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IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF COLLABORATION IN EUROPE DURING WORLD WAR II AND A SHORT COMPARISON WITH SLOVENIA

In today's sense of the word, the concept of collaboration was introduced during World War II by Marshall Philippe Pétain, who, after a meeting with Hitler in October 1940, announced that the rest of France would “collaborate” with the victorious Germany.⁴³² Later on, the concept came to apply to other aspects of the relationship between the occupying forces and the occupied territory and population as well, primarily the aspects that are disparagingly called “aiding the enemy”, “supporting the occupying forces”, “working against fundamental national interests” or even “treason” or

⁴³² Julian Jackson: *France. The Dark Years 1940–1944*. Oxford, 2001, p. 173.

“high treason”. However, modern historiography of World War II is giving more and more attention to the study of this complex and sometimes contradictory phenomenon. In addition to concrete particulars of each instance of collaboration, the various increasingly thorough monographs as well as comparative studies are now directing their critical analyses as well as both original and unoriginal systematizations towards the very concept of collaboration as well.⁴³³ In light of the previously mentioned moral connotations, it is clear that the common idea of collaboration is the result of a subjective approach; however, it should be pointed out that the study will only focus on the situation in the territories occupied by the Axis powers, primarily Nazi Germany, and not on those occupied by the Soviet Union or even the Western Allies.

Despite the limitations and reservations, however, the fundamental material and methodological foundations remain relevant, as no collaboration as we understand it can happen without them: these are occupation, i.e. occupying (enemy) forces, on the one hand, and occupied territory with its political structures and population as the subjects of occupation on the other. Most researchers agree that the decisive agent in this dichotomy is generally the occupying force, who makes decisions, i.e. allows for, wants or even demands the cooperation of the occupied. Various systems of occupation established primarily by the Nazis across Europe – from the Channel Islands to the Caucasus – thus represent the natural framework as well as a *conditio sine qua non* that determines the nature and extent of collaboration that would occur and even whether it would occur at all.⁴³⁴ That is to say, the systems of occupation reflect the short- as well as long-term goals and plans that the occupying forces have for the occupied territories and their populations, thus indirectly, or even directly, influencing the forms and degrees of collaboration.

Of course, there was virtually no territory or population that would want the Nazi occupation or would actively strived to join the German Reich. This was only the case with some more or less Nazified German minorities, i.e. Volksdeutschers, who also frequently acted as the fifth column following the occupation. On the other hand, researchers have generally come to agree that

433 Werner Rings: *Leben mit dem Feind. Anpassung und Widerstand in Hitlers Europa 1939–1945*. Munich, 1979, pp. 112–229. Michael Burleigh: *The Third Reich. A New History*. London, 2000, pp. 405–481. Boris Mlakar: *Oblike kolaboracije med drugo svetovno vojno s posebnim pogledom na dogajanje v večnacionalni Jugoslaviji* [Forms of Collaboration during World War II with a Special Regard to the Developments in the Multi-National Yugoslavia]. *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, 2005, No. 2, pp. 59–74. Czesław Madajczyk: *Zwischen neutralen Zusammenarbeit der Bevölkerung okkupierter Gebiete und Kollaboration mit den Deutschen*. In: *Europa unterm Hakenkreuz. Okkupation und Kollaboration (1938–1945)*. Berlin, Heidelberg, 1994, pp. 45–58.

434 Jan T. Gross: *Themes for a Social History of War Experience and Collaboration*. In: *The Politics of Retribution in Europe. World War II and its Aftermath*. Princeton, 2000, pp. 24–25.

only a minority of the population usually participated in active resistance. But if that was so, did the rest of the population collaborate as well? While this is obviously a rhetorical question with a negative answer, the fact remains that the majority had to somehow adapt to the new situation and choose a strategy of surviving the occupation in accordance with their values, abilities and own judgement of the situation. As our subject here is collaboration, the dilemma can also be rephrased as the question of what degree of social interaction with the enemy is still compatible with patriotism or the generally expected degree and form of loyalty to one's homeland.⁴³⁵ As we have indicated above, the answers to this question have ranged from passive acceptance to voluntary and active support for the administration of the occupying forces or even ideological identification with them. That is, many people thought that collaboration would prevent greater evils from befalling the population or that, as Marshall Pétain believed, his collaboration would shield the French people from the German surge.

Of course, this is not the place to expound on the complexity and specific features of collaboration in Europe; however, we do have to return briefly to the issue of the Nazi occupation policy and even the war goals of the Axis powers, particularly of Hitler's Reich. With regard to the global government of Europe after the presumed German victory, it has to be said that neither the Nazi command nor Hitler were explicitly concerned with the issue and that the only constant of the Nazi policy in this regard was simply the creation of the great German Reich that would, naturally, include the Baltic area, and presumably also Ukraine, in addition to the Czech Republic and Poland. In any case, the Nazi interests were particularly targeted to the east of Europe (Generalplan Ost), while the Nazi's concerns regarding the Western and Northern Europe were mostly associated with the question whether the Reich should include other Germanic countries as well or whether a different pan-Germanic community should be created. With this plan, France would be reduced to its circa-1500 borders. In the context of the ideas of the so-called New Europe or European Community, the Nazi circles sporadically came up with ideas such as the seven European federations joined in a kind of super-federation. The most serious yet still unofficial document in this regard was drafted in March 1943 by Ribbentrop's Foreign Ministry, which discussed a European union of sovereign countries and represented a kind of an answer to the Allies' Atlantic Charter. The following year, the central SS office in Berlin published a similar document planning a German Reich at the core of Europe surrounded by a circle of neighbouring peoples as well as the outer circle of the so-called »Randvölker«.

435 Rab Bennett: *Under the Shadow of the Swastika. The Moral Dilemmas of Resistance and Collaboration in Hitler's Europe*. New York, 1999, p. 71.

