77 Sodobni vojaški izzivi, oktober 2014 – 16/št. 3
Contemporary Military Challenges, October 2014 – 16/No. 3
PRISPEVEK	SLOVENIJE	K	PROGRAMU	ZA
REINTEGRACIJO	IN	SPRAVO	V	AFGANISTANU	–
POGLED	SVETOVALCA	ZA	ANALIZE	POLITIK
Aljoša Selan
SLOVENIA'S	CONTRIBUTION	TO	AFGHANISTAN
PEACE	AND	REINTEGRATION	PROGRAMME	–
POLICY	ADVISOR'S	PERSPECTIVE
Članek izhaja iz teoretičnega okvira spreminjajoče se narave vojne, gradnje miru in 
protiuporniškega delovanja in je uporabljen kot temelj za razlago enotnega programa 
za razorožitev, demobilizacijo in reintegracijo (DDR) Programa za reintegracijo 
in spravo v Afganistanu. Razloženi so temeljni koncepti, strukture in procesi tega 
programa, predstavljena pa je tudi vloga slovenskega političnega svetovalca v 
Celici za reintegracijo pri poveljstvu Mednarodnih varnostnih sil za pomoč (Isaf). 
V prispevku so pojasnjeni glavni izzivi in dinamika enotnega in kompleksnega 
programa ter delovanja političnega svetovalca. Program za reintegracijo in spravo 
v Afganistanu je pomemben mednarodno financiran projekt, ki je pripomogel 
k vrnitvi tisočev nekdanjih borcev s terena ter k podpori lokalnim skupnostim in 
reintegraciji. Članek obravnava pomanjkanje ustrezne preglednosti in merljivosti 
dosežkov programa, ki še ni odpravljeno. Pri prizadevanjih za nadaljnje oblikovanje 
učinkovitega in smotrnega programa ima Isaf zelo pozitivno podporno, strokovno in 
izvršilno vlogo. Končna analiza razkriva, da je uspešnost programa tesno povezana 
z verodostojnostjo afganistanskih oblasti in potrebo po boljšem upravljanju.
Protiuporniško delovanje, Afganistan, Isaf, DDR, APRP, politični svetovalec, 
Slovenija, poslovni primer.
This article uses theoretical framework of the changing nature of war, peace-building 
and counterinsurgency as a foundation for explaining a unique disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme – Afghanistan Peace and 
Reintegration Programme. It explains basic concepts, structures and processes of 
the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme. Additionally, it presents the 
role of the Slovenian policy advisor in the International Security and Assistance 
Force Headquarters' Force Reintegration Cell. Main challenges and the dynamics 
of the unique and complex programme and of the policy advisor’s work are laid 
Povzetek
Ključne 
besede
Abstract
DOI:10.33179/BSV.99.SVI.11.CMC.16.3.5
78 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Aljoša Selan
Key words
Introduction
out. Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme is an important internationally 
funded project which has removed thousands of former fighters from the field and 
has helped to provide support to local communities and reintegrees. The lack of 
adequate transparency and measurability of the Programme’s achievements has been 
addressed but not yet resolved. ISAF has been playing a very positive supporting, 
expert and facilitating role in an effort to help further develop a more effective and 
efficient programme. In the final analysis the overall success of the programme 
is significantly correlated to the Afghan authorities’ credibility and the need for 
improved governance.
Counterinsurgency, Afghanistan, ISAF, DDR, APRP, policy advisor, Slovenia, 
business case.
The report of the panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000, p. 7), the so-called 
“Brahimi Report” considers disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of 
former combatants as key to immediate post-conflict stability and reduced likelihood 
of conflict recurrence. Banholzer (2014) cites Casas-Casas and Guzman-Gomez: 
“DDR contributes to achieving a lasting peace process where those involved directly 
in the conflict can break with the past”. Thus, DDR is often actually embedded in 
broader peace operations. Additionally, it contributes to state building because it 
involves a shift from formal and informal rules of militant groups to the laws defined 
by the state. 
Over the past several decades of warfare in Afghanistan, low- to senior-level 
fighters have regularly changed sides. Reintegration is an integral part of the Afghan 
culture. The concept of truce is encompassed in the Pashto word “tiga”, which 
means “placing the stone”. The word symbolizes the process of utilizing a respected 
elder or peacemaker to mediate a dispute among disagreeing parties (Jones, 2011). 
Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP)1 is a five-year (2010-
2015) internationally funded programme aimed at honourably removing insurgents 
from the battlefield and peacefully returning them to their local communities, thus 
transitioning communities from conflict to peace. APRP is part of a long term political 
process to bring peace to Afghanistan and is part of a wider strategy to improve 
justice, governance and development. The programme is led and implemented by the 
Afghan Government. The funding for the programme is at about 175 million USD2. 
The political guidance for the APRP comes from the 70-member High Peace Council 
(HPC) appointed by the President. Programme policies are planned, executed and 
supervised by the Joint Secretariat (JS) in Kabul and the practical implementation is 
1 Since 2001, various programmatic approaches to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate anti-government fighters 
and local militia members in Afghanistan have had mixed results, plaqued by poor design, weak oversight and 
limited implementation support from the Government and International Community (ICG, 2011: 18).
2 The international donors have pledged 220 million USD to APRP, of which 176 mio USD has been granted by 
mid-2013. As of June 2013, around 84 mio USD has been spent. The 12 donor countries are: Japan (the largest 
contributor at 52.1 mio USD), United States, Australia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Republic of Korea, Spain, United Kingdom and Estonia. 
 79 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
SLOVENIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO AFGHANISTAN PEACE AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME –  
POLICY ADVISOR'S PERSPECTIVE
led by 25-30 member Provincial Peace Councils (PPC), consisting of civil society 
members, tribal leaders, local elders and the religious community, and the Provincial 
Joint Secretariat Teams (PJST) in Afghan provinces. PJSTs provide technical and 
administrative support to the Governors and the PPCs, and help manage reintegration 
activity in the province by linking with district and community structures, which 
exist throughout Afghanistan. Linking provincial peace efforts with civil society 
is essential for APRP success. JS is responsible for providing programme support 
to these sub-national level structures. ISAF3, through its Force Reintegration Cell 
(F-RIC), has been a supporting partner in the “Afghan Led – Afghan Owned” APRP 
process. In the period of April to October 2013, the Republic of Slovenia had a 
policy advisor in the small community of nations participating in the F-RIC, thus 
contributing tangibly to the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme.
