

Michael Strubell

---

## The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016)

The recent Catalan independence process has already attracted a great deal of scholarly attention, quite apart from the media coverage. Some good chronologies are available, making it superfluous to present another, albeit more updated one. Opinion polls and surveys, as well as election results, have been analysed, as have the upheavals suffered by most political parties. The paper highlights and documents some apparently lesser-disseminated aspects of the process. Special attention is devoted to the cold repression, or deactivating mechanisms, that the Spanish authorities have put in place, with varying degrees of success. The paper asks to what extent these strategies are likely to solve the current conflict with Catalonia, and whether they are all admissible in a modern (western) democracy. In the conclusion the long-term effectiveness of such mechanisms, in practice, will be discussed, in the face of the clash between democratic legitimacy and the legal constraints of a Constitution written shortly after the end of a 36-year-long dictatorship.

**Keywords:** Catalonia, independence movement, social movements, deactivating mechanisms, politics.

## Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016)

*Čeprav še ni dolgo aktualno, je vprašanje katalonske neodvisnosti vzbudilo precejšnjo pozornost strokovnjakov v nasprotju z mediji, ki o tem niso veliko poročali. Na voljo je veliko izčrpnih kronoloških pregledov tega procesa, zato bodo v tem prispevku izpuščeni, čeprav za ceno večje ažurnosti. Narejenih je bilo tudi veliko analiz mnenjskih anket, volilnih rezultatov in pretresov, ki jih je proces sprožil povsod razen v najbolj zakrknjenih strankah. V članku bo osvetljenih nekaj manj znanih vidikov procesa in vsak posebej bo podprt z dokumentarnim gradivom. Posebna pozornost bo posvečena deaktivacijskim mehanizmom, ki so jih uporabile španske oblasti – ponekod uspešno, spet drugje ne. V zaključnem delu bo poudarek na dolgoročni učinkovitosti omenjenih mehanizmov v praksi, še posebej v luči razkoraka med demokratično legitimnostjo in legalnimi zadržki, zapisanimi v ustavi, ki je nastala nedolgo po koncu 36-letne diktature.*

**Ključne besede:** Katalonija, gibanje za neodvisnost, socialna gibanja, deaktivacijski mehanizmi, politika.

---

**Correspondence address:** Michael Strubell, Linguapax International, Carrer de Pelai, 12, 3M, ES-08001 Barcelona, Catalonia, e-mail: info@linguapax.org, m\_strubell@yahoo.com.

## 1. Introduction

Any attempt to look at present-day Catalonia needs to start with its historical context. For over three centuries Spain as a nascent political project has had to cope with ethnic (ethnolinguistic is a preferred term) diversity, with the more or less openly confessed aim of assimilating the Catalans (including Valencians and Majorcans), the Basques (including the Navarrese) and the Galicians into a unified nation based on the Castilian people and their language, culture, history, laws and form of government. The Portuguese managed to escape from this project and restore their independence in 1640. Other former Christian kingdoms and independent countdoms (one, Catalonia, had developed a considerable empire in the Mediterranean in the 14<sup>th</sup>–15<sup>th</sup> centuries) that had grown up in the wake of the reconquering of the Iberian Peninsula from the Moors, gradually became part of a huge empire stretching across much of the world.

This assimilationist policy was the hallmark of the incumbent Bourbon monarchs that defeated the Hapsburg pretender in the War of Spanish Succession, with French help, the early 18<sup>th</sup> century. To hispanify the occupied territory, the King's 1716 secret instruction to his new leadership in Catalonia following its fall (which followed the painful withdrawal of the allies, following the Treaty of Utrecht), was that

The governor will take the greatest care to introduce the Castilian language to which end he will make the most temperate and dissimulated provisions so that the effect is obtained without the care being noticed (Monés i Pujol-Busquets 1988, 432).<sup>1</sup>

The political reawakening of the Catalans as a people took part in the general context of the Romantic revival across Europe, though until close to the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century it was a cultural, rather than political, movement. At that time the loss of the last Spanish colonies in America and Asia led to a backlash that led, for instance, to Catalan being banned in catechism and on the telephone.

In 1920 the most influential Spanish philosopher of the day wrote:

Let us not beat about the bush: Spain is a thing made by Castile, and there are reasons to suspect that, in general, only Castilian heads have adequate organs to perceive the great problem of an integrated Spain (Ortega y Gasset 2009 [1920]).<sup>2</sup>

Yet the growing power and influence of Catalonia's political institutions, in the 1920s, with a great burgeoning of Catalan culture in all its forms, and with modern 20<sup>th</sup> century policies in many fields, was resisted by the Madrid elites, and first the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930) and then the Franco dictatorship (1939-1975) – which only managed to conquer Catalonia and

put an end to the Republic after a bloody three-year war – cruelly repressed the Catalans and abolished their self-government institutions. In the year before that war broke out, many thought the Catalans and the Basques (at least) were moving towards independence, and indeed the right-wing leader José Calvo Sotelo said he preferred “a red Spain to a broken one” (Anasagasti 2006, 197), a few months before being assassinated in a revenge attack.

After Franco died in his bed in 1975, the Catalans’ and Basques’ claim to self-government was partially fulfilled in the 1978 Constitution the text of which was, however, in part imposed by the powers-that-be that insisted that it highlight the unity and indivisibility of Spain and the role of the armed forces (Vidal-Aparicio 2012). The Constitution allowed some degree of home rule to be granted not just to Catalans and Basques but to fifteen regions, most of which had never dreamt of asking for it. During the 1980s and 1990s Catalonia took over powers in the fields of education, health, planning, prisons, social welfare and others. However, the level of home rule varied in practice according to the party in power in central government, and to a number of Constitutional court rulings that cut back regional powers, thanks in both cases to one-sided interpretations of the (probably) deliberately ambiguous parts of the text. During that period (1996-2003) the People’s party was in power in Madrid, and one of its *raison d’être* is precisely to cut back regional powers and recentralize Spain, The leasing parties in Catalonia and the Basque country resisted and resented this, regarding it as a betrayal of the consensus spirit of the political transition.

Arguably the starting-point for the present – and most deeply rooted – phase of Catalonia’s political process towards independence movement can be pin-pointed in 2003, when the political parties who were to win 89 per cent of the seats in the Parliament at the regional election included in their manifestos a thorough revision of the content of the 1979 Statute of Autonomy (Generalitat de Catalunya 1979), or regional constitution; others jump ahead to 2010 following the Constitutional Court ruling (Tribunal Constitucional, 2010), requested by the Popular party, that annulled or disfigured substantial parts of the new 2006 Statute, (Generalitat de Catalunya 1979) after the draft had been severely lathed in the Spanish Parliament (or Cortes). Domènech (2013a, 2013b) presents a detailed chronology of the process, starting in 2003 and closing it at the end of 2013 (the annual publication covered events in 2013).


Whichever date is chosen, sufficient time has passed for academics to have devoted attention to the process, on several scores, and the remainder of this paper will concentrate on this period, during which time the number of publications on the subject has been considerable. Though the aim of this paper is not to offer a review of research publications, nevertheless a brief overview may be of some relevance.

Some treatises (at least, those the author has tracked down in the English language) have included Catalonia by taking an overall look at recent secession

processes, mostly placing the Scottish case in the first place (Moreno 1988, Flamini 2013, Bourne 2014, Liñeira and Cetrà 2015, Martínez and Zubiaga 2014); but see also Nagel 2001 in Scottish Affairs). Others include Scotland and Catalonia in wider-ranging studies: Guibernau et al. (2014) include Quebec, for instance. In actual fact, there are plenty of comparative studies, both earlier (e.g. Shafir 1995, on Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia, and Estonia) and more recent (Calzada 2014, 2015, Lluçh 2014, Requejo and Nagel 2014). In this area, several academics have been recently invited to give their views on US policy towards such issues, which in the past has been insensitive, in the main, to those peoples that challenged – and felt threatened by – a politically hegemonic group in a multinational country (Williams 2016, Sorens 2016, Vejvoda 2016).

Many studies are in the field of contemporary Spanish history and politics, and particularly the post-Franco era construction of a regionalised Spain. The understandable interest in comparing Basque and Catalan nationalism goes well back in time (e.g. Payne 1971) but continues today (e.g. Gillespie 2015). Martínez and Zubiaga (2014) compare Catalonia and the Basque Country using a conflict dynamics analysis approach: Triggering (or catalyzing) mechanisms, Mobilizing mechanisms, Facilitating mechanisms and Deactivating mechanisms, all interacting with processes: Desertion, Polarization, Diffusion, and “Contentious episode: Secession + State-building” (Martínez & Zubiaga 2014, see Figure 1). We shall return to the last of these mechanisms below.

*Figure 1: Mechanisms and Processes in a Secessionist Contentious Episode*



Source: Martínez and Zubiaga (2014).

Many studies regard it as an outstanding social movement sparked off by a grassroots *Assemblea Nacional Catalana* founded in 2011 (Strubell 2013, Cramer 2014, 2015, Guibernau 2012, 2014a, Burg 2015, Medir 2015), while others completely ignore this fact (e.g. Petithomme & Fernández García 2013). Its first, huge demonstration, on September 2012, gave the president of the day, Artur Mas, the courage to see independence as the only way forward for his people (Harrington 2016).

Some papers concentrate on identity issues, sometimes highlighting the field of sports (Flamini 2013, García 2012, Serrano 2014a), and issues of political discourse (Serrano 2014b). Others make theoretical contributions. Montserrat Guibernau, for instance, has developed the concept of “emancipatory nationalism” (Guibernau 2014b) to distinguish the emancipation movements of state-less nations from the nationalist ideologies that wreaked havoc in 20<sup>th</sup> century Europe.

