



ACTA HISTRIAE
30, 2022, 2



UDK/UDC 94(05)

ISSN 1318-0185
e-ISSN 2591-1767



Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko - Koper
Società storica del Litorale - Capodistria

ACTA HISTRIAE
30, 2022, 2

KOPER 2022

ISSN 1318-0185
e-ISSN 2591-1767

UDK/UDC 94(05)

Letnik 30, leto 2022, številka 2

**Odgovorni urednik/
Direttore responsabile/
Editor in Chief:**

Darko Darovec

**Uredniški odbor/
Comitato di redazione/
Board of Editors:**

Gorazd Bajc, Furio Bianco (IT), Stuart Carroll (UK), Angel Casals Martinez (ES), Alessandro Casellato (IT), Flavij Bonin, Dragica Čeč, Lovorka Čoralić (HR), Darko Darovec, Lucien Faggion (FR), Marco Fincardi (IT), Darko Friš, Aleš Maver, Borut Klabjan, John Martin (USA), Robert Matijašić (HR), Darja Mihelič, Edward Muir (USA), Žiga Oman, Jože Pirjevec, Egon Pelikan, Luciano Pezzolo (IT), Claudio Povoło (IT), Marijan Premović (MNE), Luca Rossetto (IT), Vida Rožac Darovec, Andrej Studen, Marta Verginella, Salvator Žitko

**Uredniki/Redattori/
Editors:**

Urška Lampe, Gorazd Bajc, Lara Petra Skela, Marjan Horvat, Žiga Oman

**Prevodi/Traduzioni/
Translations:**

Petra Berlot

**Lektorji/Supervisione/
Language Editors:**

Urška Lampe (angl., slo.), Gorazd Bajc (it.), Lara Petra Skela (angl., slo.)

**Izdajatelj/Editori/
Published by:**

Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko - Koper / Società storica del Litorale - Capodistria[®] / Inštitut IRRIS za raziskave, razvoj in strategije družbe, kulture in okolja / Institute IRRIS for Research, Development and Strategies of Society, Culture and Environment / Istituto IRRIS di ricerca, sviluppo e strategie della società, cultura e ambiente[®]

Sedež/Sede/Address:

Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko, SI-6000, Koper-Capodistria, Garibaldijeva 18 / Via Garibaldi 18, e-mail: actahistriae@gmail.com; https://zjdp.si/

Tisk/Stampa/Print:

Založništvo PADRE d.o.o.

Naklada/Tiratura/Copies:

300 izvodov/copie/copies

**Finančna podpora/
Supporto finanziario/
Financially supported by:**

Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije / Slovenian Research Agency, Mestna občina Koper

**Slika na naslovnici/
Foto di copertina/
Picture on the cover:**

Dvoboj med Charlesom de Lamethom in Charlesom de Castriesom 12. oktobra 1790. Jean-François Janinet (1752-1814) (Muzej Carnavalet, Pariz) / Duel between Charles de Lameth and Charles de Castries on October 12 1790. Jean-François Janinet (1752-1814) (Carnavalet Museum, Paris) / Duello tra Charles de Lameth e Charles de Castries del 12 ottobre 1790. Jean-François Janinet (1752-1814) (Museo Carnavalet, Parigi).

Redakcija te številke je bila zaključena 30. junija 2022.

Revija Acta Histriae je vključena v naslednje podatkovne baze / Gli articoli pubblicati in questa rivista sono inclusi nei seguenti indici di citazione / Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in: CLARIVATE ANALYTICS (USA): Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Social Scisearch, Arts and Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI), Journal Citation Reports / Social Sciences Edition (USA); IBZ, Internationale Bibliographie der Zeitschriftenliteratur (GER); International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) (UK); Referativnyi Zhurnal Viniti (RUS); European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences (ERIH PLUS); Elsevier B. V.: SCOPUS (NL); DOAJ.
To delo je objavljeno pod licenco / Quest'opera è distribuita con Licenza / This work is licensed under a Creative Commons BY-NC 4.0.



Navodila avtorjem in vsi članki in barvni verziji so prosto dostopni na spletni strani: <https://zjdp.si>.

Le norme redazionali e tutti gli articoli nella versione a colori sono disponibili gratuitamente sul sito: <https://zjdp.si/it/>.

The submission guidelines and all articles are freely available in color via website [http: https://zjdp.si/en/](https://zjdp.si/en/).



VSEBINA / INDICE GENERALE / CONTENTS

- Matjaž Grahornik:** Tragičen vstop v novo leto:
smrt Franca Jožefa grofa Herbersteina v dvoboju 2. januarja 1713 263
*Un tragico ingresso nell'anno nuovo: la morte in duello di
Franz Joseph conte di Herberstein il 2 gennaio 1713
A Tragic Start to a New Year: The Death of Franz Joseph
Count Herberstein in a Duel on 2 January 1713*
- Alessandro Fausti:** Relazioni di amicizia tra Salò e Venezia.
Il caso della riedizione degli statuti della Magnifica Patria 297
*Friendship Relations between Salò and Venice. The Case of
the Re-edition of the Statutes of Magnifica Patria
Prijateljski odnosi med Salòjem in Benetkami.
Primer nove izdaje statutov »Magnifice Patrie«*
- Marija V. Kocić & Nikola R. Samardžić:** British Sources
on the Crisis of the Venetian Patriariate during the Second
Morea War: The Case of Daniel IV Dolphin 325
*Fonti britanniche sulla crisi del patriziato veneziano nel periodo
della seconda guerra di Morea: il caso di Daniele IV Dolfin
Britanski viri o krizi beneškega patriariata v času druge
morejske vojne: primer Danieleja IV. Dolfina*
- Jelena Knežević & Julian Köck:** Theodor Mommsen in
Montenegro (1862) 347
*Theodor Mommsen in Montenegro (1862)
Theodor Mommsen v Črni gori (1862)*
- Milena Kavarić & Rajka Đoković:** Čedomorstvo u
modernoj i suvremenoj Crnoj Gori 377
*L'infanticidio nel Montenegro in età moderna e contemporanea
Infanticide in Modern and Contemporary Montenegro*

- Ivona Jovanović & Jasna Potočnik Topler:** The Contribution of First Teachers of French at Petrović's Court to the Transformation of Society and the Affirmation of Montenegro in Europe 407
Il contributo dei primi insegnanti di francese alla corte dei Petrović alla trasformazione della società e l'affermazione del Montenegro in Europa
Prispevek prvih učiteljev francoščine na Petrovičevem dvoru k preobrazbi družbe in uveljavitvi Črne gore v Evropi
- Ivan Jeličić:** *I migliori elementi d'italianità.* Local Political Power Ascension and Italianization during the First Years of Post-world War I in Volosca–Abbazia, 1918–1920 429
I migliori elementi d'italianità. L'ascesa al potere locale e l'italianizzazione nei primi anni del primo dopoguerra a Volosca–Abbazia, 1918–1920
I migliori elementi d'italianità. Vzpon lokalne politične moči in italijanizacija v prvih letih po prvi svetovni vojni v Volosko–Opatiji, 1918–1920
- Marko Medved:** L'abuso della religione nella liturgia politica della Fiume dannunziana: la benedizione del pugnale nella chiesa di S. Vito 451
Abuse of Religion in the Political Liturgy of D'Annunzio's Rijeka (Fiume): The Scandal of the Blessing of the Dagger in St. Vitus Church
Zloraba vere v politični liturgiji na dannunzijeovski Reki: blagoslov bodala v cerkvi sv. Vida
- Larysa Poliakova & Natalia Shkoda:** Historiographic Issues Regarding the Position of the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches in Soviet Ukraine in the Years 1920–1930 471
Problemi storiografici relativi alle posizioni della chiesa ortodossa e quella cattolica romana nell'Ucraina sovietica negli anni 1920–1930
Historiografska vprašanja glede položaja pravoslavne in rimokatoliške cerkve v sovjetski Ukrajini v letih 1920–1930
- Klemen Kocjančič:** A Contribution to the Role of (Former) Red Army Prisoners of War and White Emigrés in Slovenia during the German Occupation, 1943–1945 487
Contributo riguardo al ruolo degli (ex) prigionieri di guerra dell'Armata rossa e dell'«emigrazione bianca» in Slovenia durante l'occupazione tedesca, 1943–1945
Prispevek k vlogi (nekdanjih) rdečearmijskih vojnih ujetnikov in belih emigrantov v Sloveniji med nemško okupacijo, 1943–1945

- Borut Klabjan:** Graditi partizanski spomin v socialistični Jugoslaviji:
slovenski primer v času po drugi svetovni vojni 513
Costruire la memoria partigiana nella Jugoslavia socialista:
il caso sloveno dopo la seconda guerra mondiale
Building Partisan Memory in Socialist Yugoslavia:
The Slovene Case after World War II
- Boštjan Udovič:** “Danke Deutschland!”: The Political and Diplomatic
Contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany to the
Creation of Independent Slovenia 535
«Danke Deutschland!»: il contributo politico-diplomatico
della Repubblica Federale di Germania alla nascita dello
Stato indipendente della Slovenia
»Danke Deutschland!«: politično-diplomatski
prispevek Zvezne republike Nemčije k nastanku slovenske države

BRITISH SOURCES ON THE CRISIS OF THE VENETIAN PATRICIATE
DURING THE SECOND MOREA WAR:
THE CASE OF DANIEL IV DOLPHIN

Marija V. Kocić

University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of History, Čika Ljubina, 18-20, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: marija.kocic@f.bg.ac.rs

Nikola R. Samardžić

University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of History, Čika Ljubina, 18-20, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: nikola.samardzic@f.bg.ac.rs

ABSTRACT

This study is based on research that provided precise insights into changes in social relations in Venice during the last war with the Ottoman Empire, known as the Second Morean War 1714–1718. The focus is on very complex relations between Daniel IV Dolfin (1656–1729) and Andrea Pisani (1662–1718), as representatives of the two strongest factions in the patriciate. British sources, more precisely than Venetian contemporaries, related the general crisis of government with most important personalities on whom the war efforts were based. This study seeks to underline the credibility and precision of British sources while using achievements of contemporary Italian historiography, with respects to the visible progress over the past decades in research of the various phenomena of the Venetian patriciate.

