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Žiga VODOVNIK\*

## (RE)THINKING THE STATE IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

**Abstract.** *In this article, we argue that social sciences generally and political science in particular are faced with a peculiar epistemological challenge while researching the state in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Namely, the state has often been either naturalised, seen as a static and ahistorical entity resistant to changes in the environment, or naively rejected as a form of political organisation that is with neoliberal globalisation withering away. In either instance, the processes of redefining and redistributing of the state, and hence its de-/reterritorialising and rescaling, have largely gone unnoticed. Our analysis reassesses the hegemonic theories of state and shows that in the mainstream of political science research on the state is still anchored to the (geographical) assumptions that limit or even define the state and its exercise of power to a geographically demarcated and fixed territory. Drawing on recent approaches to space, scale and territory, this article calls for a heterodox and pluralist methodology in further research on state as well as non-state spaces.*

**Keywords:** *the state, non-state spaces, globalisation, territory, political geography*

### Introduction

Throughout history political science has often suffered from the short-sightedness of statism. Yet, in the last few decades it has witnessed a different kind of myopia. As globalisation processes have accelerated, political science has, with few exceptions, completely overlooked the state. Political science has disregarded the state due to its apparent withdrawal from the new political geography or, as Kenichi Ohmae (1995) vividly put it, because the state is a dinosaur waiting to die. Still, political science has also disregarded the state by naturalising it, understanding the state as a static and ahistorical entity resistant to changes in the environment. At best, political scientists' interest in the state has seen ebbs and flows yet has always been

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buttressed by the use of old, often outdated, theories, methodologies and vocabularies. If we take the title of this article seriously, we soon realise the social sciences generally and political science in particular are faced with a peculiar epistemological challenge while researching the new forms of statehood in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Saul Newman notes that political theory must still catch up with this new terrain since it “generally looks for visible, representative identities situated on an ontological field organized by sovereign power; it is concerned with how we are governed, or with the normative principles or constitutive logics upon which political power is founded” (Newman, 2014: 94).

Ever since the Ancient Greeks, issues of politics and political community have been related to territory and borders (Plato’s *Republic*) or their relativisation (Zeno’s *Republic*). In particular, this kind of conception was strengthened by the Westphalian arrangements that developed and deepened an inside/outside divide as the core of the state and our imagining(s) of it (Jessop, 2009). This article starts by assumption that the few decades of the neoliberal (better the neoconservative) project have significantly redefined and redistributed the state.<sup>1</sup> In our brief exploration of the hegemonic theories of the state and especially their limits in detecting processes of redefining and redistributing the state, we address a broader question of the state and the perspectives in studies on the state. This is a relevant and topical issue, even more so when we consider that the state is losing its role as the only centre of sovereignty and an arena in which key political decisions are made. In recent decades, the state has encountered fierce competition from the rising power of (global) cities, TNCs, IGOs, NGOs and social movements that according to Saskia Sassen (2012) signal the emergence of “different territorial vectors”, where the place and role of the state is significantly altered.

This means the political science community must face up to the difficult task of (re)thinking and reconceptualising the state in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. For this purpose, in December 2019 the Slovenian Political Science Association organised a conference that addressed “optical challenges” (Appadurai, 2004) in understanding the Janus-like face of the (post)modern state. We tried to highlight this challenge by modifying Abraham Bosse’s frontispiece for Hobbes’ *Leviathan* from 1651 in the visuals used for the conference. We could say that by ‘blurring’ the crowned figure we also sought to draw attention to the changed ontological status of the state that often goes undetected: if the Westphalian model made the state and its existence conditional

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<sup>1</sup> We argue that the state did not wither away as the neoliberal project emerged since it is a constitutive element of its expansion. It should be clear by now that there is nothing more and nothing less of the state, but it is completely different.

on relations vis-à-vis other states, even if they were unable to perform the main state functions, today their (non)existence is a condition of their internal capacity to be a space for autonomous political action. This fissure in the state system is seen in the existence of states that no longer function as states and non-state spaces that are becoming autonomous political entities and are already performing the main state functions.

In the introduction to his over 1,600-page work entitled *De l'État*, Henry Lefebvre asks a simple question: "What is the state?". He answers:

*Enumeration of hypotheses. The State? A conscience, the consciousness of the nation? A 'moral' or 'legal' person? A 'substance' or a set of relations? A reality? A firm? A 'subject'? An 'object'? Or the name for an absence, a simulation? For 'being' or collective presence? Would it be the 'reflection' or the result of a social structure (classes)? A sum of functions? The exercise of Power? Or 'something' else, to be discovered and defined? (Lefebvre, 2009: 95)*

To this end, the article attempts to repoliticise the state and show that the state is first and foremost constituted by political, not economic relations. This means the state must chiefly be understood as a political and not an economic entity, even if in fact it is (anti)political in its drive to eliminate the diversity, autonomy and differences that hinder the creation of the national whole or what James C. Scott terms "synoptic legibility".<sup>2</sup> We analyse how the hegemonic theories of state have responded to the new political landscape and how up-to-date and relevant they remain in helping to explain what Sassen (2012) calls a "new geography of centrality", where the place and role of the state is significantly redefined. We explore the thesis that in the mainstream of political science research on the state is anchored to outdated (geographical) assumptions that limit or even define the state and its exercise of power to a geographically demarcated and fixed territory. Drawing on recent approaches to space, scale and territory, we call for a heterodox and pluralist methodology while researching the state. In other words, we show how novel (meta)theoretical, epistemological and methodological pluralism in analysing the state enables a much broader and deeper understanding of statehood as a process, overcoming the territorial reification of the state.

Political science, then, should be able to understand the state in its respective historical mediations, while avoiding any naïve reification of the state or what Edward W. Soja (1978) and John Agnew (1994) describe as

<sup>2</sup> We thus show the contradictions and limits of state politics and call for academic attention to the non-state spaces concept.

“spatial fetishism” and a “territorial trap”, respectively. According to Agnew (2005: 441, 456), political science is entrapped by the territorialised understandings of state that emerged from the traditional Westphalian images of states and were further shaped by the development of mercantilism and industrialist capitalism, along with Enlightenment and Romantic aspirations to popular rule and nationalism.

However, since the state is at once globalising and localising, it faces a “multi-scalar meta-governance” challenge (Jessop, 2009) to adapt to the ongoing spatial and scalar restructurings. Put differently, the state continues to function as a form of the territorialisation of capitalism, yet the expansion of capitalist economy and its rescaling of territoriality call for the state’s de-/reterritorialisation on different levels. These are complex and contradictory processes that should not be misinterpreted as the demise or erosion of the state. Saul Newman thus argues that an alternative theoretical and methodological arsenal is required to fully explore the new terrain of politics that is relocating “the political relationship away from the state and its formal representative structures towards the movements of autonomy that increasingly transcend it” (Newman, 2014: 93). This necessitates new, heterodox and post-disciplinary approaches to the state, an area the article explores in the second part. In the final part, we paradoxically shift our gaze to the relevance of non-state spaces and politics constituted beyond or sometimes in opposition to the state as a way to (un)think the state from the outside.

## The State and New Thinking

When John Keane (2009; 2015) was reflecting on the state of democratic theory, he concluded that one very simple thing was missing: new thinking. Keane argues that the development and mutual enrichment of democratic ideas and practices over the last few decades have completely changed the language, institutions and normative ideals of democracy. The old criteria, like sovereign state, party pluralism, elections, representation, national identity, market economy etc., are today wholly obsolete categories that no longer have any connection to the current dynamics of democratic innovations. This is why an entirely new approach is required, building on a new grammar, metaphors, perspectives, theories and methods themselves. We imagine that Keane would similarly argue for the theories of state and studies of the state; namely, that what is missing is new thinking. The hegemonic theories of the state continue to be dominated by territorial myopia whereby states are viewed as stable geographical containers of social, economic, political and cultural relations (Brenner, 1999).

In the mainstream of political science, research on the state is still anchored to the (geographical) assumptions that limit or even define the



state and its exercise of power to a geographically demarcated and fixed territory.<sup>3</sup> In his elaboration of the “territorial trap”, John Agnew (1994) notes that political science has largely been dominated by reified understandings of the state, that “it has been too geographical and not sufficiently historical”. Conventional state research has relied on three problematic geographical assumptions which are called into question by current developments: a) the ahistorical or naturalised understanding of states as fixed sovereign spaces; b) binary logic delimitating inside/outside or domestic/foreign; and c) regarding states as ‘containers’ of societies.

In path-breaking study *New State Spaces* (2004), Neil Brenner concurs and argues that political science has lost its analytical edge by approaching the state “as a preconstituted geographical unit of analysis”. The state is viewed “as the self-enclosed geographical container of socioeconomic and politico-cultural relations” and frequently as the only one, preventing researchers from seeing beyond state-centric modes of inquiry. In his attempt to construct “new modes of analysis”, Brenner combines fragments of heterodox, interdisciplinary and even post-disciplinary methodologies that challenge spatial fetishism, methodological territorialism, methodological nationalism and, thus, state-centric epistemologies. What is becoming evident is that new territorial constellations, nexi and vectors are producing a new geography of strategic spaces that Sassen (2012) refers to as a “new geography of centrality”, where the place and role of the state is significantly redefined. Here it is useful to paraphrase the important, if not the key, question Sassen considers in her analysis of the new configurations of territoriality and transnational politics: Are we able to see and detect the formation of new *political* forms among the old *political* conditions?

In fact, many studies have moved beyond the state-centric geographical assumption yet, as Brenner (1999: 41) points out, the old errors have been remedied by introducing a new one: mainly through the state’s conceptual negation. In other words, these new reconceptualisations have been able to perceive the emerging spatial forms and corollary new political geographies, but completely overlooked the state in them – i.e. the state’s new position and, hence, novel forms of its de-/reterritorialisation and rescaling. Brenner acknowledges that the state continues to function as a form of territorialisation for capital, yet warns that the expansion of the capitalist economy continues to produce new scalar configurations of territorialisation under capitalism that make the state-centric conceptions outdated. Namely, the expansion of capitalism should be seen as a complex, conflictual process

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<sup>3</sup> It should be clear that the state, or any political organisation for this reason, can exercise power without a delimited and fixed territory and, even in this case, the state has been “unbundled” (Agnew, 1994: 55) by formal and informal agreements, networks, markets, movements, problems etc.

not only transcending regulatory systems on the national scale – that is what we usually see and study – but is simultaneously producing the new sub- and supra-national modes of accumulation and (state) control needed to facilitate and coordinate this process.

By referring to “scalar shift”, Brenner indicates that the current wave of globalisation means that the global scale depends on simultaneous reterritorialisation on a sub-global scale, mostly the new sub- and supra-national scales, and no longer exclusively on the national one (ibid.: 62). Moreover, the capital–state relationship is being inverted since “it is no longer capital that is to be molded into the (territorially integrated) geography of state space, but state space that is to be molded into the (territorially differentiated) geography of capital” (Brenner, 2004: 14). (Post)modern statehood thus means complex and continuous rescaling “at once upwards, downwards and outwards”, resulting in polymorphic institutional geographies (ibid.: 67).<sup>4</sup>

In recent years, an important contribution to studies of the state, which overcomes the theoretical/methodological *Scylla* and *Charybdis* mentioned above, has come from scholars who conceive of globalisation processes and the expansion of capitalism as a contradictory socio-spatial dialectic, constantly making and remaking new configurations of territoriality. In studies on the emerging spatial and political forms, they observed that the contradictions of neoliberalism (short term) on one hand, and the broader project of modernity (long term) on the other, are simultaneously: i) expanding and accelerating movements of goods, services, labour and capital; and ii) creating and imposing a (relatively) fixed socio-territorial infrastructure for enabling and controlling these processes:

*Globalization therefore entails a dialectical interplay between the endemic drive towards space-time compression under capitalism (the moment of deterritorialization) and continual production of relatively fixed, provisionally stabilized configurations of territorial organization on multiple geographical scales (the moment of reterritorialization).* (Brenner, 1999: 43)

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<sup>4</sup> *These processes not only make the Westphalian models of statehood outdated and useless, but the main concepts and metaphors in our categorical apparatus as well. Anderson (in Brenner, 2004: 63), for instance, suggests entirely new imaginings of the emerging political geographies: “A complex set of climbing frames, slides, swings, ropes and rope ladders, complete with weak or broken parts [...] might be nearer the mark. The metaphor of adventure playgrounds, with their mixture of constructions, multiple levels and encouragement of movement – up, down, sideways, diagonally, directly from high to low, or low to high – captures the contemporary mixture of forms and processes much better than the ladder metaphor”.*

It is then unsurprisingly that Brenner's novel (meta)theoretical, epistemological and methodological pluralism in analysing the state enables a much broader and deeper understanding of the statehood as a process, overcoming territorial reification of the state. As mentioned, an alternative theoretical and methodological arsenal is required to explore this new terrain of politics (Newman, 2014: 93). This merely confirms Appadurai's remark about research imagination (or the lack of it) because it reveals that our task is not simply a unique political and theoretical challenge is but above all an epistemological one. What we then need is not only conceptual clarity and theoretical thoroughness, but a wider epistemological transformation that will enable intersectional research, freely merging previously disciplinary delimited methodological registers and approaches. Namely, many concepts and categories are too elusive for the traditional disciplines, classical theories and Western epistemologies, in turn calling for a new, more flexible epistemology.

If previous explorations of the state in political science often resulted in an "escape from reality", as Ian Shapiro (2008) put it, it is still possible to formulate an alternative research orientation. To fully understand the redistributions and redefinitions of the state, new concepts, methods and even research logics are needed. Instead of addressing the key challenges and problems of (post)modern statehood, political science has fallen into the trap of theoretical and methodological monism in explaining the state. According to Shapiro, contemporary political science is thus largely defined by method- and theory-driven research, which are safe and attractive research orientations, yet also problematic for research itself as they lead to predetermination of the research subject itself.

Thus, with method- and theory-driven research Shapiro does not negate the sophisticated use of methods and theories in research, but methodological and theoretical monism, which necessarily results in a pre-selection of visible or relevant research topics, problems and approaches. These thus limit researchers in their perception of political reality – e.g. what is (ir)relevant, what are the problems, what are the possible solutions, what is worth researching, who the subjects are. In other words, Shapiro points out that method- and theory-driven research automatically leads to the establishment of research paradigms (cf. Kuhn, 1962) that not only determine the selection of problems but the selection of the right methods for their research as well. It is a kind of theoretical-methodological self-referentiality that does not acknowledge the possible fallacy of the theory and method itself.

The shortcomings of method- and theory-driven research can, according to Shapiro, be avoided by a different research orientation – problem-driven research. It starts by realising that political science must tackle the critical problems of (post)modern societies, while in its methodological and theoretical approach allows or even demands certain levels of innovation,

improvisation and eclecticism, as required by the research into a given problem. In a way, it is a reaffirmation of Paul Feyerabend's (1975/1993) epistemological and methodological maxim that *anything goes* if a particular problem is to be fully explored. In explaining the political reality, detecting and resolving vital challenges, political science must adjust its methods and theories to problems, not *vice versa*. Problem-driven research thus offers a radical critique of the canon of authority and authorisation which reproduces the hegemonic political theories, while rejecting the idea of interdisciplinarity that implicitly still builds on the separation of individual disciplines and methodological registers. It enables and contributes to what Brenner describes as the "postdisciplinary" mode of inquiry, "where conceptual tools and methodological strategies are adopted with reference to the challenges of making sense of particular social phenomena rather than on the basis of traditional disciplinary divisions of labor" (Brenner, 2004: 23).

### Contradictions of/in the State

While the article principally deals with how the state may be reconceptualised in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we shall make a brief detour by highlighting the need to explore politics that is constituted beyond or in opposition to the state. Our analysis of the state's de-/reterritorialisation and rescaling should paradoxically also include critique of modernity and its political forms, including the state. These political forms face an irreversible crisis due to their insistence on sovereign territory and the hierarchy of power and people. As Bookchin (2007: 93-94) argues, politics and the state are not only inherently different, but can be in direct opposition.<sup>5</sup> As we have shown elsewhere (cf. Vodovnik, 2011; Vodovnik, 2012), politics has always had a troubled relationship with the state because it has been closer to a philosophical concept of praxis as a free and creative activity in fluid polities. Only in our present has politics been integrated into state-making projects and strengthened the belief that there is no distinction between the political and statist realms, even though the modern state was born exactly as a reactionary response to Renaissance humanism. As a result, according to Richard Day (2005: 38) the struggle to dismantle community through the demutualisation being waged between politics and democracy on one side, and state and corporate forms on the other, is indeed the struggle of the (post)modern condition.

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<sup>5</sup> We might also argue that political theory often understands politics too literally, especially when we note that the word *real* comes from the Latin word *regal* or *king's*. This means that for a large part of political theory only what is 'royal' or situated in the ontological field organised by sovereign power is *real*, while counter-hegemonic and autonomous politics are discredited as a trivial pursuit.

Still, we should reiterate that non-state politics should not be understood as a rupture from the main forms of political subjectivation, but as an explication of its original intent and meaning. Political membership beyond the state is, according to James C. Scott (2009: 3–4), the regularity of history, despite the nation state’s inscription on the political map and hence the sedentarisation or, in other words, the administrative, economic and cultural standardisation of fluid political entities. The concept of uniform, homogeneous state politics emerged as a political or depoliticising tool that according to Scott (1998: 32) is a poor abstraction that may be compared to the invention of metre, kilogram and other units of measurement, standards and reforms needed for the administrative, economic and cultural standardisation of mixed and fluid political entities. We can thus understand universal state citizenship as a political equivalent to other ‘state simplifications’ as the metre that was introduced with a revolutionary decree stating: “The centuries-old dream of the masses of only one measure has come true! The Revolution has given the people the meter” (ibid.). If the universal metre swept away differences in the units that it measures, then universal state citizenship swept away differences among a heterogenous and plural multitude.<sup>6</sup> Scott contends the tension between modern citizenship and statecraft should be understood as an “uneasy bargain”, that has led to completely new forms of political membership and legibility – i.e. the modern nation state and an abstract, un-marked citizen:

*Statecraft proved difficult in these conditions of vernacular measures and vernacular resistance to assessment ... It is no exaggeration to claim that the conquest of illegibility is the most momentous achievement of the modern state. This required the standardization of weights and measures against determined local resistance. It required elaborate censuses and population rolls, cadastral surveys of landed property, and, not least, the institution of individual freehold properly adapted to cadastral science. The project of legibility allowed the state to “see” the human activity of interest to it through the simplified approximation of documents, lists, and statistics. (Scott, 2013: 97)*

<sup>6</sup> Although the etymological origin of the word citizenship – from *civitas*, *civitatus*, to the modern citizen – always linked political membership to smaller and more fluid polities, we still find it difficult to understand the relationship between citizenship and the state in societies where the equating of political membership with national or even ethnical identity results from a linguistic or semantic similarity in the two concepts. We often forget that at the very beginning citizenship was not related to the state but solely meant a specific ‘urban relationship’ between rights and duties in the city (Delanty, 2006: 12). Citizenship therefore meant political membership of a city. It is thus erroneous to talk only about a “citizen of the state” since we can also identify other citizenship types built on different – e.g. territorial or functional – criteria.

In a short and very rough sketch of his massive, four-volume work *De l'État* (1976–78; *On the State*), Henry Lefebvre writes that the modern State is founded precisely on the “principle of equivalence”, which secures unity, identity and political integration. In his pondering on the state in the modern world, he counters prevailing Marxist theorisations of the state that also in the 1970s perceived the state as a form of “heavenly life” in contrast to the “earthly life” of civil society, where man “regards other men as means, degrades himself to a means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers” (Marx in Lefebvre, 2009: 75). Lefebvre notes:

*Foundations of the modern State: The (forced) equivalence of non-equivalents: the (forced) equalization of the unequal, the identification of the non-identical ... The logic of homogenization and identity as the logic and strategy of State power. The State as reducer (of diversities, autonomies, multiplicities, differences) and as integrator of the so-called national whole.* (ibid.: 108)

Needless to say, this question calls for another *excursus* which, unfortunately, lies beyond the scope of this article. Still, we can briefly illustrate the paradox of state politics – i.e. the state as reducer *et* integrator – that should be explored in greater detail elsewhere. In his recapitulation of Plato and Aristotle, Rancière (1995) points to the important demarcation between the political subjectivities of *dēmos* and *ochlos*, which not only entails a simple divide between the “power of the people” and the “unification of individual turbulences”. For Rancière, *dēmos* is not and cannot become a singular, delimited subject, which explains, contrary to *ochlos* or a multitude of individuals in the illusion of the totality of One, why it is able to denaturalise and change the existing. *Dēmos*, as the “part of those who have no part”, is not the sum of social partners or even the totality of all differences, like state polity is often understood, but quite the opposite – the power of revealing the contingency and imperfection of such counting of partners and summing up of differences, since a people is “always more and less than what it is”.

Rancière stresses this idea gives birth to politics, even though politics (*la politique*) is too often understood as referring to problematic systems of distribution and legitimation, which we might define as state politics and lead to it being simply named the police (*la police*). As a self-managing practice of democracy, politics only emerges when the assumption of intrinsic equality is realised. The “scandal of democracy” is therefore that it no longer involves any a priori justification of one’s adequacy for political life. If we place this alongside Rancière (2014: 49), democracy is neither a form of society nor a form of government, it is precisely

the “ungovernable”.<sup>7</sup> It follows that, as a practice of democracy, politics appears when the assumption of intrinsic equality is realised. We may understand politics as one of the rare examples when subjects act as subjects that do not have the rights they are entitled to and hold rights they do not have an entitlement to and thus disturb the hegemonic (police) order. For Rancière, a declassification of order and political subjectivation is the *sine qua non* of politics – that is, the acknowledgement of the political existence of *part des sans-part*. That is, this is exactly the opposite of the “synoptic legibility” (Scott, 2013; Scott, 1998) the state-making projects are producing and struggle to maintain. Efforts to make state populations legible and that would enable the state effective in performing its main functions – e.g. taxation, conscription, monopoly of coercion – have namely always called for diverse strategies and policies aimed at sedentising the unruly *dēmos*.

### Thinking from the Outside

Any serious attempt to understand recurring crises of state politics should build on the recent academic attention paid to the *non-state spaces*. According to Grubačić and O’Hearn (2016), *non-state spaces* can be understood as *exilic spaces* because they are inhabited by communities trying to (in)voluntarily escape both state regulation and capitalist accumulation. Exilic spaces may be defined as areas in social and economic life where individuals and groups seek to extricate themselves from capitalist economic processes by either territorial escape or attempting to build structures independent of capitalist accumulation and social control.<sup>8</sup>

As we have noted elsewhere (Vodovnik and Grubačić, 2015), we can analyse non-state spaces on the “micro-political” level when we talk about their “infrapolitical” aspects that provide “much of the cultural and structural underpinning of the more visible political action on which our attention has generally been focused” (Scott, 1990: 184). We suggest it is necessary to shift our attention from the most visible – and thus the most mediated – aspects

<sup>7</sup> Hence, in his explanation of democracy, Rancière follows Plato’s idea of a political regime that is not a political regime since it lacks any foundation. The “scandal of democracy” is manifested in the very idea that the principle of distinction according to birth, wealth and knowledge has no place in the democratic world because democracy is always a matter of the declassification of order, the process of political subjectivation, and the (re)counting of the political community that is “always more or less than it is”.

<sup>8</sup> In her account of the occupy movements, Saskia Sassen (2012: 6) emphasises the importance of such projects, albeit limited in time and space, due to their ability to overcome “even if temporarily, territory’s embedded and often deeply undemocratic logics of power, and to redefine the role of citizens, mostly weakened and fatigued after decades of growing inequality and injustice. Indeed, the occupations have revealed to what extent the reality of territory goes beyond its dominant meaning throughout the twentieth century, when the term was flattened to denote national sovereign territory”.



of institutional, state politics to attempts at redefining democracy and political membership which may be found in the “immense political terrain ... between quiescence and revolt” (ibid.: 200). In its “micropolitical” sense, the concept of infrapolitics can help highlight the overlooked or at best marginalised aspects of non-state spaces, which “like infrared rays” are “beyond the visible end of the spectrum”. These spaces, communities and practices should therefore be understood as “hidden transcripts” since they are “invisible ... in large part by design – a tactical choice born of a prudent awareness of the balance of power” (ibid.: 201).

On the “macropolitical” level, the infrapolitics of non-state spaces should be understood as a process of producing forms of place-based politics within the cracks of the global capitalist system. The infrapolitics of the capitalist world economy describe the efforts to break off from the systemic processes of the state and capital. It is a process of the (self-)organisation of relatively autonomous and only partially incorporated spaces, which then leads to the antagonistic relationship that emerges between exilic spaces and the hierarchical organisations of the capitalist world economy. It is also a predictable response to the enduring logic of exit and capture inscribed in the *longue durée* of historical capitalism. Instead of ruptures and breaks, we can see a long-term, large-scale historical process of state making and state breaking, of state formation and state de-formation, of an ongoing and uneven incorporation and exilic re-appropriation and recovery.<sup>9</sup> In *The Art of Not Being Governed*, a book that has changed the way we theorise state-making projects and non-state spaces, Scott develops a provocative thesis:

*Not so very long ago, however, such self-governing peoples were the majority of humankind. Today, they are seen from the valley kingdoms as ‘our living ancestors,’ ‘what we were like before we discovered wet-rice cultivation, Buddhism and civilization.’ On the contrary, I argue that hill peoples are best understood as runaway, fugitive, maroon communities who have, over the course of two millennia, been fleeing the oppressions of state-making projects in the valleys – slavery, conscription, taxes, corvée labor, epidemics, and warfare. (Scott, 2009: ix)*

The politics of zones of refuge or, better, exilic spaces, is usually not regarded as relevant to our understanding of politics, capitalist development and change, which is not surprising as these territories are above all spaces of refuge for *etceteras* of societies. This is an important oversight since exilic

<sup>9</sup> Moreover, by paying attention to non-state spaces we can detect and explore what Carolyn Nordstrom (2000) defines as the “shadows”. For Nordstrom, the “shadow powers” remain largely invisible to formal inquiry but enable us to rethink the established theories of state sovereignty and the state system.



spaces should be seen as part of the economic structuring and restructuring of the capitalist world economy and political power. Exilic spaces are always in the making, they are always being (re)made and (de)composed through a series of, at first glance, unrelated tactics and strategies:

*Virtually everything about these people's livelihoods, social organization, ideologies, and (more controversially) even their largely oral cultures, can be read as strategic positionings designed to keep the state at arm's length. Their physical dispersion in rugged terrain, their mobility, their cropping practices, their kinship structure, their pliable ethnic identities, and their devotion to prophetic, millenarian leaders effectively serve to avoid incorporation into states and to prevent states from springing up among them. (ibid.: x)*

With a Rancièrian reading, we understand these spaces as rare instances of politics. With the inscription of the part that has no part (yet), the “communities of sharing” overcome the “political agoraphobia” (Dupuis-Déri, 2018) that defines and underpins modern representative governments.<sup>10</sup> After all, politics arises when a (mis)count – to be more precise, “the gap created by the empty freedom of the people between the arithmetical order and the geometric order” (Rancièr, 2005: 34) – leads to the assertion of equality of anyone with anyone else, reminding us that democracy is nothing but “anarchic ‘government,’ one based on nothing other than the absence of every title to govern” (Rancièr, 2014: 41).

The depoliticisation processes that accompany etatist projects must nevertheless be understood as complex and multidimensional transformations which are not necessarily characterised by a lack of the political. Depoliticisation is hence not merely non-politics, it is instead anti-politics or the marginalisation of politics, especially in the case of a new political becoming that is being constituted in response to the trivialisation of politics in liberal democracies. In this perspective, depoliticisation is seen as an inhibition of politics, which rejects political subjectivities and forms of agency from its ontological register and merely admits the establishment of sovereign power. However, the state can at the same time – and especially in the age of neoliberal or neoconservative triumph – offer the public space in which people can participate, organise themselves and influence political process, even if in limited ways and scope. Although the state is sometimes perceived as Leviathan, current events simply confirm that without its implications for curbing the neoliberal agenda the state could become

<sup>10</sup> As Dupuis-Déri argues, republicanism hinges on an understanding of ‘the people’ as irrational, susceptible to demagoguery, factious or unable to support the common good.

even more illegitimate, violent and unfair. In the “post-democratic” world (Crouch, 2004), the state can shield from the complete subjection of politics to the interests of capital, which is today manifested in the economisation of all social structures, spheres and practices.

## Conclusion

In the article, we analysed how the hegemonic theories of state are responding to the new political geography and how up-to-date and relevant they remain for helping to explain the “new geography of centrality”, one in which the state’s place and role have been significantly redefined. The analysis confirmed our initial thesis that in mainstream political science research on the state is still anchored to outdated (geographical) assumptions that limit or even define the state and its exercise of power to a geographically demarcated and fixed territory. Drawing on recent approaches to space, scale and territory, we argued for a heterodox and pluralist methodology while researching the state. In other words, we explored how novel (meta) theoretical, epistemological and methodological pluralism in analysing the state enables a much broader and deeper understanding of statehood as a process, overcoming the state’s territorial reification.

The critical issue is therefore that any spatial/temporal fix, even if convenient for research(ers), in fact prevents change being detected. The spatio-temporal framing in the mainstream of political science that ties state, politics and citizenship to bounded and generally less fixed territory has become a *fait accompli* in the field. To evoke Jessop’s musings (2016: 1), these postulates about the state return to the research agenda from time to time, only to be (re)addressed by a new generation of scholars or another epistemic community. Still, the ebbs and flows of scientific interest do not suggest the dilemmas and paradoxes these assumptions open up have been resolved, but often only that over time they go out of style or the scientific community becomes bored with them.

As evident, the social sciences generally and political science in particular faced a peculiar epistemological challenge while researching transformations of statehood in the new millennium. Namely, the state has often been either naturalised, analysed as a static and ahistorical entity resistant to changes in the environment, or naively rejected as a form of political organisation that in the age of globalisation is withering away. In either instance, the processes of redefining and redistributing the state, and hence de-/reterritorialising and rescaling it, have gone largely unnoticed. Torn between the myopia of etatism and the naturalisation and/or trivialisation of modern statehood, political science is forced to recalibrate its theoretical and methodological registers.

In a way, we sought to follow Robert Dahl's (2004) call to reconsider political science in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and its "state of the art". First and foremost, Dahl argued that political science must overcome physics and economics envy when reconsidering its own methodologies and epistemologies. Research ethics and goals should also be reconsidered since we must abandon pretentious goals of building a grand theory of politics; mechanistic and econometric explanations (and even predictions) of the political in the past have proven not only to be a waste of time but also to hinder better understanding of the paradoxes of the political. Dahl also warned against the risks of theoretical and methodological monism, which typically stems from the belief that the incredible complexity of the field can be overcome precisely by such self-restraint. Finally, we must reject reductionism in understanding of the political or attempts to explain the operation of complex systems with a single factor.

In my view, Dahl's account of political science is a useful recapitulation of the biggest deficiencies of the hegemonic approaches to the state and politics. Even more importantly, it can also help us develop new epistemologies that enable a more complex understanding of the state and, finally, a gaze beyond it: in rejecting the economic reductionism and state-centric modes of analysis in political science; in warning against the theories of (state) politics that systematically erase or trivialise vernacular political subjectivities, practices and traditions; in repudiating theoretical and methodological monism in exploring the political; and last but not least, in abandoning research approaches that regard the unruliness of the political realm as a problem to be resolved and not as a possibility to be seized both academically and politically.

### *Overview*

The articles in this thematic issue were first presented as papers at the *(Re)thinking the State in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* conference organised in December 2019 by the Slovenian Political Science Association. Although the articles selected and gathered for this issue reflect on the state and studies of the state from different perspectives and in various contexts, they all share the conference's overall goal of re-examining hegemonic theories of the state in the new millennium.

In "The Political Versus the State? The Relevance of Carl Schmitt's Concept of the Political", Tihomir Cipek offers a new reading of Carl Schmitt, focusing on his concept of the political and exploring whether it poses a threat to the state and the democratic political order. The article clearly comes at the right time as it should not only be read as a fresh recapitulation of Schmitt, but at least as much as a theoretical deconstruction of the current political

regressions and their ideological foundations. In Cipek's (re)reading of Schmitt in a new context, he considers how Schmitt may be used to explain the ideology of the new "conservative revolutionaries" in Central Europe. His lucid analysis of illiberal democracies in the region shows they seem to follow the ideas of Carl Schmitt. First, their idea of the political reduces it to the antagonist, friend-enemy dichotomy. Second, they claim that liberal and democratic elements of the political order are in an irreconcilable conflict. Third, they imagine the state as a body of an ethnically defined nation.

In "Nativist and Anti-liberal Narratives in Conservative Populist Agenda in Central Europe", Ladislav Cabada ponders nativism as a tool of identity politics and conservative populism in the region. The author offers a detailed theoretical analysis of nativism and inspects the most important expressions and characteristics of this phenomenon. In the second part, the article compares conservative populist and/or nativist political actors in six Central European countries. The analysis shows that nativism should be understood as the main ideological edifice of the neoconservative project, promoting a genuinely new way of political mobilisation and collective action. Although not so important in the early years of the political and economic transition, nativism today informs the conservative populist agenda of right-wing parties in Central Europe and might even entail the core of their politics.

In "The crisis of 2008 and the rise of the Slovenian consolidation state", Marko Hočevar reflects on the Slovenian state's transformations since 2008. He explores the rise of the debt state in Slovenia after the crisis of 2008 and explains the Slovenian state's transformation into a consolidation state after 2013, when the consolidation of public finances became the primary objective of the state's policies. He detects the internal and external factors which influenced these processes. The outcomes of these processes can, *inter alia*, be observed in the form of the de-democratisation of the Slovenian state. As Hočevar argues, these processes coincided with the rise of technocratic regimes, the limitations on the possibilities of a referendum and the limiting of any sort of fiscal democracy following adoption of the 'golden rule' in 2013.

In "On Migrants with Migrants: Migrations 5 Years after the European Migration 'Crisis'", Cirila Toplak and Andrej Kurnik explore theoretical and methodological innovations in the area of migration studies, with the mass migrations to the European Union in 2015, especially migrations along the 'Balkan Route', as their chronotope of analysis. The authors illustrate the limits state-centred epistemologies impose on migration studies and explore new theoretical and methodological approaches to 'decoding' the migrant subjectivity. The ethnographic research employed offers a new understanding of diverse processes and subjectivities, while the creative theoretical synthesis, e.g. combining escape route theory, infrapolitics, heterotopias, redefines the position held by border and migration studies.

The thematic issue closes with “Climate Crisis: Time to rethink economic planning by demystifying capitalism and its market(s)”, in which Blaž Vrečko Ilc explores the possibility of democratic economic planning. He claims that technological determinism and free-market solutions are insufficient to properly confront the climate crisis. Because planning in the global capitalist system is often undemocratic and oppressive, the article examines alternative politico-economic models and possibilities to democratise planning itself. This means that without radical change in the sphere of production and distribution the problem of ecologically sustainable life on Earth will continue. Vrečko Ilc also discusses historical examples of alternative economic planning, only to highlight their failure and/or success that may inform our imaginings of the democratic planning that is so strongly needed to radically transform our societies and make them sustainable.

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## THE POLITICAL VERSUS THE STATE? THE RELEVANCE OF CARL SCHMITT'S CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL

*Abstract.* The aim of the article is to examine the relationship between the state, democracy and the Carl Schmitt's concept of the political. That is going to be done by reconstructing the concepts of Schmitt's political theory and finding out whether they can be used to explain the ideology of the new right-wing populism and illiberal democracy. As it turns out, the Schmitt's reduction of the political to the friend/enemy antagonism makes the core of the illiberal democracies' ruling narrative. The Schmitt's understanding of the political doesn't defend the state as a political space but by cancelling of the liberal elements of democracy ruins the state institutions. The analysis shows that Schmitt's notion of the political cannot be used to build effective democratic state institutions. Namely, in his definition of the political, politics actually exists only on the outwards, towards some other nation, some other political unity, but not within the state itself.

**Keywords:** state, the political, Carl Schmitt, illiberal democracy

### Introduction

The interest of social sciences is once again centred on the relation between the state and democracy. The discussion has been prompted by the rise of the right-wing populist parties in Europe and the theses on the crisis of democracy. The rise of right-wing populism is explained in two ways. The first approach starts from the socio-economic situation and notes that the ranks of populist protest parties are being swelled by the economic losers of globalisation and transition. The second approach takes culture and national identity as its starting point, and believes that right-wing populists are supported by extremely conservative voters who feel like they need to defend their religion and nation, which are in danger. Both approaches contain some elements of truth, but the countries where right-wing populism

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first appeared are still welfare states (France, Austria, the Netherlands), while conflicts in the interpretation of cultural values occur only when the hard right comes to power and starts changing gender policy, as can be seen on the example of Poland (Manow, 2020). Of course, there were also the 2010 Eurozone crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis. All of these interpretations contain some truth, but the main reason for the rise of right-wing populist parties seems to be of a structural nature. This is about the political elites' avoidance of making decisions, of intervening in the sphere of economy with the levers of political power, and at the same time, about neglecting democracy and the state (Streeck and Schäfer, 2013). Citizens demand that politics, or rather the state, protect them, while political elites claim that the market will do that on its own. Thus, the reason for the contemporary crisis of democracy and the emergence of right-wing populism lies in neglecting the functions of politics and the state (Böckenfoerde, 1988; Mouffe, 2004; Brown, 2015, 2019; Streeck, 2020). The functions of the state are taken over by international arbiters of power, which are not democratically elected and are not subject to democratic control, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and various expert commissions and courts. At the same time, the neo-liberal ideology claims that the state is something bad because it prevents the free operation of the market. The argument is that politics is an unnecessary obstacle to the economy and that the state should be reduced to a minimum, because everything will be resolved by the market (Brown, 2019; Rizman, 2020; Cayla, 2021). On the other hand, it is quite clear that democracy is historically and institutionally tied to the state (Dharendorf, 2002; Streeck, 2020). We thus find ourselves in a paradoxical situation, in which the political is at the level of the state, but public policies are at a supranational level, or rather at the level of the EU. Essentially, we are talking about a process of depoliticization (Mounk, 2018). This text starts from the thesis that neoliberal ideology puts the interests of corporations before the interests of nation states, and that right-wing populism responds to this process of depoliticization by promising to return the state and democracy to the people. This promise of a return of politics has prompted a discussion of Carl Schmitt's political theory and his understanding of the political (Balakrishnan, 2000; Müller, 2003; Mouffe, 1999, 2013; Petersen, 2018). This poses the question whether is it possible by the means of Carl Schmitt's concept of the political to hold back the depoliticization, to enhance the dynamics in the political field, that is crucial for the state institutions, and thus strengthen the state as the true space of democracy. This question is going to be faced by the method of qualitative analysis of the discourse (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002). The starting thesis will be that the central purpose of political theory's concepts is to serve the political struggle and to develop the hegemonic model of the interpretation of political phenomena.

### *The Crises of the State?*

The understanding and the concept of the state is one of the most important phenomena in political science. In its inception, political science developed as and was called the science of the state. Today, mainstream public discourse is dominated by the thesis that the state is unnecessary, that it has allegedly been transcended, that it should be reduced to the minimum (Brown, 2015, 2019; Cayla, 2020). This is actually a ubiquitous media dissemination of the central thesis of neoliberal ideology, which claims that everything would be great if all interpersonal relations were reduced to market relations.<sup>1</sup> More pointedly, it could be said that neoliberals and US neo-conservatives claim that the state is nothing, while the market is everything (Stiglitz, 2019; Risman, 2020; Streeck, 2021). To be sure, both of these groups hold this principle to be true only until it is failed private banks that need to be bailed out by the state (Hall, 2015). This contempt toward the state has troubling, twofold consequences. The first consequence is for the liberal democracy itself. Namely, as stated by the classic of liberal political theory Ralf Dahrendorf (2002), democratic political order was historically and institutionally designed for nation states, which is why democracy depends on the efficiency of state institutions. The second point is connected to the acceptance of the idea of the social state. The idea of the social state rested on the agreement between people's and social-democratic parties that was achieved after the Second World War. The social state was the West's effective answer to the ideological challenges coming from the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist dictatorships that began in 1989 marked the beginning of the degradation of the social state of the European West. By questioning the significance of politics, the dominant media discourse also questioned the state itself in its political and economic function.

Thus the predominance of the ideology that celebrated the market and the necessary dominance of financial capital institutions over politics also wreaked havoc on the power of the state (Robison, 2006). It seemed like the state was good for nothing except listening to the dictates of banks and other institutions of financial capital. A classic idea of Hegel's political philosophy, which was based on the division between the state and society and advocated for the supremacy of the state, seemed to become obsolete. The same could be said for the theoretical premises of Max Weber, as well as many other right- and left-wing thinkers who advocated for the idea of a strong, effective state. In this sense, it is interesting that the neoliberal devaluation

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<sup>1</sup> *The way in which the Slovenian media turns essential political phenomena into non-political ones is demonstrated by Pikalo and Trdina (2011).*

of the state did not lead to the actualization of Weber's or Hegel's theory of the state, but rather put a spotlight on the political theory of Carl Schmitt, a Nazi law theorist. Schmitt has become the favourite theoretician of the radical and extreme right. What is especially popular is his concept of the political, which reduces politics to the friend-enemy relation. That is why I will use Schmitt's theories to explain the contemporary arguments about the state. I will first point to the perception of Schmitt's political deliberations. Secondly, I will try to reconstruct Schmitt's notion of the political and his interpretation of the relation between the liberal and the democratic elements of the political order. Finally, I will show how the discourse of the new "conservative revolutionaries", who pride themselves on establishing "illiberal democracy", understands the political, the state and democracy.

### *The Perception of Schmitt's Theory*

Today, Schmitt's political theory is the topic of discussion on both ideological poles, the left and the right. This is true despite the fact that Schmitt was a Nazi, and thus completely compromised as a person who was unable to distinguish right from wrong. Schmitt was accepted in the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) on the 1<sup>st</sup> May 1933, the same day as Martin Heidegger, and was banned from university work after the War. Specifically, in his texts published in the legal journals of the Third Reich, Schmitt provided justification for the Nazi totalitarian dictatorship. After the War and the victory of the anti-fascist coalition, he did not renounce his writings that legitimised Nazism, and stayed silent on Nazi crimes and the Holocaust (Mehring, 2017: 123).

In spite of this, his attack on liberalism seemed useful to the French left, which brought his theory back into discussion. In this sense, I would single out Chantal Mouffe (1999, 2013), whose theory of agonistic democracy was based on Schmitt's friend-enemy dichotomy. This allowed her to use the rehabilitation of the political to advocate for a radical change of the socio-economic order. She liked Schmitt's protest against the disappearance of the political as well as his strong rejection of liberalism. In her theory of democracy, Chantal Mouffe tries to mitigate Schmitt's attack on liberal democracy by replacing his term "enemy" with the word "adversary". Today, Mouffe (2018) is a decisive proponent of the concept of left populism. She wants to preserve the political, and use this concept to challenge the current capitalist socio-economic order. In a word, in contrast to the liberal attempt to neutralise the political, the French left used the theory of Carl Schmitt to revitalise this concept in its theoretical discourse and thus maintain the possibility of changing the economic and political order.

Tendrils of Schmitt's theory can also be found in the writing of the

hermeneutists Paul Ricoeur. In his theory, he also differentiated between *le politique* – the political, and *la politique* – politics, thus trying to preserve authenticity, or rather prevent the latter from compromising the former. The introduction of the notion of the political in the discussion is meant to heighten the tensions in the political and economic order, and thus preserve the possibility of change.

On the other hand, the radical right considers Carl Schmitt to be a cult author, alongside Ernst Jürgen (Maus, 1980; Müller, 2003; Weiß, 2017). His notion of the political, attack on liberalism and parliamentarism (Holmes, 1993), and especially his linking of nationalism and statism are key battle cries of the meta-politics of the new European right (Weiß, 2017; Salzborn, 2017).<sup>2</sup> German radical right magazines – “Junge Freiheit”, “Sezession” – often discuss his ideas. And the leading ideologist of the new French right Alain de Benoist (2003, 2010) uses Schmitt’s political ideas as a theoretical foundation for right-wing cultural revolution. Armin Mohler, whose book “Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918–1932” (1950) brought the nationalist theses of the Weimer Republic’s conservative revolutionaries back into public life, did not hide his admiration for Carl Schmitt and his political theory. Schmitt’s ideas are also propagated by the extreme right wing of the AfD, gathered around Björn Höcke and Götz Kubitschek and his Institute for State Policy (Weiß, 2017: 48). Namely, the main enemy of the new extreme right is liberalism. At the centre of their ideology is Schmitt’s notion of the political, founded on the friend-enemy relation. The idea of the political, as well as Schmitt’s linking of nationalism and statism, form the basis of illiberal democracies that are taking form in Hungary and Poland. These countries are trying to suspend liberal principles of the development and protection of individual, as well as minority rights. The ruling elites claim – following Carl Schmitt’s teaching – that the state is a reflection of the spirit, and the form of the body of a nation. On the other hand, Schmitt considers the political to be superordinate to the state (Mehring, 2011; Balakrishnan, 2000; Holmes, 1993; Posavec, 1989). The issue thus lies in the fact that Schmitt’s theory juxtaposes the political and the state. This opposition is especially strong if one understands the state as an array of institutions based on liberal-democratic principles.<sup>3</sup> However, this contradiction goes unnoticed by the extreme and radical right, which focuses on the conflict between the liberal and the democratic principles of the political order.

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<sup>2</sup> In this text, I tried to reveal the political-instrumental usage of Carl Schmitt’s political and legal theory. His influence on numerous political theoreticians who partly accepted, but also critiqued his theory, was covered by Reinhard Mehring. In this sense, he listed Schmitt’s students such as Werner Becker, Otto Kirchheimer, Ernst Forsthoff etc. (Mehring, 2017: 115–121).

<sup>3</sup> An interesting interpretation of Schmitt as a thinker who shares the liberals’ fear of the people is given by Mastnak (2015: 96–132).

But before I try to explain, I will attempt to reconstruct Schmitt's notion of the political.

### *The Political*

Schmitt considered "Der Begriff des Politischen" (Mehring, 2011: 146) to be his best work. The book appeared in three editions – 1927, 1932 and 1933 – with no major differences between them. The most commonly read and subsequently reprinted is the 1932 edition (Ottman, 2010: 241). The thinking is that this edition has not been opportunistically adjusted to Nazism and, more importantly, that it highlights the intensity of a social relation that only becomes a political relation through the degree of its intensity, which is important for the interpretation of the political. Schmitt's theses on the concept of the political bring a completely new understanding of politics. Until then, politics was seen as a phenomenon that was essentially tied to the state. The state was the political, it had political monopoly. This was implicitly understood in the political theory of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, as is observed by Henning Ottmann (2010). The state was on one side, and the society on the other, "here politics, there culture; here the internal, there the external". And further: "War and peace, military and civilian, neutral and non-neutral were separate. The introduction of the notion of the 'political' meant that those clear divisions no longer exist" (Ottmann, 2010: 242). The political was defined by Schmitt as a friend – enemy relation. "In contrast to the various relatively independent endeavours of human thought and action, particularly the moral, aesthetic, and economic, the political has its own criteria which express themselves in a characteristic way.... Let us assume that in the realm of morality the final distinctions are between good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable and unprofitable" (Schmitt, 1932: 13–14). "The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy" (Schmitt, 1932: 14). It should be emphasised that Schmitt does not use adjectives "friendly" – "antagonistic", but precisely nouns "friend" – "enemy". Hence, this is a subject that can be either a friend or an enemy. Schmitt focuses his attention on the enemy. In his theory, the enemy is more important than the friend. Namely, he thinks that it is only with regard to the enemy that a nation can be formed as a homogeneous unit. This raises the question: who is the enemy? Is the enemy an existential category? These are the questions that I will try to answer by reconstructing key parts of Schmitt's theory.

It can be said that Schmitt formulated his notion of the political by rehabilitating Hobbes' concept of a natural condition. Hobbes claims that the natural condition is a state of war. According to Schmitt's interpretation, the

political is really the natural state. But while Hobbes thinks that the natural state – as the state of war between individuals – should be abandoned, Carl Schmitt on the contrary approves the political, based on the friend-enemy relation, as the natural state. His opinion is that the moral or the normative in liberalism cannot exclude the political (Schmitt, 1932: 15–16). The enemy is simply the Other, and not just any Other, but a Stranger. The enemy is never a private adversary, he is always a public enemy (Schmitt, 1932: 16). Moreover, he is designated as a Stranger, meaning the Enemy, by his very existence. “The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible” (Schmitt, 1932: 16). For Schmitt, a “real enemy” is the one who threatens the existence. Politics is the struggle over “to be or not to be” (Ottmann, 2010: 245). It follows that the political cannot be prevented or diluted by formalism, legal provisions. For Schmitt, the return to the political signifies the abandonment of the *status quo*, guaranteed by the liberal rule of law. The political is present in particularly important cases of the state of emergency, when a particular order is in danger. The threat to the system can come from many directions. A system can be jeopardised by civil war, outside attack, terrorism. Such situations show that the “sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt, 1922: 13). The state of emergency highlights the fact that only the state has the monopoly over legitimate force. The state cannot be broken down into a series of civil society organisations, unions, churches – what we would now call non-governmental organisations. To wit, none of these institutions have the power of the state. Only the state wields the amount of power that can make a decision on war and peace. Within its borders, the state assures peace, while outwardly it can wage war (Schmitt, 1932: 38). “The justification of war does not reside in its being fought for ideals or norms of justice, but in its being fought against a real enemy” (Schmitt, 1932: 38). Interestingly, Schmitt considers politicians to be better schooled for battle than soldiers because, unlike soldiers who only fight occasionally, politicians fight constantly for as long as they are in politics (Schmitt, 1932: 22).

The state as a system of legal norms thus tries to suppress the political, but it cannot destroy it. The point of its existence is to decide who is the friend and who the enemy and, as a last resort, to lead the war against the enemy (Schmitt, 1932: 38). The concept of the political thus has a double meaning; it is as if Schmitt cannot conclusively make up his mind. On one hand, “the political assumes the place of the state”. „On the other hand, Schmitt does not support the diagnosis of the total dissolution of a sovereign state”

(Ottmann, 2010: 245). For Schmitt, the state is always and solely a nation state. The state and the nation are strongly connected, and no global, universal state is possible, claims Schmitt (1932: 42–47). He corroborates this thesis with history, and claims that there never was a world state, only empires, and that – despite their ambition of constant expansion – no empire ever encompassed the entire world. A world state, thinks Schmitt, would actually be the state of the entire human kind (Schmitt, 1932: 42). This would mean the total destruction of the political, of the friend-enemy relation. Namely, humanity as such, holds Schmitt, has no enemy (Schmitt, 1932: 42). “A world state would therefore be apolitical, an enormous consumer and production community, some kind of a global super-market, but not a state” (Ottmann, 2010: 247). Schmitt’s thesis that humanity does not have an enemy is wrong. It is namely clear that humanity can be its own enemy. Civil war between humanity has not been precluded. But Schmitt never abandoned faith in his definition of the political and the strength of nationalism, which is why he did not believe that a world state of human kind was possible. Anyway, such a state would today probably be understood as a product of market globalisation, meaning a political result of economic liberalism. And, in Schmitt’s eyes, it was precisely liberalism that was the enemy.

### *Anti-liberalism*

Schmitt scathingly wielded his political theory against two opponents – liberalism and Soviet communism. He directed his efforts at what he thought was the weaker opponent, and that was liberalism. In his opinion, liberalism is trying to destroy what is important – the political. Liberalism wants to take the conflict, struggle, decision-making and the state, and replace them with economy and ethics (Schmitt, 1932: 15). Through its moralising, which is embodied in the philosophy of human rights, liberalism wants to suppress the political. “The negation of the political, which is inherent in every consistent individualism, leads necessarily to a political practice of distrust toward all conceivable political forces and forms of state and government, but never produces on its own a positive theory of state, government, and politics” (Schmitt, 1932: 56). Schmitt argues that liberalism is trying to dissolve the political into morality or the market, because political liberalism does not have a content of its own. It transforms conflict into discussion, constantly invokes morality, and ignores the clash of real powers. It tries to turn every conflict into a competitive bidding on the market. Liberalism runs from the decisions on war or peace that are crucial for the political. Instead, it fools itself by discussion dynamics in spiritual matters, and by the principle of competition in economic matters (Schmitt, 1932: 58). Neither the first, nor the second principle cannot substitute the political as a friend-enemy



relation. This relation can only be ended by a proclamation of war, and this right to decide on matters of life and death is under the purview of the state (Schmitt, 1932: 33–34). The state was defined by Schmitt as a homogeneous unity of a nation. In his theory, the nation is not a collective of citizens who abide by the constitution and laws they adopted themselves, but a community of descent. It is precisely this thesis that makes Schmitt so popular with the new right and right-wing extremists. Namely, the extreme and radical right bases its politics on integral nationalism. The state is a reflection and the body of a unique, ethnically-based nation. This is also one of the key thesis of the ideology of the so-called illiberal democracy. Liberal understanding of the state – which restricts the power of the state through the tripartite division of power, the protection of civil and human rights, investigating journalism and independent media – is completely unacceptable to proponents of this ideology. That is why they like Schmitt's critique of liberalism so much: to recap, Schmitt claims that, although liberalism did not “deny the state”, it has “neither advanced a positive theory of state nor on its own discovered how to reform the state, but has attempted only to tie the political to the ethical and to subjugate it to economics. It has produced a doctrine of the separation and balance of powers, i.e., a system of checks and controls of state and government. This cannot be characterized as either a theory of state or a basic political principle” (Schmitt, 1932: 49).

Not only does Schmitt deny liberalism's ability to form the theory of the state, but he proclaims it an anti-national ideology. Namely, in his theory, the state is the supreme expression of a people's existence. It allows them to determine their own identity. The ultimate consequence of the political is actually a matter of the state, because the state is that body of the people that decides on matters of war and peace. And though Schmitt does not think that the political can be reduced to the state, it is still connected to it. Liberal teaching on parliamentarism and the tripartite separation of power restricts the power of the state in its effort to establish a purely moral or purely economic state. And this – emphasises Schmitt – is not possible. The political is unavoidable, and the friend-enemy relation is always established. Political decisions on who constitutes the enemy are necessary. The political is that which makes people – a people. “If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disappear” (Schmitt, 1932: 41). Conflict and nationalism are thus important elements of Schmitt's political theory. The point is that Schmitt develops the idea of a homogenous people, defined by their ethnic origins (Salzborn, 2017: 66). In its essence, the state is the body of a nation that has been defined in this way. These ideas are exactly the reason why Schmitt has been enthusiastically embraced by the ideologues of the new right and the illiberal democracy.



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*Illiberal Democracy and the State*

It seems that illiberal democracy, both as an idea and a system, emerged primarily as a reaction to neoliberalism. Namely, neoliberalism is also an ideology. It is an ideology that tries to reduce all interpersonal relations to market relations. Such reduction is, of course, not possible; people are not determined only by their interests, but also by their identities (Fukuyama, 2018).<sup>4</sup> Politics does not exist just to create a safe operating space for big businesses and financial capital, but also to watch out for the interests of people its represents. However, emboldened by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of real socialism and the communist dictatorships, Western elites concluded that the liberal ideology of market absolutization was the ideology of the future. That is why neoliberal ideology was wholeheartedly accepted by both right- and left-centre parties. The claim was that the state had lost all its functions, that the concern for citizens should be assumed by the invisible hand of the market, and that democracy in a nation state should be replaced by global democracy. In short, it was claimed that the market was everything, that those more capable and stronger always win, and that the rights of individuals were everything while the community was nothing. These theses of neoliberalism were advocated by the global class (Darendorf, 2002; Tooze, 2018).

The rule of the global class created a new inequality and thus endangered the functioning of the institutions of the nation state. Thus, while citizens were asking for the state's protection, mainstream politicians referred them to the market, explaining that it would solve all their problems. People's parties, but also social-democrats who followed the "third way" showed people that, though it was possible to choose – countries did have parliamentary elections – a real choice did not exist. It turned out that *policy* was on the level of the EU, while politics remained at the level of nation states. Politicians of the conservative nationalist right, first in Hungary and then in Poland, promised to change that – to stand up to the EU and capacitate the state to start taking care of the nation. Viktor Orbán's government thus introduced a tax on big (foreign) business and financial capital, and saved Hungarian families who had loans in Swiss francs with interest rates that kept increasing so much that, after many years of paying back the loans, they would still owe more to the banks than what they initially took out. This agony was decisively halted. The state abolished loans in Swiss francs, and all liabilities were converted to the Hungarian currency, the forint. These measures, which curtailed the tyranny of the banks, helped Orbán achieve a

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<sup>4</sup> *The basic thesis of liberalism, which states that people can always recognise their best interest, is probably questioned by Lukšić (Lukšić, 2002).*

widespread popularity. His propagandistic formula – Us (Hungarians) and Them (foreign bankers) – proved to be effective. It allowed him to position himself, and not always falsely, as the protector of the “little” Hungarian people. Liberalism was proclaimed to be the real adversary of the people; moreover, Orbán claimed that there would be no true democracy until liberalism was rejected. He started to talk about how Hungary was establishing a system of “illiberal democracy” (Orbán, 2014), and this formula became attractive to other national conservatives and radical right-wingers.

In their rejection of liberalism, illiberal democrats seem to follow the ideas of Carl Schmitt. First of all, there is the idea of the political that reduces it to the friend-enemy relation. Secondly, the idea that liberal and democratic elements of the political order are in an irreconcilable conflict. According to this idea, liberal principles of the protection of individual and human rights are in conflict with the democratic principle of the rule of the majority. The third idea concerned the state as a body of an ethnically-defined nation; the state was understood as an instrument of integral nationalism. All three ideas form the foundation of the ideology of the ruling elites that support the illiberal democracy. Based on these ideas, liberalism is proclaimed to be the main cause for the collapse of the nation. The radical right claims that liberal principles of the equality of women, gender equality, the right to a same-sex marriage, actually suppress the will of the people, meaning democracy (Cipek and Lacković, 2019: 168–170). Radically-right discourse emphasises the polarity of liberal and democratic elements of the political order. Furthermore, it is claimed that illiberal democracy is actually real democracy, and that it is only with the advent of this type of democracy that the true will of the people will be heard. Namely, the gist of the radical-right position lies in the claim that it is the only one that represents the people. And the will of the people, or rather democracy, is contrasted by Schmitt and illiberal democrats to the legal state.

But, are they not still dependent on each other? If a democracy turns into a sphere of identity and the homogeneity of the people, general will becomes an instance that is easy to shape. The people thus become everything, and the rule of law as a form of democracy becomes secondary. It seems that the rise of the radical right allowed the neoliberal neglect of the state and politics, but that does not mean that liberal and democratic principles are necessarily opposed. On the contrary, every political order is necessarily based on the liberal principle of moral equality of all people.

### *Liberal Foundations and Democratic States*

It is indisputable that liberal and democratic elements of contemporary political order can differ one from another. On the one hand, there is the

liberal principle of individual rights and autonomy, and on the other, the democratic principle of the right of the people to express their will and to rule (Vodovnik, 2017). However, according to Carl Schmitt's theory and the theses of the radical right, liberal and democratic principles are necessarily opposed. For instance, this means that, when the will of the majority is opposed to the will and rights of minorities, the rights of minorities should be subjugated to the will of the majority. Liberal principles should thus yield before democratic principles. But, is it not the fact that democracy without its liberal foundation is actually impossible? In the critique of Schmitt's strict separation of liberalism and democracy, I start from the thesis that the democratic order rests on the idea of moral equality of all men. In this sense, Schmitt's attack on liberalism is completely misdirected. The basic principle of the democratic order is that all citizens should be treated the same, or rather that the rule of law is applied to everyone equally. Furthermore, in their essence, laws must respect the liberal principle of moral and legal equality of all individuals. Democracy as the rule of majority is based on the principle of civic equality within a state. Individual rights are thus an inseparable part of democracy. The majority has an obligation to respect the rights of the minority. Specifically, it should be emphasised that the minority is also a part of the people. "The majority cannot wield a moral authority that would exceed the power of the people in its entirety. The people do not have the jurisdiction to adopt laws that infringe on individual rights, such authority cannot be assumed even by the majority" (Kis, 2019: 82). Human and civil rights based on liberal principles are therefore the foundation of the democratic order. The rule of the majority cannot be equated with the rule of the entire people, because people as a whole are not homogeneous, but divided into a number of different groups – based on gender, nationality, political affiliation, etc. And every social group deserves the same treatment by the legal state. The state, or more precisely state institutions, have a task to assure a just and equal treatment of all its citizens before the law, and that task, once again, stems from the liberal principle of moral equality of citizens. On the other hand, the state needs to develop mechanisms that would guarantee the realisation of the democratic principle of majority rule. Liberal and democratic principles supplement each other, exist in a dialectic connection, and form the basis for establishing balance through democratic political processes. Hence, they are not opposed, but connected.

## **Conclusion**

This text starts from the assumption that politics and political activity enable the free existence of man. Choosing the political means choosing the process of decision-making, choosing an option. This shows that there is a

relative autonomy of the political, because it cannot be reduced to economic tensions in society. The political cannot be reduced to interests coming from the economy, but also cannot escape the dangers that political power can bring. Hence the state is not just an apparatus or an institutional structure, but a social field of power. Similarly, statehood is the terrain that connects social and cultural contexts. That is why Schmitt was right in showing that the political cannot be dissolved in the law, which makes his theory suitable for attacking liberalism both from the left and the right. From the left, it is used by Chantal Mouffe who bases her theory of agonistic democracy on Schmitt's friend-enemy dichotomy. In her theory, she strongly defends the political, although she has replaced Schmitt's notion of the "enemy" with the notion of the "adversary". In this way, she wants to revive democracy as a discussion and conflict over the fundamental features of the capitalist order. On the other hand, right-wing populists also accept Schmitt's thesis that the political cannot be dissolved in the law. But the right does not have an issue with capitalism, and believes that capitalists can somehow be forced to serve the nation. To this end, the thinkers of the new right have affirmed Carl Schmitt's theory of the political. Although the neoliberal neglect of politics and the state has enabled the rise of right-wing populists in Hungary and Poland, this does not mean that liberal and democratic principles are necessarily opposed. Namely, the liberal principle of individual rights is the foundation of the order of democratic states. It is therefore obvious that, in its attempt to revive the political, right-wing populism is destroying the purpose of democratic politics, which is to reach a compromise between opposing interests and different cultural values. Hence, Schmitt's notion of the political cannot be used to build effective democratic state institutions. In his definition of the political, politics actually exists only on the outwards, towards some other nation, some other political unity, but not within the state itself.

Finally, it should be noted that the state is proving to be the only effective entity in which democracy has a chance to function. The state is also the only entity that can effectively oppose economic chaos. Analysis has shown that the state and politics are autonomous areas of human activity, which means that democracy's chances are still good. Any kind of liberation of the individual and the market from the evil state, as advocated by neoliberalism, can bring nothing but the collapse of liberal democracy and the rise of right-wing populism. Therefore, I believe that we need to raise awareness of the importance of the state as a true space of democracy, and thus also affirm the autonomous space of politics. Namely, it is politics – and not the political as defined by Schmitt – that is the only known space of human freedom.

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## **NATIVIST AND ANTI-LIBERAL NARRATIVES IN CONSERVATIVE POPULIST AGENDA IN CENTRAL EUROPE\*\***

*Abstract. Nativism does not only present a concept, but also an ideological framework as well as a political practice related to identity politics. In the article we firstly present the theoretical reflection of nativism and operationalise the most important terms and characteristics of this phenomenon. Later, we apply the concept of nativism to the analysis of conservative populist and/or nativist political actors in the Central European region. The analysis shows how nativism, as a relatively peripheral issue in the first 10–15 years after the democratic transition, became stronger in the next period characterised by a set of crises after 2008. The analysis demonstrates how the mainstream parties in Central Europe adopted the nativist and conservative populist agenda and implemented it into mainstream politics. Furthermore, the analysis shows how Central European nativism correlates with the long-term existence of anti-liberal streams that were revitalised after the fall of Communist regimes. These anti-modern societal groups were reformulated as the counter-cosmopolitan camp within the polarisation process that is clearly visible in the political arena.*

**Keywords:** *nativism; national conservatism; identity politics; Central Europe*

### **Introduction**

On 29 November 2017 Cambridge Dictionary's Word of the Year 2017 was declared – *populism*. In the commentary to this choice, the inauguration of the 45<sup>th</sup> President of the United States, Donald Trump, is mentioned

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as one of the key events and symbols for such a decision. In the short commentary it was stressed that populism 'represents a phenomenon that's both truly local and truly global, as populations and their leaders across the world wrestle with issues of immigration and trade, resurgent nationalism, and economic discontent' (Cambridge Words, 2017). Reflecting upon this decision, Cas Mudde (2017) proposed that nativism, not populism, should be declared because the arguments Cambridge Words used for *populism* are not in scope with the basic definition of the term – separation of societies into two antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' vs 'the corrupt elite' – but perfectly fit the definitions of the far right and even more the definition of *nativism*.

Nativism, historically associated with the premodern period, has become an important component of contemporary politics. Similarly, as in the cases of previous waves of nativism, the contemporary situation also has the characteristics of a revitalisation movement against openness, modernity and more general globalisation. Nativist actors stress the necessity to promote the interests of native inhabitants and tend to prefer social chauvinism practices, economic protectionism and even autarky, successfully securitise the migration issue and develop the historical narratives based on national populism, traditionalism, anti-modernity and anti-liberalism. The proponents of nativism also skilfully include the traditional instruments of populist and far right actors such as anti-EU stances, invoking 'normality' regarding gender and family issues, etc.

The West seems to be undergoing a strong wave of traditionalism, undermining important narratives and structural parts of its (post)modern situation such as individual freedom, general equality, free market etc. Alongside other impulses (regarding the EU, especially the institutional crisis and enlargement incapability since the mid-2000s), the fiscal and economic crisis after 2008 changed the situation dramatically. As Klíma (2020) shows, this juncture was provided by electoral earthquakes and the establishment of second post-transitive party systems. Next to the anti-corruption rhetoric the new actors also used anti-European and nationalist narratives based on criticising the catching up process as a failure.

This period was already accompanied by the politics of emotions, above all fear from the renewal/consolidation of a peripheral position of East-Central Europe (ECE) in the European architecture. Contrarily, in Western Europe the economic crisis strengthened the doubts about the prospects of the all-European Integration Project (Ágh, 2019: 44–46). Furthermore, the next juncture – the migration crisis in 2015 and beyond – further strengthened these feelings and brought a new wave of patriotism, nationalism and xenophobia into politics and societies. As Klíma (2020: 158) stressed: 'The immigration issue indeed covers a cultural identity conflict, or a

fundamental security dimension, incorporating a highly emotional component in the form of fear’.

Especially since 2015, national populist actors have been strengthening and, in many cases, we can observe their important electoral successes. Next to the election of D. Trump we have to mention the success of J. Bolsonaro in Brazil, the Brexit issue, the electoral success of national populist parties in the United Kingdom, France or Italy, as well as the stabilisation of these parties in some ECE states. The former pariahs of European politics – V. Orbán and J. Kaczyński – present themselves as ‘authentic Europeans’ criticising the ‘weak, (ultra)liberal Brussels’ and appealing for a cultural counter-revolution in Europe. The polarisation of Europe and Western societies continues and almost any new electoral campaign and result brings a new round of debates about this polarisation and clashes between two distinctively different political camps promoting (and growing from) distinctively different and competing political cultures.

### Rationale of the article

The aim of this article has to be reduced from general debate and analysis of nativist restoration in the world to less extensive goals. Firstly, I will reduce my analysis spatially and focus on the development in Central Europe. Nations of the Visegrad group and Slovenia are usually included in Central Europe by contemporary political scientists (cf. Ágh, 1998; Ágh, 2019; Cabada and Walsch, 2019; Fink-Hafner and Haček, 2000). Despite different development after WWII, Austria is also often included in Central European comparisons (Cabada and Walsch, 2019; Hloušek and Kopeček, 2004). For the group of the six mentioned nations I will apply the concept of nativism searching for manifestations of a nativist approach and policies. I will search for actors using nativist rhetoric and strategies as well as for the most important themes and paroles used by Central European nativists. Furthermore, I will analyse the overlap in Central European nativist performance and also their cooperation. I assume that nativism in Central Europe is strongly related to the unfinished and deformed modernisation processes. From this presumption I derive the first thesis: *The cultural conflict (clash of cultures) that arose in Central Europe during the process of modernisation, lasted out the period of the non-democratic regime after WWII and was revitalised after 1989.* Based on this thesis I ask the first research question: Does the contemporary nativism in Central Europe grow from visible and shared anti-liberal legacies? In the first 10–15 years of democratic consolidation the anti-modern and/or nativist actors were marginalised within the processes of socialisation, Westernisation and Europeanisation. The grand narrative of the ‘Return to Europe’ raised ‘general’ optimism in Central European

societies and the proponents of 'counter-cosmopolitanism' were relatively weak in this period. Nevertheless, after the mid-2000s the nativist ideology and national populism as a political strategy has been revitalised and transformed from being relatively peripheral in politics and society to being the political mainstream.

On one hand, I presuppose that the small parties usually located outside the mainstream used the nativist and conservative populist agendas which existed before the important junctures of 2010 (earthquake election) and 2015 (migration crisis as a new impulse for the poly-crisis situation). On the other hand, I presuppose that the mainstream parties started to use similar strategies and rhetoric only after 2015 due to tactical reasons. The situation might differ in individual countries, but in all cases I assume the combination of ideology and strategy by the mainstream actors while the 'original' nativists were gained by these new mainstream nativist actors, or pushed again to the margin of the political arena. From these presumptions I derive the second thesis: *After 2004, the mainstream parties in Central Europe often labelled as national-conservative marginalised the traditional nativist formations and/or adopted their ideology, programme and strategies.* Based on this thesis I ask the second research question: Are we observing the general mainstreamisation of the nativist issues and strategies in Central European political arenas? In the first part of the analysis, I will operationalise the general terms such as nativism, national populism, xenophobia, autarky, etc, and frame this terminology with two big concepts. From the best described case of nativism (United States/North America) I will derive the main terms and concepts into the more general framework for political science analysis. Secondly, in the case of ECE I will present the process of unfinished or deformed modernisation and the revitalisation and re-modification of the clash of cultures (*Kulturkampf*) in the last 30 years. In the second part I will apply this theoretical framework to the Central European case.

