

## VKLJUČEVANJE SLOVENSKE VOJSKE V NATO IN VOJAŠKO STRUKTURO EVROPSKE UNIJE

### INTEGRATION OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES INTO NATO AND EU MILITARY STRUCTURES

Professional article

**Povzetek** Ko smo državljani Slovenije na referendumu večinsko podprli vstop v EU in Nato, smo se zavezali tudi k integraciji Slovenske vojske (SV) v vojaški strukturi Nata in EU. Formalno sodelovanje z Natom je Slovenija začela kot članica Partnerstva za mir. Vojaška struktura EU je mlajša in manj razvita od Natove, pri njenem razvoju sodelujemo tudi mi. Slovenija zagovarja tesno sodelovanje EU in Nata na vojaškem področju, brez nepotrebnega podvajanja zmogljivosti, zato imamo iste sile pripravljene tako za Nato kot za EU. Po sprejetju Republike Slovenije v Nato je SV postala del zavezniških vojaških sil in začela integracijo, ki naj bi se končala v prvi polovici leta 2010. Hkrati z integracijo v Nato smo se vključevali tudi v vojaško strukturo EU. Integracija SV v vojaški strukturi Nata in EU pomeni sposobnost delovanja SV v obeh strukturah, predvsem pa delovanje tistih sil in posameznikov, ki so posebej deklarirani za ti strukturi. Ker SV deluje s to strukturo v MOM in tudi v vojnem delovanju, moramo biti čim bolj integrirani, da bi zmanjšali morebitne izgube in povečali možnosti za uspeh.

**Ključne besede** *Integracija, pridruževanje, sodelovanje, zavezništvo, Slovenska vojska, Natova vojaška struktura, vojaška struktura EU.*

**Abstract** At the time the majority of citizens of Slovenia voted “yes” in the referendum on accession to the EU and NATO, the country also undertook to integrate the Slovenian Armed Forces<sup>1</sup> (SAF) into NATO and EU military structures. Slovenia began its formal cooperation with NATO as a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The military structure of the EU is younger and less developed than the military structure of NATO; Slovenia also participates in its development. The country advocates close cooperation between the EU and NATO in the military field, without unnecessary duplication of capabilities, which is why it has single pool of forces prepared for NATO and the EU. After the accession of the Republic of Slovenia to NATO, the

<sup>1</sup> SAF are not divided in services, there are Joint Forces with predominant Land Component.

SAF became part of the allied military forces and began the process of integration, which is to be completed in the first half of 2010. Along with integrating into NATO, SAF has also been integrating into the EU military structure. The integration of SAF into NATO and EU military structures signifies the capability of the SAF to operate in both structures, relating in particular to the operation of those forces and individuals that are specifically defined for these two structures. SAF has to be as integrated as possible to reduce potential casualties and increase the chances of success in operations.

**Key words** *Integration, accession, cooperation, Alliance, Slovenian Armed Forces, NATO military structure, EU military structure.*

**Introduction** One of the goals of the Slovenian emancipation process was the integration of Slovenia into Euro-Atlantic structures. The majority of citizens of Slovenia voted “yes” in the referendum on the accession of Slovenia to the EU and NATO.<sup>2</sup> The country thus also pledged to integrate the SAF into the military structure of both alliances. In this way, Slovenia has, for the long term, achieved its national interest regarding the provision of security and defence, mostly by cooperating within Euro-Atlantic structures at political and diplomatic levels, and, in case of necessity, also through the military capabilities of the alliances.<sup>3</sup>

The EU is a union of countries linking almost all areas of life. The Common European Security and Defence Policy is one of the newer policies through which countries have maintained much of their national independence. On the other hand, NATO is a political and security alliance, focused on the area of defence with well organised military structure.

Through accession into NATO and the EU, Slovenia became a full member of both organisations with the right to participate in decision-making processes and the use of common mechanisms; however, this was only the beginning of the integration process. In 2004, six other countries joined NATO besides Slovenia, while nine other countries joined the EU; Slovenia was therefore not alone in the integration of its armed forces. In NATO, this process was organised and is reflected in the establishment of representatives as well as in the integration of SAF members into NATO structures<sup>4</sup>, in the cooperation with other allies within different common organisations and in the integration of SAF units into the NATO Force Structure. By raising the quality of the SAF to the level of NATO standards and by successful participation in international operations and missions<sup>5</sup> under the authority of NATO and the EU,

<sup>2</sup> In the referendum in 2003, a good 66% of voters supported the accession of Slovenia to NATO, while almost 90% of voters supported accession to the EU. Source: Annual Report of the MoD for 2003, MoD, Birografika BORI, d. o. o., Ljubljana 2004.

<sup>3</sup> Resolution on the Starting Points for a National Security Plan, National Assembly of the Rep. of Slovenia, 1993.

<sup>4</sup> Sklep Vlade RS o popolnitvi formacijskih dolžnosti v mirnodobnih poveljstvih in enotah Nata z dne 01.04.2004.

<sup>5</sup> With “international operations and missions” we named all spectrum of operations and missions out of country and manly Crises Response Operations (CRO).

Slovenia has entered into the final phase of SAF integration into the NATO structure. Integration is to be completed in the first half of 2010.

The military structure of the EU is younger and less developed than the military structure of NATO; Slovenia also participates in its development. Slovenia thus has forces planned for the EU military structure, it has participated in the rotation of the European Union battle groups (EUBG) and, during the presidency, actively participated in launching the operation under the EU authority in Chad.<sup>6</sup>

Particularly important is Slovenia's view, shared by most countries which are both EU and NATO members, of close cooperation between both structures. This view has led to the fact that Slovenia has single pool of forces planned for NATO and the EU.

This article will attempt to present the most important elements of SAF integration into NATO and EU military structures, a process which formally began with Slovenia's accession to the above organisations. As Slovenia's accession would not have been possible without preliminary processes, the article will describe the most important ones. It must be emphasised that SAF integration into NATO and EU military structures would not have been possible without the majority support of Slovenian citizens expressed in the referendum, meaning that it is not only the SAF operating in both alliances but the entire country. The most evident part of the integration process is seen in SAF forces and individuals participating in international operations and missions as well as structures led by NATO and the EU.

