Jelka Pirkovič

Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana

Does archaeology deliver evidence about the past or co-create contemporary values?

Introduction

The paper clarifies the relationship between heritage values, their categories, significance and meaning. In addition, it explores who used to be and should be involved in valorization and how this reflects in positioning archaeological knowledge in society. The paper also sheds light on intrinsic heritage values, considering value propositions developed in philosophy and social sciences and emphasizing the importance of public co-participation in assigning values in archaeological heritage conservation and management. To contribute to resolving the seemingly disconnected issues of (archaeological) heritage values and public participation, one should first refer to some essential texts that clarify the theoretical background of values relevant to the content of research.

Alois Riegl should rightly be mentioned first. His work has always been greatly appreciated in ex-Austro-Hungarian countries because it laid down a theory of heritage values in his seminal work *The Modern Cult of Monuments* (1903). He defined three classes of heritage or "old" values: two classes of historical or commemorative values – intentional and non-intentional values and age values. The age value enables individuals to embrace the passing of time and the impermanence of everything that exists. He contrasted old values with present-day ones, such as the utilitarian and art values and values of novelty. The intentional and non-intentional historical values are usually studied and interpreted by scholars. The age value, on the contrary, can be appreciated by everyone regardless of cultural and social backgrounds and is, in this respect, more universal and, at the same time, stimulates individual perception of atmosphere and feelings.

Riegl's ideas nurtured many debates among art historians and heritage specialists, apart from the archaeological community, which needed to seize the opportunity to elaborate on the thesis that most archaeological remains offer to us to contemplate all Riegl's values categories. The same goes for those art historians' positions, which exploited only Riegl's claims that seem to coincide with their views. The article of Henri Zerner illustrates this point because the author elaborates on artistic and art historian

values to be relative and, at the same time, pounds out that only two aspects or values exist: historical and art value (1976, 186).

Among archaeologists, Timothy Darvill partially embraced a position comparable to Riegl's age value. In his contribution to the 1995 publication *Managing Archaeology*, Darvill mentions the existence value relating to the mere presence of archaeological remains. He further divides the existence value into cultural identity and resistance to change values (ibid. 45–46). The latter is psychologically understandable but remains dissonant with Riegl's age value. At the same time as Darvill elaborated on archaeological values (the concluding part of the paper addresses this topic more in detail), Martin Carver argued that because of the deregulation of heritage administration, archaeologists needed to strengthen their arguments defending the archaeological value of pieces of land if they wanted to compete with economic, communal and other utilitarian values. One should consider that Carver's arguments are coloured by situations where archaeological heritage is under direct development pressure. He defines archaeological value as something deriving from the character of the deposit on the one hand and the archaeological research priorities on the other (Carver, 1996, 53–54). It is evident that at that time researching archaeological remains by excavation was regarded as a solution if preserving them *in situ* could not be negotiated. Nevertheless, even today, some archaeologists find themselves before the dilemma of digging or not digging, even in non-rescue situations. For example, the article by Raymond Karl claims, among others, that to "read" an archaeological document, one needs to bring it to sensory perception. So, "excavation is a central and essential turning point for the value of archaeological monuments" (Karl, 2018, 14).

With the turn of the century, processual and post-processual[1] archaeological praxis have also embraced public archaeology narratives. This ran in parallel with the general predominance of postmodern agendas. Martha de la Torre reports that adopting the Nara document on authenticity[2] in 1994 stimulated international recognition of the new heritage paradigm (de la Torre, 2013, 159). She further explains the implications of this shift, mainly that all the values attributed are not intrinsic, each heritage place has multiple values, and values are often in conflict (ibid., 159–161).

A recent article (Díaz-Andreu et al., 2023) exemplifies the same turn related to archaeological values. The authors clarify that Laurajane Smith's *Uses of Heritage* (2006) reflects on the cultural heritage epistemic framework and states that cultural heritage

---

1   For the scope of interest of processual and post-processual archaeological paradigms, see Shanks et al. (1995). They characterize the processual paradigm by the aspirations to positive scientific knowledge, neutrality, and reliance on controlled observation of facts (ibid., 13). In contrast, the post-processual paradigm defends a multivocal interpretation of archaeological evidence where the meaning is interpreted according to postmodern discourse focused on inclusion and exclusion in past societies (p. 14, 35).

2   https://www.icomos.org/en/charters-and-texts/179-articles-en-francais/ressources/charters-and-standards/386-the-nara-document-on-authenticity-1994.

is a process and social construction (ibid., 4). Consequently, archaeological theory and praxis started to connect past evidence with the needs and values of present-day societies, and have become primarily interested in social issues beyond their historical or aesthetic significance (ibid., 17).

Nature conservationists comprehensively understood the downsides of a dominant ecological valuing earlier than cultural heritage conservationists did, and acknowledged that people perceive and judge values in ways that may differ from the mainstream scientific lens. The paper that illustrates this understanding was elaborated at the international level (Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, IPBES). It addresses the issue of the pluralistic valuing that combines economic, ecological, social and cultural values, as well as indigenous and local knowledge (Pascual et al., 2017, 10).