The article is rooted in comparative analysis, combining the synchronic and diachronic approach and focusing on the development of political parties with nativist tendencies in ECE. Based on the two theses or assumptions presented above I focus on the development of party politics and those parties that advance the nativist attitudes. In the political discourse of individual countries, I search for typical strategies, signs and terms of the nativist narrative such as the systematic criticisms of minorities, cultural and other types of racism, moral disqualification of 'the other', idealisation of peasantry, peasant life and common sense, support of majoritarian democracy tools, above all plebiscites, the concept of naturalness, emphasis on patriotism and 'correct' European values and 'Christian Europe', etc. Behind the national discourses I then search for similarities and shared strategies of nativist actors, as well as mutual reasons for their strengthening.

## Nativism as concept, social phenomenon and program of identity politics

As already mentioned, the phenomenon of nativism is strongly interconnected with the development in North America and ethnogenesis<sup>1</sup> of the 'native' (North) American nation. Katerberg (1995: 495) describes nativism as an 'umbrella term traditionally used by North American scholars to describe anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant, racist and antiradical agitation ... Like nationalism, it originates in common customs religion and ethnicity' (Katerberg, 1995: 495). As the symbolic and general expression of North American nativism, the abbreviation 'WASP' is usually mentioned, stressing the exclusive position of the English language and predominance of Anglo-Saxon or protestant cultural values and institutions (Simcox, 1997: 132). Barša and Císař (2006: 417–419) describe the development of the nativist-rooted American nation as the ethnicisation of a folk community of settlers that led to the 'nativist' image of America as the country of the descendants of the original immigrants in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, but not the land of contemporary and future immigrants. As an important political actor rooted in this conviction, they mention the seventh U.S. President Andrew Jackson. 'Jacksonians' are rooted in evangelical Christianity stressing their own root to God. They regard the human being as limited and prone to 'sin'. Often, they consider the world endangered by dark powers – the Catholic Church, global Communism and recently the global 'Islam'. Particularism and isolationism are typical segments of their thinking.

Let us stress two important facets in this basic definition of nativists – xenophobia and the idealisation of the traditional pre-modern society rooted in agrarian and a rural/small town lifestyle. Simcox (1997: 30) stresses that 'xenophobia and racism are concepts often subsumed in the general concept of nativism'. Together with anti-Catholicism<sup>2</sup>, xenophobia and racism are usually reflected as the most important patterns of American nativism (Friedman, 1967: 408–409). As Sundstrom (2013: 80) underlines, 'xenophobia is conceptually prior to nativism' and nativism 'indicates a positive political project to actively exclude or expel those judged to be too foreign to belong, or to hoard the national community's resources and keep them from being exploited by foreigners' (Sundstrom, 2013: 72). Nativism is centred on the 'us first' idea, it is rooted in the fear that strangers will undermine

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<sup>1</sup> *We understand the ethnogenesis as the 'individual seek to achieve a measure of belonging and terrestrial immortality through identification with a group rooted in land and kinship' (Kaufmann, 1999: 444–445).*

<sup>2</sup> *Catholicism was depicted as a false religion and danger to the United States. 'From 1820 onward, the notion of Americans as genealogical descendants of Englishmen also gained in currency' (Kaufmann, 1999: 446).*

the traditional way of life (Crepaz et al., 2014: 943). Nativism is most often associated with anti-immigrant sentiments motivated by ethnic or racial bias (Bosniak, 1994: 442–443).

Let us acknowledge the second above-mentioned aspect – traditionalism and idealisation of the pre-modern societal structure. Nativists prefer and force a ‘traditional version of American culture’ (Knoll, 2013: 153). Nativism evinces typical conservative positions stressing the degressive development of humankind. Often, we can observe the idealisation of the ‘Golden Age’, idealisation of peasantry and rurality, and rejection of modernisation. Here we have to stress the paradox that nativism grew out of roots similar to that of communitarianism, both stressing the importance of *Gemeinschaft*. As Crepaz et al. (2014: 943) stressed:

*What nativism and civicness both have in common is an emphasis on community: nativists see their own culture and ways of life threatened by foreigners, while others argue that a decline in civic behaviour will undermine the very foundations and working of democracy.*

If we analyse the contemporary debate about nativism through the lenses of philosophy, we can find an important overlap of this ‘nostalgic’ concept with a selected environmental stream, especially deep ecology and ecopolitics (Mathews, 1999: 253–255). Namely, in many aspects the nativist stance rooted in deep ecology shares the criticism against the (post)modern society. To distinguish the ‘reactionary’ political nativists and the ecopolitical nativist, I use the term ‘eco-nativists’ for the latter. Regarding urbanisation, eco-nativism stresses the negative consequences of rapid urbanisation and industrialised agriculture. Against this development eco-nativists present the ‘ideal of the native self’ related to small rural or semi-rural sustainable communities. Furthermore, eco-nativists stress the necessity of spatial identity related to geographically small units, the necessity to belong to a place, ‘to have one’s identity shaped by the place to which one belongs’ (Mathews, 1999: 245). The idealised ‘home’ presenting the small community should develop the eco-nativist self-identity (Storey, 2012: 11) rooted in care and maintenance of nature.

Both types of nativism negate the modernity related to the creation of open society (Bergson, 1936; Popper, 2011) in a political but also broader societal and cultural sense. As one of the inherent characteristics of an open society is the opening and removing the borders, nativists defend the juxtaposition and promote the ‘ideal’ of a closed society. Next to open borders, mobility is also considered a negative sign of modernity and is attacked. The nativists especially deny ‘immigration’, while the eco-nativists deny mobility, especially tourism, entirely (Mathews, 1999: 247). Nevertheless,

both types of nativists negatively regard 'extensive' mobility and the blending of (groups of) people with different identities. In their opinion, such 'openness' undermines the 'state of indigeneity'. In this sense the nativists are strongly interconnected with the theories of 'rise and fall' (Kennedy, 1987) or theoretical works about the collapse of states or civilisations, more precisely with those who stress the amalgamation of societies as one of the more important or even dominant reasons.<sup>3</sup>

Indeed, eco-nativists propose the voluntary limitation of mobility accentuating that the new communication technologies create the 'awareness of a larger frame' and prevent the ecological nativists from 'narrow-minded parochialism, xenophobia, or exclusionary thinking' (Mathews, 1999: 267). In contrast, the 'traditional' nativists promote (neo)parochial political culture as the ideal. Their negative perception of (post)modernity creates a vital potential for revitalisation programmes and activities with clearly reactionary contents. Katerberg (1995: 501) labels the repeated waves of nativism as 'crusades' attempting to 'reassert what are held to be traditional customs, values, and practices'. As an important stimulus for such waves the author observes the fear that 'heterogeneity would destroy their ability to perpetuate their values, traditions, institutions, and laws' (Katerberg, 1995: 508).

Reflecting the North-American development, the first and 'by far the most important and verbalized expression of nativism was a broad fear that the large mid-century (18 century - quoted by L.C.) influx of Germans would not be assimilated into the dominant English racial culture, and that Pennsylvania therefore might become eventually a German colony'. The fear of Germanisation was even strengthened with the obsession 'that Germans would convert to Catholicism and then unite with French against the English' (Friedman, 1967: 411-412). Another wave came in the 1820s and beyond (the already mentioned 'Jacksonians' (Kaufmann, 1999: 455/) negatively reflecting the 'Catholic' population of the United States. At the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries the 'defenders of the Anglo-Saxon roots of Canada and the United States feared that immigrants of inferior racial stock, from southern and eastern Europe, would dilute the quality of American and Canadian blood, corrupt society, and threaten democratic order' (Katerberg, 1995: 506).

As we can observe, the 'aliens' change during this time, but the main characteristics of North American nativism were protected. The 'aliens'

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<sup>3</sup> Let us quote from Mathews (1999) who belongs to the eco-nativist authors, but paradoxically shares important positions with the xenophobic political nativists: 'Being native is an existential condition which imperial civilisations such as Rome, but even more particularly those of Europe in the modern era, tend to render obsolete ... The state of indigeneity becomes more and more attenuated amidst the flux of peoples and cultures and economies that imperial regimes, particularly those of modernity, entrain' (Mathews, 1999: 244).

should generally represent two kinds of threats. 'Immigration usually is said to represent two kinds of threats to this country (the United States – quoted by author). First, there is a threat posed by the identity of the immigrants ... Second, immigration is said to cost too much – economically, environmentally and socially' (Bosniak, 1994: 440). In this sense, also theoretical works on nativism differ – while some authors stress the economic competition (Friedman, 1967: 410; Simcox, 1997; Druxes and Simpson, 2016); the other group prioritise the cultural dimension. For example, Kaufmann (1999: 437–438) has doubts about the economic reasons for nativism stressing that the 'outbreaks of nativism /the 1920s, for example/ have tended not to correlate with poor economic times'. Similarly, Katerberg (1995) discusses the search for identity and cultural loyalty as the primary motivation of nativists.

The scholars often stress 'exceptionalism' as an important component for this concept. America was described by the Puritans as 'new Canaan, or the promised land' (Kaufmann, 1999: 441). Among others, millenarian movements and churches used the term 'New Jerusalem'. After the 1840s the belief that WASP-settlers were destined to expand across all of North America created the platform for the so-called manifest destiny. An important part of this exceptionalism was the 'global mission' the U.S. often stressed, including the role of leading soft power. As recent analysis of the Trumpian period of nativism has stressed, this role was abandoned. Furthermore, the global expansion of English created a situation where 'aliens' speak English along with their native languages, while Americans, living in the 'American glasshouse', do not learn foreign languages (Krastev and Holmes, 2020: 184–186).

To summarise, nativism might be understood as a social phenomenon and political program as well as a concept. Nativism could be understood from very different perspectives – for example philosophy or linguistics could reflect it in a 'neutral' manner, while social sciences mostly stress the negative influence of nativism as a political strategy on democratic development. For my research the most important question is how far – and if – the concept of nativism might be applied in a different environment than North America. As presented, the (North) American nativism was born in a very specific situation and also (some of) its characteristics are unique. Nevertheless, I am convinced that many of these characteristics might be applied as general features observable in other societies including the Central European nations.

### **Anti-modern and nativist legacies in Central Europe**

Since the beginning of the democratic transition in ECE, scholars have been discussing the question of a specific political culture of the nations in



this region. One of the main issues discussed is the limited, partial, unfinished and/or deformed modernisation in comparison with the European West. Sztompka (1993) talked about the 'fake modernity' in Eastern Europe after WWII, Bernik (1997) about the 'submodern society', both scholars stressing the top-down character of such 'modernity' unrooted in civil society.

After the fall of Communism, the 'grand narrative' of unfinished modernity and an anti-liberal notion was challenged by a new narrative of liberal democracy. Anyway, as the 'alternative' or 'parallel' model in only partially or defectively modernised societies, the traditional anti-modern narratives were developed too. The civil society in ECE often survived the Communist period in the form of a rather 'bad civil society' or uncivil society. In times of crisis such an uncivil society becomes a strong supportive vehicle for the populist politicians stressing the 'glorious past', 'national interest', 'normality' or 'the right and duty to oppose the political correctness of Euro-elites'. As Corbea-Hoisie (2013) stresses, the interconnection of different anti-Communist movements and pre-Communist anti-liberal and anti-modern narratives might be observed in ECE. He is talking about the 'camouflaged continuity' of these movements after the transition.

The issue of development and modernity in the formation and identity of different European nations is raised by many scholars and observers. Since the Enlightenment period, two different ideal types – the 'West' and the 'East' – as the European macro-regions are presented based on different cultural patterns. Between these two macro-units the 'in-between' area is often situated, namely Central Europe playing the role of the 'Western periphery' or the transitive region between the West and East. For example, Hofmannsthal labelled the Central European population and the citizens of the Habsburg monarchy 'semi-European and semi-Asian nations' (Kozuchowski, 2013: 86). At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Hope (1894) took a similar position when introducing the concept of Ruritania: a German-speaking, Catholic land in Central Europe, an absolute monarchy driven by deep social conflicts where the most important tension was between the (almost) western urban elites and the rural ethnics settled as the (semi-) peripheries. Similarly, Gellner (1998, 2008) places the Habsburg monarchy at the epicentre of the decisive modernisation conflict between the cosmopolitan liberals ('the Viennese') and the representatives of 'post-feudal obscurantism and authoritarianism'.

I assume that this phenomenon of a 'clash of cultures' is still present in Central Europe, or – in other words – that the totalitarian period as well as three decades of democracy building did not surmount or erase the anti-liberal political culture rooted in nativism and (ultra)conservatism. Despite the revolutionary rhetoric, the Communist regimes were often rooted in conservative postures, especially regarding the issues related to postmodern

values (one example is the very restrictive policies regarding the LGBT communities and/or induced abortion in many states of the Soviet bloc). Also, nationalism was very strong in Eastern Europe, based on the violent homogenisation of local populations during and immediately after WWII, as well as the almost impermeable borders and lack of contact with the representatives of other ethnicities, nations or cultures. Such 'mental introversion' became even stronger with the demolition of liberal streams and mass emigration from the region. As depicted by Kitschelt (2003) in his typology of Communist regimes, Central European Communism also did not constitute the modernisation factor, or if so, only partly.

In 1989, a juncture came with the fall of the Communist regimes and the beginning of the democratic transition. EU-membership as the second juncture presents the symbolic end of the 'accommodative' period when the new democracies in ECE underwent important changes in economic, political and institutional sectors. Nevertheless, these changes also restored the internal divisions in the societies – usually we label the two ideal typical societal groups as 'winners' and 'losers'.<sup>4</sup> Specifically, 'the boundaries between the rural and urban have remained porous in Eastern Europe, as they were under socialism' (Buzalka, 2008: 760). The reason is the massive influx of rural populations to the cities after WWII that preserved the 'rural' narratives, morality, imagery and ideology that might be more or less equated with Hope's or Gellner's concept of Ruritania. With the exception of Czechia, such a 'rural' narrative is also strongly interconnected with religiosity (Buzalka, 2008: 762-768).

I assume that the anti-modernists, facing new challenges in the form of the postmodern European community and globalisation, were relatively passive during the 1990s, suppressed by the new (neo-)liberal political actors pragmatically bringing their nations into the EU. Nevertheless, in the beginning of the 2000s we already saw the anti-European streams in ECE nations, often also using anti-modern and nativist rhetoric. Usually these actors were relatively weak and positioned outside the political mainstream, but some of the mainstream parties capitalised on such a narrative (Czech Civic Democratic Party /ODS/ under the leadership of V. Klaus might be a good example). Some of these actors achieved success in the second-order elections (League of Polish families in 2004 EP-elections), and some of them were invited into the governments.

The wave of the so-called earthquake elections at the turn of the 2000s and 2010s changed the situation. Many newcomer parties presented the national populist rhetoric, and also some of the established mainstream

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<sup>4</sup> For example, Ther (2014: 20) presents the dichotomy rich cities vs. poor countryside, while Ágh (2020) speaks about the well-developed 'European' cities and backward countryside.

parties developed the nativist segment in their policies. If we analyse the important social cleavages related to the above-mentioned segmentation of societies into the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ camps, at least three important cleavages should be mentioned, playing important and even decisive roles in the polarisation of these societies.

Table 1: STRUCTURING CLEAVAGES IN CEE DEMOCRACIES

support of post-national political institutions (for example, EU)	opposition to post-national political institutions (for example, EU)
free (global) market allocation	economic redistribution or protectionism
liberal-cosmopolitan values and recognition of cultural diversity (secularism)	authoritarian conformism, social cohesion and cultural homogeneity (including clericalism)

Source: Rensmann, 2012: 77.

All these cleavages are directly related to the nativist question. While the proponents of the stances presented in the first column might be understood as ‘cosmopolitan liberals’, the defenders of positions described in the second column tend to national or even nativist postures. Rensmann (2012) suggests labelling them as ‘counter-cosmopolitan’. In his opinion, this term better describes the basic position of anti-modernist societal groups in Central Europe and also opens the possibility of reflecting the nativist tendencies outside of a concrete ethnical/national environment. As he stresses, both the ‘nativism and counter-cosmopolitanism are generally non-inclusive orientation’, but there exist some differences. While nativism is ‘limited to territorial substrates’, counter-cosmopolitanism ‘can also be grounded in religious ... or broader cultural references’ (Rensmann, 2012: 75).

Counter-cosmopolitanism

*refers to the general opposition to all social processes associated with existing globalization. Counter-cosmopolitanism is neither limited to welfare protectionism nor “single-issues” such as anti-immigrant policy; rather, it combines opposition to: 1) socioeconomic globalization and the global capitalist market economy; 2) cosmopolitan cultural transformations, signified by increasing cultural diversity and hybridity ...; and 3) political transformations associated with global and post-national governance. (Rensmann, 2012: 74)*

In fact, the author reflects counter-cosmopolitanism as the contemporary position, but one rooted in historical legacies with clear nativist features.

Nativist politicians are able to flexibly change the ‘enemies’ as well as combine them and squeeze them under one constructed label. So, the Hungarian Fidesz and Polish PiS share irreconcilable positions against the Left, liberals,

intellectuals, 'old networks', the EU and other transnational activities and structures including the general principle of globalisation (Fehr, 2016: 25). One of the symbols of the nativist attack against open society equated with globalisation became the Hungaro-American philanthrope George Soros, attacked not only by the national conservative actors in Central Europe, but also by the declaratively left oriented populist actors such as Slovakian Prime Minister R. Fico and Czech President M. Zeman (Matulík, 2019).

The nativists successfully addressed the societal groups that were - objectively or subjectively - negatively economically affected during the transformation process. Usually they presented the minor and 'radical' actor next to the mainstream populist party or parties that also stressed the 'protection of the poor' - let us stress the co-existence of PiS and LPR in the Polish government in 2005-2007 or the repeated cooperation of the Slovakian party Direction - Social Democrats (*Smer*) with the Slovak National Party, as well as the cooperation of the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) with the NSi. Similarly, Liehbart (2020) also comments on the government cooperation of the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and FPÖ. Often, the government and the mainstream party (partly) adopted the rhetoric and strategy of such minor actors, in some cases erasing them as the relevant party.

Nevertheless, what is more important for my analysis is the fact that during this period, the national populist actors reformulated and 'completed' their programme. As Ágh (2020) shows, these actors champion the politics of past and historical memory, including the (re)construction of historical narratives. The nativists formulated the 'traditionalization' narrative about the 'glorious past that never was', remembering the 'Golden Age' of national history. Let us mention here that the 'pre-communist past of these countries often coincides with ultranationalist or fascist experiences that emphasized national unity, both spiritual and territorial' (Pirro, 2014: 604). The interwar political regimes in Austria, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, the Baltic states or Romania developed in a strictly anti-liberal course and were not capable of developing more than a temporary 'façade democracy'. Historical reflection of interwar regimes in many Central European nations led to the 'resurgence of neo-romantic, populist, anti-modern forces in the region ... In all these societies, movements and parties have emerged that romanticize the past and idealize authoritarian traditions' (Tismaneanu, 1998: 3; cf. Pirro, 2014: 603). An important part of this construct is also the mythicisation of the pre-Communist state of affairs, associated with the exile - this narrative plays an important role in Slovenia (Šori, 2015), Croatia and also Bulgaria and the Baltic states.

Analysing the most important legacies influencing this process of (re) construction of historical narratives, Pirro (2014) presents a set of pre-communist, communist and post-communist issues. In the first group he stresses the predominant role of irredentism and clericalism. The 'combination of

nativism and Christianity generally tends to reinforce the “us versus them” contraposition’ (Pirro, 2014: 606). Presenting the history of the American nativist, we mentioned the key role of anti-Catholicism. Let us stress that the construct of Judeo-Christian society presents one of the keystones of WASP-nativism (Cainkar, 2007: 10), as well as an important part of the European narrative. Despite the partial changes regarding the North American development<sup>5</sup>, the development in the last decade shows that Huntington’s ‘American Creed’ that ‘is impregnated with Protestant rather than universally Christian morals’ (Weidinger, 2017: 60) still presents the main ideological frame for the activities of such movements as the Tea Party, combining traditionalism, localism and racism.

In Europe, a similar process of combining nativism with orthodox Catholicism might be observed, as Buzalka (2008) stressed analysing the LPR, and its activities within the government led by PiS after 2005. Doubtless, the nativist groups in contemporary Europe stress the ‘Christian Europe’ concept, while this group of ‘defenders’ of Christian roots of Europe often includes such divergent actors as the ultraconservative ‘mystic’ J. Kaczyński and the former Social Democrat M. Zeman that developed after 2013 as the President of Czechia into the new ‘national-conservative’ role of ‘defender of Christian Europe’. As Weidinger (2017: 63–65) stresses while analysing the switch of the Austrian FPÖ from liberal-national towards ‘belonging without believing’ and ‘Christendom above Christianity’ positions, Zeman and similar politicians (mis)use the rhetoric of defending the Christian values to win the support of nativist-minded voter groups.

Naturally, churches often present themselves as important institutions defending ‘traditions’ and present important actors in politics. Nevertheless, in the case of Central Europe we can also observe another important tradition that is similar to the development in the U.S., namely the nationalisation of the church/es. It is more than clear that the Polish Catholic clergy strongly oppose the ‘modernisation’ of the contemporary Pope Francis; the same might be said about the tendencies in the Slovenian and Croatian Catholic clergy. We can similarly evaluate Czech Catholic officials, also supplemented by the existence of the national ‘Hussite Church’ with strong nativist tendencies (Cabada, 2019: 126–130). The church/es are playing an important role also in political decisions regarding family issues (marriages of same sex persons), perception of the LGBT community members and gender issues in all of ECE. Nativist actors in Bulgaria (Ataka) propose the

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<sup>5</sup> *While earlier waves of American nativism featured strong anti-Catholic sentiment, combining religious and racist (White nationalists) motives, the explicitly anti-Catholic ticket is not available to nativists anymore: Catholicism is now the biggest single congregation in the United States, and Catholics hold key positions within the Christian Right. However, the equation of “Protestant religious identity with being American” is still championed by relevant actors’ (Weidinger, 2017: 56).*

endorsement of Christianity as the state religion, both Fidesz and the Jobbik Party present Hungary as a country based on Christian moral principles, the Slovak National Party as well as ĽSNS promote the national, Christian and social principles (Pirro, 2014: 612).

As regards the communist issues, Pirro (2014: 608) stresses two important legacies – social national economics and anti-Communism. As regards the first, he stresses the ‘buy national’ movements as well as domestic production and agriculture (Pirro, 2014: 615). The contemporary Covid19-crisis even strengthened such tendencies including the calls for ‘food autarky’ declared by the Czech government and generally the tendencies towards economic protectionism. The process of constructing the new national bourgeoisie in Hungary is also well described (Ágh, 2019). Nevertheless, for nativist politicians the most important issue seems to be the media. In Hungary, the process of nationalising the media scene is almost completed. Immediately after the second round of presidential elections in Poland, the leader of PiS J. Kaczyński declared the next main goal to be the ‘repolonization’ of the media market, including the preparedness of the government to buy the media from foreign owners. Furthermore, we can also observe in Central Europe an important switch from ‘public’ towards ‘national’ media that could broadcast patriotic news. It’s not only in the case of the media that we observe among the Central European nativists hostility towards foreign capitals and anti-EU, anti-Western or anti-German<sup>6</sup> sentiments (Rensmann, 2012: 86).

As regards the anti-Communist legacy, it became one of the key instruments of nativist actors to delegitimise their political opponents. Usually, anti-Communism is combined with anti-intellectualism and anti-liberalism, i.e. the intellectuals and liberals are generally presented as leftist and the left is presented as post-Communist (issue of continuity) and even collaborating (Fehr, 2016: 24–27). Kaczyński, Orbán, Janša as well as the leaders of Slovakian nativist parties invented de-Communisation as an important theme of conflict and framed this theme with the paradigm of a national conservative counter-revolution as Kaczyński and Orbán labelled their goal in 2016 at their meeting in Krynica (Anderson, 2016) – rooted in moral revolution, re-traditionalisation and anti-modernisation (Fehr, 2016).

As the most important post-Communist legacy, Pirro (2014: 608) depicts the minority issues as the ‘variant of nativism in post-communist countries’. During and after WWII Central Europe underwent dramatic demographic

<sup>6</sup> As Fehr painstakingly shows in the analysis of the 2012/13 Czech presidential campaign, the national conservative actors can also team up effectively with leftist populists or radicals in some countries – in Czechia with the Communist Party. Throughout the campaign, M. Zeman was billed as a ‘genuine Czech’ in a showdown with the ‘non-Czech’ K. Schwarzenberg. National conservatives, Fehr stresses, here play the same cards that the Communists relied on before the transition: ‘In both Poland and the Czech lands, hatred of the Germans was the Communists’ last hope’ (Fehr, 2016: 114).

changes and both absolute and relative ethnic homogenisation. The situation of closed or semi-closed borders even strengthened the 'ethnic isolation' by including the mistrust and fear of other nations. The fear caused by otherness remains an important feature in the region. In domestic politics we often observe anti-Romani rhetoric, as well as repeated anti-Semitic postures. While in the case of an anti-Communist legacy Austria cannot be included into the comparison, in the minority issues the FPÖ might be understood as a trend-setter for the Central European nationalists, especially after 2015. Similar to the case of the FPÖ, the nationalist actors in ECE developed the combination of anti-migrant and Islamophobic rhetoric stressing the need to protect the 'Christian character' of Europe (Weidinger, 2017: 42).

An important additive in the nationalist discourse became Christian allusions combined with the conviction that Central European nations historically saved the Christian West from the menace from the East (Turks, Russians) (Weidinger, 2017: 41). Furthermore, the populist and nationalist actors from ECE present themselves as the saviours of European 'Christian' / traditional values before the 'ultraliberal' and declining West ('Brussels'). V. Orbán and J. Kaczyński repeatedly stress that if the West wants to survive, it has to imitate the 'East', i.e. them, the Visegrad Group and in general the ECE populist nationalists (Krašev and Holmes, 2020: 59).

Next to religious and/or national minorities, the nationalist actors also assault other minorities – typically the LGBT community and women, often using the strategy of moral disqualification. As Šori (2015) demonstrated in the example of the New Slovenia (NSi) party, the nationalist and (ultra)conservative arguments are usually mixed. The LGBT community is accused of diminishing the normality and negatively contributing to the demographic decrease in Europe that immediately provokes the next negative issue – immigration. As regards the 'female issue', nationalists often stress the 'natural' role of woman as mother and criticise the (post)modern individualism that leads to the abandonment of this 'natural' role.

## Discussion

As our analysis shows, in the last decade we have observed a dynamic development in ECE. Firstly, newcomer parties and actors have arisen with nationalist features, usually taking a more radical approach than the 'historical' parties from the period before the electoral earthquakes. Examples of such parties are both parties established by the Czech nationalist T. Okamura, the extreme and clerofascist party of M. Kotleba (LSNS) in Slovakia or the Polish party KORWiN. In some cases we have observed the programmatic transformation from (ultra)conservative positions towards a combination of populist and nationalist stances (NSi).



Nevertheless, as a more alarming trend we are observing the 'mainstreamisation' of nativism in ECE. Here, the Hungarian Fidesz and Polish PiS are the clear trend-setters not only in the region, but also in the EU. The Austrian case and the presence and role of the FPÖ in the government also demonstrates these trends. As Mudde (2014) emphasises, in situations where the mainstream political parties adopt extreme right themes including nativist attitudes, fewer opportunities are given to the small 'single-issue' radical parties. In this sense V. Orbán and J. Kaczyński have monopolised the nativist camp in their countries, utilising the salient counter-cosmopolitan preferences (Rensmann, 2012: 64-65).

It's not only in Central Europe that we can observe the negative consequences of poly-crisis and growing disillusionment in the last decade. Such development seems to be similar to the notion of anti-modernity in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century that grew primarily out of disillusionment with Europe's industrial revolution. Nowadays, we observe similar processes regarding the globalisation, negative consequences of neoliberal reforms and the transition toward an information society (Industry 4.0 etc.). In such a poly-crisis the return of traditionalism, anti-modern and anti-liberal narratives is logical despite the question of whether we face and observe the new anti-modern revolution or a new version of traditional conservative (counter-)revolutions. We are definitely witnessing the 'return' of traditionalism in Central Europe with regional aspects but also national 'specifics' - in Czechia and Slovakia we repeatedly observe a 'coalition' of (former) Communists and pan-Slavic conservative streams (geopolitically oriented on Russia and partly also China, cf. Waisová, 2020); in Hungary and Poland the situation is different regarding the strong actors stressing the important role of history, Christianity/Catholicism and also presenting specific reflections of the inter-war period. Nevertheless, a common feature of Central European 'traditionalist' belief is the criticism of the 'ultraliberal' West Europe/EU presented as overall disillusionment with European values - again the typical manifestation of nativism.

This brings us back to the Ruritania concept and to the conflict between two different cultures and societal groups in this region. In my opinion, there exists in ECE a tendency to accept only the 'technical' part of modernisation (industrialisation, welfare), but not the 'ideological' part (liberal democracy). In Ágh's (2019) terminology, the Europeanisation was successful regarding the creation of formal institutions, but failed in its socialisation part. Similarly, Krastev and Holmes (2020) reason that the imitation failed because of the absence of genuine liberal democrats both in the political elite and societies of ECE. Furthermore, the assertive anti-liberal or illiberal actors in the region enforce the turn in the process - the West has to imitate the ECE nativists, if it wants to survive.

Nativists, labelling themselves patriots, are balancing between nationalism and xenophobia using social chauvinistic rhetoric. They create a world in which it is presumed that 'compatriots take priority' (Bosniak, 1994: 445), and this was also fully proven during the contemporary pandemic. Furthermore, the ECE nativists, often very successful in the domestic political arena, continually strengthen and radicalise their rhetoric and political praxis. This might also be documented in one of the newest examples of such nativist rhetoric, namely the speech of V. Orbán on the occasion of the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Trianon Treaty. The analysis of this document would require a separate article, but to summarise the main ideas, Orbán described the Hungarian nation as the steppe tribe that created a Christian state in the Carpathian basin. This state was strong and independent, but under permanent danger from both the East and West. Trianon is presented as the betrayal of the West and an attempt to destroy the Hungarian nation. In his opinion, in 1918 'the thousand-year-old historical Hungary was stabbed in the back by the conspiracies in Budapest' – such rhetoric commemorates the radical ultraconservative and nativist position of German generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff after WWI. Repeatedly, Orbán stresses the Hungarian nation as the manifestation of 'blood and land' (Orbán, 2020). In my opinion, the speech from Sátoraljaújhely presents the peak of nativism in Central Europe so far.

## Conclusion

Nativism and radical right-wing populism are not limited to ECE, but above all the Polish and Hungarian primer make this region kind of a trendsetter. Nevertheless, these parties 'demonstrate some similarities across Europe, displaying a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism' (Pirro, 2014: 601). They focus on 'sources of identity such as the ethnic community, they are anti-establishment and thus anti-corruption by definition and they champion anti-Western orientations' (Pirro, 2014: 606).

My first research question asked whether the contemporary nativism in Central Europe grows from visible anti-liberal legacies? As our analysis of the general development of Central European nativist actors demonstrated we can reflect important legacies related with the pre-Communist parochial political culture, as well as the legacies developed within the national-accommodative types of Communist regimes. Naturally, each case study also presents a specific set of 'domestic' characteristic; still, we can distinguish some general regional specifics – especially salient specific ideological cleavages and political preference.

*Shaped by specific postcommunist legacies, the conflict axes that these cleavages generate on the demand side can be distinguished from*

*Western European contexts. Those legacies engender a significant counter-cosmopolitan segment of the electorate that opposes economic market liberalism, cosmopolitan cultural diversity, and postnational European political integration. (Rensmann, 2012: 68)*

The most important negative legacies that might be detected are ‘communist-authoritarian and ethnically exclusive societies ... authoritarian conformism, strong support of social cohesion, and ethnic exclusivism’ (Rensmann, 2012: 73).

As regards the second research question, we also demonstrated how the nativist agenda became an important part of the Central European mainstream parties’ agenda. In some cases, the mainstream party took over the strategy and ideology of smaller nativist parties (PiS; Fidesz, Austrian People’s Party), in other cases a new mainstream party was established including the nativist background (Czech ANO, 2011), and we can also observe the combination of both scenarios (Slovakian *Smer*). Generally, we can speak about the anti-modern and counter-cosmopolitan wave, inset into the all-European and even global nativist revolt.

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## THE CRISIS OF 2008 AND THE RISE OF THE SLOVENIAN CONSOLIDATION STATE

*Abstract.* The purpose of the article is to explain the creation of the Slovenian debt state and its transformation into a consolidation state after the crisis of 2008. When the crisis struck Slovenia in 2009, the banking system was near collapse. Through the recapitalisations of the banking system the public debt began to grow. After a couple of years and under the structural pressures of rating agencies and pressures from the EU, the Slovenian state had to adopt austerity measures to consolidate its public finances, while limiting the scope of democracy. The main finding of the article is that the crisis of 2008 fundamentally changed the Slovenian state.

**Keywords:** capitalist state, consolidation state, debt, Slovenia, democracy

### Introduction

In the EU context, the crisis of capitalist accumulation in 2008–2009 quickly became a crisis of sovereign debt (see Streeck, 2012; 2016; 2017; Lapavitsas, 2018; Varoufakis and Holland, 2012). The reason was simple – the deep recession of the entire capitalist economy meant the capitalist states were forced to step in to save capitalism from itself. States thus took over the debt of banks and large companies since they were allegedly ‘too big to fail’ by borrowing money by issuing government bonds. Streeck explains this process as the rise of the debt state (Streeck, 2015). This led to a rapid rise of public debt and fiscal deficits that were problematic in the context of the EU and EMU. Namely, the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact are strict concerning the highest ratio of deficit and debt to GDP permissible. Namely, the deficit-to-GDP ratio should not exceed 3% while the debt-to-GDP ratio is set at 60% (Treaty on European Union, 1992; European Council, 1997). Most states were exceeding these limits (Streeck, 2015; 2016; 2017).

The states were accumulating debt to prevent their economies collapsing. However, this “made ‘financial markets’ suspicious about states’ capacity

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to live up to their obligations as debtors” (Streeck, 2015: 7–8). Hence, the ‘financial markets’ together with the rating agencies began to lower the credit ratings of states, leading to rise in premiums on state bonds. This pushed many states into a very difficult position (Streeck, 2015; 2016; 2017). States wished to avoid bankruptcy and restore the confidence of financial institutions and financial markets in their ability to repay their debt. If they wanted to obtain help from the ECB, IMF and EC they had to accept very tough policies oriented at fiscal consolidation. The most important goal of policies in European countries therefore became fiscal consolidation via austerity. Accordingly, these processes led to transformation of the capitalist state, its policy objectives, scopes of action, and rationality. The consolidation state began to emerge (Streeck, 2015; 2017) in which the central banks became ever more independent of democratic influence, they “rise to become the principal agents of economic policy, political decisions with far-reaching social consequences move out of the purview of parliaments and elected governments” (Streeck, 2015: 25). Debt limits were inscribed in national constitutions as well as laws prescribing a balanced budget. Markets became the main political actors, leaving almost no space for any kind of democracy (Streeck, 2015: 25).

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We argue that this trajectory is also visible in Slovenia, which was seen for long time as having a transition distinct from other post-socialist countries (Stanojević, 2014). However, Janša’s first government (2004–2008) started to introduce radical neoliberal measures while also enabling many companies and managers to obtain cheap loans. When the crisis hit the Slovenian economy, it was soon clear that these debts could not be repaid, requiring multiple recapitalisations of the banking sector which, in turn, radically increased the state’s public debt. Moreover, from 2008 to 2013 the Slovenian economy twice experienced a deep recession. Every crisis and post-crisis government in Slovenia was determined to curtail public debt in order to prevent the Troika intervening. The only way to lower public debt acceptable to the capitalist class, financial markets and European institutions was to cut public expenditures by launching radical neoliberal reforms. Thus, the Slovenian consolidation state began to emerge.

The article focuses on two main research questions: 1) What were the main causes for the rise of the Slovenian debt state? 2) How was the Slovenian debt state transformed into a consolidation state? To explain how the Slovenian debt state was created and transformed into a consolidation state, we combine various statistical data with detailed analysis of strategic state documents from 2004 onwards. The analysis is based on: 1) Foucault’s methods of archaeology and genealogy (Foucault, 1984; 2011) for explaining various acts, strategic documents etc.; 2) Wolfgang Streeck’s (2015; 2016; 2015) theoretical and methodological approach for explaining different

policy measures; and 3) Marxist political theory. In this context, the article makes two original scientific contributions: first, it explains the specific circumstances making Slovenia become a debt state; second, it explains the rise of the Slovenian consolidation state in the context of the 2008 financial crisis and the EU framework by presenting statistical data as well as an interpretative analysis of various strategic documents, public policies and measures.

The article initially explains the rise of the debt state in Slovenia due to both the neoliberal policies adopted by Janša's first government and European integration processes. After that we analyse the fiscal consolidation policies and the public-debt-reduction attempts of the three crisis governments led by Borut Pahor, Janez Janša and Alenka Bratušek and the post-crisis government of Miro Cerar by considering policy measures, statistical data and analysis of strategic documents. In the fourth section we discuss the impact of the transformation of the Slovenian state on liberal democracy in Slovenia. In the conclusion we answer the two research questions and highlight the possible impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the Slovenian state.

### **The crisis of capitalism and the rise of the Slovenian debt state**

After the downfall of socialist Yugoslavia, Slovenia was considered a success story in its transition from socialism to capitalism, within the context of state's transformation and introduction of liberal democracy. The specific gradualist approach to the transition adopted in Slovenia was the crucial element for avoiding the "economic shock doctrine" (Klein, 2010). A strong neo-corporatist system emerged that was led by a centre-left political party LDS, which held power almost continuously from 1992 till 2004. This neo-corporatist model was based on the state playing a strong role in regulating economic relations, very strong trade unions, and a consensus between the political and economic elites and trade unions regarding the main goal of the state - to become an EU member state. Slovenia joined the EU in 2004 and had no problems fulfilling the Maastricht criteria because it had a very low deficit and a low public debt to GDP ratio, both below the EU average (Crowley and Stanojević, 2011; Stanojević, 2014; Stanojević and Furlan, 2018).

However, everything changed in 2004 when Slovenia became an EU member state. The left-centre LDS lost the elections and a new government was formed under the neoliberal and neoconservative SDS. Janez Janša was appointed prime minister. During Janša's first term in office, the overriding rationale behind all policies was to make a break from gradualism and introduce neoliberal reforms (Stanojević, 2014; Stanojević and Furlan, 2018). The policies of Janša's government from 2004 until 2008, such as tax cuts, huge

public spending and the attempt to create a economic elite by way of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003), are the biggest reasons Slovenia became a debt state after 2008.

During Janša’s first term, economic growth was high, the unemployment level really low, and the public debt to GDP ratio was also low. Yet, this was a consequence of the high public expenditure, low taxes, and extremely high debt levels of the economy and the banks (Mramor, 2018: 22–23). Janša’s first government adopted various tax reforms that in fact were ‘tax gifts’ to company owners and to the richest: by lowering the tax rates on capital gains, abolishing the payroll tax and in 2007 reducing the progression of personal income tax (Drenovec, 2015: 155). Moreover, during his entire first term Janša opposed the idea of increasing public sector wages, only to do precisely that before the 2008 elections in a pre-election attempt to garner more support. This all happened just before the outbreak of 2008 crisis and created many problems in the following years (Mramor, 2018: 22; Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 181–182; Mencinger, 2012: 66; Drenovec, 2015: 155). The tax gifts to the richest amounted to almost EUR 600 million, meaning the budget lost EUR 600 million in revenue per year; before the crisis 1.5% of GDP and after the crisis 2.3% of GDP. This deficit was a direct consequence of the neoliberal policies and the tax gifts for the richest. The tax gifts handed out by the first Janša government until 2015 were estimated at around EUR 5.1 billion (Drenovec, 2015: 159).

The key reason for the higher public debt in Slovenia after 2008 was the banking sector’s recapitalisation from 2011 until 2014<sup>1</sup> needed due to the ‘bad loans’ of the banks related to attempts to create a new economic elite during Janša’s first government. Janša’s goal had been to establish a new economic elite close to his right-wing political party through various buy outs and takeovers by company managers<sup>2</sup>. Since these managers did not have enough money, this process was only enabled by the banks engaging in extensive lending. These processes of privatising state-owned companies are examples of “selective privatisation” (Stanojević, 2014: 107; see also Stanojević and Furlan, 2018: 15).

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<sup>1</sup> *Due to the dispute between the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Slovenia over the recapitalisation of the banks, the recapitalisation was at the beginning too small and also too late. Many EU member states recapitalised their banking system already in 2009–2010, yet Slovenia only did so in 2013–2014. If the recapitalisation had occurred earlier, it would have required less funds for the recapitalisation and the state would also have avoided the new “bail-in” rules of the EC, in turn also meaning that the country would not have sold all of its banks (Mramor, 2018: 23–24).*

<sup>2</sup> *The two most notorious stories are those of Igor Bavčar, the head of Istrabenz, and Boško Šrot, the head of Pivovarna Laško. Istrabenz took over the companies Droga and Kolinska, which were merged, and also many hotels along the Slovenian coast. Pivovarna Laško took over the Delo newspaper, the companies Radenska and Fructal. Together, they took over shares of Mercator (Žerdin, 2012; Cirman and Vuković, 2017; Modic and Vuković, 2019).*

However, the banks did not possess sufficient funds for these operations since deposits in the banks were only growing as much as nominal GDP. When the European financial markets were opened up, Slovenian banks obtained access to cheap money. The banks' high borrowing was the sole way to secure the money needed for the buy outs and takeovers, in later years explaining the huge rise in public debt<sup>3</sup> (Mencinger, 2012: 74-75; Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 174-177; Drenovec, 2015: 160-163).

Table 1: GDP COMPONENTS AND GROWTH IN SLOVENIA, 2008-2018

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Output at basic prices (mill EUR)	76,039	68,587	70,540	71,951	69,675	69,224	71,231	73,131	74,998	81,499	87,602
Intermediate consumption at purchasing prices (mill EUR)	42,834	36,862	38,846	39,686	38,199	37,715	38,699	39,539	40,046	44,149	47,764
Total gross value added at basic prices (mio EUR)	33,204	31,725	31,693	32,266	31,475	31,509	32,532	33,592	34,953	37,35	39,838
Net taxes on products (mill EUR)	4,721	4,53	4,67	4,793	4,778	4,946	5,102	5,261	5,414	5,637	5,916
Gross domestic product, current prices (mill EUR)	37,926	36,255	36,364	37,059	36,253	36,454	37,634	38,853	40,367	42,987	45,755
Gross domestic product, real growth rate (%)	3.5	-7.5	1.3	0.9	-2.6	-1.0	2.8	2.2	3.1	4.8	4.1

Source: SORS, 2020a.

When the crisis started, the recession in Slovenia was one of the deepest in the EU. The real-estate bubble burst and the stock market also suffered a huge blow. Loans had been secured through stocks and real estate, which were both extremely overrated. A problem occurred when the markets collapsed, with Slovenian banks having to repay their debts but being unable to do so because most loans they had granted for the mentioned buy outs and takeovers were bad loans. Bad debt soon accumulated and the burden fell on banks. The only possible solution was to recapitalise the banking sector multiple times. From 2011 to 2014, the state spent approximately EUR 5.9 billion to rescue the banking sector. Between 2013 and 2014, on the recapitalisation of four banks (Abanka, NLB, NKBM, Banka Celje) the state spent EUR 3.2 billion, or 8.7% of GDP; and a further EUR 1.6 billion was taken by the DUTB, the 'bad bank' established for the purpose of buying bad loans and risk assets from the Slovenian banks, and an additional EUR 600 went to 'help' Greece and the ESM. An important factor was also the multiplier effect of these measures and policies (Drenovec, 2015: 155-159; MF, 2015).

<sup>3</sup> Moreover, Pahor's government, which succeeded Janša's first government, increased wages in the public sector, pensions and the minimum wage. The government did not increase its spending on investments and did not recapitalise the banking system. As a result, the deficit rose to 6% of GDP and the government had to borrow more than EUR 7 billion to finance its deficit (Damijan, 2013).

Table 2: DEFICIT AND PUBLIC DEBT, SLOVENIA, ANNUALLY

	Current deficit (mill EUR)	Current deficit (% GDP)	Government debt (mill EUR)	Government debt (% GDP)
2018	329.65	0.7	32,222.94	70.4
2017	-20.69	0.0	31,862.74	74.1
2016	-776.15	-1.9	31,756.03	78.7
2015	-1,106.32	-2.8	32,087.41	82.6
2014	-2,072.59	-5.5	30,219.91	80.3
2013	-5,314.55	-14.6	25,520.06	70.0
2012	-1,448.21	-4.0	19,417.68	53.6
2011	-2,456.74	-6.6	17,216.62	46.5
2010	-2,036.26	-5.6	13,916.19	38.3
2009	-2,107.47	-5.8	12,517.54	34.5
2008	-528.60	-1.4	8,262.47	21.8
2007	-17.19	0.0	8,013.61	22.8
2006	-387.39	-1.2	8,201.51	26.1
2005	-385.51	-1.3	7,685.63	26.4
2004	-536.26	-1.9	7,431.21	26.9

Source: SORS, 2020b.

Thus, the combination of internal and external factors and policies was the prime cause of the rise of the country's public debt before and after 2008. The Slovenian debt crisis was the outcome of the banks' huge foreign debt created in the period 2004–2008 as part of financing the creation of a (right-leaning) capitalist elite and which became nationalised and socialised via the banking sector's recapitalisation and the creation of the DUTB (Drenovec, 2015: 161). Crucially, in the period of the Bratušek and Cerar governments these banks were all sold off to foreign capitalist investors well below market value (see Hočevar, 2020).

The tax reforms of Janša's first government and the socialisation of the banking sector's losses, mostly a consequence of the policies of Janša's first, led to serious threats of intervention by the infamous Troika. By January 2012, three critical rating agencies (Standard & Poor's, Moodys, Fitch) had lowered their credit ratings for Slovenian government bonds, creating big structural pressure on the state. The international markets were keen to send the Troika to Slovenia and to establish a technocratic government (Breznik and Furlan, 2015). There was huge pressure to cut the deficit and balance the state budget so as to meet the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. Austerity and consolidation were to be implemented at any cost in order to satisfy both the international financial markets and the EU institutions. This was said to be the only way to save the country from bankruptcy. In this context, changes in the Slovenian capitalist state became visible and the Slovenian consolidation state began to emerge.

## Neoliberalism and the rise of the Slovenian consolidation state

To explain the rise of the Slovenian consolidation state, we now explain the essential policies and measures imposed by various governments to lower public debt and balance the budget. This analysis is complemented by a concise review of crucial strategic documents of the Slovenian state between 2008 and 2018 and statistical data<sup>4</sup>.

In 2010, the government of Borut Pahor approved certain measures aimed at fiscal consolidation, including restrictions on pensions, social transfers and public-sector wages. The government also introduced guarantees for liquidity deposits, bank guarantees, and aid to export-oriented companies. These initial measures already expanded public debt, although it should be noted that the crisis was not so deep and radical because wages had just been increased before the crisis and consumer patterns remained unchanged until 2011. Yet, by 2011 real GDP had fallen sharply and the unemployment level was very high, especially among youth, which was partly a result of the lower exports (Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 193; Drenovec, 2015: 156).

In the wake of the crisis, the Pahor government started to prepare measures to reduce long-term spending. Various measures were in the spotlight: pension reform, social system reform and reform of the labour market, especially “mini jobs”<sup>5</sup>. The trade unions were opposed to both the pension and labour market reforms because they had not been coordinated with the social partners through the social dialogue. In April 2011 a referendum was held where the labour markets reforms were rejected. After that, a triple referendum was held in June 2011 in which the government suffered a defeat, with the opposition and trade unions successfully stopping the implementation of the reforms<sup>6</sup>. At the same time, there was a huge drop in GDP, youth unemployment reached almost 21%, wages fell and unemployment doubled (Bembič, 2013: 89; Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 193; Mramor, 2018; Brezovšek, Haček and Kukovič, 2016: 281).

Interest rates on bonds issued by Slovenia had risen sharply, pushing the state ever closer to the edge of a cliff. It seemed that only one option was left if the Slovenian state wished to avoid the Greek scenario – to implement

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<sup>4</sup> Using the critical discourse analysis and Foucault's archaeology we analysed the strategic documents adopted by Slovenian governments from 2008 onwards: GRS, 2010; 2017; ME, 2013; MPA, 2015.

<sup>5</sup> Mini job is a temporary or occasional work or more permanent short-time work.

<sup>6</sup> Pahor's government claimed in the Slovenian exit strategy that the government's primary goal was to formulate a “a medium-term strategy for reducing the structural deficit, and more importantly ensuring the sustainability of public debt” (GRS, 2010: 5). Even more importantly, the “guiding principle for the formulation of economic policy measures is the consolidation of public finances, which will be achieved by reducing expenditure rather than increasing tax burdens” (GRS, 2010: 2).

austerity measures and to create a consolidation state. This was the context in which fiscal consolidation policies were introduced and Slovenia became a consolidation state via privatisations and austerity measures that favoured the rich and the wealthy.

First, the class character of the emergence of the consolidation state is visible in the nature of the tax reforms adopted to ensure a balanced budget and to cut the level of public debt. Namely, a decline in tax revenue can be seen after 2008. Although, as explained above, the crisis was caused primarily internally by the attempt to create a new class of capitalists and the tax gifts for the richest, in fact the tax reforms did not take more from the richest but were dispersed in such a way as to affect the entire population. The tax reforms were mostly focused on increases in indirect taxes such as value-added tax (normal rate from 20% to 22%; lower rate from 8.5% to 9.5%); excise duties on fuel, liquor and cigarettes; a tax on financial services was adopted in 2012 and amended in 2014. However, a property tax that would have affected the wealthiest was never adopted and the corporate income tax was reduced and has remained low (Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 193; Drenovec, 2015: 159; Verbič et al., 2016: 213–216).

Second, the external pressures and the threat of the Troika's intervention created great pressure to implement austerity measures through cuts in public spending. During Janša's second government, which was short-lived, public debt began to grow and the new coalition planned to reduce public debt to below 45% of GDP (Coalition agreement, 2012). The government's explanation was that the Troika could otherwise take over the management of the state and that it was necessary to begin with public spending cuts to regain the confidence of international financial markets and institutions. From 2011 to 2012, the funds for social assistance and child allowance were lowered significantly. To reduce public debt, Janša's second government acted in a procyclical manner and adopted the Fiscal Balance Act (FBA), which introduced radical austerity measures. FBA brought a lowering of the public sector wage scale by 8%, a radical cut in social spending by reducing social rights, lower child and parental benefits, and unconstitutionally decreased the pensions of some 28,000 pensioners (Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 211).

Moreover, FBA proved to be catastrophic for the nation's capitalist economy and the state's GDP with a direct consequence of FBA being a massive drop in the internal aggregate demand of households (Mencinger, 2014: 19). Thus, in 2012 state expenditures were cut by EUR 985 million and revenues fell by EUR 105 million. Public sector spending decreased by EUR 151 million, spending on social transfers by EUR 171 million and on investments by EUR 624 million (Damijan, 2013). In 2013, the government of Alenka Bratušek selectively lowered certain wages in the public sector



by up to 4.5%<sup>7</sup> (Furl The National Assembly The National Assembly an and Breznik, 2015: 212). These public-sector wage reductions slashed “government consumption and thus the production of public sector services, leading to a decline in total GDP” (Verbič et al., 2016: 219).

Despite FBA, the bank recapitalisations and the other austerity measures, the international organisations were still not satisfied. In response to the rise in the premiums on national bonds and the internal and external pressures, in 2013 the ‘fiscal rule’ was inscribed in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia and in 2015 later also codified in the Fiscal Rule Act, both being a consequence of the Stability and Growth Pact. This should be viewed as the third dimension leading to the rise of the consolidation state in Slovenia.

During the mandate of the Bratušek government, in May 2013 and with a two-thirds majority Article 148 of the Constitution was amended in order to limit the country’s deficit and public debt. The National Assembly thereby approved an amendment to the article in the Constitution which provides that the goal of the state is a balanced budget, without borrowing, and the goal is that revenues exceed budget expenditures. Now, it is a constitutional norm that the budget must be balanced and that all revenues and expenditures “of the budgets of the state must be balanced in the medium-term without borrowing, or revenues must exceed expenditures. Temporary deviation from this principle is only allowed when exceptional circumstances affect the state”.

In addition, the government of Miro Cerar adopted the Fiscal Rule Act in 2015 as a more concrete definition of the fiscal rule in order to balance the budget. Article 3 of the Fiscal Rule Act states that the budget

*of the state shall be balanced in the medium term without borrowing, if the structural balance of the general government sector in an individual year is not lower than the minimum value as defined in the ratified international treaty on stability, coordination and governance in economic and monetary union, and in the medium term is at least in balance or in surplus.*

Changes to the Public Finance Act in 2009 also led to the Fiscal Council being established, a technocratic institution without any democratic legitimacy. The Fiscal Council is “an independent and autonomous state authority supervising the management of the fiscal policy. Its fundamental task is to monitor the compliance with the fiscal rule, the medium-term balance

<sup>7</sup> The government of Alenka Bratušek stressed the need to consolidate public finances through two crucial measures: rationalisation of public spending, mostly via lowering wages in the public sector, and, if necessary, by raising value-added tax (Coalition agreement 2013, 2013: 2).

between revenue and expenditure without borrowing, except in exceptional circumstances”<sup>8</sup> (Fiscal Council, 2020).

The fourth dimension in these processes is the project of privatisation of the nation’s companies and banks. Until 2008, as already explained, the concept was to create a national bourgeoisie. In this context, the national banks gave very cheap loans to ‘tycoons’ to assist them in buying out and taking over as many companies as they wanted. The two most notorious examples are Igor Bavčar and Istrabenz and Boško Šrot and Pivovarna Laško. In order to finance these takeovers, the banks also had to take out loans from other banks. When the crisis hit Slovenia and these managers and newly established owners of many companies were unable to repay these debts, the entire project of the national economic bourgeoisie collapsed and the state was forced to take over the bad loans from the banks<sup>9</sup>. In order to regain the confidence of the EU and financial markets, under the leadership of Alenka Bratušek the Slovenian government adopted the National Reform Programme 2013–2014 in which it proposed the privatisation of 3–5 state-owned companies. Yet, in June 2013 the National Assembly adopted a list of 15 state-owned companies due for privatisation. The list included the following companies: Adria Airways, Aero, Elan, Fotona, Helios, Aerodrom Ljubljana, Adria Airways Tehnika, NKBM, Telekom Slovenija, Cinkarna Celje, Gospodarsko razstavišče, Paloma, Terme Olimia Bazeni, Unior, Žito (Delo, 2013). Today, most of these companies are privatised, including NLB, the biggest national bank, which had to be privatised because of the EU’s new ‘bail-in’ rules.

All of these measures proved to be counterproductive and in fact merely perpetuated the crisis and the recession in 2012–2013. That is, while the first drop in GDP in 2009 was due to the global crisis, the second was due to the austerity measures and fiscal consolidation policies in an attempt to fulfil the Maastricht criteria. Only after 2013 did the Slovenian economy begin to grow again, propelled by its export orientation. Public debt was rising until 2015, when it amounted to 82.6% of GDP, and only after then did the public debt to GDP ratio start to drop. Crucially, these trends were not the result of fiscal consolidation, despite the temptation to so argue, but more a consequence of the growth seen in other EU and non-EU countries since

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<sup>8</sup> *This comes not as a surprise but as a clear sign of a new rationality, best seen in the Strategy of Development of Slovenia 2030. It is argued that the crucial goal of Cerar’s government was to improve the country’s competitiveness. The best way to do that was to balance the budget “and the sustainable reduction of public debt” (GRS, 2017: 32). Hence, the government’s main goal was “fiscal sustainability” (GRS, 2017: 32).*

<sup>9</sup> *In the years after 2010, the “comprador bourgeoisie” (Poulantzas 2008: 200) emerged, later playing a crucial role in numerous cases of foreign direct investment and the entry of foreign capital in Slovenia. This was best seen in the many cases of privatisation from 2011–2012 onwards.*

the Slovenian economy and its companies are mostly export oriented<sup>10</sup> (Mencinger, 2014; Mramor, 2018; Verbič et al., 2016: 223).

In order to rescue capitalism and stabilise the reproduction of capitalist accumulation in the competitive world system, Slovenia underwent a transition from being a debt to a consolidation state. Under the pressure of EU institutions, the capitalist class and financial markets, the political and economic elite pursued policies of fiscal consolidation in order to maintain the state's competitive level and attract new foreign investments. While the Slovenian state wanted to avoid the Troika, in the changed structural and cultural circumstances it had to start with strict austerity programmes, pass the FBA, adopt the fiscal rule, alter the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, and engage in accumulation by dispossession. The above-mentioned demonstrates that all governments – from right to left – ensured the costs of establishing the new capitalist class and “other costs of rejoicing the newly transitioned elites” were recovered “through taxes and spending on the weakest in society” (Drenovec, 2015: 159).

### Transformation of liberal democracy in Slovenia

Slovenia is considered to be a consolidated democracy (see Fink Hafner, 2012: 208; Brezovšek, Haček and Kukovič, 2016). However, during the crisis, there were certain important changes, especially as regards the fiscal rule and the rise of technocracy. In May 2013, together with the fiscal rule, the National Assembly passed an amendment to Article 90 of the Constitution, which is about a legislative referendum. The Constitution forbids referendums “on laws on taxes, customs duties, and other compulsory charges, and on the law adopted for the implementation of the state budget”. Thus, anything that is concerned with public finances is in the scope of technocracy while the people have no say in these matters: “With this constitutional change, the people lost access to political decision-making and the state became a machine for executing the instructions of international organizations whose most important goal is the privatization of state property” (Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 195). This measure was undertaken to provide a shield for the policies of privatisation and austerity. Therefore, Streeck's argument that the rise of the consolidation state “involves the insertion of a Chinese wall between the economy and politics /.../ which will permit the markets to assert their version of justice undisturbed by discretionary political intervention” (Streeck, 2017: 117) seems to be correct in the case of Slovenia.

The fiscal rule and the changes of the Constitution regarding the

<sup>10</sup> This is not surprising at all since, as Blyth (2013) empirically showed, the austerity measures and fiscal consolidation never produced the promised results but instead prolonged the period of recession.

possibility of a legislative referendum prevent any kind of democracy with respect to fiscal policies and public finances<sup>11</sup>. The fiscal rule is essentially a technocratic measure directed against the possible revolt of the people against austerity and fiscal consolidation. In this context the fiscal rule prevents the autonomous decision-making of any government:

*On the international scene, Slovenian politics has taken the side of a hard line, which advocates the unconditional repayment of debts of debtor countries, regardless of the price that their citizens have to pay. The citizens here have faithfully accepted the recommendation of international organizations that democracy is harmful and that all we need is a 'technical government'. (Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 169)*

The fiscal rule in all its dimensions also means that the Slovenian capitalist state in practice became a tool in the hands of the international financial markets and that is directly fulfilling tasks set by international financial capital, most importantly pledging itself to repaying its debts and ensuring a strong framework for the stability of capitalist accumulation, chiefly by creating a favourable tax environment for investments of domestic and foreign capital by not raising tax levels (see Breznik and Furlan, 2015: 195; Hočevar, 2020).

It is not surprising that in the crisis years the political parties more or less had the same programmes and all met the requirements and interests of the EU and financial markets. In this regard, it may be said that “the differences between the socio-economic policies of the various parties in power are diminishing, elections seem to be becoming less and less important” (Fink-Hafner, 2012: 209). Crucially, instead of the *demos*, a new concept of democracy and of the subject of democracy emerged. Stakeholders became the principal actors addressed by the state and government (see: GRS, 2017; ME, 2013; MPA, 2015) and liberal democracy became a *stakeholder democracy* (Hočevar, 2020).

Thus, although all important democratic practices remain stable – elections, parties etc. – there is a clear sign that the democracy has transformed. These important structural changes may also explain the dramatic drop in voter turnout at national elections – both parliamentary and presidential – and the great distrust shown towards political parties and democracy in Slovenia (Hočevar, 2020; see also: ESS, 2008; 2010; 2012; 2016; SEC, 2020a; SEC, 2020b). It seems that in Slovenia we can observe “a secular implosion of the social contract of capitalist democracy, in the transition to /.../ [a] consolidation state committed to fiscal discipline” (Streeck, 2017: 117).

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<sup>11</sup> Fiscal democracy “is essentially about the flexibility of fiscal resources /.../ that is, the proportion of tax revenue available in principle to be allocated to newly chosen, current purposes” (Streeck and Mertens, 2010: 6).

## Conclusion

In the article we have examined the transformation of the Slovenian state within the framework of the 2008 crisis. Our research confirms that the crisis of 2008 fundamentally changed the Slovenian state, which first became a debt state and was later transformed into a consolidation state. In the conclusion we outline the answers to the two research questions and highlight the possible impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the Slovenian state.

First, in the article we have explained the policies and measures that led to the creation of the Slovenian debt state and its transformation into a consolidation state. The main causes for the rise of the Slovenian debt state were primarily internal processes: 1) tax reforms and the tax gifts for the rich implemented during Janša's first government; 2) the attempt to create the national bourgeoisie during Janša's first government, which led to the accumulation of bad loans which resulted in the recapitalisation of the banking sector in the years after the crisis. These are the crucial reasons for the enormous rise of public debt after the crisis of 2008.

Second, regarding the transformation of the debt state into a consolidation state, we have identified four dimensions and sets of policies which acted as the cornerstone for regaining the confidence of EU institutions and financial markets: 1) tax reforms that have affected the entire population; 2) radical austerity measures and the adoption of the Fiscal Balance Act in order to decrease public spending; 3) the inscription of the fiscal rule in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia; 4) privatisation of state owned companies and banks in order to regain the confidence of financial markets. The vital goal was to establish a consolidation state, which was seen to be the only entity that could preserve the competitiveness of the Slovenian capitalist state<sup>12</sup> and economy.

The Slovenian state has become a peripheral state in the EU whose role is to secure the concentration of capital and wealth in the core states of the capitalist world system (Hočevár, 2020). In this way, the financial markets and global capital have forced the Slovenian state to act in a "depoliticised" way through technocratic regimes of governance and "relatively independent of formalized political institutions and decision-making processes" (Hirsch, 2014: 150). The Slovenian consolidation state has become devoted to 'market justice', which creates "a situation where political institutions [are] economically neutralized" (Streeck, 2017: 172).

Still, for a brief moment, these processes were at least partly reversed in Slovenia between 2018 and 2020. The minimum wage was raised mainly

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<sup>12</sup> As Cerny points out, fiscal consolidation is essentially the foundation of pursuing the competitiveness of the capitalist state in a time of neoliberal hegemony (Cerny, 1997).

following the exclusion of additions from it. More importantly, the National Assembly almost adopted new act on medical security which could have brought an end to privatised medical insurance. The downfall of this act was one of the biggest reasons that the prime minister and the entire government resigned in February 2020. Since then, the new crisis and recession in the context of Covid-19 hold the potential to again turn things upside-down due to the rising public debt and deficit in order to prevent an even deeper recession. As Poulantzas (2014: 129) argued, if the state in capitalism is “the *specific material condensation* of a relationship of forces among classes and class fractions”, then it is clear that the functioning of the Slovenian state, its apparatuses and the content of its policies depends primarily on class power relations and the political power of specific classes. How this permanent conflict and contradiction of capitalist society and politics is to be resolved in Slovenia under the third government of Janez Janša during the Covid-19 crisis has yet to be seen. We should not be surprised if the end result is “the completion of a Hayekian social dictatorship, in which the capitalist market economy was protected from democratic correction” (Streeck, 2017: 172).

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## ON MIGRANTS WITH MIGRANTS: MIGRATIONS 5 YEARS AFTER EUROPE'S MIGRATION »CRISIS«

*Abstract.* In which ways can we theorise the recent illegalised migrations in Europe? This article considers theoretical novelties in the field of migration studies that have emerged since the mass migration into the European Union seen in 2015. Methodologically, the authors combine critical (discursive) analysis with the testing of certain still relevant theoretical concepts that have yet to be applied in migration studies, based on fieldwork along the Balkan Route over the last 5 years. The analysis has shown that the defining and decisive feature of the recent illegalised migrations, insufficiently considered by migrations scholarship, is the political subjectivity and agency of the migrants. Recognition of such agency makes migration the site of the critique of global inequalities and the site of inclusive social transformation.

**Keywords:** Migrations; Europe; Political Theory; State; Balkan Migrant Route

### Introduction

Throughout 2015, migrations into the European Union were a major focus of the media, politicians and the public, whereas social scientists were still searching for and designing theoretical tools to grasp this migration of such massive scope and dimensions. Migrations are far from a novel research topic, yet the research challenge created by this very recent phenomenon in global migration processes is multi-layered and complex and, above all, is an emergency at the present moment.

This challenge includes the need to establish an objectivising distance from the day-to-day developments in which researchers and theorists have engaged as witnesses, actors and active participants in the sense of »experts« who simply provide arguments that justify contentious political decisions for the public. Simultaneously, it is expected that researchers will not seek

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to objectivise the migration process to the point of forgetting that at its core there are living people, worthy and in need of assistance and empathy. This challenge also risks falling into the trap of dealing with migrants as a simple monolith, stirring up generally black-and-white reactions and responses and then justifying the reduction of people on the move to numbers and statistics, without registering or considering the individuality of the individuals involved. On the opposite end of the spectrum of possible reactions, objectivisation and demonisation have been countered by romanticising and idealising tendencies that have equally concealed the reality of migrations.

In attempts to rise above the perspective of migrants as amorphous Others, researchers have not been helped by the official interventions made along the routes taken by migrants. States did their most to separate migrants from the rest of the population by establishing sanitary refugee corridors, a term that in itself suggests migration is a disease that one needs to be isolated from, so as not to become infected by some nasty virus.

Sanitary corridor is not the only terminological issue arising from the 'migration crisis'. The latter phrase has been useful for establishing a social climate that has viewed the mass migrations as almost uniformly negative, like an economic or political crisis. In the post-socialist countries of Europe, we only encountered the first true crisis of the capitalist production cycle in 2008; by 2015, the term was still recent enough to arouse apprehensive associations. The term »crisis« also suggested that migrations would be a phenomenon limited by time since every crisis first occurs but then ends in this way or another, eventually becoming resolved. In practice, the media and politicians have largely concealed and ignored the fact that migrations have always been and are/will be everywhere; that those seen in 2015 were but an episode within a global social process of a Braudelian *longue durée*. We were all migrants at one time.

Further demonstrating how language shapes reality, the word »migrant« has come to dominate and do away with the more precise distinction between refugees, fugitives, defectors, displaced people, asylum-seekers, posted workers, seasonal workers etc. This variety of terms also implies various reasons for migrating, based on which a hierarchy has been established and maintained concerning the right of migrants to our assistance and hospitality. »Migrant« has turned into an empty vessel into which we may pour and then mix various meanings. Political decision-makers and monitors of media contents have endeavoured to fill this vessel with doubt, which acts to smother the public's sympathy for people on the move who may have needed to renounce their home/homeland overnight to save their very lives or had other pressing and valid reasons to emigrate.

If borders (and thus states) simply did not exist, migrations anywhere and at any time would not be seen as a problem, but merely the natural,

unhindered, free flow of people. States, borders and the concepts of citizenship are therefore, and not migrations per se, the principal issue here. That migrations in themselves are not a problem does not imply they are not associated with any issues; on the contrary, they are far more numerous than the ones briefly described above. Real and urgent issues relating to migrations that have recently also surfaced as research challenges are, for example, the acceptance of systemic violence against people on the move as self-evident in the name of »safety«; the normalisation of otherwise unacceptable cruelty in the case of Others; the paradox between conceiving migrations as a threat to human rights and the human right to migrate; migrants' traumatic homesickness pointing to the irreversible loss of rich local cultures, which host societies' 'integration' efforts only intensify; the selective, declarative openness and yet actual closedness of the EU's borders where everything flows freely except for people; the Balkan states, and especially Bosnia and Herzegovina as a migration filter, a sink hole and a buffer for migrations into Europe – to list just a few examples.

Below, we address the implications for states and the issues and limitations of the state-supported production of scientific knowledge on migration, by analysing theoretical insights pertinent to the Balkan Migration Route together with the aim of demonstrating the spectrum and deficiencies of theorising in migration studies. The research question we aim to answer in this text is how the turbulent events on Balkan Route since 2015 challenged the scholarship on migration and how the insistence on the agency of the migrants epistemologically affects the research on migration route. The text as it is based on, first, a series of academic debates on the topic in 2019 and then combined with extensive ethnographic material<sup>1</sup> gathered after 2015 along the Balkan migrant route on official migration policies, facilities and measures, NGO actions in the field and, primarily, many interviews with migrants themselves that provided them with an opportunity to think about and tell (and, importantly, choose not to tell) their experience. In the introduction, we explain specific challenges to be met by researchers in theory as well as in fieldwork pertaining to migrations, and summarise

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<sup>1</sup> *This text is based on ethnographic research conducted by the authors on the Balkan route since 2015. The research took the form of volunteering during the existence of a formalised refugee corridor in 2015–2016 in either in the framework of an official humanitarian NGO or of an autonomous solidarity collective. After the official corridor was closed, the newly established solidarity structures in the Balkan region (in Northern Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia) have become the focus of research. Such participatory research allowed us to witness the suffering and struggle of the people on the move after they had again been forced into clandestine practices. Following the change in direction taken by the route in the early 2018, Bosnia and Herzegovina has become the main site of our research interest and in spring 2019 the ethnographic research that lasted for several months was conducted there. Its focus was the local autonomous solidarity structures, the attitude of public authorities and various sectors of civil society, and the plight of people on the move and their social practices.*

the current situation of the case study presented of the Balkan migrant route. In the core part of the text, fundamental concepts of critical border and migration studies are introduced and discussed, such as competing discourses on (state) power, sovereignty and human rights, and the subjectivity of migrants. Results of empirical research on the Balkan migrant route are outlined with respect to the phenomenon of “assemblages of mobility”. Our conclusions are thus founded on relevant fieldwork and critical examinations of migrations scholarship, which we attempt to broaden by introducing concepts that allow new perspectives on migrations and their scholarship today.

