203 Troha: Yugoslav-Italian Border and the Issue of Slovenian Access to the Sea
Nevenka Troha
YUGOSLAV-ITALIAN 
BORDER AND 
THE ISSUE OF 
SLOVENIAN ACCESS 
TO THE SEA
T
he area of Slovenian settlement along the sea stretches more 
or less continuously from Duino to the Savudrian Peninsula, 
whereby the coast from Duino to Trieste was virtually Slovenian until the mid-
20
th
 century. A study written by Marjan Mašera prior to the implementation of 
the provisions laid down at the peace conference with Italy on 15 September 1947 
thus envisions the Free Territory of Trieste divided into the Trieste municipality, 
which would be given special status, and five other districts (Aurisina/Nabrežina, 
Muggia, Koper, Piran and Buje). According to Mašera’s data, the planned district 
of Aurisina with municipalities of Duino (Devin), Aurisina and Sgonico (Zgonik) 
that would extend between the municipality of Trieste and the border between the 
Free T erritory of T rieste (FTT) and Italy had 6,043 inhabitants at the time, 5,227 of 

204 Between the House of Habsburg and Tito
whom were Slovenes, 808 Italians, 7 Croats and 1 other.
600
 According to the same 
data, the population of the planned district of Muggia with municipalities of San 
Dorligo della Valle (Dolina), Muggia (Milje) and Škofije that would encompass 
the territory east of the municipality of Trieste and all the way to the border of 
Zone B or the Koper district, numbered 15,981, of whom 10,736 were Slovenes, 
5,219 were Italians, 15 were Croats and 11 were of other nationalities.
601
 Let me 
just add that in February 1948, the Yugoslav authorities counted the population 
of the then Koper district of Zone B of the FTT to number 20,905 Slovenes and 
23,993 Italians (and 363 Croats).
602
The rule that Italians lived in the cities, while Slovenes (and Croats) lived in 
the countryside, was true for the cities of the part of Istria that is now Slovenian, 
but not for Trieste or Muggia. If official data put the number of Italians in Koper 
in 1910 at 7,909, or 88 % of the population, in October 1945 at 5,362, or 87 %, and 
in February 1948 at 6,695, or as much as 96 % of the population − and similar 
data could be provided for Izola or Piran − Trieste with its surroundings was 
home to 59,319 Slovenes in 1910, or as much as a third of the population, while 
the Yugoslav estimates still put their number at 46,469 or slightly less than a 
fifth of the population in October 1945.
603
 Furthermore, Italian historian Carlo 
Schiffrer estimated the Trieste region to be home to 45,000 Slovenes, or 20 % of 
the population, in 1946.
604
 
After 1918 (or, rather, after the November 1920 signature of the Rapallo 
Treaty between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes), as the border separated Littoral Slovenes (and Istrian Croats) from 
the core of their nation within the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
(Y ugoslavia), the “Y ugoslav Slovenia” , if I may call it that for the sake of simplicity, 
was separated from the sea by a wide band of territory belonging to the Kingdom 
of Italy but densely settled with Slovenes, except for the coast. While the Treaty 
of Peace between the Allied and the Associated Powers and Italy signed on 10 
February 1947 and implemented on 15 September of the same year annexed 
600 The municipality of Duino had 1,884 inhabitants, 1,593 of whom were Slovenes, Aurisina had 
2,587 inhabitants, 2,072 of whom were Slovenes, and Sgonico had 1,572 people, 1,562 of whom 
were Slovenes. – SI AS 1529, box. 2, Marjan Mašera: Krajevne oblasti v STO-ju z vidika teritorialne 
razdelitve.
601 The municipality of San Doriligo della Valle had 3,949 people, 3,866 of whom were Slovenes, Škofije 
had 3,240 inhabitants, 3,126 of whom were Slovenes, and Muggia had 8,792 people, 3,744 of whom 
were Slovenes. – SI AS 1529, box 2, Marjan Mašera: Krajevne oblasti v STO-ju z vidika teritorialne 
razdelitve.
602 SI AS 1589, box 54, Elaborat Statistični pregled prebivalstva Istrskega okrožja STO, 12 February 1948.
603 Cadastre national de l’Istrie. Sušak, 1946. SI AS 1589, box 54, Elaborat Statistični pregled prebivalstva 
Istrskega okrožja STO, 12 February 1948. Data of the 1910 census have been published multiple 
times, e.g. in Novak and Zwitter (eds.),  Oko Trsta, pp. 141–152. 
604 Carlo Schiffrer: La Venezia Giulia. Saggio di una carta dei limiti nazionali italo–jugoslavi. Roma, 
1946, p. 122.