The international cultural heritage expert community has gradually also embraced the need to support local communities' participation in defining which values they accept in heritage-related projects and activities. The doctrinal document from 1994 marked the first informal step in this direction (Nara Document, 1994), followed by formal standard-setting tools (Council of Europe, 2005; World Heritage Centre, 2021). One of the practical methods for achieving this goal is the so-called community mapping of social values, which can be understood as a combination of economic values from the point of a specific community and intrinsic/cultural values (Torrieri et al., 2021, 1787–1788).

A literature review of works on values would only be complete by mentioning two areas where valuing represents the core interest of the field – philosophy and political science. The selection of authors presented here illustrates the essential difference in understanding values in wider expert communities compared to the views shared by heritage experts.

Robert S. Hartman (1910–1973), a German-American philosopher, is considered a founder of a comprehensive theory of value. His aspiration was that his theory laid the ground for axiology, a science of values. His seminal work was published in the 1960s (Hartman, 1967). Some of his lectures on the same topic were published posthumously (Hartman, 2019). Because of the implications of his work on the sciences, including heritage studies and archaeology, the paper deals with his theory of values in a separate chapter. It is essential to state that his theory derives mainly from a European, predominantly continental epistemological tradition, paired with some contemporary Anglo-American philosophical perspectives.

Barry Bozeman is the author of the book *Public Values and Public Interest: Counterbalancing Economic Individualism* (2007). Bozeman states that a value is a complex and broad-based assessment of an object or set of objects (where the objects may be concrete, psychological, socially constructed, or a combination of all three) charac-

terized by cognitive and emotive elements. Because a value is part of the individual's definition of self, it is not easily changed values, and has the potential to elicit action. Bozeman classifies values into intrinsic and instrumental ones. Intrinsic values are an end in themselves; once they are achieved, the related preferences are realized (ibid., 117, 119–120). By contrast, instrumental values have no value in themselves. Still, they are valued in relation to an intrinsic (or another instrumental) value.[3] Values that provide a normative consensus about citizens' rights and obligations or principles on which public authorities should base their policies are called public values (ibid., 132). The main takeaway of Bozeman's research is that intrinsic values are more important than instrumental ones because they aim to realize our personal or common goals. In contrast, instrumental values point to other preferences and are therefore tradable and replaceable. Intrinsic public values are the core of public interest.

Archaeological heritage values - some additional observations

At times of antiquarian interest in the archaeological past, the monetary value of antique finds played a decisive role (this is still the case in treasure-hunting and illicit trafficking).[4] With the rise of archaeology as a specialized science, the scientific value of archaeological artefacts became predominant but also mobilized to support contemporary political agendas (Heather, 2018, 81). Later, with the evolution of preventive archaeology, the *in situ* archaeological remains and their spatial and historical context have gained significance as evidence of past societies, cultures and the history of humankind in general.[5] After completing the fieldwork, the archaeological teams' interpretation of archaeological facts has remained the main task. Here, we speak about the so-called primary interpretation. The secondary or "popular" interpretation is referred to in the *ICOMOS Charter on protecting and management of the archaeological heritage* (ICOMOS, 1990).[6] The critical issue is interpreting archaeological evidence resonating in the contemporary world. "Connected to this is a close concern with the immediacy of the [archaeological] object – its capacity to engender an emotional response in the viewer, the physicality of the object, the art in artefact" (Carman, 1995, 110).

---

3   Following Emmanuel Kant (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785), two types of value exist: the 'price' of a thing (a "relative value" of something that can be replaced by an equivalent) and the "dignity" of a thing (an "intrinsic value" that cannot be replaced by anything else in an equivalent way). See Bos et al., 2023, 34.

4   The 19th century Austrian and Austro-Hungarian legislation, also in use at the Slovenian territory, used monetary value and compensation regimes as the basis for antiquities-related matters (Frodl, 1988).

5   This paradigm has been internationally and also nationally codified by the European convention on the protection of archaeological heritage (revised), 1992, which Slovenia ratified in 1999.

6   Presentation and information should be conceived as a popular interpretation of the current state of knowledge, and it must therefore be revised frequently. It should take account of the multifaceted approaches to an understanding of the past (Article 7, para. 2).

The main obstacle in pursuing this task is the attitude of many archaeologists that their primary interpretation should refrain from any allusion to values. In his *Concise Oxford Dictionary of Archaeology,* Timothy Darvill puts it under the term "value-free interpretation", as follows:

> Within a scientifically constituted archaeology, the idea of value-free interpretation means aspiring to the exclusion of value-laden terms and value judgements. While it is accepted that the selection of material for investigation involves value judgements about how interesting or relevant it may be based on academic or professional values, the overall aim is to separate 'facts' from 'interpretation'. That this is either possible or desirable has been widely challenged. As an alternative, it is argued that archaeologists should take full responsibility for their work and not try to detach themselves from issues of cultural politics or contemporary social articulations; archaeologists cannot justifiably claim to be concerned with neutral knowledge separable from the conditions within which it is produced and applied, (Darvill, 2021, 1236).

Evaluation of archaeological heritage (and heritage in general) is essential at the policy and strategy-setting level. It is vital because understanding heritage's significance (shared values) can inform decisions on protection policies and enable efficient archaeological heritage management. *Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Significance* (Burra Charter) gives a simplified model of the relationship between values and conservation policy from which we can deduct that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between understanding values and significance, defining heritage policy and managing individual sites (ICOMOS Australia, 2013, explanatory note, 4).