A few have underlined the apparently centuries-old prejudice, or negative stereotypes, in relations between Catalans and Castilians (or Spaniards as a whole) (Strubell, M. 2008, 2011; Bel 2015).

In the rest of this paper, and without any claim to thoroughness, brief mention will be made of research into the causes of the recent developments in Catalonia, and into likely or possible political outcomes. However, the main thrust of the paper will be on the cold repression, or deactivating mechanisms introduced to counter the pro-independence movement, mainly by the Spanish authorities.

The research question that will be dealt with below is as follows: whereas Spain in the past has used openly violent methods to repress the claims of the so-called peripheral nationalisms; some actually hold that they pre-date and gave rise to an explicit Spanish nationalism as a reaction (De Blas 1991, Archilés Cardona 2011, 301, Fusi 1985, 55-56). In a 21<sup>st</sup> century scenario, without many deeply-held beliefs about Spain’s unity having evolved, how are Spain’s central authorities attempting to solve, or at least accommodate, the current conflict with Catalonia, and to what extent are they admissible in a western democracy?

## 2. Researching the Causes

The explanation of the massive rise in support for independence is blurred, or distorted, by the economic crisis that hit Spain (including Catalonia, of course) in 2008. Nevertheless, many authors point to the June 2010 Constitutional court judgment (Tribunal Constitucional 2010) that deemed part of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy (Generalitat de Catalunya 2006) unconstitutional as the catalyst (e.g. Ruiz-Huerta 2015, 200, Strubell 2013).

Newspaper and media coverage in general, at least until the last two or three years only, tended to suggest that the economic crisis sparked off the apparently sudden surge in pro-separatist sentiment in Catalonia. It is healthy to see objective studies of such media coverage (e.g. Martín & Camon 2014, Gironès i Soler, 2015; while Dhoest and Bastiaensens (2013) compare French- and Dutch-language media coverage in Belgium). This does not mean to say that Catalan media do not get blasted too (deservedly or otherwise; see, for instance, Román (2014).

Others place financial issues firmly at the centre of the growing support of the pro-independence movement, usually hinting at the selfish attitude of the wealthy Catalans without appreciating the vast annual net outflow of public money which meant, in effect, that Catalans were receiving sub-standard public services... or that their government was becoming increasingly indebted in order to assure quality services. The root cause was more likely the slaps in the face that the whole Statute of Autonomy affair gave rise to, from the presentation of the draft to the Spanish parliament for approval, late in 2005, until the infamous 2010 Constitutional court ruling which, in spite of the fact that the Statute had been ratified by the Catalans in a referendum, basically buried any hope of a quasi-federal interpretation of the 1978 Spanish Constitution.

Academic coverage has been far less prone to this simplification. Many authors adopt a strictly non-committal academic position, describing and contextualizing events. Crameri (2014) presents an excellent detailed overview of developments and the root causes of the current phase of Catalonia's political history. Though other elections are to be found in the literature (e.g. Davis 2004, Lago et al. 2007, Rico 2012, Colino 2013), the 2012 regional election gained prominence (largely because it marked the formal start of the institutional phase of the independence process): for instance, Hopkin, in an LSE blog (2012), and Rico and Liñeira (2014). With the results, "not only is traditional autonomist and federalist Catalan nationalism enfeebled, but the ideological distance, the polarization between the different political options, has also increased" (Petithomme & Fernandez Garcia 2013, 17).

And though recent, there are also papers on the 2015 election watershed (Martí & Cetra 2016, Orriols & Rodon 2016). Medina and Molins (2014) describe the position of SMEs in the face of the prospect of Catalonia's independence. The role of schooling in the rise of pro-independence sentiment is discussed, often superficially (this is not however the case of Clots-Figueras and Masella 2013). In a different vein, a book of interviews gave a wide range of people, mostly Catalans, the chance to explain their position, in English (Strubell 2011).

Guntermann (2013) analyzes survey data to explain support for, and opposition to, Catalonia's independence, while Serrano has both analyzed emerging Spanish nationalism in its response to Catalonia's grievances (Serrano



2008), and studied the degree of congruence in citizens' opinions (Serrano 2010). Elias (2015) gives prominence to the important issue of credibility, while economic issues feature to the fore in papers by Muñoz and Tormos (2015) and Boylan (2015). Bladé (2014) attempts to go beyond identity and economic issues.

### 3. Looking into the Future

Some authors venture personal opinions as to whether or not Catalonia will become independent in the foreseeable future. Griffiths et al. (2015) work on a model based on the hypothesis of a prior independence (or declaration of independence) by Catalonia. Weiler, after making some very controversial and hotly contested comments on the pro-independence process (among his respondents, Krisch, 2012, stands out) closes the discussion by seemingly punishing Catalonia: "I repeat: Independence? Bon Voyage. But not in the EU" (Weiler 2012). This categorical statement contrasts with much more dispassionate papers (Paço 2015, Fassbender 2013, Oskam 2014), and calls for specific solutions (e.g. Guibernau 2012). One young academic explores the reasons for the secessionist movement and concludes that she does not believe "that Catalonia will be granted independence" (Marinzel 2014). A CSIS chairholder is rotund in his belief that "A potential breakup of Spain by Catalonia is not in the U.S. interest, not in Europe's interest, not in Spain's interest and ultimately, not in Catalonia's interest" (Runde 2015). Another academic, who holds a chair at Bard College, speaks out for a federal solution, saying that "the time has come for Spanish regional and national leaders to rethink their aversion to federalism" (Encarnación 2016). However, and leaving aside a number of factual errors in the paper, he obviously ignores the fact that almost all political support for Spanish federalism always came from Catalonia (e.g. Ferrer 2012), and that the 2010 Constitutional Court judgment on the 2006 Statute of Autonomy – the drafting of which had been spear-headed by a staunch federalist, President Pasqual Maragall – effectively knocked that option out of the window.

### 4. Cold Repression

This central part of the paper is aimed to fill in a gap in academic research on Catalonia's independence process, and, in the Catalan context, we shall do as Martínez and Zubiaga (2014) and

...make reference to the deactivating mechanisms that impede the development of the secessionist contentious episode: we refer to the adaptation of the subject of the demand to repressive contexts and/or to alternative political proposals made by the kin-state (Martínez and Zubiaga 2014, 6).

The kin-state, Spain, has been very active in trying to defuse the pro-independence movement, but it would be misleading to call it simply repression.

12

The repression of social movements refers to attempts by individuals, groups, or state actors (e.g., militaries, national police, and local police) to control, constrain, or prevent protest. Historically, this has often involved increasing the costs associated with social movement participation (e.g., through violence, arrest, etc.). Commonly studied forms of repression include police action at public protest events, such as arrests and police violence, military suppression of protest events, 'disappearances' of activists, arrests and/or imprisonment of activists, infiltration of social movements by informants, covert counterintelligence programs, restrictions of free speech and assembly, assaults on human rights, and murders of social movement activists (Earl 2013).

The measures discussed below are not as drastic, as shall be seen. They are more in line with (perhaps ironically, for he writes about the Spanish civil war) a concept described by Rodrigo as "cold repression" (Rodrigo 2008, 149), see also Adorno and Horkheimer:

Chronologically asymmetric is also the mode in which in both rearguards passed over from 'hot' terror to 'cold' repression, or from 'revolutionary order' to 'public order' (Adorno & Horkheimer 2001, 207).

Nevertheless, it is an understatement to claim merely that the Spanish government "has blocked all Catalan initiatives to deliver a vote on independence" (Martí 2014). To authorize a binding referendum would be tantamount to accepting that the Catalans (and by extension, the Basques and Galicians) are a people with the right of self-determination. No accommodation whatsoever has been even hinted at by political leaders in power. The so-called *tercera via* – or middle road to solve the constitutional crisis – between no change at all and full sovereignty, by redesigning the Constitution to build a federal structure (whatever that may mean), was defended for a time in Catalonia (Calvo 2014), where it enjoyed fairly wide support (Noguer 2013) but received no concrete, positive response and fizzled out, having led several parties into crises, splits and even a dissolution (Unió Democràtica de Catalunya). Nevertheless, it is clearly in Madrid's interest to revive it from time to time (Cot 2016).

Madrid has adopted a confrontational attitude, quoting the 1978 Constitution as regarding sovereignty and the unity of Spain as indivisible, and insistently saying that Catalonia's independence (which is therefore constitutionally impossible), would be up to all Spaniards to decide (Rajoy 2014). The Spanish government has taken hundreds of local councils to court, for instance, on their stance. According to the local authority organization AMI, by October 2016 councils had been reported or taken to court on 401 counts directly related to the independence process (AMI 2016).



The key question is to what extent the deactivating mechanisms, or instances of cold repression, are the result of specific plans. And as might be expected there is only indirect, and often non-substantiated, evidence for this. What follows, therefore, is based on newspaper reports, but not on reliable first-hand, verifiable evidence.

Reports that there was a detailed written plan to wage a “dirty war” (Directe 2016) emerged in 2013. They speak of a 500 page “Operación Después” (Rueda 2013, Montero & Rendueles 2013, El Confidencial Digital 2013a), a detailed plan designed by the CNI (the Spanish secret service), including the smearing of leading Catalan politicians with police reports (and some were indeed published before being proved false), apparently to prevent the Catalan nationalists winning the 2012 election, with a €10 million budget. The original source can in no way be construed as supporting or being biased towards Catalan independence. In 2012 Manuel Cuyàs reported a source that claimed incriminating dossiers (with true or false information) were in Madrid drawers, ready to be used as ammunition to discredit leading Catalans (Cuyàs 2013). El Punt Avui (2013) summarized elements of the campaign, including the so-called La Camarga incident, with the leak of a taped recording of a meeting between an opposition leader and someone claiming to have incriminating evidence against a member of the former Catalan President’s family.