 1 CHALLENGING PREPAREDNESS FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS 
THROUGH CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In the words of Clausewitz, war is a chameleon, continuously changing and adapting. 
It is thus natural for war to change in style4. The most striking phenomenon in the 
twenty-first century is the asymmetry between extremely high-tech warfare and 
new forms of organized violence, which indirectly eradicate the impact of the most 
sophisticated weaponry. The phenomenon referred to as “new wars” also involves 
the erosion of all the traditional parameters of war that distinguish between lawful 
and unlawful actors, states and private protagonists, soldiers and civilians, intra- and 
inter-state wars, and political and lucrative objectives. In her definition of new wars, 
Mary Kaldor uses the term “war” to “emphasize the political nature of this type of 
violence, even though the new wars involve a blurring of the distinction between 
war, organized crime and large-scale violations of human rights” (Blin, 2011, pp. 
289 – 290). Taking this into consideration, there is empirical evidence, though the 
analytical literature is still scant, of the emergence of a fifth generation of peace 
operations5. What makes this type of missions specific is their hybrid character – 
these missions deploy troops and police personnel under mixed command, with 
both the United Nations and regional organizations deploying troops to the same 
missions under a separate chain of command and distinct forms of mandate. These 
missions reflect a growing shift in the division of labour in the global system of 
peace operations (Kenkel, 2013). Re-emergence of counterinsurgency presents 
an important contribution to the convergence of different forms of intervention 
currently referred to in policy circles as the “integrated mission”. First proposed in 
the UN-commissioned “Brahimi report” (2000), the integrated mission is an “overall 
3 The APRP programme document defines the role of ISAF, stating that »the UN and ISAF will coordinate 
international community support behind the Afghan lead. ISAF and UNAMA will be participating in the Joint 
Secretariat to provide assistance with information, security operations, strategic communications and to assist 
the Government delivery down to the local level« (APRP, 2010).
4 Blin predicts that guerrilla warfare, in new forms, is very likely to become the most common type of armed conflict 
in the coming decades.
5 Firstly, being traditional peacekeeping, secondly, civilian tasks, thirdly, peace enforcement, fourthly, peace-
building, and fifthly, hybrid missions.
80 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
political-strategic crisis management framework” whose task is to bring “resources 
and activities closer together and ensure that they are applied in a coherent way 
across the political, military, developmental and humanitarian sectors” (Eide et al, 
2005, p. 5). Counterinsurgency is part of a deepening nexus between security and 
development, which merges the social reconstruction and reform of societies and 
peoples to the strategies of war and interventions. It is articulated as a military doctrine, 
yet the forms of engagement that it calls forth are mostly non-military. It relies 
heavily on civilian practices. The forms of engagement prized in counterinsurgency 
are traditionally civilian and quasi-civilian roles and activities, overseen and 
performed by military personnel. Arguably, the civilian interventions integral to 
counterinsurgency render policy as a war by other means. It deepens partnerships 
with non-military actors on the battlefield and relies on the use (and misuse) of 
civilian expertise. Modern counterinsurgency represents a civilianisation of warfare 
that is rooted in liberal peace interventionism (Bell, 2011, pp. 310 – 316). Since the 
end of the Cold War, the rationale that security requires development, and vice versa, 
has spread exponentially. It has become axiomatic, forming the basis of international 
development policy for many Western states. The aim of counterinsurgency doctrine 
is not battling an opposing force, but “conflict transformation”, that is, the process 
of “reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more 
viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic 
aspirations” (Bell, 2011, p. 324). Local leadership, coupled with citizen engagement, 
has proven the only way to ensure that international investment in stability and 
reconstruction helps to catalyse sustainable change. Security provision alone is 
insufficient for rebuilding – the private sector, religious networks, women’s groups, 
and the international community must all be engaged in creating the foundations for 
long-term stability (Forman and Danan, 2013, pp. 42 – 43).
Thus, considering the many complexities and challenges of counterinsurgency, in 
his COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance (2010), General David Petraeus as 
Commander of ISAF emphasized the need to learn and adapt. His basic statement 
in the guidance was that the decisive terrain is the human terrain and that people 
are the centre of gravity. He explained that only by providing them security and 
earning their trust and confidence can the Afghan government and ISAF prevail. 
He urged for close working relationship of ISAF personnel with international and 
Afghan partners, civilians as well as the military, and called for promotion of local 
reintegration, also by supporting partners’ addressed grievances. 
However, in examining lessons learned from counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 
Greentree explains that the problem is not so much in recognizing what must 
be done, but rather in actually changing organizations and the way they do 
business (2013, p. 96). The main question is whether long-term transitional and 
developmental perspectives are given the necessary attention when planning for 
and implementing integrated missions, including post-mission commitment and 
involvement of national governments, the civil society and regional organizations 
(Eide et al, 2005, p. 14).
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Outcomes in contemporary operations are not about absolutes. The aims of 
contemporary military operations are changing from pursuing concrete military 
strategic objectives and “victory” to establishing certain conditions from which 
political outcomes can be decided (Egnell, 2009, p. 11). The indicators of effectiveness 
of the conduct of contemporary operations at strategic level are (Egnell, 2009, p. 14): 
the importance of clear and achievable political aims; civil-military cooperation and 
coordination; the importance of strategic narrative. The tactical level indicators are: 
civil-military cooperation in terms of unity of command and effort; the hearts and 
minds approach – force protection and minimum use of force; cultural understanding 
of the local context; adaptability and learning.
It is crucial to note that the nature of civil-military relations within a particular 
state has an important impact on the effectiveness of its armed forces within the 
contemporary strategic context of complex and irregular peace operations6. In short, 
complex peace operations take place among the people and involve both sub-state 
and supra-state actors in a struggle for legitimacy and far-reaching political changes. 
