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received: 2022-05-23                 DOI 10.19233/ASHS.2022.25
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOUS SOCIALIZATION IN CHILDHOOD 
AND ACTUAL RELIGIOSITY IN STUDENT AGE: THE CASE OF CROATIAN 
STUDENTS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF RIJEKA
Željko BONETA
University of Rijeka, Faculty of Teacher Education, Sveučilišna avenija 6, 51000 Rijeka, Croatia
e-mail: zboneta@uniri.hr
ABSTRACT
After the collapse of socialism, Croatia experienced a religious revival and became one of the most religious 
ex-socialist countries. Religion and religiosity went from a privately tolerated but socially undesirable fact to 
becoming part of social normalcy, and formal religious socialization became a dominant pattern of raising 
children. The paper analyzes the relationship between religious socialization in childhood and actual religiosity 
in student age based on an online survey conducted in 2021 on a sample of students at the University of Rijeka 
(N=624). The results reveal a departure from the experience of primary socialization, which is dominantly 
manifested as secularization.
Keywords: (non)religious socialization, actual religiosity, socialization agents, students, secularization, Croatia
CONNESSIONE TRA SOCIALIZZAZIONE RELIGIOSA NELL‘INFANZIA E RELIGIOSITÀ ATTUALE 
IN ETÀ STUDENTESCA: IL CASO DEGLI STUDENTI CROATI DELL‘UNIVERSITÀ DI FIUME
SINTESI
Dopo il crollo del socialismo, la Croazia ha vissuto una rinascita religiosa ed è diventata uno dei paesi ex 
socialisti più religiosi. La religione e la religiosità, da un fatto privatamente tollerato ma socialmente indeside-
rabile, sono diventate parte della normalità sociale e la socializzazione religiosa formale è diventato il modello 
dominante di educazione dei figli. Il testo analizza la connessione tra socializzazione religiosa nell’infanzia e 
religiosità attuale in età studentesca, sulla base di un sondaggio online condotto nel 2021 su un campione di 
studenti dell’Università di Rijeka (N=624). I risultati rivelano un allontanamento dall’esperienza della socializ-
zazione primaria, che si manifesta prevalentemente come secolarizzazione.
Parole chiave: socializzazione (non)religiosa, religiosità attuale, agenti di socializzazione, studenti, 
secolarizzazione, Croazia
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INTRODUCTION1
Religiosity has undergone dramatic changes in 
ex-socialist countries over the past half-century, which 
cannot be reduced to a common denominator. Some 
of these countries today, according to most indicators, 
are among the most religious countries in Europe (e.g., 
Poland and Romania), while others (e.g., the Czech 
Republic and Estonia) are at the forefront of secularism 
(Inglehart, 2021). The strength of the religious revival 
in ex-socialist countries depends on the role of religion 
and confessional organizations in the history and cul-
ture of a particular society, as well as the modernization 
processes within them. The World Values Survey (WVS) 
(Inglehart, 2021) and the European Values Survey (EVS) 
(Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019) still place Croatia among 
ex-socialist countries with a high level of religiosity 
despite secularization trends. Understanding current 
and future trends of people’s attachment to religion 
and the Church is not possible without an analysis of 
the intergenerational transmission of religiosity in a 
specific social context.
The following text2 will attempt to determine the 
prevalence of different patterns of religious socializa-
tion (RS) and connect them to the students’ actual re-
ligiosity (AR). The paper is structured as follows: a brief 
review of sociological analyses of RS is followed by a 
review of traditional and AR in Croatian society in the 
socialist and post-socialist periods, with an emphasis 
on the religiosity of the youth. The central part of the 
paper deals with the analysis of the results of empiri-
cal research, problematizing the connections between 
patterns of (non)religious socialization and AR, and the 
students’ assessment of the influence of agents on their 
attitudes toward religion.
RELIGIOUS SOCIALIZATION
In fundamental texts (Prout & James, 1997), the new 
sociology of childhood justifiably criticizes classical 
socialization theories because children are treated as 
mere objects of the socialization process. The new 
paradigm considers that socialization is not a one-
way process, and children are not passive objects that 
adults, primarily parents, shape “in their image and 
likeness”. It should be noted that this critique least 
affects the process of early family RS because the only 
option for a child is to accept their parents’ religion 
(Bruce, 1999). In other words, “religiosity without per-
sonal decision” is at play in early childhood (Vrcan, 
1980). Sociologists mostly agree that the family is a 
key factor in RS (Petts, 2009; Petts & Desmond, 2016; 
1 This work has been fully supported by the University of Rijeka under the project number uniri-drustv-18-226.
2 The following abbreviations appear in the text: RS= religious socialization; ARES= attending religious education at school; AR= actual 
religiosity; RSR=religiously socialized respondents; PRSR= partially religiously socialized respondents; NRSR= non-religiously socialized 
respondents. 
Regnerus & Uecker, 2006; Roberts & Yamane, 2012; 
Sherkat, 2003; Thiessen, 2016; Vermeer, 2014; Voas, 
2015). Parents decide whether to raise children of 
that age: (non)religiously; (not) to include them in the 
religious community; (not) to practice faith together; 
(not) to enroll them in religious education, etc. “The 
family is the place where the intergenerational trans-
mission of religious beliefs and practices takes place 
and thus is of crucial importance for the persistence 
and continuation of religious traditions and commu-
nities” (Vermeer, 2014, 402). Therefore, the theory of 
social learning is the most common theoretical start-
ing point for an RS analysis. “Primary socialization 
mechanisms (i.e., family) are critical for how and why 
children approach religious or secular worldviews” 
(Thiessen, 2016, 9). Research has found that parental 
instruction, everyday family religious atmosphere, 
and the quality of child-parent relationships increase 
the chance of successful transmission (Petts, 2009). 
By maintaining social ties with families with a similar 
worldview, parents place their children in the earliest 
childhood in a broader (non)religious atmosphere of 
primary socialization and thus (pre)select potential 
friends (Kelley, 2015). Parents have the opportunity to 
prevent children’s potential alienation from the fam-
ily worldview by increasing socialization pressure, 
e.g., by enrolling children in religious schools or in 
religious education classes and thus ensure the conti-
nuity of the family RS. The transmission of religiosity 
is more successful when there is religious homogamy, 
i.e., when parents’ attitudes about religion are harmo-
nized and when parents’ messages are supported by 
their consistent religious behavior (Bader & Desmond, 
2006; Petts, 2009; Roberts & Yamane, 2012; Sherkat, 
2003). Parents are role models for their children 
(“significant others”), and research has found great 
intergenerational similarities in religious identifica-
tion, belief, and behavior (Gvozdanović et al., 2019; 
Petts, 2009). Proponents of this approach, which we 
might call the persistence perspective (Wasburn & 
Adkins Covert, 2017), argue that childhood patterns 
and preferences resist life distractions and persist into 
adulthood and play a key role in shaping one’s (non)
religiosity (Petts & Desmond, 2016; Thiessen, 2016; 
Vermeer, 2014).
As children grow older, parental control weakens, 
and the influence of peer groups, the school, and the 
media (Lövheim, 2012), whose worldview may be at 
odds with that of the family, strengthens (Vermeer, 
2014). Children/young people are becoming increas-
ingly active actors “in the construction and determina-
tion of their own social lives, the lives of those around 
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them and of the societies in which they live” (Prout 
& James, 1997, 8). Critical periods “adolescence and 
emerging adulthood are life stages often characterized 
by religious instability, but also ones that play a key 
role in the development of a religious identity” (Petts 
& Desmond, 2016, 241). In the analysis of the politi-
cal socialization process, the thesis that includes the 
possibility of deviating from the parental worldview is 
called the lifetime openness perspective (Wasburn & 
Adkins Covert, 2017). People during their lives may 
change their religion or become more or less religious 
in relation to socialization in their childhood. How-
ever, confessional conversions in Western societies 
are relatively rare (Vermeer et al., 2011), and people 
mostly choose a partner and environment that shares 
their denomination (Sherkat, 2003).