The whole arrangement would be called the “Europäische Eidgenossenschaft”. The plans even included a European passport.⁴³⁶

Regardless of such ideas, which were probably encouraged by thoughts of an increasingly improbable Nazi victory, the course of the war and especially the initial, concrete occupation policies and arrangements undoubtedly showed that the Nazi plans were primarily focused, as already mentioned, on the creation of a great German Reich with its great economic environment in the context of the so-called Lebensraum. Polish historian Madajczyk thus classifies the main objectives and phases of the Nazi occupation policies into four stages: 1) Creation of the German Lebensraum in the East, 2) Preliminary preparations for the creation of the great German Reich through the absorption of German “Volksgruppen” and Germanic peoples, 3) Securing a long-term or “eternal” subjugation of different regions with the help of the other Axis powers, 4) Occasional and limited interventions in other areas.⁴³⁷ As a matter of fact, the Nazi mechanism of subjugation and oppression manifested itself as the three main types of occupation. The first type was characterized by the direct expansion of the Reich’s government to the annexed territories annexed *de iure* or *de facto* (part of eastern Belgium, Luxembourg, Alsace, part of Lorraine, western Poland, Sudetenland, Lower Styria and Upper Carniola). The second type includes occupied territories with different forms of civilian administration (Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Polish General Government, Reichskommissariat Ostland, Reichskommissariat Ukraine), and the third includes territories under military administration (Channel Islands, Belgium, northern France, Serbia, parts of Greece and of course other areas following the capitulation of Italy). The Army Commands and the Rear Army Area Commands at the Eastern Front functioned as special kinds of military administrations.⁴³⁸

Within these systems of occupation, explicit German needs and incentives accompanied by their dissemination among the inhabitants of the occupied territories resulted in different forms and degrees of collaboration. The behaviour patterns in the native population which reflected to nothing more than efforts to survive and preserve the normal course of public life were helpful for the occupying forces as well. They allowed or sought “higher” forms of collaboration only in case they deemed them potentially beneficial in the short or perhaps

436 Hans Werner Neulen: *An deutscher Seite. Internationale Freiwillige von Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS*. Munich, 1985, pp. 23–35.

437 Madajczyk, *Zwischen neutralen Zusammenarbeit der Bevölkerung okkupierter Gebiete*, p. 49.

438 Gerhard Hirschfeld: *Formen nationalsozialistischer Besatzungspolitik im Zweitem Weltkrieg. In: Geteilt, besetzt, beherrscht. Die Tschechoslowakei 1938–1945. Reichsgau Sudetenland, Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, Slowakei*. Essen, 2004, pp. 16–17.

even long term. The whole body of collaboration was thus – self-evidently – in the service of the realization of Nazi control over the occupied territories and therefore also indirectly in the service of successful continuation of the war effort. From such perspective, it is crystal clear that the “tolerance” of collaboration in Eastern Europe was nothing more than a tactical manoeuvre. A German victory would mean that collaborators as relatively autonomous entities and, in particular, their non-German national affiliation would have to disappear. In this regard, things were different in Western Europe as the Nazis did not have any final plans for that region; of course, collaboration was welcomed, but it was especially the political collaboration that represented something of a double-edged sword for the Nazis since it implied a certain type of partnership and therefore also future obligations. With minor exceptions in the Baltic area, the Nazis tried to avoid such obligations, especially in the East, where such commitments were completely out of the question.⁴³⁹ That the focus was primarily on the short-term concrete interests of the occupying administration is also indicated by the seemingly unusual fact that Germans sometimes turned down cooperation with minor local Fascist groups, preferring instead to set up an administration on their own or in collaboration with other domestic political forces who enjoyed greater support among the population. Such was the case in Poland and the Czechia on the one hand, and on the other there were the cases of Belgium and Denmark.

Further in this paper, we will briefly present some concrete examples of the Nazi occupying regimes in Western and Eastern Europe and point out some of their features. Each example will be followed by a description of the forms of collaboration, wherein we will focus on the ideological foundations or backgrounds that had resulted in such varying forms and degrees of collaboration. It is precisely under the ideological aspect of the relationship between the occupying power and the occupied people that the phenomenon of collaboration is usually shown in its clearest and most extreme form, and this is where explicit support to the occupying power as well as identification with the Nazis are most evident – in such cases, collaboration is voluntary and the most intense. The first direct manifestation of an ideology which was identical with or obviously related to National Socialism was the ideological collaboration in the narrow sense; in this regard, various Fascist and para-Fascist movements or parties that may have been active even before the occupation or many of them appearing and becoming active after the country had been occupied should be mentioned. A typical example in this category were the so-called Paris “collaborationism”, who were labelled by using this term in order to distinguish them from the “national”

⁴³⁹ Hans Umbreit: Die Rolle der Kollaboration in der deutschen Besatzungspolitik. In: *Europa unterm Hakenkreuz*, pp. 33–44.

collaboration of Vichy.⁴⁴⁰ The ideological potential, of course, does not only result in ideological collaboration and the directly related political collaboration, but can also act as an incentive and a trigger for other types of collaboration, e.g. voluntary enrolment in the SS in order to actively participate in the fight against Bolshevism. Such motivations, of course, cannot be excluded even in cases of economic collaboration. In this regard, the contrasting cases of Renault and Michelin are often cited. The former voluntarily offered to manufacture tanks for the Germans, but even the latter, albeit being in contact with the resistance, had to somehow do business with the occupying forces.⁴⁴¹

In spite of the country's proclaimed neutrality, Germany attacked Belgium on 10 May 1940, occupying its entire territory by the end of the month. The king remained in the country but retreated into voluntary isolation and declared himself a sort of prisoner. The Government authorized its secretaries-general to administer the country and then crossed France to retreat to London, where it settled as a Government in exile. The Belgian territory, with the French departments of Nord and Pas de Calais annexed to it by the Germans, were subject to a permanent military administration. Although the territory was nominally commanded by General Alexander von Falkenhausen, the administration was led by Eggert Reeder. The German-speaking districts of Eupen and Malmédy were immediately annexed to the Reich, while the efforts of the Luxembourgian gauleiter Simon to also annex the Arlon area did not bear any fruit.⁴⁴² Although Germans always had the last word, most of the responsibilities for economic, administrative and educational activities were given to the council of the aforementioned secretaries-general and other representatives of the traditional Belgian elite.