## **1 NATO PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, PLANNING AND REVIEW PROCESS, NATO MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN, WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION**

In early 1994, NATO launched the PfP initiative.<sup>7</sup> The process of cooperation of the SAF in the Euro-Atlantic defence community started in mid-1994 when Slovenia presented the Presentation Document in which it formulated the rationale for joining the PfP.<sup>8</sup>

In 1995, the first Individual Partnership Programme was developed. In it and in the following ones, Slovenia was able to choose among activities offered in the Partnership Work Programme. Starting as a consumer, Slovenia gradually developed in the direction of a contributor – first as the host of a limited number of activities

<sup>6</sup> *The decision on launching the EU humanitarian operation in Chad was adopted during the Slovenian presidency. Slovenia supported this decision by deploying a Slovenian contingent to Chad.*

<sup>7</sup> *NATO, Official texts: Partnership for Peace Invitation Document, 10–11. 1. 1994.*

<sup>8</sup> *<http://nato.gov.si/slo/slovenija-nato/>*

and later also as a creator<sup>9</sup> of activities with content that had proved to be useful for a large number of other respective PfP and NATO countries.

The PfP is based on the principle of self-differentiation with respect to the level of cooperation of individual Partner countries with NATO. Those who preferred closer ties with the Alliance concerning the planning of forces available for operations opted for participation in the Planning and Review Process.<sup>10</sup> The internal planning process in the SAF, the aim of which was fulfilment of interoperability objectives and later partnership goals, paved the way to better understanding, learning and adoption of force planning as conducted in the Alliance. The SAF started to participate in the PfP exercise with individuals and then HQs at different levels. One of the highlights of this process was the CAE Exercise in 1998, during which the AMF-L Brigade was deployed in Slovenia.

At the Washington Summit in 1999, the Membership Action Plan was offered to aspirant countries in order to maintain momentum and streamline the efforts necessary to prepare for NATO membership.<sup>11</sup>

In parallel with efforts directed towards cooperation within the PfP framework, Slovenia became an associated partner of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1996. Although hardly comparable to the PfP with respect to intensity and diversity, activities linked to the WEU contributed to later integration of the Slovenian defence system into the Euro-Atlantic security and defence community.

## 2 ACCESSION AND INTEGRATION PROCESSES

Accession and integration are separate processes, both with regard to time and content. The main purpose of the accession process, which lasted from the signing of Slovenia's NATO Accession Protocol<sup>12</sup> on 26 March 2003 to the depositing of the Instrument of Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty on 29 March 2004, was fulfilment of all conditions for entry into the Alliance and for full NATO membership. Both in NATO and in Slovenia, special working groups were organised for this purpose. The MoD also contributed a core working group for Slovenia's accession to NATO, a special coordinating group of the SAF and individual points of contact within key commands and units. Their task was the preparation of documents intended for work and for the preparation of solutions. The documents included identification of key capabilities, fulfilment of conditions for inclusion in the inte-

<sup>9</sup> Most permanently, offers of the Slovenian Armed Forces came from its Mountain School and the PfP Language Training Centre. Source: Invitation to attend courses at the Slovenian PfP Language Training Centre, July 2007.

<sup>10</sup> NATO, *Official texts: Chairman's Summary of the Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Defence Ministers Session*, 3. 12. 1997.

<sup>11</sup> *Présidence de la République, Archives de la Présidence de M. Jacques Chirac 1995–2007: NAC-S(99)66 – 24 April 1999 Membership Action Plan (MAP)*.

<sup>12</sup> On 26 March 2006, Permanent Representatives of nineteen NATO members in Brussels signed Slovenia's NATO Accession Protocol. Source: <http://nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b030326g.pdf>

grated airspace security system, establishment of efficient communication and information connections, identification and validation of the infrastructure for support of the host country, and preparation for the takeover of national duties within the NATO command structure.<sup>13</sup>

Given that the activities in the accession process are politically driven and focused on the establishment of alliances for the provision of political, legal and military obligations arising from NATO membership, integration is the process which brings such alliances into effect. As early as in 1995, NATO identified its military requirements for candidate countries. The essence of these requirements is that the armed forces of the countries in question must be capable of contributing to the defence of the Alliance and be financially capable of implementing modernisation. We thus come to the core of the integration process, which is to define, build and maintain capabilities for cooperation in NATO operations.<sup>14</sup> The SAF has integrated into the allied force planning within the framework of defence planning, implemented the Alliance's doctrines and standards, integrated its members into NATO and EU peacetime military structures, established capabilities and a force structure in accordance with force objectives and capabilities development programmes, modified capabilities and improved the quality of the provision of interoperability with other armed forces, and continued its participation in international operations and missions as well as in joint investment projects.

The SAF began the process of defining these capabilities with Membership Action Plan, when it identified those forces which became the framework of force objectives. The Motorised Battalion, Battalion Battle Group, Movement Control Team, CIMIC experts, CBRN Defence Battalion, Transport Company, Military Police Company and Medical Unit ROLE 2 LM became key capabilities for the achievement of the desired standards and required interoperability level during the integration process.<sup>15</sup>

Control, or direction, of the integration activities for all newly invited countries which, with regard to the old NATO organisation, would fall under the South Wing, is implemented by NATO Joint Force Command Naples. Tasks for the preparation of forces were delegated to component commands in Izmir, Madrid and Naples.<sup>16</sup> Regarding the SAF force structure, the Slovenian centre of integration was between the Land Component Command in Madrid and the SAF Force Command in Vrhnika. These two commands established integration bodies which provided proper guidance and organised regular working meetings in which members reported on

<sup>13</sup> *The timeline for implementation of reforms in the area of defence and military includes 12 areas. This timeline was attached to the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, addressed to the Secretary General of NATO, which expresses the wish of the Republic of Slovenia to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty and confirms the country's readiness and capability to respect political and military obligations and commitments arising from the North Atlantic Treaty, the Study on NATO Enlargement and the NATO Strategic Concept. Source: <http://nato.gov.si/slo/slovenija-nato/postopki/pismo/>*

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.htm>

<sup>15</sup> *Slovenia and NATO, Joint website in support of the accession of Slovenia to NATO, (active 2001–2004): Membership Action Plan.*

<sup>16</sup> *Implementation plan of integration tasks of the SAF Force Command, April 2005.*

their progress and prepared annual plans of integration activities. Integration of each declared unit was conducted in two phases. The first phase included the preparation of a unit with the aim of achieving the required standards in the areas of operation, command and control, communication and information systems, preparedness, deployment capabilities, logistic support and sustainability of forces. NATO offered support in the form of workshops, visits by expert groups and organisation of various courses.<sup>17</sup> During the second phase, the prepared units had to pass a national combat readiness evaluation, so-called certification, after which the NATO control group for affirmation,<sup>18</sup> on the basis of unit checks and verification of the implementation of tasks, determined the level of interoperability and compliance with the prescribed NATO standards. Great emphasis was placed on knowledge of the English language as a condition for the attainment of interoperability.