### **Migrant Agency and Europeanisation along the Balkan Route: Moving from Political to Epistemological**

The various challenges and issues in migration studies stemming from the ongoing European ‘migrant crisis’ may be overcome and many researchers have sought to tackle them by not speaking and thinking *about* migrants but *with* them. Despite the obstacles and genuine danger on migrant routes, several academic studies (for example, see Holmes: 2013) have been produced in recent years that are a result of temporary embedment in migrants’ existence. Informed and insightful communication with migrants is possible, despite the linguistic and bureaucratic barriers. Researchers who attempted to empower and subjectivise migrants by inviting them to articulate their self-reflections have had to step outside of the academic confines, but for the good reason of refusing to limit knowledge production exclusively to the modern Western, state-oriented scientific research format.

Although the events of 2015 do not mark the start of a migrant route through the Balkans (Bojadžijev and Mezzadra, 2015), they certainly triggered its notoriety and the beginning of what was initially called a refugee crisis and, more recently, a migration crisis (De Genova, 2017), which has sent seismic waves into the fragile European political construction. The discord in the acting together of European states that was already visible during the recent global financial crisis was further accentuated in 2015, especially the discord between the ‘core’ EU member states and the peripheral post-socialist member states. The somewhat prevailing narrative of those events seemingly contrasted the more welcoming and human rights-oriented approach of the former and the unwelcoming and repressive approach adopted by the latter. German Chancellor Angela Merkel was accused of making a serious error that would destabilise societies across Europe by opening Germany’s borders to asylum-seekers stranded on the route in Budapest. Yet, at the same time, Hungary had built a wall along its border to stop people on the move trying to reach Germany and other

western and northern EU member states and was accused of being repressive and neglecting human rights, the Geneva Convention on Refugees, and international law. Since then, this rift has only grown, creating two political camps with a considerable impact on current European political dynamics: a liberal camp represented by the 'core' EU member states and an illiberal authoritarian camp that includes the Višegrad group countries and various versions of populist right-wing political movements and parties.

While our intention is not to dive deeper into this liberal-illiberal chasm that has emerged following the events on and around the Balkan Route, there is one aspect of it that should be elaborated. In the approaches of both the liberal and illiberal camps, with one claiming to manage migration based on respect for human rights and the other demanding the closure and fortification of the EU's borders, the existence of the migrants' agency is ignored (Kurnik, 2019). While the latter approach appeals to the sovereign prerogatives of states that supposedly have an unlimited right to decide who has access to the national territory, the former approach recognises that such a right is limited by the universal character of human rights and international law. Still, recognition of the plurality of norms that one must comply with does not lead to recognition that the border and migration regime is constantly being negotiated and that migrant subjectivity, i.e. the set of practices, knowledges, behaviours of people on the move, constitutes such a regime (*ibid.*). Both approaches therefore consider people who are crossing borders regardless of their entitlement to do so as simple objects of state policies. However, we argue that people on the move remain political subjects wherever they may find themselves.

In ethnography-based scholarship in particular, one can find accounts of the agency of people who tried and are still trying to reach their destination by traversing migrant routes (Papadopoulus, Stephenson and Tsianos, 2008) like the Balkan Route (El-Shaarawi and Razsa, 2019). Researchers who witnessed the drama unfold at the Kelety train station in Budapest in the late summer of 2015 called those events the Summer of Migration (Kasperek and Speer, 2015). They thereby emphasised that it is impossible to interpret the events that led to the humanitarian corridor being established prior to the EU's deal with Turkey in March 2016 without taking the collective agency of people on the move into consideration. The temporary suspension of the EU's borders and the migration regime based on the Schengen and Dublin agreements for which Chancellor Merkel was so harshly criticised would not have happened without the insistent protest march in the direction of the Austrian border by a determined multitude of migrants (*ibid.*). Moreover, this agency cannot be understood without taking account of the forms of collective struggle and organising that characterised the mass protest movements during the 'Arab Spring', later suppressed by an authoritarian and



violent backlash that forced so many into exile (Fargues, 2017). Likewise, the social practices or what is sometimes referred to as the migrant subjectivity of transnational migrants needs to be considered to fully understand how events like the Summer of Migration and mobility struggles on migrant routes were made possible. As critical migration scholars highlight, transnational migrant routes are complex and ambiguous environments as a result of the social practices of people on the move (Hess, 2018). They carve out migrant itineraries superimposed by state practices of control over mobility that attempt to keep those itineraries within manageable routes (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickles, 2015).

By considering and acknowledging migrant subjectivity we can write another history of migrant routes from the perspective of mobility struggles. Since the humanitarian corridor was established in the late summer of 2015 and its later closure in spring 2016, extensive ethnographic research on the Balkan Route has been conducted by various authors.<sup>2</sup> Those ethnographies that often refer to the tradition of militant research mainly focus on the ways the different state and non-state agencies co-constitute regimes of mobility along the route and how migrant agency is constitutive of the European migration and border regime. According to their narrative of the Balkan Route, the opening of the official humanitarian corridor and thereby the temporary suspension of the EU's border and migration regime was not a hospitable gesture but a concession to mobility which the EU powers were forced to grant to the migrant multitudes (El-Shaarawi and Razsa, 2019).

The temporary opening of state borders along the route and simultaneous suspension of the Schengen and Dublin regulations, together with the organisation of state-sponsored transport to allow the fast transit of hundreds of thousands of refugees to Europe's north, were needed to eventually suppress excessive mobility on the route, to impose control over the unruly migrant itineraries and to reintroduce the regime of mobility control. Subsequent closure – albeit never fully successful – of the route would not have been possible without its temporary legalisation (Kurnik and Razsa, 2020). The formalisation of the humanitarian corridor between September 2015 and March 2016 was therefore simply an effort by the member states to reimpose total control over the migrant route (*ibid.*). To achieve this aim, member states made use of (bio)political technologies intended to make the population easily controlled and manageable, such as the categorisation and segmentation of what may be referred to as an irreducible multiplicity into 'legitimate' migrants (initially refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan,

<sup>2</sup> See *Bez nec, Speer and Stojić Mitrović, 2016; Bez nec and Kurnik, 2020; El-Shaarawi and Razsa, 2019; Hameršak and Pleše, 2017; Kasperek and Speer, 2015; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020; Lunaček Brumen and Meh, 2016; Pistotnik, Lipovec Čebren and Kozinc, 2016; Stojić Mitrović, Ahmetašević, Bez nec and Kurnik, 2020; Župarić-Iljić and Valenta, 2019.*

later only Syrians) and ‘illegitimate’ economic migrants (all the rest) as well as the prohibition of all forms of involvement in mitigation of the humanitarian crisis along the migrant route that are not sponsored and authorised by the state (*ibid.*).

This attack on what may be called the autonomy of migration (De Genova, 2017; Papadopoulus, Stephenson and Tsianos, 2008) was occurring against the backdrop of the European integration processes (Bez nec and Kurnik, 2020; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020). Obviously, states along the Balkan route had different views on their role in the restoration of Europe’s border and migration regime. Some were relentlessly repressive (besides Hungary, Slovenia) while others were more permissive, at least initially (such as Serbia). Some immediately imposed the state monopoly over management of the route (Slovenia and Croatia), while others (Serbia again) even after the official corridor was closed continued to tolerate informal migrant itineraries with autonomously managed shelters and camps. These differences may be explained by the different structural positions in the processes of European integration held by the states along the route (*ibid.*). In part, they were also due to the different historical traditions and mentalities in dealing with migration in these societies. Ethnographic research conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ahmetašević and Mlinarević, 2019; Bez nec and Kurnik, 2020; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020) in particular, which has lately been transformed into a buffer zone for migrants or what some describe as a “dumping ground” (Stojić Mitrović; Ahmetašević; Bez nec and Kurnik, 2020), shows that Europeanisation relative to introduction of the EU’s border and migration regime in the region should be understood in more than one way: as the harmonisation of legislation and norms according to the EU’s standards and as the acceptance/imposition of the very notions of ‘being in common’ that were coined during Europe’s colonial modernity. The drama on the Balkan migrant route may thus be interpreted as yet another aspect of the re-imposition and reconfiguration of colonial power relations in the Balkans which Europeanisation as a whole has come to stand for (Bez nec and Kurnik, 2020; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020; Stojić Mitrović et al., 2020). The decisive, although tacit and almost invisible role of the EU and the ‘core’ member states in repressing the freedom of movement, the pivotal role of global migration management agencies like the International Organization of Migration (IOM) in the restoration of mobility control, the subordinate role of nation states whose constitutions are based on a colonial imaginary (such as the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also elsewhere), endogenous forms of ethno-national exclusivism and racism, the persistence of counter-hegemonic political legacies and traditions that are mobilised in solidarity with struggles for the freedom of movement – all of the above insights produced by ongoing ethnographic research reveal not only how

the coloniality of power affects the making and remaking of migrant routes but also the potential held by mobility struggles to generate a postcolonial critique in the borderlands which are crossed and co-constituted by the migrant routes (*ibid.*).

### **Critical Border and Migration Studies**

Migrants have dignity. It is essential to acknowledge and respect this fact to be able to understand migration. Yet, this simple postulate is completely overlooked in official attempts to manage migration. As mentioned, the two opposing approaches to the 'migrant crisis' – one that claims it is possible to manage migration and human mobility while acknowledging human rights and the rule of law, and the other that claims absolute rights of the state over deciding who may enter its territory – share in common a disregard for migrant agency (Kurnik, 2019). Such disregard is also seen in the dominant scientific approaches to migration which insist on push-and-pull theories that reduce migrating people to passive objects. We therefore argue that this ignorance is not merely politically driven but has its roots in the dominant epistemology. The modern Western way of producing knowledge is to silence its objects. De Castro refers to objectifying triangulation as a procedure in which those who produce knowledge impose terms on the object of knowing (De Castro, 2009: 53). Further, according to De Castro, such knowledge production is analogous to the ways the establishment of modern sovereignty is conceived (*ibid.*) The sovereign, as the proponents of the exceptionalist theory argue, exempts itself from the relationship with its subjects and imposes terms of interaction onto the ruled subjects. This means that modern epistemology is developing parallel to the modern sovereign nation state. Due to this parallel development, modern state and science tend to homogenise human collectivities and conceive of a border as an exclusivist separator. Both focus on fixed identities and establish a taxonomy, i.e. a hierarchical classification by category and identity. If migration is an irreducible multiplicity as the proponents of the theory of autonomy of migration (Bojadžijev, 2009; Pajnik, 2019) argue, the current situation on the Balkan Route and other migrant routes then highlights the gap between state and non-state subjectivity. Migrants as a non-state subjectivity reject the very essence of the modern statist epistemology, namely taxonomy, i.e. the hierarchical integration of non-state subjectivity. The repression and violence along the route are about the categorisation and identification that is enforced on migrants as a transnational, non-state subjectivity. Influenced by migrant movements and reflections on the crisis of the modern concept of political subject, critical border and migration studies started to challenge the established and objectifying approaches to migration (Hess, 2011; Hess,

2012; Hess, 2016; Hess, 2018; Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickles, 2015). The change in the conception of power that is the hallmark of poststructuralism considerably informed this challenge. Power is immanent; there is no unique centre of its rationality, no transcendent source and therefore no monopoly of the state over the articulation of power relations. This position implies that the articulation of a border and migration regime is to be interpreted as a result of various agencies that span from supranational instances, nation states, NGOs as well as migrants' practices of mobility. The border and migration regime is hence not an expression of the absolute power held by nation states, but evolves through incessant negotiations involving multiple agents, comprising mobility struggles that also constitute this regime (Bez nec and Kurnik, 2020; Kurnik, 2019). What we are actually dealing with is a strategy shaped by various agencies that possess different degrees of power not only in quantitative terms but in qualitative terms as well. Excessive and unauthorised practices of mobility that subvert attempts to bridle and subjugate it are therefore an expression of the other power that gives a potential basis for an a(nti)-hegemonic<sup>3</sup> political project (ibid.). Critical migration and border studies therefore engage in an ascending analysis similar to the one suggested by Foucault (Foucault, 2008). Such analysis grasps the ways power relations are being articulated from below, in capillaries and on the margins, and enables the overall scheme of subjugation to be identified. On the other hand, it also allows the grasping of the other power or a(nti)-hegemony that emerges from resistances which are part of power, too.

The deconstructivist approach that de-naturalises and de-objectifies the notions of migration and border (Hess, 2012) permits us to detect how the migration and border regime is articulated in times of 'governance'. One cannot understand the ways a regime is actually being articulated without taking account of the plurality and heterogeneity of the agencies it includes. Moreover, we may thus focus on the political subjectivity of migration, which is obscured by the legal discourse on migrations in both versions, the human rights' one and the sovereigntist one (Kurnik, 2019; Papadopoulus, Stephenson and Tsianos, 2008). When considering the ways Foucault (2010) rejected the legal discourse and related repressive hypothesis on power, it is not difficult to understand that migration and mobility generally are not a deviation from the canon of sedentariness; instead, they constitute one of the central contemporary social practices upon which power is being articulated. One could argue further, paraphrasing Foucault, that power in times of global integrated capitalism does not repress migration and mobility

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<sup>3</sup> We use the expression a(nti)-hegemonic beyond a simple opposition to hegemony, as the non-hegemonic aggregation and articulation of differences.

but encourages it, articulates it from within, directs it and bridles it; by and through all of this power establishes relations of exploitation, hierarchy and discrimination. With respect to the drama on the Balkan Route, i.e. restoration of Europe's border and migration regime in the Balkans, one should keep in mind that the European Union is a political entity that promotes circulation and that its core principle is freedom of movement (of capital, goods, services and labour force). Yet, saying that this entity favours migration and mobility does not mean that there is no repression. Savage repression against excessive and unauthorised mobility is used to limit mobility and to articulate global relations of inequality and domination. The globalised world is one of normalised mobility. Mobility is therefore not an excess but a (regulated) norm. It is only when it is excessive in the sense that it challenges the distribution of power, identifications and categorisations that it becomes subject to state repression, but also an act of liberation (Kurnik, 2019).

### **From Migrant Escape Routes to Infrapolitics and Heterotopias**

Research on transit migration in terms of escape routes (Papadopoulus, Stephenson and Tsianos, 2008) and the role of flight in constitution of the modern labour market (Boutang, 1998) highlights the centrality of escape and excessive mobility in the articulation of modern and postmodern capitalist power relations. Papadopoulus, Stephenson and Tsianos (2008) conceive of escape as constitutive of sovereignty or, better, of transnational and post-liberal sovereignty. The logic of the foundation of sovereign power, its substantiality and transcendent legitimation is now obsolete. Sovereign power is based on the arbitrariness of borders that emerge wherever there is a need to organise the social space and political governance with the aim to control and limit mobility. Its protagonists are both state and non-state institutions that act upon ad hoc normative principles defined in zones of exception, where human rights are deactivated (*ibid.*). Such zones of exception are conflict zones in which attempts to normalise mobility through identification, characterisation and its refinement are incessantly subverted by practices that re-appropriate the conditions of mobility. The state of exception on migrant routes is the combination of dehumanisation from above – with the aim to enforce control over mobility so that the population is hierarchised and managed, and de-subjectivisation from below – the myriad practices of de-identification, becoming, the invention of new biographies, i.e. practices that transcend the sovereign subject form (*ibid.*).

The latter practices largely fall into the category of infra-political action. Scott (1990) identified the infra-political as the cultural and structural substratum of those more visible forms of action which attract the most scholarly

attention. "So long as we confine our conception of the political to activity that is openly declared", Scott asserts, "we are driven to conclude that subordinate groups essentially lack a political life or that what political life they do have is restricted to those exceptional moments of popular explosion" (Scott, 1990: 199). Infrapolitics is relevant to how migration is conceived because it may predict that a movement, i.e. mass migration, is coming (Worth and Kuhling, 2004: 35-36) or because it allows actors to retain, uphold or perpetuate their capacity for agency when the political context precludes any serious chance of making tangible political gains (Chvasta, 2006: 5-6). Since they are deprived of access to legitimate channels for expression, people on the move cannot and will not articulate their claims via the conventional political channels, but will resort to action 'below the radar' to reclaim their dignity, be it individually or collectively. Furthermore, according to Scott, subaltern forms of resistance produce "hidden transcripts," namely, critiques of power that escape the notice of the dominant and contrast with the "public transcripts" of power relations, which may contain no record of opposition. Such discretion allows the dominated to covertly resist being symbolically appropriated by the dominant. In the case of migrants, such infra-political acts include hunger strikes, the demolition of border barriers, self-management in migrant centres and refugee camps, but also vandalism, arson, flights from state-controlled facilities, the voluntary discarding of identity papers, applying for asylum and moving on to another country etc., at the price of counter minimising their material appropriation (Scott, 1990: 188). Infra-political acts thus operate insidiously below the threshold of political detectability, making them all the more reliable vehicles of resistance: the less detectable they are, the more efficiently they conceal the resistance they inspire among the dominated (Marche, 2012).

The empowerment potential held by migration may also be detectable via another theoretical concept, the Foucauldian heterotopia. The heterotopia is a placeless place "in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invent the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect. These spaces ... are linked with all the others, yet however contradict all the other sites" (Foucault, 1984: 47) and hold a mirror up to society as a whole. And what are migrant centres and refugee camps, indeed, entire migrant routes interspersed by border regimes, but heterotopias? In line with the Foucauldian heterotopology, migrant facilities and routes can now be found in every European country, yet they may function differently depending on whether they are in the 'core' EU states or on the margins of Europe; they are a juxtaposition of several spaces because they exist in facilities and locations previously intended for other purposes; they function in heterochronia or different schedules and time frames than the rest of society (for migrants waiting for their status their time/life is on

hold); migration-related spaces presuppose a system of opening and closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable; and they have a function in relation to all of the space that remains outside them, which in the case of migration is not one of illusion or compensation but of exclusion (ibid: 48).

### **Fieldwork-based insight: assemblages of mobility and the 'Bosnian paradigm'**

Ever since the official refugee corridor was closed in March 2016, people on the move have faced increasing state repression. The plight of refugees and migrants might lull us into thinking that violence on the borders confirms the aforementioned sovereigntist hypothesis whereby the sovereign nation state is back, having regained its monopoly over force and norms in its designated territory. Given the empirical reality on the Balkan Route, we do not argue in favour of such a hypothesis (Beznec and Kurnik, 2020). Although state violence, such as the illegal pushbacks orchestrated by the Slovenian and Croatian police (Info Kolpa, 2019), drastically increase the human and material costs of unauthorised mobility, the borders remain porous, some kind of "asymmetrical membranes" that "produce new hierarchies of people while categorize and process uncontrolled mobilities as different migrant categories" (Hess, 2018). Border violence therefore does not lead to the restoration of the nation state's sedentariness, but enables the stratification and segmentation of the social space; Mezzadra and Nielsen would refer to this as the "multiplication of labour", which is an effect of the mobility regime (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013).

In an attempt to make an epistemological argument based on such an empirical insight, we claim that migration requires political categories to become immanent, i.e. for the opening of synthetic political categories and introduction of antagonism within them. It requires that essentialist ontology give space for relational ontology. Mignolo (2012) and De Castro (2009) demonstrate the way in which synthesised categories are the outcome of the coloniality of power. According to Mignolo (2012: 49-126), the critique of colonial power dismantles the universal site of enunciation and establishes hybrid sites of enunciation. De Castro (2009: 53-54) conceives epistemological decolonisation as the rejection of comparison as an objectifying triangulation (sovereign, state science) and the affirmation of comparison and translation as the mutual implication and transformation (the science of multiplicity). Elaborating on such claims, we might state that migration as excessive mobility evades (colonial) sovereignty and its identification and categorisation procedures and is thus a practical critique of coloniality. Migration co-creates assemblages of mobility, the notion we



have been using to narrate the mutual articulation of the mobility struggles and the local a(nti)hegemonic (antimodern and anticolonial) discourses and traditions along the Balkan Route (Beznec and Kurnik, 2020; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020). Assemblages of mobility are hybrid spaces of enunciation in which mutual transformation and contamination allow us to articulate a postcolonial critique in Europe's borderlands. For this reason, a precondition for reintroducing control over human mobility was to dismantle the assemblages of mobility, i.e. the joint agencies of migrant social practices and local anti-hegemonic social practices that allowed for some sort of self-management of the route. The criminalisation of solidarity such as the increased policing of the people who help migrants (Resoma, 2020) and the mobilisation of nationalist and racist sentiments in society are the two principal methods used for dismantling the assemblages of mobility.

At present, Bosnia and Herzegovina is like a disposal site, a location where the EU drastically decelerates the movement of people in transit after they have left the EU member states of Greece and Bulgaria in an attempt to reach other EU member states. The function of this disposal site is to normalise and curtail the excessive mobility of people on the move by using brutal selection mechanisms. The illegal and violent pushbacks are mostly directed against people who cannot afford smugglers and must therefore walk through the hostile territories of Croatia and Slovenia. Such a 'dumping ground' cannot be understood without taking account of the neo-colonial relations between the EU and its neighbouring states. The colonial prejudice that contends Others are incapable of ruling themselves (Heller, de Genova, Stierl, Tazzioli and van Baar, 2015) is clearly visible in the ways the EU is managing the migrant route in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By relying on global agencies such as the IOM, the EU is circumventing Bosnia and Herzegovina's national and local decision-makers and adding to the further deterioration of public authorities (Ahmetašević and Mlinarević, 2019). Bosnia and Herzegovina is a protectorate of the 'international community' and its Dayton Constitution enshrines nationalist aggression against the multicultural and plural Bosnia and Herzegovina by giving exclusive power to the ethno-nationalist oligarchies that paralyse any meaningful functioning of the public authorities. This leads to extreme forms of neglect and related tensions between local populations and people on the move. Another aspect of Europeanisation as a neo-colonial subjugation that is responsible for the plight of the people on the move in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the adoption of the European nation form (Balibar, 2004: 11-30) as the exclusive matrix of statehood and constitution of the political community, despite the rich regional history of inclusive conceptions of being in common based on diversity and heterogeneity (Mujkić, 2019). Europe's 'dumping ground' for the people on the move in Bosnia and Herzegovina thus emerges in the

context of the aggressive nationalisation of ethnic and religious belongings and state racism (Bjelić, 2018), which all contribute to dehumanisation of these people on the move.

Regardless of the growing hostility against the people on the move in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ethnographic militant research we conducted in 2019 (Bez nec and Kurnik, 2020; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020) reveals mutual articulation between the mobility struggles and the local a(nti)hegemonic political legacies which may be referred to as the “Bosnian paradigm” (Mujkić, 2019). The solidarity with the people on the move turned out to be inspired by a new wave of politicisation that confronts the ethno-nationalist exclusivism<sup>4</sup> and is historically rooted in a(nti)hegemonic discourses and traditions<sup>5</sup> that made Bosnia a “corpus separatum of European modernity, as a body that is not uniform, homogeneous, but is made of differences in constant process of differentiation” (ibid.). These are the shared characteristics of political bodies that are shaped by their rejection of the logic of hegemony. Migrant subjectivity may be considered as such a political body. When migrants cross Europe’s borders and form assemblages of mobility with other political bodies that reject the hegemonic, European, Western and colonial conceptions of being in common, they encourage decolonisation processes. Migrant subjectivity may prove to be a formidable power that will physically and conceptually open up Europe. The end of history in which migrants figure as mere objects is the beginning of histories of mobility struggles.

## Conclusion

Our principal intent with this text was to look back at the past 5 years from the current perspective to assess and discuss which developments in border and migration studies have been spurred by the ongoing European migrant situation, particularly the Balkan migrant route. Alliances of local solidarity activists and people on the move, that we together with some other researchers conceptualized as assemblages of mobility (Bez nec and Kurnik, 2020; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020), have clearly shown the necessity to consider agency of migrants and assemblages they form with local population and hidden a(nti)hegemonic political traditions. The necessity to

<sup>4</sup> *Spanning from revolution in 2013, mass protests in 2014 and solidarity initiatives during the times of floods.*

<sup>5</sup> *This is the history of the Bosnian church, of persistent attitudes of indifference when faced with imperial and hegemonic projects, of the communist idea of B&H statehood that informed the establishment of national liberation councils in WWII and thus the self-management and non-alignment ideas and practices, and finally of refugeeism as an escape from the dominant ethno-national matrix during the last nationalist aggression and war.*

consider centrality of what we also call migrant subjectivity is certainly the first answer to initial research question about the consequences of turbulent events on Balkan Route since 2015 for migration scholarship. Furthermore, the focus on the hybrid sites of enunciation (Mignolo, 2012) that are characteristic for such assemblages has led us to explore, referring to critical border and migration studies and ethnographies of migrant routes, epistemological potential of such Copernican turn in migration studies (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickles, 2015). Critical rejection of state centred approach on migration allows us to consider migration not as an object of study but as a perspective, as a hybrid site of articulation that allows us to open up notions used in political science, to make them immanent, to expose unequal and violent relations that are at their bases, to transform the border between us and Others into shared and common space of articulation and social transformation that seeks inclusive world that is commonly shared.

We established the important role played in public perception by the political invention of “migrant” and the associated terminology. This (political) reality-shaping discourse informs the rise of European populisms by feeding into fears and phantasms about Others on one hand and, on the other, it importantly intervenes in the EU accession process of EU candidate countries along the Balkan route, thus reaffirming neo-colonial power relations for anachronistic nation states squeezed between two empires, past and present: (Ottoman) Turkey and the European Union. However, as we have demonstrated, this space-between of the Balkan migrant route is a space of permanent crisis as much as an opportunity for a (conceptual) renewal based on local traditions.

The events that followed the amazing episode of Europe’s opening up in 2015 with a multitude of people on the move forcing the EU powers to temporarily suspend its border and migration regime may be interpreted as a manifestation of the central contradiction of postcolonial Europe. The status quo of the institution of a “border” of citizenship (Balibar, 2004: 76) that excludes former colonial subjects proves to be untenable, except at the cost of the extreme violence which people on the move are presently facing on the Balkan Route. The common struggle against this violence, for the dignity and rights of the people on the move reintroduces the promise of the universal emancipation of citizenship, making active citizens on both sides of a border, dismantling its institution that turned out to only be sustained by force.

When we stop observing the Balkan migration route through the lenses of rights and legal foundations and axioms of representation, the political subjectivity of migration that emerges in the space between origin and destination via de-identification, invisibility and imperceptibility as the main strategies of excessive mobility becomes detectable. The scandal of the

migration routes marked by dehumanisation, blatant racism, and state and para state violence demonstrates more than the declining rule of law or a state of exception that constitutes sovereignty and the rule of law. A subjectivity of imperceptible politics (Papadopoulus, Stephenson and Tsianos, 2008) can be identified there that emerges beyond the liberalist horizon and provides a glimpse of an a(nti)hegemonic political project while modern political forms recede irreversibly. Migrant struggles are therefore at the forefront of contemporary anti-capitalist and anti-colonial struggles.

Migrant routes such as the Balkan Route may be interpreted as worksites of Europe's opening (Kurnik, 2015). The assemblages of mobility which form on and along the route have the potential to stimulate the decolonisation of Europe's borderlands and Europe as a whole. On one hand, they articulate a critique of the coloniality of power that is easily perceived in the externalisation of Europe's border and migration regime. On the other hand, they point to the historical and latent presence of other (alter) conceptions of political community based on difference and heterogeneity and thereby to the alternatives to the modern, Western, European conception that is anchored in the notion of sovereignty and in nation form. The ethnographic research we conducted along the Balkan Route and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina has led to a narrative on the migrant route that combines the affirmation of migrant subjectivity and affirmation of local a(nti)-hegemonic epistemologies, and therefore combines the dignity of the people on the move and the epistemological dignity of the territory that historically produced inclusive notions of being in common based on difference and heterogeneity.

After the Arab Spring and the Summer of Migration, what we have come to witness may well be EUrope's Fall. We are about to see whether the 'fall' in question is the final failure of the unrealistic idea of an open, tolerant and humane EUrope, or if 'fall' may still translate into a period of maturity when past mistakes have been learned from, hollowed-out concepts have reached their expiry date and the (political) space will be truly shared by all inhabiting it, with dignity and humility.

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## CLIMATE CRISIS: TIME TO RETHINK ECONOMIC PLANNING BY DEMYSTIFYING CAPITALISM AND ITS MARKET(S)

*Abstract.* The purpose of the article is to open up epistemological space for revitalising the idea of democratic economic planning as a viable alternative vision. It argues that a proper development of the idea must be preceded by a comprehensive critical interrogation of a hegemonic multidimensional ideological mystification of capitalism and its markets. By utilizing Marxist and eco-socialist insights the article identifies and analyses several central ideological mystifications that enact an epistemic closure. These range from the obfuscation of capitalism's role in creating the climate crisis as an inherently unsustainable system, to the mystification of its non-evolutionary origins, to the obfuscation of the role economic planning plays in contemporary capitalism, to the mystification of markets as ideal spaces of freedom and innovation obfuscating the ever present market-related oppression, exploitation and environmental devastation, and to silencing concrete historical examples of democratic economic planning such as project Cybersyn that should serve as an inspiration for imagining an alternative order.

**Keywords:** climate change, ideological mystification, democratic economic planning, capitalism, neoliberalism

### Introduction

Although the present corona crisis has reduced global economic activity, harmful emissions, natural resource exploitation and various types of pollution, this should only be seen as a temporary slowdown of an otherwise unsustainable, ecologically devastating and exploitative economic system. The climate crisis caused by the capitalist global system is becoming more

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and more critical. Most political and economic elites and the public regard the climate crisis as being in need of globally coordinated solutions. Still, this perception is not universally shared, with far-right populist elites and governments (e.g. Trump's USA) and their supporters rejecting any type of coordination as an attack on national sovereignty. They perceive climate change itself as a hoax and a left-wing conspiracy. Despite the appearance that these two positions are diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive, they both operate in a shared capitalist framework. More specifically, they operate in the contemporary neoliberal capitalist framework (see Mirowski, 2014). Climate change denialism and the dominant solutions proposed for the climate crisis share a common imaginary characterised by unlimited faith in capitalism. The climate change denialism camp reinforces the existing status quo by doubling down on existing neoliberal policies and practices that exacerbate inequality, poverty and ecological degradation. This is accompanied by nationalistic, racist and chauvinistic rhetoric and policies that strive to harness and refocus people's anger due to their deteriorating living conditions onto historically discriminated minorities. On the other hand, the hegemonic camp of supporters of global solutions is reinforcing the status quo by viewing climate change as the result of market failures and primarily as an issue of wrong incentives. The solutions formulated in this framework are market and technologically based and elite/technocratically led. Despite it being declared that these solutions will establish a more sustainable system, the reality of these imagined and implemented solutions (e.g. emission markets) is their failure to address climate change (see Rogers, 2013). This failure of the dominant solutions is inextricably connected with the hegemony of the neoliberal capitalist ideology that allows no space for an alternative politico-economic order. Hence, the central issues of climate change related to environmental inequality and climate justice, the issue of people's needs vs. corporate profits, the issue of public goods and the commons vs. private property etc. cannot be addressed properly. When political, economic and scientific elites do consider these issues, they address them via an implicit market-driven, top-down, technocratic, status-quo-reproducing framework that gives the appearance of progressiveness while reproducing the status quo. Yet, most climate scientists argue that our societies should be radically transformed in view of the climate crisis (Wallace-Wells, 2020). It is understandable that their specific areas of expertise mean they do not offer ideas on how this can be achieved. However, even in the scientific fields that should offer and popularize alternative visions there seems to be a predominant silence concerning alternative frameworks for a radical transformation of society. This is disconcerting considering that the present status quo cannot be retained if we wish to respond to the climate crisis and mitigate its most serious consequences. But even if we mitigate these

consequences, our societies will still need to adapt to the changed climate as we inevitably face up to the impacts of a warmer planet.

The idea of democratic economic planning is potentially one of the most suitable frameworks for imagining, formulating and implementing the radical transformation of existing politico-economic and societal arrangements to make them sustainable in an effort to address the climate crisis. If it is properly developed and implemented, the idea can offer both a vision for reducing the effects of the climate crisis and for adapting societies to the new situation. It removes the need and the logic for the continuous accumulation of profits and the continuous intensification of exploitation of natural resources and human labor (see Phillips & Rozworski, 2019).

However, the idea of democratic economic planning needs to be revitalised before we can develop it further. The present context is characterized by a specific ideological mystification of capitalism and denigration of proper alternatives above all the notion of (democratic) economic planning. This enables the closure of the epistemological space and prevents the popularization of alternative visions of society among the general public, a necessary precondition for the needed radical socio-political and economic transformation (see Patel & Moore, 2017).

Hence, the central question that will guide our analysis is how to open up epistemological space to revitalize the idea of democratic economic planning as a viable framework for a radical transformation of society? We argue that the proper development of the idea of democratic economic planning, must be preceded by the identification and interrogation of the specific ideological mystifications of the present capitalist system that enable an epistemic closure. By utilizing and building upon Marxist (e.g. Neurath, 2006; Wood, 2017; Phillips & Rozworski, 2019) and Eco-socialist (e.g. Patel & Moore, 2017; Saito, 2017) analyses, critiques and demystification of capitalism, its genesis, nature, characteristics and planetary consequences the article addresses several dimension of the contemporary mystification of capitalism to enact an opening of the epistemological space. These dimensions range from capitalism's connection to climate change, its genesis and nature, its central contemporary characteristics, and the capitalist critiques of democratic economic planning in its theoretical and concrete forms. Hence, in the first part the article addresses the most obvious epistemological obstacle namely the lack of understanding by the public concerning the severity of the climate crisis and its fundamental cause. It critically interrogates this lack of understanding as a crucial feature of the present ideological mystification of capitalism that is performed by the neoliberal ideology, which also provides the hegemonic framework for most "realistic" solutions for the climate crisis that reaffirm the unsustainable status quo. This is followed by a demystification of the historical genesis of capitalism

as the mystification of its origins naturalises capitalism and represents the starting point of capitalist critiques of planning in contemporary elite and popular discourses, thereby establishing a central obstacle for opening up epistemological space. In the third part, we address the actual centrality of planning in contemporary capitalism, thereby demystifying its current functioning and problematizing the presumed impossibility of planning in an advanced economy. In part four, we analyse the socialist calculation debate and by utilizing the forgotten insights of Otto Neurath demystify the central arguments for capitalist markets and the critique of planning offered by von Mises and Hayek, the ‘fathers’ of neoliberalism, thereby addressing the obstacle of the presumed theoretical impossibility of democratic economic planning. Finally, we focus on Cybersyn, the Chilean project of socialist democratic planning implemented in the early 1970s by the Allende government and crushed by the Pinochet coup, thereby addressing the obstacle of the presumed non-existence of historical precedence of democratic economic planning. We conclude the article by briefly reflecting on how our analysis opens up epistemological space for a future vision for democratic planning.

## **344** The misunderstood severity, consequences and nature of the climate crisis as a product of capitalism and its ideology

A proper understanding of the climate crisis is a crucial prerequisite in the process of imagining an alternative politico-economic system. Most people do not understand the serious consequences the climate crisis holds for societies. Various negative trends and process are intensifying, affecting almost every facet of the general functioning and survival of human societies. Although there is considerable uncertainty regarding the climate crisis’ future intensity, it all depends on the extent of global warming. According to IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) scientists, any global rise in temperature beyond 2 degrees by the year 2100 will bring catastrophic consequences (IPCC, 2015). In the context of the existing policies of major states and regional organisations, a 2- to 3-degree rise is a realistic scenario (Wallace-Wells, 2020). If we take this as our starting point, we may predict the intensification of extreme fires, extreme heat waves and long droughts. There will be shorter periods of cold temperatures, sea levels will rise, and floods will increase. Coastal settlements will become unliveable. There will also be shorter, yet extremely intense wet seasons. These changes will catastrophically affect the living conditions of a substantial part of the human population by lowering access to fresh water and reducing the capacity to produce food, while they will also destroy/limit any economic activity that depends on natural resources, including tourism. Hunger, epidemics

and pandemics will reach unprecedented levels of intensity and regularity (Steffen, Broadgate, Deutsch, Gaffney & Ludwig, 2015). These processes will precipitate fundamental societal, political and economic destabilisation. Such destabilisation will range from socio-political and economic collapse in parts of the world that will bear the brunt of climate change. We will witness an exponential rise in migration from these parts to areas with a milder climate and a still-functioning society. This will then intensify all negative economic and socio-political trends in countries that are less directly affected. All conflicts over rare resources will intensify. Conflicts among states and especially among regional and global powers and superpowers will grow as these states strive to consolidate their primacy or attain it amidst general planetary climate chaos. Further intensification of all reactionary, racist, xenophobic and fascist movements, practices and public policies that will inevitably popularise these ideas among the public are to be expected (Wainwright & Mann, 2018; Wallace-Wells, 2020).

A proper response to the seriousness of the crisis is lacking. Neither the claims made by most climate scientists that a radical transformation of our way of life is needed, nor the mobilisation of school children by climate media stars like Greta Thunberg seem able to change the situation. There is no substantial societal and political discussion underway concerning the alternative visions for our societies. This is due to the hegemony enjoyed by the neoliberal framework with respect to solving the climate crisis. This framework transforms the older techno-utopian frameworks for solving societal problems via the notions of free markets and competition that will lead to optimal solutions. The hegemony of neoliberalism may be seen in the notions of 'green capitalism', 'green growth' and sustainable development. They all propagate a mix of technocratic-technological-financial-market solutions for all central issues concerning the climate crisis. Various analyses of these 'solutions' demonstrate that they do not and will not radically alter the existing unsustainable politico-economic arrangements (Rogers, 2013). The dominant solutions for the climate crisis are an obstacle to successfully addressing the climate crisis.

These ideas form part of an operation conducted by economic elites and the professional-managerial class to co-opt the struggle against the climate crisis for the purpose of further accumulation and profits. Climate crisis is a direct outcome of the capitalist system. The genesis of global capitalism and the sharp rise of carbon emissions in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century coincide. This expresses the causal link between capitalism and the devastation of environment, which is historically unprecedented. Although capitalism is a very recent social formation, no prior formation altered our relationships with each other and the environment in such fundamental ways. Capitalism relies on a permanent drive towards accumulation (Patel & Moore, 2017).

It is organised around commodity production and consumption, driven by the imperative of expanding the accumulation of surplus value by realising profits. Aggregate economic growth is the paramount objective of all capitalist nation-states as, without it, there are no profits. Capitalism needs to convert ever growing amounts of natural resources into means of production and commodities for sale and consumption. It must treat nature as a set of resources to be exploited (Wainwright & Mann, 2018). The ecological crisis is a fundamental contradiction of capitalism because its drive to accumulation is eroding its own material conditions, which eventually confronts it with the limits of nature (severely deteriorated climate conditions) (Saito, 2017).

In the present neoliberal hegemony, alternative solutions that strive for a radical transformation such as democratic planning are dismissed for being unrealistic. Regardless of the many catastrophic consequences of capitalism, the explicit and implicit notion that capitalism is the most efficient, fair and natural system which offers the most choice is hegemonic (Fisher, 2009). This notion rests on a multidimensional mystification of capitalism, which centres specifically on the idealised notions of the free and competitive market(s) that colonise people's imaginations. Hence, to remove the obstacle to imagining alternatives like democratic planning, this multidimensional mystification of capitalism must be thoroughly dismantled.

### Demystifying the genesis and foundational characteristics of capitalism

The mystification of the genesis of capitalism is one of the biggest obstacles to imagining alternative visions like democratic economic planning as viable. The dominant narrative is based on a circular way of thinking that assumes the *a priori* existence of capitalism whose central characteristics such as profit-maximisation are always-already present in human societies. It appears when the shackles that constrain people's natural propensity to exchange on the market are enabled by the removal of political, ideological and religious obstacles and when a never clearly defined extent of commerce, urbanisation and wealth accumulation is achieved. The narrative posits that capitalism developed in Europe as it was the place where the supposed obstacles were finally lifted, and a certain natural development was reached. The imagining of capitalist markets as a simple mechanism of exchange plays the key part in this narrative since trade and markets have existed for millennia (Wood, 2017). The capitalist market appears by way of evolution and not revolution. This mystification holds a specific ideological function, namely to make capitalism appear like a universal natural progression of human societies and the pinnacle of human evolution. The

transhistorical understanding of the market is underpinned by the notion that the market, regardless of its historical form, is a space of opportunity and choice. Market forces that ensure economic rationality are coercive only insofar as they force economic actors to maximise opportunities and choice. Capitalist society can thus be imagined as the most rational, freest and best society for creating opportunities and choice (Slobodian, 2018).

Considering the actual origin of capitalism, the hegemonic narrative is implausible. It establishes a teleology that directly supports the existing status quo by making capitalism appear as an expression of human nature or social and biological evolution. It has a major unacknowledged issue concerning the place and time of the origin of capitalism, which makes the commercial thesis, the thesis concerning the centrality of the urban economy and the notion that capitalism was the teleological pinnacle of social and technological evolution, very problematic. Capitalism first appeared in the English countryside in the late 16<sup>th</sup> century (Marx, 2013). England was at that time far less commercially and technologically developed than the Dutch Republic, which was a vastly more logical birthplace of capitalism due to its extensive long-distance trade and its bourgeois dominated government. Capitalism originated in the countryside, not in the English towns and cities, which subverts the urban economy thesis. It did not evolutionarily develop from pre-capitalist market relations and is not the product of universal laws of development but of human decisions in a specific historical geopolitical and socio-political setting. It required a revolutionary transformation of human-human and human-nature relations. The radical transformation of social-property relations in the English countryside is key to understanding this revolution. When the market penetrated the production of food and social reproduction became mediated and determined by the market, capitalism was born (see Wood, 2017).

The origin of this complex process in England and specifically in the English countryside was predicated on a certain political and economic context. Compared to other European states, England was the most centralised state in the 16<sup>th</sup> century when a clear division was established between the extra-economic sovereign power of the monarchy and the extensive economic power of the elites. This division and the elites' massive landholdings ushered in the development of a unique agricultural system. In this system, most of the land was rented by tenants. The truly revolutionary nature of this arrangement lay in the transformation of the rent as the rents charged by the elites started to depend on the commercial profits made by their tenants, who began to be dependent on the market. Access would be given to the land to those able to produce competitively and therefore pay higher rents. It is here that market opportunity was transformed into market dependence, oppression and an imperative. This stimulated commodification,



increased productivity, and self-sustaining economic development. Small farmers were gradually dispossessed and became wage labourers for capitalist tenants (Marx, 2013). Hence, market dependence led to mass proletarianization.

This radical transformation was not solely the product of economic forces but was accomplished in unison with the judiciary and intellectuals (e.g. John Locke). Together, they established a novel understanding of property. Property also became inextricably linked with the notion of exclusivity and improvement, understood as increasing the land's productivity to gain profit. This conception was made central in legitimising not only the colonial dispossession of native lands but also the domestic dispossession of farmers. Only productive labour that realises a profit was established as the basis of property (see Lukšič, 2016). The term producer began to connote a person who actively uses property for investment. Economic principles took on a moral meaning and expropriation was considered as an act benefitting the common good (Wood, 2017). Despite the centrality of economic forces, the nation-state was quintessential for consolidating the novel property system and instrumental in establishing favourable conditions for capitalist accumulation not only in England but later all around the world (Parenti, 2020).

This novel societal formation proved to be extremely productive, bringing two main consequences. First, it meant an exceptionally large population could be sustained. Second, due to its productivity, it required a relatively small part of the population to be engaged in agriculture, which resulted in greater numbers of people without property. This mass was then transformed into wage laborers and consumers of cheap goods, which led to the establishment of an unprecedented national competitive domestic market and formed the foundations of the English industrial revolution. The English domestic market was qualitatively specific as it was centred on cheap consumer goods while also being uniquely limited by the restricted powers of consumption of its main consumers: wage laborers. This created general pressure to produce cheaply and efficiently and to focus on economies of scale by constantly improving the productivity of labour by introducing novel technologies. The British industrial revolution universalised the capitalist mode of production that started in the countryside. It also began to radically influence economic development on the Continent and globally. It gradually universalised the imperatives of capitalism, especially the competitive pressures and capital accumulation while making people's basic needs and environmental protection secondary to profits, thereby gradually destroying the conditions for its own existence (Saito, 2017; Wood, 2017). Since the advent of industrial capitalism, "economies inserted in the international trading system and depending on it for their material needs,

whatever the prevailing social property relations (*sic!*), would be subject to capitalist imperatives” (Wood, 2017: 145). The character of this transformation and its speed depended on the geopolitical context of each society and state (e.g. a colonial metropole or a colony). While European powers were coerced to adapt so as to be competitive with the UK, the European colonies were transformed into spaces as providers of cheap natural resources, cheap labour power and as overall dependent economies whose productive capacities were complementary and not in competition to those of the metropole (Patel & Moore, 2017). It is telling that the global expansion of capitalism resulted in environmental destruction wherever capitalism expanded without being accompanied by the rising living standards that characterised the later phases of industrialisation in Britain, Europe and its (former) settler colonies (e.g. USA, Canada).

To reiterate, capitalism is not an evolutionary end state of human development and an expression of human nature. Hence, a radical politico-economic transformation of contemporary societies is not contrary to evolution and the iron laws of human development.

### **The neoliberal mystification of the market, the denigration of economic planning, and the silent legacy of the socialist calculation debate**

The rethinking of democratic economic planning is also obstructed by mystification of the capitalist market. This is one of the core elements of capitalist ideologies that secure capitalist hegemony in each historical context. The coordinates of the contemporary mystification of the market primarily derive from the neoliberal ideology, which over the last 40 years has come to dominate the existing capitalist hegemony (Mirowski, 2014). The modern neoliberal notion of the capitalist market is the silent legacy of the socialist calculation debate, which originates in Otto Neurath’s paper on a socialised economy presented in 1919 to the Bavarian Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council during the short-lived Munich Soviet Republic (Phillips & Rozworski, 2019). Neurath argued in the paper that a novel kind of planned economy should be established, one that would focus on satisfying basic human needs and not on profitability. This prompted a response from (neo)liberal thinkers that sought to undermine the idea of the socialist planned economy. The debate was never a technical debate concerning the market’s efficiency and the impossibility of planning but a “conflict about political order, economic history, and the possibility of perpetual peace” (Whyte, 2020: 33). The central issue was whether humans have a choice in submitting themselves to the market and whether an inclusive, emancipatory and deliberate process of collective self-determination is possible and desirable. It is in this context

that the contemporary commonsensical notion that there is no rational alternative to the capitalist market was born. This notion was initially elaborated during a debate involving the neoliberals Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, whose mystification of the market and critique of planning is the core part of today's hegemonic neoliberal ideology. Their mystification of the market is multidimensional, although it serves the simple goal of establishing the market as unassailable. From the technical perspective, the presumed superiority of the market price is the starting point. The price is deemed to determine every economic relationship. Von Mises claimed that markets are primary mechanisms for aggregating and calculating information in a specific economy, while market prices are the aggregates of all information concerning production and consumption (Von Mises, 2008). Hayek went even further by claiming that markets also create knowledge that would not exist without markets. Only the invisible coordination of the market can link the information isolated in the heads of individual economic actors (Hayek, 1945). The market with its "godly" capacity to create knowledge and support innovation will inevitably produce solutions to all issues.

From the political dimension, Von Mises defended the market as the only possible avenue for mutually beneficial, voluntary relations. Markets supposedly foster peace and tolerance as they allow individuals to pursue their own plans. They are necessary for political freedom. But the market itself is imagined as a form of impersonal domination to which everyone must submit for the benefit of an efficient economy. Von Mises imagined the market required international peace for uninterrupted functioning. He acknowledged that capitalism spread not only by commerce but also violent imposition, which he deemed necessary for the development of civilisation (Von Mises, 2008). Neoliberals legitimised violence for imposing capitalist markets globally and internally when the capitalist order was threatened by upheavals. In defending the markets, neoliberals imagined the state as playing a central role. The state's explicit function was to secure the legitimacy of the system (of property relations) while simultaneously preventing the masses via democratic politics from regulating the markets (Slobodian, 2018).

The neoliberals attacked planning as a collectivist interventionist action as inefficient, wasteful and impossible, and a threat to individual freedom, a road to a totalitarian order, a civilisational regression to a barbaric state, and a recipe for the destruction of peaceful coexistence (Whyte, 2020: 38). Humans do not have a choice concerning submitting themselves to the market. Hence, neoliberals rejected the notion that an inclusive, emancipatory and deliberate process of collective self-determination was possible and desirable (Hočevar, 2018).

What is forgotten is that Neurath's critique of market capitalism fundamentally obliterates every central neoliberal argument and that he articulated his ideas in the context of an experiment with an alternative politico-economic order. He argued that capitalism is systemically irrational since its imperative is profit, not human needs, and that the fundamental question about the central purpose of the economy cannot be reduced to an economic accounting issue. Neurath rejected the notion that the capitalist market is the final evolutionary stage of universal progress. By illustrating the ills brought by capitalism whose imperatives necessitate its global expansion and subjugation of non-market relations to the market, he demonstrated the fundamentally destructive, oppressive and unfree nature of capitalism. He argued that capitalism will always lead to war, colonisation and civilising missions due to the general profit motive. He claimed that the capitalist market is a site of oppression and discipline and called for democratic planning as the primary principle regulating the economy. He believed there are no purely technical decisions concerning what to produce or build. Every such decision is ultimately political and cannot be decided by a calculation (Neurath, 2006). To add to Neurath's argument, in capitalism every investment and every produced good is rationalised based on profit and not from the point of view of a good's use value, ecological sustainability, and positive social impact. Hence, capitalists invest in useless, unsustainable and socially harmful goods and services if they are profitable and vice versa. The imperative of profit also always leads to a crisis of overproduction. Neurath claimed that planning could provide a space for democratic decision-making. For him, the main issue in economic planning at the outset was the way it changes the control over economic life. If workers' power remains limited, we cannot then talk about proper socialist planning and we end up with a soviet command economy (Neurath, 2006).

Neurath's vision has been forgotten even among the socialist left because planning itself became an anathema in contemporary common sense (Whyte, 2020). Today's hegemonic understanding of the economy is predicated on abhorrence of economic planning and the presupposed dualism and incompatibility of planning and markets. Yet this dualism is an obfuscation of the reality of the omnipresence of planning in capitalism, as we address in the next chapter.

### **Planning in capitalist corporations as subversion of the mystification of market capitalism**

The text-book illusion of the market is a space populated by economic agents with similar market power and information derived from the market price that have a similar range of choices among which they choose on the

grounds of their rational decisions based on risk calculations. In this illusion, no space is left for mezzo or macro level planning because all planning takes place on the level of the individual economic actor. The reality of our everyday experience in the present neoliberal capitalist arrangements paints a substantially different picture. Despite the symbolic and material centrality of markets in and for capitalism, its contemporary form is characterised by the ubiquity of planning. Although the latter is present almost everywhere, multiple agents of the neoliberal order work tirelessly to obfuscate and silence this fact for two chief reasons. First, despite its constant failures, “negative externalities” and coercive nature, the idealised market must be preserved as the ideological centre of the commonsensical imaginary of our present system since it symbolises freedom, choice and opportunity, thereby legitimising the whole capitalist system as the best possible arrangement that is/can be. Second, the existing forms of planning in the capitalist system pose the problem of illustrating the actual nature of the oppressiveness and coercion of capitalism. These forms of planning are authoritarian, hierarchical and undemocratic.

In neoliberal globalised capitalism, planning is carried out in multiple ways but hidden behind the façade of market relations. Although market relations among economic actors are central to a capitalist society, these relations represent the minority of relations that form the everyday experience of individuals. Most of us spend large parts of our working time in relatively structured, hierarchical authoritarian, non-market relations that characterise modern private and public organisations. Even contemporary markets must be initially planned, established and preserved. State institutions continuously intervene in various markets to stabilise and consolidate them (Jones, 2020). The market(s) connects only businesses with businesses and businesses with consumers. Market relations do not regulate the internal organisation and functioning of a capitalist firm or other organisational forms of the capitalist system. Most mainstream understandings of capitalism do not focus on the actual internal functioning of firms. The latter exposes the inconvenient fact of the market economy that relies heavily on planning. More precisely, it relies on authoritarian planning which concentrates power in the hands of capitalists and upper management, while simultaneously disciplining workers (Phillips & Rozworski, 2019). This fact destroys any simple argument about the inevitability of the market price mechanism because it presupposes that market relations are a superior form of resource allocation and regulation of the supply and demand of commodities. Firms do not rely on internal markets to achieve efficiency, but rely on planning. They (strategies and bosses) plan the redistribution of resources among certain departments, they plan what each individual worker must do, which tasks must be accomplished, and how and where they should be

accomplished. Individual workers do not have any choice and freedom in this regard. Planning in contemporary capitalism in relations with workers is utilised to discipline people to perform specific tasks without having their own input and to suppress their interests (Phillips & Rozworski, 2019). Even beyond large firms, planning is omnipresent in the form of business plans, risk management, and financial projections. Planning is very apparent in the details of capitalist economic activity. Accounting and management systems, strategic management and risk management, logistics and information systems require and depend on planning (Jones, 2020).

But it could easily be claimed that planning in capitalism is only possible at the level of each individual corporation, not at the macro societal level. However, today's biggest corporations like Walmart and Amazon function not only internally but as planned economies in relation to their vast number of suppliers. These corporations utilise planning to make their operations more efficient, predictable and stable, thereby ensuring a high level of profits and/or a dominant market position. Walmart and Amazon have integrated their suppliers and other actors in their ecosystem into a highly planned arrangement (Phillips & Rozworski, 2019). Walmart as the largest privately-owned company is in many respects a planned economy. Its individual departments, stores and, most importantly, its suppliers do not compete with each other. It was one of the first companies to establish mechanisms to address the bullwhip effect in supply chains that is caused by fluctuations in consumer demand that can potentially create vast inefficiencies due to ever growing over- or under-stocking down the supply chain. The bullwhip effect can only be prevented in a situation where consumption (and orders) is equal to supply in all temporal intervals. The greater the planning, trust, transparency of information, cooperation, and openness there is in a supply chain, the more it resembles the ideal situation. Efficiency in a specific supply chain is not a product of competition but of planning. Walmart's satellite-based information infrastructure enables real-time planning not according to an initial stable plan concerning consumption. It enables a direct link between the planning carried out by Walmart in cooperation with its supplier and real-time information concerning the sale of all the commodities in its stores, thereby substantially improving information and reducing unpredictability throughout the supply chain (Phillips & Rozworski, 2019: 30–39).

Along with Walmart, Amazon directly subverts the common thesis that economic planning is only possible for infrastructure and similar segments and not for consumer goods. Similarly to Walmart, Amazon has integrated its suppliers into a planned system. It has developed a sophisticated planned economy that is based upon the enormous amount of data. It knows more about its customers than any other retailer. It is able to plan consumption

based on the past activities of its individual customers. It plans consumption via algorithms that operate based on extremely accurate and segmented data. As the biggest online retailer, it has successfully faced the biggest logistical challenges ever encountered by a capitalist company. The challenge is how to deliver the right item in the shortest amount of time, most efficiently, to millions of customers every day. Amazon is faced with an unprecedented optimisation problem (e.g. how to deliver – routes, availability of the means of transport, weather conditions). Concerning planning, this poses an extreme mathematical problem regarding the enormous number of variables that even with today's computational capabilities would be unsolvable. The revolutionary nature of Amazon's approach lies in its simplification of issues. Amazon's planning does not perfectly solve the optimisation problem. Its solution is the best possible approximation that is still substantially better than leaving its solution up to the market. Amazon understands planning as a mechanism that works regardless of its simplifications (Phillips & Rozworski, 2019: 76–99).

Given the substantial extent of planning in the mega corporations of contemporary capitalism, we must not only stress its efficient nature but above all its primary goals. The inherent capitalist logic of the existing planning is inextricably connected with the ever-growing exploitation of workers and natural resources and thus the ever-growing inequality, authoritarianism, and ecological devastation. Planning in capitalism is efficient but relies on the brutal coordinates of the system and its imperatives. This naturally raises the question of whether the organisational and technological capabilities developed by a capitalist mega corporation could be appropriated and co-opted to transform the present unsustainable system into an egalitarian, sustainable politico-economic and societal order. Learning from capitalist corporations should simultaneously be accompanied by studying the potential of forgotten historical examples of democratic socialist economic planning.

### **The Cybersyn project and the Chilean cybernetic socialist experiment as the forgotten precedence of democratic socialist economic planning**

The spectre of Soviet planning always hovers above any discussion of economic planning. It is generally presented as the ultimate proof that planning only leads to totalitarianism, inefficiency, economic crisis and ecological devastation, thereby colonising our understanding of planning (Jones, 2020). This colonization serves a specific political goal of delegitimising macro-economic planning as the potential alternative way of imagining socio-political arrangements. Additionally, it silences historical examples of democratic socialist economic planning from which we could draw our



inspiration for a future order. For instance, the short-lived Chilean project Cybersyn (*Projecto Synco*) represents the biggest experiment ever conducted in macro-economic planning based on the principles of democratic socialism. Despite this, it is practically unknown in mainstream social sciences (Medina, 2011).

Cybersyn was developed in collaboration between Allendes Chilean socialists and the British cybernetic theoretician Stafford Beer. It lasted until the *coup d'état* by Pinochet on 9/11 1973. The project was one of the most ambitious experiments to develop a system for democratic socialist planning of the economy. Chilean socialists sought to establish a society that would radically differ from western capitalism and the authoritarian planning system of the Soviet Union. They identified the Englishman Stafford Beer as an expert able to help them fulfil their vision. Beer was a cybernetic theoretician who primarily focused on developing systems that would be decentralised but would retain specific, limited centralised strategic control. His goal was to ensure the system's stability without compromising the autonomy of its constitutive parts. This was analogous to the Chilean government's goal since it wished to expand macro-economic state planning without endangering the people's liberties and democratic political institutions. It wanted to establish a broadly participative, decentralised and anti-bureaucratic form of economic management (Medina, 2011).

The general architecture of Cybersyn was based on Beer's cybernetic notion of continuous feedback loops in the form of the continuous aggregation of data from local producers (factories) at a central nodal point (a brain) – the project's operations room. The key decision-making people of this operations room were key members of the government headed by the prime minister. The design of Cybersyn ensured there would never be an overload of data that would flow to the operations room and that decisions would therefore be possible. The data received would be automatically evaluated and there would be an intervention in the production and distribution process only when a substantial deviation would appear in supply and demand. This enabled flexible coordination that was able to solve extremely complex logistical problems. Beer claimed a system for economic planning could never be non-adaptive and fixed by a predetermined model (Medina, 2011). Flexible coordination preserved the autonomy and democratic self-organisation of factories that was crucial for implementing the principles of democratic socialism. Despite integration that enabled limited yet crucial vertical control to stabilise the system and make strategic decisions, each level of the system remained irreducible, recursive and scalable. This complex system could synchronise itself without the actions of omnipotent managers. In addition, the human element was central to the system because its goal was not automation but a close symbiosis between

technology and the people working on the Cybersyn project (Gardiner, 2020: 6). To deal with the threat of the concentration of power and authority by a technocracy, Beer even imagined a complementary but never implemented Cyberfolk project intended to gather ordinary people's feedback on government policies and actions in relation to their needs in real time via an analogue, completely anonymised system of remote controls attached to the television set of all Chilean families (Medina, 2011).

Cybersyn proved its potential during a time of crises when internal and external reactionary forces organised a strike of truck owners, thus threatening the functioning of the whole Chilean economy. By utilising Cybersyn, the government was able to maintain economic activity even with substantially reduced capacities to transport materials and goods. The project also proved that cybernetic systems can be established with limited cutting-edge technology since the project utilised an existing computer (only 1 cutting-edge computer work station) and communication technology (telex stations) to establish a novel, unprecedented system that was able to foster a radical, economic, political and societal transformation from capitalism to democratic socialism (Medina, 2011).

However, the project could not prevent the government's downfall organised by combined reactionary forces. In the internal and external subversion of Chilean socialism, Cybersyn itself was misrepresented in the Western media as a totalitarian system of centralised economic planning (Medina, 2011). Despite this negative propaganda and the general politico-economic crisis that seriously hampered its full development, Cybersyn also had specific internal issues. Worker participation was severely lacking and was not an integral part of the system's design. The relations of production did not change as managers and engineers consolidated their class power over workers in the nationalised factories. Gender inequality was also never addressed and the project reaffirmed unequal gender roles via its design, decision-making and organisation of work whereby women could only be implicitly imagined as supporting the work of men (Medina, 2011). Hence, even progressive policies and projects can strongly limit general emancipation if they do not directly address asymmetrical power relations between workers and the managerial-professional classes and genders while also limiting their mobilisation potential and emotional identification.

These issues may be attributed to the project's initial improper design. Yet we must also consider the possibility that these issues reflect the limitations of cybernetic thinking. The cybernetic principles of Cybersyn were those of British cybernetics, which emphasised non-representationalism, decentralisation and spontaneity that seem emancipatory and progressive. However, they may also be interpreted as being an expression of a new structure of power and control established in the context of contemporary

technocapitalism that to some degree also functions on the basis of fluidity and openness and the free participation of individuals who make presumably free choices<sup>1</sup> and self-organise into communities (Gardiner, 2020). This relevant critique does not delegitimise Cybersyn as an inspiration for developing and implementing novel socialist planning systems since it fails to acknowledge that technology can be designed and used in a socialist way. It does not acknowledge the role of the state in this process and the role the general political sphere can play as the context in which the ideological struggle is most openly fought and where the general coordinates of the design and use of technologies are established, consolidated and transformed.

## Conclusion

In face of the ever more dire consequences of the climate crisis a radical transformation of the present hegemonic neoliberal capitalist order is not only crucial for solving the most central issues precipitating the climate crisis but also for reducing its already inevitable effects on our societies. We proposed that it is time to rethink and develop the notion of democratic economic planning in this search for an alternative order. However, we argued that we firstly need to revitalize the notion of democratic economic planning. We claimed that that could only be achieved by opening up epistemological space whose closure is precipitated by a multidimensional ideological mystification of capitalism and its markets and the denigration of proper alternatives above all democratic economic planning.

Hence, the article sought to identify and critically interrogate the various central dimensions of the ideological mystification of the present capitalist system and denigration of democratic economic planning as a relevant strategy for opening up epistemological space and revitalizing and popularizing democratic economic planning as a vision of an alternative sustainable order. In this context, we firstly critically interrogated the most pronounced obstacle for imagining an alternative order namely the lack of understanding among the general public considering the severity and nature of the climate crisis and its relation to capitalism. The analysis demonstrated that this misunderstanding is the product of the mystification of capitalism performed by the hegemonic neoliberal ideology that obfuscates the central role of capitalism in the climate crisis and promotes solutions that are fundamentally unsustainable.

Secondly, we analysed the mystification of the origins of capitalism that represents a less pronounced but fundamental obstacle for imagining

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<sup>1</sup> This freedom is circumscribed as the major corporations of technocapitalism rely on their market effects that radically reduce choice (Larson, 2020).

alternatives. The interrogation demonstrated that capitalism was not a product of social or biological evolution of humans or human nature but a contingent result of a specific structural context and human agency. Thirdly, by revisiting the socialist calculation debate, we demystified the now hegemonic neoliberal understandings of the market as a space of freedom, rationality and innovation that represents another central dimension of contemporary mystification of capitalism. Our analysis demonstrates the irrationality, oppressive nature, unsustainability and unspontaneous nature of the market while also problematising neoliberals' critique of planning as theoretically impossible and leading to authoritarianism and violence by demonstrating the theoretical possibility and the democratic potential of planning. Fourthly, we further demystified the capitalist market by interrogating the actual functioning of capitalism at the level of corporations. We demonstrated that contrary to ideological denigration of economic planning, planning is omnipresent in contemporary capitalism and that in many ways the largest global corporations resemble planned economies. But because planning is utilised for capitalist ends it is environmentally destructive, undemocratic, oppressive and concentrates power in the hands of management. In the final part, we interrogated another central dimension of the contemporary mystification of capitalism and an obstacle for imagining alternatives namely the presumed lack of historical examples of democratic economic planning by examining project Cybersyn. The latter was a Chilean democratic socialist experiment for macro-managing the whole economy via cybernetic networks that although short-lived due to Pinochet's coup d'état proved successful during a national crisis. Its visionary nature should be along with our other central insights considered a crucial element in the central undertaking of our analysis namely a comprehensive critical interrogation of the multidimensional ideological mystifications of the present neoliberal capitalist order. As we argued this demystification is a necessary first step in opening up epistemological space that would enable us to collectively imagine, popularize and further develop the notion of democratic economic planning as a viable alternative order and to not succumb to the alures of capitalist realism. A further theoretical and practical development of the framework of democratic economic planning must be considered a crucial part of present and future political struggles. To politically mobilize societies for the needed transformations, we must have a clear vision of how democratic economic planning could function at the macro level of societies, nationally, regionally and globally.

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*Breda LUTHAR in Dejan JONTES\**

## UVODNIK

Članki v tematskem sklopu tematizirajo nekatere ključne družbene in kulturne spremembe ter s temi spremembami povezano transformacijo vloge medijev v proizvodnji družbenega védenja in kulturnih ter materialnih praks, povezanih z mediji. Te spremembe, v kontekstu katerih je potrebno brati posamezne članke sklopa, lahko strnemo v pet točk. Prvič, spremembe povezane z mediatizacijo in digitalno mediatizacijo. Mediatizacija je strukturni premik tako velikih razsežnosti, da ga po Krotzovem mnenju lahko primerjamo z globalizacijo in individualizacijo. Gre torej za metaproces modifikacije komuniciranja kot temeljne prakse konstruiranja družbenega in kulturnega sveta. Za Krotza (2009; 2017) ni ključen vidik mediatizacije prenos medijske logike na druga družbena polja, npr. na politično, temveč splošneje, »komunikativne prakse, ki jih povezujemo z mediji« (2009: 24).<sup>1</sup> Drugič, članki so nastali v kontekstu globalnega vzpona etničnega populizma, ne v prvi vrsti kot ideologije, temveč kot oblike kulturnega dela in javnega označevanja ali signifikacije. Tretjič, v kontekstu specifične postsocialistične situacije, v kateri sta neoliberalna tranzicijska sedanost in »postsocialistična« razlastitev v celoti izničili mitološko obljubo emancipacije in pripoznanja, ki naj bi jo prinesla nacionalna država, temelječa na etnični pripadnosti (npr. »država Slovencev«) in jasnem izključevanju »nečlanov«. V času »postsocialistične« primitivne akumulacije je bil razprodan nacionalni kapital – proces enormnih razsežnosti, ki ga nekateri primerjajo z zgodnejšimi historičnimi dogajanjem privatizacije skupnih lovišč ter obdelovalnih in pašnih površin (angl. *commons*) na začetku industrijske revolucije v Evropi, ki jih obravnava E. P. Thompson v Nastajanju delavskega razreda v Angliji (1963/1966). V tem kontekstu lahko nacionalistični populizem v »postsocializmu« interpretiramo kot premestitev razlastitve in izgube pravic na imaginarno nacijo (Kalb, 2011: 1). Četrtič, v kontekstu periferne položaja Slovenije in Vzhodne Evrope nasploh na ozadju geopolitične razcepljenosti med Vzhodom in Zahodom in simbolne ekonomije balkanizma in vzhodizma. Velika regresija, ki smo ji priča v globalnem merilu z vzponom različnih oblik desnega populizma, je produkt skupnega učinka

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<sup>1</sup> *Jansson (2018: 6) pravi, da sam koncept mediatizacije omogoča reflektiranje večplastnih družbenih in kulturnih implikacij medijsko zasičenih družb, predvsem kaj pomeni živeti z mediji kot z normaliziranim delom okolja: »Razumevanje mediatizacije kot v osnovi kritičnega koncepta pomeni prepoznati, kako družbeni procesi na različnih področjih in ravneh postanejo neoločljivi od in v končni fazi odvisni od procesov in virov tehnične mediacije, ter identificirati občutenja in izkušnje, ki jih te odvisnosti priključijo« (prav tam).*



tveganj globalizacije in neoliberalizma in dobi v »postsocializmu« le svojo posebno in bolj usodno artikulacijo. In petič, v okoliščinah tesne sinergije med popularno kulturo in političnim komuniciranjem, kjer popularna kultura zaseda osrednjo vlogo v legitimaciji neoliberalizma prek inkorporiranja nezadovoljstva v sam kapitalistični projekt (glej npr. McGuigan, 2009; Schreiner, 2019). Legitimnost sodobnega kapitalizma se namreč vzdržuje predvsem na ravni medijske popularne kulture in potrošne kulture. Neoliberalne podobe človeka in družbe posledično ne vključujejo le velikih tem ekonomske redistribucije, privatizacije javnega premoženja ali davčne politike, temveč delujejo, kot ugotavlja P. Schreiner, tudi in prav sredi našega vsakdanjega življenja in oblikujejo »naše mišljenje, čutenje in hotenje, našo bit in naše najstvo« (2019: 30). Delujejo torej kot režim subjektivacije v mikropolitiki vsakdanjega in popularnega. Kot pravi Bröckling (2016: 16), je danes velik del neoliberalnega vladovanja in samovladovanja v popularni kulturi koncentriran v modelu t.i. podjetniškega sebstva – stalnega dela na sebi, telesne in psihološke samotransformacije, psevdopsihološkega diskurza, nasilja pozitivnega mišljenja in emocionalnega dela, nenehnega merjenja t.i. odličnosti in kvalitete v profesionalnih okoljih ter številnih drugih elementov iz »repertoarja antikolektivizma« (Hall, 1979: 17), ki prispevajo k ekonomizaciji vsega družbenega.<sup>2</sup> Couldry in Meijas (2019) sicer menita, da bo neoliberalizem (v smislu težnje, da bi družbene procese obravnavali kot trge) kmalu postal nepotreben zaradi podatkovnega kolonializma in zanašanja kapitalizma na podatke in podatkovne odnose, ki pa po njunem mnenju dobesedno spreminjajo družbene procese v trg. »Namesto da bodo družbeni odnosi vstavljeni v ekonomski sistem, družbeni odnosi *postanejo* ekonomski sistem ali vsaj njegov ključen del, s tem ko se človeško življenje konvertira v surovino za kapital preko podatkov,« ugotavljata Couldry in Meijas (2019: 117).

