugi institucij in profesionalne ekspertize, ki so potrebne, da to voljo predstavljajo«. Ali drugac.e, izkorišc.a inherenten potencial nezaupanja v demokracijah do odtujenih, skritih politic.nih sil, ki (da) zavajajo in odloc.ajo v lastno korist namesto v korist ljudstva. In prav v ozrac.ju sumnic.avosti do posredniških institucij, tehnokratskih in odtujenih elit ter anonimnih biro­kratskih in tržnih mehanizmov se emocije in njihovo »spontano«, takojšnje izražanje populistom kažejo kot »pristna« politic.na reakcija, »naraven« odziv na »krizne razmere«. Skozi populistic.no optiko se emocije dojemajo kot neposredne poli­tic.ne izjave, ki zaobidejo posredovanje in reprezentacije kompleksa insti­tucij. Predstavljajo besedo in glas tistih, katerih volja in interesi so se v kom­pleksnem politic.nem sistemu izgubili. Ta utišani glas ljudstva si pogosto »prisvojijo« karizmatic.ni voditelji in mu skušajo povrniti (afektivno) moc.. Populisti »obljubljajo prekinitev birokratskih rutin in preobrazbo politike v bolj osebno izkustvo« (Arditi, 2004: 137). Ali v Trumpovem egocentric.nem slogu: »[…] Jaz sem z vami, Americ.ani. Jaz sem vaš glas. […] Boril se bom za vas. […] Rad vas imam« (Charteris-Black, 2018: 25). V mac.istic.nem slogu prepric.ujejo, da so edini legitimni predstavniki ljudstva in edini, ki razu­mejo (c.utijo) in resno jemljejo njegove skrbi, bolec.ine, strahove in upanje (populizem igra tudi na pozitivne, ne zgolj negativne emocije). Npr. Farage je z neposrednim in namerno pretiranim jezikom ustvaril javno osebnost, ki projicira poštenost in realizem ob sooc.enju s korupcijo in prevaro (Breeze, 2020). To je bila tudi persona, ki je spodbujala in »urila« nezadovoljne držav­ljane za specific.ne nac.ine doživljanja in izražanja emocij (Leezenberg, 2017: 269). S prilašc.anjem monopola nad reprezentiranjem resnic.nih obc.utij in interesov obic.ajnih ljudi populisti delegitimizirajo politic.ne tekmece in izkazujejo svojo antipluralistic.no in antidemokratic.no držo. Populisti, skratka, vidijo emocije kot »legitimen in zadosten vodnik za urejanje politic.nih vprašanj« in zavrnejo dejstva kot nepotrebna v politic.­nem odloc.anju (Villadsen, 2020: 57). Mesto dejstev zasedejo emocije, o kate­rih se ni mogoc.e pogajati. Vpeljava emocij kot suverenega principa v politic.ni debati in sumnic.avost do dokazov, ki temeljijo na dejstvih (Villadsen, 2020: 58), vodi v neuravnote­ženo mobilizacijo patosa, logosa in etosa. Ustvarja emotivizem, ki daje pred­nost: emocionalnim impulzom pred globljimi premisleki, emocionalnim gestam pred (vsebinskimi) informacijami, trenutnim zadovoljitvam pred konkretnimi rešitvami problemov, emocionalni trivialnosti pred substantiv­nimi vprašanji in vsebinsko razpravo. Wildersovi grobi, konfrontirajoc.i tviti ne pušc.ajo nobenega prostora za razumske argumente (Leezenberg, 2017: 251), Faragejeve izjave niti niso informativne niti niso mnenja v obic.ajnem smislu (Leezenberg, 2017: 269). Emotivizem se kaže tudi v znac.ilni – (ne) premišljeni, (ne)pretehtani – takojšnosti Janševega komuniciranja: od tvita o »odsluženih prostitutkah«, Johnu Bidenu kot enem izmed najšibkejših predsednikov v zgodovini (c.e bi bil izvoljen) do poobjave tvita o klofutah, ki »bi se lepo prilegle« eni od poslank.7 Podobno je funkcija zapisa poslanca Dz Jožefa Lenarta (2021) v zvezi s »socialnimi kulturniki – kulturnimi socia­listi« (kot jih imenuje) zgolj ta, da zbode, zasmehuje, poniža: »[…] svoje zah­teve pac. izražajo na svoj nac.in, ker verjamejo v svoje umetniške talente. […] Menijo pa tudi: da imajo pravico do brezplac.nih prostorov za svoje ustvar­janje, ki pa jih v nekaj letih po njihovi uporabi ni vec. mogoc.e uporabiti niti za hlev.« Emotivizem reducira zapletena policy vprašanja na binarnost »to je super – to je grozno«, torej na razvnemanje emocij, negativnih do Drugih, pozitivnih do lastne skupine. Populistic.ni emotivizem namesto tehtnih argumentov, iskanja kompromisov in sodelovanja deluje – z negativno emocionalno retoriko, posredovano in stopnjevano skozi družbene medije, zlasti Twitter – izkljuc.evalno tako do doloc.enih družbenih skupin kot do politic.nih nasprotnikov. Seksisticne tvite objavljajo ali poobjavljajo tudi drugi politiki iz desnega spektra (npr. tvit o leglu feministk na CSD-jih), so pa tudi leve provenience (npr. tvit J. P. Damijana o ministrici). Teorija lepljivih emocij za razumevanje diskurzivne konstruiranosti in performativne vloge emo-cij v oblikovanju identitet in kolektivov skozi diskurz je potreben premik v izhodišc.u razumevanja emocij. Konvencionalno razumevanje, po katerem so emocije subjektom inherentni pojavi, je nezadostno, saj predpostavlja akterja, ki je nepovezan s strukturnim kontekstom ter razmerji moc.i. Ahmed (2004a in 2004b) je razvila alternativen model emocij, ki nas preusmeri, prvic., od osredinjenosti izkljuc.no na emocije »v« posamezniku k njihovim kolektivnim dimenzijam, drugic., k razumevanju emocij kot, vsaj delno, dis-kurzivne družbene konstrukcije in tretjic., k emocionalnemu drugac.enju v politic.nem in medijskem prostoru, prek katerega se ustvarjajo antagoni­stic.ne relacije med »nami« in »njimi« ter družbeni in politic.ni kolektivi. Emocije so intencionalne, vselej se na nekaj nanašajo – na objekte ali subjekte, stvari, specific.ne situacije, ideje, prostore itd. Ali kot navaja Ahmed (Parkinson v Ahmed, 2004a: 7), so emocije »‘o nec.em’: vkljuc.ujejo smer ali orientacijo do objekta«. Orientacija emocij je povezana z odnosom subjekta do objekta, z oceno, presojo, vrednotno sodbo o objektu.8 Ti kognitivni pro-cesi so pogojeni tako s subjektovimi zaznavami in preteklimi izkustvi kot tudi s kulturnim okvirom, znotraj katerega živi in je socializiran. Avtorica poudarja: »(…) biti na doloc.en nac.in emocionalno aktiviran v srec.anju z dru­gim vkljuc.uje branje ne le srec.anja, ampak tudi tega drugega kot nekoga, ki ima dolocene znacilnosti« (poud. v orig., 2004: 28). Te interpretacije, ocene se izražajo v nac.inu, na katerega se telesa usmerjajo glede na druga telesa. Ocene uvedejo neko vrsto delovanja – obrac.ajo nas »k« objektom/telesom (želja po bližini) in »stran« od njih (oddaljevanje, distanciranost) – ali aktiv­nosti v oz. s katero se emocije premikajo med telesi. »Emocije so relacij­ske: vsebujejo (re)akcije ali relacije ‘k’ ali ‘stran’ v odnosu do teh objektov« (Ahmed, 2004a: 8). Kraj izvora emocij ni subjektova duševnost, niso ome­jene na c.loveško telo. Nasprotno, pri emocijah gre vselej za gibanje: premi­kajo subjekte, ki se posledic.no gibajo v razlic.nih smereh, odvisno od tega, kako so emocionalno aktivirani oz. izzvani, kakšne specific.ne emocije (ob) c.utijo. Tako niso ne povsem znotraj (psihološke) ne povsem zunaj telesa (družbene),9 pac. pa so sile, ki vplivajo na samo razlikovanje med »znotraj« in »zunaj« oz. zac.rtajo meje, ki to razliko definirajo: »ustvarjajo sam uc.inek na površinah ali mejah teles in svetov« (2004b: 117). 8 Naši emocionalni odzivi na objekt vsebujejo miselne procese, ki se odvijajo socasno kot samo (ob) cutenje na ravni telesa (2004a: 6). Ahmed opisuje emocije kot preplet »obcutkov telesnih sprememb«, ki so rezultat stika z objekti oz. drugimi, in »branja« tega stika in drugih kot vzroka našega emocionalnega odziva. 9 V psihološkem modelu delujejo emocije od »znotraj navzven« (prihajajo iz posameznikove notra­njosti, iz nagonov, najprej jih zacutimo v telesu, potem se gibajo k objektom), v sociološkem modelu pa kot pri/sile, ki delujejo od »zunaj navznoter« (prihajajo iz družbe in se nato prenesejo »v« posameznika). Emocije vkljuc.ujejo subjekte in objekte, a se ne nahajajo znotraj njih (2004a: 119). Niso »v« nas ali »v« objektih. Ne povzroc.ijo jih objekti, ampak nastajajo kot rezultat našega stika z objektom (2004a: 6), in ta stik nas obli­kuje v tem, »kdo smo«.10 Emocije so relacijski pojavi, ki nastajajo v družbenih situacijah/srec.anjih oz. družbeno-politic.nih interakcijah. Ali v jeziku avto-rice, emocije krožijo med telesi: se gibljejo, premikajo, na nekatera telesa se »prilepijo« (Ahmed, 2004a: 4), prek drugih pa (z)drsijo (2004a: 8). Ne »bivajo v subjektih ali objektih«, ampak »so producirane kot uc.inki cirkulacije« (Ahmed, 2004a: 8). Izvor emocij torej niso objekti, na katere se usmerjajo, saj z njimi niso esencialno povezane, pac. pa emocije oblikujejo objekt in so same oblikovane skozi stik z njim. Prav to, da niso pritrjene na subjekte ali objekte (Ahmed, 2004a: 128, 135), govori o tem, da se nahajajo in oblikujejo le v relaciji med subjektom in objektom.11 Potencial emocij, da potujejo – se prenašajo od enega do drugega posameznika – omogoc.a, da nas povezu­jejo in združujejo oz. generirajo površine kolektivnih teles. Po Ahmed (2004a: 4) kljuc.no vprašanje emocij ni, kaj so, ampak kako delujejo, kakšen je njihov uc.inek. Emocije v svojem kroženju »ustvarjajo stvari«, sebstvo, identitete in kolektive s tem, da zarisujejo meje, ki oznac.u­jejo neko (skozi obc.uteno emocijo) zaznano razliko: med »menoj« in »dru-gim«, »menoj« in »nami«, »nami« in »njimi« ter z ohranjanjem teh binarnosti. Kot že omenjeno, niso »v« telesih, ampak »oblikujejo same površine teles, ki se izoblikujejo skozi ponavljanje delovanj v c.asu in z usmerjenostjo ‘k’ ali ‘stran’ od drugih« (2004a: 4). Površine in meje individualnih in kolektivnih teles nastajajo skozi nac.ine našega odzivanja na objekte/druge (tj. obc.utenje emocij): »jaz« in »mi« sta oblikovana s stikom z objekti oz. drugimi (2004a: 1, 10). Emocije niso stranski produkt procesa formiranja identitet, ampak osrednji proces produkcije (politic.nih) identitet. Emocionalno branje drugih vzpostavlja odnos, izkustvo odnosa pa ustvarja pomen in vrednost, izkljuc.evanje/vkljuc.evanje, pripadnost in predanost. Emocije (interpretacije drugih) torej povezujejo telesa s skup­nostmi/kolektivi ali pa jih pozicionirajo zunaj njih. Kot zapiše avtorica, emo-cije povezujejo »nekatere subjekte z nekaterimi drugimi in zoper druge« 10 Emocije oblikujejo svoje subjekte in objekte; npr. strah pred objektom (ocena, da je objekt nevaren, in spremljajoci telesni obcutki) pridobi površino kot telo, ki je usmerjeno »stran« od objekta, branje/inter­pretacija stika z objektom kot nevarnega (razumevanje objekta kot »strašljivega«) pa identificira objekt kot vzrok subjektovega strahu. Subjekt postane prestrašen, objekt pa strašljiv (»ne-jaz«): pripisovanje »krivde« oz. strahu objektu (prestrašen sem, ker si strašljiv) je ucinek srecanja, ki giblje subjekt »stran« od objekta (2004a: 8; 2004a: 126–128). 11 Emocije ne naseljujejo posameznika in potem v njem pojenjajo, ampak se premikajo med ljudmi, krožijo skozi subjektove interakcije z drugimi subjekti, so gibajoca, a se tudi pritrdijo, npr. subjekt, ki ob srecanju z neko osebo obcuti gnus, je lahko zacasno »poln cesa slabega«, toda to »slabo« se »izloci« in prilepi na objekt oz. telesa drugih (2004a: 104) – tako se konstituirajo gnusna telesa. (Ahmed, 2004a: 117). So sile, ki premikajo in umešc.ajo posameznike/sku-pine na obe strani družbeno konstruiranih meja ter signalizirajo pozicioni­ranost telesa v odnosu do meje. Ali kot pravi Ahmed, nac.in, na katerega (ob) c.utimo druge nas združuje v skupnost/kolektiv, ki se, paradoksalno, »obli­kuje« samo kot uc.inek takšne združitve, skozi vtise, ki jih na nas naredijo drugi (2004a: 54). Emocije »združujejo posameznike s skupnostmi – ali tele-sen prostor z družbenim prostorom – skozi samo intenzivnost svojih preda­nosti« (2004a: 119). Emocije pa ne krožijo kot take, ampak se gibljejo skozi cirkulacijo objek­tov, na nekatere objekte se prilepijo. Ko obravnavamo emocije in odnose med telesi (kako se telesa premikajo), je treba opazovati tudi odnos med emocijami in reprezentacijami oz. podobami v javnih diskurzih ter tekstih, ki krožijo v javni domeni. Opazovati moramo, kako se emocije povezujejo z znaki oz. cirkulirajo skupaj z njimi in kako se pri stiku med tekstom in telesi (nami) ustvari »odtis«. Po Ahmed se emocije stalno premikajo med subjekti, objekti, drugimi in znaki ter nastajajo kot uc.inki cirkulacije med objekti in znaki. En od uc.inkov njihovega cirkulacije med posamezniki in kolektivi, znaki in podobami je ta, da postanejo doloc.eni znaki in objekti »lepljive površine« oz. »zasic.eni z afektom«. Ko emocije drsijo, »tec.ejo c.ez« objekte, se na nekatere objekte (telesa drugih) pritrdijo in jim podelijo pomen. Ti z afektom nasic.eni objekti/telesa, postanejo lepljivi, potujejo in se ob stiku z našimi lastnimi telesi vtisnejo, prilepijo na nas in naša telesa se prilepijo nanje (tako produ­cirajo nadaljnje »lepljive« odnose). Ob stiku teksta in teles se ustvari uc.inek, ki pusti svojo sled (2004a: 6) ali vtis, repeticija teh (emocionalnih) vtisov pa ustvari oz. rezultira v lepljivosti. Lepljivost je »uc.inek zgodovine stikov med telesi, objekti in znaki« (Ahmed, 2004a: 90) in nac.in vzpostavljanja odnosa subjekta do objekta/teles na osnovi definiranja in vrednotenja slednjih. z uporabo metafore »afektivna ekonomija« Ahmed trdi, da emocije delu­jejo na ekonomski nac.in – bolj ko objekti, znaki (in z njimi afekti, emocije) krožijo, bolj afektivni (intenzivni) postajajo.12 Objekti ne cirkulirajo znotraj ekonomskega trga, ampak skozi razlic.ne tekste – skozi spletne zapise, poli­tic.ne govore ali izjave politic.nih akterjev ter c.asopisna poroc.ila. »To je, emo-cije delujejo kot oblika kapitala: afekt se ne nahaja v znaku ali blagu, ampak je produciran samo kot uc.inek svoje cirkulacije (…) med objekti in znaki (= akumulacija afektivne vrednosti v c.asu) (…) bolj ko znaki cirkulirajo, bolj afektivni postajajo (Ahmed 2004b: 120). Na primer, ponavljanje besed »paki« in »c.rnuh« skozi daljše c.asovno obdobje je ustvarilo lepljiv pomen 12 Ahmed (2004b: 121) opozori, da je analogija z Marxovo analizo vrednostne forme omejena in da referenca ostaja bolj ali manj metaforicna. teh besed, ki prispevajo k »sovražnemu govoru« in stimulirajo emocionalne odzive teles (Ahmed, 2004a: 59–60).13 Stik teles z razlic.nimi teksti, ki posredujejo emocije oz. podobe, ki so »nasic.ene ali celo prepolne afektov« (2004a: 95), ustvarja sledi – emocio­nalnost tekstov (tekstualnih in verbalnih sporoc.il) se dobesedno vtisne ali prilepi na telesa in ustvarja uc.inke na njih, tj. vpliva na njihove lastne emo-cionalne odzive (tj. na naslovljene teme ali družbene skupine, o katerih je govora), prevaja te emocije v delovanje in spremeni njihovo površino. Ali drugac.e, posamezniki med katerimi krožijo emocije – generirane s teksti – prevzamejo in sprejmejo te emocije kot »moje« ali »naše«, s tem se telesa mobilizirajo ter oblikujejo »površine« individualnih in kolektivnih teles. Emocija, ki jo obc.utimo kot odziv na ponavljajoc.e se besede, stavke, ideje, ne biva »v« nas, ampak »v« stiku med nami in besedo (narativom, teks-tom), njena lepljivost je uc.inek, ki izhaja iz zgodovine stika. Kako nekaj (ob)c.utimo ni preprosto stvar individualnih vtisov, ki se ustvarijo na novo v sedanjosti, ampak ta stik z nec.im ali nekom »oblikujejo pretekle zgodo-vine stika« (Ahmed, 2004a: 7). Tako so lahko doloc.ena telesa dojeta kot bolj strašljiva (gnusna) kot druga. V tem smislu emocije kot medosebni pojavi niso samo neposredni, trenutni odzivi, ampak so »odvisni od preteklih inter-pretacij, ki jih nismo nujno sami ustvarili« (Ahmed, 2004a: 171). Povezanost emocije z doloc.enim znakom ali podobo nima izvora v psihi, je sled zgodo-vine, ki »ostaja živa v sedanjosti« (Ahmed, 2004b: 126). Naše zaznave drugih, emocionalne naravnanosti nanje in naše odnose z njimi so posredovani s »kulturno zgodovino in spomini«, ki nam dajejo utemeljena znanja o doloc.e­nih skupinah ter s tem prepric.ljive razloge za doloc.ene emocionalne odzive nanje. Sklep Populizem in (skrajno) desni politic.ni diskurzi, od antimigrantskih, anti-begunskih, antiblaginjskih do antiekspertnih in drugih diskurzov, z anti­-X-sentimenti delujejo na podlagi »aktiviranja vrednotno obremenjenih in emocionalno nabitih izjav in konceptov ter spremljajoc.ih emocij« (Chilton, 2017, v Breeze, 2019: 26). Politic.na komunikacija, ki se naslovljencev »dota­kne« na emocionalni ravni, je retoric.no prepric.ljivejša od emocionalno manj evokativnih diskurzov in pomembno doloc.a politic.ne odloc.itve posame­znikov. V »dobi emocionalne politike« so pogosto uspešnejši tisti politic.ni 13 Temnopoltega cloveka, ki gre mimo, se ljudje ne ustrašijo zaradi njega samega, niti strah ne prihaja iz »belega telesa«, ampak gre za strah, ki se prenaša med telesi in pritrdi na znak temnopoltega cloveka na osnovi družbenih in historicnih konstrukcij. Posredi je torej repeticija stereotipov o temnopoltem cloveku, ta repeticija pa generira drugega kot objekt strahu, ta strah potem prevzamejo ljudje kot svojega lastnega (2004b: 131). akterji, ki s strastno (negativno) politic.no retoriko uc.inkovito generirajo objekte (tarc.e) specific.nih emocij, vzbujajo in mobilizirajo intenzivno emo-cionalno odzivanje podpornikov ter stimulirajo povezovanje enako c.utec.ih v (politic.ni) kolektiv. Slednji je vselej pozicioniran v izkljuc.evalno razmerje z drugimi kolektivi – politic.nimi nasprotniki ali skupinami, ki ogrožajo nje­gove ideale, posest, obstoj. Medtem ko je vloga emocij v oblikovanju politic.ne subjektivitete v zadnjih desetletjih široko pripoznana, je ob tem pogrešati bolj sistematic.no teoretizacijo emocij, ki bi omogoc.ila preuc.evanje njihove performativne vloge emocij, zlasti v (skrajno) desnih politic.nih diskurzih. Pri vprašanju, kako emocije delujejo in kakšni so njihovi politic.ni uc.inki, je zato dobrodo­šla teorija S. Ahmed o krožec.ih, lepljivih emocijah. V sklepnem delu nava­jamo nekaj uvidov, ki nam jih prinašata družbeni model emocij in ideja lepljivosti, s posebnim poudarkom na diskurzivni cirkulaciji najbolj lepljive od vseh emocij – sovraštva. Najprej, zavrnitev psihološkega modela, po katerem so emocije zasebna »last« subjekta, in njegova nadomestitev z relacijskim modelom odpreta nov pogled, ki pokaže, da v subjektih ni nic.esar neloc.ljivo sovražnega. Biti sovražen do koga ali c.esa ni nekaj, kar ljudje preprosto so, kajti sovraštvo ne mobilizira posameznikov »od znotraj«, ampak je kulturno uokvirjeno oz. je diskurzivne narave. Pripisovanje emocionalne vrednosti drugim je druž­beni, kulturni in diskurzivni proces. Sovraštvo ne sodi v nobenega poseb­nega posameznika ali skupino kot nekakšna static.na lastnina, ampak je produciran skozi kroženje znakov. Politic.ni diskurzi z uporabo doloc.enih form naslavljanja, poimenovanja, argumentiranja in prepric.evanja vzpostav­ljajo in obnavljajo rasistic.na, ksenofobna, homofobna in mizogina stališc.a. Sovraštvo se torej vselej kreira v kontekstu merjenja moc.i med (politic.nimi) skupinami in diskurzivnih bojev, ki izhajajo iz družbenih in (antagonistic.nih) politic.nih konfliktov znotraj danega družbenega konteksta. Posamezniki pa obc.utijo sovraštvo v svojih individualnih srec.anjih z drugimi, v katerih »berejo« in prepoznajo te druge kot »vir grožnje«, »sovražnike«. Stiki z dru­gimi so lahko medosebni, c.e pa potekajo (bolj ali manj) samo prek medijev (danes bolj pogosti kraji stikov), postanejo ti drugi še lažje tarc.e sovražnosti, saj odpade možnost preverjanja predstav o tuji in lastni skupini. Drugic., trditev, da emocije ne bivajo v objektih, razjasni, da razlic.ne tarc.e sovražnosti niso utelešenje osovraženosti, strašljivosti, gnusnost, da torej sami po sebi ne vzbujajo (niso vzrok) emocij pri subjektih. To, na kakšen nac.in nas v stiku z drugimi emocije premikajo (k njim ali stran od njih), je odvisno od naše interpretacije stika in znac.ilnosti drugih. Kot osovraženo, strašljivo, gnusno je neko telo ustvarjeno šele skozi cirkulacijo emocij v vsak­danjem jeziku politikov in drugih javnih akterjev, ki utemeljujejo razloge z obrazložitvami, da so doloc.ena telesa nekaj, c.esar se bojiš oz. kar (moreš in moraš) sovražiti. Rasistic.na ali ksenofobna retorika tako prepric.ujeta, da sta frustracija in sovraštvo do Drugih upravic.ena in da »ogroženi« s svojimi sovražnimi dejanji ravnajo prav. Bolj ko se ideje, podobe, argumenti sovra­žne retorike uporabljajo in ponavljajo, bolj emocionalno nabite postajajo, tem bolj se lepijo na telesa Drugih in stabilnejše negativne asociacije ustvar­jajo z njimi. Sovraštvo pa ne kroži »prosto«, ampak vzdolž že izoblikovanih kulturnih linij, kot so rasa, etnija, spol, spolna usmerjenost. Sovraštvo in strah se na nekatere družbene skupine lepita bolj kot na druge. Skozi tekste in govor populistic.nih strank ter grupacij s konservativnimi programi se strah in obc.utek »muslimanske invazije« lepita na telo muslimanskega migrantskega moškega (ženske) ali na prosilce azila, sovraštvo in gnus pa na telesa temno­poltnih oseb, žensk ali na telesa istospolno usmerjenih. Negativna emocio­nalna vrednost doloc.enih družbenih teles, ki so krožila v preteklosti, krožijo še dandanes, kar odseva v lahkotnosti diskreditacij, pripisovanja pomanj­kanja doloc.enih sposobnosti, marginalizacije, izkljuc.evanja in drugih oblik odzivanja na njih. Tretjic., skozi ponavljajoc.e se lepljenje doloc.enih emocij na doloc.ene družbene skupine se odvijajo procesi, ki tvorijo kolektivna telesa. Skupna sovražna obc.utja ob istih drugih (katerih bližina grozi z odvzemom, skru­nitvijo, nadvlado, prevzemom mesta) ustvarjajo skupna razpoloženja in miselnost ter deluje kot vezivo, ki subjekte povezuje in spaja v skupnost/ kolektiv. Skozi emocionalno razloc.evanje med telesi (belimi-temnopoltimi, heteroseksualnimi-homoseksualnimi, delavnimi-lenimi), drugac.nost, tujost oz. z definiranjem, kdo ne pripada, se formira »mi-skupnost«. S tem ko se emocionalno ovrednoti »zunanje«, se združi, izoblikuje »znotraj«. Sovraštvo »znotraj« pa je obc.uteno kot povzroc.eno s strani izkljuc.enih in hkrati kot pripadnost notranji skupini. Sovraštvo deluje »zoper« in premika »stran« od osovraženih ter leži v sami osnovi skupnosti, kohezije. Deluje tako, da skrbi, da se obe strani meja ne pomešata. Privlac.nost sovražne retorike in njena diskurzivna politic.na moc. pa nista (samo) v negativni nastrojenosti do »drugih«. »Dobra« stran je v tem, da sovra­štvo predstavlja kot pozitivno navezanost na »nas«, na to, kar je »naše«, kar ljubimo in kar »moramo« zavarovati pred grožnjo drugac.nih. Desni populi­stic.ni diskurzi in programi konservativnih skupin, ki se organizirajo okoli skupne ljubezni do otrok, družine, naroda, predstavljajo strast svoje sovra­žnosti v njeni pozitivni razsežnosti. Vec.jo prepric.ljivost in utemeljenost pri­dobijo šele s tem, ko se povežejo z ideali ljubezni. Emocijo/vrednoto torej, ki jo je najtežje napadati in najlažje idealizirati. Bolj kot (eksplicitno) na sovraštvo do »drugih« se zato sklicujejo na ljubezen do »svojih«: ljubezen do družine, domovine, naroda, boga. Sovražni diskurzi konstruirajo sovraštvo kot ljubezen, uporabo sovraštva pa kot obrambo pred nevarnostjo, ki grozi, da bo odvzela, kar je »naše«. Ljubezen je hrbtna stran sovraštva. Sovražna retorika, ki pravi »Skupaj sovražimo, in to sovraštvo nas združuje« (Ahmed, 2004b: 118), se dopolni (zamaskira) z jezikom ljubezni, ki sovraštvo do dru­gih zamenjuje z ljubeznijo do sebe: »Ker ljubimo, sovražimo, in to sovraštvo nas združuje« (Ahmed, 2004a: 43). V povezavi z zastavljenimi raziskovalnimi vprašanji ugotavljamo dvoje. Prvic., emocije in afekti igrajo osrednjo vlogo v politic.nih diskurzih (desnega) populizma: oblikujejo in utrjujejo politic.na stališc.a, ustvarjajo vezi med poli­tic.nimi voditelji in podporniki, legitimizirajo politic.ne odloc.itve voditeljev, zarisujejo meje med »nami« in »njimi«, tvorijo in mobilizirajo (politic.ne) kolektive oz., v celoti gledano, spodbujajo doloc.ene politic.ne ideje, strate­gije in prakse. Populizem vprašanja, kot so migracije, varnost, nacionalna kultura in blaginja, oblikuje v jeziku emocij (strah, jeza in sovraštvo). Te negativne emocije, pripete na ideje in predstave o skupinah, »odgovornih« za ta vprašanja, oz. probleme, povezane z njimi, pogosto vodijo v emotivi­zem, služijo zgolj trenutni zadovoljitvi impulzov (odobravanje, navdušenje podpornikov), polarizirajo politic.ni prostor in utrjujejo družbene neena­kosti. Drugic., teoretski model premikajoc.ih se emocij S. Ahmed omogoc.a razumevanje delovanja in uc.inkov emocij v politic.nem diskurzu in omo­goc.a nadaljnje interpretacije ter empiric.no raziskovanje realnih, živec.ih emocij/afektov kot dela širših diskurzivnih struktur. Uporaba tega edinstve­nega modela razkrije, da se s ponavljajoc.im se lepljenjem doloc.enih emocij na doloc.ena telesa skozi krožec.e diskurze, z emocionalnim vrednotenjem (vredna-nevredna telesa), diskurzivno dinamiko sovraštva in ljubezni ter posledic.nim obc.utenjem drugih družbenih teles nekateri subjekti povezu­jejo s prednostnimi pravicami ter »združujejo z nekaterimi drugimi in zoper nekatere druge«. Formiranje kolektivov je v svojem temelju bistveno afek­tivni/emocionalni proces. LITERATURA Abdel-Fadil, Mona (2019): The Politics of Affect: The Glue of Religious and Identity Conficts in Social Media. Journal of Religion Media and Digital Culture 8 (1): 11–34. Ahmed, Sara (2004a): Cultural Politics of Emotions. New York: Routledge. 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International Journal of Communication 12: 1114–1138. Woodward, Kathleen (2002): Calculating Compassion. Indiana Law Journal 77 (2), Article 2. Dostopno prek https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol77/ iss2/2, 13. 3. 2021. Wouters, Cas (1986): Formalization and Informalization: Changing Tension Balances in Civilizing processes. Theory Culture and Society 3 (2): 1–35. SOURCES Bush, George W. (2001): Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20 September 2001. Dostopno prek https://georgewbush-whitehouse. archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, 7. 4. 2021. Hutchison, Emma (2018): Why Study Emotions in International Relations? Dos-topno prek https://isnblog.ethz.ch/international-relations/why-study-emotions­in-international-relations, 13. 4. 2021. Lenart, Jožef (2021): »Ali si prebivalci Slovenije sploh še želimo biti Slovenci?« Sam kot poslanec Dz RS trdim: Ne sme nas biti strah ali pa sram, da bi povsod pon­osno pokazali, da smo Slovenci. Dostopno prek https://www.sds.si/blog/ali-si­prebivalci-slovenije-sploh-se-zelimo-biti-slovenci-sam-kot-poslanec-dz-rs-trdim-ne-sme, 29. 5. 2021. Nejc SLUKAN* POLITIKA IRONIJE NA SPLETNIH dRUŽbENIH OMREŽJIH: ORIS MEdIJSKO-TROLOVSKEGA dISPOZITIVA** Povzetek. Namen clanka je postaviti teoretsko podlago za analizo ironicnih komunikacijskih praks na spletnih družbenih omrežjih. Posebej se bomo posvetili praksam trolanja. V clanku ne definiramo ironije le kot retoricne figure, temvec tudi kot govorno dejanje, ki rekonfigu­rira razmerje med elementi komunikacijske situacije. Najprej bomo kriticno ovrednotili sodobne razlicice teo­rij tehnoloških zmožnosti, nato pa skozi prikaz komu­nikacijskih pogojev na nekaterih spletnih družbenih omrežjih pokazali, kako je mogoce dolocene njihove zmožnosti opisati kot del dispozitiva, ki ga delovno imenujemo medijsko-trolovski dispozitiv in ki posame­znike spodbuja k trolovskim oblikam izražanja. Naša zakljucna ugotovitev je, da zmožnosti spletnih družbe­nih omrežij spodbujajo trolovske oblike izražanja. Kljucni pojmi: ironija, trolanje, dispozitiv, zmožnosti, spletna družbena omrežja Uvod Sodobno mediatizirano politic.no govorico, posebej tisto, ki jo najdemo v spletni retoriki desnih populizmov (Nagle, 2017; Weatherby, 2019), moc.no zaznamujejo ironic.ne oblike izražanja, ki jih danes navadno imenujemo trolanje (Coleman, 2014; Phillips, 2015; Phillips in Milner, 2017; Weatherby, 2019). Izraz trol (ang: troll) na prvi pogled oznac.uje fantastic.na humanoidna bitja iz skandinavske mitologije, vendar izvira – v svojem spletnem kon­tekstu – iz izraza za muharjenje (ang. trolling), pri katerem vabo na trnku vlec.emo po vodi – v upanju, da bo riba zagrabila vabo (Phillips, 2015). Iz tega opisa že lahko sklepamo na doloc.eno znac.ilnost trolovskega vede­nja – posameznik/ca nastavlja past, ki vzpostavlja distinkcijo med ribic.i in ribami – troli in trolanimi. zac.etne rabe izraza troll ali trolling v internetnem * Nejc Slukan, asistent, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija. ** Izvirni znanstveni clanek. Clanek je nastal v okviru usposabljanja mladih raziskovalcev, ki ga financira ARRS pri programu P6-0400. DOI: 10.51936/tip.58.2.391-408 Nejc SLUKAN kontekstu segajo v c.as Useneta1 (Phillips, 2015: 16), na katerem so se obli­kovale prve spletne subkulture (Pfaffenberger, 2003: 27). Že zelo zgodaj se je na Usenetu v devetdesetih razvila dinamika interakcije med starejšimi, bolj izkušenimi in mlajšimi, bolj nevednimi, uporabniki in uporabnicami. Trolanje je v svoji zac.etni internetni obliki nastalo kot praksa smešenja in prepoznavanja novih uporabnikov. Izkušenejši/a uporabnik/ca bi npr. kot odgovor na vprašanje novinca/ke, ki bi bilo percipirano kot neumno ali naivno, v vsakem primeru pa kot znamenje neposvec.enosti v spletno skup­nost, objavil vec.ini starejših uporabnikov znano preteklo objavo, ki je bila že vec.krat predmet smešenja (praksa, iz katere se pravzaprav rodi interne­tni mem2). Reakcija novinca/ke bi nato pokazala ali ta izkazuje zadostno vednost ali omiko (npr. zmožnost premetenega odziva), da je lahko štet/a kot c.lan pogovorne skupnosti. Ta zgodnji primer trolanja kaže tudi na eno izmed njegovih kljuc.nih znac.ilnosti, tj. delovanje agregativne funkcije iro­nije (Hutcheon, 1994: 86–110), ki za svoje delovanje potrebuje diskurzivno skupnost, katere meje so simbolno reproducirane ob vsaki ponovni rabi trolovske komunikacije (Gal et al., 2017). Ceprav je trolanje praksa, ki jo navadno povezujemo z nastankom sodobnega uporabniškega spleta in še posebej s posebno subkulturo njegovih uporabnikov zbranih okoli anoni­mnih spletnih forumov, kot je npr. 4chan (Phillips, 2015: 72; Erasmus, 2019), pa je v svojih formalnih znac.ilnostih prisotna v javnem govoru že od nekdaj (Coleman, 2014; Kravanja, 2017). Trolanje bomo definirali kot retorološko figuro (Avanessian, 2015: 15–23) in govorno dejanje (Austin, 1990), ki uc.inkuje z vzpostavitvijo posebne konfiguracije razmerij med govorcem/ko3 (ali vec. govorci/kami), sogovorcem/ko (ali vec. sogovorci/kami), diferenciranim obc.instvom in govorno situacijo samo. Situacija, v kateri govorec/ka trola sogovorca/ko, je situacija, v kateri govorec/ka taktic.no pretirava v izražanju svojih stališc. do te mere, da pri sogovorcu/ki vzpodbudi odziv, ki v svoji afektivni inve­sticiji presega afektivno investicijo prvotne/ga govorke/ca (Kravanja, 2017). Ta afektivno pretiran odziv je možen iz dveh razlogov: 1) zaradi tega, ker je 1 »Usenet (»users network« – [uporabniška mreža op. p.]) je bil globalni internetni pogovorni sistem na osnovi teksta, ki je nastal v zgodnjih osemdesetih in je prenehal delovati v poznih dvatisocih. V njem so uporabniki/ce objavljali in brali sporocila drug drugega znotraj kategorij, ki so se nanašale na razlicne teme in so bile poznane kot newsgroups [skupine za novice op. p.] ter hierarhicno razdeljene v podteme, ki so bile oznacene z relevantnimi predponami (npr. rec.sport.basketball.college).« (Warf, 2018: 890) 2 Internetni mem je po definiciji, ki jo postavi Shifman (2014), skupina digitalnih predmetov (ki se pojavljajo v razlicnih oblikah – tekst, video, avdio, multimodalne vsebine), ki si delijo vsebino in/ali formo in/ali držo, so ustvarjeni na podlagi vednosti ustvarjalcev o tej skupini predmetov in množicno cirkulirajo po internetu. Navadno so sestavljeni kot kolaž iz razlicnih kulturnih referenc. 3 Tu uporabljamo izraza govorec/ka in sogovorec/ka, ki implicirata poseben medij komunikacije, govor, kot sinonima, ki veljata tudi za komunikacijske situacije, kjer medij posredovanja komunikacije ni govor, temvec tudi npr. tekst ali vizualno sporocanje. Nejc SLUKAN sogovorec/ka nezmožen/a prepoznati taktic.no naravo govorc.evega/kinega pretiravanja ali 2) ker kljub prepoznavanju taktike uporabe trolovskega govora sogovorec/ka le-to smatra za posebej neprimerno trenutni govorni situaciji. S tem se sogovorec/ka pred doloc.enim delom obc.instva, ki razume intenco govorc.evega pretiravanja in/ali se strinja s širšo intenco govorca nasploh in/ali pristaja na njegovo/njeno komunikacijsko normo oz. defini­cijo situacije, osmeši, ravno tako pa to govorno dejanje v veliko primerih razdeli obc.instvo na dva dela. Prvi del, ki razume pretiravanje kot izvajanje retorološke figure in/ali jo smatra za primerno situaciji, in drugi del, ki ali vzame pretiravanje zares in se s tem ravno tako hkratno osmeši pred govor­cem/ko in preostalim obc.instvom ali pa jemlje pretiravanje kot neprimerno in si s tem spet prisluži posmeh govorca/ke in prvega dela obc.instva, zaradi lastnega odklanjanja ludic.ne (Hutcheon, 1994: 46–47) norme govorice, ki jo je govorec ravnokar poskusil vsiliti v trenutno definicijo situacije (Goffman, 2015). zaradi svoje agregativne funkcije, ki zmeraj temelji ne le na povezo­vanju neke diskurzivne skupnosti, temvec. tudi na zac.rtovanju njenih mej, je trolanje inherentno politic.ni komunikacijski akt, ki deli posameznike/ce na tiste, ki pripadajo neki skupnosti, in tiste, ki ji ne. Na tem mestu je potrebno pojasniti, kaj smo imeli v mislih s tem, ko smo trolanje kot obliko ironije opredelili kot retorološko in ne zgolj kot reto­ric.no figuro. Standardna retoric.na definicija ironije razume ironijo kot pre­prosto neskladje med manifestnim pomenom nekega komunikacijskega akta in njegovo pravo vsebino, pri c.emer sta ta dva elementa v medseboj­nem protislovju – pravi pomen je nasproten manifestnemu pomenu tega, kar komuniciramo. Obe sistematic.ni študiji ironije, na katere se pri svojem delu posebej sklicujemo (Hutcheon, 1994; Avanessian, 2015), poudarjata, da je ravno tovrstna tradicija zgolj retoric.nega razumevanja ironije odgovorna za poenostavljeno razumevanje le-te. Ce bi namrec. ironija merila zgolj na posredovanje pomena, ki je nasproten manifestni vsebini sporoc.enega, bi pravzaprav težko pojasnili, kaj toc.no je njena komunikativna funkcija, mimo tega, da služi kot stilistic.no sredstvo. Obe študiji poudarjata, da funk-cija ironic.nega komunikacijskega akta ni predvsem komunikacija svojega nasprotja, temvec. komunikacija nec.esa tretjega – navadno nekega razmerja. To razmerje pa je lahko npr. odnos govorca/ke do sogovorca/ke, do obc.in­stva, do neke specific.ne tematike, do definicije situacije, v katero je trenutni govor vpet, itd. V obic.ajni ironic.ni govorni situaciji se te odnosi celo preple­tajo v razlic.nih kombinacijah. S tem pa postane ironic.no govorno dejanje nekaj, kar presega retoriko kot umetnost prepric.evanja ter vkljuc.uje tudi vzpostavljanje, utrjevanje ali rušenje trenutne definicije situacije in odno­sov med akterji in elementi v njej. Podobno kot performativ (Austin, 1990), govorno dejanje, ki proizvaja realnost, na katero se sklicuje, ima tudi iro­nija (in s tem tudi trolanje) socialno-ontološko funkcijo. zaradi te dvojne Nejc SLUKAN (retoric.ne in socialno-ontološke) vloge Avanessian ironijo (in posebej njene moderne oblike) opredeli kot retorološko. Kljub temu je mogoc.e rec.i, kot ugotavlja vec. študij, da je trolanje pose-bej pogosto v spletnem okolju (Coleman, 2014; Phillips, 2015; Nagle, 2017; Phillips in Milner, 2017). V c.lanku bomo pokazali, da razmere, v katerih poteka sodobna spletna komunikacija, posebej pa komunikacija na spletnih družbenih omrežjih, spodbujajo trolovske komunikacijske prakse. V njem bomo tako pritrdilno odgovorili na vprašanje, ali je mogoc.e pogostost tro­lovske komunikacije na spletu analizirati kot produkt niza lastnosti vmesni­kov spletnih družbenih omrežij. Ta odgovor bomo podali v obliki konstruk­cije koncepta medijsko-trolovskega dispozitiva, ki lahko služi kot podlaga za nadaljnje empiric.ne raziskave vpliva pogojev komuniciranja na spletnih družbenih omrežjih na komunikacijo na njih. Pogoje, ki jih bomo postavili kot kljuc.ne pri razumevanju tega, moramo razumeti na specific.en nac.in, tj. kot del logike vmesnika, ki jo razvije Galloway (2012), torej kot serijo »tehnic.nih dispozitivov, ki težijo k vzpod­bujanju skupine praks, ki producirajo fleksibilno, modularno in neskonc.no spremenljivo obliko oblasti« (Topinka, 2019). Vmesnik, ki posreduje med uporabnikom/co in vsebino na spletu, tj. prisotnost in razporejenost funk-cij na konkretnih spletnih družbenih omrežij ter serija splošnih znac.ilnosti rac.unalniško posredovane komunikacije (Walther, 1996; 2007), je pravza­prav skupek zmožnosti (ang: affordances) (Bucher in Helmond, 2018). Ta skupek zmožnosti bomo razumeli prek kritic.ne apropriacije Agambenove interpretacije poznega Foucaultovega koncepta dispozitiva, da bi prišli do tega, kar bomo delovno poimenovali medijsko-trolovski dispozitiv. Teorija zmožnosti in spletna družbena omrežja za zac.etnika teorije zmožnosti velja ameriški psiholog Gibson (1977). Njegova teorija se je v svoji izvorni obliki nanašala na razumevanje poten­cialov nekega predmeta v odnosu do akterjev, ki z njim nekaj poc.nejo. Nek predmet, denimo roža na travniku, ima drugac.no vlogo za razlic.ne akterje, ki z njo stopijo v stik. za mimoidoc.ega polža predstavlja hrano, za hrošc.a streho med nalivom, za c.loveka pa npr. zgolj estetski objekt. zmožnosti te rože so niz odnosov, ki se vzpostavijo med posameznimi