### 3 INTEROPERABILITY

The overall objective of interoperability<sup>19</sup> is the ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks.<sup>20</sup> The success of operations largely depends on the smooth functioning of and cooperation between the combined-joint<sup>21</sup> HQ's and forces. Interoperability is the key enabler and as such a crucial force multiplier. The following objectives or capabilities must be attained: communication, implementation of joint tasks, support, practice and training. Interoperability is thus inseparable from the capability identified by common factors which direct development and interoperability requirements.<sup>22</sup>

The SAF encountered this for the first time when Slovenia joined the NATO PfP Programme. First of all, we need to be able to communicate with each other, so

<sup>17</sup> *Allied Command Operation Accession and Integration Plan*, 30 April 2003.

<sup>18</sup> *Affirmation is NATO's official confirmation that a unit has achieved NATO standards and is capable of conducting its mission. Successful affirmation holds as very important that national combat readiness evaluation procedures (the procedure of certification) be as similar as possible to the procedures defined by NATO for the evaluation of units and commands. In determining the combat readiness of SAF units we could claim that the criteria in the national document for combat readiness evaluation are identical to the NATO CREVAL procedure. There was thus no question of successful affirmation during the process of certification.*

<sup>19</sup> *The promulgation of NATO standards in the standardisation process ensures interoperability and affects the attainment of military capabilities. Appointed national representatives of the SAF actively cooperate on standardisation committees, working groups and NATO Standardisation Organisation panels and, by adopting NATO standards, ensure the interoperability of the SAF with the allied military structure.*

<sup>20</sup> *NATO Policy for Interoperability Annex I C-M(2005)0016. ("NATO Policy for Standardisation" C-M (2000) 54, dated 24 July 2000), <http://www.nato.int/docu/interoperability/interoperability.pdf>*

<sup>21</sup> *Combined-joint HQ in NATO means that it is composed of multinational and multiservice personnel.*

<sup>22</sup> *The NATO Policy for Interoperability suggests the following as the framework of interoperability: 1) mastering communication capabilities, including a) human relations (mutual understanding in terms of language, different military background knowledge, different cultures and terminology); b) adopted procedures important for joint operations; c) modern interoperable equipment, consultations, command, control, connections and information, all being important requirements for the operational speed of missions and implementation of tasks; 2) capability of operating in international operations and missions, which depends on common understanding, differences in doctrines, tactics and procedures of Joint Multinational Forces, Combat Support Forces and Logistic Support Forces; 3) support capability as a permanent advantage in procedures and standardised equipment; 4) practice, training and exercises prior to the implementation of operations.*



English language proficiency<sup>23</sup> was and still is one of the most important elements of interoperability. Second, the forces need to synchronise their goals, and in so doing they need to know what they are talking about. Thus concepts, procedures and doctrines become more important. This is where training and education become crucial before the DO IT part, i.e. participation in the execution of operations. We can call this the interoperability objective of the ability to communicate. There are several requirement areas influencing each other: human relations, cultural relations, military background, NATO terminology, and procedures and equipment for communication. The skeleton of common work is the accepted procedures and, of course, modern equipment.

The ability to operate is the interoperability objective which depends on common understanding of the nature, capabilities, strength and limits of the capabilities involved in joint and multinational operations. These are similarities and differences in doctrines, tactics and procedures in operations. With this, countries have the ability to operate with each other in an effective and efficient manner. The ability to support each other puts a premium on procedures, equipment and standardisation.

The interoperability of systems and equipment largely determines the degree of flexibility inherent in the use of forces. Essentially it rests on standardisation in order to comply with the interchangeability, commonality or compatibility criteria of their life cycle.

The main elements of interoperability are: language, doctrine, operational concepts and planning procedures, procedures for making decisions, implementation of systems, and command, control and communications. Today these are defined by the NATO Policy for Interoperability, which is basically part of our everyday activity.

We should now describe in more detail the four steps of interoperability in the Alliance.<sup>24</sup>

Interoperability is the ability of the Alliance Forces and, when appropriate, forces of Partner and other countries, to train, exercise and operate together effectively in the execution of assigned missions and tasks. Interoperability should be achieved before a country starts participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions which are not considered complex and where the threat level is low. But even then, countries have to operate in line with the same doctrine, concepts, language and terminology, around the same principles of command, communications and computers and decision making and planning procedures, and knowing the formatting of documents. Participation in different PfP exercises, up to operations such as ALBA, SFOR, KFOR, NTM-I and OAE, is only one of the examples of increasing the interoperability level of the SAF.

<sup>23</sup> NATO STANAG 6001 *Language Proficiency Test*, 2009; <http://www.dlielc.org/bilc>

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/interoperability/interoperability.pdf>

Interchangeability is the ability of one product, process or service to be used in place of another in order to fulfill the same requirement. This is needed for execution of more complex operations such as peacekeeping or Article 5 operations where in addition to the requirements from level 1 others also need to be added. These are in the fields of logistics, maintenance, engineering, medical, manning, CIMIC, air mobility, food, rescue, life saving on land, air and sea, and of course a compatible level of combat skills. The NRF/CJTF exercises and ISAF are part of the operational theatres where the SAF needs such a level.

Compatibility level in addition to the requirements from the two previous levels deals with the fields of weapons, ammunition, C3 systems, integrated logistics, materiel, tactics, all levels of skill, dedicated transport, etc. The Force Goals of the Alliance are taken into account together with the STANAGs developed and driving our acquisition process and force capability requirements, and the suitability of processes, products or services for use together under specific conditions.<sup>25</sup>

Last is commonality. This applies when the same doctrine procedures or equipment are used.

## **4 FORCE PLANNING AND REORGANISATION OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES**

NATO Force Planning is conducted within the Defence Planning Process (DPP).<sup>26</sup> The EU uses the Capability Development Programme (CDP)<sup>27</sup>, which is comparable to the above-mentioned process. The SAF harmonises its force planning with both the DPP and CDP, and thus establishes the basis for reorganisation.

### **4.1 Force Goals as a driving factor in the reorganisation of the Slovenian Armed Forces**

As previously mentioned, the key forces declared by the SAF to participate in NATO operations were defined before Slovenia's accession to the Alliance. The requirements of the NATO Defence Requirements Review (DRR) from 2003 and the accepted levels of ambition have thus become guidelines for the first Force Goal proposal.

The Strategic Defence Review of 2004 states that the SAF, in cooperation with the allies, will develop the required capabilities for effective accomplishment of an entire range of military tasks in the air, on land, and on and below the sea. The forces that Slovenia is developing should be intended for collective and national defence. It is very likely that future NATO operations, including the operations of collective defence, will be conducted far from Slovenia's territory. All these facts, new

<sup>25</sup> NATO Policy for Standardisation C-M (2000) 54, dated 24 July 2000.