Omenjena sinergija med političnim komuniciranjem in popularno kulturo, ki nas v sklopu posebej zanima, zadeva vsaj dva vidika. Najprej gre za splošno vprašanje mediatizacije politike, ki medije vzpostavlja kot konstitutivni del delovanja drugih družbenih institucij. Predvsem digitalni mediji in nove podatkovno vodene tehnološke infrastrukture ter komunikacije močno zaznamujejo sodobno družbenost, zato se moramo vprašati, kot pravita Couldry in Hepp (2017: 7), kako je družbeno konstruirano v času globoke mediatizacije, v katerem elementi, na osnovi katerih je konstruirano občutenje družbenega, postajajo sami utemeljeni v tehnoloških procesih medijskega posredovanja. Drugič, sinergija vključuje dolgotrajne spremembe v medijih, kot je npr. personalizacija, dramtizacija, melodramtizacija, celebrifikacija, afektivnost komuniciranja in sploh emocionalna

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<sup>2</sup> Med zgodnejšimi obravnavami sorodnih transformacij glej tudi Hochschild (2003) o »komercializaciji intimnega življenja« in obravnavo »emocionalnega kapitalizma« Eve Illouz (2007).

politika t. i. »junk« novic. Pred desetletji, ko je bila televizija še nesporno najmočnejši medij, je Neil Postman, ameriški kulturni kritik, dejal, da ni toliko problem v tem, da nam televizija prinaša skoraj samo zabavo, temveč je ključni problem, da se praktično vsaka tematika predstavlja skozi formo zabavnih žanrov – dramatizacijo, spektakularizacijo, personalizacijo, vizualizacijo, simplifikacijo, emocionalizacijo.<sup>3</sup> Sinergija med popularno kulturo in drugimi medijskimi žanri, npr. informativnimi žanri in političnim diskurzom, je v zadnjem desetletju še tesnejša zaradi vstopa novih družabnih platform na področje političnega komuniciranja in njihove »emocionalne arhitekture« (Wahl-Jorgensen), tako da bi jih bilo v resnici smiselno poimenoovati emocionalni mediji (glej Šadl v tej številki). Döveling in drugi (2018) menijo, da te spremembe ne pomenijo le izmenjave informacij in mnenj, pač pa pospešujejo globalne mediatizirane izmenjave emocij, ki po njihovem vodijo do »digitalnih afektivnih kultur«. Te se nenehno spreminjajo in razvijajo, zato omenjeni avtorji zagovarjajo njihovo longitudinalno proučevanje. Ko raziskuje strukturo občutenja, ki jo podpirajo arhitekture *online* medijev, posebej formo in teksturo komuniciranja na Twitterju kot sodobnem mediju – pripovedovalcu zgodb, tudi Z. Papacharissi (2015), ugotavlja, da same tehnološke zmožnosti digitalnih platform spodbujajo in omogočajo politično formacijo afektivnega komuniciranja, pred ideološko artikulacijo ali namesto nje (glej Slukan v tej številki o t. i. trolanju oz. ironični retorološki obliki in govornem aktu, ki je inherentno političen).

Izhajamo s stališča, da neoliberalni kulturni imaginarij *mainstream* popularne in novinarske kulture ponuja »semiotični okvir konstruiranja sveta«, hkrati pa tudi aktivno prispeva k njegovi konstrukciji (Jessop, 2010: 342). Kultura ima torej osrednjo vlogo v formaciji družbenega in ekonomskega. En vidik te sinergije se kaže v vlogi emocionalnega in afektivnega v političnem diskurzu, v specifičnih komunikativnih praksah kot npr. trolanju v okviru zmožnosti novih medijev in v uprizarjanju politike v tej situaciji (glej Šadl ali Slukan) ali pa v praksi celebritizacije (konstrukcije slavnih) kot metaprocasa. Praksa celebritizacije nima organiziranega središča, temveč se materializira kot rezultat številnih mikropraks, ki se konsolidirajo v splošnejši medijski diskurz. Ta je ključen »legitimacijski narativ« in pomemben kulturni mehanizem neoliberalnega konsenza in politike zdravega razuma (glej članke Vidmar-Horvat, Pušnik in Jontes, Luthar, Crnović). Članki so tako vsebinsko uvrščeni v dva podsklopa: prvi sklop se osredotoča na posledice digitalne mediatizacije političnega komuniciranja, kot je emocionalizacija političnega komuniciranja in artikulacija teh sprememb na prezentacijskih ali emocionalnih medijih – na družbenih platformah.

<sup>3</sup> V izvirniku: »The problem is not that tv presents us with entertaining subject matter – but that all subject matter is presented as entertaining.« (Postman, 2005: 87)

Članek Zdenke Šadl tako izhaja s stališča, da populistični obrat spremlja premik v emocionalnem karakterju javnega diskurza, vključno s političnim diskurzom v »starih« in »novih« medijih. Te spremembe članek umešča v kontekst mediatizacije, predvsem vizualizacije komuniciranja s televizijo in vseprisotnostjo družabnih oziroma t. i. emocionalnih medijev. Emocionalizacija se dogaja v več oblikah: od komercializacije intimnega življenja do emocionalizacije političnega jezika. Medtem ko je vloga emocij v oblikovanju politične subjektivitete v zadnjih desetletjih široko pripoznana, pa ni sistematične teoretizacije emocij. Posebej malo je analiz specifičnih »emocionalnih režimov« in normativnih emocij in njihovega uprizarjanja v javnosti, ki bi omogočile natančnejšo analizo politično performativne vloge emocij, zlasti v desničarskem političnem diskurzu. Članek se ukvarja z osnovno pomanjkljivostjo obstoječih obravnav emocionalizacije političnega komuniciranja, pri čemer se naslanja na S. Ahmed in njeno »teorijo lepljivih emocij« ter zavrne konvencionalno razumevanje, po katerem so emocije subjektom inherentni pojav. Zagovarja model emocij, ki nas preusmeri od osredinjenosti izključno na emocije »v« posamezniku k njihovim kolektivnim dimenzijam, k razumevanju emocij kot, vsaj delno, diskurzivne družbene konstrukcije ter k emocionalnemu drugačenju v političnem in medijskem prostoru.

Nejc Slukan v svojem članku oblikuje teoretsko podlago za analizo ironičnih komunikativnih praks, posebej praks t. i. trolanja na spletnih družbenih omrežjih. Izhaja s stališča, da so za sodobno mediatizirano politično govorico, posebej za spletno retoriko desnih populizmov, značilne ironične oblike izražanja, ki jih danes navadno imenujemo trolanje. Slukan analizira komunikacijske razmere na spletnih omrežjih, ki po njegovem predstavljajo del medijsko-trolovskega dispozitiva. Analizo utemelji na kritičnem ovrednotenju sodobnih teorij o tehnoloških zmožnostih in Foucaultovem konceptu dispozitiva, kjer zmožnosti novih medijev tvorijo specifičen dispozitiv. Trolanje kot retorološka figura in govorno dejanje je po njegovem inherentno politični komunikativni akt, ki zarisuje meje med diskurzivnimi skupnostmi oz. le-te vzpostavlja, v analizi pa definira razmere, v katerih poteka sodobno spletno komuniciranje in ki spodbujajo trolovske komunikativne prakse.

Deja Crnović analizira »instagramizacijo« političnega komuniciranja pri dveh tranzicijskih politikih: slovenskem Pahorju in srbskem Vučiću. Avtorica pokaže, da je sodobna politika zaradi mediatizacije, vizualizacije, eventizacije in vdiranja tržne logike v politično polje vedno bolj personalizirana, v ospredju pa niso politike, temveč osebe, ki delujejo v političnem polju. Profila obeh predsednikov na Instagramu se sicer razlikujeta v načinu oblikovanja predsedniške podobe, obema pa je skupna popolna odsotnost političnih idej; medtem ko Pahor to počne s pomočjo objav iz svoje

zasebnosti, Vučić to počne z objavljanjem fotografij s srečanj z mednarodnimi voditelji in voditeljicami, torej z ustvarjanjem podobe zmernega in preudarnega kozmopolitskega politika s staturo v mednarodnem političnem prostoru, kar izrazito odstopa od njegove podobe v domačih, srbskih medijih. Personalizacija politike, ki jo kažeta oba primera, ni po definiciji antipolitična, temveč rezultat kompleksne artikulacija politike in popularne kulture, pri čemer se politični performans odvija na križišču političnega in zabavnjaškega. Politika je v tem kontekstu prevedena v individualne psihološke motive in značilnosti individualnega karakterja, javno življenje pa zreducirano na psihološka razmerja. Ali kot je dejal Sennett že pred tremi desetletji (1989/1974: 3), družba sama je v tem kontekstu smiselna in razumljiva le, če je preoblikovana v »velikanski psihični sistem«.

Trije članki v drugem podsklopu (Luthar, Vidmar-Horvat, Pušnik in Jontes) se osredinjijo na medijsko celebrifikacijo in spektakularizacijo. Vsi trije članki se lotevajo analize medijske obravnave Melanije Trump kot spektakelske medijske drame pred predsedniškimi volitvami 2016 in po njih v slovenskih in ameriških medijih. Celotno medijsko obravnavo Melanije Trump v lokalnih medijih lahko definiramo kot javno dramo, lokalni multimedijski dogodek in dramatični portret zamišljenega sveta ter obet nove simbolne osrednjosti Slovenije. Mediji so v številnih intervjujih z običajnimi ljudmi, novinarji in eksperti ter kvaziekspteri za mednarodno politiko (Udovič, Ferfila, Rupel, Lahovnik, takratni veleposlanik v ZDA Mirošič ter vrsto lokalnih sevniških »ekspertov« ...) razpravljali o enkratni priložnosti Slovenije za »vstop v zgodovino« in napovedali nič manj kot radikalno spremembo slovenskega geopolitičnega položaja iz periferne tranzicijske nevidnosti ter lamentirali o nešteti (že vnaprej zapravljenih) priložnostih za monetizacijo te enkratne priložnosti.

Zamišljene skupnosti tudi v postritualnem času (glej Alexander, Giesen in Mast, 2006) še vedno proizvajajo dogodke, ki tematizirajo vprašanje kolektivne identitete in solidarnosti. V lokalnih medijih je ritualna epska proizvodnja persone M. Trump in slavljenje kolektivne nacionalno-družinske povezanosti z M. Trump predstavljala prostor fragmentiranega nacionalnega spektakla in jo moramo razumeti v kontekstu komodifikacije medijev in posebej komodifikacije novic. Kot pravi Geertz (1993), skupnostni rituali, tokrat v obliki fragmentirane nacionalistične ceremonialne drame, pogosto artikulirajo metadružbeni komentar, ki slavi in reproducira družbene ideale in konvencije ali vsaj ponuja kontekst za razpravo o skupnih performativnih konvencijah in vrednotah. Ta nekajmesečni spektakel torej uteleša komercialne novičarske vrednote in industrijsko proizvodnjo novic in »novosti« kot blaga in hkrati samoorientalizacijsko uprizarjanje postsocialistične periferije ter obet nove geopolitične relevantnosti in morebitne monetizacije ruralnih posebnosti. Manjša ko je ekonomska suverenost države in bolj je ta

nepomembno periferna v sistemu globalnega kapitalizma, bolj ta poudarja svojo kulturno suverenost in posebnost in močnejši je glas neopopulističnega etničnega nacionalizma v govorici političnih elit in v medijskem diskurzu in več je čaščenja »eticiziranega ljudstva« (glej Kalb, 2018). Vzhodna Evropa je tu, v kontekstu apolitičnega diskurza o uspehu Donalda Trumpa, »slovenskega ženina« in M. Trump, »slovenske neveste« in »naše gore lista«, znova odkrita preko kolonialističnih tropov. Skozi diskurz lokalnih medijev se torej odvija/proizvaja t.i. diskurzivna samoorientalizacija/vzhodizem kot ponotranjena manjvrednost in kontinuiteta protokolonialne politike ter kot »nadaljevanje reprezentacije razmerja med centrom in periferijo, ki je vzpostavljena/utemeljena na geopolitični razcepljenosti med Vzhodom in Zahodom« (Bjelić, 2009: 488).

Članek Brede Luthar analizira reprezentacije Melanije Trump v slovenskih medijih v času pred in med Trumpovim predsedovanjem. Zanimajo jo diskurzivni repertoarji, ki so uporabljeni v tej konkretni fragmentirani multimedijski spektakelski dramatizaciji. Analizo utemeljuje na razumevanju diskurzivnega režima slave kot dela spopadov okoli oblikovanja razrednosti in spola na področju popularne kulture, ki je tesno prepleten s sodobnim regresivnim populizmom in bolj specifično z neoliberalno transformacijo v postsocializmu. Pokaže, kako je diskurz o slavi v komercialni medijski kulturi pomemben legitimacijski narativ v dani historični konstelaciji. Prispeva k regresivnemu populističnemu imaginariju kot sestavljanki tradicionalnih tem, kot so družina, materinstvo, zanašanje nase, osebni uspeh ... Ugotavlja, da imata diskurz slave in praksa celebrifikacije performativni značaj – ne predstavljata le mistifikacije ali prikrivanja razmerij moči, temveč imata ključno praktično vlogo v premestitvi strukturnih razrednih neenakosti v zamišljeno nacionalno »skupnost skupne usode«.

Ksenija Vidmar Horvat na drugi strani skozi primer neameriške prve dame iz »postkomunistične« evropske periferije analizira orientalistični pogled ameriških liberalnih medijev na »postkomunistični« svet, ki je na dnu civilizacijskih simbolnih hierarhij liberalne Amerike in »brezupno v zaostanku za civiliziranim svetom«. Avtorica se ukvarja z medijskim uokvirjanjem in uporabljenimi metaokvirji v tematizaciji M. Trump v ameriški elitni reviji *The New Yorker*, analizo pa teoretsko umesti v okvir feminističnih postkolonialnih študij belega patriarhata. Ugotavlja, da je rasno-orientalistični pogled »na svet tam čez«, ki ga opisuje *The New Yorker*, prikazan kot oddaljen od ekonomske prosperitete in vrednot Zahoda, namenjen vzpostavljanju kulturne razdalje in razlike, ki okrepi hierarhijo civilizacijske superiornosti. V tej luči je mogoče razumeti tudi komične upodobitve M. Trump kot kmečke dekle, ki v sevniškem komunističnem stanovanjskem bloku sanja o begu na Zahod. M. Trump je obravnavana kot seksualizirana »žena trofeja«, utelešenje negativnega stereotipa na novo kolonizirane

postsocialistične Vzhodne Evrope. Članek sklene z obravnavo samokolonizirajočih diskurzov, s katerimi so slovenski mediji s pozicije postsocialistične periferije odgovorili na svojo novo simbolno vidnost.

Sklop zaključuje besedilo Maruše Pušnik in Dejana Jontesa, ki na podlagi analize prispevkov o Melaniji Trump v slovenskih tiskanih medijih obravnava vzdrževanje in redistribuiranje nacionalnih vezi, idej in tradicije prek medijev in popularne kulture, zato avtorja v nasprotju z literaturo s tega področja, ki medije večinoma obravnava le kot mediatorje, v članku tudi kritično naslavlja vprašanje vloge medijev v procesu znamenja nacije in jih obravnava kot neodvisne akterje. Njuna analiza je pokazala, da številne in ponavljajoče se medijske reprezentacije »Melanie« potiskajo slovenski nacionalizem v komercialni kontekst in posledično transformirajo nacijo v blago. Avtorja zaključita, da zamišljanje skupnega in enotnega slovenskega naroda, vzbujanje globokih občutenj ponosa in prodajanje nacije lokalnim občinstvom s pomočjo medijskih reprezentacij »Melanie« ostajajo ključne vloge, ki jih zasedajo mediji v komodifikaciji in komercializaciji slovenskega nacionalizma.

Obravnava M. Trump v lokalnih medijih je torej prečila medijske žanre in medije, tako da je prišlo do zlitja tabloidnega in političnega novinarstva v širšem kontekstu kulture komercialnega medijskega prostora. Ravno spektakelska dramatizacija pa je najbolj očitna medijska logika in družbeni in kulturni kontekst, v katerem je potrebno razumeti to fragmentirano multimedijско dramo, povezano z obravnavo M. Trump v medijih. Skupna rdeča nit člankov je torej osredotočanje na tisti del političnega diskurza, ki se tradicionalno umešča zunaj področja političnega na področje medijske popularne kulture, ima pa po našem mnenju pomembne politične posledice, med drugim igra tudi pomembno vlogo pri vzponu desnega populizma<sup>4</sup> in utrjevanju neoliberalne hegemonije oz. neoliberalnega zdravega razuma (Hall in O'Shea, 2013). Kot ugotavlja tudi Riegert (2007: 4), ne gre le za vprašanje, kako se spreminja koncept »zabave«, ko postane »resnično« tudi zabavno, temveč je bolj pomembno, kako se spreminja nocija resničnega, kadar mora biti »resnično« tudi zabavno/dramatično/personalizirano/afektivno.

<sup>4</sup> Wahl-Jorgensen (2019) pokaže, kako populistični obrat, ki smo mu priča, spremlja tudi premik v emocionalni klimi javnega diskurza.

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## EMOCIJE IN AFEKT V POLITIČNEM DISKURZU\*\*

*Povzetek. V članku se ukvarjamo s sodobno obliko emocionalne politične komunikacije, posebej nas zanima populizem kot oblika politike, ki na ljudi apelira primarno na emocionalni ravni. Opozorimo na problematičnost emocionalizacije populističnih diskurzov, ki se kaže v legitimizaciji agresivne retorike, manipuliranju emocij, emotivizmu in ustvarjanju antagonističnih kolektivov. Na podlagi kritične ocene, da razumevanje političnosti emocij zahteva sistematično teoretizacijo emocij, se v zadnjem delu opremo na konceptualni okvir avtorice Sare Ahmed, s pomočjo katerega prikažemo performativno vlogo emocij in njihovo »lepljivost«, zlasti sovražnih emocij. Analiza pokaže, da teorija premikajočih se in »lepljivih« emocij ter afektov omogoča boljše razumevanje vloge emocij v političnem diskurzu, zlasti desnega populizma.*

**Ključni pojmi:** politična komunikacija, politični diskurz, emocije, sovraštvo, populizem, Sara Ahmed

### Uvod

Politično polje v kontekstu neoliberalne globalizacije, politične in ekonomske destabilizacije ter migracij zaznamujejo nacionalizmi, ksenofobija, populistični diskurz in postresničnost. V teh okoliščinah politike ni mogoče misliti brez emocij in njihovih političnih učinkov v družbenih praksah. Živimo v »dobi emocionalne politike« (Heaney, 2019: 1), v kateri so »odkrit[e] emocij[e] ne le vse bolj sprejemljiv[e], ampak, kot se zdi, potrebn[e] v sodobni politiki« (Irvine, 2007: 2). Politika postaja vse bolj »emocionalizirana« (Scherer, 2002 v Sonntag, 2011: 124; Frevert, 2019; Richards, 2004), emocije so postale osrednje v dinamiki politične deliberacije (npr. Hall, 2007) in imajo »omniprezentno vlogo v svetovni politiki« (Bleiker in Hutchison, 2008: 115). Vsenavzočnost emocij je v mediatiziranem političnem kontekstu več kot očitna. Jeza, strah, gnev, sovraštvo, sočutje, ljubezen, empatija in upanje so osrednji motivi politične komunikacije in ključna

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sredstva, ki jih v mobilizaciji podpore ter zburanju medijske pozornosti uporabljajo populistični in *mainstream* politični akterji iz celotnega političnega spektra. Emocije so »osrednjega pomena za celotno politiko, vključno z vladami in *mainstream* strankami« (Ost, 2004: 240).

Emocionalizacija politike, ki jo v članku razumemo kot diskurzivno retorično strategijo, ki uporablja in razširja emocije (patos) za prepričevalne namene, (pre)usmerjanje političnih stališč, odločitev in vedenja, je posebna specifična populizma. Sodobni populizem opazujemo kot političen slog, ki ga politični akterji uprizarjajo v različnih kulturnih in političnih kontekstih (Moffitt, 2016).<sup>1</sup> Moffitt (2016: 77) se pri konceptualizaciji populizma kot političnega sloga opre na trditev, da je v mediatizirani politični tekmi slog pomembnejši od načel, stranke in *policy*. Populističen slog označujejo tri značilnosti: apeliranje na ljudstvo nasproti elitam, slabe manire in diskurzivna konstrukcija krize (Moffitt, 2016: 45).<sup>2</sup> Politični slog se kaže skozi retoriko – uporabo retoričnih apelov (etos, logos, patos), s katerimi želijo politiki okrepiti prepričljivost svojih argumentov. Čeprav populistični politiki nimajo monopola nad retoričnimi emocionalnimi apeli, kaže populizem specifično nagnenje k uporabi patosa. V desnem populizmu, na katerega se v članku osredinjamo, se uporaba diskurza emocij kaže v značilnem slogu politične komunikacije: v poudarjeno provokativnem, sramotilnem, očita-jočem, predvsem pa v konfrontirajočem in jeznem načinu govornice ter v mobiliziranju negativnih emocij proti »elitam« (ter migrantom, istospolno usmerjenim, prejemnikom socialne pomoči itd.), ki »ogrožajo« blaginjo »ljudstva«, varnost in družbeni red. Več kot zgled populističnega sloga je Trumpov »jezni populizem« (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019). Trumpova retorika je z izkoriščanjem negativnih emocionalnih refleksov na učinke neoliberalne globalizacije in diskurzivno konstrukcijo sovražnikov ustvarjala antagonistično razmerje »mi-oni« ter polarizirala politični in celoten družbeni prostor. Zmaga Trumpa na predsedniških volitvah leta 2016 je bila pomemben mejnik v širjenju »jezne sovražnosti« tako v ZDA kot v Evropi. V slovenskem prostoru je politično mobiliziranje nestrpnosti v desnem političnem taboru (npr. Dragoš, 2004; Mekina, 2004), reproducirano z mediji (npr. Pušnik, 2017), že dolgo stalnica. V trenutnih razmerah se najbolj odmevno manifestira v jeznih in provokativnih izjavah in tvitih aktualnega premierja Janeza Janše, zlasti v njegovih napadih na novinarsko kritiko. Z množico diskurzov v javni, medijski domeni (politični govori, spletna mesta, časopisni članki)

<sup>1</sup> Populizem pa ni zgolj političen slog oz. slog politične komunikacije, razumemo ga tudi kot slabo utemeljeno ali »tanko« ideologijo (*thin-centred ideology*), ki na osnovi normativnih idej in vrednot omogoča osmislitev sveta, ki ga prikazuje.

<sup>2</sup> Po drugi strani t. i. »tehnokratski slog« združuje apeliranje na ekspertizo, lepe manire in zgodbo o stabilnosti ali napredku (Moffitt, 2016: 26, 44).

krožijo tudi emocije in afekti,<sup>3</sup> ki igrajo pomembno vlogo v oblikovanju političnih stališč, identitete in kolektivov. Izhajajoč iz predpostavke, da so politični diskurzi v osnovi usmerjeni na način čutenja, se v članku ukvarjamo s performativnostjo političnih diskurzov iz emocionalne perspektive (diskurzivno konstrukcijo emocij) in performativnostjo emocij (delovanjem in družbenimi učinki emocij, njihovo politično naravo).

Emocionalni naboj političnega jezika ni noviteta, ampak kontinuiteta. Politiki – poleg predstavljanja racionalnih argumentov – občinstvo vselej nagovarjajo tudi na emocionalni ravni. Emocije niso zgolj pojavi, ki izražajo dejanske telesne procese, temveč performirajo določene družbene pomene, prepričanja, stališča in jih organizirajo v (politično) delovanje. Kot ugotavljajo Goodwin in drugi (2001), so emocije močne motivacijske sile za politično participacijo in mobilizacijo, kar pojasnjuje njihovo nepogrešljivost v političnih tehnologijah vodenja sleherne družbe. Politični jezik vselej niha med mešanici strategij prepričevanja (logosa, patosa in etosa), pomembnost emocij za prepričljivost diskurza pa je pri-po-znana že od Aristotela dalje. Čeprav gre za zgodovinsko stalnost, se stil in vsebina emocionalne politične komunikacije navezujeta na vsakokratno družbeno-kulturni kontekst ter zgodovinsko variabilne oblike emocionalnih izkustev.

V svoji trenutni obliki se emocionalizacija politične komunikacije kaže kot rezultat procesov, ki se od poznih šestdesetih let 20. stoletja dalje odvijajo v evropskem in ameriškem prostoru, in sicer: terapevtske kulture in procesa emocionalizacije družbe (McCharty, 1989; Wounters, 1986; Furedi, 2003), ki sta spodbudila korenit premik k reflektivnemu ukvarjanju z emocijami, podelila legitimnost občutenju (ekspresiji) različnih emocij v zasebni in javni sferi ter vodila k brisanju meja med zasebno emocijo in javno komunikacijo; razvoja množičnih medijev, ki so utrdili z modernizacijskimi učinki pogojeno personalizacijo politike in personalno politično retoriko, posebej razvoja televizije, ki primarno vzbuja emocionalne (in ne kognitivne) odnose med gledalcem in govorcem (Hoggett, 2009: 54–55), ter emocionalizacije celotnih televizijskih programov (Bassols et al., 2013); spreminjajočega političnega okolja, ki zahteva ustvarjanje emocionalno privlačnih naracij, prilagojenih okusu »potrošnikov« in prevzemanje »emocionalno usmerjenih tehnik marketinga in oglaševanja« (Richards, 2004: 340;

<sup>3</sup> V literaturi glede konceptov ni soglasja, nekateri ju razlikujejo, drugi to razlikovanje zavračajo, njune razlike pa so različno opredeljene. Posplošeno vzeto lahko rečemo, da »emocije« označujejo kognitivne pojave, duševna stanja, ki so intencionalno usmerjena na objekte, »afekti« pa nezavedno občutenje ('intenzivnost') v telesu. Afekti so trdneje biološko in fiziološko določeni, nekognitivni in manj usidrani v diskurz, zato bolj fluidni in manj predvidljivi. Ahmed (2004: 40) je kritična do čezmerno polariziranega modela občutenja, ki emocije razlikuje od afektov. V članku ju razumemo kot relacijska koncepta, ki označujeta intersubjektivna izkustva in njihovo performativno vlogo v oblikovanju identitet, kolektivov in pripadnosti skozi diskurz (Westberg, 2021: 24).

Hoggett, 2009: 54–55); mediatizacije politične komunikacije, ki preferira in promovira tiste vidike politike, ki so dovolj senzacionalistični, da pritegnejo pozornost občinstva (Sonntag, 2011: 124); in nenazadnje, razvoja digitalnih tehnologij in novih kanalov komuniciranja, zlasti uporabe družbenih medijev (t.i. »emocionalnih medijev«), ki so še posebej primerni za neposreden, takojšen, angažiran in emocionaliziran slog komunikacije (Ernst et al., 2017; Tettegah, 2016; Breeze, 2020; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019). V kontekstu prepleta različnih procesov, ki jo oblikujejo, postaja emocionalna politična komunikacija bolj poudarjena in intenzivnejša kot kdajkoli prej. To še posebej velja za obdobje po 11. septembru, ko postanejo emocije močno politizirane in vpete v politiko strahu in gnusa (Ahmed, 2004a, 2004b), emocionalizacijo »vojne proti terorizmu« (Ahmed, 2015) in »nacionalno sentimentalno politiko (moške) zaščite« (Bargetz, 2015: 580). Ali kot je to v svojem govoru kongresu izjavil George W. Bush (2001) sam: »[...] Naša žalost se je spremenila v jezo in jeza v resolucijo [...] Velika škoda nam je bila storjena. Utrpeli smo veliko izgubo. In v svoji žalosti in jezi smo našli svoje poslanstvo in svoj trenutek.«

Intenziteta, s katero populistični politiki posvajajo emocionalno retoriko, reaktualizira staro zanimanje za emocije v politiki, odpira pa tudi vprašanje teoretizacije emocij, ki je pri tem pogosto umanjala. Članek začnemo z nerazdružljivo usodo politike in emocij, racionalistično koncepcijo politike in novimi pristopi, ki postavljajo emocije v središče političnih analiz. Nadaljujemo z obravnavo emocionalne dimenzije političnih diskurzov, posebej emocionalnega diskurza desnega populizma in politizacijo emocij v njem. Zatem se preusmerimo k vprašanju političnosti samih emocij. Kaj dela emocije politične oz. kakšno konceptualizacijo emocij potrebujemo za razumevanje njihove vloge v konstrukciji identitet in kolektivnih teles? Schrock in drugi (2017: 6) ugotavljajo, da se preučevanje emocij v politiki pogosto opira na razumevanje emocij kot notranjih stanj in individualnih samoizražanj.<sup>4</sup> Zgolj psihološko razumevanje emocij pa ne pojasni zadovoljivo logike delovanja (kolektivnih) emocij. Vprašanje, kako emocije delujejo v procesih ustvarjanja kolektivov, zahteva teoretizacijo in koncepte, ki, prvič, pomikajo razumevanje emocij od psiholoških modelov naprej v smeri njihove odnosnosti, performativnosti in kolektivnega značaja in drugič, raziskujejo kompleksne intersekcije med družbenimi in kulturnimi dejavniki, diskurzivnimi praksami ter individualno izkušanimi, a zgodovinsko in kulturno situiranimi emocijami. Pri obravnavi teh vprašanj se bomo oprli na konceptualni okvir Sare Ahmed (2004a; 2004b). Zastavljamo si dve glavni raziskovalni vprašanji: Kakšna je vloga emocij v političnih diskurzih

<sup>4</sup> Schrock et al. (2017: 6) še opozarjajo, da je diskurzivna produkcija emocij, kljub stahnim pozivom po raziskovanju emocij v politiki v sociologiji, še vedno premalo raziskana.

populizma? Kako nam lahko teorija emocij S. Ahmed pomaga pri razlagi vloge emocij v političnem diskurzu? Naš teoretični in metodološki pristop temelji na kombinaciji obstoječih teoretizacij in raziskav o emocionalnem stilu komuniciranja desnih političnih akterjev s teorijami emocij v družbenih vedah, ki temeljijo na konstrukcionističnem pristopu.

### Konceptualizacija politike: od izključitve k vključitvi emocij

Pri razumevanju zveze politika/politično-emocije je treba emocije obravnavati kot »utelešene misli« (Rosaldo, 1984). Emocije niso zgolj telesni, temveč tudi kognitivni (evaluativni) procesi, ki vsebujejo vrednostne (moralne) sodbe (npr. Izard, 2007; Feigenson, 2003), s katerimi subjekti izražajo svoje potrebe, želje, cilje in ideale. Telesno vznemirjenje, ki spremlja presoje in ocene objektov v danem kontekstu, pripravi subjekt za delovanje. Emocije »niso le del naših odzivov na dogodke, ampak – v obliki globokih afektivnih predanosti – oblikujejo tudi cilje naših delovanj« (Jasper, 1998: 398). Emocije odražajo naš odnos do sveta; njihovo čutenje in izražanje kažeta, kaj je za nas pomembno, kaj vpliva na nas, kako ocenjujemo stvari, druge, situacije. Kot take igrajo »vlogo v presojanju o dobrem in pravičnem ter zato v ocenah političnih idej in idealov« (Burkitt, 2005, v Linjakumpu, 2007: 4). Emocije utrjujejo in spreminjajo naša zaznavanja in prepričanja (Frijda et al., 2000) oz. imajo moč, da (pre)usmerjajo, polarizirajo in intenzivirajo naša politična stališča.

Vgrajene v komunikacijo in interakcijo so emocije osrednjega pomena za družbeno delovanje (Barbalet, 1998) in vse družbene odnose, torej so sestavina normalnega delovanja družbe in politike. Polje »političnega«, v katerem se po Szanto in Slaby (2020: 478) »pogajamo o naši pluralnosti in razlikah z namenom svobode, moči, individualne avtonomije, kolektivnega priznanja ali naših oblik sobivanja«, je bistveno afektivne narave. Ukvarja se s stvarmi, ki so

*nam pomembne, si jih želimo ali nas navdajajo s strahom, s stvarmi, ki nas zadevajo – nas kot skupnost. Velja tudi obratno, afektivno je vselej politično. Emocije niso zgolj subjektivni pojavi, ampak jih urejajo »pravila čustvovanja« (Hochschild, 1983) in uravnavajo skupne ali konfliktne vrednote. Torej, emocije vselej vključujejo pogajanja o tem, kaj, kako in skupaj s kom (ali proti komu) bi morali občutiti. (Szanto in Slaby, 2020: 478, poud. v orig.)*

Čeprav so politično relevantnost emocij v analizi retorike prepoznali že antični filozofi, so politični filozofi emocije v svojih analizah pogosto spregledali ali marginalizirali. V osrčju izključevanja emocij iz politike in

politične analize je ležala tiha predpostavka o dihotomiji emocij/strasti in razuma. Vpeta v teorije, jezik in zaznave je določala mesto emocijam tako v družbenih in političnih vedah kot tudi v družbi in politiki. V politiki so bile opredeljene kot muhaste in neukrotljive sile, v najboljšem primeru so veljale kot irelevantne, v najslabšem pa kot ovira pri doseganju nepristranskih presoj, nujnih za izvajanje pravih odločitev in učinkovitih politik (Hutchison, 2018). Prevlada dualističnega diskurza je emocije za dolga desetletja potisnila na rob politične teorije, političnih ved in politične sociologije.

Nov val zanimanja za emocije in afektivnost je sprožil t.i. emocionalni obrat, kasneje tudi afektivni obrat (Clough in Halley, 2007) v sredini devetdesetih let 20. st. Nova epistemologija v družbenih in političnih vedah je emocije povezala z družbenimi, kulturnimi in političnimi normami ter kritično izzvala zgodovinsko dihotomijo razum/emocije ter fetišizem razuma v racionalistični koncepciji politike. Dandanes je proučevanje emocij v politiki eno najbolj propulzivnih področij političnih ved in politične sociologije, zlasti na področju proučevanja narave družbenih vezi in družbene kohezije ter politične komunikacije (npr. Hoggett, 2009; Engelken-Jorge idr., 2011).

### Emocionalno-diskurzivne prakse v političnem komuniciranju

Emocionalizacija politike se kaže tako v vsakdanji uporabi emocionalnega jezika znotraj rutinske politike v parlamentih in političnih strankah, kot tudi v dramatični emocionalni retoriki volilne politike in predsedniški retoriki. Primerov prepričevanja prek patosa je veliko: od slovite fraze »Čutim vašo bolečino« v predsedniški kampanji Billa Clintona do besed »Sem ljubeč človek« v političnih govorih Georgea W. Busha po 11. septembru; od diskurza upanja (»Yes, we can!«) in empatije Baraka Obame do republikanske »politike strahu« (utemeljeni na grožnji novega terorističnega napada ali prihajajoči recesiji) ter jezne retorike gibanja čajank; od emocionalizirane volilne retorike Donalda Trumpa, Marine Le Pen, Geerta Wildersa do strastne retorike kampanje za odhod iz EU pred referendumom o brexitu; od politike jeze, zamere in upanja v obdobju Trumpovega predsedovanja vse do »politike empatije« novoizvoljenega predsednika Johna Bidna. Igranje na emocije je značilno, tako znotraj rutinske kot volilne politike, tudi za slovenski prostor, posebej pri temah, kot so begunci, tujci in manjšine (npr. Dragoš, 2004; Pušnik, 2017). Politiki z uporabo diskurza emocij stremijo k izgradnji emocionalnih vezi z občinstvom (volilno bazo) ali priklicujejo emocionalne odzive, ki napeljujejo k prepričanju, odločanju, vedenju in oblikam politične angažiranosti v duhu posredovanega emocionalnega sporočila.

Po Loseke (1993: 207; 2009) javni narativi in diskurzivne izjave vsebujejo in konstruirajo »želeno emocionalno orientiranost in odzive« ter moralno



vrednotenje »tipov« ljudi. Politiki s spretno uporabo idej o tem, kako svet deluje, kako bi moral delovati in kakšne so pravice in odgovornosti ljudi v tem svetu (simbolne kode), ter idej o tem, katere emocije je primerno občutiti kdaj, kje in kako (emocionalne kode), izvablajo ali priklicujejo specifične emocije, ki so ključnega pomena za doseganje političnih ciljev. Kot ugotavlja Reyes (2011: 789), politični diskurzi sprožajo emocionalna stanja, ki so »idealna za legitimiziranje poznejših političnih delovanj, osnovanih na učinkih teh emocij«. Emocije namreč vodijo in pripravijo občinstvo, da sprejme predloge in smeri delovanja akterjev, ki so te emocije prvotno vzbudili (ibid.: 790).

Politični diskurzi torej merijo tako na razumevanje in delovanje kot tudi na emocije državljanov (emocije so pravzaprav del »razumevanja«). Oblikujejo želene načine čutenja do določenih družbenih skupin, ki so – zlasti v desnih populističnih tekstih – naslovljeni kot radikalno drugačni (Fortier, 2010; Richards, 2007). Ne predpisujejo le, kako naj se dober, legitim državljan obnaša, ampak tudi kaj mora oz. je legitimno (ob)čutiti do določenih skupin. Tako izvabljene ali priklicane emocije državljanov politiki sočasno kanalizirajo v politično delovanje, skladno z interesi lastnih političnih strank ali drugih političnih in družbenih grupacij. Normativna konstrukcija dobrih državljanov se tako odvija skozi posebno obliko vladnosti v Foucaultovem smislu, tj. skozi mehanizme »afektivne vladnosti« – preko uporabe simbolnih in emocionalnih kod upravlja z javnimi in osebnimi emocijami/afekti ter oblikuje stališča in vedenje ljudi.

Levinger (2017) in Woodward (2002) ugotavljata, da sta izražanje in strateška uporaba emocij ključna dejavnika, ki pojasnjujeta privlačnost in prevlado določenih diskurzov. Uporaba emocij v politiki ima, kot kažejo raziskave (Escobar, 2011: 111; Schrock et al., 2017; Wirz, 2018), močan retorični potencial in povečuje učinkovitost političnega komuniciranja. Emocionalni odzivi na apele patosa so pomembni za različne oblike političnega uspeha: volilni uspeh, prevzem ali ohranitev oblasti, premik neke politične agende z obrobja v *mainstream* političnega diskurza (Levinger, 2017: 2–3), legitimizacijo političnih odločitev (Reyes, 2011), obračanje pozornosti od lastnega početja ali doseganje popularnosti. Bolj učinkovito retoriko izkazuje populistična politika (desnega krila) zaradi strastnega sloga komunikacije, medtem ko se opiranje na »tehnokratski slog« (Moffitt, 2016) pri »zmerni« politiki (iz)kaže kot manj učinkovito in manj medijsko privlačno (Schrock et al., 2017; Wirz, 2018; Abdell-Fadil, 2019: 17; Szabo, 2020: 7; Villadsen, 2020; Westen, 2007 v Hoggett, 2009: 56, 59). Levinger (2017) ugotavlja, da so bili močni emocionalni odzivi, ki jih je v volilcih vzbudila retorika strahu, jeze in ljubezni, ključni za nedavni volilni uspeh populističnih gibanj v ZDA, Združenem kraljestvu, Franciji in na Nizozemskem.

## Ko ostanejo samo še emocije: diskurzivne strategije desnega populizma

Emocionalizacija politične komunikacije ni inherentno »dobra« ali »slaba«, ampak je rezultat tega, v kakšnem »duhu«, kontekstu oz. s kakšnimi nameni in cilji politika uporablja emocionalni jezik. Politični akterji lahko svojo »strast« do skupnih zadev združujejo s komunikacijskimi in mobilizacijskimi strategijami za transformativne družbene povezave in konstruktivno razreševanje družbenih problemov. Lahko pa manipulirajo z emocijami in mobilizirajo razdruževalne strasti za ustvarjanje razklanih, (raz)druž(b)enih družb (neliberalna uporaba emocij). Progresivna politika je lahko načelna in obenem »strastna«, utemeljena je na tem, kar Hoggett (2009: 59) poimenuje »občutena premišljenost«. Brez strasti v politiki pravzaprav ni načelnosti. Strast daje političnim liberalcem moč za spoprijem z njihovimi neliberalnimi nasprotniki ter »pogum za odzivanje s sočutjem, ko je to primerno, in z agresijo, ko je to nujno« (Hoggett, 2009: 56).

»Strastno« politiko so v poznih sedemdesetih in osemdesetih letih 20. stoletja vpeljali novi politični igralci, ki so na politični trg vstopili organizirani v družbena gibanja (Frevert, 2019). Gibanja državljanov so razvila nov političen jezik, zaznamovan s terapevtsko kulturo (Furedi, 2004), ki je emocije povzdignila v osrednje sredstvo komunikacije tako v zasebni kot javni sferi. Družbena gibanja so izhajala iz osebne, emocionalnega izkustva zatiranih skupin (pod geslom »Osebno je politično«) in osebno pripoved uporabila kot osnovo za aktivizem. Gradila so solidarnost, entuziazem in samozavest kot podlago »emocionalne skupnosti« in kot vire moči za progresivne spremembe. Nov emocionalni jezik so pozneje posvojile politične stranke, ki so izšle iz vala neposredne demokracije in radikalne leve skupine, nato je lingvistične prakse patosa prevzel populizem (Frevert, 2019). V desnem populizmu je emocionalni jezik zapeljal v drugo smer – v razdruževanje, zaničevanje Drugih, krčenje politike na emocije (emotivizem), geslo »Osebno je politično« zamenja geslo »Politično je osebno«.

Populizem, ki prezentira družbo na podlagi antagonizma elita-ljudstvo, zavrača elito in glorificira ljudstvo, pripet na nacionalizem in nativizem pa prezentira in diskreditira tudi druge sovražnike ljudstva (tujce, begunce, manjšine). Politični slog populizma je prepoznaven v uporabi retorike strahu, jeze in sovraštva, s katero razvnema ljudi in stopnjuje emocionalne napetosti, ki jih generirajo prevladujoči neoliberalni diskurzivni, ekonomski in politični režimi.<sup>5</sup> Odgovornost za družbene probleme vali na osovražene

<sup>5</sup> Populizem ne kreira (kolektivnih) emocij »iz ničesar«, ampak črpa iz emocionalne naelektrenosti v družbi. Zajema iz bazena emocij, ki se oblikuje kot rezultat družbenih in ekonomskih razmer neoliberalne globalizacije, ter iz stoletja ustaljenih stereotipov v politični kulturi (npr. razizem, ksenofobija). V družbi razširjene negativne emocije (jezo, strah, tesnobo, negotovost, zamere, gnev, občutke prikrajšanosti) nezado-

skupine, ki jih razmejuje od pravega ljudstva ali »avtentične« nacionalne skupnosti (Levinger, 2017). Primer referiranja na slednjo oz. razmejevanja skupin ljudi najdemo v zapisu poslanca v DZ, ki na blogu v povezavi s t.i. »prišleki iz t.i. balkanskih republik« zapiše, da na ulicah Ljubljane velikokrat »naletimo« na tujo govorico, in nadaljuje: »Pomisliš; verjetno so turisti, ali pa tudi ne. Nekateri ne znajo jezika države, ki jih hrani. [...] Iz navedenega se moramo tisti 'staroselci' slovenskega naroda vprašati, kaj smo delali narobe. [...]« Proti koncu zapisa preberemo še: »Sam sem zato, da damo Slovenijo spet Slovencem« (Lenart, 2021). Populizem obvladuje miselnost, ki daje prednost mejam, fizičnim/prostorskim in kulturnim/simbolnim, Trumpov populizem je tu znova dober primer (omenimo zgolj predvolilno obljubo gradnje zidu na meji z Mehiko). Populistični diskurzi z retoriko okoli tem globalizacije, vdora migrantov in beguncev ipd. generirajo občutke ogroženosti in strahu. V kontekstu kroženja afektivnih podob beguncev kot ogrožajočih, nevarnih je razumeti tudi izjavo Janeza Janše, predsednika SDS, ki je v povezavi z »begunsko problematiko« v Sloveniji leta 2015 zagovarjal postavitev ograje na meji in jo v televizijskem intervjuju opredelil kot »[...] ograjo, ki brani svobodo. Je ograja, ki brani red [...]« (v Luthar, 2017: 159).<sup>6</sup> Ograja v imenu svobode »obljublja« ne le rešitev strahu pred tistimi, ki ogrožajo našo svobodo (oz. svobodo od škode pred drugimi), ampak tudi zaščito reda. Konstrukcija oz. ohranjanje mej (reda, nadzora) se odvija skozi diskurzivno produkcijo in upravljanje emocij.

Emocionalna energija, ki jo generirajo populistične politike strahu, jeze in sovraštva, ni sila, ki »poziva na in odpira politično komunikacijo, ampak jo zapira. Emocije političnih odnosov ne gradijo, ampak jih zavirajo« (Frevort, 2019: 7). Retorika, ki jo je Trump uporabljal v času svojega predsedovanja, »ni promovirala razumevanja, ampak distanco, izolacijo in zavrnitev vsega, razen množice pred njim« (Clem, 2017: 11). Na množice pred njim, lojalne podpornike je Trump apeliral z retoriko ljubezni, intenca katere je bila krepitev emocionalnih vezi (Trumpovo ponavljajoče se sporočilo občinstvu: »I love you« (»Rad vas imam«)). Kot ugotavlja Levinger (2017: 2), je bilo prav obvladovanje konvencij »jezika ljubezni« en od ključnih dejavnikov Trumpovega političnega uspeha. Ljubezen je v Trumpovi politični retoriki delovala kot vezivno tkivo, ki utrjuje vezi med voditeljem in sledilci ter sočasno kot »velika izključevalka« drugih, drugačnih.

*voljnih državljanov populizem artikulira in predeluje skozi politične diskurze tako, da se prilegajo njegovim političnim potrebam in ciljem. Ali po Hoggessu (2009: 104): politični diskurzi obstoječim emocijam podelijo pomen in s tem posebno obliko ter smer. Populizem je učinkovit, ker je družba že nekako pripravljena nanj.*

<sup>6</sup> *Navajam celoten citat (Luthar, 2017: 159): »[...] To ni ograja, kot je bil berlinski zid, ki je preprečeval, da bi šli ljudje iz Vzhodne Nemčije v svobodo, ampak je ograja, ki brani svobodo. Je ograja, ki brani red, je ograja, ki omogoča, da se obvlada množica brez nasilja. Druga možnost je samo uporaba nasilja, tega si pa nihče ne želi. [...]«.*

Po Frevert (2019) emocije ne *služijo* sodobni politiki, ampak jo *ustvarjajo*. Emocije so same po sebi pretvorjene v politični argument: »Način čustvovanja je osnova političnega delovanja, spodbuja in usmerja politiko, in to namerno. O emocijah se ni mogoče pogajati. Preprosto obstajajo. Tako vsaj pravijo« (2019: 6). Namesto o »emocionalizaciji politike« – v historičnem poteku vselej prisotnem pojavu – je zato ustreznejše govoriti o »politizaciji emocij«. V desnem populizmu so negativne emocije osrednji atribut, okoli katerega se oblikuje in na katerem je utemeljeno samo politično delovanje. Trump je bolj kot na ideološke volilce igral na strune jeznih volilcev: »Trumpov populizem deluje zaradi jeze, ki jo izraža: jeza je temelj njegovih apelo in njegovega političnega projekta« (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019: 126). V času Busha (2001), kot smo že zapisali, je jeza postala resolucija, poslanstvo, trenutek (ko zablesti volja, afekt ljudstva). Političnost se torej ne izraža le skozi politične programe, ampak se oblikuje in izraža tudi skozi skupne emocije, ki jih artikularajo diskurzi oz. skozi skupno emocionalno izkustvo. Po Abdell-Fadil (2019) »emocije utrjujejo politične ideje ali pa so sam material, iz katerega so oblikovane politične ideje«, so »sile, ki podžigajo proces drugačenja in zagotavljajo moralno upravičenje 'naše' nastrojenosti do 'drugih', s katero ščitimo sebe pred zaznano grožnjo uničenja« (Abdell-Fadil, 2019: 24).

Populizem, kot ugotavlja Arditi (2004: 137), izkorišča »napetost med demokratičnimi institucijami in odtujenostjo, ki jo te neizogibno ustvarjajo, oz. med romantičnostjo spontanega izražanja volje ljudstva na eni strani in na drugi institucij in profesionalne ekspertize, ki so potrebne, da to voljo predstavljajo«. Ali drugače, izkorišča inherenten potencial nezaupanja v demokracijah do odtujenih, skritih političnih sil, ki (da) zavajajo in odločajo v lastno korist namesto v korist ljudstva. In prav v ozračju sumničavosti do posredniških institucij, tehnokratskih in odtujenih elit ter anonimnih birokratskih in tržnih mehanizmov se emocije in njihovo »spontano«, takojšnje izražanje populistom kažejo kot »pristna« politična reakcija, »naraven« odziv na »krizne razmere«.

Skozi populistično optiko se emocije dojemajo kot neposredne politične izjave, ki zaobidejo posredovanje in reprezentacije kompleksa institucij. Predstavljajo besedo in glas tistih, katerih volja in interesi so se v kompleksnem političnem sistemu izgubili. Ta utišani glas ljudstva si pogosto »prisvojijo« karizmatični voditelji in mu skušajo povrniti (afektivno) moč. Populisti »obljublajo prekinitev birokratskih rutin in preobrazbo politike v bolj osebno izkustvo« (Arditi, 2004: 137). Ali v Trumpovem egocentričnem slogu: »[...] Jaz sem z vami, Američani. Jaz sem vaš glas. [...] Boril se bom za vas. [...] Rad vas imam« (Charteris-Black, 2018: 25). V mačističnem slogu prepričujejo, da so edini legitimni predstavniki ljudstva in edini, ki razumejo (čutijo) in resno jemljejo njegove skrbi, bolečine, strahove in upanje

(populizem igra tudi na pozitivne, ne zgolj negativne emocije). Npr. Farage je z neposrednim in namerno pretiranim jezikom ustvaril javno osebnost, ki projicira poštenost in realizem ob soočenju s korupcijo in prevaro (Breeze, 2020). To je bila tudi persona, ki je spodbujala in »urila« nezadovoljne državljanke za specifične načine doživljanja in izražanja emocij (Leezenberg, 2017: 269). S prilaščanjem monopola nad reprezentiranjem resničnih občutij in interesov običajnih ljudi populistični delegitimizirajo politične tekmece in izkazujejo svojo antipluralistično in antidemokratsko držo.

Populisti, skratka, vidijo emocije kot »legitimen in zadosten vodnik za urejanje političnih vprašanj« in zavrnejo dejstva kot nepotrebna v političnem odločanju (Villadsen, 2020: 57). Mesto dejstev zasedejo emocije, o katerih se ni mogoče pogajati.

Vpeljava emocij kot suverenega principa v politični debati in sumničavost do dokazov, ki temeljijo na dejstvih (Villadsen, 2020: 58), vodi v neuravnoteženo mobilizacijo patosa, logosa in etosa. Ustvarja emotivizem, ki daje prednost: emocionalnim impulzom pred globljimi premisleki, emocionalnim gestam pred (vsebinskimi) informacijami, trenutnim zadovoljitvam pred konkretnimi rešitvami problemov, emocionalni trivialnosti pred substantivnimi vprašanji in vsebinsko razpravo. Wildersovi grobi, konfrontirajoči tviti ne puščajo nobenega prostora za razumske argumente (Leezenberg, 2017: 251), Faragejeve izjave niti niso informativne niti niso mnenja v običajnem smislu (Leezenberg, 2017: 269). Emotivizem se kaže tudi v značilni – (ne)premišljeni, (ne)pretehtani – takojšnosti Janševega komuniciranja: od tvita o »odsluženih prostitutkah«, Johnu Bidenu kot enem izmed najšibkejših predsednikov v zgodovini (če bi bil izvoljen) do poobjave tvita o klofutah, ki »bi se lepo prilegle« eni od poslank.<sup>7</sup> Podobno je funkcija zapisa poslanca DZ Jožefa Lenarta (2021) v zvezi s »socialnimi kulturniki – kulturnimi socialisti« (kot jih imenuje) zgolj ta, da zbode, zasmehuje, poniža: »[...] svoje zahteve pač izražajo na svoj način, ker verjamejo v svoje umetniške talente. [...] Menijo pa tudi: da imajo pravico do brezplačnih prostorov za svoje ustvarjanje, ki pa jih v nekaj letih po njihovi uporabi ni več mogoče uporabiti niti za hlev.« Emotivizem reducira zapletena *policy* vprašanja na binarnost »to je super – to je grozno«, torej na razvnanje emocij, negativnih do Drugih, pozitivnih do lastne skupine. Populistični emotivizem namesto tehtnih argumentov, iskanja kompromisov in sodelovanja deluje – z negativno emocionalno retoriko, posredovano in stopnjevano skozi družbene medije, zlasti Twitter – izključevalno tako do določenih družbenih skupin kot do političnih nasprotnikov.

<sup>7</sup> Seksistične tvite objavljajo ali poobjavljajo tudi drugi politiki iz desnega spektra (npr. *twit o leglu feministk na CSD-jih*), so pa tudi leve provenience (npr. *twit J. P. Damijana o ministrici*).

## Teorija lepljivih emocij

Za razumevanje diskurzivne konstruiranosti in performativne vloge emocij v oblikovanju identitet in kolektivov skozi diskurz je potreben premik v izhodišču razumevanja emocij. Konvencionalno razumevanje, po katerem so emocije subjektom inherentni pojavi, je nezadostno, saj predpostavlja akterja, ki je nepovezan s strukturnim kontekstom ter razmerji moči. Ahmed (2004a in 2004b) je razvila alternativen model emocij, ki nas preusmeri, prvič, od osredinjenosti izključno na emocije »v« posamezniku k njihovim kolektivnim dimenzijam, drugič, k razumevanju emocij kot, vsaj delno, diskurzivne družbene konstrukcije in tretjič, k emocionalnemu drugačenju v političnem in medijskem prostoru, prek katerega se ustvarjajo antagonistične relacije med »nami« in »njimi« ter družbeni in politični kolektivi.

Emocije so intencionalne, vselej se na nekaj nanašajo – na objekte ali subjekte, stvari, specifične situacije, ideje, prostore itd. Ali kot navaja Ahmed (Parkinson v Ahmed, 2004a: 7), so emocije »‘o nečem’: vključujejo smer ali orientacijo do objekta«. Orientacija emocij je povezana z odnosom subjekta do objekta, z oceno, presojo, vrednotno sodbo o objektu.<sup>8</sup> Ti kognitivni procesi so pogojeni tako s subjektivimi zaznavami in preteklimi izkustvi kot tudi s kulturnim okvirom, znotraj katerega živi in je socializiran. Avtorica poudarja: »(...) biti na določen način emocionalno aktiviran v srečanju z drugim vključuje branje ne le srečanja, ampak tudi tega drugega kot nekoga, ki ima določene značilnosti« (poud. v orig., 2004: 28). Te interpretacije, ocene se izražajo v načinu, na katerega se telesa usmerjajo glede na druga telesa. Ocene uvedejo neko vrsto delovanja – obračajo nas »k« objektom/telesom (želja po bližini) in »stran« od njih (oddaljevanje, distanciranost) – ali aktivnosti v oz. s katero se emocije premikajo med telesi. »Emocije so relajske: vsebujejo (re)akcije ali relacije ‘k’ ali ‘stran’ v odnosu do teh objektov« (Ahmed, 2004a: 8). Kraj izvora emocij ni subjektova duševnost, niso omejene na človeško telo. Nasprotno, pri emocijah gre vselej za gibanje: premikajo subjekte, ki se posledično gibajo v različnih smereh, odvisno od tega, kako so emocionalno aktivirani oz. izzvani, kakšne specifične emocije (ob) čutijo. Tako niso ne povsem znotraj (psihološke) ne povsem zunaj telesa (družbene),<sup>9</sup> pač pa so sile, ki vplivajo na samo razlikovanje med »znotraj« in »zunaj« oz. začrtajo meje, ki to razliko definirajo: »ustvarjajo sam učinek na površinah ali mejah teles in svetov« (2004b: 117).

<sup>8</sup> Naši emocionalni odzivi na objekt vsebujejo miselne procese, ki se odvijajo sočasno kot samo (ob) čutenje na ravni telesa (2004a: 6). Ahmed opisuje emocije kot preplet »občutkov telesnih sprememb«, ki so rezultat stika z objekti oz. drugimi, in »branja« tega stika in drugih kot vzroka našega emocionalnega odziva.

<sup>9</sup> V psihološkem modelu delujejo emocije od »znotraj navzven« (prihajajo iz posameznikove notranjosti, iz nagonov, najprej jih začutimo v telesu, potem se gibajo k objektom), v sociološkem modelu pa kot pri/sile, ki delujejo od »zunaj navznoter« (prihajajo iz družbe in se nato prenesejo »v« posameznika).



Emocije vključujejo subjekte in objekte, a se ne nahajajo znotraj njih (2004a: 119). Niso »v« nas ali »v« objektih. Ne povzročijo jih objekti, ampak nastajajo kot rezultat našega stika z objektom (2004a: 6), in ta stik nas oblikuje v tem, »kdo smo«. <sup>10</sup> Emocije so relacijski pojavi, ki nastajajo v družbenih situacijah/srečanjih oz. družbeno-političnih interakcijah. Ali v jeziku avtorice, emocije krožijo med telesi: se gibljejo, premikajo, na nekatera telesa se »prilepijo« (Ahmed, 2004a: 4), prek drugih pa (z)drsijo (2004a: 8). Ne »bivajo v subjektih ali objektih«, ampak »so producirane kot učinki cirkulacije« (Ahmed, 2004a: 8). Izvor emocij torej niso objekti, na katere se usmerjajo, saj z njimi niso esencialno povezane, pač pa emocije oblikujejo objekt in so same oblikovane skozi stik z njim. Prav to, da niso pritrjene na subjekte ali objekte (Ahmed, 2004a: 128, 135), govori o tem, da se nahajajo in oblikujejo le v relaciji med subjektom in objektom. <sup>11</sup> Potencial emocij, da potujejo – se prenašajo od enega do drugega posameznika – omogoča, da nas povezujejo in združujejo oz. generirajo površine kolektivnih teles.

Po Ahmed (2004a: 4) ključno vprašanje emocij ni, kaj so, ampak kako delujejo, kakšen je njihov učinek. Emocije v svojem kroženju »ustvarjajo stvari«, sebstvo, identitete in kolektive s tem, da zarisujejo meje, ki označujejo neko (skozi občuteno emocijo) zaznano razliko: med »menoj« in »drugim«, »menoj« in »nami«, »nami« in »njimi« ter z ohranjanjem teh binarnosti. Kot že omenjeno, niso »v« telesih, ampak »oblikujejo same površine teles, ki se izoblikujejo skozi ponavljanje delovanj v času in z usmerjenostjo 'k' ali 'stran' od drugih« (2004a: 4). Površine in meje individualnih in kolektivnih teles nastajajo skozi načine našega odzivanja na objekte/druge (tj. občutenje emocij): »jaz« in »mi« sta oblikovana s stikom z objekti oz. drugimi (2004a: 1, 10). Emocije niso stranski produkt procesa formiranja identitet, ampak osrednji proces produkcije (političnih) identitet.

Emocionalno branje drugih vzpostavlja odnos, izkustvo odnosa pa ustvarja pomen in vrednost, izključevanje/vključevanje, pripadnost in predanost. Emocije (interpretacije drugih) torej povezujejo telesa s skupnostmi/kolektivi ali pa jih pozicionirajo zunaj njih. Kot zapiše avtorica, emocije povezujejo »nekatero subjekte z nekaterimi drugimi in zoper druge«

<sup>10</sup> Emocije oblikujejo svoje subjekte in objekte; npr. strah pred objektom (ocena, da je objekt nevaren, in spremljajoči telesni občutki) pridobi površino kot telo, ki je usmerjeno »stran« od objekta, branje/interpretacija stika z objektom kot nevarnega (razumevanje objekta kot »strašljivega«) pa identificira objekt kot vzrok subjektovega strahu. Subjekt postane prestrašen, objekt pa strašljiv (»ne-jaz«): pripisovanje »krivde« oz. strahu objektu (prestrašen sem, ker si strašljiv) je učinek srečanja, ki giblje subjekt »stran« od objekta (2004a: 8; 2004a: 126–128).

<sup>11</sup> Emocije ne naseljujejo posameznika in potem v njem pojenjajo, ampak se premikajo med ljudmi, krožijo skozi subjektive interakcije z drugimi subjekti, so gibajoča, a se tudi pritrjujejo, npr. subjekt, ki ob srečanju z neko osebo občuti gnus, je lahko začasno »poln česa slabega«, toda to »slabo« se »izloči« in prilepi na objekt oz. telesa drugih (2004a: 104) – tako se konstituirajo gnusna telesa.



(Ahmed, 2004a: 117). So sile, ki premikajo in umeščajo posameznike/skupine na obe strani družbeno konstruiranih meja ter signalizirajo pozicioniranost telesa v odnosu do meje. Ali kot pravi Ahmed, način, na katerega (ob) čutimo druge nas združuje v skupnost/kolektiv, ki se, paradoksalno, »oblikuje« samo kot učinek takšne združitve, skozi vtise, ki jih na nas naredijo drugi (2004a: 54). Emocije »združujejo posameznike s skupnostmi – ali telesen prostor z družbenim prostorom – skozi samo intenzivnost svojih predanosti« (2004a: 119).

Emocije pa ne krožijo kot take, ampak se gibljejo skozi cirkulacijo objektov, na nekatere objekte se prilepijo. Ko obravnavamo emocije in odnose med telesi (kako se telesa premikajo), je treba opazovati tudi odnos med emocijami in reprezentacijami oz. podobami v javnih diskurzih ter tekstih, ki krožijo v javni domeni. Opazovati moramo, kako se emocije povezujejo z znaki oz. cirkulirajo skupaj z njimi in kako se pri stiku med tekstom in telesi (nami) ustvari »odtis«.

Po Ahmed se emocije stalno premikajo med subjekti, objekti, drugimi in znaki ter nastajajo kot učinki cirkulacije med objekti in znaki. En od učinkov njihovega cirkulacije med posamezniki in kolektivi, znaki in podobami je ta, da postanejo določeni znaki in objekti »lepljive površine« oz. »zasičeni z afektom«. Ko emocije drsijo, »tečejo čez« objekte, se na nekatere objekte (telesa drugih) pritrdijo in jim podelijo pomen. Ti z afektom nasičeni objekti/telesa, postanejo lepljivi, potujejo in se ob stiku z našimi lastnimi telesi vtisnejo, prilepijo na nas in naša telesa se prilepijo nanje (tako producirajo nadaljnje »lepljive« odnose). Ob stiku teksta in teles se ustvari učinek, ki pusti svojo sled (2004a: 6) ali vtis, repeticija teh (emocionalnih) vtisov pa ustvari oz. rezultira v lepljivosti. Lepljivost je »učinek zgodovine stikov med telesi, objekti in znaki« (Ahmed, 2004a: 90) in način vzpostavljanja odnosa subjekta do objekta/teles na osnovi definiranja in vrednotenja slednjih.

Z uporabo metafore »afektivna ekonomija« Ahmed trdi, da emocije delujejo na ekonomski način – bolj ko objekti, znaki (in z njimi afekti, emocije) krožijo, bolj afektivni (intenzivni) postajajo.<sup>12</sup> Objekti ne cirkulirajo znotraj ekonomskega trga, ampak skozi različne tekste – skozi spletne zapise, politične govore ali izjave političnih akterjev ter časopisna poročila. »To je, emocije delujejo kot oblika kapitala: afekt se ne nahaja v znaku ali blagu, ampak je produciran samo kot učinek svoje cirkulacije (...) med objekti in znaki (= akumulacija afektivne vrednosti v času) (...) bolj ko znaki cirkulirajo, bolj afektivni postajajo (Ahmed 2004b: 120). Na primer, ponavljanje besed »paki« in »črnuh« skozi daljše časovno obdobje je ustvarilo lepljiv pomen

<sup>12</sup> Ahmed (2004b: 121) opozori, da je analogija z Marxovo analizo vrednostne forme omejena in da referenca ostaja bolj ali manj metaforična.

teh besed, ki prispevajo k »sovražnemu govoru« in stimulirajo emocionalne odzive teles (Ahmed, 2004a: 59–60).<sup>13</sup>

Stik teles z različnimi teksti, ki posredujejo emocije oz. podobe, ki so »nasičene ali celo prepolne afektov« (2004a: 95), ustvarja sledi – emocionalnost tekstov (tekstualnih in verbalnih sporočil) se dobesedno vtisne ali prilepi na telesa in ustvarja učinke na njih, tj. vpliva na njihove lastne emocionalne odzive (tj. na naslovljene teme ali družbene skupine, o katerih je govora), prevaja te emocije v delovanje in spremeni njihovo površino. Ali drugače, posamezniki med katerimi krožijo emocije – generirane s teksti – prevzamejo in sprejmejo te emocije kot »moje« ali »naše«, s tem se telesa mobilizirajo ter oblikujejo »površine« individualnih in kolektivnih teles.

Emocija, ki jo občutimo kot odziv na ponavljajoče se besede, stavke, ideje, ne biva »v« nas, ampak »v« stiku med nami in besedo (narativom, tekstom), njena lepljivost je učinek, ki izhaja iz zgodovine stika. Kako nekaj (ob)čutimo ni preprosto stvar individualnih vtisov, ki se ustvarijo na novo v sedanosti, ampak ta stik z nečim ali nekom »oblikujejo pretekle zgodovine stika« (Ahmed, 2004a: 7). Tako so lahko določena telesa dojeta kot bolj strašljiva (gnusna) kot druga. V tem smislu emocije kot medosebni pojavi niso samo neposredni, trenutni odzivi, ampak so »odvisni od preteklih interpretacij, ki jih nismo nujno sami ustvarili« (Ahmed, 2004a: 171). Povezanost emocije z določenim znakom ali podobo nima izvora v psihi, je sled zgodovine, ki »ostaja živa v sedanosti« (Ahmed, 2004b: 126). Naše zaznave drugih, emocionalne naravnosti nanje in naše odnose z njimi so posredovani s »kulturno zgodovino in spomini«, ki nam dajejo utemeljena znanja o določenih skupinah ter s tem prepričljive razloge za določene emocionalne odzive nanje.

## Sklep

Populizem in (skrajno) desni politični diskurzi, od antimigrantskih, anti-begunskih, antiblaginjskih do anti-ekspertnih in drugih diskurzov, z anti-X-sentimenti delujejo na podlagi »aktiviranja vrednotno obremenjenih in emocionalno nabitih izjav in konceptov ter spremljajočih emocij« (Chilton, 2017, v Breeze, 2019: 26). Politična komunikacija, ki se naslovljencev »dota-kne« na emocionalni ravni, je retorično prepričljivejša od emocionalno manj evokativnih diskurzov in pomembno določa politične odločitve posameznikov. V »dobi emocionalne politike« so pogosto uspešnejši tisti politični

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<sup>13</sup> *Temnopoltega človeka, ki gre mimo, se ljudje ne ustrašijo zaradi njega samega, niti strah ne prihaja iz »belega telesa«, ampak gre za strah, ki se prenaša med telesi in pritrdi na znak temnopoltega človeka na osnovi družbenih in historičnih konstrukcij. Posredi je torej repetitija stereotipov o temnopoltem človeku, ta repetitija pa generira drugega kot objekt strahu, ta strah potem prevzamejo ljudje kot svojega lastnega (2004b: 131).*

akterji, ki s strastno (negativno) politično retoriko učinkovito generirajo objekte (tarče) specifičnih emocij, vzbujajo in mobilizirajo intenzivno emocionalno odzivanje podpornikov ter stimulirajo povezovanje enako čutečih v (politični) kolektiv. Slednji je vselej pozicioniran v izključevalno razmerje z drugimi kolektivi – političnimi nasprotniki ali skupinami, ki ogrožajo njegove ideale, posest, obstoj.

Medtem ko je vloga emocij v oblikovanju politične subjektivitete v zadnjih desetletjih široko pripoznana, je ob tem pogrešati bolj sistematično teoretizacijo emocij, ki bi omogočila preučevanje njihove performativne vloge emocij, zlasti v (skrajno) desnih političnih diskurzih. Pri vprašanju, kako emocije delujejo in kakšni so njihovi politični učinki, je zato dobrodošla teorija S. Ahmed o krožečih, lepljivih emocijah. V sklepnem delu navajamo nekaj uvidov, ki nam jih prinašata družbeni model emocij in ideja lepljivosti, s posebnim poudarkom na diskurzivni cirkulaciji najbolj lepljive od vseh emocij – sovraštva.