Based on direct Hitler's instructions, among other things, the administration of the German occupying forces immediately started to show favouritism for the Flemish part of Belgium, to which the Germans also included the city of Brussels. In addition to linguistic and political aspects, the favouritism was primarily reflected by the fact that the Germans were quick to release the Flemish prisoners of war, while those of the Walloon origin had to remain in captivity. In any case, collaboration in Belgium was started immediately and was evident in all areas of life. The main ideological basis for collaboration was the Flemish nationalism, Belgian version of Fascism and a rather widespread rejection of democracy. The Flemish nationalism was practised by different parties and movements characterized by varying degrees of extremism and flirtation with the German Nazism. The largest such party was the Flemish National Union (Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond, VNV),

440 Dominique Veillon: *La collaboration*. Paris, 1984, p. 179–225.

441 Philippe Burrin: *La France à l'heure allemande*. Paris, 1995, p. 255–257.

442 L. Papeleux: *La Belgique occupée (1940–1944)*. *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, 1994, No. 174, p. 200.

which supported Flemish independence and, in perspective, what was called Dietsland, i.e. a national union of all Dutch-speaking countries, which, according to VNV, included Luxembourg, which would later become part of the German federation. The Germans were not too enthusiastic about the idea, but they did like receiving favours from the Flemish nationalists who soon took over positions in the council of secretaries-general as well as all lower administrative levels. Besides, VNV supported a social regime based on the people's solidarity and corporate programme. Among other, more extreme Flemish groups, there was also the Union of Dutch National Solidarists (Verbond van Dietsche National-Solidaristen, Verdinaso) and the German-Flemish Labour Community (Duitschen-Vlamsche Arbeidsgemeenschap, Devlag). The latter was explicitly pro-German; it supported the idea of annexing Flanders to the German Reich and later became something of Heinrich Himmler's personal Belgian party that was the first to advocate the establishment of Flemish SS units.⁴⁴³ In Wallonia, Léon Degrelle with his Rexist Movement (Rex) was the most prominent among those who worked with the Nazis. Degrelle, who followed the examples of Mussolini, Franco and Salazar, wanted to create an authoritarian, corporate country that would be organized as an expanded Flemish-Walloon federation. However, his vision was extended even further, towards a renewal of a kind of Burgundy that would, of course, also include parts of northern France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.⁴⁴⁴ Degrelle is also notable for having been among the few non-Germans that Hitler was friendly with. His pro-German policies went so far as Degrelle declaring Walloons to be German and saying that Belgium should, accordingly, become part of the great German Reich.⁴⁴⁵ In his case, as well as the case of Flemish collaborationists, the programmes and propaganda appearances came to be increasingly dominated with Nazi phraseology and its leitmotif of the "struggle for the European civilization".⁴⁴⁶ However, as the German defeat became more and more inevitable, it seemed that even Degrelle had trouble in understanding what was the point of the war. At the Vienna assembly of the European National Socialists in December 1944, Degrelle bluntly asked the Nazi command to tell him "what we're fighting for and not only what we're fighting against. Europe has to have a clear goal for after the war. What is this goal?"⁴⁴⁷ His question, of course, remained unanswered.

443 Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, pp. 67–68.

444 Martin Conway: *Collaboration in Belgium. Léon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement 1940–1944*. New Haven, London, 1993, pp. 33–34, 179.

445 Wilfried Wagner: *Belgien in der deutschen Politik während des Zweiten Weltkrieges*. Boppard am Rhein, 1974, pp. 198–205. Conway, *Collaboration in Belgium*, p. 173.

446 Jacques Willequet: Les fascismes belges et la Seconde guerre mondiale. *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, 1967, No. 66, p. 100.

447 David Littlejohn: *The Patriotic Traitors. A History of Collaboration in German Occupied Europe 1940/1945*. London, 1972, p. 180.

All Flemish collaborationist groups began reorganizing their paramilitary units into new volunteer formations and militias or creating new ones that later fought alongside German troops, with the Flemish Legion leaving for the Eastern Front as early as in December 1941. There were about 30 different Flemish units, including those in the SS – towards the end, as the newly constituted Flemish government was forced to retreat to Germany, the core of the Flemish volunteers organized within the 27th SS Volunteer Grenadier Division “Langemarck”.⁴⁴⁸ Both the Flemish police and the SS units, primarily those made up of Devlag supporters, also participated in actions against the resistance movement, as well as in the anti-Jewish activities.⁴⁴⁹ The situation was much clearer on the Walloon side, with Degrelle forming the Walloon Legion and leading it in combat on the Eastern Front, where it was allegedly very successful but was ultimately decimated. With the liberation of Belgium, the Walloon units found themselves fighting in Germany as well, again on the Eastern Front and elsewhere across Europe.⁴⁵⁰ With the Walloons, the role of central formation was ultimately also played by the SS division, in their case the 28th SS Volunteer Grenadier Division “Wallonien”.

Luxembourg, the tiny grand duchy bordering Belgium, was swiftly occupied by the Germans, which was easy as Luxembourg lacked an army, with the exception of a volunteer company whose members served as gendarme reservists and ceremonial guards. In any case, the Nazi regime always treated the German-speaking Luxembourgers as Germans, so all further measures taken by the occupying administration were focused on what was called “the return to the Reich” (Heim ins Reich). Following a one-month period of military administration, Luxembourg was practically annexed to the Reich as its territory was annexed to Gau Koblenz-Trier, which was renamed into Gau Moselland in February 1941. Gauleiter Gustav Simon also became chief of the civilian administration and his activities during the initial months were centred primarily on the dismantling of Luxembourg’s statehood, eventually allowing Simon to solemnly declare that Luxembourg had ceased to exist and to forbid any use of the name. The title of Simon’s proclamation from August 1941 was very distinctive: “The Period of Democracy is Over”.⁴⁵¹ The German law and German regulations were instituted, and the intensified Germanization of Luxembourg began. The local language called Lëtzebuergesch and French were both banned, names were “restored” to their German forms, and even the wearing of the Basque beret, which was

448 Ibid., pp. 176–181.

449 Bruno de Wever: *Collaboration in Belgium during the Second World War*. Florence, 2005, p. 17.

Manuscript owned by author.