For the most part they involve low-intensity, counterinsurgency type operations 
between the regular armed forces of the west and loosely formed networks of 
insurgents employing asymmetric tactics. An integrated approach to civil-military 
relations that provides an extensive interagency system and integrated civil-
military structures within the ministry of defence is more likely to produce armed 
forces that are “fit for purpose” and effective in operations. Integrated structures 
provide more accurate interpretations and adjustment to the functional imperative 
of the armed forces, where instruments of national power are better suited to deal 
with particular challenges of the contemporary strategic context. Also, integrated 
systems provide more inclusive command and control structures at the strategic 
level, causing all relevant actors in complex operations to be coordinated through 
integrated assessment, planning and execution of operations – providing what is 
often referred to as a comprehensive approach to operations. This requires well-
functioning interagency structures and cooperative working culture of trust and 
mutual understanding. Multifunctional operations require integrated multifunctional 
bureaucracies. All this refutes the normative Huntingtonian argument regarding 
the benefits of objective civilian control through a divide between the military and 
civilian leadership (Egnell, 2009, pp. 4 – 10).
Adding to the organizational challenges is the complex issue of managing 
relationships. When examining peace-building, fundamental differences between 
societies – particularly behavioural and normative distinctions between liberal 
pluralist democracies and groups dominated by intolerant ideological, nationalist 
and religious frameworks – are often underestimated. The social-psychological 
approach to peace generally assumes the existence of a common foundation based 
6 Complex peace operations are operations in the contemporary strategic context, describing situations in which 
the Western armed forces are likely to find themselves involved in the future, operations other than war, such as: 
complex irregular warfare, asymmetric warfare, stability and support operations, humanitarian interventions, 
small wars and low intensity conflicts as well as peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace support 
operations.
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POLICY ADVISOR'S PERSPECTIVE
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on shared human values. Harold Saunders, a former senior diplomat in the US State 
Department and a strong supporter of the social-psychological approach to peace, 
observed that “until relationships are changed, deep rooted human conflicts are 
not likely to be resolved”. (Steinberg, 2013, pp. 36 – 37). Providing security and 
building institutions is undoubtedly important to peace-building. But a stable order 
cannot be reached unless the psychological sources of conflict are addressed too. It 
should be stressed that therefore the task of politicians, diplomats and mediators is – 
or at least ought to be – to create a space where grievances can be freely expressed, 
and corresponding emotions can be collectively and emphatically worked through. 
At stake is not only the cessation of violence, but more importantly, that adversaries 
are encouraged to come together in the hope that their relations can be realized anew 
(Hutchinson and Bleiker, 2013, pp. 81 – 88).
Many of the challenges noted in this chapter are well illustrated through the 
frequently unpredictable and very complex dynamics and interface between Afghan 
political realities, ISAF’s counterinsurgency mission, the International Community’s 
versatile, and frequently dispersed endeavours and their role in the Afghan Peace and 
Reintegration Programme. 
2 THE GRADUAL BEGINNING
The APRP story begins in President Karzai's 2009 Inauguration Speech, where 
he called for the need to “reach out to all of our countrymen, especially our 
disenchanted brothers”. At the national consultative peace Jirga held in Kabul in 
June 2010, attended by 1600 delegates from all elements of the Afghan society, the 
main topic was establishing a framework for national peace. The Jirga provided the 
president with a strong mandate to pursue peace. On 29 June 2010, the President 
signed a decree that detailed the APRP structure and directed its implementation. 
The representatives of the international community endorsed the APRP at the 20 July 
2010 Kabul Conference. On 6 September, the Afghan Government issued a “joint 
order” providing detailed instructions to the ministries and provincial Governors 
on how to implement APRP, thus providing the actual starting point for a gradual 
implementation of the programme. The High Peace Council7 was established in 
October 2010, and it provides advice to the President, as well as guides, oversees 
and ensures the APRP implementation (F-RIC, 2012). 
According to the programme document, the APRP aims to “promote peace through 
a political approach. It will encourage regional and international cooperation, create 
the political and judicial conditions for peace and reconciliation, and encourage 
combatant foot soldiers and commanders, who previously sided with armed 
7 While the HPC is the highest body within the peace and reintegration process, its primary focus has been on 
negotiations with the Taliban and perhaps less with the reintegration process (Zyck, 2012). On 20 September 
2011, the former Afghan President and HPC Chair Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated by a 
suicide bomber while entering his home in Kabul. The attack also injured Minister Masoom Stanekzai, the chief 
executive officer of the APRP Joint Secretariat. Salahuddin Rabbani, the former HPC Chair's son became the 
new HPC chairman. 
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Table	1: 
APRP structure 
(F-RIC, 2012)
opposition and extremist groups to renounce violence and terrorism, to live within 
the laws of Afghanistan, and to join a constructive process of reintegration and 
peace” (APRP, 2010).
The first reintegree joined the programme in October 2010, and the first HPC annual 
budget was approved in January 2011, followed by a wider programme budget 
in June 2011. In September, the first APRP-funded Line Ministry8 Community 
Recovery project was started in Badghis by the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, 
Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD) – a vocational training programme in 23 centres 
for a total of 400 reintegrees and community members (F-RIC, 2012). 
The APRP is frequently misunderstood in reporting by academia and the media, 
for it is a broad-based, ambitious and complex programme which was developed in 
the middle of the conflict. According to Jones (2011, p. 21), there are “tremendous 
difficulties involved” in the reintegration efforts in Afghanistan. 
8 Line ministries included in the APRP are: Ministry of Defence (MoD), Ministry of the Interior (MoI), which 
oversee the Afghan army and police, as well as ministries involved more fully in promoting social and economic 
development, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAIL), Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, 
Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD), Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD) and the 
Ministry of Public Works (MoPW).
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POLICY ADVISOR'S PERSPECTIVE
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3 THE THREE-PHASED CONCEPT
The APRP concept is outlined in the 2010 APRP Programme document and explained 
in more detail in documents such as the 2012 F-RIC Guide to APRP.
Social Outreach, Confidence Building and Negotiation are about opening a dialogue 
through a variety of outreach sources in order to build confidence, and identify and 
negotiate grievances. This phase involves building capacity at the national, provincial, 
district and community levels, including within the ANSF, to understand the APRP and 
the reintegration process. Once an insurgent declares he wishes to leave the insurgency, 
the Afghan intelligence and security service (NDS) verifies the individual, and the 
elders acknowledge and confirm acceptance back into the local community. Under 
the political authority of the HPC, the APRP seeks to enable local initiatives to initiate 
reintegration. The PPC utilizes a network of Government and civil society leaders at 
the local levels to reach out to insurgents, address their grievances and encourage them 
to stop fighting. Reintegration includes overcoming distrust on all sides. It must be an 
all-Afghan process, involving many discussions and lots of time. 