These three stages represent the backbone of heritage protection to define the legal and institutional framework and the human, financial and intellectual resources needed for its implementation. Evaluation is a process that must continue beyond the stage of archaeological resource identification and recording. William Lipe explains that evaluation happens at all stages of archaeological resource management, namely in identifying sites, assessing them in a frame of reference that considers both their intrinsic characteristics and their resource values as established within historically developed social contexts, and responding to the potentially destructive developmental and environmental effects (Lipe, 2010, 43). In his *Archaeological Resource Management*, John Carman dedicates Chapter 5 to evaluation. He describes the difference between academic and practical evaluation, where the latter aims at concrete planning and management issues (Carman, 2015, 105–106). Some of these issues refer to questions such as how to assess the archaeological potential of the wider area, how to manage development pressure, and what interventions are necessary when rescue re-

search is underway. There is also a difference in evaluation calibration. Only a general evaluation applies at the planning and inventory stage, while at the intervention stage the evaluation must be as detailed as possible. Carman also compares individual evaluation criteria globally (ibid., Table 5.2, 122–123) and raises important points on how non-archaeologists' values are considered (ibid., 118–120). Here, the goal is to define "public values" accepted by all stakeholders and the community.

The central practical issue of public values in heritage is values-based management and interpretation. As for public values in general (Alford et al., 2009, 182–184), archaeological heritage values can become narratives that inform us about how people used to make sense of the world and how we can interpret it even today.

General framework for understanding heritage values

The rationalist idea of humans as individuals with unique identities and specific realities, expressed, for example, by Leibnitz, requires the framework of space and time. As British philosopher Roger Scruton puts it, we need identity through time to learn from the past and make plans for the future. Moreover, without a position in space, we could not act in this world: we could do neither good nor evil but would be reduced to a passive state (Scruton, 1996, 80).

Similar concerns apply to heritage values and significance. Traditionally, archaeological conservation practice concentrated on the values of uniqueness, representativity and information potential inherent in archaeological material (Samuels, 2008, 72–74). The conviction that heritage values are objectively inherent in heritage sites was until recently promoted by key UNESCO documents, such as the Operational Guidelines for the implementation of the World Heritage Convention, which described outstanding universal value using the adjectives "intrinsic" and "objective" (Labadi, 2013, 12). In recent versions of Operational Guidelines, such wording is omitted. The postmodern heritage paradigm has rejected the notion of intrinsic values, arguing that all values reflect the ever-changing ideological powerplay. In this way, values have been reduced to their instrumental side, which, in consequence, contributes to the passive position of the heritage stakeholders even more, leaving them to be preyed on by contradicting and control-seeking interest groups. Semantically, the term "intrinsic values" resonates with something limited to the world of yesterday. Nevertheless, one should only know its true meaning to accept the term. The solution should build on the reasoning of Alois Riegl in his *The Modern Cult of Monuments*. His definition of the age value corresponds to the concept of an intrinsic value. He proves that the aesthetic value (in his words, the "relative art value"), the value of novelty and the utilitarian value are subject to changes in taste. The age value, on the contrary, belongs together with historical or commemorative values to the class of "old values". Although the latter two value types represent how ex-

perts understand their past, a thorough analysis of their character proves them to pertain more to the class of values being subject to change. However, is not the age value, by its fixation on the passing of time, which, we all know, is fleeting, also subject to change? Riegl explains it as a deep-rooted human experience we encounter when we realize that time unavoidably passes and that all things, including ourselves, are impermanent. As such, connecting this value to the heritage age is misleading – it is more appropriate to understand it as the value experiencing impermanence. It is worth noting that Eastern cultures fully embrace the idea of impermanence, and Western culture has cherished it in the form of, among others, *memento mori* metaphors, admiration of romantic ruins, picturesque landscapes, art imitating historical styles and copies of antique artefacts that fill our museum collections. In this regard, Riegl's point of view parallels the contemporary understanding of values in the sense that we should consider not only scientific values but also values ordinary people contemplate in heritage.[7]

Based on the ideas set out above, the following hypothesis is presented: Academic archaeological paradigms refrain from using value statements, considering them non-objective, in other words, not appropriate for academic objectivity. However, to meet the need for public outreach, value arguments are essential.

Relationship between heritage values, public interest, significance and meaning

As the brief literature review and references show (and the bibliography on this topic is extensive),[8] the concept of "values" has drawn the attention of political theorists, psychologists, sociologists, philosophers and many more. Gerald Gaus, an American philosopher, extracted some basic characteristics of the concept of value (Gaus, 1990, 2–3) from philosophers addressing the value problems. (In the brackets, comments on heritage values are presented).

a. Value language is grammatically complex, combining verbal, adjectival and nominal forms expressing situations where someone values something, something is said to be valuable, or something is said to be a value. (This applies to heritage evaluation, as well, because value statements reflect complex considerations of epistemology, ethics and aesthetics. One should thus concentrate on the concept of values, then consider the specific situation of heritage concerning the value concept and finally, on documenting the evaluation process.)