450 SI AS 1931, OZNA, II. Odsek, Zaslüšanje Dufour Daniela, 21 March 1945.

451 Henri Koch-Kent: *Sie boten Trotz. Luxemburger im Freiheitskampf 1939–1945*. Luxembourg, 1974, p. 16.

considered a French symbol, was prohibited. Interestingly, however, Nazis never executed a *de iure* annexation of Luxembourg to the Reich.⁴⁵²

This was probably partly also due to the fact that most Luxembourgers were far from thrilled about the occupation or their “return” to the Reich. Individual Nazi measures prompted demonstrations and strikes, which in turn led to bloody German countermeasures and to the Nazis starting, though not finishing, limited deportation of Luxembourg families to Silesia. Gauleiter Simon even came up with a referendum, at which Luxembourgers were supposed to provide answers to concrete questions affirming their German affiliation. However, the referendum was a fiasco, as 98 % of responses indicated that the people considered themselves Luxembourgers by culture and nationality and their language Luxembourgish. The Gauleiter was forced to invalidate the referendum.⁴⁵³ However, pressures mounted and the Nazis initially instituted a compulsory labour scheme and then also a compulsory military service in August 1942, upon the granting of limited citizen rights. Recruitment involved those born between 1920 and 1927, over 15,000 draftees in total, however, draft evasion and desertion led to only a little over 11,000 actually joining the German army, of which almost 3,000 died on various fronts. The previously mentioned volunteer troop, which Himmler held in very high regard, was mobilized as well. The troop members went on a rightful Odyssey across Europe, with the journey having a tragic end for many of them due to resistance. Through various circumstances, part of the squad once even entered Slovenia.⁴⁵⁴

In terms of collaboration, there was no real ideological basis for it in Luxembourg, primarily due to great national homogeneity. Very few Luxembourgers were open to being convinced that they were actually Germans. Prior to the occupation, the grand duchy did not have any Nazi organizations, with the “Luxemburger Volksjugend”, an organization established by Albert Kreins as a copy of the Nazi Hitlerjugend, perhaps coming closest.⁴⁵⁵ Certain Naziphile ideas were also held by “Arbed”, an association of factory owners, however, the organization was primarily concerned with good economic relations with Germany.⁴⁵⁶ In order to expedite the “Germanification” of Luxembourgers, the Gauleiter established the extensive “Volksdeutsche Bewegung” organization as early

452 Gilbert Trausch: *Histoire du Luxembourg*. Paris, 1992, p. 166.

453 Gilbert Trausch: *Le Luxembourg à l'époque contemporaine*. Luxembourg, 1981, p. 155.

454 Louis Jacoby and René Trauffer: *Freiwillegekompanie 1940–1945. Tome II*. Luxembourg, 1986, pp. 14–15, 190–195, 425–442. Jože Košnjek: Kameradi niso poslušali nemške komande [Comrades Did Not Listen to the German Command]. *Gorenjski glas*, 5 October 2001, p. 3.

455 *Luxembourg Collaborationist Forces During WWII*. Available at: <http://www.feldgrau.com/a-lux.html>, 16 March 2007.

456 L. Papeleux: Menace fasciste au Grand-Duché. *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, 1985, No. 140, p. 99.

as July 1940, and although membership was not compulsory, people were pressured to join in order to keep their jobs, etc. The organization was initially headed by Prof. Damian Kratzenberg, a member of a small group of leaders who actually held pro-Nazi opinions, which in turn directed his propaganda. Luxembourgers resented this, and so Kratzenberg became one of the few Luxembourgers to be sentenced to death for collaboration after the war.⁴⁵⁷ In any case, the organization acquired 84,000 members by May 1942, however, researchers estimate that only a bit more than 5 % of these joined because of their convictions. Furthermore, the Nazi authorities urged Luxembourgers to enter NSDAP, i.e. the Nazi party, and its professional organizations, and men in particular to volunteer for the SS and Wehrmacht. About 4,000 Luxembourgers joined the NSDAP, and local historians consider these to have been “authentic collaborationists”.⁴⁵⁸ There were less than 2,000 volunteers in Wehrmacht and less than 300 in the SS. After the war, a total of 9,500 Luxembourgers were indicted for collaboration.

After the French military defeat, the country was divided by German dictate into five occupation zones, of course not counting the French State led by Pétain that remained unoccupied for further two and a half years and minor border corrections in favour of Hitler’s ally, Mussolini. During the occupation, the brunt of Nazi measures was born by Alsace and part of Lorraine, areas that Germany was forced to cede to the French after the country’s defeat in 1918. Provisions of the armistice made no mention of the Alsace and Lorraine status, however, this fact was of course ignored by the Nazis. The Alsatian departments of Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin were annexed to Gau Baden, while the Lorraine department of Moselle was joined to Gau Westmark.⁴⁵⁹ German laws and regulations were gradually introduced, while the French legislation and eventually any French presence at all, were simultaneously eliminated. Gauleiters Joseph Bürckel (Moselle) and Robert Wagner (Alsace) were initially appointed as chiefs of civilian administration. This, along with the fact that the complete institution of German legislation and presence of all Nazi institutions failed to actually result in an explicit, formal annexation, has led French researchers to describe the formal attitude of the German authorities to these regions as “annexion de fait sui generis”.⁴⁶⁰ In France, the Nazis carried out assimilation measures that were similar to those in Luxembourg, with the important difference, however, that they included an

457 Franz W. Seidler: *Die Kollaboration 1939–1945*. Munich, Berlin, 1995, pp. 296–298.

458 Gilbert Trausch: *Histoire du Luxembourg*, pp. 173–174.

459 Božo Repe: Francija med drugo svetovno vojno. Vprašanje kolaboracije, odpora in epuracije ter možne primerjave s Slovenijo [France during World War II. The Question of Collaboration, Resistance, Purge, and the Possible Comparisons with Slovenia]. *Borec*, 1998, No. 561–563, p. 8.

460 Georges-Gilbert Nonnenmacher: *La grande honte. De l’incorporation de force des Alsaciens-Lorrains, Eupenois-Malmédiens et Luxembourgeois dans l’armée allemande au cours de la deuxième guerre mondiale*. Colmar, 1966, p. 24. Eugène Schaeffer: *L’Alsace et la Lorraine (1940–1945)*. Paris, 1953.

extensive campaign of deportation of those that were assessed to potentially be difficult to Germanize. During 1941 and 1942, 92,000 people in a series of waves were thus deported from Lorraine to unoccupied France, including the Bishop of Metz and about a hundred members of the clergy; the Catholic Church was also the target of other measures.⁴⁶¹ About 8,000 Lorrainers were moved to Silesia and Sudetenland. Alsations suffered a similar fate, accompanied by the settlement of Volksdeutsche from elsewhere. French and German Jews living in both regions were also temporarily deported to France. In terms of expected measures, this was followed by a more or less compulsory involvement of the population in large organizations (“Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft”), by a compulsory labour scheme in April 1942 and by an announcement of compulsory military service accompanied by the draftees receiving a German citizenship in August 1942. In both regions, 200,000 young men were drafted, with about 40,000 failing to return home, most of whom of course fell on the Russian Front. In 1944, Alsace and Lorraine also saw compulsory mobilization into the SS.⁴⁶² Although the SS was looking for volunteers from the very beginning, the results were poor – researchers estimate that the SS got fewer volunteers from these annexed regions than from the rest of France in relative terms.⁴⁶³ Of course, a part of these German-speaking Frenchmen accepted the new situation and decided to actively cooperate with the Nazi authorities, meaning that the local Hitlerjugend and NSDAP chapters were not left without members.⁴⁶⁴ Although the Alsations involved had been forced into service, the French recall their participation in the infamous atrocity at Oradour-sur-Glane with bitterness, as members of the Der Führer regiment massacred 642 people as payback for a previous partisan attack in June 1944.⁴⁶⁵ In addition, a number of Slovenian internees have bad memories of Alsace because of its Natzweiler-Struthof concentration camp.⁴⁶⁶

