

phainomena

Virtualities

XXIII/88-89, June 2014

# Phainomena XXIII/88-89, June 2014

## VIRTUALITES

- 5 Christophe Perrin  
**Cogito me cogitare. Note pour servir la généalogie et la téléologie d'une formule-clé de G. W. Leibniz à J. L. Marion**
- 25 Denis Džanić  
**Derrida and Deleuze: The Phenomenological Origin of Difference in Derrida and Deleuze**
- 45 Katarina Peović Vuković  
**Virtual Worlds and Lacan. Transference in Computer Games**
- 69 Polona Tratnik  
**Entering Brave New Sociality with Super Intelligent, Emotional, and Wet Brained Robots**
- 79 Laura Potrović  
**Neuro-Transformative Performance Processes. From Neuroplasticity to the Reorganization of Performer's Body Part**
- 97 Adriano Fabris  
**Kommunikationsethik**
- 109 Dean Komel  
**Virtualität als vollendete Metaphysik**
- 127 Peter Trawny  
**Europa und die Revolution**
- 143 Petar Bojanić  
**"As". Person as Corporation – Corporation as Person  
What is (in)corporatio?**
- 157 Holger Zaborowski  
**Abschied vom "ewigen Frieden"? Neue Kriege und ihre Herausforderungen für Moral und Recht**
- 175 Philip Ogo Ujomu and Felix O. Olatunji  
**Insecurity and Instability as Challenges to the Nigerian State: Philosophical Reflections on the Meaning of Social Order**
- 199 Athanasia Glycofrydi-Leontsini  
**Orientalism in Modern Greek Art**
- 217 Žarko Paić  
**Theory of Contemporary Art: Lines and Curves. Post-History and the Discomforts of Periodisation**
- 237 **In memoriam László Tengelyi (Klaus Held)**
- 239 **In memoriam Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka**
- 241 **Abstracts**
- 259 **Addresses of Contributors**
- 263 **Instructions for authors**

# Phainomena XXIII/88-89, Junij 2014

## VIRTUALNOSTI

- 5 Christophe Perrin  
»Cogito me cogitare...« Prispèvek h genealogiji in teleologiji prairzreka od G. W. Leibniza do J. L. Mariona
- 25 Denis Džanić  
Fenomenološki izvor diference pri Derridaju in Deleuzu
- 45 Katarina Peović Vuković  
Virtualni svetovi in Lacan. Transfer pri računalniških igrich
- 69 Polona Tratnik  
Vstopanje v krasno novo družbenost s super inteligentnimi, čustvenimi in mokromožganskimi roboti
- 79 Laura Potrović  
Nevro-transformativni izvedbeni procesi.  
Od nevroplastičnosti do reorganizacije telesne partiture izvajalca
- 97 Adriano Fabris  
Etika komunikacije
- 109 Dean Komel  
Virtualnost kot totalizacija metafizike
- 127 Peter Trawny  
Evropa in revolucija
- 143 Petar Bojanić  
»Kot«. Oseba kot korporacija – korporacija kot oseba  
Kaj je (in)corporatio?
- 157 Holger Zaborowski  
Zbogom, »večni mir«? Nove vojne in njihovi moralni in pravni izzivi
- 175 Philip Ogo Ujomu in Felix O. Olatunji  
Negotovost in nestabilnost kot izziva za nigerijsko državo: filozofske refleksije o pomenu socialnega reda
- 199 Athanasia Glycofrydi-Leontsini  
Orientalizem v moderni grški umetnosti
- 217 Žarko Paić  
Teorija sodobne umetnosti: premice in krivulje Post-zgodovina in nelagodja periodizacije
- 237 In memoriam László Tengelyi (Klaus Held)
- 239 In memoriam Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka
- 241 Povzetki
- 259 Naslovi avtorjev
- 259 Navodila za avtorje

# **VIRTUALITIES**

Ljubljana, 2014

# »COGITO ME COGITARE«. NOTE POUR SERVIR LA GÉNÉALOGIE ET LA TÉLÉOLOGIE D'UNE FORMULE-CLÉ DE G. W. LEIBNIZ À J.-L. MARION

L'incipit de *L'essence de la manifestation*<sup>1</sup> pourrait nous induire en erreur. Que le *sum* du *cogito sum* soit manqué n'est en effet pas le dernier mot de Heidegger sur le *cogito*, dont toujours il reconnaît l'*ego* comme *cogitans* et admet l'ordre des raisons qui conduisent à démontrer son existence. En témoigne en 1940 sa formulation surprenante, parce qu'elle s'avère à la fois ancienne et cartésienne sans l'être : »*cogito me cogitare*«. Pour en saisir l'origine, dressons d'abord sa généalogie. On l'ignore souvent mais, comme telle, l'expression n'apparaît littéralement qu'avec Leibniz, celui-ci écrivant en avril 1676, à la fin de ces quatre années parisiennes qui l'ont fait rencontrer Malebranche, échanger avec Arnauld, étudier Pascal et travailler avec Huygens : »*operatio menti maxime mira mihi illa videtur, cum cogito me cogitare, et inter cogitandum, hoc ipsum jam noto, quod de cogitatione mea cogitem, et paulo post miror hanc triplicationem reflexionis*«. <sup>2</sup> Isolée, elle ne doit pourtant sa célébrité qu'au cours sur le nihilisme européen dont une section

---

1 »Avec le *cogito sum*, Descartes prétend procurer à la philosophie un sol nouveau et sûr. Mais ce qu'il laisse indéterminé dans ce commencement »radical«, c'est le mode d'être de la *res cogitans*, plus exactement le *sens d'être du 'sum'*« – SZ, § 6, 24/Michel Henry, *L'essence de la manifestation* (1963), Paris, PUF, coll. »Épiméthée«, 2011, p. 1.

2 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *De reminiscencia et de reflexione mentis in se ipsum* (1676), PS 3, 516. La formule réapparaît dans une lettre qu'Arnold Eckhard adresse à Leibniz au mois de mai 1677 : »*Nam et cum me ipsum cogito, cogito simul de aliqua mea actione particulari, et cum cogito me cogitare, cogito simul quid cogitarim, in quo semper extensio involvitur*« – PS 1, 237.

---

lui est consacrée,<sup>3</sup> quoique Heidegger la mentionne dès son cours du semestre d'hiver 1923/1924, notant que, chez Descartes, «avec la compréhension de l'être de la *res cogitans* est compris du même coup le critère pour l'évidence de cette compréhension. Car *cogito* signifie : *cogito me cogitare*»; et l'*Extraordinarius* marbourgeois d'alors aussitôt citer les *Meditationes* pour illustrer son propos :

*Sum certus me esse rem cogitantem. Nunquid ergo etiam scio quid requiratur ut de aliqua re sim certus ? Nempe in hac prima cognitione nihil aliud est, quam clara quaedam et distincta perceptio ejus quod affirmo ; quae sane non sufficeret ad me certum de rei veritate reddendum, si posset unquam contingere, ut aliquid, quod ita clare et distincte perciperem, falsum esset ; ac proinde jam videor pro regula generali posse statuere, illud omne esse verum, quod valde clare et distincte percipio,*<sup>4</sup>

6

avant de conclure : »il ne faut pas perdre de vue ce rapport : avec la compréhension du *cogito sum* est donnée du même coup la *clara et distincta perceptio*«. <sup>5</sup>

En bon exégète, Heidegger souligne ici un point classique de la doctrine cartésienne : c'est à partir de mon existence que sont déterminés l'essence comme les critères de la vérité. De l'impossibilité qu'il y a de douter que je sois quand je doute, eu égard au fait que douter requiert de penser et penser d'être, résulte la nécessité d'affirmer l'existence du moi comme chose pensante, au moins tant que je pense. Cependant, inutile d'aller chercher plus loin la nature de la vérité : pareille nécessité révèle que la vérité ne réside pas ailleurs que dans la nécessité même. À quoi dès lors la reconnaître ? Tenons-nous en à ce qui est. Mon existence s'imposant à mon esprit dans une pensée claire et distincte, il en va ainsi de toute vérité possible. Puisque le *cogito* est la seule certitude à triompher du doute généralisé, ses caractéristiques sont le signe de toutes les autres vérités. En somme, parce qu'il constitue la première évidence, c'est le *cogito* qui nous fait

3 *Der europäische Nihilismus*, in GA 6.2, 130-139/GA 48, 192-195.

4 *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, GA 17, 132-133/*Meditatio tertia*, AT VII, 35.

5 GA 17, 133.

saisir les règles de celle-ci.

Quoi qu'il en soit des textes cartésiens, les textes heideggériens montrent bien que, arrêtée dès les premières confrontations avec le philosophe français – il n'est pas absurde de la supposer déjà présente, sinon présentée dans les séminaires inédits des semestres d'été 1919 et d'hiver 1920/1921, puisqu'elle est énoncée sans grand développement trois ans plus tard –, l'idée du *cogito* comme « *cogito me cogitare* » est une idée fixe chez le penseur allemand. Cela ne saurait préjuger que son sens le soit d'emblée. Lors de son cours du semestre d'hiver 1925/1926, Heidegger prétend la trouver chez Descartes – «un *cogito me cogitare*, comme Descartes le dit dans la *Méditation seconde*»<sup>6</sup> – et la retrouver «presque littéralement»<sup>7</sup> chez Kant, dont la *Logik* use du syntagme «*cogito me rem cogitantem*»<sup>8</sup> dans son introduction. Synthétisant ces deux formules dans celle qu'il offre aussi inopinément qu'uniquement à la fin de *Sein und Zeit* en évoquant le «*cogito cogitare rem* où Descartes voit l'essence de la *conscientia*»,<sup>9</sup> il profite du cours du semestre d'été 1927 pour y revenir plus longuement.

7

Kant s'en tient à la détermination cartésienne. Quelque essentielles

6 Dans la *Meditatio secunda*, l'idée est approchée par le tour suivant : «*occurebat praeterea me nutrir, incedere, sentire, et cogitare*» – AT VII, 26 –, et le tour approchant dans le passage suivant : «...*cum cogitem me videre*...» – AT VII, 33. Heidegger s'explique dix ans plus tard, dans un traité de 1938/1939 : «tout *cogito* est un *ego cogito me cogitare*. Le *videre* et l'*ambulare* eux-mêmes sont un *cogitare* dans la mesure où ils ne sont véritablement, c'est-à-dire ne sont en toute certitude, que sur le mode du *cogitatum* dans le *cogito me videre, cogito me ambulare*» – *Die Negativität*, in *Hegel*, GA 68, 75-76. Heidegger lit donc les *Meditationes* en ayant les *Principia* à l'esprit : «*Nam si dicam, ego video, vel ego ambulo, ergo sum ; [...] si intelligam de ipso sensu sive conscientia videndi aut ambulandi, quia tunc refertur ad mentem, quae sola sentit sive cogitat se videre aut ambulare, est plane certa*» – I, 9, AT VIII, 7-8 –, mais surtout : «*Cogitationis nomine, intelligo illa omnia, quae nobis consciis in nobis fiunt, quatenus eorum in nobis conscientia est*» – I, 9, AT VIII, 7. Outre la définition de la pensée comme conscience, il trouve dans cette ligne cette caractérisation de la conscience comme instance représentative, au sens où «nous ne pouvons avoir aucune connaissance des choses, que par les idées que nous en concevons ; et que, par conséquent, nous n'en devons juger que par ces idées» – À Gibieuf, 19 janvier 1642, AT III, 476. Nous y revenons.

7 *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, GA 21, 323.

8 Immanuel Kant, *Logik*, AK 9, 33.

9 SZ, § 82, 433. Comme tel, ce mot est un hapax en effet.

qu'aient été et que demeurent encore à l'avenir les recherches kantienne pour l'interprétation ontologique de la subjectivité, le moi, l'*ego* est pour lui comme pour Descartes, *res cogitans* : une *res*, un quelque chose qui pense, c'est-à-dire qui représente, qui perçoit, qui donne ou qui refuse son assentiment, mais aussi qui aime, qui déteste, qui désire, etc. Descartes désigne sous le nom de *cogitationes* toutes ces manières d'être. Le moi est quelque chose qui a de telles *cogitationes*. Cependant *cogitare* est toujours pour Descartes *cogito me cogitare*. Tout représenter (*Vorstellen*) est un »je représente«, tout juger un »je juge«, tout vouloir un »je veux«. Le »je-pense«, le »me-cogitare« est à chaque fois co-représenté (*mitvorgestellt*), même s'il n'est pas proprement et expressément visé (*nicht eigens und ausdrücklich gemeint*).

## 8

Kant adopte cette détermination de l'*ego* comme *res cogitans* au sens du *cogito me cogitare*, mais en lui donnant simplement une formulation ontologique plus radicale. Il dit : l'*ego* est ce dont les déterminations sont des représentations (*Vorstellungen*), au sens plein du terme *repraesentatio*.<sup>10</sup>

Passage essentiel : Heidegger relit cette fois la formule qu'il croit cartésienne à l'aune de celle, kantienne, qui lui a inspiré la sienne. Dès lors, »*cogito me cogitare* « ne signifie plus – ou plus seulement – que »je me pense pensant«, au sens de je pense que je suis effectivement pensant – auto-intellection –, donc que je suis et que je pense, que c'est une vérité et qu'il en va là de la vérité, mais que »je me pense en pensant«, au sens de je pense celui que je suis quand je pense les objets de ma pensée – rétro-intellection –, donc que »l'être-pensant du pensant est co-pensé dans tout penser«, de telle sorte que l'*ego* est »sujet au sens de l'être-conscient-de-soi (*Subjekt im Sinne des Selbstbewußtseins*)«, puisque toujours »je me sais«. <sup>11</sup> On voit à quel point Heidegger, jusque-là fidèle à Descartes, trahit cette fois sa pensée en la repensant à partir de Kant. Alors que jamais Descartes

<sup>10</sup> *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, GA 24, 177.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 178.



ne compte la *repraesentatio* au nombre des modes de la *res cogitans* en effet, c'est par elle que Kant définit l'aperception transcendantale : « Le : *je pense* doit nécessairement *pouvoir* accompagner toutes mes représentations ; car, si tel n'était pas le cas, quelque chose serait représenté en moi qui ne pourrait aucunement être pensé – ce qui équivaut à dire que la représentation ou bien serait impossible, ou bien ne serait du moins rien pour moi ». <sup>12</sup> Dorénavant, l'*ego cogito* sera rendu équivalent au *Ich denke*, autant dire à la conscience. Il n'est donc pas étonnant, dans le cours du semestre d'hiver 1927/1928 que Heidegger fait tout entier porter sur la *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, de lire que la détermination kantienne de la pensée comme réflexion » ne peut se laisser comprendre qu'historiquement. Ici se manifeste, d'un côté, l'influence de l'empirisme anglais, de l'autre côté et surtout la position cartésienne de la philosophie des temps modernes : tout *je pense* est un *cogito me cogitare*, un comportement conscient de soi-même (*sich selbst wissendes Verhalten*) ». <sup>13</sup>

Soulignons-le : cette compréhension du « *cogito me cogitare* » ne changera plus avant sa reprise pour analyse en 1940. Tout juste assiste-t-on chez Heidegger à quelques précisions sur ce principe. Car « *cogito me cogitare* » – i.e. « *cogito aliquid = cogito me cogitare aliquid* » <sup>14</sup> – en est un. Stipulant que « chaque conscience est également conscience de soi », il est une « proposition (*Satz*) [...] que Kant prend

12 Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, AK 3, 108 (B 132). S'il reformule la leçon du philosophe de Königsberg lors du cycle de cinq conférences qu'il donne durant le semestre d'été 1957 à Fribourg – *Grundsätze des Denkens*, in *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*, GA 79, 90 –, Heidegger cite comme tel ce passage le 4 septembre 1968 : « Au sens le plus courant du mot 'réflexion', nous entendons dans ce mot le *re-flexere* latin. Le propre de la réflexion est de se réfléchir. Vers où ? Vers l'*ego*. L'essence du *cogitare* est saisie chez Descartes dans la formule : *cogito me cogitare*. Elle fait apparaître le *cogito* comme *me cogitare*, et l'*ego* en tant que *cogitans un cogitatum* = objet. Ce qui, dans le langage kantien de la déduction transcendantale est formulé ainsi : 'Le : *je pense* doit nécessairement *pouvoir* accompagner toutes mes représentations.' Le titre du § 17 de la même section est 'Le principe de l'unité synthétique de l'aperception est le principe suprême de tout l'usage de l'entendement' ; tout '*cogitare*' est par conséquent un '*ego cogito me cogitare*' » – *Seminar in Le Thor* 1968, in *Seminare*, GA 15, 307-308 (trad. mod.).

13 *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, GA 25, 233-234 (trad. mod.).

14 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, GA 27, 135.

pour base et que Descartes connaît déjà»,<sup>15</sup> apprend-on à l'hiver 1927/1928, une proposition qui a »préparé« chez Descartes le »nouveau pas«<sup>16</sup> accompli par Kant, apprend-on à l'hiver 1928/1929, une proposition par laquelle »Descartes caractéris[e] déjà« l'essence de la *res cogitans* avant même »le problème soulevé par Kant«,<sup>17</sup> apprend-t-on au printemps 1930. Héritant du »*reditus ad se ipsum*« augustinien et désignant un »acte de la conscience,« il ne fait pas qu'établir que »toute conscience d'un objet est en même temps conscience de la conscience de cet objet, donc conscience de soi«.<sup>18</sup> il »offre le premier 'objet' garanti dans son être,« dans la mesure où s'ensuit que »moi-même et les états qui sont les miens sont le premier et le véritable étant«, celui par et à partir duquel »tout ce qui est autre est mesuré«,<sup>19</sup> apprend-t-on à l'hiver 1936/1937. D'où la »*certitudo* de l'*ego cogito me cogitare*«,<sup>20</sup> qui est celle de la *repraesentatio*. Si »*ego cogito*, c'est *cogito* au sens de : *me cogitare*«,<sup>21</sup> c'est que »dans l'ordre de la genèse transcendantale de l'objet, le sujet est le premier objet d'une représentation ontologique«, apprend-on en 1938/1939.

10

Parce que, pour Descartes, la représentation est l'acte de percevoir l'idée de quelque chose, la manifestation de cette idée, de cette représentation – au sens restreint du produit de cet acte, du représenté – suppose l'unité d'un sujet – au sens large du sujet qui pense et de l'objet pensé. Heidegger est ainsi fondé à écrire que »la conscience n'est pas une simple *perceptio*, une re-présentation appréhensive, mais une *apperceptio* : elle met quelque chose en rapport avec nous tout en nous appréhendant dans ce rapport«.<sup>22</sup> Ainsi, tout se passe comme

15 *Ibid.*

16 *Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart*, GA 28, 120.

17 »*Hegel und das Problem der Metaphysik*«, in GA 80/trad. de François Vezin, in Hadrien France-Lanord et Fabrice Midal (éds.), *La fête de la pensée. Hommage à François Fédiér*, Paris, Lettrage Distribution, 2001, p. 33.

18 *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, GA 32, 191. Cf. GA 65, 213 : »...le *cogito me cogitare* (conscience de soi).«

19 *Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst*, GA 43, 97-98.

20 *Die Überwindung der Metaphysik*, in *Metaphysik und Nihilismus*, GA 67, 160.

21 *Überwindung der Metaphysik*, in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, GA 7, 72.

22 *Die Negativität*, in GA 68, 76 (trad. mod.).

si Descartes radicalisait la maxime delphique et socratique »Connais-toi toi-même«, en se connaissant lui-même en tant que sujet connaissant, tant et si bien que, dans toute connaissance, est d'abord connue la connaissance de l'ego par lui-même. Que le »*cogito, ergo sum*« soit pris et compris comme un »*cogito me cogitare*« – et notons que Heidegger maintiendra jusqu'au bout qu'il »n'est *cogito* que dans la mesure où il [l']est, *cogito me cogitare*«<sup>23</sup> – ne signifie rien d'autre au fond que je ne pense jamais rien, sans d'abord penser que je me pense, je pense moi qui pense, bref que je pense je. Envisagée sur ce mode réflexif, la subjectivité se définit alors comme première instance et instance dernière, posée *a priori* et toujours déjà impliquée dans la connaissance en tant que structure formelle et nécessaire de toute objectivité.

Bien qu'elle ne soit pas hasardeuse, l'interprétation heideggérienne du *cogito* comme »*cogito me cogitare*« demeure pourtant curieuse, car peu judicieuse, sinon fort malheureuse pour d'aucuns qui, à raison, argueront ou qu'elle ne se trouve pas dans le corpus cartésien, ou qu'elle ne s'y trouve bien que pour mieux en être rejetée. La question a longtemps animé les études cartésiennes, mais la réponse en a été définitivement donnée : »*cogito me cogitare*« est et demeure »la formule heideggérienne, mais non cartésienne«<sup>24</sup> du *cogito*. Sans doute y en a-t-il des approximations dans la *Meditatio secunda* – »...*cum cogitem me videre*«,<sup>25</sup> dans la *Meditatio quarta* – »...*quamvis concipiam me esse rem cogitantem*«<sup>26</sup> – ou dans l'*Entretien avec Burman* – »*Conscium esse est quidem cogitare et reflectare supra suam cogitationem*«. <sup>27</sup> Pour autant, nulle part l'expression n'apparaît comme telle. Faudrait-il cependant s'y arrêter, puisque cela n'a pas arrêté Heidegger qui, bien sûr, ne l'ignorait pas et le reconnaissait même volontiers?<sup>28</sup> Si tant est que l'on tolère

23 *Seminar in Le Thor 1969*, in GA 15, 348.

24 Jean-Marie Beyssade, *Descartes au fil de l'ordre*, Paris, PUF, coll. »Épiméthée«, 2001, p. 181.

25 *Meditatio secunda*, AT VII, 33.

26 *Meditatio quarta*, AT VII, 44.

27 *Entretien avec Burman*, AT V, 149.

28 Le passage des *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* cité plus haut en fait foi : si pour Descartes »le '*me-cogitare*' est à chaque fois co-représenté«, encore une fois, »il n'est pas proprement et expressément visé« – GA 24, 177.

sa conjugaison à une autre personne, il faudra cela dit admettre de la locution une mention au sein des *Responsiones* formulées aux objections faites par Bourdin. Pour évoquer la réflexivité de la représentation, Descartes a bien ce tour : »*cogitet se cogitare*«, mais un tour qui ne pèse pas bien lourd après la disqualification de l'idée qu'il vient exprimer : »*Item, cum ait non sufficere quod substantia aliqua sit cogitans, ut sit posita supra materiam et plane spiritualis, quam solam vult vocari mentem, sed insuper requiri ut actu reflexo cogitet se cogitare, sive habeat cogitationis suae conscientiam, aequè hallucinatur*«. <sup>29</sup> Ici, le jésuite mathématicien se trompe »en cela comme fait ce maçon quand il dit qu'un homme expérimenté dans l'architecture doit, par un acte réfléchi, considérer qu'il en a l'expérience avant que de pouvoir être architecte«. <sup>30</sup> C'est dire que lorsque Heidegger, en 1927, note : »cette *res est cogitans*, ce quelque chose pense ; ce qui signifie toujours pour Descartes : *cogitat se cogitare*«, <sup>31</sup> il ne peut qu'ignorer ce passage des *Responsiones*, puisqu'il use exactement des termes du père Bourdin – si tant est que l'on tolère leur conjugaison à un autre temps. Il serait néanmoins imprudent d'en conclure que »la formule *cogito me cogitare*, attribuée à Descartes par [...] Heidegger, s'avère privée dans sa pensée de tout point d'ancrage«. <sup>32</sup> À porter attention à un témoignage de Jean Beaufret, qui assure que l'herméneutique heideggérienne se fonde pour cette question sur une déduction, rien n'est moins sûr. Méditant la *Meditatio secunda* qui énonce : »*Fieri plane non potest, cum videam, sive (quod jam non distinguo) cum cogitem me videre, ut ego ipse cogitans non aliquid sim*«, <sup>33</sup> Heidegger aurait noté en marge de son exemplaire de l'œuvre de Descartes : »*Si video = cogito me videre, si imaginor = cogito me imaginari, alors cogito = cogito*

29 *Septimae Responsiones*, AT VII, 559.

30 *Septièmes Réponses*, Alq. 2, 1070.

31 GA 24, 178.

32 Nous empruntons ces mots à Grazyna Lubowicka, »La vie et la représentation chez Descartes aujourd'hui«, in Bernard Bourgeois et Jacques Havet (éds.), *L'esprit cartésien. Actes du XXVI<sup>e</sup> Congrès international de Philosophie de langue française*, Paris, Vrin, coll. »Bibliothèque d'histoire de la philosophie«, 2002, p. 632.

33 *Méditation seconde*, AT IX-1, 26.

*me cogitare*». <sup>34</sup> De ce que celui-ci ne ferait pas le départ entre le fait de voir et celui de penser voir, celui-là conclurait qu'il ne distingue pas non plus entre le fait de penser et celui de penser penser. S'ensuit nécessairement pour lui le caractère réflexif de la *cogitatio*, à qui il revient d'en venir d'abord à se cogiter elle-même, puis d'en revenir toujours à soi.

Mais »pour lui« peut aussi bien signifier pour ses élèves, ainsi Fink, qui parle du »schéma vulgaire de la réflexion : *cogito me cogitare rem*»<sup>35</sup> – réflexion selon lui, car la formule dirait la présence à soi de la *cogitatio* dans son *cogitatum* –, ou Arendt, qui écrit de la vie de l'esprit que, même silencieuse, »elle n'est jamais muette et ne peut jamais s'oublier entièrement« en raison de la réflexivité »des activités qui la compose« – en effet, »tout *cogitare*, quel qu'en soit l'objet, est aussitôt *cogito me cogitare*, tout vouloir, *volo me velle* et le jugement même n'est possible [...] que grâce à un 'retour secret sur soi-même'»<sup>36</sup>. Mieux, »pour lui« peut aussi bien signifier pour d'autres maîtres, ainsi Gueroult, pour qui le *cogito* »implique nécessairement que l'on arrive à quelque chose qui, par certains côtés, ressemble au 'Je pense' kantien, ou plutôt au Moi fichtéen«, tant il aboutit à »une représentation : celle d'une 'chose spirituelle' par laquelle «je me représente moi-même à moi-même'»<sup>37</sup>. »Pour lui« ne saurait toutefois signifier pour tous, Jean-Luc Marion à qui l'on doit de s'être interrogé plus de trente ans durant sur le bien-fondé du mot »*cogito me cogitare*« s'étant, à coup de »mises au point progressives»,<sup>38</sup> élevé contre une telle traduction, pour ne pas dire une telle trahison de la proposition originelle.

Un retour sur ces éclaircissements s'impose. Certes, ils renseignent moins sur la lecture que fait Heidegger de la *prima philosophia* cartésienne que celle qu'en

34 Ce témoignage est rapporté par Emmanuel Martineau dans la traduction qu'il offre du cours du semestre d'hiver 1930/1931 – *La »Phénoménologie de l'esprit« de Hegel*, Paris, Gallimard, coll. »Bibliothèque de Philosophie«, 1984, p. 205, note 2.

35 Eugen Fink, *Phänomenologische Werkstatt* (1927-1946), in *GA* 3, 3/2, 69, 165, 300.

36 Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978, p. 75.

37 Martial Gueroult, *Descartes selon l'ordre des raisons*, Paris, Mouton, coll. »Philosophie de l'esprit«, 1953, t. 1, respectivement p. 117 et 155.

38 Daniel Giovannangeli, *La fiction de l'être. Lectures de la philosophie moderne*, Bruxelles, De Boeck, coll. »Le point philosophique«, 1990, p. 69.

fait Jean-Luc Marion lui-même. Mais Jean-Luc Marion procédant à partir de principes herméneutiques explicitement empruntés à Heidegger, ils enseignent forcément sa meilleure compréhension. Difficile du coup de ne pas faire la relation. C'est d'ailleurs au moment où la disparition de Heidegger approche que ces précisions font leur apparition. Et comment les boudier, elles qui révèlent la téléologie propre de cette expression ? À faire exception de sa recension du *Nietzsche* deux ans plus tôt,<sup>39</sup> en 1975, c'est à deux occasions que Jean-Luc Marion s'attache pour la première fois à la formule heideggérienne, une formule qu'il juge alors approchée par Descartes sans qu'il ne l'ait forgée<sup>40</sup> et qui, à ses yeux, promeut une interprétation non pas platement ontique mais éminemment ontologique du *cogito*. S'il est vrai que »*cogito*« signifie »*cogito me cogitare*«, »ce que cogite le *cogito*, c'est d'abord, plus que tout *cogitatum*«, sinon pour tout *cogitatum*, »l'essence même de la *cogitatio*: le principe que tout étant doit, afin de plaider sa cause pour l'être, en venir à rendre raison de lui-même comme cogitable«. <sup>41</sup> Mode sur lequel tout étant est pensé et qui, pour être, doit l'être, pensé, la *cogitatio* du *cogito* spécifie le *sum* de déterminer tout *esse*. C'est là toute l'originalité du *cogito* cartésien comparé à ses »mille antécédents historiques«. <sup>42</sup> Qu'on se le dise : à la fois irrésistible et »irréversible pour toute la métaphysique«, le *cogito* ne l'est pas »comme preuve de *mon* existence«, mais comme épreuve d'»une thèse sur le

39 Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, »Recension du *Nietzsche* de Heidegger«, in *Archives de Philosophie*, 1973, cahier 36-3, pp. 455-459.

40 Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, »Heidegger et la situation métaphysique de Descartes«, in »Bulletin cartésien IV«, in *Archives de Philosophie*, Paris, Beauchesne, 1975, cahier 38-2, p. 260 : »Descartes emploie-t-il jamais le redoublement *cogito me cogitare* ? Jamais directement, à notre connaissance. Indirectement plusieurs textes y approchent«, ou *Sur l'ontologie grise de Descartes. Science cartésienne et savoir aristotélicien dans les Regulae* (1975), Paris, Vrin, coll. »Bibliothèque d'histoire de la philosophie«, 2000<sup>4</sup>, p. 206, note 45 : »la formule *Cogito me cogitare* se trouve cependant approchée«.

41 Jean-Luc Marion, *Sur l'ontologie grise de Descartes*, op. cit., p. 206.

42 *Ibid.* Pour leur présentation, se reporter à Léon Blanchet, *Les antécédents historiques du »Je pense, donc je suis«*, Paris, Alcan, 1920.

mode d'existence *en général* des étants à partir de ma *cogitatio*«. <sup>43</sup>

À cette restitution première de la thèse heideggérienne sur la thèse cartésienne, succède chez Jean-Luc Marion une première démarcation, »*cogito me cogitare*« étant considéré en 1981 comme une création délibérée de Heidegger et non plus comme une citation inventée. <sup>44</sup> Cherchant à montrer comment l'*ego* peut être tenu pour le fondement recherché par Descartes – quoiqu'il ne soit pas selon lui son véritable point d'Archimède, Dieu seul l'étant –, Jean-Luc Marion, qui explique pourquoi la *cogitatio* se réduit à l'*ego*, exemplifie cette position par un tel mot, dont il dit par là comment il se justifie. Soit l'*ego*. Cogitant, il »exerce une intention, il s'exerce *comme* une intention«, si bien que »le monde s'intentionnalise par l'*ego* et vers lui«. <sup>45</sup> Médiation de l'*ego* : rien n'est ni ne se connaît hors ce que l'*ego* a fait *cogitatum*. Direction de l'*ego* : rien n'est fait *cogitatum* sans que l'*ego* s'en soit fait un objet. Ce qui est dans l'*extensio* se ramène donc à ce qui est dans la *cogitatio*. Elle-même n'étant qu'une opération – *co-agitatio*<sup>46</sup> –, elle ramène à son opérateur : l'*ego*. C'est ainsi et ainsi seulement que ce qui se comprend sous l'appellation de *cogito* peut devenir fondement : »l'existence et la *cogitatio* ne passent si aisément l'une dans l'autre qu'autant qu'elles accomplissent le même *ego* originaire. Seul l'*ego*, comme instance de la polarisation, peut fonder l'existence, la *cogitatio* et

43 Jean-Luc Marion, « Heidegger et la situation métaphysique de Descartes », art. cit., p. 260. Cf. »Le jeu par lequel l'*ego*, comme étant suprême, se cogite comme existant, a pour indissoluble enjeu l'existence, qu'il rend possible, des autres étants, comme des *cogitata*. Par le *cogito*, l'*ego* n'établit pas tant son existence, qu'il ne permet aux étants de rendre raison de leur existence en se représentant eux-mêmes à un (re-)présentateur, – savoir l'*ego*« – *Sur l'ontologie grise de Descartes*, p. 206.

44 »Cette formule ne se trouve pas littéralement dans les textes cartésiens ; mais contrairement à ce que nous pensions (»Heidegger et la situation métaphysique de Descartes«) en 1975, Heidegger en convient. [...] La formule développée qu'il introduit est donc intentionnelle«, écrit cette fois Jean-Luc Marion, qui ne manque pas de rappeler qu' »elle se trouve enfin sous la plume d'un objecteur à Descartes, donc par lui rejetée« – *Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes* (1981), Paris, PUF, coll. »Quadrige«, 2009<sup>3</sup>, p. 391, note 32.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 391.

46 »*Cogito* se décompose étymologiquement en *co-agito* = co-agir« précise Heidegger le 12 juillet 1944 – *Skizzen zu Grundbegriffe des Denkens*, in *Nietzsche: Seminare 1937 und 1944*, GA 87, 301. Il le faisait déjà cinq ans plus tôt – GA 67, 186.

leur interaction<sup>47</sup>. Cette triple fondation, estime Jean-Luc Marion, »Heidegger se risque à [la] résumer<sup>48</sup> par la locution »*cogito me cogitare*«, au sens où je ne pense jamais quelque chose sans penser que *je le pense*. Il faut souligner chacun de ces termes. Si je ne pense jamais quelque chose sans penser que *je le pense*, c'est d'abord que *cogito = cogito* : quel que soit ce qu'elle cogite, la *cogitatio* »transgresse cet usage [...] par la conscience de sa mise en œuvre« et, »impliqu[ant] la conscience de sa condition de possibilité«, elle »implique sa transgression : fondement 'égoïque' de la *cogitatio*«. <sup>49</sup> Si je ne pense jamais quelque chose sans penser que *je le pense*, c'est ensuite que *cogito = cogito me* : quel que soit ce qu'elle cogite, la *cogitatio* fait que »non seulement le *cogitatum* dépend du *cogitans*, mais il en suppose la répétition ; donc l'existence du *cogitatum* vérifie et implique celle de l'*ego*, comme son pôle de référence : fondement 'égoïque' de la *cogitatio*«. <sup>50</sup> Si je ne pense jamais quelque chose sans penser que *je le pense*, c'est enfin que *cogito = cogito cogitare* : quel que soit ce qu'il cogite, »l'*ego* ne joue son rôle fondamental qu'en exerçant le fondement : en pensant selon la référence d'une multiplicité à une unité, bref en rendant possible la *cogitatio*, donc en s'y asservissant«. <sup>51</sup> On comprend à quel point il peut être vain de vouloir »récuser comme inauthentique [...] ou comme quasi inauthentique« ce que Jean-Luc Marion nomme en 1986 »l'étonnant syntagme«<sup>52</sup> heideggérien : il n'en est pas de meilleur en vérité pour exposer le caractère propre de la *cogitatio* de l'*ego cogito*, celui voulant qu'elle soit toujours »réflexion de la pensée pensante sur la pensée pensée«<sup>53</sup> – en deux mots : »*cogitatio sui*«, même si Descartes, qui parle de »*perceptio[...] mei ipsius*« ou d'»*idea mei ipsius*«,<sup>54</sup> ne les a pas eux non plus.

47 Jean-Luc Marion, *Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes*, op. cit., p. 391.

48 *Ibid.*

49 *Ibid.*, p. 392.

50 *Ibid.*

51 *Ibid.*

52 Jean-Luc Marion, *Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes. Constitution et limites de l'ontothéologie dans la pensée cartésienne* (1986), Paris, PUF, coll. »Épiméthée«, 2004<sup>2</sup>, p. 101.

53 *Ibid.*, p. 176.

54 *Meditatio tertia*, AT VII, 45 et 51.



Le mérite d'un tel tour s'arrête là, là où, du reste, le danger croît. Car à moins de vouloir condamner le *cogito* à ne pouvoir tenir le rôle que Descartes lui donne – ce que fait Heidegger, avec Husserl –, il faut savoir résister à la tentation de passer de la cogitation à la représentation – ce que Jean-Luc Marion dénonce en 1991, avec Michel Henry. Malgré toutes leurs différences quant à l'essence et au sens de la phénoménologie, Husserl et Heidegger ont en effet en commun »d'interpréter le *cogito, ergo sum* de Descartes à partir de l'intentionnalité«, donc à partir »de l'écart que ménage son extase et de la représentation qui le parcourt«, tous deux aboutissant au »redoublement de l'extase représentative, centrée sur elle-même«. <sup>55</sup> Représenter n'est pas un verbe transitif mais un verbe réfléchi, ou plutôt n'est un verbe transitif que d'être un verbe réfléchi : on ne représente quelque chose que parce qu'on se représente quelque chose qui, comme représenté, a pour condition de possibilité la représentation par le représentant du représentant qu'il est et qui, pour lui, est »son représentant – le lieutenant qui le représente en se présentant le premier«. <sup>56</sup> En citant le *Nietzsche II*, Jean-Luc Marion en déduit avec Heidegger que le trait essentiel de la *cogitatio* est dès lors saisi lorsque l'on dit que »tout *ego cogito* est *cogito me cogitare* ; tout 'je me représente quelque chose' représente du même coup 'moi', moi, le représentant (devant moi, dans ma représentation)«; mais eu égard à l'antériorité du représentant sur le représenté, Jean-Luc Marion en conclut contre Heidegger qu'il ne fait que répéter »la *Ichspaltung* dans laquelle s'était empêchée l'interprétation de Husserl«. <sup>57</sup> Aussi est-il impérieux de congédier cette interprétation du *cogito* pour éviter l'aporie qui en résulte, celle de la séparation radicale engendrée par l'extase représentative entre le représenté et le représentant, l'immanent et le transcendant, le phénoménal et le transcendantal. Divisé entre le *cogitatum* et le *cogitans*, »l'*ego*, loin de se réconcilier avec soi en se conciliant une existence certaine – ainsi que Descartes entendait bien l'établir –, doit admettre qu'il n'atteint alors qu'une existence empirique, autre que le *je* pur,

55 Jean-Luc Marion, *Questions cartésiennes. Méthode et métaphysique*, Paris, PUF, coll. »Philosophie d'aujourd'hui«, 1991, p. 158-159.

56 *Ibid.*, p. 159.

57 *Ibid.*, p. 160. Cf. *Der europäische Nihilismus*, in GA 6.2, 135/GA 48, 192 (trad. mod.).

aliéné par lui-même à lui-même», insiste Jean-Luc Marion, qui brandit la menace : »si le *cogito, ergo sum* relève de la représentation, alors lui aussi, comme toutes les représentations, tombera sous le coup du doute : pourquoi serait-il certain que je pense, que je suis, si cela aussi je me le représente ?<sup>58</sup> Ceci acquis, où est le tort ? Est-il dans le fait de lire le *cogito* comme »*cogito me cogitare*« ou dans celui de traduire *cogitare* par *repraesentare* ? Il l'est dans les deux en réalité, et pour deux raisons différentes énoncées par Jean-Luc Marion en 1996. La première est que »*cogito me cogitare*« explicite du *cogito* la »formulation privilégiée du commentarisme«, non »l'expression du *cogito* privilégiée par Descartes«,<sup>59</sup> la seconde que »le terme même de *repraesentare*, souvent utilisé pour définir l'*idea* en général« sans qu'il n'intervienne »jamais à propos de l'*ego cogito*« chez Descartes,<sup>60</sup> se laisse aisément détourner. Précisons.

18

»*Cogito, ergo sum*« : puisque ce n'est pas tant la formule – la plus connue et la plus rebattue de la philosophie – qui fait problème que ses formulations, constamment revues et débattues et par son auteur – »*ego sum, ego existo*«,<sup>61</sup> »*ego cogitans existo*«<sup>62</sup>... –, et par ses commentateurs – »*ego sum cogitans*«,<sup>63</sup> »*ego cogito et varia a me cogitantur*«<sup>64</sup>... –, l'histoire de la philosophie moderne obéit peu ou prou à ce principe : »dis-moi comment tu lis le principe cartésien et je te dirai qui tu es«. La chose se vérifie aisément. N'est-ce pas à toujours faire l'économie que Descartes ne fait qu'une seule fois, celle de l'*ergo*, pour discuter sa proposition

58 *Ibid.*, p. 161.

59 Jean-Luc Marion, *Questions cartésiennes II. Sur l'ego et sur Dieu*, Paris, PUF, coll. »Philosophie d'aujourd'hui«, 1996, p. 12.

60 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

61 *Meditatio Secunda*, AT VII, 25 et 27.

62 En toute rigueur : »...*quam quod ego cogitans existerem*« – *Septimae Responsiones*, AT VII, 481.

63 Baruch Spinoza, *Principia philosophiae cartesianae*, I, Prolegomenon, G 1, 144.

64 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum* (1692), I, § 7, PS 4, 357.

et, ainsi, lors même qu'il la cite souvent avec minutie,<sup>65</sup> l'exprimer comme suit : »*cogito sum*«,<sup>66</sup> ou à éclairer son mot par un autre qu'il n'a pas strictement, vers lequel il paraît tendre mais dont, par avance, il semble avoir écarté le sens : »*cogito me cogitare*«,<sup>67</sup> que Heidegger se reconnaît? Certes, si, comme d'autres, ce dernier se démarque du philosophe français par la querelle qu'il lui fait sur le sujet, celle-ci n'ayant rien d'une querelle d'Allemand, il se remarque pour être le premier à insister sur l'*esse* dans le fameux énoncé : l'*esse* impensé du *sum* avant et en 1927, ou l'*esse* repensé comme *cogitare* en 1940 et après. N'en demeure pas moins que »Heidegger, dont les coups de force jettent le plus souvent une grande lumière sur les textes qu'ils visent, reste, ici, étrangement imprécis«. <sup>68</sup> D'une part, Heidegger fait correspondre une formule dans laquelle une pensée »se cogite elle-même en sorte de conquérir sa propre existence originaire«<sup>69</sup> – »*cogito me cogitare*« – à la formule la plus célèbre du *cogito* – »*cogito, ergo sum*« –, faisant mine d'ignorer qu'elle est parfaitement étrangère à cette autre formule qu'il ne fait pas, elle, semblant de ne pas connaître – »*ego sum, ego existo*«. La différence entre l'institution de l'*ego*

65 La stricte mention »*cogito ergo sum*« – sinon »*cogito (ergo) sum*« ou »*cogito ergo – sum*« – apparaît en GA 5, 108, 110 ; GA 6.2, 131, 132, 139 ; GA 11, 24 ; GA 17, 244, 245, 305, 314 ; GA 21, 86 ; GA 23, 117, 121, 209 ; GA 36/37, 37 ; GA 41, 105 ; GA 43, 97 ; GA 45, 149 ; GA 46, 126, 309, 325, 366, 369 ; GA 48, 75, 160, 165, 167, 188, 190, 197, 200, 206, 216, 217, 219-221, 236, 237, 244, 250, 254, 256 ; GA 59, 94 ; GA 60, 164 ; GA 62, 174 ; GA 65, 212 ; GA 85, 11 ; GA 86, 303, 534, 728 ; GA 87, 253, 301, 305 ; GA 89/ZS, 142 ; GA 90, 152

66 GA 2, 33, 53, 61, 120, 279/SZ, 24, 40, 46, 89, 211 ; GA 5, 108 ; GA 6.2, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 167, 168, 271 ; GA 9, 429 ; GA 17, 132-134, 141, 229, 242, 244, 256, 267, 268, 270, 273, 312 ; GA 20, 100, 210, 296, 437 ; GA 21, 331 ; GA 23, 13, 120, 138, 140, 197, 207, 229 ; GA 24, 93 ; GA 26, 36 ; GA 32, 192 ; GA 41, 104, 105, 107 ; GA 42, 159 ; GA 48, 199-207, 215, 221, 224, 225, 228, 240-244, 248, 249, 253-255 ; GA 50, 49 ; GA 61, 173 ; GA 64, 97 ; GA 65, 201 ; GA 76, 204 ; GA 87, 71, 72, 253, 304-305, 310, 313 ; GA 88, 72, 77, 129, 236, 241 ; GA 89/ZS, 138, 142.

67 GA 2, 572/SZ, 433 ; GA 6.2, 130, 135, 136, 137, 140, 142, 160, 207, 426 ; GA 7, 72 ; GA 15, 307, 308, 348 ; GA 17, 132, 249, 255, 261, 284 ; GA 21, 323, 324, 326, 329 ; GA 23, 14, 81, 158, 197 ; GA 24, 177 ; GA 25, 234 ; GA 27, 135 ; GA 28, 31, 120 ; GA 32, 191 ; GA 43, 97 ; GA 48, 192-195, 198, 201, 202, 218, 219, 271, 308 ; GA 65, 212, 213, 215 ; GA 67, 137, 160 ; GA 68, 76 ; GA 85, 146 ; GA 86, 12, 26, 325, 390, 393, 398, 400, 490, 679, 708 ; GA 87, 254 ; GA 88, 78, 80, 104, 130, 196, 200.

68 Jean-Luc Marion, *Questions cartésiennes II*, op. cit., p. 13.

69 Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné. Essai d'une phénoménologie de la donation* (1997), Paris, PUF, coll. »Quadrige«, 2005<sup>3</sup>, p. 375, note 3.

comme existant telle que le *Discours de la méthode* et les *Principia Philosophiae* la mettent en scène dans la «formule canonique» pour «l'interprétation dominante» du *cogito* et celle que les *Meditationes* campe à partir d'«une autre formule qui omet la pensée de soi par soi [...] au profit de l'affirmation redoublée de l'existence»<sup>70</sup> est par lui entièrement passée sous silence. D'autre part, Heidegger commente cette formule «en direction d'une interprétation représentative», ne voulant voir «ni que la *cogitatio* p[eut] excéder la représentation, ni surtout que la *cogitatio* d'une chose p[eut] ne pas servir de norme à la *cogitatio sui*». <sup>71</sup> On n'en finirait pas cependant de chercher chez Descartes un seul passage définissant le *cogito* par un acte réfléchi, sauf à l'inventer.

20

Ce que fait précisément Gueroult, «qui n'hésite pas à introduire ici 'une représentation : celle d'une 'chose spirituelle' par laquelle 'je me représente moi-même à moi-même'».<sup>72</sup> Introduire, car en confrontant à son équivalent latin – «*Ex his autem meis ideis, praeter illam quae me ipsum mihi exhibet...*»<sup>73</sup> – l'unique passage de la traduction française des *Meditationes* sur laquelle s'appuie Gueroult – «...entre ces idées, outre celle qui me représente à moi-même...»<sup>74</sup> –, Jean-Luc Marion montre que non seulement le texte original «ignore donc tout d'une représentation», mais encore que «Gueroult redouble la formule simple 'me représenter moi-même' en 'me représente[r] moi-même à moi-même'»,<sup>75</sup> transformant une représentation en une réflexion là où Descartes n'envisage qu'une *exhibitio*, soit une manifestation de l'*ego*. Qu'est-ce à dire? Simplement que «cette interprétation du *cogito* à partir de l'essence de la représentation ne peut

70 *Ibid.*

71 Jean-Luc Marion, *Questions cartésiennes II*, p. 13. Et notre critique de mettre en lumière le ressort de cet aveuglement : «Ici la recherche d'une généalogie au nihilisme par l'émergence du principe de raison, donc de la pensée comme fondement, offusque des faits textuels patents» – *ibid.*

72 *Ibid.*, p. 14. Cf. Martial Gueroult, *Descartes selon l'ordre des raisons*, p. 155.

73 *Meditatio tertia*, AT VII, 42.

74 *Méditation troisième*, AT IX-1, 34.

75 Jean-Luc Marion, *Questions cartésiennes II*, p. 15.

s'autoriser de Descartes». <sup>76</sup> Ayant rappelé que Bourdin est réfuté par lui <sup>77</sup> et ayant lui-même réfuté Gueroult, il reste à Jean-Luc Marion à réfuter Heidegger. C'est chose faite en 2009. Au fond, deux phrases des *Principia* confortent Heidegger dans son interprétation: »*Cogitationis nomine intelligo illa omnia, quae nobis consciis in nobis fiunt, quatenus eorum in nobis conscientia est. Atque ita non modo intelligere, velle, imaginari, sed etiam sentire, idem est hic quod cogitare*«. <sup>78</sup> Mais Heidegger ne les examine pas à fond : parce que les redondances de la première – »*nobis consciis*«/»*nobis conscientia*« et »*in nobis*«/»*in nobis*« – accréditent l'idée de »l'implication de la conscience de soi de l'ego dans la pensée de n'importe quelle chose«, <sup>79</sup> Heidegger ne s'étonne pas de »cette intentionnalité renversée – toute conscience de quelque chose est d'abord conscience de soi« – sans que soient mentionnés »la moindre représentation, ni le terme *repraesentatio*«, pas plus qu'il ne s'attarde sur les derniers termes de la seconde – »*sentire, idem est hic quod cogitare*« –, qui font clairement ressortir au sentir et non au représenter »ce qui assure l'expérience immédiate de soi au sein de l'expérience médiate de la chose«. <sup>80</sup> Il faut croire que la fin justifie les moyens.

Devra-t-on conclure au machiavélisme de Heidegger ? Non pas. Il n'est en vérité de sens à parler de »*cogito me cogitare*« chez Descartes qu'à faire un contresens sur sa pensée, contresens sensé si l'on tient à, non pas lui reprocher l'absence d'une réflexion métaphysique, mais à le complimenter pour en avoir développé une, celle qui lui ferait penser l'être de l'étant comme représenté.

76 Jean-Luc Marion, »Descartes hors sujet« , art. cit., p. 58.

77 Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Luc Marion, *Sur la théologie blanche*, p. 391, note 32 ; *Questions cartésiennes II*, p. 13-14 ; »Descartes hors sujet« , p. 58.

78 *Principia Philosophiae*, I, 9, AT VIII-1, 7/GA 6.2, 138/GA 48, 195, GA 68, 76, GA 87, 254.

79 Jean-Luc Marion, »Descartes hors sujet« , in *Les Études philosophiques*, 2009, n° 88/1, p. 58.

80 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

## Note bibliographique

Les écrits de René Descartes sont cités d'après ses *Œuvres complètes* publiées par Charles Adam et Paul Tannery en onze volumes aux éditions Vrin, Paris, 1996 – abrégés *AT*, tome et page. Pour certaines traductions françaises non autorisées par l'auteur lui-même de ses originaux latins, nous nous conformons à ses *Œuvres philosophiques*, éditées par Ferdinand Alquié en trois volumes et rééditées en version corrigée chez Classiques Garnier à Paris en 2010 – abrégées *Alq.*, tome et page.

**22**

Les références des textes de Martin Heidegger sont données suivant les tomes de la *Gesamtausgabe* qui, depuis 1975, paraissent aux éditions Vittorio Klostermann, Francfort-sur-le-Main – abrégés *GA*, tome et page. Sont utilisées, dans la mesure du possible et quitte à les modifier, les traductions françaises existantes – nous le signalerons le cas échéant. Sans quoi nous assurerons nous-même le passage de l'allemand au français.

Exception sera faite pour *Sein und Zeit*, cité suivant sa dixième édition, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1963 – abrégé *SZ*, paragraphe et page – et selon la traduction hors commerce que l'on doit à Emmanuel Martineau – *Être et temps*, Alençon, Authentica, 1985.

Sera fait usage de la troisième et dernière édition parue en 2006, chez Vittorio Klostermann, des *Zollikoner Seminare*, dont la publication dans la *Gesamtausgabe* est prévue – abrégés *GA 89/ZS* et page.

Les principaux auteurs sont cités suivant l'édition de leurs œuvres complètes – abrégées selon leurs initiales, tome et page. La liste de celles-ci est la suivante :

- *AK* : Immanuel Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, édition de la *Königliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 33 vol., 1910-1983.
- *G* : Baruch Spinoza, *Spinoza Opera*, édition de Carl Gebhardt, Heidelberg, Carl

Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 4 vol., 1924.

- GA : Eugen Fink, *Gesamtausgabe*, édition de Stephan Grätzel, Cathrin Nielsen et Hans Rainer Sepp, Fribourg-en-Brigau/Münich, Alber, depuis 2004
- PS : Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Die philosophischen Schriften*, édition de Carl Immanuel Gerhardt, Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 7 vol., 1875-1890.





# THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF DIFFERENCE IN DERRIDA AND DELEUZE

## 1. Semiotics, semiology, and (ir)reconcilable differences

**25**

Let's start with a seemingly innocent question that may even seem to be completely out of place here: why is it that Derrida, an avid movie-goer to whom, by his own admission, movies sometimes spoke in a voice so profound, that not even books could mimic it (Peeters, 2013: 27), had never written about the cinema? Given the extraordinarily vast array of themes covered in his writings, this certainly is a strange omission. Of course, such a question – and this is precisely the point Derrida himself continually returned to in his work – is never *merely* of a bio-bibliographic nature, i.e., it cannot be reduced to a contingency exterior to proper philosophy, should such a thing exist. Therefore, Derrida's philosophy ought to have at least some pertinence to our question. Indeed, the very lack of works dedicated to cinema might be an indication of something important, if not crucial, in Derrida's philosophy. We shall propose a provisional answer shortly, but let us first take a look at the question of cinema from a different perspective. At the other end of the spectrum, we have Deleuze, who published two lengthy tomes on cinema, *Cinema 1 – The Movement-Image*, and *Cinema 2 – The Time-Image*. And yet, there is something very peculiar about these books – though

---

they mention well-known directors and are laden with specific examples found in real movies, it is hard to imagine a practicing cinematographer who, having read them, finds much practical use in them. To be sure, right from the start of these works, the reader is abundantly warned that what he is holding in his hands is in no way a handbook, or an introduction to the art of cinematography, but a philosophical treatise on cinema. One could argue, however, that the philosophical treatment of cinema contained in these books is so technical and ambitious in its projected consequences, that movies themselves take a back seat to what seems to be a sketching-out of an entire philosophical system.<sup>1</sup> So, when we are informed by Deleuze that what he's attempting is in fact a taxonomy of images and signs in cinema (Deleuze, 1986: xiv), we must always keep in mind that "the signs that Deleuze discovers in cinema are not abstracted from the collected images of different films", but rather that "they mark out the different potential experiences of a material subject" (Hughes, 2008: 16).

26

So, it would appear that, via their respective (non-)relation to cinema, we could plot a kind of a basic, albeit very formal and general, differentiation between the philosophies of Derrida and Deleuze. The latter is seeking a conceptual apparatus for describing the experiential structure of (material) subjectivity, and believes that it can be referred back to a formal order of images, the best examples of which can be found in cinema. Derrida, on the other hand, obviously didn't share the belief in the fruitfulness, or even the possibility of such a project. And while this most certainly doesn't mean that he wasn't interested in the question of the subject, very much on the contrary, it does at least imply that he didn't believe that the imaginary order of cinema provided the most apt setting for its description. Could this divergence in approach be an indication of a deeper divergence in their philosophy?

In search for further explication, we may turn to Deleuze himself, and again to the preface to *Cinema 1*, but this time the preface to the English translation of

---

1 At times, Deleuze's work on cinema might even look like a complete inversion of Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory*, which develops at length a theory of the work of art practically without ever mentioning any specific works. Here we have the opposite: two books replete with examples and specific movies, that barely have anything to do with movies as works of art.

the work. It is there that Deleuze tells us that the concepts (Deleuzian concepts, more precisely – as is well known, the very idea of philosophy, for him, is based on a certain reconceptualization of the concept as its central pillar) he expounds there are not linguistic, at least not in any way in which cinema could be called a “universal language”. Indeed, Deleuze seems to be dismissing the idea of a universal *language* altogether, at least insofar as it is understood as the fundamental and irreducible condition of experience, because it is precisely in the composition of *images* and signs that he sees the possibility for *pre-verbal* intelligible content, which would be the object of investigation of what Deleuze calls pure semiotics (Deleuze, 1986: ix). To pure semiotics he opposes semiology “of a linguistic inspiration”, which “abolishes the image and tends to dispense with the sign” (Ibid.). Images and signs, he points out towards the end of *Cinema 2*, form the utterable of a language system, and are, by that virtue, its necessary condition and correlate (Deleuze, 1989: 262). Deleuze draws a sharp dividing line between the pre-linguistic and linguistic half of experience, going so far as to proclaim them to be of different natures (Ibid.). It would seem that it is precisely this *difference*, upheld by the belief in the possibility of pre-linguistic experiential content, that Derrida dismisses as a remnant of traditional metaphysics, determined by presence. Language, constantly dissolving into two halves, only to be seamlessly patched up again; “It is at the price of this war of language against itself”, we learn, “that the sense and question of its origin will be thinkable”, and “[t]his war is obviously not one war amongst others” (Derrida, 1973: 14). What does this war owe its special status to? According to Derrida, there cannot be any sense-endowed *pre-linguistic* experience, and it is precisely those attempts to prove its existence that find themselves enmeshed in language the most. Therefore, in one of the most potent passages of *Speech and Phenomena*, we read: “A polemic for the possibility of sense and world, it takes place in this *difference*, which, we have seen, cannot reside in the world but only in language, in the transcendental disquietude of language. Indeed, far from only living in language, this war is also the origin and residence of language. Language preserves the difference that preserves language” (Ibid.). Let us not forget that the war motif is present in Deleuze’s work as well, and serves a function just as important. When trying to describe

the non-stop, close-to-chaotic movement that takes place on the plane of those pre-utterable singularities that he calls events, it is precisely battle that serves as the essential example, indeed as the Event itself. It is because “it is actualized in diverse manners at once”, because it “*hovers over* its own field, . . . [n]ever present but always yet to come and already passed”, that “the battle is graspable only by the will of anonymity which it itself inspires” (Deleuze, 1990: 100). If the god of war is the least permeable to prayers (Ibid., p. 101), this is because we lack a language in which to address him. Here we see a very different disquietude than that which characterizes the transcendentalism of language in Derrida at work. It is a terrifying transcendentalism of anonymity opposed to a constant, perhaps somewhat soothing presence of transcendent others.

28

It would seem, then, that we have come to a point of absolute divergence: Deleuze, the self-proclaimed pure metaphysician who turns to semiotics in search for conditions of experience more fundamental than linguistic ones, and Derrida, the thinker of the closure of metaphysics, who radicalizes semiology by recognizing a transcendentalism that is broadly linguistic, or perhaps archi-linguistic, in nature. And yet, we believe that, by this kind of a reading, we would be doing both of these authors serious injustice. Both of their philosophical positions are far more subtle and open for supplementation by the other one than might be first suspected because, and this is a point I shall try to make and defend in this paper, they develop from a common source – a Husserlian source. The relation of Deleuze, and especially of Derrida, to Husserl has already been explored at length, as well as their debt to phenomenology in general. However, these explorations usually serve a propaedeutic purpose, as necessary introductions in order to later show how they have moved *away* from Husserl. I will try to point in a different direction by exploring whether both Derrida’s and Deleuze’s philosophy could also be understood as a *continuation* of a philosophical project half-formulated, half-hinted at by Husserl. In order to do this, I will first take a look at how concepts of difference, developed in the works of Derrida and Deleuze, converge at two points: 1) the attempt at a reversal of Platonism as their common source, and 2) sense as the philosophical category they both need in order to attain this goal. Then, I will try to show how they both, and hence their conceptions of difference,

depend on a specifically Husserlian conception of sense. The fact that they arrive at two different conceptions of difference would then be explained by the fact that they follow two diverging paths branching from an ambiguity in Husserl's notion of sense. Between them it would not, therefore, be a matter of a fundamental, though closeted discord between a Husserlian and a Bergsonian, perception and memory, or between sign and image, semiology and semiotics, or transcendence and immanence, but of their fundamental acceptance and appropriation of the phenomenological heritage.

## **2. The undermining of Platonic transcendence through difference**

While it obviously meant different things for different people, including philosophers, it could be argued that, for Derrida and Deleuze, "*le moment '68*" predominantly consisted in developing strategies for displacing Platonism as *the* philosophical paradigm. Considering the fact that, by the early seventies, they had already published many of their most important works, and had therefore already developed the majority of the most important principles of their thought, we can say that the attempt at overthrowing Platonism remains one of the underlying themes of their philosophies in general. However, the philosophical meaning of the term "Platonism", and therefore the corresponding strategy for coping with it, is understood in different ways in Derrida and Deleuze. Let us attempt to reconstruct these different, though occasionally similar interpretations of Platonism that we find in them. In doing so, we are going to focus on the new concepts of difference that both thinkers see as necessary to develop in order to

tackle the inherent restraints of Platonism.<sup>2</sup>

30 While it is quite clear that Deleuze's thought unfolds along the lines of a Nietzschean project of *reversing* Platonism, Deleuze also must have been wary of the fact (analyzed in depth by Heidegger) that reversing Platonic hierarchies still means staying within the horizon of Platonism. Since this means retaining the category of transcendence in philosophy, a new form of thinking has to be found, one that would overturn Platonism and allow for a purely immanent account and grounding of reality. Or, as Deleuze put it, we must find a new image of thought. If this image of thought is to be completely new and purged of any kind of transcendence, then its primary task must be breaking free of the shackles of the Platonic decision, "that of subordinating difference to the supposedly initial powers of the Same and the Similar" (Deleuze, 1994: 127). For Deleuze this is not, however, merely a matter of abandoning the philosophical concepts of representation and sameness-based identity, but is, in fact, a renouncing of an entire moral worldview. Since the main use for an Idea is hunting down Sophists and pretenders of any kind (Ibid.), for Plato metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, aesthetics and ethics all converge in the essentially moral fabric of the Idea. So the Platonic divided line and the distinction between model and copy, or Idea and image, are in fact understood by Deleuze as ways of creating and maintaining a strict hierarchy between (transcendent) reality and (immanent) image of it. But, as we've said, it is not simply a matter of reversing the two and claiming that images are the only knowable reality because that would still mean subjugating them to the Platonic ideals of sameness and similarity, and therefore to thinking that is essentially Platonic. A new image of thought is necessary, and a new image of *thought*, as Miguel de Beistegui puts it, for Deleuze means a new thought of

---

2 It is worth noting that both Derrida's now-famous lecture *Différance* and Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* appeared and were published in 1968. Having already published three major works in 1967., Derrida followed this by publishing *Dissemination* in 1972., which contains one of his most sustained readings of Plato, the text *Plato's Pharmacy*. Deleuze, on the other hand, published *Logic of Sense* in 1969., which included an appendix titled *The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy*. It is also an interesting coincidence that Derrida and Deleuze both return to Plato in 1993., by publishing *Khōra* and *Plato, the Greeks* (in *Essays Critical and Clinical*), respectively.

the *image* (Beistegui, 2012: 55). Interestingly enough, he finds the seeds of such an image already planted deep inside Platonism itself, as the inherent “power of the false” emanating from within it: the “anti-Platonism at the heart of Platonism” (Deleuze, 1994: 128). For Deleuze, the embracing of the false in Platonism, an embracing in which we can hear clearly the echo of Nietzsche, happens through an embracing of the *simulacrum*, which is understood here not as a mere copy of a copy, but as an image without a model, always bearing only an illusory resemblance, and being, in fact, an image or model of pure difference in itself (Ibid.). It is a singularity without universality other than difference itself. It is these simulacra that form the cornerstone of a new metaphysics, one that overthrows Platonism, because they subvert the philosophical supremacy of the Identical, the Similar, and the Analogous by opposing to them a system of pure and constant becomings – perhaps a kind of a metaphysical system of heterogenesis (Deleuze, 1993: 7). A system of simulacra, we read in *Difference and Repetition*, is a system “in which different relates to different through difference itself” (Deleuze, 1994: 277). This is a system of pure horizontality, i.e., a system in which simulacra relate to each other on a surface of immanence in which resemblance is an effect of difference, and not the other way around. So for Deleuze, the simulacrum is the vessel for a new thinking of difference, which, in turn, is a way to avoid the Platonic imposing of transcendence upon philosophy.