Changes in the level of individual religiosity oc-
cur more frequently. This may be due to changes in 
the social context, such as the pronounced growth of 
AR in Croatian society after the collapse of socialism 
(Marinović-Jerolimov & Jokić, 2010). The instability 
of religiosity is related to the period of late adoles-
cence or emerging adulthood, when there may be a 
weakening but also a strengthening (Hill, 2009; Petts 
& Desmond, 2016) of religiosity among youth. Most 
research has found that a more common pattern is 
a decrease in religiosity associated with enrollment 
in higher education and separation from parents. For 
example, Uecker et al. (2007) found that participation 
and identification among young adult Americans have 
declined by 30–40%. Studying is considered the most 
critical period for maintaining the religiosity adopted 
and practiced in childhood (Petts & Desmond, 2016). 
Regnerus & Uecker (2006) detected the reasons for 
erosion in a weak family RS, the strengthening of indi-
vidual freedom, peer influence, and opportunities to 
independently choose activities in a new environment 
that are contrary to previous religious upbringing 
(e.g., debauched hedonistic life, drug use, premarital 
sexuality). Sherkat found the cause of turning away 
from religion in the negative impact of atheism-prone 
professors of humanities and social sciences, as op-
posed to “college professors, hard scientists – physi-
cists, mathematicians, biologists, engineers, and so 
on – [who] tend to express orthodox religious beliefs, 
and they attend church and maintain religious affilia-
tions” (Sherkat, 2003, 161). Uecker et al. (2007) hold 
the view that the expansion of the cognitive horizon 
leads to the questioning of traditional religious values 
but that higher education per se is not secularized. 
The authors believe that American universities are be-
coming places of vital religiosity and that postmodern 
discourse favors religion and spiritualism. Although 
acknowledging that “religious involvement is simply 
not a priority among this generation of young adults” 
(Uecker et al. 2007, 1686), the authors argue that 
“faith simply remains in the background of students’ 
lives as a part of who they are, but not a part they talk 
about much with their peers or professors” (Uecker et 
al., 2007, 1683). American research argues that this is 
a temporary decrease in religious participation while 
spirituality continues to rank high in student life (Hill, 
2009; Mayrl & Oeur, 2009; Uecker et al., 2007). By 
getting married, some of them will become religiously 
active again (McNammara & Abo-Zena, 2014; Petts, 
2009; Petts & Desmond, 2016), yet they admit that 
the share of young people with this life path is on the 
decline.
Collet Sabe (2007), starting from Davie’s thesis 
on “believing without belonging,” holds that the 
consequence of the process of individualization is the 
removal of young people from traditional religiosity, 
but not from spirituality. The author believes that tra-
ditional socialization institutions (school, family, and 
church) are in deep crisis because they are blindly 
adhering to the classic socialization pattern that treats 
children and youth as passive objects, which young 
people resist and create new religious identities. 
Mere teaching of religious content at school, far from 
everyday experience, was appropriate for the parents’ 
RS but not for their children. The author believes that 
the transmission of religion can be successful only 
if the religious content coincides with the everyday 
experience of young people.
Voas (2009), on the other hand, argues that the 
youth’s distancing from religion cannot be explained 
either by current life circumstances (studying) or by 
individualization that leads to the discovery of new 
religions. New generations of young people are be-
coming increasingly indifferent to religion, and, with 
age, they will not become more religious. Based on 
the results of the European Social Survey, the author 
claims that “each generation in every country surveyed 
is less religious than the last” (Voas, 2009, 167). He 
calls the dominant European trend fuzzy religiosity, 
whereby this term refers to “maintaining a certain 
loyalty to tradition, albeit in a rather unrelated way” 
(Voas, 2009, 161). It is a generational phenomenon of 
deviation from religion; “it is a staging post on the road 
from religious to secular hegemony” (Voas, 2009, 167). 
Vermeer (2014) found the cause of the weakening of 
youth religiosity in the mismatch of religious ideas 
and institutional church practice, while Bagg and Voas 
(2010) reported a weakening of parents’ participation 
and a change in social desirability, i.e., increasing ac-
ceptance of secular culture.
American research (Hill, 2009; Petts, 2009; Mayrl 
& Oeur, 2009) found that despite the current suspen-
sion of religious behavior, most young people claim 
that religion is an important and very important aspect 
of their lives (McNamara & Abo-Zena, 2014; Petts & 
Desmond, 2016). British research reveals a different 
picture. Voas and Crockett (2005) determined that 
the majority (63% of boys and 58% of girls) of young 
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people believe that religion does not affect their 
lives. In British society, unlike in American society, 
religion has become irrelevant in everyday life, and 
non-religiosity is socially acceptable. 
Religion is simply not very often on the British 
mind – whether God exists or not, He plays very 
little role in the lives of most people. And yet, 
despite the lack of daily interference, Christianity 
has not disappeared from the backdrop of socie-
ty, with a majority of Britons holding to a belief in 
some sort of God and identification as some sort 
of Christian. (Bagg & Voas, 2010, 108)
RELIGIOSITY IN SOCIALIST CROATIA (YUGOSLAVIA)
In order to comprehend the current context of 
Croatian society, which is vital for understanding 
the specifics of its RS (Kelley, 2015; Vermeer et al., 
2011), it is necessary to briefly indicate the changes 
in religiosity in the socialist period, during its col-
lapse and the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s and after the establishment of the Republic 
of Croatia. 
Religiosity, until the end of World War II, in the 
predominantly agrarian Croatian society, had the 
attribute of a normal social fact, and the largest 
religious organization – the Roman Catholic Church 
(RCC), was an important public cultural and political 
factor (Vrcan, 2001). With the establishment of the 
socialist order, the position of religion and the RCC 
began radically changing. The time had come “for 
the systematic ghettoization of religion and more or 
less constant institutional supervision and pressure 
on religion, as well as the systematic favoritism of 
atheism and non-religiousness in general” (Vrcan, 
2001, 59). The systematic atheization of society is 
a consequence of (1) the ideological agenda of the 
Communist Party; (2) “unresolved relations” between 
the RCC and the communist movement, characterized 
by a long tradition of intolerance and mutual stigma-
tization; and (3) tacit legitimacy given by the RCC in 
Croatia to the pro-fascist Independent State of Croatia 
during World War II. (Perica, 2002). From the very 
beginning, the RCC marked the communist move-
ment as one of the greatest evils of the time,3 while 
religion was marked by the communist authorities 
as opium for the people.4 In the war’s aftermath, the 
relationship between the government and the top of 
the local RCC hierarchy varied from open conflict to 
cooperation (Zrinščak, 1993; Mithans, 2020). In the 
first wave, the socialist regime drastically limited the 
3 For example, in the appendix (Syllabus) of the encyclical of Pope Pius IX Quanta Cura from 1864.
4 The phrase opium for the people follows from the Enlightenment critique of religion as a means by which the cunning elite manipulated 
the ignorant populace. It is a distorted interpretation of Marx, who uses the phrase opium of the people, criticizing social conditions 
(“inverted world”), in which religion is an illusory way of overcoming inhuman conditions, “the expression of real suffering and a protest 
against real suffering” (Marx, 1992, 244). 
rights of the RCC, nationalizing part of its property and 
acting repressively against priests, especially those 
compromised in the war. Sociologist of religion and 
priest Ivan Grubišić stated that the second-class social 
position of religion was visible in the prohibition of 
public religious rites, media ignorance of religion, 
atheistic ideologization of education, discrimination 
of practical believers in employment, prohibition of 
wearing religious symbols in the army, etc. (Grubišić, 
1993). The strained relations between the two elites 
eased in the late 1960s and soon turned into politi-
cally mutually beneficial cooperation, culminating in 
a socialist leader’s first official visit to the Vatican in 
1971 – the meeting between the SFRY President Josip 
Broz Tito and Pope Paul VI. Grubišić (1996) noted 
that ordinary citizens – practical believers – benefited 
the least from the improvement of relations between 
the elites. The incompatibility of communist political 
engagement and religiosity led to the social margin-
alization of practical believers and the rejection or 
concealment of practicing religiosity among those 
who aspired to social promotion. On the contrary, by 
witnessing one’s own faith, an individual consciously 
chooses a marginal social position (Grubišić, 1996). 