Keywords: Venice, Daniele IV Dolfin, Andrea Pisani, oligarchy, patriciate, Morea, Corfu

FONTI BRITANNICHE SULLA CRISI DEL PATRIZIATO VENEZIANO
NEL PERIODO DELLA SECONDA GUERRA DI MOREA:
IL CASO DI DANIELE IV DOLFIN

SINTESI

Il presente contributo è il risultato di una ricerca che ha fornito una visione accurata dei cambiamenti verificatisi nelle relazioni sociali a Venezia durante il periodo dell'ultima guerra della Serenissima contro l'Impero Ottomano, conosciuta come la Seconda guerra di Morea (1714-1718). L'attenzione si concentra sulla relazione complessa tra Daniele Dolfin, detto Daniele IV (1656-1729), e

Andrea Pisani (1662-1718), rappresentanti di due correnti più potenti del patriziato veneziano del tempo. Le fonti britanniche, più esaurienti e scrupolose di quelle veneziane, associavano la crisi generale del potere ai rapporti tra le figure più importanti su cui poggiavano gli sforzi bellici della Repubblica di Venezia. La presente indagine si propone quindi di ribadire la credibilità e precisione delle fonti britanniche, utilizzando allo stesso tempo i risultati della storiografia italiana contemporanea, la quale negli ultimi decenni ha conseguito progressi tangibili nello studio dei vari fenomeni concernenti il patriziato.

Parole chiave: Venezia, Daniele IV Dolfin, Andrea Pisani, oligarchia, patriziato, Morea, Corfu

INTRODUCTION: SYSTEM WEAKNESSES AND GENERAL DECADENCE

Aside from international relations, Venice was attractive with its extraordinary ambience that offered sublime rest, entertainment or leisure. Italy provided enjoyment in Roman and Renaissance antiquities, climate and ambience. The British were among the first to discover Italy as such, as Venice was an important intermediary in their Mediterranean expansion. However, the relations between Britain and Venice were not defined precisely enough, primarily due to the lack of a trade agreement that would regulate the rights and obligations of British traders in the Venetian market (Kocić, 2018, 147–166). But thanks to a particular cultural interaction, British public opinion has built a belief in the exceptionality of the Venetian system and its ability to preserve the independence of the Republic, despite the substantial changes in international relations during the eighteenth century (Eglin, 2001, 11 and further). British travelers especially contributed to a closer knowledge of the Venetian political constitution and social practices. In the early years of the eighteenth century, Joseph Addison considered the Senate to pursue wise policies, and to use influence and procedures that were unknown in other contemporary states.

Despite his enthusiasm, Addison was also aware of the system's weaknesses (Addison, 1767, 63). The British critical view of the Venetian constitution culminated in reports by British Embassy Secretary Christian Cole with a detailed description of complex social tensions at the very beginnings of the Second Morean War (1714):

They have lost their Trade, they are full of debts, tho the Subjects are loaden with taxes, they are hated by all the Gentlemen in their Terra-Firma, and by all the Greeks, they have no military virtue at all, and think now only on preserving themselves, and not at all on resolut[ion] to doe any thing that

may be dangerous. They are fallen into a perfect Oligarchy, the worst of all Governments every man gathers what he can, and those who have reigns in the hand are full of money, whilst the rest sta[te] (TNA SP 99/60, 266v–267r).

Indicating the “perfect oligarchy” could be understood in accordance with Valker Hunecke’s study of the negative connotation of the notion of oligarchy, the developments enabled 14–15 senators to take almost entire state power (Hunecke, 1999, 141, 144). In recent studies, from the past three decades, the transition from an aristocratic republic with elements of patrician democracy to an oligarchy has been examined more closely. The myth of patrician equality has been shattered, and was becoming clear how the political unity has disappeared in plutocracy as patrician factions entered into fierce political struggles (Hunecke 1991; Hunecke 1997; Hunecke, 1998; Hunecke 1999; Sabbadini, 1995; Sabbadini, 1999; Raines, 2003; Raines, 1991; Megna, 1997).

British visitors arriving in Venice from the mid seventeenth century noticed that the patricians were controlled by several of the most influential families, while the rest were expelled from power, and there were even patricians on the brink of survival, *baranabotti*. Segregation on the basis of wealth and thus the social influence arose after the co-optation of new families since the Candian War (1645–1669), and the practice continued during the First Morean War (Sabbadini, 1999, 495). Segregation also led to political divisions (Raines, 1991, 179). In the year in which the battle for Morea was fought (1715), the patriciate had 1,750 members (Sabbadini, 1999, 496, fn. 2).¹ In these circumstances, power was monopolized by several senators (*primati*). This confirmed the state of the “oligarchy”, established since the middle of the seventeenth century (Del Negro, 1984a, 422–424; Del Negro 1984b, 311–337). The conflicts between “governo largo” and “governo stretto”, between an oligarchy of the *ottimati* and a control over offices exercised by members of the lesser nobility was becoming structural. Oligarchy and plutocracy produced irreparable fractures within the nobility, but also between the Republic and its subject territories (Vigiano, 2013, 70–73). In all this, Broglio, today’s Piazzetta di San Marco, gained special significance, a narrow space intended for the rest of the patricians during the session of the Grand Council and the Senate, where all important decisions were actually made in a rather speculative way (Raines, 1991, 137 sq.).

The “oligarchy”, with such additional unofficial affiliation, also influenced the cover-up of all news and events that would challenge its special status. Pietro del Negro pointed out that after the end of the Second Morean War, “started a silence in Venetian historiography”, underlining in particular the decision of 1719 to suspend work on the Annals, a collection of the most important documents, used by the “official historians” (Del Negro, 1998).² That is why the events of the Second Morea War are not covered by any official history. As Anastaisa Stouraiti pointed out, Pietro

1 Addison recorded 1,500 members around 1702 (Addison, 1767, 64).

2 Paper available on public domain, at www.treccani.it; this version lacks pagination.

Garzoni (1645–1735) was elected to the position of “state historian” on June 10, 1692 (Stouraiti, 2005, 248). Garzoni was a senator and a prominent public figure. In two volumes of the *History of Venice*, he described the events during the First Morean War (Garzoni, 1712) and the War of the Spanish Succession (Garzoni, 1719). However, the third volume of his *History of Venice*, supposed to cover the Second Morean War, never appeared. He was convinced that by writing about the events on Morea, he would arouse the anger of his fellow citizens (Del Negro, 1998). In that circumstance, the relations at the summit of the patriciate were also contained, as party struggles, their manifestations on the internal affairs of Venice, and the attitude of the patricians towards the provinces and subjects.

The patriciate tried at all costs to conceal its own responsibility for the loss of Morea. This leads to a re-examination of the decisions and specific abilities of the members of the patriciate who made the most important decisions, to adapt to the current moment. The political games, or rather machinations, on *Broglio*, led to the concentration of power in the circle of several most powerful and influential families, according to whose interests the other patricians gravitated. Therefore, this study would be justified, to point out the details and essence of the party struggle at the top of the patriciate during the crisis years of the Second Morean War, especially since it is based on the exact and the impartial British sources. In order to focus on the person of Daniele IV Dolfin, war operations were deliberately ignored, although they were the subject of only scarce eighteenth-century Venetian histories (Ferrari, 1723; Diedo, 1751, IV). Only later research indicated the most significant moments in the conflict (Bernardy, 1902; Setton, 1997; Pinzelli, 2003).