In the East, the first country to feel the heat of the Nazi colonial expansion was Poland. After military operations concluded in September 1939, the Polish territory occupied by Germany was, as previously planned, split into two parts. The western territories with an area of 90,000 km² and a population of almost 10 million were annexed to the Reich. They were joined to Gau Wartheland

461 AJ 103-189, I. Gerasimović iz Marseja zunanjemu ministrstvu v London, 18 June 1942. Joseph Burg and Marcel Pierron: *Malgré-nous et autres oubliés*. Sarreguemines, 1991, pp. 15–16.

462 *Ibid.*, pp. 326–327.

463 Marie-Joseph Bopp: L'enrôlement de force des Alsaciens dans la Wehrmacht et la SS. *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, 1955, No. 20, pp. 41–42.

464 Georges Livet: Le drame de l'Alsace (1939–1945). *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, 1950, No. 1, p. 107.

465 Jens Kruuse: *Zločin v Oradourju*. Ljubljana, 1972.

466 *Koncentracijsko taborišče KL Natzweiler-Struthof in podružnica Ste-Marie-aux-Mines* [The KL Natzweiler-Struthof Concentration Camp and its Branch Ste-Marie-aux-Mines]. Ljubljana, 1996.

(Posen), Gau Upper Silesia and Gau Danzig-Western Prussia. After some hesitation by Hitler regarding the creation of the so-called “Restaat Polen”, the rest of Poland was assigned the status of a semi-colonial dependent territory and named General Government (“Generalgouvernement”). In this part of Poland, all power was held by the German civilian administration headed by General Governor Hans Frank and based in Krakow. However, following the attack on the Soviet Union, the district of Galicia was annexed to the Government as well. According to Hitler’s and Himmler’s plans, the annexed territories would be Germanized within ten years; the measures that followed in order to achieve this brought an unprecedented level of terror waged against a European nation. The intelligentsia, the clergy and other distinguished Polish classes were killed, taken to concentration camps or deported to the General Government without any concern paid to their needs. Together with other categories, 750,000 people were deported there, and deportation of a few million more was being planned. Polish Jews suffered a similar fate, only worse. All traces of Polish cultural and general presence were destroyed, while the seized and emptied estates and areas were settled by Germans from elsewhere, primarily those from the Baltic countries.⁴⁶⁷ Over 1,300,000 civilian workers had to leave and perform forced labour for the Reich, and about 200,000 children were likewise taken there to be Germanized.

Within the General Government, which the Nazis also planned to Germanize in the long term, Polish administration was allowed to carry out low-level activities, and small industry was likewise allowed to remain autonomous, while Polish national presence in culture, education and science was more restricted. In this phase, Nazis wanted to push the Poles to the lowest educational and cultural level or keep them there in order for them to be at the Reich’s disposal as “working people without leadership”, as Himmler puts it in his memorandum from May 1940.⁴⁶⁸ Primary education and theatres kept operating, and newspapers and books were still being published. However, their contents were censored, the press was limited to yellow journalism, theatres mostly produced casual variety shows and universities were closed or transformed into German universities.⁴⁶⁹

In such circumstances, especially in the annexed territories, there was little space left for collaboration, especially collaboration in the narrow sense, i.e. conscious and active support of the Nazi plans. In these regions, Nazis allowed no activities that could be called Polish whatsoever, not even collaboration. Ideology

467 Tone Ferenc: *Nacistična raznarodovalna politika v Sloveniji v letih 1941–1945* [The Nazi Denationalisation Policy in Slovenia between 1941 and 1945]. Maribor, 1968, pp. 33–40.

468 Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, p. 297.

469 Czesław Madajczyk: Kann man in Polen 1939–1945 von Kollaboration sprechen? In: *Europa unterm Hakenkreuz*, pp. 136, 142–144. Tomasz Szarota: Il collaborazionismo in un paese senza Quisling. Il caso di Varsavia: fonti e prospettive di ricerca. In: *Una certa Europa. Il collaborazionismo con le potenze dell’Asse 1939–1945. I fonti*. Brescia, 1992, pp. 396–397.

and politics had nothing to do with this, any reasons for potential cooperation with the authorities, which was only possible at the individual level, were distinctively social. It was about survival and keeping up at least an appearance of a minimum preservation of human dignity. This became particularly apparent in the mass enlistment of Poles to the so-called “Deutsche Volksliste” which the Nazis formed in western Poland, initially to serve as something of a list of the German population. The organization had four divisions, ranging from pure and active Germans to the so-called renegades. The last two categories were able to obtain German citizenship; however, this was subject to revocation. Because Germanization was slow, pragmatic reasons led Nazis to at least outwardly allow extremely broad integration, which led to over two million former Polish citizens being included on the list. However, as they became German citizens, they also became subject to compulsory military service. About 200,000 Poles were thus drafted into the Wehrmacht. Madajczyk wonders whether these were renegades. He doesn't provide an answer, however, he sometimes uses a label indicating that at least some of them were opportunists.⁴⁷⁰

With regard to the rest of the Polish territory, i.e. the General Government, the collaboration issue was much more complicated and the situation much more varied. What is certain, however, is that based on historiographical research carried out in the past few decades, the issue can no longer be easily eliminated with the slogan of the wartime Polish government in exile, that Poland was simply “a land without a Quisling”. Especially in the beginning, when the Germans had not yet come to a final decision on what to do with the Polish territory, there were actually a number of candidates to fill in the “position”. As early as November 1939, Germans were soliciting a group of imprisoned Polish aristocrats to form a government. Similarly, they tried to persuade peasant leader Wincenty Witos to join them, but their proposals were always turned down.⁴⁷¹ The issue then became off topic for a while; however, after a few years, as the Reich was starting to lose the war, the Germans made a number of similar steps. They first discussed the search for a common anti-Communist and anti-Soviet platform with former Prime Minister Leon Kozłowski, later with the captured Home Army commander Stefan “Grot” Rowecki and finally, after the unsuccessful Warsaw Uprising, with Grot's successor Bór-Komorowski. All of them turned down the offers, although, true enough, even Hitler was against such arrangements. Nevertheless, Himmler's people and the Gestapo command continued their attempts to form ties with

470 Czesław Madajczyk: *Kann man in Polen 1939–1945 von Kollaboration sprechen?*, p. 149. Igor Kamenetzky: *Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe. A Study of Lebensraum Policies*. New Haven, 1961, pp. 84–86. Ferenc, *Nacistična raznarodovalna politika v Sloveniji*, pp. 40–41.