The consequence of the systematic atheization of 
society, which weakened considerably in the 1980s, 
is exogenously induced secularization.
The second factor that acts as an endogenous cause 
of secularization is the modernization of Croatian soci-
ety. The territory of Croatia was on the margins of the 
first wave of European modernization processes, which 
affected it only lightly and with great delay. The main 
actor in the second (socialist) wave of modernization 
was the Communist Party, which sought to shape soci-
ety in accordance with its ideological postulates. In the 
beginnings of “socialist construction,” the epicenter of 
modernization initiatives was narrowed to the volun-
tary decisions of a group of ideologically enlightened 
revolutionaries, who based their legitimacy on the 
merits of war, which, of course, is not a guarantee 
of modernization success. Biological laws inevitably 
impose the need for the “routinization of charisma” 
(Weber) so that a key role in the system is taken over, 
as time has shown, by an inefficient bureaucratic ap-
paratus. Despite many weaknesses, socialist moderni-
zation has radically changed the structure of Croatian 
society (Županov, 1995). It should be emphasized that 
some Croatian regions are more strongly affected by 
modernization processes than others, which has left 
visible differences in religiosity (Boneta, 2000; Boneta 
& Banovac, 2007; Marinović-Jerolimov & Zrinščak, 
2006; Vrcan, 2001).
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Neither the systematic atheization of society nor 
the socialist (semi)modernization has significantly 
disrupted the traditional religiosity, which is mostly 
present and deeply rooted in the population. The share 
of the confessionally unidentified during the period of 
socialism never exceeded one-fifth of the population. 
“4% of the population claimed no confessional affilia-
tion in the Zagreb region in 1968, 6% in 1972, 15% in 
1982, and 20% in 1989. At a national level, 12.5% of 
respondents declared that they did not adhere to any 
confession in 1953 and 18% in 1989” (Hazdovac Bajić 
et al., 2020, 45).5 The religious atmosphere is present 
in the vast majority of families during the holidays, 
participation in three key religious rituals (baptism, 
wedding, funeral) is almost ubiquitous, and two-thirds 
of respondents were religiously raised (Vrcan, 1980).6 
Informal and formal RS, with the aim of maintaining 
traditional religiosity, are part of the experience of the 
majority of the Croatian population, which leads Vrcan 
to conclude that, during the period of stable social-
ism, the population was “connected with thousands of 
threads to religion and church” (Vrcan, 1980, 283).
Unlike traditional religiosity, AR was a characteristic 
of a distinct minority part of society. Practicing believ-
ers are largely recruited from politically deprived social 
groups – the working class7 and the peasantry. Secu-
larization processes at the individual level are visible 
in the gap between traditional religiosity and AR, the 
dissolution of dogmatic belief, and reduced religious 
participation mainly of women, the elderly, villagers, 
and those with lower education (Vrcan, 1980). The 
most common strategy in the conditions of systematic 
atheization of society was the hibernation of the actual, 
publicly expressed religiosity while maintaining the 
traditional connection with religion and the church. 
Research conducted at the end of the socialist 
period found that young people are “more affected 
than their parents by the process of separation from 
religion and church” (Marinović, 1988, 197). In 
addition to confessional identification, in all in-
dicators, AR is a characteristic of the minority of 
young people8 (Marinović-Jerolimov & Jokić, 2010). 
Students are less religious than the average young 
person, noting that neither the religiosity nor the 
5 “According to the 1953 census, ‘only’ 10% of the Slovenian population and 12% of the entire Yugoslavian population declared 
themselves atheists, which so disappointed the authorities that Yugoslav censuses no longer included questions about religious 
affiliation” (Mithans, 2020, 426).
6 The data are taken from research conducted in the Zagreb region in 1972 (Vrcan, 1980). Interestingly, Vrcan found that the vast majority 
of Communist Party members (or those who wanted to) were baptized (91.3%) and attended church religious education (67.8%).
7 It is paradoxical, given the proclaimed goals of socialism, that a group whose interest the system should advocate accepts the only so-
cially permissible “cultural and symbolic system of an extrasystemic nature” (Vrcan, 1986, 70).
8 A survey conducted in 1986 found that there were significantly more non-religiously (47.2%) than religiously (28.3%) declared. Only 
one-fifth (19.6%) of young people believed in the existence of God, and more than half (56%) did not believe. One-fifth (21.4%) also 
attended Mass at least once a month, and almost half (45.3%) of young people never attended Mass (Marinović-Jerolimov & Jokić, 2010). 
9 The RCC was given back most of the property confiscated during socialism; it was provided with funds from the state budget for the 
support of the clergy, the work of religious teachers in schools, the work of religious schools and colleges, the state (co)finances the con-
struction and maintenance of churches, etc. The signed contracts are often subject of public criticism because there is no clear record of 
the funds given by the state to the RCC due to the wastefulness in the construction of church buildings, etc.
non-religiosity of young people” are “homogeneous 
and consistent” (Marinović, 1988, 197).
RELIGIOSITY IN A NEW CONTEXT
Although expelled from the public sphere, religios-
ity – or rather confessionalism – in socialist Yugoslavia 
was the most important distinguishing marker between 
three ethnic groups: Croat = Catholic; Serb = Ortho-
dox; Bosniak = Muslim (Sekulić et al., 2004; Vrcan, 
2001). Identification of national and confessional iden-
tity is a characteristic of the eastern Croatian regions, 
which border Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. 
In the bloody disintegration of multiethnic and multi-
confessional Yugoslav society in the early 1990s,
religions and major confessional communities, 
in particular Serb Orthodoxy, Catholicism 
among Croats and Bosnian Islam, were neither 
major nor independent social and political ac-
tors, and although these conflicts were basically 
of a political nature, they were directly involved, 
included, and intertwined in different ways and 
to different degrees, but also consciously enga-
ged on opposite sides. (Vrcan, 2001, 20)
 After the war and the change in the confessional 
structure of Croatian society from biconfessional to 
monoconfessional, the RCC in Croatia “collects 
dividends” (Ferrari) for its engagement in dismantling 
socialism, opposing Greater Serbia politics, and sup-
porting the new ruling party (Croatian Democratic Un-
ion – HDZ). With the collapse of socialism, “religion 
penetrated the emptied public square mainly in the 
form of an overbearing and universally binding cul-
tural and symbolic system, which practically at least 
determined the boundaries of political, cultural, moral, 
and even symbolic normality and abnormality” (Vrcan, 
2001, 21). Government policy became pro-religious 
(Kelley, 2015) with desecularization intent. The state 
and the RCC signed four cooperation agreements (in 
1996 and 1998) by which the RCC, as the largest reli-
gious community with the largest number of followers, 
received numerous concessions and privileges.9 
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From a politically insignificant, the Church 
becomes a respectable political factor with 
its public activities: above all, the speeches of 
high church dignitaries and careful assessment 
of reality. … The Church […], even when it 
may not intend to do so, sets cultural criteria. 