DANIELE IV DOLFIN, BACKGROUND AND ASCENT

Daniele IV Dolfin was one of the most prominent figures during the Second Morean War, better known to contemporaries as Girolamo Dolfin. The Dolfin family was one of the 12 oldest patrician houses and emerged by separation from the Gradenigo family (Mantoan & Quaino, 2014, 175). “Dolfini di San Pantalon” stood out as a younger branch of the family in the fifteenth century, and were named after the parish and the church built in the ninth century, where their family house was built (Dolfin, 1924, 58–59). A member of the branch was Daniele IV Dolfin who took part in the battles for the conquest of Morea at the beginning of the First Morean War as *capitano ordinario delle navi*. He especially stood out during the conquest of Coron in 1685. By his merits he provided both the advancement in the army, and popularity with the fellow citizens. In the following years he participated in all operations that have made Venice win the biggest part of Morea. While fighting in the Morea, he married a certain lady from Euboea (Negroponte), but their son Pompeo was not recognized by the patricians as the legitimate family heir (Mantoan & Quaino, 2014, 182). Having gained fame in the Morea, he was appointed in 1692 to *Provveditore generale nella Dalmazia*, and kept this office until 1696. This is indicated by his report, was published thanks

to a team of collaborators gathered by Rita Tolomeo on the project *Stato da mar*. He sent the report to the Senate after the expiration of the duty of the general *provveditore* of Dalmatia. When he returned to Venice, in the Senate on March 17, 1697, he presented a detailed account of the situation in Dalmatia and suggested that certain measures be taken (ASVe, Collegio, Relazioni, b. 67).³

The conquest of Morea in 1685–1687 contributed to the strengthening of the reputation of the patricians. Francesco Morosini was given an honorary title *Il Peloponnesiaco*. The Senate sought to organize power in Morea, divided into four provinces. The process of consolidation of power was reconstructed by Gaetano Cozzi (Cozzi, 1985, 740–789), and lately also Alexis Malliaris (Malliaris 2004, 499–505; Μάλλιαρης, 2018, 247–269; Malliaris, 2007, 97–110). The Venetian military on Morea, and the successful defense during the First Morean War were brought under the light in the doctoral dissertation by Erico Pinzelli (Pinzelli, 2003), with new perspectives on the events on the eve of the Ottoman attack of 1715.

“Hero of the Mytilene” took an active role in political life after the war. During the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), he was entrusted with certain duties in the defense of *Terraferma*. In August 1705, he was elected its general provider (Pinzelli, 2003, 464). When Austrian troops conquered Milan (1706), Daniele IV defended the Senate’s decision to keep Venice neutral, according to him a wise choice so that Republic would not suffer any war damage (Pinzelli, 2003, 464). In order to stimulate the economy in the hinterland, Venice began demobilization in Terraferma, in 1711 (Pinzelli, 2003, 466). Daniele IV was however opposed, as intentions to take back Peloponnesian grew in the Ottoman Empire, and offered ideas for the upcoming war operations (Centanni, 1998, 273).⁴ Older Italian historians have discovered its unbridled nature, passion for gambling and uncontrolled outbursts (Dolfin, 1924, 171–176), but that did not diminish his influence. After all, his brother Daniele Giovanni III Dolphin (1654–1729) was appointed to ambassador in Poland in 1715, where he remained until 1717 (Setton, 1991, 423; Zorzi, 1982, 267–302; Ferrari, 1723, 34).⁵

And while Daniele IV Dolfin gained fame in his early years, over time his character has suppressed the wisdom of the mature age as he also experienced the Second Morean War. Daniele IV was elected again *Provveditore generale da Mar* in 1714 (Mantoan & Quaino, 2014, 190). British secretary Christian

3 Document available on the public domain <http://www.statodamar.it/mare.php?ly=5&ar=3&rt=47&re=306&sid=transcription> by Lia de Luca.

4 The cited Monice Centanni’s research indicated various aspects of his activities. Also in: Pedrocchi, 1996, 43–50.

5 Hugh Broughton informed London about the election of Daniele III Dolfin, referring to him as “Cavalier Dolfin”, noting that he should have asked the King of Poland for help, according to the 1699 Karlowitz peace contract (TNA SP 99/61, 20r). The same conclusion about this mission was given by Nani Mocenigo, who refers him as Giovanni Dolfin; Nani Mocenigo, 1935, 316. He exclusively mentions his brother as Daniele Dolfin (Ibid., 317). The same occasion, Giovanni Dolfin was supposed to visit Vienna and become more familiar with Austrian attitudes (Diedo, 1751, IV, 78).

Cole (1673–1734) announced in mid-March to London that three new warships (Crowned Valour, The Vittoria Morea and Iris) were soon to sail for the Levant with the general Daniele IV (TNA SP 99/60, 229r). In late July 1714, Daniele IV “has took his leave in the Colledge, and will imbarck on Sunday next for the Levant, when [h]e has aucturity of Captain General given him” (TNA SP 99/60, 368r).⁶ At that moment, Daniel IV became the most important figure in Venetian defense policy on the Levant. Reporting on the situation in Venice, Cole indirectly linked his election as commander-in-chief to rumors of a possible Ottoman fleet attack on the Italian coast (TNA SP 99/60, 368r).

DISGRACE

The years of Turkish occupation that had preceded the reconquest had reduced Morea to poverty and desolation. The rule of the Catholic Republic, instead of the Islamic Empire, did not contribute to the political favor of the local Greek Orthodox population. In a letter dated May 31, 1715, to the Secretary of State of the Southern Department James Stanhope (1673–1721) Hugh Broughton stressed the indisposition the Greeks towards the Venetian authorities on the Morea and the fact that the Venetians ordered all the inhabitants to withdraw to the four fortifications. These cities were not sufficiently supplied with weapons, provisions and ammunition, while the fleet took care of Corfu, Kefalonia and Zakynthos (TNA SP 99/61, 37r).

In British reports, Daniele IV is not mentioned during the first months of the war. Otherwise, the first document to point his activities was his letter from mid-March 1715 informing the Senate that he had prepared Morea for defense, and waiting succor (TNA SP 99/61, 24v). The press actually announced that he arrived in Modon, and was supposed to move to Corfu to be united with the rest of the fleet (AI, 1715, 53v). But there is a possibility that his name was used by the press in order to raise combat morale. Daniele IV actually remained fortified with the rest of the army at Modon (AI, 1715, 57v). In his *History of Venice* Giacomo Diedo paid tribute to his efforts. Daniele IV persistently pressed the Senate for ships, troops and supplies. He was fully aware of all the weaknesses of the Venetian defense of Morea and the islands (Diedo, 1751, IV, 82). His activities in strengthening the Venetian positions were also confirmed by the crew of the British ship “Fregatta”, after meeting him in the waters near Zakynthos, where he had passed in the meanwhile (AI, 1715, 65v).⁷ Daniele IV also assembled a War Council for a more efficient defense.

Kapudan Pasha Janım Hoca captured Tinos (June 5–6), followed by the offensive of the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha, who conquered Corinth (June 26–July 2),

6 On the significance of this position in the social order of Venice with more detail in: Casini, 2001, 219–270. Dolfin gave a speech in the Senate on that occasion: *La Via Lattea. Orazione in lode dell’Ill.mo et ecc.mo sig. Girolamo Dolfino cavalier provveditor generale in mare la seconda volta nel suo solenne ingresso fatto in Corfù l’anno 1714* (Cicogna, 1847, 412).

7 In a list he compiled to acquaint London with the strength of the Venetian fleet, Broughton cited “Bastarda” as a Dolfin’s ship (TNA SP 99/61, 35v).

Nauplio (July 12–20), Modon (August 18) and Malvasia (September 7). With that, the Ottomans took over the entire Peloponnese. Surprised by the quick surrender, British ambassador with the Ottoman Porte, Robert Sutton (ambassador: 1701–1716/1718), stated that Venice had been working for the last five years to rebuild the fortifications “with great care & Expence... & had brought them to such perfection that they were esteemed by themselves impregnable” (TNA SP 97/23, 185r). He further pointed out that Daniele IV personally, with his presence, encouraged the garrisons to prepare for the defense.

Ships arriving in Venice brought news of catastrophic losses. They were published in the press with a delay and in a milder version, but despite that, the public got the impression that the most responsible culprits for the defeat at Morea were the military commanders (AI, 1716). In a letter dated August 23, Hugh Broughton, in addition to suspecting that Morea was lost, stated that the news of these events were kept in strict secrecy (TNA SP 99/61, f 49r). The loss of Nauplio, the most fortified Venetian position on the Morea, surprised contemporaries and opened the question of the command responsibility of Daniel IV. Sutton noted that before the Ottoman attack on the city, Daniel IV ordered 8 Dalmatian and 2 German regiments (Adelman & Diegher), with another two regular regiments, a total of 5000 soldiers, leave the defense to be deployed in the fleet. To defend Nafplio, he sent one regiment from Dalmatia and 4 others,⁸ a total of 1700 to 1800 infantry. He promised to send as many more soldiers, but that reinforcement never arrived. The lack of grenadiers and artillery was especially felt, while ammunition and groceries were plentiful (TNA SP 97/23, 189r). Giacomo Diedo, who knew that Daniel IV had ordered the 8 navas and 11 galleys to withdraw from Nafplio, claimed that he had the permission of the Senate, in order to strengthen the fleet (Diedo, 1751, IV, 84). Regarding the loss of Nafplio, Diedo confirmed the beliefs in responsibility of Daniel IV, charged by the Senate to defend the city (Diedo, 1751, IV, 95).

While a possible failure to arm Nauplio revealed possible flaws, the struggle over Modon openly indicated responsibility of Daniel IV. While the battle for Nafplio was in progress, Daniel IV was anchored with the fleet at Zakynthos. When the Ottoman army besieged Modon, Daniel IV left Zakynthos and sailed with the fleet to Modon, from where he did not move (Ferrari, 1723, 58), and the Venetian fleet then escaped the catastrophe only thanks to the indecision of the kapudan-pasha Janim Hoca, who did not dare to attack swayed by the unfavorable wind (TNA SP 97/23, 197r).