205 Troha: Yugoslav-Italian Border and the Issue of Slovenian Access to the Sea
much of this territory to the People’s Republic of Slovenia (based on census data 
from 1910, the annexed territories were home to 182,474 Slovenes and only 222 
Italians), the latter did not reach the sea.
605
 The reason for this was that the area 
of Slovenian coastal settlement was included in the Free Territory of Trieste, an 
independent country under the protection of the Security Council of the UN, 
which was also supposed to appoint its governor.
 
However, this did not happen, 
and in accordance with the Instrument for the Provisional Regime of the FTT, 
an annex of the peace treaty with Italy, the FTT remained divided into Zone 
A under British-American military government and Zone B under Yugoslav 
military government.
606
 This provisional arrangement was resolved with the 
signature of the Memorandum of Understanding on 5 October 1954 (called also 
the Memorandum of London), when the former zones were, with minor border 
corrections to Yugoslavia’s benefit, assigned to the two countries.
From the perspective of national interests, the People’s Republic of Slovenia 
was cut off from the sea until 1954. However, the actual situation was different. In 
early May 1945, the Yugoslav units liberated and occupied the whole of Venezia 
Giulia, setting up a temporary military government in accordance with the 5 May 
1945 agreement between General Peter Drapšin, commander of the IV
th
 Army 
of the Yugoslav forces, and General John Harding, commander of the British 
XIII Corps, while the British-American forces remained in Trieste and within a 
corridor towards Austria. The military administration transferred some of their 
powers to civilian authorities; in the Slovenian Littoral and Trieste, such a civilian 
body was the Regional National Liberation Committee for the Slovenian Littoral 
and Trieste (PNOO). In practice, this meant that the PNOO, together with local 
authorities with Italian participation, exercised civilian authority in the whole 
coastal region between the mouth of the Soča (Isonzo) river and the Savudrian 
Peninsula.
607
 
The Slovenian civilian authorities remained in charge of part of Zone B of 
Venezia Giulia even after the Yugoslav forces left Trieste on 12 June 1945. The 
reason for this was that an agreement between the Allied forces and Yugoslavia 
was signed in Belgrade on 9 June 1945, dividing Venezia Giulia, the region whose 
future national affiliation was the subject of the peace talks, into two occupation 
605 Novak and Zwitter (eds.), Oko Trsta, pp. 141–152. The territory in question is located between the 
Rapallo border between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from 
November 1920 and today’s border between the Italian Republic and the Republic of Slovenia, but 
without the Koper District which was part of Zone B of the FTT from September 1947 to October 1954.
606 The creation and government of the FTT were governed by the Treaty of Peace between the Allies 
and Italy, signed on 10 February 1947, specifically by Articles 4 and 21 and Annexes VI (Permanent 
Statute) and VII (Instrument for the Provisional Regime).  
607 Nevenka Troha: Uprava v Slovenskem primorju 1918–1954 (Pregled) [Administration in the 
Slovenian Littoral Region 1918–1954 (Overview)]. Arhivi, 1997, No. 1-2, pp. 88–102.