471 Michel Borwicz: *L'occupant souhaitait-il un Quisling polonais?*. *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, 1963, No. 52, pp. 98–102.

local divisions of the resistance movement in order to recruit them for the anti-Soviet fight. On the other hand, initiatives were also coming in from the Polish side. The most infamous was the offer of the pro-German Władysław Studnicki to command a totalitarian Polish state annexed to Germany.⁴⁷² Later on, initiatives were also presented by various nationalist and Fascist Polish organizations such as “Miecz i Pług”. Other groups, such as “Falanga” and “Narodowe Siły Zbrojne”, were waging between resistance and alignment with the Germans, which was of course due to concerns about Communism and the looming Soviet domination in this part of Europe.

Although there was never any overt political collaboration, there were other forms occurring, particularly at the individual level, which were mainly determined by personal interests and decisions of individuals. While the issue was rather marginal for workers and peasants, it became much more critical for journalists, artists and bureaucrats. Researchers thus unanimously agree that the “Przełom” paper was fully collaborationist in character, which was, among other things, indicated by the fact that it began to be published only in Spring 1944.⁴⁷³ To a certain degree, the issue was also critical for scientists participating in the activities of the Krakow-based “Institut für Deutsche Ostarbeit”. In order to uphold patriotic behaviour, the resistance movement published a special moral code in 1941, describing crimes of treason, crimes against the Polish nation, ethical crimes and crimes against human dignity.⁴⁷⁴ In any case, about 10,000 collaborationists were sentenced to death by the resistance movement, which maintained a genuine alternative Polish underground state. In this regard, the Polish police was suspicious as well. It remained on its position, had over 11,000 officers and was known as “The Blue Police” or “Policja granatowa”, as it was called in Polish. Although the police participated in the fight against the Warsaw ghetto uprising, it was otherwise full of confidantes of the resistance. Additionally, the Polish Criminal Police was active towards the end of the war, as were also the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police, the Jewish Ghetto Police and, last but not least, the so-called “Trawniki men”, who performed various guard duties in addition to suppressing the ghetto uprising.⁴⁷⁵ The participation of Poles in the Holocaust of the Jewish population and the Jewish collaboration within the ghettos are two further, related issues. With regard to anti-Semitism, its the Polish variation was supposedly different from the Nazi version, which originated in racism. The

472 Tomasz Szarota: I Polacchi e il collaborazionismo. In: *Fascismo e antifascismo. Rimozioni, revisioni, negazioni*. Roma, Bari 2000, p. 164.

473 Szarota, *Il collaborazionismo in un paese senza Quisling*, pp. 406–407.

474 Carla Tonini: *The Polish Underground Press and the Issue of Collaboration with the Nazi Occupiers, 1939–1944*. Florence, 2005, pp. 1–2. Manuscript owned by author.

475 Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, p. 300.

Polish anti-Semitism seemed to be based on economic competition and religious prejudice. Nevertheless, researchers have discovered that the rationale for some Polish groups attempting to form ties with the Nazis included a common ideological language of anti-Semitism.⁴⁷⁶

As the war unfolded, its main effect was that the Germans were becoming increasingly interested in recruiting the Government's Poles for military participation. While German generals had been advocating this since the very beginning, the idea was initially blocked by Hitler himself. In the beginning of 1943, both Governor Frank and later also Goebbels tried to change the policy towards Poles as well as "Eastern" peoples in general. Frank sent a memorandum regarding the issue to Hitler, but his proposal was rejected yet again. Goebbels' circular on the "attitude of Germany towards European nations" was written in a similar spirit, but Hitler still blocked the engagement of Poles and other nations despite having previously relented about the Soviet territories; he allowed the military participation of Poles only as late as autumn 1944. But by then it was by far too late, and the attempt to engage new Polish volunteers for the fight against Communism in the context of the "White Eagle" formation was doomed.⁴⁷⁷

As already indicated, the fate planned by the Nazis for the three Baltic nations was also rather grim as, at least in the long term. However, events in the Baltic area in the summer following the German attack on the Soviet Union indicated nothing of the sort. Even before the war, the Baltic "liberation committees" were active in Berlin, and the Soviet authorities that lacked any legitimacy had their hand full with extensive deportations of the local elite members.⁴⁷⁸ The population welcomed the arriving German squads as liberators and many joined the Germans in their fight against the Red Army. The locals took power and formed provisional governments, except in Estonia where the local "Political Council" did not declare itself the government. Although such governments were not recognized by the Germans, they were tolerated for a while but eventually forced to dissolve. The Germans instituted civilian administration and integrated the Baltic states with Belarus as districts of a special occupation zone called "Reichskommissariat Ostland", which was headed by commissar Heinrich Lohse, who reported directly to the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories Alfred Rosenberg. Although German authorities allowed the locals to organize a parallel autonomous administration ("Selbstverwaltung"), this institution merely had

476 Klaus-Peter Friedrich: Collaboration in a "Land without a Quisling". Patterns of Collaboration with the Nazi German Occupation Regime in Poland during World War II. *Slavic Review*, 2005, No. 4, p. 717.

477 Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, p. 302. Czesław Madajczyk: Razhajanja glede okupacijske politike v prvi polovici leta 1943 [Disagreements with Regard to the Occupation Policy in the First Half of 1943]. *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, 1997, No. 2, pp. 248–251.