We shall not go into the intricacies of Deleuzian difference here. For our present purposes, it is enough to note its inextricable bond with the image, albeit a type of image traditionally avoided, repressed or subjugated in philosophy. In any case, it is clear that, for Deleuze, escaping Platonism means rethinking difference. Let us now turn to Derrida’s version of the same rethinking, before we look for what they might have in common.

In most general terms, we could say that for Derrida, as well as for Deleuze, the possibility of eluding, overturning, or reversing Platonism lies in a radical rethinking of the relation (or *difference*) between the model and the image, or between the original and the copy. As for Deleuze, we could also say that overturning Platonism for Derrida doesn’t simply mean reversing the hierarchies of Platonic terms. Rather, as in Deleuze, it means disrupting them by means of

---

32

a very non-Platonic aberration that seems to haunt Platonism and constitute an infinite Otherness within it. This aberration, as in Deleuze, is the simulacrum. Yet, it has a very different meaning for Derrida, at least at the first glance. Whereas for Deleuze Platonism primarily means a constant effort to expel the false, the illusory, and subordinate experience to an ultimate reality of ideal Sameness, that is, to introduce a reality of transcendence into the inferior immanence of lived experience, Derrida understands Platonism as a prolonged effort to ontologically fully separate the two. In other words, to deny the very possibility of their mutual contamination. This is the Platonic decision that determines every further development, including the famed distinction between speech and writing. It is a decision older perhaps even than Plato himself, and certainly one that conditions his philosophy as much as it is made by or in it. Thus we read in *Plato's Pharmacy*: “It could no doubt be shown . . . that this blockage of the passage among opposing values, is itself already an effect of “Platonism,” the consequence of something already at work . . . in the relation between “Plato” and his “text”” (Derrida, 1981: 98). The reference to text here invites a host of meanings attributed to it in Derrida's earlier work, especially in *Of Grammatology*; in other words, not only is it the case that Plato's (or anyone else's) philosophy could never be reduced to an essential core outside, behind or beyond the text that carries it, but it was Plato himself who was already confronted with and preceded by a certain “Platonism”. In this context, it is quite clear that Derrida equates Platonism with the essential way metaphysics in general functions, and that means, first and foremost, a desire for fixed identities and an aversion for any kind of equivocation or undecidability. Therefore, we can say that Derrida, like Deleuze, understands Platonism as a philosophical decision that is as much ethical as it is ontological, the main task of which is to impose a purity that opposes any kind of blend of heterogenous entities or terms. This is where his understanding of Platonism differs from Deleuze's: whereas for Deleuze Platonism means an imposition of the Same and an introduction of transcendence into immanence, Derrida finds in it a constant, underlying desire for total separation of various aspects of being. Thus, “we must say that, for Derrida, the father (the unparticipated) is not the same but pure heterogeneity, and the false suitor, the simulacrum, is not difference in itself but



the same – but here understood as contamination” (Lawlor, 2012: 69). The bearer, or source of this contamination, is *pharmakon*, which in Derrida plays a role akin to that of simulacrum in Deleuze. It is an aggressor, a housebreaker (Derrida, 1981: 128) that threatens to break every opposition that Platonism rests upon by introducing the element of play and playfulness into it. That is way the *pharmakon* is the main enemy of the philosophical state (or republic), and that is why one of the rules of the very game it puts into play is that the game “should seem to stop” (Ibid.). It would seem that philosophy has been rather successful at this game though, because we can only occasionally catch a glimpse of the *pharmakon*, as if we were witnessing a trace of it, as in the case of Plato’s text. Then it appears as a bridge between, and older than the opposites it connects (Ibid.), like in the case of “poison” and “remedy”.

It is not insignificant that the traces of the *pharmakon*, *khōra*, or simulacrum, appear, throughout the Platonic corpus, interwoven with its very tissue, i.e. its *text*. Indeed, as Derrida is at pains to show in all of his works of the period, they seem to point to a very special interweaving, a *texere* that goes beyond the oppositions of Platonic metaphysics: to a structure of the textual scene that is a structure without an indivisible origin (Derrida, 1995: 119). The *pharmakon* can only appear in Plato’s *writings* because it is itself part of an *archi-writing*, “the trace, writing in general, common root of speech and writing” (Derrida, 1997: 74). The relation between the two systems of writing is problematic, paradoxical, and unresolved, but only so because the question of origin (of one or the other) seems to be always already plagued by a non-originality or non-presence that threatens to contaminate the source, the pure heterogeneity of Sameness. Derrida’s name for this non-originality, or original impurity and contamination of the source is the neologism *différance*. It is, in fact, the name of the aforementioned “transcendental diquietude of language”. This diquietude, disrupting the metaphysical order by exposing itself only through writing, manifests itself as a constant double movement of differing and deferring within language, which, for Derrida, effectively means within the whole of experience. Overturning Platonism for him, therefore, doesn’t mean embracing the power of the illusory and the false of the simulacrum, but recognizing that the very concept

---

of the Platonic simulacrum is problematic, given the fact that within *every* lived experience lurks a non-presence that threatens to delay or divide the sense of the experience *ad infinitum*. Therefore, either there are no simulacra, since there are no “real”, undivided and pure images nor models, or, as in Deleuze, everything could be said to be simulacra.

34

Both Deleuze and Derrida try to overcome Platonism, though with different goals in mind. For Deleuze, overcoming Platonism is the first step towards building a new metaphysics – one founded on an original, non-Platonic conception of *difference*. To him, Plato is the enemy to be beaten. For Derrida, overcoming Platonism never means actually abandoning it (it is questionable if he even thought that was possible), and certainly not repairing it with a new metaphysics in mind, but remaining vigilant to its inner fluctuations that constantly threaten to absorb it into a contradiction, but never quite do so. The vessel of these contradictions is *différance*. To Derrida, Plato is the enemy that can never be beaten, but must always be fought: whilst Deleuze wants to beat Plato by banishing transcendence from the immanence of experience, Derrida wants to constantly prove that the two contaminate each other.

Both of these conceptions of difference, however, would remain incomplete without a common supplement – repetition (Deleuze), that is, iteration (Derrida). Here too, however, we seem to arrive at a divergence: Deleuze is careful to remind us that repetition is not generality, but is, in fact, related to singularities (Deleuze, 1994: 1) or *events*, that it opposes re-presentation and is *formless* (Ibid., p. 57); Derrida, on the other hand, seems to be concerned with showing precisely the opposite: in Husserlian terms, that there could never be a primordial presentation (a *Gegenwärtigung*), or a singularity, without an already existing form, or a representation (a *Vergegenwärtigung*), because “a purely idiomatic sign would not be a sign” (Derrida, 1973: 50). This iteration that produces formality is, for Derrida, fundamentally linguistic in nature. Deleuze, on the other hand, understands repetition not as an imitation of the paradigm in the image, but as “a tortuous circle in which Sameness is said only of that which differs” (Deleuze, 1994: 57). This doesn’t mean that it is not expressible in language, though. Indeed, the two orders of reality in Deleuze – the informality of events and the formality

of propositions – are intextricably bound or “essentially related” (Deleuze, 1990: 12). Both Derrida and Deleuze rely on language, specifically on the category of *sense*, to develop their theories of difference, and not just because they, by definition, form their theories in language; if they cannot do without sense, that is precisely because it is “the frontier, the cutting edge, or the articulation of the difference” between things and propositions (Ibid., p. 28), or between the world and language.

The Derridean and Deleuzian attempts at dealing with Platonism have led us to their different formulations of difference, which in turn have led us to language and sense as their point of convergence. Let us now, therefore, turn to their respective conceptions of sense.

### 3. Noema as the bearer of difference

Though Derrida’s philosophy falls under the rubric of “critique of metaphysics”, abandoning metaphysics, or casting it aside, is never his goal. Indeed, the supplementary character of *différance* means that it is always in need of a metaphysical “host”; since it can be understood solely on the basis of a sort of “hold” (“*une sorte de “prise”*”) (Derrida, 1973: 16) it has over philosophy, and thinking it means appealing to *unheard-of* thoughts (Ibid., p. 102) that we lack the names for (Ibid., p. 103), rather than directly meditating upon the form of this “hold”, Derrida always opts for showing it already at work (Ibid., p. 16). The primary field for this bringing out of *différance* (trace, *pharmakon*, or simulacrum), for Derrida, is always Husserlian phenomenology. This is not only evident from the obvious fact that many of his works of the period are dedicated explicitly to Husserl, but is also the case because of the fact that, according to Derrida, it is precisely in Husserl’s phenomenology that an allegiance to traditional metaphysics always runs parallel with an essential rupture through which it could be surpassed, even if for a moment, before diving back into metaphysics. “*That is why a thought of the trace can no more break with a transcendental phenomenology than be reduced to it*” (Derrida, 1997: 62). It is this constant contamination, or

---

36

mediation – that is, as we are warned in *Speech and Phenomena*, always guarded in and by language (Derrida, 1973: 14) – that is the reason why Derrida, when discussing sense, always appeals to the Husserlian notion of the noema. Because the noema, which for Husserl designates a kind of an idealized intended sense of the object of experience, occupies neither world, nor consciousness (it is neither *real* nor *reell*), it always presupposes free movement between the two. It at once bridges and subverts the opposition between the world and consciousness. In this respect, noematic sense for Derrida functions as the properly linguistic manifestation of *différance* within experience. With the discovery of noema, Husserl was on the right track, but simply didn't follow through, so to speak: he still remained trapped by the metaphysical presupposition that sense conceptualized in language, what Husserl calls *Bedeutung*, must always be founded on originary intuition, i.e. on intuitive sense. It is important to note here that for Husserl, *Sinn* always primarily implies sensory experience which serves as the basis for higher levels of experience. What he wasn't aware of was that the two always contaminate each other. That is why the opposition between expression and indication from the *First Logical Investigation* falls apart as well – there cannot be a pure Husserlian expression since it necessarily must pass through a form that must be iterable if it is to function within the confines of a language. This is why the concept of the noema is so important to Derrida: it introduces a split, an opening into transcendental subjectivity that forever prevents its *lebendige Gegenwart* from happening *im selben Augenblick*; that is, it forever delays the process of bestowing the world with meaning. Since the noema, i.e. sense introduces an infinite Otherness into the transcendental subject, the very idea of transcendental *Sinnbildung* and *Sinngebung* collapses under the pressure of this *proto-stage* (Ibid., p. 84) of noematic disquietude. Thus we read: “The concept of *subjectivity* belongs *a priori* and *in general* to the order of the *constituted*” (Ibid.), and even “the very concept of constitution must itself be deconstructed” (Ibid., p. 85).

Here we see how the Derridean notion of *différance* is based on a potent and highly original reading of Husserl's theory of sense. And, though he criticizes Husserl, Derrida always sees him as an ally. Indeed, it could be

argued that, to Derrida, it is Husserl, and not Heidegger, who is the most important Janus-faced philosopher, one who, at the same time, epitomizes traditional metaphysics and opens up a path for disrupting it.

Husserl occupies a similar place in Deleuze's work. At first sight, Deleuze's relation to Husserl seems to be one of hostility.<sup>3</sup> On closer inspection, however, it is revealed that Deleuze's work benefits greatly from phenomenology, to the extent that it could be said, as Alain Beaulieu does, that "the most decisive proposals of Deleuze's thought, from its conceptual creations to its most particular relationship with the history of philosophy, were decided in an energetic, virulent and drawn-out struggle with phenomenological propositions" (Beaulieu, 2009: 264). This is, perhaps, nowhere more clear than in the case of Deleuze's analyses of sense. Like Derrida, and, though in a different and far more implicit way, Husserl, Deleuze starts with recognizing the fact that experience never comes in neatly separated layers that stack one atop the other. There is always already a coincidence (what Husserl referred to as *Deckung*) of the two senses of "sense", the intuitive and linguistic sense: "one does not proceed from sounds to images and from images to sense; rather, one is established "from the outset" within sense" (Deleuze, 1990: 28). This "from the outset" doesn't simply refer to a quasi-Heideggerean, hermeneutic recognition of the fact that we always operate within a certain

---

3 Much more so than in the case of Derrida, we should add. Unlike Derrida, whose philosophical breakthrough was marked precisely by a novel reading of Husserl, Deleuze never dedicated an entire work to the great master of phenomenology. In fact, when he does mention Husserl, they are usually disparaging remarks. This, among other things, has made the attempts at rereading Deleuze in respect to the extent and importance of his Husserlian background notoriously difficult to accomplish successfully. Not all attempts, however, follow this direct approach. Some, like Stephan Günzel's, weave an intricate phenomenological web around Deleuze by tracing his other influences and showing their relation and indebtedness to Husserl – influences such as Sartre, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. This, in fact, proves to be a fruitful endeavour, because it does more than merely show how Deleuze was indirectly, or passively, influenced by Husserl. It also helps to pinpoint the exact gestation of those ideas that others had initially found to be of the most importance in Husserl's vast phenomenological legacy. This holds especially true in France, where there has always been a lot of talk about "the early Husserl", the "later Husserl", "the early Heidegger", etc. In this respect, Deleuze could, indeed, be said to be a follower of the later Husserl, and his transcendental empiricism a sort of a reaction to the late phenomenological philosophy of Husserl. (Günzel, 2013: 154ff.)

---

presupposed understanding of the world surrounding us. Rather, it points to an essential immediacy of events or surface effects that characterize, or, rather, *are* the pure becoming that is the product of eternal repetition of difference, and sense (Ibid., p. 12). In other words, Deleuzian difference is necessarily endowed with sense. Now, if we are to understand sense as the *frontier* or the *articulation of difference* between things and propositions, between denotation and expression (Ibid., p. 28), then we are getting increasingly closer to understanding it once again in terms of the free-moving sense-bearer that both bridges and subverts the said opposition – the one we saw Derrida recognize in Husserl’s notion of the noema. If sense for Deleuze is “*the expressed of the proposition*”, an “incorporeal, complex, and irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure event which inheres or subsists in the proposition” (Ibid., p. 19), and cannot be said to exist either in things or in the mind (Ibid., p. 20), doesn’t it correspond exactly to the inscrutable ontological status of the *ireell* noema in Husserl?

38

Deleuze was aware of this similarity. Indeed, it could be argued that *Logic of Sense* can be understood as a long answer to the question Deleuze himself asks: could phenomenology (and in Deleuze’s use, “phenomenology” always seems to mean “Husserlian phenomenology”) be the much needed rigorous science of these complex events at the surface of things that he recognizes as sense (Ibid., p. 21)? Again, as was the case with Derrida, Deleuze believes that Husserl was on the right track. Husserl’s rediscovery of the Stoic inspiration (Ibid., p. 20) means an ontological reevaluation of sense accomplished by removing noemata from sensible qualities as well as from their representations in the stream of consciousness; the entirely different ontological status of the noema “consists in *not* existing outside the proposition which expresses it” (Ibid., p. 21). This is precisely the defining quality of sense for Deleuze: that it does not in any way exist, but subsists in the proposition. Or, in Husserlian terms, sense, the noema, is *ireell*, but transcendental in respect to meaning.

Thus we see clearly how Deleuzian difference is also based on a potent and original reading of Husserl’s theory of sense. Unlike the Derridean reading, in which *différance* inheres in singular, originary experiences, as their non-source, or the always present possibility of their iteration, Deleuzian reading focuses on

the event character of the noema and disregards its ideality and formality: always a singularity, an event, and always on the surface of things, like a film coating them, the noema, or sense, is the immediate and essential follower of repeating difference. It could be argued that this reading of the noema is far more opposed to Husserl than that of Derrida. Indeed, whereas Derrida, in many respects, understands his reading of Husserl as a *radicalization* of Husserl, Deleuze sees his project as, amongst other things, a *rejection* of Husserl. In this respect, he wants to show that Husserl falls short of commanding the new conception of sense opened up by his own notion of the noema. Because sense is a pure event, “*on the condition that the event is not confused with its spatio-temporal realization in a state of affairs*” (Ibid., p. 22), that is, an incorporeality, it must always be characterized by becoming, or, as Deleuze would put it, its linguistic form must be a verb in the infinitive. This is precisely the kind of radicality Husserl seems to avoid though, because his notion of the noema, though *ireell*, presupposes a transcendental nucleus which, for Deleuze, “is nothing other than the relation between sense itself and the object in its reality” (Ibid., p. 97), and this, in turn, means the need for a transcendental constituent, since this nucleus is understood as the object of support or principle of unification of noematic *predicates*. If nucleus-metaphors are disquieting (Ibid., p. 98), it is because they presuppose the idea of a kind of layering of experience that is meant to be abandoned by both Deleuze and Derrida. Still, it is not quite clear whether Husserl himself believed that experience could be neatly compartmentalized, by levels or degrees, in this way. What Deleuze calls “the rational or rationalized caricature” of the true bestowal of sense (Ibid.) might not have even been Husserl’s position. Deleuze’s grasp of Husserl in *Logic of Sense* is, no doubt, limited, since there he deals only with *Ideas I*. Indeed, in his later work, Husserl becomes increasingly more interested in going beyond transcendental subjectivity, and into transcendental impersonality. We cannot deal with this now, though. It is enough to note that, throughout *Logic of Sense*, Husserl remains the enemy to be reckoned with the most, precisely because he came closest to formulating, in terms of modern philosophy, what Deleuze himself tries to formulate: a theory of sense bound with a theory of genesis of experience.

Both Derrida and Deleuze, then, have a complex relation to Husserl. For both, Husserl is perhaps the last great representative of the Western philosophical

---

40

tradition stemming from Plato. They both try to come up with ways to disrupt this Platonic tradition, though for different reasons, and they see Husserl as both an enemy to defeat and an ally to consult in this attempt. Their ambiguous relation toward Husserl arises primarily from the fact that Husserl himself oscillated between structural and genetic phenomenology, or, in his terms, between descriptive (*beschreibende*) and explanatory (*erklärende*) phenomenology. The rift between the two occasionally seems so great that siding with one mode of phenomenology effectively means choosing between idealism and realism, understood not only as epistemological, but also ontological positions. This is the reason why even the most basic questions, such as whether Platonism (of different sorts) could be ascribed to Husserl, still remain largely contested and unresolved in Husserl scholarship. This is also the reason why both Derrida and Deleuze draw upon those elements in Husserl which are difficult to classify, and which escape the usual oppositions that belong to the more traditional dimension of his phenomenology. In many respects, then, their relation to Husserl is one of appropriation of those elements of his philosophy that seem to subvert it from within. As we've seen, this is the pattern they both generally employ when trying to conceive philosophy outside of the framework of traditional metaphysics – and this means wresting it from its Platonic grip. And even though neither of them simply equates metaphysics with Platonism, it is clear that it is the Platonic paradigm they both seek to overcome. For Deleuze, this means abandoning the representationalist account of experience and reality in favor of a metaphysical system based on difference, and for Derrida, it means throwing light on the inherent impossibility of pure and unmediated experience because its totality is always delayed through the work of *différance*. Whilst overcoming Platonism for Deleuze means disposing of all traces of transcendence within immanent experience through difference as the only, paradoxical system of selection, for Derrida it means showing that the source in its self-immanence, whatever it may be, is never pure and original, but contaminated and plagued by a trace of non-originality within it that is *différance*, i.e. an infinite transcendence of Otherness.

Hence, their conceptions of difference are usually understood as diametrically opposed. We have seen, however, that they share not only a common goal – a



disruption of Platonism that is not a mere *reversal* – but also a common medium, language, and a common means, a conception of sense that, through its essential dis-placement, or non-regionality, subverts the metaphysical oppositions of model-copy, mind-world, language-world, etc. They both find a useful formulation of this conception of sense in Husserl’s theory of the noema. Indeed, for both, Husserlian phenomenology turns out to be a wellspring of tools for their own philosophical projects. Thus, when considering their relation to Husserl, the question we need to ask is not “Are Deleuze and Derrida phenomenologists?” but “In what ways do they utilise phenomenological groundwork laid out by Husserl?”. When asked in this way, the question offers a multitude of answers, one of which, without doubt, is that they both delve deep into a phenomenology of source, in order to discover within it a bottomless differentiation. One does not exclude the other. Indeed, if we were to take one more cue from Derrida, we could say that neither of them really ever had any choice in the matter (Derrida, 1997: 62).

---

**LIST OF REFERENCES**

Beaulieu, Alain (2009): "Edmund Husserl", in: *Deleuze's Philosophical Lineage*, Graham Jones, Jon Roffe (eds.), (p.) 261-81. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Beistegui, Miguel de (2012): "The Deleuzian reversal of Platonism", in: *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze*, Daniel W. Smith, Henry Somers-Hall (eds.), (p.) 55-81. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Deleuze, Gilles (1986): *Cinema 1. The Movement-Image*, London: The Athlone Press.

Deleuze, Gilles (1989): *Cinema 2. The Time-Image*, London: The Athlone Press.

Deleuze, Gilles (1990): *Logic of Sense*, London: The Athlone Press.

Deleuze, Gilles (1993): "Lettre-préface de Gilles Deleuze", in: *Variations. La philosophie de Gilles Deleuze*, Jean-Clet Martin, (p.) 7-9. Paris: Éditions Payot & Rivages.

Deleuze, Gilles (1994): *Difference and Repetition*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Derrida, Jacques (1973): *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Derrida, Jacques (1981): *Dissemination*, London: The Athlone Press.

Derrida, Jacques (1995): *On the Name*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Derrida, Jacques (1997): *Of Grammatology*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Günzel, Stephan (2013): "Deleuze und die Phänomenologie", in: *Phainomena – Genealogies XXII/84-85* (p.) 153-176. Ljubljana.

Hughes, Joe (2008): "Schizoanalysis and the Phenomenology of Cinema", in: *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema*, Ian Buchanan, Patricia MacCormack (eds.), (p.) 15-26. London, New York: Continuum.

Lawlor, Leonard (2003): "The Beginnings of Thought: The Fundamental Experience in Derrida and Deleuze", in: *Between Deleuze and Derrida*, Paul

---

Patton, John Protevi (eds.), (p.) 67-83. London, New York: Continuum.

Peeters, Benoît (2013): *Derrida. A Biography*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.



## **VIRTUAL WORLDS AND LACAN. TRANSFERENCE IN COMPUTER GAMES**

### **1. Paul Virilio's remarks on passive/ active subject of virtual worlds**

**45**

Social and/or philosophical critique of virtual worlds is marked by a certain paradox. Cyberspace is understood as “the falls approximation”, “degraded copy”, “seductive substitution of the real” (Virilio, 1995). “Computer-communication narco-economy”, claims Paul Virilio, is next to the illicit drugs-based narco-capitalism” (1995). At the same time Virilio notices different effects of cyberspace. He writes about “accident of reality”, violent effect of cyberspace as great” and “never-seen accident of the future” (1995). There is an obvious inconsistency in describing a subject and virtual worlds. Firstly, subject has been described as passive and narcotized, immersed in virtual world without any wish and strength to actively participate and understand his/her position and context. “Addiction rhetoric” (Cover, 2006) is not new in describing behavior of subject immersed in virtual worlds. There could be sad that there is a good reason for using such rhetoric. In Japan there is a term “otaku” generation that refers to a young people that tend to be locked in their rooms (usually playing computer games). Otaku generation is certainly showing symptoms of autism and/or drug addiction behavior. For that reasons we can say that even profane term “electronic fix” is rightly used when describing the socially unacceptable behavior related to longer playing, especially

---

in virtual social spaces and on line role-playing games. The most popular games are *World of Warcraft*, *Ultima Online* and *EverQuest* (that has been even named “EverCrack” in order to suggest the proportion of a problem). USA classification system included and described a disorder related to computer games as a part of the Internet Addiction Disorder (IAD). It is a psychological disorder that refers to gaming, social networking, Internet shopping and consummation of on line pornography. Psychologists such as, Kimberly S. Young therapist and author of a study *Caught in the Net* (1998), developed an method for curing IDA, and so one.

46 However, paradox is also presented in Virilio’s critique and classification system of mental disorders. Subject is described as narcotized and violent at the same time, being able of becoming a passive and destructive in real world as a reflex of his/her immersion in virtual world. Because of a strong engagement and participation in game narrative, which is often violent, psychologists fear of “translating attitudes and actions from virtual in real” (Sommerseth, 2007). Although this second description is not favorable, it is completely different from the first one. The best known example of the this is well known Columbine school massacre from 1999, where young shooters Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, players of the *Duke Nukem* and *Doom*, killed twelve students and one teacher, after which they committed suicide. The fear of transfer (from virtual to real) resulted in moral panic and stigmatization of first person shooters (Sony, company that produced *Doom*, was faced with several low suits). However, if there is an congruence between those two worlds, as Alexander R. Galloway writes, than the final outcome of playing computer games could really be “a realization of André Breton’s dream of the purest surrealist act: the desire to burst into the street with a pistol” (2006: 104)<sup>1</sup>. However, as Galloway notices there is something surrealist in comprehension of that transfer.

---

1 Moral panic expanded, on different representations of violence behavior, such as movie *The Basketball Diaries* (1995) in which the character played by Leonardo Di Caprio dreams of a school massacre. Even the broadcasting of the fantastic TV show *Buffy – The Vampire Slayer* was postponed because of the episode named “Graduation day” in which “hell mouth” opens.

The paper will elaborate three problems related to understanding of the virtual worlds and the possibility of the transfer from the virtual into real. The first is the problem of “content barrier”, the problem of focusing on gaming graphic and narrative. It is a common tendency to interpret the “influence” of virtual worlds through reading the content of that world. (The second and the third problem, that will be elaborated in separate paragraphs, are common technological determinism – the notion of the “impact” of (autonomous) technology; and a problem of dividing the Virtual and the Real.) The common interpretation of games is an interpretation of (violent) stories, while games are not only stories but also “algorithmic narrations” (Galloway, 2006; Wark, 2007; Manovich, 2001). Content barrier is common not only in popular psychologization, interpretation of transfer of virtual (often violent) content into the real world, but also in literary criticism and film theory. Both fields claim that computer games will never reach the artistic level of a novel or a film. Famous film theoretician Roger Ebert formulated this opinion in 2005. Ebert stated that video games can never be art (Choi, 2005). Theory of computer games, so called ludology warns about problems of interpreting games while using classical narratological apparatus (Aarseth, 2001; Eskelinen, 2004, Juul, 2001; Juul, 2006; Bogost, 2006). The role of narrative is almost the opposite from what critics are stressing as dangerous transfer of virtual violent narrative. The most vivid representations can have no or limited transfer. Alexander R. Galloway writes that content, story, is actually opposed to action defined by algorithm (Galloway, 2006). This is obvious in so called cut scenes, cinematic interludes which enrich a narrative by elaborating world of a game (characters, ambient, historical period, etc.), while gamers are not experiencing much, because they are forced to sit still and watch.

However there are also least two additional structural principles that are crucial for understanding the failure of interpreting the relation virtual/real in the games through the content. The first is the understanding of a transference. Ludologists already warned on the importance of a non-diegetic elements in building a pleasure of a game. But such pleasure is nevertheless related to a sort of transference – congruence between virtual and the real. Traditionally, transference is seen as a concept applied to a literature or cinema, but there are no works on the role of

---

transference in computer games. It is strange neglectance, taking into account the moral panics and proliferation of different types of answers related to the same question “what does gaming practice do to a subject”? In classical psychoanalytic sense, transference is a process of “actualization of unconscious wishes” (Laplanche/Pontalis, 1973: 492-493). Transference emerges in the psychoanalytic treatment in a form of both positive or/and negative attitudes towards the analyst, who in Lacanian terms is put in the place of the Father (Symbolical order that is trusted). Crucial mistake of classical understanding of the transfer virtual/real arises from the fact that the game transference of attitudes, wishes, or feelings does not emerge from the graphical, visual realism, but (similar to a psychoanalytic treatment) transference is an outcome of the structure, communicational process in which structure of a game allows transference to occur. Game is a profound structuration of gamers activity, qualification of his/her every move.

**48**

For example, the structure of a activity in a highly controversial game *Carmageddon* (1997), where the role of a player is to run over pedestrians, is not much different from the role of the player in the platform game *Giana Sisters* (1987), where player must collect mushrooms. (The same thing is with the *Super Mario Brothers* (1985)). There can be argued whether there is difference between the pleasure of experiencing Giana changes her hair into colorful “Mohawk” or in getting an extra live while slaughtering in a combat game, but there is certainly an experience of pleasure in both actions. Such pleasure is not related to a story, but to a structured algorithm.

From this emerges another structural dimension of relation virtual/real. The games are stories run by algorithms, which allow players to interact with the program. Those are not fictional worlds of distinct realms of story and the algorithm. The crucial point is a process of transforming an algorithm into a story. Second principle of content barrier is than of the articulating the dichotomy story/algorithm in form of contextualization, and accompanied decontextualization. If the first, which is already defined in ludologist theory, principle accents the importance of algorithm, and insists on analyzing the elements that are important in the game (and possible transference of attitudes and actions from virtual to real), the second, here proposed



principle insists in understanding a relation, dialectic between the two elements.

Ted Friedman summarizes what at first sight seems as strangely simple rule. Although we might think that we are collecting things, driving, playing the role of the mayor, etc. when playing game we are mastering the game.

“The way computer games structures of thought - the way they reorganize perception - is by getting you to internalize the logic of the program. To win, you can’t just do whatever you want. You have to figure out what will work within the rules of the game. You must learn to predict the consequences of each move, and anticipate the computer’s response. Eventually, your decisions become intuitive, as smooth and rapid-fire as the computer’s own machinations.” (Friedman, 2002)

If winning a game is a process of internalization of logic of the program, process of intuitively adopting the logic of an algorithm internalization is a process that is going on without understanding the narrative domain, the story. Jesper Juul points at something similar. It is a difference between two rules in soccer. The first rule should be “the ball is out of play when it is far away”, and second one is “the ball is out of play when it crosses the white line drawn on the grass” (Juul, 2005: 64). While the first one implies certain context, understanding of what “far away” means in a soccer, second rule is not implying anything, it describes the whole process, as an algorithm would do.

We can summarize both observations. There is important dimension of a story (meaning certain actant relations, time and space in the game, graphical realism, etc.), but importance of a story emerges from the *relations* between the story and algorithm. The story is a tool for structuring “gamic action”, the instrument for *contextualizing the algorithm* which is itself alien to narrative, story or any conceptualized human experience. That importance of relation, co-working of narrative and algorithm becomes obvious when player is faced with malfunctioning of a game. Errors, crashing of a system, freezing of an interface, problems with loading a game, are moments not only of braking down the game,

---

---

but of braking down of a narrative, or any conceptualized human reality. In such moments gamer is confronted with absolutely ignorant structure of an algorithm, where in Heideggerian sense *Gestell* is present. The same formal structure of a game can, is in most cases cleverly structured and formulated, and it function as the foundation of gamer pleasure.

While game crashes that inconsistency of narrative usually spoils a pleasure of gaming. In a moment, player is facing non-transparent algorithm instead of a *narratem*. Player is surprisingly revealing an artificial character of game. It is not a revelation of false, virtual status of imaginary world, but the moment of revealing the role of the story, narrative and its relation to the productive algorithm. In a way what gamer reveal in crashing of a game is the fact that the story is only camouflaging, contextualizing an algorithm.

**50**

The understanding of function of an algorithmic structure, and the secondary role of a story, formulated as the first principle, or the content barrier, provokes us to take another step. Beside the revealing the role of an algorithm and the secondary role of the story (the facts that are usually the reasons for mistakes in understanding the relation of virtual and real in gaming worlds), there is an importance to reveal the antagonism between those two elements as productive for the gaming experience. Such productive antagonism takes the form of transcoding the algorithms into narrative, or, in another words, it is a translation of machine language into human experience. Consequently, games aim at accomplishing seamless bond between narration and algorithm in order to create virtual world. Narrative is forming the gaming experience into “natural” experience. It is a process of contextualizing non-narrative mathematical algorithm into narrative that “naturalizes” experience of gaming. The contextualization allows player to immerse in narrative world, in order to understand what to do player must intuitively (and not rationally) internalize algorithmic logic, the logic of a machine.

This process of contextualization becomes more visible when it is obvious that player did not decided to act on the basis of understanding the content, but on the basis of understanding a structure. For example, while playing computer game with children we can find ourselves wondering how is possible for eight

---

year old child to use the terminology of economy and to elaborate the importance of “lowering the taxes on the industrial production if we want to develop the industrial zone”. The example is elaborated in now classical ludologist study *Everything Bad is Good for You* written by Steven Berlin Johnson in 2005, where he is describing his eight year old nephew playing the game *Sim City*. The causal relation between the lowering of one parameter and proportionally increasing of the other is classic example of understanding the structure, and not the content. Sometimes gamer can even ignore content he/she follows game’s algorithmic logic.

The vivid example of this are so called “conceptual games” like *Tetris* or *Pong*, which often does not fit any categorization. Genres are defined by gamers actions: solving the puzzle (adventure games), training the character, combating and exploring the virtual worlds (RTS), configuration of the elements of the world (RTS), managing the virtual life (simulations), etc. However conceptual games offer rudiment action that does not elaborate fictional world. Still it successively engages players in its world. While most adventure games, role playing games (RPG) and first person shooters (FPS) contextualize algorithm within the narrative elaborated gaming worlds, *Tetris* and *Pong* offer un-contextualized matrix.

## **2. Lacan and games. Conceptual games and the Real.**

The logic of algorithmic transference – contextualizing the algorithm in a humanly comprehensive experience – is in pure Lacanian terms - an act of clash between the Symbolic order and the Real. While it is commonly understood as a transference of violence behavior represented in computer games (through a story), or it is described as narcotic experience that isolates gamer from real world (through immobilization of all scenes), the real problem is hiding in the realm of paradoxical algorithmic Symbolic order. Virtual worlds are ruled by the algorithm that calculates, quantificates, and produces code - but does not produce any *Symbolic order*, narrative interpretation, or more broadly, any contextualized human experience. From that point of view so called “conceptual games” are the

---

closest to the Real defined by Jacques Lacan, as one of three orders of psyche. For Lacan the Real is 'the impossible' because it is outside any symbolization, order „which resists symbolization absolutely” (Lacan, 1988: 66). Similarly conceptual games are moving toward the Real, because those are the only games that are not so eager to obscure the craft, algorithmic machine behind the story. In order to build imaginary world, conceptual games are not doing much. In that laziness towards symbolization, conceptual games are similar to a highly artificial post-modern prose that brakes the seamless bond between technique and fantastic illusion. Meta-fiction, common for postmodern prose, is also the practice that reveals mechanism behind the text, the mechanism of the textually of the Real. Well known practice of postmodern author is that of referring to his/her writing instead of actually telling the story. For example, Italo Calvino in novel *If on a winter's night traveler* (1979) is a story of a readers adventures in reading book written by Italo Calvino. The book is about the art of reading, about what reader is doing in preparation for reading the next chapter.

52

Although the common opinion is that computer games are popular culture par excellence, there are also an art games that are actually using techniques inherent to postmodern literature. In doing that, both postmodern literature and art games are revealing Symbolic order of the fictional world. Similar to conceptual games, art games are sort of algorithmic Real. Stewart Hogarth's *The Naked Game* (2008), unfortunately lost, was the best example of such high art practice that is engaging in revealing the inconsistencies in Symbolic order. In that way, Hogarth's game played the similar role as post-modern highly artificial prose did for popular novel. The role that language had in post-modern literature (as self-reflective, meta-textual, autonomous), is the similar role of the algorithm in art games as meta-referential algorithmic narrative. *The Naked Game* was an art game that elaborated the disclosed structure, the mechanism which usually remains hidden. The game reconstructs the primitive version of *Pong* with exposing the version of a code governing the game and the variables affecting the mechanics of the game. Player could remove lines of code and see the effects in real time. (For example, when player removed a line of the code the paddle or a ball would disappear, or an game rhythm would distort, etc.)

Art games are using algorithm as highly self-referential post-modern “language” of games. While most adventure games, role playing games and first person shooters contextualize algorithm within the narratively elaborated gaming worlds, *Tetris* and *Pong* (as such, but their artistic versions even more) offer un-contextualized algorithmic matrix<sup>2</sup>. Conceptual and art games, each in its own way, are elaborating the basic, non-contextualized gaming structure. Although, it is not possible to create completely non-contextualised game (as it is not possible to imagine non-symbolical represent of the Real order), because such game would be un-playable. The art games are questioning the role of the interface as mediator between game and player, between algorithm and narration. Art games separate the content (violence) from form (algorithmic code). In doing so, some of them are addressing the problem of relation virtual-real, in a form inherent to postmodernism as a whole. There are numerous examples. Franc Cadet’s *Sweet Pad* (2004) allows playing the highly aggressive game *Quake 3 Arena* in an unusual way. Instead of using the joystick, the operator acts by gently touching the sphere. In a game *Massage me* (Perner-Wilson/Satomi, 2007) the player massages his/her partner in order to hit the opponent in a violent game *Tekken*. Shooting an enemy or fighting with bare hands in a highly meta-referential pose is a poetical gesture of postmodernism. The gap is always there, but players are usually not

---

2 There are several auto-referential moments in popular games as well. One occurs in the game *Max Payne* where authors ‘reveal’ to Max that he is in a computer game. Alex Galloway names this practice “Mantis moments” (Galloway, 2006: 34). The term is borrowed from the character in the game *Metal Gear Solid* (1998) Psycho Mantis. In one sequence, Mantis refers to other games played by the user (the game scans document on a console memory card). Nevertheless, even during the seamless performance there are always problematic moments, bugs, program errors, uploading the game, crashing of the system, accidents related to the software that Galloway names “death acts”. Those “death acts” reveals artificiality of virtual world and warns us about a nature of medium.

aware of it<sup>3</sup>. The gap between content and acting is crucial for meta-textual level, pointing on at difference between two arbitrary related sphere - acting according to an algorithm and telling a story, conceptualizing gamers acting according to (violent, or other) narrative.

Although gamer seems to participate in imaginary world - characters, objects, atmosphere, movements, etc. he/she becomes aware of core element that is running by game - algorithm, game engine (UI generator, or GUI). The more complex generator offers the stronger feeling of “free” acting that is meaningful in relation to a world/ narration/ game. Whole history of games can be seen as history of the “seamless bond” – designing a game in a way to seamlessly bond game generator, algorithm and narration. In early textual and graphic adventure games the player simply had to accomplish every mission, even if that meant doing meaningless “manually” work, repeating the same action always in the same way over and over. In that way “rhymes insult sword fighting” in the game *The Curse of Monkey Island* (1997) can be executed in almost automatized way. Player needs to fight dangerous pirate with rhyming his insults, but what he/she does is choosing the right answer which can be done almost automatically, even without hearing the sentence (player just needs to memorize the position of sentences on the screen).

54

3 The process of designing game is also revealing this inconsistency of relation of virtual worlds (story, narrative) and algorithm beneath it. It is not only a process of visioning the virtual world, but also a designing of an algorithm. For that reason, games that are using the same generator are alike. The games are operated by algorithmic generators, those generators are the same for Doom and Quake. By using the same generator, clones and sequels change a designed of the world (graphic, characters, weapons, levels etc.) while the basic premises (closer to algorithmic character of a game), like perspective, using of inventory, possibilities for moving etc. remain the same. It is a reason why company that produced Doom and Quake, also produced serial of sequels and clones that, at the end, founded the “first person shooter” genre.

### 3. Algorithmic narrations and *societies of control*

If games semantic emerges not from story but from compound of an algorithm and narration, reading only the content, story (driving and killing in the streets) can poorly interpret the activity of a player and specially possible addiction disorders or violent behaviors related to game playing. The lesson of the content barrier is actually the lesson of media studies from its very beginning. Marshall McLuhan and his followers Walter Ong and Eric Havelock (school of transformative theory founded in Canada) formed the rule of media structure. McLuhan in his famous moto: “Media is the message” stressed the role of the media grammar which has a greater influence on culture and individuals than the content of a medium. From the point of view of media theory, the narrative content of a computer game should be seen not as an elaborative element, but almost the opposite – as an “obstructive” element. Since the algorithmic structure is running the game, the algorithmic structure, and not the narrative can play the role in gamers transference, or/and transfer of his/her attitudes and actions from virtual into real. If there can be any virtual/real transference, than it is a greater possibility that it could be done through the structure, and not the content. Game content plays exactly the same role as in Marshall McLuhan said for the content of electronic media, it is “the juicy piece of meat carried by the burglar to distract the watchdog of the mind” (McLuhan, 1964: 25)<sup>4</sup>.

55

However, as a form of conclusion, it can be said that contemporary understanding of computer games and computer games transference is at the same time paranoid and not paranoid enough. It insists on interpreting the “violent content” (maniac driver, shotgun killer, etc.), while leaving aside understanding of “maniac algorithm”. While popular understanding is critiquing a violent

---

4 Marshall McLuhan’s definition of “acoustic space”, or Walter Ong’s “psychodynamic”, made a breakthrough in the paradigm by stressing the idea that structure of medium makes greater impact than its content. However McLuhan and his followers overstressed the role of technology and media as active and autonomous factors of social change. Marshall McLuhan’s accusation of radio for Hitler’s political success, or stressing the role of the print in emergence of schizophrenia in contemporary world, are among the well known examples.

56

content, the internalization is taking place on the level of code, formation of human activity according to an algorithmic code. Inconsistency of that critique became obvious in the case of the Seung-Hui Cho, killer in the deadliest shooting in modern U.S. history, the Virginia Tech massacre that took place in 2007. Public related shootings with game playing, presupposing that Cho was hard-core gamer who confused the reality with game in the same manner as Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, shooters in Columbine school massacre. Such presupposition was immediately withdrawn when press revealed that Cho was playing *Sonic the Hedgehog* – platform game with blue hedgehog as leading character. It seemed that such childish representation cannot be responsible for transference. Nevertheless, it seems inconsistent to step back from the previous theory. Acting within the structure of immediate quantification and evaluation of every performance is no less transformative and dangerous than immersing in violent narrative. Why to discard the idea that Virginia Tech killer was under the influence of gaming algorithm of *Sonic the Hedgehog*, while the same game represent, structurally, the form of everyday experience of every schoolboy activity? The transference of the algorithmic structure of mathematical computation, quantification of every player's move, act and decision is no less possible than the transference while playing the first person shooter game. Is it not exactly the "paradoxical logic" that Paul Virilio is describing when he is writing about vision machines, the representational surveillance logic, that acquires a something like surrealistic surprise, or 'accidental transfer (1994)'? Is it not an act of a subject that internalized paradoxical logic of machines, industrialized prevention as a kind of panic anticipation of surveillance cameras, military machinery and other types of autonomous and dangerous (virtually) vision machines? Is it not similar to Jean Baudrillard's *les strategies fatales* (1983), fatal strategies of object which are ironic toward the common morality? Can the Virginia Tech massacre be seen as an outcome of fatal strategies of objects, algorithmic structure interfering human activity?

Here we approach the second problem, the one of technological determinism deeply embedded in contemporary culture and media criticism. If it is not a content, but the structure of medium that has an influence on gamer, than we



must criticize a hypnotic character of medium it self. Marshall McLuhan resolved the problem of content barrier, but he is also responsible for the contemporary media essentialism. Pierre Levy criticized the contemporary McLuhanesque deterministic approach to technology stating that the dominant metaphor that we are using when describing a technology is “the metaphor of impact” - the technology is a missile, and culture passive target (2001: 3).

The first who located the problem of technological determinism was Raymond Williams. Williams in his study on television wrote:

“The most precise and discriminating local study of ‘effects’ can remain superficial if we have not looked into the notions of cause and effect, as between a technology and a society, a technology and a culture, a technology and a psychology, which underlie our questions and may often determine our answers.” (Williams, 1974:2).

**57**

If there is something transformative in the structure of gaming media, than it must be related to the structure of the world, not vice versa. Such proposition of media analysis can be found in McKenzie Wark’s study *Gamer Theory* where Wark writes, “the questions of the form of the game cannot be separated from the questions of the form of the world” (2007: 67). In order not to end with escapist conclusions, we must take very cautiously attitude toward game-world relation. Games cannot transform the real life, personal identities, social norms, etc. Almost the contrary, not only that games cannot be transformative as an autonomous agents of change, but they are moreover acting like an neutral elements, elements that are revealing the inconsistencies of real life, understanding of the Self, understanding of a social rules in the era of late capitalism, etc.

If anything, games are a symptoms of a lack in a social order. Symptom, is a strictly speaking “a particular element which subverts its own universal foundation, a species subverting its own genus” (Žižek, 1989: 16). For Freud symptom was an abnormality caused by return of the suppressed (Freud, 1990). Since suppressed is finding alternative ways to realize itself, it is manifested in

---

the form of a symptom. The symptom is considered as something that does not belong, a product that must be resolved. In *Die Traumdeutung* Freud described what can be understood as an initial description of a symptom, and it is very close to description of phantasmagoric scenario of computer game. When Freud asks of his patient to retell the dream, he notices that there are parts of the dream that he are covering by telling it in different way. “[T]he parts of the dream which he describes in different terms are by that fact revealed to me as the weak spot in the dream’s disguise: they serve my purpose just as Hagen’s was served by the embroidered mark on Siegfried’s cloak” (Freud, 2010: 519). In a footnote Freud explains:

58

“There was only one spot on Siegfried’s body where he could be wounded. By a trick, Hagen persuaded Kriemhild, who alone knew where the spot was, to embroider a small cross on Siegfried’s cloak at the vital point. It was there that Hagen later stabbed him. (Nibelungenlied, XV and XVI.)”

The same Siegfried’s spot, small cross on disguised dream is the spot of symptom – the place and a mark for analysand to enter the interpretation. In other words, instead of understanding the violent games as transformative or narcotic stories that intrude our otherwise harmonic societies, we should take gaming worlds as a symptoms and a spots on a social cloak that are subverting the notion of Real. Such invasion of a games is opposed to a common lamentation of contemporary society as transformed by technology, virtual spaces, transcended by virtual time, etc. But what if the notion of invaded reality, mediatised in every way, is in it self a construct, since there were no natural, non-mediatised, simple reality, but only a reality that is in-it-self already constructed? From that, point of view, quantification of every human activity and evaluation on every individual decision as formal “rule of the game”.

Playing games is commonly understood as a “waste of time”. The pleasure of game is pleasure of non-fruitful productivity. Charles Bernstein in his essay “Play It Again, Pac-Man» writes: “While the dominant formats and genres of video

games seem to involve a restricted economy, the social context of the games seems to suggest features of a general unrestricted economy” (1991). For societies that are used to collecting and accumulating as a common behavior George Bataille coined the term “the societies of restricted economy”. Accumulation in a game is taking place in the context of “unrestricted or ‘general’ economy, which involves exchange or loss or waste or discharge” (Bernstein, 1991). Bernstein encourages us to see that there is more in collecting mushrooms and diamonds since the practice reflects the change in the socio-political definition of a power based on manipulating with information, understanding “the rules of the game”.

Gaming is an exemplar activity of the late capitalist socio-economy and the socio-political definition of a power based on manipulating with information. It is a form of society that Gilles Deleuze defined as societies of control (Deleuze, 1990). The accumulation is not a matter of producing material “things” but a matter of manipulating with “code” (an algorithm).

“In the societies of control, on the other hand, what is important is no longer either a signature or a number, but a code: the code is a password, while on the other hand disciplinary societies are regulated by watchwords (as much from the point of view of integration as from that of resistance). The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to information, or reject it.”

“The corporation has replaced the factory, and the corporation is a spirit, a gas”, writes Deleuze. Corporation introduced the “states of perpetual metastability that operate through challenges, contests, and highly comic group sessions”. Deleuze predicted the form of a dominant semiotic construct of the new type of modulate, re-territorialised, numerical power. This is the implementing of “modulating principle of ‘salary according to merit’”, which is also the foundation of crisis of institutions - schooling as continuous form of control, perpetual training module, and university that replaces research and criticism with training. Deleuze, not intentionally, described the experience of mastering the game, training in simulations and algorithmic quantification of mastering the skills.

---

Classical neo-liberal studies of gaming worlds describe the process of resolving the problem in game as fruitful mechanism of training “for life”. James Paul Gee in his study *What Video Games Have to Teach Us About Learning and Literacy* (2003) describes why game *Virtual Leader* is important for management. There is no need for deeper insights, lamentations about the world of the game, what player must do is to explore the virtual world, make some hypothesis about that world, [and than] explore the same world [again] whit this hypothesis in mind (2003: 88). Educational sciences are referring to this process as “reflective learning”. It is a process in game in which the player thinks and re-thinks the basic assumptions. Critically reflecting on this practice McKenzie Wark concludes that, in the game, “every action is just a means to an and” (2007: 9). But players are not fullled, they are well aware of ‘unproductive behavior’, acting productively within the rules of unproductive economy. Not only that it is not an illusion, that gamers are well aware of the process they are engaging with, but also it would be totally wrong to thing that gaming is a waste of time. In their activity gamers are re-acting the most real and valuable socio-political “game”. It is a game of capitalist production that is marked by this process of reflective learning and non-productive non-material accumulation.

60

Jean Baudrillard considered *Crash*, a novel by James Ballard (1973), to be an exemplar narration for postmodern state. In order to understand contemporary Western subjectivity, we do not need to read classical SF literature. For Baudrillard, *Crash* is not a glorification of violence or perversion (novel represents a group of fanatics that find sexual excitement in car accidents), but precise analysis of Western subjectivity infected by mechanic hyper-functionality. The body became functional as mechanical device, which is why sex can only be understood in the manner of crash, explosion or motor combustion (Baudrillard, 2001). If that is so, computer games represent exemplar contemporary action-narrations. It is usually wrongly concluded that computer games are perfect narrations of simulacrum as false reality. However, computer games are, in their structural dimension, Baudrillardian hyper-productive mechanical mechanisms that derive form Deleuzian numerical corporate model of control. Instead of insisting on falsity of its representation, non-material illusion, it would be more precise to

see computer games through the glasses of Barudillard's elaboration of Crash as *structural* representation of new subjectivities.

#### 4. The role of Ego Ideal in process of identification

That leads us to the third and final problem of virtual worlds and understanding the paradox of passive/active subject. Dominant interpretations of popular (but also scientific) understanding of virtual gaming worlds are grounded in the clear distinction of the Real and Virtual. Primary status of the Real and secondary status of the Virtual is a result of understanding individuals and world within the apparatus of Cartesian dualism that divides mental and material. One of the greatest TV commercial *Double life* for Sony Play Station (2006) articulates this message:

“In the day, I do my job, I ride bus... But at night, I live a life of exhilaration, of missed heartbeats and adrenalin... I won't deny it I've been engaged in violence, even indulged in it... You may not think it, to look at me, but I have commanded armies and conquered worlds. ”

Here it is important to remember the message of Lacanian psychoanalysis about the fictional character of the Real and the Self. The Symbolical identification is: “The place in big Other from which I see myself in the form in which I find myself likeable...” The definition of Ego Ideal in Freudian psychoanalysis “is by definition virtual” (Žižek, 1997: 194). In order to escape the traumatic core of empty Self, subject have to invent symbolic mandate (virtual or real, in a sense of dualism of Descartes mental images and material world). It is not pure illusion, but a personal defense mechanism. An empty signifier, in Lacanian sense, is productive not because it has some content to fill into subjective identity but, exactly because there is not content. It is, off course, a Hegelian productive force of the negative. Only from this point of view the ideological role of computer games can be revealed. Imaginary identification in the Sony advert imply the existence of

two poles of identity: real one (that is sane, rational, normal, that is riding a bus...) and virtual identity that can be “violent, disregarded for life, limb and property”. However, common dichotomy, dividing the real from virtual is not more than a legitimation of stating the same, of being sure that nothing will change. Sony advert is referring to an Imaginary order, stating that it can be more real than the real real. Subject can be ignorant of his/her authentic identity beneath the mask, the crucial illusion is that of seeing the imaginary order and ignoring the role of master Signifier – the rule of the Symbolic order that is forming subjectivities in late capitalism. Games are not only reigns of Imaginary but also a places where contemporary Symbolic can be mastered.

62

Classical psychoanalytical question (that Slavoj Žižek is proposing in his study *The Plague of Fantasies*) is addressing Imaginary order as more authentic. For example, what if in a GTA serial (Grand Theft Auto, 1997/1998) our character that we are playing is more authentic than the character we are “playing” in real life? Taking into account that gamer is a person whose Ego Ideal is formed in game, we can conclude (with Žižek) that gamer can reveal his true nature - that his is really a mass-murderer (scenario can be possible in, lets say, Anders Breivik’s case) and not modest bus driver. It is possible. But cultural critiques are sometimes overlooking the most important thing about the gaming activity – its algorithmic structure. It is surprising if we take into account that psychoanalysis provided the most important lecture about the importance of the analysis the difference between manifest and latent content of a dream, and importance of analyzing the dreamwork instead of trying to decipher hidden content beneath the manifest content. In other words, from the point of view of (applied) psychoanalysis it is equally important to overcome the common urge to analyze a manifest content as it is important not to maintain neither on the level of the manifest nor latent content, but to go further and to analyze the dreamwork. The most important is not the content, visions in the dream, but the reasons why dream needed a revision or mutation. The same goes for computer games. Although playing violent computer games can reveal that person is suffering from mental disorder, it would not be so clearly understood by analyzing the content, but the structure of a game activity. Of course one can say that first person shooters can be played only in one way,

and that when referring to them as symptomatic, cultural analytic is not pointing only to their content but also a structure. Nevertheless faced with non-violent games, cultural analytic usually cannot say why those structures are nothing less incorporated in contemporary Heideggerian *Vorstellung*?

It is not Freudian Id, instinctual, dark pole of the personality that is usually responsible for experiencing a pleasure in the game, but actually it is super Ego, an instance that can be compared to a judge or a censor. It is more an internalization of symbolic (parental) prohibitions and demands, than the opposition or disregard of a ruling order. For example, in the GTA, as in every other game, player cannot do what ever he/she wants. Player needs to act in a codified and structured way. For that reason task of prospering in the mafia in GTA hierarchy is not much different from mastering the hierarchy in the simulation games like *Virtual Leader* where player starts as an apprentice and must muster the skills to get promoted in a corporation. What can be more like an super Ego's imperative than the task to eat healthy food and to work out in gym? In *GTA: San Andreas* character needs to eat in order to keep his health meter filled, but whatever CJ eats will affect his status.

In other words, the message of the virtual world is not that the Real can be intruded by violent virtual, that Virtual can transform subjects into violent-active subjects or addictive-passive ones, that playing the GTA could seriously damage young persons. Neither the message of the games is the truly self we are encountering. The more appropriate way to read the game is to read it as a symptom of post-political economy, identity politics, and social structure of the Self. The structure of the algorithm can be contextualized in violent content, but in every scenario the contextualized algorithm allows constant quantification and valorization of gamers moves, which is typical structure of work and reward in the late capitalism. Most players do not experience transference, most of them do not become violent or disoriented, while, at the same time, all players function within the rules of *societies of control*.

The problem of simulacrum is not its falsity, the nostalgic logic of authentic experience. What gets lost is the politic dimension of the 'appearance' itself. Postmodernists correctly detected that the Real is less and less distinguishable

---

from imaginary simulation, but it is so because of political retreat of ideology (why Slavoj Žižek criticizes under the term of *post-politics*). Fictional worlds are not distortions of symbolic order, political project, but there are it self formed around transsubstantialisation of symbolic order (national, religious, political, class identities). On the level of identity politics, game playing is not a deviation of rational, democratic order, but a confirmation of desubstantialised pseudo-universal identity. If so, an ideological critique of games cannot be formed as a critique of particularism, specific political view present in a game. There are propaganda games (such as *America's Army*), but the global political stand point in most games can be defined as *ideological universalism*. Žižek, in *The Parallax View* provides a formula of today's ideology: "The universality of capitalism resides in the fact that capitalism is not a name for a "civilization," for a specific cultural-symbolic world, but the name for a neutral economic-symbolic machine... (2006: 318)". What gets lost in the postmodern techno-eschatology, as well as in media studies structural definition of media influence is "political as a domain of appearance (opposed to the social reality of class and other distinctions, that is, of society as the articulated social body)..." (Žižek, 1999: 195). The structural similarity between gaming worlds and societies of control is emerging from the *appearance* of political order, and that appearance started to disintegrate. In Lacanian terms, "simulacrum is imaginary (illusion), while appearance is symbolic (fiction); when the specific dimension of symbolic appearance starts to disintegrate, the Imaginary and the Real become more and more indistinguishable." (1999: 197).

## 5. Conclusion

Here elaborated readings of a relation between virtual gaming worlds and reality, and supposed transfer, are also deeply connected to the three theoretical apparatuses. The first reading, the common understanding of games as wasting time or/and texts inferior to the novels or movies is the logical perspective of traditional literary or film theory. From the perspective of literary criticism the text is "the well-wrought urn", as Cleanth Brooks a pioneer of American school of new criticism around year 1947 defined the text (Solar, 2005: 133).



The second reading, the media studies reading, is already a challenge to transgress the content barrier. It is a reading of the possibility of transfer virtual/real as transfer of structured algorithm on common reasoning, understanding of social media constructivism<sup>5</sup>. It is the reading that stresses the role of media structure in late capitalism and post-Panopticon era, where valorization and quantification became a fundamental mode of *societies of control*. It is still inconsistent reading, because of inherent technological determinism, common in interpreting the “impact” of a media structure on the reality. Although the similarity between structure of games and societies of control (in education, health care, corporation as core model of societies of control, etc.) is obvious, the deterministic point obscures the understanding of transference. Technological determinism ignores the social matrix responsible for creating technology and defining its structure before the technology itself.

Although the second reading is an important step forward, and moving from the simple behaviorism and impact theories, there must be the third reading, since the similar problem complicates technological determinism of media theory, as well as the content barrier of literary criticism. The psychoanalytical theoretical apparatus solves the paradox common in understanding of the duality of real/virtual, dualism that divides physical and mental spheres both in analysis of the game content, and the game structure. The difference of Imaginary and Symbolic

---

5 In the process of analyzing the differences between three theoretical apparatuses in understanding the relation Virtual/Real, the first and second one are seen as opponents, since the literary theory is focused on narrative, and the media theory on structure. However, from the structuralist point of view there is no conflict between literary and media theory. Russian formalism (Viktor Shklovsky, Yuri Tynianov, Vladimir Propp), Prague school of structuralism (Roman Jakobson) and later school of narratology (Tzvetan Todorov and others) can smoothly be appropriated in media studies (and that has been done in the works of hypertext theoreticians such as George Landow and Jay David Bolter) because those schools are stressing the similar importance of elaborating media “material”. Russian formalism formulated the purpose of the material in the process of defamiliarization (*ostranenie*). The similarity between defamiliarization and Marshall McLuhan’s famous definition of media is obvious. The same idea of the medium/language as blind spot, that can be seen only in exclusive uses, defamiliarised practices, is present in both approaches. Also, such idea is also present in Marshall McLuhan’s description of the artists as “antennas”. McLuhan, who has been literary critic by vocation, promoted artists as visionaries that can predict the “impact” of every media.

---

order, defined by Jacques Lacan, is the ground for understanding why only few players experience the transfer from Virtual into Real.

To summarize, the lesson of three understandings of a social anticipation of the gaming worlds could be that gaming worlds are not embedded in a game content, but in the game structure, which is not an autonomous technological weapon, but a social symptom.

## Bibliography

Baudrillard, Jean, "Crash", in *Simulakrumi i simulacija* (Karlovac: Naklada društva arhitekata, 2001), 169-183.

Baudrillard, Jean, *Les strategies fatales* (Grasset, Paris, 1983), 10-33.

66

Bernstein, Charles, "Play It Again, Pac-Man", in *Postmodern Culture*, Vol. 2, No. 1, September, 1991.

Cadet, Franc, *Sweet Pad*, URL: [http://cyberdoll.free.fr/cyberdoll/index\\_e\\_sweetpad.html](http://cyberdoll.free.fr/cyberdoll/index_e_sweetpad.html), 2004, (last visited 25. January 2012.)

Choi, Dan, "Ebert: Video games inherently inferior to film and literature", in *Joystiq*, URL: <http://www.joystiq.com/2005/11/30/ebert-video-games-inherently-inferior-to-film-and-literature>, 30. November 2005. (25. 1. 2012.).

Calvino, Italo, *Se una notte d'inverno un viaggiatore* (Mondadori, 2002 [1979]).

Cover, Robert, "Gaming (Ad)diction: Discourse, Identity, Time and Play in the Production of the Gamer Addiction Myth", in *Games Studies* 6 (1), URL: <http://gamestudies.org/0601/articles/cove>, December 2006 (last visited 25. January 2012.).

Deleuze, Gilles, "Postskriptum uz društva kontrole", ("Postscriptum on a society of control") in *Urbani festival* 04, Zagreb, 2004, URL: <http://www.urbanfestival.hr/04/hr/uvodno.html>, 1990 (last visited 25. October 2011.).