206 Between the House of Habsburg and Tito
zones.
608
 In Zone A, located between the Austrian-Italian border from 1915 
and the demarcation (Morgan’s) line, administration was taken over by the 
British-American Allied Military Government, while Zone B, located between 
the demarcation line and the Rapallo border, was governed by the Military 
Government of the Yugoslav Army (VUJA) for the Slovenian Littoral, Istria 
and Rijeka, which was established on 25 June 1945 based on Marshal Josip Broz 
Tito’s Order No. 218. In his Order, Tito emphasized that the local civilian powers 
of the national liberation committees should remain fully intact and that the 
committees should keep exercising them in close collaboration with the military 
administration.
609
 As early as 1945, Zone B thus saw the implementation of the 
Yugoslav system, albeit adjusted to the exceptional circumstances, with Yugoslav 
laws and regulations not being enforced directly but, rather, if permitted under 
the provisional administration status (there were some exceptions), re-adopted 
by the VUJA and civilian authorities. In the east, the border between Zone B and 
Yugoslavia was the still legally valid Yugoslav-Italian (Rapallo) border that could 
only be crossed with special permits. 
From the very creation of Zone B of the Venezia Giulia, its division into 
Slovenian and Croatian areas was clear. The Slovenian part of Zone B − Zone B 
of the Slovenian Littoral − encompassed all of the Trieste and Gorizia provinces, 
which came under Yugoslav military government pursuant to the provisional 
treaty. The Eastern Littoral District with its supreme governing body, the 
Commissariat of PNOO, was established in this area. Although the governments 
of the two federal units (future people’s republics) had no formal powers in 
the territory, which international law still recognized as part of Italy, they had 
actual power, as local bodies of the people’s government as well as the military 
administration acted in accordance with their instructions. This also means that 
the People’s Republic of Slovenia, or its Koper District, had de facto access to the 
sea from as early as June 1945 onward.
610
Even before the war ended, on 13 March 1945, the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of Slovenia sent Boris Kraigher, one of the most capable 
Slovenian Communists, to the Slovenian Littoral with broad powers in order to 
be able to fully direct and manage the operation of all the local pro-Yugoslav 
organizations.
611
 Until his return to Ljubljana in July 1946, when he became 
Slovenian Minister of Internal Affairs, Kraigher was the key figure of the 
608 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici FLRJ, 1945. Belgrade, 1984, pp. 81–82.
609 Troha, Uprava, p. 100. 
610 For details on the operation of the Commissariat of PNOO, see France Perovšek: Moja resnica [My 
Truth]. Koper, 1997, pp. 13–146.
611 SI AS 1487, CK KPS, box 1: Zapis seje CK KPS, 13 March 1945, 42, Beležke Vide Tomšič, zapis 
okrožnega posvetovanja KPS, 23 March 1945.

207 Troha: Yugoslav-Italian Border and the Issue of Slovenian Access to the Sea
Slovenian government and the Party in the whole of Venezia Giulia, both in 
Zone A and in Zone B. Kraigher coordinated his decisions with the Slovenian 
government, especially with Slovenian Prime Minister Boris Kidrič. However, the 
most important decisions were only adopted by senior Slovenian Party officials 
once they had been approved by Edvard Kardelj, a top member of the Yugoslav 
government as well as the head of the Y ugoslav delegation at the peace conference 
with Italy.
612
At the peace talks, Yugoslavia demanded its border with Italy to be drawn 
along the Slovenian western ethnic border,
613
 with minor adjustments that 
were supposedly justified by economic reasons and were generally consistent 
with the old Austrian-Italian border from 1915. The Slovene-populated coastal 
region would thus become part of Yugoslavia, but not necessarily of the People’s 
Republic of Slovenia, as the September 1945 London conference of the council of 
foreign ministers saw Y ugoslav negotiators proposing that Trieste should become 
a separate, seventh federal unit of Yugoslavia. Such a solution would ensure the 
people of Trieste would retain their right to self-determination and provide 
for normal development of the city and its port as the international port of the 
countries in its hinterland.
614
 Slovenia would also have obtained access to the sea 
with the Soviet demarcation proposal, which was almost identical to the Y ugoslav 
one, except for the Grado area, but not with the proposals of two of the western 
powers, the U.S. and Great Britain, which assigned the whole of western Istria 
to Italy, nor with the French proposal, which stipulated the creation of the Free 
T erritory of Trieste. The latter proposal was the one that was ultimately adopted.
615
 
Throughout the negotiations regarding the new Italian borders, the issue of 
Slovenia’s access to the sea was continually pointed out, particularly by Littoral 
Slovenes. Before the arrival of the international border commission
616
 in February 
1946, priest and Christian Socialist Virgil Šček thus wrote in a letter to Boris 
Kraigher: “Should the commission propose a border that would more or less cut 
Slovenes from the sea /.../ and should their counterparts claim that Yugoslavia 
612 For details, see Nevenka Troha: Politika slovensko-italijanskega bratstva. Slovansko-italijanska 
antifašistična unija v coni A Julijske krajine [Slovenian-Italian Brotherhood Policy. Slavic-Italian 
Anti-Fascist Union in Zone A of Venezia Giulia]. Ljubljana, 1998.
613 In accordance with the theory that states cities belong to the hinterland, the Slovenian ethnic border 
runs along the border of compact Slovenian settlement. The border also encompasses cities with 
majority foreign populations, specifically Italian populations in the west.
614 SI AS 1277, box 29, Annex 2, The future status of Trieste in the view of the government of Democratic 
Federal Yugoslavia (DFJ), 27 September 1945. Janko Jeri: Tržaško vprašanje po drugi svetovni vojni 
[The Trieste Question after World War II]. Ljubljana, 1961, pp. 133–136. 
615 Ibid., pp. 144–153.
616 The commission of experts from the four major powers that was supposed to study the national 
distribution in the field. The commission was created by a decision adopted on 19 September 1945 at 
the London Conference and was present in Venezia Giulia between 7
 
March 1946 and 4 April 1946. 
Author’s note. 