But Daniele IV continued to perform his duty of *capitano generale*. Consultations were held, and was decided to withdraw the fleet further north, while *proveveditor straordinario* Fabio Bonvicini had to stay with large ships and provide assistance to endangered positions, and only Marco Loredan was against (Diedo, 1751, IV, 98). It was a decision to withdraw the majority of the fleet to the northern Aegean that raised doubts about the correctness of conducting operations, and led the Senate to decide to reconsider the responsibilities of the highest

8 The document mentioned: de la Sale, Tutu, Medin and one Italian.

commanders. Diedo stated that Daniele IV ordered the help to be delivered to Spinalongi, but it was not possible to carry out (Diedo, 1751, IV, 105).⁹

A useful addition to the official reports of British diplomacy was then offered by *The Historical Register*, with current events from all parts of the world, including Venice.¹⁰ Considering the circumstances during 1716, *The Historical Register* points the position of Daniel IV, who suffered the condemnation of the commons, who blamed him for the failure, while, on the other hand, the same subjects could not understand real weaknesses of the Venetian army (*THR*, 1717, I, 28). It was the public outcry that prompted the Senate to cancel him “employment” (*THR*, 1717, I, 28) and thus deprive Daniel IV of the title of the commander in chief. British Resident in Venice Alexander Cunningham (1655–1737; resident: 1715–1719) did not hear nice opinions about Dolfin. “The [co]mmon people cry out against him and [he] has ruined the Malteze Gen[era]ll at [wa]y, they add this pasquerade, that if has miscarried, that it was neither [of] want of Horse nor foot, he having 40000 Cavali and 40000 fanti, in so [man]y packs of cards, which he carried w[ith] Him” (TNA SP 99/61, 88r). They considered him must responsible for the defeat, he became the object of ridicule of ordinary people, and his gambling vice was emphasized.

CRISIS OF POWER AND APPOINTMENT OF *CAPITANO GENERALE*

Based on November 8, 1715 letter from Hugh Broughton, it could be concluded that by that date Daniel IV had been removed from the duty of *capitano generale*, and chosen Francesco Grimani (TNA SP 99/61, 75r). In the following letter he is more specific about the circumstances, although he avoided mentioning Daniel IV:

But Sig[nor] Francesco Grimani, which was elected Captain Generall seems to refuse the Charge, untill in reality he sees a sufficient Army, and fleet of Shippes & Gallies wel manned. This is most likely to be effected, for all care is taken ther[e] about against next Spring. And the Republick is raysing money by Taxes, contriving Lotterys, and selling all their land & houses to the best bidder. Also freeing banish'd People, Prissoners &c for money. But they will be very cautions to make New Patritij & Porcurators for Money, because the Moderne Nobillity are already too numerous for the antient familys & generally more rich (TNA SP 99/61, 77r).

The fact that Francesco Grimani set a restrictive condition was a precedent that opened the crisis of power in the Republic. The legal provisions provided that a patrician elected to the Grand Chamber could refuse the assigned duty, but he was

9 The same was confirmed by the French contemporary Anthleme Tricaud (Tricaud, 1718, I, 238). Dolfin persisted in his decision to keep the Venetian fleet in northern positions (Diedo, 1751, IV, 107).

10 It is significant that the publisher was *Sun Fire Office*, a company that has provided insurance services since 1706. The company soon started publishing its own magazine, as the insurance market also depended on events from all over the world. In 1716, the company decided to publish quarterly reports instead of weekly newspapers (*THR*, 1717, I, i).

obliged to pay a fine of 2,000 ducats to the Treasury, and to be deprived of the right to attend the sessions of the Grand Council over the next two years. Grimani was aware of that. He therefore asked the Senate to increase the fee in order to accept the offered position.

Another important decision followed. At the end of November 1715 was published *Proclama* announcing an investigation among officials and officers related to the omissions on the Morea and in the fleet (TNA SP 99/60, 409v). According to British sources, the strongest blow was the loss of Nafplio, and that led to the investigation. Cunningham noted that “Napoli di Romani was well provided in evrie thig but men, the garrison consisting only of about 1100 [men]. B[e]side sev[e]ral officers are ill spoke of an[y] suspected of treacherie, w[hi]ch is to be inquir[ed] into” (TNA SP 99/61, 83v). To explain the opening of the investigation, he stated that the Venetian fleet was otherwise well equipped, but lost several favorable opportunities to gain advantage over the Ottoman fleet under the pretext that several Maltese ships did not join in time. The same statement indicates that the senators were most affected by the inactivity of the fleet (TNA SP 99/61, 83v). It was a direct accusation against Daniel IV.

The appointment of Francesco Grimani soon proved to be a bad solution. Overthrown by epileptic seizures, he resigned and immediately suspended military preparations. Tricaud noticed that Grimani belonged to the “second” category of nobility, as his family was enrolled in *Libro d’Oro* after the first closure (*serrata*) of the Grand Council Consiglio Maggiore in 1297 (Tricaud, 1718, I, 247). After the first order sent to Daniele IV, to return to Venice immediately and submit a report (TNA SP 99/61, 88r), a new order soon set out, with orders to stay with the fleet at Corfu.

In a letter dated December 20, 1715, Cunningham notes “Sig[no]r Grimani latelie chosen Capt[ain] Gen[eral] was this week taken ill w[ith] Epileptick fits, a stop is put to his Equepage, and Orders are sent to Gen[eral] Dolfino to stay at Corfu w[ith] the fleet, and tis generally thought, t[ha]t he will be continued in his post” (TNA SP 99/61, 189r–189v). British sources reveal the crisis of patriciate, affecting the electoral system. On January 3, 1716, Cunningham noted that Michele Morosini (formerly sent to several diplomatic missions) had been appointed Ambassador Extraordinary, and was to visit several Italian courts and seek help (TNA SP 99/61, 91v). Two days later, on January 5, during the Sunday session of the Grand Council, Michele Morosini was elected the new Capitano Generale. Francesco Grimani retired to Padua “for his health” (TNA SP 99/61, 102r).

In Britain was also announced that the new captain general was the namesake and close relative of the famous Francesco Morosini from the previous war (MM, 1716, 17). After the election of Morosini, Daniele IV no longer had a reason to stay in Corfu. But Michele Morosini Jr., for reasons not disclosed to the public, immediately rejected his position after the election. “His exuses we found soe just, that the Senat, put noe fine upon him, and proceeded to chuse another in his room” (TNA SP 99/61,

107r).¹¹ The press in Britain, inclined to interpret the events at its own discretion, presented the repeated election to the highest position in the Venetian army as an affair at the top of the state. *Monthly Mercury* did not consider the withdrawal of Grimani and Morosini a mere coincidence. In this way, they tried to avoid public condemnation, if the Venetian army suffered another defeat. In the issue for January 1716, it was stated

...but many are of Opinion, that they made Use of it as of a specious Pretence to decline a Command, wherein they foresaw they would suffer in their Honours and reputation, as Signior Delphino has done. No doubt but the latter is a brave Man, and an experienced General; but yet he layes under the Censure of the People, who being ignorant of the true Condition of the Forces of the Republick, lay the Blame of the Loss of Morea at his Door (MM, t. XXVII, 1716, p. 17).

Andrea Pisani was elected *Provveditor Generale Inquisitore al Isole* (Diedo, 1751, IV, 85). In the midst of the election crisis, he is already mentioned as one of the candidates for a higher position in the army. Thus in a letter dated January 7, 1716, Cunningham noted:

The ballot fell on Sig[no]r Pisani, who is on Corfu, presently after this election, advice was sent to him and his answer is impatiently expected. It is thought His Ex[er]c[is]e will not accept. In that case, the Senate will return to make a new Election, wh[ic]h is thought will fall upon Sig[no]re Molinos, who far age and infirmitys is no able to stir out of his Chamber and after all, it is thought Gen[er]al Dolfino will be ordered to command in that post this year, notwithstanding of all the outcry that was made against his conduct the last Camp[aigne] (TNA SP 99/61, 107r).

On January 13, the Grand Council voted for the new Commander-in-Chief, Andrea Pisani. A special commission was appointed to inform him of the election (MM, t. XXVII, 1716, p. 17). And that's what happened. At the end of February 1716, Andrea Pisani informed the Senate that he must reject the position and Daniele IV remained the commander-in-chief until further notice (TNA SP 99/61, 133v).¹² In early March, Senate still failed to resolve the issue of the commander-in-chief (TNA SP 99/61, 135r). Suddenly, Andrea Pisani changed his mind and accepted the position of commander-in-chief on March 15 (TNA SP 99/61, 154v).

Senator Diedo, who published his *History of Venice* three decades later, almost kept silent about the election for *Capitano Generale*. The period between the Dolfin's dismissal until the appointment of Andrea Pisani, Diedo sublimated only in a few

11 Almost the same version was offered by a French contemporary Tricaud (Tricaud, 1718, I, 255).

12 Marshal Schulenburg, in the meanwhile, visited Corfu, Zakynthos and Kefalonia, and returned to Dalmatia to establish defense (TNA SP, 99/61, 133v).

lines, while trying to cover up the crisis of the system. Diedo kept silent about the elections that burdened the Grand Council from the end of 1715 to the middle of March 1716, when Andrea Pisani finally accepted the highest position in the army (Diedo, 1751, IV, 117–118). Presumably, Diedo did this not to defend the interests of Daniele IV and his supporters, but to cover up the powerlessness of the government and oligarchy he also belonged to. Girolamo Ferrari in his *History* also withheld the Commander-in-Chief election, only stating that Daniele Girolamo was succeeded by Antonio Pisani (Ferrari, 1723, 101, 339).