Felman, Shoshana, "Beyond Oedipus: The Specimen Story of Psychoanalysis". Croatian translation: "S onu stranu Edipa: primjerne priče psihoanalize", *Suvremena teorija pripovijedanja*, ed. Vladimir Biti, Zagreb, Globus, 1992[1983], 258-310.

Freud, Sigmund, *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (The Standard Edition) (Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud)* by Sigmund Freud (Author), James Strachey (Editor), Peter Gay (Introduction) W. W. Norton & Company; The Standard Edition edition (September 17, 1990).

Freud, Sigmund, *The Interpretations of Dreams*, Translated from the German and edited by James Strachey. Basic Group, New York, 2010 (1955) .

Friedman, Ted, "Civilization and its Discontents: Simulation, Subjectivity, and Space", URL: <http://www.duke.edu/~tlove/civ.htm>, 2002 (last visited 25. October 2011.)

Hogarth, Stewart (2008) *The Naked Game*, original work is lost, URL: [http://www.indiegames.com/2008/04/art\\_game\\_pick\\_the\\_naked\\_game\\_r.html](http://www.indiegames.com/2008/04/art_game_pick_the_naked_game_r.html) (last visited 21. October 2011.).

Galloway, Alexander R., *Gaming. Essays on Algorithmic Culture* (University Of Minnesota Press, 2006).

Gee, James Paul, *What Video Games Have to Teach Us About Learning and Literacy*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

Johnson, Steven Berlin, *Everything Bad Is Good for You. How Today's Popular Culture Is Actually Making Us Smarter* (Riverhead Books, New York, 2005).

Juul, Jesper, *Half-real: video games between real rules and fictional worlds* (MIT Press, 2005).

Lacan, Jacques, *The Seminar. Book I. Freud's Papers on Technique*, 1953–54, trans. with notes by John Forrester (New York: Norton; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

Laplanche, J. and J. B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis* , Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith , (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1973).

Lévy, Pierre, *Cyberculture*, transl. Robert Bononno (Minnesota Press, 2001 [1997]).

Manovich, Lev, *The Language of New Media* (MIT Press, 2001).

McLuhan, Marshall, *Understanding media. The extensions of man* (London and New York, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964).

Perner-Wilson/Satomi (2007) *Massage me* (URL: <http://www.talk2myshirt.com/blog/archives/507#>, last visited 3. October 2011.).

---

Solar, Milivoj, *Teorija književnosti* (Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 2005 [1976]).

Sommerseth, Hanna, “Gamic Realism’: Player, Perception and Action in Video Game Play”, *Proceedings of DiGRA 2007 Conference*, URL: [http://www.digra.org/dl/order\\_by\\_author?publication=Situated%20Play](http://www.digra.org/dl/order_by_author?publication=Situated%20Play), 2007 (last visited 25. October 2011.).

Virilio, Paul, *The Vision Machine* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

Virilio, Paul, “Speed and Information: Cyberspace Alarm”, *C-Theory*, URL: [www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=72](http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=72), 27. October 1995 (last visited 23. January 2012).

Wark, McKenzie, *Gamer Theory* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 2007).

Žižek, Slavoj, *Sublimni objekt ideologije* (Arkzin, Zagreb [1989] 2002).

Žižek, Slavoj, «Cyberspace, Or The Unbearable Closure of Being», in *The plague of phantasies*, (Verso, London/New York, 1997).

**68**

Žižek, Slavoj, *The Parallax View*, The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, 2006.

Žižek, Slavoj, *The Ticklish Subject. The Absent Centre of Political Ontology* (Verso, London/ New York, 1999).

## **ENTERING BRAVE NEW SOCIALITY WITH SUPER INTELLIGENT, EMOTIONAL, AND WET BRAINED ROBOTS**

During the last decade robotics has intensively developed several variants of humanoid robots – i.e. robots that resemble humans. Today robotics proceeds from improving motoric functionality to some new orientations of developing humanoid robots. These shifts lead to a contemporary re-examination of the questions, what it means to be human and how do we comprehend sociality.

Yet, the origins of the tendency to develop human-like robots are to be found in some ancient concepts. Humanoid robots are a significant example of convergence of the antique concepts *mimesis* and *technē*. The concept of *mimesis* (imitation) is central in Aristotle's comprehension of art comprehended as *technē*, but it is also the basis for other crafts (*technē*). Plato already understood art as a contest with nature, but Aristotle adds an impulse toward divinity.<sup>1</sup> Thus *mimesis* is not to be understood “as the duplication of isolated things, but as the active attempt to participate in a superior perfection.” To comprehend *mimesis* in Aristotle, the concept of *technē* has to be additionally enlightened. “Arts”, i.e. painting, poetry and music, were all to be considered sorts of craft, *technē*. For Aristotle, Nature is prudent and orders the generation of all things in proper gradation, whereat

---

<sup>1</sup> Katharine Everett Gilbert and Helmut Kuhn, *A History of Esthetics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1954), p. 62.

Man is her noblest son. With the tool he has got, the hand, he has won a capacity to invent several crafts. Craft begins with handiness coupled with the impulse to imitate.<sup>2</sup> *Technē* means artfulness of mind to trick nature and turn it to man's advantage. This is the semantic origin of the terms technique and technology. For Aristotle what matters is beauty and order in the region of Nature. What has to be done is to imitate the manners and customs of Nature. *Technē* learns from Nature and this learning takes place through imitation. The process of imitation is natural to mankind and he is most imitative of them, he learns through imitation.<sup>3</sup> In the end, as believed by Aristotle, *technē* completes what nature has begun. It goes beyond the model only after long schooling according to the model of Nature.<sup>4</sup> Here lies the surplus value of *technē* and technology.

70

The Renaissance turned to antiquity and re-discovered visuality, as well as its concepts of mimesis and *technē* inherited from antiquity. Leonardo da Vinci claims that art must have recourse to nature. Man has no chances to win in competing with nature (in the sense of bettering it), but needs to consult nature about anything: "Whoever flatters Himself that he can retain in his memory all the effects of Nature, is deceived, for our memory is not so capacious: therefore consult Nature for everything."<sup>5</sup> However, the naturalistic stance which we find among Renaissance painters is not to be taken as one of mere optical duplication. For Leonardo da Vinci, depicting a human body is much more than just producing a resemblance of the visual appearance of its surface. The method he defends instead is: "Study the science first, and then follow the practice which results from that science."<sup>6</sup> In practice this means: in order to paint a body, a painter has to know its anatomy, composition, its parts, like the bones, joints, skeleton, muscles etc. Furthermore, a painter needs to know the body in action, its interior (the

2 Ibid.

3 Aristotle's *Poetics*, trans. Leon Golden (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1981), chapter IV, p. 7.

4 Katharine Everett Gilbert and Helmut Kuhn, *A History of Esthetics*, p. 62.

5 Leonardo da Vinci, *Treatise on Painting*, trans. John Francis Rigaud (London: George Bell & Sons, 1877), article 365, p. 156.

6 Ibid., article 27, p. 10.

muscle's exertion in certain positions), and the external appearance (what the body covered with skin finally looks like and why) in accordance with a given position and action,<sup>7</sup> and with a particular body constitution considering its age, whether it is a child, a fat man, etc. For Leonardo, to paint is to first conduct a study of how something works and why. Leonardo's observations of the body, which ground the mimetic principle the painter is to use in painting, are therefore scientific: "The flesh which covers the bones near and at the joints, swells or diminishes in thickness according to their bending or extension; that is, it increases at the inside of the angle formed by the bending, and grows narrow and lengthened on the outward side of the exterior angle. The middle between the convex and concave angle participates of this increase or diminution, but in a greater or less degree as the parts are nearer to, or farther from, the angles of the bending joints."<sup>8</sup> It is true that the visual outcome displays the visible world, but first of all it shows the invisible, that which was hidden to the naked eye of the ordinary observer of the scene or person depicted. The artist *knows* more than he can see, he grasps the inner essence, the truth. In the visualizations the painter produces, the real nature of things is revealed.

For the interest in visibility, body, the functioning of nature and *technē* it is not surprising that the early modern automatons in Europe were to be produced in the sixteenth century. In the Renaissance the interest in automata actually increased. Yet complex mechanical devices were known in the ancient Greece, in the 8<sup>th</sup> century Muslim inventors and engineers produced recipes for artificial snakes, scorpions, and humans (Jābir ibn Hayyān, *Book of Stones*). In his *Book of ceremonies* (*De Ceremoniis*) Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (Constantine, 913–959) mentions three automata related to the "throne of Solomon", trees with singing birds, roaring lions, and moving beasts. The western ambassador

---

<sup>7</sup> It is worth noting that for Leonardo there is no such distinction between the interior and exterior of body as we have drawn here. We have done so in order to emphasize his interest in the whole nature (composition, functioning, etc.) of the body and not only in its visual appearance, because we are objecting to the comprehension of mimesis in the sense of resembling only the visual appearance of surfaces.

<sup>8</sup> Leonardo da Vinci, *Treatise on Painting*, article 50, p. 17–18.

---

and chronicler Liudprand of Cremona also alluded to automata in the palace of lions and singing birds in his memoirs of his trip to Constantinople in 949. Several Byzantine chronicles give evidence for the automata at the court of the emperor Theophilos (829–842). Furthermore, Islamic world was fascinated with the fantastic devices. The Abbāsīd palaces of the capital of Samarra may have had automata (Muslim accounts mention the amazement of two Byzantine ambassadors to the Abbāsīd court in Baghdad in 917 at the sight of a lavish artificial tree with singing birds placed in a pond). In both cultures the contraptions were based on the same principles devised by the engineers of late antiquity, such as the 1<sup>st</sup> century inventor Heron of Alexandria. In 1206 the Artuqīd sultan Nāṣir ad-Dīn Mahmūd ordered a book on automata from his engineer Al-Jazari. In the *Book of Knowledge of Ingenious Mechanical Devices* the latter sketched and described fanciful devices, such as elephant clock and a hand-washing device in the form of a servant pouring water from a pitcher, which is driven by a complex hydraulic system.<sup>9</sup> Around 1495 Leonardo da Vinci designed a humanoid automaton, a mechanical knight, which could independently maneuver its arms, stand, sit and raise its visor. The robotic system was operated by a series of pulleys and cables.

72

Automatons reveal that the body is comprehended as machinery, the principles of which (the mechanics) are to be studied and the craftsman (“artist”) will have recourse to nature and use mimesis for his *technē*, with which he might be able to create a body on its own. By the eighteenth century, the interest in robots simulating humankind increases.

Today we have not lost this interest in androids. Androids are a discernible example of the Aristotelian type of mimesis as it is to be found in contemporary culture. The very form of the robot is developed with recourse to the body in mimicking its mechanical functions, such as to be found in muscle, body movements and balance. It has proven to be a particularly difficult objective

9 See: Mary-Lyon Dolezal and Maria Mavroudi, in: Theodore Hyrtakenos, *Description of the Garden of St. Anna* and the Ekphrasis of Gardens,” in: Antony Littlewood, Henry Maguire, and Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn (eds.), *Byzantine Garden Culture* (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2002), pp. 128.



to develop a robot with the balancing aptitudes to be found among humans, especially for more demanding actions, such as running, football playing and rising to one's feet.

The founding principle of another branch of robotics, bionics, is again mimesis. As a knowledge-technology that solves technical problems through the study of the functions of living beings, bionics is at present in full bloom in medicine, particularly in the development of prosthetics. Here it is occupied with the question of how to develop the ultimately functional prosthetic limb as a model, paying a crucial regard to biological models. The next generation of bionic prostheses will replace the lost limbs not only in the functional sense, but also sensorily. They will enable smooth cyborgian extensions and upgrade our biological bodies with the implementation of mechanics. We can expect to get bionic skin,<sup>10</sup> which will have the ability to sense temperature and touch (human nerves will be connected with carbon nano-tubes arranged along the artificial skin formed of flexible polymers – the active ends of the living nerves will enable sensual perception; the bionic skin will also be equipped with temperature and pressure sensors, and will have implemented artificial hair). Robotics is full of biomimetics, biologically inspired and mimicking technology.

Android science now reckons upon the findings of the cognitive sciences, particularly those concerning the interaction between humans and robots. The researchers of robotics have aimed to adapt the mechanisms underlying successful inter-human interaction in order to create robots with which people could easily communicate.

In 2006 Hiroshi Ishiguro (University of Osaka) developed the first geminoid prototype HI-1. geminoid etymologically deriving from Lat. *geminus*, meaning twin, and Lat. *oides*, meaning similarity, since the robot is grounded in the model of its creator. The visual resemblance to Ishiguro's appearance is quite good; the robot makes clumsy gestures, remains seated, and speaks several languages, which it is able to use for communication with people. The teleoperational system

---

<sup>10</sup> See the project FILMskin, a common project of the Federal Laboratory at Oak Ridge and NASA, developing bionic skin for the application to patients with burns.

of the geminoid generates autonomic movement of the robot, micro-motions during the process of speech and listening (which differ in both cases), such as take shape spontaneously in human beings. The collaborators in the project propose “to use androids that behave similarly to humans for studying what it essentially means to ‘be human’, i.e. the mystery of human nature. Androids and geminoids are artificial humans that allow us to investigate human nature by means of psychological and cognitive tests, which we conduct during interaction with people.”<sup>11</sup>

The Cartesian deception of the senses is actually not to be avoided, but accounted for in a positive sense: “If we could build an android that is very similar to a human, how can we distinguish a real human from an android? The answer is not trivial. While interacting with androids, we cannot see their internal mechanisms and thus we may simply believe that they are human.”<sup>12</sup>

**74**

This quote calls to turn to Descartes and his argumentation of doubt, founded in the distrust in senses: “I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could conceal automatons? I judge that they are men. And so something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgment which is in my mind.”<sup>13</sup> Thus Descartes does not trust the senses: “I had many experiences which gradually undermined all the faith I had had in the senses. Sometimes towers which had looked round from a distance appeared square from close up; and enormous statues standing on their pediments did not seem large when observed from the ground. In these and countless other such cases, I found that the judgments of the external senses were mistaken.”<sup>14</sup>

11 ATR Intelligent Robotics and Communication Laboratories, “Geminoid HI-1,” in: Gerfried Stocker and Christine Schöpf (eds.), *Human Nature. Ars Electronica 2009* (Ostfildern: Hathe Cantz, 2009), p. 221.

12 Ibid.

13 René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 19.

14 Ibid., p. 53.

Regardless of the method of proof that is used, Descartes is “always brought back to the fact that it is only what I clearly and distinctly perceive that completely convinces me.”<sup>15</sup> It is mind which he trusts: “so long as I perceive something very clearly and distinctly I cannot but believe it to be true.”<sup>16</sup>

Michel Foucault beheld a connection between the baroque’s games of illusion and Descartes’ critique of sensual experience. Descartes rejects resemblance as an instrument for gaining knowledge; it rather becomes an occasion for mistakes, a danger to which the observer is exposed. Sensual experience itself is deceptive. The baroque is madness of vision and visibility, innovative uses of visuality are worshipped. The position of the observer becomes important; the visible depends on the observer’s position, as in the form of the cupola depicted by Andrea Pozzo for the *Apotheosis of Saint Ignatius* church in Rome (1685–1694). The baroque is at the same time a critique of vision. Vision and the visual become unreliable. However the perception tricks of visualizations that were dependent on the act of observation already appeared in the Renaissance; consider only Hans Holbein’s 1533 painting *The Ambassadors*.

**75**

Yet marvelous baroque ceilings, such as those of Pietro da Cortona, thus do not *deceive* the viewer. They instead enrich reality. If one were to claim that these are mere illusions, we would reply with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s critique of objectivity. In the case of the Müller-Lyer illusion involving two lines of equal length that we perceive as different in size, psychologists would say that we are wrong because they presume that there exists an objective word, and they thus claim that our perception is fallible. But how could we know what is real, and who is authorized to tell us what this real is? In his critique of Cartesianism, Merleau-Ponty would say that there are no two lines which are *objectively* the same, though

---

15 Ibid., p. 47.

16 Ibid., p. 48. Descartes, however, admits the frequency with which his mind is puzzled because he cannot fix his mental vision continually on the same thing so as to keep perceiving it clearly, thus the memory of a previously made judgment may often come back when he is no longer attending to the arguments which led him to make it.

we falsely estimate their lengths because of the directions of their arrow endings, the cause of the “optic deception.” The alternative of equality and inequality is only possible in an objective world, but these lines are neither equal nor unequal. Each is perceived in its own context, as if they did not belong to the same world<sup>17</sup>:

“We must not, therefore, wonder whether we really perceive a world, we must instead say: the world is what we perceive. In more general terms we must not wonder whether our self-evident truths are real truths, or whether, through some perversity inherent in our minds, that which is self-evident for us might not be illusory in relation to some truth in itself. For in so far as we talk about illusion, it is because we have identified illusions, and done so solely in the light of some perception which at the same time gave assurance of its own truth. It follows that doubt, or the fear of being mistaken, testifies as soon as it arises to our power of unmasking error, and that it could never finally tear us away from truth. We are in the realm of truth”<sup>18</sup>.

76

Counting on “deception” of senses, which does not simply mean a false perception, but similarly as in the baroque world is enriching our world, contemporary humanoid robots do enter our operational world and establish person to person interaction, even though we might be aware that there is “only” a robot we are communicating with.

Androids were particularly popular in the 1980s within the enthronement of computer culture,<sup>19</sup> when even an ordinary computer was to be understood as a sort of android, one able to imitate human mind activities to a certain extent, though not able to move autonomously, hold or move things, listen, watch or feel. The hope to create such a device or at least a part of it has remained an inspiration

17 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (London, New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 7.

18 Ibid., p. xviii.

19 They were also widely represented in popular culture – see for example the movie *Blade Runner* from 1982.

for numerous researchers in computers and other technical scientists.<sup>20</sup> *Blade Runner* discusses the question of a superior species in strength and agility, a robot called replicant, which is at least as intelligent as a human, but is yet not considered as living species. The significant difference between the robot and human species would lie in the incapacity of robots to have emotions. The movie discusses the issue of treating humanoid robots differently as human, in particular if it happens that they actually get all the characteristics of the human species, including emotions, thus being able to operate as humans, yet even in a superior form, but also able to communicate with humans in the same manner as human to human.

At present researchers are aiming to equip robots with a “digital memory” consisting of a digital database collected from the human mind (video recordings from the perspective of the body, taken in the best case during the period of a lifetime) and to equip the digital-mechanical systems of the robot with “wet-brains”. These could be biological networks made up of nerves – such an “artificial nervous system” has proven to have the ability to learn, i.e. remember and act in accordance with these memories. Or other biological systems could be used that hold some features or qualifications which are not (yet) attainable by mere computer systems – a single-cell organism of a slime mold seems a promising artificial intelligent system as it has proven to provide intelligent, simple and effective (communication) solutions when tested in complex environments, such as labyrinths.

Some researchers (like Jürgen Schmidhuber) aim to construct the ultimate intelligent organism, a scientist that will be smarter than its (or should we say his or her?) inventor. The question worth special attention is the extent to which it is legitimate to refer to androids as “artificial humans”. This is actually a question of the technique of mimesis, insofar as it is a question about how far we are able to go with imitating humans and what the status of these imitations is. What are the grounds for determining the status of these human imitations, and what politics are to be applied to them? Antonio Damasio, a neuroscientist, has acknowledged the importance of emotions in the long-run of an individual’s life, especially

---

20 Peter Laurie, *The Joy of Computers* (London: Hutchinson, 1983).

regarding one's long-lasting relations and inclusion in the social world.<sup>21</sup> We might wonder how successful androids could be in this regard.

The other question is a biopolitical one. In a world that is already overpopulated with humankind, why do we need to produce another species, a new sort of "humankind"? The question about creating a robot species after the human model links up with the work of God, who created the human species after himself. Or should we put it this way: man is in the midst of creating a robot in a similar manner as man has created God: after his model, yet improved, a superior species, whereat human is making himself an obsolete, perhaps even a subordinated species.

---

21 Antonio Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1994).

# NEURO-TRANSFORMATIVE PERFORMANCE PROCESSES – FROM NEUROPLASTICITY TO THE REORGANIZATION OF PERFORMER’S BODY PARTITURE

Can we bring into the dialogue performance studies and cognitive neuroscience, theoretical biology, eclectic genetics theory, ethology, or digital biology? Is the body of performer exactly the one that makes all the potentiality of these research disciplines relational and possible?

According to recent studies on cognitive neuroscience - the same or very similar neural structures connect our three brains: the brain or the center of the central nervous system, heart and digestive system. In Digital biology: how nature transforms our technology Bentley describes the brain as a triune entity or the one that consists of the amphibian brain, old mammalian brain or limbic system and evolutionary youngest - the neocortex. A long time ago, while on Earth lived the first multicellular organisms, the earliest form of communication between the cells was completely chemical. Our bodies still possess a form of chemical signaling through hormones. This form of communication has changed through new chemical substances that have enabled the creation of electricity, which led to the first occurrence of the nerve cells and provided gestures to simple organisms and reacting to stimuli. Following evolution, neural networks were used to control the digestive system of simple tubular organisms. In this context, digestive system was also known as “the intestinal nervous system,

---

which some neurologists call “the second brain”, since the embryo develops separately from the brain with which later becomes connected through a nerve called vagus. Some of neurologists think this is the brain that is responsible for butterflies in your stomach before going on stage, as it holds the discomfort of the central nervous system” (Bentley, 2004: 91). So-called senior brains are centers of affects and feelings, pre-reflective corporeal *awareness*, while the so-called third, the youngest brain, is the center of language and speech, reflective corporeal *awareness*. According to these centers, we have a few memory systems: affective memory system (amphibian brain/affective brain), emotional memory system (old mammalian brain/emotional brain ), and intellectual memory system (neocortex/intellectual brain ). Contemporary cognitive neuroscience in dialogue with performing arts is discovering that the practice of performance is also the practice of integration and reorganization of our all three brains. Nerve cells that structure the brain can be multiplied - new cells are formed in the hippocampus, a brain region responsible for memory. Number of nerve cells (neurons) in terms of stimulation and activity significantly increases as compared to the situation of non-activity. One area of research where dialogue between cognitive neuroscience and performing arts becomes interesting is the one that explores the plasticity of the brain or its ability to transform not only in childhood, but throughout life. Furthermore, the term neuroplasticity explains how the brain structure may vary over time due to changes in behavior or environment. In this context we can also think about experience-dependent and environment-dependent structural synaptic (neuro)plasticity. As a result of these changes, synaptic reorganization emerges among certain brain parts. Neuroplasticity also suggests the creation of new synaptic patterns by repetition. Furthermore, repetition causes synaptic pattern displacement, and the change in neural energy patterns. Memory, repetition and attention become three phenomena central to development of neuroplasticity, and therefore corpoplaticity. Selective attention is central to all aspects of learning, memory, and fluid intelligence. Attention itself is something that can be practiced towards the role of a catalyst or enhancer. Selective attention is of particular importance in enabling neuroplasticity of different brain systems. The ability to concentrate on a particular stimulus

---



and choose what will our brains process also points to the phenomenon of the neuroplasticity of attention itself - selective, peripheral or subliminal. If the most important becomes the relation between memory and repetition, as much as the relation between attention - creative, sensory, or imaginative, and memory - cellular, corporeal, affective, emotional, sensory – how can we physically think about the neuroplasticity of the performance partiture itself?

Elizabeth Wilson uses the term “body schema” in order to describe intertwining of various neural networks that constitute our body. Performative act – is an act of continuous conversion and reorganization of neural networks through repetition. During the performative act, the body is changing at the biological and chemical level, it changes its own compounds and compositions. Physical schema constitutes itself within the accumulation of experiences and their cognitive processes. Furthermore, the physical schema can be understood as physical neural network formed by the corporeal inscription of physical, emotional and affective memory. Upcoming stimuli are always interpreted in relation to the existing body schema; performer’s perception of an event at the same time is influenced by awareness of the past, lived experience, and an experience that is always forthcoming , unaware; performer exists in both, and in an irreducibly third - the sphere of his own physical chrono-singularity. Physical memory is also a neural memory or the one that directs our feelings and consciousness. Neural memory is integrative, since it integrates cellular, corporeal, affective, emotional, and sensory memory. Neural memory – within the repetition – causes synaptic repatterning or creation of new synaptic patterns. Repetition becomes crucial for neural, integrative memory - due to the release of spontaneity and increase of new synaptic patterning. According to Rhonda Blair, learning, training and rehearsals could be perceived as a performative and transformative practices of reorganization of our own brain. Cognitive neuroscience indicates that practical experience (such as memory, imagination, attention, repetition) strongest modifies the brain. Neuro-transformative performance processes - memory, attention and repetition are directly related to physical schema remapping, and performer’s physical becoming. According to Le Doux, in the context of learning and repeating the neuro-transformative process, such as memory - we are able to

---

change and convert our own genes, as much as the genes code. Can we think of genes as fluctuating partitures; how to simultaneously move and be moved by these predetermined and emerging partitures? Memory is never “mere representation of an element stored somewhere; memory is always imaginative reconstruction, the constant variation without the original” (Wilson 1998: 173). We are witnessing a shift towards the process of reimagining the memory. This indicates a change in performer’s relation towards the experience of remembering, precisely this excess of imagining a memory is a parallel process of its remapping. Imagining is remapping. The process of reimagining a memory shows itself as always present, and memory as such is a tool of the performer’s imagination. According to Le Doux, “a brain that remembers is not the same one that formed initial remembrance” (Le Doux, 2002: 160). Neural or integrative memory by repetition becomes a re-imagining of affective and cognitive performer’s gestus. Neural memory is characterized by multi-sensory integration and multi-sensory fusion or total connection of sensory information to the level of mutual conversion, and furthermore transformation and reorganization of the existing body schema. Furthermore, multi-sensorial reintegration occurs within a neural-sensory memory and action of recombining two or more senses in a fusion of sensory information. It refers to performer’s conscious work with reimagining his own neural networks, or his entire body schema. Neuro-imaginative connectivity of the performer refers to his potential of interenactivity and transformational intertwining towards the neural networks of the other - performers, spectators, environment. For many theories of embodied cognition and emotional processing - the process of reembodyment of an experience and its situated physical memory is central. Is performer someone who is simultaneously mirroring and reimagining experience? Mirror neurons are essential for the learning processes such as imitation, identification, naming, but also the ones such as empathy and pain. According to Damasio, between actor and spectator brain mediates as a convergence zone. Through mirror neurons, in the brain of one who performs (the performer) and the one who observes (the spectator) are activated the same centers, at the level of neuro-chemical reactions - performer and spectator are equal, but what makes the difference then?

---

Imaginary equals real; the chair that we imagine – for our brain equals the real, physical chair situated in the space. Imagination causes a modification of neural networks in the triune brain or theater in the theater in the theater. According to Damasio, “emotions play a role in the theater of our body. Feelings play in the theater of the mind” (Damasio, 1999: 28). Emotions - belong to prehuman, vegetal and animal performances, while feelings belong to human, and as such are a synaptic bridge between (pre)reflexive and (pre)reflective embodied knowledge. Feeling refers to how we register and interpret the emotions and consciousness; it begins with our a “sense of feeling feelings” (Damasio, 1999: 43). Joseph Le Doux first discovered the key role of the amygdala in the emotional brain. Le Doux research suggests that the amygdala, which acts as a kind of “neural alarm”, can take control of behavior, even when the prefrontal cortex is still at the stage of selecting an appropriate response. This shorter route which takes only twelve milliseconds to activate the amygdala is related with emotional reactions that could be created without the slightest conscious, cognitive contributions. According to Le Doux - consciousness is a product of unconscious cognitive processes. According to Bentley, unconscious activities of our brain delimit and expand our conscious activities (Bentley, 2004 : 93). Our Self could be also perceived as autoactualisation of multilayered unconsciousness. Thus, the Self is fluid and dynamic, it is not real even though it exists. “Performer’s Self is an ensemble in and for itself. Emily Dickinson and Walt Whitman were right: the brain is wider than the sky, and each of us contains multitudes” (Blair, 2007: 54). Further more, Bentley compares the functioning of the brain with the activity of the crowd : “Your mind, your consciousness, is the activity of the crowd, of all the billions of nerve cells organized in different areas of your brain . There isn’t one point in your brain where your Self lives. Your consciousness, as much as your Self - is made of your whole brain” (Bentley, 2004 : 96) . Can we perceive performance as potential practice of full brain activity, but also as total, reversible practice of (re)embodying brain and (re)embraining body? On a conscious level, “who we are is interdependent with the linguistic interpretation of the narratives of our experience (limits of my world are the limits of my narrative/language). Le Doux represents the idea of narrative Self, which compared with Damasio’s autobiographical Self – is created


from memory and conscious experience, but furthermore, Le Doux juxtaposes quiet Self to narrative Self (my body-worlding begins with delimitation of my narrative/language). Consequently, “explicit Self is not separated entity, but kind of configuration of implicit, unconscious Self” (Le Doux, 2002: 199).

Continuity of our awareness is enabled by the unconscious flow of nonverbal narratives that Damasio recognizes as the central consciousness. Can we think of body-worlding as externalizing, performative flow of the central consciousness? Central consciousness could be also perceived and experienced as the sphere of performer’s corporeal singularity. Combination of sensory and emotional information Damasio determines as “somatic markers” (Damasio, 2005: 50 ). Throughout somatic markers sensory information become organism guides - at the level of cognitive actions. What kind of relation there is between somatic markers and expanded consciousness; can we think of this inter-relational co-becoming as becoming of the singular body-worlding itself? What if fluctuating and transformative character of an expanded consciousness becomes the transitional attractor of performer’s mode of being? Is this a practice of relational becoming-Other, as much as practice of conversion or reorganization of our own neural network at the level of our whole body shema? Can we bring string theory into a dialogue with cognitive neurosciences and performance, and introduce the idea of inter-body, membrane-body or multidimensional resonant body ? Membrane bodies - at particle and energy levels are continuously intertwined in their own creation and destruction, mutual reorganization, without gaining a final physical existence pattern.

84

In the wake of Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza, the body is not defined by its shape, organs or functions, but the length and width: “The length of a body is the totality of its relations of speed and slowness, stillness and movement, relations which rule between an unformed elements, between the particles. The width of a body is the totality of affects that fulfill the body the any time, it is some nameless force (the force of existence, of being susceptible to influences). Thus we establish the cartography of the body. The totality of the length and width forms Nature, plane of immanence or *consistency* which is always variable due to the individuals and communities that is constantly being changed and rearranged by” (Deleuze,


2011: 142). The body is the multitude of different modes of becoming – of the Body itself in the plane of immanence. The plane of immanence constitutes itself within the plane of processual assembling, rather than organizing. Instead of shape, we bodily experience the relation of speed and slowness in-between the smallest, particles of unformed organisms. The plane of immanence constitutes itself betwixt the dynamic affective charges - movement and stillness.



transformation and intertwining of vegetal and human tissues through 24 hours

---

86



transformation and intertwining of vegetal and human tissues through 72 hours

Performance itself is the context for creating the conditions for all possible, and (in)compossible corporeal and chronoreal becomings. All of them are molecular, precisely because “becoming is not an imitation of something or someone, it does not mean identification. Neither of these two figures of analogy is equal to becoming, neither an imitation of some entity, nor proportionality of some form. Starting from the form that someone has, from the subject that someone is, organs that possesses or function that fulfills, becoming means displacement of particles. Between the particles establishes the relations of movement and stillness, speed and slowness, and these relations are closest to what someone is in the chain of becoming and through which it becomes. Becoming indicates entering the zone or neighborhood of some particles co-presence, it indicates the movement in which all the particles are retracted when they enter into this zone” (Deleuze/Guattari, 1988: 359 ). When two or more types of particles enter the intermediate zone, singular relations of movement and stillness constitute a new impossible multi-bodiness. Molecular, in relation towards the duality of the molar, does not generate itself from the imitation, shape, form, organs or functions, but (e)motional particles that enter the relationscape of a molecular multi-becomings.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his *Phenomenology of perception* defines body as a silent *cogito*, unspoken *cogito*. The body as a primary subjectivity is the form of consciousness that determines the language, but consciousness as such partly remains quiet, inarticulated. Representation of somatic perception can be approached by Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “somatic silence” and Shusterman’s concept of “somatic awareness or somaesthetic reflection” (Shusterman, 2008: 50). Merleau-Ponty defines primary consciousness as unreflected and unpredictable life of consciousness, and consciousness as such associates with intentionality of the body. Next level of consciousness associates with the perception that allows us constant awareness of external objects, as well as our body in physical (sens)a(c)tion. Primary perception and pre- reflexive consciousness are embodied in physical intentionality that can be expressed through the immediacy and spontaneity. The primordial perception belongs to the experience of the world that is beyond the reflective consciousness, and the possibility of capturing it in language. This nondiscursive level of intentionality can

---

be determined as “silent consciousness” or “primary subjectivity” and as “primordial expression”. Merleau-Ponty creates a division between the lived experience and the abstract representation of experience, and Shusterman introduces the third, combined idea of “situated somaesthetic reflection” (Shusterman, 2008: 63) which embodies itself in the simultaneity of moving as physical thinking and procedurality of decision-making on the same movement. Situated and embodied somaesthetic reflection, as well as the expanded awareness in the context of performer’s conscious change of somatic markers are some of the points for exploring performer’s physical singularity. The body leads us towards “unreflected experience of consciousness “ as Merleau-Ponty describes in his work *The structure of behavior*: “the body, therefore, opens the way towards the thinking that in its exploring movement cannot be stopped, thinking that is directed towards the unthought, knowledge which is directed toward the unknown, the speech that is directed towards speechless in order to regain its own thought and speech” (Merleau-Ponty, 1984: 26).

88

In the book *Understanding theater: the outlines of a new theatology*, Marco De Marinis in chapter *Artificial body* discusses transcultural preexpressive principles that Eugenio Barba considers the basis of extra-daily acting techniques: “In order to find extra-daily acting techniques, performer does not study physiology, but creates a network of external stimuli to which responds with physical actions” (De Marinis, 2006: 165). Extra-daily acting techniques are also called techniques of dramatic presence, since they characterize “the life of the performer even before that life begins to represent or express something or itself”; between everyday body of performer and the imaginary body of the Other, is Moriaki Watanabe’s *corps fictif* or the body that is no longer or not yet in the representational function, but also isn’t in the mode of presence of everyday life (De Marinis, 2006: 166). Within the context of preexpressive, De Marinis opens the theme of ontological status of preexpressive principles, relations between preexpressive and precultural, expressive and preexpressive, preexpressivity as specific theatrical force, as well as the mutual relation of physical and mental in force-field of preexpressive. Preexpressivity consists of elements that we find in “gaps” between the two semantic expressions – pure, concrete movement,



performer still on the scene, but no longer in the role, etc. Performative particles-signs also consist of preexpressive basis. We distinguish “mental and physical preexpressive” (De Marinis, 2006: 182); the first one relates to mental and the other to physical aspect of the performer’s preexpressivity, but they are intertwined by mutual inseparability of the performer’s body-mind co-becomings.

Furthermore, mental preexpressive does not apply to what (is being generated) but to how (is something being generated); it is connected with “the physical aspect of thinking, ways of its unfolding, changing direction or behavior” (De Marinis, 2006: 185). Except as prerequisite of the performative act, preexpressivity can be also considered as “a deep level of dramaturgical composition”, and as such its purpose lies in the activation of certain ways of thinking: “The essential characteristic of creative thought, continues Barba, is actually the fact that it moves within its own displacements, using unexpected disorientation that is forced to reorganize itself in new ways, abandoning its own well-organized schema. It is a thought-that- lives, and it is not straightforward, nor unambiguous” (De Marinis, 2006: 186). How can we learn from insects if we perceive them as networked and tactile oriented units of action? A characteristic features of many social insects are self-organizing and collective decision-making. Self-organizing system is one that is dynamic, in the continuous change and modification of predetermined and emergent levels of embodied actions, and as such is characterized by “multiple interactions (forms of self-organization and collective decision-making appear to be mediated by multiple interactions), positive feedback (an act that causes something to happen is likely to repeat itself) , negative feedback (an act that causes something to happen is less likely to repeat itself) and increased fluctuations (the butterfly effect, chance opens new possibilities and enables new selections)” (Bentley, 2004: 129). Multi compound eye of some insects consists of up to four thousand sensors that enable perceptual experience of mosaic-like image, since each individual sensor delivers one part of the information, and not the information as complete. Can we bodily or within our corporeal imagination enter the co-motional and co-perceptual zone of insects?

Can we get there through interaction, transformation and reorganization of our body partiture, and is this situated transformation also co-experienced conversion

---

of shared body? Does our perception within itself constitute the potentiality of other forms of perceiving, as well as other perceptual apparatuses? Jakob von Uexküll within the frame of theoretical biology and ethology opens the theme of situated embodiment or the one that happens in interaction with the environment and co-creates new capacities of perceiving, feeling, and orientation. Situated embodiment also includes the idea of nonanthropomorphic and metamorphic body intelligence. The body of the performer can be perceived as an intensive molecular flow, and as a medium in becoming. Life, in its dual articulation, is present as a bios, discourse or sphere of human and as zoe or sphere of inhuman intensity. Does the performer's body become the body itself through intense energy flows and molecular connection with the inside-outside world; does it move through and as environmental co-becoming? Does the body constitute in relationality and relations as such belong to the sphere of the pre-individual reality, potentiality and vitality; does the becoming-insect of performer's body emerge in the field of transindividual individuation?

90

Mapping the different modalities of the animal's body language expression, J.F. Lyotard determines animal's language as affective phraseology or one that opens up another way of establishing and maintaining relations and non-linguistic individuations. Affects denote transitions and passages between dimensions of co-becomings - viruses, plants, animals and humans. J. Derrida perceives the animal as heterogeneous multiplicity; plant or animal are just the modes of intensifications, interactions and relations between different embodiments in the form of assemblage. Assemblage does not consist of already existing elements; it is the mode of establishing and cutting energy and molecular flows. As such, it consists of speed, slowness, and its arriving into the expression instead of representing the expression as such. Becoming-plant and becoming-animal of the performer's body does not happen at the level of imitation, but at the level of the molecular expression of singular, assembled affects. Manuel DeLanda through the concept of universal singularity raises the question on the space of potential and virtual, or the one that simultaneously limits and delimits what singular body-assemblage can do, or is capable of. According to Foucault, particularly through the technique of spatialization of the body - the creation of new diagrammatic

maps becomes possible. As such, these maps are not stable and closed structures, but the modes of distribution (of) singularities. Diagrammatic becoming as such refers to the potentiality of capturing and spatialization of intensities and singularities of different body diagrams. Diversity among body diagrams also indicates the potential modes of actualization of specific body plan. Singularities of primitive life forms - vertebrates, or insects - have developed diagrammatic space of possibilities that defines what is a singular body capable of. Animal knee has such a topology of potentiality.

The primary characteristic of insects is a transformation which can be also considered as some kind of a body technique; since the technique and tools are not separated from the body of insects – their body as such is self-organizing tool and technique. Through mimicry - insects are characterized by a parallel mode of becoming in terms of body transformation and development of the temporal body. Insects as a living and interactive entities are in direct relation with the environment as active participants and constructors of it.


If the embryo itself has a history and potentiality of all kinds, does the performer have the potentiality of reorganization of his own body partiture through becoming-Other? According to contemporary research from the sphere of eclectic genetics: “the right way of thinking about development is that we face the cells that change their behavior” (Bentley, 2004: 221). In the Creative evolution Bergson describes the life as the totality of potential live forms. Within the performer’s body – there is potentiality of temporal becoming-plant and becoming-animal. The body as the totality of its own modes of transformation and reorganization also presents itself as the tool. More specifically, the body and the structure of insects, as well as performers, become natural tool of becoming-insect of performer’s body and becoming-performer of insect’s body. Since the tool is not separated from the body, the body becomes technical-integrational assemblage in continuous change and conversion. The body as such – is the assemblage of the interaction, transformation and reorganization. The body in its materiality can be experienced as temporal variation of affective assemblages. Insects, except representing a specific mode of action, are also the intensifiers of internal repetition. In the world of insects, repetition is experienced as an

---

---

intensification of certain instinctive reactions, and therefore, is more interesting because of its central role in neuroplasticity and body partiture remapping. In their relation to the environment, insects are interesting because they do not represent a case in which a multi-organism adapts to the environment, or environment to the colony, but it is question of a mutual negotiation and co-becoming. Ant as autopoietic natural machine, is also polymorphic, and metamorphic. Heterogeneity of an ant colony indicates potentiality of the body as a collective organism - organized around different tasks. Primitive forms of life are characterized by non-human models of organization. Insect as such instinctively interwoves with the environment, and as such is characterized by transformative modulation of the living environment which is simultaneously treated as an outer space and inner space as well, or the one that simultaneously belongs and does not belong to the body of the insect. Insect performatively treats space as an entity, subject, as its own temporal and spatial co-extending. Flock as a multi-agent system includes paradox of predeterminant and emergent layer of co-motion, autonavigation and navigation of multiplicity. The flock brings into existence different becomings which are always situated and co-motional. The flock is an example of mobile choreo-architecture which is not stable and hierarchically organized, but fluid - like a living multi-organism. Flocks and insects form living architectures or living systems - unstructured, and between the simultaneous becoming-spatial and spatial-becoming. The flock as a superorganism also embodies the relationality of microperceptions which coexist and cooperate in a time sequence. What flock perceives - becomes integrated into their world of collective action. A flock represents a multitudinous and self-organizing, emergent system, while insects represent non-hierarchical models of decision-making.

---



an attempt of converting the logic of hand movements

Idea of emergence relates to a new type of relation - towards atoms, molecules, organisms, the body , as well as extrinsic interdependence of all of these relations. The question of repetition and difference is the question of emergent singularity of the performer's body. Since there are no two identical events, every atom, molecule or organism in its own relationality is singular and emergent. Are the events of breathing, blinking and moving actually events of repeating differences or singularities? Predators and parasites through symbiosis become structural couples who form new entity, entity resulting from the singular interactions of various vectors of transindividuality. Performer's body as a temporal becoming of autopoietic network is determined by sensation or sphere of potentiality that is never exhausted in the current perception of the world. If we consider movement as the force that precedes an organized body, the body and the life of an insect or performer are not substances, but modes of living and compressing movements in real entities. Can we perceive affects as a technique that is not technical, nor technological, but

---

temporal, fluctuating, becoming? Can we think of the performer's body as time, continuously on the verge of becoming and arriving into our co-presence?

## References

Bentley, Peter J. (2004) *Digital biology: how nature transforms our technology*. London: Sources.

Bergson, Henri (1999) *The creative evolution. Zabok: Huaze: Igitur*.

Blair, Rhonda (2007) *The Actor, Image, and Action: Acting and Cognitive Neuroscience*. London, New York: Routledge.

Damasio, Antonio (1994) *Descartes 'Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain*. New York: Avon Books.

94

Damasio, Antonio (2003) *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain*. New York: Harcourt.

Damasio, Antonio (2005) *The sense of events: the body, the emotions and the origin of consciousness*. London: The algorithm.

De Landa, Manuel (2002) *A thousand years of nonlinear history*. London: individual companies.

Deleuze, Gilles; Guattari, Felix (1988) *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. London: Athlone Press.

Deleuze, Gilles (2011) *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*. London: Demeter.

De Marinis, Marco (2006) *Understanding theater: the outlines of a new teatrology*. London: AGM.

Le Doux, Joseph (1996) *The Emotional Brain*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Le Doux, Joseph (2002) *Synaptic Sel : How Our Brains Become Who We Are*. New York: Penguin Books.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1984) *The structure of behavior*. Belgrade: University of Texas Press.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1990) *Phenomenology of Perception*. Sarajevo: Veselin Maslesa.

Shusterman, Richard (2008) *Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics*. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi: Cambridge University Press.

Wilson, Elizabeth (1998) *Neural Geographies: Feminism and the Microstructure of Cognition*. New York: Routledge.





## KOMMUNIKATIONSETHIK

1. *Medienethik und Kommunikationsethik.* Wir leben in einer Epoche, in der die Medien performativer denn je sind. Sie wirken auf die Realität ein, verändern sie, konstruieren sie. Die Medien leisten heute eine eigentliche Virtualisierung des Wirklichen; das heißt, sie sind ein Vehikel von Virtualität.<sup>1</sup>

Das bloße Bewusstsein dieser Situation reicht indessen nicht aus. Wir müssen verstehen, welches ihre Auswirkungen sein können. Wir müssen in der Lage sein, sie einzuschätzen und zu beurteilen. Dies können wir tun, indem wir über eine phänomenologische Analyse hinausgehen und einen explizit ethischen Standpunkt einnehmen.

Zu diesem Zweck dürfen wir uns allerdings nicht nur auf die verschiedenen Medien und ihre Macht konzentrieren. Diese Macht wird nämlich von den Medien, je nach spezifischem Charakter, auf unterschiedliche Weise ausgeübt. Die Macht des Fernsehens zum Beispiel ist eine andere als diejenige von Internet. Und dennoch, trotz der Unterschiede, besitzt die Macht der Medien ein gemeinsames Element, eine gemeinsame Herkunft. Diese stammt von der Tatsache, dass alle Medien *Kommunikationsmittel* sind.

Generell hat die Kommunikation die Macht, den Raum unserer Erfahrung zu konstruieren, auf unsere Realität einzuwirken und sie zu verändern. Sie tut dies

---

<sup>1</sup> Vortrag auf der Konferenz "Virtualität. Phänomenologische Zugänge", PTHV 21. - 23. 11. 2014, Vallendar.

---

mittels der Medien. Es ist die Kommunikation, die uns eine Realität zu teilen erlaubt, einen sozialen Raum schafft. Dies kann sie auf unterschiedliche Weise tun. Es ist die Kommunikation, die heutzutage die Macht hat, die Realität zu virtualisieren – eine Macht, die die Medien ganz konkret nutzen.

Diese Macht müssen wir demnach analysieren. Wir müssen die Verbindung zwischen Kommunikation, Virtualität und Konstruktion des Sozialen vertieft untersuchen. Und dies müssen wir, wie ich bereits sagte, nicht nur mittels einer Beschreibung der Welt tun, in der wir leben, sondern auch und insbesondere mittels einer Kritik derselben. Wir müssen zeigen, dass diese Welt, in der ganz konkrete Erfahrungen virtueller Realität stattfinden, nicht die einzig mögliche ist. Ganz im Gegenteil: Es gibt verschiedene Arten, unterschiedliche Möglichkeiten, um gesellschaftlich geteilte Beziehungen zwischen Wirklichkeit und Virtualität zu schaffen. Die Ethik, die Kommunikationsethik, und dabei vor allem die ICT-Ethik (ICT steht für Information and Communication Technologies), kann uns dabei helfen, sie zu definieren und in die Tat umzusetzen.

98

Den Gedankengang in diese Richtung zu lenken, ist deshalb das Ziel meiner Rede. Ich werde versuchen, das Problem an der Wurzel anzupacken, wie es an sich immer Aufgabe der Philosophie ist. Und um die Frage in all ihren Aspekten auszuleuchten, muss neben einer *Phänomenologie des Virtualen* und einer *Ontologie des Virtualen*, die erarbeitet wurden, um die Gesellschaft zu verstehen, in der wir leben, auch eine *Ethik des Virtualen* entwickelt werden. Das ist es, was ich tun will.

2. *Die Notwendigkeit einer Kommunikationsethik.* Warum stellt sich heute die Notwendigkeit einer Kommunikationsethik? Seit einigen Jahren sind in den verschiedenen Teilen, insbesondere der westlichen Welt die Fragen der Kommunikationsethik zu einem Interessengebiet der Forschung geworden: Medienforscher, Soziologen, Philosophen. Davon zeugen die vielen Publikationen zum Thema.

Dieses Interesse entsteht allerdings nicht zufällig, sondern ist das Symptom einer ganz spezifischen Situation. Es verweist auf das zunehmende Unbehagen vieler, auf unterschiedliche Weise in kommunikative Prozesse eingebundener

---

Menschen bezüglich ihrer Position und der Rolle, die sie im Rahmen der globalen Kommunikationsprozesse innehaben. Das Interesse ist, mit anderen Worten, Ausdruck der Notwendigkeit einer Reglementierung des kommunikativen Raums, und es tritt im Bewusstsein derer, die in die entsprechenden Dynamiken einbezogen sind, immer klarer zutage.

Diese Notwendigkeit weist heute vor allem zwei Aspekte auf. Da ist zunächst das Bedürfnis zu überprüfen, ob es möglich ist, nicht einfach nur *hinzunehmen*, was durch einen globalen, selbstversorgenden und selbstregulierenden kommunikativen Prozess übermittelt wird; mit anderen Worten, die Notwendigkeit festzustellen, ob die kommunikationsfähige Person nur mit einem *Target* gleichgestellt werden muss, einem Ziel, das vom Informations-Übertragungsmechanismus angepeilt wird, oder nicht. Eine Weiterentwicklung dessen ist dann der Wunsch, einen *Freiraum* für jedermann zu schützen, der sich mittels verschiedener Medien ausdrückt; das beinhaltet auch die Freiheit, die paradoxerweise in der Verweigerung des Kommunizierens bestehen könnte, das heißt durch Ausschalten des Fernsehers oder Computers.

99

Mit Verweis auf diese Problematiken wird heute die Notwendigkeit einer Kommunikationsethik geltend gemacht<sup>2</sup>. Doch wie können wir diese Disziplin genauer definieren? Die Kommunikationsethik hat *im Rahmen der angewandten Ethiken die Aufgabe, die moralischen und die beim kommunikativen Handeln wirkenden Verhaltensprinzipien zu ermitteln, zu vertiefen und zu rechtfertigen, und zugleich zu einem von ihr festgelegten Verhalten zu motivieren.*

Wie kann die Kommunikationsethik ihre Ziele verwirklichen? Es sind insbesondere zwei Strategien, die zu einem Kommunizieren führen, das allgemein als gut und angemessen gelten kann. Die erste findet in der konkreten Ausarbeitung einer *Berufsdeontologie* statt; in der Definition eines Verhaltenskodex, der von allen, in einem bestimmten Kommunikationsbereich tätigen Personen respektiert werden soll. Die zweite besteht in einer allgemeinen Ausarbeitung dessen, was *gut kommunizieren* bedeutet, und zwar mit Verweis auf einige philosophische

---

2 Für eine Vertiefung dieser Aspekte siehe A. Fabris, *Etica della comunicazione*, Carocci, Rom 2014.

Kriterien: insbesondere auf die Idee einer kommunikativen Natur des Menschen, auf den der Sprache innewohnenden dialogischen Aspekt, auf das dem Publikum und der *Audience* geltende Augenmerk, auf das allgemeine Prinzip der Nützlichkeit, auf das (von Apel und Habermas entwickelte) ideale Kriterium der "Kommunikationsgemeinschaft".<sup>3</sup>

Doch da ist noch eine andere Aufgabe, die diese Disziplin erfüllen muss und die gerade als erste Antwort auf das oben erwähnte Unbehagen besonders interessant ist. Ich meine damit die Idee einer Kommunikationsethik als *Kritik* der scheinbar selbstverständlichen und verbreiteten Auffassung des Kommunizierens. Eine solche Kritik dient vor allem dazu, von den kommunikativen Prozessen Distanz zu nehmen, was uns erlauben kann, ihre vielfältige Gliederung zu verstehen und in der konkreten kommunikativen Tätigkeit die richtigen Entscheidungen zu treffen.

## 100

3. *Die Kommunikationsethik als Kritik der kommunikativen Vernunft.* Was bedeutet all dies genau betrachtet? Dazu ein Beispiel. Nehmen wir ein beliebiges Lehrbuch der Semiotik oder der Linguistik. Darin wird meist zu Beginn eine gute Definition von Kommunikation erläutert, die dann natürlich präzisiert und vertieft wird, ohne allerdings die ihr zugrunde liegende Struktur in Frage zu stellen. Danach bedeutet ‚kommunizieren‘ ganz allgemein, *eine Botschaft oder eine Information von einem Sender an einen Empfänger zu übermitteln.*

Einmal abgesehen von den vielfältigen Anpassungen, die diese Definition erfahren kann, bleibt die ihr zugrunde liegende Idee unverändert bestehen: kommunizieren bedeutet übermitteln. Dies ist die allgemein anerkannte, sogenannte „Standardthese“. Doch selbst bei einer stillschweigende Annahme dieser These müssen wir uns in der Perspektive einer Kommunikationsethik, im Sinne einer Kritik des Kommunizierens fragen: Was liegt dieser These zugrunde? Worauf „basiert“ sie?

---

3 In Deutschland erfolgte dies insbesondere durch die Betrachtungen von Karl-Otto Apel (der eine Kommunikationsethik erarbeitet hat, um damit eine allgemeine Ethik zu entwickeln) und dann mit der Diskursethik von Jürgen Habermas.

Auf diese Frage kann ich im vorliegenden Rahmen nicht eingehen, denn dazu müsste ich auf den historischen Hintergrund eingehen – der mit der Entstehung der Kybernetik nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg zusammenhängt –, in dem diese „Standardthese“ gereift ist und Verbreitung gefunden hat. Ich will mich aber auch nicht mit Veranschaulichungen durch mögliche Beispiele dieser Idee der Kommunikation aufhalten, unter denen sich heute, als ihre alltägliche Verkörperung, vor allem die Erfahrung der Werbekommunikation durchsetzt. Mich interessieren vielmehr die ihr zugrunde liegenden Voraussetzungen: die Prinzipien ausgehend von denen die Bedeutung des Ausdrucks „gut kommunizieren“ zu verstehen ist. Denn wenn wir diese „Standardidee“ des Kommunizierens annehmen, ändert das auch an der Art, wie wir unsere zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen leben, sehr viel. Mehr noch, es ändert in unserer Erfahrung des Sozialen schlicht alles.

Die erwähnten Prinzipien des Standardbegriffs der Kommunikation beziehen sich vor allem auf die *Leistung* eines bestimmten Prozesses, auf die *Wirksamkeit* einer bestimmten Handlung, auf die *Effizienz* eines bestimmten Systems. „Gut“ kommunizieren bedeutet, etwas auf wirksame Weise übermitteln, mit minimalem Aufwand ein maximales Resultat erhalten, alles eliminieren, was in diesem Prozess Verzögerungen, Störungen, Redundanzen oder Ambiguitäten erzeugt. Es handelt sich also um einen weiteren Ausdruck jener „Diktatur der Prozedur“ die alle Bereiche der heutigen Welt durchdringt.

Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Standardidee des Kommunizierens ergibt sich demnach als richtunggebendes Kriterium ein *wirtschaftliches Kriterium*. Und dieses verbindet sich gut und gern mit Aufgaben, die zum Beispiel die Informatik und die Telekommunikationswissenschaften erfüllen sollen. Doch dieses Kriterium gilt nicht für alle unsere kommunikativen Erfahrungen. Und vor allem ist ein solcher Begriff nicht frei von Konsequenzen, gerade was den ethischen Aspekt betrifft.

Wenn nämlich „gut kommunizieren“ bedeutet, auf wirksame und effiziente Weise kommunizieren, dann ist das bevorzugte Paradigma die Nützlichkeit. Daraus ergeben sich auch die anderen, in der Standardthese impliziert vorhandenen Elemente als selbstverständlich: der einseitig verlaufende Charakter der

---

kommunikativen Dynamik in der Beziehung zwischen Sender und Empfänger, die tendenzielle Reduktion des Kommunizierens auf eine Informationsübermittlung, die Fixierung und Isolierung der Kommunikationsinstrumente – sowie des Kanals, des Kodes und des kommunikativen Kontextes – in Bezug auf die Erfahrung der von den Kommunizierenden erlebten Interaktion. Ob ein kommunikativer Prozess gut ist, wird also letzten Endes auf das angemessene Funktionieren eines Systems reduziert. Die Gesellschaft ist dieses System und die Individuen sind dessen Komponenten.

Nun, die Kommunikationsethik als Kritik der kommunikativen Vernunft und der Modi, in denen diese Vernunft normalerweise ausgeübt wird, erlaubt uns Abstand zu nehmen von solcherlei, als selbstverständlich angesehenen Voraussetzungen. Und sie erlaubt uns vielleicht sogar, mögliche andere Wege zu ermitteln. Anhand einer komplexer artikulierten Idee von Beziehung – die über eine simple Datenübermittlung hinausgeht – können wir eine andere, ursprünglichere Auffassung des Kommunizierens erarbeiten; eine Auffassung, die weniger einseitig ist als die in der Standardthese enthaltene und besser imstande, Motivationen für ein kommunikatives Handeln zu erhalten, die nicht nur wirtschaftlicher Natur sind.

102

Wir können uns diesem Begriff annähern, indem wir uns am Etymon des Worts ‚Kommunikation‘ orientieren, wie es für die meisten europäischen Sprachen gilt. Das Wort stammt nämlich aus dem Lateinischen ‚*communicatio*‘ und bezeichnet allgemein „zur Seite legen“, andere „Anteil nehmen lassen“ an dem, was man besitzt. In diesem Begriff wirkt eine besondere Metapher, und zwar diejenige der „Beteiligung“, und nicht zufällig finden wir im Deutschen das Wort ‚*Mitteilung*‘, das zwar eine andere Etymologie hat, aber demselben semantischen Feld angehört. ‚*Communico*‘ bedeutet ursprünglich, „der Gemeinschaft zur Verfügung stellen“, „einen gemeinsamen Raum schaffen“: Augenfällig ist die Verbindung zwischen diesem Verb und dem Adjektiv, ‚*communis*‘ und dem Substantiv, ‚*communitas*‘.

Bereits diese etymologischen Verweise stellen die Eckpfeiler der Standardthese in Frage, nämlich die Einseitigkeit der kommunikativen Beziehung, die Idee, dass das *Feedback* dem erzeugten Impuls *nachfolgt* und sich daraus der repetitive mechanische Charakter ergibt, der laut dieser These den kommunikativen

Prozess kennzeichnet. Mehr noch. Wir werden uns jetzt einer grundlegenden Verwirrung bewusst, die die Standardauffassung zu Fall bringt: *die Verwirrung zwischen kommunizieren und informieren.*

‘Informieren’ bedeutet effektiv Inhalte übermitteln, Botschaften zustellen. Und dies ist zweifellos ein der Kommunikation inhärentes Merkmal. Doch im kommunikativen Bereich geschieht noch etwas mehr, das auch von den Informationsprozessen verlangt wird: Es erfolgt eine eigentliche Beteiligung, es entsteht eine Bindung, die über den reinen Informationsaustausch hinausgeht. Kurzum, es bilden sich kleine oder größere Gemeinschaften.

Dies macht eine Neudefinition des Begriffs von ‘Kommunikation’ in einer weitergefassten Perspektive notwendig. Von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus betrachtet, *bedeutet kommunizieren, einen gemeinsamen Beziehungsraum zwischen Gesprächspartnern zu eröffnen.* Und damit wird augenfällig, dass das kommunikative Handeln gleichzeitig ein ethisches Engagement voraussetzt und schafft. Doch vor allem geht daraus hervor, dass eine solche Auffassung auch der „Standardthese“ zugrunde liegt. Mehr noch: Sie erlaubt nicht nur, die Dürftigkeit und Schemenhaftigkeit der These zu überwinden, sondern auch die stillschweigende Annahme der ihr zugrunde liegenden – sich an einem utilitaristischen Paradigma orientierenden – ethischen Auffassung. Sie erlaubt damit, ein weiteres und umfassenderes Paradigma von Kommunikationsethik zu beleuchten, das den vorherdargelegten Modellen zugrunde liegt. Und schließlich erlaubt sie, unsere sozialen Beziehungen nicht nur von einem wirtschaftlichen und mechanischen Gesichtspunkt aus zu denken.

4. *Kommunikationsethik und Ethik des Virtualen.* Wir leben in einer Epoche, in der es wichtiger denn je wäre, dass die Ethik, und dabei insbesondere die angewandte Ethik eine kritische Haltung einnimmt. Dies gilt vor allem insofern, als die Entwicklung der neuen Technologien in den verschiedenen Informations- und Kommunikationsbereichen eine eigentliche Krise hervorruft. Es handelt sich dabei nicht nur um die Krise einiger traditioneller Instrumente zur Kommunikation – wie Zeitungen, die zunehmend durch auf dem Tablet gelesenen News ersetzt werden –, sondern es geht, wesentlich tiefgreifender, um eine Krise innerhalb des Kommunikations- und Informationssystems.

---

---

Ich spreche hier bewusst von *Krise* in zwei Bedeutungen. Einerseits herrscht Krise, weil die globale, von den *New Media* begünstigte Kommunikation einschneidende Konsequenzen mit sich bringt, was den Zugang zu Informationen, ihre eingehende Prüfung, Organisation, die Definition ihrer Spezifität als Information an sich betrifft sowie in Bezug auf die Professionalität und Kompetenz derjenigen, die diese Aufgaben berufshalber übernehmen müssten. Die „Internet-Galaxie“ ist insofern ein gutes Beispiel für die gegenwärtig stattfindenden Veränderungen des Kommunizierens sowie die Art und Weise, wie diese Veränderungen auf die Informationsprozesse einwirken. Andererseits und noch stärker herrscht Krise in der Beziehung zwischen der technologischen Entwicklung und dem ethischen Umgang damit, und zwar dergestalt, dass sogar grundlegende Bedingungen der kommunikativen Interaktion in Frage gestellt zu werden drohen. Ich denke dabei zum Beispiel an den Respekt vor der Wahrheit, die Achtung vor den Menschen, die Vertrauensbeziehungen zwischen Gesprächspartnern, die Würde dessen, der beruflich oder als einfacher Benutzer im Kommunikationsbereich tätig ist.

**104**

Alle diese Themen sind neuerdings in mehreren, in verschiedenen Sprachen und mit unterschiedlichem Ansatz veröffentlichten Büchern über Medienethik und Kommunikationsethik aufgegriffen und abgehandelt worden. Der angloamerikanische Ansatz richtet das Augenmerk vor allem auf die Aspekte der Berufsdeontologie und erläutert konkrete Case Studies, während die

---



Kontinentalforschung<sup>4</sup> verstärkt nach allgemeinen Kriterien sucht, die in der Lage wären, eine gute Kommunikation zu gewährleisten. Dasselbe gilt für die Forschungsbeiträge in italienischer Sprache.<sup>5</sup>

Doch wie ich bereits zu Beginn sagte, interessiert mich im Rahmen der vorliegenden Tagung die Frage, welchen Beitrag die Kommunikationsethik leisten kann im Umgang mit den Aspekten der Virtualisierung des Wirklichen, die unsere alltägliche Erfahrung zunehmend kennzeichnen und unser soziales Gefüge verändern. Dazu müssen wir jedoch in der Lage sein, eine korrekte Beziehung zwischen dem Virtualen und dem Wirklichen zu schaffen. Dies ist, wie ich dargelegt habe, eine der Aufgaben der *Ethik des Virtualen*.