208 Between the House of Habsburg and Tito
had plenty of sea in Istria and Dalmatia, is the Slovenian government in Ljubljana 
prepared to protest: Yugoslavia is a federal state, and the Istrian and Dalmatian 
sea belongs to Croatia. We Slovenes are a nation, we are next to the sea and the 
sea is ours. ”
 617
 
Demands that Slovenia have access to the sea were not met by the peace 
treaty of 1947 and would have remained unmet to this day if the FTT actually 
developed as planned in the Permanent Statute. The question of the election 
results in the FTT and the subsequent forming of the government remains the 
subject of hypothesis. However, in light of the fact that data obtained by the 
Yugoslav government in 1947 indicate that the FTT was populated by 249,280 
Italians, 82,645 Slovenes and 10,799 Croats,
618
 it is justified to believe that the 
election would have been won by Italian national parties. As the Yugoslav 
authorities were well aware of this problem in the time of the preparation 
activities for the creation of FTT, they instructed pro-Yugoslav organizations, 
whose membership included Italian Communists, to try and form ties with other 
left-leaning Italians, particularly the Socialists and the “independents” who had 
advocated establishing an independent country between 1945 and 1947.
619
 Parts 
of the Italian left centre argued for reconciliation between pro-Italian and pro-
Yugoslav organizations as well, however, they still interpreted it in a way that 
would result in their domination. According to their data, Italians represented 
as much as 80 % of the FTT population, so they did not consent to bilingualism 
as determined by the peace treaty, specifically one of its annexes, the Permanent 
Statute of the FTT.
620
 
In accordance with the provisions of the provisional statute, the division into 
two zones and two military administrations continued, albeit in a much smaller 
area of the FTT. The Military Government of the Yugoslav (People’s) Army for 
the Yugoslav Zone of the FTT as the government transferred powers regarding 
local administration to civilian authorities. 20 February 1947 saw the creation 
of the Regional People’s Committee of Istria (RPCI) and the District People’s 
Committees of Koper and Buje, associated with the Slovenian and Croatian 
authorities respectively.
621
 The division was made even more apparent on 15 May 
617 Pismo Virgila Ščeka Borisu Kraigherju, undated, before 17 March 1946. – Marko Tavčar, Egon 
Pelikan and Nevenka Troha: Korespondenca Virgila Ščeka 1918–1947 [Virgil Šček’s Correspondence 
1918–1947]. Viri 11. Ljubljana, 1997, p. 158.
618 SI AS 1529, box 3, Svobodno tržaško ozemlje, statistika prebivalstva.
619 Nevenka Troha: Komu Trst. Slovenci in Italijani med dvema državama [Who Gets Trieste. Slovenians 
and Italians between Two States]. Ljubljana, 1999, pp. 261–264. SI AS 1277, box 30/5, Politično 
poročilo s posebnim ozirom na bližnje občinske volitve v anglo-ameriški coni STO, 31 March 1949.
620 Archivio storico diplomatico del Ministero degli affari esteri. Affari politici 1946–1950, Italia, box 
135, Lettera di Edmound Puecher al ministro degli esteri Carlo Sforza, 28 February 1947.
621 Uradni list Istrskega okrožnega ljudskega odbora, No. 1, 1 September 1947, Odlok o ustanovitvi 
Istrskega okrožja.

209 Troha: Yugoslav-Italian Border and the Issue of Slovenian Access to the Sea
1952 when the commander of the VUJA issued an order transferring the powers 
of RPCI to the District People’s Committees in Koper and Buje.
622
 
The Cominform resolution of late June 1948 turned the situation on the 
local political left on its head, with the great majority of Italian workers as well 
as the majority of left-leaning Slovenes in the Zone A opting for proletarian 
internationalism and the Soviet Union. The post-war policies of the Communist 
Party of Slovenia, which often left the national question by the side and focused on 
class issues in order to retain the support of the local Italian workers, now started 
to work against the Party itself. “What the reaction was unable to accomplish in 
three years, Vidali
623
 did in three days when he trampled on the workers’ religious 
loyalty to the Soviet Union. He turned the Party and the masses into two fronts 
fighting each other instead of imperialism,” reads a report composed by Franc 
Hočevar, head of the Yugoslav economic delegation in Trieste.
624
 