It is present in the family, at school, even in the 
parliament. Politicians not only respect it but 
also ‘court’ it. (Cifrić, 1995, 820)
At the individual level, there is a strengthening 
of AR, so the share of the non-religiously identified 
almost doubled (41%–73%) in ten years (1986–1996), 
and the share of the nonreligious decreased three 
times (37%–13%).10 We find almost the same direc-
tion and scope of change in belief and participation 
(Marinović-Jerolimov, 2000). Research results are 
further supported by censuses, in which nine out of 
ten Croatian citizens declare themselves Catholics, 
while only every twentieth declares themselves to be 
agnostics or atheists.
Researches reveals that there was a large increase 
in all indicators of religiosity among young people be-
tween 1986 and 1999 (Marinović-Jerolimov & Jokić, 
2010). An additional impetus for the religiousization 
of the socialization atmosphere is the reintroduction 
of confessional religious education in primary and 
secondary schools (school year 1991/92).11 The inten-
tion of this introduction was “to secure the cultural 
transmission of religious values  to young generations” 
(Hazdovac Bajić et al., 2020, 40). Given the students’ 
response, it can be concluded that the goal has been 
achieved because nine out of ten students (Marinović, 
2018) attend Catholic religious education at school 
(ARES), which is an obvious indicator that religiosity 
is becoming the dominant pattern of primary sociali-
10 Data on drastic changes in religiosity in Croatian society between 1986 and 1999 can only be partly explained by the democratization of 
society, as the pressure of systematic atheism of the regime in the 1980s weakened considerably. Certainly, when explaining the changes, 
one should take into account the literal (war) and existential economic insecurity, but also the informal pressure of systematic theization 
of society that promotes new norms of social desirability.
11 Confessional religious education is conducted in public schools but is under the jurisdiction of religious communities. The aim of the 
subject is teaching in the faith and evangelization, i.e., introducing students to belief and participation and strengthening of their connec-
tion with religion and religious community (Marinović, 2018). An illustration of the ambitions of the RCC to present itself as a universally 
binding cultural and symbolic system is also visible in religious education textbooks, where “Catholic (Christian) religion is not presented 
as one of the existing worldviews in the world (Croatia), but as the only true religion” (Marinović, 2018, 140). Although textbooks start 
from the idea of tolerance, Marinović finds that they convey “not the acceptance of difference but the correction of atheists and preven-
tion of atheism, by evangelization” (Marinović, 2018, 146).
12 Therefore, not enrolling a child in religious education classes in elementary school can have, as a consequence, the non-conformist 
separation from the group. In high school, the situation changes because students have the option of choosing an alternative elective 
subject (Ethics).
13 The scale of religious self-identification used by EVS is questionable in terms of content because on the nonreligious side of the instru-
ment, it offers two (convinced atheist and nonreligious person), and on the religious side, only one modality (religious person). The scale 
does not include the possibility of positioning indecisive and indifferent respondents.
14 The change in the zeitgeist is also visible in the statistical data on the decline in the share of the religious in relation to civil marriages. 
The share of religious marriage dropped from 64.7% (in 2000) to 42.3% twenty years later (Statistical report, 2021).
15 There are large regional differences in the number of students who attend religious education at school. School religious education is 
attended by more than ninety percent of primary school pupils in seventeen counties (out of twenty-one), but also in only four when it 
comes to secondary school. The lowest number of pupils attending religious education is in the Istria (66%) and Primorje-Gorski Kotar 
Counties (75.5%) (Index.hr, 2018). 
zation.12 The share of ARES in the transition to high 
school decreases after children have received the 
holy sacraments (confirmation and holy communion). 
Fifteen years ago, two opposing trends emerged 
at the global level – people exposed to changes in 
the social context in some ex-socialist countries 
became more religious, while at the same time, in 
developed countries, they became less religious (In-
glehart, 2021). However, current research has found 
changes in ex-socialist countries as well. “Formerly 
communist countries continue to be the main locus 
of growing religiosity … (but) … the resurgence 
of religion in ex-communist countries was losing 
momentum” (Inglehart, 2021, 15). A secularization 
trend in Croatia is visible in the weakening of in-
dicators of church religiosity, while identification13 
is continuously highly expanded (79%). Between 
the first and third EVS, the share of regular practi-
tioners decreased from half (52.5%) to one-third of 
respondents (34.9%), with a growing gap between 
identification and participation, so there are more 
than twice as many regular practitioners as those 
who identified themselves as a religious person 
(Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019). The biggest decline 
was related to trust in the Church as an institution, 
in which almost two-thirds of respondents (62.8%) 
had high and very high trust in 1999, while in the 
last survey, their share was slightly higher than one-
third (38.4%). Weakening occurs according to the 
secularization pattern, with greater religiosity of 
women, those with lower levels of education, and 
those from smaller settlements (Nikodem & Zrinščak, 
2019). Although these changes may be indications 
of changes in the social climate in the direction of 
reducing social desirability,14 they are not reflected 
in the scope of ARES.15
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Diagnoses of the religiosity of young people in Croa-
tian society have determined that: (1) it oscillates more 
in times of transition than the religiosity of other co-
horts (Gvozdanović et al., 2019; Marinović-Jerolimov, 
2000; 2002); (2) intergenerational differences are 
reduced due to a slight increase in the religiosity of 
the youth and a slight decline in the religiosity of the 
elderly (Črpić & Zrinščak, 2010; Marinović-Jerolimov 
& Jokić, 2010); (3) students are the least religious part 
of the youth (Boneta, 2016; Ilišin, 2014; Marinović-
Jerolimov, 2002), which at the same time means that 
they are the least religious part of the population;16 
(4) the stabilization of conventional religiosity is 
at play, but also that in the last ten years, there has 
been a noticeable downward trend in all indicators 
of AR (Boneta, 2016; Lavrič, 2021); (5) students’ AR 
indicators are inconsistent with their ARES; (6) that 
there is structural and ideological religious polariza-
tion among the youth in Croatia, more strongly than 
in other countries of Southeast Europe (Lavrič, 2019). 
Structural religious polarization, i.e., the increase and 
proportional equalization of the categories of atheists 
and convinced believers, is taking place in Croatia due 
to the decrease in the share of religious people. “Secu-
larizing tendencies can lead to a defensive reaction of 
the remaining believers... The mechanism of cultural 
defense works in such a way that a religious group, in 
a situation of internal threat, unites and strengthens its 
religious identity” (Lavrič, 2019, 134).
Since the empirical research was conducted at the 
University of Rijeka (UNIRI), and more than half of 
the respondents grew up in the regions of Istria and 
Primorje, it is necessary to briefly indicate the specif-
ics of religiosity in these regions. Throughout history, 
denominationalism was not a differentia specifica of 
the three ethnicities in contact (Croatian, Slovenian, 
and Italian), so it could not be a supporting part of 
the politicized Croatian ethnic identity. In them, rela-
tions between the communist government and the 
RCC were, to a lesser extent, fraught with problems 
because a significant part of Croatian and Slovenian 
Catholic priests collaborated with the partisans dur-
ing World War II (Petešić, 1982) and participated in 
the Paris negotiations on the demarcation between 
Italy and Yugoslavia. Under socialism, these regions 
modernized faster and thus secularized faster than 
the Croatian average (Boneta, 1989; 2000). After the 
collapse of socialism, these regions also experienced 
the revitalization of religiosity, but at a lower intensity 
than in other regions (Marinović-Jerolimov & Zrinščak, 
2006) and with a lower level of politicized religiosity 
(Boneta & Banovac, 2007; Vrcan, 2001).