Najprej, zavrnitev psihološkega modela, po katerem so emocije zasebna »last« subjekta, in njegova nadomestitev z relacijskim modelom odpreta nov pogled, ki pokaže, da v subjektih ni ničesar neločljivo sovražnega. Biti sovražen do koga ali česa ni nekaj, kar ljudje preprosto so, kajti sovraštvo ne mobilizira posameznikov »od znotraj«, ampak je kulturno uokvirjeno oz. je diskurzivne narave. Pripisovanje emocionalne vrednosti drugim je družbeni, kulturni in diskurzivni proces. Sovraštvo ne sodi v nobenega posebnega posameznika ali skupino kot nekakšna statična lastnina, ampak je produciran skozi kroženje znakov. Politični diskurzi z uporabo določenih form naslavljanja, poimenovanja, argumentiranja in prepričevanja vzpostavljajo in obnavljajo rasistična, ksenofobna, homofobna in mizogina stališča. Sovraštvo se torej vselej kreira v kontekstu merjenja moči med (političnimi) skupinami in diskurzivnih bojov, ki izhajajo iz družbenih in (antagonističnih) političnih konfliktov znotraj danega družbenega konteksta. Posamezniki pa občutijo sovraštvo v svojih individualnih srečanjih z drugimi, v katerih »berejo« in prepoznajo te druge kot »vir grožnje«, »sovražnike«. Stiki z drugimi so lahko medosebni, če pa potekajo (bolj ali manj) samo prek medijev (danes bolj pogosti kraji stikov), postanejo ti drugi še lažje tarče sovražnosti, saj odpade možnost preverjanja predstav o tuji in lastni skupini.

Drugič, trditev, da emocije ne bivajo v objektih, razjasni, da različne tarče sovražnosti niso utelešenje osovražnosti, strašljivosti, gnusnosti, da torej sami po sebi ne vzbujajo (niso vzrok) emocij pri subjektih. To, na kakšen način nas v stiku z drugimi emocije premikajo (k njim ali stran od njih), je odvisno od naše interpretacije stika in značilnosti drugih. Kot osovraženo, strašljivo, gnusno je neko telo ustvarjeno šele skozi cirkulacijo emocij v vsakdanjem jeziku politikov in drugih javnih akterjev, ki utemeljujejo razloge z obrazložitvami, da so določena telesa nekaj, česar se bojiš oz. kar (moreš

in moraš) sovražiti. Rasistična ali ksenofobna retorika tako prepričujeta, da sta frustracija in sovraštvo do Drugih upravičena in da »ogroženi« s svojimi sovražnimi dejanji ravnajo prav. Bolj ko se ideje, podobe, argumenti sovražne retorike uporabljajo in ponavljajo, bolj emocionalno nabite postajajo, tem bolj se lepijo na telesa Drugih in stabilnejše negativne asociacije ustvarjajo z njimi.

Sovraštvo pa ne kroži »prosto«, ampak vzdolž že izoblikovanih kulturnih linij, kot so rasa, etnija, spol, spolna usmerjenost. Sovraštvo in strah se na nekatere družbene skupine lepita bolj kot na druge. Skozi tekste in govor populističnih strank ter grupacij s konservativnimi programi se strah in občutek »muslimanske invazije« lepita na telo muslimanskega migrantskega moškega (ženske) ali na prosilce azila, sovraštvo in gnus pa na telesa temnopoltnih oseb, žensk ali na telesa istospolno usmerjenih. Negativna emocionalna vrednost določenih družbenih teles, ki so krožila v preteklosti, krožijo še dandanes, kar odseva v lahkotnosti diskreditacij, pripisovanja pomanjkanja določenih sposobnosti, marginalizacije, izključevanja in drugih oblik odzivanja na njih.

Tretjič, skozi ponavljajoče se lepljenje določenih emocij na določene družbene skupine se odvijajo procesi, ki tvorijo kolektivna telesa. Skupna sovražna občutja ob istih drugih (katerih bližina grozi z odvzemom, skrunitvijo, nadvlado, prevzemom mesta) ustvarjajo skupna razpoloženja in miselnost ter deluje kot vezivo, ki subjekte povezuje in spaja v skupnost/kolektiv. Skozi emocionalno razločevanje med telesi (belimi-temnopoltimi, heteroseksualnimi-homoseksualnimi, delavnimi-lenimi), drugačnost, tujost oz. z definiranjem, kdo ne pripada, se formira »mi-skupnost«. S tem ko se emocionalno ovrednoti »zunanje«, se združi, izoblikuje »znotraj«. Sovraštvo »znotraj« pa je občuteno kot povzročeno s strani izključenih in hkrati kot pripadnost notranji skupini. Sovraštvo deluje »zoper« in premika »stran« od osovraženih ter leži v sami osnovi skupnosti, kohezije. Deluje tako, da skrbi, da se obe strani meja ne pomešata.

Privlačnost sovražne retorike in njena diskurzivna politična moč pa nista (samo) v negativni nastrojenosti do »drugih«. »Dobra« stran je v tem, da sovraštvo predstavlja kot pozitivno navezanost na »nas«, na to, kar je »naše«, kar ljubimo in kar »moramo« zavarovati pred grožnjo drugačnih. Desni populistični diskurzi in programi konservativnih skupin, ki se organizirajo okoli skupne ljubezni do otrok, družine, naroda, predstavljajo strast svoje sovražnosti v njeni pozitivni razsežnosti. Večjo prepričljivost in utemeljenost pridobijo šele s tem, ko se povežejo z ideali ljubezni. Emocijo/vrednoto torej, ki jo je najtežje napadati in najlažje idealizirati. Bolj kot (eksplicitno) na sovraštvo do »drugih« se zato sklicujejo na ljubezen do »svojih«: ljubezen do družine, domovine, naroda, boga. Sovražni diskurzi konstruirajo sovraštvo kot ljubezen, uporabo sovraštva pa kot obrambo pred nevarnostjo, ki grozi,

da bo odvezla, kar je »naše«. Ljubezen je hrbtna stran sovraštva. Sovražna retorika, ki pravi »Skupaj sovražimo, in to sovraštvo nas združuje« (Ahmed, 2004b: 118), se dopolni (zamaskira) z jezikom ljubezni, ki sovraštvo do drugih zamenjuje z ljubeznijo do sebe: »Ker ljubimo, sovražimo, in to sovraštvo nas združuje« (Ahmed, 2004a: 43).

V povezavi z zastavljenimi raziskovalnimi vprašanji ugotavljamo dvoje. Prvič, emocije in afekti igrajo osrednjo vlogo v političnih diskurzih (desnega) populizma: oblikujejo in utrjujejo politična stališča, ustvarjajo vezi med političnimi voditelji in podporniki, legitimizirajo politične odločitve voditeljev, zarisujejo meje med »nami« in »njimi«, tvorijo in mobilizirajo (politične) kolektive oz., v celoti gledano, spodbujajo določene politične ideje, strategije in prakse. Populizem vprašanja, kot so migracije, varnost, nacionalna kultura in blaginja, oblikuje v jeziku emocij (strah, jeza in sovraštvo). Te negativne emocije, pripete na ideje in predstave o skupinah, »odgovornih« za ta vprašanja, oz. probleme, povezane z njimi, pogosto vodijo v emotivizem, služijo zgolj trenutni zadovoljitvi impulzov (odobravanje, navdušenje podpornikov), polarizirajo politični prostor in utrjujejo družbene neenakosti. Drugič, teoretski model premikajočih se emocij S. Ahmed omogoča razumevanje delovanja in učinkov emocij v političnem diskurzu in omogoča nadaljnje interpretacije ter empirično raziskovanje realnih, živečih emocij/afektov kot dela širših diskurzivnih struktur. Uporaba tega edinstvenega modela razkrije, da se s ponavljajočim se lepljenjem določenih emocij na določena telesa skozi krožeče diskurze, z emocionalnim vrednotenjem (vredna-nevredna telesa), diskurzivno dinamiko sovraštva in ljubezni ter posledičnim občutenjem drugih družbenih teles nekateri subjekti povezujejo s prednostnimi pravicami ter »združujejo z nekaterimi drugimi in zoper nekatere druge«. Formiranje kolektivov je v svojem temelju bistveno afektivni/emocionalni proces.

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## **POLITIKA IRONIJE NA SPLETNIH DRUŽBENIH OMREŽJIH: ORIS MEDIJSKO-TROLOVSKEGA DISPOZITIVA\*\***

*Povzetek. Namen članka je postaviti teoretsko podlago za analizo ironičnih komunikacijskih praks na spletnih družbenih omrežjih. Posebej se bomo posvetili praksam trolanja. V članku ne definiramo ironije le kot retorične figure, temveč tudi kot govorno dejanje, ki rekonfigurira razmerje med elementi komunikacijske situacije. Najprej bomo kritično ovrednotili sodobne različice teorij tehnoloških zmožnosti, nato pa skozi prikaz komunikacijskih pogojev na nekaterih spletnih družbenih omrežjih pokazali, kako je mogoče določene njihove zmožnosti opisati kot del dispozitiva, ki ga delovno imenujemo medijsko-trolovski dispozitiv in ki posameznike spodbuja k trolovskim oblikam izražanja. Naša zaključna ugotovitev je, da zmožnosti spletnih družbenih omrežij spodbujajo trolovske oblike izražanja.*

**Ključni pojmi:** ironija, trolanje, dispozitiv, zmožnosti, spletna družbena omrežja

### Uvod

Sodobno mediatizirano politično govorico, posebej tisto, ki jo najdemo v spletni retoriki desnih populizmov (Nagle, 2017; Weatherby, 2019), močno zaznamujejo ironične oblike izražanja, ki jih danes navadno imenujemo trolanje (Coleman, 2014; Phillips, 2015; Phillips in Milner, 2017; Weatherby, 2019). Izraz trol (ang. *troll*) na prvi pogled označuje fantastična humanoidna bitja iz skandinavske mitologije, vendar izvira – v svojem spletnem kontekstu – iz izraza za muharjenje (ang. *trolling*), pri katerem vabo na trnku vlečemo po vodi – v upanju, da bo riba zagrabila vabo (Phillips, 2015). Iz tega opisa že lahko sklepamo na določeno značilnost trolovskega vedenja – posameznik/ca nastavlja past, ki vzpostavlja distinkcijo med ribiči in ribami – troli in trolanimi. Začetne rabe izraza *troll* ali *trolling* v internetnem

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kontekstu segajo v čas *Useneta*<sup>1</sup> (Phillips, 2015: 16), na katerem so se oblikovale prve spletne subkulture (Pfaffenberger, 2003: 27). Že zelo zgodaj se je na Usenetu v devetdesetih razvila dinamika interakcije med starejšimi, bolj izkušenimi in mlajšimi, bolj nevednimi, uporabniki in uporabnicami. Trolanje je v svoji začetni internetni obliki nastalo kot praksa smešenja in prepoznavanja novih uporabnikov. Izkušenejši/a uporabnik/ca bi npr. kot odgovor na vprašanje novinca/ke, ki bi bilo percipirano kot neumno ali naivno, v vsakem primeru pa kot znamenje neposvečenosti v spletno skupnost, objavil večini starejših uporabnikov znano preteklo objavo, ki je bila že večkrat predmet smešenja (praksa, iz katere se pravzaprav rodi internetni mem<sup>2</sup>). Reakcija novinca/ke bi nato pokazala ali ta izkazuje zadostno vednost ali omiko (npr. zmožnost premetenega odziva), da je lahko štet/a kot član pogovorne skupnosti. Ta zgodnji primer trolanja kaže tudi na eno izmed njegovih ključnih značilnosti, tj. delovanje agregativne funkcije ironije (Hutcheon, 1994: 86–110), ki za svoje delovanje potrebuje diskurzivno skupnost, katere meje so simbolno reproducirane ob vsaki ponovni rabi trolovske komunikacije (Gal et al., 2017). Čeprav je trolanje praksa, ki jo navadno povezujemo z nastankom sodobnega uporabniškega spleta in še posebej s posebno subkulturo njegovih uporabnikov zbranih okoli anonimnih spletnih forumov, kot je npr. 4chan (Phillips, 2015: 72; Erasmus, 2019), pa je v svojih formalnih značilnostih prisotna v javnem govoru že od nekdanj (Coleman, 2014; Kravanja, 2017).

Trolanje bomo definirali kot retorološko figuro (Avanessian, 2015: 15–23) in govorno dejanje (Austin, 1990), ki učinkuje z vzpostavitvijo posebne konfiguracije razmerij med govorcem/ko<sup>3</sup> (ali več govorce/kami), sogovorcem/ko (ali več sogovorci/kami), diferenciranim občinstvom in govorno situacijo samo. Situacija, v kateri govorec/ka trola sogovorca/ko, je situacija, v kateri govorec/ka taktično pretirava v izražanju svojih stališč do te mere, da pri sogovorcju/ki vzpodbudi odziv, ki v svoji afektivni investiciji presega afektivno investicijo prvotne/ga govorke/ca (Kravanja, 2017). Ta afektivno pretiran odziv je možen iz dveh razlogov: 1) zaradi tega, ker je

<sup>1</sup> »Usenet («users network» – [uporabniška mreža op. p.] je bil globalni internetni pogovorni sistem na osnovi teksta, ki je nastal v zgodnjih osemdesetih in je prenehal delovati v poznih dvatisočih. V njem so uporabniki/ce objavljali in brali sporočila drug drugega znotraj kategorij, ki so se nanašale na različne teme in so bile poznane kot newsgroups [skupine za novice op. p.] ter hierarhično razdeljene v podteme, ki so bile označene z relevantnimi predponami (npr. rec.sport.basketball.college).« (Warf, 2018: 890)

<sup>2</sup> Internetni mem je po definiciji, ki jo postavi Shifman (2014), skupina digitalnih predmetov (ki se pojavljajo v različnih oblikah – tekst, video, avdio, multimodalne vsebine), ki si delijo vsebino in/ali formo in/ali držo, so ustvarjeni na podlagi vednosti ustvarjalcev o tej skupini predmetov in množično cirkulirajo po internetu. Navadno so sestavljeni kot kolaž iz različnih kulturnih referenc.

<sup>3</sup> Tu uporabljamo izraza govorec/ka in sogovorec/ka, ki implicirata poseben medij komunikacije, govor, kot sinonima, ki veljata tudi za komunikacijske situacije, kjer medij posredovanja komunikacije ni govor, temveč tudi npr. tekst ali vizualno sporočanje.

sogovorec/ka nezmožen/a prepoznati taktično naravo govorničevega/kinega pretiravanja ali 2) ker kljub prepoznavanju taktike uporabe trolskega govora sogovorec/ka le-to smatra za posebej neprimerno trenutni govorni situaciji. S tem se sogovorec/ka pred določenim delom občinstva, ki razume intenco govorničevega pretiravanja in/ali se strinja s širšo intenco govornika nasploh in/ali pristaja na njegovo/njeno komunikacijsko normo oz. definicijo situacije, osmeši, ravno tako pa to govorno dejanje v veliko primerih razdeli občinstvo na dva dela. Prvi del, ki razume pretiravanje kot izvajanje retorološke figure in/ali jo smatra za primerno situaciji, in drugi del, ki ali vzame pretiravanje zares in se s tem ravno tako hkratno osmeši pred govornikom/ko in preostalim občinstvom ali pa jemlje pretiravanje kot neprimerno in si s tem spet prisluži posmeh govornika/ke in prvega dela občinstva, zaradi lastnega odklanjanja ludične (Hutcheon, 1994: 46–47) norme govornice, ki jo je govorec ravnokar poskusil vsiliti v trenutno definicijo situacije (Goffman, 2015). Zaradi svoje agregativne funkcije, ki zmeraj temelji ne le na povezovanju neke diskurzivne skupnosti, temveč tudi na začrtovanju njenih mej, je trolanje inherentno politični komunikacijski akt, ki deli posameznike/ce na tiste, ki pripadajo neki skupnosti, in tiste, ki ji ne.

Na tem mestu je potrebno pojasniti, kaj smo imeli v mislih s tem, ko smo trolanje kot obliko ironije opredelili kot retorološko in ne zgolj kot retorično figuro. Standardna retorična definicija ironije razume ironijo kot preprosto neskladje med manifestnim pomenom nekega komunikacijskega akta in njegovo pravo vsebino, pri čemer sta ta dva elementa v medsebojnem protislovju – pravi pomen je nasproten manifestnemu pomenu tega, kar komuniciramo. Obe sistematični študiji ironije, na katere se pri svojem delu posebej sklicujemo (Hutcheon, 1994; Avanesian, 2015), poudarjata, da je ravno tovrstna tradicija zgolj retoričnega razumevanja ironije odgovorna za poenostavljeno razumevanje le-te. Če bi namreč ironija merila zgolj na posredovanje pomena, ki je nasproten manifestni vsebini sporočenega, bi pravzaprav težko pojasnili, kaj točno je njena komunikativna funkcija, mimo tega, da služi kot stilistično sredstvo. Obe študiji poudarjata, da funkcija ironičnega komunikacijskega akta ni predvsem komunikacija svojega nasprotja, temveč komunikacija nečesa tretjega – navadno nekega razmerja. To razmerje pa je lahko npr. odnos govornika/ke do sogovornika/ke, do občinstva, do neke specifične tematike, do definicije situacije, v katero je trenutni govor vpet, itd. V običajni ironični govorni situaciji se te odnosi celo prepletajo v različnih kombinacijah. S tem pa postane ironično govorno dejanje nekaj, kar presega retoriko kot umetnost prepričevanja ter vključuje tudi vzpostavljanje, utrjevanje ali rušenje trenutne definicije situacije in odnosov med akterji in elementi v njej. Podobno kot performativ (Austin, 1990), govorno dejanje, ki proizvaja realnost, na katero se sklicuje, ima tudi ironija (in s tem tudi trolanje) socialno-ontološko funkcijo. Zaradi te dvojne

(retorične in socialno-ontološke) vloge Avanesian ironijo (in posebej njene moderne oblike) opredeli kot retorološko.

Kljub temu je mogoče reči, kot ugotavlja več študij, da je trolanje posebej pogosto v spletnem okolju (Coleman, 2014; Phillips, 2015; Nagle, 2017; Phillips in Milner, 2017). V članku bomo pokazali, da razmere, v katerih poteka sodobna spletna komunikacija, posebej pa komunikacija na spletnih družbenih omrežjih, spodbujajo trolerske komunikacijske prakse. V njem bomo tako pritrdilno odgovorili na vprašanje, ali je mogoče pogostost trolerske komunikacije na spletu analizirati kot produkt niza lastnosti vmesnikov spletnih družbenih omrežij. Ta odgovor bomo podali v obliki konstrukcije koncepta medijsko-trolerskega dispozitiva, ki lahko služi kot podlaga za nadaljnje empirične raziskave vpliva pogojev komuniciranja na spletnih družbenih omrežjih na komunikacijo na njih.

Pogoje, ki jih bomo postavili kot ključne pri razumevanju tega, moramo razumeti na specifičen način, tj. kot del logike vmesnika, ki jo razvije Galloway (2012), torej kot serijo »tehničnih dispozitivov, ki težijo k vzpodbujanju skupine praks, ki producirajo fleksibilno, modularno in neskončno spremenljivo obliko oblasti« (Topinka, 2019). Vmesnik, ki posreduje med uporabnikom/co in vsebino na spletu, tj. prisotnost in razporejenost funkcij na konkretnih spletnih družbenih omrežjih ter serija splošnih značilnosti računalniško posredovane komunikacije (Walther, 1996; 2007), je pravzaprav skupek zmožnosti (ang: *affordances*) (Bucher in Helmond, 2018). Ta skupek zmožnosti bomo razumeli prek kritične apropiacije Agambenove interpretacije poznega Foucaultovega koncepta dispozitiva, da bi prišli do tega, kar bomo delovno poimenovali medijsko-trolerski dispozitiv.

## Teorija zmožnosti in spletna družbena omrežja

Za začetnika teorije zmožnosti velja ameriški psiholog Gibson (1977). Njegova teorija se je v svoji izvorni obliki nanašala na razumevanje potencialov nekega predmeta v odnosu do akterjev, ki z njim nekaj počnejo. Nek predmet, denimo roža na travniku, ima drugačno vlogo za različne akterje, ki z njo stopijo v stik. Za mimoidočega polža predstavlja hrano, za hrošča streho med nalivom, za človeka pa npr. zgolj estetski objekt. Zmožnosti te rože so niz odnosov, ki se vzpostavijo med posameznimi akterji in predmetom ter omogočajo različne interakcije. Ključno predelavo Gibsonove zastavitve najdemo v Normanovi (1988) prilagoditvi teorije zmožnosti v teorijo oblikovanja. Zmožnosti nekega predmeta so, po Normanovi oceni, praktično neskončne, zato je potrebno, če hočemo imeti aplikativno teorijo oblikovanja, njihovo razumevanje zožiti na zmožnosti, ki jih posamezni predmet relativno jasno sporoča akterjem, ki bodo z njim upravljali. Pravilna raba predmeta mora biti torej nakazana že v njegovi obliki ali z

jasno razumljivimi znaki. Norman spremeni težišče razumevanja zmožnosti iz relacijskih značilnosti interakcije med akterjem in predmetom na sporočilne značilnosti predmeta samega, medtem ko Gaver (1991) njegovo zastavitev tipizira in razdeli zmožnosti na zaznavne, skrite in lažne. Normanov konceptualni premik omogoči Hutchbyju (2001) izpeljavo argumenta, da koncept zmožnosti pomeni razrešitev teoretskega nasprotja med tehnološkimi deterministi in socialnimi konstruktivisti na področju študij uporabe tehnologij. Zmožnosti tehnologij razume kot lastnosti, ki zamejujejo polje možnih uporab, a vendar puščajo dovolj odprtega prostora za to, da najrazličnejši družbeni vplivi rezultirajo v različnih praksah uporabe.<sup>4</sup> Problem argumentov, ki sledijo Normanovi prilagoditvi koncepta zmožnosti, pa je, da pri svojem vztrajanju na zmožnostih kot lastnostih oblikovanega predmeta zanemarijo konkretno situirano naravo vsakokratne rabe slednjih. Nagy in Neff (2015) tako ugotavljata, da

*... imajo [uporabniki/ce, op. p] lahko določena pričakovanja do svojih komunikacijskih tehnologij, podatkov in medijev, ki v praksi oblikujejo načine, na katere k njim pristopijo in za katere mislijo, da so predlagani. Ta pričakovanja niso nujno vključena v oblikovanje uporabniških orodij, vendar vseeno tvorijo zaznavo dejanj, ki so uporabnikom na voljo. (Nagy in Neff, 2015: 5)*

Po Gibsonu je razprava o zmožnostih odrinila na stran ravno prednost njegovega relacijskega koncepta. Nagy in Neff (2015) zato ponudita koncept zamišljenih zmožnosti kot rešitev tega teoretskega problema. Zamišljene zmožnosti so zmožnosti, ki jih npr. uporabnik/ca neke spletne platforme na njej razume kot take. Čeprav so ustvarjalci vmesnika neke platforme zanj predvideli določen spekter uporab, so konkretne zmožnosti uporabe, ki jih uporabniki dojemajo kot take, zmeraj produkt kompleksnega razmerja med njihovimi dispozicijami na eni strani in konkretno materialnostjo vmesnika na drugi.

Shaw (2017) njuno teorijo zmožnosti kot pristop za razumevanje novih medijev nadgradi z adaptacijo Hallovega (2012) modela ukodiranja in razkodiranja. Interpretacijo praktičnih zmožnosti, ki jih dovoljuje posamezna

<sup>4</sup> Z uporabo koncepta zmožnosti se Hutchby (2001) postavi na vmesno pozicijo med konstruktivizmom in realizmom, ki je še najbolj sorodna teoretikom ATN (actor-network theory), npr. Latourju, Lawu in Callonu. Za opis odnosa ATN do drugih paradigem s področja študij znanosti in tehnologije glej npr. Luthar (2007). Hutchby se od teoretikov ATN razlikuje predvsem po tem, da jasneje loči vlogo človeških in nečloveških akterjev ter strožje analitično razlikuje človeške smotre in materialne značilnosti objektov, pri čemer se izogne prestogemu dualizmu družba/tehnologija, prek poudarka na zmožnosti, kot koncept, ki opisuje odnos vzajemnega učinkovanja in konstrukcije med človeškimi intencami in materialnostjo objektov.

tehnologija, razume prek Hallove delitve na dominantno-hegemonska, pogajalska in opozicijska branja medijskih tekstov ter te tri moduse branja razume kot moduse »potencialnih aktivnosti z novo-medijskimi teksti, objekti in formami« (Shaw, 2017: 597). Pri poskusu aktualizacije teorije interpretacije medijskih tekstov na področje novomedijsko posredovanih komunikativnih praks pa moramo biti previdni. V takšnem početju namreč zmeraj tiči nevarnost, da interpretiramo značilnosti posameznega vmesnika kot tekst<sup>5</sup> (Hutchby, 2001). S tem bi zavrgli eno izmed glavnih prednosti koncepta zmožnosti, apliciranega na vmesnike, torej poskus razumevanja načinov, na katere oblike tehnološkega posredovanja uokvirjajo delovanja uporabnikov. Sama forma nekega vmesnika omogoča niz zmožnosti, ki sledijo neposredno iz njegove tehnične narave; ta niz zmožnosti pomeni polje omejitev, ki onemogočajo, da bi bili vmesniki zgolj *tabula rasa*, na katero lahko projiciramo katerokoli zamišljeno zmožnost. Tehnična narava vmesnikov omogoča zamišljanje šele v drugem koraku.

Na tem mestu predlagamo dodatno razširitev Shawovega modela. Na eni strani imamo tako različne stopnje odmika od dominantno-hegemonskih *rab v odnosu do vmesnika*, na drugi strani pa različne stopnje odmika *znotraj vmesnika*. Ta razdelitev se nam zdi pomembna, ker omogoča vzpostavitev dvojne kritične pozicije za razumevanje komunikacije prek novih medijev. S tem mislimo, da mora kakršnakoli kritična analiza novih medijev vzeti v obzir dva vidika. Na eni strani tehnološki in ekonomski aspekt infrastrukture novih medijev, ki stoji v ozadju konkretne manifestne oblike vmesnika, pri čemer se naš odnos do teh aspektov kaže v obliki *rab v odnosu do vmesnika*, na drugi strani pa analizo vsebine in dinamike komunikacijskih praks *znotraj vmesnika*, ki se kažejo prek raznolikih načinov uporabe manifestnega dela vmesnikov spletnih družbenih omrežij.

Prvo kritično pozicijo bomo bolje razumeli, če se navežemo na delo Srniceka (2016), ki analizira različne spletne platforme (med katere sodijo tudi spletna družbena omrežja) kot sestavne dele *platformnega kapitalizma* in poudarja dejstvo, da večina profitov in družbene moči le-teh izhaja iz popolnega beleženja delovanja uporabnic/kov na njih. Beleženi podatki imajo ekonomsko vlogo surovine, na podlagi katere je mogoče opravljati podatkovne analize,<sup>6</sup> ki koristijo poslovnim ali političnim interesom akterjev, ki uporabljajo spletne platforme za (predvsem) marketinške namene, posebej pa platformi sami kot ponudniku takih storitev. Z vidika proizvodjanja podatkovne sledi je vsak komunikacijski akt na spletnem družbenem omrežju nekaj, kar večja maso podatkov in s tem surovine, ki je platformi

<sup>5</sup> Glej npr. Woolgar in Grint (1997).

<sup>6</sup> Pri temu Srnicek eksplicitno kritizira tezo Terranove (2000), ki izhaja iz operativnega koncepta družbene tovarne, po kateri naj bi kakršnokoli udejstvovanje na spletnih družbenih omrežjih predstavljalo direktno obliko dela.



na voljo.<sup>7</sup> To pomeni, da je kakršnakoli raba *v odnosu do vmesnika* spletnih družbenih omrežij, ki pretendira k opozicijski ali vsaj pogajalski poziciji, nujno vezana na uporabo metod, ki so v subverzivnem odnosu do mehanizmov, prek katerih dotične platforme vršijo svoje operacije ekstrakcije podatkov, s ciljem nadaljnjega ustvarjanja profita. Skratka, nujno ustreza definiciji tega, kar se v internetni kulturi imenuje *exploit*<sup>8</sup> in zahteva določeno mero inženirskih znanj na področju informacijskih tehnologij in programiranja.

Namen tega članka pa je predvsem konceptualizacija druge kritične pozicije. Medtem ko je mogoče najti oblike trolanja v praksah, ki sodijo pod širšo domeno hekerskega delovanja na spletu in odnosa *do vmesnikov*, nas bo tukaj, z druge perspektive, zanimala predvsem trolavska ironija, ki jo najdemo v spletnih praksah, ki se odvijajo *znotraj vmesnikov*, torej tistih, ki so omogočene znotraj nekaterih najpogostejših komunikacijskih okvirjev sodobnih oblik računalniško posredovane komunikacije.

## Mediji in koncept dispozitiva

V svoji interpretaciji Foucaultovega koncepta dispozitiva Agamben (2006) pokaže ključno vlogo, ki ga ta zaseda v Foucaultovem razmišljanju o oblikah vladnosti, hkrati pa poudari, da Foucault v svojih tekstih koncepta nikoli eksplisitno ne definira. Po Agambenu se definiciji najbolj približa v intervjuju iz leta 1977:

*Kar poskušam definirati s tem imenom, je predvsem popolnoma heterogen skupek, ki prepleta diskurze, institucije, arhitektonske strukture, regulativne odločitve, zakone, administrativne ukrepe, znanstvene izreke, filozofske, moralne in filantropske propozicije, skratka, tako izrečeno kot neizrečeno, ki tvorijo elemente dispozitiva. Dispozitiv je mreža, ki se vzpostavi med temi elementi.* (Foucault, Michel (1994): *Dits et écrits*, vol. III, 299–300; citirano iz: Agamben, 2006: 6–7)

Agamben iz tako široke definicije izpelje ontologijo, na kateri temeljijo poznejša Foucaultova dela in deli stvarnost na tri kategorije – substance ali živa bitja, dispozitive in subjekte, ki niso ontološka realnost zase, temveč so presečišče med prvima dvema, pri čemer je lahko vsako živo bitje subjektivirano s strani množstva dispozitivov, ki jih ta opredeli kot »... dobessedno katerokoli stvar, ki ima na nek način zmožnost ujeti, orientirati, določiti,

<sup>7</sup> *Couldry in Mejias (2019) uporabljata v tem kontekstu kar metaforo kolonizacije, pri čemer je tisto, kar je kolonizirano, naše družbeno življenje.*

<sup>8</sup> *Exploit je izraz za izkoriščanje neke napake ali pomanjkljivosti v programiranem okolju, kjer posamezniki le-to izkoristijo, da bi prišli do rezultata, ki jim ponuja preprosto zabavo ali pa je celo usmerjen k politično obarvani subverziji. Za več o temi glej Galloway in Thacker (2007).*

prestreči, modelirati, kontrolirati in zagotoviti geste, vedenja, mnenja in diskurze živečih bitij» (Agamben, 2006: 21–22). Agambenovo razumevanje Foucaultovega koncepta dispozitiva je širši konceptualni okvir, znotraj katerega razumemo prej omenjeni govor o možnostih. Možnosti novih medijev, ki jih bomo opisali, tvorijo torej nek dispozitiv.

Preden se lotimo razlage sestave tega, kar bomo poimenovali medijsko-trolovski dispozitiv, torej mreže, ki jo sestavljajo predvsem štirje ključni elementi, pa bomo predhodno odgovorili še na nekaj potencialnih pomslekov na takšno konceptualizacijo. Andreasen (2019) na primeru medijev opozarja, da koncepta možnosti in dispozitiva implicirata različni perspektivi. Možnost je tako predvsem to, kar medij uporabnikom/cam omogoča, medtem ko koncept dispozitiva implicira perspektivo, pri kateri medijski dispozitiv uporabnike medija določa v njihovem delovanju. Skratka, če prvi temelji na razumevanju odnosa med akterjem in medijem, kjer je njun odnos relativno simetričen (ni mogoče reči, da narava neke naprave ali vmesnika bolj vpliva na njeno rabo kot uporabnik/ca sam/a), pa perspektiva koncepta dispozitiva opozarja na asimetrijo razmerij moči, ki so vgrajene v delovanje vsake dispozitivne mreže. A vendar se že Andreasen v zaključku istega teksta naveže na Deleuzeov (2015) pripis h konceptu družbe nadzora in zaključki, da predstavljajo uporabniški vmesniki spletnih družbenih omrežij območje, kjer ni mogoče razlikovati med nudenjem možnosti in določanjem uporabniškega delovanja s strani dispozitivov. Vmesniki spletni družbenih omrežij ustvarjajo množice *prosumerjev* – hkratnih potrošnikov in producentov vsebin, nad katerimi se oblast vrši ravno prek njihovega aktivnega angažmaja z možnostmi vmesnikov.

Drugi resnejši pomislek se tiče razmerja med tem, kar tukaj koncipiramo kot medijsko-trolovski dispozitiv, in drugimi dispozitivi, s katerimi je mogoče opisati sodobno realnost novih medijev, predvsem spletnih družbenih omrežij. Ta naloga je vse prej kot enostavna in – vsaj v smislu popolne razmejitev – nemogoča. Kot pravi Agamben, ima koncept dispozitiva v Foucaultovem delu predvsem strateško vlogo (Agamben, 2006: 5), v smislu tega, da mu ponuja možnost konceptualnega povezovanja različnih elementov, ki sodelujejo v produkciji konkretnih oblik oblasti. V tem smislu je ravno sodobnost kot obdobje množenja dispozitivov hkrati tudi obdobje prekrivanja le-teh, posebej na ravni njihovih posameznih elementov, ki lahko igrajo različne vloge v različnih dispozitivnih mrežah.

Na tem mestu bi opozorili predvsem na analizo Terranove (2015), ki poudarja prenos mehanizmov neoliberalne sekuritizacije, o katerih govori Foucault v svojih delih o biopolitiki, na spletna družbena omrežja. Ti mehanizmi temeljijo predvsem na seriji dispozitivov varnosti kot »prostorskih tehnologij oblasti, ki se tičejo predvsem upravljanja s cirkulacijo« (prav tam: 114) in težijo predvsem k njeni »ekspanziji in stabilizaciji« (prav tam).

Čeprav se Foucaultova prvotna analiza osredini predvsem na načine upravljanja populacij, ki so osredotočeni predvsem na telesa, pa je mogoče, kot to stori Terranova in kot poudarja Han (2017), ko predlaga uvedbo termina psihopolitika, tovrstno razumevanje upravljanja s cirkulacijo razširiti tudi na sfero komunikacije ter psiho-socialnega življenja prebivalstva. Psihopolitični dispozitivi, o katerih posredno govori Terranova, stojijo v ozadju spletnih družbenih omrežij kot obliki kontrolirane družbenosti, ki se, podobno kot sfera politike, podrejujejo imperativom trga, ki služi v neoliberalni epohi kot model preoblikovanja vseh družbenih institucij. Ta razmislek, ki smo ga v prejšnjem razdelku uvrstili predvsem v obliko kritike rab *v odnosu do vmesnika* (katerega primarni namen je, kot rečeno prej z drugimi besedami, omogočiti čim večjo količino kontrolirane cirkulacije informacij), seveda pomembno vpliva tudi na dinamiko samih procesov komunikacije, ki se vršijo *znotraj vmesnika*. Polje konceptualizacije, ki se ga lotevamo v tem članku, pa je nekoliko ožje in bolj specifično ter služi dopolnitvi razumevanja prepleta že opisanih dispozitivov s še neopisanim.

Zadnji pomislek, ki ga bomo tukaj na kratko omenili, sta vloga in stanje subjekta in subjektivacijskih procesov v kontekstu mnogih dispozitivov, ki določajo posameznike/ce. Kot izhodišče bomo vzeli Agambenovo tezo, da sodobno, skorajda nepregledno množenje dispozitivov, ki določajo posameznike/ce, ne rezultira v procesih subjektivacije, temveč v splošnem porastu procesov desubjektivacije.<sup>9</sup> Te procesi naj bi ustvarjali predvsem posameznike/ce, ki so nezmožni povezovanja v kolektivne politične subjekte, in s tem onemogočali grajenje družbene solidarnosti. Čeprav je več kritikov opozorilo na pretirano pavšalnost Agambenove teze, ki npr. ponavlja presežene dualizme med tehničnim uokvirjenjem delovanja in avtentično eksistenco (Stiegler, 2010: 160–171) ter podcenjuje vlogo politično-ekonomskih kategorij pri razumevanju vpliva dispozitivov na našo (de)subjektivacijo (Fischbach, 2012: 48–54), pa je vendarle pri tematiki dispozitivov vprašanje subjekta in subjektivacije neobhodno. Stališče, ki ga zato tukaj zavzemamo in ki bo postalo nekoliko bolj jasno iz opisov v naslednjem razdelku, je, da se ni mogoče postaviti na načelno, kategorično stališče glede razmerja med subjektivacijo in desubjektivacijo v delovanju medijsko-trolovskega dispozitiva. Čeprav se zdi, da je efemerna narava spletne komunikacije nekaj, kar v splošnem podpira Agambenovo tezo, pa lahko že v drugem elementu spodaj opisanega dispozitiva najdemo potencial tako za bolj kot manj stabilne oblike subjektivacije. V primeru trolanja kot prakse začrtovanja mej lastne diskurzivne skupnosti je tako mogoče najti element, ki izkazuje izrazito pripadnost neki družbeni skupini ali npr. političnemu prepričanju. Glede na

<sup>9</sup> Agambenov izraz je sicer nekoliko hiperboličen – desubjektivacija je zanj proces proizvodnje efemernih, zgolj začasnih subjektivitet, za razliko od bolj trajnih oblik subjekta.

kompleksno naravo posameznikove/čine pripadnosti neki družbeni skupini, ki je v spletnem kontekstu dodatno zakomplicirana s strani efemerne narave komuniciranja na njem, pa je odgovor na vprašanje trdnosti in trajnosti posameznih subjektivacij na spletni družbenih omrežjih mogoče najti zgolj na ravni konkretnih študij primerov.

### Trolovsko-medijski dispozitiv

Splet in njegove platforme predstavljajo največji obstoječi arhiv predhodno objavljenih medijskih vsebin, vendar ima običajni način, prek katerega do njih dostopamo, drugačno strukturo kot dostopanje do njih prek drugih, starejših medijev. Če na kratko ponazorimo to misel: ogled posnetka, ki je predvajan na televiziji, določa precej drugačna situacija recepcije kot ogled posnetka, ki se nahaja na spletnem družbenem omrežju Youtube. Posnetek je na Youtube naložil določen uporabnik in ga opremil s komentarjem, pod katerim se nahajajo komentarji drugih uporabnikov. Do nas je prišel, potem ko ga je objavil nekdo, ki mu sledimo na spletnih družbenih omrežjih; objava je potencialno spet opremljena tako s komentarjem objavljaljoče osebe kakor tudi ostalega občinstva s seznama prijateljev, ki mu je posnetek na voljo. Že postavitvev televizijske vsebine na nek kanal, v nek časovni termin, format televizijske oddaje in druge okoliščine, v katere je neka oddaja umeščena,<sup>10</sup> kontekstualizirajo sporočilno vrednost vidnega posnetka na način, prek katerega mu podelijo dodaten nabor konotacij, ki jih ni mogoče odkriti na ravni njegove manifestne vsebine, temveč izhajajo iz specifičnega prepleta razmerja med kontekstom, sporočevalcem, prejemnikom, vsebino in modalnostjo sporočila.<sup>11</sup>

Za ironijo kot retorično sredstvo je v formalnem smislu ključno neskladje med posameznimi elementi komunikacijske situacije iz prejšnjega odstavka. Čeprav je tovrstno neskladje možno pravzaprav v vsaki komunikacijski situaciji in v vsakem tipu medija, se število njenih posamičnih elementov na spletnih družbenih omrežjih drastično poveča, s tem pa tudi njene materialne zmožnosti proizvodnje ironije in s tem trolovske komunikacije. Spletna družbena omrežja, kot sta npr. Facebook ali Twitter,<sup>12</sup> imajo v svoj vmesnik vgrajeno možnost deljenja vsebin, ki so že bile deljene drugje na

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<sup>10</sup> Primer tega je npr. postavitvev oddaje pred in po določeno interstitijsko (ang. interstitial) vsebino (reklame, napovedi itd.), ki jo opisuje Ellis (2011). Umeščenost oddaje med te vsebine, po ugotovitvah avtorja, vpliva na njeno recepcijo.

<sup>11</sup> Glej npr. Fiske in Hartley (2003), posebej poglavja 3, 4, 5 in 7.

<sup>12</sup> Ta dva primera izpostavljam zgolj kot verjetno najbolj znana bralstvu – zelo podobne funkcije imajo tudi druga spletna družbena omrežja in aplikacije za instantno pošiljanje sporočil, od Wechata do Telegrama, kljub določenim posebnostim vsakega izmed njih (Instagram npr. ne dovoljuje enakega tipa deljenja vsebin).

platformi, s preprostim klikom na gumb *share* oz. *retweet*, medtem ko velik del spletnih strani zunaj teh platform ravno tako ponuja integracijo z njihovimi funkcijami. Ta oblika deljenja vsebin omogoča, da lahko s preprostim klikom spremenimo kontekst, v katerem je vsebina percipirana. To nam predstavlja prvo izmed ključnih zmožnosti komuniciranja na spletnih družbenih omrežjih in sodobnem uporabniškem spletu nasploh – (1) vseprisotnost orodij za resignifikacijo<sup>13</sup> (Weatherby, 2019). Zmožnost resignifikacije, tj. spremembe pomena vsebine na uporabniškem spletu, je v striktnem smislu sestavljena – njen pogoj je serija drugih predhodnih možnosti, ki jih Boyd (2011) postavi kot temeljne značilnosti rokovanja z vsebino na uporabniškem spletu – persistenca vsebine, njena replikabilnost, njena skalabilnost<sup>14</sup> in možnost, da iščemo po različnih vsebinah. Da bi razumeli pomembnost resignifikacije obstoječih vsebin za npr. ironični humor, nam ni treba pogledati posebej na spletna družbena omrežja. Pomislimo preprosto na dnevno-politično oddajo z ironičnim tonom, kot je Daily Show (Magill, 2007: 22). Oddaja, ki slovi po svoji humoristični predstavitvi dnevno-političnih tem, je v veliki meri sestavljena zgolj iz segmentov, ki so vzeti iz poročanja drugih televizij in pri čemer je dovolj, da samo prestavimo izsek videovsebine in ga predstavimo novemu občinstvu, da dosežemo humoristični učinek. To občinstvo v grobem tvori diskurzivno skupnost, tj. skupino ljudi, ki jih družijo »kompleksna konfiguracija deljene vednosti, verjetij, vrednot in komunikativnih strategij« (Hutcheon, 1994: 87). Spletna družbena omrežja omogočajo sleherniku, da se poslužuje primerljivih manevrov resignifikacije kot avtorji dotičnih objav.

To nas pripelje do druge pomembne zmožnosti, zaradi katere se na sodobnem spletu trolavska komunikacija dogaja tako pogosto. Čeprav posamezne stopnje posredovanja posameznega sporočila, ki smo jih orisali, omogočajo vzpostavitev različnih oblik resignifikacije prvotne vsebine sporočila, pa bi razlike, ki se pojavijo, izzvenele v prazno, če ne bi imele na voljo različnih občinstev. Tisto, kar dela trolanje za posebej mikavno komunikacijsko modaliteto izražanja na spletu, je pravzaprav kompleksna interakcija med posameznimi diskurzivnimi skupnostmi. Čeprav je preplet različnih diskurzivnih skupnosti pojav, ki ga najdemo pravzaprav že od nekdaj, je treba upoštevati, da se pogostost takšnih interakcij večja v pozni modernosti<sup>15</sup> in

<sup>13</sup> Čeprav je resignifikacija, tj. prestavitev vsebine v drug kontekst, ki vpliva na njeno recepcijo, nekaj, kar lahko najdemo že v literarnih delih, o čemer priča mnogo literarnoteoretskih razprav okoli koncepta intertekstualnosti, ravno tako pa že na televiziji in radiu, pa predstavlja obča dostopnost enostavnih orodij za resignifikacijo novost, ki jo uvede šele uporabniški splet, posebej spletna družbena omrežja.

<sup>14</sup> Skalabilnost pomeni zmožnost, da je lahko digitalna vsebina hitro in množično razširjena po spletu. Pri tem je pomembno imeti v mislih, kot pravi Boyd, da »lastnost skalabilnosti ne pomeni, da se širijo vsebine, ki jih posamezniki želijo razširiti ali tiste, za katere mislijo, da bi se morale razširiti, temveč da [spletni, op. p.] kolektiv odloča o tem, katera vsebina bo razširjena« (Boyd, 2011: 48).

<sup>15</sup> Pri razumevanju tega se naslanjamo predvsem na Harveyjevo (1989) analizo politično-ekonom-

da predstavlja uporabniški splet drastično povečanje možnosti takih srečanj. V svojem zgodnjem delu je boyd (2002) pod vplivom Meyrowitzeve (1985) študije o vplivu sodobnih medijev (predvsem televizije) na socialno dinamiko zmeraj večjega manka zamejitve med območji pravil, ki definirajo specifične družbene situacije, postavila tezo o kolapsu konteksta, ki ga prinašajo novi mediji. Zaradi tega, ker se na isti spletni platformi lahko srečajo najrazličnejše diskurzivne skupnosti, je posameznik na njej postavljen v situacijo, ko mora komunicirati na višji ravni taktičnosti, saj ima zmeraj opravka s kompleksno konfiguriranim občinstvom.

Čeprav predstavlja uporabniški splet območje vsaj deloma zamejenih grozdov (ang: *clusters*) uporabnikov, ki odražajo razlike med posameznimi družbenimi skupinami in so ravno tako osnovani na kulturnih distinkcijah razreda, spola, jezika in drugih pripadnosti, ki konstituira vsakršno diskurzivno skupnost, pa je vendarle mogoče reči, da trenutna struktura uporabniškega spleta omogoča bistveno lažje prehajanje med mesti, kjer se te skupnosti nahajajo. Veliko verjetneje je, da se bo naključni šaljivec, ki si o desnih populistih ne misli nič dobrega, znašel na njihovem profilu na Twitterju kot na kongresu njihove stranke. Sodobni splet tako omogoča (2) lažjo agregacijo specifičnih diskurzivnih skupnosti in bolj preprosto prehajanje med njihovimi mesti srečevanja. To enostavno prehajanje pa – kot protiutež kolapsu konteksta – poveča potrebo po praksah ustvarjanja distinkcij in simbolnega začrtovanja mej (Gal, 2018), ki konstituira diskurzivne skupnosti in temeljijo predvsem na ustvarjanju razlike med njihovo notranjostjo in zunanostjo. Pomemben del teh praks postane tako tudi trolanje. S tem ko nevedni/a uporabnik/ca ne prepozna trolanja, izkaže svojo nepripadnost skupnosti. To situacijo pa še posebej zaplete dejstvo, da je na spletu pogosto težko prepoznati komunikacijsko intenco posameznikov/ic.

Nemožnost ugotavljanja intence je ena izmed ključnih značilnosti situacij izražanja na spletu, ki poganja trolovski prakse. Te situacije so dovolj pogoste, da so že pred petnajstimi leti privedle do formulacije t. i. Poejevega zakona (Poe's law). Med debato o kreacionizmu na spletnem forumu christianforums.com, je leta 2005 uporabnik Nathanael Poe namreč ugotovil, da je »brez mežikajočega emotikona ali drugega očitnega izraza humorne namere ... .. popolnoma nemogoče parodirati kreacionista, ne da bi to dejanje *nekdo* interpretiral kot iskreno« (Poe's Law). To nas privede do tretje zmožnosti, ki spodbuja spletno trolovsko komunikacijo in katere zametke najdemo že v zgodnji internetni kulturi anonimnosti in psevdonimnosti:<sup>16</sup>

*ske dinamike pozne modernosti, katere rezultat je to, kar sam konceptualno opredeli kot časovno-prostorsko kompresija, in na analize Rose (2013, 2015), po kateri je temeljna poteza modernosti družbeno pospeševanje, ki se kaže na področjih tehničnega razvoja, sprememb družbenih institucij in zmeraj bolj frenetičnega živeteža vsakdana.*

<sup>16</sup> Psevdonimnost je situacija, kjer se posameznik/ca predstavlja s psevdonimom.



(3) splošne pogostosti nepoznavanja drug drugega na spletu oz. zmožnosti ne biti prepoznan. Čeprav se na spletnih družbenih omrežjih, npr. na Facebooku ali Twitterju, posamezniki povečini predstavljajo s svojim imenom in priimkom, pa je situacij, v katerih lahko pride do napačnega pripisovanja komunikacijske intence, pravzaprav ogromno. Vsaka večja, uporabnikom obče dostopna Facebook-skupina ali npr. vsaka nit komentarjev na profilu posameznega podjetja, teme ali znane osebnosti, pritegne navadno najrazličnejše uporabnike/ce, ki se med sabo povečini ne poznajo. Posebej v primerih, kjer gre za strani in skupine, ki so namenjene širši, mednarodni skupini uporabnic/kov, najdemo tako posameznike/ce, katerih intenco izrekovanja lahko ugibamo zgolj na podlagi skopih informacij. Že zgodnje študije (Donath, 1995; Pfaffenberger, 2003) vedenja uporabnikov na Usenetu, na katerem je mogoče uporabnike identificirati prek elektronskega naslova, kažejo na najrazličnejše strategije manipulacij pri izkazovanju lastne identitete in namer.

Ravno tako kot je naše prepoznavanje intence osebe, ki nam nekaj sporoča, zaradi zgoraj naštetih faktorjev nekaj, kar je na uporabniškem spletu pogosto oteženo, sproža ta situacija določene učinke na strani tistega, ki nekaj sporoča. Pogosto so tako spletni/e uporabniki/ce, ki se postavijo v situacijo anonimnosti, psevdonimnosti ali pa jim preprosto ni mar glede potencialnih negativnih sankcij oz. le-teh sploh ni (Golf-Papež in Veer, 2017), posebej motivirani za to, da v svojem komuniciranju možnost lastne neprepoznavnosti tudi izkoristijo. Zabrísana sled za pravo identiteto posameznika/ce tako omogoča, da se posamezniki/ce poslužujejo najrazličnejših manipulacij, ki izkoriščajo nevednost njihovega občinstva, kakor tudi to, da izpovejo lastne intimne tegobe in dvome, ki bi jih sicer skrivali. Ta pojav, ki je v psihologiji znan kot dezinhibijski učinek interneta (Suler, 2004; Joinson, 2007) in ga povzročajo različni dejavniki (anonimnosti, večje enakosti med posamezniki, asinhronosti komunikacije, vpliva disociativne imaginacije), ki doprinesejo k temu, da se posameznik na spletu vede na načine, na katere se sicer ne bi, je eden izmed ključnih pogojev obče razširjenosti trolvske komunikacije na internetu. Dezinhibijski učinek interneta tvori posebej učinkovito kombinacijo skupaj z različnimi načini, na katere spletne platforme vplivajo na naše afektivne odzive. Gilroy-Ware (2017: 64–139) tako ugotavlja, da vse več psiholoških raziskav kaže na to, da ima obsedenost z uporabo spletnih družbenih omrežij presenetljivo podoben značaj kot zasvojenost z igrami na srečo, pri kateri postanemo odvisni od anticipacije zadovoljstva. Po objavi, ki jo naredimo na spletnem družbenem omrežju, nastopi trenutek čakanja na morebitne odzive, ki v obliki komentarjev, všečkov, čustvenih simbolov in/ali nadaljnega deljenja objavi podelijo določeno mero pozitivnega ali negativnega pripoznanja, ki ga – skladno z našo začetno intenco – doživljamo na pozitiven ali negativen



način. V tem smislu je vsaka objava hazarderska poteza, saj lahko zgolj poučeno ugibamo glede odzivov, na katere bo naletela. Čeprav so, kakor ugotavlja Gilroy-Ware, vmesniki spletnih družbenih omrežij oblikovani tako, da na posamezni platformi dosegajo čim večjo aktivnost pri uporabnikih, pa je »hazarderski« značaj objavljanja na spletu širša značilnost, ki presega zgolj spletna družbena omrežja. Kombinacija, ki doleti mnoge uporabnike spleta, je tako na eni strani dezinhibirnost, ki izvira iz anonimnosti ali iz disociativnega značaja računalniško posredovane komunikacije, na drugi strani pa želja po pozitivnem pripoznanju določenega števila uporabnikov, ki v grobem pripadajo podobni diskurzivni skupnosti. To nas pripelje do zadnjega izmed faktorjev, ki stojijo v ozadju trolanja kot posebej pogostega in mikavnega modusa komunikacije na internetu, tj. tega, da računalniško posredovana komunikacija deluje dezinhibicijsko, medtem ko ustroj spletnih družbenih omrežij in spletnih skupnosti – prek mehanizmov pripoznanja, ki so del samega vmesnika – spodbuja prakse, ki sprožajo močne afektivne odzive. Skratka, (4) splet ponuja zmožnosti pridobivanja pripoznanja, zadovoljstva in pozitivnih sankcij za trolanje.

## Sklep

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V članku smo prikazali, kako sta tako teorijo zmožnosti kot Foucaultov koncept dispozitiva, kakor ga interpretira Agamben (2006), primerni orodji za analizo pogojev sodobne komunikacije, v katerih se vršijo sodobne prakse ironičnega izražanja na spletu, s posebnim ozirom na prakse trolanja kot primer retoroloških (Avanessian, 2015: 15–23) govornih dejanj, ki rekonfigurirajo razmerja med posameznimi elementi komunikacijske situacije in s tem producirajo družbeno realnost (Hutcheon, 1994: 9–37; Avanessian, 2015: 5–6).

Pri prikazu zmožnosti vmesnikov nekaterih izmed najpogosteje uporabljenih spletnih družbenih omrežij smo se osredotočili na tiste izmed njih, ki vzpostavljajo razmere za spodbujanje trolovskih komunikacije, in jih razdelili na štiri kategorije. Te kategorije so 1) vseprisotnost orodij za resignifikacijo vsebin, 2) enostavnejša agregacija posameznih diskurzivnih skupnosti in njihovo pogostejše medsebojno srečevanje, 3) pogostost nepoznavanja sogovorca/ke na spletu in s tem nemožnost pripisovanja intenc njegovim/njenim komunikacijskim aktom in 4) sistem spodbud na spletnih družbenih omrežij, ki temelji na funkcijah všečkanja, deljenja, komentiranja in drugih ter omogoča posameznikom/cam pridobitev pripoznanja in s tem pozitivno valorizacijo znotraj neke diskurzivne skupnosti, katere meje, prek trolovskih praks, zmeraj vnovič začrta. Součinkovanje teh štirih zmožnosti spletnih družbenih omrežij smo delovno poimenovali medijsko-trolovski dispozitiv. Glavni prispevek članka je teoretska konstrukcija tega koncepta,

prek katerega lahko analiziramo sodobne oblike spletne komunikacije kot določene s strani zmožnosti vmesnikov spletnih družbenih omrežij.

Delovanje medijsko-trolovskega dispozitiva v vsakem konkretnem primeru določa srečanje med posameznimi diskurzivnimi skupnostmi, katerih meje so okrepljene, začrtane in/ali rekonfigurirane s strani trolovske komunikacije. To vidimo kot posebej primerno izhodišče za nadaljnje empirične analize tega, kako lahko medijsko-trolovski dispozitiv vpliva na razmerja med diskurzivnimi skupnostmi na spletnih družbenih omrežjih v posamičnih situacijah. Takšne analize nam lahko pomagajo razumeti razmerje med efemernostjo in stabilnostjo diskurzivno določenih identitet, kot so npr. rasne, spolne, razredne, politične in druge pripadnosti, ter njihovega odnosa do lastne zunanosti. Takšne raziskave se nam zdijo posebej pomembne v zgodovinskem trenutku, ki ga zaznamuje retorika desnih političnih populizmov, ki pogosto spretno izkoriščajo zmožnosti komunikacije na spletnih družbenih omrežjih in se poslužujejo trolovske komunikacije. Članek je v tem smislu skromen prispevek k nadaljnjim študijam tovrstnih fenomenov.

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## EVENTIZACIJA IN KOMODIFIKACIJA POLITIKE NA INSTAGRAMU\*\*

*Povzetek. Politika 21. stoletja je zaradi mediatizacije, eventizacije in vdiranja tržne logike v politično polje vedno bolj personalizirana. V ospredju niso politike, temveč osebe, ki delujejo v političnem polju. Politiki in političarke so s svojim delovanjem blizu zvezdnikom in zvezdnicam, saj privid kompetence bolj kot v političnem delovanju črpajo v svoji zasebnosti oziroma osebnih vrednotah. Dosegajo ga z uprizarjanjem določene-ga spola in razreda, s pomočjo česar se v populistični maniri približujejo »ljudstvu« oziroma »navadnemu človeku«. Članek analizira uprizarjanje moškosti in razreda ter posledično depolitizacijo prek Instagrama na primeru dveh predsednikov držav, Boruta Pahorja in Aleksandra Vučića. Čeprav oba predsednika v svojem domačem političnem polju delujeta populistično in občasno tudi domačijsko, na njunih profilih na Instagramu prevladuje uprizarjanje kozmopolitske, v primeru Pahorja pa tudi nove, narcisoidne moškosti. Medtem ko Vučić daje prednost objavam s tujimi voditelji z mednarodnih srečanj, je pri Pahorju bistveno več fotografij iz njegove zasebnosti in domačega okolja.*

*Ključni pojmi: mediatizacija, depolitizacija, eventizacija, Instagram, politika, uprizarjanje, spol, razred*

### Uvod

Predsedniška kampanja Boruta Pahorja leta 2012 je bila v več pogledih posebna, saj je v njej Borut Pahor, nekdanji evropski poslanec, nekdanji predsednik državnega zbora in nekdanji predsednik vlade, opravljal 46 različnih poklicev: od smetarja do frizerja. Vsako opravljanje poklica je bilo dokumentirano s fotografijami, ki so jih iz Pahorjevega štaba posredovali medijem, ti pa so fotografije na svojih spletnih straneh objavljali v obsežnih fotogalerijah, včasih v političnih, včasih v zabavnih rubrikah. Fotograf Borut

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\*\* Izvirni znanstveni članek.

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Krajnc je iz fotografij, posnetih med kampanjo, ustvaril tudi koledar. Pahor je po tej kampanji leta 2012 postal predsednik države, na tem položaju je še danes. Zdaj ne opravlja več drugih poklicev, ima pa svoj uradni predsedniški profil na Instagramu s 128 tisoč sledilkami in sledilci, na katerem skoraj vsak dan objavi fotografijo; včasih iz predsedniške palače, včasih z obiska tujine, spet drugič s tekaške proge, domače naprave za fitnes, plaže. Pahor ni edini svetovni politični voditelj z bogatim profilom na Instagramu, tudi odnos do tega družbenega omrežja se je v zadnjih osmih letih precej spremenil, saj je postal skorajda nujen sestavni del političnega komuniciranja.

Posebnost družbenih medijev je, da imajo na njih nadzor nad objavljanim vsebin in njihovim uokvirjanjem politiki in političarke oziroma njihovi svetovalci in svetovalke, strokovnjaki in strokovnjakinje za odnose z javnostmi, ne pa na primer novinarji in novinarka oziroma uredniki in urednice. Medtem ko se nekateri politiki najraje poslužujejo kratkih, besedilnih objav na Twitterju (Donald Trump, Janez Janša), se drugi precej bolj posvečajo objavljanju podob na Instagramu (Borut Pahor, Justin Trudeau, Aleksandar Vučić). S tem ko osebe v politiki svoja sporočila in fotografije objavljajo na družbenih omrežjih, novinarji in novinarka izgubljajo monopol nad javnimi informacijami, zato Ekman in Windholm (2015) govorita o mediatizirani soodvisnosti, kjer so tako osebe v medijskem kot v političnem polju odvisne druga od druge pri opravljanju svojega dela. Ko so tako novinarji in novinarka kot politiki in političarke »medijski akterji« in »medijski viri«, se spremeni tudi razmerje moči; politiki in političarke se vedno bolj lahko zanašajo na lastno medijsko produkcijo, s tem pa imajo tudi večji nadzor nad svojo podobo v javnosti.

V nadaljevanju bomo zato pogledali, kaj se dogaja s političnim poljem v mediatizirani družbi, kako se to vedno bolj depolitizira in kakšno vlogo ima pri depolitizaciji uporaba družbenih omrežij, predvsem Instagrama. S pomočjo analize Instagram profilov dveh predsednikov držav, Boruta Pahorja in Aleksandra Vučića, ki sta si svetovnonazorsko na prvi pogled precej različna, bomo poskušali detektirati načine, na katere je njuno politično delovanje personalizirano, eventizirano in posledično depolitizirano. V analizi se bomo osredotočili predvsem na njuno uprizarjanje moškosti in razreda na Instagramu. Oba sta namreč v svoji dolgoletni politični karieri prestala številne transformacije, kot predsednika držav pa morata po eni strani za domače občinstvo uprizarjati bolj domačijsko različico moškosti, po možnosti delavskega razreda, za tuje občinstvo pa buržujsko-racionalistično moškost, ki je bolj primerna za uprizarjanje moškosti v mednarodni politiki. Zanimalo nas bo, kako se v njunih objavah na Instagramu odraža njuna politika, če sploh, z analizo objav v izbranem obdobju leta 2020 bomo skušali kategorizirati objave po njihovi vsebini in tako dobiti oris prevladujočih tem na profilih, z analizo posameznih objav pa razbrati »namen« objav



ter kako se predsednika v svojih objavah na družbenem omrežju, ki nagrajuje pozitivne vsebine, razlikujeta.

## Mediatizacija družbe in politike

Ne glede na vrsto prevladujočega medija živimo v mediatizirani družbi (Couldry in Hepp, 2013), v kateri so mediji ključna referenčna točka za dojetje in razumevanje sveta in družbe. To pomeni, da večino informacij, ki jih imamo o družbi, prejmemo prek medijev – tudi če govorimo o neposredni komunikaciji med osebami v živo, bo dojetje obravnavnih vsebin še vedno močno odvisno od tega, kako so bile prej posredovane prek medijev in na kakšen način so bile uokvirjene. Mediji oziroma medijsko polje niso avtonomni, temveč so podvrženi številnim zunanjim dejavnikom. Medijsko in politično polje vzajemno vplivata drug na drugega, na medijsko polje pa vpliva tudi tržna logika. Posledično to pomeni, da v politično polje prek medijskega vdirajo različni diskurzi, ki so bližje tržni logiki. Takšni so na primer zvezdniški diskurz (Street, 2003, 2004; van Zoonen, 2005), zaradi česar je politika vedno bolj personalizirana (van Santen in van Zoonen, 2010), torej osredotočena na posamezne političarke in politike, ter (epizodično) uokvirjanje (Iyengar, 1991), značilno za medijsko logiko (Altheide in Snow, 1979), zaradi česar je politika vedno bolj eventizirana (Saxer, 2007), torej osredotočena na dogodke in občutja. Tržna logika s seboj prinaša tudi t. i. banalizacijsko silo. »[Č]im širšo publiko si hoče pridobiti nek medij ali katero koli sredstvo izražanja, tem bolj se mora znebiti ostrine, vsega, kar bi lahko ločevalo, razdvajalo« (Bourdieu, 1996/2001: 39). Bolj ko je nek medij bran/gledan/poslušan, bolj se ogreva za omnibusne teme, ki ne načenjajo problemov, ki naj ne bi nikogar šokirale, glede katerih se vsi strinjajo, ki ne razdvajajo ljudi, se vsem zdijo zanimivi, »vendar na tak način, da se ne dotaknejo ničesar pomembnega« (Bourdieu, 1996/2001: 15). Objave politikov in političark na družbenih omrežjih, kjer imajo sami nadzor nad vsebino, predvsem na Instagramu, sledijo podobni logiki – čim manj vsebin, ki bi lahko razdvajale, čim več vsebin, ki prinašajo vsečke.

## Personalizacija in eventizacija politike

Ker se politika ne zanaša več na skupne družbene lastnosti svojih volivk in volivcev, mora svoje volilno telo šele »ustvariti« na podlagi privlačnosti svojih strank oziroma kandidatov in kandidatov (van Zoonen, 2005: 59). S tem prihaja do personalizacije politike, politična komunikacija pa je vedno bolj neracionalna in usmerjena k dogodkom, občutjem in izkustvom (Saxer, 2007: 185). Pri medijski »kolonizaciji« politike se s prevladujočim vplivom zabavne medijske kulture področje zasebnosti začne širiti na javno, kar je še posebno

koristno v politiki, kjer akterji vedno težje dajejo obljube, saj rezultati niso odvisni zgolj od njih; veliko lažje poudarjajo in prodajajo svojo osebnost in zasebnost. Personalizacija osebe v politiki približuje zvezdniškemu statusu, ki pa ga ti večinoma ne dosežejo po naključju, temveč z zavestnim delovanjem v smeri pridobivanja pozornosti in projiciranja določene podobe. Zvezdništvo postane utelešenje diskurzivnega boja o normah individualnosti in osebnosti znotraj kulture (Marshall, 1997: 65), zato je (zvezdniško) tekmovanje za uspeh tudi tekmovanje prevladujočih družbenih vrednot.

Politična persona temelji na performansu, ki je sestavljen iz določene mere samozavedanja in kalkulirane prevare, ker pa performans poleg družbenega življenja vključuje tudi zasebno, so pri političnih personah vedno bolj v ospredju osebne, in ne politične vrednote (Corner, 2000: 391–394), ki jih je treba predstaviti prek dogodkov, o katerih nato poročajo mediji ali pa so objavljeni na družbenih omrežjih. Medijski dogodki so »prekinitve rutine« in »oblika komunikacije« (Hepp in Couldry, 2010: 10), mediji, še posebno televizija, pa dogodke potrebujejo za svoje vsakodnevno delovanje. S spremembami v medijskem polju, kjer je zaradi finančnih omejitev vedno manj specializiranega novinarstva in vedno večji pritisk na proizvajanje velike količine novic, se »novinarske zgodbe« pogosto zreducirajo na izjave in podobe, ki povzemajo, poenostavljajo oziroma kondenzirajo kompleksne politične procese v eni podobi (Wodak, 2011). Pri tem že same izjave in podobe, če so dovolj novinarsko zanimive, postanejo dogodki.

## Družbeni mediji in mediatizacija

Vsako družbeno omrežje ima svoje značilnosti, kot so struktura omrežja, funkcionalnost, algoritmi in modeli datafikcije oziroma načini, na katere se vsebino pretvarja v podatke. Gilroy-Ware (2017) kljub razlikam med omrežji izpostavlja štiri glavne značilnosti časovnice družbenih omrežij: viri novic so uporabniku oziroma uporabnici večinoma »poznani«, saj jih je izbral/a sam/a (jih dodal/a, jim sledi, je z njimi prijatelj/ica), časovnica je navidez neskončna, torej daje vtis, da vsebin ne bo nikoli zmanjkalo, mešanica vsebin je prilagojena posamezniku ali posameznici in ne sledi več klasičnim delitvam na žanre ali formate, ter občutek novosti in nepredvidljivosti, torej občutek, da bo ob vsakem obisku omrežja uporabnik ali uporabnica videla nekaj novega. Obiskovanje družbenih omrežij po Gilroy-Ware tako nima za cilj zgolj informiranja, temveč tudi zadovoljevanje čustvenih potreb, na primer potrebe po zabavi in pozitivnih novicah kot distrakciji, ki pripomore k čustvenemu preživetju posameznika ali posameznice (Gilroy-Ware, 2017: 169). Na družbenih omrežjih so bolj kot informacije v ospredju afekti in prepričanja, zato je vedno bolj pomembno tudi uprizarjanje čustev. Medtem ko tradicionalno novinarstvo stremi predvsem k objektivnosti, tako v

novinarstvu kot na družbenih omrežjih v ospredje prihajajo čustva, ki se v političnem polju uprizarjajo strateško in glede na družbeni kontekst (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019). Z informalizacijo (po Wouters, 2007) političnega polja in vedno večjo vlogo osebnih in čustvenih narativov se spreminja tudi narava politične komunikacije. Čeprav po Wouters (2007) s tem pride do »emancipacije« čustev, pa to s seboj prinaša tudi potrebo po vedno večji samoregulaciji oziroma samonadzoru akterjev. S tem ko politiki in političarke sami postanejo medijski producenti, »breme« zabavanja občinstva, s tem pa tudi strateškega uprizarjanja čustev in njihove osebnosti, pade na njih. Družbena omrežja s svojo čustveno infrastrukturo pod vprašaj postavljajo strogo ločitev med zasebnim in javnim, individualnim in kolektivnim ter osebnim in političnim (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019), samouprizarjanje pa postane pomemben del političnega delovanja.

