77 


December 2016 

Treatises and Documents, Journal of Ethnic Studies 
Razprave in gradivo, Revija za narodnostna vprašanja 
UDC-UDK 323.15.342.4 (058)
ISSN 0354-0286 (Print /Tiskana izdaja) 
ISSN 1854-5181 (On-line edition / Elektronska izdaja) 

Editor-in-Chief / Odgovorni urednik 
Sara Brezigar (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia / Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija) 

Editor / Urednica 
Sabina Zorčič (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia / Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija) 
Editorial Board / Uredniški odbor 
Benjamin Barber (The City University of New York, USA / ZDA), Romana Bešter (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia / Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija), Sara Brezigar (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia / Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija), Milan Bufon (Science and Research Centre, Slovenia / Znanstveno raziskovalno središče, Slovenija), Sean Byrne (University of Manitoba, Canada / Univerza v Manitobi, Kanada), Jadranka Čačić-Kumpes (University of Zadar, Croatia / Univerza v Zadru, Hrvatska), Fernand de Varennes (University of Moncton, Canada / Univerza v Monctonu, Kanada), Rainer Hofmann (University of Frankfurt, Germany / Univerza v Frankfurtu, Nemčija), Boris Jesih (Institu­te for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia; Consulate General of the Republic of Slovenia in Szentgotthard / Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija; Generalni konzulat Republike Slovenije v Monoštru), Will Kymlicka (Queen’s University, Canada / Kanada) Avguštin Malle (Slovenian Scientific Institute, Austria / Slovenski znanstveni inštitut, Avstrija), Mojca Medvešek (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia / Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija), Joseph Marko (University of Graz, Austria; European Academy Bozen, Italy / Univerza v Gradcu, Avstrija; Evropska akademija v Bocnu, Italija), Francesco Palermo (University of Verona; European Academy Bozen, Italy / Univerza v Veroni;  Evropska akademija v Bocnu, Italija), Srdja Pavlović (University of Alberta, Canada / Univerza v Alberti, Kanada), Janez Pirc (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia / Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija), Tom Priestly (University of Alberta, Canada / Univerza Alberta, Kanada), Albert Reiterer (University of Vienna, Austria / Univerza na Dunaju, Avstrija), Barbara Riman (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia / Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija), Petra Roter (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia / Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija), Sherrill Stroschein (University College London, U.K . / Univerza v Londonu, V.B.), Patrick Thornberr y (Keele University; Oxford University, U.K . / Univerza v Keeleju; Univerza v Oxfordu,V.B.), Zaira Vi­dau (Slovene Research Institute, Italija / Slovenski raziskovalni inštitut, Italija), Vladimir Wakounig (University of Klagen­furt, Austria / Univerza v Celovcu, Avstrija), Colin Williams (Cardiff University, U.K . / Univerza v Cardiffu, V.B), Daniel Wutti (University of Klagenfurt, Austria / Univerza v Celovcu, Avstrija), Jernej Zupančič (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia / Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija), Mitja Žagar (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia / Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija) 


Technical editing / Tehnično urejanje 
Meta Gostinčar-Cerar, Jana Menaše, Sonja Kurinčič Mikuž 
Published by / Založil in izdal 
Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja / Institute for Ethnic Studies SI, 1000 Ljubljana, Erjavčeva 26, tel.: +386 (0)1 20 01 87 0, fax +386 (0)1 25 10 964, http://www.inv.si, e-mail: inv@inv.siLegal representative / Predstavnik: Sonja Novak-Lukanovič Co-financed by the Slovenian Research Agency / Revijo sofinancira Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost RS. 


Abstracting and indexing services / Vključitev v baze podatkov 
The journal is currently noted in the following / Revija je vključena v:
CSA Sociological Abstracts, CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstract, International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA), 
FRANCIS, IBZ, IBSS, SCOPUS. 


Contacts / Kontakti 
Editorial correspondence should be addressed to / Pošto za uredništvo revije naslovite na: 
Institute for Ethnic Studies / Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Erjavčeva 26, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, 
e-mail: editortd@guest.arnes.si
Ordering information / Naročila: Sonja Kurinčič Mikuž, Institute for Ethnic Studies / Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, 
Erjavčeva 26, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: sonja.kurincic@guest.arnes.si 


Disclaimer / Pojasnilo 
The published articles express authors’ viewpoints. / Objavljeni prispevki izražajo stališča avtorjev. 

The Journal was published as follows / Revijo smo izdajali: 
1960-1986: Razprave in gradivo (Treatises and Documents) ISSN 0034-0251; 
1987-1989: Revija za narodnostna vprašanja – Razprave in gradivo
( Journal of Ethnic Studies - Treatises and Documents) ISSN 0353-2720;
1990-2010: Razprave in gradivo: Revija za narodnostna vprašanja
(Treatises and Documents: Journal of Ethnic Studies) ISSN 0354-0286. 

Institute for Ethnic Studies © Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja (Ljubljana), http://www.inv.si 

TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016 
Table of contents / Kazalo 
ARTICLES / čLAnKI 

5  Michael Strubell  
The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016)  
Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016)   
33  Michele Gazzola, François Grin, Johan Häggman, Tom Moring The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority Languages:  A Historical Assessment   
Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim jezikom: finančni pregled  in ocena  
67  Maja Mezgec Linguistic Landscape as a Mirror: the Case of the Slovene Minority  in Italy  
Jezikovna krajina kot ogledalo: primer slovenske manjšine v Italiji  
87  Matejka Grgič The Identification and Definition of the Minority Community as  an Ideological Construct: the Case of Slovenians in Italy   
Opredeljevanje in definicija jezika narodne manjšinske skupnosti kot ideološki konstrukt: primer Slovencev v Italiji  
103  Špela Gale Vrednotenje uspešnosti jezikovnih politik in jezikovnih pobud za rabo valižanskega jezika v Walesu  
Evaluation of Performance of Language Policies and Language Initiatives  for the Use of Welsh Language in Wales   
121  Andreja Sršen Konstrukcija identiteta u sociološkom diskursu  
The Construction of Identity in Sociological Discourse Konstrukcija identitete v sociološkem diskurzu  
137  Barbara Riman  
Delovanje Slovencev v Osijeku med drugo svetovno vojno The Activities of Slovenes in Osijek during World War II  


TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016, p. 5–30 


The recent Catalan independence process has already attracted a great deal of scholarlyattention, quite apart from the media coverage. Some good chronologies are available,making it superfluous to present another, albeit more updated one. Opinion polls andsurveys, as well as election results, have been analysed, as have the upheavals sufferedby most political parties. The paper highlights and documents some apparently lesser-disseminated aspects of the process. Special attention is devoted to the cold repression,or deactivating mechanisms, that the Spanish authorities have put in place, with varyingdegrees of success. The paper asks to what extent these strategies are likely to solve thecurrent conflict with Catalonia, and whether they are all admissible in a modern (western)democracy. In the conclusion the long-term effectiveness of such mechanisms, in practice,will be discussed, in the face of the clash between democratic legitimacy and the legalconstraints of a Constitution written shortly after the end of a 36-year-long dictatorship. 
Keywords: Catalonia, independence movement, social movements, deactivating mecha­nisms, politics. 

Čeprav še ni dolgo aktualno, je vprašanje katalonske neodvisnosti vzbudilo precejšnjo pozornoststrokovnjakov v nasprotju z mediji, ki o tem niso veliko poročali. Na voljo je veliko izčrpnihkronoloških pregledov tega procesa, zato bodo v tem prispevku izpuščeni, čeprav za ceno večjeažurnosti. Narejenih je bilo tudi veliko analiz mnenjskih anket, volilnih rezultatov in pretresov,ki jih je proces sprožil povsod razen v najbolj zakrknjenih strankah. V članku bo osvetljenihnekaj manj znanih vidikov procesa in vsak posebej bo podprt z dokumentarnim gradivom.Posebna pozornost bo posvečena deaktivacijskim mehanizmom, ki so jih uporabile španskeoblasti – ponekod uspešno, spet drugje ne. V zaključnem delu bo poudarek na dolgoročniučinkovitosti omenjenih mehanizmov v praksi, še posebej v luči razkoraka med demokratičnolegitimnostjo in legalnimi zadržki, zapisanimi v ustavi, ki je nastala nedolgo po koncu 36-letnediktature. 
Ključne besede: Katalonija, gibanje za neodvisnost, socialna gibanja, deaktivacijski meha­nizmi, politika. 
Correspondence address: Michael Strubell, Linguapax International, Carrer de Pelai, 12, 3M, ES-08001 Barcelona, Catalonia, e-mail: info@linguapax.org, m_strubell@yahoo.com. 
ISSN 0354-0286 Print/ISSN 1854-5181 Online  © Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja (Ljubljana), http://www.inv.si 
M. STRUbEll The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016) 



Any attempt to look at present-day Catalonia needs to start with its historical context. For over three centuries Spain as a nascent political project has had tocope with ethnic (ethnolinguistic is a preferred term) diversity, with the more or less openly confessed aim of assimilating the Catalans (including Valenciansand Majorcans), the Basques (including the Navarrese) and the Galicians intoa unified nation based on the Castilian people and their language, culture, history, laws and form of government. The Portuguese managed to escape fromthis project and restore their independence in 1640. Other former Christiankingdoms and independent countdoms (one, Catalonia, had developed a considerable empire in the Mediterranean in the 14th–15th centuries) that had grown up in the wake of the reconquering of the Iberian Peninsula from theMoors, gradually became part of a huge empire stretching across much of the world. 
This assimilationist policy was the hallmark of the incumbent Bourbonmonarchs that defeated the Hapsburg pretender in the War of Spanish Succession, with French help, the early 18th century. To hispanify the occupied territory, the King’s 1716 secret instruction to his new leadership in Cataloniafollowing its fall (which followed the painful withdrawal of the allies, following the Treaty of Utrecht), was that 
The governor will take the greatest care to introduce the Castilian language to which end he will make the most temperate and dissimulated provisions so that the effect is obtained without the care being noticed (Monés i Pujol-Busquets 1988, 432). 1 
The political reawakening of the Catalans as a people took part in the general context of the Romantic revival across Europe, though until close to the end ofthe 19th century it was a cultural, rather than political, movement. At that timethe loss of the last Spanish colonies in America and Asia led to a backlash that led, for instance, to Catalan being banned in catechism and on the telephone.
 In 1920 the most influential Spanish philosopher of the day wrote: 
Let us not beat about the bush: Spain is a thing made by Castile, and there are reasons to suspect that, in general, only Castilian heads have adequate organs to perceive the great problem of an integrated Spain (Ortega y Gasset 2009 [1920]).2 
Yet the growing power and influence of Catalonia’s political institutions, inthe 1920s, with a great burgeoning of Catalan culture in all its forms, and withmodern 20th century policies in many fields, was resisted by the Madrid elites, and first the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930) and then the Francodictatorship (1939-1975) – which only managed to conquer Catalonia and 
RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016 
M. STRUbEll Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016) 
put an end to the Republic after a bloody three-year war – cruelly repressed theCatalans and abolished their self-government institutions. In the year beforethat war broke out, many thought the Catalans and the Basques (at least) were moving towards independence, and indeed the right-wing leader José CalvoSotelo said he preferred “a red Spain to a broken one” (Anasagasti 2006, 197), a few months before being assassinated in a revenge attack.
After Franco died in his bed in 1975, the Catalans’ and Basques’ claim toself-government was partially fulfilled in the 1978 Constitution the text of which was, however, was in part imposed by the powers-that-be that insisted that ithighlight the unity and indivisibility of Spain and the role of the armed forces(Vidal-Aparicio 2012). The Constitution allowed some degree of home rule to be granted not just to Catalans and Basques but to fifteen regions, most of whichhad never dreamt of asking for it. During the 1980s and 1990s Catalonia took overpowers in the fields of education, health, planning, prisons, social welfare and others. However, the level of home rule varied in practice according to the partyin power in central government, and to a number of Constitutional court rulingsthat cut back regional powers, thanks in both cases to one-sided interpretations of the (probably) deliberately ambiguous parts of the text. During that period(1996-2003) the People’s party was in power in Madrid, and one of its raisons d’etre is precisely to cut back regional powers and recentralize Spain, The leasingparties in Catalonia and the Basque country resisted and resented this, regardingit as a betrayal of the consensus spirit of the political transition. 
Arguably the starting-point for the present – and most deeply rooted –phase of Catalonia’s political process towards independence movement can bepin-pointed in 2003, when the political parties who were to win 89 per cent of the seats in the Parliament at the regional election included in their manifestos athorough revision of the content of the 1979 Statute of Autonomy (Generalitat deCatalunya 1979), or regional constitution; others jump ahead to 2010 following the Constitutional Court ruling (Tribunal Constitucional, 2010), requested bythe Popular party, that annulled or disfigured substantial parts of the new 2006 Statute, (Generalitat de Catalunya 1979) after the draft had been severely lathedin the Spanish Parliament (or Cortes). Domenech (2013a, 2013b) presents adetailed chronology of the process, starting in 2003 and closing it at the end of 2013 (the annual publication covered events in 2013).
Whichever date is chosen, sufficient time has passed for academics tohave devoted attention to the process, on several scores, and the remainder of this paper will concentrate on this period, during which time the number ofpublications on the subject has been considerable. Though the aim of this paperis not to offer a review of research publications, nevertheless a brief overview may be of some relevance.
Some treatises (at least, those the author has tracked down in the Englishlanguage) have included Catalonia by taking an overall look at recent secession 
M. STRUbEll The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016) 
processes, mostly placing the Scottish case in the first place (Moreno 1988,Flamini 2013, Bourne 2014, Lineira and Cetra 2015, Martínez and Zubiaga2014); but see also Nagel 2001 in Scottish Affairs). Others include Scotland and Catalonia in wider-ranging studies: Guibernau et al. (2014) include Quebec, forinstance. In actual fact, there are plenty of comparative studies, both earlier (e.g. Shafir 1995, on Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia, and Estonia) and morerecent (Calzada 2014, 2015, Lluch 2014, Requejo and Nagel 2014). In this area,several academics have been recently invited to give their views on US policy towards such issues, which in the past has been insensitive, in the main, to thosepeoples that challenged – and felt threatened by – a politically hegemonic groupin a multinational country (Williams 2016, Sorens 2016, Vejvoda 2016). 
Many studies are in the field of contemporary Spanish history and politics,and particularly the post-Franco era construction of a regionalised Spain. Theunderstandable interest in comparing Basque and Catalan nationalism goes well back in time (e.g. Payne 1971) but continues today (e.g. Gillespie 2015). Martínezand Zubiaga (2014) compare Catalonia and the Basque Country using a conflictdynamics analysis approach: Triggering (or catalyzing) mechanisms, Mobilizing mechanisms, Facilitating mechanisms and Deactivating mechanisms, allinteracting with processes: Desertion, Polarization, Diffusion, and “Contentious episode: Secession + State-building” (Martínez & Zubiaga 2014, see Figure 1).We shall return to the last of these mechanisms below. 














Source: Martínez and Zubiaga (2014). 
RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016 
M. STRUbEll Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016) 
Many studied regard it as an outstanding social movement sparked off by a grassroots Assemblea Nacional Catalana founded in 2011 (Strubell 2013, Crameri 2014, 2015, Guibernau 2012, 2014a, Burg 2015, Medir 2015), while others completely ignore this fact (e.g. Petithomme & Fernández Garcia 2013). Its first, huge demonstration, on September 2012, gave the president of the day, Artur Mas, the courage to see independence as the only way forward for his people (Harrington 2016). 
Some papers concentrate on identity issues, sometimes highlighting the field of sports (Flamini 2013, García 2012, Serrano 2014a), and issues of political discourse (Serrano 2014b). Others make theoretical contributions. Montserrat Guibernau, for instance, has developed the concept of “emancipatory nationalism” (Guibernau 2014b) to distinguish the emancipation movements of state-less nations from the nationalist ideologies that wreaked havoc in 20th century Europe. 
A few have underlined the apparently centuries-old prejudice, or negative stereotypes, in relations between Catalans and Castilians (or Spaniards as a whole) (Strubell, M. 2008, 2011; Bel 2015). 
In the rest of this paper, and without any claim to thoroughness, brief mention will be made of research into the causes of the recent developments in Catalonia, and into likely or possible political outcomes. However, the main thrust of the paper will be on the cold repression, or deactivating mechanisms introduced to counter the pro-independence movement, mainly by the Spanish authorities. 
The research question that will be dealt with below is as follows: whereas Spain in the past has used openly violent methods to repress the claims of the so-called peripheral nationalisms; some actually hold that they pre-date and gave rise to an explicit Spanish nationalism as a reaction (De Blas 1991, Archilés Cardona 2011, 301, Fusi 1985, 55-56). In a 21st century scenario, without many deeply-held beliefs about Spain’s unity having evolved, how are Spain’s central authorities attempting to solve, or at least accommodate, the current conflict with Catalonia, and to what extent are they admissible in a western democracy? 

The explanation of the massive rise in support for independence is blurred, ordistorted, by the economic crisis that hit Spain (including Catalonia, of course)in 2008. Nevertheless, many authors point to the June 2010 Constitutional court judgment (Tribunal Constitucional 2010) that deemed part of the 2006 Statuteof Autonomy (Generalitat de Catalunya 2006) unconstitutional as the catalyst
(e.g. Ruiz-Huerta 2015, 200, Strubell 2013). 
M. STRUbEll The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016) 
Newspaper and media coverage in general, at least until the last two or
three years only, tended to suggest that the economic crisis sparked off the
apparently sudden surge in pro-separatist sentiment in Catalonia. It is healthy 
10 to see objective studies of such media coverage (e.g. Martín & Camon 2014,Girones i Soler, 2015; while Dhoest and Bastiaensens (2013) compare French-and Dutch-language media coverage in Belgium). This does not mean to say thatCatalan media do not get blasted too (deservedly or otherwise; see, for instance,Román (2014). Others place financial issues firmly at the centre of the growing support ofthe pro-independence movement, usually hinting at the selfish attitude of thewealthy Catalans without appreciating the vast annual net outflow of public money which meant, in effect, that Catalans were receiving sub-standard publicservices… or that their government was becoming increasingly indebted in orderto assure quality services. The root cause was more likely the slaps in the face that the whole Statute of Autonomy affair gave rise to, from the presentation ofthe draft to the Spanish parliament for approval, late in 2005, until the infamous2010 Constitutional court ruling which, in spite of the fact that the Statute had been ratified by the Catalans in a referendum, basically buried any hope of aquasi-federal interpretation of the 1978 Spanish Constitution. Academic coverage has been far less prone to this simplification. Manyauthors adopt a strictly non-committal academic position, describing andcontextualizing events. Crameri (2014) presents an excellent detailed overview of developments and the root causes of the current phase of Catalonia’s politicalhistory. Though other elections are to be found in the literature (e.g. Davis 2004,Lago et al. 2007, Rico 2012, Colino 2013), the 2012 regional election gained prominence (largely because it marked the formal start of the institutional phaseof the independence process): for instance, Hopkin, in an LSE blog (2012), andRico and Lineira (2014). With the results, “not only is traditional autonomist and federalist Catalonian nationalism enfeebled, but the ideological distance,the polarization between the different political options, has also increased” (Petithomme & Fernandez Garcia 2013, 17).And though recent, there are also papers on the 2015 election watershed(Martí & Cetra 2016, Orriols & Rodon 2016). Medina and Molins (2014) describe the position of SMEs in the face of the prospect of Catalonia’sindependence. The role of schooling in the rise of pro-independence sentimentis discussed, often superficially (this is not however the case of Clots-Figueras and Masella 2013). In a different vein, a book of interviews gave a wide range ofpeople, mostly Catalans, the chance to explain their position, in English (Strubell2011). Guntermann (2013) analyzes survey data to explain support for, andopposition to, Catalonia’s independence, while Serrano has both analyzedemerging Spanish nationalism in its response to Catalonia’s grievances (Serrano 
M. STRUbEll Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016) 
2008), and studied the degree of congruence in citizens’ opinions (Serrano2010). Elias (2015) gives prominence to the important issue of credibility, whileeconomic issues feature to the fore in papers by Munoz and Tormos (2015) and Boylan (2015). Bladé (2014) attempts to go beyond identity and economic 11 issues. 

Some authors venture personal opinions as to whether or not Catalonia will become independent in the foreseeable future. Griffiths et al. (2015) workon a model based on the hypothesis of a prior independence (or declarationof independence) by Catalonia. Weiler, after making some very controversial and hotly contested comments on the pro-independence process (amonghis respondents, Krisch, 2012, stands out) closes the discussion by seemingly punishing Catalonia: “I repeat: Independence? Bon Voyage. But not in theEU” (Weiler 2012). This categorical statement contrasts with much moredispassionate papers (Paço 2015, Fassbender 2013, Oskam 2014), and calls for specific solutions (e.g. Guibernau 2012). One young academic explores thereasons for the secessionist movement and concludes that she does not believe “that Catalonia will be granted independence” (Marinzel 2014). A CSIS chair-holder is rotund in his belief that “A potential breakup of Spain by Catalonia is notin the U.S. interest, not in Europe’s interest, not in Spain’s interest and ultimately,not in Catalonia’s interest” (Runde 2015). Another academic, who holds a chair at Bard College, speaks out for a federal solution, saying that “the time has come for Spanish regional and national leaders to rethink their aversion to federalism”(Encarnación 2016). However, and leaving aside a number of factual errorsin the paper, he obviously ignores the fact that almost all political support for Spanish federalism always came from Catalonia (e.g. Ferrer 2012), and thatthe 2010 Constitutional Court judgment on the 2006 Statute of Autonomy – the drafting of which had been spear-headed by a staunch federalist, PresidentPasqual Maragall – effectively knocked that option out of the window. 

This central part of the paper is aimed to fill in a gap in academic research onCatalonia’s independence process, and, in the Catalan context, we shall do as Martínez and Zubiaga (2014) and 
…make reference to the deactivating mechanisms that impede the development of the secessionist contentious episode: we refer to the adaptation of the subject of the demand to repressive contexts and/or to alternative political proposals made by the kin-state (Martínez and Zubiaga 2014, 6). 
M. STRUbEll The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016) 
The kin-state, Spain, has been very active in trying to defuse the pro-independencemovement, but it would be misleading to call it simply repression. 
The repression of social movements refers to attempts by individuals, groups, or state actors (e.g., militaries, national police, and local police) to control, constrain, or prevent protest. Historically, this has often involved increasing the costs associated with social movement participation (e.g., through violence, arrest, etc.). Commonly studied forms of repression include police action at public protest events, such as arrests and police violence, military suppression of protest events, ‘disappearances’ of activists, arrests and/or imprisonment of activists, infiltration of social movements by informants, covert counterintelligence programs, restrictions of free speech and assembly, assaults on human rights, and murders of social movement activists (Earl 2013). 
The measures discussed below are not as drastic, as shall be seen. They are morein line with (perhaps ironically, for he writes about the Spanish civil war) a concept described by Rodrigo as “cold repression” (Rodrigo 2008, 149), see alsoAdorno and Horkheimer: 
Chronologically asymmetric is also the mode in which in both rearguards passed over from ‘hot’ terror to ‘cold’ repression, or from ‘revolutionary order’ to ‘public order’ (Adorno & Horkheimer 2001, 207). 
Nevertheless, it is an understatement to claim merely that the Spanish government“has blocked all Catalan initiatives to deliver a vote on independence” (Martí2014). To authorize a binding referndum would be tantamount to accepting that the Catalans (and by extension, the Basques and Galicians) are a people withthe right of self-determination. No accommodation whatsoever has been evenhinted at by political leaders in power. The so-called tercera via – or middle road to solve the constitutional crisis – between no change at all and full sovereignty,by redesigning the Constitution to build a federal structure (whatever that may mean), was defended for a time in Catalonia (Calvo 2014), where it enjoyedfairly wide support (Noguer 2013) but received no concrete, positive responseand fizzled out, having led several parties into crises, splits and even a dissolution (Unió Democratica de Catalunya). Nevertheless, it is clearly in Madrid’s interestto revive it from time to time (Cot 2016).
Madrid has adopted a confrontational attitude, quoting the 1978 Constitution as regarding sovereignty and the unity of Spain as indivisible,and insistently saying that Catalonia’s independence (which is thereforeconstitutionally impossible), would be up to all Spaniards to decide (Rajoy 2014). The Spanish government has taken hundreds of local councils to court,for instance, on their stance. According to the local authority organization AMI,by October 2016 councils had been reported or taken to court on 401 counts directly related to the independence process (AMI 2016). 
M. STRUbEll Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016) 
The key question is to what extent the deactivating mechanisms, or instancesof cold repression, are the result of specific plans. And as might be expected thereis only indirect, and often non-substantiated, evidence for this. What follows, therefore, is based on newspaper reports, but not on reliable first-hand, verifiable13 evidence. 
Reports that there was a detailed written plan to wage a “dirty war” (Directe2016) emerged in 2013. They speak of a 500 page “Operación Después” (Rueda2013, Montero & Rendueles 2013, El Confidencial Digital 2013a), a detailed plan designed by the CNI (the Spanish secret service), including the smearing ofleading Catalan politicians with police reports (and some were indeed publishedbefore being proved false), apparently to prevent the Catalan nationalists winning the 2012 election, with a €10 million budget. The original source can in no waybe construed as supporting or being biased towards Catalan independence.In 2012 Manuel Cuyas reported a source that claimed incriminating dossiers (with true or false information) were in Madrid drawers, ready to be used asammunition to discredit leading Catalans (Cuyas 2013). El Punt Avui (2013)summarized elements of the campaign, including the so-called La Camarga incident, with the leak of a taped recording of a meeting between an oppositionleader and someone claiming to have incriminating evidence against a member of the former Catalan President’s family.
The existence of an “Operación Cataluna” (El Periódico de Catalunya 2016,Bayo & López 2016) was revealed in another leaked tape recording of interior minister Jorge Fernández-Díaz with the head of Catalonia’s anti-fraud office, andby a high-ranking police officer in court (La Vanguardia 2016b) who workedagainst the independence process until 2012. Some opinion leaders believe that the leak of the two-year-old conversation, just before the June 2016 generalelection, actually boomeranged back in the face of the leakers, as the PopularParty subsequently improved its results (Antich 2016, Sáez 2016), despite a host of its members being in the dock on charges of corruption. Nevertheless theminister was eventually dropped from the government formed in November. Smear campaigns were directed against the then-mayor of Barcelona, XavierTrias (El Mundo 2014, La Sexta 2016, Lázaro 2016), just before the localelection, which he narrowly lost; and the then-President Artur Mas (Ruiz 2015). The fact that such accusations are made not in the courts but in smear presscampaigns (arising from police sources, not journalist investigation) speaks foritself and merits attention. 
One report claims that the “dirty war” is waged on four fronts, not only inthe press, but also on the legal front – in search of evidence of corruption, forinstance –, on the police front (infiltrating pro-indy organizations, informers, spying…) and through intense tax tooth-combing (including Barcelona footballclub as a prime target – several players face prison sentences on tax evasioncharges –, as well as SMEs). It hints that the creation of a Unionist organization, 
M. STRUbEll The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016) 
pretentiously called Societat Civil Catalana, was a government initiative and thatit is funded by leading Spanish enterprises (see McCoy 2015). That organisationdoes enjoy clear support from the Popular Party – it was controversially (Nació 
14 Digital 2015) awarded a European Citizen’s prize just a few months after beingfounded. However, the paper offers no sources for this information and the purported four fronts should be regarded merely as a hypothesis, howeverplausible. A similar conclusion can be reached as regards de De Porrata-Doria’sinsightful predictions (2013) on Spain’s attempts to divide Catalan society into confrontational sides. His reflection obviously builds on former prime ministerAznar’s incendiary statement to the effect that “Spain could only be broken onceCatalonia had been broken as a society” (RTVE 2012). The offensive, which has a very strong additional diplomatic front, has triedto counter claims the pro-indy camp made as regards the potential advantagesof independence. It has published and distributed reports in various languages (particularly through embassies) (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores 2013, 2014) predicting a catastrophe. Official bodies such as Real Instituto Elcano (athink-tank for international and strategic studies) devote considerable attention to the constitutional crisis brought about by Catalonia, and republish selectedpapers (e.g. “Catalonia torn in two” by Molina and Otero-Iglesias 2015; both are senior analysts at the Instituto). The Spanish government has subsidized other reports, such as the 82 page paper published by the Popular Party’s foundation,FAES (2013) which admits the government grant on page 2. And it has helped unionist news media (e.g. Maqueda 2013, Mezcua & Miranda 2013, Manso et al.2015). Such reports often appear at crucial political moments in time. Thoughit is a matter of speculation whether or not they acted at the suggestion of the Spanish government, two banking organizations issued dire warnings just ninedays before the September 27 2015 Catalan election. The Asociación Espanolade Banca (AEB), and the Confederación Espanola de Cajas de Ahorros (CECA) issued a joint statement claiming that: 
The exclusion of Catalonia from the Eurozone, as a consequence of the unilateral break­up of the current constitutional framework, would mean that all banking institutions with a presence in Catalonia would face serious problems of legal uncertainty. 
These difficulties would force the entities to reconsider their implementation strategy, with the consequent risk of a reduction of the banking supply and, with it, of financial exclusion and cost increase and credit shortage (EFE 2015). 
On almost the same day the Barcelona-based conservative Circulo de Economíasaid in a declaration that it did “not share unilateral decisions that could jeopardize the principle of legality and membership in the European institutions and the euro” (Cercle d’Economia 2015). 
M. STRUbEll Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016) 
Yet despite the offensive, what Madrid strategists and analysts hoped wouldblow over in time, is proving resilient: the soufflé is not deflating: it seems to bemade of granite (Culla 2016). 
To complete this section, a number of recurring issues are worth outlining15 and briefly illustrating. They clearly share a common aim of frightening the Catalan population and its representatives and in the author’s view, some areunprecedented in modern western European countries and amount to coldrepression. 

A number of threats from the military have been aired in the media (El Periódico de Catalunya 2015), and the Minister of Defence has said that if everyone “doestheir duty, the army will not be needed” (Europa Press 2015). Before that, aretired general, Juan Antonio Chicharro said that “the Fatherland comes before democracy” (EFE 2013), in reference to the Catalan independence process. Aretired colonel, Amadeo Martínez Inglés, was quoted as warning of the existence of an “Operación Estela” (Globedia 2014), in January 2014, a planned lightningnight-time military intervention which was to prevent Catalonia from holdingthe 9 November 2014 non-binding poll on independence. Others point out that the run-down of the army means that it would be quite incapable of controllingsuch a large territory, in the face of widespread social mobilization (Buesa 2012).Some media said that low-flynig F-18 jet fighters, up Catalan Pyrenean valleys several weeks before the 2012 election were deliberate provocation, a claimhard to verify, though the timing was hardly opportune (Casas & Mas 2012).Nevertheless, there are suspicions that the massive cyber attacks on websites of the Catalan government and pro-independence organizations immediatelybefore the 9N poll were organized by the Spanish secret service (Borras 2014;Sala 2015). Finally, whether the permanent deployment of a hundred tanks to an army base in Catalonia in 2016 is coincidental or deliberate is, of course, opento debate (Sallés 2016a). 

The issue of pensions has received a lot of attention in the Unionist camp, to tryand raise anxiety in a particularly sensitive and cautious segment of the voting population. FAES (2013), the Instituto de Estudios Económicos, El ConfidencialDigital (2013b) and Societat Civil Catalana (2014) all hold that they wouldcollapse in an independent Catalonia. Just days before the September 27 2015 election foreign minister García-Margallo claimed pensions in an independentCatalonia would drop by 40 per cent and that 689,000 jobs would be lost (El Diario 2015a). Just a couple of days later prime minister Rajoy was forced toadmit that Spain is duty-bound to pay pensioners who spent their working life 
M. STRUbEll The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016) 
paying contributions to the Spanish pension system, wherever they live once theyretire (Vila 2015). The damage to the credibility of his Government’s previousstance had been done, despite immediate efforts to backtrack (Maqueda 2015). 
16 	Moreover, Bosch and Espasa (2015) among others, have shown that a Catalanpensions scheme would not run on a deficit as Spain’s does right now, and would actually be able to raise them. 

Continued EU membership is another Damocles sword being swung in theair. Spain in effect claims it will veto Catalonia’s membership: foreign ministerGarcía-Margallo stated that an independent Catalonia would “wander through space and would be excluded from the EU for centuries” (La Vanguardia2014). An answer by president Juncker, manipulated inside the Commission, to a question put to him by a Popular Party MEP, made front page news – again,just before an election – until the scandal broke out almost immediately (ABC2015). The truth is the EU cannot take a stance on Catalonia, if and when it declares independence, unless it first recognizes it as a sovereign state. Andthat cannot happen before Spain’s authorities do so… having swallowed theirpride. Until then, of course, Catalan citizens will still be Spanish and therefore EU citizens, whether or not Catalonia decides to press for EU membership.Moreover, Prime Minister Rajoy was caught off his guard in a widely distributedinterview, when asked about this issue: yet again, in the run-up to the crucial 2015 Catalan election (El País 2015). The journalist reminded him that the Spanishconstitution forbids Spanish citizens from being deprived of their nationality. 

Another strategy being used is to scare officials. The former president ofCatalonia and three former ministers face political disqualification (González & Cué 2016) or even gaol, on the grounds of disobedience and misconduct, forhaving set up a poll (an election pledge) – very deliberately not a referendum, simply an exercise to test public opinion (Gisbert 2014) –, and holding it on 9 November 2014 despite a speedily-delivered Constitutional court injunction(Fabra 2014) to block it. Just before that poll school principals – as were mayors 
– were sent letters by the Spanish authorities to remind them of “their duty” (Ara2014), in a last-ditch, and unsuccessful, attempt to prevent them from openingtheir schools as polling stations (Ara 2014). 
In another sphere, 22 judges were threatened with disciplinary action forhaving published a manifesto on Catalonia’s “right to decide” (Vilaweb 2014),claiming that the Constitution does not prevent a referendum being held. A year earlier the chief prosecutor in Catalonia had been forced to resign after claimingsomething very similar (Ara 2013). The judges won their case (e-Noticies 2014). 
M. STRUbEll Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016) 
However, their pictures (many taken from their identity cards, a database onlyopen to the police) were published in a right-wing Madrid newspaper (La Razón,traces of the page can be found in El Comunista 2014). They sued the police and the newspaper, for allegedly infringing their right to privacy of personal data, but17 though the police official responsible for the report was identified (El Periódico 2014) the courts eventually dismissed the case (La Vanguardia 2016a). However,one of these judges, Santiago Vidal, was disqualified for three years for belongingto a group of legal specialists that wrote, in their spare time and of their own free will, a draft Catalan Constitution (Rincón 2015). His appeal to the SupremeCourt was rejected.
At the time of writing the Spanish government plans to continue its strategy of denying the Catalans the right to decide their future at the ballot box, havingissued instructions to the Prosecutor to apply for Catalan Parliament’s SpeakerCarme Forcadell to be barred from office for allowing a debate, despite an explicit Constitutional court prohibition, on what from the central government’s pointof view is (another) unconstitutional road map towards independence, whichincludes at some stage a ratifying referendum (ACN 2016). 

The growing political conflict between Catalonia and central government, particularly when the Popular party is in power in Madrid, can be quantified bythe number of laws and decrees being taken to the Constitutional court, usuallyby the Spanish government, but also by the Ombudsman or the Senate. In March 2015 the Catalan authorities were awaiting no fewer than 58 judgments(Vázquez 2015). In content, most of the issues are not directly linked to the independence process, but are of an economic or social nature. Under sixmonths later the Consumer Code of Catalonia and the Emergency Housing lawwere added to the list (El Diario 2015b). 
Precisely in order to be able to deal with the Catalan political crisis, thePopular Party gave executive powers to the Constitutional court, as if it werean ordinary court of law, in a highly controversial law ( Jefatura del Estado 2015) that was taken, ironically, to the Constitutional court itself so that it candecide whether such powers fit within the Constitution. It duly decided they do(Financial Times 2016). 

In the quest for independence of the Catalan people (more strictly, a very large proportion of the Catalan people) the issue at hand is one of democracy, not ofnationalism. “The Unity of Spain is Sacred” (La Vanguardia 2015), in the wordsnot of the Spanish church – for whom voting on independence is, nevertheless, 
M. STRUbEll The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016) 
“morally unacceptable” (Servimedia/InfoCatólica 2013) –, but of the incumbentprime minister, Mariano Rajoy and the long-standing discourse of his PopularParty (La Vanguardia 2015). Given this stance and the refusal to even consider 
18 modifying the Constitution to accommodate Catalonia’s demands (Blay 2015),the long-awaited “head-on train collision” (Pareja 2016) seems closer by the day. This may seem odd, for the conflicting parties can surely draw on… 
forms of conflict mediation and resolution, often involving more or less neutral and mutually respected third parties. This type of conflict resolution is an integral and defining characteristic of democratic systems under the rule of law. Such polities offer many institutionalized forms of conflict resolution and mediation that can help to stabilize contentious interactions and prevent their escalation to revolutionary or civil war proportions. These forms of conflict resolution and mediation include third parties, such as the electorate, parliament or the courts, whose legitimacy is accepted by all conflict parties, and which may settle conflicts authoritatively (Koopmans 2004, 27). 
Moreover Vidal-Aparicio (2015) argues against regarding the Catalan process as based first and foremost on identity and cultural matters. After recalling thatthe United States declared independence by primarily invoking the politicalphilosophy of John Locke, especially the idea that governments are legitimate only insofar as they fulfil the purpose for which they were established by thegoverned, he claims that 
the process that is underway in Catalonia announces a new era where independence movements will go back to using Lockean political principles, after a 20th century when the general trend was instead to justify independence processes putting an emphasis on the classical principles of nationalism, primarily based on identity and cultural homogeneity (Vidal-Aparicio 2015). 
Many documented examples of this are to be found. Largely because such a highproportion of the current population of Catalonia is of only fairly recent Catalan extraction, identity issues are not in the fore in the pro-independence camp,though they are constantly evoked by the unionist camp. Instead, the main thrustof the reasoning for independence is based on economic and pragmatic issues linked to the general well-being of the Catalan people or, to be more precise, ofall people living in Catalonia regardless of their political persuasion. 
The two camps are therefore at loggerheads. Unionists appeal to the rule oflaw, while separatists call for a democratic vote and, increasingly, disobedience
(e.g. El Mundo 2016, Cardús 2016). Unionists insist that it is up to all Spaniards, and not just to Catalans, to decide whether Catalonia can split from Spain. Sadly,in the words of Castillo, “the rule of law thus becomes politicised as a result of thetension around the judicialisation of the so-called Catalan sovereignist process” 
M. STRUbEll Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016) 
(Castillo 2015). The Constitutional Court, in particular, is a frequent resort,
and leading judges resent the courts being used to dodge the negotiation of a
political solution to what is, after all, a political problem (Rubio 2014). After all, 
as a unsigned Financial Times opinion article put it over two years ago, “This19 
is a political problem that requires a political answer” (Financial Times 2014). 
Its advice, that “Madrid needs to act fast over the Catalonia separatist question”
(Financial Times 2014), has been followed, but not in the direction of sitting
down to find a solution. 