akterji in pred­metom ter omogoc.ajo razlic.ne interakcije. Kljuc.no predelavo Gibsonove zastavitve najdemo v Normanovi (1988) prilagoditvi teorije zmožnosti v teorijo oblikovanja. zmožnosti nekega predmeta so, po Normanovi oceni, praktic.no neskonc.ne, zato je potrebno, c.e hoc.emo imeti aplikativno teo­rijo oblikovanja, njihovo razumevanje zožiti na zmožnosti, ki jih posa­mezni predmet relativno jasno sporoc.a akterjem, ki bodo z njim upravljali. Pravilna raba predmeta mora biti torej nakazana že v njegovi obliki ali z Nejc SLUKAN jasno razumljivimi znaki. Norman spremeni težišc.e razumevanja zmožnosti iz relacijskih znac.ilnosti interakcije med akterjem in predmetom na sporo-c.ilne znac.ilnosti predmeta samega, medtem ko Gaver (1991) njegovo zasta­vitev tipizira in razdeli zmožnosti na zaznavne, skrite in lažne. Normanov konceptualni premik omogoc.i Hutchbyju (2001) izpeljavo argumenta, da koncept zmožnosti pomeni razrešitev teoretskega nasprotja med tehnolo­škimi deterministi in socialnimi konstruktivisti na podroc.ju študij uporabe tehnologij. zmožnosti tehnologij razume kot lastnosti, ki zamejujejo polje možnih uporab, a vendar pušc.ajo dovolj odprtega prostora za to, da najra­zlic.nejši družbeni vplivi rezultirajo v razlic.nih praksah uporabe.4 Problem argumentov, ki sledijo Normanovi prilagoditvi koncepta zmožnosti, pa je, da pri svojem vztrajanju na zmožnostih kot lastnostih oblikovanega pred-meta zanemarijo konkretno situirano naravo vsakokratne rabe slednjih. Nagy in Neff (2015) tako ugotavljata, da … imajo [uporabniki/ce, op. p] lahko dolocena pricakovanja do svojih komunikacijskih tehnologij, podatkov in medijev, ki v praksi oblikujejo nacine, na katere k njim pristopijo in za katere mislijo, da so predla­gani. Ta pricakovanja niso nujno vkljucena v oblikovanje uporabni­ških orodij, vendar vseeno tvorijo zaznavo dejanj, ki so uporabnikom na voljo. (Nagy in Neff, 2015: 5) Po Gibsonu je razprava o zmožnostih odrinila na stran ravno prednost njegovega relacijskega koncepta. Nagy in Neff (2015) zato ponudita koncept zamišljenih zmožnosti kot rešitev tega teoretskega problema. zamišljene zmožnosti so zmožnosti, ki jih npr. uporabnik/ca neke spletne platforme na njej razume kot take. Ceprav so ustvarjalci vmesnika neke platforme zanj predvideli doloc.en spekter uporab, so konkretne zmožnosti uporabe, ki jih uporabniki dojemajo kot take, zmeraj produkt kompleksnega razmerja med njihovimi dispozicijami na eni strani in konkretno materialnostjo vmesnika na drugi. Shaw (2017) njuno teorijo zmožnosti kot pristop za razumevanje novih medijev nadgradi z adaptacijo Hallovega (2012) modela ukodiranja in raz­kodiranja. Interpretacijo praktic.nih zmožnosti, ki jih dovoljuje posamezna Z uporabo koncepta zmožnosti se Hutchby (2001) postavi na vmesno pozicijo med konstruktiviz-mom in realizmom, ki je še najbolj sorodna teoretikom ATN (actor-network theory), npr. Latourju, Lawu in Callonu. Za opis odnosa ATN do drugih paradigem s podrocja študij znanosti in tehnologije glej npr. Luthar (2007). Hutchby se od teoretikov ATN razlikuje predvsem po tem, da jasneje loci vlogo cloveških in necloveških akterjev ter strožje analiticno razlikuje cloveške smotre in materialne znacilnosti objektov, pri cemer se izogne prestrogemu dualizmu družba/tehnologija, prek poudarka na zmožnosti, kot koncept, ki opisuje odnos vzajemnega ucinkovanja in konstrukcije med cloveškimi intencami in materialnostjo objek­tov. tehnologija, razume prek Hallove delitve na dominantno-hegemonska, pogajalska in opozicijska branja medijskih tekstov ter te tri moduse bra-nja razume kot moduse »potencialnih aktivnosti z novo-medijskimi teksti, objekti in formami« (Shaw, 2017: 597). Pri poskusu aktualizacije teorije interpretacije medijskih tekstov na podroc.je novomedijsko posredovanih komunikativnih praks pa moramo biti previdni. V takšnem poc.etju namrec. zmeraj tic.i nevarnost, da interpretiramo znac.ilnosti posameznega vmesnika kot tekst5 (Hutchby, 2001). S tem bi zavrgli eno izmed glavnih prednosti koncepta zmožnosti, apliciranega na vmesnike, torej poskus razumevanja nac.inov, na katere oblike tehnološkega posredovanja uokvirjajo delovanja uporabnikov. Sama forma nekega vmesnika omogoc.a niz zmožnosti, ki sle­dijo neposredno iz njegove tehnic.ne narave; ta niz zmožnosti pomeni polje omejitev, ki onemogoc.ajo, da bi bili vmesniki zgolj tabula rasa, na katero lahko projiciramo katerokoli zamišljeno zmožnost. Tehnic.na narava vme­snikov omogoc.a zamišljanje šele v drugem koraku. Na tem mestu predlagamo dodatno razširitev Shawovega modela. Na eni strani imamo tako razlic.ne stopnje odmika od dominantno-hegemonskih rab v odnosu do vmesnika, na drugi strani pa razlic.ne stopnje odmika zno­traj vmesnika. Ta razdelitev se nam zdi pomembna, ker omogoc.a vzpostavi­tev dvojne kritic.ne pozicije za razumevanje komunikacije prek novih medi­jev. S tem mislimo, da mora kakršnakoli kritic.na analiza novih medijev vzeti v obzir dva vidika. Na eni strani tehnološki in ekonomski aspekt infrastruk­ture novih medijev, ki stoji v ozadju konkretne manifestne oblike vmes­nika, pri c.emer se naš odnos do teh aspektov kaže v obliki rab v odnosu do vmesnika, na drugi strani pa analizo vsebine in dinamike komunikacijskih praks znotraj vmesnika, ki se kažejo prek raznolikih nac.inov uporabe mani­festnega dela vmesnikov spletnih družbenih omrežij. Prvo kritic.no pozicijo bomo bolje razumeli, c.e se navežemo na delo Srniceka (2016), ki analizira razlic.ne spletne platforme (med katere sodijo tudi spletna družbena omrežja) kot sestavne dele platformnega kapitalizma in poudarja dejstvo, da vec.ina profitov in družbene moc.i le-teh izhaja iz popolnega beleženja delovanja uporabnic/kov na njih. Beleženi podatki imajo ekonomsko vlogo surovine, na podlagi katere je mogoc.e opravljati podatkovne analize,6 ki koristijo poslovnim ali politic.nim interesom akter­jev, ki uporabljajo spletne platforme za (predvsem) marketinške namene, posebej pa platformi sami kot ponudniku takih storitev. z vidika proizva­janja podatkovne sledi je vsak komunikacijski akt na spletnem družbenem omrežju nekaj, kar vec.a maso podatkov in s tem surovine, ki je platformi 5 Glej npr. Woolgar in Grint (1997). 6 Pri temu Srnicek eksplicitno kritizira tezo Terranove (2000), ki izhaja iz operaisticnega koncepta družbene tovarne, po kateri naj bi kakršnokoli udejstvovanje na spletnih družbenih omrežjih predstav­ljalo direktno obliko dela. na voljo.7 To pomeni, da je kakršnakoli raba v odnosu do vmesnika splet­nih družbenih omrežij, ki pretendira k opozicijski ali vsaj pogajalski poziciji, nujno vezana na uporabo metod, ki so v subverzivnem odnosu do mehaniz­mov, prek katerih dotic.ne platforme vršijo svoje operacije ekstrakcije podat­kov, s ciljem nadaljnjega ustvarjanja profita. Skratka, nujno ustreza definiciji tega, kar se v internetni kulturi imenuje exploit8 in zahteva doloc.eno mero inženirskih znanj na podroc.ju informacijskih tehnologij in programiranja. Namen tega c.lanka pa je predvsem konceptualizacija druge kritic.ne pozicije. Medtem ko je mogoc.e najti oblike trolanja v praksah, ki sodijo pod širšo domeno hekerskega delovanja na spletu in odnosa do vmesnikov, nas bo tukaj, z druge perspektive, zanimala predvsem trolovska ironija, ki jo naj-demo v spletnih praksah, ki se odvijajo znotraj vmesnikov, torej tistih, ki so omogoc.ene znotraj nekaterih najpogostejših komunikacijskih okvirjev sodobnih oblik rac.unalniško posredovane komunikacije. Mediji in koncept dispozitiva V svoji interpretaciji Foucaultovega koncepta dispozitiva Agamben (2006) pokaže kljuc.no vlogo, ki ga ta zaseda v Foucaultovem razmišljanju o oblikah vladnosti, hkrati pa poudari, da Foucault v svojih tekstih koncepta nikoli eksplicitno ne definira. Po Agambenu se definiciji najbolj približa v intervjuju iz leta 1977: Kar poskušam definirati s tem imenom, je predvsem popolnoma hete­rogen skupek, ki prepleta diskurze, institucije, arhitektonske strukture, regulativne odlocitve, zakone, administrativne ukrepe, znanstvene izreke, filozofske, moralne in filantropske propozicije, skratka, tako izreceno kot neizreceno, ki tvorijo elemente dispozitiva. Dispozitiv je mreža, ki se vzpostavi med temi elementi. (Foucault, Michel (1994): Dits et écrits, vol. III, 299–300; citirano iz: Agamben, 2006: 6–7) Agamben iz tako široke definicije izpelje ontologijo, na kateri temeljijo poznejša Foucaultova dela in deli stvarnost na tri kategorije – substance ali živa bitja, dispozitive in subjekte, ki niso ontološka realnost zase, temvec. so presec.išc.e med prvima dvema, pri c.emer je lahko vsako živo bitje subjek­tivirano s strani mnoštva dispozitivov, ki jih ta opredeli kot »… dobesedno katerokoli stvar, ki ima na nek nac.in zmožnost ujeti, orientirati, doloc.iti, 7 Couldry in Mejias (2019) uporabljata v tem kontekstu kar metaforo kolonizacije, pri cemer je tisto, kar je kolonizirano, naše družbeno življenje. 8 Exploit je izraz za izkorišcanje neke napake ali pomanjkljivosti v programiranem okolju, kjer posa­mezniki le-to izkoristijo, da bi prišli do rezultata, ki jim ponuja preprosto zabavo ali pa je celo usmerjen k politicno obarvani subverziji. Za vec o temi glej Galloway in Thacker (2007). prestrec.i, modelirati, kontrolirati in zagotoviti geste, vedenja, mnenja in diskurze živec.ih bitij« (Agamben, 2006: 21–22). Agambenovo razumevanje Foucaultovega koncepta dispozitiva je širši konceptualni okvir, znotraj kate­rega razumemo prej omenjeni govor o zmožnostih. zmožnosti novih medi­jev, ki jih bomo opisali, tvorijo torej nek dispozitiv. Preden se lotimo razlage sestave tega, kar bomo poimenovali medijsko--trolovski dispozitiv, torej mreže, ki jo sestavljajo predvsem štirje kljuc.ni elementi, pa bomo predhodno odgovorili še na nekaj potencialnih pomi­slekov na takšno konceptualizacijo. Andreasen (2019) na primeru medijev opozarja, da koncepta zmožnosti in dispozitiva implicirata razlic.ni perspek­tivi. zmožnost je tako predvsem to, kar medij uporabnikom/cam omogoc.a, medtem ko koncept dispozitiva implicira perspektivo, pri kateri medijski dispozitiv uporabnike medija doloc.a v njihovem delovanju. Skratka, c.e prvi temelji na razumevanju odnosa med akterjem in medijem, kjer je njun odnos relativno simetric.en (ni mogoc.e rec.i, da narava neke naprave ali vme­snika bolj vpliva na njeno rabo kot uporabnik/ca sam/a), pa perspektiva koncepta dispozitiva opozarja na asimetrijo razmerij moc.i, ki so vgrajene v delovanje vsake dispozitivne mreže. A vendar se že Andreasen v zakljuc.ku istega teksta naveže na Deleuzeov (2015) pripis h konceptu družbe nadzora in zakljuc.i, da predstavljajo uporabniški vmesniki spletnih družbenih omre­žij obmoc.je, kjer ni mogoc.e razlikovati med nudenjem zmožnosti in doloc.a­njem uporabniškega delovanja s strani dispozitivov. Vmesniki spletni druž­benih omrežij ustvarjajo množice prosumerjev – hkratnih potrošnikov in producentov vsebin, nad katerimi se oblast vrši ravno prek njihovega aktiv­nega angažmaja z zmožnostmi vmesnikov. Drugi resnejši pomislek se tic.e razmerja med tem, kar tukaj koncipi­ramo kot medijsko-trolovski dispozitiv, in drugimi dispozitivi, s katerimi je mogoc.e opisati sodobno realnost novih medijev, predvsem spletnih družbenih omrežij. Ta naloga je vse prej kot enostavna in – vsaj v smislu popolne razmejitve – nemogoc.a. Kot pravi Agamben, ima koncept dispozi­tiva v Foucaultovem delu predvsem strateško vlogo (Agamben, 2006: 5), v smislu tega, da mu ponuja možnost konceptualnega povezovanja razlic.nih elementov, ki sodelujejo v produkciji konkretnih oblik oblasti. V tem smislu je ravno sodobnost kot obdobje množenja dispozitivov hkrati tudi obdobje prekrivanja le-teh, posebej na ravni njihovih posameznih elementov, ki lahko igrajo razlic.ne vloge v razlic.nih dispozitivnih mrežah. Na tem mestu bi opozorili predvsem na analizo Terranove (2015), ki poudarja prenos mehanizmov neoliberalne sekuritizacije, o katerih govori Foucault v svojih delih o biopolitiki, na spletna družbena omrežja. Ti meha­nizmi temeljijo predvsem na seriji dispozitivov varnosti kot »prostorskih tehnologij oblasti, ki se tic.ejo predvsem upravljanja s cirkulacijo« (prav tam: 114) in težijo predvsem k njeni »ekspanziji in stabilizaciji« (prav tam). Ceprav se Foucaultova prvotna analiza osredini predvsem na nac.ine uprav­ljanja populacij, ki so osredotoc.eni predvsem na telesa, pa je mogoc.e, kot to stori Terranova in kot poudarja Han (2017), ko predlaga uvedbo termina psihopolitika, tovrstno razumevanje upravljanja s cirkulacijo razširiti tudi na sfero komunikacije ter psiho-socialnega življenja prebivalstva. Psihopolitic.ni dispozitivi, o katerih posredno govori Terranova, stojijo v ozadju spletnih družbenih omrežij kot obliki kontrolirane družbenosti, ki se, podobno kot sfera politike, podrejajo imperativom trga, ki služi v neoliberalni epohi kot model preoblikovanja vseh družbenih institucij. Ta razmislek, ki smo ga v prejšnjem razdelku uvrstili predvsem v obliko kritike rab v odnosu do vme­snika (katerega primarni namen je, kot rec.eno prej z drugimi besedami, omogoc.iti c.im vec.jo kolic.ino kontrolirane cirkulacije informacij), seveda pomembno vpliva tudi na dinamiko samih procesov komunikacije, ki se vršijo znotraj vmesnika. Polje konceptualizacije, ki se ga lotevamo v tem c.lanku, pa je nekoliko ožje in bolj specific.no ter služi dopolnitvi razumeva­nja prepleta že opisanih dispozitivov s še neopisanim. zadnji pomislek, ki ga bomo tukaj na kratko omenili, sta vloga in stanje subjekta in subjektivacijskih procesov v kontekstu mnogih dispozitivov, ki doloc.ajo posameznike/ce. Kot izhodišc.e bomo vzeli Agambenovo tezo, da sodobno, skorajda nepregledno množenje dispozitivov, ki doloc.ajo posa­meznike/ce, ne rezultira v procesih subjektivacije, temvec. v splošnem pora­stu procesov desubjektivacije.9 Te procesi naj bi ustvarjali predvsem posa­meznike/ce, ki so nezmožni povezovanja v kolektivne politic.ne subjekte, in s tem onemogoc.ali grajenje družbene solidarnosti. Ceprav je vec. kritikov opozorilo na pretirano pavšalnost Agambenove teze, ki npr. ponavlja pre­sežene dualizme med tehnic.nim uokvirjenjem delovanja in avtentic.no eksi­stenco (Stiegler, 2010: 160–171) ter podcenjuje vlogo politic.no-ekonomskih kategorij pri razumevanju vpliva dispozitivov na našo (de)subjektivacijo (Fischbach, 2012: 48–54), pa je vendarle pri tematiki dispozitivov vprašanje subjekta in subjektivacije neobhodno. Stališc.e, ki ga zato tukaj zavzemamo in ki bo postalo nekoliko bolj jasno iz opisov v naslednjem razdelku, je, da se ni mogoc.e postaviti na nac.elno, kategoric.no stališc.e glede razmerja med subjektivacijo in desubjektivacijo v delovanju medijsko-trolovskega dispozi­tiva. Ceprav se zdi, da je efemerna narava spletne komunikacije nekaj, kar v splošnem podpira Agambenovo tezo, pa lahko že v drugem elementu spo­daj opisanega dispozitiva najdemo potencial tako za bolj kot manj stabilne oblike subjektivacije. V primeru trolanja kot prakse zac.rtovanja mej lastne diskurzivne skupnosti je tako mogoc.e najti element, ki izkazuje izrazito pri­padnost neki družbeni skupini ali npr. politic.nemu prepric.anju. Glede na Agambenov izraz je sicer nekoliko hiperbolicen – desubjektivacija je zanj proces proizvajanja efe­mernih, zgolj zacasnih subjektivitet, za razliko od bolj trajnih oblik subjekta. kompleksno naravo posameznikove/c.ine pripadnosti neki družbeni sku­pini, ki je v spletnem kontekstu dodatno zakomplicirana s strani efemerne narave komuniciranja na njem, pa je odgovor na vprašanje trdnosti in traj­nosti posameznih subjektivacij na spletni družbenih omrežij mogoc.e najti zgolj na ravni konkretnih študij primerov. Trolovsko-medijski dispozitiv Splet in njegove platforme predstavljajo najvec.ji obstojec.i arhiv pred­hodno objavljenih medijskih vsebin, vendar ima obic.ajni nac.in, prek kate­rega do njih dostopamo, drugac.no strukturo kot dostopanje do njih prek drugih, starejših medijev. Ce na kratko ponazorimo to misel: ogled posnetka, ki je predvajan na televiziji, doloc.a precej drugac.na situacija recepcije kot ogled posnetka, ki se nahaja na spletnem družbenem omrežju Youtube. Posnetek je na Youtube naložil doloc.en uporabnik in ga opremil s komen­tarjem, pod katerim se nahajajo komentarji drugih uporabnikov. Do nas je prišel, potem ko ga je objavil nekdo, ki mu sledimo na spletnih družbenih omrežjih; objava je potencialno spet opremljena tako s komentarjem objav­ljajoc.e osebe kakor tudi ostalega obc.instva s seznama prijateljev, ki mu je posnetek na voljo. Že postavitev televizijske vsebine na nek kanal, v nek c.asovni termin, format televizijske oddaje in druge okolišc.ine, v katere je neka oddaja umešc.ena,10 kontekstualizirajo sporoc.ilno vrednost videnega posnetka na nac.in, prek katerega mu podelijo dodaten nabor konotacij, ki jih ni mogoc.e odkriti na ravni njegove manifestne vsebine, temvec. izhajajo iz specific.nega prepleta razmerja med kontekstom, sporoc.evalcem, prejem­nikom, vsebino in modalnostjo sporoc.ila.11 za ironijo kot retoric.no sredstvo je v formalnem smislu kljuc.no neskladje med posameznimi elementi komunikacijske situacije iz prejšnjega odstavka. Ceprav je tovrstno neskladje možno pravzaprav v vsaki komunikacijski situaciji in v vsakem tipu medija, se število njenih posamic.nih elemen­tov na spletnih družbenih omrežjih drastic.no povec.a, s tem pa tudi njene materialne zmožnosti proizvodnje ironije in s tem trolovske komunikacije. Spletna družbena omrežja, kot sta npr. Facebook ali Twitter,12 imajo v svoj vmesnik vgrajeno možnost deljenja vsebin, ki so že bile deljene drugje na 10 Primer tega je npr. postavitev oddaje pred in po doloceno interstiticijsko (ang: interstitial) vsebino (reklame, napovedi itd.), ki jo opisuje Ellis (2011). Umešcenost oddaje med te vsebine, po ugotovitvah avtorja, vpliva na njeno recepcijo. 11 Glej npr. Fiske in Hartley (2003), posebej poglavja 3, 4, 5 in 7. 12 Ta dva primera izpostavljamo zgolj kot verjetno najbolj znana bralstvu – zelo podobne funkcije imajo tudi druga spletna družbena omrežja in aplikacije za instantno pošiljanje sporocil, od Wechata do Telegrama, kljub dolocenim posebnostim vsakega izmed njih (Instagram npr. ne dovoljuje enakega tipa deljenja vsebin). platformi, s preprostim klikom na gumbe share oz. retweet, medtem ko velik del spletnih strani zunaj teh platform ravno tako ponuja integracijo z njihovimi funkcijami. Ta oblika deljenja vsebin omogoc.a, da lahko s pre­prostim klikom spremenimo kontekst, v katerem je vsebina percipirana. To nam predstavlja prvo izmed kljuc.nih zmožnosti komuniciranja na spletnih družbenih omrežjih in sodobnem uporabniškem spletu nasploh – (1) vse­prisotnost orodij za resignifikacijo13(Weatherby, 2019). zmožnost resignifi­kacije, tj. spremembe pomena vsebine na uporabniškem spletu, je v strikt­nem smislu sestavljena – njen pogoj je serija drugih predhodnih možnosti, ki jih Boyd (2011) postavi kot temeljne znac.ilnosti rokovanja z vsebino na uporabniškem spletu – persistenca vsebine, njena replikabilnost, njena skalabilnost14 in možnost, da išc.emo po razlic.nih vsebinah. Da bi razumeli pomembnost resignifikacije obstojec.ih vsebin za npr. ironic.ni humor, nam ni treba pogledati posebej na spletna družbena omrežja. Pomislimo pre­prosto na dnevnopolitic.no oddajo z ironic.nim tonom, kot je Daily Show (Magill, 2007: 22). Oddaja, ki slovi po svoji humorni predstavitvi dnevno­politic.nih tem, je v veliki meri sestavljena zgolj iz segmentov, ki so vzeti iz poroc.anja drugih televizij in pri c.emer je dovolj, da samo prestavimo izsek videovsebine in ga predstavimo novemu obc.instvu, da dosežemo humorni uc.inek. To obc.instvo v grobem tvori diskurzivno skupnost, tj. skupino ljudi, ki jih druži »kompleksna konfiguracija deljene vednosti, verjetij, vrednot in komunikativnih strategij« (Hutcheon, 1994: 87). Spletna družbena omrežja omogoc.ajo sleherniku, da se poslužuje primerljivih manevrov resignifika­cije kot avtorji dotic.nih objav. To nas pripelje do druge pomembne zmožnosti, zaradi katere se na sodobnem spletu trolovska komunikacija dogaja tako pogosto. Ceprav posamezne stopnje posredovanja posameznega sporoc.ila, ki smo jih orisali, omogoc.ajo vzpostavitev razlic.nih oblik resignifikacije prvotne vsebine spo­roc.ila, pa bi razlike, ki se pojavijo, izzvenele v prazno, c.e ne bi imele na voljo razlic.nih obc.instev. Tisto, kar dela trolanje za posebej mikavno komunika­cijsko modaliteto izražanja na spletu, je pravzaprav kompleksna interakcija med posameznimi diskurzivnimi skupnostmi. Ceprav je preplet razlic.nih dis-kurzivnih skupnosti pojav, ki ga najdemo pravzaprav že od nekdaj, je treba upoštevati, da se pogostost takšnih interakcij vec.a v pozni modernosti15 in 13 Ceprav je resignifikacija, tj. prestavitev vsebine v drug kontekst, ki vpliva na njeno recepcijo, nekaj, kar lahko najdemo že v literarnih delih, o cemer prica mnogo literarnoteoretskih razprav okoli koncepta intertekstualnosti, ravno tako pa že na televiziji in radiu, pa predstavlja obca dostopnost enostavnih orodij za resignifikacijo novost, ki jo uvede šele uporabniški splet, posebej spletna družbena omrežja. 14 Skalabilnost pomeni zmožnost, da je lahko digitalna vsebina hitro in množicno razširjena po spletu. Pri tem je pomembno imeti v mislih, kot pravi boyd, da »lastnost skalabilnost ne pomeni, da se širijo vsebine, ki jih posamezniki želijo razširiti ali tiste, za katere mislijo, da bi se morale razširiti, temvec da [spletni, op. p.] kolektiv odloca o tem, katera vsebina bo razširjena« (boyd, 2011: 48). 15 Pri razumevanju tega se naslanjamo predvsem na Harveyjevo (1989) analizo politicno-ekonom­ da predstavlja uporabniški splet drastic.no povec.anje možnosti takih sre-c.anj. V svojem zgodnjem delu je boyd (2002) pod vplivom Meyrowitzeve (1985) študije o vplivu sodobnih medijev (predvsem televizije) na socialno dinamiko zmeraj vec.jega manka zamejitve med obmoc.ji pravil, ki defini­rajo specific.ne družbene situacije, postavila tezo o kolapsu konteksta, ki ga prinašajo novi mediji. zaradi tega, ker se na isti spletni platformi lahko sre-c.ajo najrazlic.nejše diskurzivne skupnosti, je posameznik na njej postavljen v situacijo, ko mora komunicirati na višji ravni taktic.nosti, saj ima zmeraj opravka s kompleksno konfiguriranim obc.instvom. Ceprav predstavlja uporabniški splet obmoc.je vsaj deloma zamejenih grozdov (ang: clusters) uporabnikov, ki odražajo razlike med posameznimi družbenimi skupinami in so ravno tako osnovani na kulturnih distinkcijah razreda, spola, jezika in drugih pripadnosti, ki konstituirajo vsakršno diskur­zivno skupnost, pa je vendarle mogoc.e rec.i, da trenutna struktura uporabni­škega spleta omogoc.a bistveno lažje prehajanje med mesti, kjer se te skup­nosti nahajajo. Veliko verjetneje je, da se bo nakljuc.ni šaljivec, ki si o desnih populistih ne misli nic. dobrega, znašel na njihovem profilu na Twitterju kot na kongresu njihove stranke. Sodobni splet tako omogoc.a (2) lažjo agre­gacijo specific.nih diskurzivnih skupnosti in bolj preprosto prehajanje med njihovimi mesti srec.evanja. To enostavno prehajanje pa – kot protiutež kolapsu konteksta – povec.a potrebo po praksah ustvarjanja distinkcij in simbolnega zac.rtovanja mej (Gal, 2018), ki konstituirajo diskurzivne skup­nosti in temeljijo predvsem na ustvarjanju razlike med njihovo notranjostjo in zunanjostjo. Pomemben del teh praks postane tako tudi trolanje. S tem ko nevedni/a uporabnik/ca ne prepozna trolanja, izkaže svojo nepripadnost skupnosti. To situacijo pa še posebej zaplete dejstvo, da je na spletu pogo-sto težko prepoznati komunikacijsko intenco posameznikov/ic. Nemožnost ugotavljanja intence je ena izmed kljuc.nih znac.ilnosti situ-acij izražanja na spletu, ki poganja trolovske prakse. Te situacije so dovolj pogoste, da so že pred petnajstimi leti privedle do formulacije t. i. Poejevega zakona (Poe’s law). Med debato o kreacionizmu na spletnem forumu chri­stianforums.com, je leta 2005 uporabnik Nathanael Poe namrec. ugotovil, da je »brez mežikajoc.ega emotikona ali drugega oc.itnega izraza humorne namere … … popolnoma nemogoc.e parodirati kreacionista, ne da bi to deja-nje nekdo interpretiral kot iskreno« (Poe’s Law). To nas privede do tretje zmožnosti, ki spodbuja spletno trolovsko komunikacijo in katere zametke najdemo že v zgodnji internetni kulturi anonimnosti in psevdonimnosti:16 ske dinamike pozne modernosti, katere rezultat je to, kar sam konceptualno opredeli kot casovno-pro­storsko kompresija, in na analize Rose (2013, 2015), po kateri je temeljna poteza modernosti družbeno pospeševanje, ki se kaže na podrocjih tehnicnega razvoja, sprememb družbenih institucij in zmeraj bolj freneticnega živetega vsakdana. 16 Psevdonimnost je situacija, kjer se posameznik/ca predstavlja s psevdonimom. (3) splošne pogostosti nepoznavanja drug drugega na spletu oz. zmožno­sti ne biti prepoznan. Ceprav se na spletnih družbenih omrežjih, npr. na Facebooku ali Twitterju, posamezniki povec.ini predstavljajo s svojim ime­nom in priimkom, pa je situacij, v katerih lahko pride do napac.nega pripi­sovanja komunikacijske intence, pravzaprav ogromno. Vsaka vec.ja, uporab­nikom obc.e dostopna Facebook-skupina ali npr. vsaka nit komentarjev na profilu posameznega podjetja, teme ali znane osebnosti, pritegne navadno najrazlic.nejše uporabnike/ce, ki se med sabo povec.ini ne poznajo. Posebej v primerih, kjer gre za strani in skupine, ki so namenjene širši, mednarodni skupini uporabnic/kov, najdemo tako posameznike/ce, katerih intenco izrekanja lahko ugibamo zgolj na podlagi skopih informacij. Že zgodnje štu­dije (Donath, 1995; Pfaffenberger, 2003) vedenja uporabnikov na Usenetu, na katerem je mogoc.e uporabnike identificirati prek elektronskega naslova, kažejo na najrazlic.nejše strategije manipulacij pri izkazovanju lastne identi­tete in namer. Ravno tako kot je naše prepoznavanje intence osebe, ki nam nekaj spo­roc.a, zaradi zgoraj naštetih faktorjev nekaj, kar je na uporabniškem spletu pogosto oteženo, sproža ta situacija doloc.ene uc.inke na strani tistega, ki nekaj sporoc.a. Pogosto so tako spletni/e uporabniki/ce, ki se postavijo v situacijo anonimnosti, psevdonimnosti ali pa jim preprosto ni mar glede potencialnih negativnih sankcij oz. le-teh sploh ni (Golf-Papež in Veer, 2017), posebej motivirani za to, da v svojem komuniciranju možnost lastne neprepoznavnosti tudi izkoristijo. zabrisana sled za pravo identiteto posa­meznika/ce tako omogoc.a, da se posamezniki/ce poslužujejo najrazlic.nej­ših manipulacij, ki izkorišc.ajo nevednost njihovega obc.instva, kakor tudi to, da izpovejo lastne intimne tegobe in dvome, ki bi jih sicer skrivali. Ta pojav, ki je v psihologiji znan kot dezinhibicijski uc.inek interneta (Suler, 2004; Joinson, 2007) in ga povzroc.ajo razlic.ni dejavniki (anonimnosti, vec.je enakosti med posamezniki, asinhronosti komunikacije, vpliva disociativne imaginacije), ki doprinesejo k temu, da se posameznik na spletu vede na nac.ine, na katere se sicer ne bi, je eden izmed kljuc.nih pogojev obc.e raz­širjenosti trolovske komunikacije na internetu. Dezinhibicijski uc.inek inter-neta tvori posebej uc.inkovito kombinacijo skupaj z razlic.nimi nac.ini, na katere spletne platforme vplivajo na naše afektivne odzive. Gilroy-Ware (2017: 64–139) tako ugotavlja, da vse vec. psiholoških raziskav kaže na to, da ima obsedenost z uporabo spletnih družbenih omrežij presenetljivo podo­ben znac.aj kot zasvojenost z igrami na srec.o, pri kateri postanemo odvisni od anticipacije zadovoljstva. Po objavi, ki jo naredimo na spletnem druž­benem omrežju, nastopi trenutek c.akanja na morebitne odzive, ki v obliki komentarjev, všec.kov, c.ustvenih simbolov in/ali nadaljnjega deljenja objavi podelijo doloc.eno mero pozitivnega ali negativnega pripoznanja, ki ga – skladno z našo zac.etno intenco – doživljamo na pozitiven ali negativen nac.in. V tem smislu je vsaka objava hazarderska poteza, saj lahko zgolj pou-c.eno ugibamo glede odzivov, na katere bo naletela. Ceprav so, kakor ugo­tavlja Gilroy-Ware, vmesniki spletnih družbenih omrežij oblikovani tako, da na posamezni platformi dosegajo c.im vec.jo aktivnost pri uporabnikih, pa je »hazarderski« znac.aj objavljanja na spletu širša znac.ilnost, ki presega zgolj spletna družbena omrežja. Kombinacija, ki doleti mnoge uporabnike spleta, je tako na eni strani dezinhibiranost, ki izvira iz anonimnosti ali iz disociativnega znac.aja rac.unalniško posredovane komunikacije, na drugi strani pa želja po pozitivnem pripoznanju doloc.enega števila uporabnikov, ki v grobem pripadajo podobni diskurzivni skupnosti. To nas pripelje do zadnjega izmed faktorjev, ki stojijo v ozadju trolanja kot posebej pogostega in mikavnega modusa komunikacije na internetu, tj. tega, da rac.unalniško posredovana komunikacija deluje dezinhibicijsko, medtem ko ustroj splet­nih družbenih omrežij in spletnih skupnosti – prek mehanizmov pripozna­nja, ki so del samega vmesnika – spodbuja prakse, ki sprožajo moc.ne afek­tivne odzive. Skratka, (4) splet ponuja zmožnosti pridobivanja pripoznanja, zadovoljstva in pozitivnih sankcij za trolanje. Sklep V c.lanku smo prikazali, kako sta tako teorijo zmožnosti kot Foucaultov koncept dispozitiva, kakor ga interpretira Agamben (2006), primerni orodji za analizo pogojev sodobne komunikacije, v katerih se vršijo sodobne prakse ironic.nega izražanja na spletu, s posebnim ozirom na prakse tro­lanja kot primer retoroloških (Avanessian, 2015: 15–23) govornih dejanj, ki rekonfigurirajo razmerja med posameznimi elementi komunikacijske situacije in s tem producirajo družbeno realnost (Hutcheon, 1994: 9–37; Avanessian, 2015: 5–6). Pri prikazu zmožnosti vmesnikov nekaterih izmed najpogosteje uporab­ljenih spletnih družbenih omrežij smo se osredotoc.ili na tiste izmed njih, ki vzpostavljajo razmere za spodbujanje trolovskih komunikacije, in jih razde­lili na štiri kategorije. Te kategorije so 1) vseprisotnost orodij za resignifika­cijo vsebin, 2) enostavnejša agregacija posameznih diskurzivnih skupnosti in njihovo pogostejše medsebojno srec.evanje, 3) pogostost nepoznavanja sogovorca/ke na spletu in s tem nemožnost pripisovanja intenc njegovim/ njenim komunikacijskim aktom in 4) sistem spodbud na spletnih družbe­nih omrežij, ki temelji na funkcijah všec.kanja, deljenja, komentiranja in drugih ter omogoc.a posameznikom/cam pridobitev pripoznanja in s tem pozitivno valorizacijo znotraj neke diskurzivne skupnosti, katere meje, prek trolovskih praks, zmeraj vnovic. zac.rta. Souc.inkovanje teh štirih zmožnosti spletnih družbenih omrežij smo delovno poimenovali medijsko-trolovski dispozitiv. Glavni prispevek c.lanka je teoretska konstrukcija tega koncepta, prek katerega lahko analiziramo sodobne oblike spletne komunikacije kot doloc.ene s strani zmožnosti vmesnikov spletnih družbenih omrežij. Delovanje medijsko-trolovskega dispozitiva v vsakem konkretnem pri­meru doloc.a srec.anje med posameznimi diskurzivnimi skupnostmi, katerih meje so okrepljene, zac.rtane in/ali rekonfigurirane s strani trolovske komu­nikacije. To vidimo kot posebej primerno izhodišc.e za nadaljnje empiric.ne analize tega, kako lahko medijsko-trolovski dispozitiv vpliva na razmerja med diskurzivnimi skupnostmi na spletnih družbenih omrežjih v posamic.­nih situacijah. Takšne analize nam lahko pomagajo razumeti razmerje med efemernostjo in stabilnostjo diskurzivno doloc.enih identitet, kot so npr. rasne, spolne, razredne, politic.ne in druge pripadnosti, ter njihovega odnosa do lastne zunanjosti. Takšne raziskave se nam zdijo posebej pomembne v zgodovinskem trenutku, ki ga zaznamuje retorika desnih politic.nih popu­lizmov, ki pogosto spretno izkorišc.ajo zmožnosti komunikacije na spletnih družbenih omrežij in se poslužujejo trolovske komunikacije. 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Topinka, Robert (2019): Back to a Past that Was Futuristic: The Alt-right and the Uncanny form of racism. Dostopno prek http://www.boundary2.org/2019/10/ robert-topinka-back-to-a-past-that-was-futuristic-the-alt-right-and-the-uncanny­form-of-racism/, 15. 11. 2020. Warf, Barney (2018): Usenet. V: Warf, Barney(ur): The Sage Encyclopedia of the Internet. London: Sage Publications, 890–893. Walther, Joseph B. (1996): Computer-mediated communication: Impersonal, inter­personal and hyperpersonal interaction. V: Communication Research 23: 342– 369. Walther, Joseph B. (2007): Selective self-presentation in computer mediated com­munication: Hyperpersonal dimensions of technology, language, and cogni­tion. V: Computers in Human Behavior 23: 2538–2557. Weatherby, Leif (2019): Irony and Redundancy: The Alt Right, Media Manipulation and German Idealism. Dostopno prek http://www.boundary2.org/2019/06/ leif-weatherby-irony-and-redundancy-the-alt-right-media-manipulation-and-ger-man-idealism/, 15. 11. 2020. Woolgar, Steven in Keith Grint (1997): The Machine at Work: Technology, Work and Organization. Cambridge/Malden: Polity Press. VIRI Poe’s Law. (15. 11. 2020) Dostopno prek https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Poe%27s_ Law, 15. 11. 