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.nato.int/issues/dpp/index.html>

<sup>27</sup> Council of the European Union: Military capabilities.



security challenges and ambitions influenced the identification of key military principles and the development of SAF capabilities and thus the operational capabilities of the declared units.<sup>28</sup>

Force Goals identified with NATO during 2004 and 2006 and capabilities such as deployment, mobility, sustainability, timely availability of forces, survival and protection, combat efficiency, an effective command, control and communications system, effective intelligence, interoperability and compatibility, described in NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative launched at the Washington Summit meeting in 1999 and the Strategic Defence Review of 2004, have become the backbone of the Slovenian Armed Forces, oriented to the implementation of tasks together with the Allied Forces. Last year, the SAF complemented the Force Goals with combat support forces, such as an explosive ordnance disposal platoon, technical divers, a bridge company and a water purification unit.

Attainment of the final operational capabilities of units, identified in the Force Goals, will also present a great challenge in the next five-year period. The SAF will be faced with equipment and procedures with which it has had little experience. It will introduce new standards and prepare new instructions and procedures. Through the process of achieving the Force Goals and participating in international operations and other activities, the characteristics and nature of the military will gradually change and bring about adaptation and reorganisation of the entire SAF.

## 4.2 EU Headline Goal 2010

The Headline Goal 2010 represents the level of ambition of the EU with respect to conducting autonomous military operations.<sup>29</sup> It was built upon the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003.<sup>30</sup> There the target was established to set up a military force 50,000 to 60,000 personnel strong, able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year, with necessary command, control and other capabilities in order to be able to accomplish the Petersberg Tasks.<sup>31</sup>

While not yet a Member State and thus not participating in setting both Headline Goals, Slovenia declared its contributions to both. After accession to the EU, the SAF participated in the development of Headline Goal 2010 force planning procedures, in particular the Scrutinising – Assessment – Evaluation process and in the production of Requirements, Force and Progress Catalogues. The Long-Term Vision study from 2006 gave a perspective up to the horizon of 2025, drawing a future capability profile and underlining the challenges that lie in front of defence planners. The

<sup>28</sup> *Strategic Defence Review 2002/2003 with a vision of development by 2015, MO RS document, No. 802-00-15/2003-19, dated 12 March 2004.*

<sup>29</sup> *Compared with NATO, the EU conducts out-of-area operations and not those of collective defence.*

<sup>30</sup> *Endorsed by the European Council in 1999 in Helsinki, Finland.*

<sup>31</sup> *Endorsed by the Council of the Western European Union in 1992 at the Petersberg Hotel, Germany. In 1997, they were incorporated in the Treaty on European Union. EU crisis management tasks (Petersberg Tasks) are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.*

Capability Development Programme (CDP) emerged in 2008, incorporating both the Headline Goal and Long-Term Vision, along with two additional constitutive strands that depict current defence plans and programmes as well as lessons from current experience.

Although the CDP represents a broader framework for defence planning in the EU, including capability development priorities, the Headline Goal 2010 has remained the reference to which Member States declare their forces available for ESDP operations. Slovenia submitted its response on declared contributions according to diverse options at its disposal: in 2004 through the national response to the NATO Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) that had specific EU questions inserted, in 2006 via the national response to the Headline Goal Questionnaire (HGQ) and in 2009 again via the national response to the DPQ.

#### **4.3 Reorganisation and transformation of the Slovenian Armed Forces in line with NATO and EU expectations and goals**

It is not easy for any country, small or large, to manage the myriad capabilities required to support transformation and modernisation efforts, national priorities and NATO, EU or other commitments. For smaller countries, finding the resources and developing the full spectrum of capabilities needed for Crisis Response Operations (CRO) is indeed challenging. Before joining NATO and the EU, Slovenia was determined to have everything that larger countries have, for what today we believe were wrong considerations. We can say that we have learned to be realistic and that the time for transformation has arrived. The transformation process of the SAF is composed of professionalisation, integration, modernisation and reorganisation. Generally speaking, the SAF has applied several steps towards full integration into the NATO structure: integration into the decision-making system through a presence in the NARO HQ and NCS, implementation of NATO standards in the SAF, national certification and NATO affirmation activities, affiliation activities of SAF units to the NATO Force Structure (NFS), and a contribution to and participation in Alliance operations.

After 5 years of membership in NATO, the SAF is close to finishing the formal part of the integration. The next part leads towards increasing efficiency and affiliation of declared capabilities within the NFS. Short- and mid-term goals for affiliation-declared capabilities to the NFS are, first of all, an increased ability to operate together, which leads to military capabilities which can be used for collective defence. The following table shows the main characteristics of the old and new defence patterns. These are at the same time the characteristics of military transformation.

**Table 1:**  
Transformation  
of the defence  
paradigm

Old defence pattern	New defence pattern
From static defence, garrison forces	to mobile, expeditionary forces
From large institutional forces	to more powerful operational capabilities
From major conventional combat operations	to multiple irregular or asymmetric operations
From separate military service concepts of operation	to joint and combined operations
From an emphasis on ships, guns, tanks and planes	to the focus on information, knowledge and real-time intelligence
From threat-based planning	to capabilities-based planning

“The new defence pattern sets different demands on building military capabilities. Forces are to be more capable and efficiency-oriented, able to execute expeditionary operations as joint and combined forces. These forces focus on information, knowledge and real-time intelligence.”<sup>32</sup>

Through unit affiliation, which is considered to be a peacetime relationship supporting training and exercise activities, smaller countries gain an opportunity to develop invaluable training and experience, and can then confidently deploy with affiliated units, since affiliated units should train and fight together.

In the field of declared forces, NATO and the EU established the principle of a “single set of forces”<sup>33</sup> for both organisations in order to reduce the burden of duplication of military capabilities. In respect of NATO and EU reaction forces, the SAF has used the NRF and the EUBG as a strong tool to build national military capabilities. The NRF/EUBG standards and lessons learned have been transferred into national practice. The Slovenian contribution has been constantly increasing since 2005, starting with a platoon and increasing to a company, and from 2011 it is planned to contribute a battalion-sized unit (CBRN framework battalion).

We can conclude that for the Slovenian Armed Forces, Crisis Response Operations and capability-building for Rapid Response Forces are the main driving factors for military transformation and integration.

<sup>32</sup> A. Šteiner; *Slovenian Experiences and Challenges in Military Capabilities Development*, EUMC Away Day Seminar, Šmarješke Toplice, Slovenia, 19 May 2008.