Leaving ideological and nationalist considerations aside, the Popular Party isaware that the Yes vote could well win (e.g. Postdigital 2016). It also knows that itis perceived in Catalonia as an anti-Catalan party ( Juliana 2008), and the irony is that its policies have fuelled the pro-independence flames for years in Catalonia.
This text has been completed this shortly after the Catalan President, CarlesPuigdemont, has won a parliamentary vote of confidence and has announced that a binding referendum will be held, come what may (in Puigdemont words“o referendum o referendum”, cited in Etxearte 2016), but offering to negotiatethe terms with the Spanish government, before the end of September 2017 (Etxearte 2016). It is very doubtful that the Spanish government and authoritieswill call a truce on this issue, unless of course outside institutions apply pressure, presumably on financial and economic grounds, to bring about a change in theircurrent policy. Such pressure could come on human rights grounds, and theCatalan president has asked the United Nations and the Council of Europe to mediate (Sallés 2016b). But it is hard to envisage, at least in the medium-term,anything other than a binding referendum on Catalonia’s independence, eitherbefore (only if it can take place with democratic guarantees) or after a declaration of independence by the Parliament of Catalonia.
In answer to the basic research question, the evidence supports the hypothesisthat the Spanish authorities have hitherto failed to apply the procedures laid down in democratic regimes for conflict prevention and resolution. Far from this,they have fanned the flames with measures that have entrenched the opposing positions, while the pro-independence parties continue along the road mapthat the Catalan electorate endorsed by giving them an overall parliamentarymajority in November 2015. It remains to be seen whether a proclamation of independence, coupled with immediate tax-raising measures, would force Spainto sit down in order to negotiate a solution to its ailing pension system and itsvery high sovereign debt. 
77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
M. STRUbEll The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016) 


References 









ABC, 2015. Bruselas corrige la declaración de Juncker sobre la independencia de Cataluna.ABC, 23 September 2015.http://www.abc.es/elecciones/catalanas/2015/abci-bruselas-declaraciones-junck­er-201509231809.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
ACN (Agencia Catalana de Notícies), 2016. L’Estat posa en marxa la maquinaria contra el refe­rendum. El Món, 7 October 2016. http://elmon.cat/noticia/172244/lestat-posa-en-marxa-la-maquinaria-contra-el-referen­dum (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Adorno. T.W. & Horkheimer, 2001. Elements of Antisemitism. In Back, L., Solomos, J. (eds.)Theories of Race and Racism. A Reader. Routledge. New York / London, 206-211. 
AMI, 2016. El Govern ofereix suport als ajuntaments requerits pel 12-O i l’AMI torna a denun­ciar persecució. Associació de Municipis per la Independencia website.http://www.municipisindependencia.cat/2016/10/el-govern-ofereix-el-seu-suportals­ajuntaments-que-han-rebut-requeriments-del-govern-espanyol-per-obrir-el-12-o/(accessed 18 October 2016). 
Anasagasti, I., 2006. Llámame Telesforo. Editorial Txalaparta, Tafalla. 
Antich, X., 2016. De la picaresca a l’esperpent. La Vanguardia, 4 July 2016.http://www.gxi.cat/04-07-16-xavier-antich-de-la-picaresca-a-l-esperpent-la-vanguardia(accessed 12 October 2016). 
Ara, 2013. El fiscal en cap de Catalunya presenta la seva dimissió i Torres-Dulce l’accepta. Ara, 5 March 2013. http://www.ara.cat/politica/Catalunya-presta-dimissio-Torres-Dulce-laccepta_0_877112488.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Ara, 2014. Llanos de Luna demana per carta als directors d’institut que no permetin la utilitza­ció dels centres per celebrar el 9-N. Ara, 6 November 2014. http://www.ara.cat/politica/Llanos-Luna-directors-dinstitut-utilitzacio_0_1243675941. html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Archilés Cardona, F., 2011. Melancólico bucle. Narrativas de la nación fracasada e historiogra­fía espanola contemporánea. In Saz, I., Archilés Cardona, F. (ed.) Estudios sobre naciona­lismo y nación en la Espana contemporánea. Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, 245-330. 
Bayo, C. E. & López, P., 2016. Fernández Díaz conspiró con el jefe de la Oficina Antifraudecatalana para fabricar escándalos contra ERC y CDC. Público, 22 June 2016. http://www.publico.es/politica/fernandez-diaz-conspiro-jefe-oficina.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Bel, G., 2015. Disdain, Distrust & Dissolution: The Surge of Support for Independence in Catalonia. Sussex Academic Studies on Contemporary Spain, Brighton. 
Bladé Costa, T., 2014. El movimiento independentista catalán, más allá de la identidad y los cál­culos económicos. In Bretones, M. T., Charry, C. A. & Pastor, J. (eds.) Anuari del Conflicte Social. Observatori del Conflicte Social - Universitat de Barcelona, 395-426. http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/ACS/article/view/12291 (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Blay, J. A ., 2015. El PP podrá bloquear cualquier iniciativa para la reforma de la Constitución silogra 117 escanos. Público, 15 December 2015. http://www.publico.es/politica/pp-podra-bloquear-iniciativa-reforma.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Borras E., 2014. La ciberguerra del 9-N: així va ser l’atac informatic al Govern. Ara, 11 Novem­ber 2014. http://www.ara.cat/premium/ciberguerra-aixi-atacs-informatics-Govern_0_1246675553.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
M. STRUbEll Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016) 
Bosch, N.; Espasa, M., 2015. Pensions in an Independent Catalonia. In Amat, O. & Guinjoan,
M. (eds.) The Economy of Catalonia. Questions and Answers on the Economic Impact of Inde pendence. Comissió d’Economia Catalana. Barcelona, Col·legi d’Economistes de Catalu­nya / Profit Editorial: 175-180.http://www.coleconomistes.cat/pdf/the.economy.of.catalonia.pdf (accessed 12 October 2016) 21 
Bourne, A . K ., 2014. Europeanization and Secession. The Cases of Catalonia and Scotland,Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 13 (3), 94-120. 
Boylan, B. M., 2015. In Pursuit of Independence. The Political Economy of Catalonia’s Seces­sionist Movement. Nations and Nationalism 21 (4), 761–785. 
Buesa, M., 2012. Catalunya en el espejo de Eslovenia. Blog entry, 5 October 2012.http://mikelbuesa.wordpress.com/2012/10/05/la-guerra-de-secesion-cataluna-en-el­espejo-de-eslovenia/  (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Burg, S. L., 2015. Identity, Grievances, and Popular Mobilization for Independence in Catalo­nia. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 21 (3), 289-312. 
Calvo, L., 2014. El tortuoso camino de la tercera vía. Tiempo, 5 May 2014. http://www.tiem­podehoy.com/espana/el-tortuoso-camino-de-la-tercera-via (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Calzada, I., 2014. The Right to Decide in Democracy between Recentralisation and Indepen­dence: Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque Country. REGIONS Quarterly Magazine of the RSA. Comment and Debate. The voice of the membership. 296(4), 7-8. 
Calzada, I., 2015. Benchmarking Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque Country from the Devo­lution, Independence and Social Innovation Perspective: City-Regional Small NationsBeyond Nation-States. At 45th Annual Conference UACES, Bilbao, 7-9 September 2015.http://www.uaces.org/events/conferences/bilbao/papers/abstract.php?paper_id=731#.WEVg_00zU5s (accessed 16 January 2015). 
Cardús, Sa., 2016. Estat de desconnexió, La Vanguardia, 12 October 2016. https://www.pressreader.com/spain/la-vanguardia-catala/20161012/281543700438971(accessed 12 October 2016). 
Casas, J.; Mas, O., 2012. Provocació militar. El Punt Avui, 10 October 2012. http://www.elpuntavui.cat/societat/article/5-societat/583151-provocacio-militar.html(accessed 12 October 2016). 
Castillo Ortiz, P. J., 2015. Framing the Court: Political Reactions to the Ruling on the Declarati­on of Sovereignty of the Catalan Parliament. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 7 (1), 27-47. 
Cercle d’Economia, 2015. Opinió D’actualitat: Després de les Eleccions del 27-S: Dialeg,Acord i Reforma. 16 September 2015.http://cercleeconomia.com/opinion-de-actualidad-despues-de-las-elecciones-del-27-s-di­alogo-acuerdo-y-reforma/ (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Clots-Figueras, I. & Masella, P., 2013. Education, Language and Identity. The Economic Journal 123 (570), 332-357.http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/42501/1/EJ_Masella.pdf /http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecoj.12051/full (accessed 12 October 2016).
Colino, C., 2013. The State of Autonomies Between the Economic Crisis and Enduring Nati­onalist Tensions. Politics and Society in Contemporary Spain, The NYU European Studies Series, Springer, 81-100.http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137306623_5 (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Cot, S., 2016. Tercera via, entre la independencia i... que? El Món, 28 November 2016. http://elmon.cat/opinio/17100/tercera-via-entre-la-independencia-i-que (accessed Decem­ber 1 2016). 
Crameri, K ., 2014. ‘Goodbye, Spain?’: The Question of Independence for Catalonia. Sussex Acade­mic Press / Canada Blanch, Brighton. 
77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
M. STRUbEll The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016) 
Crameri, K ., 2015. Political Power and Civil Counterpower: the Complex Dynamics of theCatalan Independence Movement. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 21 (1), 104-120. 
Culla, J.B., 2016. Un suflé de granito. El País, 16 September 2016. http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2016/09/15/catalunya/1473950478_014775.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Cuyas, M., 2013. El setge. El Punt Avui, 15 April 2012.http://www.elpuntavui.cat/article/7-vista/8-articles/528207.html (accessed 12 Octo­ber 2016). 
Davis, A., 2004. The November 2003 Elections in Catalonia. A Landmark Change in the Cata­lan Political Landscape. South European Society and Politics 9 (3), 137-148. 
De Blas, A ., 1991. Tradición republicana y nacionalismo espanol, Madrid, Tecnos. 
De Porrata-Doria, R ., 2013. Divide et Impera. L’estrategia d’Espanya contra el sobiranisme. Nació Digital, 8 January 2013.http://www.naciodigital.cat/opinio/5163/divide/et/impera/estrategia/espanya/contra/sobiranisme (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Dhoest, A . & Bastiaensens, S., 2013. Reporting Catalonia in Belgian Newspapers. Catalan Jour­nal of Communication & Cultural Studies 5 (1), 121-128. 
Directe, 2016. Les claus de la guerra bruta contra el procés independentista. 30 June 2016,http://directe.cat/512252, Chart (image): http://www.directe.cat/imatges/noticies/guer­ra-bruta-proces.png (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Domenech Abella, J., 2013a. La revuelta soberanista en Cataluna. In Pastor, J. & Rojas Pede­monte, N. (eds.) Anuari del Conflicte Social 2013. Observatori del Conflicte Social - Uni­versitat de Barcelona, 496-520. http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/ACS/article/view/10392/13174 (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Domenech Abella, J., 2013b. Una cronología de la revuelta soberanista en Cataluna. In Pastor,
J. & Rojas Pedemonte, N. (eds.) Anuari del Conflicte Social 2013. Observatori del Conflicte Social - Universitat de Barcelona, 521-539. http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/ACS/article/view/10393/13175 (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Earl, J., 2013. Repression and Social Movements. In Snow, D. A , Della Porta, D., Klandermans,
B. & McAdam, D. (eds.) The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements. 
John Wiley and Sons Ltd., Chicester.
http://onlinelibrar y.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm446/abstract
(accessed 12 October 2016). 

EFE, 2013. Un general en la reserva dice que la “patria está antes que la democracia”. 1 March 2013. http://web.eldia.es/nacional/2013-03-01/2-general-reserva-dice-patria-esta-antes-democ­racia.htm (accessed 12 October 2016). 
EFE, 2015. La banca reconsiderará su implantación en Cataluna si opta por independencia.Barcelona,18 September 2015.http://www.efe.com/efe/espana/economia/la-banca-reconsiderara-su-implantacion­en-cataluna-si-opta-por-independencia/10003-2716126  (accessed 12 October 2016). 
El Comunista, 2014. Los jueces pro-consulta denuncian la publicación de sus fotos de DNI en‘La Razón’. El Comunista, 4 March 2014. https://elcomunista.net/2014/03/04/los-jueces-pro-consulta-denuncian-la-publica­cion-de-sus-fotos-de-dni-en-la-razon/   (accessed 12 October 2016). 
El Confidencial Digital, 2013a. Rajoy ha encargado al CNI un plan para ‘defender’ la unidad deEspana y Cataluna. El Confidencial Digital, 22 October 2013. http://www.elconfidencialdigital.com/seguridad/Rajoy-encargado-CNI-Espana-Cata­luna_0_2148385169.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
M. STRUbEll Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016) 
El Confidencial Digital, 2013b. Una Cataluna independiente no podrá pagar pensiones niasumir deudas durante los primeros diez anos, según un libro del Instituto de EstudiosEconómicos. El Confidencial Digital. 2 October 2013. http://www.elconfidencialdigital.com/dinero/Cataluna-independiente-Instituto-Estu­dios-Economicos_0_2136986284.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
El Diario, 2015a. José Manuel García-Margallo y Oriol Junqueras debaten sobre la independen­cia de Cataluna. Margallo asegura que Cataluna perdería 689.000 empleos y las pensionescaerían un 40%. 23 September 2015.http://www.eldiario.es/politica/Debate-Manuel-Garcia-Margallo-Junqueras-Catalu­na_13_434086588_4912.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
El Diario, 2015b. El TC paralitza mesures contra la pobresa energetica i els abusoshipotecaris aCatalunya. El Diario, 7 October 2015. http://www.eldiario.es/catalunyaplural/politica/TC-paralitza-energetica-hipoteca­ris-Catalunya_0_438857192.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
El Mundo, 2014. UBS no 7651162-3445.954. El Mundo, 28 October 2014. http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2014/10/28/544ed8ee268e3ead698b4571.html(accessed 12 October 2016). 
El Mundo, 2016. El Parlament llama a los catalanes a la desobediencia. Editorial. El Mundo, 8 October 2016. http://www.elmundo.es/opinion/2016/10/08/57f7e76a468aeb3d098b463c.html(accessed 12 October 2016). 
El País, 2015. .Catalán, espanol o europeo? El lío de Rajoy en la entrevista con Carlos Alsina.El País, 22 September 2015.http://verne.elpais.com/verne/2015/09/22/ar ticulo/1442931255_127211.html(accessed 12 October 2016). 
El Periódico de Catalunya, 2014. El comisario de información de la Policía de Barcelona admiteque fue él quien ordenó comprobar la identidad de los jueces proconsulta. El Periódico de Catalunya, 30 April 2014. http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/politica/comisario-informacion-policia-bar­celona-admite-fue-quien-ordeno-comprobar-identidad-jueces-proconsulta-3262620(accessed 12 October 2016). 
El Periódico de Catalunya, 2015. Otras alusiones a una intervención militar en Catalunya. 9September 2015. http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/politica/otras-amenazas-militares-proce­so-soberanista-catalunya-4493861 (accessed 12 October 2016). 
El Periódico de Catalunya, 2016. Operación Cataluna. 28 September 2016.http://www.elperiodico.com/es/temas/operacion-catalunya-21711/ (accessed 12 October 2016). 
El Punt Avui, 2013. Guerra Bruta. Operació Catalunya. 11 December 2013.http://www.elpuntavui.cat/canals/series/catalunya-vol-viure-en-llibertat/guerra-bru­ta-operacio-catalunya.html?limitstart=0 (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Elias, A., 2015. Catalan Independence and the Challenge of Credibility: The Causes and Con­sequences of Catalan Nationalist Parties’ Strategic Behavior. Nationalism and Ethnic Poli­tics, 21 (1), 83-103. 
Encarnación, O., 2016. Farewell to Catalonia? Spain Confronts a Rebellious Region. Foreign Affairs, Snapshot, 28 January 2016.https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/spain/2016-01-28/farewell-catalonia (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Etxearte, O.A ., 2016. Referendum o referendum. El Punt Avui, 28 September 2016.http://www.elpuntavui.cat/politica/article/17-politica/1007874-referendum-o-refe­rendum.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
M. STRUbEll The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016) 
Europa Press, 2015. Morenés, sobre Catalunya: Si todo el mundo cumple con su deber, no haráfalta ninguna actuación del Ejército. Público, 8 September 2015.http://www.publico.es/politica/morenes-mundo-cumple-deber-no.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
24 
e-Noticies. 2014. Revés judicial a La Razón. e-Noticies, 4 December 2014. http://politica.e-noticies.es/reves-judicial-a-la-razon--90479.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Fabra, M., 2014. El Constitucional suspende la consulta tras admitir los recursos de Rajoy. El País, 29 September 2014.http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/09/29/actualidad/1412005295_056524.html(accessed 12 October 2016). 
FAES (Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales), 2013. 20 Questions and Answers on the Secession of Catalonia. Madrid. English version:http://www.fundacionfaes.org/file_upload/news/pdfs/20140212192231.pdf (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Fassbender, B., 2013. The Place of an Independent Catalonia in the European Union. At 3rd International Conference Sobirania i Justícia, Barcelona. http://www.sij.cat/fitxers/Bardo_Fassbender.pdf (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Ferrer, B., 2012. L’unionisme federalista presenta els seus intel·lectuals. Nació Digital, 17 Octo­ber 2012. http://www.naciodigital.cat/noticia/47881/unionisme/federalista/presenta/seus/intellectuals  (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Financial Times, 2014. Spain Must Steer Away from a Collision Course. Madrid Needs to ActFast Over the Catalonia Separatist Question. FT View, 5 October 2014.  (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Financial Times, 2016. Spain’s Constitutional Court Backs Crackdown on Catalan Officials.Ruling Confirms Law Allowing Suspension of Pro-independence Politicians, 3 November2016. (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Flamini, R ., 2013. Scotland’s Independence Bid. History, Prospects, Challenges, World Affairs 176 (1), 57-63. 
Fusi, J.P., 1985. Los nacionalismos en Espana 1900-1936 (Notas para una discusión), in Nacio­nalismo y regionalismo en Espana, Córdoba, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Diputación Provincial: 55-67. 
García, C., 2012. Nationalism, Identity, and Fan Relationship Building in Barcelona FootballClub. International Journal of Sport Communication 5, 1-15. 
Generalitat de Catalunya, 1979. Statute of Autonomy. Barcelona. http://web.gencat.cat/sites/web/en/generalitat/estatut/estatut1979/  (accessed 1 Decem­ber 2016). 
Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006. Statute of Autonomy. Barcelona. http://web.gencat.cat/sites/web/en/generalitat/estatut/estatut2006/ (accessed 1 Decem­ber 2016). 
Gillespie, R ., 2015. Between Accommodation and Contestation. The Political Evolution ofBasque and Catalan Nationalism. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 21 (1), 3-23. 
Girones i Soler, R ., 2015. El tractament de l’independentisme a l’agenda mediatica i pública catala­na (2012-2014). Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. http://ddd.uab.cat/pub/tfg/2015/137999/TFG_Raquel_Girones_Soler.pdf (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Gisbert, J., 2014. Artur Mas firma el decreto de convocatoria de la consulta del 9-N. La Vanguar­dia, 27 September 2014.http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20140927/54415477543/artur-mas-convoca­consulta.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
M. STRUbEll Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016) 
Globedia, 2014. Corrupción en el Ejército, el libro ‘Un paso al frente’ y una denuncia de unCoronel sobre Cataluna dan de que pensar a todos. 19 September 2014.http://es.globedia.com/corrupcion-ejercito-libro-paso-frente-denuncia-coronel-catalu­na-pensar (accessed 12 October 2016). 
González, G. & Cué, C., 2016. La justicia catalana avala juzgar a Artur Mas por desobediencia yprevaricación. El Mundo, 15 September 2015.http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2016/09/15/57da7b33468aebcd3a8b4642.html(accessed 12 October 2016). 
Griffiths, R . D., Guillén Alvarez, P. & Martinez i Coma, F., 2015. Between the Sword and the Wall. Spain’s Limited Options for Catalan Secessionism. Nations and Nationalism 21 (1),43-61. 
Guibernau, M., 2012. The Rise of Secessionism in Catalonia has Emerged out of the Willto Decide the Region’s Political Destiny as a Nation. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46010/ 
Guibernau, M., 2014a. Catalan Secessionism. Young People’s Expectations and PoliticalChange. The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 49 (3), 106-117. 
Guibernau, M., 2014b. Secessionism in Catalonia. After Democracy. Ethnopolitics 12 (4), 368­
393. 
Guibernau, M., Rocher, F. & Casanas Adam, E., 2014. Introduction. A Special Section onSelf-Determination and the Use of Referendums. Catalonia, Quebec and Scotland. Inter­national Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 27 (1), 1-3. 
Guntermann, E., 2013. Can Secession be a Rational Choice? Explaining Support for the Inde­pendence of Catalonia. At the 71st Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Asso­ciation, 13 April 2013. NSMhttp://www.ericguntermann.com/docs/guntermann2013.pdf (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Harrington, T., 2016. Catalonia’s Rocky Road to Independence. Cold Type, December 2016: 44-48. http://www.coldtype.net/assets.16/pdf/CT129.December2016.pdf (accessed 1 Decem­ber 2016). 
Hopkin, J., 2012. Catalonia’s Election Result Reflects the Fragmented and Divided Nature ofthe Pro-independence Majority. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/49599 (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Jefatura del Estado, 2015. Ley Orgánica 2/1979, de 3 de octubre, del Tribunal Constitucional(última modificación: 17 de octubre de 2015).https://www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/1979/BOE-A-1979-23709-consolidado.pdf (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Juliana, E., 2008. “El PP es visto como anticatalán; disparate que debemos arreglar”. La Van­guardia, 29 June 2008. http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20080629/53490849854/el-pp-es-visto-como­anticatalan-disparate-que-debemos-arreglar.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Koopmans, R ., (2004). Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention.In Snow, D. A.; Soule, S.A.; Kriesi,H. eds. The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 19-46. 
Krisch, N., 2012. Catalonia’s Independence. A Reply to Joseph Weiler. EJIL:Talk! The blog of the European Journal of International Law. http://www.ejiltalk.org/catalonias-indepence-a-reply-to-joseph-weiler/ (accessed 12 October 2016). 
La Sexta, 2016. Las pruebas que demostrarían que Xavier Trias habría tenido tres cuentas enSuiza. 23 May 2016.http://www.lasexta.com/noticias/nacional/xavier-trias-habria-tenido-doce-millones-de­
M. STRUbEll The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016) 
euros-en-tres-cuentas-en-suiza_20160523574306576584a8f86262d222.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
La Vanguardia, 2014. Margallo afirma que Catalunya “vagaría por el espacio” si se independiza.10 March 2014. http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20140310/54402947586/margallo-una-cataluna­independiente-estaria-excluida-de-la-ue-durante-siglos.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
La Vanguardia, 2015. Rajoy emprende el recurso al TC: “La unidad de Espana es sagrada”. 9 November 2015. http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20151109/54438733812/rajoy-recurso-tc-cata­lunya-desconectar.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
La Vanguardia, 2016a. Segundo archivo de la causa de las fotos del DNI de 33 jueces soberanis­tas publicadas por ‘La Razón’. La Vanguardia, 28 April 2016.http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20160428/401422982994/segundo-archivo­fotos-dni-jueces-soberanistas-la-razon.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
La Vanguardia, 2016b. El comisario Villarejo revela ante el juez la existencia de una ‘OperaciónCatalunya’. 6 July 2016.http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20160706/403005854115/comisario-villarejo­juez-operacion-catalunya.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Lago, I., Montero, J. R . & Torcal, M., 2007. The 2006 Regional Election in Catalonia: Exit,Voice, and Electoral Market Failures. South European Society & Politics 12 (2), 221-235. 
Lázaro, F., 2016. La Policía documentó la cuenta suiza del ex alcalde de Barcelona Xavier Trias. El Mundo, 23 May 2016.http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2016/05/22/5742062822601d302c8b4646.html(accessed 12 October 2016). 
Lineira, R ., Cetra, D., 2015. The Independence Case in Comparative Perspective. The Political Quarterly 86 (2), 257–264. 
Lluch, J., 2014. Visions of Sovereignty.  Nationalism and Accommodation in Multinational Democ­racies. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia. 
Manso, J., Cruz, M., Núnez, F. & Sánchez, R ., 2015. .Cuáles serían las consecuencias de unaCataluna independiente?. El Mundo, 27 September 2015.http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/09/26/5605b06446163ff3208b45a3.html(accessed 12 October 2016). 
Maqueda, A., 2013. Cinco razones por las que Cataluna no puede ser la Suiza del Mediterráneo.Voxpópuli, 12 September 2013.http://www.vozpopuli.com/economia-y-finanzas/Cataluna-Espana-Suiza_0_623637652.html (accessed 12 October 2016).
Maqueda, A ., 2015. Las razones por las que Espana no estaría obligada a pagar las pensiones deuna Cataluna segregada. Voxpópuli, 25 September 2015.http://www.vozpopuli.com/economia-y-finanzas/Cataluna-Pensiones-Sahara_0_846815341.html(accessed 12 October 2016). 
Marinzel, A., 2014. Catalonia: The Quest for Independence from Spain. Senior Honors Project. Paper 39. John Carroll University.http://collected.jcu.edu/honorspapers/39 (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Martí, D., 2014. Dealing with the Secession Threat: The Strategies of the Spanish and Brit­ish Governments Compared. At The ECPR General Conference, Glasgow, 3-6 September 2014. https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/77503f3b-eef7-4cb8-a480-afe2ca516b88.pdf(accessed 12 October 2016). 
Martí, D. & Cetra, D., 2016. The 2015 Catalan Election. A de Facto Referendum on Indepen­dence? Journal of Regional & Federal Studies 26 (1), 107-119. 
M. STRUbEll Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016) 
Martín, S. & Camon, D., 2014. Informe: L’espiral del silenci a analisi. La pluralitat ideologica enl’eix nacional a les tertúlies catalanes i espanyoles. Media.cat. http://www.media.cat/2014/11/06/informe-l%E2%80%99espiral-del-silenci-a-analisi/(accessed 12 October 2016). 
Martínez Riera, M. & Zubiaga, M., 2014. Nation and State Building as Collective Action: AComparative Analysis of Mechanisms and Processes in Catalonia and the Basque Coun­try. In Bretones, M. T., Charry, C. A . & Pastor, J. (eds.) Anuari del Conflicte Social. Obser­vatori del Conflicte Social - Universitat de Barcelona, 1-36. 
McCoy, S., 2015. 29 páginas: el último legado de Botín, con aroma catalán, agita el Santander.El Confidencial, blog, 8 June 2015.http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/mercados/valor-anadido/2015-06-08/29-paginas-el­ultimo-legado-de-botin-con-aroma-catalan-agita-el-santander_873511/ (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Medina, I. & Molins, J. M., 2014. Small and Medium Enterprises and the Independence ofCatalonia. In PSA 64th Annual International Conference, 14-16 April 2014, Manchester.http://dc-10751-711240033.eu-west-1.elb.amazonaws.com/sites/default/files/conferen­ce/papers/2014/Medina%26Molins_PSA2014.pdf (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Medir, L., 2015. Understanding Local Democracy in Catalonia: From Formally Institutionali­zed Processes to Self-organized Social Referenda on Independence. International Journal of Iberian Studies 28 (2-3), 267-281. 
Mezcua, U. & Miranda, I., 2013. Diez cosas que dejaría de disfrutar una Cataluna independien­te. ABC, 9 November 2014. http://www.abc.es/espana/20141109/abci-motivos-cataluna-contra-independencia­201411070925.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 2013. Consecuencias económicas de una hipotética independen­cia de Cataluna.13 March 2013. http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/ElMinisterioInforma/Paginas/Noticias/20130313_MINISTERIO7.aspx (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 2014. Por la convivencia democratica. 5 March 2014. http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/ElMinisterioInforma/Paginas/Noticias/20140206_MINISTERIO1.aspx (accessed 12 October 2016). In English: Catalonia in Spain. For Democratic Co-existence. Ministerio de Asuntos Exterio­res, Madrid. http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/Multimedia/Publicaciones/Documents/Porlaconvivencia/por%20la%20convivencia%20democratica%20eng.pdf(accessed 12 October 2016). 
Molina, I. & Otero-Iglesias, M., 2015. Catalonia Torn in Two. Politico, Europe Edition. 2 October 2015. http://www.politico.eu/article/catalonia-torn-in-two-spain-barcelona-independence­scotland-referendum/ (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Moreno, L., 1988. Scotland and Catalonia. The Path to Home Rule. In The Scottish government yearbook.http://www.scottishgovernmentyearbooks.ed.ac.uk/record/23014/1/1988_11_Scotlan-dandCatalonia.pdf (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Monés i Pujol-Busquets, J., 1988. La Ilustración en Espana. Algunas precisiones sociolingüís­ticas sobre la escolarización. Revista de Educación, Centro de Investigación y Documenta­ción Educativa, Ministerio de Educación, 421-441. https://sede.educacion.gob.es/publiventa/d/512/19/0 (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Montero, D. & Rendueles, L., 2013. Diez millones contra la independencia. Interviú, 5 April 2013. http://www.inter viu.es/reportajes/articulos/diez-millones-contra-la-independencia(accessed 12 October 2016). 
77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
M. STRUbEll The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016) 
Munoz, J. & Tormos, R ., 2015. Economic Expectations and Support for Secession in Catalonia.Between Causality and Rationalization. European Political Science Review 7 (2), 315-341. 
Nació Digital, 2015. ICV-EUiA es manté ferma en contra de Societat Civil Catalana. Nació Digi­tal, 27 March 2015. http://www.naciodigital.cat/noticia/84707/icv-euia/es/mant/ferma/contra/societat/civil/catalana (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Nagel, K .-J., 2001. Catalan ‘nation-building’ and the Transition to Democracy in Spain. Scottish Affairs 37 (2), 122-136. 
Noguer, M., 2013. La tercera vía vence al independentismo. El País, 3 November 2013. http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2013/11/02/catalunya/1383418112_808082.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Orriols, L. & Rodon, T., 2016. The 2015 Catalan Election. The Independence Bid at the Polls.South European Society and Politics 21 (3), 359-381. 
Ortega y Gasset, J., 2009 [1920]. Espana invertebrada. Colección Austral. Madrid, Ed. Espa­sa-Calpe. 
Oskam, J., 2014. A New State in Europe? Scenarios for Catalan Self-determination. Futures, 64: 51–60. 
Paço, S., 2015. Secession and EU Membership. Is an EU Member State Secessionist TerritoryAutomatically within EU after Archiving its Independence? Academicus International Sci­entific Journal VI (12), 147-154. 
Pareja, P., (2016). El ‘choque de trenes’ marca el inicio del curso político en Cataluna. El Espanol, 25 August 2016.http://www.elespanol.com/espana/politica/20160824/150235713_0.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Payne, S., 1971. Catalan and Basque Nationalism. Journal of Contemporary History 6 (1), 15-33,35-51. 
Postdigital (2016). El ‘sí’ a la independencia ganaría en Cataluna según una encuesta. Postdigi­tal.es. 22 July 2016.http://postdigital.es/2016/07/22/si-independencia-ganaria-en-cataluna-p23317/(accessed 12 October 2016). 
Petithomme, M. & Fernandez Garcia, A., 2013. Catalonian Nationalism in Spain’s Time of Crisis.From Asymmetrical Federalism to Independence? The Federal Idea, Quebec. http://ideefederale.ca/documents/Catalonia.pdf (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Rajoy, 2014. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados. Pleno y Diputación Permanente 189, 19 March 2014, 5. http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L10/CONG/DS/PL/DSCD-10-PL -189.PDF (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Requejo, F. & Nagel, K .-J., (eds.) 2014. Politics of Religion and Nationalism. Federalism, Consocia­tionalism and Secession. Routledge, London and New York. 
Rincón, R ., 2015. El Poder Judicial suspende tres anos al juez de la Constitución catalana. El País, 26 February 2015.http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/02/26/actualidad/1424947872_361206.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Rico, G., 2012. The 2010 regional election in Catalonia: a multilevel account in an age of eco­nomic crisis. South European Society and Politics 17 (2), 217-238. 
Rico, G. & Lineira, R ., 2014. Bringing Secessionism into the Mainstream. The 2012 RegionalElection in Catalonia. South European Society and Politics 19 (2), 257-280. 
Rodrigo, J. (2008). Our Fatherland was Full of Weeds. Violence during the Spanish Civil Warand the Franco Dictatorship. In M. Baumeister, S. Schüler-Springorum (eds.) ‘If you toler­
RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016 
M. STRUbEll Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016) 
ate this’: The Spanish Civil War in the Age of Total War. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt / New 
York, 135-153. 

Román, D., 2014. Catalan TV Network Reflects Separatist Fervor. Wall Street Journal, 8 January 2014.http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304244904579276521794131700  (accessed 12 October 2016). 
RTVE, 2012. Aznar: Espana sólo podría romperse si Cataluna sufriera antes su propia rupturacomo sociedad. RTVE, 25 October 2012. http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20121025/aznar-espana-solo-podria-romperse-si-catalu­na-sufriera-antes-su-propia-ruptura-como-sociedad/571569.shtml (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Rubio Llorente, F., 2014. Despropósitos. La Vanguardia, 29 September 2014.http://www.lavanguardia.com/opinion/articulos/20140929/54416430215/despropo­sitos-francisco-rubio-llorente-opi.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Rueda, F., 2013. El plan del CNI para evitar la independencia de Cataluna. Tiempo, 24 January 2013. http://www.tiempodehoy.com/espana/el-plan-del-cni-para-evitar-la-independencia-de­cataluna (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Ruiz Coll, M. A., 2015. Esta es la prueba de que Artur Mas era beneficiario de una cuenta enLiechtenstein. Ok Diario, 12 October 2015. http://okdiario.com/investigacion/2015/10/12/prueba-de-que-artur-mas-beneficia­rio-de-cuenta-liechtenstein-9124 (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Ruiz-Huerta, J., 2015. Spanish Decentralization and Fiscal Federalism. In Pola, G. (ed.), Princi­ples and Practices of Fiscal Autonomy. Experiences, Debates and Prospects. Ashgate, Farnham, 185-202. 
Runde, D., 2015. Catalonia and the Costs of Independence, Forbes, April 8, 2015.http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielrunde/2015/04/08/catalonia-independence-artur­mas/ (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Sáez Mateu, F., 2016. Antes corrupta que rota. Ara, 28 June 2016. http://www.ara.cat/opinio/ferran-saez-mateu-antes-corrupta-que-rota_0_1604239587. html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Sala, F., 2015. El CNI Espanol va contractar una empresa d’ hackers internacionals per boico­tejar el 9N a Catalunya. 7 July 2015.http://ferransala.com/el-cni-espanol-va-contractar-una-empresa-dhackers-internaciona­ls-per-boicotejar-el-9n-a-catalunya/  (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Sallés, Q., 2016a. El Ejército envía un centenar de blindados a Catalunya. La Vanguardia, 13 March 2016. http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20160313/40405981691/ejercito-blindados­catalunya.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Sallés, Q., 2016b. Puigdemont pide ayuda por carta a Naciones Unidas. La Vanguardia, 11 October 2016. http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20161010/41902219422/carles-puigdemont­naciones-unidas-ayuda-proces-catalan-carta.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Serrano, I., 2008. The State’s Response to the Catalan Question. An Emerging Ethnic Com­ponent in Contemporary Spanish Nationalism? At 18th Annual ASEN Conference, April 2008, London School of Economics. 
Serrano, I., 2010. La complexitat dels espais sociopolítics de Catalunya: els tres cercles del sobi­ranisme. Eines per a l’esquerra nacional, Núm. 11, La nova immigració: 33-47.http://www.raco.cat/index.php/Eines/article/view/172101/224449 (accessed 12 Octo­ber 2016). 
Serrano, I., 2014a. Secession in Catalonia: Beyond Identity? Ethnopolitics 12 (4), 406-409. 
77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
M. STRUbEll The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016) 
Serrano, I., 2014b. The Evolution of the Political Discourse in Catalonia 2003-2014: From Self-government to Self-determination. Open University of Catalonia.https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ivan_Serrano2/publication/267858687_The_evo­lution_of_the_political_discourse_in_Catalonia_2003-2014_From_Self-government_to_Self-determination/links/545b4ac70cf2c46f6643f920.pdf (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Ser vimedia/InfoCatólica, 2013. El portavoz de la CEE califica de moralmente inaceptable einadmisible la consulta independentista en Cataluna. InfoCatólica, 13 December 2013. http://infocatolica.com/?t=noticia&cod=19410 (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Shafir, G., 1995. Immigrants and Nationalists. Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia,the Basque Country, Latvia, and Estonia. State University of New York Press, New York. 
Societat Civil Catalana, 2014. Consecuencias económicas de una hipotética secesión de Cataluna. 24 pp.https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/assets/documents/informe-economia-hipotetica-secesi­on.pdf (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Sorens, J., 2016. Testimony. In House of Representatives, 2016. U.S. Policy towards NationalSelf-Determination Movements. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia,and Emerging Threats of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,114th Congress, 2nd Session, March 15, 2016. Serial No. 114–152. http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20160315/104672/HHRG-114-FA14-Wstate­SorensJ-20160315.pdf (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Strubell, M., 2008. Bulls and donkeys. National identity and symbols in Catalonia and Spain. At9th Annual Joan Gili Memorial Lecture, Anglo-Catalan Society Annual Conference. Abertawe (Swansea). 
Strubell, M., 2011. W hen sticking out your tongue is even ruder! In Stickel, G. (ed.) National, Regional and Minority Languages in Europe. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 23-34. 
Strubell, M., 2013. Catalonia’s self-determination process: a bottom-up movement?. At Semi­nar “Self-Determination Processes in the EU”. UCL European Institute, London.http://miquelstrubell.blogspot.com/2013/10/ucl.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Strubell, T., 2011. What Catalans Want. Catalonia Press, Ashfield (MA). Sample:http://www.whatcatalanswant.cat/W hatCatalansWant_Sample.pdf (accessed 12 Octo­ber 2016). 
Tribunal Constitucional, 2010. Sentencia 31/2010, de 28 de junio de 2010. Recurso de incons­titucionalidad 8045-2006. Interpuesto por noventa y nueve Diputados del Grupo Parla­mentario Popular del Congreso en relación con diversos preceptos de la Ley Orgánica6/2006, de 19 de julio, de reforma del Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluna. Boletín Oficial del Estado 172, 16 July 2010, 1 – 491.http://boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2010-11409 (accessed 1 December 2016) 
Vázquez, A., 2015. Els 58 assumptes catalans pendents de resoldre. El TC acumula recursoscontra lleis de la Generalitat o de l’Estat posteriors al 2005. Ara, 9 March 2015. http://www.ara.cat/tema_del_dia/assumptes-catalans-pendents-resoldre_0_1317468271.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Vejvoda, I., 2016. Testimony. In House of Representatives, 2016. U.S. Policy towards NationalSelf-Determination Movements. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia,and Emerging Threats of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,114th Congress, 2nd Session, March 15, 2016. Serial No. 114–152.http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20160315/104672/HHRG-114-FA14-Wstate­VejvodaI-20160315.pdf (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Vidal-Aparicio, O. 2012. La dubtosa legitimitat de la constitució sota l’amenaça militar. Vilaweb, 19 October 2012. http://www.vilaweb.cat/mailobert/4048474/oriol-vidal-aparicio-dubtosa-legitimitat-cons­titucio-sota-lamenaca-militar.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
M. STRUbEll Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016) 
Vidal-Aparicio, O. 2015. Catalonia and the United States: Two Lockean Revolutions 240Years Apart. Blog entry. 21 April 2015.https://catalunyapqespanya.wordpress.com/2015/04/21/catalonia-and-the-united-sta­tes-two-lockean-revolutions-240-years-apart/ (accessed 12 October 2016). 
31
Vila, D. 2015. Rajoy admet ara que pagara les pensions en cas de DUI. El Punt Avui. 24 Sep­tember 2015. http://www.elpuntavui.cat/politica/article/17-politica/898133-rajoy-admet-ara-que­pagara-les-pensions-en-cas-de-dui.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Vilaweb. 2014. La constitució no impedeix el referendum, segons una trentena de jutges.Vilaweb, 13 February 2014.http://www.vilaweb.cat/noticia/4173148/20140213/constitucio-impedeix-referen­dum-trentena-jutges.html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Weiler, J. 2012. Catalonian Independence and the European Union. EJIL:Talk! The blog of the European Journal of International Law.http://www.ejiltalk.org/catalonian-independence-and-the-european-union/http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/23/4/909.full.pdf+html (accessed 12 October 2016). 
Williams, P. R ., 2016. Creating a Strategic Framework for Addressing the Conflict betweenSovereignty and Self-Determination: Earned Sovereignty. In House of Representatives,2016. U.S. Policy towards National Self-Determination Movements. Hearing before theSubcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats of the Committee on ForeignAffairs, House of Representatives, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, March 15, 2016. SerialNo. 114–152. http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20160315/104672/HHRG-114-FA14­Wstate-WilliamsP-20160315.pdf (accessed 12 October 2016). 

notes 





1 	“Pondra (el corregidor) el mayor cuydado en introducir la lengua castellana cuyo fin dará lasprovidencias más templadas i disimuladas pera que se consiga el efecto sin que se note el cuydado.” 
2 
“Porque no se le dé vueltas: Espana es una cosa hecha por Castilla, y hay razones para ir
sospechando que, en general, sólo cabezas castellanas tienen órganos adecuados para percibir el
gran problema de la Espana integral.” 

TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016, p. 33–66 


The EU professes to have a positive policy towards RMLs, as enshrined in Article 22 ofthe European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Since the beginning of the 1980s the thenEuropean Economic Community has shown some awareness of the issue and has tried tosupport RMLs in a variety of ways. This support, nevertheless, has decreased over time, inparticular since 2000. The goal of this article is to provide a detailed financial assessment ofEU support to RMLs from 1994 to 2006 and to present the main trend in RMLs supportafter 2006. This article, based on official data, shows that the amounts concerned, even during the relatively more favourable 1990s, have remained small. We also conclude thatRML -specific programmes and actions (as opposed to mainstreaming support) have beenmuch more successful at channelling resources towards RMLs. We conclude the article bydiscussing the most important trends in RML support after 2006, showing that supportfrom the EU in this area has remained modest. 
Keywords: Regional and minority languages, European Union, language policy evaluation, costs. 

EU se ponaša s pozitivno politiko do regionalnih in manjšinskih jezikov, kar določa tudi
22. člen Evropske listine o temeljnih pravicah. Že v zgodnjih 80. letih prejšnjega stoletja jetedanja Evropska gospodarska skupnost pokazala določeno občutljivost za to področje, ki paje sčasoma še posebej po letu 2000, precej upadla. Članek prinaša podrobno finančno ocenopodpore EU regionalnim in manjšinskim jezikom v obdobju med letoma 1994 in 2006ter prikaz trenda te podpore po letu 2006. Zneski podpore so bili celo v relativno ugodnih
90. letih nizki, specifični programi in akcije (v nasprotju z uradno podporo) veliko bolj uspešniv zagotavljanju sredstev. Članek zaključujemo z obravnavo trendov po letu 2006, ki kažejo, daje EU manjšinskim in regionalnim jezikom namenjala le skromna sredstva. 
Ključne besede: regionalni in manjšinski jeziki, Evropska unija, evaluacija jezikovne politike, stroški. 
Correspondence address: Michele Gazzola, Humboldt-Univerisität zu Berlin, Institut für Erzie­hungswissenschaften, Ökonomie und Sprache / Wirtschaftspädagogik, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany, e-mail: gazzola@hu-berlin.de; François Grin, Université de Geneve, Faculté de traduction et d'interprétation,  40 Bd du Pont-d'Arve, CH-1211 Geneve 4, e-mail: francois.grin@unige.ch; Johan Häggman, Chaussee de Wavre 212, boîte 4, B-1050 Ixelles, Belgium, e-mail: johanhaggman@yahoo. com; Tom Moring, Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki, PO Box 16, 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland (visiting address: Snellmanninkatu 12), e-mail: tom.moring@helsinki.fi. 
ISSN 0354-0286 Print/ISSN 1854-5181 Online  © Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja (Ljubljana), http://www.inv.si 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 

According to the official figures published by the European Commission, there aremore than 60 indigenous regional and minority languages (RMLs)1 in Europe,in addition to the 24 official languages of the European Union (EU).2 These languages are spoken by about 40 million people, and in the future the degreeof linguistic diversity in the Union is likely to rise as a result of increasing flowsof new immigrant communities. RMLs have neither working nor official statusin the European Union if they do not also happen to be the official language ofa Member State. It would, however, be misleading to conclude that the absenceof minority languages from the set of the official languages of the EU impliesan absence of Community activity in the field. Generally speaking, the EUprofesses to have a positive policy towards RMLs, as enshrined in Article 22 ofthe Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which states that“the Union respects cultural, religious and linguistic diversity”, and since the beginning of the 1980s the then European Economic Community has shownsome awareness of the issue and has tried to support RMLs in a variety of ways.This support, nevertheless, has decreased over time, in particular since 2000when the budget line that provided regular funding earmarked for RMLs wascancelled, and by the tightening (European Parliament 2016), in 2003-2004, ofconditions imposed on project-based funding to the European Bureau for Lesser-used languages (EBLUL) that was eventually closed in 2010. Nevertheless, after2007 the Lifelong Learning Programme of the EU funded some new networksthat are active in the promotion of RMLs such as the Network for the promotionof linguistic diversity (NPLD), the Federal Union of European Nationalities(FUEN),3 and the Mercator Research Centres. 
The picture, therefore, is neither a rosy nor completely bleak one, making it necessary to provide a historical financial assessment of the extent of EU supportto RMLs. The goal of this article is to provide just such an assessment, drawing on the SMiLE report,4 where SMiLE stands for Support for Minority Languages in Europe (Grin et al. 2003) and updating it with some more recent references.This report, which was commissioned by the EU, represents, to our knowledge,the first complete tally ever made of the different EU sources of support toRMLs and of the amounts involved. Yet its results are still relatively unknown by specialists.5 

Systematic empirical studies of the economic conditions for (minority) lan­guage maintenance with an international perspective are rare. Since seminal works, such as Joshua Fishman’s work on language revitalization (Fishman 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 
1991), comparative research has covered minority language conditions (e.g., the Euromosaic reports I-IV, see Nelde et al. 1996, updated with data on new member states 1999, 2004 and 2009; for revised methodology, see Darquennes et al. 2004). Also language policy issues have been extensively covered since early works by, e.g., Williams (1991), and today several international journals specialise in this field (for an example, focusing particularly on the same geographical region as this article, see European Journal of Language Policy, edited in co-operation with the European Language Council).6 Nevertheless, none of these contributions addresses the question of RMLs support from a financial point of view, pointing out and summarising the amount of resources invested in the promotion of minority languages. 
EU policies in this field have been critically assessed in the literature since a ruling of the European Court of Justice in 1998, requiring a legal base for all types of EU support, was carried out in practice. Efforts to install a legal base for minority language projects were not successful, and the specific budget line for such projects was suppressed in 2001 (see, e.g., Cormack & Hourigan 2007). Also, the European Parliament has passed several resolutions and been confronted with initiatives at different levels on this matter (see Grin et al. 2003, Jones 2013). 
In this context a more strict theoretical and methodological grounding of research on the economic base for language policies was called for, as a result of the spread of policy analysis and evaluation as disciplines aimed at improving the accountability of decision makers and the evaluation of the costs and effectiveness of public policies. The need for economically sound policy analysis in support for political decision-making was particularly urgent in contexts representing the type of linguistic diversity that was – and is – a fundamental characteristic of most of the world, not least Europe. Research focusing specifically on the eco­nomic aspects of language was developed by, e.g., Price (1997), and Grin and Vaillancourt (1997). 
The study that this article draws on is informed by a theoretical approach that builds on empirically informed estimations of how economical investments in language policy outputs delivers outcomes in the form of sustained or increased use of the language in everyday life (see Grin & Vaillancourt 1998). The SMiLE Report represents the only comprehensive effort to place EU funding into such a perspective. Studies with more narrow focus (i.e., Jones 2013) have also informed this article and been helpful in our effort to update our data. 
The aims of this article, nevertheless, are deliberately modest: we do not venture into explanation of how policy analysis theories and methodology can be applied to the study of minority languages (on this point, see Grin 2003). Our chief goal is to provide an information base that at the service of scholars, language planners, and other users as part of broader, yet systematic assessments of the extent of EU support for small languages. The SMiLE Report provides a 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 
suitable basis for this purpose because it departs, both in terms of methodology and results, from the usual emphasis on legal-institutional or sociolinguistic issues. Though necessary, these approaches are not always adequate for guiding the policy-maker who has to choose between policy alternatives, and must therefore understand which specific measures should be adopted in order to implement those choices effectively and cost-effectively. All this underscores the need for an analytical framework that can focus on policy choices, their effects and their costs, which, in turn, calls for a review of the financial amounts involved. 
The figures drawn from the SMiLE Report and discussed in this article, therefore, offer a systematic listing of programmes and actions in favour of RMLs. For the benefit of non-European readers, let is point out that in the context of EU policies, action is not necessarily the same thing as programme. The word action carries two meanings, both of which are significantly different from programme. The first refers to EU activities in the implementation of a given policy, but at a fairly general level. For example, an action can be been undertaken in favour of RMLs, and be embodied in particular programmes. In this sense, action is broader than a specific programme. The second meaning refers, by contrast, to a more specific, limited part of a certain programme. For example, the Erasmus+ programme speaks about key actions promoting different kinds of learning. In this case, therefore, action means a sub-programme, or a budget line within a bigger programme. 
Anyone familiar with the complexity of EU action in any given domain will appreciate the effort to provide a complete list of them, along with the corres­ponding expenditure figures. Identif ying the relevant programmes and actions, and gathering information on the corresponding financial appropriations is a difficult task at the best of times, made harder by the fact that no integrative approach had been attempted so far, whether within the Commission or outside of it, to comprehensively list forms of EU action in favour of RMLs. 
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a general overview of EU interventions in favour of RMLs and of the methodology followed in this article. Section 3 reports on support measures and figures for the 1994-2000 period. Section 4 examines at closer range support measures for the period 2000-2006 – namely, after the suspension of the specific budget line for RMLs. Section 5 provides an overview of the most important initiatives of the EU in supporting RMLs after 2006. Section 6 is devoted to brief concluding remarks. 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 

The first initiative on minority languages adopted by the EU was the Resolution of the European Parliament on a Community Charter of Regional Languagesand Cultures and on a Charter of rights of Ethnic Minorities (OJ C 287 9November 1981). The resolution was authored by Gaetano Arfé MEP; in 1983 a separate budget line was created to provide support to projects particularlybenefiting RMLs. This resolution was followed by different resolutions and own-initiative reports, the most recent one being the European Parliament on RMLsis the European Parliament Resolution on Endangered European Languagesand Linguistic Diversity in the European Union, authored by François Alfonsi and adopted on the 11th September 2013.7 Before 1992 the Commission has had a near monopoly on initiating legislation in the European Communities. TheMaastricht Treaty in 1992 gave the European Parliament an equivalent right.Under Article 192, the Parliament, with an absolute majority of its members, can request that the Commission “submits any appropriate proposal on matterson which it considers that a Community act is required for the purpose of im­plementing this Treaty”. (Corbett et al. 2005: 230-231). Between 1992 and 2015 only 37 resolutions inviting the Commission to submit such proposals have beenadopted by the Parliament, one of them being the legislative own-initiative reportand resolution regional and lesser-used languages 14 July 2003. As a result of the Ebner resolution,8 all funding programmes were opened up to all languages anda Commission portfolio exclusively for multilingualism was created. Generallyspeaking, during the three decades, the EU’s attempt to protect and promote RMLs followed three different directions. 
The first form of EU support to RMLs was the separate budget line (B3­1006 since 1998, and then B3-1000), which from 1983 to 2000 provided fun­ding to projects particularly benefiting RMLs. In 1998, the budget line for RMLswas suspended as a result of a ruling delivered by the Court of Justice.9 The suppression of the budget line for RMLs resulted from legal implications that had nothing to do with RMLs, but this ruling made it clear that the continuationof EU support to particular projects in favour of RMLs – among other EUactions not covered by a legal base – would henceforth explicitly require such a base. In practice, support to projects was allowed to continue for three years,while a legal base was being prepared. The Commission has not been successful in installing a legal base of this kind.
The second form of EU support for RMLs has been through funding forthe setting up of structures to support networking and co-operation between RML communities and projects. The European Bureau for lesser-used langua­ges (EBLUL) was established in 1982 and closed in 2010. The Bureau was an 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 
independent Non-Governmental Organisation working for languages and linguistic diversity. The Bureau had a role of central importance to European net­working in the field of language promotion. The budget line B3-1006 also served
38 to fund EBLUL and the three Mercator Centres (Mercator Education, MercatorLegislation and Mercator Media). These three research and documentationcentres on RMLs still exist, although sometimes under a different label, and they are part to the Mercator network. This network was founded in 1987. Its missionis to connect multilingual communities across Europe, promoting knowledge sharing and facilitating structured exchange of best practice and cutting edgeinitiatives through its programme of activities. The network consists of fivemembers, i.e., the Mercator European Research Centre on Multilingualism andLanguage Learning, Mercator Legislation, Mercator Media, the Research Insti­tute for Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest, andStockholm University. It was funded by the Lifelong Learning Programme ofthe European Union. This programme also contributed to the financing of the Network for the Promotion of Linguistic Diversity. This network was established in 2009, and it is a pan-European government-based institution made up byregional governments but also by some states such as Ireland. Its full members are all governments, whereas its associate members are research centres and non­profit associations. It was created with the support of the European Commission and led by different state and regional governments comprising universities,associations and NGO’s working in the field of language policy and planningfor Constitutional, Regional and Small-State Languages (CRSS) across Europe. Another organisation receiving funding under the Lifelong Learning Programmefor promoting RMLs, as mentioned before, was the Federal Union of EuropeanNationalities. The European Language Equality Network receives funding under Erasmus+ through the Digital Language Diversity Project.Finally, a third form of support to RMLs was offered by including themin projects carried out within a broader framework (a strategy known as main­streaming), along with other (non RML-related) projects fulfilling the require­ments of the programme objectives. In this article, we leave aside the supportinstitutions in order to focus on the two other types of actions. As a first step,it is necessary to understand the structure and the evolution over time of EU programmes that are, to a greater or lesser extent, related to languages. This givesrise to a representation of these programmes on a diagram bearing no less than four dimensions, namely:
•	 
the time period (1994-2000 and 2000-2006); 

•	 
the extent to which the programmes and actions considered are explicitly 


language-related, partly language-related, or non-language related; 
•	 
the languages eligible in each case; 

•	 
and finally, the administrative position of each activity in terms of its 


affiliation to other actions and programmes, in particular Socrates. 



When the type of languages addressed by the programme is mentioned neither in the legal texts nor in the action lines, the classification should rely on the range of languages addressed by the funded projects under each programme. 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 
Our discussion introduces a further distinction between projects directly aimedat RMLs and projects that merely include a partner from an RML community. Asin the SMiLE Report, the former are called A-list projects (for which exhaustive 
40 figures are provided) and the latter B-list projects. 

In order to develop these two lists, the following methodology has been adopted: these lists are based on the official archives of the EU institutions (mainly the Commission), complemented with information received from various actors, such as regional authorities, NGOs and academic institutions. The analysis and description of the allocation of funds focuses on the A-list, that is on projects that are specifically intended to promote RMLs. This listing is not exhaustive, since some of the actors contacted (for example, regional authorities) never answered the requests for information of the authors of the SMiLE report, and project lists received from them are incomplete. For these reasons, budget figures for some projects are missing. Thus, the percentages indicating the share of a programme’s or action’s funding should not be considered as an exact figure. Rather, they constitute an approximation. Another limitation that must be mentioned is that, both in the table and in the commented listing, some RMLs or some regions tend to be overrepresented, while others are underrepresented. This is due to the fact mentioned above that some regional authorities and their EU representations have been very co-operative, while others did not send or simply do not possess information requested. The long list of Basque projects funded under the regional programmes in the A-list (as opposed to the near-absence of other regions) is explained by these constraints. 
The A-list is furthermore divided into projects according to the number of partners, as well as three categories; projects with only RML partners, projects where RML partners form the majority and finally, projects with a minority of partners representing RMLs. The projects are also listed according to their size: there is a category with projects under €30 thousand in turnover, a second group with projects that have a turnover between €30 thousand and €100 thousand and a third and final column with projects with a turnover over €100 thousand. 

This section is divided in three parts in order to reflect three different degrees of inclusion of the language dimension into EU programmes or actions. As shown in Figure 1, a distinction is made between language-related programmes, partly­language-related programmes and non-language-related programmes that have been funding language-related actions. 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 

These programmes are presented in the first section10 from the bottom in Figure 1. 
•	 The Community action for the Promotion and Safeguard of Regional and41 
Minority Languages and Cultures (here referred to as the RML action); 
•	 
The Lingua action (part of Socrates, see below); 

•	 
The Multilingual Information Society programme (or MLIS); 

•	 
Language engineering (LE) and Human Language Technologies (HLT). 


The Community action for the Promotion and Safeguard of Regional andMinority Languages and Cultures was an action targeting specifically thoselanguages traditionally used within the European Union, meaning that dialectsand migrant languages could not apply for funding under this action. As notedbefore, the budget line for RMLs was launched in 1983. In current euros, thisbudget line has increases regularly until 1995, before decreasing from 1996 to 1998; the same holds in real terms, albeit with a slight dip in 1994.11 

Year  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  
€ Mil ­current euros  0.1  0.2  0.34  0.68  0.86  1  1  1.1  2  2.5  3.5  3.5  4  4  3.7  3.412  
€ Mil ­constant euros (1995)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  2.21  2.66  3.66  3.59  4  3.89  3.6  3.27  

Source: Grin et al. (2003: 30). 
a Values in constant Euros are not provided for 1990 or earlier, since the price index series used reaches back to 1991 only. b n.a.= not available 
The RML budget line was replaced by the provisional B3-1000 line for 1999and 2000, in order to fund ongoing projects, but even this line was finallysuppressed because of the failure to install a new legal basis for RMLs actions.The total amount of resources available from the B3-1000 line over this two-year period was €2.5 million. The RML action provided co-financing up to fiftypercent of eligible costs. Considering only the period from 1997 to 2000, theRML action had funded some 392 A-list projects by allocating them the entiretyof the available €9,182,860; thus, the RML action has financed more RML-related projects than the other programmes. It has supported projects in variousfields including education, culture and from general language promotion as wellas conferences on language issues. We shall return in detail on the comparisonbetween the RML action and the other programmes at the end of Section 4 andin Appendix 2. 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 
The Lingua action, on the contrary, was specifically geared to the official
languages of the EU; it included Irish, which was not an official language of the
EU until 2007, Lëtzeburgesh, Icelandic and Norwegian. From the point in time 
42 where it became applicable, this action was open to new Member States and thepre-accession countries participating in the Socrates programme.13 Under the Socrates programme – the most important EU instrument devoted to education (see below) – Lingua was a horizontal measure designed to promote languagelearning by European citizens, also through higher mobility for teachers andlearners. According to Lingua principles, special priority had to be given to lesser used and taught EU languages.Other programmes are directly related to languages, but not linked to any specific group of languages; therefore, both projects concerning official languagesand RMLs were a priori eligible under these programmes. The MultilingualInformation Society (MLIS) programme, concluded in 1999, was devoted to the promotion of linguistic diversity in the information society. About 4.3 percent of the MLIS budget was devoted to A-list projects, and in absolute terms,the programme had funded four RML projects for a total amount of €647,675.Also relevant are the Language engineering (LE) programme, which was a part of the Telematics Applications Programme (TAP) programme (itself a part ofthe Fourth Framework Programme) and the Human Language Technologies(HTL) programme, which was the successor of LE when TAP was replaced and integrated14 into the Information Society Technologies (IST) programme.IST was the largest single programme under the Fifth Framework, and its aimwas to create a user-friendly information society. The HTL action, in particular, concerns the areas of interactivity between human beings and computers,multilingualism in general, and cross-lingual information management. The main figures on the language-related programmes or action for theperiod 1994-2000, can be summarised as follows: 









Languages concerned  Title  Budget line  Period  Initial Budget (€)  
RMLs  Promotion and Safeguard of Regional and Minority Languages and Cultures action  B3 – 1006  1994 – 1998  18,600,000  
B3 – 1000  1999 – 2000  2,500,000  
Official Languages  Lingua  B3 –1001  1995 – 1999  See Socrates I – Tab. A2 ­(no separate budget figures available)  
Any Languages  Multilingual Information Society  B3 – 2004  1996 – 1999  15,000,000  
Language engineering (part of TAP)  B6 – 7111  1994 – 1998  78,000,000  
Human languages technologies (part of IST)  B6 – 6121  1998 – 2002  564,000,000  

Source: adapted from Grin et al. 2003. 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 
Except for the RML budget line, these programmes supported any languagesand were not, in fact, principally devoted to RMLs. In most cases, the totalamount financing RML-related projects was a very small percentage of the total (see Table A1 in the Appendix 1). This is a point to which we shall return later. 43 

These programmes are presented in the second section from the bottom in Figure 1.
•	 
European multilingual radio and television services; 

•	 
Open and Distance Learning (an action under Socrates); 

•	 
Others actions under Socrates; 

•	 
The Youth for Europe, Leonardo da Vinci, Connect, Kaleidoscope, Raphael,


Ariane, INFO 2000, Media II and Philoxenia programmes. 
As we can see from Figure 1, there is no partly-language-related programmespecifically designed to include RMLs. This does not mean, however, thatRMLs are excluded from participating in programmes targeting any language.Before turning to the latter, let us briefly consider those partly language-relatedprogrammes designed for official languages only.
The European multilingual radio and television services programme was crea­ted to support European initiatives in the domain of media with a multilingualdimension. The programme was suspended in 1998 because there was no legalbasis for this budget line.
Open and Distance Learning (ODL) was an action in the first phase of theSocrates programme. ODL, which was intended to promote the use of multi­media in education, turned out to be difficult to implement across the EUbecause of the limited spread of information and communication technologiesin some countries. 
Socrates has already been mentioned in relation to the Lingua action; moredetail on Socrates is necessary at this point in order to clarify the links betweenpartly-language-related programmes or actions devoted to official languagesonly, and those open to any languages. Socrates is the EU programme thataims to promote co-operation, equal opportunities and mobility between theMember States in the fields of education at every level. Socrates comprises severalactions and gives special attention to the teaching of foreign languages, which isassumed to play an important role for mutual understanding between MemberStates. The first phase of Socrates, Socrates I, started in 1995 and continued until1999. The second phase, Socrates II, was set up for the 2000–2005 period. Inthis subsection, we focus on Socrates I, which included the following actions:Lingua, ODL, Erasmus, Comenius, Arion and Adult Education. The first twohaving already been described, we now discuss the others. 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 
Erasmus is the main EU intervention in the field of higher education. It is
mainly devoted to the exchange of university students and teachers. As regards
languages, universities can use their Erasmus block grant to finance language 
44 preparation courses for participating students. Minority languages are eligiblewhen they are used by the host university. Therefore, if RMLs are used as a medium of education, Erasmus can be a useful source of support for RMLs.However, none of the A-list projects was funded through Erasmus.Comenius is an action focusing on school education, particularly on inter­cultural education through transnational projects. It is aimed at all membersof the education community. As to languages in general, projects limited toofficial languages must involve two schools from two European countries andfocus on the learning of foreign languages, with a priority for less widely usedand taught languages. Two A-list projects have been funded under the first phaseof Comenius (1995-1999) for a total amount of €230 thousand. As to RMLs,Comenius, as well as Lingua have sponsored projects in relation mainly witheducational institutions, such as schools or even universities, or with authorities responsible for education, often regional or local ones. In general, Comenius isrelevant to RMLs where educational institutions teach minority languages oruse them as a medium of instruction. Comenius had also funded thirteen B-list projects to improve the situation of the Roma, though in socio-economic ratherthan linguistic terms.Arion is an action that supports the meeting of decision-makers and spe­cialists in the field of education. These visits and the exchange of experience havealso concerned language teaching. The relevance of Arion for RML promotionlies in the fact that the RMLs that are taught or otherwise used in the educationsystem are eligible.Finally, Socrates I also included the Adult Education programme, which aimed to foster the European dimension through the cultural and social educationof adults. In 1997-1998, the Adult Education programme has funded two A-listprojects for a total of €201,605. Adult Education was renamed Grundtvig underSocrates II. In recent years, these programmes have been merged in the largeErasmus+ Programme.Several other programmes, even if not directly related to languages, couldinclude a language dimension both for official languages and, though infre­quently, for RMLs.Leonardo da Vinci (now part of Erasmus+) was a programme promoting translational initiatives in vocational training in order to support Member States’policies. Improving language skills and cross-cultural understanding within theframework of education and professional training was one of the main aims ofLeonardo. Between 1995 and 2000, Leonardo funded two A-list projects, wherethe recipient institutions were tertiary-level institutions providing vocationaltraining. Leonardo also funded at least two B-list projects to improve the situation of the Roma. 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 
Between 1995 and 1999, Youth for Europe (YFE III) was in its third phase.At the time of writing, YFE was an action under the broader Youth programme.Youth for Europe was a programme designed for young people aged 15 to 25from the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA) Member States, as well as 45 applicant states15. The aim of Youth for Europe was to encourage youth mobility,voluntary work and non-formal education in order to increase the awarenessof European citizenship. Youth for Europe can be used to promote youthexchanges among RMLs communities or associations. Projects with a linguisticor intercultural dimension receive priority.
Media II (1996–2000), a new edition of Media (now part of Creative Europe), was the EU programme supporting the European audiovisual industry. Respectfor linguistic and cultural diversity in European audiovisual production was oneof the objectives of Media II. In this respect, “particular attention was given tothe specific needs of countries with low production capacity and/or a restrictedgeographical and linguistic area” (Grin et al. 2003: 53).
Three EU programmes have been devoted to culture: Raphael, Kaleidoscope,and Ariane. These programmes respectively concerned cultural heritage, cul­tural life and, finally, books and reading. From 1996 to 1999, Kaleidoscope hasfunded only one A-list project – an itinerant festival in the Occitan-speakingregions – representing 0.27 per cent of the programme budget, that is, €70thousand. By contrast, Ariane had funded 31 A-list projects between 1997 and1999, amounting to 0.59 per cent of its budget, that is, a total of €177,647.
Connect was a link-programme connecting European programmes in diffe­rent domains, such as training, education, innovation, culture, research and newtechnologies. In 1999, Connect funded two A-list projects, one in the domain ofculture, while the second can be classified as a media project. The correspondingtotal expenditure was 1.7 per cent of the budget, that is, €262,380.
In concluding this paragraph dedicated to the EU programmes that arepartly related to (any) language, let us also mention the existence of the INFO200016 and Philoxenia17 programmes.
The total amount of funding for partly language-related programmes oractions for the 1994-2000 period is provided in Appendix 1 (Table A2). 

These programmes are presented in the third section from the bottom inFigure1. We have to consider the programmes financed by the Structural Funds.Together with the Cohesion Fund, the Structural Funds represent the secondlargest European item of expenditure after agriculture. The Structural Funds andthe Cohesion Fund were created in order to implement the drive for economicand social cohesion. There are four Structural Funds: 
•	 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 

M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 

•	 
European Social Fund (ESF) 

•	 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) 

•	 
European Maritime & Fisheries Fund (EMFF) 


During the period examined here, structural funds financed three different kindsof interventions: 
1. 	
interventions related to priority objectives18: over the 1994-1999 period,there were seven priority objectives, while from 2000 they were consolidatedinto just three; 

2. 	
interventions related to Community initiatives: over the 1994-1999 period,there were 13 ongoing initiatives, while after 2000 just four remained, namely, Interreg III, Leader +, Equal, and Urban II; 

3. 	
interventions related to innovative measures. 


Even if such programmes do not concern languages, they can provide useful complements to support linguistic diversity. In particular, ESF financial supportcan be used for cultural projects – if they contribute to job creation – andtherefore indirectly to languages. The projects related to priority objectives financed by ERDF, for instance, could assist in the maintenance of RMLsthrough the development of infrastructures for tourism, which could, in turn, slow down out-migration from RML-speaking areas.
Two programmes are worth noting within Community initiatives, namely,Interreg II and Leader II. The Interreg programme, funded by the ERDF, was adopted in 1990 and renewed and renamed Interreg II for the 1994-1999 period.The main aim of this programme was to support cross-border cooperation andstimulate interregional integration. With respect to languages, the promotion of language learning and regional cultures was taken into consideration underInterreg II. Over the 1996-1999 period, Intereg II has funded 73 A-list projectsfor a total amount of €1,204,092 – that is, 0.03 per cent of its budget. In 2000, it has funded one A-list project, for which cost figures are not available.
The Leader programme, funded by the EAGGF Guidance section, was launched in 1991, and renewed and renamed Leader II for the 1994-1999 period. Leader II was designed to help rural development. In 1997, Leader II hasfunded one A-list project, but no budget figures are available. As to B-list projects, Leader has sponsored several projects in the so-called Celtic fringe, but thiscould at best promote RMLs indirectly, since the RMLs projects within Interregand Leader mainly aim at improving infrastructure and living conditions, also in RML-speaking areas.
The total amount of funding for non-language related programmes in the1994-2000 period is provided in Appendix 1 (Table A3). The characteristics of the projects that are directly aimed at the promotion and development of RMLsfrom 1997 to 2000 are presented in Appendix 2. 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 

Many of the programmes already presented in the preceding section were simply relabelled and renamed for the 2000-2006 period. However, crucial differences47 are particularly relevant to RMLs. 

There were three such programmes: 
•	 
the Lingua action; 

•	 
the Human Language Technologies (HLT) action; 

•	 
the European Year of Languages 2001 (EYL 2001). 


As shown in Figure 1, there was no longer any programme specifically related toRMLs from 2000 onwards. Following the 1998 ruling of the European Court ofJustice, and after the 1999-2000 transition period, no legal basis was providedfor programmes or actions specifically devoted to RMLs. However, somesignificant initiatives19 could ultimately encourage the re-introduction of someform of direct support for RMLs. At the end of this section, we shall return indetail to the effects that the suppression of the RMLs action line has had on thedistribution of funds for RML-related projects.
Let us now turn to the programmes or actions that concerned official lan­guages only. This category included only the Lingua action, but whereas, underSocrates I, Lingua was a horizontal measure, under Socrates II, the new Linguawas an objective of Socrates II as a whole, and of the Erasmus, Comenius andGrundtvig actions in particular. In other words, Lingua completed and enrichedthe measures to promote language learning that were present in the other actionsof the Socrates II programme. The new Lingua action was designed to encourage and support linguistic diversity throughout the EU and to help improve languageteaching and learning. It also strove to promote access to lifelong language-learning opportunities appropriate to each individual’s needs. Lingua could berelevant also for RMLs, considering that many of them were official languages ofnew Member States and of the pre-accession countries. The new Lingua action funded one education-related A-list project for the amount of €460 thousand.
The Human Language Technologies (HTL) action and the European Yearof Languages 2001, by contrast, did not target any particular group of languages.However, they were open both to national-level official languages and to RMLs.HLT, which was a part of the Information Society Technologies programme-IST, has already been mentioned in the preceding section. In principle, therefore,IST-HLT offered possibilities for research in relation to RMLs. EYL 2001 wasan action organized jointly by the European Union and the Council of Europein 2001, with some 45 countries participating. The implementation of EYL 2001 in the EU and in the EEA was under the responsibility of the Commission. 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 
The aims of the EYL 2001 were to celebrate European linguistic diversity, toprovide information about resources for language learning and to promote thelifelong learning of languages. EYL 2001 deserves special attention because the 
48 percentage of its budget allocated to RML projects was considerably larger thanin the other programmes, and in this respect it was second only to the erstwhile RML action. The languages admissible to the EYL 2001 were all the EU officialand semi-official languages, as well as other languages recognised by the MemberStates. As to RMLs, 14.73 per cent (€758,008) of the EYL 2001 budget was devoted to A-list projects, and most of the RML projects sponsored under theEYL 2001 programme included language boards and schools, revealing a clearemphasis on core language issues. The total amount of funding for language-related programmes in the 2000­2006 period was provided in Table 3. 

Languages concerned  Title  Budget line  Period  Initial Budget (€)  
RMLs  No one  - - - 
Official Languages  Lingua  B3 – 1001  2000 – 2005  See Socrates II – Tab. A4­(no separate budget figures available)  
Any Languages  Human languages technologies (part of IST) – see Tab.2  B6 – 6121  1998 – 2002  564,000,000  
European Year of Languages 2001  B3 – 1003  2000 (preparatory year) and 2001  4,350,000  

Source: adapted from Grin et al. 2003. 

These programmes are presented in the second section from the bottom Figure 1.
•	 
Innovative multilingual radio and television channels; 

•	 
Socrates II (except the Lingua action cf. above); 

•	 
The programmes: Youth, Leonardo da Vinci II, Minerva, eContent, Culture 


2000 and Media Plus. 
Both for the 1994-2000 and for the 2000-2006 periods, there was no partly­language-related programme specifically designed to include RMLs; here again,however, this does not mean that RMLs were excluded from participating insuch programmes.
Let us first consider partly-language-related programmes meant for officiallanguages only. The Innovative multilingual radio and television channels pro­gramme (2000-2001) ser ved to relaunch objectives of the European multilingual 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 
radio and television services programme (suspended by the Court’s 1998ruling). It offered a maximum of fifty per cent co-financing of total project costsfor projects involving at least three languages. The Minerva action was in fact the earlier Open and Distance Learning (ODL) action renamed under the new49 phase of Socrates (Socrates II). Minerva sought to encourage European co­operation in the field of open and distance learning (ODL) and informationand communication technology (ICT) in education. The fact that Minerva’sobjectives included the promotion of distance learning made it relevant for minority communities, in particular the more dispersed ones. As to the B-list,Minerva has mainly funded projects against intolerance and racism.
The other partly-language-related programmes listed above did not deal exclusively with official languages, and could therefore be of interest to RMLs.Within Socrates II, it is relevant to mention Comenius, Arion20 and Erasmus again. Comenius funded three A-list projects for a total amount of €1,137,400during the 2000-2005 period. Comenius funded projects mostly in the domains of culture and education, and like Minerva, it mainly funded projects againstracism and intolerance. None of the A-list projects was funded through Erasmus or Arion. The former Adult education action was renewed under the name of Grundtvig. A priori, there was nothing to prevent adult education projects frombeing related to RMLs. 
Media Plus was the updated and renewed version of the Media II programme, without apparent linguistic constraints, implying that Media Plus (now CreativeEurope) could be of considerable potential for producers of TV programmes inRMLs. 
eContent – European digital content for the global networks was the follow-up of the Multilingual Information Society (MLIS) programme and of theINFO2000 programme. eContent shared the main objectives of the preceding programmes, in particular the promotion of multilingualism and culturaldiversity in global networks. In the 2001-2005 period, eContent funded oneA-list project to the amount of €81 thousand, representing 0.08 per cent of the programme budget. Culture 2000 was dedicated to culture, and encompassesRaphael, Kaleidoscope and Ariane. Over the 2000-2004 period, Culture 2000 funded six cultural projects related to RMLs, mostly in publishing. Theseprojects represent 0.15 per cent of its budget, or €255,280 in absolute terms. TheRML element in the cultural programmes such as Culture 2000 (and before, Ariane, Kaleidoscope and Raphael) has been of secondary relevance in the B-listprojects.
Leonardo da Vinci II was the continuation of Leonardo da Vinci I, while Youth was a broad EU programme supporting youth mobility and non-formaleducation. As noted before, Youth actions include the former Youth for Europe.Leonardo da Vinci II, Youth and Culture 2000 were programmes jointly linked to Socrates II in order to reinforce inter-sectorial cooperation. 
77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 
The total amount of funding for partly language-related programmes in the2000-2006 period is provided in Appendix 1 (Table A4). 

There is little to add to what has been already said in subsection 3.3, beside the fact that programmes were renamed Leader + and Interreg III. Funding possi­bilities for RMLs under Interreg III were significant, since it was one of the largestsources of EU funding. However, “different parties who have been participating in the application procedures have commented on problems because of thedecentralised structure and complicated application procedures that might discourage small organisations […] Similar critical remarks [are] directedalso at Leader +” (Grin et al. 2003: 57). Corresponding figures are provided inAppendix 1 (Table A5). 
It is possible to categorize support actually given to RMLs by type of reci­pient institution, domains of intervention, financial amount, language(s) sup­ported, domain of EU intervention and number of projects supported. Some of these figures have already been incorporated in the preceding overview. Generalpatterns, however, may be summarized as follows:
•	 Recipient institutions: the type of institution funded under different actions 
varied considerably from one programme to the other and covered extremelydifferent situations in practice. Generally, recipient institutions were oftenuniversities and schools, but they also included news articles, radio stations, or festivals. 
•	 Domain: with the exception of the RML action, projects in the domain of 
culture dominate, followed by education, media and social cohesion projectsrespectively. As a general observation, programmes that sought to encouragelanguage learning and to promote linguistic diversity, such as the EYL 2001, were more likely to support RML projects than others. 
•	 Languages supported: it is impossible to reveal a clear pattern. However,
several projects also included non-regional languages, and most of the Information Society Technologies (IST) programme and regionalprogrammes (Interreg and Leader) projects included only the larger RMLs. 
•	 Total expenditure for RMLs: the actual extent of EU financial support was 
quite limited. These limits are apparent first in the fact that only a small partof the various programmes and actions from which RMLs can benefit wasactually spent on them. With the exception of the RML action, the EYL 2001, Connect and the Multicultural Information Society programme,the share of the respective programme budgets assigned to RML-related projects was always less then 1 per cent. As for the programmes that have, inabsolute terms, funded more A-list projects in recent years, the conclusion is 
RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 
that the RML action was far and away the most important support channel,followed by Comenius, Interreg, the European Year of languages 2001 andby the Multilingual Information Society programme (cf. Table A1). 

Source: adapted from Grin et al. (2003: 65-66). 
The pre-eminence of the RML action over other programmes and actions in funding RML-related projects emerges clearly from Table 4, which comparesthe relative weight of different sources of funding. As shown in Table 4, fundingfrom the programmes other than the RML budget line increased during the last two years of its existence. Apart from the impact of the European Year ofLanguages, which included RMLs, this could be explained by the awareness,among organisations and authorities promoting RMLs, of the impending disappearance of the budget line. In any case, the RML action financed moreA-list programmes than all others; in particular, whereas from 1997 to 2000 it funded some 392 A-list projects, all other EU programmes for which data wereavailable funded just 152, that is, less than a third of the total (cf. Table A1).
Beside financial support, EU intervention in favour of RMLs was very important for two other reasons. First, EU support made possible the creationof common structures such as EBLUL, and network effects such as experiencesharing or information exchange. In numerous cases, the EU also functioned as a catalyst for securing funds from other sources, allowing for a betterimplementation of the projects. In fact, in most of the programmes, at least halfof the total funding was provided by non-EU sources23. Second, EU intervention had a paramount symbolic importance, since “the spectacle of EU institutions coming out in support of RMLs and offering tangible assistance provided asignificant morale boost for small, marginalised language communities” (Grinet al. 2003: 31). 
Policy intervention in favour of RMLs could differ in terms of how it is carried out. In particular, after the suppression of the RML action, the internal EU debateon how best to protect and promote RMLs edged towards a mainstreaming24 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 
rather than a direct and targeted approach. The SMiLE Report warned that for amainstreaming approach to be effective, 
clear criteria and a set of fundamental principles regarding modes of support to RMLs should be included in the specific programmes /…/. These criteria and principles would have to take into consideration the particular conditions affecting the possibilities for RML -related projects to be funded (such as the complexity of the partnerships required, and the required minimum size of projects) (Grin et al. 2003: 44). 
A report of the European Parliament confirms this view, arguing that “the actualrules to gain EU funding act to exclude smaller language groups, member state or otherwise” ( Joan i Marí 2006: 9). 