Zu diesem Zweck müssen wir zunächst die Implikationen ethischen Charakters in Verbindung mit der Dimension des Virtualen erhellen und sie

<sup>4</sup> Dazu, um nur ein paar Beispiele zu nennen, seien für den deutschsprachigen Raum erwähnt die Forschungsarbeiten unter der Leitung von Rüdiger Funiok von Uvk (Hrsg.: *Grundfragen der Kommunikationsethik*, UVK Verlag, Konstanz 1996), von Adrian Holderegger (Hrsg.: *Kommunikations- und Medienethik*, Herder, Freiburg i. B. 2004), sowie der Gruppe des ICIE, unter der Leitung von Rafael Capurro (allerdings hauptsächlich der Ethik der Neuen Medien gewidmet); für den frankophonen Sprachraum diejenigen von Frédéric Vajas (*Communication, Ethique, Institution*, Éditions Universitaires Européennes, Saarbrücken 2010) und von Dominique Wolton (zum Beispiel die kürzlich veröffentlichte Studie *Informier n'est pas communiquer*, CNRS, Paris 2009); außerdem von Richard L. Johannesen (*Ethics in Human Communication*, Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, Ill. 1996), von Louis A. Day (*Ethics in Media Communications: Cases and Controversies*, Wadsworth, Belmont 2006), sowie das ganz neue Handbuch von George Cheney, Steve May und Debashish Munshi (*The Handbook of Communication Ethics*, Routledge, New York 2011). Für die Italienische Schweiz sind erwähnenswert die beiden Bücher von Enrico Morresi: *Etica della notizia. Fondazione e critica della morale giornalistica*, Casagrande, Bellinzona 2003; und *L'onore della cronaca. Diritto all'informazione e rispetto delle persone*, Casagrande, Bellinzona 2008.

<sup>5</sup> Unter den neueren Veröffentlichungen sind zu nennen: G. Bettetini, A. Fumagalli (Hrsg.), *Quel che resta dei media. Idee per un'etica della comunicazione*, Franco Angeli, Mailand 1998; eine neue, aktualisierte Auflage 2010; R. Stella, *Media ed etica. Regole e idee per le comunicazioni di massa*, Donzelli, Rom 2008; R. Ronchi, *Teoria critica della comunicazione*, Bruno Mondadori, Mailand 2003; Id., *Filosofia della comunicazione*, Bollati Boringhieri, Mailand 2008; G. Di Biase, *Comunicare bene. Per un'etica dell'attenzione*, Vita & Pensiero, Mailand 2008; F. Bellino, *Per un'etica della comunicazione*, Bruno Mondadori, Mailand 2010. Vom Autor dieses Artikels sind zahlreiche Studien zum Thema verfügbar. Neben dem in der Fußnote 1 genannten Titel, siehe auch A. Fabris (Hrsg.), *Guida alle etiche della comunicazione*, Edizioni ETS, Pisa 2011.

einer ernsthaften Kritik unterziehen. Dabei geht es vor allem zwei Implikationen. Die erste, allgemein sehr verbreitete Implikation ist an die Idee gebunden, dass alles, was vom technologischen Fortschritt stammt, an und für sich gut ist. In unserem Fall scheint es, als wäre alles „virtuos“, was von einer „virtuellen“ Welt stammt. Was sie an Möglichkeiten bietet, muss unbedingt ausgeschöpft werden. Die Fortschritte der Technologien müssen positiv aufgenommen werden. Dass sie eine Neuheit sind, ist Gewähr dafür, dass sie gut sind.

So betrachtet, versteht man, wieso der Enthusiasmus für die technologische Dimension eine solche Sogwirkung hat. Wenn gut ist, was virtuell ist, lohnt es sich, darin Zuflucht zu nehmen. Und damit werden andere Erfahrungen, andere Realitäten, andere Welten abgewertet. Wer die virtuelle Dimension erlebt, ist überzeugt, nichts anderes zu benötigen. So denken oder handeln zum Beispiel all diejenigen, die vor dem Computer sitzen und auf jede andere Art von Sozialbeziehungen verzichten.

**106**

In dieser Perspektive braucht es keine Beurteilungskriterien mehr, die uns eine Orientierungshilfe sein könnten beim Übergang vom Möglichen zum Wirklichen. Es ist nicht mehr nötig, die Verantwortung zu spüren für die Verwirklichung von etwas in der alltäglichen Welt. Im Bereich des Virtualen ist das Mögliche bereits wirklich; was gedacht wird, ist immer auch schon vollbracht. Man braucht nur nach dem zu greifen, was die virtuelle Realität bietet. Dies bringt zudem eine Potenzierung unserer Fähigkeiten und unserer normalen Macht mit sich.

Dies stellt uns vor das zweite ethische Problem: Es ist spezifischer mit dem Risiko einer Virtualisierung der Realität verbunden, von der die Medien ein mögliches Instrument darstellen. Es geht dabei nicht nur darum, dass in dieser wirklichen und virtuellen Situation die alltägliche Erfahrung und Parallelwelten dazu neigen zusammenzufallen, sondern dass in der virtuellen Realität alle – zwischenmenschlichen – Beziehungen austauschbar, gleichgültig sind. Und dies unabhängig von der Tatsache, dass das Internet diese Beziehungen vervielfältigt und die Möglichkeit bietet, sie immer einfacher und rascher aufzunehmen. Ein Beweis dafür ist die Tatsache, dass mittels Sozialen Netzwerken nicht qualitativ intensivere, menschlichere Beziehungen geknüpft werden, sondern nur umfangreichere.

Abschließend stellt sich die Frage: Können diese beiden Problemkreise von einem ethischen Gesichtspunkt aus betrachtet werden? Und davon ausgehend: Wie sollen wir mit der Veränderung der Vorstellung von „Sozialem“ umgehen, die die Virtualisierung unserer Welt mit sich bringt? Wenn diese Probleme ihren Ursprung in der virtuellen Beziehung als reine Gleichgültigkeit haben, können wir einen ersten grundlegenden Anhaltspunkt für ein korrektes Verhalten gewinnen, indem wir versuchen, den Begriff von „Beziehung“ zu überdenken, das heißt, indem wir die ganze ethische Tragweite dieses Begriffs von einem allgemeinen Gesichtspunkt aus beleuchten, und vor allem indem wir ein Beziehungsmodell erarbeiten, das konkret verglichen werden kann mit den verschiedenen Formen virtueller Beziehungen (in denen die Differenzierung dazu tendiert, in eine Indifferenz umzukippen). Es geht hier um die Idee, gemäß der es *keine Beziehungen gibt außer zwischen Verschiedenen*.

Auf der einen Seite wird die Verschiedenheit in der Beziehung nicht aufgehoben, sondern gefördert, aber innerhalb einer Verbindung. Auf der anderen Seite wird die Verschiedenheit nicht bis zur Zwietracht getrieben, sondern – eben – in eine Bindung integriert. *Die Beziehung, kurzum, lebt vom Gleichgewicht einer Verschiedenheit, die gleichermaßen geschützt und möglichen neuen Verbindungen gegenüber immer offen ist.*

Gewiss, diese Thesen gelten auf einer allgemeinen Ebene, das heißt von einem abstrakt philosophischen Gesichtspunkt aus. Doch wenn wir sie auf unsere alltägliche Erfahrung anwenden, in der Beziehungen *mit* virtuellen Welten und Beziehungen *innerhalb* virtueller Welten inzwischen etwas Normales sind, können wir eine kritische Haltung einnehmen: eine Haltung, die – wie wir gesehen haben – die Kommunikationsethik kennzeichnet. Sie erlaubt uns, Distanz zu nehmen von der Verwirrung, der Gleichgültigkeit von Wirklichem und Virtuellem, die unser Alltagsleben bedroht, und die Möglichkeiten zu genießen, die uns die virtuelle Realität bietet, ohne auf andere Formen von Erfahrung verzichten zu müssen.

Aus dieser Perspektive wird eine ernsthafte Auseinandersetzung mit dem Virtualisierungsprozess des Wirklichen möglich, wie er die Welt der Medien zunehmend kennzeichnet – und zwar sowohl online als auch offline. Und vor

---

allem kann so die Möglichkeit einer Auseinandersetzung mit der Virtualisierung des Sozialen genutzt werden, die sich in unserer Epoche zunehmend verbreitet. Es geht dabei nicht so sehr darum, sie zu verdammen, als vielmehr zu verstehen, dass sie nur einen Aspekt darstellt, eine Möglichkeit reicher und differenzierter sozialer Beziehungen, die wir täglich erleben können. Auch und gerade durch unser Kommunizieren.

# VIRTUALITÄT UND VOLLENDUNG DER METAPHYSIK

Was in einem breiteren Bereich der kulturellen, humanistischen, wissenschaftlichen oder sonstigen Hervorbringungen unter dem Namen „Virtualität“ behandelt wird, lässt sich philosophisch zweifellos nur schwer auf den Begriff bringen. Daher scheint es angebracht, das Phänomen der Virtualität nicht mit Blick auf eine Begriffsbestimmung anzugehen, sondern es vielmehr als ein thematisches Feld zu erörtern.

**109**

Auf welcher Grundlage und vor welchem Horizont kann Virtualität jedoch philosophisch zum Thema werden? Ausgangspunkte lassen sich natürlich bei denjenigen Philosophen und Gesellschaftstheoretikern finden, die das Phänomen thematisch eröffnet haben und die geradezu als Autoren der Virtualität betrachtet werden (Virilio, Baudrillard, Deleuze u. a.). Aber diese Ausgangspunkte für sich sichern diesem Phänomen noch keine philosophische Geltung in dem Sinne, dass sich bereits hier die Notwendigkeit abzeichnen würde, Virtualität nicht nur als eines unter vielen Phänomenen der gegenwärtigen Welt zu betrachten, auf die man mehr oder weniger zufällig stößt, sondern als eine Phänomenalisierung, aus der die Welt selbst zunehmend „besteht“: als, wie ich zeigen möchte, *Prozession* der Virtualität, als *Prozedur* der virtuellen Wirklichkeit sowie als *Prozess* der Virtualisierung.

---

Innerhalb der Heideggerschen Explikation des Phänomen-Begriffs in der Einleitung von *Sein und Zeit* stößt man auf eine Wendung, die sehr treffend den ontologischen Sinn dessen zusammenzufassen scheint, was heute nicht nur in einzelnen Vorstellungen, sondern zugleich in einer allumfassenden Welt-Vorstellung und -Präsenz zugegen ist. Die Wendung lautet: „Wieviel Schein jedoch, so viel ‚Sein.‘“<sup>1</sup> Trotz oder gerade wegen ihrer Einfachheit verlangt diese Wendung die größtmögliche Vorsicht, will man in ihr ein ontologisches Charakteristikum dessen erkennen, was sich heute als Virtualität vollzieht. Zunächst freilich deshalb, weil diese Wendung Heideggers innerhalb eines Sinnzusammenhangs ausgesprochen wird, der die Ebene der Entbergung des *Seins* oder – um sich eines existenzialen Ausdrucks aus *Sein und Zeit* zu bedienen – die *Weltlichkeit der Welt* betrifft, aus der die ontologische Erfahrung von Schein und dessen Gleichsetzung, Unterscheidung oder Entgegensetzung zum Sein, die jeder Metaphysik und auch der metaphysischen Kunstauslegung zugrunde liegen, erst hervorwächst.<sup>2</sup> Das gibt Anlass dazu, die Virtualität aus dem Bereich und als Bereich dessen zu erörtern, was von Heidegger als vollendete Metaphysik bezeichnet wurde, und zwar im Doppelsinn dessen, was erstens vollendet wird, an ein Ende kommt, und zweitens von diesem Ende aus als das Voll-endete, das Voll-kommene in der Art und Weise einer Ermächtigung waltet. Dabei stützen wir uns vor allem auf die Schrift „Die Überwindung der Metaphysik“, in der Heidegger wohl am konzisesten seine Besinnung auf die Konstellation der Vollendung der Metaphysik und die Notwendigkeit ihrer Überwindung bzw. Verwindung darlegt, und auf seine Überlegungen zur „Machenschaft“ in den *Beiträgen zur Philosophie*, auf die sich die vorstehende Schrift bezieht.

Es gilt also hervorzuheben, dass es sich bei der heutigen Invasion der Virtualität nicht unmittelbar um diese metaphysische Gleichsetzung von Schein und Sein handelt, sondern vielmehr um eine Produktion von Schein, also um eine

1 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, Frankfurt am Main 1997, S. 48.

2 Vgl. dazu Martin Heidegger: *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann 1983.

Art *Je-mehr-Schein-desto-mehr-Sein*.<sup>3</sup> Der virtuelle Schein ist nicht (länger) ein Vorhang vor dem Sein, sondern dessen Schirm, sein Monitor.<sup>4</sup> Die Fiktionalität der virtuellen Wirklichkeit als „Scheingeben“ hat keinen anderen Zweck als den, das Seiende als „Scheinwert des Seins“ in die Seiendheit zu bannen. Parallel dazu nehmen der „Hunger nach Sein“ und auch der ganz konkrete Hunger nach Wohlbefinden auf unterschiedliche Weise symptomatisch zu, was darauf hinweist, dass die Produktion von Schein *erst auf die Verschwendung des Seins im Seienden folgt*. In dieser Produktion von Schein aus der Verschwendung von Sein liegt wohl der Hauptgewinn oder, wenn man so will, das Kapital der Virtualisierung samt all den zugehörigen Formen dessen, was man als Ordnung der „Realität“ betrachten könnte.

Aber welche „Realität“, „Wirklichkeit“, „Tatsächlichkeit“, also welches *Sein* setzt sich hier durch? Wenn sich an die Spitze der Prozession der Virtualität das Prinzip dessen stellt, was „wirkt“, was „wirklich“ und „wirksam ist“, dann ist ein wesenhafter Ursprung eben in dieser Wirkung und Wirksamkeit der Virtualität zu suchen und nicht in irgendeiner Ordnung des Seins. Relevant ist hier also nicht das Sein selbst, sondern die *Vorstellung seiner Wirkung*. Die Prozession der Virtualität wäre dann nicht nur von höherem Rang als irgendeine Stufe des Seins – sie diktierte auch ihre Steigerung und stellte in diesem Sinne eine Prozedur der virtuellen Realität im Prozess der Virtualisierung dar. Man sollte diesem dreifachen „P“ – Prozession, Prozedur, Prozess – wohl das Attribut „unendlich“ zusprechen, das wiederum mit der Rückführung allen Seins auf eine sukzessive Vor-stellung der Seiendheit des Seienden zusammenhängt.<sup>5</sup>

Wenn wir behaupten, dass die Bezeichnung „Virtualität“ in der modernen Philosophie und dem breiteren Umfeld moderner Geistes- und

---

3 Vgl. dazu von Jean Baudrillard: *Das perfekte Verbrechen*, München: Matthes & Seitz 1996.

4 Darüber Paul Virilio: *Fluchtgeschwindigkeit*, München / Wien: Hanser 1996.

5 Ausführlicher zur dieser prozessualen Erfahrung der Unendlichkeit Cathrin Nielsen: „Wirklichkeit als unendlicher Prozess“, in: *Phainomena* 60-61 (2007), S. 257-275.

Gesellschaftswissenschaften mit einer gewissen Autorität auftritt, dann scheint die Frage angebracht: Durch welche Zeit oder Epoche wird die Gegenwart *dieser* Philosophie, *dieses* Menschseins und *dieser* Gesellschaft bestimmt, dass sie auf eine derart gültige Art und Weise durch Virtualität vertreten werden kann? Zunächst scheint sich der Begriff *Postmodernität* anzubieten – und doch lässt sich die Erfahrung der Gegenwart dem Begriff der Postmodernität nicht einfach zuordnen. Denn das, was die Erfahrung der Gegenwart ausmacht, ist schon irgendwie geschichtlich vermittelt – andernfalls wäre es nicht gegenwärtig. „Unmittelbar denken“ und in diesem epochalen Sinne „gegenwärtig sein“ bedeutet also, von einer geschichtlichen Vermittlung her zu denken. Die Ausgangspunkte für die Besinnung auf die Virtualität können somit von einem Boden und Horizont aus gesichert werden, der von der Philosophie selbst bereitgestellt wird, insofern sie eine epochale Dimension in sich trägt. Auf der Grundlage dieser Autorität ist auch die „Virtualität“ mit dem Signum eines epochalen Geschehens zu verstehen (was ich bereits eingangs durch die Begriffe Prozession, Prozedur und Prozess angedeutet habe).

112

Zu diesen Begriffen zählt zweifelsohne auch der des „Prozessors“, dessen Stelle der „Mensch“ als Subjekt bzw. das „Menschliche“ als Subjektivität ganz souverän einzunehmen beginnen, jedoch so, dass sie zugleich als „Objekt“ bzw. „Objektivität“ auftreten. Noch angemessener wäre es daher, von „*Subjektil*“ und „*Subjektilität*“ zu sprechen, wobei sich dann sogleich die Frage stellt, was die Wahrheit dieser Subjektilität bildet. Denn es geht ja nicht mehr nur um die Gewissheit eines sich selbst bewussten Subjekts, es geht um das Fixieren, Selbst-Fertigen, Fest-Stellen, ja, man kommt nicht umhin, hier Nietzsches Bestimmung des Menschen als eines noch nicht festgestellten Tieres zu erwähnen. Auch wenn der Gestalt des Arbeiters, wie sie Ernst Jünger definierte, hier möglicherweise eine Schlüsselstelle zukommt, stellt sich die Selbstfertigung doch nicht als die Wirklichkeit der „Arbeit“ dar. Die Wirklichkeit der Arbeit erhält vielmehr selbst den Charakter des Wirkens, wobei sich als Wirkung auch und vor allem der Wirkende selbst ‚auswirkt‘. Es ist dabei nicht von Belang, was „das Menschliche“ ist, zählen tut nur, was *als* das Menschliche in der Rolle eines *Schlüsselprozessors* der Virtualisierung



wirken kann. Darin liegt, wenn man so will, der *anthropologische Grund* der Virtualisierung, der auch die Philosophie zu einer Art *Anthropologie* macht, wie es Heidegger nicht zuletzt auf der Grundlage der erwähnten Feststellung Nietzsches angedeutet hat: „Die Philosophie im Zeitalter der vollendeten Metaphysik ist die Anthropologie. Ob man eigens noch ‚philosophische‘ Anthropologie sagt oder nicht, gilt gleichviel.“<sup>6</sup>

Damit ist keine beliebige Entwertung der Philosophie verbunden; die Produktion vielfältiger Wertvorstellungen dessen, wodurch die Selbstfertigung der Menschlichkeit des Menschen gesichert wird, stellt ja gerade das „Bestreben“ einer solchen Anthropologie dar. Hier sind auch jede moralische Kritik an derart virtualisierten Werten sowie jede Verteidigung echter Werte überflüssig. Echtheit, Authentizität, Unersetzbarkeit, Einmaligkeit der Existenz „samt aller Ethik und Moral“ werden wertmäßig schon im Voraus einkalkuliert und gesichert – es bleibt nur, den „Prozessor“ zu aktivieren.

Die Autorisierung der Virtualität als *eine* Prozedur durch *einen* Prozess, *eine* Prozedur und *einen* Prozessor auf der Grundlage *einer* epochalen Autorität der Philosophie hat eine weitere Komplikation zur Folge, und zwar den Sachverhalt, dass die Virtualität die geschichtliche Autorität der Philosophie anficht. Darauf verweisen insbesondere die Manipulationen des Begriffs der „Realität“, die man sonst automatisch der traditionellen Philosophie im Allgemeinen und der Metaphysik im Besonderen zuschreibt: die Theoretiker und Praktiker der „virtuellen Realität“ nehmen die „Realität“ als ein metaphysisches Konstrukt und sogar *nur* als ein solches, wodurch die Autorität der philosophischen Tradition noch in einer weiteren Hinsicht angefochten wird.

Der Umstand, dass man es mit einem Konzept von Virtualität vor allem bei jenen philosophischen Autoren zu tun bekommt, die auf die eine oder

---

6 Martin Heidegger: *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, GA 7, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann 2000, S. 85.

andere Weise postmoderne Kritik an der traditionellen Philosophie üben, weist darauf hin, dass es sich hier um eine Auseinandersetzung, einen Kampf zweier Autoritäten handelt. Zwar wäre es wohl übertrieben zu sagen, es handele sich um die Platonische *gigantomachia peri tes ousias*; dennoch scheint es ein Kampf um das zu sein, was sich in der Geschichte der Philosophie als ein *Autoritarismus der Metaphysik* behaupten konnte. Man kann also davon ausgehen, dass es sich bei der „Virtualität“ um eine Art *Postmetaphysik*, vielleicht eine Metaphysik *nach* der Metaphysik handelt, also zugleich um eine Leistung wie um einen Überschuss der Metaphysik.

**114**

Die gleiche Frage lässt sich auch im Zusammenhang mit dem Begriff der „virtuellen Realität“ stellen. Wie folgt sie auf die „Realität“, wie wird diese durch jene ersetzt? Folgt sie ihr nach oder bildet sie ihren Ersatz? Die Tatsache, dass Realität durch Virtualität abgelöst oder durch sie ersetzt wird bzw. ersetzt werden kann, weist demnach auf eine Reichweite der Realität hin, die sowohl Potenzialität als auch Potenz, sowohl Möglichkeit als auch Macht einschließt und sich „über“ die Realität selbst „stellen“ kann – worauf auch der Begriff der Hyperrealität hinweist, der sich statt der „virtuellen Realität“ behauptet. Wenn die Virtualität in dieser Vollendung die Realität ersetzt, dann ist sie nicht eine bloße Nachfolge und ein bloßer Ersatz, sondern *die* Nachfolge und *der* Ersatz, durch welche die Prozedur der Nachfolgbarkeit und Ersetzbarkeit autorisiert wird, und zwar ins Unendliche: dass potenziell alles durch alles ersetzbar und in diesem Sinne real verfügbar ist. Dieses Potenzial der Realität als eines metaphysischen Kategorials vollendet, d. h. ermächtigt sich in der virtuellen Realität.

Was sich in der Philosophietradition als Autoritarismus der Metaphysik behauptet hat, wirkt also im virtuellen Zeitalter dahingehend nach, dass nur das, was Wirkungen hervorrufen kann, als real betrachtet wird, die Realität also allererst durch die Wirksamkeit der Produktion ‚wird‘. Dieses Werden lässt sich jedoch nicht länger auf den metaphysischen Begriff des Werdens zurückführen, der Schein und Sein in sich vereinigt und dessen Grenzpunkt bzw. äußerste Reichweite Nietzsches Konzeption der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen bildet.

Martin Heidegger, der in diesem Äußersten die Vollendung der Metaphysik erblickte, führt in diesem Zusammenhang immer wieder die folgende Sentenz Nietzsches an: „Dem Werden den Charakter des Seins *aufzuprägen* – das ist der höchste *Wille zur Macht*.“<sup>7</sup>

Heidegger scheint in einer Anmerkung zu seiner Schrift „Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra“ mit dieser Gleichsetzung der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen und dem Begriff des Werdens zu spielen, wenn er schreibt:

„Was ist das Wesen der modernen Kraftmaschine anderes als *eine* Ausformung der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen? Aber das Wesen dieser Maschine ist weder etwas Maschinelles noch gar etwas Mechanisches. Ebenso wenig lässt sich Nietzsches Gedanke von der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen in einem mechanischen Sinne auslegen.“<sup>8</sup>

**115**

Liest man die zitierte Passage aufmerksam, kann man feststellen, dass es darin weder um Gleichsetzung noch um Angleichung geht; Heidegger verweist vielmehr auf das Feld einer umfassenderen Thematik, die unseres Erachtens eben mit der Erörterung der seinsgeschichtlichen Grundlage der Virtualität zusammenhängt.

Das Ende der Metaphysik ist nach Heidegger der Ort ihrer Ermächtigung als einer bedingungslosen Macht. Dieser Ort als solcher ist aber nicht schon im Voraus geklärt und wird nicht von gewöhnlicher Unklarheit oder gar einem mystischen Geheimnis begleitet. Die Art und Weise, wie er sich in ein Geheimnis hüllt, ist vielmehr seinem Wesen immanent. Die „Lichtung des Geheimnisses“ wird von Heidegger bekanntlich als *Ereignis* bezeichnet. Hier ist nicht so sehr von Bedeutung, was Heidegger mit dem Ereignis denkt, sondern eher, dass man „durch und durch“ zu ihm hin denken soll, wobei das Wort „durch“ hier „durch

---

7 Friedrich Nietzsche: Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, DTV / De Gruyter, München / Berlin / New York 1988, S. 312; Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, S. 199.

8 Martin Heidegger: *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, S. 124.

die Geschichte des Seins“ als vollendete Metaphysik bedeutet. Das Ereignis-Denken soll als eine Zu- und An-Eignung der Philosophie verstanden werden, die etwas durchaus anderes ist als ein interpretativer Zugang, der sich dem *Willen des Interpretieren* und folglich dem Standpunkt der Subjektivität auf die eine oder die andere Weise unterwirft.

Dieser Standpunkt ist vielmehr in den Begriff der Virtualität hineinzuiinterpretieren. Der Standpunkt der Subjektivität ist kein im Hintergrund der virtuellen Realität wirkender menschlicher Faktor, sondern eben dieses virtuelle Wirken der Realität, das den Unterschied zwischen Subjekt und Objekt, Fiktion und Realität, Willen und Macht aufhebt. Der Standpunkt der Subjektivität ist der *Prozessor* der virtuellen Realität, der nur sich selbst will und als solcher eine Welt der menschlichen und zwischenmenschlichen Identifikation mittels Information und Kommunikation darstellt.

**116**

Als ein weiteres Problem bei der Erörterung der „Virtualität“ als einer vollendeten Metaphysik ist freilich der Umstand in Betracht zu ziehen, dass sie in Heideggers Überlegungen nicht unter diesem besonderen Namen auftritt. Der Begriff der Virtualität wird in *Sein und Zeit* lediglich im Zusammenhang mit der Auffassung der Geschichtlichkeit bei York erwähnt, was mit Bezug auf die oben bezeichnete Spannung hinsichtlich der Geschichtlichkeit der Philosophie sogar im gewissen Maß erhellend sein kann.<sup>9</sup>

Zu diesem „Verzicht“ Heideggers auf den Begriff der Virtualität trug wohl auch dessen offenbar bescheidene ontologische Relevanz in der traditionellen Philosophie bei, was jedoch im Besonderen zu prüfen wäre. In diesem Zusammenhang vermag allerdings schon die sprachliche Herkunft der Bezeichnung „Virtualität“ unsere Aufmerksamkeit zu erregen: Sie stammt vom neulateinischen *virtualis* bzw. dem lateinischen *virtus* (Tüchtigkeit, Tugend) und bedeutet soviel wie „für eine Wirkung tauglich sein, ohne wirklich zu wirken“,

<sup>9</sup> Vgl. *Sein und Zeit*, S. 530.

in Möglichkeit vorhanden, möglich, verborgen, „scheinbar, unwirklich“, das Potenzielle im Gegensatz zum Aktuellen, Wirklichen. Thomas von Aquin spricht von *virtualiter* im Sinne von „mit enthalten sein“ („implizit“) im Gegensatz zu *essentialiter*, *materialiter* und *actualiter*. Luther musste sich vor der Inquisition verteidigen, weil er des häretischen Virtualismus angeklagt wurde – er vertrat den Standpunkt, die christliche Eucharistie sei kein aktueller Leib und kein aktuelles Blut Christi, sondern sein virtueller Leib und virtuelles Blut.

Der philosophische Gebrauch des Ausdrucks »virtuell« mit einem besonderen Akzent auf Leibniz wird eingehender von Herbert Okolowitz in seinem Werk *Virtualität bei Leibniz. Eine Retrospektive* erörtert,<sup>10</sup> wo er unter anderem die Relevanz des Verständnisses der Virtualität als eines Prozesses hervorhebt. In diesem Zusammenhang verweist er auch auf die postmoderne Rezeption der von Leibniz entwickelten Auffassung der Virtualität bei Gilles Deleuze.<sup>11</sup> In Anlehnung an Bergson vertritt Deleuze zwar den Standpunkt, dass die Virtualität kein Gegensatz zum Realen sei, sondern zum Aktuellen, während das Reale den Gegensatz zum Wirklichen darstelle.<sup>12</sup> Der Ausdruck „virtuelle Realität“, der heute vor allem in der Computerwelt vorkommt und zum ersten Mal von Antonin Artaud in seiner Schrift *Das Theater und sein Double* verwendet wurde,<sup>13</sup> kann somit als

---

10 Dissertation, Universität Augsburg 2006.

11 Gilles Deleuze: *Die Falte. Leibniz und der Barock*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1995.

12 Gilles Deleuze: *Le Bergsonisme*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1966. Im Rahmen dieser Betrachtung vgl. besonders Marc Rölli: „Die Begriffe für das Ereignis: Aktualität und Virtualität. Oder wie die radikale Empirist Heidegger verabschiedet“, in: M. Rölli: *Das Ereignis auf Französisch*, München: Wilhelm Fink 2006, S. 337-392; Stephan Günzel: „Deleuze und Phänomenologie“, *Phainomena* XXII/84-85 (2013), *Genealogies*, hrsg. v. A. T. Komel u. H. R. Sepp, S. 153-176.

13 „Da dem so ist, sieht man, daß diese nackte Sprache des Theaters, diese nicht virtuelle, sondern reale Sprache infolge ihrer Nähe zu Grundprinzipien, die ihr auf poetische Weise ihre Energie übertragen, durch die Nutzung des nervlichen Magnetismus im Menschen die Überschreitung der üblichen Grenzen von Kunst und Wort erlaubt, um auf aktive, das heißt magische Weise und *in echten Begriffen* eine Art allumfassende Schöpfung zu verwirklichen, in der der Mensch bloß noch seinen Platz zwischen dem Traum und den Ereignissen wieder einzunehmen braucht.“ (Antonin Artaud: *Das Theater und sein Double. Das Théâtre de Seraphin*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag 1986, S. 99.).

---

in seinem inneren Wesen widersprüchlich betrachtet werden. Im Lichte dessen, was oben im Zusammenhang mit dem metaphysischen Potenzial der virtuellen Realität angedeutet wurde, erweist sich diese Widersprüchlichkeit jedoch als nicht so gravierend.

„Virtualität“ würde somit (zusammenfassend gesagt) Potenzialität bedeuten, jedoch nicht im Rahmen einer möglichen Aktualisierung, sondern als aktuelle Macht im Sinne der repräsentativen Potenzierung, d. h. Potenzierung einer Potenz, Überpotenz einer Kraft und Macht. Virtualität ist kein Gegensatz der Aktualität in dem Sinne, dass sie sie ausschliesse – sie birgt die Aktualität vielmehr als ihre eigene Wirkung in sich: darin liegt ihr *wirklich ungeheures*, in planetare und interplanetare Ausmaße vordringendes Potenzial.

Im Hinblick darauf kommen einem Heideggers abschließende Worte in seiner Schrift „Die Überwindung der Metaphysik“ in den Sinn, wo er auf diese so ungeheure Überpotenz des Willens zum Willen ausdrücklich hinweist:

**118**

„Der Wille zum Willen setzt als die Bedingungen seiner Möglichkeit die Bestandsicherung (Wahrheit) und die Übertreibbarkeit der Triebe (Kunst). Der Wille zum Willen richtet als das Sein demnach selbst das Seiende ein. Im Willen zum Willen kommt erst die Technik (Bestandsicherung) und die unbedingte Besinnungslosigkeit (‚Erlebnis‘) zur Herrschaft.“<sup>14</sup>

Und weiter heißt es:

„Keine bloße Aktion wird den Weltzustand ändern, weil das Sein als Wirksamkeit und Wirken alles Seiende gegenüber dem Ereignis verschließt. Sogar das ungeheure Leid, das über die Erde geht, vermag unmittelbar keinen Wandel zu erwecken, weil es nur als ein Leiden, dieses passiv und somit als Gegenzustand zur Aktion und daher mit dieser zusammen in dem selben Wesensbereich des Willens zum Willen erfahren wird.

Aber die Erde bleibt im unscheinbaren Gesetz des Möglichen geborgen, das sie ist. Der Wille hat dem Möglichen das Unmögliche als Ziel aufgezwungen.

14 Martin Heidegger: *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, S. 85.

Die Machenschaft, die diesen Zwang einrichtet und in der Herrschaft hält, entspringt dem Wesen der Technik, das Wort hier identisch gesetzt mit dem Begriff der sich vollendenden Metaphysik. Die unbedingte Gleichförmigkeit aller Menschentümer der Erde unter der Herrschaft des Willens zum Willen macht die Sinnlosigkeit des absolut gesetzten menschlichen Handelns deutlich.

Die Verwüstung der Erde beginnt als gewollter, aber in seinem Wesen nicht gewußter und auch nicht wißbarer Prozeß zu der Zeit, da das Wesen der Wahrheit sich als Gewißheit umgrenzt, in der zuerst das menschliche Vorstellen und Herstellen seiner selbst sicher wird.<sup>15</sup>

Das hier abschließend Zusammengefasste ist nun mit Blick auf die mögliche Bestimmung der Virtualität aus dem Horizont der vollendeten Metaphysik zu betrachten. Es gilt hier vor allem auf die Stellen hinzuweisen, die nicht schon an und für sich und unmittelbar verständlich sind, wie etwa die oben bezeichnete Heideggersche Bestimmung des Übergangs der Philosophie zur Anthropologie im Zeitalter der vollendeten Metaphysik. Damit geht offensichtlich auch eine unerwartete Umformulierung des nietzscheanisch bestimmten Willens zur Macht als eines *Willens zum Willen* einher, denn man würde doch eigentlich die Formulierung vom „Willen zur Macht“ erwarten.<sup>16</sup> Wodurch wird die Formulierung des »Willens zum Willen« gerechtfertigt und um was für einen Eigenwillen handelt es sich bei der Macht, der da nur an der Macht liegt? Es fällt einem dabei freilich ein Satz Nietzsches aus *Zur Genealogie der Moral* ein: „lieber will noch der Mensch das Nichts wollen, als nicht wollen [...]«. <sup>17</sup> Der „Wille zum Willen“ als ein Nichts-wollen kann – wie es aus Heideggers Formulierungen in „Die Überwindung der Metaphysik“ ersichtlich ist – zu einer konkreten

---

15 Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, S. 95

16 Zur Bedeutung dieser Umformulierung für Heidegger selbst siehe seinen Brief an Hannah Arendt vom 12. April 1950: „In den Aufzeichnungen über die Macht habe ich das noch nicht gesehen was Du mit dem ‚radikal Bösen‘ andeutest. Einige Jahre später, als ich im Wille zur Macht den Wille zum Willen erkannte, dachte ich an den unbedingten Aufstand einer absoluten Eigensucht im Seyn.“ (Martin Heidegger – Hannah Arendt: *Briefe 1925 bis 1975 und andere Zeugnisse*, Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann 1999, S. 93 f.).

17 Friedrich Nietzsche: *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, KSA 5, S. 412.

---

Vernichtung übergehen, und zwar bis zu dem Maße, dass dabei nicht länger Leid oder Schmerzen erfahren werden, sondern nur noch indifferente Affektivität und die Uniformität der Effektivität obwalten. Auch das Potenzial der Virtualität wird durch eine innere Zernichtung bestimmt, nach der die Virtualität zwar als Realität, jedoch im Gegensatz zur Aktualität betrachtet wird.

Diese Zernichtung wird in dem oben Zitierten durch die Feststellung angedeutet, die totale Kalkulierbarkeit technischer Verfahren werde durch eine „unbedingte Unbesonnenheit („Erlebnis‘)“ mitbestimmt. Die Art und Weise, wie Heidegger hier das „Erlebnis“ in die Diskussion einmischt, ist allerdings überraschend bzw. es ist nicht unmittelbar einzusehen, warum man angesichts der Anerkennung der Tatsache, dass das Leben zur Gänze durch seine Möglichkeiten herausgefordert wird, ins „Feld des Erlebnishaften“ übertritt und absteigt.

**120**

Dem Hinweis Heideggers auf den Übergang der Philosophie zur Anthropologie im Zeitalter der vollendeten Metaphysik folgend könnte man angesichts dieser ungeheuren Gefräßigkeit des Menschen schlussfolgern, dass heute alles durch den Menschen und wegen des Menschen „zunichte wird“ und dass sich der Mensch eben dieses Potenzial der Virtualität zur Herausforderung alles denkbar Möglichen zunutze macht.

Aber eine solche Schlussfolgerung ist nicht so einfach, wie es auf den ersten Blick scheinen mag. Obgleich sich nicht leugnen lässt, dass der Mensch heute das Lebendige und Tote gleichermaßen manipuliert, kann man gleichzeitig nicht übersehen, dass er dabei zunächst selbst einer Manipulation seines eigenen Wesens unterworfen ist. Das Manipulieren als solches wird nicht erst durch den Menschen ausgelöst; vielmehr macht sich dieses in seiner Ausgelöstheit, die hier auch den Ausdruck „Virtualität“ zulassen würde, den Menschen *wesenhaft untertan*. Oder mit anderen Worten: Die Manipulation, die von Heidegger durch die Bezeichnung „Machenschaft“ wiedergegeben wird, geht aus der Art und Weise hervor, wie das Sein dem Menschen geschickt wird und wie der Mensch durch diese Zugeschicktheit des Seins *wesenhaft* sich selbst übernimmt. Und eben dies



ist das entscheidende Moment für das Verständnis des Phänomens der Virtualität und seiner Wirkung im Zeitalter der vollendeten Metaphysik, die als eine alles umfassende Wesenlosigkeit (Unwesen) waltet. Der wesenhafte bzw. wesenlose Ursprung der Virtualität kündigt sich darin an, *wie und wodurch sie diktiert wird*. Die Bezeichnung „Machenschaft“ offenbart ein solches Diktat – womöglich auch eine Diktatur.

„Im Zusammenhang der Seinsfrage soll damit nicht ein menschliches Verhalten, sondern eine Art der Wesung des Seins benannt werden. Auch der Beiklang des Abschätzigen ist fernzuhalten, wenngleich die Machenschaft das Unwesen des Seins begünstigt. Aber selbst dieses Unwesen ist, weil wesentlich dem Wesen, nie in eine Abwertung zu setzen. Vielmehr soll der Name sogleich hinweisen auf das *Machen* (*poiesis, techne*), was wir zwar als menschliches Verhalten kennen. Allein, dieses ist eben selbst nur möglich auf Grund einer Auslegung des Seienden, in der die Machbarkeit des Seienden zum Vorschein kommt, so zwar, dass die Seiendheit gerade sich bestimmt in der Beständigkeit und Anwesenheit. Dass *sich etwas von selbst macht* und demzufolge für ein entsprechendes Vorgehen auch machbar ist, das *Sich-von-selbst-machen* ist die von der *techne* und ihrem Hinblickskreis aus vollzogene Auslegung der *physis* dergestalt, daß nun schon das Übergewicht in das Machbare und Sich-machende zur Geltung kommt (vgl. das Verhältnis von *idea* und *techne*), was kurz die Machenschaft genannt sei. Allein, in der Zeit des ersten Anfangs, da es zur Entmachtung der *physis* kommt, tritt noch nicht die *Machenschaft* in ihrem vollen Wesen an den Tag. Sie bleibt verhüllt in der beständigen Anwesenheit, deren Bestimmung in der *entelecheia*, die höchste Zuspitzung erreicht innerhalb des anfänglichen griechischen Denkens.“<sup>18</sup>

Heidegger hat mit „Machenschaft“ ein wesentliches Gepräge des Seins im Sinn, das auf das Wesen der Entbergung des Seins selbst mit ihrem Anfang in der altgriechischen *physis* verweist. Dieses Gepräge ist nicht wie ein „Stempel“

---

18 Martin Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, GA 65, Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann 1989, S. 126.

ein für alle Mal dem Sein aufgedrückt, sondern weist eine Entwicklung bzw. Verwicklung auf, nämlich die, dass die Machenschaft, „je maßgebender sie sich entfaltet“, „umso hartnäckiger und machen-schaftlicher sich *als solche* verbirgt“.<sup>19</sup> Daraus folgt ein „Gesetz“, nach dem sich die „Machenschaft“ im Zusammenhang mit dem entbirgt, was sie zugleich wesentlich verbirgt, d. h. mit *dem Erlebnis*: „je entschiedener dergestalt die Machenschaft sich verbirgt, umso mehr drängt sie auf die Vorherrschaft dessen, was ihrem Wesen ganz entgegen zu sein scheint und doch ihres Wesens ist, auf das *Erlebnis*.“<sup>20</sup>

Die Potenzierung des Erlebnisses ist keine gewöhnliche Verbergung, sondern eine solche, die aufgrund ihrer Udenkbarkeit das Potenzial der „Machenschaft“ dadurch sichert und ausfertigt, dass sie es zur Unerkennbarkeit bringt: „So fügt sich ein drittes Gesetz ein: Je unbedingter das Erleben als Maßgabe der Richtigkeit und Wahrheit (und damit ‚Wirklichkeit‘ und Beständigkeit), umso aussichtsloser wird es, dass von hier aus eine Erkenntnis der Machenschaft als solcher sich vollzieht.“<sup>21</sup>

Auf den ersten Blick scheint es (und das wird auch von Heidegger anerkannt), als gäbe es keine Grundlage, auf der sich „Machenschaft“ und „Erlebnis“ miteinander verknüpfen ließen. Andererseits bildet eben diese Unbegründetheit eine Grundlage ihrer Verknüpfung, nur dass sie sich äußerst schwer, wenn nicht sogar unmöglich auf den Plan bringen lässt. Die Sache wird noch verwickelter, wenn man der Charakterisierung dieses Zusammenhangs bei Heidegger weiter folgt: „Machenschaft und Erlebnis ist formelhafte die ursprünglichere Fassung der Formel für die Leitfrage des abendländischen Denkens: Seiendheit (Sein) und

19 Ebd., S. 127.

20 Ebd., S. 127.

21 Ebd., S. 127.

Denken (als vor-stellendes Be-greifen).“<sup>22</sup>

Auf dieser Grundlage kann Heideggers Einführung des Phänomens „Erlebnis“ in die Erörterung der „Machenschaft“ nicht bloß als eine Kritik der „Lebensphilosophie“ und der mit ihr verbundenen Verteidigung des „unmittelbaren Erlebnisstromes“ als Ursprung der philosophischen Erkenntnis betrachtet werden. Heideggers Erörterung bezieht sich offensichtlich darauf, was als Struktur des intentionalen Erlebnisses die Grundlage der phänomenologischen Philosophie bildet, auf die Husserl in seinen *Logischen Untersuchungen* zur Überbrückung der Kluft zwischen philosophischer Psychologie und Logik, Bewusstsein und Begriff zurückgreift. Die Grundlage für die Konzeption des intentionalen Erlebnisses lieferte zwar schon Brentano durch seine Charakterisierung psychischer Phänomene im Vergleich zu physischen, und zwar in seinem Werk *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874), wo er feststellt, dass alle psychischen Erlebnisse eine Vorstellung sind oder dass allen psychischen Erlebnissen eine Vorstellung zugrunde liegt, was er strukturell mit dem scholastischen Begriff „intentionale Inexistenz“ fasste, dessen Verbindung mit dem Begriff „Virtualität“ in der scholastischen Philosophie leicht ersichtlich ist.

Dieser im „Erlebnis“ steckende Doppelaspekt der Vorstellung ist offensichtlich auch für Heidegger von Bedeutung: „Das Seiende als Vor-gestelltes auf *sich zu* als die Bezugsmitte beziehen und so in ‚das Leben‘ einbeziehen. Warum der Mensch als ‚Leben‘ (*animal rationale*) (ratio Vor-stellen!).“<sup>23</sup> Oder: „Nur das Erlebte und Er-lebbare, in dem Umkreis des Er-lebens Vor-dringliche, was der Mensch sich zu bringen und vor sich zu bringen vermag, kann als ‚seiend‘ gelten.“<sup>24</sup>

124

Man könnte sagen, dass gerade das, was von Brentano und Husserl als die phänomenologische Auszeichnung des intentionalen Erlebnisses betrachtet wird, für Heidegger problematisch ist und auf die Machenschaft verweist: Indem das Seiende ins Leben gezogen wird, verfügt man darüber, wobei nicht bloß Psychologie und Anthropologie, sondern auch Logik und Physik am Werk sind, wie es das ursprüngliche Sichmelden der Machenschaft angesichts der Erfahrung der *physis* zeigt. Das alles ließe sich unter den Stichworten einer „Physiologie“ und „Psychodynamik“ der *Technik* zusammenfassen, die nach Heidegger in ihrem Wesen nicht bloß als ein Mittel der Manipulation, sondern als *die* Entbergungsweise des Seins, deren Wesensmanipulation dem „Manipulierenden“ entzogen bleibt, in die Besinnung genommen werden sollte.

Auch das Erleben und das mit ihm zusammenhängende Vor-stellen bilden eine Art der Entbergung des Seins, der es jedoch an der Erfahrung dieser Entbergung als solcher fehlt und die diese folglich durch das Vorstellen als Erfahrung des Seins der Gegenständlichkeit ersetzt. Heidegger bringt diese Erfahrung der Seinsentbergung mit der Erfahrung des altgriechischen Ausdrucks für Wahrheit, *aletheia*, in Verbindung. In diesem Zusammenhang sollte erwähnt werden, dass auch „Erlebnis“ und „Machenschaft“ bei Heidegger in der Zwiefalt von Verbergung und Entbergung gegeben werden. Man kann hier der von Heidegger gestellten Frage folgen: „Kann die Nichtigkeit des Seienden und die Seinsverlassenheit besser und größer verwahrt werden in der Maske der ‚wahren

23 Ebd., S. 129

24 Ebd., S. 129

Wirklichkeit' als durch die Machenschaft und das Erlebnis?<sup>25</sup>

Die „wahre Wirklichkeit“ ist das, wodurch das ungeheure Potenzial der Virtualität definiert wird, während sie an und für sich bloß eine „Maske“ ist, d. h. ein Maskenspiel, das – Heidegger zufolge – vom Ereignis her zu denken wäre. Der wesensgeschichtliche Zusammenhang von Machenschaft und Erlebnis kann dabei auch die Beziehung von Produktion und Konsumtion annehmen.

Wird es im Sinne einer solchen wahren Wirklichkeit genommen, bildet das Virtuelle tatsächlich keinen Gegensatz zum Realen. Wird es dagegen als Gegensatz zum Aktuellen bestimmt, werden die Fragen laut: Woher speist sich die Aktualität der Virtualität? Und wo kommt andererseits die Virtualisierung des Aktuellen her (etwa die sogenannten Medienereignisse)?

Nietzsche deutet im Kapitel seiner *Götzen-Dämmerung*, „Wie die ‚wahre Welt‘ endlich zur Fabel wurde“, Folgendes an: „Die wahre Welt haben wir abgeschafft: welche Welt blieb übrig? Die scheinbare vielleicht? ... Aber nein! Mit der wahren Welt haben wir auch die scheinbare abgeschafft!“<sup>26</sup>

**125**

Die Antworten auf die Fragen nach der Aktualität der Virtualität und der Virtualisierung des Aktuellen verbergen sich wohl in diesem „Abschaffen“ – insofern es im Sinne eines Prozesses verstanden wird, der als Abschaffung dennoch ein hyperaktuelles *Geschäft* bleibt.

---

25 Ebd., S. 131.

26 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Götzen-Dämmerung*, KSA 6, S. 80.

## Literatur

Antonin Artaud: *Das Theater und sein Double*. Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag 1986.

Jean Baudrillard: *Das perfekte Verbrechen*, München: Matthes & Seitz 1996.

Gilles Deleuze: *Le Bergsonisme*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1966.

Gilles Deleuze: *Die Falte. Leibniz und der Barock*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1995.

Stephan Günzel: „Deleuze und Phänomenologie“, *Phainomena* XXII/84-85 (2013), *Genealogies*, hrsg. v. A. T. Komel u. H. R. Sepp, S. 153-176.

Paul Virilio: *Fluchtgeschwindigkeit*, München / Wien: Hanser 1996.

Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann 1977.

Martin Heidegger: *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, GA 65, Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann 1989.

**126**

Martin Heidegger: *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, GA 7, Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann 2000.

Martin Heidegger – Hannah Arendt: *Briefe 1925 bis 1975 und andere Zeugnisse*, Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann 1999.

Cathrin Nielsen: „Wirklichkeit als unendlicher Prozess“, *Phainomena* XVI/60-61 (2007), S. 257-275.

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Götzen-Dämmerung*, KSA 6, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter 1988.

Friedrich Nietzsche: *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, KSA 5, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter 1988.

Herbert Okolowitz: *Virtualität bei Leibniz. Eine Retrospektive* Dissertation, Universität Augsburg 2006.

Marc Rölli: *Das Ereignis auf Französisch*, München: Wilhelm Fink 2006.

Paul Virilio: *Fluchtgeschwindigkeit*, München / Wien: Hanser 1996.

## EUROPA UND DIE REVOLUTION

Gibt es Europa? Oder gibt es nur ein Europa, das sich von einem anderen unterscheidet? Hat sich Europa mit sich selbst entzweit? Und ist Europa dadurch zweideutig geworden? Oder hat sich in diesem seit langem zweideutigen Europa längst ein eindeutiges eingeschlichen, so dass die Janusköpfigkeit Europas eine Maske ist, die verbirgt, was geschieht?

Es gibt einen geoökonomischen Raum der »Euro-Zone«. Diese Bezeichnung, dieser Code, der wie jeder Code eindeutig funktioniert, dient dazu, den Zugang zu einem technisch-wissenschaftlich-ökonomisch-medial definierten Gegenstand zu steuern. Europa dreht sich um diese Festlegung. Die »Euro-Zone« ist ein solch definierter Gegenstand, der alles erwürgt, was dieser Definition widerspricht.

Und doch scheint es über diese Grenze, diese Lage hinweg noch ein anderes Europa zu geben, eines, das weit zurückgeht bis zu der Grenze, jenseits derer der Niemandsraum und die Niemandszeit herrschen. Das ist die Schwelle, der Ursprung, an dem die Erinnerung beginnt und Europa erscheint. Dieses Europa ist mit den drei Orten der Akropolis, des Kapitols und – das lässt sich nicht wirklich bezweifeln – Golgathas verknüpft. Von diesen drei Orten geht alles aus, was Europa bedeuten kann.

Es gibt also anscheinend zwei Europa, deren Zusammenhang zwar behauptet,

---

aber nicht verwirklicht wird. Dafür spricht z.B. der seit Jahrzehnten immer stärker vollzogene Abbau eines Bildungsverständnisses, das sich vor allem auf die Ursprünge von Europa bezog; ein Abbau, der zu Gunsten von »Kompetenzen« institutionalisiert wird. Es handelt sich dabei um einen Begriff, der seine ökonomische Signatur nicht verheimlicht. Der »Europäer« der Zukunft ist vor allem »kompetent«.

Europa besteht und erhält sich als Euro-Zone. Diese Erhaltung manifestiert sich in seinen Sektionen Technik, Wissenschaft, Ökonomie und Medium. Die Sektionen lassen sich nicht voneinander trennen. Alle vier sind in jeder einzelnen mit anwesend. Was ihre Unterscheidung möglich macht, sind vier verschiedene Zwecke, die allerdings niemals völlig zu differenzieren sind. So lässt sich das Design der Präsentation eines Unternehmens als Kunst deuten, während die Arbeit eines Künstlers ökonomisch analysiert werden kann.

**128**

Die Erhaltung der Euro-Zone organisiert sich technisch, wissenschaftlich, ökonomisch und medial, d.h. nicht politisch. Vielmehr ist die ›Politik‹ ein Instrument, das von allen Sektionen der Zone verwendet wird. Als Instrument dient sie, sie herrscht nicht.<sup>1</sup> Die Herrschaft scheint überhaupt verdächtig geworden zu sein. Die Sprache der Herrschaft ist einer des Managements gewichen. Die Politik verweigert ihre kreativen Potentiale, die in den Anfängen Europas entspringen. Sie speist sich in die Vermittlungskanäle ein wie alles, was ist. Damit dient sie einer anderen Art von Herrschaft. Die Erhaltung der Zone ist eine Produktion, eine Anstrengung. Alle Sektoren der Euro-Zone sind effektiv. Der wachsende Reichtum der Zone ist eine Konsequenz, die sich durch spezifische Medien potenziert. Indem sich die Zone angestrengt, d.h. unter hohem Kraftaufwand sich auf sich selbst bezieht, schließt sie sich ab. Diese

1 »[...] er [der Staat] ist aber weiter Nichts als die Form der Organisation, welche sich die Bourgeois sowohl nach Außen als nach innen hin zur gegenseitigen Garantie ihres Eigentums und ihrer Interessen notwendig geben.« Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels: Die deutsche Ideologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit den bürgerlichen Weltanschauungen und dem deutschen Sozialismus in seinen verschiedenen Propheten. Berlin 1953, S. 63. Vermutlich ist der Begriff des »Bourgeois« historisch vergangen. Die Analyse, dass die Politik den Interessen der ökonomisch führenden Klasse entspricht, bleibt richtig. In den Diskurs der Gegenwart übersetzt: Höhere Besteuerung von großen Vermögen führt zur Kapitalflucht etc.



Abgeschlossenheit ist Panzerung, ist Macht; ein Abschluss gegen alles, was die Erhaltung der Euro-Zone gefährden könnte. Die Euro-Zone ist eine stabile, sich auf sich selbst zentrierende Macht.

Den Hinweis auf die Neuartigkeit des technisch-wissenschaftlich-ökonomisch-medialen Apparats verdanken wir Jacques Derrida. Der Charakter dieses Raums ist ein anderer als der von Heideggers »Ge-Stell«, wenn auch gerade dieses eine Vorahnung von dem darstellt, was heute geschieht und nicht geschieht. In *Marx' Gespenster* macht Derrida darauf aufmerksam, dass wir es mit einem »Ensemble von Transformationen aller Art (insbesondere technisch-wissenschaftlich-ökonomisch-medialen Veränderungen)« zu tun haben, das die »traditionellen Gegebenheiten«<sup>2</sup> überschreitet. Diese »Transformationen«, so Derrida, »stören die politischen Philosophen und die gängigen Konzepte der Demokratie«. Sie würden dazu »zwingen, alle Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Nation, Mensch und Bürger, Privatem und Öffentlichem usw. neu zu überdenken«. Wenn Marx und auch Heidegger in den Veränderungen von Ökonomie und Technik Bewegungen erkennen, die für das Verständnis dessen, was ist, relevant sind, so müssen wir heute anerkennen, dass wir es mit Phänomenen ganz neuer Art zu tun haben.

Die Veränderungen finden vor allem im so genannten »techno-tele-medialen Apparat« (113) statt. Dieser »Apparat« habe unseren »Begriff der Produktion« entscheidend modifiziert. Derrida nennt ihn zuweilen einfach »das Medium« (114).<sup>3</sup> Durch das Medium gebe es eine »neue Struktur des Ereignisses und seiner Spektralität«. Das Medium, diese in sich zerstreute Einheit von Technik, Wissenschaft, Ökonomie und Medien, produziert eine neue Form von Öffentlichkeit, in der sich die Art und Weise der Produktion selbst verändert hat. In dieser und als diese Öffentlichkeit konstituiert sich Europa bzw. die Euro-Zone. Was in und für diese Öffentlichkeit »Ereignis« ist, lässt sich kaum sagen, weil hier das Reale und Imaginäre nicht mehr zu unterscheiden sind. Seine Spektralität, das Gespenstische, das mit jedem Ereignis, mit der Art und Weise,

---

2 Jacques Derrida: *Marx' Gespenster. Der Staat der Schuld, die Trauerarbeit und die neue Internationale*. Frankfurt/Main 1995, S. 103.

3 Vgl. auch Peter Trawny: *Medium und Revolution*. Berlin 2011.

---

wie ein Ereignis sich ereignet, einhergeht, scheint sich absolut zu medialisieren.

Wir sollten noch ein wenig bei der Beschreibung des Mediums bleiben und zu verstehen versuchen, was uns heute sowohl mit Marx und Heidegger verbindet als auch von ihnen trennt. Marx hat (im Rückgang auf Hegel) als erster die Entstehung eines kapitalistisch organisierten Weltmarkts gesehen. Er hat auch gesehen, inwiefern die Technik an dieser Entstehung beteiligt war. Sie selbst freilich betrachtete er keineswegs als ein Problem. Heidegger hingegen hat als erster die Bedeutung der Technik in Bezug auf das »Planetarische« bzw. den Globus, also die Globalisierung, erkannt. Er hat durchaus da und dort auch gesehen, inwiefern die Ökonomie ein Moment dieses Vorgangs ist. Doch was er nicht sah und was ihn nicht interessierte, war die soziale Wirklichkeit der Produktion bzw. ihr Effekt im Technischen. Was Marx und Heidegger verband, war die Überzeugung einer Notwendigkeit eines spezifischen Ereignisses, einer Notwendigkeit der Revolution.

**130**

Das Medium ist ein Apparat von Apparaten, in dem sich die vier Sektoren der Euro-Zone in äußerster Effektivität vermitteln, d.h. realisieren. Alles, was ist, ist als und im Medium. Anderes gibt es nicht und darf es nicht geben, weil sich dann nicht nur das Sein des Mediums, sondern das Sein überhaupt wandeln könnte. Dagegen schirmt sich das Medium ab. Die Abschirmung des Mediums sorgt für eine Intransparenz, die sich als vollkommene Transparenz re-präsentiert. Was gänzlich durchschaubar ist, lässt genauso wenig sehen wie vollkommene Dunkelheit. Was im techno-tele-medialen Apparat geschieht, ist also nicht mehr in Erfahrung zu bringen. Die Sinnlichkeit hat sich seit langem von ihren gewöhnlichen Referenzen abgelöst. Bilder erscheinen und verschwinden, ohne am Körper eine Spur zu hinterlassen. Stets ereignet sich etwas, doch was eigentlich wirklich?

Was sich ereignet, muss eine Spur hinterlassen. Das Ereignis wird gespürt, gefühlt, vielleicht auch als traumatisch erfahren. Es ist eine Erschütterung, ein Riss, ein Bruch. Indem sich aber der techno-tele-mediale Apparat, d.h. die Euro-Zone, vor allem auf sich selbst bezieht, sich ab-schirmt, panzert er sich gegen jede Art von Bruch oder Zerstörung. Jedes vermeintliche Ereignis wird sogleich im Gestöber des Apparats integriert, indem es medial verarbeitet wird. Das führt

---

zu einer Normalisierung von allem, was sich innerhalb der vier Sektoren der Euro-Zone befindet. Die Zone dichtet sich ab, versiegelt sich, nicht nur an ihren geopolitischen Grenzen, sondern auch in onto-affektiver Hinsicht. Das Siegel ist die Angst.

Die onto-affektive Lage, d.h. die Stimmung der Zone, ist geprägt von einer Angst vor dem Verlust. Dieser Verlust wird unmittelbar auf die Ökonomie bezogen. Der Niedergang der Wirtschaft hätte eine Depression zur Folge, die sich der Zonen-Bewohner nicht antun möchte. Nichts ist heute schlimmer, nichts ist schwieriger hinzunehmen als zu verlieren. So begehrt er stetige Wachstums-Sicherheit. In diesem Begehren treffen sich alle, selbst wenn die Früchte dieses Begehrens ganz unterschiedlich verteilt werden. Doch unter dieser Verlust-Angst gibt es noch eine andere, eine größere Angst. Sie gilt dem Anderen, einem völlig anderen Leben, das alle kennen, und alle schamhaft verleugnen. Dieses Leben hat mit dem zu tun, was Europa in Wahrheit ist. Europa – das von Anfang an Andere. In der Zone herrscht eine Angst vor Europa.

Es gibt eine Angst vor diesem Anderen Europas. Diese Angst betrifft die Wahrheits-Möglichkeiten, die Europa an seinem Anfang erschienen sind. Sie begleitet Europa, seitdem es diese Wahrheits-Möglichkeiten gibt. Vielleicht gibt es deshalb gar keine »Europäisierung der Menschheit« (Husserl). Was es stattdessen gibt, ist eine aus Europa stammende Verängstigung der Welt. All die militärischen, ökonomischen und kulturellen Eroberungen wären erklärbar aus einer Flucht vor sich selbst. Diese Flucht ist jetzt nicht mehr möglich, denn die Angst ist global geworden.

\*

Aus dieser Angst erscheint ein spezifisches Verhältnis von Herr und Knecht. Dieses Verhältnis hat sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten unter dem Einfluss des techno-tele-medialen Apparats auf überraschende Weise verändert. Das kann eine Passage am Beginn des *Kapitals* erläutern.<sup>4</sup> Marx analysiert dort die »Wertform«.

---

4 Karl Marx: Das Kapital, Bd. 1. Berlin 1962.

An einer wichtigen Stelle geht er »zu dem großen Forscher« zurück, »der die Wertform, wie so viele Denkformen, Gesellschaftsformen und Naturformen zuerst analysiert« (73) hat. Es geht um Aristoteles.

Aristoteles hat gesehen, dass »5 Polster = 1 Haus« sich nicht unterscheidet von »5 Polster = soundso viel Geld«. Er habe auch gesehen, dass »das Haus dem Polster qualitativ gleichgesetzt« werde, denn ohne diese »Wesensgleichheit« können diese »sinnlich verschiedenen Dinge« »nicht als kommensurable Größen aufeinander beziehbar« sein. Dann aber bricht Aristoteles' Analyse der »Wertform« ab. Die »Kommensurabilität« (74) oder, griechisch, die Symmetrie dieser Dinge »kann nur etwas der wahren Natur der Dinge Fremdes sein«.