The Cominform resolution also transformed the international power 
relations. Because Yugoslavia was gradually turning from an adversary into 
an ally, the U.S. and Great Britain, who no longer needed to keep their forces 
in Trieste, were interested in the normalization of relations between Italy and 
Yugoslavia; however, this was impossible without a resolution of the question of 
Trieste. The two powers also tried to resolve the Trieste issue because the Soviet 
Union was linking it to the question of Austria from May 1950 onward. From 
late 1949 onward, the U.S. and Great Britain thus pressured Italy and Yugoslavia 
to come to an agreement which, in their opinion, would be simplest to reach 
based on the current state of affairs, by assigning Zone A to Italy and Zone B to 
Yugoslavia, with some minor corrections.
625
While Yugoslavia constantly emphasized the importance of FTT’s 
preservation in talks with western diplomats, it also considered the territory, 
organized pursuant to the Permanent Statute, to be unacceptable. In such a case, 
the Yugoslav military government would have had to retreat from Zone B, in 
which a regime identical to the one used in Y ugoslavia was becoming increasingly 
622 Uradni list Vojne uprave JA jugoslovanske zone na STO in Istrskega okrožnega ljudskega odbora.
623 Vittorio Vidali: Secretary of the pro-Cominform Communist Party of the FTT. (Author’s note).
624 SI AS 1277, box 30/5, Politički izvještaj naročito u vezi pretstoječih opštinskih izbora u angloameričkoj 
coni STT, 31 March 1949.
625 Fearing that the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 would be followed by the Soviet Union 
provoking another incident in Europe, the W estern powers reinforced NATO by extending it to Greece 
and T urkey and provided military aid to Y ugoslavia. – SI AS 1277, box 31/6, Zabeležka razgovora med 
jugoslovanskim veleposlanikom v Rimu Mladenom Ivekovićem in italijanskim zunanjim ministrom 
Carlom Sforzo, undated, 1950; Telegram Mladena Ivekovića ministru za zunanje zadeve, 18 January 
1950; Zabeležka razgovora med Titom in veleposlanikom ZDA v Beogradu Georgom V. Allenom, 
9 August 1951. SI AS 1277, box 32/8, Elaborat Diplomatski razvoj tržaškega vprašanja, 1 September 
1952. Yugoslav diplomats also had information according to which the Soviet Union, using Socialist 
Pietro Nenni as an intermediary, offered the FTT to Italy in early 1952, with the condition that Italy 
withdraw from the Atlantic Treaty.

210 Between the House of Habsburg and Tito
well-established. In July 1952, Edvard Kardelj said: “The Slovene and Italian 
proletariat in Zone B would only lose, while the proletariat in Zone A would 
gain nothing and would sooner or later end up as Italy’s dominion. We have not 
been implementing such nationalist policies and do not intend to do so in the 
future. If this should happen, a division of the zones would be preferable.”
626
 At 
the same time, those associated with the Yugoslav government would lose any 
election held in the whole FTT by a large margin. If chances were realistic for the 
pro-Yugoslav forces together with the independents to win the election if it were 
held prior to the Cominform resolution, the municipal elections in Zone A in 
1949 saw the pro-Yugoslav Slovenian-Italian People’s Front only winning 5,344 
votes, while the pro-Cominform Communist Party of the FTT won eight times 
as many and pro-Italian parties won over 60 percent.
627
  
During the negotiations regarding the fate of the FTT, the Yugoslav 
government had to mind the demands of Slovenes in the Trieste region who 
rejected the return of Italy to Trieste. Yugoslavia tried to lessen their resistance 
by having the Special Statute be adopted as an annex to the Memorandum 
of Understanding of October 1954, containing provisions dealing with the 
protection of minorities, both the Italian minority in Y ugoslavia and the Slovenian 
minority in Italy, but only in the territory of the former FTT.
628
 At the same time, 
Yugoslavia had to remember the fact that the question of Trieste was subject to 
significant exploitation in propaganda both in Yugoslavia and in Italy. With the 
Yugoslav and Italian governments thus unprepared to forfeit an area that each 
of their peoples considered their own, a provisional resolution had to be found 
that would eventually become permanent. Or as Tito told the British ambassador 
in Belgrade Sir Charles Peake in August 1951: “Italians will not declare a waiver 
of further demands of territory, and we will never give up Trieste. But at the 
moment, as we cannot do otherwise without allowing the Soviet Union to exploit 
the situation, we’re giving Trieste to Italy. ”
629
 