V primerjavi Facebooka, Twitterja, Snapchata in Instagrama Bossetta (2018) ugotavlja, da je Twitter predvsem medij reakcij, torej družbeno omrežje, na katerem se objave navezujejo predvsem na (politične) dogodke v drugih, klasičnih medijih. Instagram tovrstne časovne odvisnosti nima oziroma za razliko od Twitterja ne služi kot »drugi ekran« (Larsson, 2017). Larsson (2017) na podlagi analize volitev na Norveškem ugotavlja, da je Twitter večinoma dojet kot elitni medij, ki ga uporabljajo predvsem ljudje na položajih moči, kot so politiki in političarke ter zaposleni in zaposlene v medijih in na področju odnosov z javnostmi, medtem ko so uporabniki in uporabnice Instagrama mlajši, »navadni« ljudje. Z vidika čustvene arhitekture je Twitter medij razuma, pa tudi sovraštva, »trolanja« in negativnih čustev, medtem ko na Instagramu več pozornosti dobijo pozitivne vsebine (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019) oziroma kot je razliko opisala britanska konservativna političarka Nadine Dorries (v Hinsliff, 2019): »Twitter je za politiko. Instagram je za ljudi, ki so mi všeč, in stvari, ki jih želim videti.«

Instagram je medij strateške samoreprezentacije, kar pomeni, da gre za namerno izbrane in predstavljene rutine delovanja, pogosto s pomočjo zasebnih fotografov ali fotografij s privilegiranim dostopom, ki jih politiki ali političarke najamejo za beleženje uradnih in polzasebnih situacij. Na ta način posnete fotografije lahko predstavljajo tako resne opravke in vladne zadeve, kot so srečanja z drugimi politiki in političarkami, pa tudi vpogled v zakulisje ali zasebno življenje (Marland, 2012). Prav fotografije slednjega pripomorejo k »normalizaciji« politika ali političarke in k projekciji njegove oziroma njene avtentičnosti. »Hobiji in druge prostočasne dejavnosti nakaazujejo vidike njihove osebnosti zunaj politične arene ali iz časov pred njenim začetkom« (Liebhart in Bernhardt, 2017: 20). Objavljanje na družbenih omrežjih pogosto pomeni, da so politiki in političarke v permanentni digitalni kampanji, hkrati pa jim objavljanje na družbenih omrežjih omogoča, da zaobidejo tradicionalne medijske posrednike in neposredno naslovijo

občinstvo (Lalancette in Raynauld, 2019). Vzpon politične rabe družbenih omrežij po Ekmanu in Windholmu (2015) pripomore h komodifikaciji politike, zvezdniški politiki oziroma konstrukciji individualiziranih, oznamčenih politikov in političark, prek komunikacije na družbenih omrežjih pa je politika posledično vedno bolj depolitizirana. Personalizacija politike tako ni zgolj posledica komercializacije novic in vdiranja tržne logike v uredniško politiko, temveč tudi posledica bolj personaliziranega delovanja in komunikacije politikov in političark (Ekman in Windholm, 2015), tudi na družbenih omrežjih.

### Uprizarjanje spola in razreda v politiki

Uprizarjanje oziroma performativnost spola (Butler, 2006/1999) pomeni, da spol ni biološka danost, temveč nekaj, kar je treba ves čas uprizarjati s ponavljanjem dejanj in lastnosti, ki jih družba pripisuje moškim ali ženskam. Moškosti se večinoma pripisujejo fizična in mentalna moč, tekmovalnost, agresivnost, dominantnost, racionalnost, nečustvenost in objektivnost (Elinor Ochs, 1992) s pozitivnim predznakom, kar jih uvršča pred oziroma nad lastnosti, ki praviloma pritičejo ženskosti, kot so mehkoča, čustvenost in skrb (Beynon, 2002: 56). »Ženske lastnosti« so še vedno dojete kot manj zaželene, tudi – oziroma še posebno – pri moških. Ker pa je spol stvar uprizarjanja, je moškosti in ženskosti več, tudi znotraj političnega polja. Ena od oblik privilegirane moškosti, najpogosteje prisotne v (mednarodni) politiki, je buržujsko-racionalistični model, ki ga opisuje Hooper (2001). Ta model izvira iz mednarodne politične sfere in je model manj agresivne, bolj egalitarne in demokratične moškosti. Idealizira tekmovalni individualizem, razum, samonadzor in samozanikanje. Kombinira spoštovanje in preračunljivo racionalnost v javnem življenju, superiorni intelekt in osebna integriteta pa sta bistveno bolj cenjena kot fizična moč ali pogum. Gre za moderno obliko moškosti, prvo obliko novega moškega, ki je tesno povezana z razsvetljenstvom in moderno državo ter razvojem kapitalizma (Hooper, 2001: 88). V 80. letih prejšnjega stoletja sta se predvsem v Veliki Britaniji in njenem revijalnem tisku pojavili dve narcisoidni obliki nove moškosti, in sicer *novi moški* (New Man) in *novi fant* (New Lad), obliko nove moškosti skrbnika pa najdemo na primer v ZDA, kjer v 70. in začetku 80. let nastopi podoba *novega očeta*, ki se oblikuje kot nasprotje tradicionalni, neekspresivni, hipermaskulini moškosti (Messner, 1993), ki se vedno bolj premešča na nižje razrede. Novi moški narcis je posledica spremenjenih družbenih razmer in razmerij med spoloma, tudi posledica komercializacije moškosti in ekspanzije potrošništva po drugi svetovni vojni. Tako kot podoba novega očeta je tudi splošna kulturna podoba novega moškega podoba belega, heteroseksualnega moškega iz srednjega ali višjega razreda, pri katerem premik v osebni in življenjskem slogu

predstavlja odmik od tradicionalne moškosti, ki jo privilegirani moški vidijo kot nezdravo ali čustveno omejujočo. Poznokapitalistična družba, ki jo opisuje Lasch (2012), spodbuja vzpon narcističnega osebnostnega tipa, ki predstavlja psihološko razsežnost splošne družbene odvisnosti od države, korporacije in drugih birokracij. »Narcis namreč kljub občasnim iluzijam o lastni vsemogočnosti potrebuje druge, da potrjujejo njegovo samospoštovanje. Ne more živeti brez občudujočega občinstva« (Lasch, 2012: 28), svojo negotovost pa lahko premaga le tako, da v pozornosti drugih vidi odsev svojega grandioznega jaza. Narcisoidna nova moškost tako svojo zadovoljitev lahko najde na družbenih omrežjih, posebej na Instagramu, ki s svojo čustveno arhitekturo preferira predvsem pozitivne podobe in odzive.

Vendar pa so nove moškosti predvsem moškosti privilegiranega razreda in so posledično v političnem polju, z vidika populizma, manj učinkovite. Laclau (2008) populizem definira kot diskurzivno strategijo, ki konstruira politično fronto, ki razdeljuje družbo na dva tabora in poziva k mobilizaciji tistih z manj moči proti tistim na oblasti. Po Laclauu populizem ni ideologija in ga ne moremo pripisati specifični programski vsebini, niti ni politični režim. Je način ustvarjanja politike, ki lahko prevzame številne ideološke oblike glede na čas in kraj in je kompatibilen z vrsto institucionalnih okvirov. Po Kalbu (2011) populizem v trenutni situaciji pomeni zavračanje liberalnih, kozmopolitskih elit, ki svetovnih virov, ki so na voljo, ne znajo izkoristiti za potrebe lokalnega prebivalstva. Posledica tega so generacije telegeničnih in karizmatičnih ideologov, ki rušijo vzpostavljene politične razrede in institucije.

Moškost delavskega razreda v nasprotju z novo moškostjo ponuja tradicionalne vrednote, povezane s predindustrijskim obdobjem, ko je večja fizična moč pomenila večji zaslužek. Medtem ko moški srednjega razreda lahko pridobivajo institucionalno moč, lahko moški delavskega razreda pridobivajo fizično moč in posledično pogosto prevzemajo mačo identitete, da bi z njimi prekrili svojo nemoč, ki jo kompenzirajo tudi z dominantnostjo v domačem okolju (Beynon, 2002: 20). Medtem ko je moškost delavskega razreda v kapitalizmu podrejena moškost, pa se nekatere njene lastnosti zrcalijo v uspešnih poslovnih in politikih. Moškost delavskega razreda ima zato oznako nekakšne hipermoškosti, še posebno v primerjavi z moškostjo srednjega razreda (Hooper, 2001: 71), v političnem polju, še posebej v notranji politiki, pa prinaša »dividende«. Tako na primer ugotavljata Riabov in Riabova (2014: 23), ki na primeru Putinove Rusije opazata »remaskulinizacijo Rusije«, torej identitetno politiko, usmerjeno k ustvarjanju pozitivne kolektivne identitete Rusije. Vzroke za remaskulinizacijo Rusije pod Putinom najdeta med perestrojko v začetku postsocialističnega obdobja, ko je padec socializma zahteval »normalizacijo« razmer in vrnitev k »naravnemu redu stvari«, v katerem imata strogo določeni mesti tudi moški

in ženski spol. Ruski množični mediji po Riabovu in Riabovi (2014: 26) Putinovo podobo maskulinizirajo s pomočjo militarizacije in erotizacije ter uporabo besede mužik kot simbola prave moškosti, ki je sprva označevala kmeta, danes pa predstavlja hegemono moškost, moškost, ki temelji na ekonomski neodvisnosti, samozadostnosti, moči, redkobesednosti, poudarku na dejanjih; mužik ni politično korekten in se ne zadržuje pri izražanju seksizma in homofobije. Putin, ki je sprva ustrezal zahodnjaškemu racionalnemu tipu moškosti – bil je hladen, pragmatičen in racionalen menedžer –, se je sčasoma preobrazil v moškega bližje modelu mužika (2014: 27). Glede na to, da se tudi slovenska in srbska družba po razpadu Jugoslavije in samoupravnega socializma soočata s podobnimi premiki, ne preseneča, da tako pri Pahorju kot pri Vučiću najdemo lastnosti domačijske hipermoškosti, ki se prepletajo z buržujsko-racionalistično moškostjo mednarodne politike.

## Študiji primera

### *Borut Pahor*

Borut Pahor je svojo politično pot začel v Zvezi socialistične mladine Slovenije konec 70. let prejšnjega stoletja, leta 1997 je postal predsednik Združene liste socialnih demokratov. Leta 2004 je bil izvoljen v Evropski parlament, leta 2008 pa je po državnozborskih volitvah postal predsednik vlade. Septembra 2011 je bila njegovi vladi izglasovana nezaupnica, istega leta pa se je odločil, da kandidira za predsednika države. Pahorjeva kampanja za predsednika države je bila skrajno eventizirana, sestavljena iz dogodkov, ki niso bili neposredno povezani s kandidaturo za najvišjo funkcijo v državi, a so bili zaradi svoje nenavadnosti medijsko privlačni. Pahor je pred predsedniškimi volitvami 2012 prostovoljno opravljal 46 različnih poklicev, opravljal je večinoma fizična dela – bil je na primer smetar, cestar, mesar, gozdar, gasilec in frizer. Pri tem ni šlo za privatizacijo kampanje, saj z opravljanjem del ni razkrival svojega zasebnega življenja, temveč je šlo za personalizacijo oziroma humanizacijo, pri čemer je bil namen predstaviti svojo »človeško«, »sproščeno« ali celo zabavno plat (glej Driessens in dr., 2010). Pahor se je za potrebe kampanje »prelevil« v moškega delavskega razreda, ki pred videz postavlja opravljeno delo, moralo in solidarnost (Crnović, 2014), pri tem pa lahko zaznamo tudi poteze domačijskosti. Popolna eventizacija kampanje, ki je temeljila na prikazovanju sposobnosti kandidata, na primer telesne pripravljenosti in sposobnosti za fizično delo, je Pahorju omogočila večjo medijsko vidnost, predvsem pa z njo postavil temelje za svoje bodoče politično komuniciranje, saj se je z vzponom uporabe Instagrama tudi sam »preselil« na to družbeno omrežje, kjer še danes, kot bomo videli v nadaljevanju, komunicira predvsem prek podob.

*Aleksandar Vučić*

Aleksandar Vučić je svojo politično kariero začel leta 1993, ko je bil izvoljen kot poslanec Srbske radikalne stranke. Leta 1998 je postal minister za informiranje, v času, ko je bil predsednik Srbije Slobodan Milošević. Vučić je v tem obdobju znan po uvedbi kazni za novinarje, ki so bili preveč kritični do Miloševićevega režima. Leta 2008 se je pridružil novoustanovljeni Srbski napredni stranki in leta 2012 postal njen predsednik. Srbska napredna stranka je vsaj na začetku imela večino članstva iz Srbske radikalne stranke, zaradi česar jih mnogi imenujejo tudi »neoradikali« (Jovanović, 2018). Kratek čas je bil minister za obrambo in prvi podpredsednik srbske vlade (pred njim ta pozicija ni obstajala). Leta 2014 je postal predsednik vlade, leta 2017 pa predsednik države. Na volitvah leta 2020 je znova zmagala njegova stranka, ob bojkotu opozicijskih strank pa trenutna sestava srbskega parlamenta nima dejanske opozicije.

Kot ugotavlja Jovanović (2018), so medijske reprezentacije Aleksandra Vučića v srbskih medijih, predvsem tabloidih, ki so vidno naklonjeni Vučiću, kompleksne. V analizi naslovov se sočasno pojavlja diskurz žrtve, v katerem je Vučić predstavljen kot tarča načrtovanega, vendar vsakič znova spodletelega poskusa atentata, kot diskurz *Übermenscha*, ki ponuja razlog, zakaj naj bi bil Vučić ves čas žrtev poskusov atentata: je preveč sposoben, močan in uspešen, zaradi česar Jovanović (2018: 31) ugotavlja, da se gradi videz predsednika, ki je brez strahu in ki je kompetenten, kljub temu da je ves čas pod udarom. Hkrati uprizarja »pretirano moškost«, torej patriarhalno »pravo« moškost, pri čemer je vsak, ki se mu postavi naproti, vsaj »biseksualen«, zato ne čudi, da je ena glavnih žaljivk, usmerjenih proti Vučiću, ki jo je mogoče slišati tudi na številnih demonstracijah proti njemu, »Vučiću pederu«.<sup>1</sup> Jovanović primerja medijske reprezentacije Vučića z medijskimi reprezentacijami Viktorja Orbana, Recepta Tayyipa Erdogana in Vladimirja Putina, medtem ko Kulić (2020) komunikacijo Vučića primerja s komunikacijo Donalda Trampa in ugotavlja, da oba izkoristita večino priložnosti, da se »prepirata« z novinarji in novinarkami, le da so Trumpovi napadi bolj osebni, medtem ko Vučić svojo kritiko novinarjev in novinark premešča na »zunanje naročnike« ali »opozicijo«. Aleksandar Vučić je tako v svojem slogu komuniciranja precej bližje Janezu Janši kot pa Borutu Pahorju, vendar pa, kot bomo videli v nadaljevanju, je njegova politična komunikacija na Instagramu bistveno drugačna od njegove medijske reprezentacije v »tradicionalnih« medijih.

<sup>1</sup> Dostopno prek <http://hr.n1info.com/Regija/a182408/Vucic-snimio-predizborni-spot-Vucicu-pederu.html>, 10. 3. 2021.



## Analiza profilov Aleksandra Vučića in Boruta Pahorja na Instagramu

Ob personalizaciji in eventizaciji politike, ko politiki in političarke vedno bolj postajajo podobni zvezdnikom in zvezdnicam, je zasebna sfera tista, iz katere politik ali političarka črpa svojo kredibilnost (Luthar, 2008). Ultimatívna politična zvezda je tako sposobna uravnotežiti nasprotujoče si zahteve politike in zvezdníštva in se pozicionirati točno na sredino: projicira persono, ki ima izkušnje v politiki, a je še vedno outsider ali outsiderka (van Zoonen, 2005). Kot bomo videli v nadaljevanju, sta oba analizirana profila na Instagramu, tako tisti Boruta Pahorja kot tisti Aleksandra Vučića, usmerjena k iskanju ravnotežja med njunima političnima funkcijama, ki sta vezani na mednarodno politično polje, in zasebnostjo, s pomočjo katere skušata uprizarjati domačijskost in bližino z »ljudstvom« ter s tem doseči »normalizacijo« svoje osebnosti.

Tako Pahor kot Vučić sta na svojih profilih na Instagramu do novembra 2020 objavila okoli 1600 objav, za potrebe analize pa smo pri obeh predsednikih izbrali obdobje od marca do novembra 2020. V tem obdobju je Borut Pahor objavil 262 objav, Aleksandar Vučić pa 497. Pri tem je Vučić v večini primerov objavil po več fotografij hkrati, kar pomeni, da je bilo fotografij še vsaj trikrat toliko kot objav. Glede na to, da je zajeto obdobje trajalo 245 dni, lahko ugotovimo, da Borut Pahor večinoma objavi po eno objavo na dan, Vučić pa v povprečju po dve. Že na prvi pogled lahko ugotovimo, da so objave Boruta Pahorja bolj skrbno izbrane, saj posamična objava praviloma vsebuje zgolj eno fotografijo, medtem ko so Vučićeve objave ob pomembnih obiskih pri tujih politikih in političarkah obsežne, vsebujejo več fotografij, pogosto se isto srečanje pojavi v več zaporednih objavah.

Objave obeh predsednikov so bile razvrščene v tematske kategorije, ki so bile prirejene vsakemu predsedniku posebej. Šlo je namreč za poskus sortiranja večjega števila objav, ki pa več kot grobih razmerij med vrstami objav ne pove nič bolj natančnega. Tako lahko pri Pahorju ugotovimo, da je bilo največ fotografij posnetih v predsedniški palači oziroma na delovnem mestu, skoraj 40 odstotkov, približno 7 odstotkov je bilo neposredno posvečenih boju s pandemijo koronavirusa, na 7 odstotkih fotografij pa so bili otroci, večinoma na obisku v predsedniški palači oziroma je Pahor obiskal njih. Če fotografije z otroki pogojno umeščamo med službene zadeve, je na Instagramu Boruta Pahorja njegovemu opravljanju funkcije predsednika namenjena malo več kot polovica vseh objav na Instagram profilu v izbranem obdobju. Preostanek objav je osebne oziroma zasebne narave. Slabih 7 odstotkov fotografij je iz predsednikovega arhiva, večinoma zasebnega, na primer fotografije iz njegovega otroštva ali pa fotografije njegovega sina. Približno enak delež objavljenih fotografij so portreti predsednika z bolj ali

maj šaljivimi pripisi, nekoliko več, slabih 9 odstotkov, pa je fotografij iz predsednikove zasebnosti. Prav tako 9 odstotkov fotografij bi lahko uvrstili v kategorijo »fanart«, torej gre za risbice, portrete ali šale na račun predsednika, ki so jih ustvarili večinoma otroci in mladostniki ter komiki. Na fotografijah se je občasno pojavila tudi hrana, a zgolj na treh fotografijah. Hrana, ki je sicer eden od priljubljenih motivov na Instagramu, se je za veliko bolj pomemben del uprizarjanja politike pokazal pri Aleksandru Vučiću. Podkategorija, ki bistveno zaznamuje objave Boruta Pahorja, je šport. V izbranem obdobju je bil šport namreč tema vsaj 46 fotografij, kar je skoraj 18 odstotkov vseh objav. V času prvega vala pandemije je zabeležil tudi dva obiska frizerja.

Profil Aleksandra Vučića na Instagramu je precej manj raznolik in bistveno bolj osredotočen na Vučićevo opravljanje predsedniške funkcije. Slabih 500 objav na tem profilu v izbranem obdobju bi lahko razdelili predvsem na objave, v katerih so zabeleženi Vučićevi stiki z drugimi, predvsem tujimi politiki, ter objave, na katerih je Vučić prikazan na sestankih, obiskih in drugih službenih obveznostih. Takšnih objav je približno 300, torej več kot polovica. Še približno 100 jih je namenjenih Vučićevim obiskom in srečanjem z ljudmi iz vsakdana ali z zaposlenimi v podjetjih, ki jih je obiskal. Tudi te objave bi lahko šteli med službene, kar pomeni, da jih je od skoraj 500 objav vsaj 400 namenjenih prikazovanju Vučićevega predsedniškega dela, ki je skozi fotografije videti kot serija sestankov in obiskov, redno pa so na profilu najavljeni tudi njegovi nastopi na srbskih televizijah, mednarodnih konferencah in drugod. Dodatnih 30 objav je bilo neposredno povezanih s pandemijo, kar je primerljiv delež kot pri Borutu Pahorju, torej približno 7 odstotkov. Večina Vučićevih fotografij tako prikazuje njega med opravljanjem svojega poklica. Večinoma časa je v temnomodri obleki, ko ni fotografiran med sestanki, pa je fotografiran med prebiranjem dokumentov ali podpisovanjem le-teh.

Edina kategorija, ki izstopa pri Vučićevih objavah, je tudi tista, ki se največkrat pojavlja v srbskih satiričnih oddajah; to so fotografije Vučića in hrane. Teh je bilo sicer »zgolj« 24, kar je ob pogostosti objav zgolj 5 odstotkov vseh objav, pa vendarle so to edine objave, ki so nekoliko bolj osebne narave. Skoraj vsa hrana sodi med tradicionalno srbsko hrano, v večini primerov je šlo tudi za doma pripravljene srbske jedi, ki jih je malical ob obiskih »navadnih državljanov«. Ob prevladujočih objavah o Vučićevem udeleževanju mednarodnih dogodkov in srečanj so objave hrane tiste podobe, v katerih Vučić lahko uprizarja svojo domačijsko moškost delavskega razreda.

Tako Vučić kot Pahor kot predsednika držav v svojih objavah na Instagramu uprizarjata predvsem buržujsko-racionalistično moškost, značilno za mednarodno politiko. Večinoma sta na fotografijah v temnomodrih ali črnih oblekah, v formalnih okoliščinah, ki jih zahteva njuna funkcija. Populističnih objav, torej objav, v katerih se skušata približati predstavnikom

»ljudstva« oziroma razredu, ki mu sama ne pripadata, je pri Pahorju bistveno več, vendar v primerjavi z njegovo predsedniško kampanjo 2012 in deloma tudi 2017, ki sta temeljili skorajda izključno na uprizarjanju drugačne, delavske moškosti, je uprizarjanja delavske moškosti bistveno manj. Nekaj »domačijskosti« želi doseči z objavljanjem fotografij, na katerih se ukvarja s športom, a ker gre večinoma za individualne športe, ki ne zahtevajo fizične bližine drugih, je njegovo ukvarjanje s športom bolj značilno za novo, narcisoidno moškost srednjega razreda, kjer je šport predvsem v funkciji skrbi za telo.

Slika 1: BORUT PAHOR MED  
POČITKOM OB MORJU



Vir: Instagram Boruta Pahorja.

Slika 2: BORUT PAHOR MED  
TELOVADBO



Vir: Instagram Boruta Pahorja.

Pahorjevo uprizarjanje moškosti na Instagramu tako sledi predvsem modelu nove, narcisoidne moškosti, vključno z občasnimi selfiji in fotografijami celotnega telesa v športni opremi. V ospredju so njegova sproščenost v prostem času, vitko telo v formi ter skrb zase.

Slika 3: VLADIMIR PUTIN IN BORUT PAHOR



Vir: Instagram Boruta Pahorja.

Ko uprizarja buržujsko-racionalistično moškost, je pri tem še vedno bližje narcisoidni obliki nove moškosti, ki jo uprizarja s sproščenostjo, nasmehi in v primeru fotografije pred »spomenikom bazoviškim junakom«, pred katerim stoji z italijanskim predsednikom Sergiom Mattarellom (slika 4), s čustvenostjo in telesno bližino.



... Slika 4: ITALIJANSKI PREDSEDNIK  
SERGIO MATTARELLA  
IN BORUT PAHOR PRED  
SPOMENIKOM BAZOVIŠKIM  
JUNAKOM

Vir: Instagram Boruta Pahorja.

Pri Vučiću uprizarjanje buržujsko-racionalistične moškosti prevladuje in je skorajda v nasprotju z njegovo osebno politično zgodovino, ki temelji na uprizarjanju poudarjene moškosti, ki je bližje Putinu. Instagram je očitno bolj kot domačemu občinstvu namenjen tujini, saj se na njem Vučić skuša samoprikazati kot mednarodno relevanten voditelj, pri čemer pa bolj kot populistične poteze učinkujeta disciplinirano telo in zadržano vedenje. Poleg vseprisotnosti srbske zastave na njegovih objavah je izbor hrane še najbolj nacionalno obarvana dimenzija njegovih objav.

Slika 5: OLIVÉR VÁRHELYI IN  
ALEKSANDAR VUČIĆ  
NA SESTANKU V BRUSLJU  
OB SRBSKI PROJI IN POGAČI



Vir: Instagram Budućnost Srbije.

SLIKA 6: ALEKSANDAR VUČIĆ  
OB VPISU ŠTUDIJA ZA  
KOŠARKARSKEGA TRENERJA



Vir: Instagram Budućnost Srbije.

Njegove objave sicer niso povsem depolitizirane oziroma so bistveno manj depolitizirane kot Pahorjeve, saj s fotografiranjem s svetovnimi voditelji ilustrira, s katerimi državami je Srbija v najboljšem odnosu, kljub vsemu pa lahko ugotovimo, da so objave na Instagramu bolj kot političnemu delovanju namenjene grajenju podobe Aleksandra Vučića kot politika v mednarodnem političnem polju. Prav tako v objavah ne najdemo uprizarjanja žrtve ali Übermenscha, kot jih v analizi poročanja o Vučiću navaja Jovanović (2018), ali populizma ter napadanja novinarjev in novinark, kot ga v analizi nastopov navaja Kulić (2020). Vučić na Instagramu uprizarja predvsem buržujsko-racionalistično, privilegirano moškost, značilno za mednarodno politiko, z občasnimi domačijskimi »premorji«, ko si privošči srbsko nacionalno jed.

*Slika 7: ALEKSANDAR VUČIĆ NA TERASI PREDSEDNIŠKE PALAČE OB LUBENICI*



Vir: Instagram Budućnost Srbije.

*SLIKA 8: PREMIERKA ANA BRNABIĆ IN ALEKSANDAR VUČIĆ NA POSESTVU VUČIĆEVEGA OČETA*



Vir: Instagram Budućnost Srbije.

Izbrane fotografije z Instagrama Aleksandra Vučića odstopajo v tem, da je na njih srbski predsednik prikazan kot gostitelj (na sestanku s komisarjem za širitev EU v Bruslju, na sestanku s premierko na posestvu svojega očeta) ali pa je prikazan ob bolj zasebnih opravilih, kot je vpis na fakulteto, ki ni povezana z njegovo politično funkcijo. Kljub temu Vučić na njih ni prikazan v svoji zasebnosti, kot je to pogosto na fotografijah Boruta Pahorja, temveč je kot politik postavljen v bolj »sproščeno« okolje, pogosto v enakih oblačilih kot med opravljanjem predsedniške funkcije, le na primer brez kravate ali suknjiča.

Pahorjev Instagram je pritegnil precej pozornosti tudi v mednarodnih medijih, v tujih medijih (Associated Press, 2017) so ga opisali kot »mehkega



populista«, kar se nanaša predvsem na njegovo objavljanje všečnih podob. Tako Pahorjevo kot Vučićevo uprizarjanje politične moškosti na Instagramu bi lahko označili za populistično, vendar pa zaradi same čustvene infrastrukture Instagrama to nima enakega učinka kot na primer populizem Donalda Trumpa na Twitterju. Njun populizem ima za cilj približevanje ljudem, torej izvzemanje iz elite in približevanju ljudstvu, nima pa razsežnosti, ki jo populizmu pripisuje Müller (2016: 35), torej obračanje proti določenim (marginalnim) skupinam v družbi. Pahorjev »mehki populizem« bi lahko na podlagi Instagrama brali kot populizem brez izključevanja, saj Pahor v svojih potezah – po Laschu (2012) narcisoidno – išče potrditev pri vseh, ne glede na njihovo politično ali drugo pripadnost, medtem ko je cilj Vučićevega Instagrama predvsem prikazovanje srbskega predsednika kot enakopravnega v družbi svetovnih voditeljev, a tudi človeka ljudstva.

## Sklep

Instagram kot družbeni medij, ki temelji na podobah in je manj vezan na hipno odzivanje, kot je na primer Twitter, je primeren predvsem za grajenje podobe politične osebnosti na dolgi rok. Brez omejitev tradicionalnih medijev, predvsem uredniških zahtev po relevantnosti, Instagram lahko služi kot mesto, kjer se s podobami gradi personalizirana podoba politike, brez dejanskega bremena politike. Profili politikov in političark na Instagramu so bistveno bolj depolitizirani kot njihove medijske reprezentacije, na njih pa je tudi prostor za uprizarjanje zasebnosti, iz katere nato črpajo svojo politično kompetenco.

Kot smo videli na primeru Boruta Pahorja in Aleksandra Vučića, Instagram omogoča določeno mero nadzora nad vrsto uprizarjanja spola in razreda, saj dopušča širši nabor podob in s tem tudi uprizarjanj. Na profilu Boruta Pahorja na Instagramu je tako približno enak delež »službenih« in zasebnih objav, v katerih uprizarja kombinacijo narcisoidne nove moškosti in v primeru »službenih« objav buržujsko-racionalistične moškosti. Nova, narcisoidna moškost Boruta Pahorja je spogledljiva (Yates, 2010), temelji na bližnjih posnetkih njegovega obraza in fotografijah njegovega telesa v športni opremi ter iskanju odobravanja občinstva ne glede na njihovo politično prepričanje. Skorajda do konca depolitizirano uprizarjanje politike se ujema s čustveno infrastrukturo Instagrama, kjer Pahor oziroma njegove sodelavke postanejo ustvarjalci všečnih medijskih vsebin na družbenih omrežjih, ki imajo le občasno informativno vrednost in služijo bolj kot zabava ali distrakcija od dnevne politike oziroma njegovih predsedniških obveznosti.

Vučičev profil na Instagramu po drugi strani služi predvsem uprizarjanju buržujsko-racionalistične moškosti in s tem umeščanjem Vučića v mednarodno politično polje. Vpogledov v njegovo zasebnost je manj, ko pa

do njih pride, gre predvsem za informalizacijo manir (Wouters, 2007), pri čemer se z bolj sproščenim odnosom (brez kravate ali suknjiča, ob tradicionalni srbski hrani ali pa ob zasebnih opravih na delovnem mestu) še vedno ukvarja s politiko. Vučićev populizem se na njegovem Instagramu kaže predvsem v poudarjanju nacionalne note, torej s poudarjanjem srbske tradicije v mednarodnem političnem kontekstu, s čimer poudarja, da je kljub svoji mednarodni dejavnosti še vedno človek ljudstva. Kot ustvarjalec medijskih vsebin na družbenih omrežjih Vučić oziroma njegovi sodelavci in sodelavke gradijo predvsem na navidezni neskončnosti podob, saj vsak dan objavijo več podob predsednika in s tem ustvarjajo vtis njegove delavnosti in vseprisotnosti.

Čeprav se profila obeh predsednikov na Instagramu razlikujeta v načinu grajenja predsedniške podobe, je obema skupno to, da se v objavah distancirata od svojih političnih prepričanj (Pahor svojih političnih prepričanj sicer od izvolitve za predsednika praktično ne izreka več); medtem ko Pahor to počne s pomočjo objav iz svoje zasebnosti, Vučić to počne z objavljanjem fotografij s srečanj z mednarodnimi voditelji in voditeljicami, s čimer ustvarja podobo umirjenega kozmopolitskega politika v mednarodnem političnem prostoru, ki pa odstopa od njegove podobe v domačih, srbskih medijih. V obeh primerih gre za depolitizirane objave, saj v njih ni politične sporočilnosti, temveč imajo cilj grajenje določene podobe predsednika, le da se Pahor v njih bolj nagiba k narcisoidnemu uprizarjanju nove moškosti, Vučić pa h kozmopolitstvu.

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## POPULARNA KULTURA IN REGRESIVNI POPULIZEM\*\*

*Povzetek. Družbe se tako na individualni kot na kolektivni ravni nenehno presojuje skozi lastne elite. Medijski diskurz »celebrifikacije« in vseprisotno lokalno kulturo slavnežev razumem kot pomemben legitimacijski naraativ in enega od ključnih prispevkov k postsocialističnemu neoliberalnemu konsenzu. Članek se ukvarja z reprezentacijo Melanije Trump v slovenskih medijih in na podlagi empiričnega materiala analizira prepletenost diskurza slavnih oseb v komercialni popularni kulturi z regresivnim populizmom. Analiza ugotavlja, da zvezdnitvo predstavlja pomembno diskurzivno prakso legitimiranja obstoječih razrednih razmerij in redistribucije javnega bogastva v postsocializmu, ki ga je kot del kulturnega repertoarja »protonacionalnega« sentimenta mogoče organizirati v podporo desničarskega populizma.*

*Ključni pojmi: regresivni populizem, razred, postsocializem, slavnost, Melanija Trump*

### Uvod

Medijski diskurz o slavnih in znanih/vidnih ter splošnejše obravnave realnosti skozi perspektivo posameznikov in individualnega izkustva ima dandanes vedno pomembnejšo vlogo v procesu oblikovanja normativne individualnosti in zamišljene kolektivnosti. Različne manifestacije celebritizacije v starih in novih ali t. i. prezentacijskih medijih so rezultat ločenih, a medsebojno prepletenih fenomenov mediatizacije družbe, personalizacije in komodifikacije oz. »ekonomizacije družbenega« (Bröckling, 2020: xiv). Celebritizacijo kot reprezentacijsko prakso in diskurzivne procese celebri-fikacije moramo tako razumeti kot vidik dolgoročne strukturne transformacije in metaprocasa. Ima pomembno vlogo pri razumevanju delovanja politične in ekonomske moči, posebej dramatičnega portretiranja razreda

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in razrednih razlik, elit in običajnosti/navadnosti, torej tako konceptov individualnosti kot kolektivnosti. Couldry (2012: 81) predlaga, da razumemo slavne in vidne kot nekaj, kar počnemo, torej kot ritualno prakso. Gre torej za »... način delovanja, ki začrtuje meje med eno konstruirano kategorijo (slavneži ali 'medijski ljudje') od druge konstruirane skupine ('navadni ljudje'). Ključno je, da slavneža ne razumemo kot fiksni subjekt, temveč kot 'epistemični objekt'. Konceptualizirati ga je potrebno kot ekonomski in kulturni fenomen, blago, ki je vedno politično, ne pa kot osebni položaj posameznika« (glej tudi Reckwitz, 2017: 158).

Kot reprezentacijski režim individualnosti slava ali »celebrity« temelji na fenomenih, ki so osrednji za poznomoderno kulturo neoliberalnega kapitalizma: na ideji samotransformacije, nenehnega »dela na sebi«, primata posameznika ali »singularizacije« in njegove oz. njene možnosti neomejene mobilnosti, na kulturi samokreacije in individualne podjetniške subjektivitete.<sup>1</sup> Slavneži so, kot pravi Marshall (1997/2014, 2006: 4), »hiperprimerki individuuma, ki izražajo potencial in priložnosti posameznika« v razmerah liberalnega kapitalizma. Ta članek se ukvarja s popularno reprezentacijo Melanije Trump v slovenskih medijih in na podlagi tega empiričnega materiala analizira prepletenost diskurza slavnih oseb v popularni kulturi z regresivnim populizmom ter neoliberalno družbeno in ekonomsko konjunkturo.<sup>2</sup> Zanimajo nas diskurzivni repertoarji, ki so uporabljeni v tem konkretnem reprezentacijskem režimu in njihovo strukturiranje moralne ekonomije razreda in razrednih razlik v lokalnem kontekstu. Kaj torej počne diskurz o »znanih in slavnih« v tradicionalnih in t. i. prezentacijskih ali novih medijih? Izhajamo iz predpostavke, da bi morali fenomen medijske slave in slavnih ljudi razumeti kot diskurz o razredu in o razmerjih med elitami in »navadnimi ljudmi«. Govori o izjemnosti, vidnosti in hkrati o običajnosti, anonimnosti in položaju ljudi kot opazovalcev. Ne gre za vidik že obstoječih razrednih odnosov, temveč za prostor, kjer se razredni odnosi vzpostavljajo in v katerem se odvijajo stalni kulturni spopadi, vpleteni v oblikovanje razrednih razmerij.

Diskurz slave in praksa celebrifikacije imata torej performativni značaj: ne predstavljata le mistifikacije ali prikriivanja razmerij moči, temveč imata ključno praktično vlogo v premestitvi strukturnih razrednih neenakosti v

<sup>1</sup> O singularizaciji glej Reckwitz 2020, o podjetniški subjektiviteti v različnih družbenih sferah glej npr. M. Pajnik in M. Hrženjak, 2020 in Bröckling, 2020.

<sup>2</sup> Pojem historične konjunkturo je v kulturnih študijah uveljavil S. Hall (1990) in se pri tem naslanjal na Gramscija in v manjši meri na Althusserja. Konjunktorna analiza po mnenju Egeja in Gallasa (2019: 92) temelji na predpostavki, da se družbena protislovja v nekem specifičnem trenutku osrediščijo okoli specifičnih tem, ki najbolje označujejo dano historično konjunkturo. Analizo nekega parcialnega fenomena je torej potrebno analizirati v okviru take akumulacije in kondenzacije protislovij, torej kot trenutek srečanja različnih tokov in okoliščin.

zamišljeno nacionalno »skupnost skupne usode« in torej potlačitvi vprašanja razrednih razlik. Na drugi strani imata ključno vlogo v reprodukciji mita individualne mobilnosti, samopreoblikovanja in meritokracije. Proizvodnja lokalnih slavnežev v »novih« in »starih« medijih je v preteklih dvajsetih letih zarisala meje med »dobrimi elitami«, ki svoj elitni status zaslužijo, torej med nacionalnimi dosežkarji in zmagovalci in na drugi strani koruptivnimi elitami, ki izpodkopavajo in preprečujejo mitično konstrukcijo »nacionalne skupnosti istosti« (Bauman, 2001). Naj poudarimo, da gre tudi pri konceptu dobrih in slabih elit za epistemične kategorije – nedavna zgodovina novinarskih zapisov v lokalnih medijih je polna propadlih poslovnežev, t. i. »tajkunov«, ki so bili v nekem trenutku v medijih sistematično obravnavani kot poslovni geniji in kot del panteona nacionalnih herojev postsocialistične transformacije in kapitalske akumulacije (npr. I. Bavčar, B. Kordež ali B. Šrot). Diskurzivni režim slave zato lahko razumemo kot del spopadov okoli oblikovanja razrednosti na področju popularne kulture, ki je tesno prepleten s sodobnim regresivnim populizmom in – bolj specifično – z neoliberalno transformacijo v postsocializmu.

### Komodifikacija novic in slavnost kot blago

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Analiza je utemeljena na diskurzivnem branju in teoretski interpretaciji vzorca skoraj neobvladljivega števila 596 člankov, ki so bili objavljeni v treh mesecih pred volitvami in po njih ter inavguraciji v letu 2017 v vseh lokalnih medijih ali njihovih digitalnih platformah in so omenjali Melanijo Trump. Vsak članek, ki je omenil Melanijo Trump med 15. oktobrom in 15. novembrom (torej pred volitvami in po njih) ter med 20. januarjem in 20. marcem (po inavguraciji, ko je M. T. postala prva dama), je bil vključen v vzorec.<sup>3</sup> Analiza je bila torej opravljena v dveh korakih, vsega skupaj je bilo obdobje analize dolgo tri mesece. Zgodbe o Melaniji Trump niso bile omejene na tabloidne medije, temveč so infiltrirale novice o mednarodni politiki, poslovne rubrike, komentarje in kolumne in feljtone resnih medijev, modni in ženski žurnalizem itd. Medijska reprezentacija Trumpove je torej prečila medijske žanre in medije, tako da je prišlo do zlitja tabloidnega in političnega novinarstva v širšem kontekstu kulture komercialnega medijskega prostora. »Novi« in »stari« mediji so ustvarjali dvojno spiralo npr. med tviti, ki so se referirali na tradicionalne medije in obratno.

Novice o slavnežih so v svojih žanrski raznolikosti in neskončni repetitivnosti in ponavljajoči se obnovljivosti idealne za vizualizirano medijsko kulturo in stalno proizvodnjo »novosti«. Ritualna proizvodnja persone Melanije

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<sup>3</sup> *Medijski material tiskanih medijev in njihovih spletnih platform za obdobje treh mesecev pred ameriškimi volitvami 2016 ter po njih smo pridobili prek agencije Pristop Kliping.*

Trump je predstavljala prostor fragmentiranega nacionalnega spektakla in jo moramo razumeti v kontekstu komodifikacije medijev in posebej koncepta novice. Lokalni tradicionalni mediji in njihove digitalne platforme so zaradi privatizacije in neoliberalnega restrukturiranja, majhnega lokalnega trga in digitalnih medijev visoko skomercializirani. Kot tudi drugod povsodnost kulture slavnežev poseblja splošno transformacijo kulturne vloge medijev (gl. Turner, 2018: 18) in njihovega interesa za slavnost kot blago. Vrsta žanrov v okviru novic o slavnežih je posebej primerna za proizvodnjo z malo resursi in za hiter novičarski cikel ter kratko obliko novic, ki jih je mogoče predstaviti kot nove oz. prenovljene. Ta nekajmesečni spektakel torej uteleša komercialne novičarske vrednote in industrijsko proizvodnjo novic in »novosti« kot blaga. Cilj te analize je, prvič, odgovoriti na vprašanje, kakšna je vloga diskurza o znanih in slavnih v mistifikaciji razrednih razlik in pri razumevanju razreda v populističnem sentimentu kot inherentnem delu »celebrity« diskurza. Drugič, kako popularna kultura podpira moralistično imaginacijo politike, ki postavlja, kot pravi Müller (2017: 19), »moralno čisto in popolnoma enotno« in seveda v celoti fikcijsko ljudstvo nasproti elitam. In tretjič, naš cilj je analizirati, kakšna je bila vloga tega specifičnega dramatičnega portretiranja družbe za diskurzivno konstrukcijo elit in za medsebojno povezanost pojmovanja razreda, spola in etničnosti kot treh temeljnih kategorij družbenega razlikovanja. Upamo, da bomo s to partikularizacijo pogleda, ko se osredinimo na partikularni primer Melanije Trump, uspeli ta primer predstaviti »kot poseben primer ter ga posplošiti, torej preko apliciranja splošnega vprašanja, odkriti nespremenljive značilnosti, ki jih prikriva pod videzom svoje enkratnosti in posebnosti« (Bourdieu in Wacquant, 1992: 234).

### **Popularna kultura, postsocializem in mistifikacija razrednih razlik**

Za lokalno javno govorico o razredu, posebej za novinarski in politični diskurz o družbenih razlikah, je značilen svojevrstni protislovni populizem. Zanj je značilna kombinacija individualizacije razrednih razlik, ki se v popularnih medijih med drugim jasno artikulira npr. prek psevdopsihologije, in pomembne vloge popularnih medijev v neoliberalnem filantropizmu, medtem ko strukturni in politični vidiki lokalnih razrednih razmerij sistematično niso obravnavani. Obenem pa je potlačitev razreda povezana z »nacionalizacijo« javnega življenja v postsocializmu, ko so ljudje rutinsko nagovarjani kot povezana solidarna skupina, v kateri notranje razlike ne štejejo oz. ne bi smele šteti in je glavni cilj »mitična polnost, ki jo zaman iščemo«, torej popolnoma harmonična oz. spravljena družba (Laclau, 2005: 119). Politične in ideološke razlike so tako obravnavane kot usodna anomalija, pri čemer je svetovnonazorska »razdeljenost naroda« interpretirana kot nenaravna



in uničujoča. Ost (2015) se v uvodniku k tematski številki o tem skupnem vzhodnoevropskem fenomenu ukvarja z odsotnostjo »razredne govornice« v medijskem, političnem in družboslovnem diskurzu v »postsocialistični« Evropi, hkrati pa ugotavlja, da je ideja vsesplošnega »srednjega razreda« doživela bleščečo kariero kot označevalka zamišljene prosperitete nekje v prihodnosti kapitalistične transformacije.

Sam pojem »postsocializem« uporabljam tu z zadržkom in le kot deskriptivni pojem, ki je izšel iz specifične historične konjunktore. Ima problematične konceptualne in politične implikacije z orientalističnim jedrom, saj daje prednost teritorialni imaginaciji, hkrati pa – tako kot stalna ritualna invokacija »komunizma« s strani desne populistične politike – preprečuje potencialno imaginiranje drugačnega socializma onstran državnega socializma. Koncept postsocializma v političnem diskurzu tako hrani antisocialistične ali antikomunistične invokacije, ki prispevajo k delegitimaciji vsake alternativne leve politike kot »komunistične« (glej npr. M. Müller, 2019: 534; Owczarzak, 2009). Horvat in Štiks (2012: 39) podobno ugotavljata, da sta dva ključna razloga za vseprisotno retoriko neizvršene tranzicije iz socializma v liberalno demokracijo izogibanje resnemu spopadu s posledicami tranzicije in ohranjanje diskurza in odnosov zahodne nadvlade, pokroviteljskega skrbništva ter nadzorovanje nekdanjih socialističnih držav. »Komunistična« preteklost v socialistični Jugoslaviji je v revizionističnem historičnem okviru simbolna točka nenehnega sklicevanja na stanje pred polno uresničitvijo »naroda«. To sklicevanje se hkrati odvija na ozadju posebne različice kombinacije globalnih okoliščin, regresivnega populizma in lokalnega neoliberalizma (glej npr. Kalb, 2011; Ribač, 2018; Hočevar, 2020). Ta sedanost je v celoti izničila mitološko obljubo emancipacije, ki naj bi jo prinesla samostojna nacionalna država, temelječa na etnični pripadnosti in jasnem izključevanju nečlanov.<sup>4</sup>

Orientalistični vidik pojma postsocializem tako predstavlja sodobno artikulacijo »vzhodizma« kot vzhodnoevropskega orientalizma (glej Ballinger, 2017). Gre za simbolno geografijo in diskurzivno konfiguracijo, kjer Vzhod oz. Vzhodna Evropa, podobno kot Orient ali Balkan, obstaja kot smiselna diskurzivna konfiguracija, ki uokvirja in omogoča ekonomsko in politično perifernost Vzhodne Evrope. Kot ugotavlja D. Kalb (2011: 8), »odvisne države Vzhodne Evrope, z njihovim v celoti kompradorskim kapitalizmom 'v tranziciji', upravljajo v najboljšem primeru s približno 30% bogastva Zahodne

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<sup>4</sup> Ko Nick Couldry (2011: 33) razpravlja o problemih z upovedovanjem razrednih razlik v pozni moderni kot o splošnem, in ne kot o problemu, ki bi bil tu nacionalno specifičen, poudarja, da ni problem v tem, da »medijem ne uspe spodbujati oz. vzdrževati /ohranjati/ in podpirati obravnave razreda, ki bi temeljila na neenakem dostopu do distribucije resursev, temveč leži problem v specifičnih načinih, skozi katere jim ne uspe povedati te zgodbe. Poudarek v originalu. Vsi tradicionalni distribucijski boji po mnenju A. Honnetha (2003) vključujejo tudi zahtevo po pripoznanju enake vrednosti.

Evrope«. Učinki neoliberalizma so v teh državah zato mnogo bolj uničujoči. »Velika regresija« (Geiselberger, 2017), ki smo ji priča v globalnem merilu z vzponom različnih oblik regresivnega populizma, je produkt skupnega učinka tveganj globalizacije in neoliberalizma in dobi v »postsocializmu« le svojo posebno artikulacijo. Najbolj očiten simptom tega součinkovanja je izguba suverenosti nacionalnih ekonomij kot temelja nacionalne suverenosti. Appadurai (2017) meni, da ravno ta izguba suverenosti povzroči pomik k različnim oblikam poudarjanja kulturne suverenosti in obrat k etnonacionalizmu. V tem kontekstu je legitimacijski mit, kako bomo končno »dohiteli Zahod« in »se vrnili v Evropo«, ključnega pomena za postsocialistično transformacijo s pomočjo neoliberalnega vpliva EU in naraščajoče hegemonije neoliberalnega kapitalizma, ki se predstavlja kot naraven, ne pa historično konstruiran red (glej McGuigan, 2016: 34). Sam pojem »vzhodizma« kot simbolne geografije je lahko konceptualni okvir za razumevanje lokalnega diskurza slavnežev in njegove mistifikacije razreda ter mobilizacije fikcijske nerazredne primordiale nacionalne skupnosti na eni strani in polkolonialnega položaja na drugi. Njegov simbolizem počiva na asimetrijah moči ter na (politični) ekonomiji, ki je inherentna konceptu vzhodizma. Vzhodnoevropska periferija torej v tem članku služi kot analitični okvir, ne kot predmet analize. Izhajamo s stališča, da ima kultura osrednjo vlogo v formaciji družbenega in ekonomskega, saj neoliberalni kulturni imaginarij glavnega toka (mainstreama) popularne kulture ponuja »semiotični okvir konstruiranja sveta«, hkrati pa tudi aktivno prispeva k njegovi konstrukciji (Jessop, 2009: 342). Velik del komercialne popularne kulture in komercializiranega novinarstva ter posebej prakso celebrifikacije lahko torej razumemo kot ključni narativ legitimacije in upravičevanja, ki uokvirja aspiracije in moralno ekonomijo razrednosti v lokalnem okolju.<sup>5</sup> Še posebej diskurz o slavi je pomemben legitimacijski narativ ali »kulturni mehanizem konsenza« (Hall et al., 1978/2013: 207) v dani historični konstelaciji.

### Bila je navadno preprosto dekle: konstrukcija običajnosti in postopek »nacionaliziranja«<sup>6</sup>

Uprizarjanje navadnosti ali t.i. »demotični obrat« (Turner, 2009) s koreninami v resničnostni televiziji je tipičen za sodobno »celebrity« kulturo. V različicah se pojavlja v popularni kulturi, pa tudi na področju politike ali

<sup>5</sup> Za naše potrebe bomo moralno ekonomijo na kratko definirali kot konsenzualno razumevanje pravic in pravične distribucije resursov (glej Thompson, 1971), pri čemer so lahko viri kolektivnega delovanja tako dejansko pomanjkanje in prikrajšanost kot tudi moralne predstave o svojih pravicah.

<sup>6</sup> Pojem »nacionaliziranje« povzemamo po G. Turnerju (2018: 64–74) in se v angleškem izvorniku glasi: »nationing«. Ker v slovenskem prevodu implicira ekonomski pojem podržavljanja, naj pojasnimo, da gre za postopek diskurzivnega etničnega prisvajanja, etniziranja.

podjetništva, saj podpira mit neomejene družbene mobilnosti ter meritokratske zaslužnosti za svoj položaj. Diskurz o vidnih in slavnih v tradicionalnih in novih medijih je posebej pomemben pri vzpostavljanju meja med zaslužnimi elitami (nacionalno pomembnimi dosežkarji) ter korumpiranimi in nezaslužnimi elitami, saj ima osrednjo vlogo pri legitimacijskem mitu neoliberalne transformacije in naturalizacije redistribucije družbenega bogastva in mita meritokratske zaslužnosti. Nič izjemnega torej ni, da je bila celotna diskurzivna praksa celebritizacije Melanije Trump v lokalnih medijih utemeljena na njeni domnevni običajnosti. Uprizarjanje krepostne običajnosti je en od ključnih kulturnih tropov, prek katerega so sodobne elite predstavljene ali se same predstavljajo. Proizvodnja običajnosti je način medijske samoprezentacije, ki jo uporabljajo elite, vse od kraljevskih družin do poslovnih elit ali politikov (glej npr. Repo in Yrjölä, 2015; Adamson, 2017; Littler, 2018). Orodje te produkcije so življenjske zgodbe, narativi o vzponu znanih in slavnih od skromnih začetkov prek truda do slave, uspeha ali bogastva, ki so nepogrešljivi del diskurza o slavnih in obenem referenca na skupno izkustvo z občinstvom. Javna persona Melanije Trump (torej njen javni jaz) je daleč od navadnosti; Trumpova ni nikoli uprizarjala običajne ženske in je prek svojih odvetnikov prepovedala vsako komercialno uporabo svojega imena v Sloveniji in vsako znamčenje, povezano z njenim imenom ali osebo. Naloga utemeljevanja njene običajnosti je pripadla lokalnim medijem v postopku komodifikacije njene persone in pri tem utemeljevanju je bila njena slovenskost ključni pogoj njene običajnosti.

*Melania je bila zelo pridna in delavna. S svojimi sošolci se je dobro razumela.* (nekdanja učiteljica, Svet24, 2016: 4)

*Lepo, preprosto dekle.* (Božič, 2016: 11-12)

*Melanija je bila zelo prijetna deklica, vedno je bila ona tista, ki nas je mirila, ko smo se prepirali.* (Gleščič, 2016: 2-3)

Navadnost in koncept navadnega človeka v resnici nima realne pojavnosti, saj gre za »plavajoči označevalec«, vedno odnosen in historično spodbijan. Nima torej stabilnega pomena, temveč je pripisan oz. uprizarjan v specifičnem kontekstu za specifične učinke. Williams (1983: 225-226) govori o »navadnih ljudeh« kot označevalcu za »generalizirana telesa Drugih«, v tem primeru tistih, ki nimajo moči. Kot ugotavlja Langhamer (2018: 21) v svoji zgodovinski študiji pojmovanja navadnosti, je koncept običajnosti, navadnosti družbena kategorija, afektivna kategorija, moralna kategorija, potrošniška kategorija in predvsem politična kategorija. Navadnost ne pomeni statističnega povprečja (Sacks, 1984), temveč način, na katerega se

kdo konstituira ali ga, kot v našem primeru, konstituirajo in komodificirajo mediji. Kategorija navadnosti je torej vedno historična in politična kategorija in ključno vprašanje zadeva vrsto vrednosti, stilov in praks, ki podeljujejo pomen zahtevi po navadnosti v specifični historični konjunkturi. Kako je torej navadnost konstruirana in zagotovljena in kaj pomeni politični učinek uprizarjanja oz. pripisovanja običajnosti? Kako je torej mogoče legitimno zasesti subjektivni položaj običajnega, navadnega človeka?

Ključni element postopka legitimacije in depolitizacije položaja Melanije Trump je torej njena običajnost. Njena »izjemna običajnost« (Littler, 2018: 121) je konstruirana prek ritualne reiteracije biografske zgodbe o transformaciji iz navadnega dekleta v ženo milijonarja in predsedniškega kandidata oz. predsednika. Ta reiteracija vključuje tematizacijo njenega navadnega otroštva v malem provincialnem slovenskem mestu, spominjanja prič na njeno navadno mladost in na navadnost njenih staršev, na njeno pot v svet ter na prvo srečanje s Trumpom. Mediji jo pri tem skorajda izključno imenujejo le z lastnim imenom in si na ta način prisvojijo ljudski jezik vsakdanje interakcije, s tem pa domestificirajo in humanizirajo njeno persono. Ta biografski narativ je narativ uspeha z dvema stereotipnima mitološkima elementoma: življenje v provincialnem malem mestu (Sevnica) in srečni preboj, uspešna poročna transakcija (zgodba o poti od navadnosti do izjemnosti in uspeha). Ženski uspeh je praviloma reprezentiran kot iracionalen in slučajen dogodek – tako kot srečanje Melanije Knavs in Donalda Trumpa na sprejemu na newyorškem Tednu mode (New York Fashion Week):

*Zadela me je njegova energija, iz njega veje neverjetna življenjska sila*  
... (Bajt, 2016: 31)

Legitimnost in simbolna vrednost njenega položaja torej tu nista pripisani njenemu uspehu na patriarhalnem poročnem trgu in njeni uspešni preobrazbi, temveč njenemu običajnemu sebstvu. Drug korak v konstrukciji navadnosti je, kot bomo videli v nadaljevanju, etnizacija njene običajnosti, to je regresivna redukcija in esencializacija pripadnosti na etničnost. V regresivnem populističnem diskurzu se opredeljevanje pripadnosti namreč vedno odvija na principu izključevanja tistih, ki ne morejo pripadati. Da bi si Melanija Trump kot persona-blogo lahko lastila navadnost, se mora njeni navadnosti pripisati specifične pomene in vrsto kulturnih in političnih vrednot. Njena normalnost in običajnost sta bili utemeljeni na njeni etničnosti in uprizarjanju njene slovenskosti kot ključnemu pogoju primordialne navadnosti.

*Naše gore list Sevnčanika Melanija.* (Kovač, 2016: 3)

*(Še) vedno hči Sevnice...* (Živčec, 2016: 24)

*In Melanija, brhka deklica, rojena na sevniški strani Alp, je postala prva dama sveta. (Turk, 2016: 19)*

Subjektjni položaj »navadne Melanije« je definiran v kontekstu vrste drugih subjektivnih položajev, kot npr. lokalne in globalne elite. Nemogoče je definirati pojem navadnosti, ne da bi jo postavili v razmerje, na podlagi česar navadnost odstopa oz. običajnost lahko sploh ugotovljamo, ne da bi jo soočili z nekom, ki je izjemen, poseben in hkrati neavtentičen, tj. z družbenimi elitami na sploh:

*Še nikoli ni bilo treba tako malo truda in denarja, da bi Slovenijo promovirali v svetu. Očitno naši uradniki sedijo pregloboko v svojih foteljih, da bi to razumeli. (Lahovnik, 2016: 4)*

*Odpira se vprašanje, kako bo Slovenija unovčila dejstvo, da je slovenska rojakinja kot prva dama prišla v Belo hišo. (Malovrh, 2016: 4)*

*Slovenka bo prva dama ZDA – priložnost Slovenije za korak v zgodovino? (Kristina Božič, 2016: 2)*

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Melanija Trump je bila torej obravnavana kot običajno dekle, ki ji je uspelo in kot slovenski zaklad tradicionalnih ženskih vrlin. Toda hkrati je bila reducirana na »človeški kapital« in tržno metriko. Številni intervjuvanci, običajni ljudje, novinarji in eksperti so razmišljali o enkratni priložnosti Slovenije za »vstop v zgodovino« in spremembo slovenskega geopolitičnega položaja periferne nevidnosti ter o možni monetizaciji njene vloge prve dame.<sup>7</sup> Rezultat te medijske ritualne prakse je umestitev medijske osebe Melanije Trump v konstruirano skupino (zaslužne, dobre elite) in ločitev te skupine od druge konstruirane skupine (nezaslužne domače elite) ter umestitev skupine zaslužnih v skupno nacionalno strukturo občutenja, v nacionalno skupnost brez razrednih razlik.<sup>8</sup> Na ta način se oblikuje antagonistična ločilna črta znotraj družbenega z navadnimi ljudmi in dobrimi

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<sup>7</sup> Po drugi strani pa je znani stand-up komik in tv-voditelj Bill Maher (*Real Time z Billom Maherjem*, HBO 2016) svojo oddajo s šalami na račun Trumpa in Melanije Trump zaključil z besedami: *Preden zaploskate, pazite: prihaja iz Slovenije, dežele, ki je preveč revna, da bi si lahko privoščila ironijo. Zahodni liberalni mediji so na splošno obravnavali Melanijo Trump kot mimikrijo prve dame, saj položaja ni mogla v celoti zasesti tako zaradi svoje vzhodnoevropskosti, ki implicira tudi pomanjkanje socialnega in kulturnega kapitala. Z redkimi izjemami (npr. Bill Maher ali diet \_prada račun na Instagramu) je ta orientalizacija sicer ostala le implicitna in omejena na namige.*

<sup>8</sup> Glej Morganovo (2020) kulturnosociološko kritiko dominantnih definicij populizmov in binarno konstrukcijo ljudi in elit v različnih populizmih. Morgan ugotavlja, da moramo populizem razumeti kot obliko »kulturnega dela«, ne pa kot ideologijo. O tipologiji populizmov v slovenskem primeru glej D. Fink-Hafner (2016).

elitami na eni strani in slabimi nezaslužnimi elitami na drugi (glej Laclau, 2015). Zaslužnost je podobno kot slavnost in vidnost, epistemski položaj, ne objektivna značilnost. Figura nezaslužnih elit je trdno umeščena v regresivno populistični imaginarij, ki temelji na jasnem nasprotju med figuro poštenih navadnih ljudi in figuro nepoštenih elit, ki jih izmenoma zastopajo politiki, javni uradniki, birokrati, intelektualci ali država nasploh. Melanija Trump predstavlja navadno žensko v antagonističnem razmerju do lokalnih elit. Lahko govori v imenu drugih navadnih ljudi, njena vidnost in bogastvo, če ne institucionalna moč, pa sta na podlagi njene običajnosti popolnoma legitimna.

### Metafora »naroda-kot-družine« in banalni kulturni nacionalizem

V različicah je ponavljajoča se biografska zgodba o Melaniji Trump utemeljena na stalnem referiranju na njeno etnično pripadnost, njen rezultat pa je umestitev Trumpove v etnično »mi-skupnost«. Performativna reiteracija o nacionalni pripadnosti (*Sevničanka, hčer Sevnice, navadno dekle, rojeno na sevniški strani Alp ...*) prispeva h konstrukciji njene navadnosti prek biografskega narativa, ki jo domestificira in humanizira. Da bi bila lahko Melanija Trump običajna, mora biti udomačena, saj je kulturna intimnost, ki izhaja iz postopka etnizacije, nepogrešljivi element legitimnosti njenega položaja. Ali, kot pravi Edensor (2002: 92), da bi si lahko lastili pripadnost nacionalni identiteti kot široki in ohlapni entiteti, »... mora biti ta domestificirana, lokalizirna in personalizirana«. *Schadenfreunde* ali škodoželjnost, to je izražanje prezira do slavnih in ugodje občinstva nad njihovimi nesrečami, je pomemben vidik medijske kulture slavnih in vidnih (Cross, Littler, 2010). Prav tako kot škodoželje tudi udomačenje prek reference na njeno etničnost sproži proces niveljanja, pri čemer pride do enačenja položaja slavne osebe z občinstvom in prevrednotenja meril, na podlagi katerih se presoja o drugih. Njena običajnost torej ni utemeljena na univerzalnih merilih, temveč predvsem na kriteriju etničnosti in skupni kulturni intimnosti, torej na primordialnosti etnične pripadnosti, občinstvo lokalnih medijev pa je bilo interpelirano kot nacionalni subjekt.

*Američani Melanijo naravnost občudujejo, navdušeni so nad njo. Njen naglas jih ne moti, saj razumejo, da je priseljenka; imajo jo za lepo, uglajeno in uspešno žensko, še dodaja Hladnik. Če bo Trump zmagal, bo Slovenka postala prva dama Bele hiše in najmočnejše velesile na svetu.* (izjava direktorja Primorskih novic v Sabadin, PN, 2016: 2).

*O tem, da je Melanija v resnici še vedno srčna in dobra oseba, čeprav si je morda sposodila govor pri bolj inteligentni kolegici (čemur seveda ne ploskamo!), nas je prepričala tudi Nataša Pinoza ...* (Bajt, 2016: 31)

Ustvarjanje simbolnih meja in dihotomij (ljudje proti eliti) je način javnega označevanja, ki seveda ni omejen le na populistično uprizarjanje. Toda ključno vprašanje je, kdo lahko pripada in kdo je izločen iz esencialističnega razumevanja »navadnih ljudi«. V regresivnem nacionalističnem diskurzu o slavnih in znanih je pravica do vključenosti pogojena z etničnostjo. Moralna legitimnost Melanije Trump je torej posledično rezultat njene etničnosti, na podlagi katere se oblikuje primordialna solidarnost. Kot rojaki smo povabljeni, da uživamo v njenem uspehu in vidnosti na »interpasivni« način (Pfaller, 2017). Nacija je tu naturalizirana, esencializirana, interpretirana kot naravni red stvari in prežeta z moralnim elementom, ki povzdigne skupnost, ki je utemeljena na etničnosti, nad vse druge kolektivitete. V tem okviru je vsaka kritična presoja Trumpovega političnega projekta nacionalna izdaja. »Nacionaliziranje« ali »eticiziranje« (Turner, 2018: 64–74) omogoča proizvodnjo običajnosti Melanije Trump, ki briše in mistificira razredne razlike in je ključen vir depolitizirane obravnave »projekta Trump«.

Tako diskurz o Melaniji Trump pomeni dramtizirano konstrukcijo nacionalne enotnosti, ki jo omogoča le izničenje vseh razlik v okviru »mi-skupnosti«, tudi razrednih razlik. Še posebej je pomembno, da je njena različnost pripoznana, toda razredne razlike so prevedene v njen poseben stil življenja, ki ga omogoča meritokratsko zaslužen uspeh, to sta njena bistra podjetniška poročna izbira in uspešen stilistični in življenjski »make-over«. Trumpova volilna zmaga je bila v lokalnih popularnih medijih, pa tudi v komentatorskih žanrih drugih medijev prevladujoče predstavljena v okviru njegove družinske povezanosti s Slovenijo in uokvirjena kot »zmaga našega človeka«: »Trump je zmagal, Amerika je dobila slovenskega ženina«, »... naš ženin Donald Trump« ali »slovenski ženin D. Trump«. Sama beseda »ženin« je arhaizem in hkrati posebni kod, ki je znan tako govorcem ali govorki kot občinstvu, ki ga označuje zavest o preteklem jeziku in uporabi le-tega pri vzpostavljanju rustično folkloristične kulturne intimnosti.<sup>9</sup>

*8. novembra je bil za ameriškega predsednika izvoljen Donald Trump, nov obraz, prvi zet Slovenije.* (Štefančič, 2016: 24)

*Ti pričakujejo, da bi najbogatejši sevniški zet gotovo primaknil kakšen dolar, da bi v sevniški občini zunaj in znotraj prenovili osnovne šole Šentjanž, Studenec in Boštanj.* (Dolenjski list, 2016: 10)

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<sup>9</sup> O popularni glasbeni kulturi in vlogi imaginarnega v procesu formacije (nacionalne) identitete glej Stankovičeva analiza »rustične obsedenosti« s slovenskostjo in enkratnostjo narodno-zabavne glasbe (t. i. govejke muzike) kot hegemonskim glasbenim označevalcem slovenskosti.



*Trump ni samo slovenski, temveč tudi evropski zet in tudi zato bi se izplačalo ...* (Nedeljski dnevnik, 2016: 15-16)

Sorodstvene metafore slikajo družbena razmerja v jeziku družinskih razmerij, tako da so družbene razlike konstruirane kot kategorija naravnih razlik, ne pa strukturirane vzdolž razrednega razlikovanja. Z uporabo metafor sorodstva, razširjene družine in družinskih razmerij (*hči Sevnice, naš ženin, slovenski zet ...*) je nacija konstruirana kot skupnost enakih, hkrati pa je bil predsedniški položaja Donalda Trumpa obravnavan kot družinska zadeva. Celotna etnija, vključno z Melanijo Trump in njenim možem, je metonimični podaljšek »tistih, ki jih poznamo«. Besedne figure, ki se nanašajo na razumevanje nacionalnega v okviru družinskih razmerij in družinske ikonografije, so kulturne projekcije patriarhalnega družinskega življenja na nacijo (glej McClintock, 1995: 358). Na ta način nacija ni vzpostavljena le kot skupnost enakih, temveč tudi kot družinska zadeva, ki jo opredeljuje familiarna kulturna in torej politična homogenost. Prek tega inkluzivnega nagovora in ekscesne prijaznosti in familiarnosti se je odvijala uprizoritev egalitarne prevere: na podlagi diskurzivnega postopka etniziranja je bila Melanija Trump vzpostavljena kot moralno čista personifikacija idealiziranih nacionalnih vrednot, tako da sta bila čast in pripoznanje naroda, tako kot v klasičnem patriarhatu, povezana z ženskimi vrtilinami. Spol in tradicionalna ženskost sta vključena in mobilizirana za nacionalistični projekt, ki ne pozna razrednih delitev, le etnične. Diana Kendall (2005: 30-35) razume ta spregled razlik v življenjskem stilu in strukturi priložnosti bogatih in slavnih kot strategijo vzpostavljanja konsenza (»pod kožo smo vsi enaki«). Materialno potrošni označevalci razlik, kot so npr. obleke ali nakit, so domestificirani kot razlike v okusih in stvar arbitrarne izbire:

*... Na zadnjem predsedniškem soočenju je Melanija žarela v rožnati Guccijevi bluzi ... slovita obleka Margot umazano bele barve, ki jo je izbrala za republikansko konvencijo ..... je ob tej priložnosti žarela v dolgi beli obleki francoskega oblikovalca Thierryja Muglerja... ... V rdečem plaščku Ralpa Laurena in s torbico, na kateri se blešči ameriška zastava ...*<sup>10</sup>

Dizajnerska garderoba, brezhibna frizura, svilena Guccijeva pentljasta bluza (t.i. »pussy-bow«) predstavljajo le razliko v okusu ali stilu življenja, ki pa ne postavi pod vprašaj egalitarnega narativa.

<sup>10</sup> Vsi odlomki članka so iz revije *Avenija*, 21. 10. 2016: 7.

## Meritokratski trop postfeminizma

Nira Yuval-Davies (1997) opozarja pred spolno slepo teoretizacijo nacionalizma in razrednega sistema, saj konstrukcija naroda praviloma vključuje specifično pojmovanje »moškosti« in »ženskosti«. Nacionalizem je že v osnovi konstituiran skozi spolne neenakosti. Podoba Melanije Trump se je v lokalnem kontekstu oblikovala na podlagi vrste medsebojno povezanih, toda protislovnih diskurzov o ženskosti: postfeministične ženskosti (njena podjetniška subjektiviteta in preobrazbene sposobnosti) in obem tradicionalne ženskosti (zadržana, podporniško lojalna, materinska). Običajnost Melanije Trump ni bila utemeljena samo na etničnosti, ki zaobide razredno stratifikacijo, temveč tudi na podjetniški, a hkrati tradicionalni ženskosti, utemeljeni na naravnih spolnih razlikah. Tradicionalni koncept spola je ključni moment v konstrukciji njene navadnosti z biografsko naracijo (je mirna, toda trdna ..., je posvečena materinstvu, ima politična stališča, vendar jih izraža v zasebnosti, njen politični vpliv torej temelji na mehki ženski moči lojalne soproge itd.). Materinstvo je za strategijo personifikacije osrednji in pogosto uporabljeni narativ, ki govori o skrbstveni plati njenega značaja. Njen »ženski način«, ki zahteva hkratno izražanje krhkosti in moči, se izraža s stalno invokacijo njene ljubezni do otroka, potrpežljivosti in neprepirljivosti ter z domnevno jasnimi političnimi stališči, ki jih nikoli ne izraža v javnosti.