**132**

Marx weist darauf hin, dass der griechische Philosoph »uns also selbst« sage, »woran seine weitere Analyse« scheitere, »nämlich am Mangel des Wertbegriffs«. Was ist denn »das Gleiche, d.h. die gemeinschaftliche Substanz, die das Haus für den Polster im Wertausdruck des Polsters vorstellt«? fragt Marx. Das könne, so Aristoteles, »in Wahrheit nicht existieren«. Es existiert aber sehr wohl. Das »Gleiche« von »Polster« und »Haus«, soweit diese als Ware gleichwertig sind, sei »die menschliche Arbeit«. Nun schließt Marx: »Daß aber in der Form der Warenwerte alle Arbeiten als gleiche menschliche Arbeit und daher als gleichgeltend ausgedrückt sind, konnte Aristoteles nicht aus der Wertform selbst herauslesen, weil die griechische Gesellschaft auf der Sklavenarbeit beruhte, daher die Ungleichheit der Menschen und ihrer Arbeitskräfte zur Naturbasis hatte.« (74)

Wie bekannt hat sich die Ungleichheit der Menschen im Verlaufe des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit – vor allem im Kontext der Revolution (obwohl die Amerikanische Revolution unmittelbar den Sklaven keine Freiheit brachte) – aufgelöst. Wir gehen daher davon aus, dass die Wertform der Dinge einer Arbeit entstammt, die nach der Gleichheit der Menschen bewertet wird. Der entwickelte Begriff der Arbeit setzt voraus, dass sie von einem Menschen verrichtet wird, der als Mensch anerkannt wird. Da für Aristoteles aber die Arbeit nur sklavisch ist, kann sie nicht nach einem allgemeinen Maß beurteilt werden. Ja, bei einem solchen Fehlen eines allgemeinen Maßes wäre zu fragen, nach welchem Maß sie

überhaupt geschätzt wurde, denn Maß ist stets (irgendwie) ein Allgemeines.

Wir gehen davon aus, dass die Sklavenhaltergesellschaft hinter uns liegt. Die Ökonomie der Arbeit wird auf der Grundlage der Gleichheit des Menschen interpretiert. Das »Geheimnis des Wertausdrucks, die Gleichheit und gleiche Gültigkeit aller Arbeiten«, so Marx, »weil und insofern sie menschliche Arbeit überhaupt sind«, könne »nur entziffert werden, sobald der Begriff der menschlichen Gleichheit bereits die Festigkeit eines Volksvorurteils« (74) besitze. Heute aber, im techno-tele-medialen Apparat, hat sich ein entzifferbarer Zusammenhang der »gleichen Gültigkeit aller Arbeiten« entzogen. Er hat sich ins Imaginäre und sogar Phantastische verschoben.

Wenn aber nach Marx die »gleiche Gültigkeit aller Arbeiten« als menschliche Arbeit die »menschliche Gleichheit« voraussetzt, dann kann die ungleiche »Gültigkeit aller Arbeiten«, wie sie heute existiert, nur bedeuten, dass die Gleichheit des Menschen »die Festigkeit eines Volksvorurteils« verloren hat. Sie ist nur noch ein Vorurteil. Wir leben demnach in der Zeit einer neuen Art von Sklavenherrschaft. Diese These besagt auch, dass sich nicht mehr von einer einheitlichen Wertform sprechen lässt. Der techno-tele-mediale Apparat produziert die Ungleichheit des Menschen im Imaginären und Phantastischen der zerstörten Wertform. Arbeit hat heute den und demnach jeden Maßstab verloren.

Das ist eine seltsame These: Am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts ist uns im technisch-wissenschaftlich-ökonomisch-medialen Apparat die Gleichheit des Menschen abhanden gekommen. Wir waren seit langem misstrauisch, dass die Gleichheit des Menschen nur ein Vorwand gewesen ist, die selbstreferentielle Abgeschlossenheit des Westens ideologisch zu sichern – so als hätten wir geglaubt, dass die Reichen von Manhattan sich wirklich mit den Armen aus Angola verglichen hätten. Doch wir müssen erkennen, dass inmitten der Euro-Zone der Mensch nicht mehr der Mensch ist.

Was die neue Sklavengesellschaft begründet, ist eine imaginäre Produktion oder das Imaginäre, das die Produktion von einer einheitlichen Wertform abschneidet und sie so ins Phantastische verzerrt. Was ein Produzent leistet oder nicht leistet, hat keine Referenz mehr im produzierten Objekt. Das Verhältnis

---

zwischen Produktion und Produkt ist maßlos geworden (und in globaler Dimension übrigens noch maßloser). Es hat den märchenhaften Charakter eines »Tischlein deck dich« angenommen, wobei niemals gewusst werden kann, was auf den Tisch kommt; Effekt einer hybriden Ökonomie, die ein neues Phänomen darstellt. Die Ideologien des Kapitalismus und Liberalismus rechtfertigen die bestehende Situation, ohne in der Lage zu sein, sie zu durchschauen. Für eine breitere Anerkennung sorgt der techno-tele-mediale Apparat, der Faktor jener neuen Ökonomie ist. Er schafft den absurden Eindruck, die moderne Gesellschaft würde nach wie vor einen Zusammenhang bilden.

\*

**134**

Was der Kapitalismus ist, hat Bataille einmal in einem großartigen Rückgang auf eine Äußerung von Benjamin Franklin dargestellt:<sup>5</sup> »daß die Zeit Geld ist« (161). Das ist eine Bestimmung, über die nachzudenken sich lohnt auch deshalb, weil sich aus dieser Position von Subjekt und Prädikat die Umdrehung »Geld ist Zeit« denken lässt. Bataille hat Franklins Bestimmung des Kapitalismus dann auch besonders betont. »Der Franklinsche Grundsatz beherrscht – wenn auch selten ausgesprochen – die Ökonomie natürlich noch immer.« Und er fügt in Klammern hinzu: »(er wird sie mit Sicherheit in eine Sackgasse führen)« (162). Doch das Franklin-Zitat in Batailles *Aufhebung der Ökonomie* ist länger:

»Bedenke, daß die Zeit Geld ist; wer täglich zehn Schillinge durch seine Arbeit erwerben könnte und den halben Tag spazieren geht, oder auf seinem Zimmer faulenz, der darf, auch wenn er nur sechs Pence für sein Vergnügen ausgibt, nicht dies allein berechnen, er hat nebst dem noch fünf Schillinge ausgegeben oder vielmehr weggeworfen ... Bedenke, daß Geld

---

<sup>5</sup> Georges Bataille: *Die Aufhebung der Ökonomie. Der Begriff der Verausgabung. Der verfemte Teil. Kommunismus und Stalinismus. Die Ökonomie im Rahmen des Universums.* München 1985. Vgl. auch Alain Badiou: *Manifest für die Philosophie.* Wien u. Berlin 2010, S. 42: »Das, was sich zeigt, immer einen zeitlichen Gehalt hat und unsere Zeit im buchstäblichen Sinne gezählt ist [...].« Badiou spricht dementsprechend von einem »allgemeinen Geldäquivalent«.

von einer zeugungskräftigen und fruchtbaren Natur ist. Geld kann Geld erzeugen und so fort. Fünf Schillinge umgeschlagen sind sechs, wieder umgetrieben sieben Schilling drei Pence und so fort, bis es hundert Pfund Sterling sind. Je mehr davon vorhanden ist, desto mehr erzeugt das Geld beim Umschlag, so daß der Nutzen schneller und immer schneller steigt. Wer ein Mutterschwein tötet, vernichtet dessen ganze Nachkommenschaft bis ins tausendste Glied. Wer ein Fünfschillingstück umbringt, mordet alles, was damit hätte produziert werden können: ganze Kolonnen von Pfunden Sterling.« (161f.)

Das Wichtige an dieser Bestimmung ist, dass Franklin den Menschen nur nebenbei nennt. Das Subjekt des Kapitalismus ist das Geld oder – die Zeit. Der Kapitalismus ist nach dieser Bestimmung gleichsam ab ovo eine Besetzung des Immateriellen und Imaginären. Er vermag es, Zeit und Geld ungeregelt ineinander umschlagen zu lassen. Eine eigentümliche Bewegung, auf die noch zurückzukommen sein wird. So gesehen ist der Kapitalismus eine »zweite Natur« (Hegel). Er wuchert von selbst fort und durchdringt die Poren des Seins.

So gesehen erscheint Batailles Charakterisierung des Kapitalismus freilich als ein Widerspruch. Der Kapitalismus sei »sozusagen die rückhaltlose Hingabe an das Ding« (172). Demnach habe sich »die Menge« »der Abstumpfung durch die Produktion ergeben« und lebe »die teils komische, teils aufbringende, mechanische Existenz der Dinge« (170). Doch wir haben es mit einem Scheinwiderspruch zu tun. Die Euro-Zone wird als ein Gegenstand betrachtet, etwas Reales, Vorhandenes. Doch was dieses Vorhandene bestimmt, ist das Imaginäre. Damit ist das eigentliche Wesen der Zone bezeichnet: Sie behauptet etwas Imaginäres als die einzige und einzig mögliche Realität.

Dem neuen Sklaven entspricht ein neuer Freier, ein neuer Herr. Der neue Freie nutzt das Imaginäre der Produktion, um sich von dieser zu befreien. Er hat nichts oder nur noch wenig mit der alten Vorstellung vom Kapitalisten zu tun. Im Spielraum imaginärer Produktion macht der Freie sein Leben und verlängert es auf die nächsten Generationen. Damit findet eine Refeudalisierung der Gesellschaft statt. Es gibt Familien, die sich von der Arbeit verabschieden. Da

---

---

diese Familien in ihrem Bewusstsein zumeist bürgerliche und kleinbürgerliche Selbstbilder pflegen, werden ihre Mitglieder weiterhin aus Gewohnheit »einem bürgerlichen Beruf nachgehen«.

Die Arbeit aus Gewohnheit ist aber von der aus Not zu unterscheiden. Die neuen Herren haben sich potentialiter von der Arbeit befreit. Einerseits an der Gewohnheit festhaltend, haben die neuen Freien andererseits ein Interesse an der Kontrolle des technisch-wissenschaftlich-ökonomisch-medialen Apparats. In dieser Hinsicht kann von einer neuen Macht-Elite gesprochen werden, die sich lebensweltlich von den neuen Sklaven immer weiter entfernt. Es ist eine Macht-Elite, die sich nicht immer ihrer Macht bewusst ist und nicht bewusst sein muss.

**136**

Diese Refeudalisierung hat ihr Echo in den internationalen Verhältnissen der Euro-Zone. Bestimmte Länder fallen zurück und werden zu Satelliten reicher Kernstaaten. Ihr Verbleib in der Zone scheint soweit notwendig zu sein, wie ihr (der Zone) Bestand davon abhängt. In dem Augenblick, in dem die ökonomische Möglichkeit entsteht, die Euro-Zone zu verkleinern, ohne dass ihre Existenz bedroht ist, wird sie auch realisiert werden. Stabiles Wachstum ist das einzige Kriterium für die »Politik« der Zone. Wie heute mit Griechenland oder Spanien verfahren wird, hat schlechthin nichts mit Europa zu tun. Es hat so sehr nichts mit Europa zu tun, dass dieses nur umso mehr als das Andere erscheint.

Die Euro-Zone – eine neue in sich abgeschlossene Sklavengesellschaft. Sie stellt die behauptete Eindeutigkeit Europas dar. Zu dieser Eindeutigkeit soll es keine Alternative geben – eine Ansicht, die vom techno-tele-medialen Apparat in Endlosschleife repetiert wird. Zweideutig wird Europa aber nur durch das, was seine Eindeutigkeit bedroht, was sie vielleicht sogar zu zerstören versucht. Europas Zweideutigkeit hat sich bereits in dem Hinweis angekündigt, dass sowohl Marx als auch Heidegger die Revolution denken.

\*

Die Revolution – diese Bewegung, die auf eine radikale Neustrukturierung, Neustiftung des Gemeinwesens hinausläuft. Ein Akzent sei hier auf diese Bewegung als solche gesetzt und nicht so sehr auf die historischen Ereignisse, die

---



heute als Revolution bezeichnet werden (Amerikanische, Französische, Russische, Chinesische, Kubanische etc. Revolution). Die Historizität der Revolution ist eine eigene Sache. Sie wird zu verstehen sein, wenn gesehen wird, was in diesen Ereignissen die Revolution selbst ist.

Was ihre Geschichte betrifft, so hat Hannah Arendt in *Über die Revolution*<sup>6</sup> darauf hingewiesen, dass der Begriff der Revolution in der Neuzeit entstanden sei und die Antike (natürlich erst recht das Mittelalter) nichts von ihr weiß (23ff.). In der Tat taucht der von Kopernikus auf die Planetenbahnen bezogene Begriff erst im 16. Jahrhundert auf. Aus dem astronomischen Bereich wurde er dann auf die größten Ereignisse der letzten Jahrhunderte übertragen. Sie markieren die wichtigsten politischen Emanzipationen, mithin die Deklaration der Menschenrechte auf dem Fundament einer essentiellen Gleichheit des Menschen. Zugleich steht die Revolution für das größte Projekt der Menschheit überhaupt, für die Stiftung einer wahrhaft freien Gemeinschaft. Von ihr sind wir heute möglicherweise weiter entfernt als die antike Sklavenhaltergesellschaft.

**137**

Was Europa war, muss mit dem Ereignis der Revolution zusammenhängen. Jener Ort und jene Zeit – in denen Europa war, was es vielleicht zweideutig noch ist – kamen in diesem Ereignis zum Vorschein und bilden seitdem eine Erinnerung, die Europa immer noch zu einem Versprechen macht. Europa ist demnach nicht nur der selbstreferentielle Abschluss einer Sklavengesellschaft, sondern zugleich die Sprengung dieser Gesellschaft oder, wenn man so will, seine Transformation. Erst mit dieser Sprengung, dieser Zerstörung vermag Europa ein Versprechen zu sein, das universale Bedeutung beanspruchen darf.

Die Revolution besteht in der gewaltsamen Umdrehung eines bestimmten unfreien Zustands eines Gemeinwesens. Wenn Hannah Arendt Recht hat, dass diese Bewegung erst in der Neuzeit zu konkreten politischen Formen führte, dann ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass die Bewegung selbst samt ihrem gewaltsamen Charakter älter ist. Sie ist so alt, dass sie an den Anfang Europas zurückreicht. Der Anfang Europas aber ist ein Anfang der Philosophie.

---

<sup>6</sup> Hannah Arendt: *Über die Revolution*. München und Zürich 1965.

Die erste revolutionäre Bewegung ist die Umdrehung der Seele, wie sie Platon im Höhlengleichnis schildert. Es ist die Umdrehung der Seele zum Licht, eine Umdrehung, die die Seele eigentlich erst zur Seele macht, jedenfalls die Seele des Philosophen hervorbringt (*Politeia*, 518d). Diese Umdrehung, an deren gewaltsamem Charakter Platon keinen Zweifel lässt, ist dieselbe Bewegung wie die der Revolution.

Es ist dieselbe Bewegung, die Aristoteles am Ende der *Nikomachischen Ethik* fordert, wenn er sich fragt, wie man den, der gemäß seiner Leidenschaft lebt, zur Tugend überzeugen kann, und antwortet, dass Worte das nicht mehr könnten und daher Gewalt gebraucht werden müsse (1179b28).

Dieselbe Bewegung kehrt wieder in der Verwandlung des Saulus zum Paulus, in der Damaskus-Geschichte, dieser Erzählung einer Bekehrung des Christenverfolgers zum ersten Christen (*Apostelgeschichte* 9). Auch sie eine Revolution, ein gewaltsamer Umsturz.

138

Dieselbe Bewegung erfährt Augustinus in jenem Mailänder Garten, in dem er die Kinderstimme hört, die ihm befiehlt, eine Stelle aus dem *Römerbrief* des Paulus zu lesen, und die ihn so endlich zur Konversion veranlasst (*Confessiones*, Buch VIII, 12).

Von derselben Bewegung berichtet Rousseau. Als er Diderot in der Festung von Vincennes besucht, liest er den *Mercure de France* und findet jene Frage der Académie de Dijon, mit deren Beantwortung seine Karriere als philosophisches Ereignis beginnt (*Les Confessions*, Livre VIII).

Dieselbe Bewegung meint Hegel, wenn er in der Vorrede der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* von »unserer Zeit« als einer »Zeit der Geburt und des Übergangs zu einer neuen Periode« spricht und dieses Geschehen einen »qualitativen Sprung« nennt.<sup>7</sup>

Von derselben Bewegung spricht Marx, wenn er an die »Periode der revolutionären Umwandlung« denkt und die »politische Übergangsperiode« von der kapitalistischen zur kommunistischen Gesellschaft als eine »Diktatur des

7 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, in: ders.: Werke, Bd. 3. Hg. von Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt/Main 1970, S. 18.

Proletariats« entwirft.<sup>8</sup>

Dieselbe Bewegung denkt Nietzsche im *Zarathustra*, wenn dieser den Hirten auffordert, den Kopf der Schlange, die ihm in den Mund gekrochen war, abzubeißen und die Ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen anzuerkennen: »Nicht mehr Hirt, nicht mehr Mensch – ein Verwandelter«, also sprach Zarathustra.<sup>9</sup>

Dieselbe Bewegung denkt auch Heidegger, wenn er von der Verwandlung des *animal rationale* in das »Da-sein« spricht und diese Verwandlung in die »Kehre« einschreibt.<sup>10</sup>

Es geht um dieselbe, nicht um die gleiche Bewegung. Doch alle diese Umdrehungen, Umkehrungen, Wiederkehren, Bekehrungen und Kehren haben den einen identischen Sinn, eine radikale und d.h. auch gewaltsame Verwandlung eines sich in sich abschließenden Menschen zu denken. Mit anderen Worten: Die Revolution ist die Drehung zur Wahrheit.

Diese gewaltsame Verwandlung in der Revolution differenziert Hannah Arendt in die »Befreiung von ...« und die »Freiheit zu ...« (34ff.). Das ist auch der Sinn jener Bewegungen. Die Revolution als eine Befreiung von ... hat ihren Bezugspunkt im technisch-wissenschaftlich-ökonomisch-medialen Apparat, d.h. in der sich selbstreferentiell abschließenden Euro-Zone. Europa beugt sich auf sich selbst als Euro-Zone zurück. Europa steht gegen die Zone. Die Zweideutigkeit Europas ist demnach ein Riss, ein Riss, der Europa spaltet und gegeneinander aufstellt.

Die revolutionäre Befreiung von ... richtet sich auf die sich selbst referentiell abschirmende Euro-Zone bzw. auf die sich in ihr einrichtende Sklavengesellschaft.

---

8 Karl Marx: »Kritik des Gothaer Programms«, in: Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels: Werke, Bd. 19. Berlin 1973, S. 128.

9 Friedrich Nietzsche: Also sprach Zarathustra, in: ders.: Kritische Studienausgabe, Bd. 4. Hg. von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari. München 1980, S. 202.

10 Martin Heidegger: Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), in: ders.: GA, Bd. 65. Hg. von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt/Main 1989, S. 439. Die Abfolge der zitierten Werke Platons *Politeia*, Aristoteles' *Nikomachische Ethik*, Apostelgeschichte, Augustinus' *Confessiones*, Rousseaus *Bekenntnisse*, Hegels *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Marx' »Kritik des Gothaer Programms«, Nietzsches *Also sprach Zarathustra* und Heideggers *Beiträge zur Philosophie* bilden eine Hauptsequenz der Geschichte des Europäischen Denkens.

---

---

Europa befreit sich von einer neuen Ungleichheit des Menschen, nach der sich keine gemeinsame »Wertform« der Arbeit mehr finden lässt. Indem sich Europa von dieser Ungleichheit befreit, konstituiert es eine neue Gleichheit, die erstmals in der Geschichte der Menschheit die Subsistenz des Lebens von der ohnehin imaginären oder phantastischen Produktion abkoppeln wird. Die Befreiung ist revolutionär, d.h. dass sich Europas Herrschaftsstruktur nicht mehr anders als durch Gewalt verändert haben wird. Freilich trifft diese Gewalt auf einen Apparat, dessen Zweck einzig und allein darin besteht, jede eruptive Veränderung der Verhältnisse zu verhindern. Denn der technisch-wissenschaftlich-ökonomisch-mediale Apparat verbirgt das Imaginäre der Produktion, um die Sklavengesellschaft, die er stützt und die ihn stützt, zu perpetuieren.

**140**

Der »Klassenkampf« ist also heute der Kampf zwischen der Euro-Zone und Europa. Die Befreiung von der Euro-Zone wäre dann so etwas wie eine Freiheit zu Europa. Europa wäre dann ein politisch – und nicht technisch-wissenschaftlich-ökonomisch-medial – gestaltetes freies Europa, ein Europa, das seine selbstreferentielle Abgeschlossenheit aufgegeben hätte und nun in freier und generöser Form seine Grenzen übersteigen könnte. Europa ist die Revolution.

Doch wenn Europa die Revolution ist, kann sich die Euro-Zone nicht ganz außerhalb dieser Bestimmung befinden. In der Tat beansprucht auch die Euro-Zone eine Revolution. Für die Euro-Zone ist die Revolution der Fortschritt des technisch-wissenschaftlich-ökonomisch-medialen Apparats selbst, mithin die sozialen Errungenschaften der letzten Jahrhunderte. So erzählt sich die Euro-Zone seit der industriellen Revolution die Revolutionen der Technik, der Wissenschaft, der Sozial-Politik etc. als ein revolutionäres Selbstverständnis. Die technisch-ökonomische Dynamik der Euro-Zone wäre demnach prinzipiell genauso revolutionär wie Europa.

Aber die Revolution der Euro-Zone ist nicht die Revolution Europas. Genauer betrachtet ist die revolutionäre Euro-Zone die Zerstörung der europäischen Revolution. Das revolutionäre Prinzip des technisch-wissenschaftlich-ökonomisch-medialen Apparats erzeugt einen – politisch betrachtet – reaktiv-restaurativen Sog. Eine bestimmte gesellschaftliche Machtkonstellation unter der Macht des Mediums wird sakrosankt. Das alles ist ergriffen von jener Angst vor

---

der Wahrheit. Je umfassender die latent angsterfüllte Gegenwart dieses Apparats, desto unmöglicher die europäische Revolution, desto umfassender und stabiler die selbstreferentielle Abgeschlossenheit.

Daraus entsteht eine Situation, in der die Zweideutigkeit Europas kritisch wird und damit die einzige Krise hervorruft, die es überhaupt verdient, eine Krise genannt zu werden. In dieser Krise steht die Zukunft Europas auf dem Spiel (und damit in der Tat auch die der Euro-Zone). Entweder der Revolution Europas gelingt es, das revolutionäre Prinzip der Euro-Zone, das revolutionäre Prinzip des technisch-wissenschaftlich-ökonomisch-medialen Apparats zu widerlegen und damit zu zerstören, oder das angstvoll-reaktive Prinzip dieses Apparats vernichtet jede Erinnerung an das Versprechen, das Europa war und noch ist.

Bataille hat in der *Aufhebung der Ökonomie* darauf hingewiesen, dass »ein extremistischer und revoltierender Zug des Denkens« »in der Lethargie der Menge den Sinn einer pathetischen Nachtwache« annehme (170). Er spricht sogar von einem »romantischen Protest«, der in der verdinglichenden Ordnung des Kapitalismus nur lächerlich erscheint. Die Idee der Europäischen Revolution ist gewiss lächerlich, sie entspricht der »Romantisierung der Welt« bei Novalis.

Es bleibt aber die Gewissheit, dass es unter den gegenwärtigen Diskursen keinen gibt, der die Euro-Zone gefährden könnte. Selbst die Philosophen gehorchen dem Medium. Niemand kennt das Wort, die Losung, die das unerträgliche Problem, das Europa heute ist, löst. Deshalb ist die »Nachtwache« vielleicht kein schlechter Ort, keine schlechte Zeit, an dem und der an Europa gedacht werden kann; ein heimlicher, ein geheimer Ort zu geheimer Zeit. Denn in diesen Zeiten des Mediums, in der einem noch die Transparenz transparent gemacht wird, damit sich das Intransparente weiter abschirme, muss alles gelobt werden, das kryptisch bleibt. Denn das Verborgene und Entlegene ist nicht das Intransparente. Es ist vielmehr dessen Wahrheit. Nur noch aus dem Entlegensten kann kommen, was die Zone erschüttert. Das Entlegenste heute ist – Europa.



## **“AS”. PERSON AS CORPORATION – CORPORATION AS PERSON. WHAT IS (IN) CORPORATIO?**

My intention in this text is to thematize the relationship and difference between the real, fictional and virtual in the constitution of a juridical personality, and especially in the constitution of a corporate entity. The concept of corporation developed from the old system of fellowships, as the pure concept of collective unity, and was raised to the level of person. First, I question the stabilizing process of the reality of a group of persons who work together (who are in a “cooperation”) through the processes of registration and construction of the juridical subject; and second, in opposition to the first, interrogate the ways in which the corporation comes into existence through performative declarations or written records, even without the physical object of the corporation. The corporation, for example, has to have a mailing address, but it does not have to be a physical object. This is clear in the case when following appropriate procedures counts as the creation of a corporation and when the corporation, once created, continues to exist, but there is no person (or persons) who becomes the corporation.

I am attempting, in other words, to tentatively compare two completely different traditions in viewing theories of the institution and corporation, and then add another new element which could possibly affirm and potentially ensure a minimum of evidence that the group exists, if and only if its existence

---

is confirmed with certain documentary, or better still, written acts. (I am interested in the status of written acts in relation to speech acts, and the relation of the documentary and the virtual – does documentality represent a symmetrical opposite to virtuality?) The first of the two traditions refers to the writings of Otto von Gierke (the first tome of *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht* [*The German Law of Fellowship*] was published in 1868), and his introduction into jurisprudence and political theory the concept of fellowship (*Genossenschaft*) and corporate group personality (*Gesammpersonlichkeit*) – which, since it reflected the central role of associations in a normal social life and ensured their moral independence from the state, he regarded as the cornerstone of a just constitution and legal system – and also his notion of an area of “social law” standing between public and private law. Gierke wished to demonstrate the very considerable extent to which, in his opinion, the real group personality of voluntarily formed associations was implicit in social forms, legal documents and political evolution was actually found throughout German history. Such bodies, he argued, behaved as if (*als ob*) their members believed they could decide and act as collective unities. He contrasted this to the imposed, artificial unity or groups formed despite or against their members’ will (*Anstalt, Obrigkeit*). Both kinds of groups or collectives are non-state groups.

144

The second tradition attempts to think the institution and the corporation anew, in the context of collective intentionality and collective or corporative responsibility (John Searle, Margaret Guilbert and Amartya Sen, or even Axel Honneth).

In the title of this text, and in the subtitle (“What is (in)*corporatio*?”), which I have added surreptitiously, there is a pseudo-legal conceptual confusion, a *melange* of philosophical, theological, economic, and legal terms. One further note could also be a hypothesis or assumption that I would like to explain, and refers to realism or institutional realism, implicitly already in the title and subtitle. Namely, if I can explain what is *corporatio* or incorporation, if I can explain the ‘in’, then I could perhaps justify the existence of the ontology of law or the ontology of the institution. More specifically, the protocol of incorporation or the corporation as one of the forms of the institution (the institution as a legal entity *par excellence*), has to satisfy and affirm ‘ontology’ or ‘the ontological’ (that which concerns existence, being or being as such). If the corporation were sufficiently real and concrete (and not



pure fiction<sup>1</sup>), then it would above all illustrate the existence of law, and then the importance of law, or more generally law as law, law that holds the community together, tying people one to another.<sup>2</sup>

This last note refers to a fragment taken from Georges Renard. At the very beginning of his first lecture on the theory of the institution,<sup>3</sup> Renard, one of the most significant French institutionalists and the jurist who made Maurice Hauriou's institutionalism famous, quotes a Chinese thinker. Renard says of this fragment that it does not represent some kind of sentimental lyricism, but rather belongs to (a sort of) "experimental psychology." In combination with some words by Thomas Aquinas, the fragment could be the first association to Renard's basic question (ontology is the register of asking questions), with which he even opens his series of lectures: "What is an institution?" (*Qu'est-ce que l'institution?*). Here is that fragment by Renard, that is, by this anonymous thinker:

145

I love life, but I also love those close to me; those whose blood courses through my veins, those whose soul awakens when they smell the same native ground,

1 The Sicilian jurist, Santi Romano writes: "The institution is not a demand of reason (*un'esigenza della ragione*), an abstract principle, something ideal (*un quid ideale*), but rather a real, effective being (*un ente reale, effettivo*)." S. Romano, *Ordinamento giuridico*, 1946, Firenze, Sansoni, 96.

2 I will mention two well-known and entirely different examples of so-called ontology of law (or laws) and legal ontology. First is the examination of a contemporary and collaborator of Martin Heidegger, Erich Wolf, a jurist, regarding the ontology of law (*Rechtsontologie*) – does right exist, and how ought law be the essence of being together, 'being with', (*Mitsein*) or 'being for' (*Fürsein*)? Is law the condition of the authentic being (*Sein*), or existence (*Dasein*)? E. Wolf, "Rechtsphilosophie", in *Rechtsphilosophische Studien. Ausgewählte Schriften*, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1972, 71-72. A variation of this examination can be found in Fasso, "Dove c'è coesistenza, c'è rapporto e perciò diritto"; "Relazione vuole dire diritto"; "Rapporto significa legge". Cf. M. La Torre, *Norme, istituzioni, valori*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2008, 123. The second example of the use of ontology in law can be André Valente's ontology of law where the legal system is considered an instrument to change or influence society in specific directions, determined by social goals. A. Valente, *Legal Knowledge Engineering: A Modeling Approach*, Amsterdam, IOS Press, 1995. The third would certainly be Weinberger's differentiation between *essere* and *dover essere*.

3 The lectures were published in 1930, in the book G. Renard *La théorie de l'institution. Essai d'ontologie juridique*, Paris, Sirey. This fragment is on pages 31-32.

---

those who carry in the lines of their face the same pride of memories and the same hopes, those who are nothing other than the same spiritual body as me. *I am one of them*, and there is something of me in them as well. I love life, but my life is interwoven in the lives of those close to me, for we are of a feather... I love life, but I also love my family, my homeland, the civilization to which I belong, the Church that holds the best of my soul; and should I be unable to keep both, I should sacrifice my life, and keep the *common Good*, being greater in value of the two.<sup>4</sup>

Renard does not offer us the source of this fragment and the translation is greatly theologized, since it speaks of the Church, which interests me keenly, implying a valorization, a choice and a goal. But its construction indicates well the latent problem between life and *le Bien commun* (and according to Renard, the common Good is synonymous with the institution). Although it would be relatively easy to show that the word 'life' here does not fall under the purview of what we would today call biopolitics (it is enough to point to the narrator's or subject's manipulation and instrumentalization of his own life, separating it from the group, and, if you will, its insufficient protection because sacrificed), it seems to me that precisely the thematization of the connection and relation between the institution and life (certainly common life) could explain the 'ontology of right'.<sup>5</sup>

The background for what I am speaking about is that I am trying, similar to Renard, to write a book called "What is an Institution?" and initiate a larger

4 "J'aime la vie, mais j'aime aussi les miens; les miens dont le sang coule dans mes veines, les miens dont l'âme s'est dilatée au parfum de la même terre natale, les miens qui portent sur le front la fierté des mêmes souvenirs et des mêmes espérances, les miens qui ne sont avec moi qu'un même corps spirituel. Je suis l'un d'eux, et il y a en eux quelque chose de moi-même. J'aime la vie, mais ma vie est engagée dans la vie des miens, car nous sommes embarqués... J'aime la vie, mais j'aime aussi ma famille, ma patrie, la civilisation dont je suis tributaire, l'Eglise qui tient le meilleur de mon âme; et si je ne puis garder les deux à la fois, je sacrifierai ma vie, et je garderai le Bien commun qui vaut plus que ma vie."

5 "An institution is – according to Romano – a certain being or social body that has a stable and permanent order, and makes up a body onto itself, contains its own life within itself (*qualsiasi ente o corpo sociale che abbia un assetto stabile e permanente e formi un corpo a sé, con una vita propria*)." Cf. M. La Torre, *Norme, istituzioni, valori*, 125.

project about the history or histories of institutional action and institutional building. As part of that project, the question of the corporation is certainly one of the most basic. I am interested in how the functions and meanings of the institution and corporation overlap (how they cleave to or away from one another); I am interested in John Searle's writings where discussing the institution implies writing about the corporation. Above all, however, I am interested to understand and explain a banal sentence uttered today, now, by many people who speak English and want to survive and work with others. This sentence of course is different in other languages, but it is repeated by speakers of other languages with the same intentions:

“If you are planning to start your own business, you should know how to incorporate.”

As the director of two institutions (Institute for Philosophy and Institute for Advanced Studies), which have a plaques outside its offices, a mailing addresses, letterhead stationaries, etc. I ought not to utter the first part of this sentence. But does the second part, “how to incorporate,” have anything to do with the institution? More interesting, I think, than enumerating all the differences between the institution and corporation (or company), and the usual disdain towards the corporation as an emblem and essence of capitalism, would be to insist on a set of various operations or cooperation(s) that come along with the claim made by person X about the necessity of possessing a certain kind of knowledge as the basis of, ultimately, producing profit and sustaining that profit or company.<sup>6</sup> A company, a firm, a partnership, a *société anonyme*, a corporation, has to be registered (to be set in the register, to be incorporated) according to rules that are set by the state, generally simple, and that should be familiar (“you

---

6 In his thesis on institutionalism, “L’institution, le droit objectif et la technique positive” (Paris, Sirey, 1933), André Desqueyrat speaks about “institution corporative” which has three characteristics: the idea of a goal that ought to be realized in a social group; organizational power for the purpose of realizing that idea; and the manifestation of a community emerging from the social group for the sake of the idea and its realization.

should know”).<sup>7</sup> “X” is first a person (an “institutional person,” not just a subject or agent<sup>8</sup>). “Institutional person” ili “corporative person” implies the transfer or transformation from the singular to the plural, from first person singular to first person plural; “X” has certain interests and is surrounded by others with whom it wishes to work and who share that interest (right away we encounter the representative of this group, which will quickly lead us to Hegel and the problem of interest representation or identity representation; in that case, the unit or group will be incorporated in the action of a certain portion of the whole that represents – because considers itself identical to – that whole); further, this is neither a group of thieves, nor criminals, nor undocumented workers, since the group is ready to publicly declare its work (through “public declarations;” of course, it remains to be seen whether the institutional structure allows the group to make certain public declarations, or on the contrary, the public declarations institutionally design the group); “X” can also be single, in which case we are speaking of a “*corporation sole*; a legal entity consisting of a single (“sole”) incorporated office, occupied by a single man or woman” (however, in that case, what has been abandoned is, in Searle’s words, one of the main discoveries of contemporary capitalism, that is, limited liability; thus *corporation* is characterized by unlimited liability, meaning that if you have business debts, personal assets would be used to pay them off); further still, “plan to start your own business” implies constituting a new, dynamic entity, capable of competing with other entities, fighting for profit, expanding and developing; finally, “to incorporate” (with all the theological and above all Christian connotations of the term) *de facto* represents a certain documentation procedure, or writing act or acts. In these last two operations certain real, living

148

7 “In America, for example, there are 6 million companies, employing 120 million people, which is two fifths of the entire American population. Around 3 million new companies are registered world-wide every year.” C. Mayer, *Firm Commitment. Why the corporation is failing us and how to restore trust in it*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 22.

8 This is my paraphrase of Pettit, that the personal point of view is the condition for institutional design: “The personal point of view must have this indexical, first-personal character.” P. Pettit, “Groups with Minds of Their Own”, in F. Schmitt (Ed.), *Socializing Metaphysics*, p. 260. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

people,<sup>9</sup> exist and “transform,” through a given procedure (one made up of documents, hence objective), into a completely new entity or new form in order to more simply, quickly or safely achieve certain goals (gather new people, money, property, reserves, funds, only to redistribute them again, since “to have” always also means to distribute, to change that which is). It is precisely these last two operations that introduce the word reality or realism. Paradoxically, the question of the real existence of this new, incorporated entity (or corporation) cannot be separated from the real existence of a group that has just been constituted and united by incorporating and is now together “on paper.”

Before I give my reasons to hold together the three words (that Realism is, or presupposes or assumes a connection between Institution and Corporation), I can say, from the off, that I am interested in money and profit (or more precisely, “amount” of money or profit, or even better, “amount” as such) as the integrative element or factor of a community, as well as one of the main attributes of Realism. **149** Allow me to begin with a case that is as trivial as it is common, and that you have doubtless encountered many times. A few months ago, a professor from the University of New York, expert in social ontology, was out to dinner in Berlin with a couple of friends. Immediately before we were to order food, hesitating over the menu, she asked me discreetly who was paying for the dinner. It was important to establish the fact that neither she nor I was paying for dinner in Berlin, nor that our hosts were paying “personally,” out of their own pockets, before the food was ordered. Imagine that the University of Bonn, which is in the end paying for this expensive dinner in Berlin, is a corporation – and not just an institution, but a corporation (whereby one of the simpler definitions of a corporation could be “a collection of many individuals united into one body, under special denomination and authorized by law to act as a unit”); corporation as something insufficiently existent (someone without soul and body [*universitas non habet corpus nec animam, est res inanimata*,” Pope Innocent IV], someone fictional etc.). We

---

9 “Corporations are at least as real as people.” “Corporation is real because it is an artifact whose constituents typically include real people as well as real assets, as well as intangibles such as credit and goodwill.” Jan Dejnozka (*Corporate Entity*, 2007, manuscript), 71, 102.

ought heed this comment by Sinibaldus de Flisco, aka Innocentius IV, whose interpretation is usually considered relevant for so called fictitious theory, that is, for a potential explanation of a virtual entity or “as if” entity. We are dealing with something deficient, which exists but does not contain all the attributes of existence, which is a something or a thing, but a thing without either “body or soul.”

Further, someone is paying for dinner (the restaurant will send the University a bill or one of the hosts will pay and be reimbursed at a later date by the University) – without money it would be truly impossible to spend two and a half hours in a restaurant in Berlin or talking here and now about the social ontology and “virtuality”. Finally, the restaurant in Berlin (an establishment registered as a partnership, for example), the University of Bonn (an institution or corporation or “company” [the continental name for a corporation]), registered or incorporated German banks through which one pays, etc., are, for instance, three sites among which certain documents, receipts, copies, contracts, and charters flow. These documents, then, issued and controlled by certain departments or agencies of the state, ensure the reality and duration of these organizations. It seems to me that it is above all the number of people, money, documents, institutions, food, enjoyment, as well as the level of responsibility for the expenditure or crisis or bankruptcy, that determines the power or degree of realism here in play.

150

I suggest that the concept of “amount” and number regulate the status of the “real” and admit that this is one of two reasons why I placed the word corporation, a specific kind of institution that immediately represents business, earnings, profit, and expansion, in the title. For something to be “real” (“real is, like good, a dimension word”<sup>10</sup>), it must exist in time and in a process of realization. Among the many characteristics and themes initiated by the corporation (certainly one of the more significant human inventions), some of the most important are the protection of the rights of the individual, limited liability and

10 Cf. J. Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1962, 71. Let me offer a reminder that in his 1959 lectures, Austin designates the “little word real” first as a “normal word,” and then claims that “real is not a normal word at all.” 64.

corporate responsibility (the sentence “I didn’t do it; the company did” belongs to this protocol), as well as the relation between corporate and canonical law, the partnership and corporation, and not least the decades long resistance and critical and hypocritical stances toward the corporation as a foundation of capitalism. However, the principal reason why I introduced the corporation is of course the status of the real (or the status of real), immediately brought into question when this “judicial hallucination” is mentioned. In other words, could the corporation or the company be a good instrument for the reconstruction of our concept of reality, and then all the alternative terms that have always stood side by side with the terms “real” or “realism” (effective, actual, concrete, evident, objective, material, physical, factual, etc.)?

Before I mention a few details from Searle’s analysis of the corporation from 2010, let me briefly construct a connection between realism and the institution using a phrase by Robert Grafstein, “institutional realism.”<sup>11</sup> It is this link between the institution and realism that ought to affirm three circular moments that I intend to defend, and which are key to a small theory of the institution that I am trying to formulate. First, to register or to be incorporated (by way of charter or document) means to be “real” or, more generally, to “exist.” Second, even before the incorporation that assumes making a new person or new body (public and official) along with others (transforming oneself into something else along with others), there is a multitude of relations and they are social facts

---

11 “Institutions represent – in a sense, are – our connectedness (...) Institutions are physical wholes composed of human parts.” R. Grafstein, *Institutional Realism*, New Haven, London, Yale University Press, 1992, 13, 22. Institutional realism is supposed to oppose new institutionalism, as yet another extreme form of conventionalism, as well as anti-realist philosophy of social science. “Realism assures us that those reciprocal influences which we are then in a position to attribute to institutions and participants are physically realized in ways that, in principle, are comprehensible to science. As aggregates of human beings, institutions are, unproblematically, entities determined by their participants. As distinct physical entities, institutions can be distinct social forces.”

(which is why the corporation or institution will be real).<sup>12</sup> Third, that a “written document” or a “written act” (written Declaration or Charter) constitutes or institutionalizes a group or collective (and protects its existence in time). Thus, the institution is always preceded by certain, less developed, institutional forms. (Cautiously, we could here use Searle’s term “institutional background.”) This idea of circularity protects me from certain other elements which play a role, for example, in Searle’s theory of institution and corporation: the advantage of speech over writing, and the absence or hesitation in the introduction of the document (and a document is not an object)<sup>13</sup>; the importance of power and its ultimate example – the state (the institution above all institutions), which always has the first and last word in registering a corporation; the collective is secondary, and Searle displays carelessness when saying that acceptance of others is a necessary condition of creating deontic powers; and finally,

152

12 In a sense, this is a reformulation of the so-called Reality Theory defended by Otto von Gierke. “Reality Theory recognizes corporations to be pre-legal existing sociological persons. (...) Law cannot create its subjects, it only determines which societal facts are in conformity with its requirements.” P. French, “The Corporation as a Moral Person,” *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 16, n. 3, 1979, 209. The Law only recognizes the corporation; it did not create it. Regardless of the fact that von Gierke differentiates the corporation from the institution (*Anstalt*), collective personality is, according to him, not a fictitious person, but rather a real existence (*eine reale Existenz*). Here is a passage explaining more clearly the corporation and institution, quite in line with von Gierke. Pitirim Sorokin writes:

“Since the Roman law, two main forms of the juridical personality have been distinguished: (1) Corporations (*universitas personarum* or the medieval *collegia personalia*) where the union of the members as persons is stressed – such as most of various corporations, incorporated societies, firms etc. (2) Institutions (*universitas bonorum* or the medieval *collegia realia*) as a complex of property with a specific purpose, endowed by the law to act as a single person, such as various universities, asylums, etc.” P. Sorokin, *Sociological Theories of Today*, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, 38.

13 Searle thanks Barry Smith for the topic of corporation, in the 2005 text “What is an Institution?”. It is in this text that Searle mentions “official documentation” for the first time, and connects the corporation with writing language. In the book *Making the Social World*, Searle speaks considerably more about “special role of writing,” “written speech act,” or “written constitutive rules,” but not in the chapter that deals with the corporation. He talks about the corporation in the chapter dedicated to “Creating institutional acts,” whereas “Creating a Corporation” is a so-called “Complex Case.” J. Searle, *Making the Social World*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 97. Double Declaration is here mentioned for the first time.



Searle's understanding of the physical object is too obscure and points latently to his anti-realism.

Having here mentioned the document, let me immediately tangentially insist on the material (the paper, the ink, the body of the text, or if you will, the sound, the phoneme, the materiality of the symbol, the body of one making it). Namely, between, on the one hand, the virtual reality of the law or certain rules and, on the other hand, various statements often read (or uttered) by a rabbi, priest, lawyer, officer or stewardess, or else a money bill, property, marriage, or a declaration of the type "This is my house" – that is, between these two "realities" there is a so-called "written record."<sup>14</sup> This is the charter which creates a legal person or corporation, a decision of the governor to issue bills of this specific design, a record, a birth certificate, marriage license, lease, contract, proof of ownership, etc. I do not have to declare "This is my house," nor say "I am married to Sonia," to only then create the right to the house "because the right only exists by collective acceptance." The possibility to document what I say when I say that "this is my house," to show my papers, my ID, driver's license, to demand that the lawyer show me the article in the law that allows the creation of a corporation, or the employer the decision based on which I am being let go – is paramount for the creation of institutional reality. But not sufficient. The sentence "our marriage exists only on paper" (I am not sure whether this sentence works in German: "*Wir sind nur noch auf dem Papier verheiratet*") means that our current relationship is

---

14 Law is law, or the document is the document, because it is alive and vocal, because the letter (the paper) "has a voice." For example, Jewish political theory and Jewish Law Theory recognize a clear distinction between the Verbal and Written Obligation. A written obligation entitles the creditor to recover payment out of the debtor's encumbered assets which are in the hands of a third party, a right unavailable in the case of a mere verbal obligation, since the obligation or debt has no *kol* ("voice") and does not provide notice that will put prospective purchasers on their guard. In the case of a written obligation, a plea by the debtor that he has repaid the debt is not accepted without written proof, as would be the case with a verbal obligation. Thus, for example, an undertaking, even if in the debtor's own handwriting but not signed by witnesses, will be treated as a verbal obligation, since only properly written, witnessed, and signed obligation carries a "voice and constitutes notice." *Bava Batra* 175b. Cfr. ed. M. Elon, *The Principles of Jewish Law*, Jerusalem, Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1975, 244.

---

not harmonized by the contract we signed, and that our marriage is not worth the paper it is written on. One of the main characteristics of the institution, which Hume differentiates from and opposes to the contract (law) – apart from that the institution, unlike the contract, supposes the existence of a third party (that is the possibility that someone else join, a sense in which the institution implicitly counts everyone in, excludes no one, and ultimately assumes that there is nothing outside the institution), and that the institution is coercive because formed by various transformations of violence and force – is its artificial nature, as well as the possibility of incorporating law into a group or tying a collective together. The fact that the paper (the marriage certificate), as a document, is not a strong enough glue to keep a couple in love – after all, neither is the once upon a time performed ceremony in which we promised to have and to hold one another – does not exclude the institutional fact that our marriage still exists. Do we have a real marriage (or a factual marriage, concrete and not virtual marriage) because we are not divorced, or is the document the source of reality and then the institution? In other words, does the document institutionalize, or are we in fact, really separated, we could say organically separated, and together “on paper” only? Institution is real if and only if it can be documented, that is, to institutionalize (I chose the verb) means in fact to publish or further attach documents (a synonym for *documentum* or its prototype, is *instrumentum* [a statement made publicly, or in the presence of several witnesses]; in a different context, documentation is nothing other than argumentation), that the institution becomes an institution if it is constantly in the process of institutionalizing or documenting. To defend this option, it seems necessary to me to show that a greater transfer or distribution of paper (documents) between partners, certainly makes the marriage not only on paper. The more invoices, bills, receipts, tax declarations, etc., put simply: the more papers or the more documents – the more love.

The document amount, various transactions and contracts within the corporation and institution, truly surpasses the importance of the act of the founding of the corporation (“executing and filing articles of incorporation” or “filling a legislation document with a state officer”), and places the lesser importance on the function of the state, and in general the medieval institution

of creating a corporation (*fiat doctrine*), something that especially interests John Searle. If we plot the role of the state in founding corporations (or institutions in general) through history, we can notice that only in certain very rare periods (of colonialism, for example) does the state found and control, meaning gives the privilege to incorporate to certain powerful groups. For that reason it seems to me that even a moderate institutional realism necessarily assumes an “ontological egalitarianism,” completely lacking in Searle.<sup>15</sup>

Let us return to the hunt for physical objects as a latent anti-realism or “virtualism”.

“He [Barry Smith] pointed out that there are some institutions that have what he calls ‘free-standing Y terms’, where you can have a status function, but without any physical object on which the status function is imposed. A fascinating case is corporations. The laws of incorporation in a state such as California enable a status function to be constructed, so to speak, out of thin air. Thus, by a kind of performative declaration, the corporation comes into existence, but there need be no physical object which is the corporation. The corporation has to have a mailing address and a list of officers and stock holders and so on, but it does not have to be a physical object. This is a case where following the appropriate procedures counts as the creation of a corporation and where the corporation, once created, continues to exist, but there is no person or physical object which becomes the corporation. New status functions are created among people – as officers of the corporation, stockholders, and so on. There is indeed a corporation as Y, but there is no person or physical object X that counts as Y.”<sup>16</sup>

---

15 “Relational descriptions tying objects together – son of, slave of, president of, votes for, interrogates – are not, according to ontological egalitarianism, ontological superior to other collections of objects.” R. Grafstein, *Institutional Realism*, 24.

16 J. Searle, “What is an institution?,” *Journal of Institutional Economic* 1, 15-16.

“(...) but there is no person or physical object which becomes the corporation.” It seems to me unnecessary, easy and complicated at once, to show the shift in understanding of the phrase “physical object” in our day and age – is it necessary to prove the physical existence of an SMS, deposit, bank account, electronic signature, the displayed plaque of a company, the existence of telephone calls among the signatories of the charter, etc.? The physical object is never singular, as in Searle – on the contrary.

I have already mentioned that I am interested in the institution of the Church, almost certainly not mentioned by the Chinese thinker, which Renard adds in the above quoted fragment. (This is a complicated time in Renard’s life: his wife dies and he enters a monastery.) It seems to me that an interesting differentiation could be made between two schemes or two forms implied by the institution – a differentiation which is always thematized within canonical law. As such it could help in the disagreement between the fictive or anti-real and realist in law (in the ontology of law). Sinibaldo de’ Fieschi (Sinibaldus de Flisco or Pope Innocent IV), the great canonist, is the first to recognize the institution of the Church as a new type of legal person (for him it is a *persona ficta*). Later, however, the Church as an institution will separate: on the one hand it becomes corporation, legal person that holds its own substance in the personal element of the collegium (*persona guiridica che ha il suo substrato nellelemento personale del collegium*), and whose goal is the unification of common powers; on the other hand is the foundation, which emerges based on a creative act coming from outside or above (meaning authority, *voluntas Superioris*). The corporation acts following the will of its own members, while the foundation follows the will of authority which precedes it. Thus the organs of this institution (in fact the institution as a foundation) continue to be its executors. Later this difference can be found between Hobbes and Hume in their interpreting “*institutio*”, but remains to this day obscured by the later concept of “*corpus mysticum*” or “*corpus Christi*.”<sup>17</sup> For us this distinction is inordinately important because it is reiterated by Otto von Gierke, who opposes the authoritarian, *de facto* virtual structure and “a living collective personality” and “real existence.”

17 Cf. P. Caron, “Il concetto di “*institutio*” nel diritto della chiesa”, *Il diritto ecclesiastico*, n. 70, 1959, 330-335.

# ABSCHIED VOM „EWIGEN FRIEDEN“? NEUE KRIEGE UND IHRE HERAUSFORDERUNGEN FÜR MORAL UND RECHT<sup>1</sup>

## 1. Alte und moderne Kriege und die Aufgabe eines „ewigen Friedens“

Die Geschichte der Menschheit ist – leider! – auch eine Geschichte des Krieges. Nach dem Buch Genesis findet sich das Urbild aller kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen bereits in der zweiten Generation der Menschen. Kain und Abel, zwei Brüder, die Söhne von Adam und Eva, der Bauer und der Schafhirte, können nicht friedlich miteinander leben. Kain erschlägt aus Neid Abel – eine Tat jener sinnlosen Aggression, die sich seit diesem „Urkrieg“ anscheinend endlos wiederholt und verschärft. Das biblische Zeugnis wird durch das griechische Denken ergänzt und bestätigt. In einem berühmten Wort hat Heraklit vom Krieg, vom *polemos*, als dem „Vater aller Dinge“ gesprochen und somit in Streit und Widerspruch ein grundlegendes Prinzip der Wirklichkeit gefunden. Auf das Buch Genesis wie auf Heraklit (und Hegel) hat sich Carl Schmitt nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bezogen, um seine eigene Zeit und den Verlauf der Geschichte zu deuten: „Der Andere ist mein Bruder. Der Andere erweist sich als mein Bruder, und der Bruder erweist sich als mein Feind. Adam und Eva hatten zwei Söhne, Kain und Abel. So beginnt die Geschichte der Menschheit. So sieht der

157

---

<sup>1</sup> Die gekürzte Fassung dieses Textes erschien zuerst in: *Communio* 43 (2014), 37-50. Er geht zurück auf einen Vortrag auf der Konferenz „Virtualität. Phänomenologische Zugänge“, PTHV 21. - 23. 11. 2013, Vallendar.

Vater aller Dinge aus. Das ist die dialektische Spannung, die die Weltgeschichte in Bewegung hält, und die Weltgeschichte ist noch nicht zu Ende.“<sup>2</sup>

Aus diesem Grund verleihen nicht zuletzt Kriege der Geschichte Struktur und Sinn. Kriege trennen Vorkriegs- von Nachkriegszeiten, kulturelle Blütezeiten von Zeiten der Stagnation und des Verfalls, Epochen des Militarismus von Phasen der Besinnung auf Frieden. Die Jahre 1870, 1914 oder 1939 stellen wichtige Einschnitte im Leben jener Nationen dar, die sich in diesen Jahren im Krieg befanden – sei es als Aggressoren oder als Opfer feindlicher Überfälle. Kriege bestimmen maßgeblich politische, gesellschaftliche, wirtschaftliche, technologische oder auch wissenschaftliche Entwicklungen und stellen grausame, manchmal fanatisch initiierte, oft auch als völlig sinnlos erlebte Ereignisse für jene Menschen dar, die an ihnen beteiligt sind, in ihnen sterben, verletzt oder vertrieben werden oder durch sie den Glauben an Gott, die Menschheit oder das Gute verlieren. Bis heute bestimmen Kriege das menschliche Zusammenleben so sehr, dass man verführt sein könnte, von der kriegerischen Auseinandersetzung im Rahmen einer Natur- und Kulturgeschichte menschlicher Aggression als einer anthropologischen Grundkonstante des Menschseins zu sprechen.

158

Gegen diesen Pessimismus – eigentlich ein Realismus – spricht die Hoffnung, dass es anders stehen könnte, dass die Menschheit einmal den Kriegszustand hinter sich zurücklassen könnte und sich ein Zustand „zum ewigen Frieden“ einstellen werde. Diese Hoffnung auf eine irdische Friedenszeit hat insbesondere das Denken der Aufklärung bewegt. Geschichte erschien als Fortschritt nicht nur der Freiheit des Menschen, sondern auch als ein Weg zu einem umfassenden Frieden. Immanuel Kant schließt seine Schrift „Zum ewigen Frieden“ daher mit dem folgenden Ausblick in die Zukunft: „Wenn es Pflicht, wenn zugleich gegründete Hoffnung da ist, den Zustand eines öffentlichen Rechts, obgleich nur in einer ins Unendliche fortschreitenden Annäherung wirklich zu machen, so ist der *ewige Friede*, der auf die bisher fälschlich so genannte Friedensschlüsse (eigentlich Waffenstillstände) folgt, keine leere Idee, sondern eine Aufgabe,

<sup>2</sup> Carl Schmitt, *Ex captivitate salus. Erfahrungen der Zeit 1945/47*, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002, 89f.

die, nach und nach aufgelöst, ihrem Ziele (weil die Zeiten, in denen gleiche Fortschritte geschehen hoffentlich immer kürzer werden), beständig näher kommt.“<sup>3</sup> Je unmenschlicher Kriege in der Neuzeit wurden, je mehr die Existenz der gesamten Menschheit auf dem Spiel stand, umso notwendiger und nicht allein wünschenswert erschien auch die Aufgabe, einen dauerhaften Frieden zu erreichen: „Anders als unsere Vorfahren“, so der Historiker Arnold J. Toynbee, „haben wir heutigen Menschen im Grunde unseres Herzens das Gefühl, daß ein Weltfrieden nunmehr unumgänglich notwendig ist. Wir leben täglich in Angst vor einer Katastrophe und fürchten, daß diese bestimmt über uns hereinbrechen wird, wenn es uns nicht gelingt, das Problem eines solchen Friedens zu lösen. Es wäre keine Übertreibung, zu sagen, daß diese Furcht, die wie ein Schatten dunkel über unserer Zukunft liegt, beginnt, uns selbst bei den gewöhnlichsten Verrichtungen des täglichen Lebens geistig zu lähmen. [...] Das Schlimmste an dieser Furcht ist die unleugbare Tatsache, daß sie ihre Wurzeln nicht in unserem Gefühl, sondern in unserem Verstande hat.“<sup>4</sup>

Kants und Toynbees Überlegungen zur Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit eines dauerhaften Friedens stehen im Kontext der in der Moderne sich entfaltenden Bemühungen, den Kriegszustand durch rechtliche und moralische Regulierungen zu humanisieren. Gedanken zum „gerechten Krieg“ gehen freilich bis auf Cicero zurück. Ein Kriegsvölkerrecht hat sich allerdings erst in der Neuzeit entwickelt. Erst sehr spät, nämlich nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg wurde etwa im Briand-Kellog-Pakt der Angriffskrieg verboten. Es scheint, als hätten immer wieder erst Katastrophen zu einer Umorientierung und zur Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit verbindlicher Regeln geführt. Von zentraler Bedeutung für diese moralischen und rechtlichen Regulierungen des Krieges war ein System von Differenzierungen, das für jene Kriege, die man „modern“ nennen kann, Gültigkeit beansprucht. Grob vereinfachen lässt sich sagen: Kriegszustände und Friedenszustände

---

3 Immanuel Kant, „Zum ewigen Frieden“, in: Immanuel Kant, *Werke in zehn Bänden*, hrsg. von Wilhelm Weischedel, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983, Bd. 9.1 (*Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik*), 191-251.

4 Arnold J. Toynbee, *Krieg und Kultur. Der Militarismus im Leben der Völker*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Bücherei, 1958, 12.

---

konnten klar voneinander unterschieden werden. Kriege wurden erklärt; Frieden wurden geschlossen. Es gab ein eigenes Kriegsrecht. Neben den Angriffskriegen gab es Verteidigungskriege. Kriege, die bestimmte moralische Kriterien erfüllten, galten als gerecht, während anderen Kriegen diese Kennzeichnung nicht zukam. Im Krieg standen sich auch nicht einfach Verbrecher oder gesetzlose Gruppen gegenüber, sondern Feinde, die ihre Ehre achteten und sich im Falle der Gefangennahme mit Respekt behandelten. Andere Unterscheidungen sind für das moderne Verständnis des Krieges ähnlich bedeutsam. Zivilisten werden von Soldaten unterschieden, Waffen von anderen technischen Instrumenten. Je mehr man unterscheiden konnte, desto mehr wurde der Krieg zu einem begrenzbaren und somit auch zu einem beherrschbaren Geschehen. So schien es zumindest.

160

Fast hätte es sogar scheinen können, als sei die Menschheit tatsächlich dem Ziel eines ewigen Friedens immer näher gekommen – nicht zuletzt aufgrund jener Verstandeseinsicht, auf die Toynbee und viele andere Bezug nahmen. Denn die Entwicklung der Atombombe – und dies bedeutet: nicht allein die bloße Möglichkeit, sondern die Wirklichkeit ihrer Anwendung in Hiroshima und Nagasaki im August 1945 – hatte drastisch vor Augen geführt, dass es nur noch eine einzige Alternative gab: Frieden oder Vernichtung der Menschheit. „Die Welt nämlich, in der wir bisher lebten“, so Reinhold Schneider, „geht in jedem Fall zu Ende; das ist die unausbleibliche Folge gemachter und angebahnter Entdeckungen und Erfindungen: die Frage ist nur, ob der Krieg das Ende vollziehen wird oder der Friede.“<sup>5</sup> Diese Frage war auch Ausgangspunkt von Karl Jaspers' 1958 erschienenem *Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen*: „Eine schlechthin neue Situation ist durch die Atombombe geschaffen. Entweder wird die gesamte Menschheit physisch zugrunde gehen, oder der Mensch wird sich in seinem sittlich-politischen Zustand wandeln.“<sup>6</sup> Alles lief auf diese grundlegende Entscheidung hinaus: Krieg oder Frieden, Vernichtung der Menschheit oder ihr Überleben. Dazwischen gab es keinen Spielraum für Alternativen. Damit, so schien es, vollendete sich die Natur- und Kulturgeschichte des Krieges.

5 Reinhold Schneider, *Der Friede der Welt*, Wiesbaden: Insel-Verlag, 1956, 107.

6 Karl Jaspers, *Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen*, München: Piper, 1982, 5.



## 2. Neue Kriege und das Ende eindeutiger Unterscheidungen

Zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts sieht die Situation anders aus. Ganz unerwartet dürfte dies nicht sein. Bereits der moderne Krieg ist von einer grundlegenden Paradoxie gekennzeichnet. Der Humanisierung des Krieges durch die moralische und rechtliche Regulierung des Krieges steht nämlich die Tatsache gegenüber, dass das Kriegsgeschehen in der Neuzeit eine zuvor nicht mögliche Brutalität gezeigt hat. Das diesen Regulierungen zugrunde liegende System von Differenzierungen wurde immer wieder in Frage gestellt – oder konnte gar nicht angewendet werden. Was Krieg bedeutete, begann sich nämlich zu ändern. Die Wirklichkeit des Krieges und die Möglichkeit des Friedens sind daher schon im 19. Jahrhundert neu fragwürdig geworden. Der wichtigste Grund hierfür lag nicht im Bereich politischer, sozialer oder kultureller Veränderungen, sondern im Bereich neuer technischer Entwicklungen. Reinhold Schneider verweist in seinen Überlegungen zum Frieden der Welt auf das Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts erschienene Werk *Die Zukunft des Krieges in technischer, wirtschaftlicher und politischer Relation* des russischen Industriellen und Bankiers Johann von Bloch: „Der Fortschritt der Kriegstechnik seit 1870, führte er aus, „sei größer als die Entwicklung der Waffentechnik von dem ersten Bogenschützen bis zu diesem Jahre.“<sup>7</sup>

161

Was im 19. Jahrhundert noch eine kontroverse These war, sollte sich spätestens im Ersten Weltkrieg als unleugbares Faktum erweisen. Darauf geht auch Carl Schmitt ein, der sich 1938, im zweiten Corollarium zum *Der Begriff des Politischen*, erneut mit dem Unterschied von Freund und Feind auseinandergesetzt hat – und mit der Tatsache, dass diese vermeintlich so klare und eindeutige Unterscheidung brüchig geworden war. Die genaue Bestimmung dieser Begriffe sei „schon aus dem Grunde notwendig, weil wohl alle bisherigen völkerrechtlichen

---

7 Reinhold Schneider, *Der Friede der Welt*, 101. Vgl. Johann von / Jan Bloch, *Der Krieg. Übersetzung des russischen Werks des Autors. Der zukünftige Krieg in seiner technischen, volkswirtschaftlichen und politischen Bedeutung*, 6 Bde., Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht, 1899.