The existence of an “Operación Cataluña” (El Periódico de Catalunya 2016, Bayo & López 2016) was revealed in another leaked tape recording of interior minister Jorge Fernández-Díaz with the head of Catalonia’s anti-fraud office, and by a high-ranking police officer in court (La Vanguardia 2016b) who worked against the independence process until 2012. Some opinion leaders believe that the leak of the two-year-old conversation, just before the June 2016 general election, actually boomeranged back in the face of the leakers, as the Popular Party subsequently improved its results (Antich 2016, Sáez 2016), despite a host of its members being in the dock on charges of corruption. Nevertheless the minister was eventually dropped from the government formed in November. Smear campaigns were directed against the then-mayor of Barcelona, Xavier Trias (El Mundo 2014, La Sexta 2016, Lázaro 2016), just before the local election, which he narrowly lost; and the then-President Artur Mas (Ruiz 2015). The fact that such accusations are made not in the courts but in smear press campaigns (arising from police sources, not journalist investigation) speaks for itself and merits attention.

One report claims that the “dirty war” is waged on four fronts, not only in the press, but also on the legal front – in search of evidence of corruption, for instance –, on the police front (infiltrating pro-indy organizations, informers, spying...) and through intense tax tooth-combing (including Barcelona football club as a prime target – several players face prison sentences on tax evasion charges –, as well as SMEs). It hints that the creation of a Unionist organization,

pretentiously called *Societat Civil Catalana*, was a government initiative and that it is funded by leading Spanish enterprises (see McCoy 2015). That organisation does enjoy clear support from the Popular Party – it was controversially (Nació Digital 2015) awarded a European Citizen’s prize just a few months after being founded. However, the paper offers no sources for this information and the purported four fronts should be regarded merely as a hypothesis, however plausible. A similar conclusion can be reached as regards de Porrata-Doria’s insightful predictions (2013) on Spain’s attempts to divide Catalan society into confrontational sides. His reflection obviously builds on former prime minister Aznar’s incendiary statement to the effect that “Spain could only be broken once Catalonia had been broken as a society” (RTVE 2012).

The offensive, which has a very strong additional diplomatic front, has tried to counter claims the pro-indy camp made as regards the potential advantages of independence. It has published and distributed reports in various languages (particularly through embassies) (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores 2013, 2014) predicting a catastrophe. Official bodies such as Real Instituto Elcano (a think-tank for international and strategic studies) devote considerable attention to the constitutional crisis brought about by Catalonia, and republish selected papers (e.g. “Catalonia torn in two” by Molina and Otero-Iglesias 2015; both are senior analysts at the Instituto). The Spanish government has subsidized other reports, such as the 82 page paper published by the Popular Party’s foundation, FAES (2013) which admits the government grant on page 2. And it has helped unionist news media (e.g. Maqueda 2013, Mezcuca & Miranda 2013, Manso et al. 2015). Such reports often appear at crucial political moments in time. Though it is a matter of speculation whether or not they acted at the suggestion of the Spanish government, two banking organizations issued dire warnings just nine days before the September 27 2015 Catalan election. The *Asociación Española de Banca* (AEB), and the *Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros* (CECA) issued a joint statement claiming that:

The exclusion of Catalonia from the Eurozone, as a consequence of the unilateral break-up of the current constitutional framework, would mean that all banking institutions with a presence in Catalonia would face serious problems of legal uncertainty.

These difficulties would force the entities to reconsider their implementation strategy, with the consequent risk of a reduction of the banking supply and, with it, of financial exclusion and cost increase and credit shortage (EFE 2015).

On almost the same day the Barcelona-based conservative *Circulo de Economía* said in a declaration that it did “not share unilateral decisions that could jeopardize the principle of legality and membership in the European institutions and the euro” (*Cercle d’Economia* 2015).

Yet despite the offensive, what Madrid strategists and analysts hoped would blow over in time, is proving resilient: the soufflé is not deflating: it seems to be made of granite (Culla 2016).

To complete this section, a number of recurring issues are worth outlining and briefly illustrating. They clearly share a common aim of frightening the Catalan population and its representatives and in the author's view, some are unprecedented in modern western European countries and amount to cold repression.

#### 4.1. Military Intervention

A number of threats from the military have been aired in the media (El Periódico de Catalunya 2015), and the Minister of Defence has said that if everyone "does their duty, the army will not be needed" (Europa Press 2015). Before that, a retired general, Juan Antonio Chicharro said that "the Fatherland comes before democracy" (EFE 2013), in reference to the Catalan independence process. A retired colonel, Amadeo Martínez Inglés, was quoted as warning of the existence of an "Operación Estela" (Globedia 2014), in January 2014, a planned lightning night-time military intervention which was to prevent Catalonia from holding the 9 November 2014 non-binding poll on independence. Others point out that the run-down of the army means that it would be quite incapable of controlling such a large territory, in the face of widespread social mobilization (Buesa 2012). Some media said that low-flyng F-18 jet fighters, up Catalan Pyrenean valleys several weeks before the 2012 election were deliberate provocation, a claim hard to verify, though the timing was hardly opportune (Casas & Mas 2012). Nevertheless, there are suspicions that the massive cyber attacks on websites of the Catalan government and pro-independence organizations immediately before the 9N poll were organized by the Spanish secret service (Borràs 2014; Sala 2015). Finally, whether the permanent deployment of a hundred tanks to an army base in Catalonia in 2016 is coincidental or deliberate is, of course, open to debate (Sallés 2016a).

#### 4.2 Pensions

The issue of pensions has received a lot of attention in the Unionist camp, to try and raise anxiety in a particularly sensitive and cautious segment of the voting population. FAES (2013), the Instituto de Estudios Económicos, El Confidencial Digital (2013b) and Societat Civil Catalana (2014) all hold that they would collapse in an independent Catalonia. Just days before the September 27 2015 election foreign minister García-Margallo claimed pensions in an independent Catalonia would drop by 40 per cent and that 689,000 jobs would be lost (El Diario 2015a). Just a couple of days later prime minister Rajoy was forced to admit that Spain is duty-bound to pay pensioners who spent their working life

paying contributions to the Spanish pension system, wherever they live once they retire (Vilà 2015). The damage to the credibility of his Government's previous stance had been done, despite immediate efforts to backtrack (Maqueda 2015). Moreover, Bosch and Espasa (2015) among others, have shown that a Catalan pensions scheme would not run on a deficit as Spain's does right now, and would actually be able to raise them.

### 4.3 EU Membership

Continued EU membership is another Damocles sword being swung in the air. Spain in effect claims it will veto Catalonia's membership: foreign minister García-Margallo stated that an independent Catalonia would "wander through space and would be excluded from the EU for centuries" (La Vanguardia 2014). An answer by president Juncker, manipulated inside the Commission, to a question put to him by a Popular Party MEP, made front page news – again, just before an election – until the scandal broke out almost immediately (ABC 2015). The truth is the EU cannot take a stance on Catalonia, if and when it declares independence, unless it first recognizes it as a sovereign state. And that cannot happen before Spain's authorities do so... having swallowed their pride. Until then, of course, Catalan citizens will still be Spanish and therefore EU citizens, whether or not Catalonia decides to press for EU membership. Moreover, Prime Minister Rajoy was caught off his guard in a widely distributed interview, when asked about this issue: yet again, in the run-up to the crucial 2015 Catalan election (El País 2015). The journalist reminded him that the Spanish constitution forbids Spanish citizens from being deprived of their nationality.

### 4.4 Threatening Officials

Another strategy being used is to scare officials. The former president of Catalonia and three former ministers face political disqualification (González & Cué 2016) or even gaol, on the grounds of disobedience and misconduct, for having set up a poll (an election pledge) – very deliberately *not* a referendum, simply an exercise to test public opinion (Gisbert 2014) –, and holding it on 9 November 2014 despite a speedily-delivered Constitutional court injunction (Fabra 2014) to block it. Just before that poll school principals – as were mayors – were sent letters by the Spanish authorities to remind them of "their duty" (Ara 2014), in a last-ditch, and unsuccessful, attempt to prevent them from opening their schools as polling stations (Ara 2014).

In another sphere, 22 judges were threatened with disciplinary action for having published a manifesto on Catalonia's "right to decide" (Vilaweb 2014), claiming that the Constitution does not prevent a referendum being held. A year earlier the chief prosecutor in Catalonia had been forced to resign after claiming something very similar (Ara 2013). The judges won their case (e-Notícies 2014).

However, their pictures (many taken from their identity cards, a database only open to the police) were published in a right-wing Madrid newspaper (*La Razón*, traces of the page can be found in *El Comunista* 2014). They sued the police and the newspaper, for allegedly infringing their right to privacy of personal data, but though the police official responsible for the report was identified (*El Periódico* 2014) the courts eventually dismissed the case (*La Vanguardia* 2016a). However, one of these judges, Santiago Vidal, was disqualified for three years for belonging to a group of legal specialists that wrote, in their spare time and of their own free will, a draft Catalan Constitution (Rincón 2015). His appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected.

At the time of writing the Spanish government plans to continue its strategy of denying the Catalans the right to decide their future at the ballot box, having issued instructions to the Prosecutor to apply for Catalan Parliament's Speaker Carme Forcadell to be barred from office for allowing a debate, despite an explicit Constitutional court prohibition, on what from the central government's point of view is (another) unconstitutional road map towards independence, which includes at some stage a ratifying referendum (ACN 2016).