---

7   Pierre Leveau, in his essay on heritage epistemology, speaks about the relative values of sciences dealing with heritage as opposed to emotional ones that are neither true nor false: they express an attitude (2017, 96).
8   Google Scholar, for example, gives 1.7 million hits on the term "value concept".

b. Value judgments provide reasons for action and choice. They guide choices and enter into deliberation by providing at least a partial ordering of persons, acts, rules, institutions, experiences, objects, etc. (For further detail, see the chapter on additional issues in archaeological heritage values.)

c. People argue about values, judgments of valuableness, and whether certain value statements are correct or inappropriate. (In heritage evaluation, it is essential to define all stakeholders, especially heritage communities, as defined in the Council of Europe Framework Convention, 2008, article 2b, and co-decide on a common denominator among different values.)

d. Valuing and value judgments are grounded in the properties or characteristics of the thing valued or judged to be valuable. (In heritage evaluation praxis, the term "attributes" is used; see World Heritage Centre, 2021, para 82–85).

e. Values are often said to be chosen. (The question of instability of values concerning the difference between instrumental and intrinsic values is addressed in the next chapter.)

f. We often experience situations in which our values or value judgments conflict. (In today's world of widespread disagreement, a conflict in values is one of the critical issues we all face. In order to resolve this, a hermeneutics approach offers a solution within the context of an intercultural heritage dialogue (Pirkovič, 2023, 255 and the cited references).

g. Values are typically categorized as intrinsic and instrumental and often divided into aesthetic, hedonistic, economic, moral, etc.

h. Valuing is somehow related to the affective or conative side of life. (For the difference between intrinsic and instrumental values and the emotional and cognitive side of values, see the reference to Bozeman in subchapter 1.2.)

Heritage values, especially those represented by cultural artefacts and traditions, have great potential to become public values if the evaluation process is democratic, transparent and accountable. In the articulation and aggregation of public values, experts should illustrate their benefits and the failures that would occur if such values were lost.

Public values then guide decisions towards implementing public interest at all levels, especially at the local level, where heritage values are closest to people. According to Alford and O'Flynn (2009, 175), public interest is a political commitment produced by a public organization. By contrast, public value (if arrived at with public involvement) encompasses not only a common goal but also the related outcome, meaning that such a value impacts those who enjoy it. That is why it is better to follow public values than try to implement public interest.

The Venice Charter (*International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites*, 1964)[9] was the first international document to refer to heritage significance, and the Burra Charter (1979) gave it additional importance. The latter document lists the following values that can participate in defining heritage significance: aesthetic, historical, scientific and social values. They reflect the past and are crucial for present and future generations.

Heritage values are the qualities people attribute to heritage that give it significance (and hence meaning) (de la Torre, 2005, 5). An archaeological heritage significance statement is produced when assessing whether an archaeological site is essential because archaeological heritage is a non-renewable resource. According to de la Torre, "… 'significance' has been used to mean the overall importance of a site, determined through an analysis of the totality of the values attributed to it. Significance also reflects a place's importance with respect to one or several of its values and in relation to other comparable sites" (2005, 15). The latter means that in heritage practice many countries apply the so-called gradation of significance, which implies that the site's significance compares to other sites of the same grade. In its world heritage system, UNESCO uses two steps in defining significance; first, the member state needs to produce the "statement of significance" verified by ICOMOS experts, and then it is politically approved by the World Heritage Committee.

As far as the meaning is concerned, it is closely connected to values.[10] If one classifies heritage values as historical, commemorative, spiritual or symbolic, the meaning could be classified into the same categories. If authorities prescribe heritage values in an authorized way, such a classification ignores various circumstances and constituencies shaping the meaning. The issue is even more complicated with archaeological heritage, which centres around the past material culture without apparent connection to present-day communities (the situation refers to cultures where links with tradition no longer exist). In addition, academic and practical archaeologists share the idea that archaeological evidence waits to be uncovered and its meaning decoded for the sake of archaeology. But this is only one side of the coin in meaning-giving. According to Jordan Peterson, the "world as a forum for action is a place of value, a place where all things have meaning. This meaning, shaped as a consequence of social interaction, is an implication for action… [while] the interpretation of the world as a place of things finds its formal expression in the methods and theories of science… No complete world picture can be generated without using both [ordinary sensory and scientific] modes of construal" (Peterson, 2001, 1).

---

9   The scope of the charter is limited to architectural works and urban and rural sites. It also recognizes only two sets of values, the historical and aesthetic.
10   The American anthropologist David Graeber even considers that a value equals with meaning because by valuing we define the place of a thing in conceptual terms (Graeber 2002, 12).

Archaeology is, therefore, confronted with the difficult task of convincing contemporary communities that the archaeological heritage located "in their territory" is meaningful for them. In general, more than scientific interpretation is required. The primary tool of "imbuing" heritage places with meaning is the co-participative interpretation of archaeological heritage in an in-site or museum environment.

Hartman's theory of values (formal axiology) and its implications for archaeological heritage values

Hartman's starting point of his arguments about values is that humans are rational beings. By "rational", he denotes our capacity to combine concepts with objects, which is the capacity to find our way in this world by representing it to us, that is, by giving names to objects and interrelating the names with meaning. For him, all this implies that value is rational. We can value a thing only if we know its name, properties, and meaning. In other words, the world itself is rational insofar as it is valuable. He states that the formal or axiological value, thus, is objective. But its application is subjective (Hartman, 1967, 133–134).

First, he accounts for the characteristics of science in general, namely formal logic, structure and its relevance to actuality, precise language, definitions and axioms[11]. If axiology wants to become a science, it must adopt the characteristics of a science (Hartman, 1967, 70–71).