Erörterungen darüber, ob eine Aktion Krieg ist oder nicht, davon ausgehen, daß die Disjunktion von Krieg und Frieden restlos und ausschließlich ist, das heißt, daß von selbst und ohne dritte Möglichkeit das eine von beiden (entweder Krieg und Frieden) anzunehmen ist, wenn das andere nicht vorliegt.“<sup>8</sup> Schmitt ist sich allerdings bewusst, dass es diese eindeutige Disjunktion nicht mehr gebe: „Ob man nun Krieg annimmt, weil kein Frieden ist, oder Frieden, weil kein Krieg ist, in beiden Fällen müßte vorher gefragt werden, ob es denn wirklich kein drittes, keine Zwischenmöglichkeit, kein *nihil medium* gibt. Das wäre“, so räumt er ein, „natürlich eine Abnormität, aber es gibt eben auch abnorme Situationen.“<sup>9</sup> Schmitt ist der Ansicht, dass diese Situation zum damaligen Zeitpunkt eingetreten sei: „Tatsächlich besteht heute eine solche abnorme Zwischenlage zwischen Krieg und Frieden, in der beides gemischt ist. Sie hat drei Ursachen: erstens die Pariser Friedensdikate; zweitens das Kriegsverhütungssystem der Nachkriegszeit mit Kelloggspakt und Völkerbund; und drittens die Ausdehnung der Vorstellung vom Kriege auch auf nichtmilitärische (wirtschaftliche, propagandistische usw.) Betätigungen der Feindschaft.“<sup>10</sup> Sieht man einmal von der Frage ab, ob die von Schmitt angeführte Liste der Ursachen historisch überzeugen kann, bleibt seine Erkenntnis wahr, dass sich zu seiner Zeit – bis heute – die Abnormität einer Situation zwischen Krieg und Frieden feststellen lässt. Diese ist begrifflich – und damit auch rechtlich und moralisch – weitaus schwerer zu erfassen als die viel eindeutigere Situation des modernen Krieges, die kein *tertium* jenseits der Distinktion von Krieg und Frieden erlaubte.

Ulrich Beck hat – u. a. auch mit Verweis auf Carl Schmitt – in diesem Zusammenhang die Unterscheidung von Staatenkrieg und postnationalem Krieg eingeführt. Auch Beck verweist auf die enttäuschte „Hoffnung, daß mit dem Ende von Kriegen zwischen Staaten auch der Krieg zu Ende gehe und ein

8 Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen. Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien*, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 72002, 105f.

9 Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen*,

10 Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen*, 106f.

Zeitalter des Friedens anbrüche“.<sup>11</sup> Ein wesentliches Merkmal der „neuen Kriege“ sieht er in ihrer räumlichen und zeitlichen Entgrenzung und insbesondere auch darin, dass sich „die Grenzen zwischen den scheinbar anthropologisch gesicherten Dualen – Krieg und Frieden, Zivilgesellschaft und Militär, Feind und Freund, Krieg und Verbrechen, Militär und Polizei – verwischen“.<sup>12</sup> Man müsste an dieser Stelle ergänzend darauf hinweisen, dass mit dem Fortschritt der modernen Waffentechnologien und somit auch mit der Möglichkeit der Vernichtung der Menschheit vormoderne Formen der Kriegsführung nicht einfach ein Ende fanden. Je entwickelter die Kriegstechnologie wurde – und das heißt auch: je weniger bestimmte Waffen überhaupt eingesetzt werden konnten oder durften –, mit umso primitiveren Mitteln wurden oft in den Hinterzimmern der mächtigen und einflussreichen Nationen Kriege geführt. In einem gewissen Maße mag es daher auch gerechtfertigt sein, von einer moralischen und rechtlichen Entgrenzung in vielen neuen Kriegen zu sprechen. Zum einen sind dies als „postnationale Kriege“ oft Partisanen- oder Guerillakriege, die sich einer rechtlichen und auch moralischen Regulierung zumindest auf Seite der Partisanen bzw. Guerilleros weitestgehend entziehen. Zum anderen werden auch von vielen Staaten Maßnahmen wie u. a. die sog. „gezielte Tötung“ von Gegnern angewandt, die sich mit den bisherigen rechtlichen und moralischen Kategorien entweder gar nicht angemessen bewerten lassen oder zutiefst fragwürdig erscheinen.<sup>13</sup>

---

11 Ulrich Beck, *Der kosmopolitische Blick oder: Krieg ist Frieden*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004, 199.

12 Ulrich Beck, *Der kosmopolitische Blick oder: Krieg ist Frieden*, 199. Vgl. zur Deregulierung von Kriegen auch Zygmunt Baumann, *Flüchtige Zeiten. Leben in der Ungewissheit*, aus dem Englischen von Richard Barth, Hamburg: Verlag Hamburger Edition, 2008, 58ff.

13 In diesem Zusammenhang lesenswert sind die Ausführungen von Armin Krishnan, *Gezielte Tötung. Die Individualisierung des Krieges*, Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2013. Vgl. u. a. das abschließende Fazit (S. 217): „Im Hinblick auf die sich immer weiter entwickelnden technischen Möglichkeiten der Überwachung und heimlichen Tötung sowie die politischen Versuche, in vielen Bereichen allgemeine Prinzipien der Rechtsstaatlichkeit und des Völkerrechts außer Kraft zu setzen, muss man die allmähliche Legitimierung gezielter Tötungen mit großer Sorge betrachten. Nur eine internationale Ächtung der Praxis, ein klares internationales und umfassendes Verbot von gezielten Tötungen kann helfen, staatlichen Missbrauch zu verringern und die schlimmsten Gefahren abzuwehren.“

---

Beck erfasst mit seiner Unterscheidung von Staatenkriegen und neuen postnationalen Kriegen wichtige Unterscheidungsmerkmale der alten und der neuen Kriege. Doch stellen sich auch Fragen an die von ihm vorgenommene Differenzierung. Zum einen scheint sie zu verkennen, dass auch jene Kriege, die er „postnational“ nennt, oft zumindest in einem bestimmten Maße noch bzw. auch nationale Kriege sind, also Kriege, die von einer bestimmten Nation oder einer Koalition von Nationen geführt werden. Die Tatsache, dass sich in neuen kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen nicht immer nur unmittelbar Nationen gegenüber stehen, scheint die Verwendung dieses Terminus ohne weitere Differenzierungen nicht zu rechtfertigen. Denn Gruppen von Terroristen greifen zum Beispiel Nationen an oder werden durch bestimmte Nationen gefördert. Manchmal ist auch gar nicht eindeutig zu bestimmen (und selbst Gegenstand der kriegerischen Auseinandersetzung), was für Akteure sich überhaupt gegenüberstehen. Manche Kriege führen ja zur Bildung neuer Staaten oder Nationen. Es wäre missverständlich, viele dieser neuen kriegerischen Konflikte zu schnell im Bereich eines eindeutig postnationalen Bereiches anzusiedeln. Zum anderen aber legt diese Differenzierung nahe, dass es nach wie vor noch in ihrem Wesen unveränderte moderne Staatenkriege – nunmehr alten Typs – gebe: „Die postnationalen Kriegsformen der Zweiten Moderne bedeuten nicht, daß der klassische Krieg zwischen Staaten abgeschafft ist. Vielmehr entstehen neue, nämlich postnationale Kriege zusätzlich, neben den fortbestehenden ‚alten‘ Kriegen zwischen Staaten. Es kann sogar nicht ausgeschlossen werden, daß postnationale zu nationalen Kriegen und somit sogar zu neuen Formen von Weltkriegen kulminieren.“<sup>14</sup> An diese Annahme kann man, wie sich noch zeigen wird, zu Recht Anfragen stellen.

Man mag daher Beck zwar prinzipiell darin zustimmen, dass es von Bedeutung ist, „für die Zwecke der historischen Klassifikation [...] analytisch zwischen alten und neuen Kriegen, Staatenkriegen und postnationalen ‚kriegerischen‘ Interventionen‘ für humanitäre Zwecke oder als Prävention gegen terroristische

14 Ulrich Beck, *Der kosmopolitische Blick oder: Krieg ist Frieden*, 205.

Attacken klar zu unterscheiden“.<sup>15</sup> Allerdings scheint dies nicht eine ausreichend präzise und auch nicht die wichtigste Unterscheidung zu sein, wenn es gilt, zu verstehen, in welcher Weise sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten die Bedeutung des Krieges und des Friedens geändert hat und warum sich auch nach Beck ein „Verflüssigen und Verflüchtigen der Basisunterscheidungen, die den nationalen Staatenkrieg konstituieren“, feststellen lässt: „An die Stelle des Entweder-Oder tritt ein Sowohl-als-Auch – sowohl Krieg als auch Frieden, sowohl Polizei als auch Militär, sowohl Verbrechen als auch Krieg, sowohl Zivilist als auch Soldat.“<sup>16</sup> Becks Differenzierung von klassischem Staatenkrieg auf der einen und „postnationalem“ Krieg auf der anderen Seite geht nämlich zugleich zu weit und nicht weit genug. Weder sind die neuen Kriege einfach als postnationale Kriege zu verstehen, noch sind die alten Staatenkrieg weiterhin, was sie einmal waren, so dass man ihnen die neuen, auf eine Verflüssigung der genannten Basisunterscheidungen zurückgehenden „postnationalen“ Kriege so einfach, wie Beck dies nahe legt, gegenüberstellen könnte. Einer der maßgeblichen Gründe hierfür liegt im Bereich der technologischen Entwicklung. Die genannten Basisunterscheidungen haben sich nämlich vornehmlich auch deshalb verflüchtigt, weil sie das, was nun technisch möglich ist, nicht mehr adäquat erfassen können. Dies gilt aber sowohl für den „Staatenkrieg“ wie auch für das, was Beck den „postnationalen Krieg“ nennt. Statt die Unterscheidung von Staatenkrieg und postnationalem Krieg in den Vordergrund zu stellen, wäre es daher diagnostisch überzeugender, andere Unterscheidungen in den Vordergrund zu stellen, etwa jene zwischen dem modernen und einem neuen Kriegszustand im Zeiten der Computertechnologie, den man „spät-“ oder „postmodern“ nennen könnte. Um dies besser zu verstehen, ist es notwendig, kurz auf das Wesen der Technik und ihre konstitutive Rolle nicht allein für das Kriegsgeschehen, sondern auch für die Realität, das Verständnis und die Definition des Krieges einzugehen, um dann kurz auf den spät- oder postmodernen Krieg einzugehen.

---

15 Ulrich Beck, *Der kosmopolitische Blick oder: Krieg ist Frieden*, 205.

16 Ulrich Beck, *Der kosmopolitische Blick oder: Krieg ist Frieden*, 206.

### 3. Technik als Mittel und als Paradigma des Krieges

Die Geschichte des Krieges lässt sich auch als eine Geschichte der technischen Entwicklung der Kriegsmittel – vornehmlich der Waffen, aber auch der Transport- und Kommunikationsmittel – beschreiben. Allerdings würde, wer sich auf eine solche Beschreibung beschränkte, verkennen, dass die Technik nicht allein als Mittel der Kriegsführung verstanden werden kann. Das mag, wie sich schon angedeutet hat, bis ins späte 19. Jahrhundert der Fall gewesen sein. Änderungen der Mittel zur Kriegsführung waren bis zu dieser Zeit weitestgehend quantitativer Natur. Sie erlaubten, etwas, was man immer schon gemacht hat, schneller, öfter oder zielsicherer zu machen. Es scheint allerdings, folgt man den Analysen von Schneider, Schmitt und auch Beck, gerade im 20. Jahrhundert aufgrund der technischen Entwicklung etwas eingetreten zu sein, was sich nicht allein als Entwicklung, Ausbau oder Erweiterung bereits vorhandener Instrumente verstehen lässt. Denn die Veränderungen, die die Kriegstechnologie des 20. Jahrhunderts kennzeichnen, scheint derart zu sein, dass sich mit ihnen auch die Natur des Krieges oder das Paradigma, innerhalb dessen Krieg geführt und verstanden wird, geändert hat, und zwar so, dass die klassischen Distinktionen für alle Formen kriegerischer Auseinandersetzung an Bedeutung verloren haben – und damit auch die klassisch gewordenen moralischen und rechtlichen Bewertungen, die u. a. die Differenzierung eines gerechten von einem ungerechten Krieg erlauben.

Im 20. Jahrhundert war es beispielsweise erstmals in der Geschichte der Menschheit möglich, einen „totalen Krieg“ zu führen, der bereits in seiner Bezeichnung grundlegende Differenzen des klassischen Krieges in Frage stellte. Denn unter den Bedingungen eines totalen Krieges gibt es keine Zivilisten im Unterschied zu Soldaten mehr. Letztlich wird das Handeln aller Menschen auf den Krieg hingeordnet. Der Unterschied zwischen Instrumenten des zivilen Lebens und Waffen verschwindet. Es waren technische Voraussetzungen – wie zum Beispiel die Möglichkeit, mit Hilfe von Flugzeugen Städte zu bombardieren, bislang unbekannte Waffenarten oder auch der Einfluss, die Reichweite und die Geschwindigkeit neuer Medien – die es ermöglichten, den Krieg selbst total

werden zu lassen. Neue technische Entwicklungen können also nicht allein als Mittel für einen zuvor feststehenden Kriegszweck verstanden werden, sondern auch eine Auswirkung darauf haben, was überhaupt Krieg ist und welche Zwecke in einem Krieg verfolgt werden.

Die Entwicklung der Atombombe ist ein anderes Beispiel für die paradigmatische Bedeutung, die die technologische Entwicklung annehmen kann. Ein atomarer Krieg würde nicht allein ein totaler Krieg sein. Es würde mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit auch der letzte Krieg sein oder zumindest ein Krieg, in dem die bekannte Zivilisation ein Ende finden würde, so dass die Menschheit – so ja auch Karl Jaspers, Reinhold Schneider und Arnold J. Toynbee – im atomaren Zeitalter vor nur einer einzigen Alternative steht. Jenes, was zunächst einmal ein bloßes Medium der Kriegsführung zu sein schien, hatte zu einer bislang gänzlich unbekanntenen neuen Situation geführt und das Wesen des Krieges verändert. Nun gab es zudem nicht nur einen totalen oder gar einen absoluten, die Menschheit vernichtenden Krieg, sondern auch einen warmen neben einem kalten Krieg. Der kalte Krieg konnte (und kann) jederzeit warm werden – und war und ist paradoxerweise um des Friedens willen notwendig. Denn sofern es die Atombombe gibt, ist die permanente Drohung, sie auch tatsächlich einzusetzen, notwendig, um sich vor ihrem Einsatz zu schützen. Dann aber ist der Krieg zum Dauerzustand geworden. Gegner müssen sich mit allzeit bereiten Waffen gegenüber stehen. Somit war die Grundunterscheidung von Krieg und Frieden sinnlos geworden. Was Kant im 18. Jahrhundert noch möglich schien, ist, solange es Atomwaffen gibt, in weite Ferne gerückt.

Eine ähnliche, in ihren Konsequenzen bislang nur selten wahrgenommene Änderung des Wesens der Krieges vollzieht sich in der Gegenwart durch Entwicklungen auf dem Felde jener Technologie, die die Spät- oder Postmoderne insbesondere charakterisiert: der Computertechnologie. Dies sei im Folgenden anhand von zwei Beispielen kurz erläutert: dem Einsatz von Drohnen, also von unbemannten, fern gesteuerten Flugkörpern zum Zweck der Überwachung oder der „gezielten Tötung“ von Menschen, und einem gänzlich neuen Krieg, dem sogenannten *cyberwar*.

---

#### 4. Zwischen Krieg und Frieden? Drohneneinsatz und cyberwar

168 Bis ins 20. Jahrhundert hinein fanden in Kriegen oder kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen mehr oder weniger unmittelbare Begegnungen der miteinander kämpfenden Truppen und Soldaten statt. Dies begann sich bereits im Ersten Weltkrieg zu ändern. Schützengräben führten zu einer Distanzierung der Kämpfenden voneinander. Verschärft wurde diese Distanzierung durch die weitere technische Entwicklung des 20. Jahrhunderts. Die Piloten der Bomber, die Städte in Asche legten (und dabei oft auch viele Zivilisten töteten), waren von dem, was sie verursachten, physisch weit entfernt. Sie wussten, dass sie auch Menschen töteten. Aber sie sahen nur aus der Ferne eine zerstörte Stadt. Die geographische Ferne führte unweigerlich auch zu einer moralischen Ferne.<sup>17</sup> Ihre Opfer – d. h. konkrete Menschen – begegneten den Piloten nicht mehr in leiblicher Unmittelbarkeit. Sie wurden, wenn überhaupt an sie gedacht wurde, auf mögliche Ziele oder „Kollateralschäden“ eines auf seine technischen und militärischen Dimensionen zugespitzten Handelns reduziert. Ohne diese Abstraktionen wäre es vielen Piloten nämlich kaum möglich gewesen, ihre Angriffe auszuüben. Denn dadurch war es ihnen möglich, die tatsächlichen Folgen wie auch die Aufgabe einer moralischen Bewertung ihres Handelns zu verdrängen. Man kann in diesem Zusammenhang davon sprechen, dass die neue Technologie die moralische Abstumpfung jener, die sie nutzen und bedienen, bewirkt. Gleichzeitig waren die Bomberpiloten dem Kriegsgeschehen auch nahe. Sie standen als Soldaten nämlich in einem eindeutigen kriegerischen Kontext und nahmen zudem ein beträchtliches persönliches Risiko auf sich. Nie war, wenn sie zu ihren Flügen starteten, sicher, dass sie zurückkommen würden. Von ihnen wurde heroischer Mut verlangt.

Die moderne Drohnentechnologie erlaubt es nun sogar, dass die Piloten von Kampfdrohnen diese in so großer Entfernung vom Einsatzort steuern können, dass sie selbst nur ein minimales persönliches Risiko eingehen. Wie schon beim

---

17 Vgl. hier auch Zygmunt Bauman / David Lyon, *Daten, Drohnen, Disziplin. Ein Gespräch über flüchtige Überwachung*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2013, 98-125 (zur „Distanzierung und Automatisierung“).



Einsatz von Bombern, allerdings aufgrund der persönlichen Risikolosigkeit in noch gravierenderer Weise, ändert sich durch den Einsatz dieser neuen Technologie insbesondere auch das Verständnis des Handelns und der Verantwortung und somit auch das Verhältnis zu jenen Menschen, die Opfer des eigenen Handelns werden. Diese neue Technologie hat somit auch nicht allein Auswirkungen auf äußere Parameter des soldatischen Handelns. Auch wer eine Kampfdrohne steuert, darf sich letztlich nicht fragen, was genau er gerade tut. Je genauer er sich vergegenwärtigte, dass sein Tun Konsequenzen in der Lebenswelt hat – und welche Konsequenzen es hat –, umso fragwürdiger würde ihm nämlich sein Handeln erscheinen. Darunter könnte die Effizienz seines Handelns leiden. Das Tun dieser „neuen“ Soldaten, die nie heldenhaft agieren müssen, sondern in ihrem Handeln kaum von Menschen in Zivilberufen zu unterscheiden sind, muss daher auch möglichst virtuell erscheinen, damit es in der Lebenswelt die größtmöglichen Konsequenzen zeigen kann. Es wundert daher nicht, dass u. a.

das US-amerikanische Militär ein eigenes Computerspiel – „America’s Army“ – entwickelt hat.<sup>18</sup> Zukünftige Angehörige des Militärs sollen möglichst früh für eine Laufbahn in einer postheroischen Welt vorbereitet werden (und gemäß ihrer Befähigung zu einer solchen Laufbahn ausgewählt werden) – und das heißt auch: sie sollen möglichst früh sich derart an die virtuelle Welt gewöhnen, dass sie die Fragen nach den lebensweltlichen Konsequenzen ihres Tuns gar nicht mehr stellen. Eng mit der moralischen Überforderung durch die Virtualisierung des Kriegsgeschehens – die ja nur eine scheinbare ist! – ist die kognitive Überforderung der Soldaten verbunden. Auf diese Überforderung und ihre Konsequenzen hat Zygmunt Baumann aufmerksam gemacht: „Als bei einem Hubschrauberangriff im Februar 2011 dreiundzwanzig Gäste einer afghanischen Hochzeit getötet wurden, konnten die in Nevada auf Knöpfe drückenden Bediener der Aufklärungsdrohne die Schuld für ihren Irrtum auf die Informationsüberflutung schieben und sich darauf berufen, daß ihr Bildschirme mit Daten ‚vollgerotzt‘ würden – sie verloren

---

18 Vgl. hierzu <http://www.americasarmy.com/> sowie [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/America's\\_Army](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/America's_Army) (09. Januar 2014).

den Überblick, gerade weil sie auf die Bildschirme schauen.“<sup>19</sup> Post-heroisch sind diese neuen Kriege also nicht allein, weil von diesen Büro-Soldaten kein Mut mehr verlangt würde und sie kein Risiko mehr eingehen müssten, sondern auch, weil sie sich von aller Verantwortung, wenn sie diese denn überhaupt noch erfahren sollten, entweder selbst dispensieren können oder durch das Medium dispensiert werden.

Die technische Entwicklung, so zeigt sich, ermöglicht zwar zunächst einen Zuwachs von Freiheit. Sie ist allerdings insbesondere auch im Bereich der Kriegstechnologie mittlerweile an einem Punkt angelangt, an dem sie nicht mehr allein zu einer Erweiterung von Freiheitsräumen führt, sondern an dem sie diese und somit auch den Bereich persönlicher Verantwortung massiv einschränkt. Bereits die Entwicklung der Atombombe hat diesen Zusammenhang gezeigt. Denn wie bereits gesagt wurde, führte diese nicht nur zur Alternative von physischem Untergang der Menschheit auf der einen oder radikalem moralischen Wandel auf der anderen Seite, sondern zudem zu dem Zwang, konstant die Drohung aufrecht zu halten, die Atomwaffe gegebenenfalls auch einzusetzen. Die Atombombe ließ – und lässt, denn sie gehört ja keinesfalls zu den Phänomenen der Vergangenheit – in diesen beiden Hinsichten keine großen Freiheitsräume.

170

Diese Einschränkung des Raumes persönlicher Freiheit und Verantwortung verschärft sich durch die neuesten technischen Möglichkeiten noch. „Zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts“, so noch einmal Zygmunt Baumann, „hat die neueste Militärtechnologie die Verantwortung in einem [...] unvorstellbaren Ausmaß ‚entpersonalisiert‘. ‚Smarte‘ Waffen, ‚intelligente‘ Raketen und ‚Drohnen‘ nehmen dem gemeinsamen Soldaten wie den Spitzen des Militärapparats die Entscheidung ab und bestimmen ihre Ziele ‚autonom‘.“<sup>20</sup> Was wie eine Phantasie aus der Science-Fiction-Literatur klingt, ist mittlerweile Realität geworden. Dort, wo die erforderte Reaktionszeit so kurz ist, dass Menschen gar nicht mehr reagieren

19 Zygmunt Bauman / David Lyon, *Daten, Drohnen, Disziplin. Ein Gespräch über flüchtige Überwachung*, 114.

20 Zygmunt Bauman / David Lyon, *Daten, Drohnen, Disziplin. Ein Gespräch über flüchtige Überwachung*, 112.

könnten – bzw. nur so, dass es immer schon zu spät wäre –, berechnen Computer die erforderliche Reaktion. Sie treffen freilich keine freie Entscheidung und übernehmen auch keine Verantwortung. An die Stelle menschlicher Handlung sind technisch bestimmte Ereignisse getreten, für die, wie es scheint, kein Mensch Verantwortung übernehmen müsste oder könnte. Baumann bezeichnet dies als „Adiaphorisierung“ von Tötungen durch das Militär.<sup>21</sup> Was einmal zu den moralisch qualifizierbaren Handlungen gehört hat – nämlich die Tötung im Kriegskontext – gehört nun nicht mehr in den Bereich dessen, was überhaupt zum Gegenstand einer moralischen Bewertung gemacht werden kann.

Ein zweites Beispiel zeigt, in welcher Weise die Entwicklung der Computertechnologie das Wesen des Krieges und somit die grundlegenden Distinktionen von Freund und Feind oder von Soldat und Zivilist geändert hat. Denn Krieg – sowohl der Staatenkrieg als auch jener Krieg, den Beck „postnational“ nennt – kann sich heute auch im Bereich jener Welten entfalten, die man virtuell nennt (d. h. es wird in der Gegenwart nicht einfach nur die Kriegsführung zunehmend virtualisiert, sondern auch ein neuer Raum für die mögliche Kriegsführung erschlossen). Man spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von „cyberwar“.<sup>22</sup> Dieser Krieg kann moderne Gesellschaften treffen, wo sie am verletzlichsten sind, nämlich dort, wo die Abläufe des politischen, technischen, wirtschaftlichen, wissenschaftlichen, gesellschaftlichen oder sozialen Lebens von Computertechnologien abhängig sind. Das bedeutet, dass er sie nahezu überall und in engstens miteinander vernetzten zentralen Bereichen der gegenwärtigen Kultur treffen kann. Daher ist der *cyberwar* potentiell ein totaler Krieg. Er ist auch zumeist ein geheimer Krieg. Oft lassen sich

---

21 Zygmunt Bauman / David Lyon, *Daten, Drohnen, Disziplin. Ein Gespräch über flüchtige Überwachung*, 112.

22 Vgl. hierzu neben Sandro Gaycken, *Cyberwar. Das Internet als Kriegsschauplatz*, München: Open Source Press, 2012 auch Gayckens allgemeinverständliche Darstellung *Cyberwar. Das Wettrüsten hat längst begonnen. Vom digitalen Angriff zum realen Ausnahmezustand*, München: Goldmann, 2012. Zudem sei an dieser Stelle verwiesen auf Mischa Hansel, „Stuxnet und die Sabotage des iranischen Atomprogramms: Ein neuer Kriegsschauplatz im Cyberspace?“, in: Thomas Jäger / Rasmus Beckmann (Hrsg.), *Handbuch Kriegstheorien*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011, 564-576 (mit zahlreichen weiteren Literaturangaben).

---

Verursacher von störenden Eingriffen in die technischen Systeme nämlich gar nicht identifizieren. Manchmal ist sogar unklar, ob es überhaupt einen Verursacher gibt, d. h. ob überhaupt etwas geschehen ist, was auf einer Handlung mit feindlicher oder kriegerischer Absicht zurückgeht.

Es ist beispielsweise möglich, Devisen- oder Börsenkurse so zu manipulieren, dass die Manipulation als solche gar nicht auffällt.<sup>23</sup> Was sich ändert, sind freilich die Kurse mit teils beträchtlichen Konsequenzen in der Lebenswelt – von der Enteignung der Besitzer von Vermögen oder Unternehmensanteilen über politische Unruhen bis hin zu Bürgerkriegen und Hungersnöten, die auf gezielte Kursmanipulationen zurückgehen. Selbst wenn eine Manipulation als solche auffallen sollte, dürfte man oft nicht eindeutig sagen können, wer sie ausgeübt hat. Spuren solcher Manipulationen lassen sich nämlich leicht verschleiern oder sogar in eine falsche Richtung lenken, so dass, wer eigentlich ein Freund ist, als Feind erscheint – und umgekehrt. Weil man keinem Feind mehr von Angesicht zu Angesicht gegenübersteht, könnten plötzlich auch alle zu möglichen Feinden werden. Ein Krieg wird dann freilich nicht mehr erklärt. Es könnte dann selbstverständlich geworden sein, dass ein permanenter Kriegszustand herrscht.

172

## 5. Die Herausforderungen der neuen Kriege für Moral und Recht

Im Virtuellen kann der Krieg eine ganz neue Wirklichkeit annehmen,<sup>24</sup> für die bislang noch keine ausreichenden moralischen oder rechtlichen Regelungen getroffen wurden – und vielleicht auch gar nicht getroffen werden

23 Vgl. hierzu u. a. Sandro Gaycken, *Cyberwar. Das Wettrüsten hat längst begonnen. Vom digitalen Angriff zum realen Ausnahmezustand*, 136-143; Sandro Gaycken, *Cyberwar. Das Internet als Kriegsschauplatz*, 93-120.

24 Die Neuheit des *cyberwar* betont auch Sandro Gaycken, *Cyberwar. Das Wettrüsten hat längst begonnen. Vom digitalen Angriff zum realen Ausnahmezustand*, 68: "Cyberwar ist nicht nur eine neu Dimension des Krieges oder eine neue Waffengattung. Es ist eine ganz neue Art von Krieg. Wer über eine gute Cybertruppe verfügt, kann unentdeckt und im Geheimen die Machtgewichtungen der Welt entscheidend verändern."

können. Man könnte angesichts der spät- oder postmodernen Formen des Krieges pessimistisch schließen. Moralisch bewertet werden kann, wie es scheint, allein noch die Entscheidung, überhaupt Waffentechnologien einzusetzen, die die Freiheit und Verantwortung des Menschen so sehr einschränken, dass man nicht mehr von Waffen im klassischen Sinne sprechen kann. Allerdings wird die Frage nach der moralischen Bewertung dieser Entscheidungen unter dem normativen Druck des Faktischen nur sehr selten gestellt. Zudem scheint der technischen Entwicklung auch in diesem Bereich eine eigene Konsequenz zueigen zu sein. Sobald nämlich eine Technologie einmal entwickelt ist, wird sie auch Anwendung finden. Mit einer ihr eigenen Logik verschiebt sie sich aus dem Bereich des Möglichen in den Bereich des Wirklichen. Außerdem scheint ein Phänomen wie der *cyberwar* auch kaum moralisch oder rechtlich zu regulieren zu sein: „Sind Angreifer nicht zu identifizieren, kann die Einhaltung von Verträgen grundsätzlich nicht garantiert werden.“<sup>25</sup> An die Seite des Pessimismus tritt ein lakonisches Lächeln.

Man kann auch mit einer Forderung schließen, die als Zeichen eines vorsichtigen Optimismus gelesen werden kann: dass nun die Aufgabe ernst genommen werde, im Bereiche der Moral und des Rechts die notwendigen Antworten auf technische Entwicklungen zu finden, die ganz neue Formen des Krieges möglich machen und die Menschheit vor gänzlich neue Fragen und Herausforderungen stellen. Dabei wird neben der Ächtung von bestimmten Waffen und militärischen Vorgehensweisen die Frage nach verbesserten Sicherheitsstandards in einer zunehmend vernetzten Welt eine maßgebliche Rolle spielen.

---

25 Sandro Gaycken, *Cyberwar. Das Internet als Kriegsschauplatz*, 196.



# **INSECURITY AND INSTABILITY AS CHALLENGES TO THE NIGERIAN STATE: PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE MEANING OF SOCIAL ORDER**

## **Introduction**

**175**

This paper attempts to provide an answer to the question: what is social order? To make sense of this question, we need to clarify the reason why social order is an issue requiring attention or for that matter why philosophers see it as a problem. The problem of social order has been an age-long one tackled by different social and political philosophers. The substance of this problem is the search for community, which raises fundamental questions about justice between men and how they can achieve co-operation for the common good in the society. Also, it raises the question of how rights, duties and responsibilities can be properly and effectively maintained among the members of society. Thus, the problem of social order concerns the need to balance the conflicts of interest among individuals and between individuals and the state or society. It is the struggle to create or discover strategies and approaches for building a more humane, tolerant and peaceful human society. Human beings have always had problems with one of the basic philosophical questions of: how do I relate with other human beings? As

---

<sup>1</sup> Lead Author.

---

such, the human factor is central to social order. These questions and concerns are particularly significant given the Nigerian problem of disorder.

### **The Nigerian Condition of Insecurity and Disorder as a Problematic**

176 Nigeria faces a serious problem of social disorder. The fundamental problems confronting Nigeria's nation-state project have not altered significantly in the past decades. The disorder can be summarised in the inability to tackle the basic problems of unity, security and social justice at the personal and institutional levels within the dynamics of the state. The security problem in Nigeria is easily seen in the inability of the to ensure the protection of its core values: territories, infrastructure, officials, citizens, laws and institutions. This has ensured that the various governments and the state agencies have been unable to consistently and institutionally guarantee the adequate protection, peace and well being of the generality of the citizens. The problem of security in the Nigerian nation-state is seen in the fact that the idea of security was reduced to the personal security of the ruler and that of his immediate supporters (Ujomu, 2008:34-35). The security calculus of the Nigerian state failed because it was over militarised and there were conflicts of interest, undue competitions and overlap of functions as well as a crisis of professionalism among the security forces. The Nigerian security paradigm did not securitise and include vital aspects of social existence in a multi-ethnic society such as social justice correlates especially institutionalised dialogue, equity in resource distribution, anti-corruption and the provision of basic social amenities. The deficits in these critical areas have triggered feelings of neglect and abandonment by the bulk of the citizens hence creating alienated consciousness.

Disorder is noticed in the real consequences of alienated consciousness. The threats to national security arising thereof, indicate that Nigeria, as it exists, may not have fully articulated the conditions for establishing a truly humane and progressive society. The reality of a system lacking in enduring principles of trust, social justice and moral action, which can promote genuine social reconciliation,

---



suggests that Nigeria remains a terrain of conflicting identities after decades of independence. The state remains a battle-ground where individuals fight for whatever resource or power they can capture. This situation is worrisome because the long period of co-existence among various groupings has not yielded genuine mutual respect, understanding and common purpose. This is a significant pointer to the potential continuation of insecurity in the country (Ujomu, 2008:35-36).

The Nigerian state is post-colonial in its form. Post-coloniality is tied to marginality. In turn, marginality can be said to be central to experiences of disorder in a post-colonial life-world or discourse. Over the years, different governments, individuals and institutions in Nigeria have systematically entrenched a culture of marginalisation within the social order. What are the immanent consequences of this marginality? One repercussion is that ethnic and other minorities are under-represented and oppressed among those with power in the social, political and economic as well as education system. At the heart of marginalisation, are the real consequences of differences in language, values and beliefs, and the tensions arising from these when we merge with the different interests and aspirations of the groups. Groups attempt to ensure their dominance over others by controlling the key institutions while the minority groups struggle for recognition and a fair deal in the distribution of resources. Political life is organised around the desire by the various ethnic groups to further and protect their own interests. These interests are culturally defined and have to do with what groups possess as distinct communities and what they can get from others in a competitive situation. Instability, over centralisation of power, intense ethnic and elite competition for resources and power and the diverse forms of repression and deprivation affect security at all levels of life. We should note that certain levels of marginality are now beyond the merely ethnic factor. These include the travails of the destitute, unemployed, down-trodden rank and file of the different social institutions, the rural peoples, the handicapped, the aged, the abused youth and children, etc (Ujomu 2008:35-37).

Consequently, the dangerous trend towards disorder has emerged whereby violent and ill-trained militia, militants have cashed in on these institutional lapses to assume state duties and often cause trouble. Furthermore, the general

---

---

lack of commitment to the common good has ensured that most military personnel seek only to satisfy their avarice and narcissism. Such people lack the intellectual and moral basis for the proper utilisation of knowledge and power for the good of all (Ujomu, 2000:39). Thus, they ultimately create conditions of insecurity, deprivation and instability in the polity. Conscious manipulations (of a negative kind) can lead to the loss of unity and cohesion. To fully understand the consequences of alienation for national consciousness, we need to conceptualise the deplorable state of our national experience as typified by institutional and moral problems. According to Temlong (2003:13), “the parlous state of the economy has also reduced the majority of the citizenry to abject poverty and increased unemployment”. We add that the objectionable state of our infrastructure, the moral decay in our society, the pervasive corruption, social discontent, lawlessness, selfishness and cynicism that have taken over all areas of national life are irrefutable manifestations of the security crisis in the land.

**178**

The security problem and the attendant disorder, is bigger than any group or institution and is a matter of a challenged national consciousness. These are evidences that national consciousness is on the decline in the society. National consciousness has implications for national security, which itself is an important concern in the life of a person, group or society. The central feature in the quest for national security is the concern for national survival, which cannot come about unless there is, in the society, some degree of joint action and purpose, for the common good (Ujomu, 2008:36-37). Evidence of the defeat of social order and national consciousness is seen in the increasing attacks on national leaders and citizens by violent mobs, armed robbers, assassins and kidnappers, ethnic militia groups, as well as the invading rebel forces from neighboring countries to the north of Nigeria. It is ironic the Nigerian state and its military system has not been able to perfect the art and craft of upholding institutional and regime security. We may recall the various national security problems and lapses that have led to the death of top government officials at the hands of assassins and other criminals. We also recall the problems that have led to the predation of infrastructures (civil and military) in which the negligence, laxity and incompetence within certain institutions have been revealed. All of these have had negative effects on

---

the development of national consciousness both for men and women (Ujomu, 2008:36-37).

In addition, Braithwaithe concurs with the above when he says that “an unprecedented and widespread corruption in governance and injustice have combined to engender insecurities, insurgencies, heightened criminalities, widespread unemployment, all in the face of mindless profligacy of the corrupt” (Braithwaithe 2012:10). This situation revolves around “the quality and manner of life as the poor majority are banished to the ghettos where there is no electricity, water supply or sanitation facilities, as armed robbery, hooliganism, prostitution have become a way of life” (Okonta and Douglass in Osha 2006:15). We notice a link between disorder and social justice deficits. There is currently a crisis in the context of the deterioration of the various instruments of justice, such as the police, national assembly agencies of government, law courts, prisons, etc, due to inefficiency, under-funding, incompetence, ethnicity, politicization and social dissatisfaction. Nielsen (1996:82) puts it succinctly that the problem or “the question of justice is the question of what is that genuine social order that can guarantee human flourishing (and) social harmony”.

An empirical account of the disorderly state of our economy and the implications for social justice in Nigeria is seen in a recent Nigerian House of Representatives Fuel Subsidy Probe Report 2009-2011(2012:62 & 63), which reports that “the mood of the nation is justifiably ill tempered.” There is a conflict between the people’s larger interest and the self interested clique of government officials seemingly out of tune with the existential realities of the ordinary man in the street. The Nigerian people from all social indicators are already impoverished by the maladministration of the political elite.” This social justice problem is tied to the concerns over endemic corruption. According to the House of Representatives Fuel Subsidy Probe Report 2009-2011 (2012: 129-130) the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation “NNPC continued to pressurize officials of other agencies, to process and pay subsidy on the product, arrogated to themselves the power to override the Presidential Directive.” In fact, the “inefficiency of the NNPC and Ministry of Petroleum reflected in the failure to supply the product to Nigerians at affordable pricing while the NNPC feasted on the Federation Account to bloat

---

the subsidy payable, some of the Marketers took the option of claiming subsidy on products not supplied.” (House of Representatives Fuel Subsidy Probe Report 2009-2011 (2012:131, 74 & 116).

The problem of disorder as seen in the deficits in the value and quality of human life also has consequences for security, social justice and human rights. This problem is endemic on the Nigerian landscape and is underscored by even more recent civil society documents like the Center for constitutionalism and Demilitarization 2011 annual report CENCOD 2011 Annual Report (2011:ix-xi) which says that “Nigerians still face varying forms of human rights violations. The state is still largely authoritarian as security forces trample on the rights of the citizens with a surprising impunity unexpected in a democracy. This often takes the form of harassment, extortion, unlawful detention and extra judicial killings. There are reports of misappropriation and misapplication of state resources by incumbent state actors” as well as local authorities and foreign business interests. The common people have been driven beyond the poverty threshold “the unemployment rate in the country is alarming” (CENCOD 2011:xi). Beyond the general trends, there were specific patterns in the trend of social disorder, national insecurity and problems of human dignity in Nigeria. Predominant among the challenges were cases of kidnapping, harassment by security forces, extra judicial killings, violations of women’s rights, intra communal clashes, gun battles between criminal gangs and local vigilante groups, student union protests, child abuses, assault on the media, political intolerance, illegal sects (CENCOD 2011:xii-xviii).

The disorder is seen at another level, whereby the social justice question triggers a problem of unity easily seen in the inability of the diverse ethnic and religious groups to co-exist politically, culturally and socially as a community by living together in peace through mutual respect, trust and cooperation for the personal and common good of all concerned. The situation is that given the divisive nature of the Nigerian state and the ineffectiveness of its key executive and legislative organs, there has been a rise of ethnic and parochial interests whose basic argument is that the current configuration of the Nigerian state is not equitable and humane to all concerned. In relation to the Niger-Delta and

---

indeed most parts of Nigeria “there is a deep seated feeling of neglect, which lies at the root of widespread discontentment, grievances, conflict, criminality and violence. Economic inadequacies predispose youth to violence and manipulation” (Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta 2008 (2010:82, 93& 107). Put simply, “the root causes of insecurity in the areas had to do with the neglect, frustration, and the sense of abandonment of the people” (2002 Report of the Special Security Committee on Oil Producing Areas 2007: 120&132). What can the philosophical discussion on social order contribute to solving this problem of disorder in Nigeria? Let us review the goals of social order.

### **Understanding the Major Goals of Social Order as a Prelude to Clarifying the Meaning of our Concept**

Do human beings have certain goals in mind when they try to establish and sustain social order? One of the most important goals of social order is to achieve the security, protection, safety, defence and preservation of the lives and property of people in a society. The protection of lives and property is the central goal of social order because society cannot survive for long in any meaningful sense if the safety of lives and property is not maintained. This goal is assured by identifying and distributing properly certain roles, rights, duties and benefits that accrue from effective social co-existence among people. This proper allocation of goods, duties and burdens among the members of a society ensures that everyone has some stake or interest in the society which induces him to strive for individual and collective security and protection. To ensure security of lives and properties, the social order allows each person to have certain valuable possessions and commitments which can only be retained within a social environment that is secure and safe.

A second goal of social order is to ensure that things are done in the common or public interest. This means that the social order ensures that people do those things which assure the sustenance and security of everyone in the community. Common interests are thus separated from the private interests of individuals or even the group interests of associations which serve personal or sectional ends.

---

---

The idea of common interests or public interest suggests the conscious promotion of the shared interests of a community as an effective means of guaranteeing certain rights and advantages to individuals and groups. Such advantages include security of lives and property, peace, freedom, and mutual co-operation. And these would constitute the central and basic focus towards which the energies of all the members of society are directed. Social order is also agreed towards achieving peace among all and sundry in the society. Peace in the community is emphasised because, it is only in an atmosphere of peace that any community can survive and make progress. A peaceful environment allows all the social rules, policies and institutions to operate efficiently and purposefully towards the central goal of the society in whatever way it has been designed.

Another goal of social order is to promote love, good conduct and morals within the society. Social order is impossible without these qualities. The co-existence of any group or community of people requires some level of friendly feelings shared among them. **182** Such friendly feelings facilitate mutual cooperation, communal rapport and integrated activities. These friendly feelings also help to manage and control inevitable differences of opinion and interest that can arise out of communal co-habitation. It is also impossible for people to live conveniently together within a community if morality is absent. Morality is what defines the way people conduct of people, morality also guarantees the harmonization of diverse interests through the promotion of the disposition by individuals to take the interests of others into account. Therefore, a significant level of good conduct is vital to the survival of individuals and even a community.

Lastly, social order aims at ensuring the progress, prosperity and wellbeing of all in the society. Socio-economic progress and prosperity are vital elements in the maintenance of a social order because for social order to be functional and meaningful people need to be induced to make a commitment, and contribute to the well being and progress of the community by their different activities. The people's interest and dedication to preserving the social order is assured if they have made some valuable and perennial inputs to the prosperity and wealth of the society. Let us make sense of these goals of social order and thus shed light on the meaning of the problem of social order by doing a detailed conceptual study of the idea.

---

## **The Quest for the Meaning of Social Order *via* a Conceptual Analysis of Key Terms**

This section of the paper examines the concept of social order with a view to determining its meaning. Social order refers to the social systems and schemes of social relations that define the political, economic and social roles, rights and duties of people in a society. It is the sum of all the human arrangements, values, rules, norms, regulations, ideologies and institutions that enhance the proper functioning of the various parts of the society or community (Bierstedt 1963:1, Messner 1949: 149, Fagothey:1959: 523). To start with, a distinction can be made between society and community. On the one hand, community is hinged on a feeling of belonging or sense of togetherness that exists prior to the solidarity instituted by contractual agreement. The idea of community is descriptive of a wide spectrum of societies, of familial, religious or cultural types. The shared sense of identity and solidarity in the community arises from the acceptance of common values and norms relevant in the pursuit of common goals (Kaiser 1979: 31-32, Messner 1958:80 & 83, Schmitz 1983: 246, Grisez and Shaw 1989: 38, McDowell 1962: 5-994, Ekennia 1998: 351. A community is bound together by a common creed or belief, a common ancestry or blood ties.

On the other hand, a society refers to the network of structures and relations developed by human activity. Society, viewed as the totality of social relational structures and the individuals operating in this domain, is the union of individuals who are guided by a particular form of organisation. The aim of society is to secure social ends (private or common goods) by organisational and legal institutions (Messner, 1958: 386-394). We have seen how society differs from community. The real issue is: how do both connect to social order? In what way, if any does the social order facilitate the proper functioning of various parts of the society? Social order is a set of arrangements put in place by man in order to attain certain important ends like justice, peace, self and group actualisation as well as the general well-being of all in a social system. Social order arises out of the need to balance the conflicts and interplay of interests existing among individuals and between individuals and the society. It means that a community or society will

---

possess a framework that defines rules, roles and functions of its members. Social order is akin to a skeleton that supports a body, a scheme of social relations or a social system that underlies our real life actions as members of a society.

The idea of a social system is fundamental to the conceptual analysis of social order because the social system refers to both the structure and organisation of human beings within a society. For Park (1982: 16), the structure of the social system refers to the orderly, fixed arrangements of the different individuals and groups that constitute society, while the organisation of the social system refers to the dynamic efficiency of a structure or the relation of integrated and purposive actions in view of their common goals and interest. As such, the structure and organisation of a social system make up its form or character by which it can be identified and evaluated as a stable, viable or enduring social order. Therefore social order, understood as the form of a social system, refers to the various social roles allocated to each number and group of the society. Social roles depict the political, economic, religious and administrative functions of people in a society (Park, 1982: 16). According to Grisez and Shaw (1989:38), each person possesses a variety of social rules that arise from his membership in various communities. Each of these social roles carries with it a variety of duties. Social roles are like job descriptions specified for an individual and the fulfilment of these roles require that the individual occupying them act in certain ways. These required ways of acting can be seen as duties. Therefore, Emmet (1989:324) argues that social roles as they concern persons living in society “mean that a certain number of reasonably stable functions and expectations can be depended upon”. We may therefore hold that social roles are basically defined and identified through the powers, rights and duties associated with them.

The clarification of the concept of role is important in social order because a role refers to a set of expectations associated with the position of a person in a society. Since all social organisations are characterised by a differentiation of functions, then stable role definitions allow social organisations to function effectively and properly (Scheibe 1982: 271). According to Zanden (1977:173) roles help people to formulate their behaviour so that their actions can fit into those of others. A role does not exist by itself; rather, it is a bundle of activities

---



meshed into the activities of other people. Roles embody both expectations as well as obligations. In addition, Emmet says that roles are linked to the human moral consciousness, social demands and regular patterns of social interactions (Emmet 1989: 323). Therefore, in relation to the social order, Zanden holds that roles are sets of norms that define our obligations which are the actions that others can legitimately insist that we perform. Given the nature of a social system, roles usually operate in conjunction with norms. According to Zanden, roles are sets of norms that define our behaviour, while norms are standards of behaviour which members of a social group share. People are expected to conform to these norms which are enforced by sanctions. He suggests further that roles and norms provide us with a sense of social order by ensuring conformity. The notion of conformity presupposes predictable modes of conduct and the adherence to social expectations. Conformity makes social order possible and social order makes society possible (Zanden 1977: 153-173).

Thus, we may agree with Zanden (1977: 153-173) that social order, presumes organisation, regularity, stability and predictability. It is these qualities of social life that give us an appearance of social order. Social order, as we have seen, is based on the identification of social roles as they define our expectations and obligations. Our obligations according to Zanden are those actions that others can legitimately insist that we perform while our expectations are those actions that we can legitimately insist that others perform. Obligation as conceived by Kant “is the necessity of a free action when it is seen in relation to a categorical imperative of reason. And duty is the designation of any action to which anyone is bound by an obligation (Kant 1990: 391). Social order, which is the product of the structure and organization of a social system, is fundamentally based on the proper definition of social roles through a reciprocal and systematic way of relating obligations with expectations. Social roles are more significantly viewed as ways of distributing rights and duties among the members of the society. In a profound manner, rights and duties are the basis of defining human relations. In fact, the whole idea of justice which is one of the goals of social order is more significantly comprehend through the analysis of rights and duties. These notions help in attaining the proper organization and the smooth-functioning of the society (Kant 1990: 391).

---

The most minimal formulation of a right goes thus: A right “is the moral and inviolable power vested in a person to do, hold or exact something as his own” (Bittle 1950: 273-280, Fagothey 1965: 238-259. It also refers to an immunity or privilege protected or enforceable by law (Gerwith 1981:2) “rights are justified claims or entitlements to the carrying out of correlative duties positive or negative” Bittle (1950: 276). Brugger (1972) on his part says that “rights are those normative legal relationships which protect a man from others in all that concerns his personal dignity and individuality and which bind him as an essentially social being to larger social groups both natural and freely organized.” Following this conception of right, Brugger holds that the notion of right relates the individual and the social aspects of human life to each other by determining the structure of social life itself and also forming the supporting frame around which the structure of society is to be constructed. Rights therefore concern the relations between persons in a community (Brugger 1972).

186

To reinforce the connection between rights and community, J. S. Mill holds that “a right is anything which a person has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it either by the force of law, education or opinion” (Mill 1990: 470). On his part, Marx sees the notion of right as a judicial concept whose proper function is discerned in the moral or legal institutions of society. And such institutions and relations viewed in the light of the materialist conception of history form part of the social superstructure (Marx in A. Wood 1979: 268). Kordig (1981:171) discusses, and lays much emphasis on the social nature of rights. For him, rights relate members of society to each other. More importantly, rights concern justice as it defines the actions of one person in relation to those of others (Kordig 1981:171). Justice on its part concerns public morality and in fact, justice is a part of morality.

In discussing the foundation of rights or the reason for which rights exist, Kordig (1981:171) argues that rights exist, and are based on the principle that a person should be given the opportunities for full human development. Rights seek to preserve human dignity which is itself the foundation of human rights. Human dignity involves acting knowingly and willingly, that is, acting freely and responsibly. Rights are usually classified into various categories. The major

classifications made by scholars separate natural rights, such as the right to life, from political and civil rights. Political rights include the right to vote while civil rights include the right to own private property. There are also social and economic rights (Meyers 1981: 139, Kordig 1981:171, Gerwith 1981:1-2, Schauer 1981: 229). Rights are also separated into active and passive rights. Active rights are rights of action or the right to do something while passive rights are rights of a recipient, claims rights or the right to have. Another group of rights are those that give liberties and powers. On the whole we can view rights as both descriptive and prescriptive, within the context of social order.

To facilitate our understanding of the notion of right, it is necessary to conceptually examine the idea of duty. A duty refers to “the moral obligation to do something or to omit something in favour of another according to the demands of strict justice” (Bittle 1950: 277). Within the context of society, Grisez and Shaw 1989: 38) hold that a duty is something that one has a responsibility for doing or not doing by virtue of one’s role in a particular community. For them, duties are genuine moral responsibilities because the members of a community are engaged in a joint action seeking the realization of a fundamental human purpose (Grisez and Shaw 1989: 38). According to Gerwith (1981:2) a duty is a requirement that some action be performed or not be performed. For Kant, a duty is the designation of any action to which anyone is bound by an obligation. It is the subject matter of all obligation. The categorical imperative which expresses an obligation in respect to certain actions is a morally practical law (Kant 1990: 391). Mill asserts that duty is a thing which may be exacted from a person as one exacts a debt. Real duties are duties of perfect obligation which ensures that a correlative right resides in some person (Mill 1990: 468). The essential character of a right or a duty as amoral demand suggests that the claims of right or duty are not invalidated even if there are situations in which they are breached or neglected. The above clarifications provide a basis for redefining social order as the way a social system identifies and allocates social roles through the definition of rights and duties which are reflections of the core values of a society.

A social order can be understood in terms of the values it upholds and practices. It is interesting to note that the disorder problem in Nigeria and the

---

conflicts arising thereof, symbolize basically a field of competing values, beliefs and attitudes. The issue of “the nature of value is one of the central and most persistent problems of human existence” (Titus 1970:331). Central to overcoming this disorder or crisis of our values and value system is the definition and appropriation of the mechanisms of values and valuation. While value concerns the worth of something and the way we come to attain that worth, valuation is based on the decided weighted cost-benefit of the placement of a price or primacy on something as important, desirable or interesting. In either of these ways the concrete concern is to discover how people can live in peaceful cooperation, obedience to laws, amenability to organization and loyalty to the state. This is a phenomenological issue that interfaces what we are, what we have become and what we ought to become. In pursuing this track of moving from is to ought, we must pursue the normative and prescriptive re-entry into a tripartite challenge of social order, understood as stability or predictability, reliability or cooperation and change or creativity.

**188**

We can understand the nature of values better when we realise that every society sets for itself “an ideal form of life or an image which it seeks to attain and to which it constantly refers in the process of going through life” (Sogolo 1993:119). More importantly, values are the basis of all cultural life; the foundation of all cognition and the category structure of the human consciousness” (Brunner and Raemers 1937: 87-88). To capture the essence of the notion of value, Perry affirms that a thing or anything has value when it is the object of an interest, which is a train of events determined by an expectation of its outcome (Perry 1968:336). Singer, on his part, adds an extra dimension to the conceptual analysis of values when he suggests that a “person’s values are what the person regards as or thinks important” (Singer 1989:145). The same is applicable to the society insofar as a society’s values are what it considers important. According to Ackermann (1981:451) values must, then, be considered in intimate connection with what could be called the “collective interests of the very social groups that hold them.”(Ackermann 1981:451) Otite differentiated between the balancing, assimilative and overarching approaches to dealing with ethnicity. The dual tragedies of the first two show that there is a real context of dominance and imposition

in the quagmire of ethnicity. But the third approach is what is of interest here. The third approach “is called overarching by which members of all the ethnic groups are made to be committed to a common set of values which may be ideological or religious in nature, but which overrides all other differing interests based on ethnicity. There is no overarching set of values or an overwhelming and dominant ethnic group that does not need others in alliance to control the federal government” (Otitte 1990:143). The kinds of overarching values that we push for are those that cross-cut the different ethnic groups and the mental and physical barriers that they have set up.

From the fore-going, Bertsch (1991:109) holds that people are likely to give pride of place to values that promote the wider devolution or distribution of power as opposed to concentration. Also people will demand greater respect and the opportunity to express their political beliefs and initiative. Kudadjie (1992) holds that the present situation is that there is very little, if anything, by way of a national policy for the cultivation of such values. The paucity of morally good human resources has thwarted efforts to bring about development thus the creation of a moral community will require moral education of the members of the society. The aim of social order is to create a social system whose values are expressed mainly through its ideologies. According to Macridis (1989:2-3) an ideology refers to a set of closely related beliefs or ideas or even attitudes characteristic of a group or community. Within a community, an acceptable ideology rationalises the status quo while other competing ideologies and movements challenge it. He holds that ideologies especially of the political kind, address themselves to value such as the quality of life, the distribution of goods and services etc (Macridis 1989:2-3). To further clarify the notion of ideology, Wiredu asserts that ideologies in a more positive sense refer to “a set of ideas about what form the good society must take” (Wiredu in Oladipo 1996:58). As such, an ideology is necessary for every society and its aim is to provide a theoretical framework for socio-political action. For him, the social and political organization of a society requires the guidance of a set of ideas (ideology) about the goals of society and the means of their attainment (Wiredu in Oladipo 1996:58).

Social order originates from certain fundamental questions or concerns about justice between men and it is realized in the idea of partnership among men who exercise rights, duties and responsibilities. Thus, social order whose primary goal is the

---

attainment of justice, arises out of the need to balance the conflicts of interest existing among individuals as well as between them and the society (Neuner and Dupuis 1990: 676). An analysis of the essential features of social order reveals clearly that the question about justice is fundamental to the proper and full conceptualization of social order. In its most minimal understanding, justice demands that each part of a social scheme be given its due, rights, duties, roles and benefits in relation to others. Justice is that condition in which each component is given its proper function to exercise within the framework of social relations. The essence of the notion of justice is captured by some major social philosophers. According to Plato, justice is when each man fulfils his proper duties and functions (Plato 1990: 349-355). Justice is division of labour. There is an expectation that people will play their parts. Given that it encourages good practices that lead to virtue, Aristotle (1990: 376-382) says then that the just act which is the good act is also a virtuous act. For Aristotle, the just is the lawful and fair. Justice is the greatest of virtues which encompasses those acts prescribed by the law with a view to education for the common good. Therefore, justice exists only between men whose mutual relations are governed by law.

190

For St. Augustine, justice is that virtue which gives everyone his due (Augustine 1990: 231 & 593). As such, a republic (society) cannot be administered without justice because where there is no justice, there can be no right. To further develop and appreciate the idea of justice, Thomas Aquinas holds that the function of justice is to establish rectitude in various kinds of exchanges and again in distributions (Aquinas 1990: 51-52). Justice is discussed in respect of something due to someone or another. It pertains to justice that a man gives another his due. Also Montaigne affirms that justice consists in obeying the law of well-doing or doing that which is virtuous or good (Montaigne 1990: 342). According to Hegel (1990: 39-40) justice is "rectitude or the general character (behaviour) that may be demanded of a person by law or custom." For him, in a community, it is easy to say what a man must do, what are the duties he has to fulfil order to be virtuous. For Hegel, a man simply has to follow the well known and explicit rules of his own situation (society). Therefore justice is when individuals perform their duties in conformity to the ethical life or social order (Hegel 1990: 39-40).

The idea of justice, for J. S. Mill (1990) arises from the fact of living in society. Justice renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct consists in, first, not injuring the interests of one another and secondly, that each person bears his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of some labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury. For Mill, justice demands that people observe certain general rules that define what to do and expect. Justice is thus the conformity to law. It implies something which it is not only right to do and wrong not to do but which some individuals can claim from us as his moral right. Mill concludes by saying that justice is grounded on utility (Mill 1990: 302-303 and 467-476). John Rawls (1971) gives a contemporary account of what justice entails. For him, “justice is a set of principles required for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine the division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares. These principles are the principles of social justice, they provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.” (Rawls, 1971: 4).

### **Key Elements of Social Order in the Social Doctrines of the Catholic Church**

According to the social teachings of the Church, the social order operates on four central principles. These are the common good, personality, solidarity and subsidiarity. The first principle of the whole ethical and social order is that of the common good (John Paul II, 1981: 68, Werhahn, 1990: 28). Brugger holds that this principle affirms the state’s duty to ensure common justice and fairness in the relationship between individuals. It assumes that every common body be it a society or community has its own proper task or aim which is the reason for its existence and the basis of its character. For him, the aim of a society must consist in some good, which is to be accomplished by the activity of that society. This good must be accomplished in such a way that it is useful both for the society itself and its individual members themselves (Brugger, 1974). According to Brugger, there

---

---

are different ways of conceptualizing the common good. The two major ways of doing this are as follows: The common good may be understood primarily as the perfection of the members through the existence of the society. Perfection here means enrichment with all the human values that make for a full life. It is in this sense that the common good is conceived for the society and its members. For Brugger, the second approach to the notion of common good is seen as a state or condition of the society itself. This is to say that the common good is, in a sense, an organizing value, which requires two things. First is that the society should have a way of endowing its members with the means necessary for the attainment of its goal. Secondly, the society should also have a way of influencing its members so that they can attain effective cooperation (Brugger, 1974:62).

**192**

The second principle of social order is that of personality, which affirms the dignity of man, expressed through his personal freedom and responsibility of man help to guarantee his dignity as a person who can exist and participate in a social order. In general, “freedom refers to that state of not being forced or determined by something external in so far as it is joined to a definite faculty of self determination” (Brugger, 1974). Freedom for Brugger can be viewed from the physical, moral and psychological perspectives. Seen in the context of the principle of personality, Brugger holds that freedom presupposes freewill or the power a being possesses to determine itself with regard to known limited values, and to choose or not to choose any limited good. Freewill is important to the personality and dignity of man because, without freewill a man cannot be held responsible for his willed actions as such he is not worthy of praise or blame. For him, if freewill is abandoned, then the moral dignity of the person is renounced. But the principle of personality affirms the dignity of man by upholding the freedom and responsibility of the individual as necessary conditions for existence in a social order. According to Brugger, responsibility is also linked to the principle of personality because responsibility is a necessary consequence of human free will, which allows the moral person to be a decisive cause of his good and evil deeds. Responsibility also ensures that a person answers for his deeds and accepts any consequences of his actions. Brugger holds that the dignity of the human person, as a vital condition for his existence within a social order, is seen in his

---



capacity to bear personal responsibility. It is within this context of the freedom and responsibility of the person that the idea of social order as the allocation of social roles, rights and duties in a social system can best be understood (Brugger, 1974:147).

The third principle of social order is the principle of solidarity, which holds that the society and its members are mutually interlinked and responsible for one another (Mc Oustra, 1990, Werhahn, 28, Joseph Cardinal Hoffner, 1990:24, John Paul II 1991: 33, Pope Paul VI, 1967:20). It enhances human dignity, responsibility and contribution to the common good. The mutual bond and obligation existing among the members of a society is the aim of this principle of solidarity. By its nature, the principle of solidarity rejects individualism because it denies the social nature of man. Also, the principle rejects collectivisation because it denies man of his personal dignity and freedom. Within a social order, the principle of solidarity affirms reciprocal relationships, defence of the weak members of society, limitation of the autonomy of powerful groups and persons as well as mutual help and interaction among all in the society.

**193**

The fourth principle of social order is that of subsidiarity, which holds that in the relationship between the individual and society, the subordinate group should have priority over the superior group (Pius XI, 1931:38). That is, neither the state nor any society should substitute itself for the initiative and responsibility of individuals and of intermediate groups in their functions and freedoms. This principle aims at creating favourable conditions for the free existence of economic activity, which will lead to an abundance of opportunities for employment and generation of wealth. Therefore the principle of subsidiarity captures the true aim of social order, which is to help people in a society and not to absorb or destroy them. The principles of social order discussed above provide ample indications of the nature and goals of social order in social and political philosophy.