16 A comparison of data from national surveys of the population (Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019), youth (Gvozdanović et al., 2019), and stu-
dents (Ilišin, 2014) at the national level reveals that the share of religiously identified students (57.3%) is significantly lower than among 
young people (69%) and in the population (79%). There are fewer full-time practitioners (21.1%) among students than in the population 
(34.9%) and twice less than among young people (44%). The reason for such a more frequent religious participation of pupils is partly 
related to the obligations of school religious education.
METHODOLOGY
The aims of this paper are: (1) analysis of the pat-
terns of students’ (non)religious socialization in their 
childhood; (2) analysis of the relationship between 
these patterns and their actual religiosity; (3) analysis 
of students’ perceptions of the influence of individual 
socialization agents on their attitudes toward religion.
Based on previous research, the following hypoth-
eses have been formulated:
H1: Most respondents have the experience of family 
religious socialization and/or religious education.
H2: The level of students’ actual religiosity is lower 
than the population average and the youth average.
H3: The experience of (non)religious socialization 
affects the level of actual religiosity.
H4: Socio-demographic variables will influence 
(non)religious socialization in line with the secu-
larization theory.
Kelley (2015) finds that in predominantly religious 
societies, which includes Croatian society, the religious 
environment has a greater effect on the intergenera-
tional transmission of religiosity than all other factors, 
even family RS. Kelley claims that, in this environment, 
the effect of social desirability (conformism) will play 
an important role in RS. Because of that:
H5 Respondents who attended religious educa-
tion at school and were not socialized religiously 
or non-religiously in the family will be more si-
milar to religiously than non-religiously educated 
respondents in their actual religiosity due to the 
high level of religiosity in Croatian society. 
Measuring instruments
Religious socialization is an independent vari-
able operationalized by two indicators. The first is 
family upbringing in the faith with three modalities 
of response: 1. No, I was raised non-religiously; 2. 
They raised me to be neither in favor nor against 
religion; 3. Yes, they raised me religiously. The second 
is ARES with three modalities: 1. No, never; 2. Yes, 
in primary school; 3. Yes, in primary and secondary 
school. Based on these two variables, a composite 
variable, patterns of (non)religious socialization in 
childhood, was created, which has three modalities. 
The first modality includes non-religiously socialized 
respondents (NRSR) who have no experience of either 
family or school RS. The second modality includes 
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respondents who were not raised by their parents to 
be either in favor or against religion but who, as part 
of their education, attended religious education – par-
tially religiously socialized respondents (PRSR). The 
third modality is religiously socialized respondents 
(RSR), who have experience with both types of RS.
Four indicators of actual religiosity (AR) are 
dependent variables. Religious self-identification 
was measured on a five-point scale: 1. Convinced 
atheist; 2. Much more inclined to disbelieve than 
to believe; 3. I do not know, I cannot assess; 4. 
Much more inclined to believe than to disbelieve; 
5. Convinced believer (Čulig, Kufrin & Landripet, 
2007). Religious belief was analyzed through belief 
in four dogmas: 1. There is a God; 2. God created 
the world; 3. There is Heaven and Hell; 4. God is 
the source of moral precepts and duties, to which 
three-point scales were added: 1. I do not believe; 2. 
I doubt it; 3. I believe. Participation was measured 
with the frequency of attending Mass with possible 
answers: 1. Never; 2. Only on major holidays; 3. 
Several times a month; 4. At least once a week.17 
The importance of faith in life is measured with the 
question: To what extent does living in accordance 
with the teachings of faith represent your desirable 
life goal? A five-point Likert-type scale was added 
to this ranging from 1. Completely undesirable to 5. 
Extremely desirable.
The influence of agents was measured with two 
instruments. In the first, the respondents were asked 
to assess the level of influence of their mother, father, 
other relatives, and school religion teachers on their 
attitudes toward religion. In a separate question, they 
needed to single out an agent that decisively influenced 
their views on religion.
The following socio-demographic variables 
were used: sex, size of their childhood settlement, 
childhood region,18 the highest level of education of 
their mother and father, year of university study, and 
scientific field of study.
17 For respondents who never go to Mass, we will use the term abstainers, for those who do so only on major holidays (Easter and 
Christmas) occasional believers, and the answers several times a month and weekly in chi-square analyzes are grouped into 
regular practitioners.
18 The respondents filled out the county where they grew up. Considering the established differences in the social context of certain 
Croatian regions, which are the consequences of different historical experiences, and the intensity of the modernization and secu-
larization process, this variable was recoded into two variables in statistical processing. The first category included participants 
from counties afflicted by direct warfare in the 1990s, in which ethno-confessional identification is more pronounced, and the 
second category included students from counties in which there was no direct warfare. In the second, we distinguish respondents 
who grew up in the Istria and Primorje-Gorski Kotar Countries (Istria and Primorje), regions that were more affected by moderniza-
tion and secularization processes, and respondents from other Croatian counties. 
19 Students from the following University constituents participated in the research: Faculty of Civil Engineering, Faculty of Econom-
ics and Business, Faculty of Engineering, Faculty of Humanities and Social Studies, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Maritime Studies, 
Faculty of Tourism and Hospitality Management, Faculty of Teacher Education and Department of Informatics. 
20 Spearman’s correlation test, Chi-square tests, t-tests, and analysis of the variance were performed. In ANOVA, a test of homoge-
neity of the variance was performed, the F-ratio was tested, and post-hoc multiple comparison tests were performed. The Scheffe 
test was used in the case of homogeneous variances, and the Tamhane T2 test in the case of inhomogeneous variances. Due to 
spatial restrictions, the statistical values of p in all analyses will be presented with the notation * for p <0.01 and the notation 
** for p <.001.
21 There is a significant statistical correlation between informal and formal RS (rs=.423)
Data collection and sample
The paper is based on the results of an online 
survey conducted in the second half of 2021 on a 
sample of UNIRI students19 (N = 624) whose charac-
teristics are shown in Table 1. Data were processed 
in the statistical package SPSS 24 at the level of 
univariate and bivariate analysis.20 The research 
procedures were approved by the Ethics Committee 
of the Faculty of Teacher Education, UNIRI.
RESULTS
Religious socialization
The vast majority of respondents have experience 
of formal and/or informal RS, confirming thereby H1; 
however, there are almost twice as many of them at-
tended religious education at school as those raised 
in the faith (Table 2). Only one in twenty respondents 
were raised as an atheist, while there is an equal share 
of those raised in the faith and those who grew up in a 
family environment that encouraged neither religiosity 
nor atheism. ARES is the expected continuation of RS 
in the family,21 but it is a characteristic of both one-half 
of the atheistically raised and more than four-fifths of 
neutrally raised respondents. 
The most numerous category in the composite 
variable patterns of (non)religious socialization are 
RSR (47.1%), followed by PRSR (43.3%), and NRSR 
(9.1%). Since ARES is present to the same extent as 
baptism (90.9%) in all three parenting patterns, it can 
be concluded that most parents want their children to 
receive the sacrament of confirmation and first com-
munion, which is not possible without ARES.
Statistical analyses found that four socio-demo-
graphic variables influence the socialization pattern 
in line with the secularization thesis (H4). Statisti-
cally significant differences were found with respect 
to sex (rs=.097*), childhood county (rs=.157**), size 
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of settlement (rs=-.174**), and the education level of 
the mother (rs=-.151*). The share of male students 
(13.7%) who were raised non-religiously is almost 
twice as high as that of female students (7.7%), which 
supports the thesis on differential gender socializa-
tion (Voas, 2015). RS is the predominant pattern 
(62.0%) in the smallest settlements, while nonreli-
22 Percentages of students who did not answer the question are not shown, except in cases where the number of abstainers is indicative.
gious upbringing in them is an anomaly (<2%). RSRs 
are the majority only in families where mothers have 
the lowest level of education, while PRSRs dominate 
in other families. Respondents who grew up in coun-
ties with direct war experience (60.9%) were mostly 
religiously educated, while PRSR is the most numer-
ous category (43.6%) in “peaceful areas.” 