<sup>33</sup> *A set of forces declared for NATO and the EU, excluding NATO and EU (BG) Rapid Reaction Forces.*

## 5 THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AS PART OF NATO AND EU MILITARY STRUCTURES

### 5.1 NATO military structure<sup>34</sup>

NATO is a political and security alliance with a strong military component, having a diverse and complex structure, organised at several levels. As NATO is an alliance of countries, the most important part of its organisation lies at the inter-governmental political level at which final decisions are adopted. To realise these decisions, the countries provide capabilities and resources on the basis of free, proportional and reasonable burden-sharing. Forces and capabilities, contributed by member states, are under the limited control of NATO and at the same time remain in the national chain of command and control at all levels. Support to this organisation in the adoption and implementation of decisions is offered by the common organisational structure. This structure may be divided into political (civilian) and military as well as into agencies and organisations.<sup>35</sup> In terms of organisation, the systemised common organisational structure of NATO is composed of several types and divided into:

- NATO Headquarters (NATO HQ) with agencies and other organisational units in Brussels,
- NATO Command Structure (NCS),
- NATO organisational units formed and operating in accordance with multinational agreements (MOU organisations<sup>36</sup>),
- NATO Force Structure (NFS),
- NATO Response Forces (NRF), and
- NATO forces in international operations and missions.

The main decision-making institution at the political level in NATO is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), while the Military Committee is the most important military body. Committees and other working bodies consisting of representatives of member states are subordinate to the NAC.

The NATO Command Structure consists of two large military commands: Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). ACO and ACT, closely supported by the NATO Communications and Information Systems Agency, present the mechanism of the Alliance for the command of military forces available in NATO.

NATO, except for the AWACS and signal units, has no common independent military forces. As the Alliance is composed of countries, one could even say that all the armed forces of member states constitute a common NATO army. NATO-led forces participating in international operations and missions constitute the most important part. Upon deployment of forces to international operations and missions, allies

<sup>34</sup> Humar, David, *Common organizational structure of NATO alliance*, Bilten SV 11/2, Ljubljana 2009

<sup>35</sup> The general basic structure of NATO is shown at [www.nato.int/structur/structure.htm](http://www.nato.int/structur/structure.htm)

<sup>36</sup> MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) organisations are organisational units established by all or some allies in accordance with international agreements.

transfer part of their command authority to the SACEUR,<sup>37</sup> who, through the chain of command and control, further transfers this authority to subordinate commanders. The national chain of command in international operations and missions is provided by the senior national representatives. Most of the forces, including NRF, come from the NFS, which consists of multinational and national forces.

## 5.2 EU military structure

Unlike NATO, the EU has no permanent command structure, but on the other hand, in order to provide political control and strategic direction in a crisis, the European Council<sup>38</sup> has decided to establish permanent political and military structures within the Council of the EU. These new structures are: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The EUMC is part of the overall structure of committees and working bodies of the Council of the EU. The EUMC is the highest military body set up within the Council and provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. The Committee is supported by a military working group (EUMCWG) that deals with topics from the EUMC agenda at working level. The main operational functions of the EUMS comprise early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. It supports the EUMC regarding situation assessment and military aspects of strategic planning over the full range of EU-led military operations. Although the EUMS<sup>39</sup> assists the EUMC, it is a department of the Council General Secretariat and is directly attached to the High Representative. Its staff participates in the Joint Situation Centre.

For ESDP military operations, the EU has an additional military structure available. Berlin Plus arrangements provide for recourse to NATO capabilities and common assets such as SHAPE.<sup>40</sup> For autonomous ESDP military operations, several Member States have made available operational and force HQ's. In addition, since 2007, the EU has had its own capability for commanding operations of limited size, the EU Operations Centre. Operation and force HQ's consist of nucleus staff manned by personnel from contributing Member States.<sup>41</sup>

It should be mentioned that neither the EUMS nor the EUMC are part of the C2 structure. However, the Operation Commander's primary Point of Contact with regard to all questions related to an operation is the Chairman EUMC. The C2 structure at different levels must be decided by the PSC on an ad hoc basis.

<sup>37</sup> *Supreme Allied Commander Europe who leads ACO.*

<sup>38</sup> *In Nice, December 2000. Council of the European Union: ESDP structures and instruments, 20 May 2009.*

<sup>39</sup> *The EUMS, with around 150 persons, forms part of the Council Secretariat, with 2700 persons working there. This means that only 0.5% of the staff in the EU organisation are military.*

<sup>40</sup> *Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, situated in Mons, Belgium it is Supreme HQ of ACO.*

<sup>41</sup> *Apart from SHAPE (Berlin +) and the EU OPS Centre, five nations provide OHQ for EU needs, in rotation with delegated BGs: France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom. In the case of the operation in Congo, Germany provided OHQ in Potsdam, and for the operation in Chad, France provided OHQ in Paris.*

The Operation Commander is appointed by the Council and usually supported by a non-deployed Operation HQ. The Force Commander, with his Force HQ, will be deployed in a theatre. And finally, the required number of component commands with subordinate units, of course also deployed in the area of operations. Evidently, this chain of command will always be tailored to the specific operation.

### 5.3 Integration of the Slovenian Armed Forces into NATO and EU military structures through participation in Crisis Response Operations

As previously stated, the SAF's CROs are one of the main driving factors of military transformation. Initial representatives of Slovenian cooperation in CROs in 1997/98 were members of the 10<sup>th</sup> Battalion for International Cooperation, the 15<sup>th</sup> Aviation Brigade and the 17<sup>th</sup> Military Police Battalion. However, members of other units also participated. Units are gaining valuable experience related to the required training and equipment for operations in different climates, and insight that will inform national training plans and affect future procurement decisions. The SAF started with deployments to CROs in 1997. Up to this day, the SAF has participated in 18 operations and concluded 12.<sup>42</sup> In 2007, for example, Slovenia deployed a battalion to KFOR for the first time. We can affirm that the achievement of an FOC for that unit would essentially be harder without operational deployment. From among 4587<sup>43</sup> people, many have been deployed more than once.

The basic principle of participation was to start with staff positions and smaller units, gain experience, and then increase the importance and number of positions and units on the ground. Individuals were sent to different positions to support common goals and gain experience as a part of their professional growth. At the beginning, individual volunteers were sent, and later, units composed of volunteers; today CROs have become a normal activity of organic units.