Demobilization is the most standardized of all phases and begins with the vetting 
of potential reintegrees. The key part of that is done by the national intelligence and 
security service, the NDS as well as the MoI, MoD and the JS. The information 
and background data is collected from the potential reintegree at the provincial 
level. Formal enrolment includes an intent-to-reintegrate form, individual survey 
conducted by reintegree candidate with the assistance of the PJST, biometric data 
collection, small arms registration and heavy weapons turn-in. The reintegration 
candidates are then provided basic Transition Assistance9 (TA). Provinces and 
affected communities' leadership must consider security needs of reintegrees at 
this stage, including possible short-term relocation to safe houses. The TA lasts for 
three months during which time the goal is to enrol the reintegration candidates 
in Disengagement Training, which includes modules on dispute resolution, social 
responsibility and religion. Afterwards follows a formal reintegration, with political 
amnesty for insurgent offences provided, but criminal offenses may be subject 
to later prosecution. Enrolment in the APRP also results in the reintegrees being 
removed from targeting lists by the ANSF or international forces. 
Peace Consolidation and Community Recovery includes the provision of assistance 
to those communities which are receiving reintegrated fighters. It is about the eligibility 
of a former insurgent and his community to receive small grants10 of up to 25,000 
USD, or for larger communities the sum of up to 200,000 USD. The focus is on what 
the Community experiencing reintegration wants or needs11. Depending on district 
9 This is 120 USD per month for three months.
10 Small Grants APRP projects are not to be mistaken with other, wider-Ministerial development projects. 
11 A community may desire vocational training so that its people can learn agricultural techniques, manufacturing, 
welding, demining or they may simply need schools for their children or adult literacy programmes. Communities 
and not reintegrees make decisions on what community projects they want or need. To a large extent it is about 
improving access to basic services, education, training and long-term employment.
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location, long-term development projects are accessible through line ministry projects. 
Community recovery is designed to consolidate peace by demonstrating peace dividends 
and benefits to reintegree communities and is a supporting factor of grievance resolution. 
The activities include agricultural services, rehabilitating and maintaining agricultural 
and transport infrastructure, and community based development activities. The activities 
must be linked with overall long-term GIRoA development programmes. Planning and 
implementing community recovery projects (in which reintegrees and other community 
members can participate) demand close collaboration of all involved (civil society 
leaders, the communities, PJST, PPC, JS, district and provincial government bodies). 
 4 PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION AND DELIVERY 
Only the Afghans are eligible for APRP, which is based on the reality that most 
Afghan insurgents are fighting in or near their communities, and only a minority 
is ideologically motivated. Most insurgents fight because of grievances12, typically 
12 A 2011 RAND study examined 36 insurgent reintegree cases, prior to APRP establishment, when another 
programme was in place. Of these, 71% had reintegrated in order to pursue the resolution of grievances. 36% 
reintegrated because they believed the Taliban and other insurgent groups were losing the war. 33% reintegrated 
because they felt coerced into doing so (being specifically targeted by the Afghan or international forces). The 
insurgents could specify multiple reasons for reintegrating (Zyck, 2012).
Table	2: 
APRP phases 
and processes
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POLICY ADVISOR'S PERSPECTIVE
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of local origin13. The APRP seeks to enable sustainable support to local agreements 
where communities, supported by the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan (GIRoA), reach out to insurgents in order to address their grievances, 
encourage them to stop fighting, and re-join their communities with dignity and 
honour. Grievance resolution and alternatives to fighting, as well as justifiable 
confidence in survivability of the integration process are keys to successful 
implementation of the APRP. Reintegration removes fighters from the battlefield 
and possibly enhances conditions for high-level reconciliation or peace agreement. 
In general, the reintegration and reconciliation can be viewed as two sides of the 
same coin, one inevitably affecting the other. Jones (2011) believes that effective 
reintegration cannot be separated from reconciliation with insurgent leaders.
To deliver the programme, the HPC and JS are partnered with security and non-
security ministries. For appropriate and structured execution of the Programme the 
Joint Secretariat is divided into Policy, Administration and Finance, Operations, 
Development and Communications Departments14. At the provincial level, Governors 
have the lead directing the PPCs and PJSTs, with support from the participating line 
ministry directorates. 
The largest source of funding for the APRP is the internationally funded finance 
mechanism15. The APRP Reintegration Trust Fund Finance Mechanism disburses 
funds to the Joint Secretariat through the UNDP (United Nations Development 
Programme)16. The JS then distributes these funds at the provincial level to the 
PJSTs, managing four different accounts: Operational Expenditure (salaries, office 
rent, utilities, outreach…), Float and Outreach Account (rapid reaction accounts 
for governors to use for outreach, grievance resolution…), Transition Assistance 
Account and Small Grants Account (project funding). Other financial mechanisms 
are also in place (F-RIC, 2012).
According to JS reports, a cumulative total of 7,796 ex-combatants have renounced 
violence and joined the peace programme by the end of 201317. In 2013, a key 
development within the APRP was engaging mid-level insurgent leadership, where 
400 commanders enrolled in the Commanders Programme18. The UNDP annual 
13 These can be anger against the ANSF or ISAF for the death of a family member, lack of access to development 
resources due to discrimination by a Government official, conflicts with the neighbouring communities over land 
or water, complex and long standing tribal blood feuds. The fundamental premise of APRP is that addressing 
these would remove the motivation to fight. Therefore, the Governors and PPCs have broad latitude to conduct 
their activities, including mapping, resolving grievances, generating local peace deals, thus removing peripheral 
fighters from the battlefield, which allows the ANSF to focus their efforts on core Taliban insurgency (Zyck, 2012). 
14 This structure is reflected on the ISAF HQ Force Reintegration Cell side.
15 Supplementing the APRP is the U.S. funded Afghanistan Reintegration Programme (ARP), designed to be used 
for gap filling, fast implementation and capacity building.