He claims that the axiom of "Value" is the central question of axiology and explains this axiom as follows: "A thing is good (has value) in the degree to which it fulfils its concept… We measure the value of a thing by its concept" (Hartman, 2019, 60, 63).

The general term "value" is that kind which corresponds to the concept "Value" while a specific value is either a particular or a singular value (Hartman, 1967, 121). Thus, in the case of archaeological values, they are specific values that are further differentiated into particular and singular. Particular values pertain to classes (or groups) of archaeological "things" and singular ones to individual "things".

How experts define archaeological "things" depends on archaeology (as is the case for other sciences such as sociology, psychology, history, economics, aesthetics, etc.). Nevertheless, the definition must also be relevant to actuality and axiology. Hartman gives instructions on how to define a thing. 1. We must give it a specific name[12]; 2. This name has a meaning specified by a set of qualitative properties 3. Individual things with the same name should possess all the properties contained in the meaning of

---

11   As defined in the Encyclopediae Britannica, an axiom in logic is an indemonstrable first principle, rule, or maxim that has found general acceptance or is thought worthy of common acceptance, whether by a claim to intrinsic merit or based on an appeal to self-evidence.
12   A name gives a unique identity to a thing and thus defines its meaning.

the name (Hartman, 1967, 127).[13] In the case of archaeology, a thing can be all kinds of archaeological facts; it could be a remain, a feature, an artefact/ecofact or a context that can be used as evidence of past human activities and their relation to the natural environment. It is essential to know that meaning and value are closely connected, and that one defines and, at the same time, depends on the other. The properties Hartman refers to are not simply descriptions of a thing or its class but qualities that define their meaning.

So, there is a chain of basic concepts central to applying axiology to archaeological values and evaluation: names of classes of "things", their meaning and the qualitative properties that constitute the meaning. From this process and applying the axion of "Value", archaeologists can define the values relevant to archaeological theoretical and practical work. In any case, the expert precisely determines the properties of a class of things and compares them with those contained in the meaning of the thing's concept (Hartman, 2019, 56).

How does the concept of heritage values co-creation fit Hartman's axiology? Value co-creation is a term initially used in business and marketing circles. There, researching and understanding consumer needs and preferences stand at the centre of business models if companies want to build this aspect in the value chain production. For the sake of archaeology, a similar, if not even more straightforward, path should be developed. This is also the path to deepen the involvement of archaeological heritage values in determining public values.

First, we should understand how Hartman defines intrinsic values. Singular meanings correspond to the class meaning and generic ones. On top of this, they embrace an indefinite number of singular meanings. Thus, the singular value is richer in meaning than the specific, and the specific is richer than the generic. The singular value has the full concreteness of all its meanings (derived from properties), the specific value has only the meaning of class properties, and the generic value has only the meaning (of property or properties) contained in the definition of the concept "Value".

In evaluation, Hartman distinguishes three value dimensions: 1. Systemic values – here, the evaluation restrains to two value dimensions: perfection or non-value. 2. Extrinsic values – all values abstracted in the class definition; these are values that all things belonging to the class have in common. Here, we evaluate individual things by comparing them to other class members. So, the extrinsic value is the value of comparison. 3. Intrinsic values and they are the complete fulfilment of an axiom. Each intrinsic value is the liminal point of an infinite set of extrinsic values. Intrinsic value is the valuation of individuals. This valuation is emphatic.

---

13   In his 1967 and 2019 essays, Hartman speaks of intension pertaining to properties of things. In Freedom to Live, he uses the term "meaning", which is more understandable from the point of view of our analysis.

Systemic value is the value of perfection, extrinsic value is goodness, and singular or intrinsic value is the value of uniqueness. The meaning of intrinsic values is the most potent element of the value system. Consequently, things valued by individuals are of the highest value compared to extrinsic and even more systemic ones (Hartman, 1967, 136–139, 217, 219).

The account of Harman's axiological theory can be wrapped up by showing how he understands the application of his value system to specific phenomenal fields of individual sciences. As set out in the table below, he describes six classes of things that values can be applied to, namely to persons, to groups of persons, to things, to groups of things, to concepts, and finally, to words. He differentiates the application of systemic, extrinsic and intrinsic values to the six classes of things. The table indicates how heritage studies and archaeology as its constituent part fit this approach. Archaeological evaluation should be part and parcel of the Science of Civilization, where intrinsic values reside. In Ecology, archaeological extrinsic values make an essential contribution.

Table 1: Value systems of individual scientific fields (Hartman, 1967, 311).

Application to	Intrinsic value	Extrinsic value	System value
Individual persons	Ethics*	Psychology*	Physiology, Jurisprudence of "Person"
Groups of Persons	Political Science, Social Ethics*	Sociology	Law of Persons and Institutions*
Individual Things	Aesthetics***	Economics*	Technology***
Group of Things	Science of Civilization**	Ecology*	Industrial Technology, Civil Engineering*, Games***, Law of Property*, Ritual*
Concepts	Metaphysics	Epistemology*	Logic*
Words	Poetry, Literary Criticism	Rhetoric, Semantic*, Linguistic Analysis	Grammar, Theory of Communication*

* Links to heritage studies and, through this, also to archaeology

** Links specific to archaeology.

***Links specific to other heritage disciplines, exceptionally to archaeology.

The table reveals the specific relevance of the Hartman axiology system for archaeological values. The intrinsic values that archaeology, as the study of the material remains from past civilizations, should accentuate are ethical norms and, to a limited degree, aes-

thetics. Archaeology also belongs to heritage studies and indirectly to other humanities. Hence, epistemological, semantics and psychological intrinsic values apply. Economics and ecology provide some extrinsic values to the archaeological field. From the systemic point of view, archaeology also depends on technology, law, logical argumentation and communication knowledge, such as in exercising public archaeology projects, including film, TV production and video games with archaeological topics.