2020. Deja CRNOVIC* EVENTIZACIJA IN KOMOdIFIKACIJA POLITIKE NA INSTAGRAMU** Povzetek. Politika 21. stoletja je zaradi mediatizacije, eventizacije in vdiranja tržne logike v politicno polje vedno bolj personalizirana. V ospredju niso politike, temvec osebe, ki delujejo v politicnem polju. Politiki in politicarke so s svojim delovanjem blizu zvezdnikom in zvezdnicam, saj privid kompetence bolj kot v politic­nem delovanju crpajo v svoji zasebnosti oziroma oseb­nih vrednotah. Dosegajo ga z uprizarjanjem dolocene­ga spola in razreda, s pomocjo cesar se v populisticni maniri približujejo »ljudstvu« oziroma »navadnemu cloveku«. Clanek analizira uprizarjanje moškosti in razreda ter posledicno depolitizacijo prek Instagrama na primeru dveh predsednikov držav, Boruta Pahorja in Aleksandra Vucica. Ceprav oba predsednika v svo­jem domacem politicnem polju delujeta populisticno in obcasno tudi domacijsko, na njunih profilih na Instagramu prevladuje uprizarjanje kozmopolitske, v primeru Pahorja pa tudi nove, narcisoidne moškosti. Medtem ko Vucic daje prednost objavam s tujimi vodi­telji z mednarodnih srecanj, je pri Pahorju bistveno vec fotografij iz njegove zasebnosti in domacega okolja. Kljucni pojmi: mediatizacija, depolitizacija, eventizaci­ja, Instagram, politika, uprizarjanje, spol, razred Uvod Predsedniška kampanja Boruta Pahorja leta 2012 je bila v vec. pogledih posebna, saj je v njej Borut Pahor, nekdanji evropski poslanec, nekdanji predsednik državnega zbora in nekdanji predsednik vlade, opravljal 46 razlic.nih poklicev: od smetarja do frizerja. Vsako opravljanje poklica je bilo dokumentirano s fotografijami, ki so jih iz Pahorjevega štaba posredovali medijem, ti pa so fotografije na svojih spletnih straneh objavljali v obsežnih fotogalerijah, vc.asih v politic.nih, vc.asih v zabavnih rubrikah. Fotograf Borut * Dr. Deja Crnovic, samozaposlena v kulturi, dejacrnovic@gmail.com. ** Izvirni znanstveni clanek. DOI: 10.51936/tip.58.2.409-427 Krajnc je iz fotografij, posnetih med kampanjo, ustvaril tudi koledar. Pahor je po tej kampanji leta 2012 postal predsednik države, na tem položaju je še danes. zdaj ne opravlja vec. drugih poklicev, ima pa svoj uradni predsedni­ški profil na Instagramu s 128 tisoc. sledilkami in sledilci, na katerem skoraj vsak dan objavi fotografijo; vc.asih iz predsedniške palac.e, vc.asih z obiska tujine, spet drugic. s tekaške proge, domac.e naprave za fitnes, plaže. Pahor ni edini svetovni politic.ni voditelj z bogatim profilom na Instagramu, tudi odnos do tega družbenega omrežja se je v zadnjih osmih letih precej spre­menil, saj je postal skorajda nujen sestavni del politic.nega komuniciranja. Posebnost družbenih medijev je, da imajo na njih nadzor nad objavlja­njem vsebin in njihovim uokvirjanjem politiki in politic.arke oziroma nji­hovi svetovalci in svetovalke, strokovnjaki in strokovnjakinje za odnose z javnostmi, ne pa na primer novinarji in novinarke oziroma uredniki in ure­dnice. Medtem ko se nekateri politiki najraje poslužujejo kratkih, besedil­nih objav na Twitterju (Donald Trump, Janez Janša), se drugi precej bolj posvec.ajo objavljanju podob na Instagramu (Borut Pahor, Justin Trudeau, Aleksandar Vuc.ic´). S tem ko osebe v politiki svoja sporoc.ila in fotografije objavljajo na družbenih omrežjih, novinarji in novinarke izgubljajo mono-pol nad javnimi informacijami, zato Ekman in Windholm (2015) govorita o mediatizirani soodvisnosti, kjer so tako osebe v medijskem kot v politic.nem polju odvisne druga od druge pri opravljanju svojega dela. Ko so tako novi­narji in novinarke kot politiki in politic.arke »medijski akterji« in »medijski viri«, se spremeni tudi razmerje moc.i; politiki in politic.arke se vedno bolj lahko zanašajo na lastno medijsko produkcijo, s tem pa imajo tudi vec.ji nad­zor nad svojo podobo v javnosti. V nadaljevanju bomo zato pogledali, kaj se dogaja s politic.nim poljem v mediatizirani družbi, kako se to vedno bolj depolitizira in kakšno vlogo ima pri depolitizaciji uporaba družbenih omrežij, predvsem Instagrama. S pomoc.jo analize Instagram profilov dveh predsednikov držav, Boruta Pahorja in Aleksandra Vuc.ic´a, ki sta si svetovnonazorsko na prvi pogled precej razlic.na, bomo poskušali detektirati nac.ine, na katere je njuno poli­tic.no delovanje personalizirano, eventizirano in posledic.no depolitizirano. V analizi se bomo osredotoc.ili predvsem na njuno uprizarjanje moškosti in razreda na Instagramu. Oba sta namrec. v svoji dolgoletni politic.ni kari­eri prestala številne transformacije, kot predsednika držav pa morata po eni strani za domac.e obc.instvo uprizarjati bolj domac.ijsko razlic.ico moškosti, po možnosti delavskega razreda, za tuje obc.instvo pa buržujsko-racionali­stic.no moškost, ki je bolj primerna za uprizarjanje moškosti v mednarodni politiki. zanimalo nas bo, kako se v njunih objavah na Instagramu odraža njuna politika, c.e sploh, z analizo objav v izbranem obdobju leta 2020 bomo skušali kategorizirati objave po njihovi vsebini in tako dobiti oris prevladu­joc.ih tem na profilih, z analizo posameznih objav pa razbrati »namen« objav ter kako se predsednika v svojih objavah na družbenem omrežju, ki nagra­juje pozitivne vsebine, razlikujeta. Mediatizacija družbe in politike Ne glede na vrsto prevladujoc.ega medija živimo v mediatizirani družbi (Couldry in Hepp, 2013), v kateri so mediji kljuc.na referenc.na toc.ka za doje­manje in razumevanje sveta in družbe. To pomeni, da vec.ino informacij, ki jih imamo o družbi, prejmemo prek medijev – tudi c.e govorimo o nepo­sredni komunikaciji med osebami v živo, bo dojemanje obravnavnih vse-bin še vedno moc.no odvisno od tega, kako so bile prej posredovane prek medijev in na kakšen nac.in so bile uokvirjene. Mediji oziroma medijsko polje niso avtonomni, temvec. so podvrženi številnim zunanjim dejavnikom. Medijsko in politic.no polje vzajemno vplivata drug na drugega, na medijsko polje pa vpliva tudi tržna logika. Posledic.no to pomeni, da v politic.no polje prek medijskega vdirajo razlic.ni diskurzi, ki so bližje tržni logiki. Takšni so na primer zvezdniški diskurz (Street, 2003, 2004; van zoonen, 2005), zaradi c.esar je politika vedno bolj personalizirana (van Santen in van zoonen, 2010), torej osredotoc.ena na posamezne politic.arke in politike, ter (epizo­dic.no) uokvirjanje (Iyengar, 1991), znac.ilno za medijsko logiko (Altheide in Snow, 1979), zaradi c.esar je politika vedno bolj eventizirana (Saxer, 2007), torej osredotoc.ena na dogodke in obc.utja. Tržna logika s seboj prinaša tudi t. i. banalizacijsko silo. »[C]im širšo publiko si hoc.e pridobiti nek medij ali katero koli sredstvo izražanja, tem bolj se mora znebiti ostrine, vsega, kar bi lahko loc.evalo, razdvajalo« (Bourdieu, 1996/2001: 39). Bolj ko je nek medij bran/gledan/poslušan, bolj se ogreva za omnibusne teme, ki ne nac.enjajo problemov, ki naj ne bi nikogar šokirale, glede katerih se vsi strinjajo, ki ne razdvajajo ljudi, se vsem zdijo zanimivi, »vendar na tak nac.in, da se ne dota­knejo nic.esar pomembnega« (Bourdieu, 1996/2001: 15). Objave politikov in politic.ark na družbenih omrežjih, kjer imajo sami nadzor nad vsebino, pred­vsem na Instagramu, sledijo podobni logiki – c.im manj vsebin, ki bi lahko razdvajale, c.im vec. vsebin, ki prinašajo všec.ke. Personalizacija in eventizacija politike Ker se politika ne zanaša vec. na skupne družbene lastnosti svojih volivk in volivcev, mora svoje volilno telo šele »ustvariti« na podlagi privlac.nosti svojih strank oziroma kandidatk in kandidatov (van zoonen, 2005: 59). S tem prihaja do personalizacije politike, politic.na komunikacija pa je vedno bolj neracionalna in usmerjena k dogodkom, obc.utjem in izkustvom (Saxer, 2007: 185). Pri medijski »kolonizaciji« politike se s prevladujoc.im vplivom zabavne medijske kulture podroc.je zasebnosti zac.ne širiti na javno, kar je še posebno koristno v politiki, kjer akterji vedno težje dajejo obljube, saj rezultati niso odvisni zgolj od njih; veliko lažje poudarjajo in prodajajo svojo osebnost in zasebnost. Personalizacija osebe v politiki približuje zvezdniškemu statusu, ki pa ga ti vec.inoma ne dosežejo po nakljuc.ju, temvec. z zavestnim delo­vanjem v smeri pridobivanja pozornosti in projiciranja doloc.ene podobe. zvezdništvo postane utelešenje diskurzivnega boja o normah individualno­sti in osebnosti znotraj kulture (Marshall, 1997: 65), zato je (zvezdniško) tek­movanje za uspeh tudi tekmovanje prevladujoc.ih družbenih vrednot. Politic.na persona temelji na performansu, ki je sestavljen iz doloc.ene mere samozavedanja in kalkulirane prevare, ker pa performans poleg druž­benega življenja vkljuc.uje tudi zasebno, so pri politic.nih personah vedno bolj v ospredju osebne, in ne politic.ne vrednote (Corner, 2000: 391–394), ki jih je treba predstaviti prek dogodkov, o katerih nato poroc.ajo mediji ali pa so objavljeni na družbenih omrežjih. Medijski dogodki so »prekini­tve rutine« in »oblika komunikacije« (Hepp in Couldry, 2010: 10), mediji, še posebno televizija, pa dogodke potrebujejo za svoje vsakodnevno delova­nje. S spremembami v medijskem polju, kjer je zaradi financ.nih omejitev vedno manj specializiranega novinarstva in vedno vec.ji pritisk na proizva­janje velike kolic.ine novic, se »novinarske zgodbe« pogosto zreducirajo na izjave in podobe, ki povzemajo, poenostavljajo oziroma kondenzirajo kompleksne politic.ne procese v eni podobi (Wodak, 2011). Pri tem že same izjave in podobe, c.e so dovolj novinarsko zanimive, postanejo dogodki. Družbeni mediji in mediatizacija Vsako družbeno omrežje ima svoje znac.ilnosti, kot so struktura omrežja, funkcionalnost, algoritmi in modeli datafikcije oziroma nac.ini, na katere se vsebino pretvarja v podatke. Gilroy-Ware (2017) kljub razlikam med omrežji izpostavlja štiri glavne znac.ilnosti c.asovnice družbenih omrežij: viri novic so uporabniku oziroma uporabnici vec.inoma »poznani«, saj jih je izbral/a sam/a (jih dodal/a, jim sledi, je z njimi prijatelj/ica), c.asovnica je navidez neskonc.na, torej daje vtis, da vsebin ne bo nikoli zmanjkalo, mešanica vse-bin je prilagojena posamezniku ali posameznici in ne sledi vec. klasic.nim delitvam na žanre ali formate, ter obc.utek novosti in nepredvidljivosti, torej obc.utek, da bo ob vsakem obisku omrežja uporabnik ali uporabnica videla nekaj novega. Obiskovanje družbenih omrežij po Gilroy-Ware tako nima za cilj zgolj informiranja, temvec. tudi zadovoljevanje c.ustvenih potreb, na pri­mer potrebe po zabavi in pozitivnih novicah kot distrakciji, ki pripomore k c.ustvenemu preživetju posameznika ali posameznice (Gilroy-Ware, 2017: 169). Na družbenih omrežjih so bolj kot informacije v ospredju afekti in pre­pric.anja, zato je vedno bolj pomembno tudi uprizarjanje c.ustev. Medtem ko tradicionalno novinarstvo stremi predvsem k objektivnosti, tako v novinarstvu kot na družbenih omrežjih v ospredje prihajajo c.ustva, ki se v politic.nem polju uprizarjajo strateško in glede na družbeni kontekst (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019). z informalizacijo (po Wouters, 2007) politic.nega polja in vedno vec.jo vlogo osebnih in c.ustvenih narativov se spreminja tudi narava politic.ne komunikacije. Ceprav po Wouters (2007) s tem pride do »eman­cipacije« c.ustev, pa to s seboj prinaša tudi potrebo po vedno vec.ji samore­gulaciji oziroma samonadzoru akterjev. S tem ko politiki in politic.arke sami postanejo medijski producenti, »breme« zabavanja obc.instva, s tem pa tudi strateškega uprizarjanja c.ustev in njihove osebnosti, pade na njih. Družbena omrežja s svojo c.ustveno infrastrukturo pod vprašaj postavljajo strogo loc.i­tev med zasebnim in javnim, individualnim in kolektivnim ter osebnim in politic.nim (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019), samouprizarjanje pa postane pomem­ben del politic.nega delovanja. V primerjavi Facebooka, Twitterja, Snapchata in Instagrama Bossetta (2018) ugotavlja, da je Twitter predvsem medij reakcij, torej družbeno omrežje, na katerem se objave navezujejo predvsem na (politic.ne) dogodke v drugih, klasic.nih medijih. Instagram tovrstne c.asovne odvisnosti nima oziroma za razliko od Twitterja ne služi kot »drugi ekran« (Larsson, 2017). Larsson (2017) na podlagi analize volitev na Norveškem ugotavlja, da je Twitter vec.inoma dojet kot elitni medij, ki ga uporabljajo predvsem ljudje na položajih moc.i, kot so politiki in politic.arke ter zaposleni in zaposlene v medijih in na podroc.ju odnosov z javnostmi, medtem ko so uporabniki in uporabnice Instagrama mlajši, »navadni« ljudje. z vidika c.ustvene arhi­tekture je Twitter medij razuma, pa tudi sovraštva, »trolanja« in negativnih c.ustev, medtem ko na Instagramu vec. pozornosti dobijo pozitivne vsebine (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019) oziroma kot je razliko opisala britanska konserva­tivna politic.arka Nadine Dorries (v Hinsliff, 2019): »Twitter je za politiko. Instagram je za ljudi, ki so mi všec., in stvari, ki jih želim videti.« Instagram je medij strateške samoreprezentacije, kar pomeni, da gre za namerno izbrane in predstavljene rutine delovanja, pogosto s pomoc.jo zasebnih fotografov ali fotografinj s privilegiranim dostopom, ki jih politiki ali politic.arke najamejo za beleženje uradnih in polzasebnih situacij. Na ta nac.in posnete fotografije lahko predstavljajo tako resne opravke in vladne zadeve, kot so srec.anja z drugimi politiki in politic.arkami, pa tudi vpogled v zakulisje ali zasebno življenje (Marland, 2012). Prav fotografije slednjega pripomorejo k »normalizaciji« politika ali politic.arke in k projekciji njegove oziroma njene avtentic.nosti. »Hobiji in druge prostoc.asne dejavnosti naka­zujejo vidike njihove osebnosti zunaj politic.ne arene ali iz c.asov pred nje­nim zac.etkom« (Liebhart in Bernhardt, 2017: 20). Objavljanje na družbenih omrežjih pogosto pomeni, da so politiki in politic.arke v permanentni digi­talni kampanji, hkrati pa jim objavljanje na družbenih omrežjih omogoc.a, da zaobidejo tradicionalne medijske posrednike in neposredno naslovijo obc.instvo (Lalancette in Raynauld, 2019). Vzpon politic.ne rabe družbenih omrežij po Ekmanu in Windholmu (2015) pripomore h komodifikaciji poli­tike, zvezdniški politiki oziroma konstrukciji individualiziranih, oznamc.e­nih politikov in politic.ark, prek komunikacije na družbenih omrežjih pa je politika posledic.no vedno bolj depolitizirana. Personalizacija politike tako ni zgolj posledica komercializacije novic in vdiranja tržne logike v uredni­ško politiko, temvec. tudi posledica bolj personaliziranega delovanja in komunikacije politikov in politic.ark (Ekman in Windholm, 2015), tudi na družbenih omrežjih. Uprizarjanje spola in razreda v politiki Uprizarjanje oziroma performativnost spola (Butler, 2006/1999) pomeni, da spol ni biološka danost, temvec. nekaj, kar je treba ves c.as uprizarjati s ponavljanjem dejanj in lastnosti, ki jih družba pripisuje moškim ali žen­skam. Moškosti se vec.inoma pripisujejo fizic.na in mentalna moc., tekmoval­nost, agresivnost, dominantnost, racionalnost, nec.ustvenost in objektivnost (Elinor Ochs, 1992) s pozitivnim predznakom, kar jih uvršc.a pred oziroma nad lastnosti, ki praviloma pritic.ejo ženskosti, kot so mehkoba, c.ustvenost in skrb (Beynon, 2002: 56). »Ženske lastnosti« so še vedno dojete kot manj zaželene, tudi – oziroma še posebno – pri moških. Ker pa je spol stvar upri­zarjanja, je moškosti in ženskosti vec., tudi znotraj politic.nega polja. Ena od oblik privilegirane moškosti, najpogosteje prisotne v (mednarodni) politiki, je buržujsko-racionalistic.ni model, ki ga opisuje Hooper (2001). Ta model izvira iz mednarodne politic.ne sfere in je model manj agresivne, bolj egali­tarne in demokratic.ne moškosti. Idealizira tekmovalni individualizem, razum, samonadzor in samozanikanje. Kombinira spoštovanje in prerac.unljivo raci­onalnost v javnem življenju, superiorni intelekt in osebna integriteta pa sta bistveno bolj cenjena kot fizic.na moc. ali pogum. Gre za moderno obliko moškosti, prvo obliko novega moškega, ki je tesno povezana z razsvetljen­stvom in moderno državo ter razvojem kapitalizma (Hooper, 2001: 88). V 80. letih prejšnjega stoletja sta se predvsem v Veliki Britaniji in njenem revijalnem tisku pojavili dve narcisoidni obliki nove moškosti, in sicer novi moški (New Man) in novi fant (New Lad), obliko nove moškosti skrbnika pa najdemo na primer v zDA, kjer v 70. in zac.etku 80. let nastopi podoba novega oceta, ki se oblikuje kot nasprotje tradicionalni, neekspresivni, hipermaskulini moško­sti (Messner, 1993), ki se vedno bolj premešc.a na nižje razrede. Novi moški narcis je posledica spremenjenih družbenih razmer in razmerij med spo­loma, tudi posledica komercializacije moškosti in ekspanzije potrošništva po drugi svetovni vojni. Tako kot podoba novega oc.eta je tudi splošna kulturna podoba novega moškega podoba belega, heteroseksualnega moškega iz sred­njega ali višjega razreda, pri katerem premik v osebnem in življenjskem slogu predstavlja odmik od tradicionalne moškosti, ki jo privilegirani moški vidijo kot nezdravo ali c.ustveno omejujoc.o. Poznokapitalistic.na družba, ki jo opi­suje Lasch (2012), spodbuja vzpon narcistic.nega osebnostnega tipa, ki pred­stavlja psihološko razsežnost splošne družbene odvisnosti od države, korpo­racije in drugih birokracij. »Narcis namrec. kljub obc.asnim iluzijam o lastni vsemogoc.nosti potrebuje druge, da potrjujejo njegovo samospoštovanje. Ne more živeti brez obc.udujoc.ega obc.instva« (Lasch, 2012: 28), svojo negotovost pa lahko premaga le tako, da v pozornosti drugih vidi odsev svojega grandio­znega jaza. Narcisoidna nova moškost tako svojo zadovoljitev lahko najde na družbenih omrežjih, posebej na Instagramu, ki s svojo c.ustveno arhitekturo preferira predvsem pozitivne podobe in odzive. Vendar pa so nove moškosti predvsem moškosti privilegiranega razreda in so posledic.no v politic.nem polju, z vidika populizma, manj uc.inkovite. Laclau (2008) populizem definira kot diskurzivno strategijo, ki konstruira politic.no fronto, ki razdeljuje družbo na dva tabora in poziva k mobilizaciji tistih z manj moc.i proti tistim na oblasti. Po Laclauu populizem ni ideolo­gija in ga ne moremo pripisati specific.ni programski vsebini, niti ni poli­tic.ni režim. Je nac.in ustvarjanja politike, ki lahko prevzame številne ideo­loške oblike glede na c.as in kraj in je kompatibilen z vrsto institucionalnih okvirov. Po Kalbu (2011) populizem v trenutni situaciji pomeni zavrac.anje liberalnih, kozmopolitskih elit, ki svetovnih virov, ki so na voljo, ne znajo izkoristiti za potrebe lokalnega prebivalstva. Posledica tega so generacije telegenic.nih in karizmatic.nih ideologov, ki rušijo vzpostavljene politic.ne razrede in institucije. Moškost delavskega razreda v nasprotju z novo moškostjo ponuja tra­dicionalne vrednote, povezane s predindustrijskim obdobjem, ko je vec.ja fizic.na moc. pomenila vec.ji zaslužek. Medtem ko moški srednjega razreda lahko pridobivajo institucionalno moc., lahko moški delavskega razreda pridobivajo fizic.no moc. in posledic.no pogosto prevzemajo mac.o iden­titete, da bi z njimi prekrili svojo nemoc., ki jo kompenzirajo tudi z domi­nantnostjo v domac.em okolju (Beynon, 2002: 20). Medtem ko je moškost delavskega razreda v kapitalizmu podrejena moškost, pa se nekatere njene lastnosti zrcalijo v uspešnih poslovnežih in politikih. Moškost delavskega razreda ima zato oznako nekakšne hipermoškosti, še posebno v primerjavi z moškostjo srednjega razreda (Hooper, 2001: 71), v politic.nem polju, še posebej v notranji politiki, pa prinaša »dividende«. Tako na primer ugota­vljata Riabov in Riabova (2014: 23), ki na primeru Putinove Rusije opažata »remaskulinizacijo Rusije«, torej identitetno politiko, usmerjeno k ustvar­janju pozitivne kolektivne identitete Rusije. Vzroke za remaskulinizacijo Rusije pod Putinom najdeta med perestrojko v zac.etku postsocialistic.nega obdobja, ko je padec socializma zahteval »normalizacijo« razmer in vrnitev k »naravnemu redu stvari«, v katerem imata strogo doloc.eni mesti tudi moški in ženski spol. Ruski množic.ni mediji po Riabovu in Riabovi (2014: 26) Putinovo podobo maskulinizirajo s pomoc.jo militarizacije in erotizacije ter uporabo besede mužik kot simbola prave moškosti, ki je sprva oznac.evala kmeta, danes pa predstavlja hegemono moškost, moškost, ki temelji na eko­nomski neodvisnosti, samozadostnosti, moc.i, redkobesednosti, poudarku na dejanjih; mužik ni politic.no korekten in se ne zadržuje pri izražanju sek­sizma in homofobije. Putin, ki je sprva ustrezal zahodnjaškemu racional­nemu tipu moškosti – bil je hladen, pragmatic.en in racionalen menedžer –, se je sc.asoma preobrazil v moškega bližje modelu mužika (2014: 27). Glede na to, da se tudi slovenska in srbska družba po razpadu Jugoslavije in samo­upravnega socializma sooc.ata s podobnimi premiki, ne presenec.a, da tako pri Pahorju kot pri Vuc.ic´u najdemo lastnosti domac.ijske hipermoškosti, ki se prepletajo z buržujsko-racionalistic.no moškostjo mednarodne politike. Študiji primera Borut Pahor Borut Pahor je svojo politic.no pot zac.el v zvezi socialistic.ne mladine Slovenije konec 70. let prejšnjega stoletja, leta 1997 je postal predsednik združene liste socialnih demokratov. Leta 2004 je bil izvoljen v Evropski parlament, leta 2008 pa je po državnozborskih volitvah postal predsednik vlade. Septembra 2011 je bila njegovi vladi izglasovana nezaupnica, istega leta pa se je odloc.il, da kandidira za predsednika države. Pahorjeva kampa­nja za predsednika države je bila skrajno eventizirana, sestavljena iz dogod­kov, ki niso bili neposredno povezani s kandidaturo za najvišjo funkcijo v državi, a so bili zaradi svoje nenavadnosti medijsko privlac.ni. Pahor je pred predsedniškimi volitvami 2012 prostovoljno opravljal 46 razlic.nih poklicev, opravljal je vec.inoma fizic.na dela – bil je na primer smetar, cestar, mesar, gozdar, gasilec in frizer. Pri tem ni šlo za privatizacijo kampanje, saj z oprav­ljanjem del ni razkrival svojega zasebnega življenja, temvec. je šlo za perso­nalizacijo oziroma humanizacijo, pri c.emer je bil namen predstaviti svojo »c.loveško«, »sprošc.eno« ali celo zabavno plat (glej Driessens in dr., 2010). Pahor se je za potrebe kampanje »prelevil« v moškega delavskega razreda, ki pred videz postavlja opravljeno delo, moralo in solidarnost (Crnovic´, 2014), pri tem pa lahko zaznamo tudi poteze domac.ijskosti. Popolna eventizacija kampanje, ki je temeljila na prikazovanju sposobnosti kandidata, na primer telesne pripravljenosti in sposobnosti za fizic.no delo, je Pahorju omogoc.ila vec.jo medijsko vidnost, predvsem pa z njo postavil temelje za svoje bodoc.e politic.no komuniciranje, saj se je z vzponom uporabe Instagrama tudi sam »preselil« na to družbeno omrežje, kjer še danes, kot bomo videli v nadalje­vanju, komunicira predvsem prek podob. Aleksandar Vucic Aleksandar Vuc.ic´ je svojo politic.no kariero zac.el leta 1993, ko je bil izvo­ljen kot poslanec Srbske radikalne stranke. Leta 1998 je postal minister za informiranje, v c.asu, ko je bil predsednik Srbije Slobodan Miloševic´. Vuc.ic´ je v tem obdobju znan po uvedbi kazni za novinarje, ki so bili prevec. kritic.ni do Miloševic´evega režima. Leta 2008 se je pridružil novoustanovljeni Srbski napredni stranki in leta 2012 postal njen predsednik. Srbska napredna stranka je vsaj na zac.etku imela vec.ino c.lanstva iz Srbske radikalne stranke, zaradi c.esar jih mnogi imenujejo tudi »neoradikali« (Jovanovic´, 2018). Kratek c.as je bil minister za obrambo in prvi podpredsednik srbske vlade (pred njim ta pozicija ni obstajala). Leta 2014 je postal predsednik vlade, leta 2017 pa predsednik države. Na volitvah leta 2020 je znova zmagala njegova stranka, ob bojkotu opozicijskih strank pa trenutna sestava srbskega parla­menta nima dejanske opozicije. Kot ugotavlja Jovanovic´ (2018), so medijske reprezentacije Aleksandra Vuc.ic´a v srbskih medijih, predvsem tabloidih, ki so vidno naklonjeni Vuc.ic´u, kompleksne. V analizi naslovov se soc.asno pojavlja diskurz žrtve, v katerem je Vuc.ic´ predstavljen kot tarc.a nac.rtovanega, vendar vsakic. znova spodletelega poskusa atentata, kot diskurz Übermenscha, ki ponuja razlog, zakaj naj bi bil Vuc.ic´ ves c.as žrtev poskusov atentata: je prevec. sposoben, moc.an in uspešen, zaradi c.esar Jovanovic´ (2018: 31) ugotavlja, da se gradi videz predsednika, ki je brez strahu in ki je kompetenten, kljub temu da je ves c.as pod udarom. Hkrati uprizarja »pretirano moškost«, torej patriarhalno »pravo« moškost, pri c.emer je vsak, ki se mu postavi naproti, vsaj »biseksua­len«, zato ne c.udi, da je ena glavnih žaljivk, usmerjenih proti Vuc.ic´u, ki jo je mogoc.e slišati tudi na številnih demonstracijah proti njemu, »Vuc.ic´u pederu«.1 Jovanovic´ primerja medijske reprezentacije Vuc.ic´a z medijskimi reprezentacijami Viktorja Orbana, Recepa Tayyipa Erdogana in Vladimirja Putina, medtem ko Kulic´ (2020) komunikacijo Vuc.ic´a primerja s komuni­kacijo Donalda Trumpa in ugotavlja, da oba izkoristita vec.ino priložnosti, da se »prepirata« z novinarji in novinarkami, le da so Trumpovi napadi bolj osebni, medtem ko Vuc.ic´ svojo kritiko novinarjev in novinark premešc.a na »zunanje naroc.nike« ali »opozicijo«. Aleksandar Vuc.ic´ je tako v svojem slogu komuniciranja precej bližje Janezu Janši kot pa Borutu Pahorju, ven­dar pa, kot bomo videli v nadaljevanju, je njegova politic.na komunikacija na Instagramu bistveno drugac.na od njegove medijske reprezentacije v »tradi­cionalnih« medijih. Dostopno prek http://hr.n1info.com/Regija/a182408/Vucic-snimio-predizborni-spot-Vucicu-pederu. html, 10. 3. 2021. Analiza profilov Aleksandra Vucica in Boruta Pahorja na Instagramu Ob personalizaciji in eventizaciji politike, ko politiki in politic.arke vedno bolj postajajo podobni zvezdnikom in zvezdnicam, je zasebna sfera tista, iz katere politik ali politic.arka c.rpa svojo kredibilnost (Luthar, 2008). Ultimativna politic.na zvezda je tako sposobna uravnotežiti nasprotujoc.e si zahteve politike in zvezdništva in se pozicionirati toc.no na sredino: projicira persono, ki ima izkušnje v politiki, a je še vedno outsider ali outsiderka (van zoonen, 2005). Kot bomo videli v nadaljevanju, sta oba analizirana profila na Instagramu, tako tisti Boruta Pahorja kot tisti Aleksandra Vuc.ic´a, usmer­jena k iskanju ravnotežja med njunima politic.nima funkcijama, ki sta vezani na mednarodno politic.no polje, in zasebnostjo, s pomoc.jo katere skušata uprizarjati domac.ijskost in bližino z »ljudstvom« ter s tem dosec.i »normaliza­cijo« svoje osebnosti. Tako Pahor kot Vuc.ic´ sta na svojih profilih na Instagramu do novembra 2020 objavila okoli 1600 objav, za potrebe analize pa smo pri obeh predse­dnikih izbrali obdobje od marca do novembra 2020. V tem obdobju je Borut Pahor objavil 262 objav, Aleksandar Vuc.ic´ pa 497. Pri tem je Vuc.ic´ v vec.ini primerov objavil po vec. fotografij hkrati, kar pomeni, da je bilo fotografij še vsaj trikrat toliko kot objav. Glede na to, da je zajeto obdobje trajalo 245 dni, lahko ugotovimo, da Borut Pahor vec.inoma objavi po eno objavo na dan, Vuc.ic´ pa v povprec.ju po dve. Že na prvi pogled lahko ugotovimo, da so objave Boruta Pahorja bolj skrbno izbrane, saj posamic.na objava praviloma vsebuje zgolj eno fotografijo, medtem ko so Vuc.ic´eve objave ob pomemb­nih obiskih pri tujih politikih in politic.arkah obsežne, vsebujejo vec. fotogra­fij, pogosto se isto srec.anje pojavi v vec. zaporednih objavah. Objave obeh predsednikov so bile razvršc.ene v tematske kategorije, ki so bile prirejene vsakemu predsedniku posebej. Šlo je namrec. za poskus sortiranja vec.jega števila objav, ki pa vec. kot grobih razmerij med vrstami objav ne pove nic. bolj natanc.nega. Tako lahko pri Pahorju ugotovimo, da je bilo najvec. fotografij posnetih v predsedniški palac.i oziroma na delov­nem mestu, skoraj 40 odstotkov, približno 7 odstotkov je bilo neposredno posvec.enih boju s pandemijo koronavirusa, na 7 odstotkih fotografij pa so bili otroci, vec.inoma na obisku v predsedniški palac.i oziroma je Pahor obi-skal njih. Ce fotografije z otroki pogojno umešc.amo med službene zadeve, je na Instagramu Boruta Pahorja njegovemu opravljanju funkcije predsednika namenjena malo vec. kot polovica vseh objav na Instagram profilu v izbra­nem obdobju. Preostanek objav je osebne oziroma zasebne narave. Slabih 7 odstotkov fotografij je iz predsednikovega arhiva, vec.inoma zasebnega, na primer fotografije iz njegovega otroštva ali pa fotografije njegovega sina. Približno enak delež objavljenih fotografij so portreti predsednika z bolj ali maj šaljivimi pripisi, nekoliko vec., slabih 9 odstotkov, pa je fotografij iz pred­sednikove zasebnosti. Prav tako 9 odstotkov fotografij bi lahko uvrstili v kate­gorijo »fanart«, torej gre za risbice, portrete ali šale na rac.un predsednika, ki so jih ustvarili vec.inoma otroci in mladostniki ter komiki. Na fotografijah se je obc.asno pojavila tudi hrana, a zgolj na treh fotografijah. Hrana, ki je sicer eden od priljubljenih motivov na Instagramu, se je za veliko bolj pomem­ben del uprizarjanja politike pokazal pri Aleksandru Vuc.ic´u. Podkategorija, ki bistveno zaznamuje objave Boruta Pahorja, je šport. V izbranem obdobju je bil šport namrec. tema vsaj 46 fotografij, kar je skoraj 18 odstotkov vseh objav. V c.asu prvega vala pandemije je zabeležil tudi dva obiska frizerja. Profil Aleksandra Vuc.ic´a na Instagramu je precej manj raznolik in bistveno bolj osredotoc.en na Vuc.ic´evo opravljanje predsedniške funkcije. Slabih 500 objav na tem profilu v izbranem obdobju bi lahko razdelili pred­vsem na objave, v katerih so zabeleženi Vuc.ic´evi stiki z drugimi, predvsem tujimi politiki, ter objave, na katerih je Vuc.ic´ prikazan na sestankih, obiskih in drugih službenih obveznostih. Takšnih objav je približno 300, torej vec. kot polovica. Še približno 100 jih je namenjenih Vuc.ic´evim obiskom in sre-c.anjem z ljudmi iz vsakdana ali z zaposlenimi v podjetjih, ki jih je obiskal. Tudi te objave bi lahko šteli med službene, kar pomeni, da jih je od skoraj 500 objav vsaj 400 namenjenih prikazovanju Vuc.ic´evega predsedniškega dela, ki je skozi fotografije videti kot serija sestankov in obiskov, redno pa so na profilu najavljeni tudi njegovi nastopi na srbskih televizijah, medna­rodnih konferencah in drugod. Dodatnih 30 objav je bilo neposredno pove­zanih s pandemijo, kar je primerljiv delež kot pri Borutu Pahorju, torej pri­bližno 7 odstotkov. Vec.ina Vuc.ic´evih fotografij tako prikazuje njega med opravljanjem svojega poklica. Vec.inoma c.asa je v temnomodri obleki, ko ni fotografiran med sestanki, pa je fotografiran med prebiranjem dokumentov ali podpisovanjem le-teh. Edina kategorija, ki izstopa pri Vuc.ic´evih objavah, je tudi tista, ki se naj-vec.krat pojavlja v srbskih satiric.nih oddajah; to so fotografije Vuc.ic´a in hrane. Teh je bilo sicer »zgolj« 24, kar je ob pogostosti objav zgolj 5 odstot­kov vseh objav, pa vendarle so to edine objave, ki so nekoliko bolj osebne narave. Skoraj vsa hrana sodi med tradicionalno srbsko hrano, v vec.ini pri­merov je šlo tudi za doma pripravljene srbske jedi, ki jih je malical ob obi-skih »navadnih državljanov«. Ob prevladujoc.ih objavah o Vuc.ic´evem udele­ževanju mednarodnih dogodkov in srec.anj so objave hrane tiste podobe, v katerih Vuc.ic´ lahko uprizarja svojo domac.ijsko moškost delavskega razreda. Tako Vuc.ic´ kot Pahor kot predsednika držav v svojih objavah na Instagramu uprizarjata predvsem buržujsko-racionalistic.no moškost, zna-c.ilno za mednarodno politiko. Vec.inoma sta na fotografijah v temnomo­drih ali c.rnih oblekah, v formalnih okolišc.inah, ki jih zahteva njuna funkcija. Populistic.nih objav, torej objav, v katerih se skušata približati predstavnikom »ljudstva« oziroma razredu, ki mu sama ne pripadata, je pri Pahorju bistveno vec., vendar v primerjavi z njegovo predsedniško kampanjo 2012 in deloma tudi 2017, ki sta temeljili skorajda izkljuc.no na uprizarjanju drugac.ne, delav­ske moškosti, je uprizarjanja delavske moškosti bistveno manj. Nekaj »doma-c.ijskosti« želi dosec.i z objavljanjem fotografij, na katerih se ukvarja s športom, a ker gre vec.inoma za individualne športe, ki ne zahtevajo fizic.ne bližine drugih, je njegovo ukvarjanje s športom bolj znac.ilno za novo, narcisoidno moškost srednjega razreda, kjer je šport predvsem v funkciji skrbi za telo. Slika 1: BORUT PAHOR MED Slika 2: BORUT PAHOR MED Slika 1: POCITKOM OB MORJU Slika 1: TELOVADBO Vir: Instagram Boruta Pahorja. Vir: Instagram Boruta Pahorja. Pahorjevo uprizarjanje moškosti na Instagramu tako sledi predvsem modelu nove, narcisoidne moškosti, vkljuc.no z obc.asnimi selfiji in fotogra­fijami celotnega telesa v športni opremi. V ospredju so njegova sprošc.enost v prostem c.asu, vitko telo v formi ter skrb zase. Slika 3: VLADIMIR PUTIN IN BORUT PAHOR Vir: Instagram Boruta Pahorja. Ko uprizarja buržujsko-racionalistic.no moškost, je pri tem še vedno bližje narcisoidni obliki nove moškosti, ki jo uprizarja s sprošc.enostjo, nasmehi in v primeru fotografije pred »spomenikom bazoviškim junakom«, pred kate-rim stoji z italijanskim predsednikom Sergiom Mattarello (slika 4), s c.ustve­nostjo in telesno bližino. Slika 4: ITALIJANSKI PREDSEDNIK SERGIO MATTARELLA IN BORUT PAHOR PRED SPOMENIKOM BAZOVIŠKIM JUNAKOM Vir: Instagram Boruta Pahorja. Pri Vuc.ic´u uprizarjanje buržujsko-racionalistic.ne moškosti prevladuje in je skorajda v nasprotju z njegovo osebno politic.no zgodovino, ki temelji na uprizarjanju poudarjene moškosti, ki je bližje Putinu. Instagram je oc.itno bolj kot domac.emu obc.instvu namenjen tujini, saj se na njem Vuc.ic´ skuša 421 samoprikazati kot mednarodno relevanten voditelj, pri c.emer pa bolj kot populistic.ne poteze uc.inkujeta disciplinirano telo in zadržano vedenje. Poleg vseprisotnosti srbske zastave na njegovih objavah je izbor hrane še najbolj nacionalno obarvana dimenzija njegovih objav. Slika 5: OLIVÉR VÁRHELYI IN SLIKA 6: ALEKSANDAR VUCIC ALEKSANDAR VUCIC SLIKA 6: OB VPISU ŠTUDIJA ZA NA SESTANKU V BRUSLJU SLIKA 6: KOŠARKARSKEGA TRENERJA OB SRBSKI PROJI IN POGACI Vir: Instagram Buduc.nost Srbije. Vir: Instagram Buduc.nost Srbije. Njegove objave sicer niso povsem depolitizirane oziroma so bistveno manj depolitizirane kot Pahorjeve, saj s fotografiranjem s svetovnimi vodi­telji ilustrira, s katerimi državami je Srbija v najboljšem odnosu, kljub vsemu pa lahko ugotovimo, da so objave na Instagramu bolj kot politic.nemu delo­vanju namenjene grajenju podobe Aleksandra Vuc.ic´a kot politika v med-narodnem politic.nem polju. Prav tako v objavah ne najdemo uprizarjanja žrtve ali Übermenscha, kot jih v analizi poroc.anja o Vuc.ic´u navaja Jovanovic´ (2018), ali populizma ter napadanja novinarjev in novinark, kot ga v ana­lizi nastopov navaja Kulic´ (2020). Vuc.ic´ na Instagramu uprizarja predvsem buržujsko-racionalistic.no, privilegirano moškost, znac.ilno za mednarodno politiko, z obc.asnimi domac.ijskimi »premori«, ko si privošc.i srbsko nacio­ nalno jed. Slika 7: ALEKSANDAR VUCIC NA SLIKA 8: PREMIERKA ANA BRNABIC TERASI PREDSEDNIŠKE SLIKA 6: IN ALEKSANDAR VUCIC NA PALACE OB LUBENICI SLIKA 6: POSESTVU VUCICEVEGA SLIKA 6: OCETA Vir: Instagram Buduc.nost Srbije. Vir: Instagram Buduc.nost Srbije. Izbrane fotografije z Instagrama Aleksandra Vuc.ic´a odstopajo v tem, da je na njih srbski predsednik prikazan kot gostitelj (na sestanku s komisarjem za širitev EU v Bruslju, na sestanku s premierko na posestvu svojega oc.eta) ali pa je prikazan ob bolj zasebnih opravilih, kot je vpis na fakulteto, ki ni povezana z njegovo politic.no funkcijo. Kljub temu Vuc.ic´ na njih ni prikazan v svoji zasebnosti, kot je to pogosto na fotografijah Boruta Pahorja, temvec. je kot politik postavljen v bolj »sprošc.eno« okolje, pogosto v enakih oblac.i­lih kot med opravljanjem predsedniške funkcije, le na primer brez kravate ali suknjic.a. Pahorjev Instagram je pritegnil precej pozornosti tudi v mednarodnih medijih, v tujih medijih (Associated Press, 2017) so ga opisali kot »mehkega populista«, kar se nanaša predvsem na njegovo objavljanje všec.nih podob. Tako Pahorjevo kot Vuc.ic´evo uprizarjanje politic.ne moškosti na Instagramu bi lahko oznac.ili za populistic.no, vendar pa zaradi same c.ustvene infrastruk­ture Instagrama to nima enakega uc.inka kot na primer populizem Donalda Trumpa na Twitterju. Njun populizem ima za cilj približevanje ljudem, torej izvzemanje iz elite in približevanju ljudstvu, nima pa razsežnosti, ki jo popu­lizmu pripisuje Müller (2016: 35), torej obrac.anje proti doloc.enim (margi-nalnim) skupinam v družbi. Pahorjev »mehki populizem« bi lahko na pod-lagi Instagrama brali kot populizem brez izkljuc.evanja, saj Pahor v svojih potezah – po Laschu (2012) narcisoidno – išc.e potrditev pri vseh, ne glede na njihovo politic.no ali drugo pripadnost, medtem ko je cilj Vuc.ic´evega Instagrama predvsem prikazovanje srbskega predsednika kot enakoprav­nega v družbi svetovnih voditeljev, a tudi c.loveka ljudstva. Sklep Instagram kot družbeni medij, ki temelji na podobah in je manj vezan na hipno odzivanje, kot je na primer Twitter, je primeren predvsem za grajenje podobe politic.ne osebnosti na dolgi rok. Brez omejitev tradicionalnih medi­jev, predvsem uredniških zahtev po relevantnosti, Instagram lahko služi kot mesto, kjer se s podobami gradi personalizirana podoba politike, brez dejanskega bremena politike. Profili politikov in politic.ark na Instagramu so bistveno bolj depolitizirani kot njihove medijske reprezentacije, na njih pa je tudi prostor za uprizarjanje zasebnosti, iz katere nato c.rpajo svojo poli­tic.no kompetenco. Kot smo videli na primeru Boruta Pahorja in Aleksandra Vuc.ic´a, Instagram omogoc.a doloc.eno mero nadzora nad vrsto uprizarjanja spola in razreda, saj dopušc.a širši nabor podob in s tem tudi uprizarjanj. Na profilu Boruta Pahorja na Instagramu je tako približno enak delež »službenih« in zasebnih objav, v katerih uprizarja kombinacijo narcisoidne nove moškosti in v pri­meru »službenih« objav buržujsko-racionalistic.ne moškosti. Nova, narciso­idna moškost Boruta Pahorja je spogledljiva (Yates, 2010), temelji na bliž­njih posnetkih njegovega obraza in fotografijah njegovega telesa v športni opremi ter iskanju odobravanja obc.instva ne glede na njihovo politic.no pre­pric.anje. Skorajda do konca depolitizirano uprizarjanje politike se ujema s c.ustveno infrastrukturo Instagrama, kjer Pahor oziroma njegove sodelavke postanejo ustvarjalci všec.nih medijskih vsebin na družbenih omrežjih, ki imajo le obc.asno informativno vrednost in služijo bolj kot zabava ali distrak­cija od dnevne politike oziroma njegovih predsedniških obveznosti. Vuc.ic´ev profil na Instagramu po drugi strani služi predvsem uprizarja­nju buržujsko-racionalistic.ne moškosti in s tem umešc.anjem Vuc.ic´a v med-narodno politic.no polje. Vpogledov v njegovo zasebnost je manj, ko pa do njih pride, gre predvsem za informalizacijo manir (Wouters, 2007), pri c.emer se z bolj sprošc.enim odnosom (brez kravate ali suknjic.a, ob tradi­cionalni srbski hrani ali pa ob zasebnih opravkih na delovnem mestu) še vedno ukvarja s politiko. Vuc.ic´ev populizem se na njegovem Instagramu kaže predvsem v poudarjanju nacionalne note, torej s poudarjanjem srb­ske tradicije v mednarodnem politic.nem kontekstu, s c.imer poudarja, da je kljub svoji mednarodni dejavnosti še vedno c.lovek ljudstva. Kot ustvarjalec medijskih vsebin na družbenih omrežjih Vuc.ic´ oziroma njegovi sodelavci in sodelavke gradijo predvsem na navidezni neskonc.nosti podob, saj vsak dan objavijo vec. podob predsednika in s tem ustvarjajo vtis njegove delavnosti in vseprisotnosti. Ceprav se profila obeh predsednikov na Instagramu razlikujeta v nac.inu grajenja predsedniške podobe, je obema skupno to, da se v objavah dis-tancirata od svojih politic.nih prepric.anj (Pahor svojih politic.nih prepric.anj sicer od izvolitve za predsednika praktic.no ne izreka vec.); medtem ko Pahor to poc.ne s pomoc.jo objav iz svoje zasebnosti, Vuc.ic´ to poc.ne z objavlja­njem fotografij s srec.anj z mednarodnimi voditelji in voditeljicami, s c.imer ustvarja podobo umirjenega kozmopolitskega politika v mednarodnem politic.nem prostoru, ki pa odstopa od njegove podobe v domac.ih, srbskih medijih. V obeh primerih gre za depolitizirane objave, saj v njih ni politic.ne sporoc.ilnosti, temvec. imajo cilj grajenje doloc.ene podobe predsednika, le da se Pahor v njih bolj nagiba k narcisoidnemu uprizarjanju nove moškosti, Vuc.ic´ pa h kozmopolitstvu. LITERATURA Altheide, David in Robert Snow (1979): Media Logic. Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications. 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A woman’s guide to celebrity politics. European Journal of Cultural Studies 9 (3): 287–301. Wahl-Jorgensen, Karin (2019): Emotions, Media and Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. Wodak, Ruth (2011): Disenchantment with Politics and the Salience of Images. V: Images in Use, ur. Matteo Stocchetti in Karin Kukkonen, 69–88. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Wouters, Cas (2007): Informalization: Manners and Emotions Since 1890. Los Angeles, Calif: SAGE Publications Ltd. Yates, Candida (2010): Spinning, spooning and the seductions of flirtatious mascu­linity in contemporary politics. Subjectivity 3 (3): 282–302. VIRI Aleksandar Vuc.ic´ (@buducnostsrbijeav). Dostopno prek https://www.instagram. com/buducnostsrbijeav, 10. 3. 2021. Associated Press (2017): Barbie, and not a bad guy: meet Borut Pahor, Slovenia’s Instagram president. Dostopno prek https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2017/mar/08/borut-pahor-slovenia-instagram-president, 10. 3. 2021. Borut Pahor (@borutpahor). Dostopno prek https://www.instagram.com/borutpa­hor/, 10. 3. 