In practice, the mainstreaming approach adopted by the Commission since 2000resulted in a substantial decrease in actual possibilities of accessing EU funding from RML communities. According to Jones, 
whilst [the mainstreaming approach] does open the door on a much larger potential sources of funding, the competition for this funding is far greater and the tasks associated with submitting such an application may well be beyond the scope and reach of small language communities, especially in terms of the match funding of project work. Also, the EU now requires a guarantee against this funding in many contexts. Being able to do provide a guarantee for large sums may be very problematic in the context of endangered languages ( Jones 2013: 25). 
Although from 2007 to 2010 the EU had a fully-fledged Commissioner for Multi­lingualism who was responsible for language policy of the European Union,25 and all funding programmes were made accessible for all languages, not only forofficial languages. RMLs was not one of the priority objectives of EU fundingprogrammes during that period. Since 2007 new opportunities were provided for all language groups, but “it does not appear that equal access to these fundshas been provided, especially for the smaller language communities” ( Jones2013: 26); officially all languages were on an equal footing legally speaking, but due to the mainstream approach the bigger languages had an advantage. It wasmore difficult competing for smaller languages. 
To our knowledge, no official figures on the amounts spent for support toRMLs have been collected or retrieved since the SMiLE Report. Nevertheless,evidence available shows that financing has been meagre. As noted by Cullen et al. “in the major education and training programmes funded by the EU – likeSocrates and Leonardo – only around 10 per cent were devoted to minority 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 
languages” (2008a: 75), and this notwithstanding the fact that these programmeswere pointed out as potential sources of support for RMLs in the Action Plan ofthe European Commission (2003). 
Funding was also channelled via programmes such as Media and Culture,but the net contribution of these programmes to RMLs projects has be marginal.According to Cullen et al. facts show that 
compared with multilingualism, minority languages […] have consistently been ‘short changed’ with regard to concrete actions. An example to support this view is the relative lack of response at the level of the European Commission and in member states of the recommendations recently developed by the European Parliament via the ‘Ebner Report’26 […], which, inter alia, called for practical measures like a legal act to establish a multi-annual programme for linguistic diversity and the establishment of concrete financial measures to promote projects in the field (Cullen et al. 2008a: 12). 
The picture has not improved since 2010. In 2010 with the disappearance of aCommissioner exclusively for multilingualism, the funding decreased. As noted in the European Parliament Resolution of 11 September 2013 on EndangeredEuropean Languages and Linguistic Diversity in the European Union, “over thelast two multiannual financial framework periods (2000-2007 and 2007-2013), European funding for these languages has been cut drastically”. Minority lan­guage organisations are small, which makes it difficult to compete with majoritylanguages organisations for the same money. In previous programmes priority was given to smaller or less-widely spoken languages. Not only has this positivediscrimination disappeared in the new generation of programmes, but manyof the new programmes are limited to the 24 official languages. Some or the largest programmes of the EU aimed at supporting education and culture suchas Erasmus+ and Creative Europe give priority to the official languages of the EU, particularly to the largest languages among those. For instance Erasmus+gives priority to the five languages more frequently used in mobility, as the EUdefines them, that is, English, French, German, Italian, Spanish), the translation and publication of fiction in the Creative Europe programme is limited to theofficial languages of the EU and EFTA and priority is given to the four biggest(English, French, German, and Spanish). 
While funding opportunities for regional and minority languages havealmost vanished, some projects contributing to RMLs – fully or partly – arestill worth mentioning. A couple of research projects have been funded under the Seventh Framework Programme for Research, for instance EuropeanLanguage Diversity for All (ELDIA), a project on the Finno-ugric minoritylanguages coordinated by Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität in Mainz. Another is the Advancing the European Multilingual Experience (Atheme) project,coordinated by the University of Leiden, which has produced two reports on thepreservation of regional languages and on their grammatical diversity. The project 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 
Regional Languages and the Multilingual Challenge for the European Citizen,coordinated by the University of Trento is also funded under the programme.The project Mobility and Inclusion in a Multilingual Europe (MIME) explores
54 multilingualism in the European Union and its implications in terms of inclusionand mobility. The programme on adult learning called Creactive – Create ActiveAging –, which was financed under the Grundtvig line of the Lifelong LearningProgramme during 2012-2014. Some of the partners of the project representedminority languages (i.e., the Aromanians from Romania and the Sardinians fromItaly). Finally, let us mention the LangOER project that also received fundingunder the Lifelong Learning Programme 2014-2016. LangOER is a Europeannetwork focused on enhancing the linguistic and cultural components of OER(open educational resources) by offering OER in less used languages (includingregional and minority languages) and by enhancing sustainability through OER reuse.27 Under its predecessor, the Sixth Framework Programme, two projectsincluding aspects relating to RMLs namely Language dynamics and managementof diversity, (DYLAN), and Languages In a Network of European Excellence,(LINEE) received funding.A project funded under Erasmus+, is GO TO the FUTURE (GaelicOccitan TOgether For language Users Through United Roots and Experiences).The aim is to transform the way people see local languages, from a perceivedhandicap into an economic resource, stimulating tourism and related activities.In the programme proceeding Erasmus+, called Lifelong Learning, a projectcalled Language and Education addressed through Research and Networkingby Mercator (LEARNme) was financed. It provides policy guidelines andrecommendations for policy stakeholders and practitioners in the field oflanguage education.By reducing financial support to RMLs, the EU gives up the only tool it has to influence the language policy of its Member States in this area. Symbolically, it also gives up its endorsement to small languages. There are several reasons forthe vanishing EU support for minority languages. Members of the EuropeanParliament are not active enough in the Committee on Culture and Education ofthe European Parliament, and proposing amendments in Commission proposalsdoes not bring too much visibility to them. Further, the previous ambition toenhance integration has been replaced by increasing demands of devolving backpower to the Member States, and the European Parliament does not use all thetools at its disposal to push for financial support in favour of RMLs. The EP has onseveral occasions actively deleted any reference to RMLs in Commission draftsfor new programme proposals. As a result, there will be less future funding forprojects promoting RMLs. This is somewhat a paradox, because the MaastrichtTreaty (art.192) gives the European Parliament an equivalent right to initiatelegislation. The Parliament can request, by an absolute majority of its members,that the Commission “submits any appropriate proposal on matters on which 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 

it considers that a Community act is required for the purpose of implementingthis Treaty”. Since the Treaty came into force only 37 legislative initiative reportshave been adopted by the EP, and only one was about regional and lesser-used languages. 55 
6. Concluding Remarks 











The SMiLE report contains a number of results that can be useful for scholarsand practitioners interested in the promotion of RMLs. Its chief goal is to offer aretrospective look through a detailed review of the lines and types of EU fundingavailable for the protection and promotion of regional or minority languages upto and including 2001. This article starts from the point where the SMiLE reportstopped. We present and revise a set of figures on the financial support providedby the EU for the protection and promotion of RMLs from 1994 to 2006 on thebasis of the SMiLe Report, and we discuss some recent trends in EU supportdrawing from existing sources.
The paper therefore makes accessible, in a structured fashion, informationwhich most people (scholars or citizens in general) were generally not aware of.Although lack of data often makes full-fledged cost-benefit evaluations, let alonecomparisons, impossible, our findings highlight a whole range of noteworthypoints. First, the unit cost of the promotion of small languages is modest. Forexample, the gross per-year cost per child of attending Irish-medium preschoolstood, in the early 2000s, at about 400 euros; the Welsh language initiatives,called Mentrau Iaith which help to anchor and stimulate the use of a language atlocal community level, cost approximately two euros per Welsh speaker and peryear. Another interesting set of findings concern transfrontier cooperation, inwhich the Slovenian television was involved as well.28 Transfrontier cooperationcan significantly enhance the cost-effectiveness of language policies by extendingservices (such as minority-language television programming) at a very modestmarginal cost. These strategically powerful findings, at the same time, can onlyhighlight, by contrast a sobering diagnostic: the extent of support enjoyedby RMLs in Europe in recent decades has remained, for a variety of (mostlypolitical) reasons, rather limited.
Apart from a retrospective look, the approach developed in this paper is alsoan invitation to look into the future. This paper also provides tools for thinkingabout the protection and promotion of RMLs, and the most generally usefulof those tools may well be its analytical framework itself. This framework hasbeen applied to 17 types of actions, which can be viewed either as independentinterventions and evaluated for their own sake, or analysed as policy measuresreflecting a set of social and political priorities – even when they have not beenadopted and implemented by state authorities. The critical conceptual connectionbetween a proper policy plan and these specific actions rests on the possibility of interpreting the latter in terms of the main areas of intervention listed in the 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The implication is thatany specific measure being contemplated, in one or another context, to protectand promote a regional or minority language, can be conceptualised, presented
56 and defended vis-a-vis the outside as a coherent, properly thought-throughenterprise. This contributes to the legitimization of policies in favour of RMLsin general.Three main ideas can be singled out: 
•	 first, the figures reported and analysed in the paper indicate that EU support
to RMLs is both manageable and politically relevant; 
•	 second, precisely because our detailed account, based on official data,
of the extent of such support from 1994 to 2006 shows that the amountsconcerned, even during the relatively more favourable 1990s, have remainedsmall, they reveal that there is a con-siderable room for improvement. TheRMLs of the EU have certainly not been cush-ioned or pampered; 
•	 third, RML-specific programmes and actions (as opposed to mainstreaming
support) have been much more successful at channelling resources towardsRMLs. This is a particularly important finding, whether for citizens involvedin the protection and promotion of RMLs or for decision-makers at theEuropean level with responsibility for funding language policies in favour ofRMLs. 
Given the current evolution towards mainstreaming in the EU’s approach tosupport for RMLs, we consider it essential for particular attention to be devotedby all stakeholders (RML users or activists, relevant language boards, scholars,as well as by the Commission itself ) to ensure that the implementation of the mainstreaming strategy offers adequate safeguards for RMLs, particularly smallerones. Let us emphasise that mainstreaming is a double-edged sword. If part of apolicy approach animated by a sincere commitment to the long-term prospectsof RMLs, it can herald significant advances in their situation. But mainstreamingcan also hide ulterior motives, coming only just a little short of a first-class funeralfor RML protection and promotion. Safeguards are therefore essential; they mayinclude, for example, explicit and specific mentions of support to RMLs in thegeneral objectives of relevant programmes. It is striking how often much morefrequently-asked questions of gender equality are mentioned among overallpolicy goals in various substantive policies, for example in areas such as educationand health; by the same token, a greater visibility of the cause of RML protectionand promotion would be amply justified. Along the same lines, safeguards couldalso include specific targets for all relevant programmes, expressed in terms ofthe percentage of total programme budget that is actually spent on the protectionand promotion of RMLs, or less demanding requirements in terms of non-EUmatching funds secured by RML applicants. 
While article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Unioncan be regarded as perhaps the biggest legal setback for regional and minority 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 
languages, since it underlines the different competences between the Union andits Member States29, directly implying that language policy would be a competenceof the Member States, its article 22 would go in the opposite direction. As noted at the outset of this paper, generally speaking, the EU professes to have a positive57 policy towards RMLs, as this Article states that “the Union respects cultural,religious and linguistic diversity”, without distinguishing between the official status of languages. This would indeed call for attention to RMLs, and a Unionpolicy that does not make undue distinction between its languages. 
Summing up, this article may be useful not only as a contribution to theunderstanding of language policies undertaken so far, but also as a resource inthe process of development of more robust and effective Community support for RMLs in the future. The very targeted angle adopted in this article, therefore,should not be seen as a restrictive one, because we believe that ploughing throughthese figures, despite (or perhaps because of ) its admittedly limited entertainmentvalue, is a necessary prerequisite for efficient advocacy and successful policies. Ultimately, the protection and promotion of RMLs is a political matter, and theexercise proposed in the foregoing article is intended as a modest contribution to a transparent political debate on RML protection and promotion. 


References 









Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01). Official Journal of the European Communities C 364/13 (18 December 2000). 
Corbett, R ., Francis, J. & Michael, S., 2005. The European Parliament. John Harper Publishing, London. 
Cormack, M. & Hourigan, N. (eds), 2007. Minority Language Media: Concepts, Critiques and Case Studies. Multilingual Matters, Clevedon. 
Cullen, J., Cullen, C., Maes, V. & Paviotti, G., 2008a. Multilingualism: Between Policy Objectives and Implementation. European Parliament, Brussels. 
Cullen, J., Cullen, C., Maes, V. & Paviotti, G., 2008b. Multilingualism: between policy objectives and implementation - Annexes. Parlamento europeo, Bruxelles. 
Darquennes, J., Salmasi, S., Tikka, M. & Weber, P. J., 2004. Euromosaic III: Presence of Regionaland Minority Language Groups in the New Member States. Research Centre on Multilin­gualism at the KU Brussel, Brussels. 
Delgado, E., Balta, J. & Staiger, U., 2004. Ex-post Evaluation of Activities in the Field of Regional and Minority Languages 1998-2002. Interarts. http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/search/download.do;jsessionid=ob0q5lLgUwiJqwxULW982cjDhje2TGkqbT-By8Swvk0BPl1D9XaO!1168777535?documentId=2150. (Accessed the 28th November 2016). 
European Commission, 2003. Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action Plan 2004 – 2006, COM(2003) 449 final. European Commission, Brussels. 
European Parliament Resolution of 11 September 2013 on Endangered European Languages andLinguistic Diversity in the European Union (2013/2007(INI)). Official Journal of the Euro­pean Union C 43 (9 March 2016). 
European Parliament Resolution with Recommendations to the Commission on European Regionaland Lesser-used languages – the Languages of Minorities in the EU – in the Context of Enlarge­
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 
ment and Cultural Diversity (2003/2057(INI)). Official Journal of the European Union C 76 E (25 March 2004). 
European Parliament Resolution of 13 December 2001 on Regional and Lesser-Used Languages. Official Journal of the European Union C 177 E (25 July 2002). 
European Parliament Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures andon a Charter of rights of Ethnic Minorities. Official Journal of the European Union C 287 (9 November 1981). 
Fishman, J. A., 1991. Reversing Language Shift. Multilingual Matters, Clevedon. 
Grin, F., 2003. Language Policy Evaluation and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
Grin, F., Moring, T., Gorter, D., Häggman, J., Ó Riagáin, D. & Strubell, M., 2003. Support for Minority Languages in Europe. European Commission, Brussels. 
Grin, F. & Vaillancourt, F., 1997. The Economics of Multilingualism: Overview and AnalyticalFramework. Annual Review of Applied Linguistics 17, 43-65. 
Grin, F. & Vaillancourt, F., 1998. Language Revitalisation Policy: An Analytical Survey. TheoreticalFramework, Policy Experience and Application to Te Reo Maori, Treasury Working Paper 98/6, Wellington (NZ).http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/wp/1998/98-06 (Accessed the 28th November 2016). 
Joan i Marí, B., 2006. Report on a New Framework Strateg y for Multilingualism, (2006/2083(INI))
- A6-0372/2006. Committee on Culture and Education. European Parliament, Brussels. Jones, M. P., 2013. Endangered Languages and Linguistic Diversity in the European Union, PE 
495.851. Directorate general for internal policies policy. Department B: structural andcohesion policies. European Parliament, Brussels. 
Nelde, P., Strubell, M. & Williams, G., 1996. Euromosaic. The Production and Reproduction ofthe Minority Language Groups in the European Union. European Commission/DG XXII, Brussels. 
Price, A., 1997. The Diversity Dividend. European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, Brussels. 
Williams, C. (ed), 1991. Linguistic Minorities. Society and Territory. Multilingual Matters, Cle­vedon. 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 

M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 
Comenius (2) (2000-2005)(Action under Socrates II ; noseparate budget figures available)RML share per year: no dataavailable  2000  3  379,133  1,137,400  
Subtotal  5  1,367,400  
Lingua (2)  (2000-2005)(Action under Socrates II ; noseparate budget figures available)RML share per year: no dataavailable Subtotal  2000  1  460,000  460,000  
1  460,000  
Adult Education (Action under Socrates I ; noseparate budget figures available)RML share per year: no dataavailable  1997  1  81,605  81,605  
1998  1  120,000  120,000  
Subtotal  2  201,605  
Culture 2000 € 167,000,000 RML share per year : 0.15 % Subtotal  2000  6  42,547  255,280  
6  255,280  
Kaleidoscope€ 26,000,000 RML share per year : 0.27 %  1  70,000  70,000  
Subtotal  1  70,000  
Ariane € 30,000,000 RML share per year : 0.59 % Subtotal  1997  13  10,101  131,310  
1998  18  2,574  46,337  
31  177,647  
European Year of Languages 2001€ 5,144,768 RML share per year : 14.73 %  2001  23  64,006  758,008  
Subtotal  23  758,008  
RML action € 9,182,860 RML share per year : 100 % Subtotal  1997  152  24,519  3,726,858  
1998  171  19,592  3,350,305  
1999 ­2000  69  30,517  2,105,697  
392  9,182,860  
General total  544  14’667’947 30  

Source: adapted from Grin et al. (2003: 65). 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 

Source: adapted form Grin et al. (2003). 

Source: adapted from Grin et al. (2003). 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 

Source: adapted from Grin et al. (2003). 

Languages concerned  Title  Budget line  Period  Initial Budget (€)  
RML  No one  - - - 
Official Languages  No one  - - - 
Any Languages  Objective 1, Objective 2, Objective 3  2000 – 2006  Approximately 183,300,000,000  
Leader +  B2 – 140  2000 – 2006  2,020,000,000  
Interreg III  B2 – 1410  2000 – 2006  4,875,000,000  

Source: adapted from Grin et al. (2003). 

RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 

Appendix 2. The Structure of the A-list Projects 




























In this section, we focus on the characteristics of the projects that are directly aimed at the promotion and development of RMLs, and we review EU funding63 for RMLs on three dimensions: the importance of partners representing regional and minority languages, the type of projects, and their size. The appendix providesa variety of analytical breakdowns of the total amount of financial support spenton RMLs. Depending on the analytical angle chosen, the information available does not always enable us to assign a particular item of expenditure to a specificcategory. In such cases, we have decided to err on the side of caution and to keepthe items concerned out of the respective summary tables. Consequently, the figure for total spending (occasionally for some subtotals) may differ betweentables. 
As shown in Table A6, most of the projects funded included one partner only. However, if projects funded by the RML budget line are left out, the mostcommon kind of project included at least three partners. This reflects the fact thatmany EU programmes require the participation of at least three partners from three different Member States. This type of requirement complicates matters for some organisations and authorities involved in RML protection and promotion.Language barriers hinder the efficient search for partners in other countries and not all stakeholders have the resources to overcome them. Smaller RMLs cannot always compete for EU funding on an equal footing with the state languages or the bigger RMLs. 

Source: Grin et al. (2003: 67). 
With respect to the size of the projects: the main part of the support both regarding the RML action and the other programmes or actions as a whole, wasdirected to comparatively big projects. More than 70 per cent of the funding under the RML action went to projects of over €30 thousand, and almost 60 percent of the funding under other actions went to projects of over €100 thousand.The main figures are shown in the Table A7. 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 






Table A7: Comparison of Funding in Relation to the Size of the Project (1997-2000) –
















Total amount spent on projects in budget range of:  
Under € 30,000  € 30,000 to € 100,000  Over € 100,000  
RML action  2,442,282  3,031,535  3,709,043  
All other programmes and actions  960,541  1,362,253  3,162,500  
Subtotal  3,402,823  4,393,788  6,871,543  
Percentage (Total: € 14,668,154)  23.20%  29,95%  46,5%  

Source: Grin et al. (2003: 67). 
However, if we consider the number of projects funded, overall some 300 projectsunder €30 thousand were funded, whereas less than 100 projects received EU funding between €30 thousand and €100 thousand, and only some 20 projectsreceived more than €100 thousand. Funding under the RML action was clearlymore accessible for small and mid-range sized projects than other programmes and actions. 

Source: Grin et al. (2003: 68). 
Finally, the great majority of A-list projects concerned RML partners only (Table A8). Nevertheless, if the RML action is excluded from the calculation, the percentage of projects with RML partners only is not particularly high.This suggests that programmes directly designed for RMLs were more likely to concern RML partners only.
It was also quite common for a project to involve a linguistic minority whilethe language itself was not directly promoted or did not play a central role in the project. Exceptions can be found among some of the Interreg projects, as wellas most of the EYL 2001 projects included in the A-list. Other projects includeda partner representing an RML, but its main goal did not need to be language protection or promotion. 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinjskim ... 
Finally, it is worth noting that RML projects tended to benefit mainly fromprogrammes with a one-off character, in the sense that they were not part of anexplicit and integrated language promotion strategy. It could be important to include into the next generation programmes some criteria to cover all the issues65 relevant to the long-term survival of RMLs. 

notes 





1 	In this article, no analytical difference is made between regional or minority languages (RMLs)and Lesser-used languages (LULs), and the former expression will be used throughout. 
2 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/linguistic-diversity/regional-minority-languages_
en.htm. 

3 
FUEN received money under the Lifelong Learning Programme to carry out the project
RML2future and the follow up project Language Diversity. 

4 
This article draws in particular on results presented in Chapter 2 of the SMiLE project report. A
few misprints in figures quoted in the original Report have been corrected in this article. 

5 
Additional evidence, but limited to the 1998-2002 period, is provided in Delgado, Balta and
Staiger (2004). 

6 	European Journal of Language Policy. Liverpool University Press (see http://online.liver­pooluniversitypress.co.uk/loi/ejlp ). 
7 
A complete overview on the articles of the Treaties, European Parliament or Council resolutions,
opinions, statements and decisions, is available in Jones (2013), Cullen et al. (2008b), Cullen et
al. (2008a) and Grin et al. (2003). 

8 	European Parliament resolution with recommendations to the Commission on Europeanregional and lesser-used languages – the languages of minorities in the EU – in the context ofenlargement and cultural diversity (2003/2057(INI)). OJ 076 E, 25 March 2004. 
9 
Court of Justice ruling C-106/96 of 12th May 1998. 
10 These programmes are presented in the first of the two areas or (sections) evoking semicircles. 
11 	Note that the B3-1006 line has decreased in real terms when the European Parliament wasrenewed (1989 and 1994, but not in 1984). 
12 Because of a printing error, the amount of resources indicated in the SMiLE report for 1998 is €4million instead of €3.4 million. 
13 Gradually all of the central and Eastern European countries, as well as Cyprus, became involved inSocrates (and therefore in Lingua) between 1997 and 1999. 
14 Jointly with the programmes Advanced Communication Technologies and Services (ACTS)and Information Technologies-Esprit (IT-Esprit). 
15 A programme to foster exchanges with third countries, such as Mediterranean or Latin Americancountries, was also launched. 
16 INFO 2000 (1996 – 1999) was a programme aimed to increase the use of multimedia productsand to encourage the development of a European multimedia content industry. 
17 Philoxenia (1997 – 2000) was a programme supporting European tourism, which could alsoencourage language learning. 
M. GAZZOlA, F. GRIN, J. HäGGMAN, T. MORING The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority ... 
18 Among others, we should mention Objective 1, which deals with helping regions whosedevelopment was lagging behind to catch up; Objective 2, which supports economic and socialconversion in areas facing structural difficulties; Objective 3 which aims at modernising systemsof training and promoting employment. 
19 See the European Parliament Resolution on Regional and Lesser-Used Languages of 13December 2001 (OJ C 177 E, 25 July 2002), and the already quoted European Parliamentresolution with recommendations to the Commission on European regional and lesser-usedlanguages – the languages of minorities in the EU – in the context of enlargement and culturaldiversity of 4 September 2003. 
20 Arion belongs to the observation and innovation programme of Socrates II, along with Eurydice,the information network on education (the Eurydice report on language learning in schoolsincluded RMLs) and NARIC (Network of Academic Recognition Centres). 
21 Figures do not include an amount of €227,210 from 21 A-list projects funded in 1996 by theInterreg II programme and an amount of € 70 thousand from the Kaleidoscope programme,since the latter ran from 1996 through 1999, and the information available did not allow us todetermine the amount concerning the 1997-2000 period relevant to this table (see table A1). 
22 This figure differs from that given in table 2 (budget line B3-1000: €2.5 million) probably becausethe initial budget was not completely used. 
23 This reflects the fact that, statutorily, the EU only plays a secondary role in the promotion ofcultures and languages, because according to the principle of subsidiarity, Member States andlocal authorities retain leading competencies in these domains. 
24 The mainstreaming approach can be described as the practice of incorporating a particular issueinto all general programmes or policies. For example, support to a RML might be a chapter in abroader programme on the revitalisation of rural areas, together with infrastructure building oragricultural diversification programmes. 
25 From 2004 to 2007, multilingualism was a responsibility of the European Commissioner forEducation, Training, Culture and Multilingualism, and after 2010 it was re-merged into theeducation and culture portfolio. 
26 See the aforementioned European Parliament resolution with recommendations to theCommission on European regional and lesser-used languages – the languages of minorities in theEU – in the context of enlargement and cultural diversity. 
27
 Cf. http://langoer.eun.org/home. 
28 The SMiLE report included two case studies of EU-funded projects involving the Slovenianlanguage, i.e., the Slovene-German radio service (Radio Agora) and the Slovenian televisioncooperation. 
29
 “…with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, [the Charter is applicable to] the MemberStates only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights inaccordance with their respective powers”. 
30 Depending on the analytical angle chosen, the information available does not always enable usto assign a particular item of expenditure to a specific category. Consequently, the figure for totalspending differs from those provided in Table 4, Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7. 
31 For the same reason explained in the previous footnote, the figure for total spending differs fromthat provided in Table 4. 
TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016, p. 67–86 


Linguistic landscape studies represent a new approach in the research on multilingualismbased on the analysis of the language(s) in signs. Linguistic landscape refers to linguisticobjects marking the public space. The language used in writing reflects the status andsocial use of languages. This paper focuses on the linguistic landscape of the area wherethe Slovene minority in Italy is settled. Its aim is to analyse the visibility of the Slovenelanguage and draw a comparison between the use of the Slovene language in the linguisticlandscape and the official language, i.e. Italian. The empirical research follows themethodology developed by Cenoz and Gorter (2006) with some minor adjustments.The hypothesis is that in the case studied, the status of the Slovene language is visiblethroughout the linguistic landscape. The discussion focuses on the importance of thevisibility of minority languages and the impact of language policies on the linguisticlandscape. 
Keywords: linguistic landscape, sociolinguistic situation, Slovene minority in Italy, language status, sociolinguistic context, language policies. 

Študije o jezikovni krajini predstavljajo novejši pristop k proučevanju večjezičnosti, ki izhajaiz analize jezika/-kov na napisih. Jezikovna krajina se nanaša na jezik/-e v javnem prostoru.Jeziki, ki se uporabljajo na napisih, odražajo status in družbeno rabo jezikov. V prispevku jezajeta analiza jezikovne krajine ozemlja, kjer je naseljena slovenska manjšina. Namen delaje proučiti vidnost slovenščine in primerjati njeno rabo v jezikovni krajini v primerjavi zuradnim jezikom – italijanščino. Empirični del sledi metodologiji Cenoza in Gorterja (2006) znekaterimi manjšimi prilagoditvenimi spremembami. Preverja se hipoteza, ali se na izbranemprimeru status slovenskega jezika zrcali v jezikovni krajini. V razpravi sta poudarjena pomenvidnosti manjšinskega jezika in vpliv jezikovnih politik na jezikovno krajino. 
Ključne besede: jezikovna krajina, sociolingvistična situacija, slovenska manjšina, status jezika, socioligvistični kontekst, jezikovne politike. 
Correspondence address: Maja Mezgec, Slovenski raziskovalni inštitut (SLORI), ul./via Beccaria 6, Trst/Trieste, Italy; Univerza na Primorskem, Pedagoška fakulteta, Cankarjeva 5, Koper/Capodistria, Slovenia, e-mail: majamezgec@slori.it, maja.mezgec@pef.upr.si. 
ISSN 0354-0286 Print/ISSN 1854-5181 Online  © Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja (Ljubljana), http://www.inv.si 
77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
M. MEZGEC Linguistic Landscape as a Mirror: the Case of the Slovene Minority in Italy 



Linguistic landscape research is a relatively recent field of study that is rapidly expanding. A large number of research projects, scientific papers, journals andvolumes (e.g. by Gorter 2006a, Shohamy & Gorter 2009, Backhaus 2007, Shohamy et al. 2010, Jaworski & Thurlow 2010, Gorter et al. 2012) indicatean increasing interest in applied linguistics in the use of written texts in urbanspaces, especially in bilingual and multilingual settings (Shohamy & Gorter 2009, Gorter 2013). Backhaus (2007) presented a first detailed review ofprevious research in the field of linguistic landscape and listed 30 publications,while Troyer (2012) presented an updated bibliography of publications edited in English and listed 116 publications since 2007.
As can be inferred from one of the most prominent books on this topic called“Linguistic Landscape: a new approach to multilingualism” (Gorter 2006a), this is a new approach to multilingualism based on the analysis of the languagein signs. The recent establishment of a scientific journal on this topic provides evidence to the growing interest in this field.
Multilingual contexts give the opportunity to analyze languages in context by focusing on the written information that is available on language signs in a specificarea (Cenoz & Gorter 2006, 67). Furthermore “the study of linguistic landscape aims to add another view to our knowledge about societal multilingualism byfocusing on language choices, hierarchies of languages, contact-phenomena,regulations, and aspects of literacy” (Gorter 2013, 193). 
A large number of researchers have recently investigated the presence andstatus of minority languages in linguistic landscapes (e.g. Cenoz & Gorter 2006,Lado 2011, Coluzzi 2009, Marten 2012, Moriarty 2012, Shohamy & Abu Ghazaleh-Mahajneh 2012, Blackwood & Tufi 2012, Comajoan Colomé & Long2012, Muth 2012, Salo 2012, Syabó et al. 2012).
The definition of linguistic landscape that has been used since the seminal paper by Landry and Bourhis is that “the language of public road signs, adver­tising billboards, street names, place names, commercial shop signs and publicsigns on government buildings combines to form the linguistic landscape of a given territory, region, or urban agglomeration” (Laundry & Bourhis 1997, 25).Therefore, linguistic landscape can be considered as an additional source of information about the sociolinguistic context (Cenoz & Gorter 2006).
This paper focuses on the relationship between linguistic landscape and thesociolinguistic context in the area where the Slovene minority in Italy is settled. As stated by Cenoz and Gorter (2006) the relationship between linguisticlandscape and sociolinguistic context is bidirectional: on the one hand, thelinguistic landscape reflects the relative power and status of the different languages in a given sociolinguistic context; on the other, it contributes to the constructionof the sociolinguistic context, since people process visual information from the 
M. MEZGEC Jezikovna krajina kot ogledalo: primer slovenske manjšine v Italiji 
surroundings and the language in which signs are written can influence theirperception of the status of the different languages, affect their linguistic behaviorand - in the writer’s opinion - their ideology about languages. 
The language used in signs has an informational and symbolic function69 (Spolsky & Cooper 1991, Landry & Bourhis 1997, Ben-Rafael et al. 2006). With reference to the informational function, the writings and the language used reflect the social use of the languages spoken in a given area, the behavior towardslanguages, the borders between them, and the (un)balanced power relationsamong linguistic groups. On the contrary, the symbolic function refers to the use of different languages mainly when the language is a key factor of socialidentity in a linguistic group (Landry & Bourhis, 1997). Minority languages are seen as important markers of identity. Therefore, their visibility is important forits members, as it helps to give visibility to and define the territory where theminority is settled. 
W hile research on linguistic landscape and minority languages is spreadingat European level (e.g. Cenoz & Gorter 2006, Lado 2011, Coluzzi 2009, Marten2012, Moriarty 2012, Blackwood & Tufi 2012, Comajoan Colomé & Long 2012,Muth 2012, Salo 2012, Syabó et al. 2012), in Italy only five pieces of research on autochthonous minorities settled in Italy have been conducted. The first one hasbeen carried out in Bolzano/Bozen (Plank 2006), the second one in CortinaD’Ampezzo (Grazioli 2006), the third one in Formazza (Piemonte) (Dal Negro 2009), the fourth one in Udine/Videm (Coluzzi 2009) and the fifth one inTrieste/Trst (Tufi 2013). At a later stage, one piece of research analysing the linguistic landscape of Southern Carinthia (Austria) - an area where the Sloveneminority is settled - was found (Rasinger 2014).
This paper outlines an extract of the research performed by SLORI (Mezgec2015) in the linguistic landscape of the territory where the Slovene minority in Italy has historically been settled. A corpus of 3.879 scripts collected in the threeprovinces of Trieste/Trst, Gorizia/Gorica and Udine/Videm was analyzed.Main streets and squares, which are considered to be more representative, were included in the sample. All recorded scripts were analyzed in terms of languagesused (monolingual/bilingual or multilingual signs) and the rule of one language over the other/s. 

Slovenes in Italy are an autochthonous minority that is mainly settled alongthe border between Italy and Slovenia in three provinces of the Friuli-VeneziaGiulia region: Trieste/Trst, Gorizia/Gorica and Udine/Videm. In this area - also characterized by the presence of the Friulian and German minorities - Italianis the official and dominant language. Slovene is the language of the Slovene 
77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
M. MEZGEC Linguistic Landscape as a Mirror: the Case of the Slovene Minority in Italy 
national minority in Italy and the official language of the bordering Republicof Slovenia1. Slovene minority members are considered bilingual, since theydevelop bilingual competencies in both Italian and Slovene, whereas majority 
70 members do not speak nor understand Slovene with few exceptions (Bogatec2015, Jagodic & Čok 2013, Pertot 2011).The current border was defined after the Second World War, when the Slovene community in Italy turned into a minority community within thepolitical and socio-economic context of a different country (Čok & Pertot 2010, 66)2 . The protection of the Slovene minority in Italy was defined by the post-wartreaties, whereby minority members were granted specific rights by the Stateof Italy (see Vidau 2013, 2015). The right to use Slovene in public has been regulated by legislation arising from national and regional laws or municipal andprovincial statutes (see Vidau 2015). These rights have been fully acknowledged by the Italian State with Law 38/2001 Regulations on the Protection of SloveneLinguistic Minority in the Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, also known asProtection Law. Articles 83 and 10 provide for the obligation to give visibility tothe Slovene language in the public administration. The conditions and development of the Slovene language have always beeninfluenced by a series of factors linked to the impossibility to use Slovene inpublic affairs. Even when legal measures have been adopted - even nowadays, fifteen years after the signing of the Slovene minority protection law, regulationshave not yet been fully implemented - Slovene and Italian are not equal in public and private life (Čok & Pertot 2010). A recent study (Sussi et al. 2011) evaluatingthe implementation of the Protection Law confirms that public administrationshave obligations in this respect but implementation is too slow. 
3. Aim of the Research and Research Questions 































The aim of the research was to investigate the presence of the Slovene language and the wider linguistic landscape in the region of Friuli Venezia Giulia, wherethe Slovene minority has been historically settled and acknowledged by Law38/2001 (Protection Law). The main point was to determine whether Slovene is present in the linguistic landscape and to what extent it is used with respect to theofficial language (Italian). Public signs (such as street signs, signs on government buildings, announcements, plaques) and private signs (advertising billboards,shop names and other forms of writing such as graffiti, event announcements,etc.) were included in the sample. The corpus of data includes all the texts that can be seen in the streets of the sample areas.
Therefore the present study is not intended as an evaluation of the
implementation of Protection Law regulations that provide visibility for the 
Slovene language in the public administration (articles 8 and 10), but in a broader 
M. MEZGEC Jezikovna krajina kot ogledalo: primer slovenske manjšine v Italiji 
sense it investigates the visibility of Slovene in the linguistic landscape. Suchlandscape represents a public space and its linguistic features are determined byprivate and public entities. 
This paper focuses on the Slovene language and its use in signs. The71 assumption is that the status of the language is visible through the linguistic landscape, which reflects power relations among the linguistic groups of the area.
The research questions were the following: 
1. 	
Which are the languages displayed in the linguistic landscape of the sample area and their relative weight? 

2. 	
What are the characteristics of bilingual and multilingual signs? 

3. 	
What does the linguistic landscape analysis show about the status of Slovene in the sample area? 


The methodology adopted by Cenoz and Gorter (2006) was followed in thisresearch. The overall concept of the methodology was maintained but some adjustments were made, as the analysis focused on each text as described below. 

The research considered the areas where the Slovene minority has been historically settled4 and acknowledged by law. For sampling purposes, different areas were selected according to their representativeness and sections of theirmain streets were taken into account. Such sections had to be representativeand were chosen based on the availability of public and private services, such as shops, bars, restaurants, libraries, schools, supermarkets, etc. In the mainsettlements - i.e. the cities of Trieste/Trst, Gorizia/Gorica and Cividale/Čedad
- two main streets were considered, each with a section of approximately 500m. In small settlements and villages the whole center was considered including themain street, square, locations with shops, bus station, notice boards and otherservices5 covering approximately the same length (Table 1). 

77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
M. MEZGEC Linguistic Landscape as a Mirror: the Case of the Slovene Minority in Italy 
Gorizia/Gorica  Gorizia/Gorica city center  Gorizia/Gorica: Vittoria Squareand Roma Street  341  
Gorizia/Gorica: Corso Italia  591  
Village near Gorizia/Gorica  Sant’Andrea/Štandrež  128  
Village near Gorizia/Gorica  Doberdo/Doberdob  91  
Udine/Videm  Valli del Natisone/Benečija  San Pietro/Špeter  180  
Cividale/Čedad  306  
Val Canale/Kanalska Dolina  Tar visio/Trbiž  292  
Camporosso/Žabnice  110  
Valli del Torre/Terska Dolina  Lusevera/Bardo  37  
Taipana/Tipana  59  
Resia/Rezija  Stolvizza/Solbica  50  
Prato di Resia/Ravanca  67  
Total  3.876  

Source: Mezgec (2015). 

Data collection was made in spring 2015. The field work was carried out withthe support of a digital camera and a data collection form. Digital pictures of all the texts seen in the streets were taken. That resulted in a corpus of 3.879units including the complete inventory of the linguistic landscape for the sampleareas. Pictures in each settlement were taken on one day. 

Codification of the units required making some methodological decisions, asreported by previous research in this field (see Cenoz & Gorter 2006, 71, Ben-Rafael et al. 2006). 
For the purposes of this research, each text was the unit of analysis and thefollowing items were included:
•	 all texts (on entrances, shop doors and windows including names), even 
small ones if visible and readable from the street; 
•	 
temporary texts such as renting, selling, etc.; 

•	 
road signs and place names; 

•	 
logos with texts. 


On the contrary, the following items were not included:
•	 
texts on products (such as t-shirts, newspapers, magazines, etc.); 

•	 
short technical texts (such as number of light poles, etc.); 

•	 
texts inside shops and offices if not readable from outside; 

M. MEZGEC Jezikovna krajina kot ogledalo: primer slovenske manjšine v Italiji 

•	 
unreadable texts; 

•	 
flat-panel displays.6 


Exceptions:73 
•	 shop windows (e.g. real estate agencies or supermarkets) full of small posters
with announcements or promotions using the same corporate layout and 
linguistic features were considered as one unit; 
•	 in small settlements road signs bearing place names were included; in bigger 
settlements they were not available in the sample section of the street; 
•	 unclear names of shops or businesses were coded apart as not defined; 
English terms used in Italian texts that have become common in Italian were not considered as foreign terms (e.g. wireless, club, etc.).
A coding scheme was developed including a series of variables related to the place where the sign was located, the type of sign, the number of languages inthe sign, the language in the sign, top-down versus bottom-up signs, intrinsicfeatures of multilingual signs revealing the predominant language (e.g. order of appearance of different languages in multilingual signs, amount of informationin each language, or size and font used for each language). 

The SPSS software, descriptive statistics, the Anova test and the crosstab analysiswere used for data analysis. 