#### 4.5. Blocking Catalan Legislation

The growing political conflict between Catalonia and central government, particularly when the Popular party is in power in Madrid, can be quantified by the number of laws and decrees being taken to the Constitutional court, usually by the Spanish government, but also by the Ombudsman or the Senate. In March 2015 the Catalan authorities were awaiting no fewer than 58 judgments (Vázquez 2015). In content, most of the issues are not directly linked to the independence process, but are of an economic or social nature. Under six months later the Consumer Code of Catalonia and the Emergency Housing law were added to the list (*El Diario* 2015b).

Precisely in order to be able to deal with the Catalan political crisis, the Popular Party gave executive powers to the Constitutional court, as if it were an ordinary court of law, in a highly controversial law (*Jefatura del Estado* 2015) that was taken, ironically, to the Constitutional court itself so that it can decide whether such powers fit within the Constitution. It duly decided they do (*Financial Times* 2016).

### 5. Conclusion

In the quest for independence of the Catalan people (more strictly, a very large proportion of the Catalan people) the issue at hand is one of democracy, not of nationalism. "The Unity of Spain is Sacred" (*La Vanguardia* 2015), in the words not of the Spanish church – for whom voting on independence is, nevertheless,



“morally unacceptable” (Servimedia/InfoCatólica 2013) –, but of the incumbent prime minister, Mariano Rajoy and the long-standing discourse of his Popular Party (La Vanguardia 2015). Given this stance and the refusal to even consider modifying the Constitution to accommodate Catalonia’s demands (Blay 2015), the long-awaited “head-on train collision” (Pareja 2016) seems closer by the day.

This may seem odd, for the conflicting parties can surely draw on...

forms of conflict mediation and resolution, often involving more or less neutral and mutually respected third parties. This type of conflict resolution is an integral and defining characteristic of democratic systems under the rule of law. Such polities offer many institutionalized forms of conflict resolution and mediation that can help to stabilize contentious interactions and prevent their escalation to revolutionary or civil war proportions. These forms of conflict resolution and mediation include third parties, such as the electorate, parliament or the courts, whose legitimacy is accepted by all conflict parties, and which may settle conflicts authoritatively (Koopmans 2004, 27).

Moreover Vidal-Aparicio (2015) argues against regarding the Catalan process as based first and foremost on identity and cultural matters. After recalling that the United States declared independence by primarily invoking the political philosophy of John Locke, especially the idea that governments are legitimate only insofar as they fulfil the purpose for which they were established by the governed, he claims that

the process that is underway in Catalonia announces a new era where independence movements will go back to using Lockean political principles, after a 20th century when the general trend was instead to justify independence processes putting an emphasis on the classical principles of nationalism, primarily based on identity and cultural homogeneity (Vidal-Aparicio 2015).

Many documented examples of this are to be found. Largely because such a high proportion of the current population of Catalonia is of only fairly recent Catalan extraction, identity issues are not in the fore in the pro-independence camp, though they are constantly evoked by the unionist camp. Instead, the main thrust of the reasoning for independence is based on economic and pragmatic issues linked to the general well-being of the Catalan people or, to be more precise, of all people living in Catalonia regardless of their political persuasion.

The two camps are therefore at loggerheads. Unionists appeal to the rule of law, while separatists call for a democratic vote and, increasingly, disobedience (e.g. El Mundo 2016, Cardús 2016). Unionists insist that it is up to all Spaniards, and not just to Catalans, to decide whether Catalonia can split from Spain. Sadly, in the words of Castillo, “the rule of law thus becomes politicised as a result of the tension around the judicialisation of the so-called Catalan sovereignist process”



(Castillo 2015). The Constitutional Court, in particular, is a frequent resort, and leading judges resent the courts being used to dodge the negotiation of a political solution to what is, after all, a political problem (Rubio 2014). After all, as a unsigned Financial Times opinion article put it over two years ago, “This is a political problem that requires a political answer” (Financial Times 2014). Its advice, that “Madrid needs to act fast over the Catalonia separatist question” (Financial Times 2014), has been followed, but not in the direction of sitting down to find a solution.

Leaving ideological and nationalist considerations aside, the Popular Party is aware that the Yes vote could well win (e.g. Postdigital 2016). It also knows that it is perceived in Catalonia as an anti-Catalan party (Juliana 2008), and the irony is that its policies have fuelled the pro-independence flames for years in Catalonia.

This text has been completed this shortly after the Catalan President, Carles Puigdemont, has won a parliamentary vote of confidence and has announced that a binding referendum will be held, come what may (in Puigdemont words “o referèndum o referèndum”, cited in Etxearte 2016), but offering to negotiate the terms with the Spanish government, before the end of September 2017 (Etxearte 2016). It is very doubtful that the Spanish government and authorities will call a truce on this issue, unless of course outside institutions apply pressure, presumably on financial and economic grounds, to bring about a change in their current policy. Such pressure could come on human rights grounds, and the Catalan president has asked the United Nations and the Council of Europe to mediate (Sallés 2016b). But it is hard to envisage, at least in the medium-term, anything other than a binding referendum on Catalonia’s independence, either before (only if it can take place with democratic guarantees) or after a declaration of independence by the Parliament of Catalonia.

In answer to the basic research question, the evidence supports the hypothesis that the Spanish authorities have hitherto failed to apply the procedures laid down in democratic regimes for conflict prevention and resolution. Far from this, they have fanned the flames with measures that have entrenched the opposing positions, while the pro-independence parties continue along the road map that the Catalan electorate endorsed by giving them an overall parliamentary majority in November 2015. It remains to be seen whether a proclamation of independence, coupled with immediate tax-raising measures, would force Spain to sit down in order to negotiate a solution to its ailing pension system and its very high sovereign debt.

## References

20

- ABC, 2015. Bruselas corrige la declaración de Juncker sobre la independencia de Cataluña. ABC, 23 September 2015.  
<http://www.abc.es/elecciones/catalanas/2015/abci-bruselas-declaraciones-juncker-201509231809.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- ACN (Agència Catalana de Notícies), 2016. L'Estat posa en marxa la maquinària contra el referèndum. *El Món*, 7 October 2016.  
<http://elmon.cat/noticia/172244/lestat-posa-en-marxa-la-maquinari-a-contra-el-referendum> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Adorno. T.W. & Horkheimer, 2001. Elements of Antisemitism. In Back, L., Solomos, J. (eds.) *Theories of Race and Racism. A Reader*. Routledge. New York / London, 206-211.
- AMI, 2016. El Govern ofereix suport als ajuntaments requerits pel 12-O i l'AMI torna a denunciar persecució. Associació de Municipis per la Independència website.  
<http://www.municipisindependencia.cat/2016/10/el-govern-ofereix-el-seu-suportals-ajuntaments-que-han-rebut-requeriments-del-govern-espanyol-per-obrir-el-12-o/> (accessed 18 October 2016).
- Anasagasti, I., 2006. *Llámame Telesforo*. Editorial Txalaparta, Tafalla.
- Antich, X., 2016. De la picaresca a l'esperpent. *La Vanguardia*, 4 July 2016.  
<http://www.gxi.cat/04-07-16-xavier-antich-de-la-picaresca-a-l-esperpent-la-vanguardia> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Ara, 2013. El fiscal en cap de Catalunya presenta la seva dimissió i Torres-Dulce l'accepta. *Ara*, 5 March 2013.  
[http://www.ara.cat/politica/Catalunya-presta-dimissio-Torres-Dulce-laccepta\\_0\\_877112488.html](http://www.ara.cat/politica/Catalunya-presta-dimissio-Torres-Dulce-laccepta_0_877112488.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Ara, 2014. Llanos de Luna demana per carta als directors d'institut que no permetin la utilització dels centres per celebrar el 9-N. *Ara*, 6 November 2014.  
[http://www.ara.cat/politica/Llanos-Luna-directors-dinstitut-utilitzacio\\_0\\_1243675941.html](http://www.ara.cat/politica/Llanos-Luna-directors-dinstitut-utilitzacio_0_1243675941.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Archilés Cardona, F., 2011. Melancólico bucle. Narrativas de la nación fracasada e historiografía española contemporánea. In Saz, I., Archilés Cardona, F. (ed.) *Estudios sobre nacionalismo y nación en la España contemporánea*. Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, 245-330.
- Bayo, C. E. & López, P., 2016. Fernández Díaz conspiró con el jefe de la Oficina Antifraude catalana para fabricar escándalos contra ERC y CDC. *Público*, 22 June 2016.  
<http://www.publico.es/politica/fernandez-diaz-conspiro-jefe-oficina.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Bel, G., 2015. *Disdain, Distrust & Dissolution: The Surge of Support for Independence in Catalonia*. Sussex Academic Studies on Contemporary Spain, Brighton.
- Bladé Costa, T., 2014. El movimiento independentista catalán, más allá de la identidad y los cálculos económicos. In Bretones, M. T., Charry, C. A. & Pastor, J. (eds.) *Anuari del conflicte Social*. Observatori del conflicte Social - Universitat de Barcelona, 395-426.  
<http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/ACS/article/view/12291> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Blay, J. A., 2015. El PP podrá bloquear cualquier iniciativa para la reforma de la Constitución si logra 117 escaños. *Público*, 15 December 2015.  
<http://www.publico.es/politica/pp-podra-bloquear-iniciativa-reforma.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Borràs E., 2014. La ciberguerra del 9-N: així va ser l'atac informàtic al Govern. *Ara*, 11 November 2014.  
[http://www.ara.cat/premium/ciberguerra-aixi-atacs-informatics-Govern\\_0\\_1246675553.html](http://www.ara.cat/premium/ciberguerra-aixi-atacs-informatics-Govern_0_1246675553.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).