ELECTION FOR THE SAINT MARK'S PROSECUTOR

In mid-April 1716, Daniele IV was expected to return to Venice (TNA SP 99/61, 157v). A letter from Corfu reported that he boarded the ship *Rosa Moceniga*, leaving the fleet in good condition under the command of Pisani (TNA SP 99/61, 166r). A letter from Venice dated April 18, 1716, published by *The Monthly Mercury*, claims that Daniele IV arrived in Venice the day before. It is further stated in that document "...and after he has made a Report to the Senate of the Condition of our Forces both by Sea nad Land, and of the Transactions of the last Campaign, 'tis hoped we shall know the true Cause of the ill Success thereof, and particular the Reasons whay Napoli di Romania, and other Fortresses in Morea, made little or no Resistance, and how that fine Country was so easily conquered by the Turks" (MM, t. XXVII, pp. 158–159)

Daniele IV left quarantine on May 20 and appeared in Venice (Tricaud, 1718, I, 274). The Senate was convened to discuss his acting in Morea. In his defense, Daniele IV stated that the help was not delivered on time (Tricaud, 1718, I, 275). In the mid May 1716 "...after long debates on Gen[era]l Dolfinos conduct last camp[ai]gn, it was appoven in Pregadi by ballot and more than two thirds wer[e] for him" (TNA SP 99/61, 174r). That is how he escaped the trial. It was rumored that after the vote he would be sent back to Corfu to command the army and navy together with Pisani "in quality of Providitore Gen[era]l or some such Name" (TNA SP 99/61, 176r). The limited choice that the government faced (TNA SP 99/61, 176r–176v), as well as the power that the family had in society, really led to that compromise.

At the end of June 1716 Daniele IV appeared before his fellow citizens in a large procession accompanied by many friends as a procurator of St. Mark (TNA SP 99/61, 197v). From the beginning of the war until that moment, several patricians were elected procurator. In accordance with the constitutional structure, the position of the procurator was just below the doge's. The procurator could not participate in the session of the Grand Council, but enjoyed lifelong participation in the Senate. Its holder only could not run for the position of doge. About a month or two passed from the elections to the Grand Chamber, to the solemn entry into the city in the clothes of the procurator. Some of the elected procurators, since they were under penalty (in bando), could not organize a solemn procession. In the case of Daniel

IV, British sources do not state the moment when he was elected procurator, but only the ceremony he organized that occasion at the end of June 1716. As the ban on communication with foreign representatives has been tightened, it is possible that this information remained unknown to Cunningham. It is most probable that the election of Daniel IV was kept secret so as not to provoke the subjects, who considered him personally accountable for the loss of Morea.

The purchase of the title of procurator, after he was acquitted of all charges, was justified from the aspect of its public demonstration. He also ordered that the speech he gave when entering the Procuratria should be printed and distributed, wishing to suppress a bad impression in public. The speech was printed “con licenza de’superiori”, indicating that he has not yet lost the support of the oligarchy. With the speech he addressed Venetian patricians as the social and political basis of the existing order. He began by saying that the Consiglio (Grand Council) and the army were the two pillars of Venice, the first in charge of its glory and the second of its strength, *fermezza* (Orazione, 1716, 3). He purposefully tried to make up for his failures on the Morea with successes in Dalmatia as he stated that the investigation of the failures in the Morea determined the minimum of his responsibility (Orazione, 1716, 6). After that, Daniele IV returned to Corfu and took part in the battles for the island.

CORFU DEFENSE: THE PEAK OF THE DOLFIN VS. PISANI STRUGGLE

The single significant stronghold on the Levant remained Corfu. The island was the most important Venetian base towards the Levant, where the bulk of its fleet was stationed. On July 5, 1716, the Ottoman fleet escaped the Venetian fleet and entered the Corfu Canal (Pinzelli, 2003, 500). In the first attack, the Ottomans were repulsed in an attempt to disembark (July 5–8). Diedo mentions his participation in the fighting in the Corfu Channel, when he “con qualche altra Nave, che preso postro tra i Legni Veneti, e gli Ottomani...” (Diedo, 1751, IV, 129). The fighting continued after that, and on July 19, the landing of Ottoman forces on the island began. The attackers threatened the city of Corfu itself. The Venetians still managed to defend the city with the support of their Greek subjects. Simultaneously, on August 5 the Austrian army of Prince Eugene of Savoy defeated Grand Vizier Damat Ali Pasha and the Ottomans at Petrovaradin. The news reached the Ottoman camp near Corfu in the night between August 20 and 21, following a terrible storm that probably also saved the island. The Ottoman withdrawal place between 22 and 25 August (TNA SP 99/61, 229r).

It is indisputable that Corfu was preserved for Venice by the decision of Charles VI (1711–1740) to conclude the Holy League with Venice and the Pope against the Ottoman Empire, and that the defeat of the Ottoman army under Petrovaradin contributed to the Ottoman withdrawal. The Ottomans, however, were primarily wary of bad weather. All these facts are ignored by British sources, in the first place Alexander Cunningham’s reports are partially ignored, emphasizing in the first place military skills of Marshal

Matthias Johann von der Schulenburg (1661–1747).¹³ He had spent much of the winter improving the fortifications. As pointed in a British source “all agree t[ha]t the Repub[li]ck owns Corfu to the wise conduct and braverie of Gen[era]l Sculenburg, and noe doubt, but all Italia is infinitely obliged to him, but they begin alreddy to give the Glorie of it to the Blessed Virgin and some unknown Saint” (TNA SP 99/61, 233v).¹⁴ An unpleasant circumstance occurred for the patricians. Although Venice used foreign mercenaries, the commanding position belonged exclusively to the patricians, who based their influence in politics and society on their merits in the warfare (a classic example was Francesco Morosini during the First Morean War). Since Venice had weak infantry, the title *generale dal sbarco*, already created, was assigned to Schulemburg. Thus, in the defense of Corfu, all the glory and gratitude went to him. The Venetian command staff went unnoticed, and this was also case with Pisani as with Daniel IV.¹⁵

The defense of Corfu ended a series of defeats and raised the spirits, but also intensified the conflict between the supporters of Pisani and Dolfin. The fact that the Venetian fleet set out in search of the Ottomans on August 27, but returned to Corfu the very next day, Cunningham explained by the same hostility of their clans (TNA SP 99/61, 229v; 233v). Although neither Anrea Pisani nor Daniele IV Dolfin excelled in defending Corfu, this did not prevent their supporters from deepening the conflict, especially on the issue of conducting war operations (TNA SP 99/61, 229v). The British contemporary was explicit in claiming that there was a huge hatred between the Pisani and clans, but he still remained basically restrained, stating that there was a custom for the commander-in-chief to report to the Senate regularly with reports on his actions, presenting his own assessments. That is why Cunningham decided to wait for the arrival of the first British ship with news, more inclined to trust British than Venetian sources (TNA SP 99/61, 233v).

-
- 13 At the end of 1714, Venice decided to hire Baron Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg in rank of *Generale del sbarco* if the Ottoman army attacks Morea (TNA SP 99/60, 405r). *Generale del sbarco* was the title given to the Senate awarding the most prestigious of foreign generals engaged during the war in the Venetian service. Schulenburg had a long military service and not only distinguished himself as a commander, but also as a diplomat. In his early age he left his native Emden, not far from Magdeburg (Margravate of Brandenburg), for France, where he studied maths from 1680 at a Huguenot university in Saumur. He then entered the civil administration of Brunswick–Wolfenbüttel, but he soon left that position, opting in favor of military career. He fought in Hungary 1687–1688. Then he was in a diplomatic mission in service of Duke of Brunswick (Killy, 2005, 187). During the War of the Spanish Succession he managed to gain respect of the Prince Eugene of Savoy, although he fought on the opposite side. Until 1711 he remained in the service of the Saxon elector Frederick Augustus I (1670–1733), then he was also with the King of Poland (1697–1706). In the Great Northern War (1700–1721) he fought against the Swedish King Charles XII (1697–1718), gaining fame. But he failed to join the Austrian army of Charles VI. This was opposed by Eugene of Savoy himself (Killy, 2005, 187). The Senate hired him at the end of 1714, but he did not arrive in Venice until December 13 1715 (TNA SP 99/61, 77r).
- 14 In September, the Senate decided to reward Schulenburg with a diamond-studded golden sword and an annual salary of 1,000 *pistoles*. French currency. The press also covered the event, alleging that Schulenburg received an annual salary of 5,000 ducats (*AI*, 1717, 11r.) The very next day, the Grand Chamber decided to erect his statue on Corfu (*Ibid.*, 235r). Inspired by the victories of Schulenburg Antonio Vivaldi (1678–1741) composed in his honor oratorium *Judita* (Killy, 2005, 187).
- 15 “In all this siedge non distinguished themselves, like Gen[era]l Sculenburg and the Adm[ira]l of the Turks, the one for the brave defence made, t[h]e other for the retreat” (TNA SP 99/61, 229v).