2021. Hinsliff, Gaby (2019): How Instagram became the politicians’ playground. Guardian 10. 3. 2019. Dostopno prek https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/ mar/10/how-instagram-became-the-politicians-playground, 20. 10. 2020. N1 Srbija (2017): Vuc.ic´ snimio predizborni spot »Vuc.ic´u, pederu!«. Dostopno prek http://hr.n1info.com/Regija/a182408/Vucic-snimio-predizborni-spot-Vucicu­pederu.html, 10. 3. 2021. Breda LUTHAR* POPULARNA KULTURA IN REGRESIVNI POPULIZEM** Povzetek. Družbe se tako na individualni kot na kolek­tivni ravni nenehno presojajo skozi lastne elite. Medijski diskurz »celebrifikacije« in vseprisotno lokalno kulturo slavnežev razumem kot pomemben legitimacijski nara­tiv in enega od kljucnih prispevkov k postsocialistic­nemu neoliberalnemu konsenzu. Clanek se ukvarja z reprezentacijo Melanije Trump v slovenskih medijih in na podlagi empiricnega materiala analizira preplete­nost diskurza slavnih oseb v komercialni popularni kul­turi z regresivnim populizmom. Analiza ugotavlja, da zvezdništvo predstavlja pomembno diskurzivno prakso legitimiranja obstojecih razrednih razmerij in redistri­bucije javnega bogastva v postsocializmu, ki ga je kot del kulturnega repertoarja »protonacionalnega« senti­menta mogoce organizirati v podporo desnicarskega populizma. Kljucni pojmi: regresivni populizem, razred, postsocia­lizem, slavnost, Melanija Trump Uvod Medijski diskurz o slavnih in znanih/vidnih ter splošnejše obravnave realnosti skozi perspektivo posameznikov in individualnega izkustva ima dandanes vedno pomembnejšo vlogo v procesu oblikovanja normativne individualnosti in zamišljene kolektivnosti. Razlic.ne manifestacije celebriti­zacije v starih in novih ali t.i. prezentacijskih medijih so rezultat loc.enih, a medsebojno prepletenih fenomenov mediatizacije družbe, personalizacije in komodifikacije oz. »ekonomizacije družbenega« (Bröckling, 2020: xiv). Celebritizacijo kot reprezentacijsko prakso in diskurzivne procese celebri­fikacije moramo tako razumeti kot vidik dolgoroc.ne strukturne transfor­macije in metaproces. Ima pomembno vlogo pri razumevanju delovanja politic.ne in ekonomske moc.i, posebej dramatic.nega portretiranja razreda * Dr. Breda Luthar, redna profesorica, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija. ** Izvirni znanstveni clanek. Študija je nastala v okviru raziskovalnega programa »Družbena pogodba v 21. stoletju« (P6-0400), in v okviru raziskovalnega projekta »Oblikovanje novega kulturnega polja v Sloveniji v 1980-ih (J6-2576), ki ju financira ARRS, Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije. DOI: 10.51936/tip.58.2.428-446 in razrednih razlik, elit in obic.ajnosti/navadnosti, torej tako konceptov indi­vidualnosti kot kolektivnosti. Couldry (2012: 81) predlaga, da razumemo slavne in vidne kot nekaj, kar poc.nemo, torej kot ritualno prakso. Gre torej za »… nac.in delovanja, ki zac.rtuje meje med eno konstruirano kategorijo (slavneži ali ‘medijski ljudje’) od druge konstruirane skupine (‘navadni ljudje’). Kljuc.no je, da slavneža ne razumemo kot fiksni subjekt, temvec. kot ‘epistemic.ni objekt’. Konceptualizirati ga je potrebno kot ekonomski in kul­turni fenomen, blago, ki je vedno politic.no, ne pa kot osebni položaj posa­meznika« (glej tudi Reckwitz, 2017: 158). Kot reprezentacijski režim individualnosti slava ali »celebrity« temelji na fenomenih, ki so osrednji za poznomoderno kulturo neoliberalnega kapi­talizma: na ideji samotransformacije, nenehnega »dela na sebi«, primata posameznika ali »singularizacije« in njegove oz. njene možnosti neomejene mobilnosti, na kulturi samokreacije in individualne podjetniške subjektivi­tete.1 Slavneži so, kot pravi Marshall (1997/2014, 2006: 4), »hiperprimerki individuuma, ki izražajo potencial in priložnosti posameznika« v razme-rah liberalnega kapitalizma. Ta c.lanek se ukvarja s popularno reprezenta­cijo Melanije Trump v slovenskih medijih in na podlagi tega empiric.nega materiala analizira prepletenost diskurza slavnih oseb v popularni kulturi z regresivnim populizmom ter neoliberalno družbeno in ekonomsko konjunkturo.2 zanimajo nas diskurzivni repertoarji, ki so uporabljeni v tem konkretnem repezentacijskem režimu in njihovo strukturiranje moralne ekonomije razreda in razrednih razlik v lokalnem kontekstu. Kaj torej poc.ne diskurz o »znanih in slavnih« v tradicionalnih in t. i. prezentacijskih ali novih medijih? Izhajamo iz predpostavke, da bi morali fenomen medijske slave in slavnih ljudi razumeti kot diskurz o razredu in o razmerjih med elitami in »navadnimi ljudmi«. Govori o izjemnosti, vidnosti in hkrati o obic.ajnosti, anonimnosti in položaju ljudi kot opazovalcev. Ne gre za vidik že obstojec.ih razrednih odnosov, temvec. za prostor, kjer se razredni odnosi vzpostavljajo in v katerem se odvijajo stalni kulturni spopadi, vpleteni v oblikovanje razre­dnih razmerij. Diskurz slave in praksa celebrifikacije imata torej performativni znac.aj: ne predstavljata le mistifikacije ali prikrivanja razmerij moc.i, temvec. imata kljuc.no praktic.no vlogo v premestitvi strukturnih razrednih neenakosti v 1 O singularizaciji glej Reckwitz 2020, o podjetniški subjektiviteti v razlicnih družbenih sferah glej npr. M. Pajnik in M. Hrženjak, 2020 in Bröckling, 2020. 2 Pojem historicne konjunkture je v kulturnih študijah uveljavil S. Hall (1990) in se pri tem naslanjal na Gramscija in v manjši meri na Althusserja. Konjunkturna analiza po mnenju Egeja in Gallasa (2019: 92) temelji na predpostavki, da se družbena protislovja v nekem specificnem trenutku osredišcijo okoli specificnih tem, ki najbolje oznacujejo dano historicno konjunkturo. Analizo nekega parcialnega feno­mena je torej potrebno analizirati v okviru take akumulacije in kondenzacije protislovij, torej kot trenutek srecanja razlicnih tokov in okolišcin. zamišljeno nacionalno »skupnost skupne usode« in torej potlac.itvi vpraša­nja razrednih razlik. Na drugi strani imata kljuc.no vlogo v reprodukciji mita individualne mobilnosti, samopreoblikovanja in meritokracije. Proizvodnja lokalnih slavnežev v »novih« in »starih« medijih je v preteklih dvajsetih letih zarisala meje med »dobrimi elitami«, ki svoj elitni status zaslužijo, torej med nacionalnimi dosežkarji in zmagovalci in na drugi strani koruptivnimi eli­tami, ki izpodkopavajo in preprec.ujejo mitic.no konstrukcijo »nacionalne skupnosti istosti« (Bauman, 2001). Naj poudarimo, da gre tudi pri konceptu dobrih in slabih elit za epistemic.ne kategorije – nedavna zgodovina novi­narskih zapisov v lokalnih medijih je polna propadlih poslovnežev, t. i. »taj­kunov«, ki so bili v nekem trenutku v medijih sistematic.no obravnavani kot poslovni geniji in kot del panteona nacionalnih herojev postsocialistic.ne transformacije in kapitalske akumulacije (npr. I. Bavc.ar, B. Kordež ali B. Šrot). Diskurzivni režim slave zato lahko razumemo kot del spopadov okoli oblikovanja razrednosti na podroc.ju popularne kulture, ki je tesno preple-ten s sodobnim regresivnim populizmom in – bolj specific.no – z neolibe­ralno transformacijo v postsocializmu. Komodifikacija novic in slavnost kot blago Analiza je utemeljena na diskurzivnem branju in teoretski interpreta­ciji vzorca skoraj neobvladljivega števila 596 c.lankov, ki so bili objavljeni v treh mesecih pred volitvami in po njih ter inavguraciji v letu 2017 v vseh lokalnih medijih ali njihovih digitalnih platformah in so omenjali Melanijo Trump. Vsak c.lanek, ki je omenil Melanijo Trump med 15. oktobrom in 15. novembrom (torej pred volitvami in po njih) ter med 20. januarjem in 20. marcem (po inavguraciji, ko je M. T. postala prva dama), je bil vkljuc.en v vzorec.3 Analiza je bila torej opravljena v dveh korakih, vsega skupaj je bilo obdobje analize dolgo tri mesece. zgodbe o Melaniji Trump niso bile ome­jene na tabloidne medije, temvec. so infiltrirale novice o mednarodni poli­tiki, poslovne rubrike, komentarje in kolumne in feljtone resnih medijev, modni in ženski žurnalizem itd. Medijska reprezentacija Trumpove je torej prec.ila medijske žanre in medije, tako da je prišlo do zlitja tabloidnega in politic.nega novinarstva v širšem kontekstu kulture komercialnega medij­skega prostora. »Novi« in »stari« mediji so ustvarjali dvojno spiralo npr. med tviti, ki so se referirali na tradicionalne medije in obratno. Novice o slavnežih so v svojih žanrski raznolikosti in neskonc.ni repetitiv­nosti in ponavljajoc.i se obnovljivosti idealne za vizualizirano medijsko kul­turo in stalno proizvodnjo »novosti«. Ritualna proizvodnja persone Melanije Medijski material tiskanih medijev in njihovih spletnih platform za obdobje treh mesecev pred ame­riškimi volitvami 2016 ter po njih smo pridobili prek agencije Pristop Kliping. Trump je predstavljala prostor fragmentiranega nacionalnega spektakla in jo moramo razumeti v kontekstu komodifikacije medijev in posebej kon­cepta novice. Lokalni tradicionalni mediji in njihove digitalne platforme so zaradi privatizacije in neoliberalnega restrukturiranja, majhnega lokalnega trga in digitalnih medijev visoko skomercializirani. Kot tudi drugod povsod­nost kulture slavnežev pooseblja splošno transformacijo kulturne vloge medijev (gl. Turner, 2018: 18) in njihovega interesa za slavnost kot blago. Vrsta žanrov v okviru novic o slavnežih je posebej primerna za proizvod­njo z malo resursi in za hiter novic.arski cikel ter kratko obliko novic, ki jih je mogoc.e predstaviti kot nove oz. prenovljene. Ta nekajmesec.ni spektakel torej uteleša komercialne novic.arske vrednote in industrijsko proizvodnjo novic in »novosti« kot blaga. Cilj te analize je, prvic., odgovoriti na vprašanje, kakšna je vloga diskurza o znanih in slavnih v mistifikaciji razrednih razlik in pri razumevanju razreda v populistic.nem sentimentu kot inherentnem delu »celebrity« diskurza. Drugic., kako popularna kultura podpira moralistic.no imaginacijo politike, ki postavlja, kot pravi Müller (2017: 19), »moralno c.isto in popolnoma enotno« in seveda v celoti fikcijsko ljudstvo nasproti elitam. In tretjic., naš cilj je analizirati, kakšna je bila vloga tega specific.nega dramatic.nega portretiranja družbe za diskurzivno konstrukcijo elit in za medsebojno povezanost pojmovanja razreda, spola in etnic.nosti kot treh temeljnih kategorij družbenega razlikovanja. Upamo, da bomo s to partiku­larizacijo pogleda, ko se osredinimo na partikularni primer Melanije Trump, uspeli ta primer predstaviti »kot poseben primer ter ga posplošiti, torej preko apliciranja splošnega vprašanja, odkriti nespremenljive znac.ilnosti, ki jih prikriva pod videzom svoje enkratnosti in posebnosti« (Bourdieu in Wacquant, 1992: 234). Popularna kultura, postsocializem in mistifikacija razrednih razlik za lokalno javno govorico o razredu, posebej za novinarski in politic.ni diskurz o družbenih razlikah, je znac.ilen svojevrstni protislovni populizem. zanj je znac.ilna kombinacija individualizacije razrednih razlik, ki se v popu­larnih medijih med drugim jasno artikulira npr. prek psevdopsihologije, in pomembne vloge popularnih medijev v neoliberalnem filantropizmu, med-tem ko strukturni in politic.ni vidiki lokalnih razrednih razmerij sistematic.no niso obravnavani. Obenem pa je potlac.itev razreda povezana z »nacionali­zacijo« javnega življenja v postsocializmu, ko so ljudje rutinsko nagovarjani kot povezana solidarna skupina, v kateri notranje razlike ne štejejo oz. ne bi smele šteti in je glavni cilj »mitic.na polnost, ki jo zaman išc.emo«, torej popolnoma harmonic.na oz. spravljena družba (Laclau, 2005: 119). Politic.ne in ideološke razlike so tako obravnavane kot usodna anomalija, pri c.emer je svetovnonazorska »razdeljenost naroda« interpretirana kot nenaravna in unic.ujoc.a. Ost (2015) se v uvodniku k tematski številki o tem skupnem vzhodnoevropskem fenomenu ukvarja z odsotnostjo »razredne govorice« v medijskem, politic.nem in družboslovnem diskurzu v »postsocialistic.ni« Evropi, hkrati pa ugotavlja, da je ideja vsesplošnega »srednjega razreda« doživela blešc.ec.o kariero kot oznac.evalka zamišljene prosperitete nekje v prihodnosti kapitalistic.ne transformacije. Sam pojem »postsocializem« uporabljam tu z zadržkom in le kot deskrip­tivni pojem, ki je izšel iz specific.ne historic.ne konjunkture. Ima problema­tic.ne konceptualne in politic.ne implikacije z orientalistic.nim jedrom, saj daje prednost teritorialni imaginaciji, hkrati pa – tako kot stalna ritualna invokacija »komunizma« s strani desne populistic.ne politike – preprec.uje potencialno imaginiranje drugac.nega socializma onstran državnega socia­lizma. Koncept postsocializma v politic.nem diskurzu tako hrani antisocia­listic.ne ali antikomunistic.ne invokacije, ki prispevajo k delegitimaciji vsake alternativne leve politike kot »komunistic.ne« (glej npr. M. Müller, 2019: 534; Owczarzak, 2009). Horvat in Štiks (2012: 39) podobno ugotavljata, da sta dva kljuc.na razloga za vseprisotno retoriko neizvršene tranzicije iz socializma v liberalno demokracijo izogibanje resnemu spopadu s posledicami tranzi­cije in ohranjanje diskurza in odnosov zahodne nadvlade, pokroviteljskega skrbništva ter nadzorovanje nekdanjih socialistic.nih držav. »Komunistic.na« preteklost v socialistic.ni Jugoslaviji je v revizionistic.nem historic.nem okviru simbolna toc.ka nenehnega sklicevanja na stanje pred polno uresnic.itvijo »naroda«. To sklicevanje se hkrati odvija na ozadju posebne razlic.ice kom­binacije globalnih okolišc.in, regresivnega populizma in lokalnega neolibe­ralizma (glej npr. Kalb, 2011; Ribac´, 2018; Hoc.evar, 2020). Ta sedanjost je v celoti iznic.ila mitološko obljubo emancipacije, ki naj bi jo prinesla samo­stojna nacionalna država, temeljec.a na etnic.ni pripadnosti in jasnem izklju-c.evanju nec.lanov.4 Orientalistic.ni vidik pojma postsocializem tako predstavlja sodobno arti­kulacijo »vzhodizma« kot vzhodnoevropskega orientalizma (glej Ballinger, 2017). Gre za simbolno geografijo in diskurzivno konfiguracijo, kjer Vzhod oz. Vzhodna Evropa, podobno kot Orient ali Balkan, obstaja kot smiselna diskurzivna konfiguracija, ki uokvirja in omogoc.a ekonomsko in politic.no perifernost Vzhodne Evrope. Kot ugotavlja D. Kalb (2011: 8), »odvisne države Vzhodne Evrope, z njihovim v celoti kompradorskim kapitalizmom ‘v tran­ziciji’, upravljajo v najboljšem primeru s približno 30 % bogastva zahodne Ko Nick Couldry (2011: 33) razpravlja o problemih z upovedovanjem razrednih razlik v pozni moderni kot o splošnem, in ne kot o problemu, ki bi bil tu nacionalno specificen, poudarja, da ni problem v tem, da »medijem ne uspe spodbujati oz. vzdrževati /ohranjati/ in podpirati obravnave razreda, ki bi temeljila na neenakem dostopu do distribucije resursev, temvec leži problem v specificnih nacinih, skozi katere jim ne uspe povedati te zgodbe. Poudarek v originalu. Vsi tradicionalni distribucijski boji po mne­nju A. Honnetha (2003) vkljucujejo tudi zahtevo po pripoznanju enake vrednosti. Evrope«. Uc.inki neoliberalizma so v teh državah zato mnogo bolj unic.ujoc.i. »Velika regresija« (Geiselberger, 2017), ki smo ji pric.a v globalnem merilu z vzponom razlic.nih oblik regresivnega populizma, je produkt skupnega uc.inka tveganj globalizacije in neoliberalizma in dobi v »postsocializmu« le svojo posebno artikulacijo. Najbolj oc.iten simptom tega souc.inkovanja je izguba suverenosti nacionalnih ekonomij kot temelja nacionalne suvereno­sti. Appadurai (2017) meni, da ravno ta izguba suverenosti povzroc.i pomik k razlic.nim oblikam poudarjanja kulturne suverenosti in obrat k etnonaci­onalizmu. V tem kontekstu je legitimacijski mit, kako bomo konc.no »dohi­teli zahod« in »se vrnili v Evropo«, kljuc.nega pomena za postsocialistic.no transformacijo s pomoc.jo neoliberalnega vpliva EU in narašc.ajoc.e hegemo­nije neoliberalnega kapitalizma, ki se predstavlja kot naraven, ne pa histo­ric.no konstruiran red (glej McGuigan, 2016: 34). Sam pojem »vzhodizma« kot simbolne geografije je lahko konceptualni okvir za razumevanje lokal­nega diskurza slavnežev in njegove mistifikacije razreda ter mobilizacije fikcijske nerazredne primordialne nacionalne skupnosti na eni strani in polkolonialnega položaja na drugi. Njegov simbolizem poc.iva na asimetri­jah moc.i ter na (politic.ni) ekonomiji, ki je inherentna konceptu vzhodizma. Vzhodnoevropska periferija torej v tem c.lanku služi kot analitic.ni okvir, ne kot predmet analize. Izhajamo s stališc.a, da ima kultura osrednjo vlogo v formaciji družbenega in ekonomskega, saj neoliberalni kulturni imaginarij glavnega toka (mainstreama) popularne kulture ponuja »semiotic.ni okvir konstruiranja sveta«, hkrati pa tudi aktivno prispeva k njegovi konstrukciji (Jessop, 2009: 342). Velik del komercialne popularne kulture in komerci­aliziranega novinarstva ter posebej prakso celebrifikacije lahko torej razu-memo kot kljuc.ni narativ legitimacije in upravic.evanja, ki uokvirja aspiracije in moralno ekonomijo razrednosti v lokalnem okolju.5 Še posebej diskurz o slavi je pomemben legitimacijski narativ ali »kulturni mehanizem konsenza« (Hall et al., 1978/2013: 207) v dani historic.ni konstelaciji. Bila je navadno preprosto dekle: konstrukcija obicajnosti in postopek »nacionaliziranja«6 Uprizarjanje navadnosti ali t. i. »demotic.ni obrat« (Turner, 2009) s kore­ninami v resnic.nostni televiziji je tipic.en za sodobno »celebrity« kulturo. V razlic.icah se pojavlja v popularni kulturi, pa tudi na podroc.ju politike ali 5 Za naše potrebe bomo moralno ekonomijo na kratko definirali kot konsenzualno razumevanje pravic in pravicne distribucije resursev (glej Thompson, 1971), pri cemer so lahko viri kolektivnega delova­nja tako dejansko pomankanje in prikrajšanost kot tudi moralne predstave o svojih pravicah. 6 Pojem »nacionaliziranje« povzemamo po G. Turnerju (2018: 64–74) in se v angleškem izvirniku glasi: »nationing«. Ker v slovenskem prevodu implicira ekonomski pojem podržavljanja, naj pojasnimo, da gre za postopek diskurzivnega etnicnega prisvajanja, etniziranja. podjetništva, saj podpira mit neomejene družbene mobilnosti ter merito­kratske zaslužnosti za svoj položaj. Diskurz o vidnih in slavnih v tradicio­nalnih in novih medijih je posebej pomemben pri vzpostavljanju meja med zaslužnimi elitami (nacionalno pomembnimi dosežkarji) ter korumpira­nimi in nezaslužnimi elitami, saj ima osrednjo vlogo pri legitimacijskem mitu neoliberalne transformacije in naturalizacije redistribucije družbe­nega bogastva in mita meritokratske zaslužnosti. Nic. izjemnega torej ni, da je bila celotna diskurzivna praksa celebritizacije Melanije Trump v lokalnih medijih utemeljena na njeni domnevni obic.ajnosti. Uprizarjanje krepostne obic.ajnosti je en od kljuc.nih kulturnih tropov, prek katerega so sodobne elite predstavljene ali se same predstavljajo. Proizvodnja obic.ajnosti je nac.in medijske samoprezentacije, ki jo uporabljajo elite, vse od kraljevskih dru­žin do poslovnih elit ali politikov (glej npr. Repo in Yrjölä, 2015; Adamson, 2017; Littler, 2018). Orodje te produkcije so življenjske zgodbe, narativi o vzponu znanih in slavnih od skromnih zac.etkov prek truda do slave, uspeha ali bogastva, ki so nepogrešljivi del diskurza o slavnih in obenem referenca na skupno izkustvo z obc.instvom. Javna persona Melanije Trump (torej njen javni jaz) je dalec. od navadnosti; Trumpova ni nikoli uprizarjala obi-c.ajne ženske in je prek svojih odvetnikov prepovedala vsako komercialno uporabo svojega imena v Sloveniji in vsako znamc.enje, povezano z njenim imenom ali osebo. Naloga utemeljevanja njene obic.ajnosti je pripadla lokal­nim medijem v postopku komodifikacije njene persone in pri tem utemelje­vanju je bila njena slovenskost kljuc.ni pogoj njene obic.ajnosti. Melania je bila zelo pridna in delavna. S svojimi sošolci se je dobro razu­ mela. (nekdanja uc.iteljica, Svet24, 2016: 4) Lepo, preprosto dekle. (Božic., 2016: 11–12) Melanija je bila zelo prijetna deklica, vedno je bila ona tista, ki nas je mirila, ko smo se prepirali. (Glešc.ic., 2016: 2–3) Navadnost in koncept navadnega c.loveka v resnici nima realne pojavno­sti, saj gre za »plavajoc.i oznac.evalec«, vedno odnosen in historic.no spodbi­jan. Nima torej stabilnega pomena, temvec. je pripisan oz. uprizarjan v spe­cific.nem kontekstu za specific.ne uc.inke. Williams (1983: 225–226) govori o »navadnih ljudeh« kot oznac.evalcu za »generalizirana telesa Drugih«, v tem primeru tistih, ki nimajo moc.i. Kot ugotavlja Langhamer (2018: 21) v svoji zgodovinski študiji pojmovanja navadnosti, je koncept obic.ajnosti, navadnosti družbena kategorija, afektivna kategorija, moralna kategorija, potrošniška kategorija in predvsem politic.na kategorija. Navadnost ne pomeni statistic.nega povprec.ja (Sacks, 1984), temvec. nac.in, na katerega se kdo konstituira ali ga, kot v našem primeru, konstituirajo in komodificirajo mediji. Kategorija navadnosti je torej vedno historic.na in politic.na kategorija in kljuc.no vprašanje zadeva vrsto vrednosti, stilov in praks, ki podeljujejo pomen zahtevi po navadnosti v specific.ni historic.ni konjunkturi. Kako je torej navadnost konstruirana in zagotovljena in kaj pomeni politic.ni uc.inek uprizarjanja oz. pripisovanja obic.ajnosti? Kako je torej mogoc.e legitimno zasesti subjektni položaj obic.ajnega, navadnega c.loveka? Kljuc.ni element postopka legitimacije in depolitizacije položaja Melanije Trump je torej njena obic.ajnost. Njena »izjemna obic.ajnost« (Littler, 2018: 121) je konstruirana prek ritualne reiteracije biografske zgodbe o transfor­maciji iz navadnega dekleta v ženo milijonarja in predsedniškega kandidata oz. predsednika. Ta reiteracija vkljuc.uje tematizacijo njenega navadnega otroštva v malem provincialnem slovenskem mestu, spominjanja pric. na njeno navadno mladost in na navadnost njenih staršev, na njeno pot v svet ter na prvo srec.anje s Trumpom. Mediji jo pri tem skorajda izkljuc.no ime­nujejo le z lastnim imenom in si na ta nac.in prisvojijo ljudski jezik vsakda­nje interakcije, s tem pa domestificirajo in humanizirajo njeno persono. Ta biografski narativ je narativ uspeha z dvema stereotipnima mitološkima ele­mentoma: življenje v provincialnem malem mestu (Sevnica) in srec.ni pre­boj, uspešna poroc.na transakcija (zgodba o poti od navadnosti do izjemno­sti in uspeha). Ženski uspeh je praviloma reprezentiran kot iracionalen in sluc.ajen dogodek – tako kot srec.anje Melanije Knavs in Donalda Trumpa na sprejemu na newyorškem Tednu mode (New York Fashion Week): Zadela me je njegova energija, iz njega veje neverjetna življenjska sila … (Bajt, 2016: 31) Legitimnost in simbolna vrednost njenega položaja torej tu nista pripisani njenemu uspehu na patriarhalnem poroc.nem trgu in njeni uspešni preo­brazbi, temvec. njenemu obic.ajnemu sebstvu. Drug korak v konstrukciji nava­dnosti je, kot bomo videli v nadaljevanju, etnizacija njene obic.ajnosti, to je regresivna redukcija in esencializacija pripadnosti na etnic.nost. V regresiv­nem populistic.nem diskurzu se opredeljevanje pripadnosti namrec. vedno odvija na principu izkljuc.evanja tistih, ki ne morejo pripadati. Da bi si Melanija Trump kot persona-blago lahko lastila navadnost, se mora njeni navadnosti pripisati specific.ne pomene in vrsto kulturnih in politic.nih vrednot. Njena normalnost in obic.ajnost sta bili utemeljeni na njeni etnic.nosti in uprizarjanju njene slovenskosti kot kljuc.nemu pogoju primordialne navadnosti. Naše gore list Sevnicanka Melanija. (Kovac., 2016: 3) (Še) vedno hci Sevnice… (Živc.ec, 2016: 24) In Melanija, brhka deklica, rojena na sevniški strani Alp, je postala prva dama sveta. (Turk, 2016: 19) Subjektni položaj »navadne Melanije« je definiran v kontekstu vrste dru­gih subjektnih položajev, kot npr. lokalne in globalne elite. Nemogoc.e je definirati pojem navadnosti, ne da bi jo postavili v razmerje, na podlagi c.esar navadnost odstopa oz. obic.ajnost lahko sploh ugotavljamo, ne da bi jo sooc.ili z nekom, ki je izjemen, poseben in hkrati neavtentic.en, tj. z družbe­nimi elitami na sploh: Še nikoli ni bilo treba tako malo truda in denarja, da bi Slovenijo pro- movirali v svetu. Ocitno naši uradniki sedijo pregloboko v svojih foteljih, da bi to razumeli. (Lahovnik, 2016: 4) Odpira se vprašanje, kako bo Slovenija unovcila dejstvo, da je slovenska rojakinja kot prva dama prišla v Belo hišo. (Malovrh, 2016: 4) Slovenka bo prva dama ZDA – priložnost Slovenije za korak v zgodo- vino? (Kristina Božic., 2016: 2) Melanija Trump je bila torej obravnavana kot obic.ajno dekle, ki ji je uspelo in kot slovenski zaklad tradicionalnih ženskih vrlin. Toda hkrati je bila reducirana na »c.loveški kapital« in tržno metriko. Številni intervjuvanci, obic.ajni ljudje, novinarji in eksperti so razmišljali o enkratni priložnosti Slovenije za »vstop v zgodovino« in spremembo slovenskega geopolitic.­nega položaja periferne nevidnosti ter o možni monetizaciji njene vloge prve dame.7 Rezultat te medijske ritualne prakse je umestitev medijske per-sone Melanije Trump v konstruirano skupino (zaslužne, dobre elite) in loc.i­tev te skupine od druge konstruirane skupine (nezaslužne domac.e elite) ter umestitev skupine zaslužnih v skupno nacionalno strukturo obc.utenja, v nacionalno skupnost brez razrednih razlik.8 Na ta nac.in se oblikuje anta­gonistic.na loc.ilna c.rta znotraj družbenega z navadnimi ljudmi in dobrimi 7 Po drugi strani pa je znani stand-up komik in tv-voditelj Bill Maher (Real Time z Billom Maherjem, HBO 2016) svojo oddajo s šalami na racun Trumpa in Melanije Trump zakljucil z besedami: Preden zaploskate, pazite: prihaja iz Slovenije, dežele, ki je prevec revna, da bi si lahko privošcila ironijo. Zahodni liberalni mediji so na splošno obravnavali Melanijo Trump kot mimikrijo prve dame, saj položaja ni mogla v celoti zasesti tako zaradi svoje vzhodnoevropskosti, ki implicira tudi pomanjkanje socialnega in kulturnega kapitala. Z redkimi izjemami (npr. Bill Maher ali diet_prada racun na Instagramu) je ta orien­talizacija sicer ostala le implicitna in omejena na namige. 8 Glej Morganovo (2020) kulturnosociološko kritiko dominantnih definicij populizmov in binarno konstrukcijo ljudi in elit v razlicnih populizmih. Morgan ugotavlja, da moramo populizem razumeti kot obliko »kulturnega dela«, ne pa kot ideologijo. O tipologiji populizmov v slovenskem primeru glej D. Fink-Hafner (2016). elitami na eni strani in slabimi nezaslužnimi elitami na drugi (glej Laclau, 2015). zaslužnost je podobno kot slavnost in vidnost, epistemski položaj, ne objektivna znac.ilnost. Figura nezaslužnih elit je trdno umešc.ena v regre­sivno populistic.ni imaginarij, ki temelji na jasnem nasprotju med figuro poštenih navadnih ljudi in figuro nepoštenih elit, ki jih izmenoma zastopajo politiki, javni uradniki, birokrati, intelektualci ali država nasploh. Melanija Trump predstavlja navadno žensko v antagonistic.nem razmerju do lokalnih elit. Lahko govori v imenu drugih navadnih ljudi, njena vidnost in bogastvo, c.e ne institucionalna moc., pa sta na podlagi njene obic.ajnosti popolnoma legitimna. Metafora »naroda-kot-družine« in banalni kulturni nacionalizem V razlic.icah je ponavljajoc.a se biografska zgodba o Melaniji Trump ute­meljena na stalnem referiranju na njeno etnic.no pripadnost, njen rezultat pa je umestitev Trumpove v etnic.no »mi-skupnost«. Performativna reiteracija o nacionalni pripadnosti (Sevnicanka, hcer Sevnice, navadno dekle, rojeno na sevniški strani Alp …) prispeva h konstrukciji njene navadnosti prek biograf­skega narativa, ki jo domestificira in humanizira. Da bi bila lahko Melanija Trump obic.ajna, mora biti udomac.ena, saj je kulturna intimnost, ki izhaja iz postopka etnizacije, nepogrešljivi element legitimnosti njenega položaja. Ali, kot pravi Edensor (2002: 92), da bi si lahko lastili pripadnost nacionalni iden­titeti kot široki in ohlapni entiteti, »… mora biti ta domestificirana, lokalizirna in personalizirana«. Schadenfreunde ali škodoželjnost, to je izražanje prezira do slavnih in ugodje obc.instva nad njihovimi nesrec.ami, je pomemben vidik medijske kulture slavnih in vidnih (Cross, Littler, 2010). Prav tako kot škodo­želje tudi udomac.enje prek reference na njeno etnic.nost sproži proces nive­liranja, pri c.emer pride do enac.enja položaja slavne osebe z obc.instvom in prevrednotenja meril, na podlagi katerih se presoja o drugih. Njena obic.ajnost torej ni utemeljena na univerzalnih merilih, temvec. predvsem na kriteriju etnic.­nosti in skupni kulturni intimnosti, torej na primordialnosti etnic.ne pripadno­sti, obc.instvo lokalnih medijev pa je bilo interpelirano kot nacionalni subjekt. Americani Melanijo naravnost obcudujejo, navdušeni so nad njo. Njen naglas jih ne moti, saj razumejo, da je priseljenka; imajo jo za lepo, uglajeno in uspešno žensko, še dodaja Hladnik. Ce bo Trump zmagal, bo Slovenka postala prva dama Bele hiše in najmocnejše velesile na svetu. (izjava direktorja Primorskih novic v Sabadin, PN, 2016: 2). O tem, da je Melanija v resnici še vedno srcna in dobra oseba, ceprav si je morda sposodila govor pri bolj inteligentni kolegici (cemur seveda ne ploskamo!), nas je prepricala tudi Nataša Pinoza … (Bajt, 2016: 31) Ustvarjanje simbolnih meja in dihotomij (ljudje proti eliti) je nac.in jav­nega oznac.evanja, ki seveda ni omejen le na populistic.no uprizarjanje. Toda kljuc.no vprašanje je, kdo lahko pripada in kdo je izloc.en iz esencialistic.nega razumevanja »navadnih ljudi«. V regresivnem nacionalistic.nem diskurzu o slavnih in znanih je pravica do vkljuc.enosti pogojena z etnic.nostjo. Moralna legitimnost Melanije Trump je torej posledic.no rezultat njene etnic.nosti, na podlagi katere se oblikuje primordialna solidarnost. Kot rojaki smo pova­bljeni, da uživamo v njenem uspehu in vidnosti na »interpasivni« nac.in (Pfaller, 2017). Nacija je tu naturalizirana, esencializirana, interpretirana kot naravni red stvari in prežeta z moralnim elementom, ki povzdigne skupnost, ki je utemeljena na etnic.nosti, nad vse druge kolektivitete. V tem okviru je vsaka kritic.na presoja Trumpovega politic.nega projekta nacionalna izdaja. »Nacionaliziranje« ali »etniciziranje« (Turner, 2018: 64–74) omogoc.a proiz­vodnjo obic.ajnosti Melanije Trump, ki briše in mistificira razredne razlike in je kljuc.en vir depolitizirane obravnave »projekta Trump«. Tako diskurz o Melaniji Trump pomeni dramatizirano konstrukcijo nacionalne enotnosti, ki jo omogoc.a le iznic.enje vseh razlik v okviru »mi­-skupnosti«, tudi razrednih razlik. Še posebej je pomembno, da je njena raz­lic.nost pripoznana, toda razredne razlike so prevedene v njen poseben stil življenja, ki ga omogoc.a meritokratsko zaslužen uspeh, to sta njena bistra podjetniška poroc.na izbira in uspešen stilistic.ni in življenjski »make-over«. Trumpova volilna zmaga je bila v lokalnih popularnih medijih, pa tudi v komentatorskih žanrih drugih medijev prevladujoc.e predstavljena v okviru njegove družinske povezanosti s Slovenijo in uokvirjena kot »zmaga našega c.loveka«: »Trump je zmagal, Amerika je dobila slovenskega ženina«, »… naš ženin Donald Trump« ali »slovenski ženin D. Trump«. Sama beseda »ženin« je arhaizem in hkrati posebni kod, ki je znan tako govorcu ali govorki kot obc.instvu, ki ga oznac.uje zavest o preteklem jeziku in uporabi le-tega pri vzpostavljanju rustic.no folkloristic.ne kulturne intimnosti.9 8. novembra je bil za ameriškega predsednika izvoljen Donald Trump, nov obraz, prvi zet Slovenije. (Štefanc.ic., 2016: 24) Ti pricakujejo, da bi najbogatejši sevniški zet gotovo primaknil kakšen dolar, da bi v sevniški obcini zunaj in znotraj prenovili osnovne šole Šentjanž, Studenec in Boštanj. (Dolenjski list, 2016: 10) O popularni glasbeni kulturi in vlogi imaginarnega v procesu formacije (nacionalne) identitete glej Stankovicevo analizo »rusticne obsedenosti« s slovenskostjo in enkratnostjo narodno-zabavne glasbe (t.i. goveje muzike) kot hegemonskim glasbenim oznacevalcem slovenskosti. Trump ni samo slovenski, temvec tudi evropski zet in tudi zato bi se izplacalo … (Nedeljski dnevnik, 2016: 15–16) Sorodstvene metafore slikajo družbena razmerja v jeziku družinskih raz­merij, tako da so družbene razlike konstruirane kot kategorija naravnih raz­lik, ne pa strukturirane vzdolž razrednega razlikovanja. z uporabo metafor sorodstva, razširjene družine in družinskih razmerij (hci Sevnice, naš ženin, slovenski zet …) je nacija konstruirana kot skupnost enakih, hkrati pa je bil predsedniški položaja Donalda Trumpa obravnavan kot družinska zadeva. Celotna etnija, vkljuc.no z Melanijo Trump in njenim možem, je metonimic.ni podaljšek »tistih, ki jih poznamo«. Besedne figure, ki se nanašajo na razume­vanje nacionalnega v okviru družinskih razmerij in družinske ikonografije, so kulturne projekcije patriarhalnega družinskega življenja na nacijo (glej McClintock, 1995: 358). Na ta nac.in nacija ni vzpostavljena le kot skupnost enakih, temvec. tudi kot družinska zadeva, ki jo opredeljuje familiarna kul­turna in torej politic.na homogenost. Prek tega inkluzivnega nagovora in ekscesne prijaznosti in familiarnosti se je odvijala uprizoritev egalitarne pre­vare: na podlagi diskurzivnega postopka etniziranja je bila Melanija Trump vzpostavljena kot moralno c.ista personifikacija idealiziranih nacionalnih vrednot, tako da sta bila c.ast in pripoznanje naroda, tako kot v klasic.nem patriarhatu, povezana z ženskimi vrlinami. Spol in tradicionalna ženskost sta vkljuc.ena in mobilizirana za nacionalistic.ni projekt, ki ne pozna razrednih delitev, le etnic.ne. Diana Kendall (2005: 30–35) razume ta spregled razlik v življenjskem stilu in strukturi priložnosti bogatih in slavnih kot strategijo vzpostavljanja konsenza (»pod kožo smo vsi enaki«). Materialno potrošni oznac.evalci razlik, kot so npr. obleke ali nakit, so domestificirani kot razlike v okusih in stvar arbitrarne izbire: … Na zadnjem predsedniškem soocenju je Melanija žarela v rožnati Guccijevi bluzi … slovita obleka Margot umazano bele barve, ki jo je izbrala za republikansko konvencijo …… je ob tej priložnosti žarela v dolgi beli obleki francoskega oblikovalca Thierryja Muglerja… … V rde-cem plašcku Ralpha Laurena in s torbico, na kateri se blešci ameriška zastava … 10 Dizajnerska garderoba, brezhibna frizura, svilena Guccijeva pentljasta bluza (t. i. »pussy-bow«) predstavljajo le razliko v okusu ali stilu življenja, ki pa ne postavi pod vprašaj egalitarnega narativa. 10 Vsi odlomki clanka so iz revije Avenija, 21. 10. 