Table 1: Respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics 22 (%).
Area of primary socialization
Afflicted by direct warfare 21.3 Istria and Primorje 59.1
Not afflicted by direct warfare 78.7 Other parts of Croatia 40.9
Scientific field Sex
Technical sciences 26.4 Female 71.2
Social Sciences 73.2 Male 27.1
Father’s education Mother’s education
Elementary school   3.5 Elementary school 4.0
Three-year high school 17.6 Three-year high school 12.7
Four-year high school 46.0 Four-year high school 44.2
College 11.7 College 10.6
University 20.8 University 28.5
Settlement size Year of study
Up to 1.000 19.6 First 40.1
1.001 – 10.000 35.1 Second 17.3
10.001 – 100.000 24.8 Third 17.9
100.001 and above 20.4 Fourth 13.0
Fifth 11.1 
Table 2: Family upbringing in the faith and attending religious education at school. 
No, 
never
Yes, in primary school
Yes, in primary and 
secondary school
Total
No, I was raised non-religiously 
% row 48.3 31.0 20.7 100.00
% total 2.3 1.4 1.0 4.7
They raised me to be neither in favor 
nor against religion 
% row 14.9 34.1 51.0 100.00
% total 7.1 16.2 24.3 47.6
Yes, they raised me religiously 
% row 1.0 14.5 84.5 100.00
% total 0.5 6.9 40.4 47.7
Total % total 9.8 24.6 65.6 100.00
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Finally, there is a difference in RS between adult 
respondents in Istria and Primorje and those adults 
in other parts of Croatia (rs=.176**). In Istria and 
Primorje, there are more PRSR (46.3%) than RSR 
(40.9%), while among others, there are more RSR 
(56.5%) than PRSR (39.2%).
Religious self-identification
The distribution of responses shown in Table 3 
reveals that more respondents were placed on the 
religious (44.4%) than on the nonreligious (37.7%) 
side of the scale, while one in six respondents was 
undecided. On both sides of the scale, there are more 
moderate than extreme modalities. Changes between 
research from 2015 (Boneta, 2016) and this research 
on the same student population reveal weaker pro-
cesses of structural religious polarization compared to 
those that Lavrič (2019; 2021) found among Croatian 
and Slovenian youth.23 In line with H2, students are 
significantly less religious (-33.9%) than the general 
population average (Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019) and 
the youth average (-24.6%) (Gvozdanović et al., 2019).
23 The religious part of the scale recorded a decline (-6.9%), while the nonreligious part increased (+4.9%), with both extreme modali-
ties recording a slight decline. Changes in the direction of greater secularization are visible in all indicators of religiosity. Although the 
analysis of structural ideological and religious polarization is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that, in the context of politicized 
religiosity in Croatian society, the decline of religiosity strengthens ideological polarization. 
We also find secularization tendencies in the 
expansion of self-identification. Respondents whose 
fathers have the lowest level of education (rs=-.105*) 
and who grew up in “war counties” (rs=.146**) are 
more religious. Interestingly, a mild but statistically 
significant association (rs=.097*) was found between 
the study type and identification. Contrary to Sher-
kat’s findings (Sherkat, 2003), UNIRI social science 
students are placed more in religious (47.8%) and 
less in nonreligious categories (33.7%) than techni-
cal science students (35.2% religious and 45.4% 
nonreligious), although there is no difference be-
tween them in the RS pattern.
Statistical analysis (Table 4) reveals that, in line with 
H3, the RS experience to a significant extent (rs=.431**) 
determines the current (non)religious identity of the 
two categories that were exposed to consistent agent 
information in childhood (NRSR and RSR). However, 
in both categories, we find a deviation from primary 
socialization; in this case, it is higher among RSRs, of 
which one-third do not fit into religious categories. At 
the same time, the move away from family socialization 
is a characteristic of just under a fifth of NRSRs. The 
Table 3: Religious self-identification.
 
UNIRI
2015
UNIRI
2021
EVS Croatia
2017a
Youth Croatia 
2018b
Convinced atheists 14.2 12.9 5.4
8
Much more inclined to disbelieve than to believe 17.5 23.7 9.5
I do not know, I cannot assess 15.1 18.1 6.8 22
Much more inclined to believe than to disbelieve 30.9 25.8
78.3 69
Convinced believers 21.4 19.6
Table 4: Patterns of (non)religious socialization and religious self-identification.
Convinced 
atheists
Nonreligious Undecided Religious
Convinced 
believers
NRSR 31.0 44.8 6.9 8.6 8.6
PRSR 16.4 32.3 24.5 19.3 7.4
RSR 5.8 14.3 13.9 36.1 29.9
Total 12.7 25.0 17.9 26.2 18.2
aNikodem & Zrinščak, 2019; bGvozdanović et al., 2019 
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most dispersed group are PRSRs, of which, contrary 
to H5, almost half are nonreligious, and an additional 
quarter is undecided. 
Religious beliefs
More than half of the students believe only 
in the existence of God (51.4%), with a quarter 
(27.2%) doubting and a fifth not believing (21.3%). 
Acceptance of other fundamental beliefs of RCC 
deviates even more from the experience of RS. Stu-
dents mostly do not believe in the claim that God 
is the source of moral precepts and duties (41.5%), 
and they mostly doubt the claim of the existence of 
Heaven and Hell (33.7%). The distribution of an-
swers about the belief in the existence of God also 
confirms H2 because the surveyed students believe 
in it much less (-30.4%) than the general population 
(Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019).24 
24 There is no comparison with beliefs among young people because there are no such variables in the research by Gvozdanović et al. (2019).
ANOVA reveals that RSR differs from the other 
two categories because more respondents believe 
in all four dogmas (Table 5). However, it should be 
emphasized that, here too, more than half of them 
believe only in the existence of God, while half of 
them demonstrate uncertainty and disbelief when it 
comes to the remaining three beliefs. PRSRs mostly 
believe in the existence of God (37.0%), while 
slightly fewer doubt it (34.4%) and do not believe in 
it (28.5%), while most of them do not believe in the 
remaining three claims. Despite ARES, and contrary 
to H5, the majority of PRSRs are more similar to 
NSRRs than RSRs.
Religious participation
To what extent does RS manifest itself in church 
religious behavior during student years? Most students 
belong to the category of abstainers who never go to 
Table 5: Testing differences in religious belief with respect to patterns of (non)religious socialization.
N M SD df F Post-hoc
There is a God (Tamhane)
1. NRSR 58 1.72 .790
2 54.919**
1<2<3
2. PRSR 270 2.09 .807
3. RSR 294 2.61 .656
God created the world (Tamhane)
1. NRSR 58 1.45 .654
2 53.851**
1<2<3
2. PRSR 270 1.70 .805
3. RSR 294 2.30 .787
God is the source of moral precepts (Tamhane)
1. NRSR 58 1.43 .678
2 50.892** 1.2<32. PRSR 270 1.66 .801
3. RSR 294 2.26 .822
There is Heaven and Hell (Tamhane)
1. NRSR 58 1.45 .626
2 48.123** 1<2<32. PRSR 270 1.80 .782
3. RSR 294 2.31 .763
Table 6: Patterns of (non)religious socialization and attending Mass.
Never Only on major holidays Several times per month
1. NRSR 91.4 6.9 1.7
2. PRSR 58.9 35.9 5.2
3. RSR 20.4 48.6 31.0
Total 43.7 39.2 17.0
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Mass, followed by the category of occasional practi-
tioners who do so exclusively on major holidays, and 
less than a fifth are regular practitioners (Table 6).