Schulenburg arrived in Venice only on December 5.¹⁶ He's praise bothered patricians and their political factions. Families that were giving cavaliers, procurators, doges for centuries, recognized a danger in strengthening his reputation. When he appeared in the Doge's Palace, he did not meet a sufficient number of senators, so Senate session could not be held (TNA SP 99/61, 297r). Disputes also arose over the reception ceremony. In public, rumors were spread about "all profits that the Gen[era]l has enjoyed last year, w[hic]h they make amount to 300000 Florins Germ[ans]" (TNA SP 99/61, 297r), to be discredited among ordinary people. To one of those who spread the rumors, Cunningham sharply replied: "He saved Corfou, consequently Venise¹⁷ and all the Italie. And if he had been employed sooner He might have preserved t[h]e Morea, w[hic]h non of them could doe¹⁸ t[h]e year before" (TNA SP 99/61, 297v).

GAMBLING AND RETREAT

Daniel IV Dolfin and Schulenburg returned to Venice at the same time (report of January 1, 1717). Daniele IV was in need of a new position in the military also because he sunk in gambling debts (TNA SP 99/61, 283v). It is possible that Daniel IV, through his supporters, had a share in creating the opposition against Schulenburg. Political struggles were also important in the perspective of an immediate priority to raise a new fleet. Cunningham noticed that Schulenburg enjoys sympathies of ordinary people (TNA SP 99/61, 307r). A significant number of senators considered Schulenburg indispensable. It was assumed that the Ottomans would launch an offensive in Hungary, while Dalmatia could be attacked from land and sea, and Venice was not ready for defense (TNA SP 99/61, 307r–307v). That is how Schulenburg became even more important.

Daniele IV Dolfin knew how to manipulate the public while his clique seemed in retreat and Schulenburg's popularity growing. As the press reported (news from Venice from January 23, 1717) "*Capitano Generale Girolamo*" paid 25,000 ducats "*to fight the common enemy.*" The press brought this news as related to the election of Andrea Cornaro to the post of procurator (AI, 1717, 19v). Since the election of a procurator cost just that much, Daniele IV most likely thought that with this voluntary gesture he would persuade the Grand Council to elect him to one of the commanding positions in

16 Leaving Corfu, Schulenburg ordered the fortification of Santa Maura (TNA SP 99/61, 264r). On his way back to Venice, he informed the Pope about the new cult of St. Spyridon, and that alleged contribution which to the defense of Corfu (TNA SP 99/61, 265v). The next day, he was visited by a delegation of senators with congratulatory greetings. Cunningham visited him on the same occasion and offered a stay at the British Palace, thus repeating the offer made the previous year by King George I (TNA SP 99/61, 273r–273v). Schulenburg apologized for not getting Senate permission to communicate with officials from other states (TNA SP 99/61, 275v; 283v). After enduring quarantine, he appeared in the city in January 1717 and was solemnly presented with a valuable saber (TNA SP 99/61, 286r). One of the most eminent sculptors of the time Francesco Cabianca (1665–1737) finished his statue (AI, 1717, 3v).

17 Cunningham uses the French form, instead of the English "Venice". By the way, he corresponded with state secretaries in English as well as in French.

18 To be read "do". Version "doe" is common in Cunningham's correspondence.

the army. In early February, the Senate elected Andrea Dolfin *Padrone delle Navi*. Until then, he had served as one of six *governatori straordinarii delle Navi* (AI, 1717, 27r).

By early February 1717, it became known that Daniel IV had gambled a lot of money, he was unemployed, and had lost all influence over *Broglio* (TNA SP 99/61, 307r). Simultaneously, Schulemburg was gaining public support, and the Andrea Pisani achieved influence in the army and navy. A recent study states that Daniel IV was first elected *provveditore dei Fortezze* and then for ambassador to Poland (Mantoan & Quaino, 2014, 191). Cunningham, however, did not mention either of the two appointments. The election to the position of ambassador of a man who until then excelled in military skills and was not engaged in diplomatic missions reveals that the Dolphin family managed to secure the position of Daniel IV in order to remove him from Venice, even for a short period.

Subsequently in the Cunningham reports relations on Daniel IV cease, as attention shifted to the rise of Andrea Pisani and his supporters (Setton, 1991, 445). Indecisive naval battles in the summer of 1717 contributed to the impressions of seemingly undefeated Pisani, while the public had to be assured of the Venetian fleet leverage. Cunningham was aware of that, too. He was particularly angered by the public sentiments, as the press attributed the conquest of Vonitsa (the south coast of the Ambracian gulf near Lefkada) to Pisani, while Cunningham considered that the most deserving was Schulemburg (TNA SP 99/61, 423r–423v). The culmination of Pisani's influence was the proposal made at the end of November 1717 to be elected a knight of St. Mark "which passed w[ith] much opposition in the Pregadi" (TNA SP 99/61, 427v). It seems that neither of the two conflicting currents managed to take the key advantage.

At the end of March, an order was sent by Andrea Dolfin, who commanded the *nava Padrone*, and also the commander of the convoy leaving the port, to move towards the main corps of the Venetian fleet (AI, 1717, 56v).¹⁹

Daniele IV Dolfin became the subject of gossip again in the summer of 1718 after an incident briefly, concisely and condemningly described by Cunningham in a report of 24 June: "Sig[no]r Dolfino, who fired a pistol on Sig[no]r Favangrolo,

19 The Senate sent an order to Dolfin on April 6 to board the convoy equipped for Morea with other commanders (Trincaud, 1718, II, 394–395). In early May "noble Delfino" arrived in Corfu with 10 ships (Trincaud, 1718, II, 401). Dolfin was given the task of supervising, from 2 ships, the fleet that was gathering in Bay of Cattaro (Trincaud, 1718, II, 411, ref. a). Mario Nani Mocenigo mentioned Dolfin's participation in the battles during the summer of 1717 against the Ottoman fleet. Dolfin stood out on June 16 near the island of Strati when he prevented the capture of the nava with the commander Ludovico Flangini (Nani Mocenigo, 1935, 334–335). Diedo in *History of Venice* mentions the participation of one of the Dolphins in the circumstances when the Venetian fleet was anchored in the port Passavà, and the Ottoman in Corinth. He further stated: "ma ritrovandosi l'Almirante di Daniele Delfino troppo vicina al nemico fu dato principio alla battaglia..." (Diedo, 1751, IV, 144). However, the press, while closely following the events, did not mention the participation of any member of the Dolphin family in clashes on June 12 near Imbros, on June 13 near S. Stratto, and on June 16 near Monte Santo (AI, 1717, 125r–125v). On July 20, 1717, the Grand Council elected Marc Antonio Diedo after the perished Flangini, while Corero was elected to the position of *Capitaine ordinarie*, instead of Dolphin (Trincaud, 1718, II, 438). At the same time, fighting was taking place at Cape Matapan, and Pisani sailed with the fleet for Cerigo (Diedo, 1751, IV, 145). In the battles for Vojnitza in October 1717, Diedo did not mention the participation of Daniel IV Dolphin (Diedo, 1751, IV, 147–148).

and wounded him in t[h]e arm, is fled from justice, and banished by Senate, and it is said He is to goe to Peru” (TNA SP 99/62, 73r). The reason for the attack on the mentioned Favangrolo is difficult to determine, although it can be assumed that he pulled the gun because of gambling debts or a love affair. It is almost certain that that the report referred to Daniel IV, since his cousin Antonio Dolfin was engaged in operations in the Aegean at the time. Cunningham stated on September 26, 1718: “Sig[no]re Delfino is to succeed Sig[no]re Diedo who was killed in t[h]e last bat[t]le” (TNA SP 99/62, 115r–115v). The press also announced that Andrea Dolfin had been appointed to that position (AI, 1718, 163r). From the way the report was formulated in the press, it is very likely that Cunningham only copied the news. According to the previously mentioned genealogy, Daniel IV Andrea Dolfin (1689–?) was listed as the son of Daniele III Dolfin (Mantoan & Quaino, 2014, 180). Diedo in his *History of Venice* mentioned the death of Ludovico Diedo, who was mourned for his courage and merits, but not that any member of the Dolphin family was then appointed to his post (Diedo, 1751, IV, 163–164). He also withheld their participation in the battles for Dulcigno.

EPILOGUE (INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION)

The Passarowitz peace treaty was signed on July 21, 1718, between the Ottoman Empire on one side and Austria and the Republic of Venice on the other. Two days after the signing of the treaty, Venice attacked Dulcigno. The siege lasted until August 11, when the Venetian forces withdrew (Stanojević, 1970, 456). Remaining under Ottoman rule, Dulcigno continued to serve as the most important stronghold of pirates in the southern Adriatic. Venetian ships suffered the most from pirate attacks, but sometimes even merchant ships belonging to “nations” that enjoyed good relations with the Ottoman government were their prey (Kocić & Samardžić, 2019). With the Passarowitz peace treaty Venice had to be content with Cythera, Butrinto, Preveza and Vonitsa, and a few additional frontier fortresses in Dalmatia (Imotski). According to the 1699 peace agreement, Venice was also obliged to allow free Ottoman communications with Ragusa (Dubrovnik). Venice held the borders established in 1718 unchanged until the end of the Republic.²⁰ The Treaty of Passarowitz confirmed the long-standing stagnation. Venice was already withdrawing from active politics in Italy during the second half of the seventeenth century (Samardžić, 2011, 24).