## **Conclusion**

We reviewed the pattern of disorder in Nigeria. We made a conceptual analysis of social order as a solution taking care to show how its defining elements were

---

linked together in a web of interlocking ideas. Such elements included social system, structure, organization, roles, rights, duties, norms, values, ideologies and justice. We also discussed the four principles of social order namely; the common good, personality, solidarity and subsidiarity. We tried to show how they were linked individually and collectively to the idea of social order. Finally, we examined the major goals of social order such as the security and protection of lives and properties, peace, progress, love and morals. We saw how these goals and the values that enhance them combine to provide a full notion of community which is what social order ultimately aims at.

## References

194

Ackermann, Werner. 1981. "Cultural Values and Social Choice of Technology". *International Social Science Journal*. vol. XXXIII, No. 3. pp. 447-465.

Ajibola in Gyamfi Charles Coffie. 2010. Our story of social and economic breakdown by Ajibola, The Guardian Newspapers. Friday. October 1, p.11.

Aquinas T. 1990. *The Summa Theologica* Aquinas II. Trans. F. Shapcote. L. Great books of the Western World Vol.18 (edited Alder M. J. (Chicago Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc).

Aristotle. 1990. *Politics* Aristotle II. Trans. Jowett, B. Great Books of the Western World Vol. 8 (edited) Alder M. J. (Chicago Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc).

Augustine 1990. *The City of God* (trans) Dods M. Great Books of the Western World (edited) Alder M. J. (Chicago Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.).

Bertsch, Gary, Clark Robert and Wood, David., 1991. *Power and Policy in Three Worlds: Comparing Political Systems*. New York: Macmillan.

Bierstedt, K. 1963. *The Social Order* New York: McGraw Hill.

Bittle C.N. 1950. *Man and Morals* (Milwaulkee The Bruce Pub. Co.).

Braithwiate Tunji. 2012. Corruption, the bane of the nations ills. The Guardian Newspapers. Monday. October 1, p.10.

Brunner. A. and Raemers S.,1937. *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy* London: Herder Books.

Brugger, W. 1972. *Philosophical Dictionary*. Trans. Baker K. Washington: Gonzaga University Press.

Brugger W. 1974. *Philosophical Dictionary*. Washington: Gonzaga University Press.

CENCOD Center for constitutionalism and Demilitarization 2011 Annual Report. 2011. *State of Human Rights in Nigeria*. Lagos: CENCOD.

CENCOD Center for constitutionalism and Demilitarization 2012 Annual Report. 2012. *State of Human Rights in Nigeria*. Lagos: CENCOD.

Collier Paul and Gunning Jan Willem. 1999. "Why Has Africa Grown Slowly". *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. Vol.13. no.3. (Summer). Pp. 3-22.

Ekennia, J. 1998. "African communalism and Political Rationality" *Africa: Philosophy and Public Affairs*. (edited) J.O. Oguejiofor (Enugu. Delta Publishers).

Emmet, D. 1939. "Justice and equality" *Philosophy*. Vol. xiv. no. 53. pp. 46-58.

Fagothey, A. 1959. *Right and Reason* (USA The C.V. Mosby).

Gerwith A. 1981. 'Are there Absolute Rights' *The Philosophical Quarterly* vol. 31 No. 122 (January).

Grisez, G. and Shaw, R. 1989. "A Contemporary Account of the Virtuous life" *right Conduct: Theories and Applications*. Edited by Michael Bayles and Kenneth Henley. New York: Random House.

Hegel G.W.F. 1990. *The Philosophy of Right* Great Books of the Western World Vol. 48 (edited) Alder M.J.. (Chicago Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.).

Hoffner J. Cardinal. 1988. *Economic Systems and Economic Ethics* ORDO SOCIALIS No. 1. Germany: A.A.C.S.S.

House of Representatives 2009-2011. Fuel Subsidy Probe Report. 2012 "House of Representatives Fuel Subsidy Probe Report (2009-2011)" *The Constitution*. Vol. 12. No.3. september. Pp. 129-156.

House of Representatives 2009-2011. Fuel Subsidy Probe Report. 2012. "House of Representatives Fuel Subsidy Probe Report (2009-2011)" *The Constitution*. Vol. 12. No.4. december. Pp. 70-116.

John Paul II. 1981. *Laborum Exercens Encyclical on Human Work*. London: Catholic Truth Society.

John Paul II. 1991. *Centesimus Annus Encyclical on the 100th Anniversary of*

*Rerum Novarum*. Ibadan St. Paul.

Kaiser, F. 1979. "The U.S. Intelligence Community" Society. (May/June).

Kant. I. 1990. *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysical of Morals*. The Science of Right (trans) Hastie W. Great Books of the Western World vol. 39 (edited) Alder M.J. (Chicago Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.).

Kilbourne William E., 2006, "The Role of the Dominant social Paradigm in the quality of Life/ environmental Interface" *Applied Research in Quality of Life*. Vol. 1. pp. 39-61.

Kordig C.R. 1981 'A Theory of rights' *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* vol. 62 No. 2 April).

Kudadjie J. N., 1992, "Towards Moral and Social Development in Contemporary Africa: in Sights from Dongon Traditional Moral Experience in K. Wiredu and K. Gyekye (eds) *Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies 1*. Washington D.C: The Council for the Research in Values and Philosophy. pp. 207-221.

Macridis R. 1989. *Contemporary Political Ideologies*. Illinois: Scot Foresman.

Mc Dowell, J. 1962 "Community". *The American Peoples Encyclopaedia*. New York: Grolier.

Mc Oustra C. 1990. *Love in the Economy*. England St. Paul Pub.

Messner J. 1949. *Social Ethics*. London: Herder Books.

Messner J. 1958. "Community". *New Catholic Encyclopaedia* Vol. IV. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America.

Messner J. 1958. "Society". *New Catholic Encyclopaedia* Vol. 13. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America.

Mill, J.S., 1990. *On Liberty Representative Government Utilitarianism* Great Books of *The Western World*, Vol. 40 (Edited) M.J. Alder (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc).

Nielsen, K. 1996. "Conceptions of Justice" In Mary Hawkesworth (Ed) *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics Volume 1*. London: Routledge.

Oladipo, Olusegun. 1996. *Philosophy and the African Experience* (Ibadan: Hope.

Osha Sanya. 2006."Slow death in the Niger Delta" Review of where vultures feast: Shell, human rights and oil by Okonta and Oronto. *Africa Review of Books*. Vol.2.no.1.march. Pp.14-15.

Otite Onigu. 1990. *Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Shaneson.

Ozohu-Suleiman Abdulhamid and Baba Samuel. 2009. Crime prevention and control in Nigeria: Institutional failure and the option of food security. *The Constitution*. Vol. 9. no. 4. December. Pp.42-60.

Park G. 1982. 'Social Structure and Organization' American Academic Encyclopaedia Sne-Sz 18. Connecticut: Grolier.Inc.

Paul VI. 1967. *Populorum Progressio Encyclical on the Development of Peoples*. Kenya St. Paul's Publishers.

Perry, R. B., 1968. "The Definition of Value" John Hospers (ed) *Readings in Introductory Philosophical Analysis*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Pius XI, 1931. *Quadragesimo Anno Encyclical on Social Reconstruction*. Nairobi: St. Paul Publishers.

Plato 1990. *The Republic I - X* (trans) Jowett B. Great Books of the Western World Vol. 6. Ed. Alder M.J. (Chicago Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.).

**197**

Rawls J. 1971. *Theory of Justice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Removal of Fuel Subsidy. 2012. *The Constitution*. Vol. 12. Culled from the Guardian Newspapers. Editorials of January 9, 10, 11. Lagos, Nigeria. Vol. 12. No. 4. December. Pp. 62-68.

Report of the 2008 Technical Committee on the Niger Delta 2010. *The Constitution*. Vol. 10. no. 1. March. Pp. 82-132.

Report of the 2002 Special Security Committee on oil producing areas (Ogomudia Report) 2007. *The Constitution*. Vol.7. no.3. March. Pp.120-156.

Samatar Abdi Ismail and Samatar Ahmed .I. 2002. *The African State* ((eds) Portsmouth: Heinemann

Schauer F. 1981. 'Can Rights be Abused?' *The Philosophical Quarterly* vol. 31 No. 124. (July).

Scheibe, K. E. 1982. 'role'. *Academic American Encyclopedia* 16 (USA. Connecticut, Grolier), 271.

Schultz Walter. 1982. "The philosophy of inter-personal relations: I and Others"

---

UNIVERSITAS. Vol.24. no.2. pp. 107-114.

Singer Marcus. 1989. "Value Judgements and Normative Claims" in A. P. Griffiths edited *Key Themes in Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sogolo Godwin. 1993. *Foundations of African Philosophy*. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.

Temlong, J. N. Brig Gen. 2003 "Security Agencies and Domestic Security Consideration" *Defence Newsletter* (January / March).

Titus Harold. 1970. *Living issues in Philosophy*. New York: Van Nostrand.

Tocqueville. A. 1990. *Democracy in America Vols 1 & 2* (Trans) Lawrence G. Great Books of the Western World Vol. 44 (edited) Alder M.J. (Chicago encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.)

**198**

Ujomu P. O. 2008. *The Bounds Of Security Theorizing: Envisioning Discursive Inputs For The Rectification Of A Postcolonial Situation* Professor D. Adelugba D and Dr P. Ujomu 2008. *Rethinking Security in Nigeria: Conceptual issues in the quest for social order and national integration*. (Dakar: Senegal CODESRIA). pp.5-56

Ujomu, Philip Ogo. 2000-2001 "Ethics and National Security in Nigeria: Critical Issues In The Search For Sustainable Development". *Voice Millennial Edition* No. 39. pp. 38-40.

Ujomu P. O, 2009. Nigeria's national security problematic and the reinvention of social order: some aesthetic considerations. *The Constitution*. Vol.9. no.1. March. Pp.21-37.

Werhahn P. H. 1990. "The Entrepreneur". *ORDO SOCIALIS*. No. 4 Germany. AACSS.

Wood A. 1979. 'Marx on Right and Justice: A Reply to Husami' *Philosophy and Public Affairs* Vol. 8 No. 3 (Spring).

Zanden J. 1977. *Social Psychology* (New York Random House ).

## **PERCEPTIONS OF THE ORIENTAL IN MODERN GREEK PAINTING**

Greek painting may be divided into three distinct periods: the Ancient, the Byzantine and the Modern. The 19<sup>th</sup> century – a century important to the whole world and even more important to modern Greece – marks the Modern period of Greek painting, and finds the newly established Greek nation, after four centuries of Ottoman occupation, ready to receive every influence from the western world. Following the creation of the Modern Greek State (1828) and the establishment of the School of Arts in Athens, it was natural for the Greek painters to draw their inspiration from the immediate past, representing mostly scenes from the War of Independence (1821). They also immortalized the figures of its heroes whilst displaying at the same time scenes of everyday life always in conjunction with “the Greeks close attachment to their religious faith, their family and their glorious past”. The descriptive detail, a narrative tone, folkloric elements and local costumes became the basic characteristics of Greek genre painting, which later incorporated all new trends of art and concentrated not only in genre painting but also in landscape painting and portraiture. The involvement of genre painting with landscape painting became the main characteristic of the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a period in which are obvious the influences from abroad to the arts and literature and at the same time a modernistic tendency towards

Greekness and the depiction of Greek nature and traditions.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, in this paper it is my intention to discuss the perceptions of the Oriental as they were developed by the Greek painters of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries focusing on several of their own Oriental experiences and on their relations with the Westerners' Orientalism, that is an "Orient rêvé", that reflects their fantasies of a world of intrigue, mystery and exoticism, and in a lesser degree an "Orient connu" by traveling,<sup>2</sup> that was long given an extraordinary experience of the picturesque and exotic as well as of the otherness.<sup>3</sup>

In what follows I will focus on Greek Orientalism, considered it as part of the European Orientalism in terms of its resemblances and aesthetics, and one aspect of the evolution of the secular Greek painting of the 19<sup>th</sup> century showing the new paths of the Greek artists' inspiration and creativity. I will present some Greek painters who under the influences of Westerners artists were at a certain period of time delighted in the high-key intensity of the Oriental light and clapped a colorful palette to render the exotic atmosphere of the Orient in ethnographic paintings they created. They depicted faithfully in a realistic, naturalistic or impressionistic way the images of the Orient, mostly from Greece and Near and Middle East, that fascinated their eyes, with ethnographic exactitude, and represented Oriental picturesque scenes and various aspects of the oriental with sensitivity in the description of customs and characters that illuminates their own perceptions as well as their relationship with the westerners imaginary of the East.<sup>4</sup>

200

1 For the claims of originality in visual arts through Greekness and the autonomous selfhood, at this period, see Periklis Giannopoulos, *Greek line and Greek colour* (in Greek), 'Nea Synora'-A.A. Libanis, Athens, 1922.

2 Cf. A. Souriau, 'Orient/Orientalisme', in *Etienne Souriau, Vocabulaire d'Esthétique*, PUF, 1990, pp. 1098-1099.

3 Cf. Jean-Claude Berchet, *Le voyage en Orient*, in Robert Laffant (ed.), *Anthologie des voyageurs français dans la Levant au XIXe siècle*, Paris, 1985, Introduction.

4 Cf. Tony Spiteris, *Introduction à la peinture néo-hellénique* (in Greek), Athens, 1962, and Angelos Prokopiou, *History of Art 1750-1950*, vol. 2, Romanticism, Realism, Impressionism in Greece (in Greek), M. Pechlivanides, Athens, 1961, pp. 353-457. See also Stelios Lidakis, *Geschichte der griechischen Malerei des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Prestel Verlag, München, 1972.



## Historical Background

Edward W. Said's *Orientalism*, published in 1978,<sup>5</sup> being a defence of the Orient's integrity and a challenge to established Western attitudes towards the East, had in the last decades a major impact on the study of the Orient and led to fruitful analyses in the fields of cultural studies and aesthetics; although Said paid little attention to visual materials, his work served as a source of inspiration for art historians and cultural critics to reconsider Orientalist painting, early colonial photography, postcards and illustrated travelogues.<sup>6</sup> The Orient, as an environment, aesthetically and intellectually distinct from the Occident, as a place of romance and of exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes as well as remarkable experiences, attracted the attention of travelers, writers and painters from the Romantic period of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century till the first decades of the twentieth century, and gave birth to Orientalism, a way of coming to terms with the Orient, based on the Orient's special place in European Western experience.<sup>7</sup> "Orientalism – truly flowered in the nineteenth century, when steam navigation and the railroad made travel easier and facilitated contacts with other landscapes and other people" – and is connected mostly with a space that is located in the Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>8</sup> Actually, it was travel literature and picturing that had been particularly interested in describing, evaluating and imagining the physical and cultural environment of Eastern countries such as Greece, Turkey, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, and cities such as Constantinople, Cairo, and Alexandria. The desire to describe and depict the Orient at that period of time is apparent in the textual and visual representations of the Orient, a space interwoven with Islamic and Christian elements, full of contradictions, that captured the romantic imagination and created Orientalism as a product of an aesthetic mobility and as a mode of discourse and a style of thought. It was actually

---

5 Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, Penguin Books, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

6 Cf. I. Boer, "Orientalism" in M. Kelly (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics*, Oxford University Press, v. 3 (1998), pp. 406-408.

7 Cf. E. W. Said, *Orientalism*, Penguin Books, London-New York, 1978, Introduction, p. 1.

8 Cf. Christine Peltre, *Orientalism*, Editions Terrail/Edigroup, Paris, 2004, p. 12.

---

the Mediterranean space that became an object of permanent fascination for the “orientaliste” – meaning someone who is knowledgeable about Oriental people, their languages, history, customs, religions, and literature, a term that also applies to Western painters inspired by “un Orient connu” – and the “Orientalisant”, the one inspired by “un Orient rêvé”.<sup>9</sup> Since the late Renaissance and throughout the eighteenth century, European travelers had made their journey to the Orient drawn by an insatiable curiosity to know the languages, history, customs, religions, and literature of Oriental people. By the nineteenth century the Oriental journey had become, according to Jean-Claude Berchet, “much more than a mere tourism phenomenon. People aren’t content just to make it; they are forever dreaming about it, having fantasies about it, and depicting it down in words, in painting and in music. The mystery may well have become hackneyed, but it still retains its glamour among the Salon-going public and bookshop customer”.<sup>10</sup>

**202**

Orientalism – related to the arts, literature and the aesthetics of travel – is an art-historical term and a cultural category referring to the depiction of a loosely defined cultural region such as the “Orient”.<sup>11</sup> It is considered, related to the Orientalist painting, as a revelation of the colors, shadows, contrasts, mysteries and unfamiliar faces and landscapes of the Orient; it also demonstrates the European encounter with it that became the studied, the seen, the observed, the object and the source of inspiration linked with such qualities as the exotic,

9 Cf. A. Souriau, ‘Orient/Orientalisme’, in *Etienne Souriau Vocabulaire d’Esthétique*, PUF, Paris 1990, pp. 1098-1099.

10 J.-C. Berchet, *Le Voyage en Orient, Anthologie des voyageurs français dans le Levant au XXe siècle*, Robert Laffont (ed.), Paris, 1985, Introduction. Narratives of the Orient give usually depictions with many different qualities that are apparent in textual and visual representations of it. G. Flaubert, one among many of the French travelers, wrote on March 27, 1853: “We have understood the Orient as something glinting, blaring, passionate and contrasting. In it we saw no more than bayadères and curved sabers, fanaticism, voluptuousness, etc. In a word we were still in the days of Byron. For myself, I felt it differently. What, on the contrary, I like about the Orient is that grandeur that is so unaware of itself, and that harmony of disparate things. I remember a bather with a silver bracelet on his left arm, a blister on the other. There’s the true and yet poetic Orient, rascals in tatters trimmed with braid and all covered in vermin ... It reminds me of Jaffa. As I entered I sniffed both the smell of lemon trees and the smell of dead bodies” in Gustave Flaubert, *Lettres d’Orient*, L’Horizon chimérique, Bordeaux, 1990.

11 Cf. A. Souriau, “Orientalism”, *op. cit.*

the erotic, the sensual, the mysterious, the picturesque, and the unfamiliar. The Oriental obsession existing in the western painting of the nineteenth century, incorporates paintings “well drawn” and “well-painted” in the academic manner of the time, while in later 19th century received new directions corresponding to the diversification of the aesthetic concerns that followed the break down of the academic system and expanded into the impressionists, symbolists and avant-gardists painters’ conceptions of the Orient.<sup>12</sup> Related to painting from Delacroix to Klee, Orientalism incorporated pictures that were linked thematically rather than stylistically, demonstrating the excited responses to the mysteries and seductions of the exotic, that was spread by the storybook entitled *The Thousand and One Nights*, popularly known as *The Arabian Nights* as well as the attitudes caused by the unfamiliar.<sup>13</sup>

The Orient, as an entire system of thought and scholarship, seen as different and sensual, although usually limited in the Mediterranean, is a wide geographical space in which are included the life, history and topography of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Greece, the Crimea, Albania, and Sudan, a wide area that attracted the interest of the artists and travelers long before Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, it was expended in the whole of the 19th century, when Europe became more involved culturally and politically in the Near East, an interest noticed by Victor Hugo in his 1829 poems entitled *Orientales*, inspired by the Greek War of Independence (1821). In the preface to this poetry collection Victor Hugo noted that “In Louis XVI’s time one was a Hellenist, now one is an Orientalist. For empires as for literature perhaps it will not be long before the Orient is called upon to play a role in the Occident”,<sup>15</sup> noticing the fact that the Orient has become in his age a “general concern” for the arts, the science and

---

12 Roger Benjamin (ed.), *Orientalism. Delacroix to Klee*, The Art Gallery of New South Wales (1997), 2001, Introduction.

13 Lynne Thornton, *The Orientalists Painter-Travelers*, ACR Poche Couleur, Paris, 1994, Introduction.

14 *Encyclopaedia of Art*, *op. cit.*

15 V. Hugo, *Préface des Orientales*, (1829).

---

politics. On the other Delacroix's Orientalism introduced concepts and images that fuel certain inflammatory Orientalist images of the Islamic world. In these images, as for example *The Massacre of Chios* (1824) and *The death of Sardanapalus* (1827), inspired by a play by Byron, despotism and violence as well as the ruler's brutal control over the destiny of the people, linked to sex were given a certain perception and attitude towards the Orient that was going to be influential to other artists, such as Regnault, Dehodencq, Clairin and Benjamin Constant. At the same time the Orientalist images of the Islamic world were depicted in the celebrated series of odalisques and the images of harem and bath of J.-A.D. Ingres who relied on travelers accounts as the Turkish Embassy Letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu.<sup>16</sup>

**204**

Many western painters – in particular the early travelers such as the Orientalists, primarily French and British travelers and stay-at-home alike – often relied heavily on literary sources for their works. One of the painter-travellers was Delacroix who traveled to Morocco to have the Orientalistic experience, while later on Klee visited Tunisia for the same reason; nevertheless the usual destinations of European Orientalists in the 1830's and 1840's were Turkey and Egypt. For example, Alexandre-Gabriel Decamps (1803-1860) has given to the audiences the first Orientalist paintings and achieved an unequalled reputation with his travels to Asia Minor and Syria in 1828 as he explored the “everyday life” of Turkish citizens under Islam. Later on the English painters Frederic Lewis and Edward Lear or French painters such as Jean-Léon Gérôme and Léon Belly traveled in Egypt and have given their own conceptions and images of the Orient in their “photographic painting”. Eugène Fromentin, a novelist as well as a painter, has travelled extensively in Algeria in the late 1840's and has written his memories in two influential travel books, *A Year in the Sahel* and *A Summer in the Sahara*, while in his paintings tried to represent pictures of the Orient in an ethnographic and over-documented way. All these Orientalists were attracted by the romantic opportunity of “seeing” and “making” pictures of harems and baths, slave and street markets, Bedouins and soldiers, landscape and architecture,

16 Cf. Roger Benjamin, *Orientalism. From Delacroix to Klee, op.cit.*, pp. 8-9.

choosing themes and stereotypes that are common in all of them, in a realistic or impressionistic way. A new generation of painters including Manet, Renoir, Cézanne, and later on Kandinsky, Matisse, Chagall, Picasso, and Klee, have been attracted by the charm of the East and have given also to us new perceptions of the Orient depicting scenes, portraits and landscapes in a new style, although keeping close to the Orientalist tradition.<sup>17</sup> With all these artists painting became a 'prestigious vehicle for the expression of cultural values' as well as a representation of the Islamic cultures and identities.

### **Greek perceptions of the Oriental**

The lure of the Orient, as it was expressed by the European painters during the nineteenth century, is apparently found in many paintings of the Greek Orientalists of the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, among which are included Nikephoros Lytras, Nicolaos Gyzis, Theodoros Rallis, Symeon Savvides, Pavlos Prosalentis the younger, and Pericles Tsirigotis; later a new generation of painters, inspired by impressionism, such as Thalia Flora-Karavia, K. Parthenis and K. Maleas, represented a later Orientalism, choosing subjects such as gardens, palm trees and sand as well as seascapes, sites and panoramas. All these modern Greek painters have been trained in Athens and abroad, either in Germany, France or Italy; some of them were born in the East or stayed there for long or smaller periods, especially in Asia Minor and Egypt. They were artists influenced by the widespread climate of Orientalism with different starting points and a different direction, since their place of birth or study or the seat of their artistic or exhibition activity was Munich, Paris, London, Rome, Athens or Alexandria. Actually we can distinguish two periods of Greek Orientalism connected with the establishment of the Greek nation-state: the first starts in 1844 and ends by 1862 and the influences from the academic "Munich School" of painting are apparent in the works of the Greek painters N. Lytras and N. Gyzis. At that period influences coming from France and Italy can also be traced in the paintings of

---

17 Cf. Christine Peltre, *Orientalism*, Editions Terrail/Edigroup, Paris, 2004, pp. 216-226.

Th. Rallis, S. Savvides, A. Giallinas, and P. Prosalentis the younger. There is also a later period (1863-1881) of Greek Orientalism, characterized by a plurality of themes and expressive means that bears the marks of impressionism. Among the painters of that period are P. Tsirigotis and S. Scavellis, while at the turn of the century and the first decades of the twentieth century, Thalia-Flora Karavia, a female painter, and K. Parthenis and K. Maleas, important twentieth century painters, also created Orientalist paintings under the influence of impressionism and of new artistic styles.<sup>18</sup> Following their European Orientalistic experience the Greek painters, most of them born in cities of the Orient such as Constantinople, Smyrna, Alexandria, Cairo, or other cities in Asia Minor, kept alive the memories of their youth; after their studies abroad they traveled or stayed for long periods to the East and depicted themes and stereotyped figures similar to the ones presented by the formalistic or impressionistic aesthetics of European masters. The visual representations of the Oriental experiences depicted by the Greek painters convey realistic and unprejudiced views of the “Other” or imported stereotypes.<sup>19</sup> The Greek painters’ memories and their encounter with Eastern cultures is clearly observed in their paintings that bear the mark of the influences exercised upon them and at the same time their own perceptions and fantasies of a world that was familiar to them. Although the so-called Greek Orientalists watched and absorbed the Westerners’ images of the Orient and represented in their pictures themes related to the landscape, natural and cultural, and to stereotyped figures similar to the ones depicted by the Westerners, nevertheless they had their own recollections of an Orient that was attractive and not unfamiliar to them.

In this paper, I shall take as study cases, first Nikephoros Lytras (1832-

18 See E. Georgitzogianni, “The Orient’s enchantment by the Greek painters” (in Gr.), newspaper *Kathimerini*, 2006, pp. 16-19, and Maria Katsanaki, “Images of the Orient in the Greek Painting of the 19<sup>th</sup> century”, in *National Gallery: 100 Years. Four Centuries of Greek Paintings*, (in Greek, 2000), Athens, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., 2001, pp. 89-99.

19 See Yiorgos Kechagioglou, “The national, ethnic and religious ‘Other’ in Modern Greek original prose and prose translations (18<sup>th</sup> c.-1821): A preliminary sketch”, in Anna Tabaki & Stessi Athini (eds.), *Identity and Alterity in Literature 18<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> c. Translation and Intercultural Relations*, Domos, Athens, 2001, pp. 35-48.

1904)<sup>20</sup> and Nicolaos Gyzis (1842-1901)<sup>21</sup>, compatriots coming from the Greek island of Tinos who studied in Athens and Munich, a place where artists such as Franz von Lenbarch (1836-1904) were interested in Orient. They are the most prominent representatives of what is known in the history of Greek painting as the “Munich School”.<sup>22</sup> Besides their scenes of daily life, they made portraits and still-lives and were attracted by the peaceful ambience of the family and the idyllic beauty of country life. The representation of scenes of everyday life was very popular in Munich, in the so-called Biedermeier style or in the style of the School of Carl Theodor von Piloty. Following the Bavarian artists, who exalted the charms of family life, of nature and of rural merrymaking, these two Greek artists have chosen exclusively Greek themes, as Lytras painted exclusively genre scenes in a naturalistic manner, while Gyzis produced at the beginning of his career genre compositions and later symbolic and allegorical works. Their Orientalistic paintings are of “an Orient connu”, as in the summer of 1873 they travel together to Asia Minor and Smyrna, a trip that was unforgettable to them as Gyzis recalls six years later in a letter written in 1879 and addressed to Lytras: “I will never forget our trip to Smyrna. I still have before my eyes those trabs, the

<sup>20</sup> Lytras was taught at the Polytechnic School of Athens by Ludwig Thiersch and later entered the Academy of Fine Arts in Munich as a pupil of Piloty (1826-1886). In his return to Greece he was appointed professor of painting at the School of Arts, took part in many art exhibitions in Western Europe and is considered as the leading painter of the “Munich School” and the most important Greek painter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. He was awarded several first prizes for his genre paintings depicted in a fine naturalistic style. His works can be found in the National Picture Gallery of Athens, the National Bank of Greece, the Coultides Collection, and many other private collections.

<sup>21</sup> Nicolaos Gyzis studied first at the School of Arts in Athens and in 1865 at the Academy of Fine Arts in Munich under Carl Theodor von Piloty (1826-1886). He was at that time influenced by another painter of the realistic school, Franz von Defregger, a student and friend of Piloty's. In 1872 he returned to Athens and established himself there permanently. He exhibited successfully in various exhibitions in Nürnberg, Munich and Paris, and in 1882 was appointed Full Professor at the Academy of Fine Arts in Munich and his work was widely recognized abroad. An extensive and representative collection of his paintings is in the National Picture Gallery of Athens, the Coultides Collection, and many other private collections, as well as in the Neue Pinakothek in Munich.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Andreas Ioannou, *Greek Painting, The 19<sup>th</sup> century*, English translation by D. Dellagrammatika, Melissa Publishing House, Athens, 1974, p. 60 ff.

---

camels chewing their cuds and I can still see you in Aidini when you were taking quince for your fever”<sup>23</sup>. In the same year (1879) Lytras visited alone Egypt and was much attracted by the picturesque of the country which soon will become a source of inspiration to many Greek artists. Nevertheless, both Gyzis and Lytras were inspired by the world of the Orient before their visit there. As early as 1869, Gyzis was already exhibiting at the International Exhibition of Munich an *Oriental with Pipe* (Picture 1), while Lytras had been working on his *Abducted Maid*, a scene which is set on Greek soil; these paintings have given to both artists the opportunity to depict Oriental types before their trip to Asia Minor. Gyzis and Lytras produced later different paintings with Oriental themes, in different styles, naturalistic or impressionistic, and they have been photographed in Munich as Easterners, dressed the one as a Bushi-bourouk and the other as a Hodja.

**208**

Gyzis, after his trip in the Orient, revitalized his expressive powers depicting new themes in a strong natural light enriched by vivid colors in his Munich atelier. He painted many colorful pictures of the traditional professions and customs of the Ottoman world, as is well represented in his works *Oriental with Pipe*, *The Fruit Vendor* (Picture 2), *The Punishment of the Chicken-thief*, *the Slave-market*, *Courtship in Cairo*, *The Abduction of Greek Children* (Picture 3), or *Three Baskibouvouk playing at Cards in a Coffee House at Smyrna*. Gyzis following the practice of the European painters transferred the atmosphere of the Orient into his studio in Munich where he had a collection of objects and costumes from Greece and the Orient and painted “like a German artist, in somber colors, indoors, closed in his studio, even though his soul, full of bright memories”. Gyzis, whose studies of the internal spaces is compared with Ingres’ quality,<sup>24</sup> revitalized also his iconographic and stylistic style and changed his perception of light and color, a change that is apparent too in the paintings of his friend Lytras who, after traveling to the East, displayed his ability to compose multiple-figure groups of exceptional live

23 Maria Katsanaki, “Images of the Orient in the Greek Painting of the 19th century”, in *National Gallery: 100 Years. Four Centuries of Greek Paintings*, Athens, (2000), 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 2001, pp. 89-99.

24 See *Greek Painters* (in Greek), Melissa Publications, Athens, v. 1, pp. 109-110.



lines. Lytras painting entitled *The Fortune Teller* (Picture 4) gives the impression of spontaneity of approach that is an interaction of his working outdoors and reminds us of the Moroccan story-teller of Alfred Dehodencq whose realism and careful observation of costume and ethnic type as well as his fluent brushwork is evident in his work that serves as “a durable document”.<sup>25</sup> The most interesting thing in both Gyzis and Lytras paintings is their tendency to depict in some of their Oriental works the “Oriental other” as Greek subjects. That is apparent in one of Gyzis paintings in which he is showing his friend Lytras on his creative fervor, that is drawing with the tools of his art, surrounded by men, women and children who are watching him, a scene painted in 1875 entitled *The Painter in the Orient* (Picture 5) that reminds nevertheless a home in the Greek countryside with Greeks depicted in it rather than an Oriental environment,<sup>26</sup>

The same interest in depicting the ethnic types, gestures and customs is found in the paintings of Pavlos Prosalentis the younger (Venice, 1857-Alexandria,(?)1894) and of Symeon Savvides (Tokati in Asia Minor,1859, Athens1927), artists that have been also attracted by the Orientalist movement fashionable at that time in Europe. Pavlos Prosalentis, grew up to an artistic milieu of the island of Corfu, and studied painting in the School of Arts in Athens having N. Lytras as a teacher; later he studied in Naples and Paris, before returning to Corfu, his native place. He also lived and worked in Egypt for a long time. His paintings are primarily portraits and his work, more influenced by his Italian schooling, is characterized by a formal realism. A number of oriental subjects depicted by him are kept in Cairo and a small number in his birthplace, Corfu.<sup>27</sup> Savvides on the other hand, an artist of German apprenticeship with a work of a superior quality, was born in Asia Minor (Tocat) in 1869, and had his artistic studies in Athens, at the Polytechnic School, the School of Arts, where he studied architecture, and in Munich where he went on a private scholarship. In Munich he studied under the Greek master Nicolaos Gyzis and the Germans Ludwig von Löfftz and

---

25 Cf. R. Benjamin (ed.), *Orientalism...*, *op.cit.*, pp. 118-119.

26 *Ibid.*

27 Cf. *Greek artists in Egypt, 1860-1920* (in Greek), EPMAS, Athens, 1983.

---

Wilhelm von Diez. He lived in Munich for 24 years while at an advanced age he returned to Athens and died there in 1929. In his artistic life he was fuelled by his travels round his birth place in Near East, from which he borrowed most of the themes for his compositions. He was particularly interested in the study of light and color and many of his oriental subjects offer just such a field of application of his research. Savvides was fascinated by the rich color and the luxury of the Orient. Inspired by a world that was familiar to him he produced a rich artistic work which is distinguished by its tenderness and expressionism. In his *Oriental Bazar* (1905), a work in which he applies his observations regarding light, he transformed the paintings' surface into a game of light and shadow, bright and dark tones, vivid and muted colours. The same style of expression and technique is also found in his *Lighting of the Pipe* (Picture 6). Savvides was a painter of academic genre scenes who painted mainly landscapes,<sup>28</sup> and in all his paintings shows the influence of the western 'plein-airists' and his interest in ethnic types and ethnographic scenes.<sup>29</sup>

**210**

The influence of the French School is apparent in the works of many noteworthy Greek painters who having completed their training in the French studios returned to Greece, mostly during the years after 1850, and contributed to the development of Modern Greek art. Theodoros Rallis (Constantinople 1852-?1909)<sup>30</sup>, is an interesting case of Greek Orientalism, influenced by the French academic style as he was a student in 1876 of Jean-Leon Gérôme (1824-1904), the major representative of late Orientalism in 19<sup>th</sup> century France. Rallis had absorbed his teachers' powerfully sensuous realism and masterly technique and by 1875 he had begun exhibiting in the various Parisian "Salons" and a few

28 Savvides presented his works at important exhibitions in Berlin, Leipzig, Hamburg, Vienna, Paris and London and wrote an essay on painting in German. His works are in the National Picture Gallery of Athens, the Coultides Collection, in art museums in Europe and in many private collections in Greece and abroad.

29 See *Greek Painters*, Melissa Publications, *op .cit.*, pp. 277-278. See also *National gallery*, *op. cit.*

30 His paintings may be found in the Museums of the Louvre, the Picture Gallery of Sydney, Australia, the National Picture Gallery of Athens, the Coultides Collection, and other private collections in England, Egypt and Greece.

years later in the annual exhibiting of the Royal Academy of Art, in London. Born in Constantinople, of a wealthy merchant family, he was initially educated in England, in preparation for a commercial career. Nevertheless, soon he went to Paris and settled permanently in the French capital, where he entered the École des Beaux Arts and became one of the leading figures in the world of art. In 1900 he was appointed a member of the Jury at the Paris International Exhibition, and soon he was made a member of the French Legion of Honour. He painted portraits, but mainly genre scenes and themes inspired from Greek daily life and religion. He proved to be – because of his scenes from life in the Moslem, Jewish and Orthodox Orient – perhaps the Greek orientalist painter *par excellence*.<sup>31</sup> Rallis traveled to Middle East and his great love for this area is reflected in his works that are characterized by an “idealistic mysticism”. In his painting entitled *The Booty* (Picture 7), exhibited at the Paris Salon in 1906, Rallis is inspired by violent acts of the Turkish conquerors and depicts a Greek woman bound and immobilized inside an Orthodox Christian church, a place bathed in an atmosphere of mysticism. It is a painting based perhaps on his recollections of Delacroix’s *Scenes from the massacre at Chios* (1824) and shows his technical precision and visual perfection as well as his master’s documentary realism and at the same time the Greek recollections to the cruelties of the Ottoman conqueror.

Rallis was interested in depicting stereotyped themes in his oriental paintings such as the harem and the hammam, places which present the East as the place where Western erotic imagination found its home. Romantic visions of the hammam are expressed by J. L. D. Ingres in his *Turkish Baths* (Musée de Louvre, 1852) and by J.J. Gérôme in his *The bath* (le Brain, c. 1880-85). Rallis’ paintings such as a *Circasian Woman at the Bath* (1909), show his skill of depicting the nude body, “un élément nécessaire de success” according to Cézanne, as his master Jean-Leon Gérôme. The same influences are also found in his *Oriental Bath* (1880-1890), a painting expressing his memories or fantasies from public baths in the Orient, or Ingres’ fancies of the harem and bath. In the above mentioned picture Rallis represents the myth of the “alabaster” women that reminds us Jean-Leon

---

31 See *National Galley, op.cit.* See also A. Ioannou, *Greek painting..., op. cit.*, p. 243-244.

Gérôme's *Pygmalion and Galatea* (New York, Metropolitan Museum of Arts). In the *Circasian Woman at the Bath* mentioned above, Rallis shows his art to depict the female grace in nudity with the feeling for beauty in a stone interior lighted by light penetrating artfully through the openings in the domed ceiling.<sup>32</sup> In the same way he depicts the nude in his *Oriental Bath* (1880-1890, Metsovo, Picture 8) where the unified colorful space incorporates the architectural elements of the interior with the fair skinned nude feminine bodies is an aesthetically pleasing surrounding. The Ottoman hammam, a place for the cleanliness of the body and for socializing and entertainment of women, attracted the fantasies not only of painters but also of writers as the Greek author Demetrius Kambouroglou (1852-1932) whose description in his *Memoirs of a long life* of a bath in Athens, located in Monastiraki, depicts baths as a place of mystery: "The atmosphere in this bath is surrounded by remarkable mystery. One thinks that a fairytale is being woven in which one could take part in".<sup>33</sup> The same mystery and excitement surrounds the harem and every experience that is connected with the Oriental dream or the mirage that evokes the Orient as depicted by westerners and Greek painters..

**212**

Depicting landscapes and everyday scenes from the Orient coincides with understanding distant cultures. In the aesthetic reflections of the late nineteenth century the art and civilization of the Near, Middle and Far East, mainly China and Japan, and to some extent India, are linked to a desire to understand early or exotic "high civilizations". In this way the encounter of nineteenth-century European art and scholarship with the exotic art and high civilizations shaped the perceptions or insights of creative artists who depicted the picturesqueness of figures and genre scenes as well as landscapes in a photographic manner as well as in an impressionistic style. The Greek artists make in particular in their paintings apparent their European influences and on the other hand express the sentiments of the persons depicted or the atmosphere imposed by the formal and plastic qualities of the landscape; at the same time tried to reconcile the naturalistic rendering of reality, the faithful depiction of the regional costumes

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> See D. Kambouroglou, *Memoirs of a long life* (in Greek), Athens, 1930.

and of the simple decoration of peasant homes with the idyllic nature of the scenes. If the first Greek Orientalists would prefer the picturing of reality in a naturalistic or realistic manner, the painters of the second generation are characterized by indefinitiveness in the outlines of the figures and by the application of impressionistic techniques due to the influences imposed on them. Their paintings are characterized by ethnographic realism and their landscapes by views of the desert and its vegetation. Landscapes of Egypt as represented by the Greek Orientalists of the late period of Modern Greek painting, are of a special importance, since they make exotic elements of the surrounding space coincide with the sentiments of tranquillity and peacefulness reflected by the oriental scenery. Many of these landscape depictions incorporate the variety in color entailed by the strong daylight of the sun or the weak nightlight of the moon and show the influence of European art and Orientalist aesthetics. The traits of the landscape paintings described above become especially apparent in the paintings of such painters as Spyridon Scarvellis (Corfu,1868-Athens,1942), Pericles Tsirigotis (Corfu,1860-Cairo,1924), Konstantinos Parthenis (Alexandria, 1878-Athens, 1967), Thalia Flora-Karavia (Siatista,1870-Athens,1960), and Konstantinos Maleas (Constantinople, 1879-Athens, 1928); this new generation of painters introduced into Greece a revived Orientalism; as impressionism increasingly became the *lingua franca* of international modernist painting from the 1890s onwards impressionism and post-impressionism were incorporated in modern Greek paintings as well as Symbolism, Art Nouveau and Jugendstil. They Greek painters feature the modernist avant-garde Orientalism as expressed by Klee's highly abstracted landscapes or Matisse's Moroccan paintings of 1912-13; the latter restated selected iconographies prevalent in nineteenth century Orientalism, from Delacroix and Ingres to the Gérôme school.<sup>34</sup> The artists mentioned above belonged to a new generation and were westernized through their studies, mostly in Paris; they also had strong links with the East and inspirations from Constantinople, Egypt, especially Cairo and Alexandria, as we can see in Parthenis' *Landscape in Egypt* (Picture 9), Tsirigotis' *Sphinx in Cairo*

---

34 *Orientalism, Delacroix to Klee, op. cit.*, pp. 25ff.

(Picture 10) and Thalia Flora-Karavia's *Women carrying water in Nile*. Konstantinos Maleas, born and educated in Constantinople and in Paris, almost inclusively a landscapist (Picture 11), through his travels in the Orient, especially in Egypt, and under foreign modernist influences, formed his own style as he had adopted the new revolutionary experimentations and teachings of modern art, which can be found in the adoption of his formalistic composition or in the simplification of colour and his technique incorporated in his Egyptian landscapes.<sup>35</sup> For the above mentioned artists Turkey and Egypt were irresistible as images of the Islamic splendour of caliphate architecture or for depicting landscapes and 'everyday life' of Turkish or Egyptian citizens.

**214**

Generally speaking the painters of the Orient took care to transfer its atmosphere and its perfume to their European studios where they amassed of various objects from the countries they had visited which did not simply decorate the work space but were used, along with the drawings they had executed during their trips, in the composition of their paintings. Of course one might agree with Edward Said that oriental depictions constitute manifestations of European and Christian prejudice against the Arab-Islamic world and its culture or taste conception of the cultural other.<sup>36</sup> But one has to admit that in the works of the Greek Orientalists the Orient is not represented only as a picturesque or beautified image of a dream or of the imagination or even according to prejudices and misconceptions. In this sense, in some of the paintings of the Greek Orientalists, one can conceive the perceptions of the Orient of these painters and their attitude to express the very spirit of an Orient experienced which was, because of their roots and idiosyncrasy, familiar and valuable for pictorial representation. Looking at their pictures we realize that they can be enjoyable, exciting, moving or communicative. Some pictures are easily

35 For the relation of the Greek poet K. P. Kavafis (born in Alexandria 1863- 1933) with Greek painters such as Thalia Flora- Kavadia, who stayed and worked for many years in Alexandria, or Konstantinos Maleas, his reception of the visual figures of his age and environment, as well as his knowledge of the texts of Theophile Gautier or of the French Symbolism, see E. Andreadi (ed.), *K. P. Kavafis. His world and the visual figures of his age*, Ministry of Culture-Megaron, Athens, 2004 and *Greek artists in Egypt 1860-1920* (in Greek), Athens, 1983.

36 E. Said, *Orientalism*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978.

appreciated at first glance, but others require some explanation before they can be fully understood. In particular, some of the landscapes of Egypt represented by the Greek painters of the twentieth century are discerned by their sentimentality.

Usually Orientalist Aesthetics approaches the visual culture of exoticism by ranging wide from decorative arts to colonial museums. Orientalist art was created by ‘armchairs Orientalists’, naturalists who spent years of living in the oases of the Sahara, Fauve and Cubist travelers who created decors of indigenous figures and tropical plants; in the period of high modernism it has given, besides Renoir’s Algerian oeuvre, the abstract vision of Matisse’s Morocco or Klee’s picturesque landscapes.<sup>37</sup>

It is well known that a good painter knows how to compose his picture, has a subtle sense of color harmonies or a bold sense of tonal dissonance; his work can give satisfaction, please and enlarge our understanding of a theme, enrich our perceptions of form, or can open up to us a whole new world of feeling and seeing. That applies to all Orientalists. In the case of the Greek Orientalists one can say that their depictions and what they represent were naturally contoured to the things they depict and showed their mastery, as in their works, although inspired by the European trends of art, they have given a rich body of work connected with their perceptions of an “Orient connu” that was familiar and significant to them. In their paintings we can see ways of perceiving the Orient as well as their reflections on art, and their willingness to adopt the Goncourts’ definition of art: “To see, to feel, to express, this is the whole of art”.<sup>38</sup> Their pictures incorporate this dictum as well as aestheticism and beauty, connect art with history and culture, and indicate their ability to adopt the taste of their age and at the same time their own creativity.

---

37 For a history of Orientalist art, see in Roger Benjamin, *Orientalist Aesthetics. Art, Colonialism and French North Africa 1880-1930*, University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 2003. See also Roger Benjamin, *The Decorative Landscape. Fauvism and the Arabesque of Observation* (1993).

38 Cf. Edmond and Jules Goncourt, *Journal des Goncourt. Mémoires de la vie littéraire*, II, Monaco, 1956, p. 251.

---

With the oriental perceptions of the modern Greek painters I mentioned above we have a cultural paradigm reflecting memories connected with their past and present. Besides, we experience an accepted cultural orientation connected with the European Orientalism, classical, modernistic and avant-gardistic. In the last few years the profound impact of the crisis in all levels of contemporary Greek life had generated a new interest for the Eastern world and cultures. A paradigm of the representation of the East through non-European eyes is the Turkish TV series of Suleiman the Magnificent that make possible to wide audiences to experience the life, the arts, the customs and the culture of a distanced age in an representational way that depicts in an authentic way the life and art of the 16<sup>th</sup> century Turkish life. As in the Orientalistic paintings so in contemporary movies, presented and directed not by westerners but by easterners, there is a tendency to depict actual, historical and imaginary facts in an naturalistic way and create characters who pass through borders of time, history, geography and politics.



## **THEORY OF CONTEMPORARY ART: LINES AND CURVES (Post-History and the Discomforts of Periodisation)**

Why does it seem so self-intelligible that the major watershed world historical events are crucial for the periodisation of art? Is this not just a proof of the proposition that art cannot be understood just per se? Anyone who today wishes to preserve the idea of the autonomy of modern art has to come to terms with an intransigent paradox. If art serves no one outside its own purposes, how is it at all possible that through repeated invocations of autonomy in fact reference is made to its necessary intervention in the social setting, in the cultural configurations of power, political projects, economic relations and ethical principles? Let us put the problem more simply as follows. Art in the modern period has liberated itself from external coercion by becoming autonomous. It has become the subject of aesthetics as its own new metaphysical theory. The periodisation of art, as history of styles, is at the foundation of the origin of the autonomous academic discipline of art history, since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, all the way down to its current transformation into the interdisciplinary complex of the study of art. And from the very beginning it has been seen that the paradox of the independent consideration of art as “subject” of the historical consideration of its adventure rests in the essence of that which art opens through its epochal manner of happening or acting in the world.

---

Art in all historical epochs has the task of being more than art. It can never be either autonomous or heteronymous. It can never serve just itself or some other purposes. Nor can it be reduced just to the aesthetic truth, experience, incidence. Social revolutions and historical events that change the manner of life of people hence are not superordinate for an insight into the being of artistic practice. In the event of what has for half a century by now been called contemporary art, the problem is radicalised. Unlike modern art, which reposes on the idea of autonomy, contemporary art endeavours to put into practice the essence of the avant-garde art of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It attempts, that is, artistically to revolutionise the social conditions of the self-generation of art.

**218**

Contemporary art, by its very act of radical negation of history as linear progress, is an exceptional adventure in the total modification of the society in which it occurs and acts. Hence it is clear that the paradox of social self-reference determines its incessant striving for innovations, novelty and dynamism. It is impossible then to periodise visual art in such a manner that from some event-in-the-world, like, for example, the Socialist Revolution of 1917, the whole project of the Russian avant-garde is connected with the social and political subjects of change. Malevich and Russian Futurism were an ideational and artistic avant-garde of the actual social revolution, which was to end up in the defeat of Utopia and the installation of totalitarian ideology as the result of the lack of radicalness of the idea of the demolition of tradition. It is also inappropriate to say that we can periodise contemporary art itself, and the theory of it after 1989, and the end of the period of communism in eastern Europe, from the squaring of accounts with the symbolic power of the year of the epoch-making end of a modern ideology. The French Revolution is not the key for the beginning of modern art, just as a world historical event, like the said 1989 and the entry into the period of post-history, is not the superordinate framework for the periodisation of that which constitutes the essence of the story of contemporary art today.

The debate about historical periodising can too often be futile, but is nevertheless incontestably utile. From it we can derive a certain security in our own procedures, even when they are explained by the consequences of the working of the spirit of the times. For many people, the entry into the 21<sup>st</sup> century

---

will be marked by the symbolic deed of the terrorist Al Qaeda group on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. The question of periodisation was legitimate all the way to the end of the period of the modern and the postmodern as identical, if diverse, configurations of the ideas and styles present in the arts of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This period was brought to a symbolic close in 1989 with the great turn of the liberal democratic revolutions in Europe and the world at large. The globalisation that has been in operation in earnest since that date has led to a radical transformation of the world in general. The end of ideologies as the end of history marked the moment of the real occurrence of post-history. In this event, there is no longer any strict differentiation and separation. Everything is instable and fluid. Styles are individualised. The collective practices of the neo-avant-garde became the aesthetic and political canon. Kitsch has become democratised. Taste qua category is obsolescent. The same thing happened long ago with the categories of the aesthetics of the modern world (beauty, the sublime, moderation, harmony, pleasure and so on). Finally, life itself in the time of bio-genetics and bio-technology has contributed to the space-time environment being understood as the realised space of an artificial surrounding and a life modified by technology. It can be supplanted at any moment whatsoever.<sup>1</sup>

It is no longer appropriate to speak of some regional, local or any nationally defined space in which art happens as a contemporary experience of the freedom of surmounting borders. This, on the other hand, in no way marks the triumph of some illusory cosmopolitan culture and art with no grounding in its own space and time. On the contrary, the basic characteristic of this state of permanent transition in the world of art is fluidity and the traumatic search for a new identity. In this article about the state of the theory of contemporary art after 1989 there can only be a discussion of universal tendencies. Particularity is not in any case any marker of serious theory. Just as in the global age national philosophy or science is a *contradictio in adjecto* so contemporary art and the theory of it lie beyond the dynamics of the nation state. If contemporary identities are trans- or

---

1 Žarko Paić, *Image without the World: The Iconoclasm of contemporary Art*, Litteris, Zagreb, 2006.

---

post-national, then this has to be reflected in the local Croatian scene too. Social, political and cultural postulates for the effect and incidence of contemporary art in Croatia since 1989 make up only the inevitable context of the changes that have overcome the whole of eastern Europe, particularly with respect to the end of the neo-avant-garde projects of that space.

The cartography of art is not definitive when it comes to the essence of artistic strategies. But it does turn out to be a fundamental problem in the representation of contemporary art. In this the conceptual conflict of West and East can be seen as a primarily ideological conflict concerning the occupation of power in the social representing of culture and art. As the situation with the post-communist image of eastern Europe is becoming standardised, so the ideological construction of the region in which we lie – eastern Europe, the Balkans – appears only any longer as a cultural stereotype. Now that such countries as Bulgaria and Romania have entered the EU, the prevailing discourse of reflexive cultural racism, which has been able to be read off from various reviews and exhibitions of contemporary art from these areas, has had to change. The case of the Harald Szemann exhibition *Blood and Honey* is a paradigmatic example of the working of a conscious or unconscious cartography of culture that reflects the situation of intercultural relations between the West and the East of Europe.<sup>2</sup>

**220**

---

2 See in this connection the exhibition catalogue and introduction of Harald Szemann: *Blut & Honig: Zukunft ist am Balkan*, Kunst der Gegenwart, Sammlung Essl, Vienna, 16.05.-28.9.2003.

### *The borders of contemporary art*

All this is self-intelligible, but precisely for this reason it is missing in many worthwhile panoramas, reviews and reconstructions of contemporary art.<sup>3</sup> But since after 1989 there has been an appreciable rise in interest in thinking about contemporary art, manifestly, in the period of post-history, the main problem for the theory of contemporary art is that it is no longer possible to define the borders of events or actions of the essence of an art that transcends itself and makes social and cultural life its own circle of signification. In various different theories of contemporary art we are constantly coming upon the following question: is it any more possible to speak about contemporary art without making references to the development of the paradigms of contemporary social and humanist and natural sciences and philosophy?<sup>4</sup> The relation between the contemporary artist and the contemporary scientist or thinker is not the relation of mutual partners about the same job, but more of a matter of a

221

3 Heinrich Klotz starts his exceptionally important book about the theory of contemporary art with the incontrovertible apodictic judgement from which follows the mainly accepted periodising of the epochal lines of development of visual art in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The judgement is apodictic because it starts off from the premises that the “comprehensive concept for the history of art in the 20<sup>th</sup> century is the concept of the Moderne [in the sense of *Art moderne* –tr.]. All alternatives to the concept of the Moderne have failed to give results.” Then naming the dictators and totalitarian leaders that endeavoured to turn the direction of history by the revival of classicism in art and architecture (neo-Baroque and the local or regional style), Klotz with justice considers contemporary art in the continuity from modernism to the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The periodisation of temporally determined trends is the result of the process of modernisation as progress and development, cycle and revival. It is meanwhile clear that after the period of the fatigue of the avant-gardes, always on the agenda is some form of the renovation of the new as the non-obsolescent. Klotz is thus a consistent neo-modernist, who divides the history of art of the 20<sup>th</sup> century into: (1) the avant-garde (the classical Moderne or international style), (2) the period of the classicising reaction of the dictators (3), the post-war Moderne (fifties); (4) the functionalism of reconstruction and development; (5) the age of post-Moderne and (6) the trends of neo-Moderne or the second Moderne of the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century - Heinrich Klotz, *Kunst im 20. Jahrhundert: Moderne, Postmoderne, Zweite Moderne*, C.H. Beck, Munich, 1999. p. 7.

4 Heinrich Klotz, *Kunst im 20. Jahrhundert: Moderne, Postmoderne, Zweite Moderne*, C.H. Beck, München, 1999, Dieter Mersch, *Ereignis und Aura: Untersuchungen zu einer Ästhetik des Performativen*, Edition Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M, 2002, Marc Jimenez, *La querelle de l'art contemporaine*, Gallimard, Paris, 2005, Christa Maar/Hubert Burda (eds.), *ICONIC TURN: Die Neue Macht der Bilder*, DuMont, Cologne, 2005.

metaphor of tuned bells on the opposite side of the hill, which Heidegger mentioned when he wanted to give a suitable simile for the essence of hermeneutics.

The real question is no longer how to determine the borders of the given area. It is simply not possible to analyse the contemporary arts in the age of the media without a knowledge of new media theories and practices. Just as mediology itself has been since quite recently one of the new sciences of the image, so the actual art that makes use of media resources is necessarily the art of the new media or the media art.<sup>5</sup> Instead, then, of the issue of the disciplinary borders of theory (of art) and of contemporary art that in its very beginnings – since the period of the historical avant-garde of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – set about the modification of society via overcoming the boundaries between art and life, the turn is in the posing of the question itself. What is it in general that sets the need for the issue of the border? Why do we need to fix a boundary for something that is in its tendency unbounded and unlimited? If the whole history of art from the Moderne to the present days is the development of the disappearance of borders among worlds – or art, society, cultural and life – then the most recent period from, provisionally, 1989 can be appropriately understood only from an insight concerning the permanent transition of the world of art.

**222**

Here it is at once necessary to say that this concept does not refer to events in the so-called post-communist condition. Boris Groys, theoretician of modern art, developed a scientific project concerning this topic, resting on the idea of the re-politicisation of art. The condition of incessant transition between two shores, from one point to another, from one side to another, seems even to be an impossible project for the total mobilisation of art. The only thing that is certain after 1989 and the entry into the period of post-history of globalisation is the fact that all the borders have vanished, and that all the walls between cultures and identities have been pulled down. Art did not become global. The world

---

5 Lev Manovich, *The Language of New Media*, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, Cambridge-London, 2001, Klaus-Sachs Hombach, *Znanost o slici: discipline, teme, metode*, Izdanja Antibarbarus, Zagreb, 2006, Régis Debray, *Cours de médiologie générale*, Gallimard, Paris, 1991, Lambert Wiesing, *Artifizielle Präsenz: Studien zur Philosophie des Bildes*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M, 2005.

is globalised, but the issue of the essential character of such a world is the issue of the meaning of post/trans/meta-national identities as social constructions of cultures. Identity is simultaneously constructed and deconstructed. It is never a final product. It is created in conflict and in dialogue. It is possessed only when one's own life is determinedly run as if it were a style. It is lost with acquiescence in the possibility of choice, by the fact of the choice of the a priori contingent and subsisting. The paradox of the contemporary identity lies in its being able to be constructed through the deconstruction of the modern identity. The same thing holds for the works and events of contemporary art. Every raid on authenticity is condemned at the outset to the ironic treatment of the original. From Duchamp's ready-mades to the paradoxical logic of the simulacrum leads the same road.

It is not hard to remark that many reviews of contemporary art, like Documenta in Kassel in 2002, when the selector was a US-based Nigerian political scientist, Enwezor, in terms of idea, are just a copy of social changes that have taken place caused by the process of the globalisation of a world without borders. In spite of sociologists of globalisation speaking of a nascent global culture, this is in fact a process in which the traditional difference between technology and culture has vanished. Media art in the digital age is a reliable indicator of this assumption. What we are witnessing today is the process of the interfusion of spheres of human assumptions of attitudes that have previously been kept apart. The technologising of culture and art is at the same time a process of culturalising and aestheticising contemporary technology.<sup>6</sup>

In his destructive criticism of contemporary art and spectacle Jean Baudrillard quotes Marshall McLuhan: We have now become aware of the possibility of arranging the entire human environment as a work of art. At issue here is the wish to aestheticise the world as work of art. In this nihilistic stance about the realisation of art in the world of design and art we encounter the vanishing of

---

<sup>6</sup> Žarko Paić, *Identity Politics: The Culture as new Ideology*, Antibarbarus Editions, Zagreb, 2005.

metaphysical borders.<sup>7</sup> Contemporary art and its theory in the condition of post-history constantly confirm this awareness of their own fluidness and traumatic search for the point of their own existence in their works and doings. The theory of art in all possible discourse of the crossing of borders (philosophy of art, aesthetics, science about arts, history of art) is not longer just a reflexion about its own subject, but above all else something a great deal more rigorous. In this certain dangers should be seen, and an attempt should be made to obviate them in time. Art theory in the era of post-history has the pretension of direct art itself according to the idea of art as a *Novum Organum* of perception, if it were wished to speak in a more gentle Schellingish tone instead of the cynical postulate of many contemporary artists that today there is a reign of theoretical terror over works of artistic practice.

224

The problem of the disappearance of borders among disciplines has though far-reaching negative consequences. The appointment of new concepts for artistic reality and its object has become a way of operating with arbitrary definitions. The language of this kind of theory is a hybrid complex of the articulating of meanings without any materially fixed objects. Semiotics has become from an auxiliary and marginal discipline, today, a kind of ontology of culture for the world of media and visual self-transparency. There is utterly no knowing why every act of intellectual reflection about art has to be called theoretical. What is called collectively theory is the result of the cultural turn that happened in the

<sup>7</sup> The revolutionary idea of contemporary art was that any object, any detail or fragment of the world could exert the same attraction and raise the same questions as those formerly restricted to a few aristocratic forms called works of art. That was democracy: not just in the access of all people to the enjoyment of art, but in the aesthetic uprising of an object-world where, to quote Warhol's famous formula, each object, without distinction, would have its quarter hour of fame - and particularly those banal objects, images and commodities. All are equivalent, everything is great - universal ready-made. Reciprocally art and the work of art are also transformed into objects - ready-mades without illusion or transcendence - art as a merely conceptual acting-out, a generator of deconstructed objects that deconstruct us in turn. Conceptual objects generated not by art itself, but by the idea of art. No body, no face, no gaze - just organs without a body, flows and networks without substance, fractals and molecules. No more judgment, pleasure or contemplation - one gets connected, absorbed, immersed, just as within force-fields or networks. Cf. Jean Baudrillard, *Inteligencija zla ili pakt lucidnosti*, Naklada Ljevak, Zagreb, 2006, p. 100. Translate: Leonardo Kovačević



social and human sciences, sociology, anthropology and ethnology, in the 1980s.<sup>8</sup> All the sciences in the interdisciplinary endeavour to find a new place became part of the great postmodern complex of the theory of culture and cultural studies. The primacy of culture over society, identity over functions and structures, live styles over social role was also reflected on the status of contemporary art and theory about it.

The legitimacy and performativeness of the cultural turn marks the final incursion of culture as new ideology into the discourse of all the newly founded disciplines. There is only one thing to talk of then – the reign of terror of culture, as theory, over all other sections of the complex totality of reality in a disintegrated world with no borders. This is at the same time the reason why I do not think all contemporary attempts at a theory of art, nor contemporary art itself in the age of post-history, a radical opening up of a new world, but just rather more successful or perhaps better executed projects, strategies, experiments of turning in the same vicious circle that has determined the fate of contemporary art from the time of the first avant-garde onwards. Terrorisation by culture theory is a continuation of reduction of art to society. And the next step, already realised, is the terror of artistic life as a technologised second nature (media art in the A-life digital space) over the authentic life of art in general.