2016: 7. Meritokratski trop postfeminizma Nira Yuval-Davies (1997) opozarja pred spolno slepo teoretizacijo naci­onalizma in razrednega sistema, saj konstrukcija naroda praviloma vklju-c.uje specific.no pojmovanje »moškosti« in »ženskosti«. Nacionalizem je že v osnovi konstituiran skozi spolne neenakosti. Podoba Melanije Trump se je v lokalnem kontekstu oblikovala na podlagi vrste medsebojno poveza­nih, toda protislovnih diskurzov o ženskosti: postfeministic.ne ženskosti (njena podjetniška subjektiviteta in preobrazbene sposobnosti) in obe­nem tradicionalne ženskosti (zadržana, podporniško lojalna, materinska). Obic.ajnost Melanije Trump ni bila utemeljena samo na etnic.nosti, ki zaob­ide razredno stratifikacijo, temvec. tudi na podjetniški, a hkrati tradicionalni ženskosti, utemeljeni na naravnih spolnih razlikah. Tradicionalni koncept spola je kljuc.ni moment v konstrukciji njene navadnosti z biografsko nara­cijo (je mirna, toda trdna …, je posvec.ena materinstvu, ima politic.na stališc.a, vendar jih izraža v zasebnosti, njen politic.ni vpliv torej temelji na mehki ženski moc.i lojalne soproge itd.). Materinstvo je za strategijo personifika­cije osrednji in pogosto uporabljeni narativ, ki govori o skrbstveni plati nje­nega znac.aja. Njen »ženski nac.in«, ki zahteva hkratno izražanje krhkosti in moc.i, se izraža s stalno invokacijo njene ljubezni do otroka, potrpežljivosti in neprepirljivosti ter z domnevno jasnimi politic.nimi stališc.i, ki jih nikoli ne izraža v javnosti. Ta dva vidika ženskosti sta sicer v medsebojni napetosti, toda hkrati podpirata drug drugega. Kot pravi R. Gill (2007; 2017; 2020), lahko postfe­minizem razumemo kot posebno razlic.ico ospolnjenega neoliberalizma, senzibilnost, ki jo oblikujejo številne med seboj povezane znac.ilnosti: samo­disciplina, individualizem, izbira, opolnomoc.enje, vnovic.na oživitev idej o naravni spolni razliki itd.). Gre za strukturo obc.utenja, ki se izraža in repro­ducira prek novega slovarja; osebna srec.a, skrb zase, ravnovesje med delom in družino … so normativni okviri in ideali, ki nadomešc.ajo vprašanje pra­vic in kritike patriarhalnih struktur. Slava in vidnost je tako v komercialni popularni kulturi dostopna predvsem tistim, ki lahko utelešajo to specific.no podobo ženskosti. Podoba tradicionalne ženske domestic.nosti je stalnica v intervjujih in kratkih izjavah nekdanjih uc.iteljev, sosedov, prebivalcev Sevnice, pa tudi povabljenih strokovnjakov – od modnih fotografov do vele­poslanika Slovenje v zDA (Iztok Mirošic.) ali strokovnjaka za mednarodne odnose, ki razglašajo, da se Sloveniji obeta nova doba mednarodne vidnosti. Njena medijska persona je tako vkopana v t. i. »neoliberalni narativ pravice« (Littler, 2018: 68), ki predpisuje kompetitivni individualizem kot zdravilo za neenakost in patriarhalne strukture, toda hkrati oživlja esencialistic.no poj­movanje spolnih razlik in vrlin tradicionalne ženskosti. Obic.ajnost Melanije Trump je ustvarjena in ohranjana s predpostavko esencialistic.nega koncepta ženskosti v okviru tradicionalnih popularnih vrednot. Meritokratska bio-grafska zgodba o njenih individualnih dosežkih in preobrazbi je torej pre­pletena s podobo tradicionalne domestic.nosti v kontekstu naturalizirane umestitve moških v javno sfero in žensk v zasebno sfero potrošnega delo­vanja. O politiki ne govorim v javnosti, o tem bolj govorim doma. (Klaric., 2016: 4) … tisti, ki jo poznajo, pa pravijo, da bo na tem položaju izjemna, ker je tiha, dostojanstvena in zelo lepa … možu ne bo vsiljevala svojih politic­ nih pogledov. (Svet24, 2016: 4) Ne nazadnje pa tudi ni nepomembno, kdo ob zajtrku in jutranji kavici prišepne predsedniku ZDA kakšen nasvet ali mnenje. To je za moža vedno obvezujoc premislek. Cetudi o Piranskem zalivu, kot že pišejo naši prijatelji Hrvati. (Mirošic., 2016a: 3; Mirošic., 2016b: 5) V okviru postfeministic.ne senzibilnosti je v lokalnih medijih zakon Melanije Trump interpretiran kot njena meritokratska zmaga, njen življenj-ski karierni dosežek, dokaz njene apolitic.ne podjetniške zmožnosti in poštenega trdega dela. V idealni artikulaciji postfeministic.nega ženskega sebstva so individualni uspeh, samotransformacija in samoznamc.enje (Banet-Weiser, 2012; 2018a; 2018b) predstavljeni kot kljuc.ni vidiki ženskega subjekta. Tradicionalna parohialna ženskost se torej tu kaže hkrati s post­feministic.nim diskurzom individualizma in individualnega opolnomoc.enja, kjer se posameznikovo življenje lomi na apolitic.ni ideologiji osebne izbire in samoodloc.anja. Ali, kot ugotavlja R. Gill v svoji razpravi o postfeministic.ni medijski kulturi (2017: 617), ta verzija feminizma je neverjetno vseprisotna v medijih, posebej prek psevdopsihološkega diskurza in promocije ženskega samozaupanja in samozavesti, stalnega dela »na sebi«, pozitivnega mišljenja, samozavesti in samoljubezni. Sklep Velike transformacije, kot je npr. postsocializem s privatizacijo, mar-ketizacijo in komodifikacijo in splošnim procesom redistribucije javnega bogastva, vedno pomenijo kršitev percipiranih moralnih pravic. Razprava o revšc.ini in pomankanju na eni strani in tajkunstvu in privilegijih, korup­ciji in demonstrativni potrošnji elit na drugi strani je vseprisotna v javnem diskurzu vse od globalne ekonomske krize. Toda kljub temu je sam kon­cept družbenega razreda postopoma popolnoma izginil, ne le iz medijev in popularne kulture, temvec. tudi iz družbenih ved in politic.nega diskurza. Nadomestil ga je pojem izkljuc.enosti (glej Boltanski in Chiapello, 2005), tako da je pojem razreda znova v žarišc.u pozornosti šele zadnjih nekaj let. za Vzhodno Evropo še bolj velja, da sta bili v kontekstu neoliberalne doxe sama razredna analiza in celo uporaba pojma razred vse do nedavnega politic.no neizgovorljivi in intelektualno marginalizirani. Še posebej je bilo potlac.eno razumevanje razreda kot odnosne strukturne kategorije (Ost, 2015: 547) in s tem povezanih razmerij moc.i. Privatizacija in dramatic.na redistribucija »družbene lastnine« nista bili interpretirani kot razredna poli­tika, temvec. kot moralno prekrškarstvo, torej osebno »tajkunstvo«, »kraja«, ali kot »korupcija«. (glej Kalb, 2018: 307), medtem ko se je o revšc.ini govo­rilo izkljuc.no znotraj moralistic.nega melodramatskega okvira. Razprava o družbenih razlikah tako v javnem diskurzu še vedno poteka kot afektivna »orgija obc.utkov« (Anker, 2014). Sistematic.na razredna politika akumulacije kapitala s pomoc.jo razlašc.anja in kapitalistic.ne transformacije je torej inter-pretirana kot moralno vprašanje. Popularna kultura in posebej komodificiran diskurz slave je kulturna praksa, ki prispeva k regresivnemu populistic.nemu imaginariju kot sestav­ljanju tradicionalnih tem, kot so družina, materinstvo, zanašanje nase, osebni uspeh in drugi elementi »iz repertoarja antikolektivizma« (Hall, 1979: 17). V tej vlogi ima pomembne implikacije za analizo sodobne formacije/tre­nutka in za moralno ekonomijo razreda v trenutni populistic.ni konjunkturi. »zvezdništvo« kot reprezentacijski žanr, kot diskurzivna praksa in diskur­zivni uc.inek je tako konstitutivnega pomena za hegemonic.ni boj in razre­dno dinamiko. Ima pomembne posledice za razumevanje individualnega sebstva, razumevanje kolektivitete in za razmerje med obema ter za nac.in, na katerega se uprizarjata in definirata v specific.nem historic.nem trenutku. Glede na to, da diskurz o subjektu in sebstvu vedno implicira vprašanje režima subjektivacije, ima opisovanje subjekta vedno predpisovalno vlogo: medijske reprezentacije Melanije Trump v popolnoma depolitiziranem okviru meritokratskih dosežkov torej ne moremo razumeti kot v protislovju z uprizarjanjem njene obic.ajnosti in krepostne navadnosti. Nasprotno, obo­jemu je skupen isti performativen uc.inek, saj oboje pripomore k afirmaciji skupne nacionalne družbenosti, kjer so navadni ljudje v opoziciji z lažnimi elitami, toda v kulturni harmoniji z zaslužnimi. Utemeljenost te govorice na regresivno populistic.nem momentu in etno­nacionalizmu je najbolj vidna v nenehnem impliciranju drugosti (nespo­sobne lokalne elite) in simulaciji kritike ter v postopku esencializacije, torej na izkljuc.ujoc.i etnic.ni opredelitvi zamišljene »mi-skupnosti« (glej Gebhardt, 2019). Dvojnost, ki je vzpostavljena med zaslužnimi in nezaslužnimi elitami, tistimi, ki jim njihov status privošc.imo, in tistimi, ki ga niso vredni, torej kon­strukcija dela elite kot moralno zaslužne in torej kot »izjemnih, toda obic.ajnih ljudi«, je temeljni kamen populizma. Uc.inkuje kot mistifikacija neenakosti in predstavlja neoliberalno reartikulacijo razrednih razlik kot problema izklju-c.enosti. Razredni odnosi so v kontekstu te neoliberalne depolitizacije razlik in regresivnega populizma, tematizirani zgolj kot moralni problem, »razde­ljeni narod« pa je pri tem ponovno prevladujoc.i diskurzivni trop. Diskurz zvezdništva in naš posebni primer Melanije Trump torej predstavlja diskur­zivno prakso legitimiranja obstojec.ih razrednih razmerij in s tem legitimi­ranja radikalne redistribucije javnega bogastva v postsocializmu in hkrati spodbujanje »protonacionalnega« sentimenta (Hobsbawm, 1990), ki ga je mogoc.e organizirati v podporo desnic.arskega populizma. 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Primorske novice, 8. 11.: 2. Svet24 (2016): Melanija Trump – iz Sevnice na vrh sveta. Svet24, 10. 11.: 4–8. Štefanc.ic., Marcel (2016): Dan zapisan sramoti. Mladina, 11. 11.: 24–31. Turk, Robert (2016): Sajens fikšn. Primorske novice, 11. 11.: 19–20. Živc.ec, Denis (2016): Ameriško jutro v Melanijini Sevnici. Vec.er, 10. 11.: 24–25. Ksenija VIDMAR HORVAT* POSTIMPERIALNI PATRIARHAT IN KARNEVALESKNA PERIFERIJA: MELANIA TRUMP V TRANSNACIONALNI JAVNOSTI** Povzetek. Clanek obravnava recepcijo prve dame Melanie Trump v ameriškem in slovenskem javnem prostoru. Analiza v prvem delu temelji na razclenitvi medijskih upodobitev v reviji The New Yorker. V drugem delu se ukvarja z odzivi v slovenski javnosti s posebnim poudarkom na dveh spletnih portalih (siol.si in delo. si). Temeljna ugotovitev primerjave je, da v ameriškem kontekstu prevladuje distribuiranje medijskih podob Melanie Trump kot naturalizirane prve dame s koreni­nami na socialisticnem Vzhodu. V slovenskem prostoru je dejstvo etnicne pripadnosti predmet prisvajanja v nacionalno fantazijo, ki, nasprotno, utrjuje predstavo o razvezi s socialisticno preteklostjo, pri cemer pa se, kot pokaže primer postavitve kipa v rojstni Sevnici, kažejo tudi poskusi destabiliziranja dihotomije center-periferi­ja. Študija si na podlagi teh dvoumnih odzivov zastav­lja raziskovalno vprašanje usode simbolnega materin­stva v dobi transnacionalizacije sodobnih družb. Kljucni pojmi: Melania Trump, prva dama, postsociali­zem, nacionalizem, spol, Vzhod Uvod Ko je 20. januarja 2017 Donald Trump z zaprisego postal petinštiride­seti predsednik zDA, je z njim na prizorišc.e Bele hiše vstopila tudi prva dama Melania Trump. Melania Trump, kot piše na uradni spletni strani Bele hiše, je »edina prva dama, ki je postala naturalizirana državljanka zDA«. Pred njo je bila deloma tujega porekla Louisa Adams; soproga predsednika Johna Quincyja Adamsa je bila rojena v Londonu ameriškemu trgovcu in Angležinji, a ji v zgodovinopisju Bele hiše malokdo pripisuje status tujke – ali migrantke; omenja se jo kot prvo prvo damo, ki je bila rojena zunaj * Dr. Ksenija Vidmar Horvat, redna profesorica, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija. ** Izvirni znanstveni clanek. Študija je nastala v okviru raziskovalnega programa »Družbena pogodba v 21. stoletju« (P6-0400), ki ga financira ARRS, Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije. DOI: 10.51936/tip.58.2.447-463 zDA. Melania Trump, po drugi strani, je zaznamovana s svojim slovenskim etnic.nim poreklom. V zDA je prišla kot Melania Knauss in se z delovno vizo do poroke s Trumpom preživljala kot fotomodel. Cetudi jo ameriški mediji že med predsedniško kampanjo opisujejo kot »tujko, ki je oc.itno brezbrižna do svoje domovine« (Collins, 2016: 4), ostaja njeno tujstvo predmet javne pozornosti. V prvem delu c.lanek analizira medijske upodobitve tega »tuj­stva«, pri c.emer v ospredje postavlja objave v reviji The New Yorker. Medtem ko v zDA etnic.na identiteta prve dame vzbuja javno nelagodje, v Sloveniji sproži valovanje navdušenja. Tudi tu novinarska peresa zaznavajo, da je za Melanio Trump Slovenija »izbrisana datoteka« (Mlakar, 2018), a to ne iznic.i upov, kaj vse lahko ameriška Prva dama prinese Sloveniji. Vrstijo se izrazi nacionalnega ponosa in sestavlja se ekonomija trženja njenega imena. Medtem ko ameriška javnost prvo damo opazuje skozi lec.o previdnosti do njene tujosti, se v Sloveniji množijo pric.akovanja, da bo »slovenska neve­sta« v Beli hiši deželo postavila na svetovni zemljevid politic.ne, kulturne in ekonomske veljave. V drugem delu obravnavam to medijsko fascinacijo s podrobnejšo obravnavo izbranih primerov objav na spletnih portalih siol. si in delo.si. Dihotomna percepcija prve dame Melanie Trump sproža sociološko zanimivo vprašanje oblikovanja nacionalnih imaginarijev, ki ga poganjajo sile globalizacije in ženske migracije. Raziskovalno vprašanje te analize je, kakšna je pri tem vloga »simbolnega materinstva«, ki naj bi bila kljuc.na za reprodukcijo nacij v dobi modernosti; in kako se umešc.a v širšo razpravo o usodi zahodne modernosti v transnacionalnem krožišc.u ženskega repro­duktivnega dela. Metodološko se študija opira na vizualno in diskurzivno analizo po metodi medijskih uokvirjanj, ki jo dopolnim s primerjalnim okvi­rom dveh nacionalnih kontekstov. Ugotovitve obravnavam v luc.i teorije belega patriarhata, to je rasne in spolne pogodbe, ki, tako trdim, v postim­perialnih konstelacijah prevzema vlogo ohranjanja starih hierarhij centra in periferije. Melania Trump kot prva dama Funkcija prve dame je v zDA neformalna. Njena vloga predvideva aktiv­nosti pretežno ceremonialne narave; zgodovinarji jo opisujejo kot maha­joc.o silhueto, predsedniški »dekor« ali »gostiteljico v Beli hiši« (Boyd Caroli, 2010; Loizeau, 2015; Mayo, 2000; O’Connor, Nye in Van Assendelft, 1996; Watson, 2014). Scharrer in Bissell (2000: 81) ji namenita mesto »predsedni­kovega ornamentalnega spremstva«. Razpon njihovih aktivnosti v javnem življenju lahko v resnici precej variira: lahko so »graciozne gostiteljice« (Lady Washington), pa tudi upravnice in konzervatorke Bele hiše (Caroline Harrison, Jackie Kennedy); sopotnice v kampanjah (Barbara Bush, Betty Ford, Hillary Clinton, Michelle Obama); tihe zaupnice in svetovalke (Abigail Adams, Dolley Madison, Nancy Reagan) (Watson, 2014). Kadar se odlo-c.ijo za vidnejše javno udejstvovanje, so jim odmerjene – z izjemo Eleanor Roosevelt, ki je prva in doslej edina vpeljala tedenske tiskovne konference, s katerimi je promovirala svoje politic.no delo (Flint, 2011: 120) – »mehke« socialne politike in humanitarizem – obnavljajoc. predpostavko, da jim žen-ska senzitivnost služi bolje pri teh vprašanjih kot pri vojaških ali ekonom­skih zadevah (Scharrer in Bissell, 2000: 57–58). Melania Trump ustreza predstavam o prvi dami zDA le kratek c.as. Hišna novinarka revije The New Yorker Jia Tolentino (2017: 2) jo v zgodnjih dneh opiše kot osebo, »ki uteleša vse, kar vec.ina pric.akuje od prve dame: nasmehe, lepe obleke, neprikrito ženskost, negrozec.o avro«. Nikoli ne prestopa svo­jih meja; njena kampanja »Bodi najboljši« (Be Best), ki se posvec.a »social­nemu, emocionalnemu in psihic.nemu zdravju« otrok, ustreza predstavam o »mehki politiki«. zelo kmalu po (zakasneli) selitvi v Belo hišo, ko se, oble-c.ena v zeleno jakno blagovne znamke zara, z napisom »I really don’t care, do U?«, odpravi v Teksas k migrantskim otrokom, loc.enim od svojih staršev, in nekaj mesecev zatem sama odpotuje v Egipt, narašc.a dvom, ali nemara ne spodkopava predsednikove moc.i. Frank Bruni v c.lanku »Melania Trump bi bila lahko naša najvec.ja prva dama« opozarja, da »smo se nemara preuranili« o oceni Trumpove soproge; kampanja proti sovražnemu govoru na spletu in hvalnica bogati afriški kulturi sta nemara izražanje politic.ne etike, dru­gac.ne od predsednikove (Bruni, 2018). Drugi komentar pri istem c.asopisu analizira, da je sporoc.ilo zarine jakne morda izraz »c.loveške frustracije v ozadju popolno zglajene kulise« (Friedman, 2018). Ko se odloc.i za blagovno znamko Gucci, znano po podpori pravici žensk do splava, se ugiba, ali se s tem ne zoperstavlja moževemu nasprotnemu stališc.u (Friedman, 2019a). Poudarek na oblac.ilnih izbirah ni nakljuc.en: »modna diplomacija«, kot to opiše Young, predpostavlja nepisano obveznost slavne soproge, da »z izbo­rom oblac.il in stila dopolnjuje in krepi podobo vodilnega moža tako na domac.em prizorišc.u kot v svetu« (Young, 2011: 17–19). Sc.asoma komenta­torji sklenejo, da imamo v primeru Melanie Trump opraviti s »smrtjo modne diplomacije« (ibid.) Prva dama je prej ko ne »popolno telo, na katerega obe­siš blagovno znamko« (Collins, 2016: 4), brezbrižno do politic.nih sporoc.il: »njeno sporoc.ilo je, da ni sporoc.ila« (Friedman, 2020). Da v Egiptu nosi beli c.eladasti klobuk, simbol kolonialnih c.asov, je v resnici izraz nevednosti – in, tako kot njen mož, te nevednosti niti ne želi skriti niti odpraviti (Rogers, 2018). Naposled je le »modni« podaljšek predsednikovega vladanja. Oblac.i se, kot se vede Donald Trump, brez diplomatskih sporoc.il, neurejeno, osu­pljivo, vpadljivo – in politic.no nekorektno. zasuk v percepciji razkriva globlje nelagodje. V nadaljevanju potujem po sledi tega nelagodja prek c.asovne analize poroc.anja revije The New Yorker. V vzorec so zajeti tiskani in elektronski izvodi od maja 2016 do decembra 2018. Revijo sem izbrala iz dveh razlogov: zaradi oc.itnega uredniškega interesa za Melanio Trump in ker se Melania Trump, sama ali v tandemu z Donaldom Trumpom, pogosto pojavlja v karikaturah revije. Ta drugi aspekt mi bo v pomoc. pri primerjalni analizi lokalne slovenske »karikature« prve dame v drugem delu c.lanka. Analiza temelji na metodološkem pristopu teo­rije reprezentacije, ki vkljuc.uje vizualno in narativno-diskurzivno analizo izbrane besedilne ali slikovne enote (Hall in dr., 2013), ter na metodi »medij­skega uokvirjanja«. Pippa Norris (1997: 2) medijske (novic.arske) okvire opredeli kot »interpretativne strukture, ki doloc.ene dogodke umestijo v širši kontekst«, in sicer tako, da jih uredijo v zgodbe, ki dogodkom, dejanjem in ljudem v njih priskrbijo pomen. Pri tem se poslužujejo znanih družbenih kategorij in ideoloških namigov, na primer: ko mediji poroc.ajo o ameriških predsedniških volitvah, je mogoc.e zaznati medijske okvire, kot so »leto žen­ske« na volitvah 1992, »leto jeznih mladih mož« leta 1994. Kot je razvidno s tega seznama, okviri raznolike vsebine poroc.anja poenotijo v vodilno pri­poved, ki usmerja pomen. Ko govorimo o medijskem uokvirjanju Melanie Trump, je v središc.u podoba, kot bo razvidno v nadaljevanju, ki jo revija pomensko utrdi s tropom: »nema kraljica« (Waldman, 2018). Nema kraljica Melania si »pridržuje pravico, da ostaja tiho«, zapišejo pri The New Yorkerju v novembrski izdaji revije v prvem letu Trumpovega predsedova­nja (Tolentino, 2017: 2). Njena »zadržana osebnost«, ki deluje, kot »da bi bila replika svoje prejšnje osebe«, je nemara rezultat tega, da je »vec.ino svojega odraslega življenja preživela kot vizualni objekt« (ibid.). Nemost bi lahko bila preostanek prejšnje kariere v modni industriji, toda hkrati ta »poklicna deformacija« otežuje prepoznavanje, kdo v resnici je prva dama. Je »lepa ujetnica ali zlobna kraljica« (ibid.)? Garderoba soproge je moc.no prizorišc.e politic.nega izjavljanja, medtem ko se od nje pric.akuje, da je tiho, v študiji Power Dressing piše Robb Young (2011). A kod molc.ec.nosti prve dame, ki ga udejanja Melania Trump, ne sporoc.a skladnosti z normo; signalizira uganko identitete. Revija za Melanio Trump uporablja vrsto nelagodnih oznac.eval­cev: »papirnata punc.ka«, »ledena kraljica«, »obraz, izklesan iz gline«. Katy Waldman (2018: 3) jo opiše kot »avatar praznine, molc.ec.o kraljico«; je kot »sramežljiv, prikupen otrok, ki iz ozadja opazuje, kako ga bo nekdo napadel« (ibid.). Nauc.ena, da je pretežno »vizualni objekt«, ki ga prežema »neprijetna prevleka igrac.e ali robota«, deluje kot nedejaven subjekt, »tuje žensko bitje«, katerega »zavestna pasivnost je nemara njen najmoc.nejši izraz delovanja« (ibid.). Delno so te lastnosti povezane s kariero fotomodela, ki jo je nauc.ila, da »praznost predstavlja kot estetiko« (Tolentino, 2017: 2). Jia Tolentino (2017: 1) prenos tega poklicnega kapitala povzema v treh korakih: »Najprej fotomodel, nato tretja žena milijarderja in sedaj v glavnem nema prva dama.« V drugih c.lankih je opisana kot »iskreno apatic.na«, freudovsko »nedomac.a (uncanny)«, »tiha«, »dvojnik«, »enigmatic.na prisotnost«. Vsi ti opisi se zgostijo v podobo subjekta, katerega telo in glas sta zamrznjena, obdana s praznino pomena. Tudi karikature Melanii Trump niso bolj prijazne. Karikature so provoka­tivni teksti; kadar se lotijo bogatih in vplivnih, je njihov imperativ, da sme­šijo. Edwards in Chen prouc.ujeta karikature Barbare Bush in Hillary Clinton v vlogah prve dame (2016: 370); ugotavljata, da je bil cilj karikatur »razkri­vati dinamike spolnih vlog, patriarhalne kulture in ideologije«. Kadar se zdi, da je moški del v paru »šibak«, karikature uporabijo »simbolno kaznovanje, tako da transformirajo ženski del«: v primeru Barbare Bush tako, da so jo pri­kazovale kot »boksarja … v ringu«, ki mora stopiti na mesto svojega šibkega in neodloc.nega moža; v primeru Hillary Clinton, kjer je tarc.a njena politic.na ambicioznost, ki slabi moc. predsednika, tako da jo demonizirajo ali »utišajo« (2016: 380–382). V primeru Melanie Trump velja obratno: karikature poskušajo iz nje izvlec.i tisto, kar je utišano. V karikaturi z naslovom »Melaniina božic.na drevesa« (30. 11. 2018) Ivana Ehlersa so nanizane tri vrste dreves, prekri­tih v rdec.o prevleko z napisi: »I really don’t care, do U?«, »Nazaj hoc.em svoje življenje«, »Bodi najboljši«, »Sem bogata eh ne eh ne odpušc.ena«, »Eh, tako neumna«, »Eh, vse vas sovražim« (»Ur, I hate U all«). V karikaturi (9. 5. 2018) z naslovom »Predsednik in prva dama razmišljata o svojih pobudah« sta narisana s hrbtom drug proti drugemu pred tablama z napisi »Bodi naj­boljši« (Melania) in »Jaz najboljši« (Donald). V karikaturi »Melaniine nepri­merne pete« (30. 8. 2017) se nahaja merilnik, ki beleži razliko v višini med Donaldom Trumpom in c.evlji prve dame. V drugi karikaturi se sprašuje: »Ali naj si izberem modri ton ali gluhi ton?« (22. 6. 2018) Ellis Rosen upodobi Melanio z dvema kosoma oblac.il v rokah, modrim in zelenim, slednji z napi­som: »I really don’t care, do U?« Karikature Melanio Trump prikazujejo kot osebo, ki ji manjkata inteligenca in soc.utje; prevladujeta nevednost in nic.e­vost. Kot ob škandalu z zarino jakno z napisom komentira Troy Patterson (2018: 2): »Nositi oblac.ila je njena prva obrt«; oblac.ila, ki si jih je nadela v kontekstu svojega moža in njegovih nehumanih obravnav imigrantov ter vseh drugih, pravi, oblac.enje približa slogu »fašizma s hitro modo«. V c.lanku »zgledna Americ.anka« Collins (2016: 6) presoja, da je prva dama »ponotra­njila vse vidike Donaldove kulture: njegov ahistoricizem, njegovo žolc.nost; njegove lažne dihotomije med morilskimi izobc.enci in zaslužnimi drža­vljani, soprogami, ki nic. ne zahtevajo in ne tec.narijo«. Mati imigrantka Ce je politic.na funkcija prve dame v njeni podobi spremljevalne orna­mentalne silhuete, pa je njena simbolna funkcija bistveno bolj osredišc.ena. Že v c.asu ustanovnih oc.etov je soprogam predsednikov zDA pripadlo mesto ustanovnih mater. Bile so »simbol nacije v najc.istejši obliki«, trdi popularni publicist (Flint, 2011: 30). Kot biološke matere svojih otrok so kolektivni skupnosti ponujale dokaz o heteroseksualnosti in maskulinosti oc.eta nacije in sodelovale so v simbolni reprodukciji »heteroseksualnega družinskega konteksta nacionalnega patriarhata« (Edwards in Chen, 2000: 379). Do Michelle Obama je bila idealizirana prva mati izpeljanka bele Americ.anke srednjega razreda. Kot v ameriški družbi nasploh, kjer je bil ženskam rasnih in etnic.nih manjšin dostop do simbolne reprezentacije materinstva zaprt (Nakano Glenn, 1994), je tudi delo simbolne nacionalne reprodukcije lahko opravljala le materinska figura, katere biografski izvor je bil etnic.no, rasno in razredno »nekompromitiran«. Ob boku ji od konca 19. stoletja stoji »mati izseljencev« – Kip svobode, ki se na vhodu v domovino pridruži simbol­nemu delu v podobi ritualne ikone (pre)poroda imigrantov – tujcev, ki s potovanjem mimo njenega vznožja opušc.ajo stare vezi (etnic.nega) pripa­danja, da bi lahko vstopili v politic.no telo bodoc.ih naturaliziranih ameriških državljanov (Berlant, 1991). In c.e je mati sama imigrantka? V dveh c.lankih, enem objavljenem med predsedniško kampanjo in drugem leto dni po prihodu Trumpov v Belo hišo, revija obnovi biografijo Melanie Trump – od njenega rojstva v nekda­nji Jugoslaviji, kariere fotomodela, pridobitve delovne vize H-1B do poroke z Donaldom Trumpom, kar ji je prineslo ameriško državljanstvo. »Velja omeniti,« zapiše Collins, da je »Donald Trump poroc.en z imigrantko«, ki je odrašc.ala v komunistic.nem blokovskem naselju v Sevnici (2016: 1–2). Ce bi uporabili retoriko Donalda Trumpa v boju proti vizam H-1B, dopolni, bi morali skleniti, da sodi Melania Trump med tiste zac.asne tuje delavce, ki so »uvoženi od zunaj z jasnim namenom, da za nižje plac.ilo nadomestijo ame­riške delavce« (Collins, 2016: 1). Ce bo Trump izvoljen za predsednika, še opozori avtorica, bo Melania Knauss (sic!) s priimkom svojega moža »izjema v moževi politiki nativizma«. Glavna težava imigrantskega statusa prve dame, ki jo zazna Collins, je, da Melania Trump, kot je razbrati iz njenega govora, ni povsem opustila slo­venskega jezika (Collins, 2016: 9). Tudi Tolentino v svojem c.lanku sumi, da Melania Trump najverjetneje igra vlogo vizualnega objekta – zaradi »glavo-bola prevajanja«. »Nema kraljica« je nemara molc.ec.a zato, ker »anglešc.ina ni njen prvi niti drugi, morda niti ne tretji jezik« (Tolentino, 2017: 1). Naglas, ki ga zaznavajo tudi drugi mediji, prenaša na svojega sina Barrona. »Najbrž mora biti Donaldu nenavadno, da ima vec.jezic.nega sina, ki govori angleško s slovenskim naglasom« (Collins, 2016: 9). Collins spomni na nastop družine pri ameriškem TV-voditelju Larryju Kingu leta 2010, ko ta zaprepašc.eno ugotovi: »On [Barron] govori z naglasom?« Melania Trump je izpolnila nalogo prve dame, da poskrbi za nasledstvo, toda z neprijetnim zaznamkom tujosti. Kot sledi v nadaljevanju, je ta tujost dodatno zatemnjena s senco vzhodnjaštva. V iskanju postsocialisticnega Vzhoda V ameriški spolni slovnici nacionalizma je jezikovna nekompetentnost opazna prepreka v oblikovanju vezi pripadanja. Kot poudarjajo Forrester, zaborowska in Gapova (2004), nezmožnost tekoc.ega komuniciranja v zahodnem jeziku, posebej angleškem, pomeni izolacijo in »notranji eksil«. Obremenitev jezika z akcentom, ko gre za osebe z obmoc.ja nekdanje socialistic.ne Evrope, konotira vzhodnjaštvo. Trdost in okornost v izgovor­javi aludirata na subjekt iz komunistic.ne preteklosti, zamrznjen v zgodovini – kakor je zamrznjena družba, ki ji je pripadal. Vzhodni naglas je zaznamek družbenega reda in kulture, ki so ju pojmi modernosti in napredka obšli. V karikaturi Paula Rudnicka (2016) lik Melanie Trump piše v svoj dnevnik: »Vc.asih si želim, da bi bila spet nazaj v Sloveniji; medtem ko bi kot fotomodel razkazovala jopice iz poliestra, bi naši kozi pripovedovala: ‘Nekoc. bom odšla v Ameriko in poroc.ila bogatega, c.ednega moža.’« »V iskanju doma iz otroštva Melanie Trump« Vendela Vida (2018) pri isti reviji potuje v Sevnico. Po enem dnevu potovanja v spremstvu svoje družine sklene, da je Slovenija »lepa dežela, skorajda kot Švica, smo se strinjali«. V Sevnici domuje velika tovarna obutve, kar avtorico napelje na še eno primerjavo: »To tovarniško mesto se ne razlikuje dosti od mest v zDA, ki so volila za Trumpa.« Ko se kasneje družina odpravi na iskanje restavracije, opažajo napol opušc.ene kraje: »Hodili smo mimo pekarne (zaprto), lekarne (zaprto) in svetlo zelen­ega kegljišc.a (v zapiranju) … Na koncu smo pristali v restavraciji brez imena, le z znakom, ki je prikazoval jedilni pribor.« V notranjosti, nasprotno, pa se gnete »absurdno veliko« ljudi, pari srednjih let, ki »si delijo predjedi«, in dvajsetletnice, ki, nagnjene vznak, kadijo cigarete: »zdi se, da v Sloveniji vsi kadijo« – ne brezbrižno kot v Franciji, avtorica dodaja antropološki detajl, pac. pa zavzeto, »s smotrom« (2018: 5). Kartografsko premapiranje majhnega mesta na državo implicira kul­turo, ki je hkrati avtentic.no tuja in prazna lastnega oznac.enca. Opisati jo je mogoc.e le prek primerjav z drugimi: Švico, zDA, Francijo. Edina izjema je, ko se popotnica zazre v travo s tako moc.no barvo zelene, » da sem morala sneti svoja oc.ala, da bi se prepric.ala, ali vidim prav« (2018: 2). V spisu »Kako sem našla Vzhodno Evropo« Andalua Borcila (2004: 54) opisuje, kako zahod po padcu Berlinskega zidu odkriva vzhodno Evropo. Ta se pojavlja kot »motna«, »nejasna«, »negibna« – teritorij, ki se sicer sestavlja na novo, a pri tem c.rpa iz preostankov enobarvnega režima in zgodovine hladne vojne, ki še naprej zaznamujejo njeno podobo in identiteto. Ta novinarski potopis vse­buje sorodne predstave o kraju, ki je obtic.al v zgodovini. Ko pred vhodom v restavracijo družina srec.a »tri dolgonoge najstnice«, se avtorica ne more izogniti misli, kako »tudi ta dekleta, kot Melania, išc.ejo pot odtod« (2018: 4). V restavraciji, v dialogu z natakarico, jo podobno prešine, »c.e tudi ona ne sanja o drugac.nem življenju« (2018: 5). Mesto mladim dekletom oc.itno nima ponuditi nic.esar – ne premore opore ne identitetam ne ambiciji – do meje »absurdne« skrajnosti amerikaniziranega menija, ki gostom ponuja »top shit Burger« in mehiške jedi; tista tranzicijska »pušc.ava postsocializma« (Horvat in Štiks, 2016) pac., ki daje razlog za kajenje. Beli patriarhat Ko Katharina Wiedlack (2018) obravnava skec. »Melanianade« popu­larnega ameriškega TV-programa Saturday Night Live, izpostavlja komic.no vizualno reprezentacijo Melanie Trump kot utelesitve negativnega ste­reotipa vzhodne Evropejke. Funkcija te reprezentacije, pravi, je ustvariti podobo bele Druge, ki služi utrjevanju protipola emancipirane, izobražene in feministic.no ozavešc.ene bele Americ.anke. Vzhodne Evropejke so nastanjene v predstavi o še ne polno realiziranih subjektih, so »surovo gradivo«, ki je šele v procesu formiranja po zgledu zahodnih standardov. Melania Drugost izraža v jezikovnem naglaševanju in v dejstvu, da je ujet­nica toksic.ne maskulinosti soproga, kar jo zadržuje na mestu podrazreda. Je Druga, ki si sicer prizadeva zmuzniti se skozi reže rasnega prepoznavanja, a to lahko stori samo kot »prevarantka«, ki se znajde na poziciji moc.i, kar je zaradi vzhodnoevropskih vezi nelegitimno. Njena vzhodnjaška Drugost ji ne dovoli polnega vstopa v »belo elito«. Doseže lahko le položaj seksual­izirane »žene trofeje«, ki ji vez s socialistic.nim Vzhodom »preprec.uje, da bi postala polno moderna progresivna ameriška državljanka« (2018: 1069). Komic.no upodobitev Melanie Trump lahko razumemo v funkciji neg-ativne projekcije, ki utrdi dominacijo nacionalno progresivne, liberalno­feministic.ne identitete bele Americ.anke. Rasno-orientalistic.ni pogled »na svet tam c.ez,«, ki ga opisuje The New Yorker, je prikazan kot oddaljen od ekonomske prosperitete in vrednot zahoda; kulturna razdalja in razlika okrepita hierarhijo civilizacijske superiornosti slednjega. V tej luc.i lažje razumemo napore komic.nih upodobitev Melanie Trump kot kmec.ke dekline, ki sanja o begu na zahod. Rasializacija Vzhodne Evropejke, pravi Wiedlack, poteka prek »materializacije vmesne pozicije med dvema poloma, diferenciacije med naravo in kulturo, med surovim mesom barbar­skega Drugega in sofisticiranim intelektom civiliziranega individua«. zato je na poti v kulturo ta ženska prestavljena v telo blaga: je moževa pridobitev, namenjena razkazovanju seksualizirane erotic.ne Druge, a brez lastne identitete. Lahko pa vidimo to karikaturo tudi v funkciji odziva na bolj zapleteno razmerje, ki zadeva usodo zahodnega belega patriarhata. Sodobni kon­teksti transnacionalizacije in ženske migracije razstavljajo moderno para­digmo nacije kot zamejene skupnosti, z varnimi razmejitvami med »zunaj« in »znotraj«. Kot poudarjajo postkolonialne feministic.ne avtorice, moderne politic.ne skupnosti na zahodu vzniknejo kot rezultat specific.nega zgodovin­skega upravljanja z etnic.no, rasno in spolno razliko, vpisano v teritorializirani prostor z utrjenimi mejami (Collins Hill, 1994; Kaplan, Alarcon in Moallem, 1999; Shome, 2011). Institucionalizacija modernega nacionalnega patriarhata je ospoljena in rasializirana pripoved: ženske iz podrejenih rasnih, etnic.nih in razrednih skupin po scenariju hegemonega (belega) nacionalizma ne pre­morejo ne bioloških (biološki rasizem) ne kulturnih (kulturni rasizem) kapac­itet, s katerimi bi prispevale k vitalnosti nacije. V modernem patriarhalnem nac.rtu sta spol in nacionalizem povezani kategoriji državljanstva in pripad­nosti, belo materinstvo v dejanskih gospodinjstvih ali v simbolnih projekcijah »nacije kot družine« pa rasni dodatek k slavi nacionalne reprodukcije. Sodobni procesi ekonomske transformacije in globalizacije so žensko, zaprto med stenami gospodinjstva in družine, naredili za lik iz preteklosti. Ne samo da so belke srednjega razreda v zadnjih petdesetih letih zapustile neplac.ano gospodinjsko delo; neoliberalna preobrazba socialne države in politic.ne ekonomije je ustvarila novi tip gospodinjstva, poseljen s transna­cionalnimi materami in tujo domac.o pomoc.jo. V moderno spolno pogodbo so vstopile migrantke. Razpad kolonialnega sveta, vkljuc.ujoc. Sovjetsko zvezo, je razkril rasializirano pripoved univerzalnosti materinstva (Glenn, 1994). Medtem ko neoliberalna biopolitika nacije razstavlja socialno kompo­zicijo belega doma srednjega razreda, pa se postmoderni nacionalni diskurz še vedno opira na artikuliranje družbenih odnosov v spolnih pojmovnikih. Pri tem si tokrat pomaga z vpoklicem »nacionalnih in transnacionalnih ikon in diskurzov« (Alarcón et al., 1999: 15). Belke na pozicijah moc.i vstopajo na globalno prizorišc.e kot posvojiteljice otrok iz tretjega sveta, multikulturne matere (Shome, 2011) ali kot misijonarke v simbolnem materinskem delu. Kot razlaga Raka Shome, ženske s politic.no in kulturno moc.jo postimpe­rialnega zahoda vstopajo v biopolitic.ni scenarij nacije v trenutku, ko se ta spopada z ranljivostjo svoje spolne in rasne konstitucije. Naj gre za belke v mednarodni diplomaciji, njihove podobe v diskurzih o clovekovih pravicah ali na civilizacijskih misijah v »razvijajocem se« svetu, kulturni imperializem Zahoda potrebuje rasializirano in ospo­ljeno domacnost bele ženskosti, s katero uprizarja svojo nacionalno maskulinost. (Shome, 2011: 333) Ženskam imperialne sile je dodeljena nova vloga; namesto zavezujoc.e biološke reprodukcije in varovanja družinskega doma sodelujejo v rasnih in kulturnih projektih izrisovanja kartografij postimperialnega sveta. V tem kontekstu pa lahko razumemo tudi nelagodje, ki ga proizvaja prva dama s koreninami v tem nekdanjem koloniziranem svetu socialistic.nega imperija. Tukaj si spet lahko pomagamo z njeno retoriko oblac.il. zarino jakno, ki jo je nosila na obisku v taborišc.u za migrantske otroke, v svoji militantni zeleni barvi preberemo kot uprizarjanje lika rasne in maskulinizirane varuhinje nacije. Na svoji poti v Afriko, kjer je nosila repliko belega pokrivala kolonial­nega gospodarja, smo pric.a podobnemu razkazovanju imperialne moc.i. Prve dame so bile v preteklosti že vpletene v scenarij udejanja Bele hiše kot imperialnega domovanja nacije (Mayo, 2000). Collins v The New Yorkerju Melanio Trump opiše kot »pasivno, a imperialno«. Elliot Ross (2018) pri Al Jazeeri doda, »najbrž je težko razumeti, zakaj se je prva dama odloc.ila za kostum belega kolonialista v Keniji leta 2018«; razen c.e, kot doda, »tudi razu-memo, da c.elada predstavlja ne samo kolonialnost, temvec. tudi belost«. Toda škandal, ki ga povzroc.i Melania Trump, je toliko bolj neznosen, kolikor je neznosna njena nepolna belost. Melania Trump namrec. ni prava prva dama, temvec. vlogo prve dame igra. Je oponaševalka, toda kot rasno ne povsem ustrezna, kot poudarja Wiedlack, to lahko poc.ne le s pretirava­njem in površinsko. Je plagiatorka: dobesedno – ko na Republikanski nacio­nalni konvenciji govor prepiše po govoru Michelle Obama – in v razredno--rasnem smislu. Je belka, pripadajoc.a novemu razredu bogatih imigrantov/ tk in v tem oziru sprejemljivejša od temnopoltih migrantk; toda obenem kot fotomodel z nekdanje socialistic.ne dežele, dedinja »kulture goljufanja v vzhodnoevropskih šolah« (kot njeno dejanje pojasni Washington Post, cit. v Wiedlack, 2018) – torej subjekt dvomljive morale in znac.aja, ki mimikrijo imperialne moc.i pretvori v modno burkaštvo. Melania Trump in periferni kic Medtem ko se zahod še naprej zanaša na svojo razdaljo do Vzhoda, pra­vijo Forrester, zaborowska in Gapova (2004: 17), Vzhod zagotavlja razliko tako, da ponotranji svojo manjvrednost. Po padcu Berlinskega zidu se je za Vzhod oblikovala predstava o evropskem Drugem. Opirajoc. se na bogato tradicijo razpravljanja o Balkanu se je tega Drugega posebej na obmoc.ju nekdanje Jugoslavije povezalo z etnic.nimi konflikti, divjaštvom in nazadnja­štvom (Colovic´, 2015; Bjelic´ in Savic´, 2005; Todorova, 2001). Slovenija se je kot nekdanja jugoslovanska republika otepala te dedišc.ine z argumentom, da je bila pod Titom žrtev prisilne balkanizacije ter da v resnici sodi v druš-c.ino srednjeevropskih narodov. S prihodom Melanie Trump v Belo hišo se je obnovilo upanje, da bo Slovenija pridobila vidnost na mednarodnem prizorišc.u ter da bo naposled, po dolgih letih zamenjevanja s Slovaško, pri­poznana kot povsem zahodna dežela. V preostanku razprave analiziram zapise, objavljene na slovenskih spletnih portalih siol.net in delo.si med januarjem 2017 in decembrom 2019. Da bo »Melania postavila Slovenijo na svetovni zemljevid«, so po poroc.a­nju medijev upali v rojstni Sevnici; takšni so bili tudi širši medijski upi. Ko je Melania Trump v svojem govoru na republikanski konvenciji omenila, da je bila rojena »v majhni, lepi, tedaj še komunistic.ni deželi v srednji Evropi«, njena referenca na geografsko lokacijo v medijih ni ostala neopažena. Melania nas postavlja »v srednjo Evropo in soc.asno oddaljuje od Balkana«, se je glasil zapis na portalu siol.net (Žužek, 2017). V c.lanku avtor obnovi faze v zgodovini, ko so »nas« razlic.ni svetovni voditelji, od papeža Janeza Pavla II. do Billa Clintona, globalni mediji, kot je The New York Times, in pred tem srbski nacionalistic.ni geografi poskusili potisniti v objem Balkanskega polo-toka. Sedaj je najbrž vendarle jasno, da je Slovenija »doma pod Alpami in torej v srednji Evropi« (ibid.). Postati zahoden, piše Bjelic´, pomeni »usvojiti zahodne vrednote in zahodne orientalistic.ne stereotipe« (Bjelic´, 2009: 490). Samokolonizirajoc.a gesta, izražena skozi frustracijo nad napac.nim prepo­znavanjem nacionalne identitete kot balkanske, utrdi orientalistic.no-bal­kanski princip, kamor, paradoksno, kot poudarja vrsto avtorjev (prim. npr. Colovic´, 2015), sodi tudi samo zanikanje pripadanja Balkanu. Lokalno trženje Melanie Trump kot blagovne znamke sodi v soroden sklop samokoloniziranja. Linija »First lady« (c.okoladni izdelki, salama in vino), Melaniina torta, pita, palac.inke, c.aj in copati (Intihar, 2017), turistic.ni proizvod »First lady village« z ogledom rojstne hiše in šole, ki jo je obisko­vala prva dama (Lonc.ar, 2019), ustvarjajo periferni zemljevid patriotic.nega samopodrejanja slavni podobi. Teorija trženja nacije kot blagovne znamke (nation-branding) ugotavlja, da so se nekdanje socialistic.ne države znašle v kontradiktornih politikah reprezentiranja. Po eni strani si morajo za samo­promocijo izbirati tarc.e, ki so že predmet globalnega kroženja stereotipov o Vzhodu (npr. Romunija kot dežela Drakule, Kazahstan kot Boratova dežela); po drugi strani pa s tem tudi ohranjajo položaj dežel, ki so brezupno v zao­stanku za civiliziranim svetom (Bardan in Imre, 2011: 169). Ker državam na obmoc.jih razpadlih sovjetskega in jugoslovanskega imperija manjka blagovnih znamk, ki bi bile prepoznavne na zahodu, tako kot to velja za zahodne države z dolgo tradicijo globalnega trženja lastnih kultur in iden­titet, so prisiljene vstopiti v tekmovanje za prepoznavnost prek simbolov, za katere verjamejo, da imajo tržno vrednost. S tem ko pristanejo na znam-c.enje po vnaprej predvidenih oznac.evalcih nacionalne identitete, pa tudi »krepijo neoimperialne neenakosti med nacijami« (ibid.). Karnivaleskni smeh Takšno samostereotipiziranje ne najde vselej harmonic.nega sozvoc.ja z lokalnim prebivalstvom. »Škandal« kipa Melanie, lesene skulpture, ki jo je na vhodu v Sevnico julija 2019 postavil ameriški umetnik v rezidenci v Sloveniji Brad Downey, dokumentira nelagodje. Kip, ki imitira prvo damo ob zaprisegi Donalda Trumpa, je po umetnikovi predlogi roc.no izdelal lokalni rokodelec Aleš Župevc. Globalni mediji, CNN, BBC, Sky News, The New York Times, The Washington Post, nemška RTL so objavili sliko lokal­nega »poklona« prvi dami, imenovano tudi »strašilo« oz. Smrketa. Nacionalni Reporter je v postavitvi kipa zaznal nameren napad na podobo »Melanie in Trumpa« in deželi prinesel sramoto. Po pisanju c.asnika ima žalitev »politic.no ozadje«. »Nas Slovence pa še bolj potiska proti Moskvi, c.eprav smo imeli že leta 1948, ko nas je Stalin izobc.il iz svoje rdec.e cerkve, zelo neprijetne izkuš­nje. Takrat so nam iz godlje, v katero so nas vsak po svoje potisnili Rusi in naši komunisti, pomagali Americ.ani, iz katerih se sedaj norc.ujemo.