Andrea Pisani’s last action was the attack on Ulcinj, or Dulcigno (Nani Mocenigo, 1935, 349). Then there was peace, and everything was returning to normal life. However, on the night of september 21, a warehouse with 3,000 barrels of

20 After the conclusion of Passarowitz peace in 1718, Schulenburg stayed for a while in Corfu (TNA SP 99/62, 109r). He returned to Venice in September. The Senate, pleased with his successes, decided to renew his contract at the end of the year (Ibid, 195r). Schulenburg remained in the service of Venice until his death in 1747 (Setton, 1991, 444).

gunpowder exploded in the city of Corfu. Andrea Pisani was also killed, as his palace was also hit (Nani Mocenigo, 1935, 350; AI, 1719, p. 6v). Mass in his honor was served on January 11, 1719 in the church of *BB Vegine* (AI, 1719, p. 16r). At the beginning of February, a coffin with his body arrived in Venice, and in a public procession numerous patricians and citizens took part (AI, 1719, p. 29v).

The glory acquired in the First Morean War the Venetian oligarchy could not use in the Second Morean War. Venice was weakened by neutrality, system inefficiency and inert decision-making as the conflicting clans in the patrician monopolized state foreign and domestic policy. Fortunate were the decisions to engage a German general Schulenburg, and to enter into an alliance with Austria and the pope in 1716. Daniel IV Dolfin appears in British reports both as a person with a significant function in the army, and as a paradigm of regression of the elite, institutions and system. Venetian “official” historians of the era, avoided mentioning the details that revealed the depth and essence of the crisis. Daniel IV’s myth originated precisely in the official Venetian chronicles and their bias in relation to the oligarchy. The nobility was suffering an identity crisis, while, regardless of the current that would prevail in the Senate or the Grand Council, the whole nobility had as a common goal the preservation of the existing order. On the other side, ordinary subjects, as the majority of the population, were kept away from the executive and the legislature, although the crisis of power began to suggest the existence of a “public opinion”, and the emerging press was contributing, along with narratives and gossips, to its formation. British sources gave more precise insights into the state and changes of Venetian institutions, than domestic sources.

The struggle for supremacy in the patriciate did not end with the fall of Daniel IV and the death of Pisani. The period from 1719 to 1723 was marked by the struggle of two clans. One of them was led by Lorenzo Tiepolo, procurator and representative of *primi signori*, the oligarchy. The leader of the second clan was Giovanni Emo, brother of Angelo Emo, with the support of patricians of middle and lower wealth. (Del Negro, 1997). The rivalry between the two clans marked the political life of Venice during the next two decades. Fifteen influential patricians also participated in political life (Hunecke, 1991, 144).

In the whirlwind of conflicts between the clans, the memory of Morea did not disappear in vain. Charles de Montesquieu, who visited Venice in 1728, noticed among its inhabitants a desire to return to Nafplio and Malvasia. (Montesquieu, 1894, I, 21–22). He noticed that the loss of Morea mostly affected the patricians of lower financial status, who could gain income by gaining administrative positions in that province (Montesquieu, 1894, I, 57).

Finally, some members of the Dolphin family survived the fall of Daniel IV. This primarily refers to the son of Daniel III Dolphin, also named Daniel (1688–1734), who joined the church and for a time, slightly before his death, served as a bishop in Udine (Preto, 1991).

BRITANSKI VIRI O KRIZI BENEŠKEGA PATRICIATA V ČASU DRUGE
MOREJSKE VOJNE: PRIMER DANIELEJA IV. DOLFINA*Marija V. KOCIĆ*

Univerza v Beogradu, Filozofska fakulteta, Čika Ljubina 18–20, 11000 Beograd, Srbija

e-mail: marija.kocic@f.bg.ac.rs

Nikola R. SAMARDŽIĆ

Univerza v Beogradu, Filozofska fakulteta, Čika Ljubina 18–20, 11000 Beograd, Srbija

e-mail: nsamardzic@f.bg.ac.rs

POVZETEK

V pričujoči študiji avtorja skušata na metodološko ustrezen način pokazati na spremembe v beneškem patriciatu, do katerih je prišlo v obdobju konflikta, znanega kot druga morejska vojna. V središču njenega raziskovanja so uradna poročila britanskih predstavnikov v tem mestu, ki so do leta 1716 delovali na položaju sekretarja, od takrat naprej pa tudi na položaju rezidenta (diplomatskega predstavnika, za stopnjo nižjega od poslanika). Avtorja skušata tako razmere v patriciatu kot tudi konflikt med političnimi strujami prikazati na primeru delovanja Danieleja IV. Dolfina. Vzpon in padec slednjega preučujeta skozi dogodke, povezane z osvajanjem in izgubo Moreje [Peloponeza]. Turška zasedba Moreje leta 1715 je v Benetkah ustvarila negativno ozračje, zaradi česar je postalo nujno poiskati primerne krivca za vojni debakel. Smotrnost svoje raziskave avtorja utemeljujeta tudi z izsledki sodobnega italijanskega zgodovinopisja, ki je na področju raziskovanja razmer v patriciatu na podlagi beneških virov močno napredovalo. Posebej analizirata krizo uradnega zgodovinopisja, za katerega menita, da je namerno in načrtno zamolčalo tako medstrankarske razprtije kot tudi spor v zvezi z izvolitvijo vrhovnega poveljnika vojne mornarice (capitano generale). Odnosi med najpomembnejšimi akterji dogajanja zrcalijo krizo institucij in kažejo na zastarelo, disfunkcionalno družbeno strukturo. Obramba Moreje in ostalih posesti na Levantu, za katero si je beneška oblast resno prizadevala v letih pred vojno, je bila v napadu turške vojske uničena v pičlih nekaj tednih. Zato so konec leta 1715, da bi vsaj malo pomirili nezadovoljno javnost, v beneškem senatu sprožili več sodnih procesov, v katerih je bil eden izmed obtoženih tudi Daniele IV. Dolfin. Problem, ki je bil s tem načet, pa so v pravo luč postavile volitve za položaj vrhovnega poveljnika (capitano generale). Britanska poročila, na katera se sklicujeta avtorja, razkrivajo pomembne vidike njegovega ravnanja, ki so jih Hugh Broughton (konzul), Christian Cole (sekretar) in Alexander Cunningham (rezident) opisali nedvoumno in natančno. Avtorja primerjata naracije različnih zgodovinskih virov in hkrati pojasnjujeta tudi posamezne dogodke iz življenja Danieleja IV. Dolfina, o katerih uradno beneško zgodovinopisje namenoma molči.

Ključne besede: Benetke, Daniele IV. Dolfin, Andrea Pisani, oligarhija, patriciat, Moreja, Krf

SOURCES AND LITERATURE

- Addison, Joseph (1767):** *Remarks on Several Parts of Italy, &c. in the Years 1701, 1702, 1703.* London, J. and R. Tonson.
- AI (1715):** *Avvisi Italiani, ordinarii e straordinari, dell'anno 1715.* Vienna, Appresso Gio. van Ghelen.
- AI (1716):** *Avvisi Italiani, ordinarii e straordinari, dell'anno 1716.* Vienna, Appresso Gio. van Ghelen.
- AI (1717):** *Avvisi Italiani, ordinarii e straordinari, dell'anno 1717.* Vienna, Appresso Gio. van Ghelen.
- AI (1718):** *Avvisi Italiani, ordinarii e straordinari, dell'anno 1718.* Vienna, Appresso Gio. van Ghelen.
- AI (1719):** *Avvisi Italiani, ordinarii e straordinari, dell'anno 1719.* Vienna, Appresso Gio. van Ghelen.
- ASVe:** *Collegio, Relazioni, b. 67: Archivio di stato di Venezia, Collegio, Relazioni, busta 67.*
- Document is available on the publick domain: <http://www.statodamar.it/mare.php?ly=5&ar=3&rt=47&re=306&sid=> (last access: 2022-06-20).
- Bernardy, Amy (1902):** *L'Ultima guerra turco-veneziana (MDCCXIV–MDCCXVIII).* Firenze, Stab. Tip. G. Civelli.
- Casini, Matteo (2001):** *Immagini dei capitani generali “da Mar” a Venezia in età barocca.* In: Fantoni, Marcello (ed.): *Il “Perfetto Capitano”. Immagini e significati del “capitano” fra Cinque e Seicento.* Rome, Bulzoni, 219–270.
- Centanni, Monica (1998):** „Guerra e morte fraterna: Il mito storico romano nelle tele di Giovambattista Tiepolo per i Dolfin“. In: Lionello, Puppi (ed.): *Giambattista Tiepolo nel terzo centenario della nascita.* Padova, Il Poligrafo, 267–275.
- Cicogna, Emmanuele Antonio (1847):** *Saggio di bibliografia veneziana.* Venezia, Dalla Tipografia di G. B. Merlo.
- Cozzi, Gaetano (1985):** *La Repubblica di Venezia in Morea: un diritto per il nuovo Regno (1687–1715).* In: Ajello, Raffaele, Firpo, Massimo, Guerci, Luciano & Giuseppe Ricuperati (eds.): *L'eta dei lumi. Studi storici sul Settecento europeo in onore di Franco Venturi, vol. I–II.* Naples, Jovene, II, 740–789.
- Del Negro, Piero (1984a):** *Forme e istituzioni del discorso politico veneziano.* In: Arnaldi Girolamo & Pastore M. Stocchi (eds.): *Storia della Cultura veneta, vol. IV, t. 2: Il Seicento.* Vicenza, Neri Pozza, 407–436.
- Del Negro, Piero (1984b):** *La distribuzione del potere all'interno del patriziato veneziano nel Settecento.* In: Tagliaferri, Amelio (ed.): *I ceti dirigenti in Italia in età moderna e contemporanea. Atti del Convegno Cividale del Friuli, 10–12 settembre 1983.* Udine, Del Bianco editore, 311–337.
- Del Negro, Piero (1998):** *L'ultima fase della Serenissima: nota introduttiva.* In: Del Negro, Piero & Preto, Paolo (eds.): *L'ultima fase della Serenissima, [ed.] Storia di Venezia. Dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima, vol. VIII.* Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana.