The following section shows the most significant data concerning the researchquestions above.
Out of 3,876 signs, the majority are monolingual (83.4 per cent), 15.1 per cent are bilingual or multilingual and for the 1.5 percent were not defined (theywere mainly names) (Figure 1). As for monolingual items, the majority are inItalian (91.4 per cent), followed by English (5.8 per cent), Slovene (1.4 per cent) and Slovene dialects in the province of Udine/Videm7 (0.5 per cent) values for other languages are low.
The signs where two or more languages are used were classified as multilingual 
(e.g. Picture 1 and 2). In that case Italian is almost always present (99 per centof the cases), Slovene in over half cases (53.2 per cent), and the Slovene dialectspoken in the province of Udine/Videm in 6.8 per cent. 
M. MEZGEC Linguistic Landscape as a Mirror: the Case of the Slovene Minority in Italy 

Source: Mezgec (2015). 

Source: Mezgec (2015). 
M. MEZGEC Jezikovna krajina kot ogledalo: primer slovenske manjšine v Italiji 






















Source: Mezgec (2015). 
Data show that in the sample area the linguistic landscape is mainly monolingualItalian (84.7 per cent of signs are monolingual, out of which 91.4 per cent are inItalian only), although this is the area where the Slovene, Friulian and German minorities are settled8 and officially acknowledged. This situation results fromthe Italian monolingual language policy pursued in the state of Italy and inthe Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia: though being a multilingual region, it has not been promoting its language diversity. The Italian nation state has neverpromoted ethnic or language diversity (Vidau 2015, 26). In the XX and XXIcenturies major changes in the language policy were introduced providing for the use of minority languages in the public administration. However, de facto minority languages are not considered as regional or state official languages,although recent legislation on visible bilingualism has slowly been implemented. This progress can be seen in the local linguistic landscape as - by way of a paradox
- plurilingualism is mostly made visible by the public administration and public entities. This phenomenon will be described in the paragraphs below.
As for Slovene, previous research has already pointed out its absence inTrieste/Trst city center (Tufi 2013, Kaučič-Baša 1997), as shown by our data. In Trieste/Trst city centre, Slovene is present only in 1.7 per cent of signs, whilein Gorizia/Gorica in 6.9 per cent (see Figure 2). As Tufi stated (2013), Sloveneis virtually absent in the linguistic landscape of Trieste, which leads to a visual silence where Slovenians are left invisible. 
The limited presence of Slovene in signs is common in the whole province ofTrieste/Trst (see Figure 3), where it accounts only for 9.2 per cent of the corpus although significant variances exist.
As Shohamy (2006) argues, the presence or absence of certain languages inthe public arena sends a message that reveals the centrality versus the marginality of these languages in society. 
M. MEZGEC Linguistic Landscape as a Mirror: the Case of the Slovene Minority in Italy 

VI-Resia/ Rez 0, 9% 68,4% 30,8% TS-City cent 
1, 7% 98,3% 
GO Doberdo/Doberdob (N=91) 
TS-Aurisina/ 
58, 1% 
41,9% TS- Prosecco 
GO-City center of Gorizia/Gorica (N=932) 
23, 0% 
77,0% GO-St. Andr 
22, 7% 77,3% 
GO-St. Andrea/Štandrež (N=128) 
GO-City cen 
6, 9% 
93,1% GO Doberdo 
62, 6% 37,4% 
TS-Prosecco/Prosek (N=244) 
TS-Aurisina/Nabrežina (N=124) 
TS-City center of Trieste/Trst (N=1259) 
VI-Resia/Rezija (N=117) 
VI-Val Canale/Kanalska dolina (N=402) 
VI-Valli del Natisone/Nadiške doline (N=486) 
VI-Valli del Torre/Terska dolina (N=96) 

with Slovene with Slovene with no Slovene 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%100% 
Udine/ Videm 5,2% 5, 2% 89,6% Gorizia/ Gor 

13,0% 

87,0% 
with Slovene 
without Slovene 

with Slovene local dialects 
Trieste/ Trst 9,2% 90,8% 
Source: Mezgec (2015). 


with Slovene 

with Slovene local dialects Gorizia/Gorica (N=1151) 
Trieste/Trst (N=1627) 

with no Slovene 
Udine/Videm (N=1101) 

Source: Mezge (2015). 
In the surrounding area of Trieste/Trst and Gorizia/Gorica, there are settlements where the Slovene population is larger in number or belonging to bilingual municipal administrations. The latter settlements are located in areas where the Slovene population is or used to be the majority. However, data show that even in this case the linguistic landscape is not predominantly Slovene nor completely bilingual (e.g. in the village of Aurisina/Nabrežina, signs with Slovene writings 
M. MEZGEC Jezikovna krajina kot ogledalo: primer slovenske manjšine v Italiji 
account for 58.1 per cent), and Italian is still predominant. This is evidence of the inferior status of the Slovene language and reflects the sociolinguistic situation: Slovene is mainly an in-group language (Kaučič-Baša 1997) used for oral communication only. When it comes to writing and official writing, its use becomes troublesome. Italian is traditionally used as an official language, while Slovene is used in official communication only by public authorities and only when its use is defined by law or other regulations. Slovene-only signs are more of an exception (45 items). 
If only multilingual signs are considered (585 items), Slovene is not present in approximately one third of multilingual signs in the province of Trieste/ Trst and Gorizia/Gorica (30.6 per cent respectively Gorizia/Gorica and 
36.6 per cent for Trieste/Trst). That means that even when signs are not only Italian monolingual, Slovene is not present by default. Therefore, the linguistic landscape is mainly monolingual - Italian only - and when multilingual signs are used Slovene is not necessarily included, which again might be a clear sign of the status of the Slovene language. In the current language policy, multilingual signs are addressed to the readers who do not understand Italian and are not designed to recall the presence of other language communities in the area. Actually, the Italian language policy tries to deny the symbolic value of the presence of minority languages. 
Moreover multilingual signs where Slovene is also used were analyzed. In that case Slovene has the same status as Italian: the font and size of letters are the same as Italian (94.2 per cent and 91.4 per cent), the contents and length of the text are the same9 (81.9 per cent and 82.6 per cent). In any case, the predominant position of Italian is obvious due to the order of appearance: Italian always comes first. 

The types of institutions using signs were also analyzed. Two main categories were considered: public and private institutions. Slovene is more present in signs of public institutions (among writings by public administration is present in 17.8 per cent of cases, among writings by public authorities in 21.8 per cent of cases) than in private ones (5.1 per cent). 
If a distinction is made between bottom-up and top-down signs10 (see Ben-Rafael et al. 2006, 14, Cenoz and Gorter 2006, 71, Coluzzi 2009, 303-304 and Tufi 2013, 399), results are still the same: Slovene is more rarely present in bottom-up signs (6.5 per cent) than in top-down signs (17.8 per cent) (Figure 4) (see 
e.g. Picture 3 and 4). Data show that public administrations (i.e. municipalities, provinces, region and State) are more consistent in using the minority language and play a major role in shaping a multilingual linguistic landscape, although they lag behind in the application of minority rights as established by Law 38/2001, 
77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
M. MEZGEC Linguistic Landscape as a Mirror: the Case of the Slovene Minority in Italy 
and especially by Article 10 on visual bilingualism (Sussi et. al. 2011). Evidence shows that there are conflicting trends between the public and private sectors (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006, Cenoz & Gorter 2006, Coluzzi 2009, Lado 2011). Official top-down signs are the result of the legislation introduced in 2001 (Law 38/2001), which however has not had [or only partially had] an impact on the linguistic landscape of Trieste (Tufi 2013). 
That means there is still room for improving the presence of the Slovene language in the linguistic landscape by promoting its use in the private sector. 

Source: Mezgec (2015). 

Source: Mezgec (2015). 
M. MEZGEC Jezikovna krajina kot ogledalo: primer slovenske manjšine v Italiji 

bottom up 
top down 
Writings with Slovene 
Writings without Slovene 
Source: Mezgec (2015). 


The study of the linguistic landscape is particularly interesting in the contextof minority languages as it mirrors their use and their status. “The linguisticlandscape can provide information about the sociolinguistic context and the use of the different languages in signs can be compared to the official policy of theregion /…/” (Cenoz & Gorter 2006, 68). Moreover, the linguistic landscapeprovides double feedback on the impact of the language policy: on the one hand, it shows its will to promote and make minority languages visible, as reflected intop-down writings; on the other, it shows the impact on individuals and societyas a whole, as reflected in bottom-up signs (Landry & Bourhis 1997, Cenoz & Gorter 2006, Coluzzi 2009).
Data confirm a clear predominance of the national language and that theminority language must struggle for visibility. This is why a language policy is highly needed and must be fully implemented. If no action is taken the linguisticlandscape tends to be monolingual. 
The predominant position of Italian was also highlighted by Coluzzi (2009)and Gorter (2007, 21 cited in Coluzzi 2009, 306). Both authors conclude theirresearch stating that the Italian linguistic landscape is basically monolingual, with a limited presence of English. Coluzzi (2009) mentions that some areassuch as Friuli Venezia Giulia (where the Slovene minority is settled), theprovince of Bolzano (where the German and Ladin minorities are settled) and Aosta Valley (where the French minority is settled) should be excluded fromthe predominance of Italian. However, collected data show that Italian is stillpredominant even in the area where the Slovene minority is settled and its status recognized by law. 
77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
M. MEZGEC Linguistic Landscape as a Mirror: the Case of the Slovene Minority in Italy 
Data also confirm previous findings for Trieste/Trst (Tufi 2013), whereby theSlovene language does not enjoy a high status. An unbalanced situation wasdetected: Slovene is often present only where it is required by law, while its 
80 spontaneous use (e.g. in private and bottom-up signs) is very limited.Rules and regulations - in particular Law 38/2001 - provide for the use for the public entities, but not for the private one. Consequently, it is not compulsoryto use Slovene in public signs of private entities. Even in bilingual municipalitiesby statute, there is no obligation for private players to use Slovene (whereas it is compulsory for municipal administrations). This research shows that legislationis lacking in this respect, as shown by Coluzzi (2009) with reference to theFriulian language. Slovene would be much more visible if legal provisions were adopted to urge the private sector to use it, at least partially. Kaučič-Baša (1997)also highlighted that public written communication in the minority languageneeds to be developed with institutional support. This would have a number of positive effects on the perceived status of the Slovene language amongst bothSlovenians and Italians. The truth is that current legislation does not provide for the use of Slovene in private business. Nor has Slovene such a high status that would encourage itsuse in public signs, nor there is sufficient cultural awareness11 on the symbolicimportance of minority languages in public writings. Such lack of awarenessis present even among Slovene entrepreneurs. Additional research would be needed to further investigate this phenomenon, which is supposedly related tothe perception that the minority language is of little use for conducting public affairs. To quote Landry and Bourhis: 
Exclusion of in-group language from public signs can convey a message to the effect that one’s own language is not valued and has little status within society. Further, such exclusion conveys the notion that the in-group language is of little use for conducting public affairs /…/ (Landry & Bourhis, 1997, 28). 
To conclude, the private sector has an interesting potential to promote the use ofSlovene, which has to be considered in order to shape a more bi- or multilingual environment. 










As already stated by Cenoz and Gorter (2006), the study of the linguistic landscapeis limited to the analysis of linguistic signs that does not necessarily reflect the use of languages in oral communication, though providing information on theirwritten use. Therefore, the relationship between the linguistic landscape and thelanguages spoken is not straightforward (Coluzzi 2009, 307). In this paper, the linguistic landscape reflects the impact of the language policy implemented in 
M. MEZGEC Jezikovna krajina kot ogledalo: primer slovenske manjšine v Italiji 
the area where the Slovene minority is settled. When considering the resultsof the study, we would like stress two important limitations of the study: firstly,the research is limited to sample areas and gives a picture of the status quo. Further research could include e.g. writings on streets outside inhabited centers.81 Secondly, the current status quo might change in future, as regulation about visible bilingualism for public authorities has not been fully implemented, yet. 


Source: Mezgec (2015). 
To conclude, Slovene certainly does not enjoy a high status in the linguistic landscape where the Slovene minority has historically been settled. This isparticularly highlighted by the small number of writings in Slovene amongprivate players, that are neither obliged nor willing to use it. Special efforts to promote Slovene in the private sector might bring about changes in the linguistic 
77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
M. MEZGEC Linguistic Landscape as a Mirror: the Case of the Slovene Minority in Italy 
landscape. As can be inferred from the case of the Basque Countries presented byCenoz and Gorter (2006), a language policy promoting the minority languagehas an important impact on its visibility in the linguistic landscape, with both 
82 top-down and bottom-up signs.As Lado (2011) shows for Valencian, the visibility (of lack thereof ) of the minority language in the streets seems to be a reflection of the socio-historical,linguistic, political and ideological factors, which favor the use of the majoritylanguage. Literature on the linguistic landscape (e.g. Backhaus 2006, Ben-Rafael etal. 2006, Cenoz & Gorter 2006, Gorter 2006b, Huebner 2006, Coluzzi, 2009, Lado 2011) shows that the linguistic landscape reflects discrepancies between top-down and bottom-up signs due to ideological or political considerations.Linguistic landscape is not static, but a complex dynamic entity subject tochanges and shaped by vast numbers of actors that participate in molding it (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006). A large variety of actors shape the linguistic landscape:public institutions, associations, firms, individuals, etc.12 Such actors do not necessarily act harmoniously, nor even coherently (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006, 8)
(e.g. Picture 5). Using Bourdieu (1991) considerations on social reality, each typology of agents is to be analyzed in terms of its power dynamics and unequal power relations between linguistic communities in the local linguistic market. 


References 









Backhaus, P., 2006. Multilingualism in Tokyo: A Look into the Linguistic Landscape. Interna­tional Journal of Multilingualism 3, 52-56. 
Backhaus, P., 2007. Linguistic Landscapes: a Comparative Study of Urban Multilingualism in Tokyo. Multilingual Matters, Clevedon. 
Bajc, G., 2004. Na oni strani meje. Slovenska manjšina v Italiji in njen pravni položaj: zgodovinski inpravni pregled 1866-2004. Univerza na Primorskem, Znanstveno – raziskovalno središče: Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko, Koper. 
Ben-Rafael, E., Shoami, E., Amara, M. H. & Trumper-Hecht, N., 2006. Linguistic Landscapeas Symbolic Construction of the Public Space: the Case of Israel. International Journal of Multilingualism 3, 7–30. 
Blackwood, R . & Tufi S., 2012. Policies vs. Non –policies: Analysing Regional Languages andthe National Standard in the Linguistic Landscape of French and Italian MediterraneanCities. In Gorter, D., Marten, H. F. & Van Mensel, L. (eds.), Minority Languages in the Linguistic Landscape. Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, 109-126. 
Bogatec, N. (ed.), 2004. Slovene. The Slovene Language in Education in Italy. Mercator Education, Ljouwert/Leeuwarden. 
Bogatec, N., 2015. Šolanje v slovenskem jeziku v Italiji. Razprave in gradivo, revija za narodnost­na vprašanja 74, 5-21. 
Bourdieu, P., 1991. Language and Symbolic Power. Polity press, Cambridge. 
Brezigar, S., 2007. Marketing Minority Language as a Valid Tool in the Fight for Survival ofMinority Languages: the Case of the Slovenes in Italy. Treatises and Documents, Journal of Ethnic Studies 52, 198-214. 
M. MEZGEC Jezikovna krajina kot ogledalo: primer slovenske manjšine v Italiji 
Cenoz, J. & Gorter, D., 2006. Lingustic Landscape and Minority Languages. International Journal of Multilingualism 3, 67–80. 
Coluzzi, P., 2009. The Italian Linguistic Landscape: the Cases of Milan and Udine. International Journal of Multilingualism 1, 1–15. 
Comajoan Colomé, L. & Long, E., 2012. The Linguistic Landscape of Three Streets in Bar­celona: Patterns of Language Visibility in Public Space. In Gorter, D., Marten, H. F. & Van Mensel, L. (eds.), Minority Languages in the Linguistic Landscape. Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, 183-203. 
Čok, L. & Pertot, S., 2010. Bilingual Education in the Ethnically Mixed Areas along the Slove­ne-Italian Border. Comparative Education 46, 63-78. 
Dal Negro, S., 2009. Local Policy Modeling the Linguistic Landscape. In Shohamy, E. & Gorter,
D. (eds.), Linguistic Landscape: Expanding the Scenery. Routledge, Abingdon, 141–154. 
Decree of the President of the Region Friuli Venezia Giulia n. 346 from 18th December 2008. Official Gazzette of the Friuli Venezia Giulia (BUR) 2 (2009), 14 January 2009. 
Gorter, D. (ed.), 2006a. Linguistic Landscape: a New Approach to Multilingualism. Multilingual Matters, Clevedon. 
Gorter, D., 2006b. Further Possibilities for Linguistic Landscape Research. International Journal of Multilingualism 3, 81-89. 
Gorter D., 2013. Linguistic Landscape in a Multilingual Word. Annual Review of Applied Lin­guistics 33, 190-212. 
Gorter, D., Marten, H. F. & Van Mensel, L. (eds.), 2012. Minority Languages in the Linguistic Landscape. Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
Grazioli, M., 2006. Strada privata/Privatstrasse: paesaggio linguistico in Alto Adige. Diploma di laurea, Universita del Piemonte Orientale, Vercelli. 
Huebner, T., 2006. Bangkok’s Linguistic Landscapes: Environmental Print, Codemixing andLanguage Change. International Journal of Multilingualism 3, 31-51. 
Jagodic, D. & Čok, Š. (eds.), 2013. Med drugim in tujim jezikom: poučevanje in učenje slovenščinepri odraslih v obmejnem pasu Furlanije Julijske krajine. Ciljno začasno združenje “JEZIK­LINGUA”, Trst. 
Jaworski A. & Thurlow C. (eds.), 2010. Semiotic Landscapes. Language, Image, Space. Contiuum, London and New York. 
Kaučič-Baša, M., 1997. W here do Slovenes Speak Slovene and to W hom? Minority LanguageChoice in a Transactional Settings. International Journal of the Sociolog y of Language 124, 51–73. 
Lado, B., 2011. Linguistic Landscape as a Reflection of the Linguistic and Ideological Conflictin the Valancian Community. International Journal of Multilingualism 8, 135-150. 
Landry, R . & Bourhis, R . Y., 1997. Linguistic Landscape and Ethnolinguistic Vitality: an Empi­rical Study. Journal of Language and Social Psycholog y 16, 23–49. 
Law 38/2001: Regulations on the Protection of Slovene Linguistic Minority in the Regionof Friuli-Venezia Giulia = Legge 38/2001: Norme di tutela della minoranza linguisticaslovena della regione Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana 56 (2001). 
Marten, H. F., 2012. “Latgalian is not a Language”: Linguistic Landscape in Eastern Latvia andhow they Reflect Centralist Attitudes. In Gorter, D., Marten, H. F. & Van Mensel, L. (eds.), Minority Languages in the Linguistic Landscape. Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, 19-35. 
Mezgec, M., 2012. Funkcionalna pismenost v manjšinskem jeziku. Univerzitetna založba Annales, Koper. 
77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
M. MEZGEC Linguistic Landscape as a Mirror: the Case of the Slovene Minority in Italy 
Mezgec, M., 2015. Raziskava o jezikovni pokrajini na naselitvenem območju slovenske skupnosti vItaliji: raziskovalno poročilo. Slori, Trst. 
Moriarty, M., 2012. Language Ideological Debates in the Linguistic Landscape of an Irish Tou­rist Town. In Gorter, D., Marten, H. F. & Van Mensel, L. (eds.), Minority Languages in the Linguistic Landscape. Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, 74-88. 
Muth, S., 2012. The Linguistic Landscape of Chişinău and Vilnius: Linguistic Landscape andthe Representation of Minority Languages in Two Post-soviet Capitals. In Gorter, D., Marten, H. F., & Van Mensel, L. (eds.), Minority Languages in the Linguistic Landscape.Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, 204-224. 
Plank, B., 2006. Linguistic Landscape in Bozen- Bolzano: Monolingual and Multilingual Areas inBozen- Bolzano. 
http://disi.unitn.it/~plank/papers/LinguisticLandscapes_Plank.pdf (15. 9. 2013). 
Pertot, S., 2011. Identity Changes among Slovenes in Italy, as Reflected in the Families of PupilsAttending Italian Schools with Slovene as the Language of Instruction. Treatises and Docu­ments, Journal of Ethnic Studies 66, 24-43. 
Rasinger, S. M., 2014. Linguistic Landscapes in Southern Carinthia (Austria). Journal of Multi­lingual and Multicultural Development 6, 580-602. 
Reh, M., 2004. Multilingual Writing: a Reader Oriented Typology – with Examples from LiraMunicipality (Uganda). International Journal of the Sociolog y of Language 170, 1-41. 
Regional Law 26/2007. Official Gazzette of the Region Friuli Venezia Giulia (BUR) 47 (2007),21 November 2007. 
Salo, H., 2012. Using Linguistic Landscape to Examine the Visibility of Sámi Languages in theNorth Calotte. In Gorter, D., Marten, H. F., & Van Mensel, L. (eds.), Minority languages in the linguistic landscape. Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, 243-259. 
Shohamy, E., 2006. Language Policy: Hidden Agendas and New Approaches. Routledge, New York. 
Shohamy, E., Ben-Rafael, E. & Barni M. (eds.), 2010. Linguistic Landscape in the City. Multilin­gual Matters, Bristol. 
Shohamy, E. & Abu Ghazaleh-Mahajneh M., 2012. Linguistic Landscape as a Tool for Inter­preting Language Vitality: Arabic as a Minor Language in Israel. In Gorter, D., Marten, 
H. F., & Van Mensel, L. (eds.), Minority Languages in the Linguistic Landscape. Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, 89-106. 
Shohamy, E. & Gorter, D., 2009. Linguistic Landscape: Expanding Scenery. Routledge, New York. 
Spolsky, B. & Cooper, R ., 1991. The Lanuguages of Jerusalem. Clarendom Press, Oxford. 
Stranj, P., 1992. The Submerged Community - An A to Ž of the Slovenes in Italy. Slovene Research Institute, Trieste. 
Sussi, E., Vidali, Z., Janežič, A. & Bogatec, N., 2011. Raziskava o preverjanju izvajanja zaščite slovenske manjšine po 8. členu zakona št. 38/2001 (po nalogu Institucionalnega paritetnegaodbora za probleme slovenske manjšine) / Indagine conoscitiva sull’attuazione della tutela afavore della minoranza slovena ai sensi dell’art. 8 della L. 38/2001 (commissionata dal Comi­tato istituzionale paritetico per i problemi della minoranza slovena). Institucionalni paritetniodbor za probleme slovenske manjšine-Slovenski raziskovalni inštitut SLORI, Trst. 
Syabó Gilinger, E., Sloboda M., Simčič L. & Vigers D., 2012. Discourse Coalitions For andAgainst Minority Languages on Signs: Linguistic Landscape as a Social Issue. In Gorter, D., Marten, H. F., & Van Mensel, L. (eds.), Minority Languages in the Linguistic Landscape.Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, 263-280. 
Tufi, S., 2013. Shared Places, Unshared Identities: Vernacular Discorses and Spatialised Con­structions of Identity in the Linguistic Landscape of Trieste. Modern Italy 4, 391–408. 
M. MEZGEC Jezikovna krajina kot ogledalo: primer slovenske manjšine v Italiji 
Troyer, R ., 2012. Linguistic Landscape: Bibliography of English Publications. https://www.zotero.org/groups/linguistic_landscape_bibliography/items/collection-Key/XF7UTDBM (accessed November 2016). 
Vidau, Z., 2013. The Legal Protection of National and Linguistic Minorities in the Region of
85
Friuli Venezia Giulia: a Comparison of the Three Regional Laws for the “Slovene Lin­guistic Minority ” for the “Friulian Language” and for the “German- speaking Minorities”. 
Treatises and Documents, Journal of Ethnic Studies 71, 27-52. 

Vidau, Z., 2015. Upravljanje jezikovne različnosti v javni upravi. Univerzitetna založba Annales, Koper. 

notes 





1 
For further reading about legislative and sociolinguistic issues on the Slovene minority in Italy see
Mezgec 2012, 65-80, Vidau 2015, 129-227, Brezigar 2007, Bogatec 2004, Stranj 1992. 

2 
For a thorough historical analysis of the legal framework of the Slovene minority in Italy see Bajc
(2004). 

3 
Article 8 defines the use of Slovene in the public administration; Article 10 defines the use of
Slovene in public writings and place names. The decree of the president of the region Friuli
Venezia Giulia n. 346 from 2008 (decree of the president of the region Friuli Venezia Giulia n.
346/2008) define the territory for the implementations of article 10. The city centre of Trieste/
Trst and Gorizia/Gorica are not included in the area where these regulations have to be adopted
and implemented. 

4 
Including the provinces of Trieste/Trst, Gorizia/Gorica and Udine/Videm. 
5 
Following the approach adopted by Dal Negro (2009). 
6 
An exhaustive description of all the methodological details is available in Mezgec 2015. 
7 
By effect of regional law n. 26/2007 (Regional law 26/2007), rights acknowledged to Slovene
language by regional regulations are acknowledged to Slovene dialects in the province of Udine as
well. 

8 
The Friulian minority is officially present in the province of Udine/Videm and partly in Gorizia/
Gorica; the German minority is settled in the northern part of the province of Udine/Videm. 

9 	Reh (2004) identifies different types of arrangements: duplicating multilingualism, fragmentarymultilingualism, overlapping multilingualism and complementary multilingualism. 
10 Top-down linguistic landscape items included those issued by public and national bureaucracies,such as public institutions, signs in public sites, public announcements and street names. Bottom-up signs included those issued by social players (shop owners and companies) such as shopnames, business signs and personal announcements (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006, 14). 
11 That can be seen as a consequence of a language policy. 
12 Gorter refers to the distinction made by Itagi and Singh (2002, cited in Gorter 2013) betweenlinguistic landscape and linguistic landscaping, suggesting that the gerund form means theplanning and implementation of actions, while the noun form includes the final results of thelandscaping activity. 
TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016, p. 87–102 


W hen identifying the language/-s spoken by different members of a community, we firstcategorise and then further merge it/them into definitions. The author discusses somesuch definitions often used in discourse on the Slovenian language in Italy. The authorgathered and analysed these definitions using the method of critical analysis of mediadiscourse on language. She discusses the material from an epistemological perspectivethat transcends the linguistics field and reaches to other fields of humanities and socialstudies. Namely, the social dynamics and cultural paradigms of a language-speakingcommunity are reflected in the perceptions of languages, their practices, and languagepolicies. In this article, the author shows examples of language definitions found in theanalysed material and explains when and why these definitions could be problematic. 
Keywords: linguistics epistemology, critical discourse analysis, language ideology, mother tongue, standard language, dialect. 

Ko želimo opredeliti jezik/-e, ki ga/jih uporabljajo različni govorci neke skupnosti, ga/jihpo navadi razvrstimo v kategorije, ki jih nadalje strnemo v definicije. V nadaljevanju člankaavtorica obravnava nekatere take definicije, ki se pogosto pojavljajo v diskurzu o slovenskemjeziku v Italiji; definicije so bile zbrane in analizirane s kritično analizo medijskih diskurzov ojeziku, v tem prispevku pa gradivo obravnava kot epistemološko vprašanje, ki ne sega samo napodročje jezikoslovnih ved, ampak tudi na druga področja humanistike in družboslovja. Skozipercepcije jezika ter prakse in politike, ki so z jezikom povezane, se namreč odražajo družbenedinamike in kulturne paradigme skupnosti govorcev. V članku avtorica ob primerih definicijjezika, ki jih je zasledila v analiziranem gradivu, pokaže, kdaj in zakaj so lahko te definicije sporne. 
Ključne besede: epistemologija jezikovnih ved, kritična analiza diskurza, jezikovna ideologija, materni jezik, knjižni jezik, narečje. 
Correspondence address: Matejka Grgič, Slovenski raziskovalni inštitut (SLORI), ul./via Beccaria 6, Trst/ Trieste, Italy; e-mail: m.grgic@slori.org. 
ISSN 0354-0286 Print/ISSN 1854-5181 Online  © Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja (Ljubljana), http://www.inv.si 
M. GRGIč The Identification and Definition of the Minority Community as an Ideological Construct: the ... 

In this article, I introduce some results from the first part of the research con­ducted in 2009–2015, which I explain in detail later on.
The aim of this article is to show the ideologically motivated use of some, originally otherwise neutral language definitions and phenomena. This questionis significant since the ideologically motivated use occurs predominantly in themedia discourse and, at the same time, reflects and determines public opinion. The language can in certain circumstances become an element that representsgrounds for establishing relations between belonging and excluding, power anddiscrimination, knowing (knowledge) and not knowing (ignorance). Knowing these dynamics can contribute to more informed identifications of the languageand language phenomena, and can at the same time offer some tools for theimplementation of more efficient language planning policies. A comprehensive critical analysis of language definitions that occur in a certain context is rare inscientific literature, even though there are some studies that discuss in depth some views that I will point out further on.
The goal of this article is to review the five most common definitions oflanguage and language phenomena that occur in the selected corpus of texts and thus show how specific definitions gain an ideological connotation if usedoutside the epistemological context in which they originate. 

In the period of 2009–2015, the first research series was conducted on the lan­guage discourse of those speakers identified as the Slovenian national community(minority) in Italy (Grgič 2016). Predominantly those texts were examined that were published in the three printed media published in the population area of theSlovenian minority in Italy – i.e. Primorski dnevnik, Novi glas and Novi Matajur. One of the aspects I have analysed is the use of specialised terminology from different linguistics studies; I have focused on certain terms that the authorshave used frequently in the analysed texts to define (Slovenian) language. This research is currently ongoing by gathering material from public and publiclyavailable sources, mostly those on-line. Besides other findings (Grgič 2011,2016), the analysis so far has also opened some epistemological questions, related to generally recognised definitions and terminological identifications ofthe language that overcame the boundaries of specialised texts and have becomea part of a general discourse on language. 
These are mostly sociolinguistic, psycholinguistic and language didacticsterms, such as mother tongue or first language, the language of the environment,second language, foreign language, and others, as well as some identifications of different types of language, e.g. standard language or dialect. These definitions 
M. GRGIč Opredeljevanje in definicija jezika narodne manjšinske skupnosti kot ideološki konstrukt: ... 
are used to identify different aspects of language and its use, though they donot necessarily belong to the same epistemological context. That is why anindividual definition can become questionable or at least unsuitable. Each one of these identifications or definitions namely arose in a certain context, with89 certain goals, and with certain boundaries; they were products of individual linguistics studies’ necessity to define its subject of examination and to verbaliseit as precisely as possible (Grgič 2016, 15). That is why we can form a hypothesisthat each of these definitions is ideologically neutral within its original context (Van Dijk 2006); as soon as they are used outside that context and with differentintentions, they become more or less ideologically motivated.
The use of a certain language definition in epistemological contexts that are different to the definitions’ original contexts can be especially questionable whenit spreads into linguistically more exposed areas and when it becomes a part of ageneral discourse on language perception, on attitude towards the language, and on knowledge of the language. In such cases, the use of individual definitionsmay no longer have (only) cognitive, gnoseological function, but (mostly) adistinctive ideological background, so that within language discourses, it starts creating divisions between us and them, starts raising the dynamics of inclusionand exclusion, superordination and subordination, of knowing (knowledge) and not knowing (ignorance) that can, in the end effect, be even discriminatory(Van Dijk 2006, Elias & Scotson 2008).
Language definitions and identifications that were supposed to be professionally neutral, non-ideological and aprioristic can thus be – the same asthe use of language itself – the element that reflects social relations and culturalformations if not even generates them. This is especially obvious in linguistically exposed areas where seemingly neutral language identifications can alsorepresent the identity option of speakers and community (Pertot 2014, 14). Inother words: the community is not only formed through its language but also through perceptions and definitions of this or other languages with which thiscommunity is in contact (Grgič 2016, Petrović 2006). 

The research is based on the examination of the text corpus by using the methodof critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2010, Van Dijk 2006, 2008, 2012).Unlike classical discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis (CDA) that is based on the prior findings of Althusser, Foucault and other theories focusesmainly on the two aspects: the identification of language as a social practice anda discourse as a space where relationships of power, domination, and exclusion (can) form (Wodak & Meyer 2001, 2-12). The critical discourse analysis thusdoes not only discuss textual elements and narration processes but also the contexts from which these texts and processes derive. That is why it calls for a 
M. GRGIč The Identification and Definition of the Minority Community as an Ideological Construct: the ... 
distinctively interdisciplinary approach that should take into considerationdifferent elements (texts, social interaction, culture formations and others), andfor orientation towards concrete goals and changes in current social situations 
90 	(Van Dijk 1993, 253). Critical discourse analysis is thus a method that isespecially useful and usable there, where it is presumed that the processes of exclusion and domination are a consequence of subtle discourse practices, andwhere we believe that by using this analysis, we can contribute to more awareand structured discourses as well as to the introduction of different development politics – even with the language. 

In the analysed texts, we can see frequent use1 of mainly those terms that areintroduced later in this paper. The speakers use them to identify not only thelanguage as an object but also this language’s place in the society and their attitude towards it. In short, the expert terms and definitions introduced in this paper arenot only the a posteriori marks that place language in a certain scientific paradigm but also identification options that shape language as a cultural formation. 

The terminology linking the language learning process with the role of a mother, and language proficiency and its use with the concept of the nation, was estab­lished primarily in the 19th century (Hobsbawm 1992) but was alreadyformed before that time. Dante Alighieri, e.g. defined that concept in a slightly different way by saying that folk language is the language learned by childrenspontaneously when in contact with their nannies - as opposed to the Latinthat they had to learn later, intentionally and with teachers.2 Despite the terminological inconsistency, some key features can be observed in the Dante’sand the later definition of mother tongue: Early learning and consequentiallyoptimal language proficiency that represents the primary (if not the only) option of individual’s identification and thus the primary (if not the only) nationallyconstitutive element (Formigari 2001, 272). 
The concept of mother tongue is generally linked with the formation ofthe ideal – and not necessarily real – speaker whose language knowledge andskills are intertwined with the speaker’s origin (Saniei 2011, 77), i.e. the family as well as the social, cultural and national (Mufwene 1994). Mother tonguethus represents a static category since it is clear that no speaker can a posterioriinfluence the language used by their parents from the speaker’s birth to about the third year of age. Mother tongue cannot be changed - it is some sort of abirthmark, presumably given by the family, especially by the family memberthat nurtures the baby: the mother (Davies 2003). While the interpretation of 
M. GRGIč Opredeljevanje in definicija jezika narodne manjšinske skupnosti kot ideološki konstrukt: ... 
the language as a static formation that equates learning processes, identificationoptions and the proficiency level was in line with classical philosophical, socialand linguistic theories of the 19th century, in the 20th century epistemological,cultural, and social frame changed fundamentally. The concept of mother tongue91 remained present in popular literature but was reshaped into the concept of anative speaker or the first language in scientific contexts (Bonfiglio 2010), as wewill see later on. 
The term mother tongue is mostly used in popular texts where it may haveentirely different meanings. In the analysed corpus of texts, the following optionsthat define mother tongue are most frequent: “the language that the speakerknows the best”; “the language that the speaker learned first”; “the languagewith which the speaker identifies themself.”3 Mostly the combination of thesethree meanings and uses is questionable or ideologically motivated: it is namelyby no means self-evident or certain that the speaker knows the first taughtlanguage the best and that this is the language with which the speaker primarilyand exclusively identifies themself – even within the speaker’s options of ethnicbelonging (Myhill 2003). In the analysed text corpus, the minority language(Slovenian) is predominantly identified as the mother(’s) tongue of the speakersthat identify themselves as a part of this group.
In the analysed pool of 250 texts, this term occurred twenty-one times. Forcomparison: a related term first language bearing the meaning “the languagethat the speaker learned first in early childhood / the family” recurred fourtimes, and the term primary language does not occur at all. We can see from thetexts that the term mother tongue always occurs in one possible combinationof meanings that derive from the above-mentioned options (the language thatthe speaker knows the best and has learned as the first and with which theyidentify themself ): “mother tongue is a language that a child learns in earlychildhood from its environment, most times from the mother”; “[mother’stongue] is a gift”; “this is the language that belongs to us.” The quantity andthe collocations of these occurrences – mostly in comparison to other relatedidentifications of the minority language – show a certain paradigm predominantin a community of speakers. This is a national-bourgeois paradigm of the 19thcentury that equated the language with the nation and furthermore linked bothwith the family: the speaker – a member of the nation was born and raised in thatlanguage; something that clearly happens within the family where the motherplays the crucial role.
Given the fact that the media considered in this article is widespread andgiven the number of term occurrences, we can assume that this media discourseparadigm is spreading and is becoming generally accepted in the entirecommunity of Slovenian-speaking speakers in Italy. Alongside other factors, this can additionally influence the establishment of a static, nostalgic identificationof the language and can thus also steer language planning policies and strategies in the same direction. 
M. GRGIč The Identification and Definition of the Minority Community as an Ideological Construct: the ... 
4.2 First Language (Also native Speaker) 























The term first language that is to some extent related to the term mother tongue,
92 occurs rarely (four occurrences) in the analysed text pool; the term nativespeaker meaning “the speaker that has been learning the language since birthor has already learned it by the third year of age” does not occur in the analysedtexts. I only mention it here because it is frequently used4 in contemporary linguistics and also in popular texts.Both terms (fist language and native speaker) summarise some aspects ofthe term mother tongue but were based on the generative grammar theory andcognitive linguistics that were established in the second half of the 20th century;in such context, their function is neutral and thus enable scientists to understand certain formation and transformation processes. By defining the term of anative speaker, Chomsky set foundations for his generative grammar that seesthe transformational processes as intuitive derivations of the internal language,referred to as the I-language by the generativists (Isac & Reiss 2013, 77).The terms first language or native speaker can, though, become problematicwhen they are used in sociolinguistics and language didactics withoutappropriate identification, especially when discussing linguistically exposed andmultilingual areas (Bonfiglio 2010). As with the definition mother tongue, theterms first language and native speaker also presume a static condition - that thespeaker presumably has the best knowledge of the same language through theirentire life and that this is the language the speaker has learned in early childhood-, which is, at least in such environments, more an exception rather than therule. This is where the presumption that becomes a general fact in an ideologicaldiscourse derives from (Van Dijk 2006): that a native speaker is a better andmore competent speaker in comparison to someone that has learned a languageat a later time in life; equating presumably all native speakers – all speakers thathave learned a certain language in their earliest childhood, regardless of their laterlanguage skills development – is also ideological. Nevertheless, this concept alsobecame a part of language competence (self )evaluation where a degree of levelproficiency is often marked simply with terms mother tongue, native speaker orfirst language that only state the fact of which language the speaker has learnedas the first or in their early childhood but not also how the speaker is using thislanguage at the moment of their proficiency (self )evaluation.By doing so, the concept that contemporary didactics and the theory oflanguage learning discuss as essential mainly for learning minority languages,loses its meaning entirely: this is the concept of exposure. The research hasnamely shown that exposure to the language is a key factor for achieving a certainlanguage proficiency level (Thordardottir 2011). Even with the concept ofexposure, the speakers’ age is one of the factors that influence the effectiveness oflanguage learning: early exposure is in principle more effective than the one later in life. Nevertheless, exposure to language also includes other factors that are 
M. GRGIč Opredeljevanje in definicija jezika narodne manjšinske skupnosti kot ideološki konstrukt: ... 
considered as fundamental elements of the learning processes. Learning is more effective if the exposure is continuous (if the speaker is exposed to the language all the time or at least in different periods of their life) and diverse (if the speaker is exposed to different uses and communication practices of this language – i.e. different codes, genres and idioms or lects5). 
Based on the research focusing on the concept of exposure it is, though, important to promote spontaneous language learning in the earliest period (0–3 year). At the same time, language planning policies and implementation of didactic models should ensure further continuous exposure to diverse language practices. These should not only enable but also demand from the speakers the use of different language codes, genres and idioms of a certain language continuum6. Language proficiency that is in epistemological context perceived as a lever of language skills development (Meisel 2007, 496) is thus a result of different factors, environments and strategies – it changes over time and is not just an end product. Whether a certain language is the speaker’s mother tongue or not, or the first language or not, is thus in this perspective only one of the three key factors that influence what we could – lastly – name language proficiency. The role of the family (and, presumably, of the mother) in the language learning processes and achieving a certain level of language proficiency or skills is in this epistemological paradigm somewhat redimensioned. Whether a speaker is more or less proficient or skilful in different ways of using a given language – code, genre, idiom – depends only to some (though important) extent on the fact in which language the speaker communicated (presumably with parents, relatives and caretakers) in their earliest period of life. The responsibility for successful learning and lastly even for language proficiency is thus, at least partially, shifting from the family to the society or the community of speakers which is in such model implicitly responsible for forming proper strategies that will ensure continuous and differentiated exposure of speakers to different uses of the language. 
In the analysed pool of texts, I did not come across the term exposure (meaning exposure to language or different language usage in the language learning processes). This can mean that the models of indirect or direct support of practices that supposedly retain only certain forms, structures and types of use of the Slovenian language are becoming more established than the active and professionally examined language policies. Further ongoing studies in the community of speakers of the Slovenian language in Italy show that these are mostly normalised, standard/literary models and uses that supposedly display the authenticity and autarchy of the local language. 
Next to the term mother tongue examined in this article, the identification our language is most frequently used in the analysed pool of texts. This is an explicit use of a deictic term that authors of the texts use with very different references: Sometimes they identify with it the entire continuum of the Slovenian 
M. GRGIč The Identification and Definition of the Minority Community as an Ideological Construct: the ... 

language and its idioms, and sometimes only local use, dialects and even certainspecific occurrences of language contact, e.g. different compensation strategies,code-mixing and code-switching. Such use of the label our language shows that 
94 	the speakers identify themselves with different idioms of the Slovenian languagecontinuum, predominantly with the local variants (Pertot 2014). 