All proposals submitted by Yugoslavia after April 1950 paid heed to the 
demands of the People’ s Republic of Slovenia for access to the sea. In April 1950, the 
Y ugoslav negotiators thus proposed that Italy should get Trieste, while Y ugoslavia 
should get Zone B as well as a part of Zone A based on ethnic compensation.
630
 In 
August 1950, Tito held separate discussions with the U.S. ambassador George V . 
626 SI AS 537, box 1303, Zapisnik seje o problemih tržaškega gibanja, 4 July 1952.
627 SI AS 1569, 172, Zapisnik zasedanja partijskega aktiva, 14 June 1949. Nevenka Troha: Volitve v coni 
A Svobodnega tržaškega ozemlja [Elections in the Zone A of the Free Trieste Territory]. In: Luthar 
and Perovšek (eds.), Zbornik Janka Pleterskega, pp. 475–490.
628 The Special Statute is published in Jeri, Tržaško vprašanje, pp. 363–368.
629 SI AS 1277, box 31/7, Zabeležka razgovora med Titom in Charlesom Peakom, 12 August 1951.
630 SI AS 1277, box 32/8, Referat Naši predlogi za rešitev vprašanja STO in italijansko reagiranje nanje, 
1 September 1952.

211 Troha: Yugoslav-Italian Border and the Issue of Slovenian Access to the Sea
Allen and the British ambassador Sir Charles Peake, setting the status quo as the 
starting point, but also proposing, as one of the alternatives, that Y ugoslavia would 
make Zone B an autonomous region similar to Kosovo and Vojvodina, that Italy 
would get Trieste and that the rest of Zone A would be given to Yugoslavia. And 
the worst possibility still acceptable to Yugoslavia would have been the division 
of the zones with some border corrections so that Italy would get Koper and a 
narrow corridor to Trieste, while Yugoslavia would get the villages next to the 
railway in Zone A. Additionally, Tito demanded an autonomous statute for both 
minorities.
631
 
According to the next Y ugoslav proposal made in December 1951, Y ugoslavia 
would get the area around Servola (Škedenj, eastern T rieste) and Aquilinia (Žavlje) 
and the Muggia Peninsula, while Italy would get T rieste, Koper and Izola with their 
immediate environs. The two Istrian cities would thus become an Italian enclave 
with a road and maritime connection to the parent country regulated according 
to a special regime. At the same time, Italy would also get the Slovene-settled 
corridor with a road and a railway in Zone A, stretching from the border between 
Italy and the FTT valid at the time to Trieste. The swap was justified by the ethnic 
principle as the demanded area in Zone A was mostly Slovene while Koper and 
Izola were mostly Italian. The Yugoslav government stressed that the annexation 
of Servola and Aquilinia was also important for the economic development of the 
entire Istria, the Slovenian Littoral as well as Slovenia as a whole, as it would have 
compensated the loss of the coast and Trieste. A port was supposed to have been 
constructed in this area, connecting to the Yugoslav hinterland.
632
 The official 
Yugoslav explanation claimed that such a proposal was favourable to Italy as the 
annexed territory would have contained more Yugoslavs (about 48,000) than 
Yugoslavia Italians (about 29,000). However, looking at the ethnic shares of the 
minorities, Italy would be home to about 50,000 Slovenes more than Yugoslavia 
would be home to Italians. The Yugoslav negotiators submitted data indicating 
that the 1910 census of the area annexed to Yugoslavia in 1947 found 114,076 
Italians living there, the 1948 census found 67,856 and the 1951 census found 
about 40,000. According to the Yugoslav government, the number of Italians 
dropped dramatically due to the voluntary emigration of 114,000 Italians (over 
30,000 in 1948 alone). The emigration supposedly confirmed that the Italians 
631 SI AS 1277, box 31/7, Zapisnik razgovora med Titom in Georgem V. Allenom, 9 August 1951; 
Zapisnik razgovora med Titom in Charlesom Peakom, 12 August 1951.
632 SI AS 1277, box 32/8, Zabeležka razgovora med Edvardom Kardeljem in Georgem V . Allenom, 28 
January 1952. Among other things, Kardelj explained to Allen that there are Slovenian settlements 
with great economic weight located next to the Italian cities of Istria (Servola, Aquilinia). One 
notable fact of this discussion is that the border Kardelj indicated as the one masses would interpret 
as the result of extreme concessions given to Italy was the demarcation line, which was actually 
implemented in 1954 with only minor adjustments.