Providing forces and other elements for CROs gives the best results for improving both national capabilities and contributing to NATO and EU operations, but there are advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, this provides an immediate impact. As a result of contributions to deployed operations, a large number of troops have received important operational experience, thereby enhancing the mission effectiveness of these forces and profiting from lessons learned. This ensures efficient pre-deployment training of rotating units and enhances the overall level of training within the national forces. A very important fact in CRO participation is the broad possibility for networking among people, which makes all further communications and exchanges of information easier. On the other hand, the SAF has made sure

<sup>42</sup> NATO: Albania – Allied Harbour (1999), BiH – Joint guardian/Joint Force (1997-2004), Iraq – NTM-I (2006–2008), Pakistan – NATO Support to Pakistan (2005), Afghanistan – ISAF (2003- ).

<sup>EU</sup>: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – Concordia (2003), BiH Althea – EUFOR (2005- ), Congo – EUFOR (2006), Sudan – AMIS II (Darfur) (2006–2007), Tchad (2008), EU NAVFOR ATALANTA (2009- )

<sup>UN</sup>: Cyprus – UNFICYP (1997–2001), Kosovo – MACC/UNMIK (1999–2001), BiH – OHR (2001–2004)

<sup>OSCE</sup>: Albania – ALBA (1997), UNTSO.

<sup>43</sup> Data from May 2009.



not to overcommit its forces exclusively to operations, also focusing on mid- and long-term capability development. A high operational tempo may, over time, have an effect on equipment readiness and modernisation timelines in a limited-resource environment.

Smaller countries can have immediate and lasting impact in contributing to operations by establishing one or more specific capabilities which are missing from the pool of forces and capabilities identified in the Defence Review. The SAF has been attempting to make a qualitative contribution as a necessary special or niche capability (helicopters, MP, Role 1). However, for smaller countries it is also imperative to have a combat presence on the ground to demonstrate their capability and the will of sharing risks. Thus the SAF has deployed the SF and motorised platoon to ISAF, and Motorised Infantry Battalion to KFOR.

A multinational approach to Combat Service Support has been essential, since the national capabilities required to provide full logistic support are limited. We have to be aware that there are also limits to what countries can do with multinational affiliations and mutually supportive arrangements.

The 10<sup>th</sup> Motorised Battalion (10. MOTB) is the main pillar and contributor of the SAF to international operations and missions. The history of the 10. MOTB extends back to 1996, when the 10<sup>th</sup> Battalion for International Military Cooperation was first formed. One year later, ten battalion members, including a medical unit, left for the first international operation and mission in Albania.<sup>44</sup> This took place almost simultaneously with the National Assembly adopting the decision that Slovenia's main security interest lay in the collective defence provided by NATO. Through the participation in first CRO, Slovenia symbolically, yet clearly, indicated its willingness to play a more distinctive role in the system of collective security.

SAF cooperation in international operations and missions after Operation ALBA continued with a section of the 10<sup>th</sup> Battalion participating in the UN mission in Cyprus. Eight platoon shifts operated in Cyprus until September 2001. In the same year the SAF began participating in the NATO-led SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a Bell-412 helicopter and a Turbolet aircraft. Members of the Military Police joined the operation in 1998. A motorised company of the 10. MOTB<sup>45</sup> began participating in the operation in January 2003. The company was part of the international battle group in Doboj, composed of Polish, Portuguese and Slovenian members. Members of the 10. MOTB later also participated in NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. The year 2007 can be said to be a turning point for the SAF as regards their participation in international operations and missions. This was the first time that Slovenia deployed a battalion-size unit to KFOR which also included units of the allied armed forces. Eleven years after its establishment, the 10. MOTB

<sup>44</sup> The operation was named ALBA and was conducted under the auspices of the OSCE with a UN mandate from 14 May to 27 July 1997.

<sup>45</sup> The Battalion for International Military Cooperation changed its name to the 10. MOTB in 2001.

successfully passed national certification and NATO affirmation, and participated in an international operation. The Battalion returned to Kosovo this year.

Already at the time of its formation, the battalion was in a way assigned a developmental role, being the holder of the process of interoperability with NATO at the tactical level and playing an important role in the professionalisation of the SAF.<sup>46</sup> The knowledge and experience gained in international exercises as well as international operations and missions were not only passed on to the 10<sup>th</sup> Battalion members but became the driving force for the development and transformation of the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade.

#### 5.4 Incorporation and integration into the peacetime establishment structure

After joining the PfP, Slovenia sent liaison officers to NATO HQ in Brussels and the Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons,<sup>47</sup> in September and November 1995, respectively. In 1998, the officers continued on to Brussels and Naples according to the decision on the establishment of Partner Staff Elements.<sup>48</sup> This constituted the start of filling both national posts in military liaison teams and international assignments dedicated to military personnel from Partner Countries. Both components were successively augmented in the years to come. Since 1995, more than 130 SAF members have gained experience in working within NATO and the EU.

Becoming a member state of the Alliance led to some new obligations of active participation in the NATO Command Structure (NCS). According to the agreements, Slovenia was obliged to fulfil different peacetime establishment positions in different NATO HQs.<sup>49</sup> Each position has its own job description describing the requirements to be met by the selected personnel to fulfil the position. Some of them also incorporate crisis establishment duty requirements. Language requirements are already known from the PfP, but now, doctrine, processes and procedures have to be upgraded to the highest level of interoperability, at the skill level of individuals. The process of preparing people already started in the PfP phase with our individual participation in exercises and in Command and War Colleges in Alliance nations. NATO Schools and the NDC, together with the Garmisch Centre, also play a valuable role.

The NCS, with HQs at tactical, operational and strategic levels and crisis establishment operational-level HQs (CJTF) give Slovenian soldiers experience in structures which the SAF does not possess. The individual is an active piece of the puzzle, shaping and contributing to the challenges of today's situations as well as preparing

<sup>46</sup> Special issue of the magazine *Slovenska vojska – Bulletin of the 10<sup>th</sup> Battalion*, published on the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the battalion, 27 May 2006, p. 9.

<sup>47</sup> According to the provisions of the Partnership for Peace Invitation and Framework Documents.

<sup>48</sup> The establishment of the PSEs was considered at the Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Defence Ministers Session in December 1997 among other recommendations from the Comprehensive Progress Report on the Implementation of the EAPC Basic Document and the PfP Enhancement.

<sup>49</sup> Sklep Vlade RS o popolnitvi formacijskih dolžnosti v mirnodobnih poveljstvih in enotah Nata (št. 802-02/2002-16 z dne 01.04.2004) in dopolnitev z dne 22.04.2004.

for future ones while doing their jobs. This is a unique opportunity to learn and practice all joint functions and processes in preparing, planning and conducting the operational level of war (operations) activities. Therefore, these personnel need to bring back their experiences to the SAF, further enhancing the interoperability level. How can the SAF best prepare future rotations of personnel? Using the same processes, procedures and doctrine, C2 arrangements and decision-making processes will give the personnel the best preparation for those positions.