16 The UNDP provides programmatic and operational assistance to the APRP Joint Secretariat and other APRP 
partners at the national and sub-national levels to enable them to effectively implement key components of the 
APRP. In addition, the UNDP manages Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund (the so-called “Window B”).
17 SIGAR report puts that number at 8,503 by March 2014 (SIGAR, II/2014).
18 This programme is designed to mobilize and influence wider support for peace efforts within insurgent networks, 
with former commanders conducting peace campaigns in the communities to persuade others to join the APRP. 
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report also explains that “Line Ministries' projects provided 3,400 reintegrees and 
34,000 community members with direct benefits such as access to improved services, 
work or livelihood opportunities and vocational training opportunities19. 1,200,000 
community members will benefit from the 168 line ministry projects directly”. 
The UNDP APRP 2013 annual report states that although significant progress has 
been made, there remain implementation risks and issues, including the question 
of continued funding, loss of logistical support due to international community 
drawdown, increased political dynamics due to the elections, lack of qualified staff 
in a few key positions and inadequate information gathered to measure the true 
impact of the project (UNDP, 2013). 
All in all, within the APRP, as the UNDP (2013) reports, 164 Small Grants Projects 
have been implemented and 82 projects have been completed. These projects are 
designed to provide livelihood assistance to former combatants and reach out to 
more than 170,000 beneficiaries in communities throughout the country. SIGAR 
(II/2014) July 2014 Quarterly Report refers to 53 Small Grants Projects and 1,162 
Afghan government projects under way in 32 provinces and 190 districts.
 5 ISAF PERSPECTIVE
The ISAF main effort in support of the APRP has been to weaken the insurgency, 
reduce violence, and improve security by supporting and building a self-sustaining, 
effective GIRoA implementation of the APRP in order to enable reintegration to take 
place on the greatest scale possible, and undermine the resilience and capability of 
the insurgency. ISAF's role is to team with the Afghans at every level, and coordinate 
security operations with the local political peace processes. ISAF helps Afghans 
in communicating the programme and its opportunities to the Afghan people, and 
supports its implementation. The desired end state of the APRP from the ISAF point 
of view was an enduring and fully enabled GIRoA programme that operates without 
ISAF assistance and continues to draw insurgents out of the fight permanently, 
thereby improving security and development, and acting as an accelerant to conflict 
resolution. The ISAF objectives20 regarding the APRP have thus been (F-RIC, 2012):
 – To assist in the establishment of an effective, self-sustaining and robust GIRoA 
programme that is enabled by structures at the national and sub-national levels 
that delivers reintegration efficiently and effectively;
 – To educate and persuade target audiences to engage in and support the APRP and 
create conditions for grievance identification and resolution;
19 For example, MoLSAMD's vocational education training (15 projects) was provided to 1,278 reintegrees and 
2,562 (681 women) community members in skills demanded in local market (tailoring, carpentry, embroidery, 
carpet weaving, vehicle repair, plumbing, electronics repair…). 58 reforestation (planting pistachio and pine 
trees), 13 fruit orchard and 17 irrigation projects of MAIL provided short-term work opportunities to 13,000 
community members and 1,200 former fighters. Former fighters and community members worked on routine 
maintenance of over 1,500 km of roads (MoPW provided 1,058 community members with full-time employment 
on routine road maintenance). 
20 F-RIC POLAD objectives and engagements clearly reflect these goals, mainly in helping build a sustainable 
Afghan capacity in the policy and strategic communications fields. 
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 – To assist GIRoA, if required, in demobilization of insurgents;
 – To sustain reintegration through supporting GIRoA community recovery efforts;
 – To sustain the Afghan and International Community political will at all levels to
ensure lasting commitment to reintegration.
Among other things, ISAF has been partnering with the UNDP and JS in the context 
of focused APRP provincial training programmes. ISAF has also been providing 
expanded logistical support to PPCs and PJSTs so they can travel widely and 
implement the APRP in remote areas as well.
6 AFGHANISTAN PEACE AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME 
CHALLENGES
The APRP is considered to be a crucial element of the stabilization of Afghanistan 
and intends to integrate the political process of negotiation or reconciliation with 
armed groups and the reintegration of insurgent fighters. It integrates both civilian 
and military stakeholders and brings together governance, economic and security 
oriented processes within multi-layered institutional architecture. It absolutely 
requires courageous Afghan leaders to make bold decisions, to reject the cycle of 
violence, and work to build local and national peace processes. It requires huge 
energy to overcome the inertia of war and great persistence to build confidence and 
trust at a necessary level to achieve some form of momentum (Zyck, 2012). 
In her analysis of the various disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR) programmes Banholzer has come up with several recommendations in order 
for these programmes to be successful. “A wider recovery strategy” that places 
DDR in a “multi-dimensional peace-building framework” is essential for success. 
Additionally, “functional government institutions” help to ensure that states can 
fulfil their commitments and provide security to former combatants. Also, the 
“presence of institutionalised conflict-solving mechanisms” helps prevent minor 
conflicts. Furthermore, “DDR works best in stabilising peace” and should as such 
best be “launched after the end of hostilities”. Finally, “training and economic 
reintegration programmes must match the needs of people on the ground and skills 
training should be relevant to local markets”. She also adds that DDR programmes 
need to be accompanied by thorough evaluation processes (Banholzer, 2014, 
pp. 1 – 2). Gonzalez Palau notes that often DDR process begins when economy 
is weak, which is why reintegrees become frustrated when vocational training or 
short-term financial support they receive do not ultimately lead to suitable, if any, 
jobs. DDR programmes must thus be viewed as long-term undertakings requiring 
continued support (Gonzalez Palau, 2012). On the basis of analysing open sources, 
Zyck (2012) assessed and raised a number of concerns regarding the functioning 
of the APRP, noting that “poorly designed, inadequate or unfulfilled promises of 
reintegration assistance could discourage its members from reintegrating and could 
deepen grievances”. Also, “unprotected, poorly prepared or poorly treated former 
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insurgents would become powerful information operations opportunities for the 
insurgents”21. Main challenges of the APRP have thus been (Zyck, 2012):
 – Attacks against reintegrating fighters (lack of systematic solution for providing 
security to former fighters and their families);
 – Amnesties for reintegrating insurgents (no clear policy in place to ensure that 
insurgents who join the APRP would not ultimately be prosecuted for past actions, 
since there is no distinction between insurgent and criminal offences);
 – Limited Afghan Government commitment (strong role of provincial Governors - 
their influence on provincial structure enables them to obstruct the APRP progress, 
therefore their buy-in is vital for programme success);
 – “Fake Insurgents” reintegrating (it is difficult to clearly identify hard-core 
insurgents entering the programme from those people who are not insurgents but 
claim so in order to gain APRP benefits);
 – Lack of synergies with a political process (differences of opinion among 
international actors and within the GIRoA whether the majority of reintegration 
should proceed or follow a wider peace or reconciliation agreement);
 – Inability to address key grievances (many insurgent grievances, including the 
Afghan Government’s corruption or bad performance, cannot be readily addressed 
within the scale of the APRP “grievance resolution” process);
 – Weak monitoring and evaluation (the M&E systems have not been put in place at 
the beginning of the APRP). 