- Bosch, N.; Espasa, M., 2015. Pensions in an Independent Catalonia. In Amat, O. & Guinjoan, M. (eds.) *The Economy of Catalonia. Questions and Answers on the Economic Impact of Independence*. Comissió d'Economia Catalana. Barcelona, Col·legi d'Economistes de Catalunya / Profit Editorial: 175-180.  
<http://www.coleconomistes.cat/pdf/the.economy.of.catalonia.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2016)
- Bourne, A. K., 2014. Europeanization and Secession. The Cases of Catalonia and Scotland, *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 13 (3), 94-120.
- Boylan, B. M., 2015. In Pursuit of Independence. The Political Economy of Catalonia's Secessionist Movement. *Nations and Nationalism* 21 (4), 761-785.
- Buesa, M., 2012. Catalunya en el espejo de Eslovenia. Blog entry, 5 October 2012.  
<http://mikelbuesa.wordpress.com/2012/10/05/la-guerra-de-secesion-cataluna-en-el-espejo-de-eslovenia/> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Burg, S. L., 2015. Identity, Grievances, and Popular Mobilization for Independence in Catalonia. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 21 (3), 289-312.
- Calvo, L., 2014. El tortuoso camino de la tercera vía. *Tiempo*, 5 May 2014. <http://www.tiem-podehoy.com/espana/el-tortuoso-camino-de-la-tercera-via> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Calzada, I., 2014. The Right to Decide in Democracy between Recentralisation and Independence: Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque Country. *REGIONS Quarterly Magazine of the RSA*. Comment and Debate. The voice of the membership. 296(4), 7-8.
- Calzada, I., 2015. Benchmarking Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque Country from the Devolution, Independence and Social Innovation Perspective: City-Regional Small Nations Beyond Nation-States. At *45th Annual Conference UACES*, Bilbao, 7-9 September 2015.  
[http://www.uaces.org/events/conferences/bilbao/papers/abstract.php?paper\\_id=731#WEVg\\_00zUSs](http://www.uaces.org/events/conferences/bilbao/papers/abstract.php?paper_id=731#WEVg_00zUSs) (accessed 16 January 2015).
- Cardús, Sa., 2016. Estat de desconnexió, *La Vanguardia*, 12 October 2016.  
<https://www.pressreader.com/spain/la-vanguardia-català/20161012/281543700438971> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Casas, J.; Mas, O., 2012. Provocació militar. *El Punt Avui*, 10 October 2012.  
<http://www.elpuntavui.cat/societat/article/5-societat/583151-provocacio-militar.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Castillo Ortiz, P. J., 2015. Framing the Court: Political Reactions to the Ruling on the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Catalan Parliament. *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* 7 (1), 27-47.
- Cercle d'Economia, 2015. Opinió D'actualitat: Després de les Eleccions del 27-S: Diàleg, Acord i Reforma. 16 September 2015.  
<http://cercleeconomia.com/opinion-de-actualidad-despues-de-las-elecciones-del-27-s-dialogo-acuerdo-y-reforma/> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Clots-Figueras, I. & Masella, P., 2013. Education, Language and Identity. *The Economic Journal* 123 (S70), 332-357.  
[http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/42501/1/EJ\\_Masella.pdf](http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/42501/1/EJ_Masella.pdf)  
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecoj.12051/full> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Colino, C., 2013. The State of Autonomies Between the Economic Crisis and Enduring Nationalist Tensions. *Politics and Society in Contemporary Spain*, The NYU European Studies Series, Springer, 81-100.  
[http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137306623\\_5](http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137306623_5) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Cot, S., 2016. Tercera via, entre la independència i... què? *El Món*, 28 November 2016.  
<http://elmon.cat/opinio/17100/tercera-via-entre-la-independencia-i-que> (accessed December 1 2016).
- Cramer, K., 2014. *'Goodbye, Spain?': The Question of Independence for Catalonia*. Sussex Academic Press / Cañada Blanch, Brighton.

- Cramer, K., 2015. Political Power and Civil Counterpower: the Complex Dynamics of the Catalan Independence Movement. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 21 (1), 104-120.
- Culla, J.B., 2016. Un suflé de granito. *El País*, 16 September 2016.  
[http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2016/09/15/catalunya/1473950478\\_014775.html](http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2016/09/15/catalunya/1473950478_014775.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Cuyàs, M., 2013. El setge. *El Punt Avui*, 15 April 2012.  
<http://www.elpuntavui.cat/article/7-vista/8-articles/528207.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Davis, A., 2004. The November 2003 Elections in Catalonia. A Landmark Change in the Catalan Political Landscape. *South European Society and Politics* 9 (3), 137-148.
- De Blas, A., 1991. *Tradición republicana y nacionalismo español*, Madrid, Tecnos.
- De Porrata-Doria, R., 2013. *Divide et Impera. L'estratègia d'Espanya contra el sobiranisme. Nació Digital*, 8 January 2013.  
<http://www.naciodigital.cat/opinio/5163/divide/et/impera/estrategia/espanya/contra/sobiranisme> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Dhoest, A. & Bastiaensens, S., 2013. Reporting Catalonia in Belgian Newspapers. *Catalan Journal of Communication & Cultural Studies* 5 (1), 121-128.
- Directe, 2016. Les claus de la guerra bruta contra el procés independentista. 30 June 2016, <http://directe.cat/512252>, Chart (image): <http://www.directe.cat/imatges/noticies/guerra-bruta-proces.png> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Domènech Abella, J., 2013a. La revuelta soberanista en Cataluña. In Pastor, J. & Rojas Pedemonte, N. (eds.) *Anuari del Conflicte Social 2013*. Observatori del Conflicte Social - Universitat de Barcelona, 496-520.  
<http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/ACS/article/view/10392/13174> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Domènech Abella, J., 2013b. Una cronologia de la revuelta soberanista en Cataluña. In Pastor, J. & Rojas Pedemonte, N. (eds.) *Anuari del Conflicte Social 2013*. Observatori del Conflicte Social - Universitat de Barcelona, 521-539.  
<http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/ACS/article/view/10393/13175> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Earl, J., 2013. Repression and Social Movements. In Snow, D. A, Della Porta, D., Klandermans, B. & McAdam, D. (eds.) *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*. John Wiley and Sons Ltd., Chicester.  
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm446/abstract> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- EFE, 2013. Un general en la reserva dice que la "patria está antes que la democracia". 1 March 2013.  
<http://web.eldia.es/nacional/2013-03-01/2-general-reserva-dice-patria-esta-antes-democracia.htm> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- EFE, 2015. La banca reconsiderará su implantación en Cataluña si opta por independencia. Barcelona, 18 September 2015.  
<http://www.efe.com/efe/espana/economia/la-banca-reconsiderara-su-implantacion-en-cataluna-si-opta-por-independencia/10003-2716126> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- El Comunista, 2014. Los jueces pro-consulta denuncian la publicación de sus fotos de DNI en 'La Razón'. *El Comunista*, 4 March 2014.  
<https://elcomunista.net/2014/03/04/los-jueces-pro-consulta-denuncian-la-publicacion-de-sus-fotos-de-dni-en-la-razon/> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- El Confidencial Digital, 2013a. Rajoy ha encargado al CNI un plan para 'defender' la unidad de España y Cataluña. *El Confidencial Digital*, 22 October 2013.  
[http://www.elconfidencialdigital.com/seguridad/Rajoy-encargado-CNI-Espana-Cataluna\\_0\\_2148385169.html](http://www.elconfidencialdigital.com/seguridad/Rajoy-encargado-CNI-Espana-Cataluna_0_2148385169.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).

- El Confidencial Digital, 2013b. Una Cataluña independiente no podrá pagar pensiones ni asumir deudas durante los primeros diez años, según un libro del Instituto de Estudios Económicos. *El Confidencial Digital*, 2 October 2013.  
[http://www.elconfidencialdigital.com/dinero/Cataluna-independiente-Instituto-Estudios-Economicos\\_0\\_2136986284.html](http://www.elconfidencialdigital.com/dinero/Cataluna-independiente-Instituto-Estudios-Economicos_0_2136986284.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- El Diario, 2015a. José Manuel García-Margallo y Oriol Junqueras debaten sobre la independencia de Cataluña. Margallo asegura que Cataluña perdería 689.000 empleos y las pensiones caerían un 40%. 23 September 2015.  
[http://www.eldiario.es/politica/Debate-Manuel-Garcia-Margallo-Junqueras-Cataluna\\_13\\_434086588\\_4912.html](http://www.eldiario.es/politica/Debate-Manuel-Garcia-Margallo-Junqueras-Cataluna_13_434086588_4912.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- El Diario, 2015b. El TC paralitza mesures contra la pobresa energètica i els abusos hipotecaris a Catalunya. *El Diario*, 7 October 2015.  
[http://www.eldiario.es/catalunyaplural/politica/TC-paralitza-energetica-hipotecaris-Catalunya\\_0\\_438857192.html](http://www.eldiario.es/catalunyaplural/politica/TC-paralitza-energetica-hipotecaris-Catalunya_0_438857192.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- El Mundo, 2014. UBS nº 7651162-3445.954. *El Mundo*, 28 October 2014.  
<http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2014/10/28/544ed8ee268e3ead698b4571.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- El Mundo, 2016. El Parlament llama a los catalanes a la desobediencia. Editorial. *El Mundo*, 8 October 2016.  
<http://www.elmundo.es/opinion/2016/10/08/57f7e76a468aeb3d098b463c.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- El País, 2015. ¿Catalán, español o europeo? El lío de Rajoy en la entrevista con Carlos Alsina. *El País*, 22 September 2015.  
[http://verne.elpais.com/verne/2015/09/22/articulo/1442931255\\_127211.html](http://verne.elpais.com/verne/2015/09/22/articulo/1442931255_127211.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- El Periódico de Catalunya, 2014. El comisario de información de la Policía de Barcelona admite que fue él quien ordenó comprobar la identidad de los jueces proconsulta. *El Periódico de Catalunya*, 30 April 2014.  
<http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/politica/comisario-informacion-policia-barcelona-admite-fue-quien-ordeno-comprobar-identidad-jueces-proconsulta-3262620> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- El Periódico de Catalunya, 2015. Otras alusiones a una intervención militar en Catalunya. 9 September 2015.  
<http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/politica/otras-amenazas-militares-proceso-soberanista-catalunya-4493861> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- El Periódico de Catalunya, 2016. Operación Cataluña. 28 September 2016.  
<http://www.elperiodico.com/es/temas/operacion-catalunya-21711/> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- El Punt Avui, 2013. Guerra Bruta. Operació Catalunya. 11 December 2013.  
<http://www.elpuntavui.cat/canals/series/catalunya-vol-viure-en-llibertat/guerra-bruta-operacio-catalunya.html?limitstart=0> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Elias, A., 2015. Catalan Independence and the Challenge of Credibility: The Causes and Consequences of Catalan Nationalist Parties' Strategic Behavior. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 21 (1), 83-103.
- Encarnación, O., 2016. Farewell to Catalonia? Spain Confronts a Rebellious Region. *Foreign Affairs*, Snapshot, 28 January 2016.  
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/spain/2016-01-28/farewell-catalonia> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Etxearte, O.A., 2016. Referèndum o referèndum. *El Punt Avui*, 28 September 2016.  
<http://www.elpuntavui.cat/politica/article/17-politica/1007874-referendum-o-referendum.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).