« (Staric., 2019) Ko države postsocialistic.ne periferije uprizarjajo nacionalne identitete, se pogosto oprejo na estetiko kic.a, ki hiperbolizira balkansko drugost. Kot to popisuje Ivan Ditchev (2016), si pri tem pogosto sposojajo pri pop iko­nah zahodnega sveta: Bill Clinton v Prištini, Bruce Lee v Mostarju, Sylvester Stallone v Žitištju v Srbiji, pa George Bush in Tina Turner, John Lennon, Elton John in Mick Jagger v Albaniji (2016: 101). Ta »skupna« raba simbolov slave služi kot ideološki »motor za pogajanje o geografski bližini zahodni Evropi« (2016: 94). Pri tem ostaja nejasno, ali imitatorji razumejo, celo namerno izigravajo dejstvo, da bolj ko pretiravajo, dlje od prepoznavnosti lastnega zahodnjaštva drvijo; ali so povsem nevedni o negativnih uc.inkih te estetike? Kip Melanie Trump lahko razumemo v luc.i kic. nacionalizma, le da ta deluje v nasprotni smeri, stran od estetike slave in spektakla k uprizarjanju estetike »primitivcev«, umetnikov samoukov, ki se poskušajo približati duhu ljudskega in kulture po poti avtentic.nega, neobdelanega stila neposrednosti materialov (les) in upodobitev (rokodelstvo z žago). Uc.inek je podoben karnevalesknemu smehu. Bahtin karnevaleskno kul­turo smeha opiše kot svobodno, sprošc.eno izražanje utopic.nega drugega sveta, izražanje, ki je brez umetniških ambicij (2008: 11–13). V ospredju tega ustvarjanja »izhoda iz uradne življenjske ureditve« je materialno telesni prin­cip, ki si sposoja pri grotesknem realizmu. Telo je hiperbolizirano do mere, da potelešenje postane groteskno; zadovoljstvo se »poraja ob samem zni­žanju visokega« (ibid.: 304). Brad Downey je kip Melanie Trump pojasnil kot izdelek »burkaškega formalizma«, ki je »stil svobodne strategije in flui­dnega prilagajanja situaciji« (PV, 2019). Karnivaleskna periferija je ustvarila svoj lastni poklon »slovenski prvi dami«, le da se ob tem, ko imitira medijsko histerijo, umika v še eno enigmo Melanie Trump. Je ta tiha dama še en odli­tek nacionalnega kic.a na postsocialistic.ni periferiji; ali pa gre za dejanje ljudske transgresije, ustvarjenje v mednarodnem zavezništvu umetnosti in rokodelstva, ki s pomoc.jo estetike in identitete podeželskega primitivizma razvrednoti globalno slavo imperialne matere zahoda? Sklep V svoji raziskavi sem si zastavila vprašanje, kakšna je usoda simbolnega materinstva, ko ga uteleša tujka. Po opravljeni analizi je jasno, da je odgovor v primeru Melanie Trump povezan z izvorom v domovini s (pol)bele perife­rije. Ta izvor doloc.a medijski metaokvir »neme kraljice«, ki ga njeni podobi nameni liberalni medij. Razšifriranje enigmatic.ne tujosti prve dame, vsta­vljene na ozadje migrantke z Vzhoda, ne velja le za The New Yorker. Tudi drugi liberalni medijski programi, kot so The Saturday Night Live in The Daily Show with Trevor Noah (»Is Donald Trump Trying to Deport Melania«, 14. 8. 2019) ali Borat II, posnemajo njeno okorno izgovorjavo in izposta­vljajo njen nekdanji poklic (negovorec.ega) fotomodela. zasmehovanje glasu (kot naglasa) omogoc.i, da se podobo naseli v vodilno pripoved o transformaciji migrantke iz perifernega subjekta v imitacijo zahodnjakinje. Clanki kot »Melaniina evolucija« v reviji Time (Rhodan, 2017) ali »Melania Trump: od majhnega mesta Slovenije do praga Bele hiše« (Horowitz, 2018) transformacijo opremijo z diskurzom napredovanja med dvema telesoma, telesom fotomodela in telesom prve dame, kot potovanje med dvema kultu­rama. Le da transformacija nikoli ni povsem zakljuc.ena: »Saj še vedno ne zna govoriti angleško«, tvita Bette Midller ob njenem govoru na republikanski konvenciji 2020 in jo cinic.no poimenuje »ena srec.na Slovenka«. Ko preuredi vrt pred Belo hišo, ji nekdanji novinar The New York Timesa oc.ita »unic.enje naše dedišc.ine«. »Tokrat je prvic., ko sem zares besen, da je @FLOTUS tujka … Nima pravice, da razstavlja našo zgodovino,« zapiše Kurt Eichenwald. Na podlagi analize lahko odgovorim, da je usoda simbolne moc.i migrant-ske prve matere zapisana v sodobni, z ekonomsko globalizacijo povezani krizi belega patriarhata. Bela feminilnost je funkcionalno orodje v oblikova­nju zahodnega patriarhalnega socio-družbenega reda: je »locus, na katerem se varujejo meje rase, spola, seksualnosti in nacionalnosti« (Shome, 2011). Vzhodnjaški etnic.ni preostanek prve dame služi afirmaciji ideala. Potujevanje Melanie Trump, piše Wiedlack, je hkrati del boja za kulturno hegemonijo v zDA. Kulturne vojne, ki potekajo med liberalnodemokratic.nimi in konserva­tivnimi desnimi silami, zadevajo vprašanja rasne, spolne in seksualne identi­tete ameriške družbe. Paradoksno so prav liberalni mediji tisti, ki reafirmirajo konservativne ideje o superiorni nacionalni kulturi, s tem ko se poslužujejo rasializiranja in seksualiziranja njenega vzhodnjaštva. »Jopice iz poliestra«, »koza« in »trava«, ki opredeljujejo njeno rojstno domovino, služijo temu, da z biografsko preteklostjo vzpostavljajo kulturno razdaljo med Vzhodom in zahodom, med modernostjo in zaostalostjo, med pastoralnim deklištvom in odraslo (emancipirano) ženskostjo belega zahoda. Pogled na predmoderno migrantko z Vzhoda igra vlogo v ohranjanju kulturnih hierarhij. Na postsocialistic.ni periferiji se po principu (samo) orientaliziranja podobo prve dame mobilizira v funkciji izražanja kulturne superiornosti (nasproti balkanskemu Drugemu); pa tudi s pogledom nazaj na zahod. Ta pogled je poseljen s spopadi za lokalno kulturno identiteto, vkljuc.ujoc. stereotipizirani subjekt postsocialistic.nega Drugega, pa tudi, kot nakazuje požig lesene skulpture Melanie Trump pred Sevnico, ljudski (po) smeh kic.u, ki ga ta uprizarja na domac.ih tleh. Spolni imaginariji nacije so v dobi transnacionalizacije materinskih figur, dejanskih ali simbolnih, postali pomembno pric.evanje o kratkosti, ranljivosti in nestabilnosti modernega nacionalnega reda, ki je potlac.eval dejstvo ženskih migracij, mater etnic.nih (in rasnih) manjšin in povelic.eval maskulino potenco zahodnega patriarhata. Da bi lahko zajeli vso kompleks­nost tega krožišc.a med nacionalnimi imaginariji in žensko migracijo, se bo morala sociološka razprava – v dobi transnacionalizacije družb – intenziv­neje posluževati transnacionalnih primerjav. Simbolne matere na mejah dveh domovin so lahko pomemben prispevek k tem raziskovanjem – ne glede na to, kaj si mislimo o njihovih dejanskih vlogah v razreševanju neena­kosti ženskega migrantstva, tujosti in perifernosti. LITERATURA Bahtin, Mihail M. (2008): Ustvarjanje Françoisa Rabelaisa in ljudska kultura sredn­jega veka in renesanse. Ljubljana: Literatura. Berlant, Lauren (1991): The Anatomy of National Fantasy. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Bjelic´, Dušan (ur.) in Obrad Savic´ (ur) (2005): Balkan as Metaphor: Between Globalization and Fragmentation. Boston: MIT Press. Bjelic´, Dušan (2009): Immigrants as the Enemy: Psychoanalysis and the Balkans Self-orientalization. Seer 87, 3. Dostopno prek file:///C:/Users/vidmar/Downloads/ Immigrants_as_the_Enemy_Psychoanalysis_a.pdf, 20. 5. 2020. Borcila, Andaluna (2004): How I Found Eastern Europe: Televisual Geography, Travel Sites, and Museum Installations. V: S. Forrester (ur.), M. J. zaborowska (ur.) in E. Gapova (ur), Over the Wall/After the Fall: Post-Communist Cultures Through an East-West Gaze, 42–66. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Boyd Caroli, Betty (2010): First Ladies: From Martha Washington to Michelle Obama. New York: Oxford University Press. Collins Hill, Patrizia (1994): Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist Theorising About Motherhood. V: G.E. Nakano (ur.), G. Chang (ur.) in R. Forcey (ur), Mothering: Ideology, Experience, and Agency, 45–65. New York: Routledge. Colovic´, Ivan (2015): Balkan: teror kulture. Ljubljana: znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete. Ditchev, Ivan (2016): Balkan Mimesis: Kitsch as a Geographic Concept. V: z. Krajina (ur.) in N. Blanuša (ur), Europe Unfinished: Mediating Europe and the Balkans in a Time of Crisis, 93–104. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Edwards, Janis L. in Huey-Rong Chen (2000): The First Lady/First Wife in Editorial Cartoons: Rhetorical Visions Through Gendered Lenses. Women’s Studies in Communication 23 (3): 367–391. Flint, Lynn (2011): One Nation Under Sex: How the Private Lives of Presidents, First Ladies and Their Lovers Changed the Course of American History. New York: St Martins’ Press. Forrester, Sibelan (ur.), Magdalena zaborowska (ur.) in Elena Gapova (ur) (2004): Over the Wall/After the Fall: Post-Communist Cultures Through an East–West Gaze. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Glenn, Evelyn Nakano (1999): Social Construction of Mothering: A Thematic Overview. V: E. Nakano Glenn (ur.), G. Chang (ur.) in R. Forcey (ur), Mothering: Ideology, Experience, and Agency. 1–29. New York: Routledge. Hall, Stuart, Jessica Evans in Sean Nixon (2013): Representation. Cultural Represen­tation and Signifying Practices. London: Sage. Horvat, Srec.ko in Igor Štiks (ur.) (2016): Dobrodošli u pustinju post-socializma. zagreb: Fraktura. Houchin Winfield, Betty H. (1997): The First Lady, Political Power, and the Media: Who Elected her Anyway. V: P. Norris (ur.) Women, Media, and Politics, 166– 179. New York: Oxford University Press. Kaplan, Caren (ur.), Norma Alarcon (ur.) in Minoo Moallem (ur.) (1999): Between Woman and Nation: Nationalisms, Transnational Feminisms, and the State. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Layoun, Mary N. (1999): A Guest at the Wedding: Honor, Memory, and (National) Desire in Michel Khleife’s Wedding in Galilee. V: C. Kaplan (ur.), N. Alarcon (ur.), M. Moallem (ur.) Between Woman and Nation: Nationalisms, Transnational Feminisms, and the State, 92–107. Durham in London: Duke University Press. Loizeau, Pierre-Marie (2015): First Lady but Second Fiddle, or the Rise and Rejection of the Political Couple in the White House: 1933–Today. European Journal of American Studies 10 (1). Dostopno prek https://www.researchgate.net/publica­tion/277357409_First_Lady_But_Second_Fiddle_or_the_rise_and_rejection_of_ the_political_couple_in_the_White_House_1933-today, 7. 7. 2019. Mayo, Edith P. (2000): Party Politics: The Political Impact of the First Ladies’ Social Role. The Social Science Journal 37 (4): 557–90. Norris, Pippa (1997): Introduction. Women, Media, and Politics. V: P. Norris (ur.), Women, Media, and Politics, 1–18. New York: Oxford University Press. O’Connor, Karen, Bernardette Nye in Laura Van Assendelft (1996): Wives in the White House: The Political Influence of First Ladies. Presidential Studies Quarterly 26 (3): 835–853. Scharrer, Erica, in Kim Bissell (2000): Overcoming Traditional Boundaries. Women and Politics 21 (1): 55–83. Shome, Raka (2011): Global Motherhood: The Transnational Intimacies of White Femininity. Critical Studies in Media Communication 28 (5): 388–406. Todorova, Maria (2001): Imaginarij Balkana. Ljubljana: ICK. Watson, Robert P. (2014): The Presidents’ Wives: The Office of the First Lady in US Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Wiedlack, Katharina (2018): In/visibly Different: Melania Trump and the Othering of Eastern European Women in US culture. Feminist Media Studies 19 (8): 1063–1078. Young, Robb (2011): Power Dressing. First Ladies, Women Politicians and Fashion. Merrell Publishers. Yuval-Davis, Nira (2009): Spol in nacija. Ljubljana: Sophia. VIRI Bruni, Frank (2018): Melania Trump Could Be Our Greatest First Lady. The New York Times. Dostopno prek https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/opinion/ melania-trump-could-be-our-greatest-first-lady.html, 21. 8. 2018. Collins, Lauren (2016): Who is Melania Trump? The New Yorker. Dostopno prek https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/05/09/who-is-melania-trump? verso=true, 30. 5. 2018. Friedman, Vanessa (2018): Melania Trump: Out of Africa, Still in Costume. Dostopno prek https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/fashion/melania-trump-africa-trip­fashion-fedora.html, 29. 7. 2020. Friedman, Vanessa (2019a): On The Fourth of July, Melania Trump Dresses for Independence. Dostopno prek https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/fashion/ melania-trump-fourth-of-july-herrera.html, 29. 7. 2020. Friedman, Vanessa (2019b): The Death of Fashion Diplomacy. Dostopno prek https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/07/fashion/the-death-of-fashion-diplo­macy.html, 29. 7. 2020. Friedman, Vanessa (2020): The Politics of Dress at the State of the Union. Dostopno prek https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/style/melanie-trump-congress­women-in-white-state-of-the-union.html, 29. 7. 2020. Horowitz, Jason (2016): Melania Trump: From Small-town Slovenia to Doorstep of White House. Dostopno prek https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/us/poli­tics/melania-trump-slovenia.html, 29. 7. 2020. Intihar, Anja (2018): Ko prva dama zDA postane pravi posel. Dostopno prek https:// www.delo.si/novice/slovenija/ko-prva-dama-zda-postane-pravi-posel-tudi-ali­predvsem-za-sevnico-73955.html, 11. 9. 2018. Kopušar, Sebastijan (2018): Politic.ni cilji slovenske prve dame. Dostopno prek https://www.delo.si/novice/svet/politicni-cilji-slovenske-prve-dame-48761. html, 8. 5. 2018. Lonc.ar, Andreja (2019): Uc.inek Melanie Trump po dveh letih. Dostopno prek https://siol.net/novice/slovenija/azijski-turistki-je-zanimalo-od-kod-izhaja-mela­nia-507111, 14. 11. 2019. Mlakar, Luka (2018): Slovenija za Melanio Trump za zdaj ostaja izbrisana datoteka. Dostopno prek https://siol.net/novice/svet/slovenija-za-melanio-trump-za-zdaj­ostaja-izbrisana-datoteka-video-457690, 12. 12. 2019. P. V. (2019): Ozadje lesenega kipa Melanie. Dostopno prek https://www.delo.si/ magazin/zanimivosti/delavec-ki-stoji-za-kipom-melanie-203602.html, 28. 11. 2019. Rhodan, Maya (2017): Melania’s Evolution. Time: Dostopno prek https://time.com/ melania-trump-inauguration-model-first-lady/, 29. 7. 2020. Ross, Elliot (2018): When Melania Went to Africa Wearing a Pith Helmet. Dostopno prek https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/melania-africa-wearing-pith­helmet-181007071847726.html, 7. 12. 2019. Rudnick, Paul (2016): Melania’s Diary, The New Yorker. Dostopno prek https:// www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/29/melanias-diary-by-paul-rudnick?verso=true, 22. 12. 2019. Patterson, Troy (2018): Interrogating Melania Trump’s Statement Jacket and Its Fast-fashion Fascism. The New Yorker. Dostopno prek https://www.newyorker. com/culture/annals-of-appearances/interrogating-melania-trumps-statement-jacket-and-its-fast-fashion-fascism?verso=true, 6. 12. 2019. Staric., Peter (2019): Spomenik pri Sevnici je namerna žalitev Melanie in Trumpa, odgovorne je treba kaznovati! Reporter. Dostopno prek https://reporter.si/ clanek/slovenija/zgrozeni-peter-staric-spomenik-pri-sevnici-je-namerna-zalitev­melanie-in-trumpa-odgovorne-je-treba-kaznovati-712445, 10. 11. 2020. Tolentino, Jia (2017): With the White House Christmas, the Image of Melania Trump Transforms from Fairy-Tale Prisoner to Wicked Queen. The New Yorker. Dostopno prek https://www.newyorker.com/culture/annals-of-appearances/ with-the-white-house-christmas-the-image-of-melania-trump-transforms-from-fairy-tale-prisoner-to-wicked-queen, 19. 1. 2020. Vida, Vendela (2018): Searching for Melania Trump’s Childhood Home. The New Yorker. Dostopno prek https://www.newyorker.com/culture/personal-history/ searching-for-melania-trumps-childhood-home?verso=true, 23. 5. 2018. Waldman, Katy (2018): The Childlike Strangeness of Melania Trump’s “Be Best” Campaign. The New Yorker. Dostopno prek https://www.newyorker.com/ culture/culture-desk/the-childlike-strangeness-of-melania-trumps-be-best-cam­paign?verso=true, 8. 5. 2018. Žužek, Aleš (2017): Melania je Slovenijo z Balkana potegnila nazaj v srednjo Evropo. Siol.net. Dostopno prek https://siol.net/forum/thread/melania-je-slovenijo-z­balkana-potegnila-nazaj-v-srednjo-evropo-8235, 30. 1. 2017. Maruša PUŠNIK, Dejan JONTES* MEdIJI IN SPONTANI NACIONALIZEM: PRIMER MELANIE TRUMP** Povzetek. Clanek analizira reprezentacije Melanie Trump v slovenskih tiskanih medijih in raziskuje, kako je bil v prispevkih o Melanii Trump konstruiran sponta­ni nacionalizem, ta pa je bil v medijih povezan s promo-cijo slovenske nacije prek Melanie kot blagovne znamke. Moc nacionalnih vezi, idej in tradicije je namrec vzdr­ževana in redistribuirana prek medijev in popularne kulture, zato avtorja v nasprotju z literaturo s tega pod-rocja, ki medije vecinoma obravnava le kot mediatorje, v clanku tudi kriticno naslavljata vprašanje vloge medi­jev v procesu znamcenja nacije in jih obravnavata kot neodvisne akterje. Avtorja analizirata 594 prispevkov o Melanii Trump, objavljenih v slovenskih tiskanih medi­jih v obdobju treh mesecev v letih 2016 in 2017. Analiza tiskanih medijev v Sloveniji je pokazala, da številne in ponavljajoce se medijske reprezentacije »Melanie« poti­skajo slovenski nacionalizem v komercialni kontekst in posledicno transformirajo nacijo v blago. Kljucni pojmi: medijski diskurz, komodifikacija, Melania Trump, prva dama, nacionalizem, znamcenje nacije Uvod Clanek uporablja primer Melanie Trump, nekdanje prve dame zDA, da bi analiziral diskurzivne strategije, prek katerih so tiskani mediji v Sloveniji nacionalistic.no reprezentirali »Melanio« kot etnic.no rojeno Slovenko. zaradi zelo tekmovalnega globalnega ekonomskega okolja se države dandanes s pomoc.jo medijev pogosto predstavljajo kot blagovne znamke in vse to klic.e * Dr. Maruša Pušnik, izredna profesorica, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija; dr. Dejan Jontes, izredni profesor, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija. ** Izvirni znanstveni clanek. Raziskava, predstavljena v tem clanku, je bila izvedena v okviru nacionalnega raziskovalnega pro- grama Družbena pogodba v 21. stoletju (P6-0400, 2015–2025), ki ga financira Javna agencija za razisko­valno dejavnost Republike Slovenije. DOI: 10.51936/tip.58.2.464-480 po ponovnem premisleku o konceptu nacionalizma.1 V tem oziru Castelló in Mihelj (2018) zatrjujeta, da trenutna oživitev nacionalnega presega pod­roc.je politike, saj je le-to bolj zasidrano v logiki globalnega kapitalizma in je tako postalo neloc.ljivo povezano s praksami promocije in potrošnje. Omenjata vec. razprav, ki so se pojavile v okviru razlic.nih tem, od »ekonom­skega nacionalizma«, »znamc.enja nacije«, »potrošniškega etnocentrizma« do »komercialnega nacionalizma«. Vidmar Horvat (2019) govori o preobratu procesov od sodobne etnizacije nacije do postmodernega trženja nacije, ko opisuje postmilenijski nacionalizem kot korporativno idejo, pri kateri se c.ustveni odnosi spajajo s komercialno privlac.nostjo. V zvezi s tem v c.lanku predlagamo koncept komodificiranega nacionalizma za opis procesov, kako so slovenski mediji kreirali Melanio Trump kot slovensko nacionalno blagovno znamko. Številni avtorji namrec. poudarjajo povezavo med nacionalizmom in trže­njem v sodobnem svetu. Na primer, Aronczyk (2013) trdi, da znamc.enje nacije kot proces oblikovanja in komuniciranja nacionalne identitete upo­rablja orodja, tehnike in strokovna znanja iz sveta korporativnega uprav­ljanja blagovnih znamk. Poleg tega Hoefte in Veenendaal (2019) dodajata, da sta dandanes gradnja nacionalne države in znamc.enje nacije tesno pre­pletena procesa, saj slednjega ni mogoc.e obravnavati loc.eno od izgradnje nacionalne države. znamc.enje slovenske nacije prek podob »Melanie« v medijih tako vedno vkljuc.uje tudi izgradnjo zamišljene slovenske nacio­nalne skupnosti. Vendar pa po besedah Varge (2013) tak proces znamc.enja nacije, ki vkljuc.uje tudi ekonomski vidik, kot kulturni projekt pomaga ohra­njati, legitimirati in ustvarjati neoliberalni družbeni red, v katerem so vsi kul­turni fenomeni videni in obravnavani skozi ekonomsko perspektivo. Tržno znamc.enje nacije torej na nek nac.in izpodriva stari etnonacionalizem in ga zamenjuje z novo obliko tržno vsidranega nacionalnega upravljanja podob (Bolin in Miazhevich, 2018). Takšno marketinško orodje – znamc.enje nacije je še posebej aktivno na ozemlju vzhodnoevropskih držav in tudi v Sloveniji kot delu nekdanje Jugoslavije (glej Volc.ic., 2008; Konec.nik Ruzzier, 2012; Vitic in Ringer, 2007; Szondi, 2007; Jansen, 2008; Kania-Lundholm, 2012; Volc.ic. in Andrejevic, 2011), saj so morale te države intenzivno poiskati svojo kohe­rentno nacionalno identiteto in nacionalno pripadnost, zato so v mnogih primerih aktivirale, kot pravi Volc.ic. (2008), »projekte nacionalnega znam-c.enja države«. Prav tako tudi Kaneva in Popescu (2011) trdita, da so napori postkomunistic.nih držav (za primer vzameta Romunijo in Bolgarijo), da bi ponovno iznašli nacionalne podobe prek rabe nacionalnega znamc.enja, še vec.ji, saj so te države po padcu komunizima obc.utile globoko potrebo po Po devetdesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja je znamcenje nacije pritegnilo veliko pozornost tako razisk­ovalcev na eni strani kot vladnih akterjev na drugi strani, zatrjujeta Bolin in Miazhevich (2018: 527). nacionalni redefiniciji. To pa je šlo z roko v roki s porajanjem kapitalizma v teh državah. zdi se tudi, da je znamc.enje nacije bolj znac.ilnost majhnih peri­fernih držav, ki morajo ubraniti svoj položaj in vlogo v primerjavi z velikimi, nadrejenimi narodi, in v tem pogledu se ta postmoderna gradnja nacije raz­likuje od tradicionalnih modernistic.nih konstrukcij nacionalne države. Naš cilj analize je prikazati posebnosti tega postmodernega znamc.enja sloven-ske nacije na primeru »Melanie«, ki je na eni strani povezana z zvezdniškim nacionalizmom in na drugi s komodifikacijo nacije. Osrednje raziskovalno vprašanje je, kako je celotno znamc.enje Melanie v slovenskih tiskanih medi­jih v prvi vrsti povezano z obc.utki majhne in neprepoznavne nacije in kako se prek medijskih reprezentacij »Melanie« konstruira slovenska nacija kot tržno blago. Naš primer je specific.en v tem smislu, da ni bilo neke skladne in dirigi­rane kampanje znamc.enja, ampak je medijski diskurz samostojno deloval kot državotvorni in narodotvorni diskurz in je predstavljal Melanio Trump kot slovensko blagovno znamko prek spontanega izliva nacionalistic.nega izražanja. Mediji so tako zelo pomembna orodja v sodobnih procesih znamc.enja nacije, kar ugotavljata tudi Bolin in Miazhevich (2018: 527–533). Pokažeta, da medtem ko so se kritic.ne študije o nacionalnem znamc.enju primarno opirale predvsem na sociološke in antropološke teorije nacional­nosti, identitet in trgov, pa je bila, nasprotno, vloga medijev – kot institu­cij, sistemov in družbenih pripovedovalcev zgodb – premalo teoretizirana v odnosu do nacionalnega znamc.enja. z drugimi besedami, mediji »so bili opisani kot pasivna orodja pri orkestriranju kampanj znamc.enja nacij brez lastnega akterstva« (Bolin in Stahlberg, 2015: 3066), c.eprav so mediji prav­zaprav sestavni del nacionalnega znamc.enja, saj ohranjajo ideje, podobe, ideologije, diskurze in prakse znamc.enja nacij.2 V c.lanku ugotavljamo, da je takšna oblika znamc.enja nacije sodobna oblika nacionalizma, zlasti v pri­meru turizma, kar pa je bilo le redko obravnavano v okviru medijskih nara­cij (glej Frew in White, 2011; Fan, 2006; Pamment in Cassinger, 2018; Volc.ic., 2011; Dinnie, 2016; Shepherd, 2002). Cilj te študije je tako odkriti medijsko generirane podobe, da bi razumeli, kaj se dogaja z nacionalizmom v mediatiziranih potrošniških družbah. Naša analiza torej temelji na predpostavki, da se komodifikacija nacije v našem primeru odvija v dveh korakih, prvic., mediji reprezentirajo »Melanio« kot avtentic.no Slovenko, kot »našo« skromno, izjemno in slavno Slovenko, in drugic., »Melania« je v tem oziru predstavljena kot tista, ki »nam« lahko pomaga v ekonomskem smislu; ali rec.eno drugac.e, »Melanio« se uporablja Kim in Lee (2018) na primeru Koreje prikažeta, kako so razlicni kulturni akterji v državi, tudi mediji, sodelovali z nacionalnimi vladami, da bi promovirali nacionalni ponos doma in pozitivno podobo nacije v mednarodnem prostoru v dobi globalne kompeticije. Nacionalno znamcenje tako povežeta s pro-cesi marketizacije, saj se je vse to odvijalo na blagovnih trgih. za trženje slovenske nacije kot blaga. Še vec., v ozadju tega kulturnega feno­mena znamc.enja nacije ni toliko proces narodotvorja ali neke kolektivne identifikacije bralcev z nacijo, temvec. bolj banalne, vsakdanje fantazije, ki temeljijo na povzdigovanju majhnih narodov iz anonimnosti. V analizo je bilo vkljuc.enih 594 prispevkov o Melanii Trump, objavljenih v slovenskih tiskanih medijih3 v obdobju treh mesecev v letih 2016 in 2017. Vzorc.enje je bilo omejeno na doloc.ena c.asovna obdobja, saj smo vkljuc.ili vse tiste novinarske tekste, ki so bili objavljeni med 15. oktobrom 2016 in 15. novembrom 2016, torej tri tedne pred predsedniškimi volitvami v zDA 8. novembra 2016 in teden po volitvah, ter od 20. januarja 2017 do 20. marca 2017, to je dva meseca po inavguraciji 45. predsednika zDA, ki je potekala 20. januarja 2017. Študija je eksploratorna in temelji na širokem vzorcu novi­narskih tekstov iz izbranih c.asovnih obdobij in predvsem nas zanimajo tudi razlike v poroc.anju med tema obdobjema. Vzorc.enje je temeljilo na iskalnih besedah Melania Trump, opravila pa ga je osrednja slovenska tiskovna kli-ping agencija Kliping. V izbirnem postopku nismo loc.evali med mnenji in novic.arskimi prispevki in smo v analizo vkljuc.ili oboje. Analiza temelji na induktivnem pristopu k podatkom, oba avtorja sta prebrala vsa besedila in sta v reprezentacijah »Melanie« s pomoc.jo metode tekstualne analize posku­šala prepoznati glavne novinarske diskurzivne mehanizme, ki kreirajo slo­vensko nacijo kot blago. Pri tem je treba izpostaviti, da je v vzorcu približno enakomerno zastopan tako t. i. kakovostni kot regionalni, revijalni in rumeni tisk, skupaj prek 30 razlic.nih publikacij. Ce omenimo samo tiste z vec. kot 20 besedili v vzorcu, je bilo iz Dnevnika v analizo vkljuc.enih 72 c.lankov z ome­njenimi iskanimi besedami, iz Vec.era 61, Dela 57, Sveta24 48, Reporterja 45, Primorskih novic 42, Slovenskih novic 34 in Mladine 23. Nacije kot komercialna podjetja in poblagovljenje nacionalnih custev Roosvall in Salovaara-Moring (2010: 9) izpostavljata, da je bila nacija »kot kljuc.na družbena kategorija« v medijskih študijih v globalni dobi podteoreti­zirana. Bila je eksplicitno oznac.ena kot »postnacionalna« ali »denacionalna«, v razpravah o glokalizaciji je bila tudi pozabljena/prezrta, kot je bila pre­zrta tudi v vec.jem delu splošnejše globalizacijske paradigme. Lahko rec.emo, da je bila nacija prezrta kot kulturno-ekonomska kategorija, zato Bolin in Stĺhlberg (2010) obravnavata nove nac.ine, kako se dandanes nacije kon­struirajo v kulturnem in ideološkem smislu kot skupnost, a hkrati tudi kot Po besedah B. Luthar in A. Trdina (2015: 284) priljubljeni tabloidni tedniki, ki predstavljajo pomemben del našega vzorca, še vedno ostajajo osrednji za diskurz o celebrifikaciji v Sloveniji, »ceprav se kultura slavnih diseminira v široki paleti popularne kulture in medijskih žanrov v starih in novih medijih, je težko zamejiti njene meje«. blago. Poudarjata, da sodobne nacionalne države vedno bolj delujejo kot komercialna podjetja, ki svojo novo nacionalistic.no retoriko usmerjajo k mednarodnemu obc.instvu investitorjev in turistov. Castile (1996: 743) citira Wallerstina, ki pravi, da je že sam zgodovinski razvoj kapitalizma vkljuc.eval procese komodificiranja »vsega«, kar je vkljuc.evalo tudi formiranje trga za etnonacionalne identitete. Valaskivi (2016) v tem oziru uvaja koncept »cool nacij«, da bi opisala vlogo medijev pri družbenem imaginiranju oznamc.enih držav v kapitalistic.nih družbah, kjer je »biti cool« centralnega pomena. zato lahko parafraziramo Bolina in Stĺhlberga (2010) in ugotovimo, da praksa znamc.enja na primeru »Melanie« konstituira solidarnost v odnosu do nacije, kot to poc.ne nacionalizem, soc.asno pa takšno znamc.enje nacije uporablja kulturne tehnologije za konstitucijo nacije kot blaga. To pa proi­zvaja nacijo kot neoliberalno nacijo, saj se znamc.enje kvalitativno razlikuje od zgodnejših oblik zamišljanja nacionalnih skupnosti. Tako se nacija vse bolj transformira iz politic.nega koncepta v komercialni produkt in postaja orodje za trženje blaga potencialnim kupcem (Stĺhlberg in Bolin, 2016: 274).4 Na ta nac.in se nacijo zreducira na blago in je posledic.no komercia­lizirana tudi v medijih, od televizije do tiskanih oglasov in turistic.nih leta­kov. Tak komercialni nacionalizem se tako vedno bolj uporablja za pro-dajo izdelkov – nacij, da bi, v našem primeru, slovenski narod postal bolj prepoznaven. Gray (2007) k temu vidiku dodaja še kulturno komponento, ko govori predvsem o komodifikaciji nacionalne »kulture« za »nekulturne« namene, v tem primeru za politic.ne narodotvorne projekte države (glej tudi Heller (2010) za podobno tezo o komodifikaciji nacionalnega jezika kot kul­turnega artefakta za promocijo nacije). Na podlagi številnih nedavnih razprav v c.lanku pokažemo, da je »Melania« v medijih diskurzivno konstruirana kot slovenska nacionalna blagovna znamka in da pri reprezentiranju slovensko-ameriških odnosov takšna blagovna znamka promovira ekonomsko vrednost in vec.jo prepo­znavnost majhnega slovenskega naroda, kar bi Slovenijo lahko umestilo na širši globalni zmeljevid. Po mnenju Bolina in Miazhevicha (2018: 527) take kampanje znamc.enja nacije ustvarjajo ahistoric.ne in ekskluzivistic.ne repre­zentacije nacije in pospešujejo obliko »komercialnega nacionalizma«, ki je zelo problematic.en. Sledec. Baudrillardu Kaneva (2018: 631) trdi, da lahko nacionalne blagovne znamke vidimo kot simulakre, ki obstajajo v transna­cionalnem sistemu za ustvarjanje, kroženje in porabo takšnega blaga – zna­kov. »Melania« kot nacionalna blagovna znamka tako deluje kot blago – znak. V tem oziru Kaneva (2018: 631) dodaja, da nacionalne blagovne znamke nosijo reprezentacijsko breme, da stojijo za nacijo kot celoto. z besedami Ta praksa se pogosto uporablja ne samo v turisticnem sektorju, temvec tudi v gospodarskem in poli-ticnem sektorju obstojecih nacionalnih držav. z. Volc.ic. in Andrejevica (2011) lahko ugotovimo, da slovenski mediji zlo­rabljajo »Melanio« za razširjanje nacionalnih interesov in za spodbujanje obc.utka lojalnosti in pripadnosti. V zvezi s tem lahko rec.emo, da je znam-c.enje nacije praksa, ki apelira na državljane, vkljuc.uje jih kot aktivne potro­šnike in proizvajalce znamke ali, c.e parafraziramo z. Volc.ic. in Andrejevica (2011), slovenski državljani obc.utijo »Melanio« kot nacionalno blagovno znamko, kar pomeni, da se identificirajo z njo in se vedejo v skladu s strate­gijo tega znamc.enja. Poleg tega praksa znamc.enja »Melanie« kot nacionalne blagovne znamke v medijih vkljuc.uje konstrukcijo globokih nacionalnih c.ustev do »Melanie« kot Slovenke in ta c.ustva se nato uporablja za konstrukcijo vezi in obc.utenj slovenstva na eni, notranje-nacionalni strani s pomoc.jo medijskega graje­nja idola, in na zunanji strani za trženje slovenskega naroda kot privlac.nega potrošniškega izdelka na lokalnih in globalnih trgih. Nacionalna c.ustva so torej poblagovljena za namene trženja slovenske nacije; to ustvarja tesne vezi med vsemi državljani, ki si delijo ta isti sentiment o tem, da je »Melania« Slovenka tako kot oni. Te globoke vezi in obc.utki ljubezni do lastne domo-vine so povezani bodisi z etnic.nimi koreninami, kulturno dedišc.ino, zgo­dovinskimi vidiki bodisi s politic.nimi znac.ilnostmi (glej Nussbaum, 2010; Bodnar, 1994; Tan, 2004). Naša predpostavka torej je, da se v slovenskih medijih oblikuje posebna vrsta komodificiranega nacionalistic.nega gibanja (prim. Lahusen, 1993), ko se reprezentira »Melanio« kot etnic.no rojeno Slovenko, kot osrednjo predstavnico slovenskega naroda in tesno povezano s slovensko zemljo. Ali c.e parafraziramo Stĺhlberga in Bolina (2016), ima »Melania« dve funk-ciji v slovenskih medijih: 1.) deluje kot nacionalni oznac.evalec za nadzor in discipliniranje prebivalstva države in za krepitev kolektivnega nacional­nega obc.utenja skupnosti med državljani nekega naroda, 2.) hkrati deluje tudi kot trženjsko orodje za promoviranje nacije kot privlac.nega blaga za lokalno in mednarodno obc.instvo. Menimo, da je druga funkcija veliko moc.nejša v slovenskih medijih, še posebej za namene dvigovanja sloven-skega naroda iz njegove anonimnosti in majhnosti s pomoc.jo »Melanie«. Balabanis in drugi (2001) namrec. trdijo, da se v sodobnih potrošniških druž-bah pojavlja moc.an vpliv nacionalizma kot predhodnika potrošniškemu etnocentrizmu. Ta nova vrsta slovenskega komodificiranega nacionalizma, ki temelji na reprezentacijah »Melaniinega« avtentic.nega slovenstva, goji obc.utek ljubezni, predanosti in obc.utek navezanosti na slovensko nacijo ter vzpostavlja vezi med državljani, ki si delijo ta isti sentiment – obc.udovanje »Melanie« in posledic.no obc.udovanje Slovenije. V nadaljevanju c.lanka se osredotoc.amo na novinarske diskurzivne strategije znamc.enja »Melanie« za komercialno-nacionalne namene. Reprezentacije slovenskih korenin »Melanie« Najbolj pogosta praksa konstruiranja »Melanie« kot slovenske nacio­nalne znamke v tiskanih medijih je povezana z reprezentacijo in konstruk­cijo Melanie Trump kot avtentic.ne Slovenke, rojene v Sloveniji – »Slovenka v Beli hiši« (Reporter, 14. 11. 2016: 46). Vec.krat lahko zasledimo navedbe, da s pomoc.jo Melanie Trump Slovenija vstopa v Belo hišo. Na primer v prispevku: »Ce je res, da ženska podpira tri vogale vsake hiše, potem bo Slovenka že c.ez dobra dva meseca podpirala tri vogale najvplivnejše hiše na svetu, tiste Bele v Washingtonu. Slovenija na hrbtu Štajerke Melanije Knavs jaha med sve­tovne supersile!« (Utenkar, Nedelo, 13. 11. 2016: 9) Tovrstne reprezentacije »Melanie« izpostavljajo državo njenega rojstva in, kar je še pomembneje, njene avtentic.ne slovenske korenine. Ce parafraziramo Eadeja (1990), medijski dis-kurzi na lokalni in bolj globalni ravni spodbujajo artikulacijo primordialne, nacionalne solidarnosti, ki ustvarijo vez med Slovenci. Še vec., Slovenija je nenehno enac.ena z »Melanio«, s tem ko je Melaniina avtentic.na slovenskost reprezentirana skozi njen rojstni kraj, etnic.ne korenine itd., pa so v ospredje tovrstnega nacionalnega »prizadevanja za avtentic.nost« (Eade, 1990: 493) postavljeni obc.utki ponosa in istosti. Pogosto je izpostavljen ponos: »Nova prva dama zDA je na vc.erajšnji inavguraciji blestela kot prava dama. Slovenija je ponosna nate, Melania!« (Svet24, 21. 1. 2017) ali: »V Belo hišo s Trumpom prihaja prva dama, Slovenka, Sevnic.anka Melania. To pa ni kar tako in na to bi morali biti ponosni« (Šurla, Reporter, 14. 11. 2016: 3). Uc.inek tovrstnega medijskega poroc.anja je z drugimi besedami »prioritizacija partikularne iden­titete«, medijski diskurz pa je v tem primeru tesno povezan s politic.nim dis-kurzom – nacionalistic.nim diskurzom, zato je treba medijski diskurz umestiti »znotraj politic.nih diskurzov in praks, ki ustvarjajo povezavo med ljudmi kot c.lani ‘zamišljene skupnosti’« (Eade, 1990: 493). Vendar pa je osebni ponos transformiran v nacionalni ponos, ko lahko bralci kot osebe vidijo njihovo celotno skupnost v medijskem diskurzu o koreninah »Melanie«: Ce slovenskim rokometašem ni uspelo zasesti samega vrha sveta, pa je to uspelo slovenski lepotici Melanii Trump. Ko je njen mož Donald prise-gel kot 45. predsednik ZDA, je postala prva na tujem rojena prva dama ZDA po letu 1829. Vsekakor ji gre priznati, da je prvo nalogo v novi vlogi, ki jo je morala opraviti, opravila z odliko. Tako njen izbor cudo­vite obleke, podpisane z Ralph Lauren, kot njena drža na inavguraciji sta kazala, da je svoji novi vlogi za zdaj kos, na kar še v predvolilni kam­panji ni kazalo. (Obrazi, 9. 2. 