On the issue of insurgent intake Derksen notes that many reintegrees are not “genuine 
Taliban but criminals or members of self-defence groups”22, few of whom signed up 
from the south and southeast, the heartlands of the insurgency. In her view the main 
reason for the disarmament and reintegration initiatives failing are not flaws in the 
programmes but an extremely adverse political context without the peace agreement 
(Derksen, 2014, pp. 2 – 3). Some authors see preventive benefits to reintegrating 
non-insurgency groups or individuals, who have been otherwise disintegrated from 
social and political processes of Afghanistan (Checchia, 2012). 
It is also interesting to note some observations on issues of relationship among Afghan 
central and local leadership. International Crisis Group report from the beginning of 
2012 blames the central Government for the APRP ineffectiveness due to the failure 
to obtain sufficient local buy-in and the absence of vigorous support from the centre. 
It calls for substantial delegation of power to the local authorities (ICG, 2012, p. 22). 
Afghan Governors’ national conference report from June 2013 similarly criticizes 
the Afghan Government for lack of coordinated approach towards peace building 
and lack of consultation with provincial structures about project implementation. 
It further notes that employment opportunities provided to reintegrees are not 
21 SIGAR (II/2014) quotes a report published in June 2014 by Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 
(AIHRC) and 11 Afghan civil society groups, in which interviewed reintegrees stated that the APRP failed to 
deliver on its promises and left them feeling used, unsupported in the long run, and vulnerable to attack for their 
cooperation with the Afghan government.
22 SIGAR report (II/2014) quotes State Department and F-RIC saying that the APRP has a robust vetting process 
to confirm that individuals who want to join the programme are actually insurgents.
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sustainable and that the reintegrees’ activities are not being tracked. Finally, the 
Government is supposedly not adequately working on communicating the “pro-
development ideology” to the general public (IDLG, 2013).
7 FORCE REINTEGRATION CELL POLICY ADVISOR DYNAMICS 
It was into this unprecedented, complex, dynamic and challenging environment that 
the Slovenian Policy Advisor (POLAD) in Force Reintegration Cell (F-RIC) arrived 
in Kabul in April 2013. What followed were weeks of intensive familiarization 
process, studying the whole spectrum of APRP documentation, from the APRP 
programme documents, APRP bi-monthly reports and other policy documents, to 
the operational and classified material on the ISAF side, before starting to build key 
relationships with the JS counterparts. Thus began the forming of a comprehensive 
perception of a unique nature of the programme but also numerous contradictions, 
subtle layers and very difficult implementation challenges. 
Gradually, the POLAD was increasingly being included in various policy discussions 
within the Force Reintegration Cell and could contribute advice regarding the 
daily activities within the F-RIC and with our Afghan and international partners. 
Continuous participation and engagement was expected when POLAD became one 
of the section heads23. At this point, the primary POLAD “job requirements” were 
complete English language interoperability (written and spoken proficiency) with 
the Staff and comprehension of policy issues, including the discrepancies between 
the normative versus the actual dynamics on the ground. Comparing or aligning 
the planning segment of the APRP with the nominal reporting and actual “output” 
metrics - such as ISAF reporting from the provinces, the JS bi-monthly reporting and 
the UNDP reporting - as well as discussions with the more experienced colleagues, 
provided for a good picture regarding the weak links of the APRP, such as the 
virtually non-existing monitoring and evaluation of the programme24. 
Because of the programme delays, primarily of financial nature, a major issue was 
the need for financial improvements to enable a swifter and uninterrupted processing 
23 Sitting at the F-RIC leadership desk during regular staff meetings several times a week were the F-RIC director, 
his deputy and the section chiefs, among them Programmes, Operations, Support and Policy, surrounded by other 
staff. All but the Slovenian Policy Head were US or UK senior experts.
24 In February 2013, the UNDP published its long awaited independent MTE, the mid-term evaluation of the 
programme, with many recommendations. At the inaugural Project Board meeting on 2 June, the donors asked 
for a detailed description of the actions that had already been undertaken by the JS. The implementation was 
regularly postponed, but during the June - July timeframe the Afghan side presented the MTE recommendation 
action plan specific actions undertaken with a projection that the majority of the points be completed by the 
August – September timeframe. The UNDP 2013 annual report states that “the JS was able to successfully 
implement most of the 40+ recommendations of the plan and to incorporate some of the suggestions into the 
Business Case”. The success of the business case is thus also in integrating various disconnected parts of the 
APRP into a whole. The crux of the problem was the weak Monitoring and Evaluation capacity of JS, which 
has gradually been improving, providing greater visibility and measurability of the programme's achievements. 
The M&E was also one of the weak areas depicted in the MTE and remained so at the end of 2013, others being 
(UNDP, 2013): inadequate social outreach, too few armed groups joining the programme, too few communities 
receiving recovery projects, gender issues. 