- Europa Press, 2015. Morenés, sobre Catalunya: Si todo el mundo cumple con su deber, no hará falta ninguna actuación del Ejército. *Público*, 8 September 2015.  
<http://www.publico.es/politica/morenes-mundo-cumple-deber-no.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- e-Notícies. 2014. Revés judicial a La Razón. *e-Notícies*, 4 December 2014.  
<http://politica.e-noticies.es/revés-judicial-a-la-razón--90479.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Fabra, M., 2014. El Constitucional suspende la consulta tras admitir los recursos de Rajoy. *El País*, 29 September 2014.  
[http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/09/29/actualidad/1412005295\\_056524.html](http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/09/29/actualidad/1412005295_056524.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- FAES (Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales), 2013. *20 Questions and Answers on the Secession of Catalonia*. Madrid. English version:  
[http://www.fundacionfaes.org/file\\_upload/news/pdfs/20140212192231.pdf](http://www.fundacionfaes.org/file_upload/news/pdfs/20140212192231.pdf) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Fassbender, B., 2013. The Place of an Independent Catalonia in the European Union. At *3rd International Conference Sobirania i Justícia*, Barcelona.  
[http://www.sij.cat/fitxers/Bardo\\_Fassbender.pdf](http://www.sij.cat/fitxers/Bardo_Fassbender.pdf) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Ferrer, B., 2012. L'unionisme federalista presenta els seus intel·lectuals. *Nació Digital*, 17 October 2012.  
<http://www.naciodigital.cat/noticia/47881/unionisme/federalista/presenta/seus/intellectuals> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Financial Times, 2014. Spain Must Steer Away from a Collision Course. Madrid Needs to Act Fast Over the Catalonia Separatist Question. *FT View*, 5 October 2014. (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Financial Times, 2016. Spain's Constitutional Court Backs Crackdown on Catalan Officials. Ruling Confirms Law Allowing Suspension of Pro-independence Politicians, 3 November 2016. (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Flamini, R., 2013. Scotland's Independence Bid. History, Prospects, Challenges, *World Affairs* 176 (1), 57-63.
- Fusi, J.P., 1985. Los nacionalismos en España 1900-1936 (Notas para una discusión), in *Nacionalismo y regionalismo en España*, Córdoba, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Diputación Provincial: 55-67.
- García, C., 2012. Nationalism, Identity, and Fan Relationship Building in Barcelona Football Club. *International Journal of Sport Communication* 5, 1-15.
- Generalitat de Catalunya, 1979. *Statute of Autonomy*. Barcelona.  
<http://web.gencat.cat/sites/web/en/generalitat/estatut/estatut1979/> (accessed 1 December 2016).
- Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006. *Statute of Autonomy*. Barcelona.  
<http://web.gencat.cat/sites/web/en/generalitat/estatut/estatut2006/> (accessed 1 December 2016).
- Gillespie, R., 2015. Between Accommodation and Contestation. The Political Evolution of Basque and Catalan Nationalism. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 21 (1), 3-23.
- Gironès i Soler, R., 2015. *El tractament de l'independentisme a l'agenda mediàtica i pública catalana (2012-2014)*. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.  
[http://ddd.uab.cat/pub/tfg/2015/137999/TFG\\_Raquel\\_Girones\\_Soler.pdf](http://ddd.uab.cat/pub/tfg/2015/137999/TFG_Raquel_Girones_Soler.pdf) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Gisbert, J., 2014. Artur Mas firma el decreto de convocatoria de la consulta del 9-N. *La Vanguardia*, 27 September 2014.  
<http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20140927/54415477543/artur-mas-convoca-consulta.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).



- Globedia, 2014. Corrupción en el Ejército, el libro 'Un paso al frente' y una denuncia de un Coronel sobre Cataluña dan de que pensar a todos. 19 September 2014.  
<http://es.globedia.com/corrupcion-ejercito-libro-paso-frente-denuncia-coronel-cataluna-pensar> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- González, G. & Cué, C., 2016. La justicia catalana avala juzgar a Artur Mas por desobediencia y prevaricación. *El Mundo*, 15 September 2015.  
<http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2016/09/15/57da7b33468aebcd3a8b4642.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Griffiths, R. D., Guillén Alvarez, P. & Martínez i Coma, F., 2015. Between the Sword and the Wall. Spain's Limited Options for Catalan Secessionism. *Nations and Nationalism* 21 (1), 43-61.
- Guibernau, M., 2012. The Rise of Secessionism in Catalonia has Emerged out of the Will to Decide the Region's Political Destiny as a Nation. *LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog*. <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46010/>
- Guibernau, M., 2014a. Catalan Secessionism. Young People's Expectations and Political Change. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* 49 (3), 106-117.
- Guibernau, M., 2014b. Secessionism in Catalonia. After Democracy. *Ethnopolitics* 12 (4), 368-393.
- Guibernau, M., Rocher, F. & Casanas Adam, E., 2014. Introduction. A Special Section on Self-Determination and the Use of Referendums. Catalonia, Quebec and Scotland. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 27 (1), 1-3.
- Guntermann, E., 2013. Can Secession be a Rational Choice? Explaining Support for the Independence of Catalonia. At the 71st Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, 13 April 2013. NSM  
<http://www.ericguntermann.com/docs/guntermann2013.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Harrington, T., 2016. Catalonia's Rocky Road to Independence. *Cold Type*, December 2016: 44-48.  
<http://www.coldtype.net/assets.16/pdf/CT129.December2016.pdf> (accessed 1 December 2016).
- Hopkin, J., 2012. Catalonia's Election Result Reflects the Fragmented and Divided Nature of the Pro-independence Majority. *LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog*.  
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/49599> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Jefatura del Estado, 2015. Ley Orgánica 2/1979, de 3 de octubre, del Tribunal Constitucional (última modificación: 17 de octubre de 2015).  
<https://www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/1979/BOE-A-1979-23709-consolidado.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Juliana, E., 2008. "El PP es visto como anticatalán; disparate que debemos arreglar". *La Vanguardia*, 29 June 2008.  
<http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20080629/53490849854/el-pp-es-visto-como-anticatalan-disparate-que-debemos-arreglar.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Koopmans, R., (2004). Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention. In Snow, D.A.; Soule, S.A.; Kriesi, H. eds. *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 19-46.
- Krisch, N., 2012. Catalonia's Independence. A Reply to Joseph Weiler. *EJIL:Talk! The blog of the European Journal of International Law*.  
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/catalonias-independence-a-reply-to-joseph-weiler/> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- La Sexta, 2016. Las pruebas que demostrarían que Xavier Trias habría tenido tres cuentas en Suiza. 23 May 2016.  
<http://www.lasexta.com/noticias/nacional/xavier-trias-habria-tenido-doce-millones-de>