212 Between the House of Habsburg and Tito
living there were not an “indigenous ethnic element attached to this place” , but, 
rather, immigrants. According to the same source, about 80,000 Slovenes lived 
within Italy’s borders in 1951.
633
 
As the relations between Y ugoslavia and Italy again became strained, Tito used the 
6 September 1953 gathering in Okroglica near the Italy-Y ugoslav border organized to 
celebrate the 6
th
 anniversary of the annexation of the Slovenian Littoral to Yugoslavia 
(some sources claim the gathering was attended by about 200,000 people) to denounce 
Italian policies and make a propaganda-serving demand that Trieste become an 
international city while all its surroundings are annexed to Yugoslavia.
634
  
The turning point for the resolution of the Trieste question was the decision 
made by the two western powers on 8 October 1953 to retreat their troops from 
Zone A and hand it over to Italy, whereby no date of retreat was set. One of the 
reasons for the decision were the newly strained relations between Italy and 
Yugoslavia. As the western powers had not notified the Yugoslav authorities of 
this measure, the reaction was severe. The Yugoslav government organized mass 
protests and responded to Italian military reinforcements arriving at the border by 
sending their own. However, Tito’s speeches in Leskovac and Skopje on 10 and 11 
October 1953 scaled down the demands from Okroglica, with Tito proposing Italy 
to get Trieste and Yugoslavia to get the rest of Zone A and the whole of Zone B.
635
On 15 October 1953, the situation that had arisen was discussed by the 
Federal Executive Council of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY). 
Chief reporter Edvard Kardelj presented the genesis of the Trieste question and 
the Yugoslav proposals for its resolution. He noted that the latest measures taken 
by the U.S. and Great Britain were actually humiliating towards Yugoslavia as 
the Yugoslav government had always counted on the West taking into account 
at least a minimal share of Yugoslav demands, i.e. that Italy should not get the 
whole Zone A, that minorities would be allowed an autonomous statute and that 
Yugoslav interests in the port of Trieste be recognized. Yugoslavia could thus not 
acquiesce to the solution that was being forced upon it. The Yugoslav citizens had 
reacted swiftly and spontaneously as what had happened, according to Kardelj, 
“was not merely the loss of our territory but an insult to our independence and 
international equality − the pride of our nations” .
636
 
Pro-Italian protests broke out in Trieste, turning into bloody unrest on 3 
633 SI AS 1277, box 32/8. Memorandum 1952. According to some estimates, a total of 200,000 to 250,000 
Italians emigrated from the territories that were annexed to Yugoslavia. 
634 Trst naj postane internacionalno mesto, vse slovensko ozemlje pa priključi k Jugoslaviji. – Slovenski 
poročevalec, 7 September 1953, p. 1. 
635 Slovenski poročevalec, 11 and 12 October 1954. In Skopje, Tito also uttered his famous words: “I 
declare that we will always be vigilant of any Italian soldiers entering Zone A. At the moment they 
do – we will march on the zone ourselves. ”
636 SI AS 1277, box 30, Zabeležke Edvarda Kardelja za tajno sejo ZIS, 15
 
October 1953.

213 Troha: Yugoslav-Italian Border and the Issue of Slovenian Access to the Sea
November, the anniversary of Italy’s entrance into Trieste in 1918. At the same 
time, diplomatic talks began, primarily due to Yugoslavia’s resolute reaction. 
The Yugoslav government instructed its negotiators to try and prevent the peace 
treaty from being implemented, although they were formally not allowed to 
renounce it as it represented a legal foundation. The negotiators were supposed to 
make various demands regarding the border that they anticipated to be rejected. 
However, they were also allowed to negotiate a division along the demarcation line 
with some adjustments. The treaty was supposed to be formed so that Italy would 
not formally forgo Zone B and Yugoslavia would not do so for Zone A, while the 
Western powers would publicly state that they would not support the demands of 
either side after the agreement on the temporary demarcation of the zones.
637
 