## 5.5 Affiliation of units to the NATO Force Structure

By affiliation of units to the NFS, the units pass from the common NATO pool of forces, composed of forces of all the Allies, to the pool of those forces which methodically train together and unite in peace, thus reaching a higher level of interoperability. The units are still under the national command but train within the NFS at the unit level. The SAF, mostly composed of land forces, has set itself the goal of affiliating into two corps of the NFS. At the moment, the 10<sup>th</sup> Motorised Battalion is in the process of affiliation to NRDC-ITA and the 18<sup>th</sup> CBRN Defence Battalion to MNC N/E.

The 10. MOTB was the second SAF unit, after the transport company, to pass the national combat readiness evaluation with certification and later affirmation. Earlier, the battalion completed the training phase based on the operational cycle, which lasted a year and a half. The combat readiness evaluation took place during the exercise Hawk Strike, which lasted from 23 October to 17 November 2006 and was conducted at the Hungarian training ground at Varpalota. The first international assessment of an SAF unit took place at the same training-ground in May 2003 when the 20<sup>th</sup> Motorised Battalion was assessed within the MLF exercise.<sup>50</sup>

The national combat readiness evaluation signified the last phase of attaining final operational capabilities for the 10. MOTB. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the national directive based on the model of NATO's Combat Readiness Evaluation (CREVAL) methodology and performed by a group of assessors from the SAF. After this certification, a group of NATO officers from Madrid conducted the affirmation. The group found minor deviations in the battalion, linked to interoperability, which, however, did not prevent the unit's inclusion in the NATO pool of forces.

The 18<sup>th</sup> CBRN Defence Battalion attained final operational capabilities this year, on the basis of which it will be capable of conducting nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological surveillance, reconnaissance, decontamination, sampling and laboratory analysis. The building of battalion capabilities proceeded gradually. Participation in the NRF forces, through which the unit gained important experience, played an important role in this process. The battalion began participating in the NRF in 2005 when it contributed a decontamination platoon to NRF-4,<sup>51</sup> led by Germany. This

<sup>50</sup> *The Multinational Land Force (MLF) prepared and assessed the unit in the context of preparations for KFOR during the exercise Clever Ferret 2003.*

<sup>51</sup> *CBRN Def Bn: Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Defence Battalion.*

was an important milestone for the battalion, as its members began facing challenges which they had been unfamiliar with. The battalion has thus begun introducing NATO standards, testing new equipment, practicing deployment outside Slovenia, training in a real environment with real casualty agents and becoming familiar with similar units of other NATO members. All these experiences were upgraded in the six NRF rotations with units from the level of platoon to the level of company. One of the important experiences was also leadership of a unit from a different member state and familiarisation with the capabilities of the entire international CBRN battalion. Participation in the NRF was most valuable in terms of the exchange of experience among the armed forces of different countries, confirmation of comparability of knowledge and competence at the international level, confirmation of compatibility of resources and equipment, as well as in terms of following-up the progress made in the area of experience and equipment of CBRN units. These experiences will be very valuable during the leadership of the international CBRN element in the NRF in 2011.

## 5.6 NATINADS and air policing

The NATO Integrated Air Defence System is essential for maintaining a visible deterrent posture and the integrity of the Alliance airspace. Air policing is a peacetime task that is performed by the Alliance in an integrated way. The system includes the Air Surveillance and Control System, Air C2 System and Air Defence Capability, including fighters (interceptors) to execute the task of protecting the integrity of the Alliance airspace. The system will also include Theatre Missile Defence.

This is a peacetime operation executed by the SACEUR over the Alliance territory. NATO's provision of air policing is particularly important for Slovenia, which lacks its own interceptors. This operation is executed on behalf of Slovenia and thus increases its security and the security of Slovenia's air space. Slovenia is part of this with its ASOC,<sup>52</sup> which is integrated into the NATO Integrated Air Defence System. For small countries with limited assets, this is a real force multiplier that helps Slovenia achieve and maintain the desired degree of control of the air through which the country also contributes to the protection and freedom of the manoeuvre of the Alliance in addressing the full spectrum of operations.

## 5.7 EU pool of forces and EU Battle Groups

The EU pool of forces comprises national contributions to the Force Catalogue. They come from EU Member States, mostly as national units, some as multinational. In addition, NATO countries in Europe that are not members of the EU may also declare their contributions. With the exception of multinational formations, such contributions are national stand-alone units and not included in the pre-arranged, structured and trained multinational deployable formations. Only the EU Battle Groups (EUBG) are structured and trained in advance, according to the EU semestrial roster.

<sup>52</sup> ASOC (Air Sovereignty Operations Center) which supports the NATO Integrated Air Picture will in future become an Control and Report Post.

Slovenia declared contributions to the EU pool of forces as a candidate country.<sup>53</sup> In committing its forces, Slovenia has followed the principle of a single set of forces.

A root of the EU Rapid Response lies in the Helsinki Headline Goal, dated December 1999 at the Helsinki Summit. The Member States set themselves the Headline Goal: “by the year 2003<sup>54</sup> cooperating together voluntarily, nations will be able to deploy and sustain forces capable of the full range of ‘Petersberg Tasks’.” The Headline Goal 2010 expresses the requirements of the ESS, giving priority to the interoperability of European forces and to the capability for rapid deployment. The importance of Rapid Response Capabilities can also be seen from the EU illustrative scenarios from the Requirement Catalogue 05.<sup>55</sup> Rapid response is based on Rapid Response Elements – EUBG, combined and joint, tailored to a specific task and at very high readiness (available and deployable on short notice), either as part of an overall force or to conduct an urgent operation on a smaller scale and self-contained.

The EU permanently has 2 BG on 5–30 days readiness in a 6-month rotation. Slovenia has contributed a contingent to the EUBG composed of approximately 200 people.<sup>56</sup> Slovenia’s contribution was based on a pre-established MLF brigade, a trilateral brigade among Italy, Hungary and Slovenia. The BG was delegated for a stand-by period in the second semester of 2007 and is also delegated for the second semester of 2012. Before being delegated as an EU BG, the MLF had passed several evaluations and participated in two operations in Kosovo in 2003/2004 and 2005/2006. The MLF passed the hard way, from an initiative the intention of which was regional co-operation and which developed over many years.<sup>57</sup>

After the conclusion of the stand-by period, Slovenia gained experiences which were positive, but also negative. The first and very positive experience was the MLF background. It was easy to work and pass all necessary steps within the unit, which had been operating together and which had passed several trainings, evaluations and missions. Additionally, a combined structure requires a strong liaison system, which was well established in the MLF.