- euros-en-tres-cuentas-en-suiza\_20160523574306576584a8f86262d222.html (accessed 12 October 2016).
- La Vanguardia, 2014. Margallo afirma que Catalunya “vagaría por el espacio” si se independiza. 10 March 2014.  
<http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20140310/54402947586/margallo-una-cataluna-independiente-estaria-excluida-de-la-ue-durante-siglos.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- La Vanguardia, 2015. Rajoy emprende el recurso al TC: “La unidad de España es sagrada”. 9 November 2015.  
<http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20151109/54438733812/rajoy-recurso-tc-cataluna-desconectar.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- La Vanguardia, 2016a. Segundo archivo de la causa de las fotos del DNI de 33 jueces soberanistas publicadas por ‘La Razón’. *La Vanguardia*, 28 April 2016.  
<http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20160428/401422982994/segundo-archivo-fotos-dni-jueces-soberanistas-la-razon.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- La Vanguardia, 2016b. El comisario Villarejo revela ante el juez la existencia de una ‘Operación Catalunya’. 6 July 2016.  
<http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20160706/403005854115/comisario-villarejo-juez-operacion-catalunya.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Lago, I., Montero, J. R. & Torcal, M., 2007. The 2006 Regional Election in Catalonia: Exit, Voice, and Electoral Market Failures. *South European Society & Politics* 12 (2), 221-235.
- Lázaro, F., 2016. La Policía documentó la cuenta suiza del ex alcalde de Barcelona Xavier Trias. *El Mundo*, 23 May 2016.  
<http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2016/05/22/5742062822601d302c8b4646.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Liñeira, R., Cetrà, D., 2015. The Independence Case in Comparative Perspective. *The Political Quarterly* 86 (2), 257-264.
- Lluch, J., 2014. *Visions of Sovereignty. Nationalism and Accommodation in Multinational Democracies*. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.
- Manso, J., Cruz, M., Núñez, F. & Sánchez, R., 2015. ¿Cuáles serían las consecuencias de una Cataluña independiente?. *El Mundo*, 27 September 2015.  
<http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/09/26/5605b06446163ff3208b45a3.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Maqueda, A., 2013. Cinco razones por las que Cataluña no puede ser la Suiza del Mediterráneo. *Voxpòpuli*, 12 September 2013.  
[http://www.vozpopuli.com/economia-y-finanzas/Cataluna-Espana-Suiza\\_0\\_623637652.html](http://www.vozpopuli.com/economia-y-finanzas/Cataluna-Espana-Suiza_0_623637652.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Maqueda, A., 2015. Las razones por las que España no estaría obligada a pagar las pensiones de una Cataluña segregada. *Voxpòpuli*, 25 September 2015.  
[http://www.vozpopuli.com/economia-y-finanzas/Cataluna-Pensiones-Sahara\\_0\\_846815341.html](http://www.vozpopuli.com/economia-y-finanzas/Cataluna-Pensiones-Sahara_0_846815341.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Marinzel, A., 2014. *Catalonia: The Quest for Independence from Spain*. Senior Honors Project. Paper 39. John Carroll University.  
<http://collected.jcu.edu/honorspapers/39> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Martí, D., 2014. Dealing with the Secession Threat: The Strategies of the Spanish and British Governments Compared. At *The ECPR General Conference*, Glasgow, 3-6 September 2014.  
<https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/77503f3b-ee7-4cb8-a480-afe2ca516b88.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Martí, D. & Cetrà, D., 2016. The 2015 Catalan Election. A de Facto Referendum on Independence? *Journal of Regional & Federal Studies* 26 (1), 107-119.

- Martín, S. & Camon, D., 2014. *Informe: L'espiral del silenci a anàlisi. La pluralitat ideològica en l'eix nacional a les tertúlies catalanes i espanyoles*. Media.cat.  
<http://www.media.cat/2014/11/06/informe-l%E2%80%99espiral-del-silenci-a-analisi/> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Martínez Riera, M. & Zubiaga, M., 2014. Nation and State Building as Collective Action: A Comparative Analysis of Mechanisms and Processes in Catalonia and the Basque Country. In Bretones, M. T., Charry, C. A. & Pastor, J. (eds.) *Anuari del conflicte Social*. Observatori del conflicte Social - Universitat de Barcelona, 1-36.
- McCoy, S., 2015. 29 páginas: el último legado de Botín, con aroma catalán, agita el Santander. *El Confidencial*, blog, 8 June 2015.  
[http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/mercados/valor-anadido/2015-06-08/29-paginas-el-ultimo-legado-de-botin-con-aroma-catalan-agita-el-santander\\_873511/](http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/mercados/valor-anadido/2015-06-08/29-paginas-el-ultimo-legado-de-botin-con-aroma-catalan-agita-el-santander_873511/) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Medina, I. & Molins, J. M., 2014. Small and Medium Enterprises and the Independence of Catalonia. In *PSA 64th Annual International Conference*, 14-16 April 2014, Manchester.  
[http://dc-10751-711240033.eu-west-1.elb.amazonaws.com/sites/default/files/conferen-ce/papers/2014/Medina%26Molins\\_PSA2014.pdf](http://dc-10751-711240033.eu-west-1.elb.amazonaws.com/sites/default/files/conferen-ce/papers/2014/Medina%26Molins_PSA2014.pdf) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Medir, L., 2015. Understanding Local Democracy in Catalonia: From Formally Institutionalized Processes to Self-organized Social Referenda on Independence. *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 28 (2-3), 267-281.
- Mezcua, U. & Miranda, I., 2013. Diez cosas que dejaría de disfrutar una Cataluña independiente. *ABC*, 9 November 2014.  
<http://www.abc.es/espana/20141109/abci-motivos-cataluna-contra-independencia-201411070925.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 2013. *Consecuencias económicas de una hipotética independencia de Cataluña*. 13 March 2013.  
[http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/ElMinisterioInforma/Paginas/Noticias/20130313\\_MINISTERIO7.aspx](http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/ElMinisterioInforma/Paginas/Noticias/20130313_MINISTERIO7.aspx) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 2014. *Por la convivencia democrática*. 5 March 2014.  
[http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/ElMinisterioInforma/Paginas/Noticias/20140206\\_MINISTERIO1.aspx](http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/ElMinisterioInforma/Paginas/Noticias/20140206_MINISTERIO1.aspx) (accessed 12 October 2016).  
In English: *Catalonia in Spain. For Democratic Co-existence*. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid.  
<http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/Multimedia/Publicaciones/Documents/Porlaconvivencia/por%20la%20convivencia%20democratica%20eng.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Molina, I. & Otero-Iglesias, M., 2015. Catalonia Torn in Two. *Politico, Europe Edition*. 2 October 2015.  
<http://www.politico.eu/article/catalonia-torn-in-two-spain-barcelona-independence-scotland-referendum/> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Moreno, L., 1988. Scotland and Catalonia. The Path to Home Rule. In *The Scottish government yearbook*.  
[http://www.scottishgovernmentyearbooks.ed.ac.uk/record/23014/1/1988\\_11\\_ScotlandandCatalonia.pdf](http://www.scottishgovernmentyearbooks.ed.ac.uk/record/23014/1/1988_11_ScotlandandCatalonia.pdf) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Monés i Pujol-Busquets, J., 1988. La Ilustración en España. Algunas precisiones sociolingüísticas sobre la escolarización. *Revista de Educación*, Centro de Investigación y Documentación Educativa, Ministerio de Educación, 421-441.  
<https://sede.educacion.gob.es/publiventa/d/512/19/0> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Montero, D. & Rendueles, L., 2013. Diez millones contra la independencia. *Interviú*, 5 April 2013.  
<http://www.interviu.es/reportajes/articulos/diez-millones-contra-la-independencia> (accessed 12 October 2016).

- Muñoz, J. & Tormos, R., 2015. Economic Expectations and Support for Secession in Catalonia. Between Causality and Rationalization. *European Political Science Review* 7 (2), 315-341.
- Nació Digital, 2015. ICV-EUiA es manté ferma en contra de Societat Civil Catalana. *Nació Digital*, 27 March 2015.  
<http://www.naciodigital.cat/noticia/84707/icv-euia/es/mant/ferma/contra/societat/civil/catalana> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Nagel, K.-J., 2001. Catalan 'nation-building' and the Transition to Democracy in Spain. *Scottish Affairs* 37 (2), 122-136.
- Noguer, M., 2013. La tercera vía vence al independentismo. *El País*, 3 November 2013.  
[http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2013/11/02/catalunya/1383418112\\_808082.html](http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2013/11/02/catalunya/1383418112_808082.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Oriols, L. & Rodon, T., 2016. The 2015 Catalan Election. The Independence Bid at the Polls. *South European Society and Politics* 21 (3), 359-381.
- Ortega y Gasset, J., 2009 [1920]. *España invertebrada*. Colección Austral. Madrid, Ed. Espasa-Calpe.
- Oskam, J., 2014. A New State in Europe? Scenarios for Catalan Self-determination. *Futures*, 64: 51-60.
- Paço, S., 2015. Secession and EU Membership. Is an EU Member State Secessionist Territory Automatically within EU after Archiving its Independence? *Academicus International Scientific Journal* VI (12), 147-154.
- Pareja, P., (2016). El 'choque de trenes' marca el inicio del curso político en Cataluña. *El Español*, 25 August 2016.  
[http://www.elespanol.com/espana/politica/20160824/150235713\\_0.html](http://www.elespanol.com/espana/politica/20160824/150235713_0.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Payne, S., 1971. Catalan and Basque Nationalism. *Journal of Contemporary History* 6 (1), 15-33, 35-51.
- Postdigital (2016). El 'sí' a la independencia ganaría en Cataluña según una encuesta. Postdigital.es. 22 July 2016.  
<http://postdigital.es/2016/07/22/si-independencia-ganaria-en-cataluna-p23317/> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Petithomme, M. & Fernandez Garcia, A., 2013. *Catalonian Nationalism in Spain's Time of Crisis. From Asymmetrical Federalism to Independence?* The Federal Idea, Quebec.  
<http://ideefederale.ca/documents/Catalonia.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Rajoy, 2014. *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados. Pleno y Diputación Permanente* 189, 19 March 2014, 5.  
[http://www.congreso.es/public\\_oficiales/L10/CONG/DS/PL/DSCD-10-PL-189.PDF](http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L10/CONG/DS/PL/DSCD-10-PL-189.PDF) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Requejo, F. & Nagel, K.-J., (eds.) 2014. *Politics of Religion and Nationalism. Federalism, Consociationalism and Secession*. Routledge, London and New York.
- Rincón, R., 2015. El Poder Judicial suspende tres años al juez de la Constitución catalana. *El País*, 26 February 2015.  
[http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/02/26/actualidad/1424947872\\_361206.html](http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/02/26/actualidad/1424947872_361206.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Rico, G., 2012. The 2010 regional election in Catalonia: a multilevel account in an age of economic crisis. *South European Society and Politics* 17 (2), 217-238.
- Rico, G. & Liñeira, R., 2014. Bringing Secessionism into the Mainstream. The 2012 Regional Election in Catalonia. *South European Society and Politics* 19 (2), 257-280.
- Rodrigo, J. (2008). Our Fatherland was Full of Weeds. Violence during the Spanish Civil War and the Franco Dictatorship. In M. Baumeister, S. Schüler-Springorum (eds.) *'If you toler-*