4.3 Language of Environment 











If we presume that a corresponding exposure is necessary in order to achieve acertain level of language proficiency that enables the speaker to competently usethe language in presumably all communication environments, the presence ofthe language in the environment becomes essential. In the discussed pool of texts,the minority language is in fact identified as the language of the environmentwhere it is presumed that the speakers can (also) learn it spontaneously – withintheir living environment where they are sufficiently exposed to this language. Inthe analysed texts, I found this term in connection with the Slovenian languagein Italy seven times, most (five) in texts that can be classified as popular scientific.
The definition of the minority language as the language of the environmentis also not always self-evident, even though it is established in many areas.7 W hat is in fact regarded as the term environment, is namely already problematic. Thefact that the presence of a language in only some environments – e.g. family,neighbourhood, informal communication situations – and only in a certaindevelopment period – e.g. childhood – leads into a sociolinguistic situationreferred to as diglossia that was already proven a long time ago (Schiffman 1993,120). But not only that: Even in the areas where the use of the minority languageis possible in more prestige environments, e.g. school, public space, legaladministrative procedures or other public administrative contacts, it can occurthat the language use is weakening in other contexts and is thus abandoned inthe long run as the general means of communication (Cooper 1989).
When defining the environment in which the language should be presentfor successful spontaneous learning and language skills development, one ofthe effective exposure factors is most often not taken into account: diversity.(Legal) status and (perceived) prestige that are also defined by the presence ofthe language in some formal contexts, mostly public, do not ensure the use ofthe minority language in potentially all communication situations. This wouldenable speakers to use different, even not standardised and less formal codes –from general colloquial language to different types of slang and jargon.
Furthermore, the environment cannot be understood merely as a physicalspace in which speakers exist. The language environment is also an environmentwith which the speakers are in indirect contact through their communicationpractices and do not require all participants of such communication processesto be present at the same time. In the past, mostly books and letters made such practices possible, then newsletters and magazines, and later on even television 
M. GRGIč Opredeljevanje in definicija jezika narodne manjšinske skupnosti kot ideološki konstrukt: ... 
and radio shows, films, and records. Language environment today is largelyvirtual and on-line: social networks, web media, chat rooms and other e-content and channels represent an important segment of communication. If in a world where such communication practices blur the line between the local and the95 global (even within a single language continuum) the speakers remain in contactonly with local variants of certain language continuum, it may happen that theirspectrum of available codes, genre and idioms or lects drastically decreases or itat least does not develop in line with new communicational requirements.
One consequence of that is the fact that even languages of a communitythat is otherwise not a language enclave or island (Auer & Schmidt 2010), arereduced to the level of so-called heritage languages (Benmamoun et al. 2010)that in the end only have a symbolic value but no functional ties with a widercommunity of speakers of a certain language continuum (Cooper 1989). Thesecond consequence is the establishing of a parallel standard in all environmentsand communicational situations. The speakers are no longer familiar with typesof use that are distinctive for presumably the entire language continuum but onlywith those distinctive for their own narrow environment or even geographicalspace. That is why they begin to develop compensation strategies (Winford2003) that at first enable them to communicate in a dialect, perceived as a part oftheir own language continuum; at some point, though, these usages can be verydifferent from otherwise standard use in this given language continuum.
The identification of a minority language as the language of the environmentis thus not self-evident. This definition is entirely arbitrary and thus ideologicalif it is not founded on empirically provable information8 that can prove thatthere is enough of such language presence in an environment that spontaneouslearning processes of a wide spectrum of language codes of a certain continuumcan be established. On the level of language strategies, planning and didacticssuch establishing can be problematic since it is founded on false or at leastunconfirmed assumptions. 

4.4 Second and Foreign Language 













In a context where definitions of the mother tongue and the first language, thenative speaker and the language of the environment are problematic, the linebetween the mother tongue and the foreign language or between the first andthe second language (or languages) also starts to weaken or shift in a different way.
At least until the second half of the 20th century, it was generally consideredthat every speaker has their own mother tongue and that they can know oneor more foreign languages. Of course, this division was not entirely up to dateeven in a pre-globalised world: it mostly reflected the ideology of one nation – one language. In the second half of the 20th century, rapid social changes andnew epistemological models brought some kind of a tripartite division to the 

M. GRGIč The Identification and Definition of the Minority Community as an Ideological Construct: the ... 
first language (or languages), learned in early childhood and definitely beforeall other languages, the second language (or languages), learned in different lifeperiods in environments with such language exposure, and foreign languages,
96 learned in a didactically structured environment, presumably without contactwith an environment or environments in which these languages are generallypresent (Schmidt 2010).In such model, the first language of a member of a certain minority communityis supposed to be a minority language, the second language the majority languagewith which this member would be in contact in the environment, and the foreign language or the third language the language learned only in school. Thisdivision should also reflect the proficiency level and type – the first language isthe language the speaker knows the best, sequentially then follow the secondand the foreign language (languages) – and the individual’s identification withthe language or the community that uses this language: in such paradigm, thelanguage of the identification is strictly mother tongue or the first language.Right after the beginning of the 21st century, it became clear that such divisionsare obsolete (Canagarajah 2005).The exposure to first and non-first languages in multilingual and generallyheterogeneous and dynamic societies can be very different. That is why thelearning processes, language proficiency and types of use of different languageswith which the speakers are in contact also differ. Modern technologies, mainlyweb access to examples of language use, enable certain forms of spontaneouslearning. Up until recently, this was impossible or even unimaginable. At thesame time, interim phases of language perception and knowledge are appearingin the multilingual, dynamic and heterogeneous communities. These phasescannot be identified within the mentioned divisions. The complex dynamic of language learning and identification with differentcommunities of speakers occurs precisely in minority communities; as aconsequence, e.g., the proficiency level of the second (majority) language is higherwith some minority speakers than the level of the first (minority) language, andthe speakers identify their belonging to different groups of speakers in differentperiods of their lives, thus creating fluid and multiple identities (Pertot 2014,20). Next to that it can occur that speakers only develop certain codes, idiomsor functions (though they may be prestige, literary or formal) in the minoritylanguage – even though this is their first language – and are not familiar with thebroad spectrum of use in a different communication context (Cooper 1989). 

4.5 Standard Language and Dialect 


















In the analysed texts, the terms standard language9 and dialect occurred twelve and nine times respectively. A label standard also occurred several (six) times incertain collocations, e.g. “standard use”, “this is not standard” etc.; a label dialect is also used in phrases such as “all that is in dialect”, “dialect poetry” etc. (seven 

M. GRGIč Opredeljevanje in definicija jezika narodne manjšinske skupnosti kot ideološki konstrukt: ... 
times). Standard language has very unambiguous connotations: It represents a standardised, high-standard language that the speakers should have used as often as possible; it is a model and a canon for the language use. As we will see further on, the connotation of a dialect is not as unambiguous. 
The concept of the standard language as the highest language level that all cultivated speakers should try to achieve, was lastly formulated in the 19th century, hand in hand with the rise of the bourgeoisie and with the processes of modern nation-states formation. In this context, standard language played a part in connecting and in nation formation ( Joseph 1987). This role at least partially changed in the social context of the transition from the 20th to the 21st century. 
The idea that every country (nation) should have an own language that defines it and with which it can identify, and is at the same time used for communicating at the highest social levels was already present in the Middle Ages and began spreading rapidly during the Renaissance: When the individual standard languages formed and became standardised, Dante’s dream of a national idiom came true – it was to be illustre (prestige), cardinale (standard in normative sense), aulico e curiale (suitable for use at court, i.e. for political and state matters). 
Standard language is an ideal and always also at least partially an artificial construct. Different from other idioms, it namely does not develop only spontaneously (Lippi-Green 1997): It is also defined and delineated by individual groups that are formed in a certain context as the (scientific, expert, artistic) elites that gain power and the role of setting the language norm (Petrović 2006). These groups then set the models and criteria under which they will form the standard language: The language that undergoes these standardisation processes and lastly becomes the standard language is a result of discarding language elements based on the criteria of geography, history, and genre. At the same time, language learning methods are defined in these processes thus implicitly and explicitly limiting the group of speakers that have the option to access genres of this language that are perceived as the highest (Tollefson 2000). 
The perception of the standard language as the highest and most prestigious language level and also the only standard for language proficiency evaluation changed in the 20th century. On one side, the quantity and the diversity of texts created by the community of speakers, distinctively influenced the emergence and the development of different language genres that became the most suitable or that were established as a canon of an individual text genre (Kodrić 2010). On the other side, because of social movements and the emergence of new, different groups of speakers, it became more and more apparent that the standard language cannot be the only idiom that is considered cardinale in a particular language context. With the development of (language) technologies nowadays, even the concept of standardisation or the norm essential for standard language has different dimensions and valences. 
M. GRGIč The Identification and Definition of the Minority Community as an Ideological Construct: the ... 
The problem of the language genre study, established during the transition from the 19th to the 20th century, is especially distinctive on language exposed areas and considering the lack of natural language learning processes. It can thus potentially occur that mainly the speakers of non-autochthonous minorities, e.g. migrants, never achieve the proficiency level of the hosting country’s standard language that would be comparable to the level of other speakers which can lead to social inequalities and discrimination (Lippi-Green 1997). Inversely, it can occur that individual speaker communities know and use standard language because they learn it in didactically structured environments, but do not know any other language genres because they are not adequately exposed to them – e.g. this happens to the national minority communities that live outside areas where this language is primary. As a consequence, the use of this language is being discarded (Pauwels 2016) since the (formal, written) standard language is not suitable for use in certain, especially less formal contexts that represent the most common communicational practices and thus the use of the language. Next to that, speakers do not always identify themselves with a standard language since they perceive it as distant and partially artificial (Kordić 2010); when analysing communities of speakers it is more distinctive that – perhaps because of the lack of a not-normalised yet still standardised general colloquial idiom – the speakers do not identify themselves with uses that are typical for the entire Slovenian language continuum, but rather more and more distinctively with local variants of the Slovenian language (Pertot 2014). 
In emphasising and supporting the local community, the dialects and their functions have a special place within a broad spectrum of language uses and communicational practices. A dialect is on one side a carrier of authenticity values, locality and belonging to a (smaller) community, and on the other a lower lever genre of the non-cultivated speakers (Grgič 2016). It is sometimes hard to establish a synthesis between these two positions that would bridge such purely dichotomic divisions. Because of that, the attitude towards a dialect is always only partial and thus problematic. After all, this can also be reflected in the policies of language planning, language revitalisation, and the development of the minority community languages (Dorian 1994, 486-487). Though this dualism is typical for the history and epistemology of linguistic studies of the 20th century, it is even more apparent in certain geographical and cultural contexts. 
In a very distinctively diachronous 19th century linguistics that tried to reconstruct mainly the historical development of the language with then current language uses, the dialect was one of the ideal examples that supported such research (Petrović 2006). The desired purity, originality and authenticity were insured by its distance in time and space – e.g. the oldest possible speaker in the most remote areas is regarded as a typical informant (Williams 1973). 
In the analysed texts, dialect overtakes some roles and functions of a standard language (Auer 2011): This occurs in the environments where standard language 
M. GRGIč Opredeljevanje in definicija jezika narodne manjšinske skupnosti kot ideološki konstrukt: ... 
would normally be expected (e.g. even in media language10, toponymy, andpublicly available inscriptions) and represents an idiom with which the speakersidentify themselves. Both occurrences can on one side represent a bottom-up experiment of language revitalisation and language use promotion, or can lead99 to language secessionism on the other (Kordić 2009): Speakers can at some point perceive a dialect as the independent (Abstand) language formation thatis no longer a part of certain language continuum – namely Slovenian. It shouldbe noted that the perception processes of a language (non-)continuum and (non-)identification with the language are independent from scientific or expertlanguage discussions; more than scientific argumentation, are they subject tobroader social, even political and economic factors. 

Some definitions that were supposed to be potentially neutral but are in fact ideologically motivated arise from the language discourse that is, at thesame time, also a discourse on this language speakers’ identity option and oncommunities formed by the use of a certain language. They were created within certain epistemological paradigms and models with its function to study aspecific linguistic phenomenon but are used also in other and different contexts by the media discourse that reflects and generates the discourses of the (entire)speakers’ community.
When definitions are used in contexts that are different to those in which they were created without appropriate modification, can this contribute tocreating ideological centres that furthermore influence the perception oflinguistic phenomena, identification processes, language formation, language policies formation and the decision-makers’ implementation plans. 

Auer, P. & Schmidt, J. (eds.), 2010. Language and Space. An International Handbook of LinguisticVariation. Volume 1. Theories and Methods. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York. 
Auer, P., 2011. Dialects vs. Standard. A typology of scenarios in Europe. In B. Kortmann & J. Vander Auwera (eds.) The Languages and linguistics of Europe. De Gruyter Mouton, Berlin – Boston. 
Benmamoun, E., Montrul, S. & Polinsky, M., 2010. White Paper. Prolegomena to Heritage Lin­guistics. http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mpolinsky/files/hl_white_paper_june_12.pdf (accessed 7 December 2016). 
Bonfiglio, Th. P., 2010. Mother Tongues and Nations: The Invention of the Native Speaker. De Gruyter, Berlin. 
Canagarajah, A . S. (ed.), 2005. Reclaiming the Local in Language Policy and Practice. Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah (NJ). 
100 

77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
M. GRGIč The Identification and Definition of the Minority Community as an Ideological Construct: the ... 
Cooper, R . L., 1989. Language Planning and Social Change. Cambridge University Press, Cam­bridge. 
Davies, A., 2003. The Native Speaker. Myth and Reality. Multillingual Matters, Clevedon – Buf­falo – Toronto – Sydney. 
Dorian, N., 1994. Purism vs. Compromise in Language Revitalization and Language Revival.Language in Society 23 (4), 479-494. 
Elias, N. & Scotson, J., 2008. The Established and the Outsiders. The Collected Works of Norbert Elias, Volume IV. University college Dublin press – Preas Choláiste Ollscoile Bhaile Átha Cliath, Dublin. 
Fairclough, N., 2010. Critical Discourse Analysis. Routledge, New York. 
Formigari, L., 2001. Il linguaggio. Storia delle teorie. Laterza, Roma – Bari. 
Grgič, M., 2011. Semiotika in teorija simbolov: kaj nam povesta o odnosu govorcev do (lastnegajezika)? In S. Kranjc (ed.) Meddisciplinarnost v slovenistiki (Simpozij Obdobja). Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete, Ljubljana. 
Grgič, M., 2016. Jezik: sistem, sredstvo in simbol – Identiteta in ideologija med Slovenci v Italiji. Slovenski raziskovalni inštitut SLORI, Slovenski izobraževalni konzorcij SLOVIK , Trst/Gorica. 
Hobsbawm, E.,1992. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge University press. 
Isac, D. & Reiss, C., 2013. I-Language: An Introduction to Linguistics as Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press. 
Joseph, J. E., 1987. Eloquence and Power: The Rise of Language Standards and Standard Langua­ges. Basil Blackwell, New York. 
Kordić, S., 2009. Plurizentrische Sprachen, Ausbausprachen, Abstandsprachen und die Ser­bokroatistik. Zeitschrift für Balkanologie 45 (2), 210-215. 
Kordić, S., 2010. Jezik i nacionalizam. Rotulus Universitas, Zagreb. 
Lippi-Green, R ., 1997. English with an Accent. Language, Ideolog y, and Discrimination in the United States. Routledge, London. 
Meisel, J., 2007. The Weaker Language in Early Child Bilingualism: Acquiring a First Languageas a Second Language? Applied Psycholinguistics 28 (3), 495-514. 
Mezgec, M., 2015. Raziskava o jezikovni pokrajini na naselitvenem območju slovenske skupnosti vItaliji: raziskovalno poročilo. Slovenski raziskovalni inštitut SLORI, Trst. 
Mufwene, S., 1994. New Englishes and the Criteria for Naming them. World Englishes 13 (1),21-31. 
Myhill, J., 2003. The Native Speaker, Identity and the Authenticity Hierarchy. Language Sciences 25 (1), 77–97. 
Pauwels, A ., 2016. Language Maintenance and Shift. Cambridge University Press. 
Pertot, S., 2014. Dvajset let med slovenščino in italijanščino. Primerjava med generacijamimaturantov srednjih šol druge stopnje s slovenskim učnim jezikom v Italiji o uporabislovenščine in italijanščine kot jezikov sporazumevanja in notranjega govora. In S. Pertot& M. Kosic (eds.) Jeziki in identitete v precepu. Mišljenje, govor in predstave o identiteti pri trehgeneracijah maturantov šol s slovenskim učnim jezikom v Italiji. Trst: Slori. 
Petrović, T., 2006. Ne tu, ne tam. Srbi v Beli krajini in njihova jezikovna ideologija v procesuzamenjave jezika. Založba ZRC, Ljubljana. 
Saniei, A., 2011. W ho Is An Ideal Native Speaker?! At 2011 International Conference on Lan­guages, Literature and Linguistics. International Proceedings of Economics Development andResearch 26, 74-78. 
M. GRGIč Opredeljevanje in definicija jezika narodne manjšinske skupnosti kot ideološki konstrukt: ... 
Schiffman, H. F., 1993. The Balance of Power in Multiglossic Languages. Implications for Lan­guage Shift. International Journal of the Sociolog y of Language 103, 115-148. 
Schmidt, R ., 2010. Attention, Awareness, and Individual Differences in Language Learning. In
W. M. Chan,S. Chi, K . N. Cin, J. Istanto, M. Nagami, J. W. Sew, T. Suthiwan, & I. Walker,
101
(eds.) Proceedings of CLaSIC 2010, National University of Singapore, Centre for Language 
Studies Singapore, 721-737. 

Thordardottir, E., 2011. The Relationship Between Bilingual Exposure and Vocabulary Deve­lopment Article. International Journal of Bilingualism 15 (4), 426-445. 
Tollefson, J. W., 2000. Language Ideology and Language Education. In J. Shaw, D. Lubelska &
M. Noullet (eds.) Partnership and Interaction. Proceedings of the Fourth International Confe­rence on Language and Development. Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok. 

Van Dijk, T. A ., 1993. Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. Discourse & Society 4 (2), 249­
283. Van Dijk, T. A., 2006. Ideology and Discourse Analysis. Journal of Political Ideologies 11 (2),
115–140. 
Van Dijk, T. A., 2008. Discourse and Power. Palgrave-MacMillan, Houndsmills. 
Van Dijk, T. A., 2012. Discourse and Knowledge. In J. P. Gee & M. Handford (eds.) Handbook 
of Discourse Analysis. Routledge, London. 
Williams, R ., 1973. The Country and the City. Oxford University Press, New York. 
Winford, D., 2003. An Introduction to Contact Linguistics. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford. 
Wodak, R . & Meyer, M., 2001. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. Sage Publications, Lon­
don , New Delhi. 


notes 





1 
Critical discourse analysis does not foresee quantitative analyses of individual term recurren­ces in the analysed texts. I thus define as frequent those recurrences that I found in different
text types (news articles, columns, sections, readers’ letters...) and recurred continuously in
the entire time frame. 

2 
“/…/ vulgarem locutionem appellamus eam qua infantes assuefiunt ab assistentibus cum
primitus distinguere voces incipiunt; vel, quod brevius dici potest, vulgarem locutionem
asserimus quam sine omni regola nutricem imitantes accipimus.” De vulgari eloquentia, I.2. 

3 
For more details about the quotes from the analyzed texts please cfr. Grgič 2016, 47. 
4 
Given the fact that this term is also used in some texts published in the Slovenian-Italian
linguistic area, we cannot rule out the possibility that the term does also occur in the media
discourse but that the analysis of the pool of texts in the given corpus did not yield such
result. 

5 
I use the terms idiom and lect as potentially neutral terms that encompass “also language,
dialect, local language system, and any type of sociolect and specific language of an indivi­dual (or. idiolect). /.../ ‘Idioms’ [are] therefore all language codes used by a community in
question” (Petrović 2006). 

6 	The term language continuum is used as a potentially neutral concept for denoting poten­tially all possible languages, variants, dialects, and codes that are perceived as a standalonelanguage, disregarding their diversity. 
7 
It is used, e.g., to label the position of the Italian language in bilingual municipalities in Slove­nia (Istria), that is predominantly in the scientific literature that deals with minority language
teaching/learning. 

77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
M. GRGIč The Identification and Definition of the Minority Community as an Ideological Construct: the ... 
8 
Such research was conducted for the specific case of the Slovenian minority in Italy in 2015but only considered the so-called language landscape of a population area of the said mino­rity (Cf. Mezgec 2015). 
9
102 	In Slovenian: knjižni jezik (the most formal level of the language, used especially in writtentexts and standardized by norm – rather then by use –, deduced at least in part from classicalliterary examples). 
10 	The majority of the analysed texts published in the weekly paper Novi Matajur is written in adialect. 
TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016, p. 103–120 


Urejanje področja manjšinske zaščite se je v Evropi pogosto razvijalo v negotovemzgodovinskem okviru. Močna evropska regionalna gibanja so s poudarjanjem vrednostiregionalnih, jezikovnih in družbenih posebnosti evropskih perifernih skupnostizaznamovala sredino 60. let prejšnjega stoletja. Wales predstavlja danes uradnodvojezično regijo, za katero sta značilni enojezična večinska in dvojezična manjšinskaskupnost in ki predstavlja pester laboratorij inovativnih jezikovnih praks in strateškopremišljenih jezikovnih pobud, zasnovanih na celovitih družbenih mrežah (sistemumreženja). Na osnovi analize primarnih in sekundarnih podatkovnih virov ter dodatnegaterenskega raziskovanja smo poskušali povzeti vrednotenje uspešnosti jezikovnih politikin izbranih jezikovnih pobud ter med njimi poiskati primere, ki so bili z vidika spremembrazširjenosti rabe jezika inovativni in učinkoviti. 
Ključne besede: jezikovna zakonodaja, jezikovna politika, jezikovne prakse, promo­cija manjšinskega jezika, družbena raba jezika, valižanski jezik. 

Editing of the minority protection area in Europe often evolved in an uncertain historicalcontext. Strong regional movements, which emphasized the value of regional, linguistic andsocial particularities of the European peripheral communities, marked the middle of the 60sof the last century. Wales represents the officially bilingual region, which is characterized by amonolingual majority and bilingual minority. The Welsh language represents a rich laboratoryof innovative best practices and strategically premeditated language initiatives in the areas ofplanning of the use of Welsh language, and the strategically thoughtful language initiatives,designed on comprehensive social networks (networking ). Based on an analysis of primary andsecondary data sources as well as with an additional field work, we have tried to summarize theevaluation of the performance that shapes language policies and selected language initiatives,and find among them examples that were innovative and efficient in terms of the language useprevalence changes. 
Keywords: language legislation, language policy, language practices, promotion of mino­rity language, social use of language, Welsh language. 
Correspondence address: Špela Gale, Statistični urad Republike Slovenije/Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Litostrojska cesta 54, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija, e-mail: spela.gale@gov.si. 
ISSN 0354-0286 Print/ISSN 1854-5181 Online  © Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja (Ljubljana), http://www.inv.si 
1. Uvod 





Zgodovinske ali avtohtone manjšinske skupnosti po Kosicevi idr. (2013) predstavljajo skupnosti, ki se od večinskega prebivalstva neke države razlikujejopo svojem jeziku in kulturi, število njihovih pripadnikov pa je nižje od števila pripadnikov večinskega prebivalstva – mednje avtorji uvrščajo narodne alinacionalne manjšinske skupnosti1, narode brez države2 in etnične manjšinske skupnosti3. Člani manjšinske skupnosti so ponavadi dvojezični, kar pomeni, da že od otroštva obvladajo svoj jezik in tudi uradni jezik države, v kateri živijo. Ker jejezik običajno ena izmed glavnih značilnosti, po katerih se manjšinske skupnostirazlikujejo od večinske, se poleg oznake zgodovinske večkrat uporablja tudi naziv jezikovne manjšinske skupnosti; poseben primer jezikovnih manjšinskihskupnosti so jezikovne manjšinske skupnosti regionalnih jezikov4 . 
Obdobje urejanja področja manjšinske zaščite v evropskem prostoru, pri čemer so imeli ključno vlogo Združeni narodi, Svet Evrope, Organizacija zavarnost in sodelovanje ter Evropska skupnost, se je po navedbah Kovačičeve(2010) pogosto razvijalo v negotovem zgodovinskem okviru. Najprej ga je zaznamovala dekolonizacija, od sredine 60. let prejšnjega stoletja dalje pa sose oblikovala močna regionalna gibanja, ki so poudarjala vrednost regionalnih,jezikovnih in družbenih posebnosti evropskih perifernih skupnosti. V obdobju klasičnega razvoja evropskih nacionalnih držav v 19. in 20. stoletju so bilemanjšinske skupnosti predmet teritorialne delitve evropskih držav; stremeleso k homogenosti lastne države. Ob koncu 20. stoletja je urejanje manjšinske zaščite dodatno zaznamoval razpad nekaterih večnacionalnih držav, začel se jetudi proces tranzicije.
Klopčič (2006, 324–325) poudarja, da je sistem mednarodnopravnega varstva človekovih pravic na univerzalni in regionalni ravni po drugi svetovnivojni postopoma spreminjal vlogo države, ki je do tedaj edina presojala raven uresničevanja človekovih pravic; oblikovali so se mehanizmi, ki so postopomazačeli priznavati kolektivno razsežnost manjšinskih pravic. Žagar (2002)ugotavlja, da je na deklarativni ravni manjšinam sicer posvečena precejšnja pozornost, dodeljevanje in uresničevanje posebnih pravic pripadnikomnarodnih manjšin pa sta ostala notranja zadeva držav in predmet bilateralnihmeddržavnih odnosov. Zupančič (2005) dodaja, da je večina zakonodajnih vsebin v evropskih dokumentih posplošenih, prav tako na evropski ravni še nipodana opredelitev narodne ali etnične manjšine. Vloga jezikovnih in drugihmanjšinskih skupnosti se ob močni vpetosti v evropski družbeni in prostorski kontekst vse bolj spreminja. Odprt evropski prostor je obmejnim območjempo eni strani prinesel veliko priložnosti, predvsem projektno sodelovanje, saj so periferna območja v vsej Evropski uniji deležna raznih pobud in subvencij,po drugi strani pa predstavlja tem območjem še vedno velik izziv konkuriranjemočnim osrednjim krajem. 
Poleg konvencij in deklaracij, ki na evropski ravni določajo etična in splošnapolitična načela za zaščito jezikovnih manjšin (Kosic idr. 2013), sta zaščitajezikovne različnosti kot kulturne dediščine in spoštovanje neodtujljive pravice do uporabe regionalnega jezika v javnem in zasebnem življenju ali jeziku105 narodne manjšine urejena v Resolucijah Evropskega parlamenta o jezikovnih in kulturnih manjšinah v Evropski skupnosti (1981 in nadaljnje). Evropska listina
o regionalnih in manjšinskih jezikih (1992) ter Okvirna konvencija za varstvonarodnih manjšin (1995), ki ju je odobril Svet Evrope, sta postali prva pravno obvezujoča mednarodna dokumenta o varstvu manjšin.
Proces evropske integracije je poenostavil in povečal obseg čezmejne komu­nikacije in medregionalnega sodelovanja, manjšine so postale povezovalni ele­ment, spodbujevalke in nosilke dejavnosti, njihove institucije pa most medregijami in državami (Zupančič 2005). Jezikovna izbira v večjezičnih okoljihpostaja posebej aktualna zaradi vse intenzivnejših migracijskih in globalizacijskih tokov. Williams (2005) ugotavlja, da so globalizacijski procesi, ki so se zaradispremenjenih oblik vladanja pojavili v 80. letih prejšnjega stoletja, vplivali napovečano politično vlogo regij. V mnogih evropskih državah centralna vlada suverenosti več ne izvaja na absoluten način, upravljanje ni več hierarhičnood zgoraj navzdol (top-down) in tehnokratsko, temveč temelji na višji stopnji izenačenosti in decentralizacije ter vključuje različne družbeno-socialne skupine.Poudarek na lokalizaciji, subsidiarnosti in decentralizirani vladi je vplival nadecentralizacijo odločanja od centralne vlade k lokalnim nivojem civilne družbe in predstavniški vladi. Nekatere evropske manjšinske jezikovne skupnosti sose na evropske integracijske in globalizacijske procese odzvale z oblikovanjeminformacijskih mrež, reformami izobraževalnih sistemov in oblikovanjem zavezništev z odločujočimi vladnimi telesi. Veljavna jezikovna politika, kijo razumemo kot institucionalizirane postopke, s katerimi družba vpliva nausmerjanje jezikovne zavesti svojih pripadnikov, predstavlja pa splošne jezikovne cilje, opredeljene s strani socialnih institucij, lahko predstavlja odločilni dejavnikstopnje političnega in gospodarskega razvoja. 
Ena izmed posledic evropskih in integracijskih procesov je spremembaparadigme evropske jezikovne politike (Williams 2007). Konvencionalneevropske jezikovne politike so v glavnem temeljile na teritorialnem principu načrtovanja za kontaktna jezikovna območja, medtem ko se v procesih glo­balizacije oblikujejo nove oblike medregionalnih stikov. Z omejitvijo teri­torialnega principa na ključna družbena področja rabe jezika (npr. uprava in izobraževanje), ustvarjanjem neodvisnih jezikovnih mrež in ukrepi jezikovneganačrtovanja se je potencialnim konfliktom lažje izogniti.
Uradni status valižanskega jezika5, ki predstavlja enega izmed regionalnih manjšinskih jezikov Združenega kraljestva, se je oblikoval v specifičnemdružbeno-socialnem okolju, v katerem izraz narodna manjšina6 nima posebnegapravnega pomena. Pojmovanje se razlikuje od klasičnega pojmovanja manjšine v drugih evropskih državah, zato za urejanje statusa družbenih skupin državanima ustreznega mehanizma (Kovačič 2010). Kot samostojni jezik se jeoblikoval v 6. stoletju, od 11. stoletja dalje pa ga povezujejo z razširjeno rabo 
106 na današnjem ozemlju Walesa7. Tradicionalni jezikovni domeni sta predstavljalacerkev in ruralno okolje. V sredini 20. stoletja je zaradi upada števila govorcevin migracijskih procesov enojezična valižansko govoreča skupnost razpadla (Williams 2000). Do konca 19. stoletja je valižanski jezik še predstavljal jezikvečinskega prebivalstva, medtem ko je za večino 20. stoletja značilen stalen trend krčenja (upadanja številčnosti) jezikovne skupnosti; število govorcev vali­žanskega jezika se je po podatkih popisa prvič ponovno povečalo leta 1981 v ka­tegoriji otrok. Do prelomnih sprememb v zgodovini rabe valižanskega jezika jeprišlo v 70. letih 20. stoletja z oblikovanjem jezikovnega gibanja za valižanski jezik, ustanovitvijo televizijskega programa SC48 (leta 1982) in sprejemom Zakona oreformi izobraževanja (1988). Wales danes predstavlja uradno dvojezično regijo, za katero sta značilni enojezična večinska in dvojezična manjšinska skupnost. Wales v evropskem in svetovnem merilu na področju družbene rabe jezikapredstavlja pester laboratorij inovativnih in celostnih dobrih praks, pri čemerjezikovne pobude odlikujejo strateška premišljenost, predanost in celovito načrtovanje socialnih in družbenih mrež (mreženje) (Williams 2005). Namenprispevka je zato orisati družbenopolitični razvoj in oblikovanje jezikovne zakonodaje v Walesu ter na osnovi analize popisnih podatkov prikazati časovnespremembe nekaterih jezikovnih praks rabe valižanskega jezika. V prispevkuprikazujemo nekatere zanimive jezikovne pobude za revitalizacijo valižanskega jezika ter na osnovi primarnih in predvsem sekundarnih virov poskušamopovzeti vrednotenje njihove uspešnosti in uspešnosti valižanskih jezikovnihpolitik. V prvem delu prispevka prikazujemo zgodovinski razvoj jezikovne zako­nodaje v Walesu, ki je s sprejetjem ključnih dokumentov in njihovih glavnihdoločil postopoma uveljavila priznanje jezikovnih pravic za rabo valižanskega jezika ter postavila temelje za njegovo rabo v različnih domenah. V nadaljevanjuz analizo popisnih podatkov za obdobje 1971–2011, pri čemer je poseben poudarek na podatkih zadnjih dveh popisov prebivalstva (2001 in 2011), in zanalizo statističnih podatkov s področja izobraževanja poskušamo prikazatispremembe številčnosti in geografske razporeditve valižanske jezikovne skupnosti ter dinamike rabe valižanskega jezika v družinskem in šolskem okolju,ki so bile med drugim posledica postopnega oblikovanja jezikovne zakonodaje.V drugem delu prispevka preverjamo, ali je veljavna jezikovna zakonodaja v Walesu spodbudila mobilizacijo različnih socialnih in družbenih skupin oziromaoblikovala dobre prakse, ki so imele dejanski učinek na številčnost govorcevvaližanskega jezika, in poskušamo poiskati primere inovativnih in učinkovitih jezikovnih pobud za rabo valižanskega jezika, ki bi se morda lahko uporabile prijezikovnem načrtovanju drugih manjšinskih jezikov. V zaključku povzemamo 

glavne prednosti in slabosti jezikovnih politik in izbranih valižanskih jezikovnihpobud ter prednostna področja prihodnjega jezikovnega načrtovanja. 
107 
V okviru priprave prispevka smo analizirali domačo in tujo znanstveno literaturo s področij evropske jezikovne zakonodaje, jezikovne politike ter jezikovnihpravic in jezikovnega načrtovanja rabe valižanskega jezika. Analizirani so biliprimarni in sekundarni podatkovni viri, ki se nanašajo na izbrano tematiko, pregledani pa so bili tudi popisni podatki zadnjih nekaj popisov prebivalstva(1971–2011). Izčrpno dodatno gradivo smo pridobili s terenskim delom in več študijskimi obiski Walesa. 

Družbenopolitične razmere in politični razvoj Walesa so vplivali na dinamiko jezikovnih praks valižanskega jezika. Kot urejeno v Zakonu o uniji (1536 in 1542), je po Williamsu (2000) valižanski jezik izgubil vlogo prevladujočegadružbenega jezika, saj je ta vseboval določilo o prepovedi njegove rabe. Šele s sprejemom Zakona o rabi valižanskega jezika v sodstvu (1942), prav tako po Williamsu (2000), so bila določila, ki so rabo valižanskega jezika prepovedovala, ukinjena. Po Williamsu (2000) je jezik dodatno priznanje pridobil z uvedbo Zakona o valižanskem jeziku (1967), ki je sicer vseboval nejasno opredelitev enake obravnave angleškega in valižanskega jezika v Walesu – ta se je nanašala na rabo valižanskega jezika v sodnem pravu in pravnih postopkih, ne pa tudi na širok spekter rabe v javni upravi in formalnih jezikovnih pravic. 
Britanska vlada je s procesom decentralizacije9 načrtovanju revitalizacijskih jezikovnih politik dala večjo politično težo, z asimetrično vladno organizirano­stjo in pojavom novih oblik regionalnega in lokalnega upravljanja pa so pri­dobile večji pomen. Z ustanovitvijo valižanske vlade se je začelo obdobje jezi­kovnega načrtovanja in oblikovanja vizije dvojezičnega Walesa, pristojnosti in odgovornost za načrtovanje jezikovnih politik so se iz centralne britanske vlade prenesle na civilno družbo in izvoljene predstavnike regionalne dvojezične vlade Walesa. Wales je uradno dvojezičnost prepoznal kot družbenopolitično realnost ter jo z oblikovanjem jezikovnih politik in poglobljeno dvojezičnostjo javnih institucij zakonodajno in institucionalno uredil. 
Po Williamsu (2007) so bile centralne britanske vlade pri oblikovanja jezikovne zakonodaje10 večkrat neodločne ter so sprejemale nezadostna in ne­jasna zakonodajna določila. V procesih evropske integracije ter večjega pomena evropskih regij in večjezičnosti se je njihov odnos do oblikovanja jezikovne zakonodaje nekoliko spremenil. V Walesu se na nekaterih političnih področjih, na primer na področju jezikovne politike, vse bolj uveljavlja posvetovalna demokracija11. Jezikovna zakonodaja je v Walesu postopoma urejala področja 
108 
družbene rabe valižanskega jezika. Z ureditvijo v Zakonu o valižanskem jeziku (1993) je bila uzakonjena enakovredna obravnava angleškega in valižanskega jezika, ustanovljen je bil tudi Odbor za valižanski jezik12, ki je dobil vlogo osrednjega jezikovnega telesa pri načrtovanju rabe valižanskega jezika v različnih družbenih domenah. Eden izmed njegovih prednostnih ciljev je bil načrtovanje rabe valižanskega jezika, ki je bilo utemeljeno na sistemu jezikovnih načrtov javnih organizacij. Z reformo izobraževanja je bilo urejeno tudi področje rabe jezika v sistemu izobraževanja – valižanski jezik je kot samostojni obvezni predmet postal redni del nacionalnega kurikula (Zakon o reformi izobraževanja 1998). Z Zakonom o valižanskem jeziku (1993) so bila opredeljena tudi prednostna jezikovna vprašanja13 različnih področij jezikovne politike. Kot je urejeno v Jezikovni strategiji za valižanske jezikovne ukrepe (2011), je bil po prenehanju delovanja Odbora za valižanski jezik v letu 2012 ustanovljen Urad jezikovnega komisarja14. Načini regulativnih vidikov uradne jezikovne politike so se spremenili, aktualne družbene jezikovne pobude na lokalni in regionalni ravni, ki so se oblikovale kot rezultat postopnega razvoja jezikovne zakonodaje, pa predstavljajo zgodovinsko zavezo vlade k oblikovanju in utrditvi dvojezičnega Walesa (Williams 2007). 