In line with H3, the participation frequency was 
statistically significantly related to RS (rs=.506**). Not 
attending Mass is the characteristic of the majority 
of NRSRs and PRSRs, while most RSRs do so only on 
major holidays. 
Students are generally the most religiously passive 
part of Croatian society (H2), as they regularly attend 
Mass twice less than the population average (Nikodem 
& Zrinščak, 2019) and two and a half times less than the 
youth average (Gvozdanović et al., 2019). Statistical 
analysis reveals that, in line with H4, female students 
attend Mass more regularly (rs=-.115*), those from set-
tlements with up to 10.000 inhabitants (rs=-.204**), and 
those whose adults in war-stricken counties (rs=.185**). 
Interestingly, the test reveals a statistically significant 
relationship (rs=-.139**) between participation and the 
year of study. As the year of study increases, the share 
of abstainers increases while the number of regular 
Mass participants decreases. The share of regular par-
ticipants among first- and second-year students is twice 
as high (20%) than among fifth-year students (10.1%).
Importance of religion in life
The importance of religion in the life of the re-
spondents was measured by the desirability of living 
in accordance with the teachings of their faith. The 
25 In line with H2, we come across a difference even here because, at the national level (Nikodem & Zrinščak, 2019), there are twice as 
many respondents (63.9%) who claim that religion is important and very important in their lives.
result is in line with the responses of highly religious 
European countries (Voas & Day, 2010), as more than 
a quarter of respondents (29.0%) consider it a desir-
able life goal. However, for the majority of respond-
ents (42.9%), it is an undesirable and completely 
undesirable life goal, and for a quarter, it is neither a 
desirable nor an undesirable (28.0%) life goal. In the 
extreme categories of the scale, there are three times 
more of those who are completely undesirable than 
those who are extremely desirable.25 We notice two 
differences in relation to the research results found 
among American students (Sherkat, 2003). A consid-
erable part of our respondents distances themselves 
from religion in participation but also in the impor-
tance they attach to it in life. Differences suggesting 
distance from religion during studies have also been 
noted. ANOVA (F(613)=5.004**) found that first-year 
students (M=2.96) show a lower level of undesirable-
ness of this goal than students in the fifth (M=2.30) 
years of study. No differences were found with regard 
to the region where the students grew up.
In line with H3, the RS experience affects (rs=.384**) 
the desirability of living in accordance with the teach-
ings of the faith (Table 7). However, the findings 
contradict H5 because the NRSR and PRSR categories 
classify this life goal as undesirable on average (M 
<2.5), which makes both categories different from RSR. 
Even with RSR, the mean value does not exceed 3.5, 
which means that it is placed in neither a desirable nor 
an undesirable life goal. Specifically, for less than half 
Table 7: Testing the differences in the desirability of living in accordance with the teachings of the faith with 
regard to the pattern of (non)religious socialization.
N M SD df F Post-hoc
1. NRSR 58 1.97 1.228
2 55.668**
1<3
2<3
2. PRSR 271 2.24 1.156
3. RSR 293  3.21 1.274
Table 8: To what extent have your attitudes toward religion been influenced by. 
Not at all A little Somewhat A lot Significantly M SD
Your mother 25.5% 17.5% 25.8% 21.2% 10.1% 2.73 1.319
Your father 32.5% 19.9% 23.9% 17.3% 6.2% 2.45 1.274
Other relatives 35.9% 16.0% 24.4% 16.5% 7.1% 2.43 1.312
Teachers of religious education 36.5% 21.2% 22.0% 14.1% 6.3% 2.32 1.269
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of RSRs, this is mostly and extremely desirable (45.9%), 
and for a quarter of them, it is a completely or mostly 
undesirable life goal (25.5%). More than half of the 
remaining two groups of students classify life in ac-
cordance with the teachings of the faith as undesirable 
and just over a tenth as a desirable life goal.
Influence of agents on the respondents‘ attitudes 
toward religion
The arithmetic means of the answers (Table 8) 
reveal that the respondents consider the influence 
of all primary and secondary socialization agents on 
their attitudes toward religion, except the mother, 
to be weak. The most numerous answer in all items 
was not at all, and only a few more assessed the 
influence of the mother as somewhat.
We have previously determined that there are 
connections between RS and AR patterns, with a 
trend of religious passivation in the PRSR and RSR 
categories. Since NRSRs have distanced themselves 
the least from the content of socialization in 
childhood, does this mean that they recognize the 
greater influence of socialization agents compared 
to the other two categories? Analysis of the variance 
(Table 9) reveals that this is not the case, as NRSRs 
assess the influence of both parents as weak with a 
tendency toward moderate, and the PRSRs assess 
the influence of their parents as even weaker. RSRs 
recognize the greatest influence of agents, although 
even here, only the mother’s influence leans toward 
significant influence.
When asked an additional direct question 
about the decisive influence, almost half of the 
sample (46.3%) replied that no one has decisively 
influenced their views on religion, one-quarter 
mentioned their family and its members (25.6%), 
and one-tenth the Church (10.7%), religious educa-
tion teachers (8.3%), and other influences (9.0%). 
The RS pattern is also related to this variable (rs=-
.298**). Two-thirds of NRSRs (69.0%) claimed that 
no one has decisively influenced them, and a fifth 
(22.4%) acknowledge the influence of family mem-
bers. Also, the majority of PRSRs (55.6%) claimed 
that no one has had a decisive influence on them, 
and one-tenth of the respondents stated: the Church 
and religious education teachers. The majority of 
RSRs (38.8%) stated the key role of family members, 
but it should be noted that the share of those who 
claimed to have created their own views on religion 
in this category is only slightly lower (33.7%). The 
intersection of this response with self-identifica-
tion reveals a twofold assessment of the influence 
of the Church and religious education teachers 
(rs=-.237**). Convinced atheists (21.5%) and nonre-
ligious (16.7%) obviously cite them as a form of a 
negative and RSRs as a positive influence.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Traditional religiosity is constantly present in 
Croatian society, so even the half-century margin-
alization of religion and the church in socialism did 
not seriously disrupt it. The collapse of socialism 
Table 9: Testing the differences in the importance of agent influence with respect to the pattern of (non)
religious socialization.
N M SD df F Post-hoc
Influence of the mother
(Tamhane)
1. NRSR 58 2.38 1.400
2 108.115**
1<3
2<3
2. PRSR 270 2.04 1.036
3. RSR 294 3.43 1.172
Influence of the father
(Tamhane)
1. NRSR 58 2.40 1.426
2 63.143** 2<1<32. PRSR 270 1.87 1.032
3. RSR 294 2.98 1.218
Influence of other relatives 
(Tamhane)
1. NRSR 58 1.52 .863
2 66.022** 1<2<32. PRSR 270 2.01 1.150
3. RSR 294 2.99 1.286
Influence of the school 
religious education teacher 
(Tamhane)
1. NRSR 58 1.24 .823
2 46.980** 1<2<32. PRSR 270 2.11 1.222
3. RSR 294 2.75 1.209
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has led to a “radical deprivation of religion” (Vrcan, 
2001), and the RS is an integral part of growing up 
for the vast majority of respondents (H1). For some 
parents, enrolling children in religious education 
at school is a continuation of family socialization, 
while others do so to ensure that children receive 
the holy sacraments, and the transmission of religi-
osity becomes part of formal socialization. The fact 
that more than half of parents who practice atheis-
tic education also enroll their children in religious 
education speaks of an ingrained tradition but also 
points to the power of social conformism.
The RS experience affects the differences in all 
analyzed students’ AR indicators (H3). In addition 
to maintaining the worldview and patterns of be-
havior mediated by socialization, we find a differ-
ent degree of deviation from them in all categories. 