Conclusions

As explained, the postmodern heritage paradigm gains ground in archaeological discourses today. According to this paradigm, a relativistic approach to defining values as a social construct prevails, and an ethical approach loses ground. Profound ethical values are those rooted deep in human nature and transcend individual societies and cultures. Heritage values encompass not only the right to heritage as a part of human rights but also require the personal commitments of everyone in contact with heritage to care about it regardless of being a heritage of "others". The standard-setting tools of the Council of Europe have defined such heritage rights and obligations as the highest ethical norm.[14] With the formal adoption of these international standards, Slovenia recognises heritage public values as defined by Barry Bozeman. To conclude, heritage public values are closely connected to heritage rights and obligations, limiting the authorised approach in heritage matters.

Besides the impermanence (or Riegl's age) value, modern psychology and heritage epistemology define other values that tend to be more connected with intrinsic values than with instrumental ones. In this respect, Timothy Darvill's contribution is the most illustrative. He mentions the value of stability and the value of mystery and enigma belonging to the class of option values. Among the class of existence values, he enlists the identity value and the value of resistance to change (Darvill, 1995, 44–45). These values have a common denominator to contribute to the identity of individuals and groups. Our understanding of the value of stability and resistance to change differs from Darvill's explanation. Stability refers more to institutions and the social system responsible for heritage conservation. In contrast, resistance to change refers more to individuals and groups, which relates to adherence to traditions.

In Slovenia, the state authorities[15] and academia identify and evaluate heritage, including archaeological heritage. At the same time, the local public is generally excluded and seldom recognises archaeological remains as the "heritage of the com-

---

14   See the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, particularly articles 1b, 2 and 4b and c.

15   Slovenia has only recently formalized the evaluation criteria for protection areas by issuing a governmental decree. For evaluation of archaeological sites, the following criteria are prescribed: authenticity, state of preservation and typology. Historical or spatial significance should be used only exceptionally. The evaluation is performed only by experts. See the Decree on heritage protection areas, Uradni list RS 69/22.

munity". To remedy this situation, the paper proposes introducing an archaeological value system combining Riegl's and Darvill's approaches and, with such consideration in mind, upgrading Hartman's value system presented in Table 1.

Table 2: An outline of a comprehensive archaeological value system

	The system developed in public co-participation		The system developed in collaboration with other experts		The system developed by archaeology	
Evaluation addressed to	*Intrinsic values (defined by stakeholders)*	*Special expertise needed*	*Extrinsic values (defined by archaeologists in cooperation with other experts)*	*Special expertise needed*	*Systemic values (defined by archaeologists)*	*Special expertise needed*
Individuals and heritage communities	Values that stimulate curiosity and drive us to discover new things, to participate	Ethics	Values that enable the future enjoyment of archaeological heritage	Psychology, Theory of Communication	Research values (for archaeology and other sciences)	Archaeological Community Engagement
Individual Artefacts	Values that stimulate social cohesion	Hermeneutics	Values that exploit the touristic appeal of archaeological museums and sites	Semantics, Interpretative methods	Educational values of the new archaeological knowledge	Museology
Artefacts Classes	Values that promote open-science approach	Science of civilisation	Values for creating added value in the creative industries	Environmental sciences, Epistemology	Values for the legitimation of archaeology and the political objectives it indirectly serves	Heritage Studies (Heritology), Public Archaeology

To conclude, heritage experts' understanding of intrinsic values corresponds neither to Hartman's axiological theory nor to the social sciences, as represented above by Bozeman. For the latter, intrinsic values are at the core of public interest. Hartman's theory proves that intrinsic values have the full concreteness of all meanings of our reality. From a rational point of view, valuing helps people find purpose in life, and experts have an essential role in this process (Hartman, 1967, 120, 134).

The main takeaway of the paper is that values are not physical, factual things but the experiences people encounter when understanding and cherishing something. Experts need to consider the mechanism of people's experiences to classify what values in accordance with their contribution to individual and social well-being based on the value concept and values specific to a particular field, in our case, archaeology. The meaning of intrinsic values can be described as essential or ethical, and extrinsic ones

as instrumental, socially accepted or cultural values. The material remains from the past can deliver the full scope of such meaning if archaeologists explain their importance for present individuals and communities.

References

Alford, J., O'Flynn, J., Making Sense of Public Value: Concepts, Critiques and Emergent Meanings, *International Journal of Public Administration* 32, 3, 2009, p. 171–191.

Bos, M. et al., Vers une dynamique d'objectivation de l'évaluation patrimoniale, *Lieuxdits* 23, 2023, p. 32–44,

Bozeman, B., *Public Values and Public Interest: Counterbalancing Economic Individualism*, Washington DC 2007.