2017: 8) V tem smislu je »Melania« tudi utelešena kot Slovenka, kot slovenski pa so poudarjeni deli njenega telesa kar lahko izzove globoka nacionalistic.na c.ustva: /…/ obstaja možnost, da dobimo prvo damo, da Belo hišo okupira slo­venska nožica (v vrtoglavo visokih petkah). Kako se bomo lahko šopirili, ce se bo to zgodilo! (Vklop, 20. 10. 2016, Marjana Vovk) Kot trdita Pamment in Cassinger (2018), tovrstne medijske strategije pomagajo spodbujati participacijo državljanov pri promociji slovenskih vrednot, deloma z namenom pokazati avtentic.no plat države in deloma za ustvarjanje publicitete. V našem vzorcu je s takšnim avtentic.nim nacional­nim interesom povezana skrb za materni jezik. »Melania« je v številnih c.lan­kih prikazana kot mati naroda, saj je reprezentirana ne le kot dobra mati, ampak tudi kot dobra mati naroda, kot nekdo, ki ga ne skrbi le za svoje naslednike, pac. pa za celoten narod: Mladenka iz Sevnice je kot nekakšna kraljica Estera postala prva dama v Beli hiši, v domu ameriškega predsednika Trumpa. Melanio Trump cenim zaradi tega, ker je svojega sina naucila govoriti slovensko. (Turinek, Reporter, 14. 11. 2016) Žrtvovanje za sina in medtem tudi za narod je pogosta strategija prika­zovanja »Melanie« kot matere naroda ali – z besedami Ramaswamyja (2010) – »boginje naroda«. V medijih je izpostavljeno, da niti v zDA ni pozabila na slovenske korenine, takšne reprezentacije »Melanie« pa so uporabljene kot zgled za slovenske bralce. Prikazana je kot primer najboljše mame ter obe­nem lepe ženske, tovrstne ponavljajoc.e se reprezentacije v medijih pa jo vzpostavljajo kot posebne vrste zvezdo: Že pred meseci, ko so vecinski svetovni mediji hoteli narediti Trumpu škodo in so objavili slike 20 let mlajše napol gole Melanije, sem napove­dal, da so mu naredili uslugo. Manekenka Melanija se je v teh 20 letih še polepšala, in ko je Trump nagovarjal volivce, da bo Ameriko nare­dil boljšo, torej tudi lepšo, mu je vecina najbrž verjela, kajti clovek, ki je po poroki še polepšal svojo ženo, mora že znati polepšati tudi ZDA. (Sajovic, Reporter, 14. 11. 2016: 16, poudarki dodani) Kot sta pokazali Luthar in Trdina, je v popularnih medijih diskurz etnic.­nega nacionalizma tesno povezan s spolom in vprašanjem družbenih distinkcij. Trdita, da moc. tradicionalnih nacionalnih ceremonij in spekta­kularnih medijskih dogodkov pri uprizarjanju nacije dopolnjujejo popular-nokulturne forme (Luthar in Trdina, 2015: 265). »Melania« kot slavna oseba, manekenka, skrbna mati in prva dama – »Prva prava slovenska prva dama« (Nedelo, 13. 11. 2016: 5) – je prikazana kot superženska, to pa je povezano z njenimi slovenskimi koreninami. To je denimo razvidno tudi iz prispevka o »darilih iz domovine« za »Melanio«: »Pergerjevi se z Melanio niso nikoli osebno srec.ali, a po tem, koliko ji pomenijo njihovi izdelki, so prepric.ani, da je ponosna na to, da je Slovenka« (Nedelo, 13. 11. 2016: 5). Tovrstni prostori slavnih, ki so uporabljeni za nacionalistic.ne namene (glej tudi O’Connor, 2012) v slovenskih medijih konstruirajo »Melaniino« slo­venskost tudi skozi uporabo tradicionalnih ritualov in praks, kot je denimo slovenska himna, ki jo je bralec spremenil na nac.in, da je besedilo vsebo­valo »Melanio« in njen rojstni kraj Sevnico, vse skupaj pa je objavil desno usmerjen politic.ni tednik (Reporter, 6. 2. 2017b: 58). Ce sledimo Nussbaumu (2010), lahko ugotovimo, da ti poetic.ni verzi o »Melanii« kot Slovenki spro­žajo globoka c.ustva do domovine, pri c.emer so »Melaniine« etnic.ne kore-nine povezane s slovenskim kulturnim izroc.ilom in zgodovinskimi vidiki. Tovrsten nacionalizem se torej napaja tako iz popularnih diskurzov (zvezd­niški diskurz) kot tradicionalnih diskurzov (najpomembnejši slovenski pesnik, državna himna). Uc.inek je, da se lahko bralci identificirajo s takšno slavno osebo, kot je »Melania«, ko je predstavljena kot »lepo dekle iz Sevnice«. Reprezentacije rasti slovenske ekonomije in spontani nacionalizem Da bi prikazali prepletanje nacionalizma in ekonomskega življenja (Castelló in Mihelj, 2018) na primeru »Melanie«, lahko ugotovimo, da tiskani mediji v Sloveniji kontinuirano reproducirajo potrošniški nacionalizem, kot ga izpeljeta Castelló in Mihelj (2018). Ta temelji tako na zavestnih nacionali­stic.nih diskurzih in praksah kot na bolj banalnih, vsakdanjih oblikah nacio­nalizma. Najpogostejša novinarska diskurzivna strategija tu je združevanje slovenskih nacionalistic.nih diskurzov z ekonomskimi uc.inki »Melanie« kot prve dame, torej s potencialno rastjo slovenske ekonomije zaradi nje­nega položaja v ameriški politiki. V tednu po volitvah so skoraj vsi v vzorec vkljuc.eni mediji objavili prispevke o potencialnih ekonomskih pridobit­vah Slovenije. za Donalda Trumpa so skovali izraz »slovenski zet«, njegovo poslovno ozadje pa je bilo pogosto omenjano v kontekstu možnih investicij ameriških podjetij v Slovenijo. Številni c.lanki v tiskanih medijih tako zdru­žujejo etnocentrizem in ekonomsko rast, ko trdijo, da »Melaniine« sloven-ske korenine in njena dosledna nacionalna zavednost vplivata na slovensko ekonomijo in pospeševanje slovensko-ameriških odnosov. Na primer: Jure Stojan, direktor raziskav in razvoja na Inštitutu za strateške rešitve, je izracunal, da je Slovenija že imela korist od Melanie Trump. /…/ Povecanje je 23-odstotno, Stojan, nekdanji novinar Vecera, pa ta ekonomski pojav imenuje Melania effect oziroma ucinek Melanije. (Finance, 10. 11. 2016: 3) Tovrsten »uc.inek Melanie« je primer spontanega nacionalizma v tiska­nih medijih in je sodec. po Aronczyku (2013) praksa znamc.enja nacije, ki je uporabljena za dojemanje nacije kot uporabnega vira v narašc.ujoc.i konku­renc.nosti za globalne investicije, poslovanje in turizem. V našem primeru spontane prakse znamc.enja nacije v medijih temeljijo na treh osnovnih stra­tegijah, na simbolnem združevanju bralcev, internacionalizaciji Slovenije in potrošnji »Melanie«: »Docent s katedre za mednarodne odnose na FDV Boštjan Udovic. odloc.no pove, da je pomembno, ali bo Slovenija znala izko­ristiti dejstvo, da bo prva dama Slovenka. /…/ Gre za promocijo države kot blagovne znamke. /…/ S pragmatic.nim pristopom, je prepric.an, lahko vsaj kaj pridobimo: Morda tudi investicije.« (Vec.er, 14. 11. 2016b: 2). Ce parafrazi­ramo Wanga (2006), lahko rec.emo, da so tiskani mediji in potrošniki/bralci znova odkrili in priklicali moc.na nacionalistic.na obc.utenja, podkrepljena z Melaniinim položajem v Beli hiši. Vloga medijev je zvedena na promocijo etnic.nih povezav na notranji, nacionalni strani in ekonomsko priznanje na zunanji, globalni strani: »Trumpova administracija se bo manj ukvarjala z Evropo in bolj z rastoc.imi trgi. Posebnega odnosa s Slovenijo ni pric.akovati, lahko pa bi slovenski menedžerji izkoristili popularnost in prepoznavnost Melanie Trump pri sklepanju poslov.« (Primorske novice, 20. 1. 2017: 11; poudarki dodani). Izhajajoc. iz tovrstnih primerov menimo, da je takšen potrošniški nacio­nalizem, ki se pojavlja v analiziranih tiskanih medijih, neodvisen od organi­ziranih državnih marketinških kampanj, je hkrati banalen in spontan, saj je kombinacija (re)produkcije slovenske nacionalne tradicije, konstrukcije slo­venske identitete in, kot je pokazal Li (2009) na primeru Kitajske, potrošni­škega etosa v globaliziranem kontekstu. »Melania« je, prvic., konstruirana kot slovenski produkt, nato je oglaševana v medijih kot slovenska nacionalna znamka in je nato, tretjic., prodana bralcem kot nacionalni potrošniški arte­fakt. Takšna kombinacija potrošniškega in nacionalistic.nega etosa omogoc.a bralcem identifikacijo z »Melanio« in narodom ter »obc.utenje opolnomoc.e­nja« (Li, 2009: 435). Je Melania Trump res samo ženska, ki je nespretno ukradla govor Michelle Obama, ali je to ženska, ki pomeni priložnost za Slovenijo? /…/ Naša dežela torej lahko izkoristi dejstvo, da je nekdanja manekenka pri­šla tako dalec. Ce se zgodi, da se bo preselila tudi v Belo hišo, bo to lahko za nas odlicna promocija – ce si le ne bomo vsega slovesa zapravili že sami z nenehnim kritiziranjem. (Grazia, 1. 11. 2016: 31) Nekateri prispevki v našem vzorcu ostajajo na eksplicitni ravni skeptic.ni do resnic.nega uc.inka »Melanie« na slovensko politiko in ekonomijo, ven­dar pa implicitno predlagajo, da lahko »Melania« pomaga tržiti Slovenijo kot prepoznavno znamko, ta medijska strategija pa omogoc.a bralkam in bralcem sanjarjenje o skupnih koreninah z »Melanio« ter o njeni pomoc.i pri izboljševanju položaja Slovenije na globalnem zemljevidu: Dejstvo je, da je Sevnicanka Melania Trump za prepoznavnost Slovenije že zdaj naredila toliko kot še nihce pred njo, kar se med drugim že kaže v povecanem številu ameriških turistov pri nas. Toda kaka vecja pricakovanja, da se bosta zaradi Slovenke v Beli hiši v »majhni in lepi« državici na soncni strani Alp cedila med in mleko, so precej naivna. (Reporter, 23. 1. 2017a: 3) Takšen c.astivreden etnonacionalizem, ki ga reproducira medijski dis-kurz, je tesno povezan s potrošništvom in, c.e parafraziramo Edensorja (2002), lahko ugotovimo, da »Melania« kot kulturna ikona reproducira in transformira obc.utek nacionalne identitete v Sloveniji v skladu z marketin­škimi diskurzi. Ta mediatizirana konstrukcija etnocentrizma je povezana s komercialnimi vidiki, ta tip potrošniškega nacionalizma pa bi lahko po Prideauxju (2009) imenovali »vsakdanji nacionalizem«, kjer igrajo pomem­ben del spontane marketinške strategije medijev pri pomociji Slovenije. Reprezentacije »Melanie« kot turisticnega magneta in poblagovljenje države Tretja najpogostejša diskurzivna strategija v našem vzorcu je znamc.enje »Melanije« kot lokalne in nacionalne turistic.ne znamke. Skozi to strategijo je država poblagovljena, da bi postala zanimiva za potencialne obiskovalce – turiste in investitorje. Tukaj zaseda posebno mesto Sevnica, njen domac.i kraj, saj ta postane lokalna tržna znamka, hkrati pa predstavlja celo Slovenijo. Lokalni podjetniki so tako pric.eli tržiti celo vrsto izdelkov pod znamko prve dame, od vina in c.okolade do copat in tradicionalnih klobas; ti izdelki pa so bili denimo pogosto opremljeni s prestižno embalažo, napisi »Prva dama« z zlatimi c.rkami in podobno. Najbolj prodajan tabloid je tako poroc.al: V casu, ko je prisegal novi ameriški predsednik Donald Trump in je sev­niška rojakinja Melania postala prva dama Amerike, so v Sevnici pote­kali dnevi odprtih vrat, na katerih so številnim novinarskim ekipam z vsega sveta predstavljali domace blagovne znamke in lepote krajev, v katerih rastejo tako lepa (in uspešna) dekleta. (Slovenske novice, 24. 1. 2017: 10) Kot kompleksen in nastajajoc. fenomen takšen popularen, banalen in vsakdanji populizem v medijih predstavlja tudi resne izzive mednarodnim tržnikom, pri c.emer podroc.je turizma ni nobena izjema (glej denimo Cheng in Ipkin Wong, 2014). Številni naslovi in c.lanki govorijo o potencialni »invaziji« turistov – »Tuji turisti bodo drli v Sevnico« (Slovenske novice, 10. 11. 2016: 2) – še vec., Sevnica je enac.ena z »Melanio« – »Ameriško jutro v Melanijini Sevnici« (Vec.er, 10. 11. 2016a: 24). Takšen banalni medijski nacio­nalizem lahko nadomešc.a bolj organizirane turistic.ne ali državne strategije trženja, njihov cilj pa je privabiti c.im vec. turistov in investitorjev. Pri oznac.e­vanju »Melanie« kot Slovenke je obic.ajno uporabljana množina, s c.imer je še dodatno konotirana »našost« »Melanie«, kot denimo v primeru: Zgodilo se je, kar smo decembra 1999 objavili v Slovenskih novicah: Gola Slovenka prva dama ZDA? V clanku s tem naslovom smo pisali o Donaldu Trumpu, ki se je po dveh propadlih zakonih do ušes zaljubil v našo Sevnicanko, ki je bila tistikrat med vrhunskimi svetovnimi mane-kenkami /…/ Melania Trump, rojena Melanija Knavs, je postala prva dama ZDA! (Slovenske novice, 10. 11. 2016: 2) Fan (2006) trdi, da se moramo vprašati, kaj natanc.no je znamc.eno, ko govorimo o znamc.enju nacije. V našem primeru postane nacionalna znamka v medijih »Melania« sama in v tem smislu njene reprezentacije pripomorejo k promoviranju slovenske pokrajine in kulture, od kuliniric.nih do zgodo­vinskih in ostalih doma narejenih izdelkov. Med inavguracijo njenega moža je bila »Melania« uporabljena v medijih kot tržna znamka, ki oznac.uje lokal­nost in nacionalnost – »Številni Slovenci ne skrivajo ponosa, da je prva dama zDA postala njihova sorojakinja, še posebej so nad dejstvom navdušeni v njeni rodni Sevnici, kjer, kakopak, kanijo iz priložnosti c.im vec. iztržiti« (Saša Eržen, Mladina, 20. 1. 2017: 54). Nedvomno je »Melania« v medijih ustvarjena kot slovenski nacionalni simbol in, c.e parafraziramo Bolina in Miazhevicha (2018), takšna mehka moc. komercializiranega nacionalizma v medijih poveže bralce v zamišljeno slovensko skupnost na eni strani, na drugi strani pa predstavlja Slovenijo in njeno lokalnost – Sevnico na globalnem zemlje­vidu nacionalnih držav. Po inavguraciji Donalda Trumpa so Slovenijo obi-skali številni tuji novinarji in v tiskanih medijih so bila objavljena številna nekritic.na poroc.ila o tem: Zaradi prisege novega ameriškega predsednika so se na pozornost sve­tovne javnosti pripravili tudi v Sevnici, rojstnem kraju nove prve dame ZDA Melanie Trump. Ta konec tedna pricakujejo številne tuje novi­narje, ki bodo v svet ponesli tudi glas o priznanih sevniških blagovnih znamkah. Zanimanje tuje javnosti so zadnje dni pritegnili zlasti novi kulinaricni izdelki z imenom Melania. (Nedelo, 22. 1. 2017: 24) Ni se še zgodilo, da bi prestižna revija Vogue, ki velja za najbolj pri­znano modno revijo na svetu, kaj šele v ameriški izdaji, pisala o Sevnici in Sloveniji. Tokrat je bilo tako. V spletni izdaji 23. januarja je novi­narka Liana Satenstein porocala o slovenskem ponosu na novo ameri­ško prvo damo, ki prihaja iz Sevnice, »majhnega slikovitega kraja«, kot pravi. Omenjala je tudi izdelke z njenim imenom, od razvpitega loncka medu z njenim portretom, torte do košcka mila vijolicne barve z vonjem po sivki /…/. (Nedeljski dnevnik, 25. 1. 2017: 28) Številni lokalni pridelovalci so uporabili »Melanio« kot prvo damo in ustvarili številne izdelke, povezane z njo, denimo natikac.e »Melania«, v medijih pa so bili objavljeni številni recepti za jedi z njenim imenom. Kot je denimo poroc.alo Nedelo (22. 1. 2017: 24), nedeljski c.asopis z najvišjo naklado, so lokalni pridelovalci iz Sevnice izumili cel nabor oznamc.ene hrane, kot denimo jagodno sladico, jabolc.no pito in burger, poimenovane po Melaniji, da bi s tem privabili slovenske in tuje turiste, mediji pa so o tem nereflektirano poroc.ali. Tovrstno poroc.anje ni imelo namena znamc.enja in ustvarjanja slovenske nacije, vendar pa sta implicitni posledici takšnega spontanega poroc.anja dve: »Melanio« so oznamc.ili kot lokalno in nacionalno tržno znamko, hkrati pa so interpelirali bralce kot nacionalne subjekte skozi spontan, vsakdanji nacionalizem, ki so ga reproducirali; »Novinarji svetov­nih medijskih hiš so si kar podajali kljuke lokalov, kjer je mogoc.e poskusiti Melanijine dobrote.« (Nedelo, 22. 1. 2017: 24). Tiskani mediji v Sloveniji skozi znamc.enje »Melanie« (kot nacionalne in lokalne znamke) torej sodelujejo pri trženju nacionalne in lokalne pokra­jine in kulture, od zgodovine do kulinarike. Ceprav mediji le posnemajo oziroma sledijo lokalnim ponudnikom novih proizvodov, povezanih z »Melanio«, je njihova vloga pri konstruiranju in znamc.enju nacije kljuc.na, medtem ko aktivno sodelujejo v delovanju spontanega, banalnega, popu­larnega nacionalizma, c.igar cilj je ustvariti skupnost kot nacijo s pomoc.jo banalnih, vsakdanjih praks in stvari, ki jih jemljemo za samoumevne, od lokalne pokrajine do hrane, c.e uporabimo Edensorove besede (2002). Sklep Naša analiza je pokazala, da igrajo slovenski tiskani mediji pomembno vlogo v strategijah znamc.enja nacije, s pomoc.jo podob »Melanie« pa spon­tano reproducirajo vsakdanji komodificirani nacionalizem, ko konstruirajo Melanio kot slovensko nacionalno tržno znamko. Ugotovili smo, da vse tri diskurzivne strategije, ki smo jih izpostavili v c.lanku, spodbujajo specifi-c.en tip nacionalizma, ki ga mediji tesno povezujejo s komercialno usmer­jenimi praksami. V primerjavi s tradicionalnim, modernistic.nim projektom etnicizacije nacije je ta postmoderni projekt znamc.enja nacije v slovenskih medijih usmerjen bolj k marketizaciji nacije in bolj služi dvigu slovenske nacije iz anonimnosti in majhnosti kot procesu grajenja naroda ali kolektivni identifikaciji bralk in bralcev z narodom. V medijskem diskurzu o »Melanii« so prav tako komodificirana nacionalna obc.utenja, ki delujejo kot banalna (Billig, 1995) oziroma kot mehka oblika nacionalizma. Sprožena c.ustva napram »Melanii« dovoljujeo bralcem in bralkam specific.no nacionalno intimnost in medtem ko je »Melania« oznamc.ena kot slovenska nacionalna znamka v medijih, so komodificirana tudi globoka nacionalna c.ustva bral­cev-potrošnikov, saj se skuša Slovenija in c.ustva do nje prodati kot potrošni­ški izdelek, to pa nacionalizem spreminja v komercialno prakso. Na osnovi študije ugotavljamo tudi, da so bili v literaturi o znamc.enju nacije mediji vec.inoma obravnavani zgolj kot posredniki med drugimi akterji v kampanjah znamc.enja. V c.lanku zato izpostavljamo pomembno ugotovitev, in sicer vlogo medijev kot samostojnih akterjev, kot dejavnikov spontanega znamc.enja nacije v primeru Melanie Trump. Posledic.no opo­zarjamo, da je konceptualizacija znamc.enja nacije kot prakse vlad, podjetij in specialistov za trženje in odnose z javnostmi preozka. Pri tem pokažemo, da v tem oziru niso relevantni le vec.ji medijski konglomerati, kot so BBC, CNN in National Geographic, kot sta predlagala Bolin in Stahlberg (2015: 3077), pac. pa tudi manjši, nacionalni mediji od popularnih revij do nacio­nalnih dnevnikov. V naši analizi ni bilo opaznejših razlik v poroc.anju niti med razlic.nimi medijskimi žanri in tipi medijev niti med obema obdobjema, vkljuc.enima v analizo, saj so bile tako v popularnih revijah kot v resnih c.asnikih pred in po inavguraciji prisotne razlic.ne strategije znamc.enja. V obeh obdobjih »Melania« nastopa kot vzdržljivi oznac.evalec nacionalne energic.nosti in pripadnosti, pri c.emer hkrati promovira ekonomsko rast. Tiskani mediji v Sloveniji tako uporabljajo »Melanio«, da bi zgradili razkošno nacionalno bla­govno znamko, ki bi promovirala Slovenijo razlic.nim obc.instvom. Pri tem pa je zanimivo, da sodec. po enem zadnjih medijskih zapisov, znamc.enje »Melanie« v zadnjih letih v slovenskih medijih ni bilo pretirano uspešno v smislu ekonomskih pridobitev. Številne turistic.ne agencije so namrec. ponujale izlete v »Melaniin« domac.i kraj, a jim ni uspelo pritegniti zadostnega števila turistov, ki so obiskovali bolj uveljavljene turistic.ne atrak­cije v Sloveniji. Tovrstni podatki pric.ajo o tem, da ustvarjanje »Melanie« kot slovenske nacionalne znamke ni uspelo nagovoriti globalnih obc.instev in privabiti vec.jega števila tujih turistov, uspešneje pa so te reprezentacije nagovorile domac.e, nacionalno obc.instvo predvsem z vzbujanjem globo­kih nacionalnih obc.utenj prek reprezentacij »Melaniinih« etnic.nih kore­nin. zamišljanje skupnega in enotnega slovenskega naroda, vzbujanje glo­bokih obc.utenj ponosa in trženja nacije lokalnim obc.instvom s pomoc.jo medijskih reprezentacij »Melanie« tako ostajajo kljuc.ne vloge, ki jih igrajo mediji v komodifikaciji in komercializaciji slovenskega nacionalizma. LITERATURA Aronczyk, Melissa (2013): Branding the nation: The global business of national identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Balabanis, George, Adamantios Diamantopoulos, Rene Dentiste Mueller in T. C. Melewar (2001): The Impact of Nationalism, Patriotism and Internationalism on Consumer Ethnocentric Tendencies. 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Human and Minority Rights Protection by Multiple Diversity Governance Routledge, New York 2019, 504 pages, EUR 153.50 (ISBN: 978-1-138-95444-1) The book “Human and Minority Rights Protection by Multiple Diver­sity Governance” is a comprehensive and thorough analysis of the state of the art of minority protection. Through an extensive and in-depth analysis of historical developments, political theories and national and international case law, the authors aim to deconstruct the ‘problem’ of minorities as an ideological construct of the nation-cum-state paradigm. Provoked by the global trend of rena­tionalisation, national tensions in the West (by now considered immune to ‘bad nationalisms’) and the rise of the far-right on both local and global levels, the book aims to provide an­swers to two burning questions ď why should we protect minorities and whether it is possible to effectively protect them. Already at the beginning of the book, we sense a dose of pessi­mism that within the present con­text, which frames minorities as the ‘problem’ and the ‘threat’ to the very existence of the state, effective mi­nority protection is impossible to be achieved. The authors, however, turn this logic upside-down and ar­gue that, instead of minorities, the ac­tual problem is the nation-cum-state paradigm, which requires a critical deconstruction and its eventual re­placement with an alternative, more just model. To achieve this ambitious goal, they take an interdisciplinary approach building on the tenets of social constructivism (extensively elaborated on in the second chapter). After describing the research prob­lem and methodological contours of the analysis, in Chapter 3 the reader is introduced to the historical develop­ment of state formation and nation-building that has led to the present ideological hegemony of the nation-cum-state paradigm. This chapter re­lies on a critical interpretation of po­litical and philosophical discussions in the period between the 16th and 19th centuries, as well as key histori­cal events in Western and Central Eu­rope, with a view to the development of human and minority rights and standards. On this basis, the authors reveal four paradoxes embedded in the liberal democratic state (Lock’s liberal paradox, Jennings’ democratic paradox, Arendt’s paradox and Böck­enförde’s paradox), which amount to structural limitations on effective hu­man and minority rights protection. However, despite the comprehen­sive analysis of religious and political power constellations through history, the analysis here suffers from a lack of consideration of the economic aspect, precisely the impact of the development of capitalist economic relations on the standing of minori­ties. Drawing parallels from other analyses about the impact of capital­ism on other discriminated groups in history, such as women (illustratively captured by Silvia Federici in the “Cal­iban and the Witch”), this emerges as a potentially important perspective also worth considering in the context of minorities. In Chapter 4, the nation-cum-state is dissected as an ideological con­struct relying on many irreconcilable dichotomies – stateďsociety, civicďeth­nic, politicsďculture, publicďprivate, universalďparticular and individual vs. collective rights. Although construct­ed, the authors confidently argue that these ideological dichotomies are no less real as they are internalised in the very organisation of the nation-cum-state and thus used as a basis for legitimating the many problematic policies that disproportionally affect minorities. Through a rich empiri­cal, theoretical and case-law analysis, the authors discuss these problems along the following lines: 1) the myth of neutrality ď referring to the duty, but also inability of the liberal state to be neutral (leading inevitably to the assimilation or marginalisation of cultural diversity); 2) the concept of collective self-determination ď torn between, on one hand, the goal of au­tonomy pursued by minorities and, on the other, the principle of the in­divisibility of sovereignty guarded by the state (discussed through the case of Catalan independence); and 3) the artificial antagonism between formal and substantial equality ď favouring the former to the detriment of the lat­ter. Further, as an additional prob­lem of the nation-cum-state, Chapter 5 refers to the essentialist approach to “diversity as a natural difference”, which perceives groups as homoge­neous entities with pre-determined behaviour based on their ethnic or cultural ‘properties’. To counter-ar­gue this position, the authors adopt a sociological neo-institutionalist stance and discuss differences be­tween groups as a product of interac­tion and social relations embedded in a specific situational context. On this basis, they rebuke the natural-ised conflation of ethnicityďculture and differenceďdiversity characteristic of the nation-cum-state, and thereby open the door to intersectionism which understands identity as a mul­tidimensional construct (consisting of dual or multiple identities). This new approach leaves room for opti­mism since it no longer sees internal­ly divided societies as inherently an­tagonistic. However, annulling group antagonism in practice requires something that the nation-cum-state lacks (and is incapable of having), that is, social and system integration that encourages the development of multiple identities and secures equal status on both individual and group levels, in all segments of society. The significance of this chapter lies in de­constructing how ambiguous a phe­nomenon cultural difference can be, in contrast to the nation-cum-state il­lusion of it being a fixed and ‘natural’ property. In addition, provoked by the many gross atrocities minorities have experienced in history, Chapter 6 re­fers to the right to existence ď under­stood as the physical and psychologi­cal security of members of a minority group; fulfilment of their economic needs while keeping their different lifestyle; and their right to have rights (i.e. Arendt’s paradox). This relies on a thorough analysis of the legal standards established since the Sec­ond World War addressing various degrees of violations of this right ď war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and genocide. Re­garding genocide, as the worst viola­tion of all, the authors note some pro­gress in terms of: 1) wide acceptance of the doctrine of the ‘responsibility to protect’, which puts the burden on states to prevent mass atrocities; and 2) the fact that not only individuals but also states can be considered per­petrators. As to the economic aspects of the right to existence, the conclu­sions are more pessimistic, noting that the different lifestyles crucial for the economic and cultural survival of certain groups (i.e. indigenous people) cannot be effectively pro­tected within the present neoliberal economic context. In the end, by re­visiting Arendt’s paradox (the ‘right to have rights’) in the context of the problem of statelessness, the authors conclude that the deeply entrenched presumptions of the nation-cum-state do not allow it to be solved in favour of the most disadvantaged. In Chapter 7, the authors discuss the obstacles to multiple identity formation as a potential ‘antidote’ to the essentialist approach of the na­tion-cum-state to ethnic/cultural dif­ference. As the main obstacle, they identify the primacy given to major­ity languages and religion resulting from: 1) linguistic standardisation of the language of majorities ď implying superiority and hierarchy vis-ŕ-vis non-standard dialects and minority languages; and 2) secularisation pre­suming the freedom of religion as a negative freedom. The former rests on the perception of language as a means of communication, which to­gether with the significant margin of appreciation given to states gener­ates a favourable environment for the assimilation of linguistic minorities. The latter ď the freedom of religion as a negative freedom, indirectly privi­leges the Christian majority while disproportionately affecting religious minorities (precisely Muslims). With­out trying to undermine the conclu­sions about the position held by re­ligion in Europe today, this chapter would have benefited from a clearer expression of the authors’ stance on specific case law ď whether they see the court’s argument for building on the nation-cum-state logic, or the de­cisions as such, as problematic. Chapter 8 revisits the ‘formal ď sub­stantial equality’ dichotomy to more closely look at the tension between, on one hand, the duty of the state to refrain from discrimination and, on the other, the need for active state intervention to effectively address the unfavourable conditions faced by persons belonging to minorities. This discussion is complemented with a deliberation on the distinction between direct and indirect discrimi­nation on whose basis the authors build the argument for the need for a group dimension in policymak­ing. However, they conclude that, al­though necessary, the group dimen­sion is insufficient to effectively up­root structural discrimination unless it is combined with a redistributive dimension. As an issue related to the prob­lem of equality, Chapter 9 refers to the effective participation of persons belonging to minorities and critically discusses a range of instruments and rights, from freedom of association to external self-determination. Based on an extensive comparative analysis of different arrangements of minor­ity participation, the authors come to a similar conclusion as in the previ­ous chapters, namely, that to ensure effective participation state policies/ instruments must include a group di­mension. In this context, the reader is also provided with a critical analysis of already implemented institutional solutions, which contrary to their ini­tial goal have not only deepened the ethnic cleavages, discrimination and marginalisation of minorities but led to state dysfunctionality (demonstrat­ed in the case of Bosnia and Herze­govina). Nevertheless, these failures are not pointed out as the inevitable destiny of participatory instruments, as the authors also provide some positive examples, such as the case of the German-speaking community in Belgium. Eventually, the last chapter draws the contours of an alternative model to the nation-cum-state paradigm called multiple diversity governance. This model builds on the triangula­tion of the principles of liberty, equal­ity and human dignity, recognised as the most solid basis for reconciliating the ideas of political unity with legal equality and multiple diversities. The key role here is given to the principle of human dignity as the main yard­stick for the interpretation of nor­mative principles and establishment of institutional arrangements, to achieve both freedom from domina­tion and freedom from interference by others. However, this concluding chapter would have benefited more had ‘human dignity’, as a highly con­tested theoretical concept, been criti­cally discussed and defined. Specifi­cally, a reference to the criticism of this concept as being too vague and potentially problematic (even retro­grade) from the aspect of the lately very popular political/philosophical discussions tackling the issue of ani­mal rights would have enriched this chapter and justified (or made the authors reconsider) the very basis of this model. Nevertheless, this book is a must-read for all those working or interest­ed in the areas of human and minor­ity rights, nationalism and European politics. It provides a rich body of information and thought-provoking discussions that clearly detect and dissect the structural problems which are preventing effective minor­ity protection. Moreover, this book identifies the need for an alternative model to the nation-cum-state and provides the initial input in this direc­tion. At this point, the multiple diver­sity governance model proposed as a solution would benefit from a wider and more critical discussion, which will hopefully inspire a more com­prehensive and solid framework for effective minority protection. Ivan Svetlik Univerza v Ljubljani Rado Bohinc Univerza in država: Pravna analiza družbenega položaja univerze založba FDV, Ljubljana 2020, zbirka: Pravo in gospodarstvo, 348 str. (ISBN 978-961-235-964-5) Dr. Rado Bohinc nam je postre-gel z dokaj obsežnim in razvejanim delom. V središc.u njegove pozorno­sti je umešc.enost univerze v sistem družbenih institucij, pri c.emer izsto-pa odnos z državo. Obravnava temo, ki jo je živel kot univerzitetni profe­sor, dekan fakultete in rektor univer­ze. Pri tem uporabi orodja pravne analize, izhajajoc. iz svoje speciali­zacije za podroc.je organizacijskega prava. Analizira normativne akte in sklepe sodišc.. Bralcu razširi pogled z drugimi podroc.ji prava in druž­boslovne analize, pri c.emer dobro izkoristi svoje karierne izkušnje iz politike, javnih služb in gospodar­stva, vkljuc.no s pisanjem nikoli spre­jetega zakona o univerzi. Knjiga je razdeljena na osem notranje podrobno razc.lenjenih poglavij, dodan pa ji je predgo­vor dveh bivših rektorjev. Skozi ta poglavja avtor analizira položaj univerze z mnogoterih vidikov, kar daje knjigi znac.aj enciklopedic.no­sti. Bralcu ponuja tako rekoc. vec. odgovorov, kot bi ta utegnil imeti vprašanj. Pravno analizo dopolnju­je z opazovanjem univerze v siste-mu visokega šolstva in znanosti v Sloveniji ter z njenim odnosom do trga dela, kjer odpira tudi vprašanje zaposljivosti diplomantov. Mestoma doda tudi zgodovinsko razsežnost, izrazito pa jo obogati z mednarod­nimi primerjavami, pri c.emer izpo­stavi opredelitev položaja univerze v dokumentih mednarodnih organi­zacij, v nekaterih evropskih državah ter v Južni Koreji. Avtorjev pristop je družboslov-no kritic.en. Ost kritike je uperjena na neustrezno izpeljavo 58. c.lena Ustave Republike Slovenije, ki uni-verzi izrecno podeljuje avtonomijo z zapisom, da so univerza in druge javne visoke šole avtonomne, da pa jim država mora zagotoviti financi­ranje na podlagi zakona. Namesto da bi univerzam in visokim šolam namenili posebno, njim prilago­jeno ureditev, so jih po zakonu o zavodih opredelili kot javne zavo­de. Namesto da bi jim omogoc.ili, da sami urejajo notranja razmerja med c.lanicami, z zaposlenimi in štu­denti, so jih podvrgli podrobnemu normiranju od zunaj, in to ne le z zakonom o visokem šolstvu, tem­vec. tudi z mnogimi drugimi, kot so zakon o javnih uslužbencih, zakon o sistemu plac. v javnem sektorju in podobni. Namesto da bi visokošol-skim uc.iteljem, raziskovalcem in štu­dentom omogoc.ili ustvarjalno delo, so jih spremenili v javne uslužbence oziroma državne uradnike. S tem so povsem zgrešili pri urejanju polo-žaja akademskega osebja, katerega naloga je skupaj s študenti ustvarjati novo znanje in razmišljati in delovati zunaj ustaljenih okvirov, ne pa rutin­sko zagotavljati storitve vsem stran­kam v enakem obsegu in na enak nac.in, kakor to velevajo predpisi. Namesto da bi bila univerza najpo­membnejši agens družbenega razvo­ja, ki v partnerstvu z državo išc.e najboljše razvojne rešitve, je državi hierarhic.no podrejena in nadzirana tako, da ne more v polni meri izkori­stiti intelektualnega potenciala zapo­slenih in študentov, ki jih omejujejo nepotrebna pravila, postopki, poro-c.anja in podobno. Podrejenost uni-verze državi tudi preprec.uje, da bi ta lahko odgovorno uresnic.evala svoje družbeno poslanstvo, saj se mora nenehno ozirati na zahteve, ki priha­jajo do nje iz državne administracije. Takšno stanje se vzdržuje že vse od nastanka slovenske države, ko »sta bili obe takratni univerzi v bistvu nacionalizirani« (str. 313). Kljub obc.asnim presojam Ustavnega sodi­šc.a se v zadnjih tridesetih letih stanje ni bistveno spremenilo. Še vec., tudi Ustavno sodišc.e ni zmoglo univerze iztrgati iz objema javnih zavodov – ne glede na to, da ustavna opredeli­tev avtonomije univerze ne dopušc.a nobenega dvoma. Tako je Ustavno sodišc.e odloc.ilo, da »avtonomnost univerze ne vkljuc.uje tudi pravice do samoorganiziranja« (str. 209), kar je po avtorjevi sodbi pravno nevzdrž-no. zakonodajalec je vseskozi držal visoko šolstvo v okviru zastarelega zakona o zavodih in krpal zakon o visokim šolstvu, katerega obseg se je povec.eval, posamezni c.leni pa so pogosto v medsebojnem nasprotju ter v neskladju z Ustavo. Med dru­gim ne opredeljuje javne službe. Je pa tudi v neskladju s priporoc.ili in usmeritvami razlic.nih mednarodnih dokumentov. Posledice dolgo trajajoc.ega neu­streznega zakonskega urejanja viso­kega šolstva v Republiki Sloveniji so globlje, kot se zdi na prvi pogled. Avtor jih prikaže skozi polom ure­snic.evanja strategije visokega šol­stva v obdobju 2010–2020 ter skozi razvojno neuc.inkovitost visokega šolstva pri nas. Med drugim kljub pogosti hvali politike zaostajamo za razvitimi državami tudi v deležu visoko izobraženega prebivalstva. Kot piše avtor, »univerza v slovenski družbi žal ni partner državi, ampak njej podrejena in od nje odvisna javna ustanova z ustavno zagotovlje-no, vendar v praksi neuresnic.eno avtonomnostjo. Razlog za takšno sta­nje je njen zakonsko podrobno in v mnogoc.em protiustavno opredeljen položaj v družbi in na tem uteme­ljena oblastna percepcija univerze« (str. 79). Osrednji avtorjev koncept je avtonomija univerze, ki ga motri z razvojne perspektive in perspek­tive mednarodnih dokumentov. Sicer pa sledi operacionalizaciji univerzitetne avtonomije, kot jo uporablja Evropsko združenje uni-verz. Gre za akademsko, financ.no, organizacijsko in kadrovsko avto­nomijo. Avtor posebej kritic.no ana­lizira kadrovsko neavtonomnost, pri c.emer univerzi ni priznana partner-ska vloga v socialnem dialogu, kjer so plac.e in nagrajevanje po uspe­šnosti in napredovanja doloc.eni z državnimi predpisi, uvršc.anje v plac.