478 Kārlis Kangeris: Kollaboration vor der Kollaboration? Die baltische Emigranten und ihre "Befreiungskomitees" in Deutschland 1940/1941. In: *Europa unterm Hakenkreuz*, pp. 165–190.

administrative and consulting powers. In Lithuania, the administration units were called “General Councils”, in Latvia they were named “General Directorates” and in Estonia they were known as “Provincial Directorates”.⁴⁷⁹

To the great disappointment of the people and their elites, Germans showed no intention whatsoever to restore the independence of the three countries. Not only that, they did not even show willingness to restore the original tenure situation, as the Soviet authorities had already collectivized the land and nationalized businesses. The companies were taken over by large authorized German companies, which was initially followed by voluntary and later by compulsory deportations of workers to Germany. Lower administration bodies continued to operate at the local levels, except in large cities. Cultural and religious activities at the national level remained in the autonomous jurisdiction of the locals.

It is uncertain whether the cooperation of Baltic people with the German occupying forces, which there was no shortage of, can rightfully be labelled collaboration in the original, negative sense of the word. It is namely a fact that the Balts owed absolutely nothing to the country they belonged to in 1941. Not only that, the still-vivid memories and unhealed wounds reinforced their anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevik feelings that became their main motivation for cooperation with the Nazis. This was also partly true for their participation in the Holocaust. Informal groups had already been exterminating Jews during war operations – the activities which later received support from the Nazis and were, therefore, intensified even further. In 1941 alone, over 100,000 Jews were killed, with only the “Arajs Kommando” killing 26,000. The anti-Semitism had roots in the old times, while those of more recent origin supposedly stemmed from the Soviet occupation and its policies which leaned heavily on the Jews. However, this was only part of the truth.⁴⁸⁰ The other motive for collaboration was a definitive pro-Nazi attitude, although there were few explicitly Fascist groups such as Thunder Crosses (“Perkonkrusts”) in Latvia.⁴⁸¹

The Germans forced the local administration to mobilize men into various military and police units. The most famous of these units, and also the highest in numbers, were the formal mobilization-based defensive battalions (“Schutzmannschafts-Bataillone”), which were followed by new mobilizations, such as the one in Autumn 1943. The response was poor, particularly in Lithuania, but it improved in the winter as Lithuania relegated the command over the “local divisions” to General Povilas Plechavičius. Latvia and Estonia continued to mobilize troops into ancillary police units and legions which the SS command

479 Romuald Misiunas and Rein Taagepera: *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940–1990*. London, 2006, pp. 49–51.

480 *Ibid.*, pp. 61–63.

481 Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, p. 290.

intended to re-form into domestic Waffen-SS units. When this eventually took place, two divisions were formed in Latvia, i.e. the 15th and 19th “Waffen-Grenadier-Divisions der SS”, and one in Estonia, i.e. the 20th “Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (estn. Nr.1)”. Each numbered between 13,000 and 15,000 men. Despite different promises, the units were deployed to the Eastern Front and even elsewhere in Europe, rather than domestically and in the fight against partisans. In 1944, however, the front line again moved close to the Baltic countries and the fear of a renewed Soviet occupation spurred greater success in further mobilizations and calls to arms. This was particularly true in the case of Estonia, whose people felt the greatest threat. All together, as many as 70,000 Estonians, 110,000 Latvians, and 37,000 Lithuanians served in the “German” units. Estonians, in particular, fought tooth and nail against the charge of the Red Army.⁴⁸²

The occupation regimes described above and the manifestations of their collaboration were typical of occupied territories that formed the core area of the Nazi invasion interests. Among other states, this area certainly also included Slovenia, or at least its northern parts. The subject is further treated below. However, we must first point to the already known fact that the Nazi Germany, and to a lesser extent also the other Axis powers, operated wildly different types of occupation regimes in its vast occupied territory, which were accompanied by different forms of collaboration development. Slovenia’s surrounding area includes countries that, during World War II, suffered fates very different from the ones described above as well as from that of Slovenia. These countries are Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia and Italy. In the Fascist camp, all of them were considered independent countries, despite being more or less subordinate to the German Reich. Italy and Hungary were German allies, while Slovakia and Croatia were created as new vassal states. Hitler threatened Slovakia’s leader Jozef Tiso with dividing Slovakia between the neighbouring countries and so practically forced him to declare independence, while the creation of the “Independent State of Croatia” (NDH) can be ascribed to the nationalist potential of the Ustashe and the unresolved national question of Yugoslavia. However, both states were created in order to split up or demolish larger countries, i.e. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. NDH was actually occupied from the very beginning, Slovakia and Germany from 1944, and Italy from the autumn of 1943. Before the occupation, Slovakia and

482 Lennart Meri: Estonec potrebuje (vsaj) majhen hrib. Pogovor z estonskim predsednikom [Estonians Need (at Least) a Small Hill. A Discussion with the Estonian President]. *Nova revija*, 1999, No. 202/203, pp. 15–16. On the system of occupation and collaboration in the Baltic area see also: Anatol Lieven: *The Baltic Revolution*. New Haven, London, 1997. Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm: Die Rolle der Kollaboration für die deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Litauen und “Weissruthenien”. In: *Europa unterm Hakenkreuz*, pp. 191–216. Geoffrey Swain: *Between Stalin and Hitler. Class war and race war on the Dvina, 1940–46*. London, New York, 2004. Ruth Bettina Birn: *Die Sicherheitspolizei in Estland 1941–1944. Eine Studie zur Kollaboration im Osten*. Paderborn, 2006.

Hungary were more or less autonomous, having only to satisfy the Nazi demands, which were generally related to the supply of goods in the case of Slovakia, and to military aid in the case of Hungary. By 1944, both countries had only partly satisfied the Nazi demands regarding the extradition and extermination of Jews. Italy and NDH had strong indigenous Fascist movements which resulted in great tragedies, particularly the racist version in Croatia. In Slovakia and Hungary, Fascist groups were weak and only became notable once the countries were occupied. Among these countries, Italy's case particularly stands out; it includes the fall of the Fascist state in the autumn of 1943, which was formed upon Hitler's mercy, having become the vassal "Italian Social Republic" headed by Hitler's idol Benito Mussolini. In the case of Croatia, we can speak of collaboration from the very beginning; in other countries, however, collaboration only started after the German occupation. Especially in Italy, where the new Republican Fascists did everything they could to help the occupying forces deal with the Italian resistance movement.⁴⁸³

The above facts make it clear that the occupation regimes in Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia and Italy, as well as reasons for the occupation and its numerous forms, were very different from the corresponding mechanisms in the countries initially described here, and also in Slovenia. A further few words should thus be said regarding the possible comparisons between Slovenia and the mentioned cases in Western and Eastern Europe.