- ate this': The Spanish Civil War in the Age of Total War.* Campus Verlag, Frankfurt / New York, 135-153.
- Román, D., 2014. Catalan TV Network Reflects Separatist Fervor. *Wall Street Journal*, 8 January 2014. <http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304244904579276521794131700> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- RTVE, 2012. Aznar: España sólo podría romperse si Cataluña sufriera antes su propia ruptura como sociedad. *RTVE*, 25 October 2012. <http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20121025/aznar-espana-solo-podria-romperse-si-cataluna-sufriera-antes-su-propia-ruptura-como-sociedad/571569.shtml> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Rubio Llorente, F., 2014. Despropósitos. *La Vanguardia*, 29 September 2014. <http://www.lavanguardia.com/opinion/articulos/20140929/54416430215/despropósitos-francisco-rubio-llorente-opi.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Rueda, F., 2013. El plan del CNI para evitar la independencia de Cataluña. *Tiempo*, 24 January 2013. <http://www.tiempodehoy.com/espana/el-plan-del-cni-para-evitar-la-independencia-de-cataluna> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Ruiz Coll, M. A., 2015. Esta es la prueba de que Artur Mas era beneficiario de una cuenta en Liechtenstein. *Ok Diario*, 12 October 2015. <http://okdiario.com/investigacion/2015/10/12/prueba-de-que-artur-mas-beneficiario-de-cuenta-liechtenstein-9124> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Ruiz-Huerta, J., 2015. Spanish Decentralization and Fiscal Federalism. In Pola, G. (ed.), *Principles and Practices of Fiscal Autonomy. Experiences, Debates and Prospects*. Ashgate, Farnham, 185-202.
- Runde, D., 2015. Catalonia and the Costs of Independence, *Forbes*, April 8, 2015. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielrunde/2015/04/08/catalonia-independence-artur-mas/> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Sáez Mateu, F., 2016. Antes corrupta que rota. *Ara*, 28 June 2016. [http://www.ara.cat/opinio/ferran-saez-mateu-antes-corrupta-que-rot\\_0\\_1604239587.html](http://www.ara.cat/opinio/ferran-saez-mateu-antes-corrupta-que-rot_0_1604239587.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Sala, F., 2015. El CNI Español va contractar una empresa d'hackers internacionals per boicotejar el 9N a Catalunya. 7 July 2015. <http://ferransala.com/el-cni-espanol-va-contractar-una-empresa-dhackers-internacionals-per-boicotejar-el-9n-a-catalunya/> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Sallés, Q., 2016a. El Ejército envía un centenar de blindados a Catalunya. *La Vanguardia*, 13 March 2016. <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20160313/40405981691/ejercito-blindados-catalunya.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Sallés, Q., 2016b. Puigdemont pide ayuda por carta a Naciones Unidas. *La Vanguardia*, 11 October 2016. <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20161010/41902219422/carles-puigdemont-naciones-unidas-ayuda-proces-catalan-carta.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Serrano, I., 2008. The State's Response to the Catalan Question. An Emerging Ethnic Component in Contemporary Spanish Nationalism? At *18th Annual ASEN Conference*, April 2008, London School of Economics.
- Serrano, I., 2010. La complexitat dels espais sociopolítics de Catalunya: els tres cercles del sobiranisme. *Eines per a l'esquerra nacional*, Núm. 11, La nova immigració: 33-47. <http://www.raco.cat/index.php/Eines/article/view/172101/224449> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Serrano, I., 2014a. Secession in Catalonia: Beyond Identity? *Ethnopolitics* 12 (4), 406-409.



- Serrano, I., 2014b. *The Evolution of the Political Discourse in Catalonia 2003-2014: From Self-government to Self-determination*. Open University of Catalonia.  
[https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ivan\\_Serrano2/publication/267858687\\_The\\_evolution\\_of\\_the\\_political\\_discourse\\_in\\_Catalonia\\_2003-2014\\_From\\_Self-government\\_to\\_Self-determination/links/545b4ac70cf2c46f6643f920.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ivan_Serrano2/publication/267858687_The_evolution_of_the_political_discourse_in_Catalonia_2003-2014_From_Self-government_to_Self-determination/links/545b4ac70cf2c46f6643f920.pdf) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Servimedia/InfoCatòlica, 2013. El portavoz de la CEE califica de moralmente inaceptable e inadmisibile la consulta independentista en Cataluña. *InfoCatòlica*, 13 December 2013.  
<http://infocatolica.com/?t=noticia&cod=19410> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Shafir, G., 1995. *Immigrants and Nationalists. Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia, and Estonia*. State University of New York Press, New York.
- Societat Civil Catalana, 2014. *Consequencias econòmiques de una hipotètica secesió de Catalunya*. 24 pp.  
<https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/assets/documents/informe-economia-hipotetica-secesio.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Sorens, J., 2016. Testimony. In House of Representatives, 2016. U.S. Policy towards National Self-Determination Movements. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, March 15, 2016. Serial No. 114–152.  
<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20160315/104672/HHRG-114-FA14-Wstate-SorensJ-20160315.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Strubell, M., 2008. Bulls and donkeys. National identity and symbols in Catalonia and Spain. At *9th Annual Joan Gili Memorial Lecture, Anglo-Catalan Society Annual Conference*. Abertawe (Swansea).
- Strubell, M., 2011. When sticking out your tongue is even ruder! In Stickel, G. (ed.) *National, Regional and Minority Languages in Europe*. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 23-34.
- Strubell, M., 2013. Catalonia's self-determination process: a bottom-up movement?. At Seminar "Self-Determination Processes in the EU". UCL European Institute, London.  
<http://miquelstrubell.blogspot.com/2013/10/ucl.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Strubell, T., 2011. *What Catalans Want*. Catalonia Press, Ashfield (MA). Sample:  
[http://www.whatcatalanswant.cat/WhatCatalansWant\\_Sample.pdf](http://www.whatcatalanswant.cat/WhatCatalansWant_Sample.pdf) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Tribunal Constitucional, 2010. Sentencia 31/2010, de 28 de junio de 2010. Recurso de inconstitucionalidad 8045-2006. Interpuesto por noventa y nueve Diputados del Grupo Parlamentario Popular del Congreso en relación con diversos preceptos de la Ley Orgánica 6/2006, de 19 de julio, de reforma del Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña. *Boletín Oficial del Estado* 172, 16 July 2010, 1 – 491.  
[http://boe.es/diario\\_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2010-11409](http://boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2010-11409) (accessed 1 December 2016)
- Vázquez, A., 2015. Els 58 assumptes catalans pendents de resoldre. El TC acumula recursos contra lleis de la Generalitat o de l'Estat posteriors al 2005. *Ara*, 9 March 2015.  
[http://www.ara.cat/tema\\_del\\_dia/assumptes-catalans-pendents-resoldre\\_0\\_1317468271.html](http://www.ara.cat/tema_del_dia/assumptes-catalans-pendents-resoldre_0_1317468271.html) (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Vejevoda, I., 2016. Testimony. In House of Representatives, 2016. U.S. Policy towards National Self-Determination Movements. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, March 15, 2016. Serial No. 114–152.  
<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20160315/104672/HHRG-114-FA14-Wstate-VejvodaI-20160315.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Vidal-Aparicio, O. 2012. La dubtosa legitimitat de la constitució sota l'amenaça militar. *Vilaweb*, 19 October 2012.  
<http://www.vilaweb.cat/mailobert/4048474/oriol-vidal-aporicio-dubtosa-legitimitat-constitucio-sota-lamenaca-militar.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).



- Vidal-Aparicio, O. 2015. Catalonia and the United States: Two Lockean Revolutions 240 Years Apart. Blog entry. 21 April 2015.  
<https://catalunyapqespanya.wordpress.com/2015/04/21/catalonia-and-the-united-states-two-lockean-revolutions-240-years-apart/> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Vilà, D. 2015. Rajoy admet ara que pagarà les pensions en cas de DUI. *El Punt Avui*. 24 September 2015.  
<http://www.elpuntavui.cat/politica/article/17-politica/898133-rajoy-admet-ara-que-pagara-les-pensions-en-cas-de-dui.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Vilaweb. 2014. La constitució no impedeix el referèndum, segons una trentena de jutges. *Vilaweb*, 13 February 2014.  
<http://www.vilaweb.cat/noticia/4173148/20140213/constitucio-impedeix-referendum-trentena-jutges.html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Weiler, J. 2012. Catalanian Independence and the European Union. *EJIL:Talk! The blog of the European Journal of International Law*.  
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/catalonian-independence-and-the-european-union/>  
<http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/23/4/909.full.pdf+html> (accessed 12 October 2016).
- Williams, P. R., 2016. Creating a Strategic Framework for Addressing the Conflict between Sovereignty and Self-Determination: Earned Sovereignty. In House of Representatives, 2016. U.S. Policy towards National Self-Determination Movements. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, March 15, 2016. Serial No. 114–152.  
<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20160315/104672/HHRG-114-FA14-Wstate-WilliamsP-20160315.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2016).

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> “Pondrà (el corregidor) el mayor cuydado en introducir la lengua castellana cuyo fin dará las providencias más templadas i disimuladas pera que se consiga el efecto sin que se note el cuydado.”
- <sup>2</sup> “Porque no se le dé vueltas: España es una cosa hecha por Castilla, y hay razones para ir sospechando que, en general, sólo cabezas castellanas tienen órganos adecuados para percibir el gran problema de la España integral.”