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of the APRP funds being funnelled into the JS system and into the provinces. This 
was not easy due to the JS and PJST lack of capacity and skill as well as due to 
the very strict and somewhat rigid UNDP rules for finance reconciliation.25 The 
intensive dynamics at F-RIC focused on the future improvements of the APRP which 
was showing a serious lack of capacity to smoothly implement all the processes 
envisaged by the APRP Programme document. April and May saw significant and 
far-reaching developments. In order to overcome the regular programme cash-flow 
bottlenecks and improve the ability to reconcile trust fund advances with expenses 
receipts, the Financial Improvements task force developed financial improvements 
recommendations that were solidified by the agreement of the senior leaders of the 
JS, UNDP and F-RIC. Within this process, the F-RIC experts played an important 
role in devising proposals and driving the dynamics and processes forward, also by 
influencing the strategic decision making.
Due to the fact that disturbances in the stable financing of the APRP and the lack of 
robust monitoring and evaluation were vital issues with possibly damaging policy 
implications, these were the two fields that the POLAD was initially focusing on 
with the F-RIC Programmes Department seasoned experts. Also, after thoroughly 
discussing the POLAD’s previous experiences and expertise with the F-RIC director 
it was decided that the focus areas and regular engagements with the JS staff shall be 
on the Policy and Strategic Communications sides, primarily with the two department 
heads26 and later on also with the second JS deputy CEO in charge of Policy. In May 
it became obvious from our interactions with the donor nation representatives that the 
APRP funding should become more dependent on specific, visible and measurable 
results. The element that significantly changed the future of the APRP was the end 
of May Donor letter to minister Masoom Stanekzai, the JS CEO, which for the first 
time put conditionality on the future APRP funding, calling for JS to present a clear 
Business Case and contingency planning for the future of the programme. In short, 
the APRP international partners were calling for more transparency and progress. It 
was agreed by the donor representatives and the JS leadership that the APRP Business 
Case should be developed in close cooperation and support of the F-RIC experts. 
The document was to be the basis for future funding and international support. It 
was agreed that the F-RIC POLAD will be the primary F-RIC advisor and point of 
contact supporting the development of Business Case under the lead of the JS CEO 
minister Stanekzai, with primary JS focal point being the Policy Department at JS.
What followed was a very intensive series of planning events initiated by the JS 
and dedicated in one way or another to regaining the programme’s momentum and 
focusing on the future of APRP. The APRP Strategic Conference (28 May) identified 
successes and challenges of the programme, and saw commitment of the APRP CEO 
25 Quarterly tranches of money were funnelled to JS, where the JS had to show 80% of the expensed receipts for the 
quarter before receiving the next tranche of money.
26 Thus began a culturally specific gradual process of frequent interactions slowly increasing confidence building 
and gradually heading up to discussing and resolving the actual APRP issues at hand. The process of slowly 
gaining acceptance with the Afghan partners was in somewhat of a contrast with the relatively short-term 
rotational nature of ISAF personnel postings. 
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that the Business Case will soon be presented to the Financial Oversight Committee. 
The APRP Inaugural Project Board Meeting (2 June) came up with a renewed donor 
pressure, discussion about the UNDP Mid-Term Evaluation implementation action 
plan and the devising of the Business Case methodology. The PPC/PJST Conference 
(5 – 6 June) manifested very transparent and critical consultations between the 
central and local APRP leadership structures, identifying challenges on the ground, 
providing more guidance to the provinces, and discussing strategic communication 
challenges, lack of coordination and the importance of the programme’s credibility. 
The F-RIC POLAD participated in all these events in order to maintain continuity, an 
integrated overview of developments at all levels and in all formats, with a purpose 
of providing a coherent overall picture of developments, agreements, promises, 
criticisms and proposals, for use in all future interactions. The overarching aim was 
to be able to participate actively, fully and credibly in preparing the APRP Business 
Case. 
The following four-month period saw a wide spectrum of activities dedicated to 
preparing the Business Case, with the F-RIC being heavily involved in advising 
the JS on the best approach to complete the document, including its methodology. 
Initially, the aim of the APRP CEO was to have a political document that will 
represent the consensus of the HPC on the future of the programme. The donors on 
the other hand expected a specific, project-oriented document. Initial drafts lacked 
realism and went beyond the APRP basic programme framework. The F-RIC was 
trying to manage expectations and steer towards progress and finding a common 
ground. A key challenge proved to be the lack of evidence on the workings of the 
programme and a plan or rationale on how different elements of the programme will 
be implemented. The JS avoided presenting several financially supported options 
(contingency planning was demanded by the Donor Letter) and was very selective 
and slow in accepting recommendations, but donors called for further revisions of the 
document. The second donor letter helped streamline and focus further JS/UNDP/F-
RIC coordination on the Business Case. Eventually, the JS accepted the majority of 
the donor recommendations, although significant time was lost. Two programme 
options were presented along with financial projections, which were more realistic 
than with the first proposal. In subsequent interactions, donor representatives called 
for the JS to articulate the APRP to post-APRP transition plan and also asked for the 
Implementation Plan. Throughout this process, the F-RIC experts played an active 
and constructive supporting and facilitating role, discussing challenges, options and 
possible solutions with the JS on daily basis, as well as listening in on the Donor 
concerns. In mid-October, the Donors finally agreed to the Business Case narrative 
as the Afghan side was finishing the Appendixes to the document. The result was 
not only a stable financial framework for going forward, but also increased mutual 
understanding among different parties and increased capacity of the JS for strategic 
self-reflection.
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 8 AFGHANISTAN PEACE AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME 
POLICY TASKS AND CHALLENGES 
The main continuous task of the F-RIC POLAD, apart from the internal ISAF policy 
dynamics and information sharing, was following the policy developments and related 
strategic communications efforts on the JS and HPC side by interacting with the 
heads of departments and other personnel. This also included providing suggestions 
on development of the Monitoring and Evaluation27 system of the APRP to improve 
the capacity on the JS side to measure the effectiveness of various segments of the 
APRP by analyzing field visit findings, APRP processes and management practices 
and such. The POLAD attended a variety of meetings with the UNDP and JS and 
other entities, such as the EU, the Embassies and the NGOs. Financial Oversight 
Committee, Technical Committee, Project Board, the JS – UNDP – F-RIC tripartite 
and other meeting formats were regularly attended in order to provide for continuity, 
insight and a comprehensive and integrated understanding of the real time dynamics 
and challenges of the programme. Later on, these issues were considered in preparing 
the Business Case document. 