Ta dva vidika ženskosti sta sicer v medsebojni napetosti, toda hkrati podpirata drug drugega. Kot pravi R. Gill (2007; 2017; 2020), lahko postfeminizem razumemo kot posebno različico ospoljenega neoliberalizma, senzibilnost, ki jo oblikujejo številne med seboj povezane značilnosti: samodisciplina, individualizem, izbira, opolnomočenje, vnovična ožvitev idej o naravni spolni razliki itd.). Gre za strukturo občutenja, ki se izraža in reproducira prek novega slovarja; osebna sreča, skrb zase, ravnovesje med delom in družino ... so normativni okviri in ideali, ki nadomeščajo vprašanje pravic in kritike patriarhalnih struktur. Slava in vidnost je tako v komercialni popularni kulturi dostopna predvsem tistim, ki lahko utelešajo to specifično podobo ženskosti. Podoba tradicionalne ženske domesticnosti je stalnica v intervjujih in kratkih izjavah nekdanjih učiteljev, sosedov, prebivalcev Sevnice, pa tudi povabljenih strokovnjakov – od modnih fotografov do veleposlanika Slovenije v ZDA (Iztok Mirošič) ali strokovnjaka za mednarodne odnose, ki razglašajo, da se Sloveniji obeta nova doba mednarodne vidnosti. Njena medijska persona je tako vkopana v t.i. »neoliberalni narativ pravice« (Littler, 2018: 68), ki predpisuje kompetitivni individualizem kot zdravilo za neenakost in patriarhalne strukture, toda hkrati oživlja esencialistično pojmovanje spolnih razlik in vrlin tradicionalne ženskosti. Običajnost Melanije Trump je ustvarjena in ohranjana s predpostavko esencialističnega koncepta

ženskosti v okviru tradicionalnih popularnih vrednot. Meritokratska biografška zgodba o njenih individualnih dosežkih in preobrazbi je torej prepletena s podobo tradicionalne domestičnosti v kontekstu naturalizirane umestitve moških v javno sfero in žensk v zasebno sfero potrošnega delovanja.

*O politiki ne govorim v javnosti, o tem bolj govorim doma.* (Klarič, 2016: 4)

*... tisti, ki jo poznajo, pa pravijo, da bo na tem položaju izjemna, ker je tiha, dostojanstvena in zelo lepa ... možu ne bo vsiljevala svojih političnih pogledov.* (Svet24, 2016: 4)

*Ne nazadnje pa tudi ni nepomembno, kdo ob zajtrku in jutranji kavici prišepne predsedniku ZDA kakšen nasvet ali mnenje. To je za moža vedno obvezujoč premislek. Četudi o Piranskem zalivu, kot že pišejo naši prijatelji Hrvati.* (Mirošič, 2016a: 3; Mirošič, 2016b: 5)

V okviru postfeministične senzibilnosti je v lokalnih medijih zakon Melanije Trump interpretiran kot njena meritokratska zmaga, njen življenjski karierni dosežek, dokaz njene apolitične podjetniške zmožnosti in poštenega trdega dela. V idealni artikulaciji postfeminističnega ženskega sebstva so individualni uspeh, samotransformacija in samoznamčenje (Banet-Weiser, 2012; 2018a; 2018b) predstavljeni kot ključni vidiki ženskega subjekta. Tradicionalna parohialna ženskost se torej tu kaže hkrati s postfeminističnim diskurzom individualizma in individualnega opolnomočenja, kjer se posameznikovo življenje lomi na apolitični ideologiji osebne izbire in samoodločanja. Ali, kot ugotavlja R. Gill v svoji razpravi o postfeministični medijski kulturi (2017: 617), ta verzija feminizma je neverjetno vseprisotna v medijih, posebej prek psevdopsihološkega diskurza in promocije ženskega samozaupanja in samozavesti, stalnega dela »na sebi«, pozitivnega mišljenja, samozavesti in samoljubezni.

## Sklep

Velike transformacije, kot je npr. postsocializem s privatizacijo, marketizacijo in komodifikacijo in splošnim procesom redistribucije javnega bogastva, vedno pomenijo kršitev percipiranih moralnih pravic. Razprava o revščini in pomankanju na eni strani in tajkunstvu in privilegijih, korupciji in demonstrativni potrošnji elit na drugi strani je vseprisotna v javnem diskurzu vse od globalne ekonomske krize. Toda kljub temu je sam koncept družbenega razreda postopoma popolnoma izginil, ne le iz medijev in popularne kulture, temveč tudi iz družbenih ved in političnega diskurza.

Nadomestil ga je pojem izključenosti (glej Boltanski in Chiapello, 2005), tako da je pojem razreda znova v žarišču pozornosti šele zadnjih nekaj let. Za Vzhodno Evropo še bolj velja, da sta bili v kontekstu *neoliberalne doxe* sama razredna analiza in celo uporaba pojma razred vse do nedavnega politično neizgovorljivi in intelektualno marginalizirani. Še posebej je bilo potlačeno razumevanje razreda kot odnosne strukturne kategorije (Ost, 2015: 547) in s tem povezanih razmerij moči. Privatizacija in dramatična redistribucija »družbene lastnine« nista bili interpretirani kot razredna politika, temveč kot moralno prekrškarstvo, torej osebno »tajkunstvo«, »kraja«, ali kot »korupcija«. (glej Kalb, 2018: 307), medtem ko se je o revščini govorilo izključno znotraj moralističnega melodramatskega okvira. Razprava o družbenih razlikah tako v javnem diskurzu še vedno poteka kot afektivna »orgija občutkov« (Anker, 2014). Sistematična razredna politika akumulacije kapitala s pomočjo razlašanja in kapitalistične transformacije je torej interpretirana kot moralno vprašanje.

Popularna kultura in posebej komodificiran diskurz slave je kulturna praksa, ki prispeva k regresivnemu populističnemu imaginariju kot sestavljanju tradicionalnih tem, kot so družina, materinstvo, zanašanje nase, osebni uspeh in drugi elementi »iz repertoarja antikolektivizma« (Hall, 1979: 17). V tej vlogi ima pomembne implikacije za analizo sodobne formacije/trenutka in za moralno ekonomijo razreda v trenutni populistični konjunkturi. »Zvezdništvo« kot reprezentacijski žanr, kot diskurzivna praksa in diskurzivni učinek je tako konstitutivnega pomena za hegemonični boj in razredno dinamiko. Ima pomembne posledice za razumevanje individualnega sebstva, razumevanje kolektivitete in za razmerje med obema ter za način, na katerega se uprizarjata in definirata v specifičnem historičnem trenutku. Glede na to, da diskurz o subjektu in sebstvu vedno implicira vprašanje režima subjektivacije, ima opisovanje subjekta vedno predpisovalno vlogo: medijske reprezentacije Melanije Trump v popolnoma depolitiziranem okviru meritokratskih dosežkov torej ne moremo razumeti kot v protislovju z uprizarjanjem njene običajnosti in krepostne navadnosti. Nasprotno, obojemu je skupen isti performativen učinek, saj oboje pripomore k afirmaciji skupne nacionalne družbenosti, kjer so navadni ljudje v opoziciji z lažnimi elitami, toda v kulturni harmoniji z zaslužnimi.

Utemeljenost te govornice na regresivno populističnem momentu in etnonacionalizmu je najbolj vidna v nenehnem impliciranju drugosti (nesposobne lokalne elite) in simulaciji kritike ter v postopku esencializacije, torej na izključujoči etnični opredelitvi zamišljene »mi-skupnosti« (glej Gebhardt, 2019). Dvojnost, ki je vzpostavljena med zaslužnimi in nezaslužnimi elitami, tistimi, ki jim njihov status privoščimo, in tistimi, ki ga niso vredni, torej konstrukcija dela elite kot moralno zaslužne in torej kot »izjemnih, toda običajnih ljudi«, je temeljni kamen populizma. Učinkuje kot mistifikacija neenakosti in

predstavlja neoliberalno reartikulacijo razrednih razlik kot problema izključenosti. Razredni odnosi so v kontekstu te neoliberalne depolitizacije razlik in regresivnega populizma, tematizirani zgolj kot moralni problem, »razdeljeni narod« pa je pri tem ponovno prevladujoči diskurzivni trop. Diskurz zvezdnitva in naš posebni primer Melanije Trump torej predstavlja diskurzivno prakso legitimiranja obstoječih razrednih razmerij in s tem legitimiranja radikalne redistribucije javnega bogastva v postsocializmu in hkrati spodbujanje »protonacionalnega« sentimenta (Hobsbawm, 1990), ki ga je mogoče organizirati v podporo desničarskega populizma.

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## POSTIMPERIALNI PATRIARHAT IN KARNEVALESKNA PERIFERIJA: MELANIA TRUMP V TRANSNACIONALNI JAVNOSTI\*\*

*Povzetek. Članek obravnava recepcijo prve dame Melanie Trump v ameriškem in slovenskem javnem prostoru. Analiza v prvem delu temelji na razčlenitvi medijskih upodobitev v reviji The New Yorker. V drugem delu se ukvarja z odzivi v slovenski javnosti s posebnim poudarkom na dveh spletnih portalih (siol.si in delo.si). Temeljna ugotovitev primerjave je, da v ameriškem kontekstu prevladuje distribuiranje medijskih podob Melanie Trump kot naturalizirane prve dame s koreninami na socialističnem Vzhodu. V slovenskem prostoru je dejstvo etnične pripadnosti predmet prisvajanja v nacionalno fantazijo, ki, nasprotno, utrjuje predstavo o razvezi s socialistično preteklostjo, pri čemer pa se, kot pokaže primer postavitve kipa v rojstni Sevnici, kažejo tudi poskusi destabiliziranja dihotomije center-periferija. Študija si na podlagi teh dvoumnih odzivov zastavlja raziskovalno vprašanje usode simbolnega materinstva v dobi transnacionalizacije sodobnih družb.*

*Ključni pojmi: Melania Trump, prva dama, postsocializem, nacionalizem, spol, Vzhod*

### Uvod

Ko je 20. januarja 2017 Donald Trump z zaprisego postal petinštirideseti predsednik ZDA, je z njim na prizorišče Bele hiše vstopila tudi prva dama Melania Trump. Melania Trump, kot piše na uradni spletni strani Bele hiše, je »edina prva dama, ki je postala naturalizirana državljanka ZDA«. Pred njo je bila deloma tujega porekla Louisa Adams; soproga predsednika Johna Quincyja Adamsa je bila rojena v Londonu ameriškemu trgovcu in Angležinji, a ji v zgodovinopisju Bele hiše malokdo pripisuje status tujke – ali migrantke; omenja se jo kot prvo prvo damo, ki je bila rojena zunaj

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ZDA. Melania Trump, po drugi strani, je zaznamovana s svojim slovenskim etničnim poreklom. V ZDA je prišla kot Melania Knauss in se z delovno vizo do poroke s Trumpom preživljala kot fotomodel. Četudi jo ameriški mediji že med predsedniško kampanjo opisujejo kot »tujko, ki je očitno brezбриžna do svoje domovine« (Collins, 2016: 4), ostaja njeno tujstvo predmet javne pozornosti. V prvem delu članek analizira medijske upodobitve tega »tujstva«, pri čemer v ospredje postavlja objave v reviji *The New Yorker*.

Medtem ko v ZDA etnična identiteta prve dame vzbuja javno nelagodje, v Sloveniji sproži valovanje navdušenja. Tudi tu novinarska peresa zaznavajo, da je za Melanio Trump Slovenija »izbrisana datoteka« (Mlakar, 2018), a to ne izniči upov, kaj vse lahko ameriška Prva dama prinese Sloveniji. Vrstijo se izrazi nacionalnega ponosa in sestavlja se ekonomija trženja njenega imena. Medtem ko ameriška javnost prvo damo opazuje skozi lečo previdnosti do njene tujosti, se v Sloveniji množijo pričakovanja, da bo »slovenska nevesta« v Beli hiši deželo postavila na svetovni zemljevid politične, kulturne in ekonomske veljave. V drugem delu obravnavam to medijsko fascinacijo s podrobnejšo obravnavo izbranih primerov objav na spletnih portalih siol.si in delo.si.

Dihotomna percepcija prve dame Melanie Trump sproža sociološko zanimivo vprašanje oblikovanja nacionalnih imaginarijev, ki ga poganjajo sile globalizacije in ženske migracije. Raziskovalno vprašanje te analize je, kakšna je pri tem vloga »simbolnega materinstva«, ki naj bi bila ključna za reprodukcijo nacij v dobi modernosti; in kako se umešča v širšo razpravo o usodi zahodne modernosti v transnacionalnem krožišču ženskega reproduktivnega dela. Metodološko se študija opira na vizualno in diskurzivno analizo po metodi medijskih uokvirjanj, ki jo dopolnim s primerjalnim okvirom dveh nacionalnih kontekstov. Ugotovitve obravnavam v luči teorije belega patriarhata, to je rasne in spolne pogodbe, ki, tako trdim, v postimperialnih konstelacijah prevzema vlogo ohranjanja starih hierarhij centra in periferije.

## Melania Trump kot prva dama

Funkcija prve dame je v ZDA neformalna. Njena vloga predvideva aktivnosti pretežno ceremonialne narave; zgodovinarji jo opisujejo kot mahačo silhueto, predsedniški »dekor« ali »gostiteljico v Beli hiši« (Boyd Caroli, 2010; Loizeau, 2015; Mayo, 2000; O'Connor, Nye in Van Assendelft, 1996; Watson, 2014). Scharrer in Bissell (2000: 81) ji namenita mesto »predsednikovega ornamentalnega spremstva«. Razpon njihovih aktivnosti v javnem življenju lahko v resnici precej variira: lahko so »graciozne gostiteljice« (Lady Washington), pa tudi upravnice in konzervatorke Bele hiše (Caroline Harrison, Jackie Kennedy); sopotnice v kampanjah (Barbara Bush, Betty

Ford, Hillary Clinton, Michelle Obama); tihe zaupnice in svetovalke (Abigail Adams, Dolley Madison, Nancy Reagan) (Watson, 2014). Kadar se odločijo za vidnejše javno udejstvovanje, so jim odmerjene – z izjemo Eleanor Roosevelt, ki je prva in doslej edina vpeljala tedenske tiskovne konference, s katerimi je promovirala svoje politično delo (Flint, 2011: 120) – »mehke« socialne politike in humanitarizem – obnavljajoč predpostavko, da jim ženska senzitivnost služi bolje pri teh vprašanjih kot pri vojaških ali ekonomskih zadevah (Scharer in Bissell, 2000: 57–58).

Melania Trump ustreza predstavam o prvi dami ZDA le kratek čas. Hišna novinarka revije *The New Yorker* Jia Tolentino (2017: 2) jo v zgodnjih dneh opiše kot osebo, »ki uteleša vse, kar večina pričakuje od prve dame: nasmeh, lepe obleke, neprikrito ženskost, negrozečo avro«. Nikoli ne prestopa svojih meja; njena kampanja »Bodi najboljši« (*Be Best*), ki se posveča »socialnemu, emocionalnemu in psihičnemu zdravju« otrok, ustreza predstavam o »mehki politiki«. Zelo kmalu po (zakasneli) selitvi v Belo hišo, ko se, oblečena v zeleno jakno blagovne znamke Zara, z napisom »I really don't care, do U?«, odpravi v Teksas k migrantskim otrokom, ločenim od svojih staršev, in nekaj mesecev zatem sama odpotuje v Egipt, narašča dvom, ali nemara ne spodkopava predsednikove moči. Frank Bruni v članku »Melania Trump bi bila lahko naša največja prva dama« opozarja, da »smo se nemara preuranili« o oceni Trumpove soproge; kampanja proti sovražnemu govoru na spletu in hvalnica bogati afriški kulturi sta nemara izražanje politične etike, drugačne od predsednikove (Bruni, 2018). Drugi komentar pri istem časopisu analizira, da je sporočilo Zarine jakne morda izraz »človeške frustracije v ozadju popolno zglijane kulise« (Friedman, 2018). Ko se odloči za blagovno znamko Gucci, znano po podpori pravici žensk do splava, se ugiba, ali se s tem ne zoperstavlja moževemu nasprotnemu stališču (Friedman, 2019a). Poudarek na oblačilnih izbirah ni naključen: »modna diplomacija«, kot to opiše Young, predpostavlja nepisano obveznost slavne soproge, da »z izborom oblačil in stila dopolnjuje in krepi podobo vodilnega moža tako na domačem prizorišču kot v svetu« (Young, 2011: 17–19). Sčasoma komentatorji sklenejo, da imamo v primeru Melanie Trump opraviti s »smrtjo modne diplomacije« (ibid.) Prva dama je prej ko ne »popolno telo, na katerega obesiš blagovno znamko« (Collins, 2016: 4), brezbrizno do političnih sporočil: »njeno sporočilo je, da ni sporočila« (Friedman, 2020). Da v Egiptu nosi beli čeladasti klobuk, simbol kolonialnih časov, je v resnici izraz nevednosti – in, tako kot njen mož, te nevednosti niti ne želi skriti niti odpraviti (Rogers, 2018). Naposled je le »modni« podaljšek predsednikovega vladanja. Oblači se, kot se vede Donald Trump, brez diplomatskih sporočil, neurejeno, osupljivo, vpadljivo – in politično nekorektno.

Zasuk v percepciji razkriva globlje nelagodje. V nadaljevanju potujem po sledi tega nelagodja prek časovne analize poročanja revije *The New Yorker*.

V vzorec so zajeti tiskani in elektronski izvodi od maja 2016 do decembra 2018. Revijo sem izbrala iz dveh razlogov: zaradi očitnega uredniškega interesa za Melanio Trump in ker se Melania Trump, sama ali v tandemu z Donaldom Trumpom, pogosto pojavlja v karikaturah revije. Ta drugi aspekt mi bo v pomoč pri primerjalni analizi lokalne slovenske »karikature« prve dame v drugem delu članka. Analiza temelji na metodološkem pristopu teorije reprezentacije, ki vključuje vizualno in narativno-diskurzivno analizo izbrane besedilne ali slikovne enote (Hall in dr., 2013), ter na metodi »medijskega uokvirjanja«. Pippa Norris (1997: 2) medijske (novičarske) okvire opredeli kot »interpretativne strukture, ki določene dogodke umestijo v širši kontekst«, in sicer tako, da jih uredijo v zgodbe, ki dogodkom, dejanjem in ljudem v njih priskrbijo pomen. Pri tem se poslužujejo znanih družbenih kategorij in ideoloških namigov, na primer: ko mediji poročajo o ameriških predsedniških volitvah, je mogoče zaznati medijske okvire, kot so »leto ženske« na volitvah 1992, »leto jeznih mladih mož« leta 1994. Kot je razvidno s tega seznama, okviri raznolike vsebine poročanja poenotijo v vodilno pripoved, ki usmerja pomen. Ko govorimo o medijskem uokvirjanju Melanie Trump, je v središču podoba, kot bo razvidno v nadaljevanju, ki jo revija pomensko utrdi s tropom: »nema kraljica« (Waldman, 2018).

## Nema kraljica

Melania si »pridrži pravo, da ostaja tiho«, zapišejo pri *The New Yorkerju* v novembrski izdaji revije v prvem letu Trumpovega predsedovanja (Tolentino, 2017: 2). Njena »zadržana osebnost«, ki deluje, kot »da bi bila replika svoje prejšnje osebe«, je nemara rezultat tega, da je »večino svojega odraslega življenja preživela kot vizualni objekt« (ibid.). Nemost bi lahko bila preostanek prejšnje kariere v modni industriji, toda hkrati ta »poklicna deformacija« otežuje prepoznavanje, kdo v resnici je prva dama. Je »lepa ujetnica ali zlobna kraljica« (ibid.)? Garderoba soproge je močno prizorišče političnega izjavljanja, medtem ko se od nje pričakuje, da je tiho, v študiji *Power Dressing* piše Robb Young (2011). A kod molčečnosti prve dame, ki ga udejanja Melania Trump, ne sporoča skladnosti z normo; signalizira uganko identitete.

Revija za Melanio Trump uporablja vrsto nelagodnih označevalcev: »papirnata punčka«, »ledena kraljica«, »obraz, izklesan iz gline«. Katy Waldman (2018: 3) jo opiše kot »avatar praznine, molčečo kraljico«; je kot »sramežljiv, prikupen otrok, ki iz ozadja opazuje, kako ga bo nekdo napadel« (ibid.). Naučena, da je pretežno »vizualni objekt«, ki ga prežema »neprijetna prevleka igrače ali robota«, deluje kot nedejaven subjekt, »tuje žensko bitje«, katerega »zavestna pasivnost je nemara njen najmočnejši izraz delovanja« (ibid.). Delno so te lastnosti povezane s kariero fotomodela, ki jo je naučila,

da »praznost predstavlja kot estetiko« (Tolentino, 2017: 2). Jia Tolentino (2017: 1) prenos tega poklicnega kapitala povzema v treh korakih: »Najprej fotomodel, nato tretja žena milijarderja in sedaj v glavnem nema prva dama.« V drugih člankih je opisana kot »iskreno apatična«, freudovsko »nedomača (uncanny)«, »tiha«, »dvojniki«, »enigmatična prisotnost«. Vsi ti opisi se zgotostijo v podobo subjekta, katerega telo in glas sta zamrznjena, obdana s praznino pomena.

Tudi karikature Melanii Trump niso bolj prijazne. Karikature so provokativni teksti; kadar se lotijo bogatih in vplivnih, je njihov imperativ, da smešijo. Edwards in Chen proučujeta karikature Barbare Bush in Hillary Clinton v vlogah prve dame (2016: 370); ugotavljata, da je bil cilj karikatur »razkrievati dinamike spolnih vlog, patriarhalne kulture in ideologije«. Kadar se zdi, da je moški del v paru »šibak«, karikature uporabijo »simbolno kaznovanje, tako da transformirajo ženski del«: v primeru Barbare Bush tako, da so jo prikazovale kot »boksarja ... v ringu«, ki mora stopiti na mesto svojega šibkega in neodločnega moža; v primeru Hillary Clinton, kjer je tarča njena politična ambicioznost, ki slabi moč predsednika, tako da jo demonizirajo ali »utišajo« (2016: 380–382).

V primeru Melanie Trump velja obratno: karikature poskušajo iz nje izvleči tisto, kar je utišano. V karikaturi z naslovom »Melaniina božična drevesa« (30. 11. 2018) Ivana Ehlersa so nanizane tri vrste dreves, prekritih v rdečo prevleko z napisi: »I really don't care, do U?«, »Nazaj hočem svoje življenje«, »Bodi najboljši«, »Sem bogata eh ne eh ne odpuščena«, »Eh, tako neumna«, »Eh, vse vas sovražim« (»Ur, I hate U all«). V karikaturi (9. 5. 2018) z naslovom »Predsednik in prva dama razmišljata o svojih pobudah« sta narisana s hrbtom drug proti drugemu pred tablama z napisi »Bodi najboljši« (Melania) in »Jaz najboljši« (Donald). V karikaturi »Melaniine nepriemerne pete« (30. 8. 2017) se nahaja merilnik, ki beleži razliko v višini med Donaldom Trumpom in čevlji prve dame. V drugi karikaturi se sprašuje: »Ali naj si izberem modri ton ali gluhi ton?« (22. 6. 2018) Ellis Rosen upodobi Melanio z dvema kosoma oblačil v rokah, modrim in zelenim, slednji z napisom: »I really don't care, do U?« Karikature Melanio Trump prikazujejo kot osebo, ki ji manjkata inteligenca in sočutje; prevladujeta nevednost in ničevost. Kot ob škandalu z Zarino jakno z napisom komentira Troy Patterson (2018: 2): »Nositi oblačila je njena prva obrt«; oblačila, ki si jih je nadela v kontekstu svojega moža in njegovih nehumanih obravnav imigrantov ter vseh drugih, pravi, oblačenje približa slogu »fašizma s hitro modo«. V članku »Zgledna Američanka« Collins (2016: 6) presoja, da je prva dama »ponotranjila vse vidike Donaldove kulture: njegov ahistoricizem, njegovo žolčnost; njegove lažne dihotomije med morilskimi izobčenci in zaslužnimi državljani, soprogami, ki nič ne zahtevajo in ne tečnarijo«.

## Mati imigrantka

Če je politična funkcija prve dame v njeni podobi spremljevalne ornamentalne silhuete, pa je njena simbolna funkcija bistveno bolj osrediščena. Že v času ustanovnih očetov je soprogam predsednikov ZDA pripadlo mesto ustanovnih mater. Bile so »simbol nacije v najčistejši obliki«, trdi popularni publicist (Flint, 2011: 30). Kot biološke matere svojih otrok so kolektivni skupnosti ponujale dokaz o heteroseksualnosti in maskulinosti očeta nacije in sodelovale so v simbolni reprodukciji »heteroseksualnega družinskega konteksta nacionalnega patriarhata« (Edwards in Chen, 2000: 379). Do Michelle Obama je bila idealizirana prva mati izpeljanka bele Američanke srednjega razreda. Kot v ameriški družbi nasploh, kjer je bil ženskam rasnih in etničnih manjšin dostop do simbolne reprezentacije materinstva zaprt (Nakano Glenn, 1994), je tudi delo simbolne nacionalne reprodukcije lahko opravljala le materinska figura, katere biografski izvor je bil etnično, rasno in razredno »nekompromitiran«. Ob boku ji od konca 19. stoletja stoji »mati izseljencev« – Kip svobode, ki se na vhodu v domovino pridruži simbolnemu delu v podobi ritualne ikone (pre)poroda imigrantov – tujcev, ki s potovanjem mimo njenega vznožja opuščajo stare vezi (etničnega) pripadanja, da bi lahko vstopili v politično telo bodočih naturaliziranih ameriških državljanov (Berlant, 1991).

In če je mati sama imigrantka? V dveh člankih, enem objavljenem med predsedniško kampanjo in drugem leto dni po prihodu Trumpov v Belo hišo, revija obnovi biografijo Melanie Trump – od njenega rojstva v nekdanji Jugoslaviji, kariere fotomodela, pridobitve delovne vize H-1B do poroke z Donaldom Trumpom, kar ji je prineslo ameriško državljanstvo. »Velja omeniti,« zapiše Collins, da je »Donald Trump poročen z imigrantko«, ki je odraščala v komunističnem blokovskem naselju v Sevnici (2016: 1–2). Če bi uporabili retoriko Donalda Trumpa v boju proti vizam H-1B, dopolni, bi morali skleniti, da sodi Melania Trump med tiste začasne tuje delavce, ki so »uvoženi od zunaj z jasnim namenom, da za nižje plačilo nadomestijo ameriške delavce« (Collins, 2016: 1). Če bo Trump izvoljen za predsednika, še opozori avtorica, bo Melania Knauss (sic!) s priimkom svojega moža »izjema v moževi politiki nativizma«.

Glavna težava imigrantskega statusa prve dame, ki jo zazna Collins, je, da Melania Trump, kot je razbrati iz njenega govora, ni povsem opustila slovenskega jezika (Collins, 2016: 9). Tudi Tolentino v svojem članku sumi, da Melania Trump najverjetneje igra vlogo vizualnega objekta – zaradi »glavobola prevajanja«. »Nema kraljica« je nemara molčeča zato, ker »angleščina ni njen prvi niti drugi, morda niti ne tretji jezik« (Tolentino, 2017: 1). Naglas, ki ga zaznavajo tudi drugi mediji, prenaša na svojega sina Barrona. »Najbrž mora biti Donaldu nenavadno, da ima večjezičnega sina, ki govori angleško s



slovenskim naglasom« (Collins, 2016: 9). Collins spomni na nastop družine pri ameriškem TV-voditelju Larryju Kingu leta 2010, ko ta zaprepasčeno ugotovi: »On [Barron] govori z naglasom?« Melania Trump je izpolnila nalogo prve dame, da poskrbi za nasledstvo, toda z neprijetnim zaznamkom tujosti. Kot sledi v nadaljevanju, je ta tujost dodatno zatemnjena s senco vzhodnjaštva.

## V iskanju postsocialističnega Vzhoda

V ameriški spolni slovnici nacionalizma je jezikovna nekompetentnost opazna prepreka v oblikovanju vezi pripadanja. Kot poudarjajo Forrester, Zaborowska in Gapova (2004), nezmožnost tekočega komuniciranja v zahodnem jeziku, posebej angleškem, pomeni izolacijo in »notranji eksil«. Obremenitev jezika z akcentom, ko gre za osebe z območja nekdanje socialistične Evrope, konotira vzhodnjaštvo. Trdost in okornost v izgovorjavi aludirata na subjekt iz komunistične preteklosti, zamrznjen v zgodovini – kakor je zamrznjena družba, ki ji je pripadal. Vzhodni naglas je zaznamek družbenega reda in kulture, ki so ju pojmi modernosti in napredka obšli.

V karikaturi Paula Rudnicka (2016) lik Melanie Trump piše v svoj dnevnik: »Včasih si želim, da bi bila spet nazaj v Sloveniji; medtem ko bi kot fotomodel razkazovala jopice iz poliestra, bi naši kozi pripovedovala: 'Nekoč bom odšla v Ameriko in poročila bogatega, čednega moža.'« »V iskanju doma iz otroštva Melanie Trump« Vendela Vida (2018) pri isti reviji potuje v Sevnico. Po enem dnevu potovanja v spremstvu svoje družine sklene, da je Slovenija »lepa dežela, skorajda kot Švica, smo se strinjali«. V Sevnici domuje velika tovarna obutve, kar avtorico napelje na še eno primerjavo: »To tovarniško mesto se ne razlikuje dosti od mest v ZDA, ki so volila za Trumpa.« Ko se kasneje družina odpravi na iskanje restavracije, opažajo napol opuščene kraje: »Hodili smo mimo pekarnice (zaprto), lekarne (zaprto) in svetlo zelenega kegljišča (v zapiranju) ... Na koncu smo pristali v restavraciji brez imena, le z znakom, ki je prikazoval jedilni pribor.« V notranjosti, nasprotno, pa se gnete »absurdno veliko« ljudi, pari srednjih let, ki »si delijo predjedi«, in dvajsetletnice, ki, nagnjene vznak, kadijo cigarete: »Zdi se, da v Sloveniji vsi kadijo« – ne brezbrizno kot v Franciji, avtorica dodaja antropološki detajl, pač pa zavzeto, »s smotrom« (2018: 5).

Kartografsko premapiranje majhnega mesta na državo implicira kulturo, ki je hkrati avtentično tuja in prazna lastnega označenca. Opisati jo je mogoče le prek primerjav z drugimi: Švico, ZDA, Francijo. Edina izjema je, ko se popotnica zazre v travo s tako močno barvo zelene, »da sem morala sneti svoja očala, da bi se prepričala, ali vidim prav« (2018: 2). V spisu »Kako sem našla Vzhodno Evropo« Andalu Borcila (2004: 54) opisuje, kako Zahod po padcu Berlinskega zidu odkriva vzhodno Evropo. Ta se pojavlja kot »motna«, »nejasna«, »negibna« – teritorij, ki se sicer sestavlja na novo, a pri tem

črpa iz preostankov enobarvnega režima in zgodovine hladne vojne, ki še naprej zaznamujejo njeno podobo in identiteto. Ta novinarski potopis vsebuje sorodne predstave o kraju, ki je obtičal v zgodovini. Ko pred vhomom v restavracijo družina sreča »tri dolgonoge najstnice«, se avtorica ne more izogniti misli, kako »tudi ta dekleta, kot Melania, iščejo pot odtod« (2018: 4). V restavraciji, v dialogu z natakarico, jo podobno prešine, »če tudi ona ne sanja o drugačnem življenju« (2018: 5). Mesto mladim dekletom očitno nima ponuditi ničesar – ne premore opore ne identitetam ne ambiciji – do meje »absurdne« skrajnosti amerikaniziranega menija, ki gostom ponuja »top shit Burger« in mehiške jedi; tista tranzicijska »puščava postsocializma« (Horvat in Štiks, 2016) pač, ki daje razlog za kajenje.

### Beli patriarhat

Ko Katharina Wiedlack (2018) obravnava skeč »Melanianade« popularnega ameriškega TV-programa *Saturday Night Live*, izpostavlja komično vizualno reprezentacijo Melanie Trump kot utelesitve negativnega stereotipa vzhodne Evropejke. Funkcija te reprezentacije, pravi, je ustvariti podobo bele Druge, ki služi utrjevanju protipola emancipirane, izobražene in feministično ozaveščene bele Američanke. Vzhodne Evropejke so nastanjene v predstavi o še ne polno realiziranih subjektih, so »surovo gradivo«, ki je šele v procesu formiranja po zgledu zahodnih standardov. Melania Drugost izraža v jezikovnem naglaševanju in v dejstvu, da je ujetnica toksične maskuliniteti soproga, kar jo zadržuje na mestu podrazreda. Je Druga, ki si sicer prizadeva zmuzniti se skozi reže rasnega prepoznavanja, a to lahko stori samo kot »prevarantka«, ki se znajde na poziciji moči, kar je zaradi vzhodnoevropskih vezi nelegitimno. Njena vzhodnjaška Drugost ji ne dovoli polnega vstopa v »belo elito«. Doseže lahko le položaj seksualizirane »žene trofeje«, ki ji vez s socialističnim Vzhodom »preprečuje, da bi postala polno moderna progresivna ameriška državljanka« (2018: 1069).

Komično upodobitev Melanie Trump lahko razumemo v funkciji negativne projekcije, ki utrdi dominacijo nacionalno progresivne, liberalno-feministične identitete bele Američanke. Rasno-orientalistični pogled »na svet tam čez«, ki ga opisuje *The New Yorker*, je prikazan kot oddaljen od ekonomske prosperitete in vrednot Zahoda; kulturna razdalja in razlika okrepita hierarhijo civilizacijske superiornosti slednjega. V tej luči lažje razumemo napore komičnih upodobitev Melanie Trump kot kmečke dekline, ki sanja o begu na Zahod. Rasializacija Vzhodne Evropejke, pravi Wiedlack, poteka prek »materializacije vmesne pozicije med dvema poloma, diferenciacije med naravo in kulturo, med surovim mesom barbarskega Drugega in sofisticiranim intelektom civiliziranega individua«. Zato je na poti v kulturo ta ženska predstavljena v telo blaga: je moževa pridobitev,

namenjena razkazovanju seksualizirane erotične Druge, a brez lastne identitete.

Lahko pa vidimo to karikaturu tudi v funkciji odziva na bolj zapleteno razmerje, ki zadeva usodo zahodnega belega patriarhata. Sodobni konteksti transnacionalizacije in ženske migracije razstavljajo moderno paradigmo nacije kot zamejene skupnosti, z varnimi razmejitvami med »zunaj« in »znotraj«. Kot poudarjajo postkolonialne feministične avtorice, moderne politične skupnosti na Zahodu vzniknejo kot rezultat specifičnega zgodovinskega upravljanja z etnično, rasno in spolno razliko, vpisano v teritorializirani prostor z utrjenimi mejami (Collins Hill, 1994; Kaplan, Alarcon in Moallem, 1999; Shome, 2011). Institucionalizacija modernega nacionalnega patriarhata je ospoljena in rasializirana pripoved: ženske iz podrejenih rasnih, etničnih in razrednih skupin po scenariju hegemonnega (belega) nacionalizma ne premorejo ne bioloških (biološki rasizem) ne kulturnih (kulturni rasizem) kapacitet, s katerimi bi prispevale k vitalnosti nacije. V modernem patriarhalnem načrtu sta spol in nacionalizem povezani kategoriji državljanstva in pripadnosti, belo materinstvo v dejanskih gospodinjstvih ali v simbolnih projekcijah »nacije kot družine« pa rasni dodatek k slavi nacionalne reprodukcije.

Sodobni procesi ekonomske transformacije in globalizacije so žensko, zaprto med stenami gospodinjstva in družine, naredili za lik iz preteklosti. Ne samo da so belke srednjega razreda v zadnjih petdesetih letih zapustile neplačano gospodinjstvo; neoliberalna preobrazba socialne države in politične ekonomije je ustvarila novi tip gospodinjstva, poseljen s transnacionalnimi materami in tujo domačo pomočjo. V moderno spolno pogodbo so vstopile migrantke. Razpad kolonialnega sveta, vključujoč Sovjetsko zvezo, je razkril rasializirano pripoved univerzalnosti materinstva (Glenn, 1994). Medtem ko neoliberalna biopolitika nacije razstavlja socialno kompozicijo belega doma srednjega razreda, pa se postmoderni nacionalni diskurz še vedno opira na artikuliranje družbenih odnosov v spolnih pojmovnikih. Pri tem si tokrat pomaga z vpoklicem »nacionalnih in transnacionalnih ikon in diskurzov« (Alarcón et al., 1999: 15). Belke na pozicijah moči vstopajo na globalno prizorišče kot posvojiteljice otrok iz tretjega sveta, multikulturne matere (Shome, 2011) ali kot misijonarke v simbolnem materinskem delu. Kot razlaga Raka Shome, ženske s politično in kulturno močjo postimperialnega Zahoda vstopajo v biopolitični scenarij nacije v trenutku, ko se ta spopada z ranljivostjo svoje spolne in rasne konstitucije.

*Naj gre za belke v mednarodni diplomaciji, njihove podobe v diskurzih o človekovih pravicah ali na civilizacijskih misijah v »razvijajočem se« svetu, kulturni imperializem Zahoda potrebuje rasializirano in ospoljeno domačnost bele ženskosti, s katero uprizarja svojo nacionalno maskulnost. (Shome, 2011: 333)*

Ženskam imperialne sile je dodeljena nova vloga; namesto zavezujoče biološke reprodukcije in varovanja družinskega doma sodelujejo v rasnih in kulturnih projektih izrisovanja kartografij postimperialnega sveta. V tem kontekstu pa lahko razumemo tudi nelagodje, ki ga proizvajata prva dama s koreninami v tem nekdanjem koloniziranem svetu socialističnega imperija. Tukaj si spet lahko pomagamo z njeno retoriko oblačil. Zarino jakno, ki jo je nosila na obisku v taborišču za migrantske otroke, v svoji militantni zeleni barvi preberemo kot uprizarjanje lika rasne in maskulinizirane varuhinje nacije. Na svoji poti v Afriko, kjer je nosila repliko belega pokrivala kolonialnega gospodarja, smo priča podobnemu razkazovanju imperialne moči. Prve dame so bile v preteklosti že vpletene v scenarij udejanja Bele hiše kot imperialnega domovanja nacije (Mayo, 2000). Collins v *The New Yorkerju* Melanio Trump opiše kot »pasivno, a imperialno«. Elliot Ross (2018) pri Al Jazeera dodaja, »najbrž je težko razumeti, zakaj se je prva dama odločila za kostum belega kolonialista v Keniji leta 2018«; razen če, kot dodaja, »tudi razumemo, da čelada predstavlja ne samo kolonialnost, temveč tudi belost«.

Toda škandal, ki ga povzroči Melania Trump, je toliko bolj neznosen, kolikor je neznosna njena nepolna belost. Melania Trump namreč ni prava prva dama, temveč vlogo prve dame igra. Je oponaševalka, toda kot rasno ne povsem ustrezna, kot poudarja Wiedlack, to lahko počne le s pretiravanjem in površinsko. Je plagiatorica: dobesedno – ko na Republikanski nacionalni konvenciji govor prepíše po govoru Michelle Obama – in v razredno-rasnem smislu. Je belka, pripadajoča novemu razredu bogatih imigrantov/tk in v tem oziru sprejemljivejša od temnopoltih migrantk; toda obenem kot fotomodel z nekdanje socialistične dežele, dedinja »kulture goljufanja v vzhodnoevropskih šolah« (kot njeno dejanje pojasni *Washington Post*, cit. v Wiedlack, 2018) – torej subjekt dvomljive morale in značaja, ki mimikrijo imperialne moči pretvori v modno burkaštvo.

### Melania Trump in periferni kič

Medtem ko se Zahod še naprej zanaša na svojo razdaljo do Vzhoda, pravijo Forrester, Zaborowska in Gapova (2004: 17), Vzhod zagotavlja razliko tako, da ponotrani svojo manjvrednost. Po padcu Berlinskega zidu se je za Vzhod oblikovala predstava o evropskem Drugem. Opirajoč se na bogato tradicijo razpravljanja o Balkanu se je tega Drugega posebej na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije povežalo z etničnimi konflikti, divjaštvom in nazadnjaštvom (Čolović, 2015; Bjelić in Savić, 2005; Todorova, 2001). Slovenija se je kot nekdanja jugoslovanska republika otepala te dediščine z argumentom, da je bila pod Titom žrtev prisilne balkanizacije ter da v resnici sodi v družčino srednjeevropskih narodov. S prihodom Melanie Trump v Belo hišo se je obnovilo upanje, da bo Slovenija pridobila vidnost na mednarodnem

prizorišču ter da bo naposled, po dolgih letih zamenjevanja s Slovaško, priznana kot povsem zahodna dežela. V preostanku razprave analiziram zapise, objavljene na slovenskih spletnih portalih siol.net in delo.si med januarjem 2017 in decembrom 2019.

Da bo »Melania postavila Slovenijo na svetovni zemljevid«, so po poročanju medijev upali v rojstni Sevnici; takšni so bili tudi širši medijski upi. Ko je Melania Trump v svojem govoru na republikanski konvenciji omenila, da je bila rojena »v majhni, lepi, tedaj še komunistični deželi v srednji Evropi«, njena referenca na geografsko lokacijo v medijih ni ostala neopažena. Melania nas postavlja »v srednjo Evropo in sočasno oddaljuje od Balkana«, se je glasil zapis na portalu siol.net (Žužek, 2017). V članku avtor obnovi faze v zgodovini, ko so »nas« različni svetovni voditelji, od papeža Janeza Pavla II. do Billa Clintona, globalni mediji, kot je *The New York Times*, in pred tem srbski nacionalistični geografi poskusili potisniti v objem Balkanskega polotoka. Sedaj je najbrž vendarle jasno, da je Slovenija »doma pod Alpami in torej v srednji Evropi« (ibid.). Postati zahoden, piše Bjelić, pomeni »usvojiti zahodne vrednote in zahodne orientalistične stereotipe« (Bjelić, 2009: 490). Samokolonizirajoča gesta, izražena skozi frustracijo nad napačnim prepoznavanjem nacionalne identitete kot balkanske, utrdi orientalistično-balkanski princip, kamor, paradokсно, kot poudarja vrsto avtorjev (prim. npr. Čolović, 2015), sodi tudi samo zanikanje pripadanja Balkanu.

Lokalno trženje Melanie Trump kot blagovne znamke sodi v soroden sklop samokoloniziranja. Linija »First lady« (čokoladni izdelki, salama in vino), Melaniina torta, pita, palačinke, čaj in copati (Intihar, 2017), turistični proizvod »First lady village« z ogledom rojstne hiše in šole, ki jo je obiskovala prva dama (Lončar, 2019), ustvarjajo periferni zemljevid patriotičnega samopodrejanja slavni podobi. Teorija trženja nacije kot blagovne znamke (*nation-branding*) ugotavlja, da so se nekdanje socialistične države znašle v kontradiktornih politikah reprezentiranja. Po eni strani si morajo za samopromocijo izbirati tarče, ki so že predmet globalnega kroženja stereotipov o Vzhodu (npr. Romunija kot dežela Drakule, Kazahstan kot Boratova dežela); po drugi strani pa s tem tudi ohranjajo položaj dežel, ki so brezupno v zaostanku za civiliziranim svetom (Bardan in Imre, 2011: 169). Ker državam na območjih razpadlih sovjetskega in jugoslovanskega imperija manjka blagovnih znamk, ki bi bile prepoznavne na Zahodu, tako kot to velja za zahodne države z dolgo tradicijo globalnega trženja lastnih kultur in identitet, so prisiljene vstopiti v tekmovanje za prepoznavnost prek simbolov, za katere verjamejo, da imajo tržno vrednost. S tem ko pristanejo na znamenje po vnaprej predvidenih označevalcih nacionalne identitete, pa tudi »krepijo neoimperialne neenakosti med nacijami« (ibid.).

## Karnivaleskni smeh

Takšno samostereotipiziranje ne najde vselej harmoničnega sozvočja z lokalnim prebivalstvom. »Škandal« kipa Melanie, lesene skulpture, ki jo je na vhodu v Sevnico julija 2019 postavil ameriški umetnik v rezidenci v Sloveniji Brad Downey, dokumentira nelagodje. Kip, ki imitira prvo damo ob zaprisegi Donalda Trumpa, je po umetnikovi predlogi ročno izdelal lokalni rokodellec Aleš Župevc. Globalni mediji, CNN, BBC, Sky News, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, nemška RTL so objavili sliko lokalnega »poklona« prvi dami, imenovano tudi »strašilo« oz. Smrketa. Nacionalni *Reporter* je v postavitvi kipa zaznal nameren napad na podobo »Melanie in Trumpa« in deželi prinesel sramoto. Po pisanju časnika ima žalitev »politično ozadje«. »Nas Slovence pa še bolj potiska proti Moskvi, čeprav smo imeli že leta 1948, ko nas je Stalin izobčil iz svoje rdeče cerkve, zelo neprijetne izkušnje. Takrat so nam iz godlje, v katero so nas vsak po svoje potisnili Rusi in naši komunisti, pomagali Američani, iz katerih se sedaj norčujemo.« (Starič, 2019)

Ko države postsocialistične periferije uprizarjajo nacionalne identitete, se pogosto oprejo na estetiko kiča, ki hiperbolizira balkansko drugost. Kot to popisuje Ivan Ditchev (2016), si pri tem pogosto sposojajo pri pop ikonah zahodnega sveta: Bill Clinton v Prištini, Bruce Lee v Mostarju, Sylvester Stallone v Žitištvu v Srbiji, pa George Bush in Tina Turner, John Lennon, Elton John in Mick Jagger v Albaniji (2016: 101). Ta »skupna« raba simbolov slave služi kot ideološki »motor za pogajanje o geografski bližini zahodni Evropi« (2016: 94). Pri tem ostaja nejasno, ali imitatorji razumejo, celo namerno izigravajo dejstvo, da bolj ko pretiravajo, dlje od prepoznavnosti lastnega zahodnjaštva drivijo; ali so povsem nevedni o negativnih učinkih te estetike? Kip Melanie Trump lahko razumemo v luči kič nacionalizma, le da ta deluje v nasprotni smeri, stran od estetike slave in spektakla k uprizarjanju estetike »primitivcev«, umetnikov samoukov, ki se poskušajo približati duhu ljudskega in kulture po poti avtentičnega, neobdelanega stila neposrednosti materialov (les) in upodobitev (rokodelstvo z žago).

Učinek je podoben karnevalesknemu smehu. Bahtin karnevaleskno kulturo smeha opiše kot svobodno, sproščeno izražanje utopičnega drugega sveta, izražanje, ki je brez umetniških ambicij (2008: 11–13). V ospredju tega ustvarjanja »izhoda iz uradne življenjske ureditve« je materialno telesni princip, ki si sposoja pri grotesknem realizmu. Telo je hiperbolizirano do mere, da potešenje postane groteskno; zadovoljstvo se »poraja ob samem znižanju visokega« (ibid.: 304). Brad Downey je kip Melanie Trump pojasnil kot izdelek »burkaškega formalizma«, ki je »stil svobodne strategije in fluidnega prilagajanja situaciji« (PV, 2019). Karnivaleskna periferija je ustvarila svoj lastni poklon »slovenski prvi dami«, le da se ob tem, ko imitira medijsko



histerijo, umika v še eno enigmo Melanie Trump. Je ta tiha dama še en odliček nacionalnega kiča na postsocialistični periferiji; ali pa gre za dejanje ljudske transgresije, ustvarjenje v mednarodnem zavezništvu umetnosti in rokodelstva, ki s pomočjo estetike in identitete podeželskega primitivizma razvrednoti globalno slavo imperialne matere Zahoda?

## Sklep

V svoji raziskavi sem si zastavila vprašanje, kakšna je usoda simbolnega materinstva, ko ga uteleša tujka. Po opravljeni analizi je jasno, da je odgovor v primeru Melanie Trump povezan z izvorom v domovini s (pol)bele periferije. Ta izvor določa medijski metaokvir »neme kraljice«, ki ga njeni podobi nameni liberalni medij. Razšifriranje enigmatične tujosti prve dame, vstavljene na ozadje migrantke z Vzhoda, ne velja le za *The New Yorker*. Tudi drugi liberalni medijski programi, kot so *The Saturday Night Live* in *The Daily Show with Trevor Noah* (»Is Donald Trump Trying to Deport Melania«, 14. 8. 2019) ali *Borat II*, posnemajo njeno okorno izgovorjavo in izpostavljajo njen nekdanji poklic (negovorečega) fotomodela. Zasmehovanje glasu (kot naglasa) omogoči, da se podoba naseli v vodilno pripoved o transformaciji migrantke iz perifernega subjekta v imitacijo zahodnjakinje. Članki kot »Melaniina evolucija« v reviji *Time* (Rhodan, 2017) ali »Melania Trump: od majhnega mesta Slovenije do praga Bele hiše« (Horowitz, 2018) transformacijo opremijo z diskurzom napredovanja med dvema telesoma, telesom fotomodela in telesom prve dame, kot potovanje med dvema kultura. Le da transformacija nikoli ni povsem zaključena: »Saj še vedno ne zna govoriti angleško«, tvita Bette Midler ob njenem govoru na republikanski konvenciji 2020 in jo cinično poimenuje »ena srečna Slovenka«. Ko preuredi vrt pred Belo hišo, ji nekdanji novinar *The New York Timesa* očita »uničenje naše dediščine«. »Tokrat je prvič, ko sem zares besen, da je @FLOTUS tujka ... Nima pravice, da razstavlja našo zgodovino,« zapiše Kurt Eichenwald.

Na podlagi analize lahko odgovorim, da je usoda simbolne moči migrantke prve matere zapisana v sodobni, z ekonomsko globalizacijo povezani krizi belega patriarhata. Bela feminilnost je funkcionalno orodje v oblikovanju zahodnega patriarhalnega socio-družbenega reda: je »locus, na katerem se varujejo meje rase, spola, seksualnosti in nacionalnosti« (Shome, 2011). Vzhodnjaški etnični preostanek prve dame služi afirmaciji ideala. Potujevanje Melanie Trump, piše Wiedlack, je hkrati del boja za kulturno hegemonijo v ZDA. Kulturne vojne, ki potekajo med liberalnodemokratskimi in konservativnimi desnimi silami, zadevajo vprašanja rasne, spolne in seksualne identitete ameriške družbe. Paradokсно so prav liberalni mediji tisti, ki reafirmirajo konservativne ideje o superiorni nacionalni kulturi, s tem ko se poslužujejo rasializiranja in seksualiziranja njenega vzhodnjaštva. »Jopice iz poliestra«,



»koza« in »trava«, ki opredeljujejo njeno rojstno domovino, služijo temu, da z biografsko preteklostjo vzpostavljajo kulturno razdaljo med Vzhodom in Zahodom, med modernostjo in zaostalostjo, med pastoralnim deklinštvom in odraslo (emancipirano) ženskostjo belega Zahoda.

Pogled na predmoderno migrantko z Vzhoda igra vlogo v ohranjanju kulturnih hierarhij. Na postsocialistični periferiji se po principu (samo) orientaliziranja podoba prve dame mobilizira v funkciji izražanja kulturne superiornosti (nasproti balkanskemu Drugemu); pa tudi s pogledom nazaj na Zahod. Ta pogled je poseljen s spopadi za lokalno kulturno identiteto, vključujoč stereotipizirani subjekt postsocialističnega Drugega, pa tudi, kot nakazuje požig lesene skulpture Melanie Trump pred Sevnico, ljudski (po) smeh kiču, ki ga ta uprizarja na domačih tleh.

Spolni imaginariji nacije so v dobi transnacionalizacije materinskih figur, dejanskih ali simbolnih, postali pomembno pričevanje o kratkosti, ranljivosti in nestabilnosti modernega nacionalnega reda, ki je potlačeval dejstvo ženskih migracij, mater etničnih (in rasnih) manjšin in povečeval maskulino potenco zahodnega patriarhata. Da bi lahko zajeli vso kompleksnost tega krožišča med nacionalnimi imaginariji in žensko migracijo, se bo morala sociološka razprava – v dobi transnacionalizacije družb – intenzivneje posluževati transnacionalnih primerjav. Simbolne matere na mejah dveh domovin so lahko pomemben prispevek k tem raziskovanjem – ne glede na to, kaj si mislimo o njihovih dejanskih vlogah v razreševanju neenakosti ženskega migrantstva, tujosti in perifernosti.

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## MEDIJI IN SPONTANI NACIONALIZEM: PRIMER MELANIE TRUMP\*\*

*Povzetek. Članek analizira reprezentacije Melanie Trump v slovenskih tiskanih medijih in raziskuje, kako je bil v prispevkih o Melanii Trump konstruiran spontani nacionalizem, ta pa je bil v medijih povezan s promocijo slovenske nacije prek Melanie kot blagovne znamke. Moč nacionalnih vezi, idej in tradicije je namreč vzdrževana in redistribuirana prek medijev in popularne kulture, zato avtorja v nasprotju z literaturo s tega področja, ki medije večinoma obravnava le kot mediatorje, v članku tudi kritično naslavljata vprašanje vloge medijev v procesu namčenja nacije in jih obravnavata kot neodvisne akterje. Avtorja analizirata 594 prispevkov o Melanii Trump, objavljenih v slovenskih tiskanih medijih v obdobju treh mesecev v letih 2016 in 2017. Analiza tiskanih medijev v Sloveniji je pokazala, da številne in ponavljajoče se medijske reprezentacije »Melanie« potiskajo slovenski nacionalizem v komercialni kontekst in posledično transformirajo nacijo v blago.*

*Ključni pojmi: medijski diskurz, komodifikacija, Melania Trump, prva dama, nacionalizem, namčenje nacije*

### Uvod

Članek uporablja primer Melanie Trump, nekdanje prve dame ZDA, da bi analiziral diskurzivne strategije, prek katerih so tiskani mediji v Sloveniji nacionalistično reprezentirali »Melanio« kot etnično rojeno Slovenko. Zaradi zelo tekmovalnega globalnega ekonomskega okolja se države dandanes s pomočjo medijev pogosto predstavljajo kot blagovne znamke in vse to kliče

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\*\* Izvirni znanstveni članek.

Raziskava, predstavljena v tem članku, je bila izvedena v okviru nacionalnega raziskovalnega programa Družbena pogodba v 21. stoletju (P6-0400, 2015–2025), ki ga financira Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

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po ponovnem premisleku o konceptu nacionalizma.<sup>1</sup> V tem oziru Castelló in Mihelj (2018) zatrjujeta, da trenutna oživitev nacionalnega presega področje politike, saj je le-to bolj zasidrano v logiki globalnega kapitalizma in je tako postalo neločljivo povezano s praksami promocije in potrošnje. Omenjata več razprav, ki so se pojavile v okviru različnih tem, od »ekonomskega nacionalizma«, »znamčenja nacije«, »potrošniškega etnocentrizma« do »komercialnega nacionalizma«. Vidmar Horvat (2019) govori o preobratu procesov od sodobne etnizacije nacije do postmodernega trženja nacije, ko opisuje postmilenijski nacionalizem kot korporativno idejo, pri kateri se čustveni odnosi spajajo s komercialno privlačnostjo. V zvezi s tem v članku predlagamo koncept komodificiranega nacionalizma za opis procesov, kako so slovenski mediji kreirali Melanio Trump kot slovensko nacionalno blagovno znamko.

Številni avtorji namreč poudarjajo povezavo med nacionalizmom in trženjem v sodobnem svetu. Na primer, Aronczyk (2013) trdi, da znamčenje nacije kot proces oblikovanja in komuniciranja nacionalne identitete uporablja orodja, tehnike in strokovna znanja iz sveta korporativnega upravljanja blagovnih znamk. Poleg tega Hoefte in Veenendaal (2019) dodajata, da sta dandanes gradnja nacionalne države in znamčenje nacije tesno prepletena procesa, saj slednjega ni mogoče obravnavati ločeno od izgradnje nacionalne države. Znamčenje slovenske nacije prek podob »Melanie« v medijih tako vedno vključuje tudi izgradnjo zamišljene slovenske nacionalne skupnosti. Vendar pa po besedah Varge (2013) tak proces znamčenja nacije, ki vključuje tudi ekonomski vidik, kot kulturni projekt pomaga ohranjati, legitimirati in ustvarjati neoliberalni družbeni red, v katerem so vsi kulturni fenomeni videni in obravnavani skozi ekonomsko perspektivo. Tržno znamčenje nacije torej na nek način izpodriva stari etnonacionalizem in ga zamenjuje z novo obliko tržno vsidranega nacionalnega upravljanja podob (Bolin in Miazhevich, 2018). Takšno marketinško orodje – znamčenje nacije je še posebej aktivno na ozemlju vzhodnoevropskih držav in tudi v Sloveniji kot delu nekdanje Jugoslavije (glej Volčič, 2008; Konečnik Ruzzier, 2012; Vitic in Ringer, 2007; Szondi, 2007; Jansen, 2008; Kania-Lundholm, 2012; Volčič in Andrejevic, 2011), saj so morale te države intenzivno poiskati svojo koherentno nacionalno identiteto in nacionalno pripadnost, zato so v mnogih primerih aktivirale, kot pravi Volčič (2008), »projekte nacionalnega znamčenja države«. Prav tako tudi Kaneva in Popescu (2011) trdita, da so napor postkomunističnih držav (za primer vzameta Romunijo in Bolgarijo), da bi ponovno iznašli nacionalne podobe prek rabe nacionalnega znamčenja, še večji, saj so te države po padcu komunizma občutile globoko potrebo po

<sup>1</sup> Po devetdesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja je znamčenje nacije pritegnilo veliko pozornost tako raziskovalcev na eni strani kot vladnih akterjev na drugi strani, zatrjujeta Bolin in Miazhevich (2018: 527).

nacionalni redefiniciji. To pa je šlo z roko v roki s porajanjem kapitalizma v teh državah. Zdi se tudi, da je znamenje nacije bolj značilnost majhnih perifernih držav, ki morajo ubraniti svoj položaj in vlogo v primerjavi z velikimi, nadrejenimi narodi, in v tem pogledu se ta postmoderna gradnja nacije razlikuje od tradicionalnih modernističnih konstrukcij nacionalne države. Naš cilj analize je prikazati posebnosti tega postmodernega znamenja slovenske nacije na primeru »Melanie«, ki je na eni strani povezana z zvezdniškim nacionalizmom in na drugi s komodifikacijo nacije. Osrednje raziskovalno vprašanje je, kako je celotno znamenje Melanie v slovenskih tiskanih medijih v prvi vrsti povezano z občutki majhne in neprepoznavne nacije in kako se prek medijskih reprezentacij »Melanie« konstruira slovenska nacija kot tržno blago.

Naš primer je specifičen v tem smislu, da ni bilo neke skladne in dirigirane kampanje znamenja, ampak je medijski diskurz samostojno deloval kot državotvorni in narodotvorni diskurz in je predstavljal Melanio Trump kot slovensko blagovno znamko prek spontanega izliva nacionalističnega izražanja. Mediji so tako zelo pomembna orodja v sodobnih procesih znamenja nacije, kar ugotavljata tudi Bolin in Miazhevich (2018: 527–533). Pokažeta, da medtem ko so se kritične študije o nacionalnem znamenju primarno opirale predvsem na sociološke in antropološke teorije nacionalnosti, identitet in trgov, pa je bila, nasprotno, vloga medijev – kot institucij, sistemov in družbenih pripovedovalcev zgodb – premalo teoretizirana v odnosu do nacionalnega znamenja. Z drugimi besedami, mediji »so bili opisani kot pasivna orodja pri orkestriranju kampanj znamenja nacij brez lastnega akterstva« (Bolin in Stahlberg, 2015: 3066), čeprav so mediji pravzaprav sestavni del nacionalnega znamenja, saj ohranjajo ideje, podobe, ideologije, diskurze in prakse znamenja nacij.<sup>2</sup> V članku ugotavljamo, da je takšna oblika znamenja nacije sodobna oblika nacionalizma, zlasti v primeru turizma, kar pa je bilo le redko obravnavano v okviru medijskih naričaj (glej Frew in White, 2011; Fan, 2006; Pamment in Cassinger, 2018; Volčič, 2011; Dinnie, 2016; Shepherd, 2002).

Cilj te študije je tako odkriti medijsko generirane podobe, da bi razumeli, kaj se dogaja z nacionalizmom v mediatiziranih potrošniških družbah. Naša analiza torej temelji na predpostavki, da se komodifikacija nacije v našem primeru odvija v dveh korakih, prvič, mediji reprezentirajo »Melanio« kot avtentično Slovenko, kot »našo« skromno, izjemno in slavno Slovenko, in drugič, »Melania« je v tem oziru predstavljena kot tista, ki »nam« lahko pomaga v ekonomskem smislu; ali rečeno drugače, »Melanio« se uporablja

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<sup>2</sup> Kim in Lee (2018) na primeru Koreje prikažeta, kako so različni kulturni akterji v državi, tudi mediji, sodelovali z nacionalnimi vladami, da bi promovirali nacionalni ponos doma in pozitivno podobo nacije v mednarodnem prostoru v dobi globalne kompeticije. Nacionalno znamenje tako povežeta s procesi marketizacije, saj se je vse to odvijalo na blagovnih trgih.



za trženje slovenske nacije kot blaga. Še več, v ozadju tega kulturnega fenomena znamčenja nacije ni toliko proces narodotvorja ali neke kolektivne identifikacije bralcev z nacijo, temveč bolj banalne, vsakdanje fantazije, ki temeljijo na povzdigovanju majhnih narodov iz anonimnosti.

V analizo je bilo vključenih 594 prispevkov o Melanii Trump, objavljenih v slovenskih tiskanih medijih<sup>3</sup> v obdobju treh mesecev v letih 2016 in 2017. Vzorcenje je bilo omejeno na določena časovna obdobja, saj smo vključili vse tiste novinarske tekste, ki so bili objavljeni med 15. oktobrom 2016 in 15. novembrom 2016, torej tri tedne pred predsedniškimi volitvami v ZDA 8. novembra 2016 in teden po volitvah, ter od 20. januarja 2017 do 20. marca 2017, to je dva meseca po inavguraciji 45. predsednika ZDA, ki je potekala 20. januarja 2017. Študija je eksploratorna in temelji na širokem vzorcu novinarskih tekstov iz izbranih časovnih obdobj in predvsem nas zanimajo tudi razlike v poročanju med tema obdobjema. Vzorcenje je temeljilo na iskalnih besedah Melania Trump, opravila pa ga je osrednja slovenska tiskovna kliping agencija Kliping. V izbirnem postopku nismo ločevali med mnenji in novičarskimi prispevki in smo v analizo vključili oboje. Analiza temelji na induktivnem pristopu k podatkom, oba avtorja sta prebrala vsa besedila in sta v reprezentacijah »Melanie« s pomočjo metode tekstualne analize poskušala prepoznati glavne novinarske diskurzivne mehanizme, ki kreirajo slovensko nacijo kot blago. Pri tem je treba izpostaviti, da je v vzorcu približno enakomerno zastopan tako t. i. kakovostni kot regionalni, revijalni in rumeni tisk, skupaj prek 30 različnih publikacij. Če omenimo samo tiste z več kot 20 besedili v vzorcu, je bilo iz Dnevnika v analizo vključenih 72 člankov z omejenimi iskanimi besedami, iz Večera 61, Dela 57, Sveta24 48, Reporterja 45, Primorskih novic 42, Slovenskih novic 34 in Mladine 23.

## Nacije kot komercialna podjetja in poblagovljenje nacionalnih čustev

Roosvall in Salovaara-Moring (2010: 9) izpostavljata, da je bila nacija »kot ključna družbena kategorija« v medijskih študijih v globalni dobi podteoretizirana. Bila je eksplicitno označena kot »postnacionalna« ali »denacionalna«, v razpravah o glocalizaciji je bila tudi pozabljena/prezrta, kot je bila prezrta tudi v večjem delu splošnejše globalizacijske paradigme. Lahko rečemo, da je bila nacija prezrta kot kulturno-ekonomska kategorija, zato Bolin in Ståhlberg (2010) obravnavata nove načine, kako se dandanes nacije konstruirajo v kulturnem in ideološkem smislu kot skupnost, a hkrati tudi kot

<sup>3</sup> Po besedah B. Luthar in A. Trdina (2015: 284) priljubljeni tabloidni tedniki, ki predstavljajo pomemben del našega vzorca, še vedno ostajajo osrednji za diskurz o celebritifikaciji v Sloveniji, »čeprav se kultura slavnih disseminira v široki paleti popularne kulture in medijskih žanrov v starih in novih medijih, je težko zamejiti njene meje«.

blago. Poudarjata, da sodobne nacionalne države vedno bolj delujejo kot komercialna podjetja, ki svojo novo nacionalistično retoriko usmerjajo k mednarodnemu občinstvu investitorjev in turistov. Castile (1996: 743) citira Wallerstina, ki pravi, da je že sam zgodovinski razvoj kapitalizma vključeval procese komodificiranja »vsega«, kar je vključevalo tudi formiranje trga za etnonacionalne identitete. Valaskivi (2016) v tem oziru uvaja koncept »cool nacij«, da bi opisala vlogo medijev pri družbenem imaginiranju oznamčenih držav v kapitalističnih družbah, kjer je »biti cool« centralnega pomena.

Zato lahko parafraziramo Bolina in Ståhlberga (2010) in ugotovimo, da praksa znamčenja na primeru »Melanie« konstituira solidarnost v odnosu do nacije, kot to počne nacionalizem, sočasno pa takšno znamčenje nacije uporablja kulturne tehnologije za konstitucijo nacije kot blaga. To pa proi-zvaja nacijo kot neoliberalno nacijo, saj se znamčenje kvalitativno razlikuje od zgodnejših oblik zamišljanja nacionalnih skupnosti. Tako se nacija vse bolj transformira iz političnega koncepta v komercialni produkt in postaja orodje za trženje blaga potencialnim kupcem (Ståhlberg in Bolin, 2016: 274).<sup>4</sup> Na ta način se nacijo zreducira na blago in je posledično komercia-lizirana tudi v medijih, od televizije do tiskanih oglasov in turističnih leta-kov. Tak komercialni nacionalizem se tako vedno bolj uporablja za pro-dajo izdelkov – nacij, da bi, v našem primeru, slovenski narod postal bolj prepoznaven. Gray (2007) k temu vidiku dodaja še kulturno komponento, ko govori predvsem o komodifikaciji nacionalne »kulture« za »nekulturne« namene, v tem primeru za politične narodotvorne projekte države (glej tudi Heller (2010) za podobno tezo o komodifikaciji nacionalnega jezika kot kul-turnega artefakta za promocijo nacije).

Na podlagi številnih nedavnih razprav v članku pokažemo, da je »Melania« v medijih diskurzivno konstruirana kot slovenska nacionalna blagovna znamka in da pri reprezentiranju slovensko-ameriških odnosov takšna blagovna znamka promovira ekonomsko vrednost in večjo prepo-znavnost majhnega slovenskega naroda, kar bi Slovenijo lahko umestilo na širši globalni zmeljevid. Po mnenju Bolina in Miazhevicha (2018: 527) take kampanje znamčenja nacije ustvarjajo ahistorične in ekskluzivistične repre-zentacije nacije in pospešujejo obliko »komercialnega nacionalizma«, ki je zelo problematičen. Sledeč Baudrillardu Kaneva (2018: 631) trdi, da lahko nacionalne blagovne znamke vidimo kot simulakre, ki obstajajo v transna-cionalnem sistemu za ustvarjanje, kroženje in porabo takšnega blaga – zna-kov. »Melania« kot nacionalna blagovna znamka tako deluje kot blago – znak. V tem oziru Kaneva (2018: 631) dodaja, da nacionalne blagovne znamke nosijo reprezentacijsko breme, da stojijo za nacijo kot celoto. Z besedami

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<sup>4</sup> Ta praksa se pogosto uporablja ne samo v turističnem sektorju, temveč tudi v gospodarskem in poli-tičnem sektorju obstoječih nacionalnih držav.

Z. Volčič in Andrejevica (2011) lahko ugotovimo, da slovenski mediji zlorablajo »Melanio« za razširjanje nacionalnih interesov in za spodbujanje občutka lojalnosti in pripadnosti. V zvezi s tem lahko rečemo, da je znamenje nacije praksa, ki apelira na državljane, vključuje jih kot aktivne potrošnike in proizvajalce znamke ali, če parafraziramo Z. Volčič in Andrejevica (2011), slovenski državljani občutijo »Melanio« kot nacionalno blagovno znamko, kar pomeni, da se identificirajo z njo in se vedejo v skladu s strategijo tega znamčenja.

Poleg tega praksa znamčenja »Melanie« kot nacionalne blagovne znamke v medijih vključuje konstrukcijo globokih nacionalnih čustev do »Melanie« kot Slovenke in ta čustva se nato uporablja za konstrukcijo vezi in občutenj slovenstva na eni, notranje-nacionalni strani s pomočjo medijskega graje-nja idola, in na zunanji strani za trženje slovenskega naroda kot privlačnega potrošniškega izdelka na lokalnih in globalnih trgih. Nacionalna čustva so torej poblagovljena za namene trženja slovenske nacije; to ustvarja tesne vezi med vsemi državljani, ki si delijo ta isti sentiment o tem, da je »Melania« Slovenka tako kot oni. Te globoke vezi in občutki ljubezni do lastne domovine so povezani bodisi z etničnimi koreninami, kulturno dediščino, zgodovinskimi vidiki bodisi s političnimi značilnostmi (glej Nussbaum, 2010; Bodnar, 1994; Tan, 2004).