Carman, J., Interpreting, writing and presenting the past, in: *Interpreting Archaeology: Finding Meaning the Past* (eds. Alexandri, A., Buchi, V., Carman, J., Hodder, I., Kast, J., Lucas, G., Shanks, M.), London - New York 1995, p. 110–124.

Carman, J., *Archaeological Resource Management: an International Perspective*, Cambridge 2015.

Carver, M., On archaeological value, *Antiquity* 70, 1996, p. 45–56.

Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, Republic of Slovenia Ratification act: *Uradni list RS - Mednarodne pogodbe* 22, 2008, https://www.uradni-list.si/1/objava.jsp?sop=2008-02-0026, accessed 24. 8. 2023.

Darvill, T., *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Archaeology*, Oxford 2021 (3rd electronic edn).

Darvill, T., Value Systems in Archaeology, in: *Managing Archaeology* (eds. Carman, J., Cooper, M., Firth, A., Wheatley, D.), London - New York 1995, p. 38–48.

Díaz-Andreu, M., Pastor Pérez, A., Archaeological Heritage Values and Significance, in: *Reference Models in Social Sciences,* Amsterdam - Barcelona 2023, p. 1–20, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/B9780323907996000495?via%3Dihub, accessed 24. 8. 2023.

European Convention on the Protection of Archaeological Heritage – revised, Republic of Slovenia Ratification act: *Uradni list RS, Mednarodne* pogodbe 24, 1999, https://www.uradni-list.si/glasilo-uradni-list-rs/vsebina/1999-02-0021?sop=1999-02-0021, accessed 24. 8. 2023.

Frodl, W., *Idee und Verwirklichung: das Werden der staatlichen Denkmalpflege in Österreich*, Vienna 1988.

Gaus, G. F., *Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory*, New York 1990.

Graeber, D., *Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value*, New York 2001.

Hartman, R. S., *The Structure of Value: Foundations of Scientific Axiology*, Carbondale, Oregon 1967.

Hartman, R. S., *The Freedom to Live: The Robert Hartman Story* (ed. Ellis, A.), Eugene, Oregon 2013.

Hartman, R. S., *Five Lectures on Formal Axiology*, Salt Lake City, Utah 2019.

Heather, P., Race, Migration and National Origins, p. 80–100, in: *History, Memory and Public Life: The Past in the Present* (eds. Maerker, A., Sleight, S., Sutcliffe, A.), Abington, Oxon – New York 2018.

ICOMOS Australia, *The Burra Charter: Charter for Places of Cultural Significance,* 1979, revised 2013, https://australia.icomos.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Burra-Charter-2013-Adopted-31.10.2013.pdf, accessed 24. 8. 2023.

Karl, R., Die Bewertung archäologischer Denkmale: In situ und ex situ, ex ante und ex post, *Archäologische Denkmalpflege* 2, 2018, p. 10–20.

Labadi, S., *UNESCO, Cultural Heritage and Outstanding Universal Values: Value-based Analysis of World Heritage and Intangible Cultural Heritage Conventions*, Lanham 2013.

Leveau, P., Épistémologie de la conservation-restauration: définition, méthode et objectifs, in: *Actes du 6 e colloque international de l'ARAAFU: Retours d'expérience et regards rétrospectifs,* Paris 2017, 93–100.

Lipe, W. D., Archaeological Values and Resource Management, in: *Archaeology & Cultural Resource Management: Visions for the Future* (eds. Sebastian, L., Lipe, W.), Santa Fe, 2010, p. 41–63.

Pascual, U., et al., Valuing nature's contributions to people: the IPBES approach, *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability* 26–27, 2017, p. 7–16, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877343517300040, accessed 24. 8. 2023.

Peterson, J. B., *Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief*, London 2002.

Pirkovič, J., Model of Heritage Interpretation Tailored to Public Co-Participation, *Art & Humanitas* 17, 2023, p. 252–270.

Riegl, A., *Der moderne Denkmalkultus. Sein Wesen und seine Entstehung,* Vienna 1903, (English translation, The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and its Origin, O*ppositions* 25, 1982, p. 20–51).

Samuels, K., Value and significance in archaeology, *Archaeological Dialogues* 15, 1, 2008, p. 71–97.

Scruton, R., *An Intelligent Person's Guide to Philosophy*, Richmond, UK 1996.

Shanks, M., Hodder I., Processual, postprocessual and interpretative archaeologies, in: *Interpreting Archaeology: Finding meaning in the Past* (eds. Alexandri, A., Buchi, V., Carman, J., Hodder, I., Kast, J., Lucas, G., Shanks, M.), London – New York 1995. p. 12–41.

Smith, L., *Uses of Heritage*, London - New York 2006.

de la Torre, M., Values and heritage conservation, *Heritage & Society* 60, 2, 2013, p. 155–166.

Torrieri, F., Oppio, A., Rossitti, M., Cultural Heritage Social Value and Community Mapping, in: *New Metropolitan Perspectives* (eds. Bevilaque, C., Calabrò, F., Della Spina, L.), Cham 2021, p. 1786–1795.

World Heritage Centre, *Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention*, 2021.

Zerner, H., 1976 Alois Riegl: Art, Value, and Historicism, *Daedalus* 5 (1), 1976, p. 177–188.