A slight deviation from the experience of primary 
socialization in NRSRs is found in the belief in God 
and self-identification and very weak in participa-
tion. On the other hand, a significant part of RSRs 
distances itself from religion and the Church, albeit 
on a more modest scale than suggested by Voas and 
Crockett’s (2005) findings. Distancing is less visible 
in self-identification and belief in God and more 
in disbelief and doubt in remaining dogmas and 
sporadic participation in Masses. From the aspect 
of the success of the transition to religiosity, the 
most interesting category is PRSR. This research 
does not confirm Kelley’s thesis, from which H5 
was derived because neither the predominantly 
religious national context nor the ARES experience 
prevented the majority of PRSRs from becoming 
religiously passive during their student years and 
even completely distancing themselves from reli-
gion and the Church. This supports the thesis that 
RS, and especially ARES itself in the absence of 
family upbringing in religion, is not a guarantee of 
AR at student age.
More than half of PRSRs are nonreligious in 
all AR indicators, which makes them, contrary to 
H5, more similar to NRSRs than RSRs. Seculariza-
tion tendencies are also found among RSRs in all 
AR indicators. Distancing oneself from a religious 
worldview in which the majority is, at least formally 
(ARES), socialized is most evident in not accepting 
life in accordance with the principles of faith as 
a life goal that even the majority of RSRs do not 
consider desirable.
In their research of political attitudes, Boehke, 
Hadjar, and Baier (2007) argue that parents whose 
worldview is marginal to the zeitgeist of a particular 
society will seek to reduce or eliminate external in-
fluences in primary socialization to make the trans-
mission of family values  more successful. Applying 
an analogy in the analysis of RS in a highly religious 
Croatian society, it was to be expected that NRSRs 
would recognize the greater influence of parents in 
shaping their attitudes than RSRs. However, the re-
sults reveal just the opposite – NRSRs recognize the 
crucial family influence twice, and the PRSRs even 
four times less than RSRs. It would be expected 
that PRSRs would adhere to the socially dominant 
pattern, i.e., be as religious as the RSRs; however, 
most of them are “going against the current.” More 
successful transmission of religiosity is associated 
with the recognition of stronger family influence 
and, according to previous findings (Petts & Des-
mond, 2016), the greater influence of the mother. 
Distancing oneself from religion and the Church 
is associated with minimizing the influence of all 
agents of socialization and emphasizing autonomy 
in creating attitudes about religion, which fits into 
the concept of individualization and self-socializa-
tion characteristic of late modernity.
To explain the weak AR of UNIRI students, 
it is not enough to take into account the level of 
secularization in the area of primary socialization 
of the majority of respondents (Istria and Primorje) 
because only a tenth of respondents had no RS 
experience in their childhood. Moving away from 
religion and the Church is clearly a generational 
phenomenon (Voas & Crockett, 2005) because 
students are generally less religious than the aver-
age population (H2). Furthermore, it is evident that 
passivation and indifference towards religion grow 
with the year of study, which means that students, 
emancipating themselves from family influence and 
control, in new life circumstances move away from 
worldviews and patterns of behavior from child-
hood. 
A number of questions arise about the rea-
sons for the observed trends and possible further 
directions of change, and the answers to them 
go beyond the spatial limitations of this text. Are 
secularization trends among students an indication 
of “a self-reinforcing spiral of secularization” (Kel-
ley, 2015)? Do global changes in the socio-cultural 
context of growing up mediated by new technolo-
gies (Lövheim, 2012), shape students’ worldview 
more strongly than the content of traditional RS? Is 
it a transient decline in religiosity at this stage of 
life, which will be reversed by establishing one’s 
own procreation family, or is it the opposite – the 
level of religiosity within a particular cohort in life 
unchanged (Voas, 2015) and the majority of current 
students are Christians only nominally? Is it a dif-
fusion of moral evolution coming from developed 
countries, whose students represent the avant-garde 
and hint at future secularization trends (Inglehart, 
2021)? Will, according to the principle of stratified 
diffusion (Willmot and Young), student attitudes 
and patterns of behavior expand to other young 
people and, in the future, become a normative posi-
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tion in society? Is there a partial change in patterns 
of social desirability that leads to ideological and 
religious polarization at play?
The not-so-distant past warns us that one 
should be very careful in predicting further trends 
of people’s attachment to religion and the Church 
in this region. The deep-rooted equality of the 
confessional and the national identity carries with 
it the smoldering potential of conflict, a conveni-
ent means to which the elites resort for the purpose 
of political mobilization and gaining legitimacy 
(Vrcan, 2001). 
Finally, the limitations of this study arising from 
the specificity of the sample and the region in which 
the research was conducted should be emphasized. 
Students whose patterns cannot be mechanically rep-
licated on all young people were interviewed, but, at 
the same time, it should be borne in mind that this is a 
group from which the social elite will be recruited to-
morrow, which will dictate the rhythm of future social 
changes. Furthermore, UNIRI has a regional character, 
and although the region variable is statistically weakly 
related to indicators of religiosity, it should be empha-
sized that the largest part of the surveyed students grew 
up in the counties with a lower level of religiosity. 
Nevertheless, one should not ignore the finding that, 
for a significant part of students, regardless of regional 
affiliation and despite the RS experience in childhood, 
“religion plays a very minor role (if any) in their lives” 
(Voas, 2009, 164). 
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POVEZAVE MED RELIGIOZNO SOCIALIZACIJO V OTROŠTVU IN AKTUALNO RELIGIOZNOSTJO 
V ŠTUDENTSKIH LETIH: PRIMER HRVAŠKIH ŠTUDENTOV UNIVERZE NA REKI
Željko BONETA
Univerza na Reki, Učiteljska fakulteta, Sveučilišna avenija 6, 51000 Reka, Hrvaška
e-mail: zboneta@uniri.hr
POVZETEK
Po razpadu socializma je Hrvaška doživela verski preporod in postala ena izmed najbolj religioznih nek-
danjih socialističnih držav. Vera in religioznost sta iz zasebno toleriranega, a družbeno nezaželenega, postali 
del družbene normale, uradna verska socializacija pa prevladujoča oblika vzgoje otrok. Prispevek analizira 
povezavo med vzorci (ne)religiozne socializacije in religioznostjo v študentskih letih, in sicer na podlagi 
spletne ankete, ki je bila izvedena leta 2021 na vzorcu študentov Univerze na Reki (N=624). Glede na 
vzorec socializacije ločimo tri kategorije: (1) versko socializirane anketirance, ki so jih starši vzgajali versko 
in so hodili k šolskemu verouku; (2) delno versko socializirane anketirance, ki so hodili k šolskemu verouku, 
vendar jih starši niso vzgajali ne versko ne neversko; (3) anketiranci, katere so starši vzgajali neversko in 
niso hodili k šolskemu verouku. Rezultati razkrivajo, da socializacijski vzorec pomembno vpliva na razlike 
med vsemi analiziranimi kazalniki religioznosti študentov. Ob ohranjanju svetovnonazorskih in vedenjskih 
vzorcev, sprejetih s socializacijo, ugotavljamo odstopanje v vseh kategorijah. To odstopanje se večinoma 
kaže kot oddaljevanje od vere in cerkva anketirancev, ki imajo na podlagi svojih izkušenj eno ali obe obliki 
verske socializacije. Niti visoko religiozen nacionalni kontekst, niti izkušnja uradne religiozne socializacije, 
nista zagotovilo za religioznost v študentskih letih, če družinske religiozne socializacije ni bilo. Odmik od 
svetovnega nazora, v katerem je večina vsaj formalno socializirana, se najbolj kaže v nesprejemanju življenja 
po načelih vere kot zaželenega življenjskega cilja.
Ključne besede: (ne)religiozna socializacija, aktualna religioznost, dejavniki socializacije, študenti, sekularizacija, 
Hrvaška
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