4. Analiza popisnih statističnih podatkov 















Jones (2012) navaja, da je bil prvi statistični popis v Walesu izveden leta 1801, pri čemer do popisa leta 1891 popisi niso vsebovali vprašanj o jezikovni rabi. Od leta 1891 je bilo v popis vključeno vsaj eno vprašanje o jeziku. Vprašanje se je do leta 1971 nanašalo na zmožnost govora v valižanskem ali angleškem jeziku. Do leta 1971 je popis vključeval vprašanje o zmožnosti branja in pisanja v valižanskem jeziku za tiste, ki so se opredelili za govorce jezika. Zadnji popis, ki je vseboval splošno vprašanje o zmožnosti govora v valižanskem jeziku, je bil izveden leta 1981. Leta 2001 se je oblika vprašanja spremenila v bolj nedvoumno v zvezi z jezikovnimi zmožnostmi in spretnostmi, hkrati pa je bilo prvič zastavljeno vprašanje, ali vprašani razumejo valižanski jezik. Popis iz leta 2011 je prvič vseboval tudi vprašanje o nacionalni identiteti prebivalstva. 
Leta 1901 je v Walesu 50 odstotkov oziroma 929.800 prebivalcev govorilovaližansko. Število govorcev se je do leta 1971 znižalo za 29 odstotnih točk; leta 1971 je bilo 21 odstotkov oziroma 542.400 govorcev valižanskega jezika. V letu 1981 sta se število in delež govorcev še znižala, saj je valižansko govorilo 19 odstotkov oziroma 508.200 prebivalcev Walesa. Leta 1991 je bilo govorcev 18,5 odstotka oziroma 500.000 prebivalcev Walesa. Za obdobje 1971–1991 jebil pozitiven obrat značilen za število govorcev v mlajših starostnih skupinah. V starostni skupini 3–4 leta je leta 1971 valižansko govorilo 11 odstotkov otrok,leta 1991 pa 16 odstotkov. V enakem obdobju je bilo zaznati tudi povečanjedeleža govorcev v vseh starostnih skupinah do 25 let (IWA 2016). 

Podatki popisa iz leta 2001 so pokazali, da se je število govorcev po dolgem109 trendu upadanja ponovno povečalo, saj je v tem letu valižanski jezik govorilo 21odstotkov oziroma 582.400 prebivalcev Walesa. Število govorcev se je do leta2011 ponovno nekoliko zmanjšalo (562.200 govorcev), prav tako tudi deležznotraj celotne populacije Walesa (19 odstotkov) (IWA 2016). 

Vir: prirejeno po Aitchinson in Carter (1994). 
Po Jonesu (2012) se je med letoma 1991 in 2011 precej spremenila geografska razporeditev valižanske jezikovne skupnosti. Znatno se je povečal deležgovorcev na jugovzhodu Walesa, kar je bila posledica reforme izobraževanja(1988), v štirih osrednjih okrajih s tradicionalno najvišjim deležem govorcev (Anglesey, Gwynedd, Ceredigion in Carmarthenshire) pa se je delež govorcevv tem obdobju znižal. Jones (2012) prav tako ugotavlja, da se je postopno začelzniževati tudi delež gospodinjstev, v katerih so bili vsi člani govorci valižanskega jezika, in ocenjuje, da je to z vidika vitalnosti jezikovne skupnosti in možnosti za njeno revitalizacijo velikega pomena – člani teh gospodinjstev namreč valižanski jezik najpogosteje uporabljajo tudi izven družinskega okolja. V letu2011 je bilo v Walesu 1.209.000 gospodinjstev. Jones (2012, 6) ocenjuje, da jebilo od tega 11 odstotkov (ali 135.000 gospodinjstev) takih, v katerih so bili vsi člani zmožni govoriti valižansko. 28 odstotkov so predstavljala gospodinjstva, v katerih je bil govorec valižanskega jezika vsaj en član gospodinjstva. Kar 34 odstotkov vseh govorcev jezika (193.000) je živelo v gospodinjstvih, v katerih 
110 
drugi člani valižanskega jezika niso govorili; od tega jih je tretjina živela v enočlanskem gospodinjstvu ( Jones 2012, 54). V letu 2011 se je nadaljeval trend krčenja jezikovne skupnosti v tradicionalnih govornih okoljih. Za valižansko jezikovno skupnost sta značilni vse večja razpršenost in posledično izolacija govorcev (posebej tistih, ki se selijo v urbana lokalna okolja15), ki so vse pogosteje izpostavljeni le pasivni rabi jezika prek uporabe spleta in drugih sredstev obveščanja. 

Vir: prirejeno po Jones (2013). 
Po Jonesu (2012) se je z reformo izobraževanja (1988) in oblikovanjem gibanja za valižanski jezik prek pobude Mudiad Meithrin začelo povečevati število oblikovanih predšolskih in šolskih skupin s poukom v valižanskem jeziku, pa tudi število vpisanih otrok v te skupine. V Walesu se je od 70. let prejšnjega stoletja do danes oblikovalo in deluje okrog 500 predšolskih in 500 šolskih skupin, ki jih v glavnem vodijo prostovoljci. V letu 1992 je predšolske skupine obiskovalo 10.246 otrok, v šolskem letu 2008/2009 pa že 12.031 otrok; od tega se jih je 87 odstotkov vpisalo naprej v osnovno šolo s poukom v valižanskem jeziku. Primerjava popisnih podatkov iz let 2001 in 2011 kaže, da je delež otrok v starosti 3–4 leta, ki so govorili valižansko, leta 2011 znašal 23,6 odstotka, medtem ko je leta 2001 znašal 18,8 odstotka. To dokazuje vitalno vlogo dvojezičnih predšolskih in šolskih skupin s poukom v valižanskem jeziku (Welsh. The Welsh Language in Education in the UK 2014). 
Povečalo se je tudi število šol s prevladujočim valižanskim jezikom pou­čevanja. V šolskem letu 1993/1994 je delež teh šol znašal 27 odstotkov, v šolskemletu 2008/2009 pa 31 odstotkov. Jones (2012) poudarja, da je povečanje števila tovrstnih šol pomenilo pomembno ustvarjanje novih vstopnih mest za111 usvajanje jezika učencev. Pozitiven učinek obveznega učenja valižanskega jezika po vpeljani reformi je pomenilo tudi povečanje deleža učencev, ki (so) se jezikaučijo (učili) kot drugega jezika, in deleža razredov s poukom v valižanskemjeziku. Od šolskega leta 1991/1992 (ko je 16 odstotkov učencev obiskovalo razrede s poukom v valižanskem jeziku) do šolskega leta 2010/2011 se je deležrazredov s poukom v valižanskem jeziku povečal (21 odstotkov vseh razredov).Delež razredov s poukom v valižanskem jeziku se je povečal v celotnem Walesu. Povečevanje deleža učencev, tako Jones (2012), ki se valižanski jezik učijokot drugi jezik, se je začelo v šolskem letu 1987/1988, ko je bilo z ureditvijo vZakonu o reformi izobraževanja (1988) uvedeno obvezno učenje valižanskega jezika kot drugega jezika.
Po Jonesu (2012) je v šolskem letu 2009/2010 7.090 učencev obiskovalouvajalno valižansko šolsko skupino; število vpisanih otrok je bilo podobno strokovni oceni števila otrok, ki zapustijo igralne predšolske skupine. Najmlajšiotroci (stari 3–5 let) so vključeni v vrtčevske skupine ali sprejemni razred, kjer ostanejo 1–2 leti, preden začnejo obiskovati 1. razred osnovne šole.
Po pričakovanjih naj bi bilo v višjih razredih osnovne šole že zaznati višjidelež otrok, ki so tekoči govorci valižanskega jezika, vendar podatki tega niso pokazali. Jones (2012) tudi povzema, da je bilo v šolskem letu 2011/2012 medotroki, starimi 5 let ali več, ki so doma govorili valižansko in so opravili 6 razredovosnovne šole, le 8 odstotkov tekočih govorcev manjšinskega jezika in 5 odstotkov govorcev valižanskega jezika med otroki, ki doma jezika niso uporabljali. Popisnipodatki iz leta 2001 so pokazali, da je 39 odstotkov vseh otrok v starosti 6–11 letgovorilo valižansko; delež je do leta 2011 padel na 38 odstotkov.
Število govorcev v starosti 7 let, ki so bili ocenjeni v valižanskem jeziku, seje v obdobju 2003–2013 povečalo iz 6.538 učencev (19 odstotkov) v letu 2003na 7.468 učencev (nekaj več kot 22 odstotkov) v letu 2013. Število učencev vstarosti 11 let, ki so bili ocenjeni v valižanskem jeziku, se je v enakem obdobjuzmanjšalo iz 6.961 na 6.193 v letu 2013, vendar se je njihov delež povečal iz 18odstotkov na 20 odstotkov. Število učencev v starosti 16 let, ki so bili ocenjeniv valižanskem jeziku, pa se je v tem obdobju povečalo iz 4.899 učencev (13odstotkov) na 5.638 učencev (16 odstotkov) (Welsh. The Welsh Language in Education in the UK 2014).
Dejstvo, da je valižanska jezikovna skupnost postala dvojezična, spreminjanaravo in kontekst jezikovne produkcije in reprodukcije. Valižansko jezikovno skupnost danes označujejo številčna majhnost, krčenje tradicionalnih govornihokolij, selitve v urbana okolja in nastanek vse bolj razpršenih in (večkrat)izoliranih urbanih, virtualnih jezikovnih skupnosti. Jezikovna skupnost se sooča z nizkimi stopnjami medgeneracijskega prenosa jezika, vse večjo razdrobljenostjoin omejenimi možnostmi izobraževanja v manjšinskem jeziku. Do sredine 20.stoletja so relativna marginalnost in sorazmerno stabilne stopnje jezikovne 
112 	reprodukcije v družinskem okolju še ohranjale stabilnost jezikovne skupnosti,gospodarski in infrastrukturni razvoj ter urbanizacija in modernizacija skupaj z novimi migracijskimi tokovi pa so vplivali na demografsko transformacijoregionalnega območja Walesa. Zaradi nezmožnosti družin in družbe prizagotavljanju zadostne stopnje reprodukcije za preživetje jezika je področje izobraževanja postalo prednostno področje revitalizacijskih pobud. PoHodgesovi (2011, 57) Wales predstavlja regijo z decentraliziranimi pristojnostmi,v kateri se je od ustanovitve dvojezične valižanske vlade leta 1999 postopno povečal občutek valižanske identitete. Oblikovanje valižanske dimenzijenacionalnega kurikula, ki je sledila reformi šolstva leta 1989, prav tako ponujavpogled v povečano zavedanje o valižanski identiteti in spoštovanju valižanskega jezika. Zakon o valižanskem jeziku (1993) je uzakonil enakovredno obravnavoangleškega in valižanskega jezika v javnem sektorju, aktualna ureditev v Jezikovnistrategiji za valižanske jezikovne ukrepe (2011) pa naj bi z ustanovitvijo funkcije jezikovnega komisarja zagotovila njeno večjo zakonodajno pristojnost, kar bomorda lahko v bodoče dodatno vplivalo na javno mnenje. 

Za manjšinske jezikovne skupnosti je jezikovna zakonodaja, ki predvidevaustrezne jezikovne politične ukrepe, potrebna zaradi večinskega okolja, ki je večkrat odklonilno do obstoja in širše rabe manjšinskega jezika. Prispeva kuradnemu priznanju jezika in predstavlja okvir med pravom, birokratskimaparatom in javnostjo. Williams (2005) ugotavlja, da veljavna jezikovna zakonodaja postavlja standardne norme in jezikovna določila za manjšinskejezikovne storitve ter ustvarja normativne spremembe družbenega okolja, ki lahko posledično spodbujajo mobilizacijo različnih socialnih in družbenihskupin; vpliva namreč na izboljšanje vrednosti manjšinskega jezika in poglabljajezikovne zahteve znotraj posameznih jezikovnih domen. Te z oblikovanjem aktualnih jezikovnih pobud, ki odgovarjajo na potrebe jezikovne skupnosti,povečujejo možnosti za razširjeno rabo, vidnost in prestiž jezika. Williams (2005)še dodaja, da Wales v evropskem in svetovnem merilu na področju družbene rabe jezika predstavlja pester laboratorij inovativnih in celostnih dobrih praks,pri čemer jezikovne pobude odlikujejo strateška premišljenost, predanost tercelovito načrtovanje socialnih in družbenih mrež (mreženje). 
Celovit sistem zgodnjega stika s starši novorojencev in nadaljnjega jezikovnegarazvoja otrok v skupinah v okviru družbene pobude TwF (Rast) ter sistem predšolskih skupin do začetka osnovnega šolanja v okviru družbenih pobud Mudiad Meithrin (2016) predstavljata primera dobre prakse. Koordinacija teh skupin z jezikovnimi tečaji, namenjenimi staršem, učinkovito odgovarja na razvojne potrebe valižanske jezikovne skupnosti. Po Edwardsovi in Pritchard Newcombovi (2005) inovativna pobuda TwF predstavlja učinkovit sistem svetovanja staršem v predporodnem in zgodnjem poporodnem obdobju. Namen te, v svetovnem merilu pionirske pobude je spodbujanje staršev k rabi preprostih fraz v valižanskem jeziku pri vsakodnevni komunikaciji z otrokom ter promocija dvojezičnosti v družinskem okolju in sistemu javnega zdravstva. Pobuda vključuje terenske strokovnjake, ki sodelujejo z valižansko govorečim medicinskim osebjem, patronažnimi delavci, babicami in zaposlenimi v poporodnih klinikah, s ciljem promovirati prednosti rabe valižanskega jezika v družinskem okolju in izobraževanje v tem jeziku. Namen prizadevanj je spodbuda staršem, da uporabljajo valižanski jezik (v družinah, kjer sta oba starša govorca valižanskega jezika) in da oblikujejo jezikovne prakse z uporabo angleškega in valižanskega jezika pri komuniciranju z otrokom v najzgodnejšem obdobju (v družinah, kjer je govorec eden izmed staršev). Za starše, ki niso govorci valižanskega jezika in ki jim primanjkuje samozavesti pri jezikovni pomoči svojim otrokom, v okviru pobude TwF terenski strokovnjaki pripravljajo in izvajajo delavnice za mlade starše in male otroke. TwF je oblikovala uporabno spletno stran z novicami, različnimi jezikovnimi viri za starše, nasveti in drugimi informacijami. Po Edwardsovi in Pritchard Newcombovi (2005) uporabno vrednost predstavlja kakovostno zasnovano izobraževanje terenskih strokovnjakov, ki pridobijo znanja za učinkovito soočanje z raznolikimi jezikovnimi situacijami; v valižansko govorečih družinskih okoljih je njihova prednostna vloga krepitev starševske odločitve za vsakodnevno rabo valižanskega jezika pri komunikaciji z otroki, v večinoma angleškem družinskem okolju pa predvsem podpora otrokom pri zgodnjem usvajanju jezika. Dodano vrednost predstavlja tudi zasnova socialno vključujočega koncepta, ki povezuje širok nabor javnih organizacij. Pobuda je bila strateško usmerjena na področje javnega zdravstva z intenzivnim sodelovanjem z mladimi starši. V naslednji razvojni fazi bodo v okviru pobude opredeljene ciljne skupine družin s specifičnimi demografskimi, jezikovnimi in osebnimi značilnostmi, ki potrebujejo intenzivnejšo podporo, v načrtovanje pa bodo vključeni tudi stari starši. 
Mudiad Meithrin je prostovoljna družbena organizacija, ki je specializirana za ponudbo dejavnosti v valižanskem jeziku za otroke v zgodnjih otroških letih. Terenski sodelavci (predvideni so trije terenski delavci v posameznem okraju) delujejo na lokalni ravni. V lokalnih skupnostih, kjer primanjkuje organiziranih skupin za starše in otroke do 2. leta starosti, sodelujejo pri organiziranju teh skupin. Terenski sodelavci skupine spremljajo prvi 2 leti delovanja, nato pa delovanje prevzame lokalna skupnost. Terenski sodelavci skupinam nudijo vsepotrebne informacije in podporo, spremljajo pa tudi oblikovanje podpornihigralnih skupin (igralnic) – Cylchhoedd Meithrin, ki jih je po Jonesu (2012) do 
113 

danes v Walesu nastalo okrog 500, namenjene pa so otrokom, starim 2–4 leta.Pozitiven učinek delovanja skupin je oblikovanje številnih družbenih lokalnihstarševskih omrežij. Mudiad Meithrin prek svetovalnic in spodbud staršem za
114 domačo rabo valižanskega jezika omogoča podporo 60–65 odstotkom staršem,ki niso govorci manjšinskega jezika, hkrati pa pripravlja svetovalne sheme zadružine z otroki s posebnimi potrebami.Za celovitejše načrtovanje sprememb jezikovnih vzorcev pri izbiri jezika inza starševsko podporo sta bila znotraj valižanske jezikovne skupnosti oblikovanasistema družinskih jezikovnih tečajev in tečajev za starše z dojenčki. Jezikovnitečaji Valižanski jezik od zibelke predstavljajo sistem podpore staršem z do­jenčki. Vključujejo učenje preprostega besedišča in pesmi, ki se uporabljajo pri komunikaciji z dojenčki pri vsakodnevnih dejavnostih (pri hranjenju, kopanjuitd.). Sistem 2-letnih družinskih tečajev Valižanski jezik za družino, ki ponujapodporo staršem in varuhom otrok, je namenjen usposobljenju družin zarabo jezika v vsakodnevni domači komunikaciji, v katerih starša nista govorcavaližanskega jezika. Cilj tečajev je tudi spodbujanje zanimanja otrok za branjevse od najzgodnejših let in spodbujanje staršev h kasnejšemu vpisu otrok v šoles poukom v valižanskem jeziku. Kot dopolnitev te ponudbe so organiziranejezikovne učne delavnice za starše Učni dnevi valižanskega jezika za družino, obkaterih je organizirana igra otrok v valižanskem jeziku (Williams 2007).Po Williamsu (2007) je Athrawon Bro inovativna mreža področnih teren­skih učiteljev, ki zagotavlja podporo priseljenskim družinam. Predstavlja spe­cialistično ekipo učiteljev, ki prihajajo iz štirih tradicionalnih govornih okra­jev, in pripravlja gradivo v podporo učiteljem pri zagotavljanju odličnosti izo­braževanja v valižanskem jeziku ob srečevanju z najrazličnejšimi okoliščinamivse intenzivnejših selitvenih tokov. Vloga specialistične ekipe je v promociji inizmenjavi primerov dobrih praks visokokakovostnega poučevanja in učenja vvaližanskem jeziku z namenom spodbujati oblikovanje lokalnih mrež šol. 

Williams (2007) poudarja, da je Wales pridobil mednarodni sloves zaradiinovacij in pionirskega razvoja jezikovne revitalizacije in kulturne vitalnostiv 60. in 70. letih prejšnjega stoletja. Valižanske jezikovne pobude so bile meddrugim uspešne zaradi vztrajnega spodbujanja posvetovalne demokracije,celostnega jezikovnega načrtovanja vseh deležnikov jezikovne rabe in mreženjana različnih nivojih. Prednosti načrtovanja družbene rabe valižanskega jezikaso njegova strateška premišljenost, zavestno načrtovanje in dokaj celovit razvojnekaterih segmentov jezikovne podpore (npr. starševska podpora, podporazgodnjemu stiku z manjšinskim jezikom). Prednostne pobude za normalizacijorabe jezika so se nanašale na načrtovanje rabe manjšinskega jezika v družinskem okolju ter med otroki in mladimi, pa tudi na celovito načrtovanje šolstva v valižanskem jeziku, da bi zagotovile ustrezni nivo določil in standardov javnih jezikovnih storitev. Omejitve za še učinkovitejše revitalizacijske jezikovne politike predstavljajo strukturne nedorečenosti veljavne jezikovne zakonodaje, nezadostna razpoložljivost jezikovnih storitev in nezadostno spremljanje (monitoring) uresničevanja jezikovnih ciljev. Zagotavljanje polno delujočih in uspešnih jezikovnih politik bo v prihodnje možno prek sistema družbenega inženiringa, ki za svoje delovanje potrebuje finančne injekcije, usposobljenost kadra in (še prej) politično podporo. Kljub družbenopolitičnemu prehodu k bolj horizontalnim oblikam vladanja in poudarjenemu pomenu posvetovalne demokracije v Walesu obstaja nevarnost, da jezikovni načrti v praksi zaradi (še vedno) prevladujočega vodenja politike od zgoraj navzdol in pomanjkanja lokalnih zavez ne bi bili uspešni. 
Po predhodnih raziskovalnih ugotovitvah Williamsa (2000) ključen izziv dvojezičnega okolja in jezikovnih izbir Walesa predstavlja optimizacija pogojev za spontano rabo jezika v vseh vidikih družbenega življenja. Nekateri valižanskim jezikovnim pobudam očitajo tudi zapostavljenost načrtovanja jezikovne reprodukcije v vse bolj jezikovno razdrobljenih tradicionalnih govornih okoljih, zato bo v prihodnjem obdobju za nadaljnjo revitalizacijo valižanskega jezika in uspešno doseganje strateških ciljev jezikovnih politik potrebno spodbujanje jezikovne reprodukcije v večinskih valižansko govorečih družinah. Ob tem velja poudariti veliko vlogo dvojezičnega šolstva in produkcije jezika prek izobraževalnega sistema, ki lahko močno vpliva na mlajše generacije govorcev, hkrati pa se postavlja vprašanje jezikovne lojalnosti mlajše generacije, če bo živela v okolju, kjer se valižanski jezik večinoma uporablja kot drugi jezik in ni prva logična jezikovna izbira. Fragmentacija in upad domen rabe jezika sta odraz mnogih valižanskih jezikovnih skupnosti na lokalni ravni. Vprašanje, ki se ob tem postavlja, je, ali se valižanski jezik lahko ohrani brez avtohtonega teritorialnega osrčja kot osnove jezikovnih virov. Za prebivalce Walesa velik izziv predstavlja prilagoditev večinskega prebivalstva spreminjajoči se sestavi prebivalstva. Mestna območja Walesa (Cardiff, Swansea in Newport) se soočajo z dvojnim izzivom absorpcije novih govorcev angleškega jezika in šolskim sistemom izobraževanja v valižanskem jeziku, ki išče načine za ohranitev vpeljanega dvojezičnega izobraževalnega sistema ob novih tokovih priseljencev z vsega sveta. Kljub naporom za revitalizacijo valižanske jezikovne skupnosti v okviru izobraževanja, uvedbi obveznega predmeta valižanskega jezika in povečevanju števila šol s poukom v valižanskem jeziku glavni jezik rabe pri otrocih večinoma ostaja angleški. V območjih z nizkim deležem govorcev valižanskega jezika in brez staršev govorcev imajo otroci relativno malo možnosti za rabo jezika izven šolskega okolja, kar ima velik vpliv na pogostost rabe manjšinskega jezika. Poudarek dosedanjih jezikovnih pobud je bil na področjih izobraževanja in javne rabe manjšinskega jezika, zaostaja pa področje načrtovanja jezikovnega 
115 

razvoja v zasebnem in prostovoljnem sektorju (Williams 2007). Za čim učin­kovitejše načrtovanje in izvajanje jezikovnih politik po Williamsu (2005)navsezadnje ni zanemarljivo odgovoriti tudi na vprašanje, kako lahko partnerstva 
116 	med centralnimi in lokalnimi javnimi organizacijami ter prostovoljni sektorv prihodnje zagotovijo mobilizacijo družbene energije in okrepijo jezikovno promocijo in izvajanje jezikovnih pravic v praksi. 



Povečevanje jezikovne raznolikosti zaradi evropskih migracijskih procesov,aktiven proces revitalizacije manjšinskih jezikovnih skupnosti in tudi vse večjajezikovna raznolikost urbanih regij ter večkrat neurejena raba manjšinskih jezikov na področjih javnih storitev v sodobnem času pogojujejo princip oblikovanjajezikovnih politik. V regionalnem okolju Walesa se je uveljavil model, ki temelji na principu enakosti posameznikov in lokalnih območij; upravljanje državnegaaparata temelji na višji stopnji izenačenosti in decentralizacije ter predstavljapluralistični proces, ki vključuje različne družbeno-socialne skupine. Politiko jezikovnega načrtovanja v Walesu oblikujejo v glavnem vladne agencije in krovnajezikovna telesa, ki delujejo v tesnem sodelovanju z regionalno vlado. Političnikonsenz in zaveza jezikovne zakonodaje k utrjevanju in spodbujanju širše rabe valižanskega jezika sta vodila v spremenjen odnos javnosti do njegove rabe indvojezične družbe. Rezultat družbenih jezikovnih pobud je bil tudi oblikovanjeločenega nacionalnega kurikula za izobraževanje v valižanskem jeziku. Zaradi migracijskih in globalizacijskih tokov se valižanska jezikovna skupnost sooča zvse kompleksnejšimi spremembami identitete v lokalnih okoljih, ki postajajo vsebolj večjezična; del naporov za revitalizacijo jezikovne skupnosti je bil uspešen in je prek oblikovanja družbenih in socialnih lokalnih mrež vplival na povečanještevila govorcev valižanskega jezika, na zanimanje za rabo valižanskega jezika s strani negovorcev ter na družbeno mobilizacijo in standard jezikovnih storitev.
Učinek najinovativnejših jezikovnih pobud, ki so se nanašale na zgodnji stikz valižanskim jezikom (pobuda TwF in različni jezikovni tečaji), in promocija izobraževanja v valižanskem jeziku (prek pobud Mudiad Meithrin) sta poWilliamsu (2005) povečala zanimanja staršev, ki niso govorci valižanskega jezika,za vpis otrok v šole s poukom v valižanskem jeziku, saj se poleg povečevanja števila šol in razredov, ki nudijo pouk v valižanskem jeziku, povečuje tudi številootrok, vpisanih v te šole. Spodbudno je tudi, da se je število govorcev v starosti5–15 let povečalo, prav tako se je povečala raba jezika v novih kontekstih/ domenah (Welsh. The Welsh Language in Education in the UK 2014). Kljubpovečanemu številu mladih, ki so vpisani v šole s poukom v valižanskem jeziku inv dvojezične šole, ter kljub večji razširjenosti rabe valižanskega jezika v različnih domenah rabe jezika pa še vedno ostaja razlog za skrb. V severnem in zahodnemdelu Walesa, ki sta predstavljala tradicionalni govorni okolji valižanskega jezika, se delež govorcev zmanjšuje. Na zmanjšanje deleža govorcev je med drugim vplivalo razmerje med priselitvami in odselitvami, veliko mladih se je v iskanju zaposlitve odselilo v urbana okolja (Welsh Language Strategy 2012-2017). 
117
Postavlja se tudi vprašanje v zvezi z obsegom dejanske rabe valižanskega jezika med mladimi po koncu šolskega obdobja. Za zagotavljanje prihodnje rabe valižanskega jezika tako postaja vse pomembnejše načrtovanje rabe valižanskega jezika v gospodarskem sektorju, pojavlja pa se tudi potreba po poklicnem izobraževanju v tem jeziku (Welsh. The Welsh Language in Education in the UK 2014). 
Prednostna prihodnja zaveza Walesa je v skladu z aktualno jezikovno strategijo (Welsh Language Strategy 2012-2017utrditev rabe valižanskega jezika v vsakodnevnem življenju. Prednostni cilji se nanašajo na povečanje števila prebivalstva, ki govori in uporablja valižanski jezik v vsakodnevnih situacijah, ustvarjanje novih priložnosti za rabo jezika, utrjevanje jezikovne spretnosti govorcev in položaj valižanskega jezika v Walesu, pa tudi na zagotovitev močnejše zastopanosti valižanskega jezika v sodobnih digitalnih medijih. 
Izkušnja nekaterih izbranih jezikovnih pobud v Walesu dokazuje, da miroljubni in vztrajni pritiski za družbene reforme lahko preobrazijo stoletja trajajočo državno diskriminacijo in vodijo v bolj pluralno, demokratično in pozitivno zasnovano civilno družbo (Williams 2013) ter da načrtovanje rabe valižanskega jezika predstavlja laboratorij, ki je oblikoval nekatere dobre prakse, ki so imele pozitiven učinek na odnos do valižanskega jezika, zaradi povečanega zanimanja staršev za izobraževanje v valižanskem jeziku pa tudi na številčnost valižanske jezikovne skupnosti. 

Aitchinson, J. W. & Carter, H., 1994. A Geography of the Welsh Language. University of Wales Press, Cardiff. 
Brezigar, S., 2001. Tehnike promocije manjšinskih jezikov: primer valižanščine. Diplomsko delo. Univerza v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Ljubljana. 
Edwards, V. & Pritchard Newcombe, L., 2005. Language Transmission in the Family in Wales.An Example of Innovative Language Planning. Language Problems and Planning 29 (2),135–150. 
Evropska listina o regionalnih in manjšinskih jezikih. Council of Europe.http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/148. (27. 9. 2016). 
Hodges, R . S., 2011. Integrative or instrumental incentives? Non-Welsh speaking parents andWelsh-medium education in the Rhymni Valley, South Wales. Razprave in gradivo, revija za narodnostna vprašanja 66, 44–63. 
IWA 2016. Wales Factfile. http://www.iwa.wales/click/wpcontent/uploads/5_Factfile_Language.pdf. (13. 5. 2016). 
Jezikovna strategija za valižanske jezikovne ukrepe. UK Government. 2011 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/mwa/2011/1/contents/enacted. (10. 12. 2016). 
Jones, H., 2012. A Statistical Overview of the Welsh Language. Welsh Language Board, Cardiff. 
Jones, H., 2013. The Welsh Language and the Results of 2011 Census. CWISERD Conference, Cardiff. 
118 Klopčič, V., 2006. Evropski pravni standardi manjšinskega varstva, uresničevanje in dilemerazvoja. Razprave in gradivo, revija za narodnostna vprašanja 50–51, 312–327. 
Kosic, M., Medeot, F. & Vidali, Z. (ur.), 2013. Sosedje … prijatelji, ki jih je vredno spoznati. Itali­jani, Slovenci in Furlani se predstavijo. SLORI, Societa Filologica Friulana, Unione Italiana, Trst, Videm, Koper. 
Kovačič, B., 2010. Funkcionalni in normativni vidiki položaja evropskih manjšin. Doktorsko delo. Univerza v Ljubljani, Oddelek za geografijo Filozofske fakultete, Ljubljana. 
Mentrau Iaith. http://www.mentrau-iaith.com/. (12. 12. 2016). 
Mudiad Meithrin - Welsh early years specialists.
http://www.meithrin.cymru/about-us/. (10. 12. 2016). 

Nacionalni akcijski načrt za dvojezični Wales. Welsh Government. http://gov.wales/topics/welshlanguage/publications/iaithpawb/?lang=en. (12. 12. 2016) 
Okvirna konvencija za varstvo narodnih manjšin. Council of Europe.https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchSer vices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016800c10cf. (27. 9. 2016). 
Resolucija Evropskega parlamenta o jezikovnih in kulturnih manjšinah v Evropski skupnosti.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA­2003-0372+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. (27. 9. 2016). 
SC4. http://www.s4c.cymru/en/. (15. 8. 2016). 
Twf Cymraeg o‘r crud. http://twfcymru.com/?skip=1&lang=en. (23. 8. 2016). 
Welsh. The Welsh Language in Education in the UK (2nd edition). 2014. Mercator-Education, Ljouwert/Leeuwarden. 
Welsh Language Strateg y 2012–2017. A Living Language. A Language for Living. Welsh Government, Cardiff. 
Williams, C. H., 2000. Language Revitalization. Policy and Planning in Wales. University of Wales Press, Cardiff. 
Williams, C. H., 2005. The Role of Para-governmental Institutions in Language Planning. Supreme Court Law Review 31, 61–83. 
Williams, C. H., 2007. Language and Governance. University of Wales Press, Cardiff. 
Williams, C. H., 2013. Minority Language Promotion, Protection and Regulation. The Mask of Piety. Palgrave MacMillan, London. 
Zakon o rasnih odnosi. U.K . Government. 1976. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1976/74. (10.12.2016) 

Zakon o reformi izobraževanja. U.K . Government. 1988, c.40. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/40/part/II/chapter/I. (27. 11. 2016). 
Zakon o valižanskem jeziku. U.K . Government. 1993, c.38. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1993/38/contents. (10. 12. 2016). 
Zakon o valižanski vladi. UK Government. 1998. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/32/contents. (12. 12. 2016). 
Zupančič, J., 2005. V loge in pomen narodnih manjšin v čezmejnem sodelovanju. Primermanjšin v Sloveniji in Slovencev v sosednjih državah. Razprave in gradivo, revija za narod­nostna vprašanja 47, 26–41. 
Žagar, M., 2002. Nekateri novejši trendi razvoja varstva manjšin in (posebnih) pravic narodnihin drugih manjšin. V: M. Polzer, L. Kalčina, & M. Žagar (ur.), Slovenija in evropski standardi varstva narodnih manjšin. Informacijsko dokumentacijski center Sveta Evrope pri NUK ,Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Avstrijski inštitut za vzhodno in jugovzhodno Evropo,Ljubljana, 71–81. 119 
notes 





1 
Narodne ali nacionalne manjšine običajno predstavljajo podaljšek naroda, ki živi v sosednji ali
drugi državi. Najpogosteje so to obmejne manjšine, katerih večina matičnega naroda živi v
sosednji državi (Kosic idr. 2013). 

2 
Narodi brez države so narodi, ki so oblikovali idejo o lastni državi, a je iz različnih političnih in
družbenih razlogov nimajo (npr. Kurdi ali Katalonci) (Kosic idr. 2013). 
3 
Etnične skupnosti so skupnosti, katerih pripadnike združujeta jezik in kultura, a niso razvili
političnih idej o samostojni organiziranosti ali svoji državi (Kosic idr. 2013). 
4 
Regionalni jeziki so (evropski) zgodovinski ali avtohtoni jeziki, ki so značilni za omejena območja,
govorci pa nimajo naroda s svojo državo, v kateri je ta jezik državni ali uradni jezik (npr. valižanski
jezik v Združenem kraljestvu) (Kosic idr. 2013). 

5 
Najsorodnejši je bretonskemu in kornižanskemu keltskemu jeziku, podoben pa je tudi irskemu in
škotskemu keltskemu jeziku ter jeziku manx. 
6 
Po Kovačičevi (2010) zakonsko podlago predstavlja Zakon o rasnih odnosih (sprejet 1976,
spremenjen 2000), v katerem se uporablja izraz rasne skupine; ta izraz vključuje širok razpon
opredeljevanja manjšin, mednje pa spadajo naslednje manjšinske skupnosti: Škoti, Irci, Valižani
itd. 

7 
Pokrajina na jugozahodu Združenega kraljestva, ki obsega območje med Liverpoolom na severu,
bristolskim kanalom na jugu in približno upravno mejo iz trinajstega stoletja na vzhodu (Brezigar
2001). 

8 
Http://www.s4c.cymru/en/. 
9 
Po Williamsu (2007) decentralizacija britanske vlade predstavlja proces asimetričnih strukturnih
sprememb, ki je leta 1998 oblikoval nov statut (Zakon o valižanski vladi) in v Walesu ustanovil
dvojezični državni zbor. Ta decentralizacija je med drugim vplivala na spremembo oblik vladanja.
Slabost decentraliziranega sistema je, da administracije decentraliziranih območij niso obvezane
zagotoviti izvedbe britanskih političnih ciljev, britanska vlada pa nima političnih mehanizmov
znotraj posameznih področij, ki bi ji omogočali uskladitev s cilji regionalnih območij. 

10 Temeljno jezikovno zakonodajo predstavljajo Zakon o valižanskem jeziku (1993), Zakon oreformi izobraževanja (1988), Zakon o valižanski vladi (1998), jezikovne pobude Mentrau Iaith,Nacionalni akcijski načrt za dvojezični Wales Iaith Pawb (2003), Jezikovna strategija za valižanskejezikovne ukrepe Welsh Language Measures (2011) ter Jezikovna strategija za valižanski jezik Aliving language (Welsh Language Strategy 2012-2017). 
11 	Posvetovalna demokracija pomeni horizontalno obliko vladanja, ki poudarja posvetovalnonačrtovanje regionalnih izobraževalnih programov, programov javne kulture in javnegafinanciranja, vključuje pa posvetovalne ankete, vladne pobude, spletne programe in skupinskeanalize ter javna posvetovanja. 
12 Odbor za valižanski jezik je predstavljal osrednje enotno jezikovno telo, katerega vloge so bilesvetovanje javnim organizacijam, ki pripravljajo jezikovne načrte, določanje prioritet jezikovneganačrtovanja, zasledovanje strateških ciljev, oblikovanje inovativnih tržnih promocijskih kampanj in pobud za prostovoljni in javni sektor ter oblikovanje mrežnih partnerstev za širitev domen rabevaližanskega jezika. 
13 Prednostna jezikovna vprašanja se nanašajo na promocijo rabe manjšinskega jezika, uvedbo120 jezikovnih standardov rabe jezika za zagotavljanje enakovredne rabe valižanskega in angleškegajezika ter spodbujanje širitve domen za rabo valižanskega jezika. 
14 	Funkcija jezikovnega komisarja je bila ustanovljena leta 2012 po prenehanju delovanja Odbora zavaližanski jezik zaradi težnje vlade po kontroli področja jezikovne politike ter predstavlja glavnegapromotorja družbene rabe valižanskega jezika v Walesu in na evropski ravni (Williams 2013). 
15 Jones (2012) ocenjuje, da v urbanih okoljih Walesa danes živi okoli 40 odstotkov valižanskejezikovne skupnosti. 
TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016, p. 121–136 


U radu se propituje postmoderni sociološki diskurs o identitetu koji ga promatra kaoformu individualne i društvene egzistencije. Unutar te forme uvijek je prepoznatljivnjegov prirodno-povijesni i esencijalistički koncept. Unutar sociologijske analize pojmaidentiteta potiču se dvije istraživačke tradicije. Prva je, simbolički interakcionizam,prema kojemu se identitet oblikuje kao međusobno djelovanje socijalnih aktera. Drugaistraživačka tradicija naslanja se na uporabu pojma smisla, odnosno na važnost smislau oblikovanju socijalnog djelovanja. Procesi moderne dovode u pitanje tradicionalnojedinstvo identiteta. Tezom o presudnoj važnosti identiteta kao refleksivne stvarnostimoderniteta danas se mogu pokrivati svi društveni akteri i oblici društvenog djelovanjakoji postaju prikladna diskurzivna jezgra za stvaranje nove identitetske paradigme. 
Ključne riječi: identitet, refleksivnost, modernitet, postmoderni diskurs, simbolički interakcionizam, socijalno djelovanje. 

The paper deals with post-modern sociological discourse on identity; this is viewed as a form ofindividual and social existence. Within it, identity is always recognizable by virtue of its natural-historical and essentialist concept. Within the sociological analysis of the concept of identity tworesearch traditions are pursued. The first is symbolic interactionism, according to which identityis formed by the interactions of social actors. The second tradition relies on the use of the term“sense,” i.e., sense of the importance of shaping social action. Modern processes question thetraditional unity of identity. Nowadays the theory about the crucial importance of identity as areflexive reality of modernity relates to all social actors and forms of social action that becomethe appropriate discursive core for the creation of a new paradigm of identity.. 
Keywords: identity, reflexivity, modernity, postmodern discourse, symbolic interactionism, social action. 
Correspondence address: Andreja Sršen, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Hrvatski studiji/University of Zagreb, Center for Croatian Studies, Department of Sociology, Borongajska 83d, HR-10000 Zagreb, Croatia, e-mail: srsen.andreja@gmail.com. 
ISSN 0354-0286 Print/ISSN 1854-5181 Online  © Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja (Ljubljana), http://www.inv.si 
A. SRšEN The Construction of Identity in Sociological Discourse 

V prispevku je obravnavan postmoderni sociološki diskurz o identiteti, ki jo ima ta za oblikoindividualne in družbene eksistence. Identiteta je znotraj te oblike vedno prepoznavna ponaravnem zgodovinskem in esencialističnem konceptu. V okviru sociološke analize konceptaidentitete se pojavljata dve raziskovalni tradiciji. Prva je simbolični interakcionizem, pokaterem se identiteta oblikuje kot interakcija družbenih akterjev. Druga raziskovalna tradicijapa sloni na rabi pojma smisel oziroma pomembnost oblikovanja socialnega delovanja.Moderni družbeni procesi izpodbijajo tradicionalno enovitost identitete. Dandanes se teze obistvenem pomenu identitete kot refleksivne realnosti modernega časa lahko nanašajo na vsedružbene akterje in oblike družbenega delovanja, ki tako postajajo priročno diskurzivno jedroza oblikovanje nove identitetne paradigme. 
Ključne besede: identiteta, refleksivnost, modernost, postmoderni diskurz, simbolični interakcionizem, družbeno delovanje. 