The country also collected some challenges for the future, such as lack of strategic transport capabilities, related to very high costs for strategic lifts. All three nations

<sup>53</sup> *Supplement to Helsinki Force Catalogue 04. After becoming an EU Member State, contributions were made to Force Catalogue 06, Force Catalogue(s) 07 and Force Catalogue 09.*

<sup>54</sup> *By 2003, EU nations are supposed to provide up to 50–60,000 troops (additional air and naval elements), deployable within 60 days (+ high readiness elements), sustainable for at least 1 year (C2I, logistics, combat support), and to establish new permanent political and military structures (PSC, EUMC, EUMS, HTF).*

<sup>55</sup> *Four out of five existing illustrative scenarios require Rapid Response Forces. Under each scenario the Petersberg missions are included. These scenarios are: Separation of Parties by Force, Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military Advice to Third Countries, Conflict Prevention, Evacuation Operations, and Assistance to Humanitarian Operations. Only in Stabilisation are reconstruction and military assistance to third countries not required.*

<sup>56</sup> *HQ elements 20, LOG Elements 40, Motorised COY125, MP element 3, NSE 12.*

<sup>57</sup> *A. Šteiner, Slovenian Experiences and Challenges in Military Capabilities Development, EUMC Away Day Seminar, Šmarješke Toplice, Slovenia, May 19, 2008.*

also have obligations in other organisations conducting operations around the world. Preparations for the BG lasted a year and a half, which meant 2600 persons not available for other deployments. On the other hand, the units were ready to go: but among troops there is certain disappointment after a stand-by period of not being deployed.

For the SAF, the MLF<sup>58</sup> was a useful transformational tool to elevate a unit from regional cooperation to a unit with importance at the global level in several meanings: on the one hand, the MLF proved that rapid reaction forces could also be created at the tactical level, such as EU BG; the MLF enabled the integration of the SAF in the NFS and NRDC-IT; through the MLF, the SAF took over a battle group in KFOR.

## 5.8 Single pool (set) of forces for NATO and the EU

Detailed medium- and long-term planning will assist nations in maximising the use of limited resources and in prioritising the equipping, training and modernisation of their forces and their ability to provide the required capabilities to national, multinational, EU and NATO operations. Most of the countries which are members of both organisations possess limited military resources. Therefore, they try to participate in joint projects and programmes provided by both NATO and the EU, often with the same goal in mind. The principle of a single set of forces can be applied first of all within national declared forces to NATO and the EU defined in the DPQ and HGQ. As a small country with limited resources, Slovenia is especially interested in a better and more efficient partnership, which means the least possible duplication of forces. Competition between organisations should be minimised. In this sense Slovenia supports the principle of a single set of forces in coordination with NATO and EU forces, as well as all activities which support reductions of duplication.

The NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP reiterated the following political principles of strategic partnership: effective mutual consultation; equality for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and NATO; respect for the interests of the EU and NATO Member States; respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of military capability requirements in common.<sup>59</sup>

Besides declared and reaction forces, NATO-EU cooperation is very active in CROs. The basis for a strategic partnership in EU-NATO crisis management is constituted in the “Berlin +” arrangements,<sup>60</sup> which have built a genuine strategic partnership that is now well established and deep-rooted. These arrangements cover three main elements that are directly connected to operations and can be combined as: EU

<sup>58</sup> Croatia and Austria have had observer status since 2002.

<sup>59</sup> NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP, 16 December 2002.

<sup>60</sup> Initiated on 3 June 1996 at the Berlin NATO Council.



access to NATO planning, NATO European command options and the use of NATO assets and capabilities.<sup>61</sup>

Although the EU and NATO staffs exchange information on ongoing activities and efforts on priority issues of mutual interest in the area of military capability development, and in particular on overlapping identified shortfalls, we can assert that this cooperation could be much stronger and better. On the other hand, we can firmly say that although there is room for improvement, at the working level, especially in operations, cooperation between both organisations is good.

**Conclusion** The integration of the SAF into NATO and EU military structures signifies the capability of the SAF to operate in alliances. As the SAF operates in international operations and missions as well as in war operations in alliances, Slovenia has to be as integrated as possible to reduce potential casualties and increase the chances of success. The results of integration are visible in collective operations; transformation, through participation in international operations and missions, has thus been particularly useful in the process of integration.

The SAF is about to complete its formal integration into the NATO military structure. This does not mean, however, that integration will be finished. The levels of integration and interoperability will continue to increase, in part due to the fact that the Alliance is accepting new members<sup>62</sup>, but also because the allied armed forces are changing and growing in quality. Integration and interoperability will therefore be integral parts of the further development of the SAF. The SAF has the most recent experience in the integration process; it is therefore appropriate to share this experience and in this way help new members.

We have to be aware of the fact that the fundamental part of integration has been completed by SAF individuals and the certified units. These units will now continue conducting combined-joint exercises and operations within the NATO Force Structure. The task of the SAF is to expand this knowledge and experience to include the entire armed forces, all units and members.

In many areas, the conclusion of formal processes signifies that the SAF has attained only the minimum required quality. It should not, of course, be satisfied with this but aim for higher quality. It would be ideal if the entire SAF attained final operational capabilities. In order to achieve this goal, the SAF has to continue modernising and transforming into a modern deployable army which will include not only paid members but also professionals of active and reserve components who will be able to work with Alliance members on an equal rights basis and, if necessary, establish a strategic reserve for national purposes.

<sup>61</sup> Additionally, the DSACEUR (NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) has the role of an EU Operation Commander.

<sup>62</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49212.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm)

NATO and EU member states must be aware of their national interests and capabilities. Each country accepts the obligations deriving from the alliance individually, yet on the basis of harmonisation. In taking joint decisions, the countries have to make sure that the requirements are acceptable and attainable. The alliances offer quality development criteria and the possibility of cooperation and comparison to others. Slovenia's contribution to the alliances depends on its capabilities; however, the country has to be aware of the principles of solidarity and burden-sharing, which represent the basis of the alliances. The goal of the SAF, with 50 percent deployable and 10 percent sustainable land forces, along with a defence budget ratio of 50:30:20 for personnel, operations and procurement, allows for the army's readiness and appropriate quality with regard to national requirements as well as those of NATO and the EU. The SAF, as the national armed forces of the Republic of Slovenia, a NATO and EU member, strives to meet Slovenia's goals in these two organisations but also the common goals of NATO and the EU.

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