Ali arheologija zagotavlja dokaze o preteklosti ali soustvarja sodobne vrednote?

Ključne besede: arheološke vrednote, teorija vrednot, aksiologija, epistemologija (arheološke) dediščine

Prispevek se osredotoča na dediščinske vrednote, s posebnim poudarkom na arheološkem razumevanju vrednot in vrednotenja. Primerjava ključnih aksioloških teorij vrednot in na drugi strani vrednotenja (arheološke) dediščine pokaže, da slednje pretežno sledi postmoderni paradigmi, medtem ko zavrača perspektivo intrinzičnih vrednot, utemeljenih s splošnimi aksiološkimi predpostavkami. Slovenska dediščinska praksa, tudi arheološka, je bila sprva zasidrana v srednjeevropski, zlasti nekdanji avstro-ogrski tradiciji, katere osrednja osebnost je bil Alois Riegl, zato prispevek obravnava to zgodovinsko ozadje vrednotenja. V prispevku je na kratko predstavljeno ključno delo s področja aksiologije, tj. teorije vrednot, nemško-ameriškega filozofa Roberta S. Hartmana. Izhodišče raziskave je hipoteza, da se akademska arheološka razmišljanja ogibajo vrednostnih izjav, ker veljajo za pristranske in zato ne pritičejo akademski drži. Nasprotno pa so vrednostne izjave nujne, da bi zadostili potrebi po posredovanju pomena arheološke dediščine javnosti. Da bi pojasnili raziskovalno hipotezo, prispevek analizira teoretične in praktične vidike vrednot (arheološke) dediščine, vključno z vprašanji kategorizacije vrednot ter razmislekom o tem, kdo dediščini pripisuje vrednote in kako to vpliva na sprejemanje arheološkega znanja v družbi. Obravnava tudi nekatere bistvene vidike vrednotenja pri ohranjanju in upravljanju arheološke dediščine ter pri vzpostavljanju zavezništev z lokalnim prebivalstvom in skupnostmi, ki se identificirajo z dediščino. V zaključku je orisan sistem arheološkega vrednotenja z upoštevanjem sistemskih, ekstrinzičnih in intrinzičnih arheoloških vrednot na podlagi pristopov, ki sta jih vsak na svojem področju razvila arheolog Timothy Darvill in aksiolog Robert S. Hartman.

Does archaeology deliver evidence about the past or co-create contemporary values?

Keywords: archaeological values, value theory, (archaeological) heritage epistemology, axiology

The paper focuses on heritage value systems, particularly investigating the archaeological understanding of heritage values and evaluation. The literature review shows that the postmodern archaeological paradigm predominantly covers the topic, while the perspective of the intrinsic value is less explored. The starting point of our research is the thesis that archaeological paradigms obstruct better public support if they refrain from using axiological considerations. By archaeological paradigm, we refer to the processual and postprocessual ones (the latter focusing on understanding past social phenomena). Axiology, as the theory of values, developed in the second half of the 20th century. Its approach is now used in many areas of social sciences (for example, education and medical care). Public archaeology is more open to societal needs than processual and post-processual archaeology but has yet to apply a values-based approach consistently. To clarify our thesis, we analyse the theoretical and practical considerations on the values of (archaeological) heritage, including the issues of the categorization of values, reflection on who assigns values to heritage and how this affects the reception of archaeological knowledge in society. The paper addresses some critical aspects of the evaluation in archaeological heritage conservation, management and building alliances with locals and communities who identify with heritage. I outline a comprehensive archaeological evaluation system considering systemic, extrinsic and intrinsic archaeological values in the conclusions.

O avtorici

Jelka Pirkovič je doktorica konservatorstva in magistrica umetnostne zgodovine (Filozofska fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani). Je avtorica več kot sto člankov in petnajstih publikacij s tega področja. Na Oddelku za arheologijo (Filozofska fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani) predava vsebine iz heritologije, arheologije za javnost in upravljanja arheološke dediščine. Je tudi članica učiteljskega zbora Fakultete za slovenske in mednarodne študije na Novi univerzi. Zaposlena je bila na Zavodu za varstvo kulturne dediščine Slovenije in na Ministrstvu za kulturo, kjer je bila med drugim državna sekretarka (2004–2008) in direktorica Direktorata za kulturno dediščino (2020–2022). Sodelovala je pri sprejemanju novega zakona o varstvu kulturne dediščine ter v različnih organih Sveta Evrope in Evropske unije, zlasti v okviru dveh predsedovanj Slovenije Svetu EU. Dejavna je v nevladnih organizacijah na področju varstva kulturne dediščine.
E-naslov: jelka.pirkovic@guest.arnes.si

About the author

Jelka Pirkovič holds a PhD in Conservation and a master's degree in Art History. She is the author of over one hundred articles and fifteen publications in this field. She is a lecturer at the Department of Archaeology at the University of Ljubljana and a member of the academic staff of the Faculty of Slovenian and International Studies at the New University. She has worked at the Slovenian Institute for the Protection of Cultural Heritage and the Ministry of Culture, where she was State Secretary (2004–2008) and Director of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage (2020–2022). She has participated in various bodies of the Council of Europe and the European Union, particularly in the framework of both Slovenian EU Council Presidencies. She is active in non-governmental organizations in the field of heritage protection.

E-mail: jelka.pirkovic@guest.arnes.si