This was followed by a period of negotiations at which the Y ugoslav government 
appended its fundamental demands with an autonomous statute that would 
ensure the equality of the Yugoslav population in Zone A (as well as the Italian 
population in Zone B). At the same time, Y ugoslavia was no longer ready to accept 
substitutions in Zone B not tied to substitutions in the Gulf of Trieste.
638
 In the 
concluding phase of the negotiations in June 1954, representatives of the Federal 
Secretariat of Foreign Affairs notified the leaders of pro-Yugoslav organizations 
in the Trieste region of their progress, including the fact that the Statute of the 
FTT would de iure continue existing but that the provisional situation would 
automatically become final. The pro-Yugoslav organizations were also notified 
of a minor border adjustment on the Muggia Peninsula in order to give Koper, 
which was to become the centre of the Slovenian Littoral, a larger hinterland. 
The U.S. and Great Britain undertook to try and influence Italy to guarantee that 
Trieste would remain autonomous due to its great economic import.
639
 
The progress of diplomatic negotiations was closely monitored by Slovenes 
living in the Trieste region
640
 who were most shocked by the information 
that Yugoslavia would give up Trieste and be compensated with funds for the 
construction of a port in Koper and a railway connection to Ljubljana.
641
 The 
only bright spot was the hope that the parent country would ensure Italy would 
compensate for the injustices of Fascism and provide Slovenes with effective 
minority protection. In the countryside, people were concerned that, should they 
637 SI AS 1277, box 33/9, Pismo Edvarda Kardelja ambasadi v Washingtonu, 21 October 1953.
638 SI AS 1277, box 33/10, Zabeležka razgovora med Edvardom Kardeljem in britanskim veleposlanikom 
v Beogradu Ivom Malletom, 8 March 1954. 
639 SI AS 537, box 1303, Zapisnik seje pri oddelku za zamejstvo, 15 June 1954.
640 SI AS 1931, Engelbert Besednjak: Pismo Engelberta Besednjaka, 9 July 1954. Besednjak wrote: “For 
Slovenes, the entrance of Italy into Trieste will be a day of sorrow, anger and despair. ”
641 SI AS 1931, Engelbert Besednjak: Pismo Engelberta Besednjaka, 18 May 1954. The people were 
supposedly saying: “We’re being sold off! Yugoslavia will receive aid from the U.S. in the form of 
weapons and funds, and we’re to be eaten up by the Italians. ”

214 Between the House of Habsburg and Tito
be annexed to Y ugoslavia, they would be cut off from Trieste with which they had 
economic ties.
642
 The only solution that would have been at least partly acceptable 
to the local population would thus have been one that would include a very 
permeable border, which would alleviate the economic crisis as well as bolster 
the Slovene community in Trieste that would thus be able to keep in contact with 
their compatriots.
643
 
 The negotiations concluded with the adoption of the Memorandum 
of Understanding of 5 October 1954, which divided the two zones of the FTT 
between the two countries, with some minor adjustments in Yugoslavia’s favour. 
The Yugoslav civilian administration (military duty, legislation, regulations, 
organization of government, etc.) thus extended to Zone B. In 1975, the 
provisional treaty was further built upon by the Treaty of Osimo signed between 
Italy and Yugoslavia. 
In his speech upon the publication of the Memorandum of Understanding, 
Boris Kraigher stressed that the treaty was very clear regarding Y ugoslavia’ s rights 
in this area. In this regard, he emphasized the Western powers’ statement that 
they would no longer support Italian demands. It was imperative to create such 
relations between the two countries as to make the border as irrelevant an issue 
as possible, and Kraigher believed this could be achieved through the creation 
of socialist relations in Yugoslavia and Italy. Kraigher continues: “The Yugoslav 
policy regarding the western border has long been based on the motto: We’d 
give our lives − we won’t give Trieste! /.../ However, if we wanted to consistently 
stick to the motto, we should have given our lives back in 1945 when our troops 
were forced to leave Trieste. That’s when this issue was decided.” Kraigher 
further stressed the importance of the fact that Yugoslavia withdrew its demands 
regarding Trieste based on an agreement, “that we have forced the Italians to 
recognize the specificity of our interests in Trieste, to recognize the existenc e of 
our national minorities, to recognize our economic interests. /.../ I do not believe 
that this is the only solution for Trieste, however, it is the only one possible at the 
moment. We will help uplift Koper, but not as competition to Trieste but rather 
as a centre that would be able to replace Trieste for us. /.../ We will not receive 
any direct aid from the Allies to build up Zone B, and we haven’t requested it 
either. This is our own undertaking. With regard to our aid to Trieste and our 
organizations based in the city, we will help according to our abilities. ”
644
642 SI AS 1931, Engelbert Besednjak, Pismo Engelberta Besednjaka, 18 May 1954. 
643 Ibid.
644 SI AS 1529, box 22, Govor Borisa Kraigherja, undated, after the adoption of the Memorandum of 
Understanding in October 1954.