­ne razrede je doloc.eno z zakonom, prav tako visokošolski nazivi, delov­na in pedagoška obveznost. Pri tem jasno izpostavi, da avtonomija ni absolutna, je pa nujno potrebna, c.e naj univerza razvija partnerske odno­se z državo in drugimi deležniki. Posebej zanimiva je njegova oprede­litev sodobne univerze, ki bi morala biti raziskovalna in ustvarjalna, vpeta v družbeno okolje, mora delovati v obc.o korist, mora biti odprta v med-narodni prostor in povezana z njim, njeni znac.ilnosti pa sta tudi univer­zalnost in odlic.nost. Avtor ne ostane le pri kritiki. zavzame se za spremembo zakono­daje o zavodih, pri c.emer bi morali upoštevati njihove razlic.ne funkcije, poslanstva in vire financiranja ter slediti praksi razvitih držav, v katerih so javne službe pogosto organizira­ne po korporacijskih nac.elih, viso­košolsko izobraževanje pa štejejo kot gospodarsko dejavnost. V tem okviru bi morali sprejeti tudi pose-ben zakon o univerzi, ki bi ji priznal poseben status najvišje kulturne, raz­iskovalne, izobraževalne in razvojne institucije in jo razloc.il od drugih visokošolskih organizacij. Kot pravi avtor, je »nujno temeljito preurediti visokošolsko in raziskovalno zako­nodajo ter vzpostaviti sodoben institucionalni okvir …« (str. 11). »Univerza naj ima status samostojne in samoupravne neprofitne korpo­racije« (str. 145). Mora biti avtono­mni zavod s posebnim položajem, podobno kot ga ima Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti. Pri oblikovanju predlogov avtor ne ostane le na nac.elni ravni, temvec. da zelo konkretne napotke, kako to urediti. Knjiga je pregledno urejena in razc.lenjeni podnaslovi omogoc.ajo bralcu, da hitro najde vprašanje, ki ga zanima. Podajanje je tekoc.e brez nepotrebne pravne ezoterike in je tako dostopno širokemu krogu izobraženih bralcev. Priporoc.am jo vsem, ki išc.ejo odgovore na vpraša­nja o prešibkem razvoju visokega šolstva pri nas. Še posebej pa poma­ga pojasniti številne nelogic.nosti, na katere pri svojem delu in študiju naletijo akademsko osebje in štu­denti. Ko se ob koncu vprašam, ali v tej knjigi kaj pogrešam, je to ana­liza vloge sindikatov in študentske organizacije pri ohranjanju nizke avtonomije slovenskih univerz. To pa je morda tudi tema za naslednjo študijo. AVTORSKI POVZETKI UDK 321.01 Žiga VODOVNIK: (PRE)MISLITI DRŽAVO V 21. STOLETJU Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, let. LVIII, št. 2, str. 249–267 V c.lanku trdimo, da se družboslovje na splošno in še posebej politologija srec.ujeta s svojevrstnim epistemološkim izzivom pri raziskovanju države v 21. stoletju. Država je namrec. bila pogosto naturalizirana, razumljena kot static.na in ahistoric.na entiteta, ki je odporna na spremembe v okolju, ali pa je bila naivno zavrnjena kot oblika politic.ne organizacije, ki z neoliberalno globalizacijo vene. V obeh primerih so procesi redefiniranja in redistribui­ranja države, s tem pa njene de-/reteritorizacije in prostorskega prestruktu­riranja, v glavnem ostali neopaženi. V obravnavi hegemonskih teorij države pokažemo, da v politic.ni znanosti raziskavanja države še vedno temeljijo na (geografskih) predpostavkah, ki državo omejujejo ali celo opredeljujejo kot geografsko razmejeno in nespremenljivo ozemlje. Na podlagi aktualnih pristopov v raziskovanju prostora, obsega in teritorija, klic.emo k heterodo­ksni in pluralistic.ni metodologiji v nadaljnjem prouc.evanju države kot tudi nedržavnih prostorov. Kljucni pojmi: država, nedržavni prostori, globalizacija, ozemlje, politic.na geografija UDK 321.7:321.01Schmitt C. Tihomir CIPEK: POLITICNO PROTI DRŽAVI? RELEVANTNOST KONCEPTA POLITICNEGA CARLA SCHMITTA Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, let. LVIII, št. 2, str. 268–283 Clanek analizira razmerje med državo, demokracijo in konceptom politic.­nega v teoriji Carla Schmitta. To bomo naredili z rekonstrukcijo konceptov Schmittove politic.ne teorije in ugotavljanjem, ali jih je mogoc.e uporabiti za razlago ideologije novega desnic.arskega populizma in neliberalne demokra­cije. Kot se je izkazalo, Schmittova redukcija politic.nega na antagonizem prija­telj/sovražnik predstavlja jedro vladajoc.e pripovedi neliberalnih demokracij. Schmitovo razumevanje politic.nega ne brani države kot politic.nega prostora, temvec. z odpravo liberalnih elementov demokracije unic.uje državne institu­cije. Analiza je pokazala, da Schmittovega pojma politic.nega ni mogoc.e upora­biti za gradnjo uc.inkovitih demokratic.nih institucij države. V njegovi definiciji politic.nega namrec. politika dejansko obstaja le navzven, do nekega drugega naroda, neke druge politic.ne enotnosti, ne pa tudi znotraj same države. Kljucni pojmi: država, politic.no, Carl Schmitt, neliberalna demokracija UDK 329.11(4-191.2) Ladislav CABADA: NATIVISTICNI IN ANTILIBERALNI NARATIVI V KONzERVATIVNI POPULISTICNI AGENDI V SREDNJI EVROPI Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, let. LVIII, št. 2, str. 284–304 Nativizem ni le koncept, ampak pomeni tudi ideološki okvir in politic.­no prakso, povezano z identitetno politiko. V c.lanku najprej predstavimo teoretic.ni uvod v nativizem in opredelimo najpomembnejše izraze in zna-c.ilnosti tega fenomena. V nadaljevanju koncept uporabimo za analizo nati­vizma pri konzervativno populistic.nih in/ali nativistic.nih politic.nih akterjih v Srednji Evropi. Analiza razkriva, kako je nativizem, ki je bil v prvih petnaj­stih letih po demokratic.nem prehodu obrobna problematika, kasneje postal bolj pomemben koncept, zlasti po nizu kriz od leta 2008 dalje. Analiza pri­kaže, kako so osrednje politic.ne stranke v Srednji Evropi prevzele nativi­zem in konzervativno populistic.no agendo ter ju vnesle v osrednjo politiko. Dodatno pa analiza pokaže, kako se nativizem v Srednji Evropi povezuje z dolgoletnimi protiliberalnimi tokovi, ki so znova oživeli po padcu komu­nistic.nih sistemov. Te protimoderne družbene skupine so bile v procesu polarizacije jasno videne v politic.nem prostoru in preoblikovane v protisve­tovljanski tabor. Kljucni pojmi: nativizem, nacionalni konzervatizem, politika identitet, Srednja Evropa UDK 338.124.4:336.274.3(497.4) Marko HOCEVAR: KRIzA 2008 IN VzPON SLOVENSKE KONSOLIDIRAJOCE SE DRŽAVE Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, let. LVIII, št. 2, str. 305–321 Namen c.lanka je razložiti vzpon slovenske države dolga in njeno pre­oblikovanje v konsolidirajoc.o se državo. Ko je leta 2009 kriza zajela Slo­venijo, je bil banc.ni sistem blizu kolapsa. z dokapitalizacijami banc.nega sistema je javni dolg zac.el rasti. Po nekaj letih in pod strukturnimi pritiski in omejitvami bonitetnih agencij ter pritiski iz EU je morala slovenska država sprejeti varc.evalne ukrepe za konsolidacijo javnih financ ter omejiti doseg demokracije. Glavna ugotovitev c.lanka je, da je kriza 2008 v temeljih spre­menila slovensko državo. Kljucni pojmi: kapitalistic.na država, konsolidirajoc.a se država, dolg, Slovenija, demokracija UDK 321.01:314.151.3-054.73(4) Andrej KURNIK, Cirila TOPLAK: O MIGRANTIH z MIGRANTI: MIGRACIJE PET LET PO EVROPSKI MIGRANTSKI »KRIzI« Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, let. LVIII, št. 2, str. 322–340 Kako teoretizirati aktualne ilegalizirane migracije v Evropo? Clanek obravnava teoretske novosti v polju migracijskih študij od množic.nih migracij v Evropsko unijo leta 2015. Metodološko avtorja povežeta kritic.no (diskurzivno) analizo s preizkusom še ne zajetih, a relevantnih konceptov v okviru migracijskih študij na osnovi terenskega raziskovanja na balkanski poti v zadnjih petih letih. Opravljena analiza je pokazala, da sta doloc.ujoc.i in odloc.ilni prvini aktualnih ilegaliziranih migracij politic.na subjektivite­ta in politic.no delovanje migrantov, kar v študijah migracij še ni zadostno pripoznano. S takšnim pripoznanjem postane migracija mesto artikulacije kritike globalnih odnosov neenakosti in mesto vkljuc.ujoc.e družbene trans-formacije. Kljucni pojmi: migracije, Evropa, politic.na teorija, država, balkanska migrantska pot UDK 321.01:504.7 Blaž VRECKO ILC: KLIMATSKA KRIzA: CAS zA PONOVNI PREMISLEK EKONOMSKEGA NACRTOVANJA S POMOCJO DEMISTIFIKACIJE KAPITALIzMA Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, let. LVIII, št. 2, str. 341–360 Namen c.lanka je razširiti epistemološki horizont za revitalizacije ideje demokratic.nega ekonomskega nac.rtovanja kot možne alternativne vizije. Pri tem predpostavlja, da mora dejanski celovit razvoj te alternativen vizije nujno predhoditi kritic.na analiza hegemonske vec.dimenzionalne ideološke mistifikacije kapitalizma in trga. Crpajoc. iz uvidov marksistic.ne in ekosocia­listic.ne analitic.ne tradicije, c.lanek identificira in analizira niz kljuc.nih ideo­loških mistifikacij, ki zapirajo epistemološki horizont. V tem okviru analizira tako prikrivanje vloge kapitalizma kot: inherentno netrajnostnega sistema v pojavu klimatske krize, mistifikacijo izvora kapitalizma kot domnevne­ga izraza evolucija, prikrivanje vloge ekonomskega nac.rtovanja v sodob­nem kapitalizmu, mistifikacijo trgov kot prostorov svobode in inovacije in zakrivanje njihove vloge pri represiji, izkorišc.anju in unic.evanju okolja, ki so pripisani primarno ekonomskemu nac.rtovanju. Hkrati kritic.no naslovi utišanje konkretnih zgodovinskih primerov demokratic.nega ekonomskega nac.rtovanja, kot je projekt Cybersyn, ki bi lahko služili kot inspiracija za nadaljnji razvoj vizij alternativne ureditve. Kljucni pojmi: klimatske spremembe, ideološka mistifikacija, demokra­tic.no ekonomsko nac.rtovanje, kapitalizem, neoliberalizem UDK 316.613.4:316.774:32 zdenka ŠADL: EMOTIONS AND AFFECT IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, pp. 370–390 In this article, we deal with the contemporary form of emotional polit­ical communication, where we are especially interested in populism as a form of politics that appeals to people chiefly on an emotional level. We draw attention to the problematic nature of the emotionalisation of popu­list discourses as reflected in the legitimisation of aggressive rhetoric, the manipulation of emotions, emotivism, and the creation of antagonistic col­lectives. Building on the critical assessment that understanding the politics of emotions requires the systematic theorising of emotions, in the last part we rely on Sarah Ahmed’s conceptual framework to show the performative role of emotions and the 'stickiness' of hatred. The analysis shows that her approach to emotions can be fruitful for better understanding the role of emotions in political discourse, particularly right-wing populist parties. Keywords: political communication, political discourse, emotions, hatred, populism, Sara Ahmed UDK 316.773.3:077.5 Nejc SLUKAN: THE POLITICS OF IRONY ON SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS: OUTLINE OF THE TROLLING DISPOSITIF OF SOCIAL MEDIA Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, pp. 391–408 The article aims to give the theoretical foundations upon which we can analyse ironic communication practices in social media. Special emphasis is paid to trolling practices. Irony is understood in the article not just as a rhetorical figure, but as a speech act that reconfigures the relationships between the elements of the communicative situation. We first critically summarise contemporary versions of the theory of technological affordanc-es before proceeding to conceptualise, by describing the conditions of communication in certain social media, some of their affordances as part of a dispositive, which we tentatively call the media-trolling dispositive and which encourages individuals to express themselves by way of trolling. We conclude that the affordances of social media encourage troll-like forms of expression. Keywords: irony, trolling, dispositif, affordances, social media UDK 32:316.77:316.472.4 Deja CRNOVIC: THE EVENTISATION AND COMMODIFICATION OF POLITICS ON INSTAGRAM Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, pp. 409–427 Due to mediatisation, eventisation and the influence of market logic, the politics of the 21st century has become increasingly personalised. Instead of a political agenda, the forefront of politics is taken over by the people/per­sonas who work in politics. Politicians are therefore ever more like celeb­rities since the illusion of their competence is provided by their personal life and values. This is achieved by performing a certain gender or class to enable them to mover »closer to the ordinary person« in a populistic man­ner. The article examines gender and class performativity and consequently the depoliticisation seen on the Instagram profiles of two state leaders: the President of Slovenia Borut Pahor and the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vuc.ic´. While both presidents are known for their populism, occasionally even domesticity, in their respective national contexts their Instagram pho­tos express cosmopolitanism and, in the case of Pahor, new, narcissist mas­culinity. Whereas Vuc.ic´ prefers to post photos of himself meeting interna­tional leaders, Pahor's Instagram is filled with photos from his private life and the national environment. Keywords: mediatisation, depoliticisation, eventisation, Instagram, poli­tics, performing gender, class UDK 07(497.4):329:929Trump M. Breda LUTHAR: POPULAR CULTURE AND REGRESSIVE POPULISM Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, pp. 428–446 On both the individual and collective levels, society has a constant ten­dency to observe itself through elites. I understand the practice of celebri­fication and the ubiquity of local celebrity culture as an important justifica­tion narrative that plays a vital role in the post-socialist neoliberal consensus. This analysis addresses the way Melania Trump is popularly represented in Slovenian media and argues that this involves the entanglement of celeb­rity discourse and practice of celebrification in commercial media culture with regressive populism. The celebrity discourse is an important discursive practice in the legitimation of the existing class relations and redistribution of public wealth after socialism. As a cultural repertoire of ‘proto-national’ sentiments, it can be organised to support right-wing populism. Keywords: regressive populism, class, postsocialism, celebrity, Melania Trump UDK 07(73+497.4):929Trump M. Ksenija VIDMAR HORVAT: POST-IMPERIAL PATRIARCHY AND THE CARNIVALESQUE PERIPHERY: MELANIA TRUMP WITHIN A TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, pp. 447–463 This article studies perceptions of Melania Trump as The First Lady in the USA and in Slovenian public spaces. The analysis first investigates media depictions of Melania Trump in the weekly magazine The New Yorker. The main finding of the comparison is that representations in the USA focus on The First Lady’s immigrant status and her roots in the former socialist East. Yet, in contrast, in Slovenia the fact of her ethnic origin is mobilised to cre­ate a national fantasy which aims to establish a distance from the socialist past. Still, reactions to the wooden statue of Melania in her hometown of Sevnica suggest a contested struggle over a post-socialist identity, in effect undermining the centre–periphery dichotomy. Based on these observa­tions, the research question addresses the fate of symbolic motherhood in an era of the transnationalisation of modern societies. Keywords: Melania Trump, First Lady, post-socialism, nationalism, gen­der, East UDK 07(497.4):323.1:929Trump M. Maruša PUŠNIK, Dejan JONTES: MEDIA AND SPONTANEOUS NATIONALISM: THE CASE OF MELANIA TRUMP Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, pp. 464–480 The article analyses representations of Melania Trump in Slovenian print media and investigates how spontaneous nationalism was constructed in articles about Melania Trump, which in the media was related to promotion of the Slovenian nation by presenting Melania as a brand. The power of national ties, ideas and tradition is maintained and redistributed through the media and popular culture and this leads the authors, unlike the literature in this field that mostly treats the media only as mediators, to also critically address the role played by the media as independent agents in this pro­cess of branding the nation. The authors analyse 594 articles about Melania Trump published in Slovenian print media over a period of 3 months in 2016 and 2017. The mentioned analysis showed that the many, recurring media representations of “Melania” have pushed Slovenian nationalism into a commercial context and thereby transformed the nation into a commod­ity. Keywords: media discourse, commodification, Melania Trump, First Lady, nationalism, nation branding NAVODILA AVTORICAM IN AVTORJEM Teorija in praksa sprejema v presojo za objavo izvirna znanstvena bese­dila, ki še niso bila objavljena drugje ali niso v recenzentskem postopku pri kateri drugi znanstveni reviji oziroma monografiji. Objava c.lanka ali knjižne recenzije v Teoriji in praksi je brezplac.na. Besedilo pošljite na elektronski naslov teorija.praksa@fdv.uni-lj.si. Besedilo naj bo v formatu A4 z 1,5-vrstic.nim razmikom, tip c.rk Times New Roman, velikost 12, obojestransko poravnano, z robovi 2,5 cm. Vse strani besedila morajo biti zaporedno oštevilc.ene. Ime in priimek avtorice/avtorja naj bo izpisano na posebni naslovni strani pod naslovom prispevka, skupaj s strokovnim nazivom in trenutno zaposlitvijo, s polnim naslovom, telefonsko številko in naslovom elektronske pošte. Priimek avtorice oziroma avtorja naj bo izpisan z velikimi tiskanimi c.rkami. Prva oziroma zac.etna stran besedila naj vsebuje le naslov besedila in povzetek besedila. Besedilo mora spremljati izjava avtorice oziroma avtorja, da besedilo še ni bilo objavljeno oziroma ni v pripravi za tisk pri kateri drugi znanstveni reviji ali monografiji. Avtorica/ avtor naj v izjavi navede svoj predlog uvrstitve besedila v skladu s tipologijo dokumentov/del (izvirni, pregledni c.lanek ali knjižna recenzija) za vodenje bibliografij v sistemu COBISS. O konc.ni uvrstitvi odloc.a uredništvo revije. CLANKI znanstveni c.lanki v slovenskem ali angleškem jeziku naj ne presegajo 6.500 besed. V kolikor želi avtorica oziroma avtor objaviti daljše besedilo, naj se o tem predhodno posvetuje z glavnim urednikom. Clanek naj bo opremljen s povzetkom v slovenskem in angleškem jeziku v obsegu do 100 besed. Pov­zetek naj vsebuje natanc.no opredelitev teme besedila, metodo argumenta­cije in zakljuc.ke. Avtorica/avtor naj navede tudi do sedem kljuc.nih pojmov, tako v slovenskem kakor tudi v angleškem jeziku. Naslovi morajo biti jasni in povedni. Glavni naslov, izpisan s krepkimi velikimi tiskanimi c.rkami, ne sme presegati dolžine 100 znakov. Besedila, daljša od 1.500 besed, morajo vsebovati podnaslove, ki so lahko najvec. dvonivojski. Podnaslovi druge ravni naj bodo tiskani poševno. Tabele, grafi in slike morajo biti izdelani kot priloge (in ne vkljuc.eni v besedilo) z jasnimi naslovi, pri c.emer naj avtorica/avtor uporabi velike tiskane c.rke v poševnem tisku; biti morajo zaporedno oštevilc.eni (Slika 1: NASLOV SLIKE, Graf 2: NASLOV GRAFA, Tabela 3: NASLOV TABELE). Vsaka tabela in slika mora biti izpisana na posebnem listu papirja. V besedilu naj bo okvirno oznac.eno mesto, kamor sodi. Avtorica/avtor naj pri vsaki tabeli, grafu in sliki opredeli, koliko prostora zavzema v besedilu. Tabele, grafe in slike naj avtorica/avtor šteje v obseg besedila bodisi kot 250 besed (pol strani) ali 500 besed (celotna stran). Pod tabelami in grafi je potrebno nave-sti vir. Navedba vira naj se zakljuc.i s piko. Uporabljajte orodje za oblikova­nje tabel v programu Word. Tabela 1: UCINEK ODBOROV Regulativni ucinek Mešani ucinek Distribucijski ucinek BUDG, TRAN, IMCO, ECON, ENVI, ITRE, LIBE EMPL, AGRI, PECH, REGI JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA Vir: Yordanova, 2009: 256. Opombe morajo biti v besedilu jasno oznac.ene z zaporednimi števil­kami od zac.etka do konca, napisane na ustreznem mestu v besedilu in po enakem vrstnem redu razvršc.ene pod besedilom. Število in dolžina opomb naj bo omejena. Opomba o avtorici/avtorju in morebitna zahvala naj vklju-c.ujeta informacije o organizacijski pripadnosti avtorice/avtorja, ki so rele­vantne za obravnavano problematiko v besedilu, ter o financ.nih in drugih pomoc.eh pri pripravi besedila. Dobesedni navedki, ki so dolgi tri ali vec. vrstic, naj bodo postavljeni v poseben odstavek, robovi odstavka naj bodo obojestransko zamaknjeni, besedilo naj bo v poševnem tisku in brez narekovajev. Ce so gibanja za pravice vložila svoja telesa v aktivizem in mobilizira­nje novih oblik diskurza, da bi tako omajala njihovo marginalizacijo in zatiranje, so filozofske in teoretske kritike kartezijanstva na novo pre­tehtale subjekt in ga opredelile kot hkrati razsredišcenega (ki v sebi ni v celoti koherenten) In utelešenega (ne cisti “kogito”). (Jones, 2002: 239) RECENzIJE KNJIG TIP sprejema v objavo recenzije domac.ih in tujih znanstvenih del, ki niso starejša od dveh let. Recenzija naj ne bo daljša od 1.500 besed. V recenziji naj se avtorica/avtor dosledno izogiba navajanju literature in virov. Recen­zija naj ne vsebuje naslova ali podnaslovov. Na zac.etku recenzije naj navede podatke o sebi in recenzirani knjigi v spodaj navedeni obliki: Ime PRIIMEK Institucionalna pripadnost Ime in priimek avtorja knjige Naslov knjige: podnaslov založnik, Kraj letnica objave, število strani, cena (ISBN številka) Janez NOVAK Fakulteta za družbene vede, UL Eviatar zerubavel Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past The University of Chicago Press, Chicago in London 2003, 184 str., 25.00 $ (ISBN 0-226-98152-5) NAVAJANJE Osnovna oblika reference v besedilu je (Novak, 1994). za navajanje strani naj avtorica oziroma avtor uporablja naslednjo obliko navajanja: (Novak, 1994: 27–29). Ce sta avtorja reference dva, naj avtorica oziroma avtor navede oba: (Novak in Kosec, 2007). Ce je avtorjev reference vec., naj se v tekstu uporablja naslednja oblika navajanja: (Novak et al., 1994: 27), v seznamu LITERATURE pa naj se navedejo vsi avtorji. Ce avtorica oziroma avtor besedila ne uporablja prve izdaje knjige, naj pri navajanju zabeleži tudi letnico prve izdaje: (Novak, 1953/1994: 7). Vec. referenc hkrati naj avtorica oziroma avtor loc.i s podpi-c.jem: (Novak, 1994: 7; Kosec, 1998: 3–4; 2005: 58). Pri navajanju vec.jega šte­vila referenc enega avtorja, objavljenih v istem letu, naj avtorica oziroma avtor reference med seboj loc.i s c.rkami a, b, c itd.: (Novak, 1994a: 27–29; Novak, 1994b: 1), in sicer v zaporedju, v kakršnem se prvic. pojavijo v besedilu. Seznam referenc sodi na konec besedila in naj ima podnaslov LITERATURA. V seznam referenc naj avtorica oziroma avtor vkljuc.i vso uporabljeno literaturo. Morebitne vire naj navede za seznamom referenc, in sicer s podnaslovom VIRI. Seznam referenc mora biti urejen po abecednem redu priimkov avtorjev referenc ter v primeru istega avtorja po c.asovnem zaporedju izdaj. Knjige Priimek, ime (letnica izdaje knjige): Naslov knjige: Podnaslov. Kraj: založba. Geertz, Clifford (1980): Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zborniki Priimek, Ime (ur.) (letnica izdaje knjige): Naslov knjige: Podnaslov. Kraj: založba. Featherstone, Mike (ur.) in Mike Hepworth (ur.) (1991): The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory. London: SAGE Publications. Samostojni sestavek ali poglavje v monografiji Priimek, Ime (letnica izdaje monografije): Naslov prispevka v zborniku. V: Ime Priimek urednika (ur.), Naslov zbornika, strani prispevka. Kraj: založba. Palan, Ronen (1999): Global Governance and Social Closure or Who is to Governed in an Era of Global Governance? V: Martin Hewson (ur.) in Thimothy J. Sinclar (ur.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory, 55–72. Albany: State University New York Press. Clanki Priimek, Ime (letnica izida c.lanka): Naslov c.lanka. Ime revije letnik (šte­vilka): strani. Bachrach, Peter in Morton S. Baratz (1963): Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework. American Political Science Review 57 (3): 632–42. Svetovni splet (WWW) Priimek, Ime (letnica): Naslov. Dostopno prek Internetni naslov, datum dostopa. Deluze, Gilles (1978): Spinoza. Dostopno prek http://www.imaginet.fr/ deluze/TXT/420178.html, 10. 1. 2001. Viri Avtorica/avtor je sam odgovoren za spoštovanje materialnih in moralnih avtorskih pravic, povezanih z uporabo podatkov, datotek, reprodukcij in del (v nadaljevanju vir) drugih fizic.nih in pravnih oseb v njegovem c.lanku. Avtorstvo vira, ki ga avtorica oziroma avtor uporablja v c.lanku in ki ni plod njegovega raziskovalnega dela, mora biti jasno razvidno v obliki ustreznega navajanja vira v seznamu VIROV in v navajanju vira v besedilu c.lanka. Avtorica oziroma avtor naj smiselno navede c.im vec. podatkov o viru, kot so na primer avtor vira, mesto oziroma institucija, v kateri se vir nahaja, naslov, ime ali opis vira, evidenc.na številka vira, naslov spletne strani, kraj in leto nastanka vira in podobno. Pri tem je smiselnost navajanja opredeljena kot zmožnost sledenja viru oziroma zmožnost intersubjektivne preverljivo­sti uporabljenega vira. Avtorica oziroma avtor naj navede tudi datum, ko je bil vir pridobljen, c.e gre za elektronski vir. Priimek, Ime (letnica nastanka vira): Naslov/nosilec vira. Mesto hranjenja vira. Dostopno prek Internetni naslov, datum dostopa. Koprivec, Daša (2005–2008): Avdio kasete. Kustodiat za slovenske izse­ljence in zamejce SEM. Dostopno prek http://www.imaginet.fr/deluze/ TXT/420178.html, 10. 1. 2010. ali Luthar, Breda, Samo Kropivnik, Tanja Oblak, Blanka Tivadar, Mirjana Ule, Slavko Kurdija in Samo Uhan (2006): Življenjski stili v medijski družbi 2001. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. Ce gre za vir iz zasebnega arhiva avtorja c.lanka, kakega drugega razi­skovalca ali posameznika, naj bo to jasno navedeno. Navajanje identitete lastnika vira iz zasebnega arhiva je zaželeno, vendar ne nujno, kadar gre za zašc.ito njegovih materialnih pravic ali varovanje njegove osebne identitete. Priimek, Ime morebitnega avtorja (morebitna letnica nastanka vira): Ime ali opis vira/arhivska številka. Mesto hranjenja vira. zasebni arhiv. zbirka navijaških šalov. Avtoštoparski muzej, Kanal ob Soc.i. zasebni arhiv Mirana Ipavca. ali zbirka pisem Janeza Novaka. 1953–1989. Privatni arhiv. Avtorica oziroma avtor naj v primeru znanega avtorja in leta nastanka vira uporabi enako doloc.ilo o navajanju v besedilu c.lanka, kot je to v primeru navajanja c.lanka, prispevka v monografiji ali monografije. Kadar avtor in leto nastanka vira nista znana, naj avtorica oziroma avtor v besedilu c.lanka smiselno uporabi naslov, ime ali opis vira. V primeru, da so naslov, ime ali opis vira daljši od petih besed, naj avtorica oziroma avtor pri navajanju vira smiselno uporabi zac.etne besede iz naslova, imena ali opisa vira tako, da bo nedvoumno razpoznavno, kateri v seznamu literature navedeni vir navaja. (Poroc.ilo o delu državnega zbora, 2000) ali (zbirka navijaških šalov) Glede ostalih dodatnih oblik navajanja uporabljene literature ali virov naj se avtorica oziroma avtor obrne na uredništvo TIP. RECENzENTSKI POSTOPEK Uredništvo TIP uporablja za vse vrste c.lankov in za knjižne eseje obojestran­sko anonimni recenzentski postopek. Clanke in knjižne eseje recenzirata vsaj dva recenzenta. Postopek recenziranja, od oddaje besedila do seznanitve avto­rice/avtorja z recenzentskimi mnenji, traja dva meseca. Uredništvo TIP lahko brez zunanjega recenziranja zavrne objavo besedila, c.e ugotovi, da avtorica oziroma avtor besedila ni pripravil v skladu z zgoraj navedenimi navodili, ali pa c.e oceni, da besedilo ne sodi na znanstveno podroc.je, ki ga revija pokriva. Uredništvo ima pravico, da prispevkov, ki ne ustrezajo merilom knjižne slo­venšc.ine (ali anglešc.ine, c.e je c.lanek oddan v anglešc.ini; upošteva se British English) ne sprejme v recenzentski postopek. Stroški obveznega lektoriranja angleških besedil se avtorjem zarac.unavajo po predhodnem dogovoru. Avtorica/avtor ima od trenutka, ko je seznanjen z recenzentskimi mnenji, tri tedne c.asa, da v besedilo vnese popravke in popravljeno besedilo vrne v uredništvo TIP. V primeru, ko recenzenti zahtevajo temeljitejše popravke, se popravljeno besedilo ponovno vrne recenzentu v presojo. Avtorica/avtor naj popravljenemu besedilu priloži poseben obrazec “avtorjevo poroc.ilo”, ki ga dobi skupaj z recenzijama besedila, v katerem naj obrazloži, katere dele besedila je popravil in kako. Ce avtorica/avtor oziroma avtor meni, da so pripombe recenzenta neutemeljene, pomanjkljive ali kakorkoli nera­zumljive, naj neupoštevanje recenzentskih pripomb pojasni in utemelji v posebnem poroc.ilu glavnemu uredniku. Avtorica/avtor in soavtorji ob objavi dobijo po en brezplac.en izvod šte­vilke revije, v kateri je bil objavljen njihov prispevek. Vsak dodaten izvod stane 10 evrov (plus poštnina). Na zahtevo lahko avtorici/avtorju pošljemo brezplac.en izvod njegove objave v formatu pdf. Avtorica/avtor prenese materiale avtorske pravice za objavljeni prispe­vek na izdajatelja revije. INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS Submitted texts should not be previously published or the subject of a peer-review procedure for another journal or book/monograph. The publishing of an article or a book review in Teorija in praksa is free of charge. Texts should be sent to the e-mail address: teorija.praksa@fdv.uni-lj.si. A text should be in A4 format with 1.5 spacing, Times New Roman of 12-point font size, and the centre aligned with 2.5 cm margins. All pages of the text should be numbered consecutively. The first and last name of the author/s should be placed on a separate cover sheet showing the title of the article, along with their academic title and current employment, full postal address, telephone number and e-mail address. The last name of the author/s should be printed in uppercase. The initial page of the text should only include the title of the text, and the abstract. The text should be accompanied by the author/s’ statement that the text has not previously been published or is not in press with any other journal or monograph. In the statement, the author/s should also make a proposal for the article’s classification in compliance with the typology of documents/works (an original article, a review article, or a book review). The Editorial Board shall decide on the final classification of a submitted text. ARTICLES Original or review articles written in the English language (British English) should not exceed 6,500 words. If the author wishes to publish a longer text, they should first consult the Editor. An article should be accompanied by an abstract of up to 100 words, written in both Slovenian and English, contain­ing a definition of the subject under scrutiny, methods of argumentation, and conclusions. The author should also provide up to seven key words. The titles should be clear and indicative. The main title, printed in bold uppercase letters, should not exceed 100 characters. Texts longer than 1,500 words should contain subtitles of no more than two levels. The subtitles of the second level should be italicised. Tables, graphs and figures should be designed as attachments (and not included in the text), with informative titles, in uppercase letters and ital­ics; they should be numbered consecutively (Figure 1: TITLE OF FIGURE, Graph 2: TITLE OF GRAPH, Table 3: TITLE OF TABLE). Each table and fig­ure should be on a separate sheet. Their approximate positions in the text should be marked in the text. The author should determine how much space each table, graph or figure will occupy in the text. The space required for tables, graphs and pictures should be included in the total text length, as either 250 words (1/2 page) or 500 words (1 page). The sources of tables and graphs should be written below the table and graph and should end with full-stop. Use the table feature in Word to create tables. Table 1: COMMITTEE EFFECT Relugative effect Mixet effect Distributional effect BUDG, TRAN, IMCO, ECON, ENVI, ITRE, LIBE EMPL, AGRI, PECH, REGI JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA Source: Yordanova, 2009: 256. Footnotes should be clearly marked in the text with consecutive num­bers from beginning to end; written in appropriate places in the text; and arranged in the same order under the text. Footnotes must be limited in both number and length. Notes about the author/s, as well as any acknowl­edgements, should include information on the organisation to which the author/s belongs when relevant to the subject addressed in the text, and should also include information regarding any financial or other assistance given for preparing the text. Quotations of three or more lines in length should be placed in a sepa­rate centre-aligned paragraph, with the text appearing in italics and without inverted commas. The fact that most of the posts have been liked is an evidence that citizens find the posts made by the local government interesting and useful, but they do not show any further interest by sharing the information with friends or by engaging in dialog commenting on them. (Bonsón et al., 2013: 12) BOOK REVIEWS Book reviews not older than 2 years are accepted for publication in Teorija in praksa and should contain up to 1,500 words. In a book review, the author should strictly avoid making any references to any sources and literature. The book review should not include title or subtitles. Information about the author and the reviewed book should be given at the review’s start in the form shown below: First Name LAST NAME Institutional affiliation Author’s First and Last Name Title: Subtitle Publisher, City Year of publication, number of pages, price (ISBN number) John SMITH Oxford University Eviatar zerubavel Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2003, 184 pages, USD 25.00 (ISBN 0-226-98152-5) REFERENCES The basic form of an in-text reference is (Smith, 1994). To indicate the page, use the following form: (Smith, 1994: 27–28). If two authors are referred to, they should both be stated: (Smith and Doe, 2007). When there are three or more authors, the following form should be used: (Smith et al., 1994: 27), while all authors should be mentioned in the reference list. If the author does not use the first edition of the book, the year the first edition was pub­lished should also be given: (Smith, 1953/1994: 7). Several simultaneous ref­erences should be separated by a semicolon: (Smith, 1994: 7; Doe, 1998: 3–4; 2005: 58). When citing several references by the same author published in the same year, references should be separated by letters a, b, c etc.: (Smith, 1994a; 27–29; Smith 1994b: 1) in the order they first appear in the text. The list of references should be placed at the end of the text, under the heading BIBLIOGRAPHY. It should only include units of literature used in the text. Sources should be listed after the list of references under the head­ing SOURCES. The bibliography should be arranged in alphabetical order of the last names of the authors and, in the case of multiple works by the same author, by the consecutive order of editions. Books Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title of the Book: Subtitle. City: Publisher. Geertz, Clifford (1980): Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Edited Books Last Name, First Name (ed.) (year of publication): Title of the Book: Subtitle. City: Publisher. Featherstone, Mike and Mike Hepworth, Bryan S. Turner (eds.) (1991): The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory. London: SAGE Publications. Chapters or Essays in Monographs Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title of the Chapter/essay in the Edited Book. In First Name Last Name of the editor (ed.), Title of the Edited Book, pages of the chapter/essay. City: Publisher. Palan, Ronen (1999): Global Governance and Social Closure or Who is to Be Governed in an Era of Global Governance? In Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair (eds.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory, 55–72. Albany: State University New York Press. Articles Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title of the Article: Subtitle. Name of Journal Volume (Number): pages. Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz (1963): Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework. American Political Science Review 57 (3): 632– 642. Internet (WWW) Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title. Accessible at Internet address, date of access. Deluze, Gilles (1978): Spinoza. Accessible at http://www.imaginet.fr/deluze/ TXT/420178.html, 10. 1. 2001. Sources It is the author’s sole responsibility to respect the material and moral copy­rights related to the use of data, files, reproductions and works (hereinaf­ter: the source) of other natural and legal persons in his or her article. The authorship of a source an author uses which is not the outcome of their own research must be clearly identifiable by properly including the source in the list of SOURCES and by citing the source in the text. 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