The postulate, then, is that the universal criticism of post-history in works and events of contemporary art and its theories has not opened up any possibilities for the deconstruction of what for a whole century has crucially determined all the failures and all the utopian projects of contemporary art. This is the dazzling, spellbinding, dogmatic, unreflected power of the new, which is constantly and always again taken over as the watchword of each new generation. The novelty of the new is a regressive and progressive marking time, without any radical possibility of getting over a world in which the object from the surrounding world, like Duchamp's bicycle or urinal occupies the aesthetic position of artistic production or, like the generated object from the live digitalised environment as

---

8 Doris Bachmann-Medick, *Cultural Turns: Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften*, Rowohlt, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2006.

model of relations between interactive subjects of communication.<sup>9</sup>

Contemporary art does not live up to its name. It is not con-temporary, rather current. Only currency in the form of the temporal ecstasy of presentness determines its temporal character. Contemporary art must in its ontological and temporal attitude towards the world, divine and human, even when this set is called into question or historically demolished, open up a possibility for the encounter of an dialogue between epochal worlds. Time cannot be reduced to the current. It outlives now, for it is guided by what is behind the now. Every ecstasy of the new assumes a hypostasis of the future. While the first historical avant-garde was held an open space of the future qua utopia, the second or neo-avant-garde of the 1960s attempted a return to reality.<sup>10</sup> This was a moment when the media-produced world of art was halted in the triumph of the consumer culture of late capitalism. The current with no past or future closed with the Pop Art of Warhol and Rauschenberg any possible dialogue of the epochal witnesses of diverse times. Now the situation is such that new art no longer deconstructs the old. It no longer has as its objective a project for a society of the future, rather ever new art only produces its own currency in a time that has been totally voided and discharged of the imminent.

226

Many artists who do not resist a dialogue with theory, but rather in fact back it up and make it a concept in their events/their works of art practice, like the Croatian conceptualist and transmedia artist Dalibor Martinis<sup>11</sup> and Andreja Kulunčić, who, for example, in their most recent works, belong to the metapolitical spaces of artistic intervention in the social space of democracy, tell of the attempt at a reflexive attitude towards issues of time, as the basic issue of contemporary art. A breakthrough beyond the current is as it were considered a

9 Boris Groys, *Art Power*, The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, 2008, Oliver Grau, *Virtual Art: From Illusion to Immersion*, The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London-Cambridge, 2003

10 Hal Foster, *The Return of the Real*, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, London-Cambridge, 1996.

11 For the artistic oeuvre of Dalibor Martinis see: Nada Beroš, *Dalibor Martinis: Javne tajne / Public Secrets*, MSU-Omnimedia, Zagreb, 2006.

necessary step into a-historicity or anachronism. But this is all that art can offer as some possibility of an alternative to the current world of globalised technology, culture and social fragments of identity. If art cannot have the power to create alternative worlds, then it is reduced to being a product of communication, not a creative *mise-en-scene* of the happening of the new. All competent theories of contemporary art that have marked the post-historical period since 1989 even in the most profane significance ascribe to art the power of the alternative.

Art as alternative to the current? This never appears as concept since contemporary art is condemned to wandering through the world without a labyrinth. Wherever there is no mystery, the mysterious power of the desert reigns. Every thing is infinitely open, infinitely empty. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* saw in the image of the desert the moment of the creation of history as a transverse striped space of the crossing of perspectives. What do these perspectives look like, what kind of credibility do they have?

### Three paradigms

Contemporary art theory since 1989 is determined by the endeavour to deconstruct a single ruling idea from which every possible real art project and its incarnation can be explained. There is no royal road to the centre of the problem. The most important theories of contemporary art are at once paradigms for the explanation of the relations between the world, society, politics, culture and art in the age of post-history. Three paradigms are the most credit-worthy since they correspond in terms of theory to the essence of our time. Under their aegis, and in contemporary Croatian art or the contemporary period it is possible to identify the ability creatively to appropriate the area of an alternative to the world of the neo-imperialist globalitarian order in which art has become a generating plant for the production of cultural spectacle. All three paradigms answer the question about the point of contemporary art in a world after the establishment of an integrated ideological and political, and economic, model of globalisation. Their basic feature is determined by an insight into the necessity of re-evaluating

---

the inheritance of modern and avant-garde art, traditional aesthetics and post-aesthetics, the history of art, science concerning art and the phenomenology of the image. The first paradigm is the re-politicisation of art; the second is the re-aestheticising of the world of life, and the third is the visual or iconic turn. The most important theorist of the first paradigm is Boris Groys, of the second Dieter Mersch, and of the third a group of various different art historians, art philosophers, sociologists of knowledge and visual theoreticians such as Gottfried Boehm, Hans Belting, Peter Sloterdijk, Bruno Latour and W. J. T. Mitchell.

(1) The understanding of contemporary art of the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century seems inseparable from new radically critical attempts of theory (of philosophy, sociology, psychoanalysis) at the explanation of the working of the ideology of globalisation and globalism. A turn from the insight that with the end of communism there had come the end of history as the world of liberal democracy and global capitalism occurs actually with the renovation of various neo-Marxian and post-Marxian theories of history. It should be enough to mention the influential works of Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Giorgio Agamben and Paolo Virno of the new approach to “humanity” from the horizon of the issue of the limits or boundaries of human rights. From a criticism of global capitalism and its biopolitical production of the person to utopian projects for surmounting the commodity structure of the society of spectacle the analyses and theoreticians of contemporary society. The already mentioned platform of Documenta in Kassel in 2002 confirms the idea that the paradigm of the repoliticisation of art is a kind of new discursive power. The main topics of artistic practice are at one and the same time the main topics of the critical theory of globalisation. These include the liberation of the Other (women, sex and gender minorities, authentic third world peoples), resistance to the spectacle of the power of the consumer society, the rights of animals, art as utopian space of community outside the logic of Western (Eurocentric) universalism.

German philosopher and art theorist Boris Groys has best articulated the essence of this paradigm.<sup>12</sup> By abandoning the categories of beauty and the sublime, contemporary aesthetics and art are becoming communicative practices. Beauty is subordinated to fashion, and fashions are in constant mutual conflict and contradiction. With the transformation of the aestheticised object into the world of life, a turn has occurred. The world of life has subordinated the world of art to its own purposes. The main marker of the art of our time is hyperproduction (of photographs, video art, cyber art, film). Hence the theory of art has changed its standardising function. It no longer dictates the conceptual framework of contemporary art, rather keeps up with it, although the relation between theory and contemporary art is shot through with paradoxes. New aesthetics and theories of art attempt to impose on the big art exhibitions (Venice, Kassel) at least the basic orientations, the concepts, the paradigm, if it is not possible to achieve some canon or typology of styles. In his analyses of the strategies of contemporary art, Groys follows the logic of the contemporary avant-gardes. If everything has become the world of a life that is ruled by politics, then art has been left with the possibility of joining in the critical resistance to the world of global capitalism by the repoliticisation of its subject.

Groys's position is that of social criticism and ontological politics. Repoliticising art means to work in conformity with the basic ideas of the avant-garde concerning the change of social and living conditions of the reproduction of life itself. In such an extension of the historical avant-gardes with other means, art takes over the role of the activity of life itself. Groys belongs to the circle of neo-Marxist critical thinking. He finds inspiration for his theoretical work in Adorno, Benjamin, Debord. Referring to the theoretical writings of Foucault, Agamben and Hardt/Negri, he connected biopolitics with the necessity for the repoliticisation of art. New biotechnology opens up the possibilities and limits of the genuine relation of the world of life with the issue of humanism. From the autonomy that belongs to modern art, contemporary art has to move into an active, and activist, stance towards the neo-imperial system of global capitalism.

---

12 Boris Groys, *Topologie der Kunst*, C. Hanser, München, 2003.

The repoliticisation paradigm for art has been derived from the paradigm of the repoliticisation of culture, which was sociologically carried out by Pierre Bourdieu.<sup>13</sup> It is obvious here that art has an autonomous status vis-à-vis culture, which is itself primarily an ideological tool in the system of global capitalism. Art has not lost its ability to create new worlds by having engaged with the world with social criticism. Where are the borders of such a commitment? If we ask where the need is at all for art to be repoliticised, we will find ourselves up against the challenge of the criticism of a paradigm that derives its programme from a superior social, political and cultural criticism of existing. Like the other two paradigms of the theory of contemporary art, Groys' repoliticisation of art is nothing but a revival of the potentials of the avant-garde in the time of the end of the avant-garde. The prevailing form of artistic intervention into society under the rule of ideologies is the conceptual and performative deed of opening up awareness about the problem of the perversion of human liberty. The deconstruction of the body in the space of the perversion of human liberty, the iconoclastic act of destroying the new visuality that is being put to use by the spectacle of capital, the networking of collective initiatives (community art) comprise a triad of procedures of the social criticism function of art in the time of post-history. The borders of this paradigm lie simply in its responding to the loss of art's autonomy by reducing it to politics. As in the case of the first historical avant-garde, here too we are concerned with a reduction of the original assemblage of art.

230

When art is reduced to society and politics, the chance for any alternative to the world of the current vanishes. Art becomes only social commentary, political activism and means for a different end. Groys and numerous advocates of this paradigm have never carried out a radically critical deconstruction of the whole of the heritage of the avant-garde for a breakthrough beyond the functional system of the new, of the current and the social participation of art. The repoliticisation of art is a reductive paradigm of the revival of the old for the new age, that of biopolitics. And here life itself is still treated as a social and cultural body instead of, via a criticism of biopolitics, criticism of any need for a new politicisation of art being derived.

13 Žarko Paić, *The Power of Non-Subjugation: Intellectual and Biopolitics*, Antibarbarus Editions, Zagreb, 2006, pp. 126.-139.

(2) The re-aestheticisation of the world of life does not refer so much to the orientation of art practices in the age of post-history as much as to the problem of testing out the possibility of art being thought of out of itself as a new aesthetic event (Ereignis). Thus since 1989 there have been relatively many theoretical attempts of the new aesthetics (appearance [in the sense of coming into view] or phenomenon, mise-en-scene, performativeness). These have all be responses to the problem observed that contemporary art can no longer be understood from the standpoint of the massive ontology of the beautiful and the sublime. The most interesting representative of this paradigm must be the German philosopher and media theorist Dieter Mersch. He has articulated a new language and conceptual framework for the situation of the post-historical constellation of art as event and aura (Heidegger-Benjamin) in the environment of the performative practice of contemporary art.<sup>14</sup> For Mersch three aesthetics have been drawn into the vortex of the modern age: the aesthetics of tradition, of the work of art and of the avant-garde. Conceptual differences between modern and contemporary art correspond to some kind of epistemological cut. Thus for modern art, the aesthetics of the work is relevant, for contemporary aesthetics, of the event. The objectlessness of abstract painting and the iconoclasm of the avant-garde lead into the space-time of the re-aestheticisation of the world of life because in it the event of the performative relation of man and world unfolds as an event of the gleam of the world. Event-art, happening, the installations and performances since the 60s and the period of the second historical avant-garde in the visual arts no longer show anything.

This is the meta-art of the event. It takes place in the world of life, for the work, in the traditional meaning of the autonomous work of art, has been replaced by the production of life itself as artistic event that has deprived the work of the right to authenticity. Performativeness for Mersch then is the basic category for the artistic event. The historical moment of the origin of the performative event in 20<sup>th</sup> century art was Dadaism. For contemporary art since the 1960s only

---

14 Dieter Mersch, *Ereignis und Aura: Untersuchungen zu einer Ästhetik des Performativen*, Edition Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M, 2002.

the *act* is important, the action, the moment of intervention in the space, the provocation of the state of society, the overturning of taboos, communication with the environment, interaction and *mise-en-scene*.

Performative projects go on in a time outside vulgar metaphysical temporality (past-present-future). They are virtually incapable of being represented. They occur at a moment. Photograph, video, film, the new media, are hence not just technological and media instruments for the re-aestheticising of the world of life, but through them and with them contemporary art takes place as an effective manner for opening up life itself. The basic categories of the performative aesthetic are: (1) destruction, (2) self-referentiality and (3) paradox. The artist destroys the previous work of the modern epoch with its self-referential body-in-motion and paradoxically once again “creates” it by breaking down its aura. Performativeness is not the aesthetics of either the beautiful or the ugly. Rejecting reduction to politics, society or any of the derivations of the modern creation of man as autonomous subject of history, the paradigm of the re-aestheticising of the world of life considers the performative event the end point of the sublimation of contemporary art. The problem of all attempts to renew the aesthetic in the world without the rule of any superordinate principle, cause or purpose lies in their bringing back the possibility of some faith in the incomplete project of Modernism. Mersch’s aesthetics of the performative, unlike the repoliticisation of art, leaves open the likelihood of overcoming art as mere social criticism. If art cannot be reduced to social, political or cultural power of creating new worlds, still it remains at issue how much the fragility of the event of performativeness is ensured against the pressures of life itself that takes from art its historical being.

(3) The visual or iconic turn is a collective name for various endeavours to revive the power of the visible and the iconic from the rule of logocentrism. In other words, in the new media conditions for the reproduction of the world, an attempt is being made to give the image back its own right to autonomy. The visual construction of culture corresponds to the iconic turn in contemporary art. This does not of course mean that we should simply say that we are witnessing the revival of painting or some other traditional medium for the representation of art in the age of the overwhelming digitalisation of the visual. The projects



created at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in interdisciplinary collaboration among philosophers, art historians, sociologists, mediologists, natural scientists and artists characterise the work of ZKM Karlsruhe and the project Iconic Turn.

Among the many theorists of this paradigm I would pick out W. J. T. Mitchell primarily because for epistemological reasons in his criticisms of the linguistic philosophy of Rorty and the neo-pragmatists he has created the premises for a far-reaching theoretical pictorial/visualistic turn. The image after the long-term domination of text and speech is henceforth to be considered as an autonomous field of meaning. It belongs to the visual construction of the world in the age of the media. It is its own precursor and its own superordinate. This kind of iconocentrism derives from Mitchell's basic premise of the visual construction of reality as revolution in the theory of cultural studies. Instead of a culture that organises reality according to its own codes, in the time of post-history it is visuality that is actually crucial. Images have their own history, surplus meanings and their own visual logic. Our area of autonomous visuality is determined by the semantic and semiotic context. In it images appear as vehicles of meaning and are themselves sign structures of the contemporary world.

Images are the iconocentric circle of the media culture of visuality. But their power is actually hence illusory. In his analysis of biocybernetics, Mitchell pulls together the story of artificially created life and computer technology. Biocybernetics is not just a information and communication event within which life and art possess completely different characteristics. There is at work a communication community at work that functions according to the model of calculation and proposition. Traditional categories that were still in use in the writings of Roland Barthes in the analysis of photography of the analogue age – memory, fantasy, emotion, experience, similitude – vanish in the digital image. The concept of the new image, unlike that which determined the modern concept of the picture as pictoriality of material, expression and form is very much changed in the new context. The consequences of the biocybernetic revolution with respect to the status of the image are far-reaching for thinking about the iconic turn. The first consequence is the loss of original and copy. Instead of the aura of the artwork (Benjamin) we are partaking in the replacement of the aura by the

---

---

spirit of the copy. Digital photography no longer shows, rather generates reality as hyper-real event. Another consequence is the transformation of relations between artist and work via a model that has in itself the properties of tool and apparatus. The cameraman has been replaced by the designer, the real by the simulacrum of events, and the cyber artist today operates with a very different concept of reality than the artist of analogue aesthetics. The third consequence is the impossibility of showing and representing the image of reality. It is a question, on the contrary, of the generation of a media-determined reality (films such as *Matrix*).

Mitchell puts contemporary art theory in his debt by having founded visual studies. Interdisciplinary science of the collaboration of different disciplines in the consideration of the phenomenon of the image and visibility has contributed to a different understanding of the media in the age of biocybernetic reproduction. In its breaking away from the natural world (of language, symbol, history), the entire world is media-organised. The network of relationships in the visual construction of reality will henceforth determine the world and art as communication structure. A problem with the overall concept of the visual or iconic turn is in the iconocentrism of visual studies. After the liberation of the image from text and speech, the actual image itself is generated in a different manner than traditional text. But the image is not the other side of the text, but from the very beginning of the avant-garde the text has been represented in image terms. Hence the deed of deconstruction of text and philosophy of language is justified only to the extent to which the possibility of a new totality of relations in which visibility precedes every other form of human relationship to the world is not opened up. Contemporary art under the aegis of the paradigm of the visual/iconic tern is just one section of the complex structure of reality that is articulated through media.

If we wished to be radical, it would have to be said that the programme of visual studies as the visual culture for our age of post history necessitates something much more important than the expansion of the area of culture to the world of life. Visual studies and the pictoriality/visibility of the media age are only a mirror of the same discomfort in other means. There is a covert deontology of culture that is liberated from all the sins of the avant-garde by instead of society its placing the culture of the image and biocybernetic life at the top of its cognitive pyramid.

---

The iconoclasm of the avant-garde finishes, paradoxically, with a luxuriant visualisation of reality generated from idea machines. The world of art in which we live is no longer a world, and art from it has long since disappeared, turning into a mass of figures and forms such as media, virtual and digital art. There is only one constant residue in all these metamorphoses: the event and the work of immaterial and autopoietic creativity that no longer derives from reality, but from pure ideas. Conceptual art is only the visible phenomenon of this process of painful emergence from a world of iconic fascination that enthralls even when it shows nothing.

### **The outlook?**

From all this it can be seen that in the theory of contemporary art the last act of long-since unresolved issues has been played out. How to approach contemporary art without the intention of ascribing to its events and works the remains of the metaphysical aesthetics of beauty, the sublime, illusion? Does philosophy seek in the essence of contemporary art, in the form of its own realisation, just a last straw for the resuscitation of what we are still calling aesthetics? If philosophy in this post-historical assemblage still intends to maintain itself, then its basic question is no longer what is the essence of contemporary art, rather what at all is the point of contemporary art if its “world” has become philosophically produced in the scientific production of objects from pure idea machines?

Contemporary art and its theory is faced with the challenge of a second beginning. Instead of going round and round in a circle and the tautological stance that contemporary art responds to the world the way it is and the way that is necessarily possible here and now, perhaps the time has really ripened for the question to be asked concerning the point of one and the other (contemporary art and contemporary art theory) with the question of their future, which neither utopias nor eschatologies will be projecting any longer, but which will be generated by the mere iconicity of the image without a world of its own. But is there at all such a future, as not to be comprehensible from this total currency of the new that consumes everything?

---



---

## IN MEMORIAM

### **Klaus Held: Ein persönliches Gedenkwort für László Tengelyi \* 11. 7. 1954–† 19. 7. 2014**

Am frühen Morgen des 19. Juli 2014 verstarb plötzlich und unerwartet László Tengelyi an einem Herzversagen. Er gehörte zur Spitzengruppe der international führenden Phänomenologen. Seine Forschungen, in denen er viele neue Erkenntnisse der französischen Phänomenologie in äußerst fruchtbarer Weise aufnahm, zeichneten sich durch strenge Sachlichkeit im Detail und zugleich systematische Zielstrebigkeit aus und gründeten sich auf eine bewundernswerte Gelehrsamkeit in der Philosophiegeschichte von den griechischen Anfängen bis zum deutschen Idealismus. Die wichtigsten seiner zahlreichen Veröffentlichungen in ungarischer, deutscher und französischer Sprache sind in dem Nachruf aufgeführt, der sich auf den Internetseiten der Philosophie an der Bergischen Universität Wuppertal findet (<http://www.philosophie.uni-wuppertal.de/home.html>).

Die weltweite Anerkennung für Tengelyis Werk zeigte sich unter anderem darin, dass er als Gastprofessor in Frankreich, Belgien, Mexiko, Kanada, den U.S.A., China und Hongkong lehrte. Von 2003 bis 2005 war er Präsident der Deutschen Gesellschaft für phänomenologische Forschung. Auf László Tengelyi, der 2010 einen Ruf an die Universität von Memphis/Tennessee ablehnte, ruhte die Hoffnung für die Zukunft der phänomenologischen Tradition in Wuppertal. Als

Gründer dieser Tradition war ich glücklich darüber, einen Nachfolger von solchem Rang auf meinem Lehrstuhl zu erleben, den er – ein geborener Ungar – seit 2001 inne hatte. Als Leiter des 2005 von ihm gegründeten Instituts für Phänomenologie an der Bergischen Universität machte er Wuppertal nicht nur durch seine überragende wissenschaftliche Qualifikation zu einem phänomenologischen Zentrum, das eine große Zahl von Doktoranden aus aller Welt anzog, sondern auch durch das freundschaftliche Einfühlungsvermögen, mit dem er sie betreute. Ich bin zusammen mit diesen jungen Menschen erschüttert, weil sie durch den völlig überraschenden Tod von László Tengelyi einen zuverlässigen Pol ihres Lebens verloren haben. Eine Woche vor seinem Tod fand an unserer Universität eine wohlgelungene Tagung aus Anlass seines 60. Geburtstages (am 11. Juli) statt. In allen Diskussionen und Begegnungen dieser Tagung präsentierte László Tengelyi sich in bestechender intellektueller Frische und in einer so glücklichen Stimmung, wie ich ihn selten erlebt hatte, und er hielt einen meisterlichen Abendvortrag über „Philosophie als Weltoffenheit“, den er nutzte, um eine Reihe seiner neuen Gedanken der letzten Jahre systematisch zu bündeln. Diesen Vortrag müssen und dürfen wir nun ebenso wie sein bald erscheinendes Werk „Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik“ als sein Vermächtnis ansehen. Die gelöste Heiterkeit seines Auftretens bei der Geburtstagstagung wird für viele wohl als der letzte Eindruck bleiben, der sie die Trostlosigkeit dieses tragischen Todes vielleicht ein wenig leichter ertragen lässt.

*Wuppertal, den 25. 7. 2014*

---

## IN MEMORIAM

### Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka

Dr. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka 91, Founder and President of the World Phenomenology Institute, died June 7, 2014, at her beloved farm in Pomfret, Vermont. She was born in Marianowo, Poland, into an aristocratic family of historical significance. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka Houthakker, an internationally known philosopher, was a professor of continental phenomenology. In 1976, her independent spirit led her to found the World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning, in Belmont, Massachusetts, later moving the Institute to Hanover, New Hampshire. This Institute remained Dr. Tymienieckas life-long work and passion. She was the author of 14 books and monographs (with the central treatise *Logos and Life* in four volumes) as well as the founder and editor (since 1968) of *Analecta Husserliana*, the Yearbook of Phenomenological Research (117 volumes in print) and of *Phenomenological Inquiry: A Review of Philosophical Ideas and Trends* (in its 37th issue). As President of the World Phenomenology Institute, she spearheaded and organized some 80 international conferences, two world congresses of phenomenology among them. From 1988 till 1998, she served on the Steering Committee of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies. Dr. Tymieniecka studied at University of Krakow, Sorbonne, and University of Fribourg, Switzerland, where she earned her Ph.D. in philosophy. Academic appointments include University

of California, Berkeley; Oregon State University; Sorbonne; Pennsylvania State University; Yale University (Postdoctoral Research Fellow); Bryn Mawr College, Lecturer; Radcliffe Institute for Independent Studies (Associate Scholar); Duquesne University; University of Waterloo; and St. Johns University. Though Dr. Tymieniecka received many academic honors throughout her long and productive life, one special recognition was the Honorary Doctorate she received from the University of Bergen, Norway, in 2008, for her scholarly contributions to philosophy, particularly phenomenology. Her many friends, acquaintances, and colleagues throughout the world included Pope John Paul II, who visited her family in Vermont when he was Cardinal. Dr. Tymieniecka and Pope John Paul II collaborated on several academic publications and remained devoted friends until his death in 2005. Born on February 28, 1923, in Marianowo, Poland, Professor Tymieniecka Houthakker was the daughter of Wladyslaw Zaremba Tymieniecki and Baroness Maria Ludwika de Lenval. In 1955 Professor Tymieniecka married Hendrik S. Houthakker, who was a long-time member of the Department of Economics at Harvard; he predeceased her in 2008. She is survived by two sons, Louis and Jan of Pomfret, Vermont, and one daughter, Isabelle Houthakker of Ukiah, California. Her funeral mass took place at St. Denis Church in Hanover, New Hampshire, on June 11, and she was buried in Woodstock, Vermont. Arrangments were under the direction of the Rand-Wilson Funeral Home of Hanover, NH.

**240**

Published in *The Boston Globe* on June 20, 2014

---



**Christophe Perrin**

**»Cogito me cogitare...« Tribute to the Genealogy and the Teleology of a Key Formula from G. W. Leibniz to J.-L. Marion**

We think the motto is of Descartes: it is of Leibniz. We know it authorizes a reading of the cogito according to the representation: we ignore it forbids it. Heidegger puts sixteen years before explaining it: Jean-Luc Marion puts thirty six to criticize it. Since seizing its sense means seizing its nonsense so that the reproach made for Descartes on the sum of the cogito commutes in a compliment, it is necessary to clarify it by drawing up its genealogy and by redrawing its teleology.

*Key words:* cogito, Descartes, Heidegger, Marion, representation.

**Christophe Perrin**

**»Cogito me cogitare...« Prispevek k genealogiji in teleologiji prazreka od G. W. Leibniz do J.-L. Mariona**

Mislimo, da je avtor mota Descartes: dejansko je njegov avtor Leibniz. Vemo, da avtorizira branje cogita v skladu z reprezentacijo: prezremo, da jo dejansko prepoveduje. Heidegger je potreboval šestnajst let, preden ga je pojasnil: Jean-Luc Marion je potreboval šestintrideset let, da ga je kritično premislil. Ker zajeti njegov smisel pomeni zajeti njegov nesmisel, tako da se očitek Descartesu na podlagi cogita spremeni v kompliment, ga je potrebno razjasniti s tem, da načrtamo njegovo genealogijo in znova zarišemo njegovo teleologijo.

*Ključne besede:* cogito, Descartes, Heidegger, Marion, reprezentacija.

**Denis Džanić**

## **The Phenomenological Origin of Difference in Derrida and Deleuze**

**242**

The aim of this paper will be to shed light on the Husserlian origin of the concepts of difference found in the philosophies of Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze. As is well known, the notion of difference plays the key role in their thought, albeit in contrasting ways. Whereas difference in Deleuze may be said to be the principal metaphysical concept around which a system (of immanence and heterogenesis, that is) is to be built, for Derrida difference is always a kind of a double movement of differing and deferring, that transcends metaphysics and serves as the impossible condition of its possibility. According to this classical view, their conceptions of difference are almost like two parallel lines with no point of intersection, one directed towards immanence and the other one towards transcendence. I will try to show that this is not entirely true, by arguing that their respective conceptions of difference converge in, or better yet, stem from a common root that is found in Husserl's phenomenological attempt at overturning Platonism. Therefore, this argumentation will consist of two parts: I will first inspect how Derrida and Deleuze come to grips with the problem of Platonism, which may be said to be their common and main philosophical adversary, and how their solutions seem to rest upon the notion of sense; then I will turn to their relation to Husserl in order to show how these two very different philosophical utilisations of the concept of difference both have their origin in Husserlian phenomenology.

*Key words:* Derrida, Deleuze, difference, sense, Platonism, Husserl, phenomenology.

**Denis Džanić**

## **Fenomenološki izvor diference pri Derridaju in Deleuzu**

Cilj članka je osvetliti husserlovski izvor pojmovanja diference, kakršnega

lahko najdemo v filozofiji Jacquesa Derridaja in Gillesa Deleuza. Dobro je znano, da ideja difference, četudi na drugačen način, igra ključno vlogo v njuni misli. Medtem ko lahko rečemo, da je pri Deleuzu diferenca temeljni metafizični pojem, na podlagi katerega gradi svoj sistem (in sicer imanence in heterogeneze), je za Derridaja diferenca vselej nekakšno dvojno gibanje razlike in odloga, ki transcendirata metafiziko in je nemožni pogoj njene možnosti. V skladu s tem klasičnim pogledom sta njuni pojmovanji difference skorajda kot dve vzporednici, ki se ne sekata v nobeni točki, saj je ena usmerjena k imanenci, druga pa k transcendenci. Da to ne drži povsem, poskušam pokazati z zagovarjanjem trditve, da njuni pojmovanji difference konvergirata oziroma, boljše, izraščata iz skupne korenine, ki jo lahko najdemo v Husserlovem fenomenološkem poskusu preobrnitve platonizma. Zato je argumentacija razdeljena na dva dela: najprej raziščem, kako se Derrida in Deleuze spoprijemata s problemom platonizma, za katerega lahko rečemo, da je njun skupen in glavni filozofski nasprotnik, in kako njuni rešitvi slonita, se zdi, na ideji smisla; nato se zaobrnem k njenemu odnosu do Husserla, da bi pokazal, kako ti dve zelo različni filozofski rabi pojma difference izvirata iz Husserlove fenomenologije.

*Ključne besede:* Derrida, Deleuze, diferenca, smisel, platonizem, Husserl, fenomenologija.

**Katarina Peović Vuković**

### **Virtual Worlds and Lacan. Transference in Computer Games**

The paper addresses the problem of relation virtual/real through conceptualizing the most prominent debate on the role of player in computer games and congruency between two worlds. The paper does so through critique of three related issues. The first is the problem of content of virtual worlds and tendency to interpret the “influence” through reading the narrative and/or graphic of virtual worlds. The second is common technological determinism, the notion of the “impact” of (autonomous) technology. The paper will question whether such influence could be read from the influence of content or structure (and suggest

---

constructivism as possible answer). The third will be a problem of dividing the Virtual and the Real and the transference of virtual into real as crucial aspect of game *jouissance*. Instead of Freudian Id the paper will propose super Ego as pleasure principle, and ideal agent of the game in a society of control.

*Key words:* computer games, virtual, real, technology, transference.

**Katarina Peović Vuković**

### **Virtualni svetovi in Lacan. Transfer pri računalniških igrich**

Članek obravnava problem odnosa virtualno/realno s premislekom o zelo pomembni polemiki glede vloge igralca pri računalniških igrich in o kongruenci med obema svetovoma. Članek predstavlja kritični pretres treh medsebojnopovezanih tem. Prva je problem vsebine virtualnih svetov in tendenca, da bi njihov »vpliv« interpretirali z branjem pripovedi in/ali grafike virtualnih svetov. Druga je splošni tehnološki determinizem, predstava o »učinku« (avtonomne) tehnologije. Članek sprašuje, ali takšen vpliv lahko beremo kot vplivanje vsebine ali kot vplivanje strukture (in predlaga konstruktivizem kot možen odgovor). Tretja tema je problem razločevanja Virtualnega in Realnega in transferja virtualnega v realno kot odločilnega vidika igralne *jouissance*. Namesto freudovskega Ida članek predlaga Superego kot načelo ugodja in kot idealno gibalo igre v družbi nadzora.

*Ključne besede:* računalniške igrice, virtualno, realno, tehnologija, transfer.

**Polona Tratnik**

### **Entering Brave New Sociality with Super Intelligent, Emotional, and Wet Brained Robots**

During the last decade robotics has intensively developed several variants of humanoid robots that resemble human. In the article the author discusses the

origins of this tendency, which she follows to the antique concepts and into the Christian thought. She links the contemporary development of robotics with the interest for automatons, which grows at least since the eight century, when the early automatons were conceptualized by the Muslim and Byzantine inventors, and which Western culture in renaissance and particularly in Baroque constructs after the human figure. Today robotics proceeds from improving motoric functionality to some new orientations of developing humanoid robots. Research focuses on the interaction between robots and people. There are to be found attempts to surpass cybernetic limitations of robots in the sense of more human-like intelligence and feeling, e.g. with combining technology with biological systems, in some cases in addition with an ambition to create a species, which would in its features be superior to human. These shifts lead to a contemporary re-examination of the questions, what it means to be human and how do we comprehend sociality.

*Key words:* humanoid robots, technology, sociality, transhumanism.

### **Polona Tratnik**

#### **Vstopanje v krasno novo družbenost s super inteligentnimi, čustvenimi in mokromožganskimi roboti**

V zadnjem desetletju robotika intenzivno razvija različne variante humanoidnih robotov, ki posnemajo človeka. Avtorica v članku razpravlja o izvorih te težnje, ki ji sledi do antičnih konceptov in v krščansko misel. Sodoben razvoj robotike povezuje z interesom za avtomatone, ki raste že vsaj od osmega stoletja, ko zgodnje avtomatone snujejo muslimanski ter bizantinski izumitelji, ter ki jih zahodna kultura v renesansi in še zlasti v baroku gradi po človeški podobi. Danes robotika od izpopolnjevanja motorične funkcionalnosti prehaja k nekaterim novim smernicam razvoja humanoidnih robotov. Raziskave se osredotočajo na interakcijo med roboti in ljudmi. Pojavljajo pa se tudi poskusi preseganja kibernetičnih omejitev robotov v smeri človeku bolj sorodne inteligence in čustvovanja, npr. prek kombiniranja tehnologije z biološkimi sistemi, v

---

nekaterih primerih tudi z ambicijo stvaritve vrste, ki bo po svojih potezah boljša od človeške. Ti premiki nas vodijo k sodobnemu premisleku vprašanj, kaj pomeni biti človek in kako pojmujeemo družbenost.

*Ključne besede:* humanoidni roboti, tehnologija, družbenost, transhumanizem.

**Laura Potrović**

**Neuro-Transformative Performance Processes.**

**From Neuroplasticity to the Reorganization of Performer's Body**

**Partiture**

**246**

Neuro-transformative performance processes – memory, attention and repetition – are directly related to physical schema remapping, and performer's physical becoming. Can we bodily or within our corporeal imagination enter the co-motional and co-perceptual zone of animal and vegetal? Can we get there through interaction, transformation and reorganization of our body partiture, and is this situated transformation also co-experienced conversion of shared body? Does our perception within itself constitute the potentiality of other forms of perceiving, as well as other perceptual apparatuses? If the embryo itself has a history and potentiality of all kinds, does the performer have the potentiality to reorganize his body partiture through becoming-Other? A performative act is an act of continuous conversion and reorganization of neural networks through repetition. Physical memory is also a neural memory or the one that directs our feelings and consciousness. Neural memory is integrative, since it integrates cellular, corporeal, affective, emotional, and sensory memory. Neural memory – within the repetition – causes synaptic repatterning or creation of new synaptic patterns.

*Key words:* body, memory, attention, repetition, synaptic repatterning, interaction, transformation, reorganization, becoming.

**Laura Potrović**

**Nevro-transformativni izvedbeni procesi.**

**Od nevroplastičnosti do reorganizacije telesne partiture izvajalca**

Nevro-transformativni izvedbeni procesi – spomin, pozornost in ponavljanje – so neposredno povezani z remapiranjem telesne sheme in s tem tudi celote izvajalčevega telesnega postajanja. Ali lahko s telesom oziroma z našo telesno imaginacijo vstopimo v so-gibalno in so-zaznavno cono animalnega in vegetativnega? Ali jo lahko spremenimo z interakcijo, transformacijo in reorganizacijo naše telesne partiture in ali je takšna situirana transformacija obenem tudi so-izkušena sprememba našega deljenega telesa? Ali vsebuje naša zaznava potencial drugačnih oblik zaznavanja in drugih zaznavnih aparatov? Kolikor ima embrio v sebi zgodovino in potencialnost vseh vrst, ali lahko izvajalec reorganizira svojo telesno partituro s tem, da postane Drugi? Izvedbeno dejanje je dejanje kontinuiranega spreminjanja in reorganiziranja lastnih nevronskih mrež s ponavljanjem. Telesni spomin je obenem tudi nevronski spomin, usmerja naša občutja in zavest. Nevronski spomin je integrativen, saj integrira celični, telesni, afektivni, emotivni in čutilni spomin. Nevronski spomin povzroča – s ponavljanjem – sinaptično prevzorčenje oziroma ustvarja nove sinapse, sinaptične spoje in nove sinaptične vzorce.

*Ključne besede:* telo, spomin, pozornost, ponavljanje, sinaptično prevzorčenje, interakcija, transformacija, reorganizacija, postajanje.

**Adriano Fabris**

**Ethics of Communication**

Ethics of Communication is a form of applied ethics that studies the ethical principles involved in the human communication. Ethics of Communication can be described in three ways: in a deontological way (related to the professional use of communication, for example in the media); as ethics of communication in strict sense (devoted to clarify the meaning of basic ethical concepts: good,

---

right, responsibility etc. in the communication); as ethics in the communication (dedicated to find ethical elements in the communicative processes: that is the founding project of Apel and Habermas). The paper discusses these forms and highlights the necessity of the ethics of communication – as critique of communicative reason – in the contemporary society and in the virtual world.

*Key words:* ethics, communication, deontology, society, virtuality.

**Adriano Fabris**

### **Etika komunikacije**

Etika komunikacije je oblika praktične etike, ki preučuje etične principe, kakršne vključuje človeška komunikacija. Etiko komunikacije lahko opišem na tri načine: na deontološki način (nanaša se profesionalno uporabo komunikacije, na primer v medijih); kot etiko komunikacije v strogem smislu (ukvarja se s pojasnjevanjem pomena temeljnih etičnih pojmov, kakršni so dobro, pravičnost, odgovornost itd., v komunikaciji); kot etiko v komunikaciji (posveča se iskanju etičnih elementov v komunikativnem procesu: to je osnovni projekt Apela in Habermasa). Članek obravnava te oblike in poudari nujnost etike komunikacije – kot kritike komunikativnega uma – v sodobni družbi in v virtualnem svetu.

**248**

*Ključne besede:* etika, komunikacija, deontologija, družba, virtuality.

**Dean Komel**

### **Virtuality as the Totalization of Metaphysics**

The article attempts to define the phenomenon of virtuality as a process, a procession and a procedure. The question of the processor of virtuality intensifies the aspect of subjectivity as the will to power, which could be understood in the context of what Heidegger discussed as the completion of metaphysics with a distinct tendency towards totalization. In this regard virtuality does not cause



the fictionalization of reality, but its fixation, which has not been emphasized enough in the postmodern theories of virtuality. The “escape” from reality into virtuality can be viewed differently if we allow ourselves to be confounded by the circumstance that within virtuality there is no place to “escape” to – inasmuch as the presumption is true, that what we are dealing here with is the completion and the totalization of metaphysics or that which it itself has invented as reality and what seems to be invented as “virtual reality” by us just now.

*Key words:* Totalization, virtuality, reality, Heidegger, metaphysics.

**Dean Komel**

### **Virtualnost kot dovršena metafizika**

Članek skuša definirati fenomen virtualnosti kot proces, proceduro, procesijo. Vprašanje o procesorju virtualnosti zaostri vidik subjektivitete kot volje do moči, ki jo je možno razumeti v okvirih tega, kar je Heidegger opredelil kot dovršitev metafizike z izrazito totalitarizirajočo tendenco. V tem oziru virtualnost ne sproža fikcionalizacije realnosti, marveč njeno fiksacijo, kar v postmodernih teorijah virtualnosti ni dovolj poudarjeno. »Beg« od realnosti v virtualnost se pokaže drugače, če nas »zbega« okoliščina, da v virtualnosti ni mogoče nikamor »pobegniti« – kolikor drži predpostavka, da gre tu za dovršitev in totalizacijo metafizike oziroma tega, kar je ta doumila kot realnost in kar se zdi, da izumljamo kot virtualno realnost.

*Ključne besede:* totalizacija, virtualnost, realnost, Heidegger, metafizika.

**Peter Trawny**

### **Europe and Revolution**

Does Europe exist? Or is there only one Europe, which differentiates itself from another Europe? Has Europe dissociated itself from itself? And did it thus

---

become ambiguously twofold? Or has something onefold long ago interpolated itself into this since long ago twofold Europe, so that the two-facedness of Europe is only a mask, which conceals, what is actually taking place?

*Key words:* Europe, revolution, medium, history, philosophy.

**Peter Trawny**  
**Evropa in revolucija**

Ali Evropa obstaja? Ali obstaja samo ena Evropa, ki se razlikuje od druge Evrope? Se je Evropa sama v sebi razdvojila? Je tako postala dvoumna? Ali pa se je že zdavnaj v to, že dolgo dvoumno Evropo vtihotapilo nekaj enoumnega, tako da je dvoličnost Evrope samo maska, ki prikriva, kaj se dogaja?

**250**

*Ključne besede:* Evropa, revolucija, medium, zgodovina, filozofija.

**Petar Bojanić:**  
**“As”. Person as Corporation – Corporation as Person**  
**What is (in)corporatio?**

My intention in this text is to thematize the relationship and difference between the real, fictional and virtual in the constitution of a juridical personality, and especially in the constitution of a corporate entity. The concept of corporation developed from the old system of fellowships, as the pure concept of collective unity, and was raised to the level of person. First, I question the stabilizing process of the reality of a group of persons who work together (who are in a “cooperation”) through the processes of registration and construction of the juridical subject; and secondly, in opposition to the first, interrogate the ways in which the corporation comes into existence through performative declarations or written records, even without the physical object of the corporation. The corporation, for example, has to have a mailing address, but it does not have to be a physical object. This is clear

in the case when following appropriate procedures counts as the creation of a corporation and when the corporation, once created, continues to exist, but there is no person (or persons) who becomes the corporation.

*Key words:* corporation, real, fictional, virtual, juridical subject, person.

**Petar Bojanić**

**»Kot«. Oseba kot korporacija – korporacija kot oseba**

**Kaj je (in)corporatio?**

Namen članka je tematizacija razmerja in razlike med realnim, fiktivnim in virtualnim pri konstituiranju pravne osebe in še posebej pri konstituiranju korporativne entitete. Koncept korporacije se je razvil iz starega sistema bratovščine kot čistega koncepta kolektivne entitete in se je povzdignil na raven osebe. Najprej obravnavam proces stabilizacije realnosti skupine oseb, ki delajo skupaj (ki so v »kooperaciji«), s procesi registracije in konstrukcije pravnega subjekta; in nato, v nasprotju s prvim, raziščem načine, na katere korporacija nastaja s performativnimi deklaracijami ali pisnimi dokumenti, celo brez fizičnega objekta korporacije. Korporacija, npr., mora imeti poštni naslov, toda zanjo ni potrebno, da bi bila fizični objekt. To je povsem jasno v primeru, kadar sledenje primernim postopkom obvelja za ustanovitev korporacije in kadar korporacija, potem ko je bila ustanovljena, obstaja, a ni osebe (ali oseb), ki bi postala korporacija.

**251**

*Ključne besede:* korporacija, realno, fiktivno, virtualno, pravni subjekt, oseba.

**Holger Zaborowski**

**Farewell to “Eternal Peace”? New Wars and their Moral and Legal Challenges**

This essay first discusses modern wars and the idea of “eternal peace” as developed in modernity. It shows how in the 20<sup>th</sup> century the reality of war (as well as the concept of peace) was already transformed due to the development

---

---

of new technologies such as the nuclear bomb. Now, peace was replaced by a “cold war”. The essay then goes on to introduce the concept of post-national wars (as opposed to modern national wars). It argues that this concept fails fully to describe contemporary warfare. What is needed is a deeper analysis that considers most recent technological developments such as the world wide web or drone technology and the way how these technologies paradigmatically change the concept and reality of war (and of peace, too). The essay concludes by arguing that the moral and legal challenges of this kind of war deserve more attention than they are getting in the current discussion.

*Key words:* war, peace, modernity, national and post-national wars, technology.

**Holger Zaborowski**

**252** **Zbogom, »večni mir«? Nove vojne in njihovi moralni in pravni izzivi**

Članek najprej obravnava moderne vojne in idejo »večnega miru«, kakor jo je razvila moderna. Pokaže, kako se je v dvajsetem stoletju realnost vojne (in tudi pojem miru) že transformirala spričo razvoja novih tehnologij, kakršna je atomska bomba. Mir je zdaj zamenjala »hladna vojna«. Članek nato vpelje pojem postnacionalne vojne (v nasprotju z modernimi nacionalnimi vojnami). Dokazuje, da ta pojem ne more v celoti opisati sodobnega vojskovanja. Potrebna je globlja analiza, ki bi upoštevala tako najnovejši tehnološki razvoj, kakršnega predstavljata svetovni splet in tehnologija dronov, kot način, na katerega te tehnologije paradigmatško spreminjajo pojem in realnost vojne (in tudi miru). Članek sklepa ugotovitev, da bi bilo potrebno moralnim in pravnim izzivom takšne vojne posvetiti več pozornosti, kakor je dobijo v današnji diskusiji.

*Gljučne besede:* vojna, mir, moderna, nacionalne in postnacionalne vojne, tehnologija.

---

**Alfred Denker**

**The Social World – Structures of Performing. Hermeneutics of Facticity.**

In this paper I examine the question how an ontology of the social could be possible. My starting point is the hermeneutics of facticity that Heidegger developed in his ground-breaking course of summer semester 1923. In the first part I discuss the main ideas in Heidegger's course. In the second part I try to move beyond Heidegger by using his phenomenological method of formal indication. This method enables to locate and understand the phenomenon of the social. Human being ("Dasein") is happening in three different ways at the same time: as being oneself, as being in the world and as being with other. The social is primarily a form of being with others. The virtual aspect of human being is grounded in "Dasein's" being its own possibility. This means that human being or being human is never finished. In the final section I try to show that the internet of not a virtual world but a thing.

**253**

*Key words:* social world, structures of performing, hermeneutics of facticity, Dasein, internet.

**Alfred Denker**

**Socialni svet – strukture izvrševanja. Hermenevtika fakticitete**

V prispevku obravnavam vprašanje, kako je možna ontologija socialnega. Izhodišče tvori hermenevtika fakticitete, ki jo Heidegger razvil v svojih prelomnih predavanjih leta v poletnem semestru leta 1923. V prvem delu razpravljam o ključni ideji Heideggrovih predavanj. V drugem delu skušam nadgraditi Heideggerja z uporabo fenomenološke metode formalne naznake. Človeška bit («Dasein») se dogaja istočasno na tri različne načine: kot samo-bit, bit-v-svetu in bit-z-drugimi. Socialno je primarno oblika biti z drugimi. Virtualni aspekt človeške biti je zasnovan v lastni možnosti »tubiti«. To pomeni, da se človeška bit

---

ali biti-človek nikoli ne zaključí. V zadnjem delu skušam pokazati, da internet ni toliko virtualni svet kot stvar.

*Ključne besede:* socialni svet, strukture izvrševanja, hermenevtika fakticitete, Dasein, internet.

**Philip Ogo Ujomu and Felix O. Olatunji**

**Insecurity and Instability as Challenges to the Nigerian State: Philosophical Reflections on the Meaning of Social Order**

This paper attempts to provide a philosophical answer to the question: What is social order? The Nigerian situation of disorder compels us to re-examine this question. The substance of this problem understood conceptually, is the search for community which raises fundamental questions about justice between men and how they can achieve co-operation for the common good in the society. Thus, the problem of social order concerns the need to balance the conflicts of interest among individuals and between individuals and the state or society. It is the struggle to create or discover strategies and approaches for building a more humane, tolerant and peaceful human society. Human beings have always had problems with one of the basic philosophical questions of: How do I relate with other human beings? This paper offers a philosophical study, or, put otherwise, a conceptual clarification of the key elements, goals and features of social order.

**255**

*Key words:* social order, community, justice, co-operation, Nigeria.

**Philip Ogo Ujomu in Felix O. Olatunji**

**Negotovost in nestabilnost kot izziva za nigerijsko državo: filozofske refleksije o pomenu socialnega reda**

Članek poskuša podati filozofski odgovor na vprašanje o tem, kaj je socialni red. Nigerijska situacija nereda nas sili, da to vprašanje ponovno premislimo. Podlaga problema, razumljena konceptualno, je iskanje skupnosti, ki poraja temeljna vprašanja o pravičnosti med ljudmi in o tem, kako lahko dosežejo sodelovanje za skupno dobro družbe. Problem socialnega reda torej zadeva potrebo po vzpostavitvi ravnovesja v konfliktnih interesov med posamezniki in

---

med posamezniki in državo ali družbo. Je prizadevanje, da bi ustvarili ali odkrili strategije in pristope za izgradnjo humanejše, tolerantnejše in miroljubnejše človeške družbe. Ljudem je vedno bilo problematično eno izmed temeljnih filozofskih vprašanj: kako vzpostavljam odnose z drugimi ljudmi? Članek ponuja filozofsko obravnavo ali, povedano drugače, pojmovno razjasnitev ključnih elementov, ciljev in potez socialnega reda.

*Ključne besede:* socialni red, skupnost, pravičnost, sodelovanje, Nigerija.

### **Athanasia Glycofrydi-Leontsini** **Orientalism in Modern Greek Art**

**256**

In this paper it is my intention to discuss perceptions of the Oriental as they were developed by the Greek painters of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries focusing on several of their own Oriental experiences and on their relations with the Westerners' Orientalism, that is mostly an "Orient rêvé", reflecting their fantasies of a world of intrigue, mystery and exoticism, and in a lesser degree an "Orient connu" by traveling, that was long given an extraordinary experience of the picturesque and exotic as well as of the alterity. Greek Orientalism, considered as part of the European Orientalism in terms of its resemblances and aesthetics, is one aspect of the evolution of the secular Greek painting of the 19<sup>th</sup> century that shows the new paths of the Greek artists' inspiration and creativity. The Greek painters under the influences of Western artists were delighted in the high-key intensity of the Oriental light and clapped a colorful palette to render the exotic atmosphere of the Orient in ethnographic paintings. They depicted faithfully in a realistic, naturalistic or impressionistic way the images of the Orient, mostly from Greece and Near and Middle East, that fascinated their eyes, with ethnographic exactitude and represented Oriental picturesque scenes with sensitivity in the description of customs and characters. Their works rank them among important European painters and incorporate an aesthetic value that has to be evaluated in the context not only of the influences exercised upon them but also of the ability and creativity that makes them masters of the visual art.



*Key words:* Orientalism, Greek art, painting, exoticism, alterity.

**Athanasia Glycofrydi-Leontsini**

### **Orientalizem v moderni grški umetnosti**

Namen članka je obravnava percepcij orientalnega, kakršne so v devetnajstem in zgodnjem dvajsetem stoletju razvili grški slikarji. Osredotoča se na nekaj njihovih izkušenj Orienta in na njihove vezi z orientalizmom zahodnjakov, ki je predvsem »Orient rêvé«, odsevajoč fantazije o svetu spletk, skrivnosti in eksotike, in v manjši meri »Orient connu«, kakršnega so spoznali s potovanji, ki so jim pripisovali izjemno izkustvo slikovitega, eksotičnega in tudi drug(ačn)ega. Grški orientalizem, ki ga po njegovi estetiki in podobnosti lahko imamo za del evropskega orientalizma, je eden izmed vidikov razvoja sekularnega grškega slikarstva 19. stoletja in kaže nove poti navdiha in ustvarjalnosti grških umetnikov. Grške slikarje je pod vplivom zahodnih umetnikov navduševala velika intenzivnost orientalske svetlobe in sprejeli so barvito paletu, s katero je mogoče zajeti eksotično atmosfero Orienta v etnografskem slikarstvu. Na realističen, naturalističen ali impresionističen način so z etnografsko natančnostjo slikali podobe Orienta, predvsem Grčije in Bližnjega ter Srednjega Vzhoda, ki so fascinirale njihove oči, in z občutljivim orisovanjem običajev in značajev prikazovali slikovite orientalske prizore. Njihova dela jih umeščajo med pomembne evropske slikarje in vsebujejo estetsko vrednost, ki jo je potrebno oceniti ne le v kontekstu vplivov, ki so jih oblikovali, temveč tudi v kontekstu spretnosti in ustvarjalnosti, zaradi katerih so mojstri vizualne umetnosti.

**257**

*Ključne besede:* orientalizem, grška umetnost, slikarstvo, eksotizem, drugost.

**Žarko Paić**

**Theory of Contemporary Art: Lines and Curves**

**Post-History and the Discomforts of Periodization**

Art in all historical epochs has the task of being more than art. It can never be

---

---

either autonomous or heteronymous. It can never serve just itself or some other purposes. Nor can it be reduced just to the aesthetic truth, experience, incidence. Social revolutions and historical events that change the manner of life of people hence are not superordinate for an insight into the being of artistic practice. In the event of what has for a half a century by now been called contemporary art, the problem is radicalised. Unlike modern art, which reposes on the idea of autonomy, contemporary art endeavours to put into practice the essence of the avant-garde art of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It attempts, that is, artistically to revolutionise the social conditions of the self-generation of art.

*Key words:* contemporary art, theory, politics, ideology, iconic turn, image, aesthetics.

**258****Žarko Paić****Teorija sodobne umetnosti: premice in krivulje****Post-zgodovina in nelagodja periodizacije**

Umetnost ima v vseh zgodovinskih obdobjih nalogo, da je več kot umetnost. Nikdar ne more biti ne avtonomna ne heteronomna. Nikdar ne more služiti samo sama sebi ali samo kakšnemu drugemu smotru. In nikoli je ni mogoče reducirati samo na estetsko resnico, izkustvo, pojavnost. Socialne revolucije in zgodovinski dogodki, ki spreminjajo način življenja ljudi, torej nikdar ne ponujajo nadrejenega stališča za uvid v bit umetniške prakse. Primer tega, kar se zadnjega pol stoletja imenuje sodobna umetnost, radikalizira problem. V nasprotju z moderno umetnostjo, ki temelji na ideji avtonomije, si sodobna umetnost prizadeva, da bi udejanjila bistvo avantgardne umetnosti iz prve polovice 20. stoletja. Poskuša umetniško revolucionirati socialne pogoje samo-proizvajanja umetnosti.

*Ključne besede:* sodobna umetnost, teorija, politika, ideologija, ikonični obrat, podoba, estetika.

---

---

## Addresses of Contributors

**Dr. Christophe Perrin**

Chargé de recherches au FNRS  
Université catholique de Louvain  
Institut supérieur de philosophie  
Place du Cardinal Mercier, 14  
Bureau 142  
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve  
Belgium  
ch-pe@orange.fr  
<http://uclouvain.academia.edu/ChristophePERRIN>

**259**

**PhD Candidate Denis Džanić**

Department of Philosophy  
Faculty of philosophy  
University of Sarajevo  
Franje Račkog 1  
71100 Sarajevo  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  
dendzanic@gmail.com

**Assist. Prof. Dr. Katarina Peović Vuković**

Department of Cultural Studies  
Faculty of Philosophy  
Omladinska 1  
51000 Rijeka  
Croatia  
kpvukovic@ffri.hr

---

**Assist. Prof. Dr. Polona Tratnik**

Faculty of Humanities  
University of Primorska  
Titov trg 5  
6000 Koper  
Slovenia  
polona.tratnik@guest.arnes.si

**PhD Candidate Laura Potrović**

Prilaz baruna Filipovića 12  
10000 Zagreb  
Croatia  
laura.petrovic@gmail.com

**260****Prof. Dr. Dean Komel**

Department of Philosophy  
Faculty of Arts  
University of Ljubljana  
Askerčeva 2  
1000 Ljubljana  
Slovenia  
dean.kome@guest.arnes.si

**Prof. Dr. Peter Trawny**

Heidegger Institute  
Faculty of Humanities  
University of Wuppertal  
Gaußstraße 20  
42097 Wuppertal  
Germany  
petertrawny@aol.com

---

**Prof. Dr. Petar Bojanić**

Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory,  
University of Belgrade  
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory  
Kraljice Natalije 45  
11000 Belgrade  
Serbia  
bojanicp@gmail.com

**Prof. Dr. Holger Zaborowski**

PTHV gGmbH  
Pallottistr. 3  
56179 Vallendar  
Germany  
Holger.Zaborowski@gmx.net

**Prof. Dr. Alfred Denker**

PTHV gGmbH  
Pallottistr. 3  
56179 Vallendar  
Germany  
alfred.denker@yahoo.com

**Prof. Dr. Philip Ogo Ujomu**

Dept of Philosophy and Religions  
Faculty of Arts  
University of Benin,  
Benin-City, PMB 1154  
Nigeria  
pujomu@yahoo.com,

**Prof. Dr. Felix O. Olatunji**

Dept of General Studies (Philosophy Unit)  
Ladoke Akintola University of Technology  
Ogbomoso, PMB 4000  
Nigeria  
felixolatunji28@gmail.com

---

**Prof. Dr. Athanasia Glycofrydi-Leontsini**

Chair of Modern European and Neohellenic Philosophy

Department of Philosophy

Faculty of Arts

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Panepistimiopolis, Ilissia 15784

Greece

aleon@ppp.uoa.gr

**Assoc. Prof. Dr. Žarko Paić**

Faculty of Textile Technology

University of Zagreb

Prilaz baruna Filipovića 28a

10000 Zagreb

Croatia

zarko.paic@zg.t-com.hr

---

# INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

Manuscripts should be addressed to the Editorial Office. Contributions should be sent in typewritten form and on a floppy disc (3.5"). Manuscripts cannot be returned.

The paper submitted for publication should not have been previously published and should not be currently under consideration for publication elsewhere, nor will it be during the first three months after its submission. When republishing the paper in another journal, the author is required to indicate the first publication in the *Phainomena* Journal.

Contributions should not exceed 8000 words (45,000 characters).

The title, subtitle and chapter titles of the article should be written in **bold characters**, and the titles of books and journals in *italics*. Authors are required to use double quotation marks in referring to the titles of articles in journals and collected volumes of articles (" and ").

Contributions should be double-spaced, except for references, footnotes and abstract, which are single-spaced. No paragraph breaks should be applied. New paragraphs are introduced by shifting the left margin to the right (using the TAB key). The left margin of the contribution is aligned, and the text remains unaligned on the right. Word division is not to be applied. Graphic design (titles, various fonts, framing, edges, pagination etc.) should not be applied. Tables and

---

synoptic tables should be used in tabular form as enabled by the Word editor.

The author should adhere to the following rules of writing: for noting the year of publication (1960--61), indicating the page (p. 99--115, 650--58), use of punctuation marks (dash should be put down as --)

The author should include an abstract of the article of in more than 150 words and with five keywords in the language of the original and in English.

Authors do the proof-reading of their own texts.

For notes and references, only footnotes should be applied. Notes should be indicated by consecutive superscript numbers in the text immediately after the punctuation mark using the automatic footnote feature in Word (*e.g.* according to Toulmin<sup>3</sup>). Citations and literature should be indicated to the rules applied in the examples listed below (different for monographs and periodical articles):

**264**

Stephen Toulmin, *Cosmopolis. The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1992, p. 31.

Klaus Held, »Husserls These von der Europäisierung der Menschheit«, in: Otto Pöggeler (Hrsg.), *Phänomenologie im Widerstreit*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1989, S. 13--39.

Rainer Wiehl, »Gadamers philosophische Hermeneutik und die begriffsgeschichtliche Methode«, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 45 (2003), S. 10--20.

Toulmin, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

*Ibid.*, p.15.

The "author-date" style of referencing is also acceptable. The references are cited in the main body of the text by inserting the **author's surname and year of publication in brackets** at the relevant point (Toulmin 1992: 31). The reference



list at the end of text should contain all cited sources in alphabetical order by author's surname.

Held, Klaus (1989): »Husserls These von der Europäisierung der Menschheit«, in: *Phänomenologie im Widerstreit*, Otto Pöggeler (Hrsg.), (S.) 13--39. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Toulmin, Stephen (1992): *Cosmopolis. The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. (p.) 31.

Wiehl, Rainer (2003): »Gadamers philosophische Hermeneutik und die begriffsgeschichtliche Methode«, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 45, (S.) 10--20.



---

e-ISSN 2232-6650

UDK 1

## PHAINOMENA

### REVIJA ZA FENOMENOLOGIJO IN HERMENEVTIKO

### JOURNAL OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND HERMENEUTICS

GLAVNA UREDNICA/EDITOR IN CHIEF

Andrina Tonkli Komel

UREDNIŠKI ODBOR - EDITORIAL BOARD

Jan Bednarik, Tine Hribar, Valentin Kalan, Branko Klun, Dean Komel, Ivan Urbančič, Franci Zore.

MEDNARODNI ZNANSTVENI SVET - INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD

Pedro M. S. Alves (Lisbon), Damir Barbarić (Zagreb), Miguel de Beistegui (Warwick), Azelarabe Lahkim Bennani (Fès), Rudolf Bernet (Leuven), Petar Bojanić (Belgrade), Philip Buckley (Montreal), Donatella Di Cesare (Rome), Umesh C. Chattopadhyaya (Allahabad), Ion Copoeru (Cluj), Jean François Courtine (Paris), Renato Cristin (Trieste), Alfred Denker (Vallendar), Lester Embree (Boca Raton), Adriano Fabris (Pisa), Cheung Chan Fai (Hong Kong), Günter Figal (Freiburg), Andrzej Gniadzowski (Warszawa), Klaus Held (Wuppertal), Heinrich Hüni (Wuppertal), Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Freiburg), Ilya Inishev (Moscow), Dimitri Ginev (Sofia), Jean Grondin (Montreal), Guy van Kerckhoven (Brussel/Bochum), Pavel Kouba (Prague), İoanna Kuçuradi (Ankara), Thomas Luckmann (Konstanz), Jeff Malpas (Tasmania), Javier San Martín (Madrid), Viktor Molchanov (Moscow), Liangkang Ni (Guangzhou), Karl Novotny (Prague), Tadashi Ogawa (Kyoto), Žarko Paić (Zagreb), Željko Pavić (Zagreb), Tatiana Shchytsova (Minsk), Gunter Scholtz (Bochum), Hans Rainer Sepp (Freiburg), Önay Sözer (Istanbul), Silvia Stoller (Wien), Rainer Thurnher (Innsbruck), Peter Trawny (Wuppertal), Toru Tani (Kyoto), Lubica Učnik (Perth), Helmuth Vetter (Wien), Ugo Vlaisavljević (Sarajevo), Holger Zaborowski (Vallendar), Dan Zahavi (Copenhagen), Bernhard Waldenfels (Bochum), Andrzej Wierciński (Toronto), Ichiro Yamaguchi (Yokohama), Chung-Chi Yu (Kaohsiung).

267

Tajnik uredništva/Secretary: Jurij Verč

Revija izhaja štirikrat letno./Published quarterly.

Revija objavlja članke s področja fenomenologije, hermenevtike, zgodovine filozofije, filozofije kulture, filozofije umetnosti in teorije znanosti. Recenzentske izvode knjig pošiljajte na naslov uredništva./

The journal covers the fields of phenomenology, hermeneutics, history of philosophy, philosophy of culture, philosophy of art, phenomenological theory of science. Books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office.

NASLOV UREDNIŠTVA/EDITORIAL OFFICE ADDRESS

Andrina Tonkli Komel, Inštitut Nove revije, Gospodinjska 8, 1000 Ljubljana tel. (386 1) 24 44 560, mail: [institut@nova-revija.si](mailto:institut@nova-revija.si)

Oddelek za filozofijo (kab. 432b), Filozofska fakulteta, Aškerčeva 2, Ljubljana 1000, te. 386 1 2411106, [dean.komel@guest.arnes.si](mailto:dean.komel@guest.arnes.si)

Spletna stran / Website: <http://www.fenomenolosko-drustvo.si>

<http://www.phainomena.com>

---