The Joint Secretariat as a very hierarchical type of a structure to a large extent prevented 
bottom-up expert initiatives or decision making, which translated into substantial 
passivity and delays in the functioning and processing within the organization. The 
somewhat static nature of the JS was also manifested through lack of sufficient 
coordination among and within various JS departments and wider, among various 
Government departments. The flow of information was not as effective and the 
level of professionalism not as high as it should be. This called for more interaction 
with the JS CEO, which seemed to create positive dynamics and progress. Another 
challenge was a wide spectrum of varying interests on the Afghans side, sometimes 
preventing focusing on the logical and goal-related activities for ensuring the 
maximum effectiveness of the APRP. Throughout the majority of activities there was 
a clear manifestation of the lack of ownership of the processes, which made work 
slow and difficult, especially since any effective project implementation – which in 
the final analysis is the ultimate goal – ultimately depends on effective leadership and 
participant buy-in. These challenges were diverse, numerous and constant. With the 
F-RIC being just one of the supporting actors in the APRP, the scope of possibility 
for facilitating change was not too wide, although it was well used through constant 
interaction, support, presence and influencing. 
27 The UNDP 2013 annual report states that “the current JS report format does not clearly identify the outputs, 
baselines, targets and indicators that form the basis of the programme strategy, and as such it is difficult to 
measure progress against specific targets. However, the M&E unit of the JS is now in the process of formulating 
these measurable indicators in their M&E framework, which will be advanced in 2014” (UNDP, 2013). My 
personal observation is that this has been happening at a far too slow a pace, at a very late stage of the programme.
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9 AFGHANISTAN PEACE AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME 
SUCCESSES 
Despite setbacks and complexities, there were significant successes with the APRP 
in 201328. The UNDP Mid-Term Evaluation and Business Case provided a mutually 
enhancing framework for facilitating the progress of the APRP. 
A number of tools were developed and implemented in 2013 to review and provide 
oversight of programme implementation and increase efficiency and effectiveness. 
These were, among others, revisions of various standard operating procedures, 
in vetting, small grant projects, prioritization of districts, increasing the length of 
TA assistance to 6 months, staff performance assessments, provincial banking and 
transfer protocols developed to ease the financial delays, guidelines for civil society 
groups to access the APRP funds, and monitoring and evaluation field visit checklists 
(UNDP, 2013). 
The UNDP 2013 annual report touches upon the whole Business Case dynamics 
which lasted from spring to autumn, concluding that “intensive collaboration and 
coordination was required in the development of the Business Case. All of these 
changes led to a more involved partnership”. Under “lessons learned”, the report 
further articulates that “developing the Business Case, which sets out the strategic 
direction of the APRP for the last 2 years of the programme, was a huge collaborative 
effort on the part of the JS and resulted in an important and substantive document. It 
was also a process that allowed significant learning, and JS will be much better placed 
to develop the next key document – the transition plan – because of the experience of 
developing the Business Case. All the lessons learned from producing the Business 
Case can be applied to the task of developing the transition plan” (UNDP, 2013). 
In my view this evaluation best describes the successful efforts of the F-RIC experts 
who put their safety at risk while consistently providing their substantial expertise, 
knowledge and experience, primarily through intensive and continuous support to the 
JS personnel through embedding and partnering for a greater success of the APRP.
The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme has been an important 
internationally funded project which has removed thousands of former fighters 
from the field and has helped provide support to local communities and reintegrees. 
The original APRP concept was ambitious and the following implementation and 
successes ambiguous and in some areas slow. As Derksen (2011) notes, the APRP 
was initially hastily implemented to respond to donor imperatives. Many segments 
of the programme, such as security provision and grievance resolution infrastructure, 
were lagging behind the actual pace of the reintegration. There have also been many 
complaints about both the Joint Secretariat ineffectiveness and inefficiency and lack 
28 The UN Security Council Resolution 2120 (2013) which extends authorization for ISAF until December 2014 
“recognizes the increased number of reintegrees that have joined the APRP” and encourages “further efforts to 
address the remaining operational challenges” and further encourages “the international community to support 
this Afghan-led effort”.
Conclusion
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of capacity in the provinces, as well as lack of communication and distrust between 
different APRP implementing partners.
But many things have progressed visibly since then. The conditionality regarding 
further financial support of the international donors provided an important new 
stimulus to the programme. The serious issue of the lack of adequate transparency 
and measurability of the Programme’s achievements has been addressed but not yet 
resolved. ISAF has been playing a positive facilitating and supportive role in an 
effort to help further develop a more effective and efficient programme. If properly 
executed, the APRP could influence or provide a notable stimulus to the high-
level reconciliation process. On the other hand, it might also provide a very useful 
in-place and verified tool for a possible reintegration flow following a high-level 
reconciliation peace deal. In the final analysis, the overall success of the programme 
is also significantly correlated to the Afghan central and local authorities’ credibility 
and improved governance. 
The efforts for long-term stabilization of Afghanistan, within which reconciliation, 
reintegration, peace talks, capacity building, local ownership and local development 
play an integral part, are fully complementary with the foreign and defence policy 
principles and goals of the Republic of Slovenia. Therefore, very active and noticeable 
participation in the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme was not only a 
significant and unique personal and professional challenge but – more importantly – 
an opportunity for national strategic positioning and promotion of the policies and 
activities of the Republic of Slovenia and the Ministry of Defence in the bilateral and 
multilateral international fora and at home.
1. Asia Report No. 221: Talking about talks – toward a political settlement in Afghanistan, 
March 2012. International Crisis Group (ICG).
2. Banholzer, L., 2014. When do Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Programmes Succeed? German Development Institute. August 2014.
3. Bell, C., 2011. Civilianising warfare: ways of war and peace in modern 
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pp. 309 – 332.
4. Blin, A., 2011. Armed groups and intra-state conflicts: the dawn of a new era? 
International Review of the Red Cross. Vol. 93, No. 882, pp. 287 – 310. 
5. Checcia, M., 2012. Security Aspects of Peace and Reintegration. Civil-Military Fusion 
Centre. May 2012.
6. COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, 2010. http://www.stripes.com/polopoly_
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8. Derksen, D., 2014. Reintegrating Armed Groups in Afghanistan – Lessons from the Past. 
United States Institute of Peace. March 2014. 
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Povzetek
Ključne 
besede
Abstract
Aljoša Selan