Naša predpostavka torej je, da se v slovenskih medijih oblikuje posebna vrsta komodificiranega nacionalističnega gibanja (prim. Lahusen, 1993), ko se reprezentira »Melanio« kot etnično rojeno Slovenko, kot osrednjo predstavnico slovenskega naroda in tesno povezano s slovensko zemljo. Ali če parafraziramo Ståhlberga in Bolina (2016), ima »Melania« dve funkciji v slovenskih medijih: 1.) deluje kot nacionalni označevalec za nadzor in discipliniranje prebivalstva države in za krepitev kolektivnega nacionalnega občutenja skupnosti med državljani nekega naroda, 2.) hkrati deluje tudi kot trženjsko orodje za promoviranje nacije kot privlačnega blaga za lokalno in mednarodno občinstvo. Menimo, da je druga funkcija veliko močnejša v slovenskih medijih, še posebej za namene dvigovanja slovenskega naroda iz njegove anonimnosti in majhnosti s pomočjo »Melanie«. Balabanis in drugi (2001) namreč trdijo, da se v sodobnih potrošniških družbah pojavlja močan vpliv nacionalizma kot predhodnika potrošniškemu etnocentrizmu. Ta nova vrsta slovenskega komodificiranega nacionalizma, ki temelji na reprezentacijah »Melaniinega« avtentičnega slovenstva, goji občutek ljubezni, predanosti in občutek navezanosti na slovensko nacijo ter vzpostavlja vezi med državljani, ki si delijo ta isti sentiment – občudovanje »Melanie« in posledično občudovanje Slovenije. V nadaljevanju članka se osredotočamo na novinarske diskurzivne strategije znamčenja »Melanie« za komercialno-nacionalne namene.

## Reprezentacije slovenskih korenin »Melanie«

Najbolj pogosta praksa konstruiranja »Melanie« kot slovenske nacionalne znamke v tiskanih medijih je povezana z reprezentacijo in konstrukcijo Melanie Trump kot avtentične Slovenke, rojene v Sloveniji – »Slovenka v Beli hiši« (Reporter, 14. 11. 2016: 46). Večkrat lahko zasledimo navedbe, da s pomočjo Melanie Trump Slovenija vstopa v Belo hišo. Na primer v prispevku: »Če je res, da ženska podpira tri vogale vsake hiše, potem bo Slovenka že čez dobra dva meseca podpirala tri vogale najvplivnejše hiše na svetu, tiste Bele v Washingtonu. Slovenija na hrbtu Štajerke Melanije Knavs jaha med svetovne supersile!« (Utenkar, Nedelo, 13. 11. 2016: 9) Tovrstne reprezentacije »Melanie« izpostavljajo državo njenega rojstva in, kar je še pomembneje, njene avtentične slovenske korenine. Če parafraziramo Eadeja (1990), medijski diskurzi na lokalni in bolj globalni ravni spodbujajo artikulacijo primordialne, nacionalne solidarnosti, ki ustvarijo vez med Slovenci. Še več, Slovenija je nenehno enačena z »Melanio«, s tem ko je Melaniina avtentična slovenskost reprezentirana skozi njen rojstni kraj, etnične korenine itd., pa so v ospredje tovrstnega nacionalnega »prizadevanja za avtentičnost« (Eade, 1990: 493) postavljeni občutki ponosa in istosti. Pogosto je izpostavljen ponos: »Nova prva dama ZDA je na včerajšnji inavguraciji blestela kot prava dama. Slovenija je ponosna nate, Melania!« (Svet24, 21. 1. 2017) ali: »V Belo hišo s Trumpom prihaja prva dama, Slovenka, Sevníčanka Melania. To pa ni kar tako in na to bi morali biti ponosni« (Šurla, Reporter, 14. 11. 2016: 3). Učinek tovrstnega medijskega poročanja je z drugimi besedami »prioritizacija partikularne identitete«, medijski diskurz pa je v tem primeru tesno povezan s političnim diskurzom – nacionalističnim diskurzom, zato je treba medijski diskurz umestiti »znotraj političnih diskurzov in praks, ki ustvarjajo povezavo med ljudmi kot člani 'zamišljene skupnosti'« (Eade, 1990: 493). Vendar pa je osebni ponos transformiran v nacionalni ponos, ko lahko bralci kot osebe vidijo njihovo celotno skupnost v medijskem diskurzu o koreninah »Melanie«:

*Če slovenskim rokometašem ni uspelo zasesti samega vrha sveta, pa je to uspelo slovenski lepotici Melanii Trump. Ko je njen mož Donald prisegel kot 45. predsednik ZDA, je postala prva na tujem rojena prva dama ZDA po letu 1829. Vsekakor ji gre priznati, da je prvo nalogo v novi vlogi, ki jo je morala opraviti, opravila z odliko. Tako njen izbor čudovite obleke, podpisane z Ralph Lauren, kot njena drža na inavguraciji sta kazala, da je svoji novi vlogi za zdaj kos, na kar še v predvolilni kampanji ni kazalo. (Obrazi, 9. 2. 2017: 8)*

V tem smislu je »Melania« tudi utelešena kot Slovenka, kot slovenski pa so poudarjeni deli njenega telesa kar lahko izzove globoka nacionalistična čustva:

*/.../ obstaja možnost, da dobimo prvo damo, da Belo hišo okupira slovenska nožica (v vrtoglavo visokih petkah). Kako se bomo lahko šopirili, če se bo to zgodilo!* (Vkllop, 20. 10. 2016, Marjana Vovk)

Kot trdita Pamment in Cassinger (2018), tovrstne medijske strategije pomagajo spodbujati participacijo državljanov pri promociji slovenskih vrednot, deloma z namenom pokazati avtentično plat države in deloma za ustvarjanje publicitete. V našem vzorcu je s takšnim avtentičnim nacionalnim interesom povezana skrb za materni jezik. »Melania« je v številnih člankih prikazana kot mati naroda, saj je reprezentirana ne le kot dobra mati, ampak tudi kot dobra mati naroda, kot nekdo, ki ga ne skrbi le za svoje naslednike, pač pa za celoten narod:

*Mladenka iz Sevnice je kot nekakšna kraljica Estera postala prva dama v Beli hiši, v domu ameriškega predsednika Trumpa. Melanio Trump cenim zaradi tega, ker je svojega sina naučila govoriti slovensko.* (Turinek, Reporter, 14. 11. 2016)

Žrtvovanje za sina in medtem tudi za narod je pogosta strategija prikazovanja »Melanie« kot matere naroda ali – z besedami Ramaswamyja (2010) – »boginje naroda«. V medijih je izpostavljeno, da niti v ZDA ni pozabila na slovenske korenine, takšne reprezentacije »Melanie« pa so uporabljene kot zgled za slovenske bralce. Prikazana je kot primer najboljše mame ter ob enem lepe ženske, tovrstne ponavljajoče se reprezentacije v medijih pa jo vzpostavljajo kot posebne vrste zvezdo:

*Že pred meseci, ko so večinski svetovni mediji hoteli narediti Trumpu škodo in so objavili slike 20 let mlajše napol gole Melanije, sem napovedal, da so mu naredili uslugo. Manekenka Melanija se je v teh 20 letih še polepšala, in ko je Trump nagovarjal volivce, da bo Ameriko naredil boljšo, torej tudi lepšo, mu je večina najbrž verjela, kajti človek, ki je po poroki še polepšal svojo ženo, mora že znati polepšati tudi ZDA.* (Sajovic, Reporter, 14. 11. 2016: 16, poudarki dodani)

Kot sta pokazali Luthar in Trdina, je v popularnih medijih diskurz etničnega nacionalizma tesno povezan s spolom in vprašanjem družbenih distinkcij. Trdita, da moč tradicionalnih nacionalnih ceremonij in spektakularnih medijskih dogodkov pri uprizarjanju nacije dopolnjujejo popularnokulturne forme (Luthar in Trdina, 2015: 265). »Melania« kot slavna oseba, manekenka, skrbna mati in prva dama – »Prva prava slovenska prva dama« (Nedelo, 13. 11. 2016: 5) – je prikazana kot superženska, to pa je povezano z njenimi slovenskimi koreninami. To je denimo razvidno tudi iz prispevka

o »darilih iz domovine« za »Melanio«: »Pergerjevi se z Melanio niso nikoli osebno srečali, a po tem, koliko ji pomenijo njihovi izdelki, so prepričani, da je ponosna na to, da je Slovenka« (Nedelo, 13. 11. 2016: 5).

Tovrstni prostori slavnih, ki so uporabljeni za nacionalistične namene (glej tudi O'Connor, 2012) v slovenskih medijih konstruirajo »Melaniino« slovenskost tudi skozi uporabo tradicionalnih ritualov in praks, kot je denimo slovenska himna, ki jo je bralec spremenil na način, da je besedilo vsebovalo »Melanio« in njen rojstni kraj Sevnico, vse skupaj pa je objavil desno usmerjen politični tednik (Reporter, 6. 2. 2017b: 58). Če sledimo Nussbaumu (2010), lahko ugotovimo, da ti poetični verzi o »Melanii« kot Slovenki sprožajo globoka čustva do domovine, pri čemer so »Melaniine« etnične korenine povezane s slovenskim kulturnim izročilom in zgodovinskimi vidiki. Tovrsten nacionalizem se torej napaja tako iz popularnih diskurzov (zvezdniški diskurz) kot tradicionalnih diskurzov (najpomembnejši slovenski pesnik, državna himna). Učinek je, da se lahko bralci identificirajo s takšno slavno osebo, kot je »Melania«, ko je predstavljena kot »lepo dekle iz Sevnice«.

## Reprezentacije rasti slovenske ekonomije in spontani nacionalizem

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Da bi prikazali prepletanje nacionalizma in ekonomskega življenja (Castelló in Mihelj, 2018) na primeru »Melanie«, lahko ugotovimo, da tiskani mediji v Sloveniji kontinuirano reproducirajo potrošniški nacionalizem, kot ga izpeljeta Castelló in Mihelj (2018). Ta temelji tako na zavestnih nacionalističnih diskurzih in praksah kot na bolj banalnih, vsakdanjih oblikah nacionalizma. Najpogostejša novinarska diskurzivna strategija tu je združevanje slovenskih nacionalističnih diskurzov z ekonomskimi učinki »Melanie« kot prve dame, torej s potencialno rastjo slovenske ekonomije zaradi njenega položaja v ameriški politiki. V tednu po volitvah so skoraj vsi v vzorec vključeni mediji objavili prispevke o potencialnih ekonomskih pridobitvah Slovenije. Za Donalda Trumpa so skovali izraz »slovenski zet«, njegovo poslovno ozadje pa je bilo pogosto omenjeno v kontekstu možnih investicij ameriških podjetij v Slovenijo. Številni članki v tiskanih medijih tako združujejo etnocentrizem in ekonomsko rast, ko trdijo, da »Melaniine« slovenske korenine in njena dosledna nacionalna zavednost vplivata na slovensko ekonomijo in pospeševanje slovensko-ameriških odnosov. Na primer:

*Jure Stojan, direktor raziskav in razvoja na Inštitutu za strateške rešitve, je izračunal, da je Slovenija že imela korist od Melanie Trump. /.../ Povečanje je 23-odstotno, Stojan, nekdanji novinar Večera, pa ta ekonomski pojav imenuje Melania effect oziroma učinek Melanije. (Finance, 10. 11. 2016: 3)*

Tovrsten »učinek Melanie« je primer spontanega nacionalizma v tiskanih medijih in je sodeč po Aronczyku (2013) praksa znamčenja nacije, ki je uporabljena za dojemanje nacije kot uporabnega vira v naraščajoči konkurenčnosti za globalne investicije, poslovanje in turizem. V našem primeru spontane prakse znamčenja nacije v medijih temeljijo na treh osnovnih strategijah, na simbolnem združevanju bralcev, internacionalizaciji Slovenije in potrošnji »Melanie«: »Docent s katedre za mednarodne odnose na FDV Boštjan Udovič odločno pove, da je pomembno, ali bo Slovenija znala izkoristiti dejstvo, da bo prva dama Slovenka. /.../ Gre za promocijo države kot blagovne znamke. /.../ S pragmatičnim pristopom, je prepričan, lahko vsaj kaj pridobimo: Morda tudi investicije.« (Večer, 14. 11. 2016b: 2). Če parafraziramo Wanga (2006), lahko rečemo, da so tiskani mediji in potrošniki/bralci znova odkrili in priklicali močna nacionalistična občutenja, podkrepljena z Melaniinim položajem v Beli hiši. Vloga medijev je zvedena na promocijo etničnih povezav na notranji, nacionalni strani in ekonomsko priznanje na zunanji, globalni strani: »Trumpova administracija se bo manj ukvarjala z Evropo in bolj z rastočimi trgi. Posebnega odnosa s Slovenijo ni pričakovati, lahko pa bi slovenski menedžerji izkoristili popularnost in prepoznavnost Melanie Trump pri sklepanju poslov.« (Primorske novice, 20. 1. 2017: 11; poudarki dodani).

Izhajajoč iz tovrstnih primerov menimo, da je takšen potrošniški nacionalizem, ki se pojavlja v analiziranih tiskanih medijih, neodvisen od organiziranih državnih marketinških kampanj, je hkrati banalen in spontan, saj je kombinacija (re)produkcije slovenske nacionalne tradicije, konstrukcije slovenske identitete in, kot je pokazal Li (2009) na primeru Kitajske, potrošniškega etosa v globaliziranem kontekstu. »Melania« je, prvič, konstruirana kot slovenski produkt, nato je oglaševana v medijih kot slovenska nacionalna znamka in je nato, tretjič, prodana bralcem kot nacionalni potrošniški artefakt. Takšna kombinacija potrošniškega in nacionalističnega etosa omogoča bralcem identifikacijo z »Melanio« in narodom ter »občutenje opolnomočenja« (Li, 2009: 435).

*Je Melania Trump res samo ženska, ki je nespretno ukradla govor Michelle Obama, ali je to ženska, ki pomeni priložnost za Slovenijo? /.../ Naša dežela torej lahko izkoristi dejstvo, da je nekdanja manekenka prišla tako daleč. Če se zgodi, da se bo preselila tudi v Belo hišo, bo to lahko za nas odlična promocija – če si le ne bomo vsega slovesa zapravili že sami z nenehnim kritiziranjem.* (Grazia, 1. 11. 2016: 31)

Nekateri prispevki v našem vzorcu ostajajo na eksplicitni ravni skeptični do resničnega učinka »Melanie« na slovensko politiko in ekonomijo, vendar pa implicitno predlagajo, da lahko »Melania« pomaga tržiti Slovenijo



kot prepoznavno znamko, ta medijska strategija pa omogoča bralkam in bralcem sanjarjenje o skupnih koreninah z »Melanio« ter o njeni pomoči pri izboljševanju položaja Slovenije na globalnem zemljevidu:

*Dejstvo je, da je Sevnica Melania Trump za prepoznavnost Slovenije že zdaj naredila toliko kot še nihče pred njo, kar se med drugim že kaže v povečanem številu ameriških turistov pri nas. Toda kaka večja pričakovanja, da se bosta zaradi Slovenke v Beli hiši v »majhni in lepi« državi na sončni strani Alp cedila med in mleko, so precej naivna. (Reporter, 23. 1. 2017a: 3)*

Takšen častivreden etnonacionalizem, ki ga reproducira medijski diskurz, je tesno povezan s potrošništvom in, če parafraziramo Edensorja (2002), lahko ugotovimo, da »Melania« kot kulturna ikona reproducira in transformira občutek nacionalne identitete v Sloveniji v skladu z marketinškimi diskurzi. Ta mediatizirana konstrukcija etnocentrizma je povezana s komercialnimi vidiki, ta tip potrošniškega nacionalizma pa bi lahko po Prideauxju (2009) imenovali »vsakdanji nacionalizem«, kjer igrajo pomemben del spontane marketinške strategije medijev pri pomoči Slovenije.

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### Reprezentacije »Melanie« kot turističnega magneta in poblagovljenje države

Tretja najpogostejša diskurzivna strategija v našem vzorcu je znamčenje »Melanije« kot lokalne in nacionalne turistične znamke. Skozi to strategijo je država poblagovljena, da bi postala zanimiva za potencialne obiskovalce – turiste in investitorje. Tukaj zaseda posebno mesto Sevnica, njen domači kraj, saj ta postane lokalna tržna znamka, hkrati pa predstavlja celo Slovenijo. Lokalni podjetniki so tako pričeli tržiti celo vrsto izdelkov pod znamko prve dame, od vina in čokolade do copat in tradicionalnih klobas; ti izdelki pa so bili denimo pogosto opremljeni s prestižno embalažo, napisi »Prva dama« z zlatimi črkami in podobno. Najbolj prodajen tabloid je tako poročal:

*V času, ko je prisegal novi ameriški predsednik Donald Trump in je sevnica rojkinja Melania postala prva dama Amerike, so v Sevnici potekali dnevi odprtih vrat, na katerih so številnim novinarskim ekipam z vsega sveta predstavljali domače blagovne znamke in lepote krajev, v katerih rastejo tako lepa (in uspešna) dekleta. (Slovenske novice, 24. 1. 2017: 10)*

Kot kompleksen in nastajajoč fenomen takšen popularen, banalen in vsakdanji populizem v medijih predstavlja tudi resne izzive mednarodnim

tržnikom, pri čemer področje turizma ni nobena izjema (glej denimo Cheng in Ipkín Wong, 2014). Številni naslovi in članki govorijo o potencialni »invaziji« turistov – »Tuji turisti bodo drli v Sevnico« (Slovenske novice, 10. 11. 2016: 2) – še več, Sevnica je enačena z »Melanio« – »Ameriško jutro v Melanijini Sevnici« (Večer, 10. 11. 2016a: 24). Takšen banalni medijski nacionalizem lahko nadomešča bolj organizirane turistične ali državne strategije trženja, njihov cilj pa je privabiti čim več turistov in investitorjev. Pri označevanju »Melanie« kot Slovenke je običajno uporabljena množina, s čimer je še dodatno konotirana »našost« »Melanie«, kot denimo v primeru:

*Zgodilo se je, kar smo decembra 1999 objavili v Slovenskih novicah: Gola Slovenka prva dama ZDA? V članku s tem naslovom smo pisali o Donaldu Trumpu, ki se je po dveh propadlih zakonih do ušes zaljubil v našo Sevničanko, ki je bila tistikrat med vrhunskimi svetovnimi manekenkami /.../ Melania Trump, rojena Melanija Knaus, je postala prva dama ZDA! (Slovenske novice, 10. 11. 2016: 2)*

Fan (2006) trdi, da se moramo vprašati, kaj natančno je znamčeno, ko govorimo o znamčenju nacije. V našem primeru postane nacionalna znamka v medijih »Melania« sama in v tem smislu njene reprezentacije pripomorejo k promoviranju slovenske pokrajine in kulture, od kuliniričnih do zgodovinskih in ostalih doma narejenih izdelkov. Med inavguracijo njenega moža je bila »Melania« uporabljena v medijih kot tržna znamka, ki označuje lokalnost in nacionalnost – »Številni Slovenci ne skrivajo ponosa, da je prva dama ZDA postala njihova sorojakinja, še posebej so nad dejstvom navdušeni v njeni rodni Sevnici, kjer, kakopak, kanijo iz priložnosti čim več iztržiti« (Saša Eržen, Mladina, 20. 1. 2017: 54). Nedvomno je »Melania« v medijih ustvarjena kot slovenski nacionalni simbol in, če parafraziramo Bolina in Miazhevicha (2018), takšna mehka moč komercializiranega nacionalizma v medijih poveže bralce v zamišljeno slovensko skupnost na eni strani, na drugi strani pa predstavlja Slovenijo in njeno lokalnost – Sevnico na globalnem zemljevidu nacionalnih držav. Po inavguraciji Donalda Trumpa so Slovenijo obiskali številni tuji novinarji in v tiskanih medijih so bila objavljena številna nekritična poročila o tem:

*Zaradi prisege novega ameriškega predsednika so se na pozornost svetovne javnosti pripravili tudi v Sevnici, rojstnem kraju nove prve dame ZDA Melanie Trump. Ta konec tedna pričakujejo številne tuje novinarje, ki bodo v svet ponesli tudi glas o priznanih sevniških blagovnih znamkah. Zanimanje tuje javnosti so zadnje dni pritegnili zlasti novi kulinarični izdelki z imenom Melania. (Nedelo, 22. 1. 2017: 24)*

*Ni se še zgodilo, da bi prestižna revija Vogue, ki velja za najbolj priznana modno revijo na svetu, kaj šele v ameriški izdaji, pisala o Sevnici in Sloveniji. Tokrat je bilo tako. V spletni izdaji 23. januarja je novinarka Liana Satenstein poročala o slovenskem ponosu na novo ameriško prvo damo, ki prihaja iz Sevnice, »majhnega slikovitega kraja«, kot pravi. Omenjala je tudi izdelke z njenim imenom, od razvpitega lončka medu z njenim portretom, torte do koščka mila vijolične barve z vonjem po sivki /.../. (Nedeljski dnevnik, 25. 1. 2017: 28)*

Številni lokalni pridelovalci so uporabili »Melanio« kot prvo damo in ustvarili številne izdelke, povezane z njo, denimo natikače »Melania«, v medijih pa so bili objavljeni številni recepti za jedi z njenim imenom. Kot je denimo poročalo Nedelo (22. 1. 2017: 24), nedeljski časopis z najvišjo naklado, so lokalni pridelovalci iz Sevnice izumili cel nabor oznamčene hrane, kot denimo jagodno sladico, jabolčno pito in burger, poimenovane po Melaniji, da bi s tem privabili slovenske in tuje turiste, mediji pa so o tem nereflektirano poročali. Tovrstno poročanje ni imelo namena znamčenja in ustvarjanja slovenske nacije, vendar pa sta implicitni posledici takšnega spontanega poročanja dve: »Melanio« so oznamčili kot lokalno in nacionalno tržno znamko, hkrati pa so interpelirali bralce kot nacionalne subjekte skozi spontan, vsakdanji nacionalizem, ki so ga reproducirali; »Novinarji svetovnih medijskih hiš so si kar podajali kljuke lokalov, kjer je mogoče poskusiti Melanijine dobrote.« (Nedelo, 22. 1. 2017: 24).

Tiskani mediji v Sloveniji skozi znamčenje »Melanie« (kot nacionalne in lokalne znamke) torej sodelujejo pri trženju nacionalne in lokalne pokrajine in kulture, od zgodovine do kulinarike. Čeprav mediji le posnemajo oziroma sledijo lokalnim ponudnikom novih proizvodov, povezanih z »Melanio«, je njihova vloga pri konstruiranju in znamčenju nacije ključna, medtem ko aktivno sodelujejo v delovanju spontanega, banalnega, popularnega nacionalizma, čigar cilj je ustvariti skupnost kot nacijo s pomočjo banalnih, vsakdanjih praks in stvari, ki jih jemljemo za samoumevne, od lokalne pokrajine do hrane, če uporabimo Edensorove besede (2002).

## Sklep

Naša analiza je pokazala, da igrajo slovenski tiskani mediji pomembno vlogo v strategijah znamčenja nacije, s pomočjo podob »Melanie« pa spontano reproducirajo vsakdanji komodificirani nacionalizem, ko konstruirajo Melanio kot slovensko nacionalno tržno znamko. Ugotovili smo, da vse tri diskurzivne strategije, ki smo jih izpostavili v članku, spodbujajo specifičen tip nacionalizma, ki ga mediji tesno povezujejo s komercialno usmerjenimi praksami. V primerjavi s tradicionalnim, modernističnim projektom

eticizacije nacije je ta postmoderni projekt znamčenja nacije v slovenskih medijih usmerjen bolj k marketizaciji nacije in bolj služi dvigu slovenske nacije iz anonimnosti in majhnosti kot procesu grajenja naroda ali kolektivni identifikaciji bralk in bralcev z narodom. V medijskem diskurzu o »Melanii« so prav tako komodificirana nacionalna občutenja, ki delujejo kot banalna (Billig, 1995) oziroma kot mehka oblika nacionalizma. Sprožena čustva napram »Melanii« dovoljujejo bralcem in bralkam specifično nacionalno intimnost in medtem ko je »Melania« oznamčena kot slovenska nacionalna znamka v medijih, so komodificirana tudi globoka nacionalna čustva bralcev-potrošnikov, saj se skuša Slovenija in čustva do nje prodati kot potrošniški izdelek, to pa nacionalizem spreminja v komercialno prakso.

Na osnovi študije ugotavljamo tudi, da so bili v literaturi o znamčenju nacije mediji večinoma obravnavani zgolj kot posredniki med drugimi akterji v kampanjah znamčenja. V članku zato izpostavljamo pomembno ugotovitev, in sicer vlogo medijev kot samostojnih akterjev, kot dejavnikov spontanega znamčenja nacije v primeru Melanie Trump. Posledično opozarjamo, da je konceptualizacija znamčenja nacije kot prakse vlad, podjetij in specialistov za trženje in odnose z javnostmi preozka. Pri tem pokažemo, da v tem oziru niso relevantni le večji medijski konglomerati, kot so BBC, CNN in National Geographic, kot sta predlagala Bolin in Stahlberg (2015: 3077), pač pa tudi manjši, nacionalni mediji od popularnih revij do nacionalnih dnevnikov.

V naši analizi ni bilo opaznejših razlik v poročanju niti med različnimi medijskimi žanri in tipi medijev niti med obema obdobjema, vključenima v analizo, saj so bile tako v popularnih revijah kot v resnih časnikih pred in po inauguraciji prisotne različne strategije znamčenja. V obeh obdobjih »Melania« nastopa kot vzdržljivi označevalec nacionalne energičnosti in pripadnosti, pri čemer hkrati promovira ekonomsko rast. Tiskani mediji v Sloveniji tako uporabljajo »Melanio«, da bi zgradili razkošno nacionalno blagovno znamko, ki bi promovirala Slovenijo različnim občinstvom.

Pri tem pa je zanimivo, da sodeč po enem zadnjih medijskih zapisov, znamčenje »Melanie« v zadnjih letih v slovenskih medijih ni bilo pretirano uspešno v smislu ekonomskih pridobitev. Številne turistične agencije so namreč ponujale izlete v »Melaniin« domači kraj, a jim ni uspelo pritegniti zadostnega števila turistov, ki so obiskovali bolj uveljavljene turistične atrakcije v Sloveniji. Tovrstni podatki pričajo o tem, da ustvarjanje »Melanie« kot slovenske nacionalne znamke ni uspelo nagovoriti globalnih občinstev in privabiti večjega števila tujih turistov, uspešneje pa so te reprezentacije nagovorile domače, nacionalno občinstvo predvsem z vzbujanjem globokih nacionalnih občutenj prek reprezentacij »Melaniinih« etničnih korenin. Zamišljanje skupnega in enotnega slovenskega naroda, vzbujanje globokih občutenj ponosa in trženja nacije lokalnim občinstvom s pomočjo

medijskih reprezentacij »Melanie« tako ostajajo ključne vloge, ki jih igrajo mediji v komodifikaciji in komercializaciji slovenskega nacionalizma.

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Joseph Marko and  
Sergiu Constantin (eds.)  
**Human and Minority Rights  
Protection by Multiple Diversity  
Governance**  
Routledge, New York 2019,  
504 pages, EUR 153.50  
(ISBN: 978-1-138-95444-1)

The book “Human and Minority Rights Protection by Multiple Diversity Governance” is a comprehensive and thorough analysis of the state of the art of minority protection. Through an extensive and in-depth analysis of historical developments, political theories and national and international case law, the authors aim to deconstruct the ‘problem’ of minorities as an ideological construct of the nation-cum-state paradigm. Provoked by the global trend of re-nationalisation, national tensions in the West (by now considered immune to ‘bad nationalisms’) and the rise of the far-right on both local and global levels, the book aims to provide answers to two burning questions – why should we protect minorities and whether it is possible to effectively protect them.

Already at the beginning of the book, we sense a dose of pessimism that within the present context, which frames minorities as the ‘problem’ and the ‘threat’ to the very existence of the state, effective minority protection is impossible to

be achieved. The authors, however, turn this logic upside-down and argue that, instead of minorities, the actual problem is the nation-cum-state paradigm, which requires a critical deconstruction and its eventual replacement with an alternative, more just model. To achieve this ambitious goal, they take an interdisciplinary approach building on the tenets of social constructivism (extensively elaborated on in the second chapter).

After describing the research problem and methodological contours of the analysis, in Chapter 3 the reader is introduced to the historical development of state formation and nation-building that has led to the present ideological hegemony of the nation-cum-state paradigm. This chapter relies on a critical interpretation of political and philosophical discussions in the period between the 16<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, as well as key historical events in Western and Central Europe, with a view to the development of human and minority rights and standards. On this basis, the authors reveal four paradoxes embedded in the liberal democratic state (Lock’s liberal paradox, Jennings’ democratic paradox, Arendt’s paradox and Böckenförde’s paradox), which amount to structural limitations on effective human and minority rights protection. However, despite the comprehensive analysis of religious and political power constellations through history, the analysis here suffers from a lack of consideration of the economic aspect, precisely the impact of the development of capitalist economic

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relations on the standing of minorities. Drawing parallels from other analyses about the impact of capitalism on other discriminated groups in history, such as women (illustratively captured by Silvia Federici in the “Caliban and the Witch”), this emerges as a potentially important perspective also worth considering in the context of minorities.

In Chapter 4, the nation-cum-state is dissected as an ideological construct relying on many irreconcilable dichotomies – state society, civic ethnic, politics culture, public private, universal particular and individual vs. collective rights. Although constructed, the authors confidently argue that these ideological dichotomies are no less real as they are internalised in the very organisation of the nation-cum-state and thus used as a basis for legitimating the many problematic policies that disproportionately affect minorities. Through a rich empirical, theoretical and case-law analysis, the authors discuss these problems along the following lines: 1) the myth of neutrality referring to the duty, but also inability of the liberal state to be neutral (leading inevitably to the assimilation or marginalisation of cultural diversity); 2) the concept of collective self-determination torn between, on one hand, the goal of autonomy pursued by minorities and, on the other, the principle of the indivisibility of sovereignty guarded by the state (discussed through the case of Catalan independence); and 3) the artificial antagonism between formal and substantial equality favouring

the former to the detriment of the latter.

Further, as an additional problem of the nation-cum-state, Chapter 5 refers to the essentialist approach to “diversity as a natural difference”, which perceives groups as homogeneous entities with pre-determined behaviour based on their ethnic or cultural ‘properties’. To counter-argue this position, the authors adopt a sociological neo-institutionalist stance and discuss differences between groups as a product of interaction and social relations embedded in a specific situational context. On this basis, they rebuke the naturalised conflation of ethnicity culture and difference diversity characteristic of the nation-cum-state, and thereby open the door to intersectionism which understands identity as a multidimensional construct (consisting of dual or multiple identities). This new approach leaves room for optimism since it no longer sees internally divided societies as inherently antagonistic. However, annulling group antagonism in practice requires something that the nation-cum-state lacks (and is incapable of having), that is, social and system integration that encourages the development of multiple identities and secures equal status on both individual and group levels, in all segments of society. The significance of this chapter lies in deconstructing how ambiguous a phenomenon cultural difference can be, in contrast to the nation-cum-state illusion of it being a fixed and ‘natural’ property.

In addition, provoked by the many gross atrocities minorities have experienced in history, Chapter 6 refers to the right to existence understood as the physical and psychological security of members of a minority group; fulfilment of their economic needs while keeping their different lifestyle; and their right to have rights (i.e. Arendt's paradox). This relies on a thorough analysis of the legal standards established since the Second World War addressing various degrees of violations of this right: war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and genocide. Regarding genocide, as the worst violation of all, the authors note some progress in terms of: 1) wide acceptance of the doctrine of the 'responsibility to protect', which puts the burden on states to prevent mass atrocities; and 2) the fact that not only individuals but also states can be considered perpetrators. As to the economic aspects of the right to existence, the conclusions are more pessimistic, noting that the different lifestyles crucial for the economic and cultural survival of certain groups (i.e. indigenous people) cannot be effectively protected within the present neoliberal economic context. In the end, by revisiting Arendt's paradox (the 'right to have rights') in the context of the problem of statelessness, the authors conclude that the deeply entrenched presumptions of the nation-cum-state do not allow it to be solved in favour of the most disadvantaged.

In Chapter 7, the authors discuss the obstacles to multiple identity

formation as a potential 'antidote' to the essentialist approach of the nation-cum-state to ethnic/cultural difference. As the main obstacle, they identify the primacy given to majority languages and religion resulting from: 1) linguistic standardisation of the language of majorities implying superiority and hierarchy vis-à-vis non-standard dialects and minority languages; and 2) secularisation presuming the freedom of religion as a negative freedom. The former rests on the perception of language as a means of communication, which together with the significant margin of appreciation given to states generates a favourable environment for the assimilation of linguistic minorities. The latter – the freedom of religion as a negative freedom, indirectly privileges the Christian majority while disproportionately affecting religious minorities (precisely Muslims). Without trying to undermine the conclusions about the position held by religion in Europe today, this chapter would have benefited from a clearer expression of the authors' stance on specific case law – whether they see the court's argument for building on the nation-cum-state logic, or the decisions as such, as problematic.

Chapter 8 revisits the 'formal substantial equality' dichotomy to more closely look at the tension between, on one hand, the duty of the state to refrain from discrimination and, on the other, the need for active state intervention to effectively address the unfavourable conditions faced by persons belonging to minorities.

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This discussion is complemented with a deliberation on the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination on whose basis the authors build the argument for the need for a group dimension in policymaking. However, they conclude that, although necessary, the group dimension is insufficient to effectively uproot structural discrimination unless it is combined with a redistributive dimension.

As an issue related to the problem of equality, Chapter 9 refers to the effective participation of persons belonging to minorities and critically discusses a range of instruments and rights, from freedom of association to external self-determination. Based on an extensive comparative analysis of different arrangements of minority participation, the authors come to a similar conclusion as in the previous chapters, namely, that to ensure effective participation state policies/instruments must include a group dimension. In this context, the reader is also provided with a critical analysis of already implemented institutional solutions, which contrary to their initial goal have not only deepened the ethnic cleavages, discrimination and marginalisation of minorities but led to state dysfunctionality (demonstrated in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Nevertheless, these failures are not pointed out as the inevitable destiny of participatory instruments, as the authors also provide some positive examples, such as the case of the German-speaking community in Belgium.

Eventually, the last chapter draws the contours of an alternative model to the nation-cum-state paradigm called multiple diversity governance. This model builds on the triangulation of the principles of liberty, equality and human dignity, recognised as the most solid basis for reconciling the ideas of political unity with legal equality and multiple diversities. The key role here is given to the principle of human dignity as the main yardstick for the interpretation of normative principles and establishment of institutional arrangements, to achieve both freedom from domination and freedom from interference by others. However, this concluding chapter would have benefited more had 'human dignity', as a highly contested theoretical concept, been critically discussed and defined. Specifically, a reference to the criticism of this concept as being too vague and potentially problematic (even retrograde) from the aspect of the lately very popular political/philosophical discussions tackling the issue of animal rights would have enriched this chapter and justified (or made the authors reconsider) the very basis of this model.

Nevertheless, this book is a must-read for all those working or interested in the areas of human and minority rights, nationalism and European politics. It provides a rich body of information and thought-provoking discussions that clearly detect and dissect the structural problems which are preventing effective minority protection. Moreover, this book

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identifies the need for an alternative model to the nation-cum-state and provides the initial input in this direction. At this point, the multiple diversity governance model proposed as a solution would benefit from a wider and more critical discussion, which will hopefully inspire a more comprehensive and solid framework for effective minority protection.

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Rado Bohinc  
**Univerza in država: Pravna analiza družbenega položaja univerze**  
Založba FDV, Ljubljana 2020,  
zbirka: Pravo in gospodarstvo,  
348 str. (ISBN 978-961-235-964-5)

Dr. Rado Bohinc nam je postregel z dokaj obsežnim in razvejanim delom. V središču njegove pozornosti je umeščenost univerze v sistem družbenih institucij, pri čemer izstopa odnos z državo. Obravnava temo, ki jo je živel kot univerzitetni profesor, dekan fakultete in rektor univerze. Pri tem uporabi orodja pravne analize, izhajajoč iz svoje specializacije za področje organizacijskega prava. Analizira normativne akte in sklepe sodišč. Bralcu razširi pogled z drugimi področji prava in družboslovne analize, pri čemer dobro izkoristi svoje karijerne izkušnje iz politike, javnih služb in gospodarstva, vključno s pisanjem nikoli sprejetega zakona o univerzi.

Knjiga je razdeljena na osem

notranje podrobno razčlenjenih poglavij, dodan pa ji je predgovor dveh bivših rektorjev. Skozi ta poglavja avtor analizira položaj univerze z mnogoterih vidikov, kar daje knjigi značaj enciklopedičnosti. Bralcu ponuja tako rekoč več odgovorov, kot bi ta utegnil imeti vprašanj. Pravno analizo dopolnjuje z opazovanjem univerze v sistemu visokega šolstva in znanosti v Sloveniji ter z njenim odnosom do trga dela, kjer odpira tudi vprašanje zaposljivosti diplomantov. Mestoma doda tudi zgodovinsko razsežnost, izrazito pa jo obogati z mednarodnimi primerjavami, pri čemer izpostavi opredelitev položaja univerze v dokumentih mednarodnih organizacij, v nekaterih evropskih državah ter v Južni Koreji.

Avtorjev pristop je družboslovno kritičen. Ost kritike je uperjena na neustrezno izpeljavo 58. člena Ustave Republike Slovenije, ki univerzi izrecno podeljuje avtonomijo z zapisom, da so univerza in druge javne visoke šole avtonomne, da pa jim država mora zagotoviti financiranje na podlagi zakona. Namesto da bi univerzam in visokim šolam namenili posebno, njim prilagojeno ureditev, so jih po Zakonu o zavodih opredelili kot javne zavode. Namesto da bi jim omogočili, da sami urejajo notranja razmerja med članicami, z zaposlenimi in študenti, so jih podvrgli podrobnemu normiranju od zunaj, in to ne le z Zakonom o visokem šolstvu, temveč tudi z mnogimi drugimi, kot so Zakon o javnih uslužbencih, Zakon

o sistemu plač v javnem sektorju in podobni. Namesto da bi visokošolskim učiteljem, raziskovalcem in študentom omogočili ustvarjalno delo, so jih spremenili v javne uslužbence oziroma državne uradnike. S tem so povsem zgrešili pri urejanju položaja akademskega osebja, katerega naloga je skupaj s študenti ustvarjati novo znanje in razmišljati in delovati zunaj ustaljenih okvirov, ne pa rutinsko zagotavljati storitve vsem strankam v enakem obsegu in na enak način, kakor to velevajo predpisi. Namesto da bi bila univerza najpomembnejši agens družbenega razvoja, ki v partnerstvu z državo išče najboljše razvojne rešitve, je državi hierarhično podrejena in nadzirana tako, da ne more v polni meri izkoristiti intelektualnega potenciala zaposlenih in študentov, ki jih omejujejo nepotrebna pravila, postopki, poročanja in podobno. Podrejenost univerze državi tudi preprečuje, da bi ta lahko odgovorno uresničevala svoje družbeno poslanstvo, saj se mora nenehno ozirati na zahteve, ki prihajajo do nje iz državne administracije.

Takšno stanje se vzdržuje že vse od nastanka slovenske države, ko »sta bili obe takratni univerzi v bistvu nacionalizirani« (str. 313). Kljub občasnim presojam Ustavnega sodišča se v zadnjih tridesetih letih stanje ni bistveno spremenilo. Še več, tudi Ustavno sodišče ni zmoglo univerze iztrgati iz objema javnih zavodov – ne glede na to, da ustavna opredelitev avtonomije univerze ne dopušča nobenega dvoma. Tako je Ustavno sodišče odločilo, da »avtonomnost

univerze ne vključuje tudi pravice do samoorganiziranja« (str. 209), kar je po avtorjevi sodbi pravno nevzdržno. Zakonodajalec je vseskozi držal visoko šolstvo v okviru zastarelega Zakona o zavodih in krpal Zakon o visokim šolstvu, katerega obseg se je povečeval, posamezni členi pa so pogosto v medsebojnem nasprotju ter v neskladju z Ustavo. Med drugim ne opredeljuje javne službe. Je pa tudi v neskladju s priporočili in usmeritvami različnih mednarodnih dokumentov.

Posledice dolgo trajajočega neustreznega zakonskega urejanja visokega šolstva v Republiki Sloveniji so globlje, kot se zdi na prvi pogled. Avtor jih prikaže skozi polom uresničevanja strategije visokega šolstva v obdobju 2010–2020 ter skozi razvojno neučinkovitost visokega šolstva pri nas. Med drugim kljub pogosti hvali politike zaostajamo za razvitimi državami tudi v deležu visoko izobraženega prebivalstva. Kot piše avtor, »univerza v slovenski družbi žal ni partner državi, ampak njej podrejena in od nje odvisna javna ustanova z ustavno zagotovljeno, vendar v praksi neuresničeno avtonomnostjo. Razlog za takšno stanje je njen zakonsko podrobno in v mnogočem protiustavno opredeljen položaj v družbi in na tem utemeljena oblastna percepcija univerze« (str. 79).

Osrednji avtorjev koncept je avtonomija univerze, ki ga motri z razvojne perspektive in perspektive mednarodnih dokumentov. Sicer pa sledi operacionalizaciji

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univerzitetne avtonomije, kot jo uporablja Evropsko združenje univerz. Gre za akademsko, finančno, organizacijsko in kadrovsko avtonomijo. Avtor posebej kritično analizira kadrovsko neavtonomnost, pri čemer univerzi ni priznana partnerska vloga v socialnem dialogu, kjer so plače in nagrajevanje po uspešnosti in napredovanja določeni z državnimi predpisi, uvrščanje v plačne razrede je določeno z zakonom, prav tako visokošolski nazivi, delovna in pedagoška obveznost. Pri tem jasno izpostavi, da avtonomija ni absolutna, je pa nujno potrebna, če naj univerza razvija partnerske odnose z državo in drugimi deležniki. Posebej zanimiva je njegova opredelitev sodobne univerze, ki bi morala biti raziskovalna in ustvarjalna, vpeta v družbeno okolje, mora delovati v občo korist, mora biti odprta v mednarodni prostor in povezana z njim, njeni značilnosti pa sta tudi univerzalnost in odličnost.

Avtor ne ostane le pri kritiki. Zavzame se za spremembo zakonodaje o zavodih, pri čemer bi morali upoštevati njihove različne funkcije, poslanstva in vire financiranja ter slediti praksi razvitih držav, v katerih so javne službe pogosto organizirane po korporacijskih načelih, visokošolsko izobraževanje pa štejejo kot gospodarsko dejavnost. V tem okviru bi morali sprejeti tudi poseben zakon o univerzi, ki bi ji priznal

poseben status najvišje kulturne, raziskovalne, izobraževalne in razvojne institucije in jo razločil od drugih visokošolskih organizacij. Kot pravi avtor, je »nujno temeljito preurediti visokošolsko in raziskovalno zakonodajo ter vzpostaviti sodoben institucionalni okvir ...« (str. 11). »Univerza naj ima status samostojne in samoupravne neprofitne korporacije« (str. 145). Mora biti avtonomi zavod s posebnim položajem, podobno kot ga ima Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti. Pri oblikovanju predlogov avtor ne ostane le na načelni ravni, temveč da zelo konkretne napotke, kako to urediti.

Knjiga je pregledno urejena in razčlenjeni podnaslovi omogočajo bralcu, da hitro najde vprašanje, ki ga zanima. Podajanje je tekoče brez nepotrebne pravne ezoterike in je tako dostopno širokemu krogu izobraženih bralcev. Priporočam jo vsem, ki iščejo odgovore na vprašanja o prešibkem razvoju visokega šolstva pri nas. Še posebej pa pomaga pojasniti številne nelogičnosti, na katere pri svojem delu in študiju naletijo akademsko osebje in študenti. Ko se ob koncu vprašam, ali v tej knjigi kaj pogrešam, je to analiza vloge sindikatov in študentske organizacije pri ohranjanju nizke avtonomije slovenskih univerz. To pa je morda tudi tema za naslednjo študijo.



Žiga VODOVNIK: (PRE)MISLITI DRŽAVO V 21. STOLETJU  
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, let. LVIII, št. 2, str. 249–267

V članku trdimo, da se družboslovje na splošno in še posebej politologija srečujeta s svojevrstnim epistemološkim izzivom pri raziskovanju države v 21. stoletju. Država je namreč bila pogosto naturalizirana, razumljena kot statična in ahistorična entiteta, ki je odporna na spremembe v okolju, ali pa je bila naivno zavržena kot oblika politične organizacije, ki z neoliberalno globalizacijo vene. V obeh primerih so procesi redefiniranja in redistribuiranja države, s tem pa njene de-/reteritorizacije in prostorskega prestrukturiranja, v glavnem ostali neopaženi. V obravnavi hegemonskih teorij države pokažemo, da v politični znanosti raziskavanja države še vedno temeljijo na (geografskih) predpostavkah, ki državo omejujejo ali celo opredeljujejo kot geografsko razmejeno in nespremenljivo ozemlje. Na podlagi aktualnih pristopov v raziskovanju prostora, obsega in teritorija, kličemo k heterodoksnim in pluralističnim metodologijam v nadaljnjem proučevanju države kot tudi nedržavnih prostorov.

**Ključni pojmi:** država, nedržavni prostori, globalizacija, ozemlje, politična geografija

UDK 321.7:321.01Schmitt C.

Tihomir CIPEK: POLITIČNO PROTI DRŽAVI?  
RELEVANTNOST KONCEPTA POLITIČNEGA CARLA SCHMITTA  
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, let. LVIII, št. 2, str. 268–283

Članek analizira razmerje med državo, demokracijo in konceptom političnega v teoriji Carla Schmitta. To bomo naredili z rekonstrukcijo konceptov Schmittove politične teorije in ugotavljanjem, ali jih je mogoče uporabiti za razlago ideologije novega desničarskega populizma in neliberalne demokracije. Kot se je izkazalo, Schmittova redukcija političnega na antagonizem prijatelj/sovražnik predstavlja jedro vladajoče pripovedi neliberalnih demokracij. Schmittovo razumevanje političnega ne brani države kot političnega prostora, temveč z odpravo liberalnih elementov demokracije uničuje državne institucije. Analiza je pokazala, da Schmittovega pojma političnega ni mogoče uporabiti za gradnjo učinkovitih demokratičnih institucij države. V njegovi definiciji političnega namreč politika dejansko obstaja le navzven, do nekega drugega naroda, neke druge politične enotnosti, ne pa tudi znotraj same države.

**Ključni pojmi:** država, politično, Carl Schmitt, neliberalna demokracija

Ladislav CABADA: NATIVISTIČNI IN ANTILIBERALNI NARATIVI  
V KONZERVATIVNI POPULISTIČNI AGENDI V SREDNJI EVROPI

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, let. LVIII, št. 2, str. 284–304

Nativizem ni le koncept, ampak pomeni tudi ideološki okvir in politično prakso, povezano z identitetno politiko. V članku najprej predstavimo teoretični uvod v nativizem in opredelimo najpomembnejše izraze in značilnosti tega fenomena. V nadaljevanju koncept uporabimo za analizo nativizma pri konzervativno populističnih in/ali nativističnih političnih akterjih v Srednji Evropi. Analiza razkriva, kako je nativizem, ki je bil v prvih petnajstih letih po demokratičnem prehodu obrobna problematika, kasneje postal bolj pomemben koncept, zlasti po nizu kriz od leta 2008 dalje. Analiza prikaže, kako so osrednje politične stranke v Srednji Evropi prevzele nativizem in konzervativno populistično agendo ter ju vnesle v osrednjo politiko. Dodatno pa analiza pokaže, kako se nativizem v Srednji Evropi povezuje z dolgoletnimi protiliberalnimi tokovi, ki so znova oživelili po padcu komunističnih sistemov. Te protimoderne družbene skupine so bile v procesu polarizacije jasno videne v političnem prostoru in preoblikovane v protisvetovljanski tabor.

**Ključni pojmi:** nativizem, nacionalni konzervativizem, politika identitet, Srednja Evropa

UDK 338.124.4:336.274.3(497.4)

Marko HOČEVAR: KRIZA 2008 IN VZPON SLOVENSKE  
KONSOLIDIRAJOČE SE DRŽAVE

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, let. LVIII, št. 2, str. 305–321

Namen članka je razložiti vzpon slovenske države dolga in njeno preoblikovanje v konsolidirajočo se državo. Ko je leta 2009 kriza zajela Slovenijo, je bil bančni sistem blizu kolapsa. Z dokapitalizacijami bančnega sistema je javni dolg začel rasti. Po nekaj letih in pod strukturnimi pritiski in omejitvami bonitetnih agencij ter pritiski iz EU je morala slovenska država sprejeti varčevalne ukrepe za konsolidacijo javnih financ ter omejiti doseg demokracije. Glavna ugotovitev članka je, da je kriza 2008 v temeljih spremenila slovensko državo.

**Ključni pojmi:** kapitalistična država, konsolidirajoča se država, dolg, Slovenija, demokracija

Andrej KURNIK, Cirila TOPLAK: **O MIGRANTIH Z MIGRANTI: MIGRACIJE PET LET PO EVROPSKI MIGRANTSKI »KRIZI«**  
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, let. LVIII, št. 2, str. 322–340

Kako teoretizirati aktualne ilegalizirane migracije v Evropo? Članek obravnava teoretske novosti v polju migracijskih študij od množičnih migracij v Evropsko unijo leta 2015. Metodološko avtorja povežeta kritično (diskurzivno) analizo s preizkusom še ne zajetih, a relevantnih konceptov v okviru migracijskih študij na osnovi terenskega raziskovanja na balkanski poti v zadnjih petih letih. Opravljena analiza je pokazala, da sta določujoči in odločilni prvini aktualnih ilegaliziranih migracij politična subjektiviteta in politično delovanje migrantov, kar v študijah migracij še ni zadostno pripoznano. S takšnim pripoznanjem postane migracija mesto artikulacije kritike globalnih odnosov neenakosti in mesto vključujoče družbene transformacije.

**Ključni pojmi:** migracije, Evropa, politična teorija, država, balkanska migrantska pot

Blaž VREČKO ILC: **KLIMATSKA KRIZA: ČAS ZA PONOVI PREMISLEK EKONOMSKEGA NAČRTOVANJA S POMOČJO DEMISTIFIKACIJE KAPITALIZMA**  
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, let. LVIII, št. 2, str. 341–360

Namen članka je razširiti epistemološki horizont za revitalizacije ideje demokratičnega ekonomskega načrtovanja kot možne alternativne vizije. Pri tem predpostavlja, da mora dejanski celovit razvoj te alternativne vizije nujno predhoditi kritična analiza hegemonске večdimenzionalne ideološke mistifikacije kapitalizma in trga. Črpajoč iz uvidov marksistične in ekosocialistične analitične tradicije, članek identificira in analizira niz ključnih ideoloških mistifikacij, ki zapirajo epistemološki horizont. V tem okviru analizira tako prikrivanje vloge kapitalizma kot: inherentno netrajnostnega sistema v pojavu klimatske krize, mistifikacijo izvora kapitalizma kot domnevnega izraza evolucija, prikrivanje vloge ekonomskega načrtovanja v sodobnem kapitalizmu, mistifikacijo trgov kot prostorov svobode in inovacije in zakrivanje njihove vloge pri represiji, izkoriščanju in uničevanju okolja, ki so pripisani primarno ekonomskemu načrtovanju. Hkrati kritično naslovi utišanje konkretnih zgodovinskih primerov demokratičnega ekonomskega

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načrtovanja, kot je projekt Cybersyn, ki bi lahko služili kot inspiracija za nadaljnji razvoj vizij alternativne ureditve.

**Ključni pojmi:** klimatske spremembe, ideološka mistifikacija, demokratično ekonomsko načrtovanje, kapitalizem, neoliberalizem

UDK 316.613.4:316.774:32

Zdenka ŠADL: EMOTIONS AND AFFECT IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, pp. 370–390

In this article, we deal with the contemporary form of emotional political communication, where we are especially interested in populism as a form of politics that appeals to people chiefly on an emotional level. We draw attention to the problematic nature of the emotionalisation of populist discourses as reflected in the legitimisation of aggressive rhetoric, the manipulation of emotions, emotivism, and the creation of antagonistic collectives. Building on the critical assessment that understanding the politics of emotions requires the systematic theorising of emotions, in the last part we rely on Sarah Ahmed's conceptual framework to show the performative role of emotions and the 'stickiness' of hatred. The analysis shows that her approach to emotions can be fruitful for better understanding the role of emotions in political discourse, particularly right-wing populist parties.

**Keywords:** political communication, political discourse, emotions, hatred, populism, Sara Ahmed

UDK 316.773.3:077.5

Nejc SLUKAN: THE POLITICS OF IRONY ON SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS: OUTLINE OF THE TROLLING DISPOSITIF OF SOCIAL MEDIA

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, pp. 391–408

The article aims to give the theoretical foundations upon which we can analyse ironic communication practices in social media. Special emphasis is paid to trolling practices. Irony is understood in the article not just as a rhetorical figure, but as a speech act that reconfigures the relationships between the elements of the communicative situation. We first critically summarise contemporary versions of the theory of technological affordances before proceeding to conceptualise, by describing the conditions of communication in certain social media, some of their affordances as part of a dispositive, which we tentatively call the media-trolling dispositive and

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which encourages individuals to express themselves by way of trolling. We conclude that the affordances of social media encourage troll-like forms of expression.

**Keywords:** irony, trolling, dispositif, affordances, social media

UDK 32:316.77:316.472.4

**Deja CRNOVIĆ: THE EVENTISATION AND COMMODIFICATION OF POLITICS ON INSTAGRAM**

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, pp. 409–427

Due to mediatisation, eventisation and the influence of market logic, the politics of the 21st century has become increasingly personalised. Instead of a political agenda, the forefront of politics is taken over by the people/personas who work in politics. Politicians are therefore ever more like celebrities since the illusion of their competence is provided by their personal life and values. This is achieved by performing a certain gender or class to enable them to mover »closer to the ordinary person« in a populist manner. The article examines gender and class performativity and consequently the depoliticisation seen on the Instagram profiles of two state leaders: the President of Slovenia Borut Pahor and the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić. While both presidents are known for their populism, occasionally even domesticity, in their respective national contexts their Instagram photos express cosmopolitanism and, in the case of Pahor, new, narcissist masculinity. Whereas Vučić prefers to post photos of himself meeting international leaders, Pahor's Instagram is filled with photos from his private life and the national environment.

**Keywords:** mediatisation, depoliticisation, eventisation, Instagram, politics, performing gender, class

UDK 07(497.4):329:929Trump M.

**Breda LUTHAR: POPULAR CULTURE AND REGRESSIVE POPULISM**

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, pp. 428–446

On both the individual and collective levels, society has a constant tendency to observe itself through elites. I understand the practice of celebri-fication and the ubiquity of local celebrity culture as an important justification narrative that plays a vital role in the post-socialist neoliberal consensus. This analysis addresses the way Melania Trump is popularly represented in

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Slovenian media and argues that this involves the entanglement of celebrity discourse and practice of celebrification in commercial media culture with regressive populism. The celebrity discourse is an important discursive practice in the legitimation of the existing class relations and redistribution of public wealth after socialism. As a cultural repertoire of 'proto-national' sentiments, it can be organised to support right-wing populism.

**Keywords:** regressive populism, class, postsocialism, celebrity, Melania Trump

UDK 07(73+497.4):929Trump M.

**Ksenija VIDMAR HORVAT: POST-IMPERIAL PATRIARCHY AND THE CARNIVALESQUE PERIPHERY: MELANIA TRUMP WITHIN A TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC**

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, pp. 447–463

This article studies perceptions of Melania Trump as The First Lady in the USA and in Slovenian public spaces. The analysis first investigates media depictions of Melania Trump in the weekly magazine *The New Yorker*. The main finding of the comparison is that representations in the USA focus on The First Lady's immigrant status and her roots in the former socialist East. Yet, in contrast, in Slovenia the fact of her ethnic origin is mobilised to create a national fantasy which aims to establish a distance from the socialist past. Still, reactions to the wooden statue of Melania in her hometown of Sevnica suggest a contested struggle over a post-socialist identity, in effect undermining the centre–periphery dichotomy. Based on these observations, the research question addresses the fate of symbolic motherhood in an era of the transnationalisation of modern societies.

**Keywords:** Melania Trump, First Lady, post-socialism, nationalism, gender, East

UDK 07(497.4):323.1:929Trump M.

**Maruša PUŠNIK, Dejan JONTES: MEDIA AND SPONTANEOUS NATIONALISM: THE CASE OF MELANIA TRUMP**

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2021, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, pp. 464–480

The article analyses representations of Melania Trump in Slovenian print media and investigates how spontaneous nationalism was constructed in articles about Melania Trump, which in the media was related to promotion

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of the Slovenian nation by presenting Melania as a brand. The power of national ties, ideas and tradition is maintained and redistributed through the media and popular culture and this leads the authors, unlike the literature in this field that mostly treats the media only as mediators, to also critically address the role played by the media as independent agents in this process of branding the nation. The authors analyse 594 articles about Melania Trump published in Slovenian print media over a period of 3 months in 2016 and 2017. The mentioned analysis showed that the many, recurring media representations of “Melania” have pushed Slovenian nationalism into a commercial context and thereby transformed the nation into a commodity.

**Keywords:** media discourse, commodification, Melania Trump, First Lady, nationalism, nation branding



Teorija in praksa sprejema v presojo za objavo izvirna znanstvena besedila, ki še niso bila objavljena drugje ali niso v recenzentskem postopku pri kateri drugi znanstveni reviji oziroma monografiji. Objava članka ali knjižne recenzije v Teoriji in praksi je brezplačna.

Besedilo pošljite na elektronski naslov [teorija.praksa@fdv.uni-lj.si](mailto:teorija.praksa@fdv.uni-lj.si). Besedilo naj bo v formatu A4 z 1,5-vrstičnim razmikom, tip črk Times New Roman, velikost 12, obojestransko poravnano, z robovi 2,5 cm. Vse strani besedila morajo biti zaporedno oštevilčene. Ime in priimek avtorice/avtorja naj bo izpisano na posebni naslovni strani pod naslovom prispevka, skupaj s strokovnim nazivom in trenutno zaposlitvijo, s polnim naslovom, telefonsko številko in naslovom elektronske pošte. Priimek avtorice oziroma avtorja naj bo izpisan z velikimi tiskanimi črkami. Prva oziroma začetna stran besedila naj vsebuje le naslov besedila in povzetek besedila. Besedilo mora spremljati izjava avtorice oziroma avtorja, da besedilo še ni bilo objavljeno oziroma ni v pripravi za tisk pri kateri drugi znanstveni reviji ali monografiji. Avtorica/avtor naj v izjavi navede svoj predlog uvrstitve besedila v skladu s tipologijo dokumentov/del (izvirni, pregledni članek ali knjižna recenzija) za vodenje bibliografij v sistemu COBISS. O končni uvrstitvi odloča uredništvo revije.

### ČLANKI

Znanstveni članki v slovenskem ali angleškem jeziku naj ne presegajo 6.500 besed. V kolikor želi avtorica oziroma avtor objaviti daljše besedilo, naj se o tem predhodno posvetuje z glavnim urednikom. Članek naj bo opremljen s povzetkom v slovenskem in angleškem jeziku v obsegu do 100 besed. Povzetek naj vsebuje natančno opredelitev teme besedila, metodo argumentacije in zaključke. Avtorica/avtor naj navede tudi do sedem ključnih pojmov, tako v slovenskem kakor tudi v angleškem jeziku. Naslovi morajo biti jasni in povedni. Glavni naslov, izpisan s krepkimi velikimi tiskanimi črkami, ne sme presegati dolžine 100 znakov. Besedila, daljša od 1.500 besed, morajo vsebovati podnaslove, ki so lahko največ dvonivojski. Podnaslovi druge ravni naj bodo tiskani poševno.

Tabele, grafi in slike morajo biti izdelani kot priloge (in ne vključeni v besedilo) z jasnimi naslovi, pri čemer naj avtorica/avtor uporabi velike tiskane črke v poševnem tisku; biti morajo zaporedno oštevilčeni (Slika 1: NASLOV SLIKE, Graf 2: NASLOV GRAFA, Tabela 3: NASLOV TABELE). Vsaka tabela in slika mora biti izpisana na posebnem listu papirja. V besedilu naj bo okvirno označeno mesto, kamor sodi. Avtorica/avtor naj pri vsaki tabeli, grafu in sliki opredeli, koliko prostora zavzema v besedilu. Tabele, grafe in slike naj avtorica/avtor šteje v obseg besedila bodisi kot 250 besed (pol strani) ali 500 besed (celotna stran). Pod tabelami in grafi je potrebno navesti vir. Navedba vira naj se zaključí s piko. Uporabljajte orodje za oblikovanje tabel v programu Word.

Tabela 1: UČINEK ODBOROV

Regulativni učinek	Mešani učinek	Distribucijski učinek
BUDG, TRAN, IMCO,	ECON, ENVI, ITRE, LIBE	EMPL, AGRI, PECH, REGI
JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA	JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA	JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA

Vir: Yordanova, 2009: 256.

Opombe morajo biti v besedilu jasno označene z zaporednimi številkami od začetka do konca, napisane na ustreznem mestu v besedilu in po enakem vrstnem redu razvrščene pod besedilom. Število in dolžina opomb naj bo omejena. Opomba o avtorici/avtorju in morebitna zahvala naj vključujeta informacije o organizacijski pripadnosti avtorice/avtorja, ki so relevantne za obravnavano problematiko v besedilu, ter o finančnih in drugih pomočeh pri pripravi besedila.

Dobesedni navedki, ki so dolgi tri ali več vrstic, naj bodo postavljeni v poseben odstavek, robovi odstavka naj bodo obojestransko zamaknjeni, besedilo naj bo v poševnem tisku in brez narekovajev.

*Če so gibanja za pravice vložila svoja telesa v aktivizem in mobiliziranje novih oblik diskurza, da bi tako omajala njihovo marginalizacijo in zatiranje, so filozofske in teoretske kritike kartezijanstva na novo pretehtale subjekt in ga opredelile kot hkrati razsrediščenega (ki v sebi ni v celoti koherenten) In utelešenega (ne čisti "kogito"). (Jones, 2002: 239)*

## RECENZIJE KNJIG

TIP sprejema v objavo recenzije domačih in tujih znanstvenih del, ki niso starejša od dveh let. Recenzija naj ne bo daljša od 1.500 besed. V recenziji naj se avtorica/avtor dosledno izogiba navajanju literature in virov. Recenzija naj ne vsebuje naslova ali podnaslovov. Na začetku recenzije naj navede podatke o sebi in recenzirani knjigi v spodaj navedeni obliki:

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Institucionalna pripadnost

Ime in priimek avtorja knjige

**Naslov knjige: podnaslov**

Založnik, Kraj letnica objave, število strani, cena (ISBN številka)

Janez NOVAK

Fakulteta za družbene vede, UL

Eviatar Zerubavel

**Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past**

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago in London 2003, 184 str., 25.00 \$ (ISBN 0-226-98152-5)

## NAVAJANJE

Osnovna oblika reference v besedilu je (Novak, 1994). Za navajanje strani naj avtorica oziroma avtor uporablja naslednjo obliko navajanja: (Novak, 1994: 27–29). Če sta avtorja reference dva, naj avtorica oziroma avtor navede oba: (Novak in Kosec, 2007). Če je avtorjev reference več, naj se v tekstu uporablja naslednja oblika navajanja: (Novak et al., 1994: 27), v seznamu LITERATURE pa naj se navedejo vsi avtorji. Če avtorica oziroma avtor besedila ne uporablja prve izdaje knjige, naj pri navajanju zabeleži tudi letnico prve izdaje: (Novak, 1953/1994: 7). Več referenc hkrati naj avtorica oziroma avtor loči s podpičjem: (Novak, 1994: 7; Kosec, 1998: 3–4; 2005: 58). Pri navajanju večjega števila referenc enega avtorja, objavljenih v istem letu, naj avtorica oziroma avtor reference med seboj loči s črkami a, b, c itd.: (Novak, 1994a: 27–29; Novak, 1994b: 1), in sicer v zaporedju, v kakršnem se prvič pojavijo v besedilu.

Seznam referenc sodi na konec besedila in naj ima podnaslov LITERATURA. V seznam referenc naj avtorica oziroma avtor vključi vso uporabljeno literaturo. Morebitne vire naj navede za seznamom referenc, in sicer s podnaslovom VIRI. Seznam referenc mora biti urejen po abecednem redu priimkov avtorjev referenc ter v primeru istega avtorja po časovnem zaporedju izdaj.

### *Knjige*

Priimek, ime (letnica izdaje knjige): Naslov knjige: Podnaslov. Kraj: Založba. Geertz, Clifford (1980): Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

### *Zborniki*

Priimek, Ime (ur.) (letnica izdaje knjige): Naslov knjige: Podnaslov. Kraj: Založba. Featherstone, Mike (ur.) in Mike Hepworth (ur.) (1991): The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory. London: SAGE Publications.

### *Samostojni sestavek ali poglavje v monografiji*

Priimek, Ime (letnica izdaje monografije): Naslov prispevka v zborniku. V: Ime Priimek urednika (ur.), Naslov zbornika, strani prispevka. Kraj: Založba. Palan, Ronen (1999): Global Governance and Social Closure or Who is to Governed in an Era of Global Governance? V: Martin Hewson (ur.) in Timothy J. Sinclair (ur.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory, 55–72. Albany: State University New York Press.

### *Članki*

Priimek, Ime (letnica izida članka): Naslov članka. Ime revije letnik (številk): strani. Bachrach, Peter in Morton S. Baratz (1963): Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework. American Political Science Review 57 (3): 632–42.

*Svetovni splet (WWW)*

Priimek, Ime (letnica): Naslov. Dostopno prek Internetni naslov, datum dostopa.

Deluze, Gilles (1978): Spinoza. Dostopno prek <http://www.imaginet.fr/deluze/TXT/420178.html>, 10. 1. 2001.

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Koprivec, Daša (2005–2008): Avdio kasete. Kustodiat za slovenske izsejlence in zamejce SEM. Dostopno prek <http://www.imaginet.fr/deluze/TXT/420178.html>, 10. 1. 2010.

ali

Luthar, Breda, Samo Kropivnik, Tanja Oblak, Blanka Tivadar, Mirjana Ule, Slavko Kurdija in Samo Uhan (2006): Življenjski stili v medijski družbi 2001. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov.

Če gre za vir iz zasebnega arhiva avtorja članka, kakega drugega raziskovalca ali posameznika, naj bo to jasno navedeno. Navajanje identitete lastnika vira iz zasebnega arhiva je zaželeno, vendar ne nujno, kadar gre za zaščito njegovih materialnih pravic ali varovanje njegove osebne identitete.

Priimek, Ime morebitnega avtorja (morebitna letnica nastanka vira): Ime ali opis vira/arhivska številka. Mesto hranjenja vira. Zasebni arhiv.

Zbirka navijaških šalov. Avtoštoparski muzej, Kanal ob Soči. Zasebni arhiv Mirana Ipavca.

ali

Zbirka pisem Janeza Novaka. 1953–1989. Privatni arhiv.

Avtorica oziroma avtor naj v primeru znanega avtorja in leta nastanka vira

uporabi enako določilo o navajanju v besedilu članka, kot je to v primeru navajanja članka, prispevka v monografiji ali monografije. Kadar avtor in leto nastanka vira nista znana, naj avtorica oziroma avtor v besedilu članka smiselno uporabi naslov, ime ali opis vira. V primeru, da so naslov, ime ali opis vira daljši od petih besed, naj avtorica oziroma avtor pri navajanju vira smiselno uporabi začetne besede iz naslova, imena ali opisa vira tako, da bo nedvoumno razpoznavno, kateri v seznamu literature navedeni vir navaja.

(Poročilo o delu državnega zbora, 2000)  
ali

(Zbirka navijaških šalov)

Glede ostalih dodatnih oblik navajanja uporabljene literature ali virov naj se avtorica oziroma avtor obrne na uredništvo TIP.

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### 500

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Table 1: COMMITTEE EFFECT

Relugative effect	Mixet effect	Distributional effect
BUDG, TRAN, IMCO,	ECON, ENVI, ITRE, LIBE	EMPL, AGRI, PECH, REGI
JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA	JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA	JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA

Source: Yordanova, 2009: 256.

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*The fact that most of the posts have been liked is an evidence that citizens find the posts made by the local government interesting and useful, but they do not show any further interest by sharing the information with friends or by engaging in dialog commenting on them.* (Bonsón et al., 2013: 12)

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First Name LAST NAME

Institutional affiliation

Author's First and Last Name

Title: Subtitle

Publisher, City Year of publication, number of pages, price (ISBN number)

John SMITH

Oxford University

Eviatar Zerubavel

**Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past**



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University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2003, 184 pages, USD 25.00 (ISBN 0-226-98152-5)

## REFERENCES

The basic form of an in-text reference is (Smith, 1994). To indicate the page, use the following form: (Smith, 1994: 27–28). If two authors are referred to, they should both be stated: (Smith and Doe, 2007). When there are three or more authors, the following form should be used: (Smith et al., 1994: 27), while all authors should be mentioned in the reference list. If the author does not use the first edition of the book, the year the first edition was published should also be given: (Smith, 1953/1994: 7). Several simultaneous references should be separated by a semicolon: (Smith, 1994: 7; Doe, 1998: 3–4; 2005: 58). When citing several references by the same author published in the same year, references should be separated by letters a, b, c etc.: (Smith, 1994a; 27–29; Smith 1994b: 1) in the order they first appear in the text.

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Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title of the Book: Subtitle. City: Publisher.

Geertz, Clifford (1980): Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Featherstone, Mike and Mike Hepworth, Bryan S. Turner (eds.) (1991): The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory. London: SAGE Publications.

### *Chapters or Essays in Monographs*

Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title of the Chapter/essay in the Edited Book. In First Name Last Name of the editor (ed.), Title of the Edited Book, pages of the chapter/essay. City: Publisher.

Palan, Ronen (1999): Global Governance and Social Closure or Who is to Be Governed in an Era of Global Governance? In Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair (eds.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory, 55–72. Albany: State University New York Press.

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Activity Report of the National Assembly of Republic of Slovenia, 1996–2000. Ljubljana: National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 2000.

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or

(Collection of supporters' scarves)

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