- Diedo, Giacomo (1751):** Storia della Repubblica di Venezia dalla sua Fondazione Sino l'Anno MDCCXLVII, vol. I–IV. Venezia, Nella Stamperia di Andrea Poletti.
- Dolfin, Bortolo Giovanni (1924):** I Dolfin (Delfino) Patrizii Veneziani nella storia di Venezia dall'anno 452 al 1923. Milano, Parenti.
- Eglin, John (2001):** Venice transfigured: The Myth of Venice in British Culture, 1660–1797. New York, Palgrave.
- Ferrari, Girolamo (1723):** Delle Notizie Storiche della Lega tra l'Imperatore Carlo VI e la Repubblica di Venezia Contra il Gran Sultano Acmet III e de'loro fatti d'armi dall'anno 1714 sino alla Pace di Passarowitz. Venezia, Presso Carlo Buonarrigo.
- Garzoni, Pietro (1712):** Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia in tempo della Sacra Lega Contra Maometto IV., e tre suoi Successori, Gran Sultani de' Turchi. Venezia, Appresso Gio: Manfrè.
- Garzoni, Pietro (1719):** Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia, Ove insieme narrasi la Guerra per la Successione delle Spagne al Re Carlo II. Venezia, Appresso Gio: Manfrè.
- Hunecke, Volker (1991):** Matrimonio e demografia del patriziato veneziano (secc. XVII–XVIII). Studi Veneziani, 21, 269–319.
- Hunecke, Volker (1997):** Il patriziato veneziano alla fine della Repubblica. 1646–1797. Demografia, famiglia, ménage. Roma, Jouvence.
- Hunecke, Volker (1998):** Il corpo aristocratico. In: Del Negro, Piero & Paolo, Preto (eds.): L'ultima fase della Serenissima, Storia di Venezia. Dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima, vol. VIII, 359–429. Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana.
- Hunecke, Volker (1999):** I Savi Grandi – Gli Oligarchi di Venezia? Acta Histriae, 7, 141–152.
- Killy, Walther (ed.) (2005):** Dictionary of German Biography, vol. 9: Schmidt – Theyer. München, K. G. Saur.
- Kocić, Marija (2018):** Britansko-mletački odnosi u doba Drugog morejskog rata (1714. – 1718.). Radovi Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Zadru, 60, 147–166.
- Kocić, Marija V. & Nikola R. Samardžić (2019):** Dve strane jednog napada: otmica britanskog trgovačkog broda Adventure 1718. godine. Annales, Series historia et sociologia, 29, 2, 293–302.
- Mantoan, Diego & Otello Quaino (2014):** I Dolfin e la loro dimora veneziana: Vicende attorno a una nobile famiglia e al palazzo di San Pantalon. In: Mantoan, Diego & Otello Quaino (eds.): Ca'Dolfin e i Cadolfini. Storia di un collegio universitario a Venezia. Venezia, Edizioni Ca' Foscari, 173–205.
- Megna, Laura (1997):** Grandezza e miseria della nobiltà veneziana". In: Benzoni, Gino & Gaetano Cozzi (eds.): La Venezia barocca, Storia di Venezia dalla origine alla caduta della Serenissima, vol. VII. Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 161–200.
- Malliaris, Alexis (2004):** La mobilitazione della terra in un paese di nuova conquista: lo stato fondiario nel Peloponneso veneziano agli inizi del XVIII secolo. In: Cavaciocchi, Simonetta (ed.): Il mercato della terra secc. XIII–XVIII. Atti della "Trentacinquesima Settimana di Studi" 5–9 maggio 2003. Prato, Le Monnier, 499–505.
- Malliaris, Alexis (2007):** Population Exchange and Integration of Immigrant Communities in the Venetian Morea, 1687–1715. In: Davies, Siriol & Jack L. Davies (eds.): Between Venice and Istanbul: Colonial Landscapes in Early Modern Greece. Athens, American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 97–110.

- Μάλλιαρης, Αλέξης (2018):** Ο κόσμος της υπαίθρου στη βενετική Πελοπόννησο (1686–1715) [Il mondo dei contadini nel Peloponneso durante il dominio veneziano (1686–1715)]. In: Lambrinos, Kostas (ed.): *Società rurali nell’Oriente greco-veneziano* (sec. XIII–XVIII). Atene, Accademia di Atene Centro di Ricerche medievali e neoelleniche, 247–269.
- MM (1716):** *The Present State of Europe: or The Historical and Political Monthly Mercury, Givin an Account of all the Publick and Private Occurrences, Civil, Ecclesiastical, and Military, that are most Considerable in Every Court: The Interest of Princes, their Pretension, and Intrigues, &c., vol. XXVII.* London, Printed for Henry Rhodes at the Star.
- Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat (de) (1894):** *Voyage*, vol. I–II. Paris, Bordeaux, Alphonse Picard & fils, G. Gounouilhou, Imprimeur-éditeur.
- Nani Mocenigo, Mario (1935):** *Storia della marina veneziana: da Lepanto alla caduta della Repubblica.* Roma, Tipo lit. Ministero della Marina – Uff. Gabinetto.
- Pedrocco, Filippo (1996):** Appunti per una storia del mecenatismo artistico della famiglia Dolfin. In: Ganzer, Gilberto (ed): *Splendori di una Dinastia: L’eredità Europea dei Manin e dei Dolfin.* Milano, Electa, 43–50.
- Pinzelli, Eric (2003):** *Venise et la Morée: du triomphe à la désillusion (1684–1718), Histoire.* Doctoral dissertation. Aix-Marseille, Université de Provence.
- Preto, Paolo (1991):** Dolfin, Daniele. In: *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, vol. 40. Roma, Istituto della enciclopedia italiana.
- Raines, Dorit (1991):** Office Seeking, Broglio, and the Pocket Political Guidebooks in Cinquecento and Seicento Venice. *Studi Veneziani*, XXII, 137–194.
- Raines, Dorit (2003):** Cooptazione, aggregazione e presenza al Maggior Consiglio: la casate del patriziato veneziano 1297–1797. *Storia di Venezia*, 1, 1–64.
- Sabbadini, Roberto (1995):** *L’acquisto della tradizione: Tradizione aristocratica e nuova nobiltà a Venezia* (secc. XVII–XVIII). Udine, Istituto editoriale Veneto Friulano.
- Sabbadini, Roberto (1999):** *Il nuovo patriziato Veneziano: criteri di scelta e logiche di comportamento.* *Acta Histriae*, 7, 1, 495–504.
- Samardžić, Nikola (2011):** The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718: An Introduction. In: Ingrao, Charles W., Samardžić, Nikola & Jovan Pešalj (eds.): *The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718.* West Lafayette, Purdue University Press, 9–38.
- Setton, Kenneth Meyer (1991):** *Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century.* Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society.
- Stanojević, Gligor (1970):** *Jugoslovenske zemlje u mletačko-turskim ratovima XVI–XVIII vijeka.* Beograd, Istorijski institut [in Cyrillic].
- Stouraiti, Anastasia (2005):** *Una storia della guerra. Pietro Garzoni e il suo archivio.* In: Infelise, Mario & Anastasia Stouraiti (eds.): *Venezia e la guerra di Morea. Guerra, poitica e cultura alla fine del ‘600.* Milan, Franco Angeli, 242–269.
- THR (1717):** *The Historical Register, Containing an Impartial Relation of all Transactions, Foreign and Domesticks. Vol. I: For the Year 1716.* London, Printed and sold by H. Meere in Black Fryners.

- TNA SP 99/60**– The National Archives, Kew-London (TNA), Records assembled by the State Paper Office, including papers of the Secretaries of State up to 1782, 1231–c1888 (SP); Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign, Venice, c1559–1778 (99), / 60 [Alexander Cunningham and Christian Cole, 1713–1714].
- TNA SP 99/61** – TNA, SP, 99 / 61 [Letters from M[yste]r Cunningham to the Secretaries of State From 8. Jan[uar]y 1715. to the 31. Dec[embe]r 1717].
- TNA SP 99/62** – TNA, SP, 99 / 62 [Letters from M[yester] Cunningham, Cons[ul]s Brown & Burgis to The Secretaries of State].
- TNA SP 97/23** – TNA, SP, Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign, Turkey (97) /23. [Sir Rob[er]t Sutton from 31st January 1713 to 10th May 1716].
- Trincaud, Anthelme (1718)**: *Campagnes de Monsieur le Prince Eugène en Hongrie et des Généraux Vénitiens dans la Morée pendant les années 1716. & 1717.*, vol. I–II. Lyon, Chez Thomas Amaulry.
- Viggiano, Alfredo (2013)**: *Politics and Constitution*. In: Dursteler, Eric R. (ed.): *A Companion to Venetian History, 1400–1797*. Leiden, Boston, Brill, 47–84.
- Zorzi, Marino (1982)**: Daniele Dolfin 3^o, ambasciatore in Polonia, *Ateneo Veneto*, 20, 1–2, 267–302.