The systems of occupation in Slovenia, and elsewhere in Europe, were briefly compared by Tone Ferenc and Božo Repe, the latter only focusing on the Baltic region and France.⁴⁸⁴ In the case of the Nazi occupation in Slovenian part of Styria (Štajerska), Upper Carniola (Gorenjska) and parts of Carinthia (Koroška), a number of parallels can be drawn regarding the situation in other occupied areas which the Nazis considered their core national territory and were thus the first in line to be annexed to the Reich. As we point out these parallels, we have

483 For occupation regimes and collaboration in these countries see: Ivan Kamenec: *Slovenský stát (1939–1945)*. Prague, 1992. *Slovaška zgodovina* [Slovak History]. Ljubljana, 2005. István Pintér: *Hungarian Anti-Fascism and Resistance 1941–1945*. Budapest, 1986. Mario Fenyo: *German-Hungarian Relations 1941–1944*. New Haven, London, 1972. Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat: *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat 1941–1945*. Stuttgart, 1964. Fikreta Jelić-Butić: *Ustaše i Nezavisna država Hrvatska 1941–1945*. Zagreb, 1977. Lutz Klinkhammer: *L'occupazione tedesca in Italia 1943–1945*. Torino, 1993. Luigi Ganapini: *La repubblica delle camicie nere*. Milano, 2002. Enzo Collotti: Kollaboration in Italien während der deutschen Besatzung 1943–1945. In: *Europa unterm Hakenkreuz*, pp. 415–430.

484 Tone Ferenc: Okupacijski sistemi v Evropi in v Sloveniji 1941 [Occupation Systems in Europe and Slovenia 1941]. *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, 2001, No. 2, pp. 105–112. Božo Repe: Baltiške države med drugo svetovno vojno in primerjava s Slovenijo [Baltic States during World War II and the Comparison with Slovenia]. *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, 1997, No. 2, pp. 235–246. Božo Repe: Francija med drugo svetovno vojno. Vprašanje kolaboracije, odpora in epuracije ter možne primerjave s Slovenijo [France during World War II. The Question of Collaboration, Resistance, Purge, and the Possible Comparisons with Slovenia]. *Borec*, 1998, No. 561–563, pp. 5–92.

practically already defined annexationism as the primary common characteristic. The only difference was that Germany annexed some of these areas in full, while Luxembourg, Alsace, a part of Lorraine and the Slovenian occupied territories were never formally annexed. However, there was practically no difference between both categories as these territories were annexed *de facto*. They were joined to the German (neighbouring) *gaus*, the authorities instituted labour schemes, military service and enforced German laws as well as administrative and political systems. The only detail that stood out was the population, which the racist Nazi authorities considered too immature to acquire German citizenships. In order to facilitate this, all these territories were subjected to active Germanization and tiered systems of citizenship were instituted, as well as formally voluntary membership in mass organizations. In this respect, the “Steirischer Heimatbund” in Štajerska and “Kärntner Volksbund” in Gorenjska can be compared to the “Volksdeutsche Bewegung” in Luxembourg, “Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft” in Alsace, and especially to the “Deutsche Volksliste” in Poland.

In order to quickly give a certain territory a German character, Nazis resorted to measures of mass deportation and expulsion of the local population and its replacement with *Volksdeutschers* from across Europe. This was typical of all the cases described herein, with the exception of Belgium which retained its individuality even in the visions of Nazis, as well as the Baltic countries whose colonisation was postponed until the far future. In the “Italian” Province of Ljubljana, the situation with its retained cultural and, to a certain extent, administrative autonomy was comparable to the German system of occupation in the Baltic countries; however, the latter were granted a higher level of self-government right up to the end. This was also true for the Province of Ljubljana, but only from the Autumn of 1943 onward, when the province was occupied by the Germans.

Looking at the phenomenon and specific features of collaboration, the developments in Slovenia were not at all comparable to those in Belgium, where all forms of collaboration were present, with special emphasis on ideological collaboration and extremely strong volunteer SS units. To a certain degree, the situation in the Baltic area was similar; however, the main drive for mobilization there was the fear of Communism and the Soviet Union. To a certain extent, similarities can be observed with the development of collaboration in central Slovenia, primarily due to concerns about the possibility of a Communist takeover which could be anticipated from the actions of the Partisan movement under the Communist command. Unlike the situation in Belgium and, to a lesser extent, that in Luxembourg, the Baltic countries, and Poland, there was virtually no Fascist movement in Slovenia. It would be possible, however, to draw some weak parallels between Fascism and the so-called Rupnik circle during Rupnik’s

provincial administration in Ljubljana established after the capitulation of Italy. With regard to police and military form of collaboration, Slovenia and Belgium are again impossible to compare, with Belgium having been greatly influenced by the Flemish nationalism that acted as a trigger. While the situation was similar in the Baltic countries, in Slovenia the already mentioned key role in this respect was played by the fear of and resistance against Communism, i.e. a sort of counter-revolutionary drive. In the German-occupied Slovenian territory as at before 1943, collaboration was prominent among the German minority and the opportunistic part of the local population, which was reminiscent of the situation in Luxembourg, Alsace and Poland. As was the case in Poland, the Slovenian political and military collaboration with a Slovene national character was either not accepted by the Nazis or was considered unnecessary (with minor exceptions in Gorenjska occurring towards the end of the war). Similarly as elsewhere, there were Slovenes volunteering for the SS and Wehrmacht, although the numbers were limited. Looking at the big picture, it is clear that the situation in Slovenia can be compared to that in other countries, particularly those occupied and annexed to the Reich by the Nazis. However, Slovenia, which was, unlike other areas, initially occupied by three different powers, retains some of its original features.⁴⁸⁵

485 For collaboration in Slovenia see: Boris Mlakar: *Slovensko domobranstvo 1943–1945. Ustanovitev, organizacija, idejno ozadje* [Slovenian Home Guard 1943–1945. Foundation, Organisation, Ideological Background]. Ljubljana, 2003. France Bučar: *Usodne odločitve* [Fatal Decisions]. Ljubljana, 1988. Stane Kos: *Stalinistična revolucija na Slovenskem 1941–1945* [Stalinist Revolution in Slovenia 1941–1945], I-II. Rome, 1984 and Buenos Aires, 1991. Tone Ferenc: Die Kollaboration in Slowenien. Grundlagen, soziale Träger, Konzepte und Wirkungen. In: *Europa unterm Hakenkreuz*, pp. 337–348.