Identitet je kao pojmovni konstrukt danas postao nositeljem najrazličitijih konkretnih određenja upozoravajući tako na karakter i značenje postmoderne obnove identitetske tematike. U tom kontekstu tema rada ima za cilj rasvijetliti međuodnos njegove diskurzivne i empirijske pojavnosti. Stoga se u radu iznose razlozi zašto ovaj pojam postaje sve više središnji interes praktičnog djelovanja i zašto zbog svoje višeznačnosti ostaje i dalje razapet između esencijalističih težnji i konstruktivističkih objektivnosti. Potom se razrađuje teza da ovaj pojam danas, u želji da sudjeluje u ravnoteži socijalnih, političkih, ekonomskih i kulturnih društvenih subjekata, postaje zapravo manipulativni koncept. Postmodernistička fragmentacija društva svakako pogoduje tomu zbog narušavanja, više ili manje, ustaljene strukture društva u kojoj se pojam identiteta dovodi u dvije krajnjosti – od njegova apsolutiziranja do njegove relativizacije. 
Početkom 19. stoljeća identitet se pojavljuje kao znanstveno, političko i kulturno pitanje. Nije nikakva slučajnost da se upravo s pojavom prosvjetiteljstva, procesom industrijalizacije, nestajanjem feudalizma i opadanjem religijskog autoriteta pojavljuju rasprave o uspostavljanju nove društvene ravnoteže naslan­jajući se na tezu o emancipaciji pojedinca i različitih društvenih grupa. Svi ti pro­cesi ruše dotadašnji sustav vrijednosti što je posljedično dovelo i do jačanja novih uporišta individualnog i kolektivnog doživljavanja, percipiranja i reflektiranja svijesti o identitetu. Takvo stanje dovelo je do krize identiteta u socijalizaciji poje­dinca. Naime, novi društveni koncepti zahtijevali su nove društvene forme za oblikovanje identiteta, pa je takvo “anomično sociokulturno stanje zahtijevalo model jastva koji će s jedne strane omogućiti osjećaj kontinuirane osobne 
A. SRšEN Konstrukcija identiteta u sociološkom diskursu 
istosti jastva kroz vrijeme, a s druge strane, omogućiti prilagodljivost na brze društvene promjene i procese diferencijacije” (Cifrići & Nikodem 2006, 174). Nove društvene promjene dovele su do procesa destabilizacije i delegitimizacije određenih društvenih struktura budući da su čimbenici na kojima se temeljio osjećaj kontinuiteta, kao što su preci, tradicija, zavičaj, zajednica, klasa, bili destabilizirani, a oni koji su pružali osjećaj različitosti, primjerice, društveni položaj i religija bili delegitimizirani. U svjetlu takvih promjena Kalanj (2010) navodi kako identitet postaje “prikladno diskurzivno pribježište za nove kanonizirajuće rekonstrukcije ili revizije povijesti, za rastakanje društvene sadašnjosti i za oblikovanje društvene budućnosti koja počiva na pretpostavkama najrazličitijih, teško uskladivih identitetskih strategija i fragmentacija” (Kalanj 2010, 118). Ideja identiteta u moderni postaje nova osnova po kojoj se pojedincima i grupama počinju pripisivati univerzalna građansko-politička prava u duhu nove liberalne doktrine “iz koje, u javnoj sferi, izrastaju stranke i parlamenti kao organizirani pluralistički oblici izražavanja individualnih volja i njihovih interesnih projekcija” (Kalanj 2007, 114). U tom svjetlu samoprepoznavanje grupe prati percepcija činjenica da se u novim vrijednostima i simbolima prepoznaju, ili ne prepoznaju, pa tako vrijednosti u koje su donedavno svi vjerovali, postaju zamijenjeni novom idejom zajedništva. Ta ideja zajedništva ogleda se u kontekstu postmodernističke koncepcije nacije Benedicta Andersona (1990) koji daje svoju definiciju nacije: “To je zamišljena politička zajednica, i to zamišljena kao istodobno inherentno ograničena i suverena” (Anderson 1990, 17). Smith u tumačenju Andersonove definicije zamišljene građanske zajednice navodi kako “pod uvjetom da je politička, omeđena i suverena, svaku zamišljenu zajednicu – bio to grad-država, kraljevstvo ili neko kolonijalno carstvo s jedinstvenim lingua franca – njezini pripadnici mogu odrediti kao naciju” (Smith 2003, 141). Iz Andersonovog modernističkog okvira da se zaključiti kako pojavu novih tipova identiteta, unutar kojih se pojavljuju novi oblici društvene integracije temeljene na novim granicama individualnog i kolektivnog identiteta, prati ideja “da se nacija otpočetka doživljavala u jeziku, ne u krvi, i da je mogla biti ‘izumljena’ kao zamišljena zajednica” (Anderson 1991, 145). 
S obzirom na navedenu temu, kao i njezin cilj, pravac rasprave ide u smjeru tako da se u prvom poglavlju raspravlja o konceptualnoj tvorbi identiteta, tj. odnosu esencijalizama i konstruktivizama koji proizlazi iz disimetričnih odnosa moći. U drugom se poglavlju raspravlja o identitetu kao novom pojmovnom konstruktu gdje se određuju njegova najopćenitija uporišta unutar društvenog područja identitetskih analiza. Potom će, u idućem poglavlju, biti riječi o ulozi simboličkih kôdova kolektivnog identiteta gdje se analizira njihova tipologija. I konačno, rasprava završava s poglavljem o postmoderni gdje se identitet sagledava u refleksiji globalizacije. 
123 

A. SRšEN The Construction of Identity in Sociological Discourse 

124 
Kada je riječ o pojmu identiteta u sociološkom diskursu njegovo značenje ovisi 
o povijesnim i društvenim prilikama u kojima se koncipira, pa je kao takav“konceptualna tvorba koja ima određenu funkciju, bez obzira da li je relativiziramo ili apsolutiziramo” (Kalanj 2010, 120). Drugim riječima, konceptualizacijaidentiteta općenito može se opisati kao shvaćanje identiteta kao fiksnog, trajnog,esencijalnog, za razliku od promjenjivog i socijalno konstruiranog identiteta. Problem s konstrukcijom identiteta uvijek se veže uz značenje identiteta kojeje “uvijek uklopljeno u neke međuljudske i društvene odnose i stoga su, sasociološkog stajališta, najbliže zbiljskoj istini stvari oni koji drže da je to relacijski ili relacionistički koncept” (Kalanj 2010, 120). Prema nekim autorima (Kalanj2008, Barth 1997) “relacijskoj naravi identiteta očigledno najviše odgovarakonstrukcionistički pristup, koji danas prevladava u području identitetskih analiza” (Kalanj 2010, 120). Esencijalističko shvaćanje identiteta počiva naesencijalnoj prirodi “kao bit koja ne podliježe evoluciji i na koju ni pojedinac ni grupa nemaju nikakva utjecaja” (Kalanj 2003, 53). U tom smislu esencijalistički pristup kao takav “nije daleko od uvjerenja da je identitet praktički upisan u genetsko naslijeđe, iz čega vrlo lako može proizaći rasijalizacija pojedinaca i grupa” (Kalanj 2003, 54). U tom kontekstu identitet uvijek izražava određeni tip odnosa koji počiva na tenziji između esencijalizma i konstruktivizma gdje “osnovni put osporavanja esencijalizma je upozoravanje na socijalne i kulturne procese na kojima su identiteti konstruirani i koji ih mijenjaju” (Calhoun 1994, 14). Esencijalistički shvaćen identitet uvijek počiva na nekoj svojoj prirodnoj datosti, objektivnosti, biološkoj određenosti, povijesnoj zadanosti i nikada ne podliježe rekonstrukciji. Sa stajališta esencijalizma opravdano je postaviti pitanje 

o “pravom” identitetu (Sekulić 2010, 29). Nasuprot tomu, konstruktivistički shvaćen identiteta počiva na socijalnim i kulturnim konstruiranim granicama. Osnovni put osporavanja esencijalizma za konstruktiviste jest da esencijalistički mišljen koncept identiteta kao takav ne postoji, te da shvaćanje identiteta nije ništa drugo do razumijevanja povijesnog procesa njegove konstrukcije. Iz ovih dviju orijentacija se i izvlače fundamentalno različita sociološka stajališta kada je riječ o konceptualnoj tvorbi identiteta. Postmodernističko shvaćanje identitetske fragmentacije (Anderson 1990, Giddens 1991) ide u smjeru narušavanja više ili manje ustaljene strukture nekog društva. U tom smislu, kada je riječ o strukturi u kojoj se percipira i reflektira identitet, bilo u svojoj esencijalističkoj ili konstruktivističkoj formi, ona uvijek obuhvaća unutrašnje i vanjsko, pojedinačno i opće, individualno i društveno. Identitet unutar tih odnosa i veza uvijek proizlazi iz zbiljskih nejednakosti i disimetričnih odnosa moći. Konstrukcija identiteta prvotno polazi od simboličkog zamišljanja samoga sebe, a ta slika uvijek ovisi i o drugima. Zbog toga dolazi do određene vrste 


A. SRšEN Konstrukcija identiteta u sociološkom diskursu 
sučeljavanja unutar društvene strukture individualnog djelovanja i čovjekovesposobnosti da prerađuje prirodu oko sebe kao i dio vlastite prirode. To se naj­prije očituje u odnosu urođenog i stečenog u konstituciji identiteta. Neki autori različito gledaju na takav odnos, pa ih u jednoj općoj klasifikaciji možemo125 podijeliti na nativiste i kulturaliste (Katunarić 2010, 52). Nativisti vjeruju da jeu tvorbi osobnog identiteta presudno prirodno naslijeđe, genetska struktura,odnosno biološka podloga čovjeka, za razliku od kulturalista1 koji su uvjereniu presudnost stečenog kao i u čovjekove sposobnosti da prerađuje prirodu okosebe kao i dio vlastite prirode (Katunarić 2010, 52).
Značenje identiteta je uvijek uklopljeno u neke međuljudske i društveneodnose. Kako su ti odnosi konstantni ili raznoliki, shodno tomu, su konstantni ili raznoliki koncepcijski pojmovi identiteta. Relacijskoj naravi identiteta, ipaknajviše odgovara konstrukcionistički pristup, koji danas prevladava u područjuidentitetskih analiza (Kalanj 2008; Barth 1997). 
3. Identitet kao novi pojmovni konstrukt 




















Najopćenitija uporišta identiteta unutar društvenog područja identitetskihanaliza su: obitelj, religija, klasa, rod i etnicitet zbog čega Brubaker “predlaže tripojmovne inačice koje su, po njegovu mišljenju, analitički operacionalnije, a tosu zajedničnost, grupnost i povezanost” (Brubaker 2001, 66). U skladu s tim,identitet kao forma društvene i individualne egzistencije uvijek ide u dva smjera.Prvi se odnosi na to kako netko vidi samoga sebe i kako ga vide drugi, a drugi seočituje u želji i mogućnosti da se te želje ostvare unutar čovjekove prirode kojusam prerađuje i prilagođava svojim potrebama. S obzirom na potonju činjenicuvidimo da je čovjekov identitet zapravo vezan uz stvaranje uvjeta svojegapostojanja. U tom kontekstu sagledavamo i tezu o čovjeku kao conditio humana, 2 kao generičkom biću koji neprestano stvara i uvijek je otvoren budućnosti. Stoga,u konceptualnoj tvorbi identitet danas sve više određuje ono što će biti, a ne onošto jest. Upravo na tom tragu u okviru teorije refleksivne modernizacije UlrichaBecka (Beck & Grande 2006) očituje se razlikovanje kolektivnih identiteta udoba druge moderne ili globalizacije. Postmodernističko shvaćanje identitetaunutar sociološkog diskursa ne dvoji da su identiteti promjenjivi, fluidni i dauvijek postoji mogućnost stjecanja novih (Beck & Grande 2006). U tom smislutemeljna razlika u teorijskom pristupu proučavanja identiteta obično se odnosi naprocese koji utječu na identitet i subjekte koji ga kao takvog definiraju. Društvenisubjekti su, ne tako davno, imali mnogobrojne okosnice oko kojih su konstruiralisvoj identitet, kao što su, obitelj, nacija, društvena klasa, etnička skupina i druge.Međutim, moderna društva, a napose postmoderna, uvode više izvora identitetakoji presijecaju prijašnje proizvodeći složeniji obrazac identiteta i pripadnosti.U tom kontekstu kada promatramo identitet kao pojmovni konstrukt unutarsociološkog diskursa on se prikazuje kroz određene relacijske odnose koji seprema nekim autorima mogu svesti na pet temeljnih individualnih ili kolektivnih 
A. SRšEN The Construction of Identity in Sociological Discourse 
odnosa: “odnos prema sebi, prema drugima, prema svijetu, prema prirodi i prema Bogu” (Cifrić 2004, 221-255). Kao što je prethodno rečeno relacijskojnaravi identiteta najviše odgovara konstrukcionistički pristup. U znanstvenoj126 praksi napušta se koncept esencijalizma gdje se upozorava sve više na socijalne ikulturne procese na kojima su identiteti konstruirani (Calhoun 1994, 14). Smjersocijalno biheviorističke kulturalne antropologije Georga Herberta Meada dajeteorijski uvid u složenost osobnog identiteta kroz simbolički interakcionizamuma, osobe i društva (Mead 2003). Za Meada je o identitetu teško govoriti kao
o priključenosti na društvenu strukturu ili politički poredak, već je od primarnevažnosti doživljaj i percepcija društvenog obzorja vrijednosti. Za razliku odfunkcionalizma koji je koncentriran na objektivnu stranu socijalne strukturesimbolički interakcionizam polazi od subjektivnog svijeta kojeg pojedinac gradi uinterakciji s drugima (Mead 2003). Za daljnju raspravu važno je napomenuti kakopolazišna točka simboličkog interakcionizma nije svijest kao takva, već ključnuulogu ima jezik kao skup značenjskih simbola. Ipak, Mead smatra kako svijestima puno važniju ulogu kao društveni proces gdje se jasno razlikuje individua iuloga koju igra. Na toj razlikovnoj osnovi i zasniva se koncept shvaćanja da ulogejesu identiteti. Polazeći od radikalne biheviorističke pretpostavke da socijalnapsihologija započinje s proučavanjem opažljivih aktivnosti, dakle sa socijalnomakcijom i interakcijom, “Mead proširuje biheviorizam u dva smjera: u područjesvijesti i u područje društva” (Ritzer 1997, 185).

Svijest u Meadovoj teoriji poprima karakter društvenog procesa, odnosnoza njega “svijest je funkcionalna, a ne supstantivna” (Mead 1934, 112). Dakle,mogli bismo reći da je riječ o identitetu koji nastaje kroz razmišljanje pojedinca

o tome što ih veže uz društveni svijet i kroz njihovo simboličko predstavljanje samih sebe. Sažeto rečeno, daje se prioritet socijalnim uzrocima naglašavajući“da društvo, prema Meadu, postoji prije osobe, a mentalni odnosi proizlaze izdruštva” (Ritzer 1997, 189).


U daljnjoj raspravi o konceptualizaciji identiteta koja se oslanja na manj­kavosti funkcionalističkog pristupa unutar simboličkog interakcionizma mo­žemo primijetiti jednu zanimljivu sintezu funkcionalizma i simboličkog inter­akcionizma u radovima Ervinga Goffmana (Goffman 1963, 1959, 1971). Zarazliku od funkcionalista koji socijalnoj strukturi pristupaju kao objektivnopostojećem izvorištu identiteta i socijalne integracije, Goffmanova analiza je širai dinamičnija od klasičnog funkcionalizma jer dopušta širok stvaralački prostorza individualnu akciju i kreaciju (Sekulić 2010, 28). Goffman stvara razlikovnuosnovu uloge i osobe. Budući da na različite načine u izvođenju uloge svakipojedinac unosi sebe, shodno tomu, i na različite načine igramo svoje uloge. Iakoje ovakva tvrdnja u svjetlu Meadove analize ja i mene, gdje je “osoba proizvododnosa između ja i mene” (Mead 1934), Goffman ipak naglašava kako postojiprocjep “između onoga što bi osoba trebala biti, a što naziva virtualnim socijalnimidentitetom, i onoga što osoba zapravo jest, odnosno aktualnog socijalnog identiteta” (Rizter 1997, 200). Dok su funkcionalisti zainteresirani ponajprije za 
A. SRšEN Konstrukcija identiteta u sociološkom diskursu 
socijalnu strukturu kao objektivno postojeći identitet i za socijalnu integraciju,Goffman “je nezainteresiran za pitanja institucionalne integracije društva kaocjeline” (Collins 2004, 16). Različita pitanja koja se odnose na fragmentiranje identiteta posljednjih desetljeća razlog su zbog kojeg se problem identiteta i127 modernosti našao u središtu interesa suvremenih socioloških pristupa, posebice onih koji se oslanjaju na tradiciju simboličkog interakcionizma i objašnjenjaidentiteta što su ih u toj tradiciji ponudili Mead, Goffman, te Herbert Blumer(Mead 1934, Goffman 1959, Blumer 1969). Meadova teza kako identitet nije fiksan, već promjenjiv i fluidan, što je na tragu i Beckove teze (Beck & Grande,2006), presudno je utjecala na simboličko-interakcionističke analize.
Dalekosežne su promjene u formi i sadržaju pojma identiteta u postmoderni gdje se problem osobnog identiteta kao modernog subjekta sagledava krozrazumijevanje društvene akcije u kojoj “refleksivni projekt identiteta stvara noveaktualizacije i vještine, a identitet postaje nešto što se mora stvoriti i učvrstiti u refleksivnim aktivnostima individue” (Tomić-Koludrović & Knežević 2004,114). U socijalnopsihološkoj perspektivi možemo navesti teoriju identiteta ErikaEriksona (1968) koji kao osnovnu karakteristiku identiteta ističe “subjektivni osjećaj ojačane istovjetnosti i kontinuiteta” (Cifrić & Nikodem 2006, 176).Ovakve je koncepcije dalje razvijao Blumer koji je tvrdio da osoba djeluje prema sebi, odnosno, upravlja svojim akcijama na osnovi pretpostavki o samoj sebi kao
o predmetu, stoga, ona pomaže drugim ljudima da započnu djelovati (Blumer1969). U tom kontekstu Blumer je kritičan prema “sociološkom determinizmu [u kojem] se socijalna akcija ljudi razmatra kao neki tijek ili izraz sila koje njimaupravljaju, a ne kao djelovanja koja su ljudi ostvarili svojim interpretacijamasituacija u koje su stavljeni” (Blumer 1969, 84).
Razvidno je kako je kod spomenutih teoretičara pojam identiteta važanelement za razumijevanje postindustrijskih moderniziranih društava. Teore­tičari koji su osobito pripomogli razumijevanju takvih društava su svakakoGiddens (1991), Beck (Beck & Grande 2006) i Bauman (2004), gdje posebicevalja naglasiti Giddensovu teoriju djelovanja aktera koja se odvija unutar strukture koju, međutim, ne treba shvatiti kao prisilu. Ona, iako pruža okvirza individualna djelovanja, istodobno nastaje kao njihova posljedica. Giddens (1991) je, oslanjajući se na Becka (Beck & Grande 2006), postavke teorijestrukturacije doveo u kontekst refleksivne modernizacije gdje se modernodruštvo i refleksivnost isprepliću. Jedna od bitnih odlika modernizma za Giddensa je raskidanje s uvriježenim normama i vrijednostima, odnosno snaučenim ponašanjem. U modernosti postoji diskontinuitet prema tradiciji itradicionalnom poretku gdje 
prošlost o kojoj govorimo je prije zajednička nego individualna /.../ Svaki kontekst 
detradicionalizacije nudi mogućnost veće slobode djelovanja od one koja je postojala 
prije – ovdje govorimo o oslobođenju čovjeka od okova prošlosti. Kod tradicije prošlost 
strukturira sadašnjost kroz zajednička vjerovanja i osjećaje (Giddens 2005, 61). 

A. SRšEN The Construction of Identity in Sociological Discourse 
U tom kontekstu društvo kasne modernosti (Giddens 2005), ili kako ga Becknaziva ”postindustrijski modernizirano društvo, postaje društvo rizika” (Beck &Grande, 2006) gdje se razlika predmodernog i modernog vremena najbolje vidi 
128 kroz dijalektički odnos povjerenja i rizika. 

Na tragu idealnih tipova Maxa Webera, autori Shmuel Eisenstadt i BernhardGiesen postavljaju opći model za analizu kolektivnog identiteta (Eisenstadt & Giesen, 1995). Unutar tog općeg modela ovi analiziraju tipologiju simboličkihkôdova kolektivnog identiteta (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995, 72-102). U tomkontekstu, osnovni kôd konstrukcije kolektivnog identiteta zasniva se na razlici mi – drugi, što je posebice značajno kod društvenih politiziranih identiteta.3 Svojstvo kolektivnog identiteta prema postavkama Eisenstadta i Giesena (1995)jest da on može ispuniti svoju funkciju samo ako društveni procesi koji ga konstituiraju ostanu na latentnoj razini. U svom modelu naglašavaju kako kolek­tivni identitet nije prirodno generiran, već društveno konstruiran, odnosno,proizveden društvenom konstrukcijom granica čijem procesu prethodi sim­boličko kodiranje razlika. Osnovni kôdovi konstrukcije kolektivnog identitetasu primordijalni, građanski i sveti temeljem čega se određuju i tri ideal-tipa kolektivnog identiteta (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995, 72-102).
Kada je riječ o primordijalnom idealnom tipu kolektivnog identiteta onse temelji na rodu, generaciji, srodstvu, etnicitetu i rasi, što ujedno sačinjava njegovu granicu između onog izvanjskog i unutrašnjeg.4 Ovaj tip kolektivnog identiteta se u sociologiji često referira i na razne vrste društvenih veza o čemuje prvi govorio Edward Shils (1957). Shils je razlikovao “javne, građanske vezemoderne države i primordijalne veze obitelji te vjerskih i etničkih skupina” (Smith 2003, 155) te na taj način “dokazivao da su primordijalne veze srodstvai religije ostale vrlo žive i u modernim svjetovnim društvima, o čemu svjedoče njihovi simboli i javne svečanosti” (Smith 2003, 155). Naime, ovaj kolektivniidentitet je često i višestoljetni, budući da se referira na rod, etnicitet, rasu, tekao takav predstavlja skup zapamćenih događaja koji su sabrani u našu osobnost. On se kao takav odnosi na pitanje moći koje je vladalo nekim prostorom krozneko vrijeme. Temu primordijalnih veza, koja podsjeća na “Durkheimovutezu da se jezgra starijeg srodstva, moralnih i vjerskih veza – sličnosti uvjerenja i savjesti u mehaničkoj solidarnosti – zadržala i u modernim, industrijskimdruštvima” (Smith 2003, 155) razradio je Clifford Geertz (1973) koji je tupostavku “primijenio na nove države, a često stara društva, Azije i Afrike” (Smith 2003, 155). Geertz daje naglasak ulozi moderne države u poticanju vjerovanja iosjećaja primordijalnost razlikujući unutardržavne i međudržavne primordijalnevezanosti (Geertz 1973, 270) polazeći od klasifikacije etničko-državnih odnosa 
A. SRšEN Konstrukcija identiteta u sociološkom diskursu 
gdje obrasci primordijalne identifikacije “nisu fluidni, bezoblični i beskonačnorazličiti, nego su jasno omeđeni i razlikuju se na sustavne načine” (Geertz 1973,268). U tom kontekstu on dokazuje da nastanak političke svijesti vezane uz modernu državu potiče primordijalne osjećaje. Međutim, prema Geertzu,upravo primordijalne veze u novim državama, sagledavajući ih kao društva, postaju osjetljive na nelojalnost izazvanu upravo tim vezama, pa u svezi s timGeertz objašnjava: 
Pod primordijalnom vezanošću podrazumijeva se vezanost koja proistječe iz ‘danosti’ – ili, točnije, budući da je u te stvari neminovno upletena kultura, navodne ‘danosti’ – društvene egzistencije: poglavito neposrednog susjedstva i rodbinskih veza ali, osim njih, i danosti koja proistječe iz rođenja u određenoj vjerskoj zajednosti, govorenja određenim jezikom ili jezičnim narječjem, te prihvaćanja određenih društvenih običaja….Opća snaga primordijalnih spona i tipovi tih veza koji su važni razlikuju se od osobe do osobe, od društva do društva i od razdoblja do razdoblja (Geertz 1973, 259-260). 
Sagledavajući uloge primordijalnih tipova simboličkog kodiranja Smith (2003),slijedeći problem sociobioloških objašnjenja, postavlja pitanje 
ne odlazeći u drugu krajnosti i smatrajući etnije, i još više, nacije čisto apstraktnim zamišljenim zajednicama, kako možemo znati da naša mišljenja o etničkom srodstvu imaju genetsku osnovu ili da se veza obitelji i klana mogu proširiti nepotizmom velikih razmjera na istoj fizičkoj i reprodukcijskoj osnovi na relativne strance zato što, eto, govore istim jezikom i imaju istu religiju i običaje itd? (Smith 2003, 154). 
U okviru ove teme svakako treba spomenuti Pierrea van den Berghea (1978) glavnog predstavnika sociobiološkog pristupa etničnosti i nacionalnosti, kojiističe kako čovjekova društvenost počiva na trima načelima: rodbinskom oda­biru, uzajamnosti i prisili (Van den Berghe 1978, 404). Njegovo poimanje etničnosti, kasta i ‘rasa’ koje su obično “definirane zajedničkim podrijetlom,općenito naslijedne i često endogamne [te kao takve nastaju iz malih ‘plemena’i pretvaraju se] u nadobitelj” (Van den Berghe 1978, 403-404). No, kritike na ovu argumentaciju daje Vernon Reynolds (1980) ističući: “Ako njegova pri­mordijalna međugurpna teorija utemeljena na sociobiologiji ne može objasnitizašto novi negenetski prijenos srodstva i pripadnosti skupini mora slijediti logiku staroga genetskoga, ona se ruši” (Reynolds 1980, 311). Razvidno jekako se primordijalni tipovi simboličkog kodiranja u osnovi oslanjaju na socio­biološke prikaze prirođenih, konstitutivnih granica unutarnje i vanjske grupe, zanemarujući cijeli spektar društvenih i kulturnih pojavnosti na koje se oslanjajugrađanski i sveti kodôvi konstrukcije kolektivnog identiteta.
Drugi temeljni kôd kolektivnog identiteta sačinjava građanski koji se zasniva na prisnosti koja podrazumijeva implicitna pravila, tradiciju i socijalne rutine, 
129 

A. SRšEN The Construction of Identity in Sociological Discourse 
te se kao takav temelji na implicitnim pravilima života u zajednici (Eisenstadt& Giesen 1995, 73-83). Ovaj tip kolektivnog identiteta polazi od činjenice dase pojedincima i grupama mogu normativno pripisati univerzalna građansko­
130 političke prava. Međutim, međuidentitetske snošljivosti i obzirnosti koje činetemelj građanskog kolektivnog identiteta, što podrazumijeva priznavanje drugoga i drugačijega, ipak u praksi ne ostvaruju puninu političke izvedbe. Uprovedbenom smislu politika priznavanja bi trebala biti okosnica rješavanjaproblema posebnih kulturnih prilika i potreba različitih etničkih manjina, što se danas posebno očituje u multikulturalnoj formi identitetske politike (Sršen,2013). Ona je danas gotovo najzaslužnija za politizaciju identiteta, a njenouporište stvaraju situacije multietničkih društava i potrebe vladajuće državne volje da očuva i osigura poštivanje i jednaku vrijednost različitih kultura kojesupostoje unutar neke teritorijalno određene zajednice (Kalanj 2010, 129). Utom smislu, politika multikulturalizma identitetska uporišta različitih grupa unutar određene zajednice stavlja kao osnovu za razmatranje administrativnihi financijskih mehanizama važnih za regulaciju poštivanja načela građanstva, štose napose danas odnosi na ujedinjenu Europu. Kulturne raznolikosti identiteta u europskoj stvarnosti danas odaju pesimističku perspektivu procesa koji težisjedinjenju strukturalnih dimenzija nacionalnog identiteta s instrumentalnom racionalnosti novog europskog nadnacionalnog identiteta (Sršen & Piskač2012, 160). U tom smislu rekonstrukcija socijalne zbilje popraćene inter­akcijskom politikom priznanja treba svakako voditi računa o priznanju njenih komunitarnih obilježja. Od suvremenih autora koji se nalaze na tom tragusvakako je najrelevantniji Charles Taylor (2011) koji drži da identitetskasebstva imaju društvene izvore i njihova autentičnost dolazi do izražaja samo ako je relacijski i interakcijski priznata, a ne samo nominalno i normativističkikonstatirana (Kalanj 2010, 128). U tom kontekstu Kalanj (2010) ističe kako je postmodernost “indicirala krizu identitetske refleksije, ali joj ni u promijenjenimdruštvenim i komunikacijskim uvjetima nije oduzela moć traganja za sebstvom”(Kalanj 2010, 124). Treći temeljni kôd kolektivnog identiteta je koncepcija svetoga, koji se zasnivana ograničenom i privilegiranom pristupu svetom (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995,73-83). Ovaj tip kolektivnog identiteta u osnovi se oblikuje na osnovi svetoga i to bez obzira je li sakralno definirano kao Bog, progres ili racionalnost: ono svojizraz dobiva u ideologijama ili religijama (Cipek 2000, 63). Religijski je identitetjedan od svakako najdubljih oslonaca u svijesti pojedinca, ali i društva. Njegova snaga počiva na uvjerenju koje može biti, kako povoljan tako i nepovoljan, okidačrazličitih društvenih konflikata. U tom smislu uvjerenje pojedinca u određeni sustav vrijednosti kojeg mu nameće vjera predstavlja izbor, koji kao takavpostaje osnova svakog drugog djelovanja. Racionalisti se tako predaju razumu,koji postaje oslonac ideja i pokretač djelovanja, dok se vjerska svijest artikulira s obzirom na dvije međusobno povezane ideje: transcendenciju i vjeru (Parekh 
A. SRšEN Konstrukcija identiteta u sociološkom diskursu 
2008, 114). Prelazak religijskog identitetskog kôda u ideologijski predstavljanovo opasno identitetsko uporište društvenog djelovanja. Smith (2003) navodikako je moguće naći povijesne primjere koji dokazuju “stanoviti kontinuitet između postojećih etničkih zajednica (etnija) i modernih nacija [čiji je identitet131 oblikovan] nekom skripturalnom religijom; najpoznatiji su, ali nipošto i jedini,primjeri Armenci i Židovi” (Smith 2003, 179). Povijesno gledano, neki autorikao što je Susan Reynolds (1984) ulogu svetog kôda kolektivnog identitetavidi kao poveznicu “između srednjovjekovnog ‘naroda’ i njegova kraljevstva, na jednoj strani, i moderne ‘nacije’ i njezine države, na drugoj” (Reynolds 1984, 253). To upućuje na činjenicu da je na “srednjovjekovnom Zapadu, regnalnasvijest, koja je ideja srodstva i običaja združila s kraljevskom vladavinom, de­finirala ‘narode’ tog područja, te je na taj način pojam etnički gotovo uvijek spajao konotacije i podrijetla i kulture” (Smith 2003, 178). Slijedom navedenogamoguće je zaključiti kako je pitanje religijskog identitetskog kôda sponaspajanja, ali i razdvajanja, kada je riječ o traženju povijesnih primjera koji dokazuju stanoviti kontinuitet između postojećih etničkih zajednica (etnija) imodernih nacija. U današnjem globaliziranom svijetu veliki povratak iskonu, odnosno primordijalnim temeljima zajednice kroz ideologiju fundamentalizma,što se ogleda u religijskog identitetskog kôdu, dovodi u pitanje sociologijskorazumijevanje svjetskog rizičnog društva. 

5. Identitet u refleksiji globalizacije 























Postmodernost je indicirala krizu identitetske refleksije. Upravo u toj krizi nije slučajna Beckova (Beck & Grande 2006) i Giddensova (2005) kritika globalnogkapitalizma u kojoj nastaje i kriza identiteta. Takvoj analizi identiteta, gdjeje jedno od ključnih pitanja - pitanje moći suvremenog svijeta - pridružio se i Manuel Castells (2002). On u tom kontekstu identitet definira, ukoliko se onnaravno odnosi na društvene aktere, kao proces stvaranja smisla na temelju kulturnog atributa ili srodnog niza kulturnih atributa. Njima je dana prednost uodnosu prema drugim izvorima smisla. Identiteti uključuju i proces pregovaranjaizmeđu osobe i vanjskih čimbenika, te u tom smislu identitet u odnosu na društvene aktere podrazumijeva proces stvaranja smisla temeljem kulturnogatributa ili srodnog niza kulturnih atributa kojima je dana prednost u odnosuprema drugim (vanjskim) izvorima smisla (Castells 2002, 16). Gledajući iden­titet u informacijskom društvu kao strukturalnoj posljedici utjecaja novih infor­macijsko-komunikacijskih tehnologija na politiku, ekonomiju i kulturu, Castellsističe važnu ulogu kulturnog identiteta koji se pojavljuje kao najekspresivnijaidentitetska paradigma (Castells 2000, 2002). Shodno tomu autor navodi tri izvora izgradnje tog identiteta: legitimirajući identitet – uvode ga dominantnedruštvene institucije radi proširenja i racionalizacije svoje dominacije naddruštvenim akterima; identitet otpora – kojeg stvaraju subjekti u podređenim 

A. SRšEN The Construction of Identity in Sociological Discourse 
položajima i koji se temelje na načelima suprotnim od onih koja zastupajuinstitucije, te projektni identitet – koji označava stvaranje novih identitetana temelju različitih kulturnih čimbenika, te koji utječu na promjene u samoj 
132 	društvenoj strukturi (Castells 2002, 12-18). Odgovori koje daje Castellsunutar kulturno-identitetskog diskursa jesu da za kolektivnog aktera možepostojati mnoštvo identiteta. Međutim, to mnoštvo postaje izvor proturječja u samopredstavljanju kao i u društvenom djelovanju. Stoga Castells ističe kako“umjesto različitih društvenih uloga pojedinca – od, primjerice, radnika, pro­fesora, navijača, turista, homoseksualca, vjernika – u novom se društvenom kontekstu identiteti stječu kao ustrajno djelovanje izvan dominantnih institucijamodrenog društva. Proces individualizacije odlučuje o identitetu” (Castells 2002, 17-19). Stoga, identitet kao pojmovni konstrukt u globalizirajućemsvijetu postaje medij njegove kulturalizacije čime on ostaje jedini fundamentalnimodus dokazivanja i obrane svoje vlastitosti. U tom smislu “individualizacija u suvremenim društvima označava stanje u kojem se osobno Ja ne pokazuje tekkao puki nositelj društvenih uloga, nego kao potpuna osobnost koja racionalnoi emocionalno nadzire vođenje vlastita života” (Paić 2005, 98). Najvažniji razlog novoprobuđenog interesa za probleme identiteta unutar suvremenih sociološkihteorija su procesi karakteristični za refleksivnu modernizaciju. U tom procesu seidentitet konceptualizira kao samo-refleksivni individualni projekt u kontekstu višestrukih šansi koje društvo nudi za njegovu realizaciju.5 Neki autori (Cifrić & Nikodem 2006) navode da je suvremena kriza identiteta povezana s četiriproblema jastva koja karakteriziraju razdoblje kasnog moderniteta:
1. 	
Problematiziranje samospoznaje (spoznaje jastva). U pred-modernim društvima jastvo je uglavnom bilo transparentno i nezanimljivo, no po­četkom 20. stoljeća jastvo se promatra kao ‘unutrašnji kontinent’ koji se teško može istražiti bez stručne pomoći (psihoanaliza). 

2. 	
Isticanje ljudskog potencijala. Procesi moderne sekularizacije kao prioritetpostavljaju postizanje samoostvarenja u ovom svijetu, a ne zadovoljstvo sovim svijetom i čekanje ‘onog svijeta’. 

3. 	
Rastvaranje hijerarhijske društvene strukture, razvoj individualizma i so­cijalne mobilnosti, te stvaranje potencijala za brze društvene promjene otvo­rili su mogućnost konstrukcije novih identiteta. 

4. 	
Nova fleksibilnost u određivanju jastva, odnosno u samoodređivanju. (Cifrić & Nikodem 2006, 179). 


Upravo je problem rastvaranja hijerarhijske društvene strukture najvidljivijiunutar globalizacijskih procesa. Naime, u ranijim društvenim epohama tradicijaje pružala jasno definirane uloge i bila temelj društvenog uređenja, a s procesom globalizacije jača proces individualizacije i pluralizacije identiteta. Modernidruštveni procesi potaknuti globalizacijom potkopavaju, između ostalog, iosjećaj pripadnosti naciji. Étienne Balibar (2003) smatra kako se, unutar post­
A. SRšEN Konstrukcija identiteta u sociološkom diskursu 
modernističke koncepcije, “nacija reproducira kroz mrežu (ideoloških) aparatašto znači da se pojedinac svakidašnjom praksom oblikuje kao homo nationalis”(Balibar 2003, 395) smatrajući tako da je pojedinac ključan čimbenik u de­finiranju pojma nacije. U tom smislu “nacija ne nastaje samo kolektivnim ocrta-133 vanjem imaginarne političke zajednice koja je istovremeno inherentna i su­verena, nego je riječ o procesu u kojemu pojedinac internalizacijom granica postaje pripadnikom određene nacije” (Božić Blanuša 2010, 313).
U tom procesu nestaju velike društvene klasne formacije i sve više dobivajuna važnosti identiteti koji se temelje na mnogostrukosti životnih stilova. Su­vremeno društvo dokida tradicionalne veze gdje pojedinac gubi vezu sa svojomprirodnom bazom, kao što je obitelji, ali i širom okolinom. Razlog tomu jesve veća prostorna mobilnost, ali i činjenica da on kao jedinka sam izabire što želi biti, jer su mu tradicionalne zadatosti nestale iz sjećanja.6 Sukladno Gidden­sovu shvaćanju jedno od glavnih svojstava modernosti jest ono što se naziva“refleksivnim projektom sebstva” (Giddens, 1982), odnosno, refleksija i konti­nuirani rad pojedinca na vlastitome identitetu. Giddens kao teoretičar moder­nizacija zajedno s Beckom “dijeli shvaćanje globalizacije u smislu uspostaveprostorno-vremenskog udaljavanja prema nacionalno i teritorijalno homo­genom području djelovanja subjekta/aktera” (Paić 2005, 56). Upravo na po­litičkom području globalizacije “subjekti/akteri globalnog političkog poretka su nacije-države, a ekonomskog poduzetničke elite djeluju transnacionalno” (Paić2005, 56).
Od osamdesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća unutar sociologije se uspostav­lja konsenzus o uporabi analitičkog povezivanja mikro i makro aspekata društva, što se u teorijskom smislu da primijeniti na pojmu identiteta u kasnoj moderno­sti, ili kako ga Giddens naziva razdoblju, “refleksivne modernizacije” (Tomić­Koludrovići & Knežević 2004, 113). Upravo posljednjih desetljeća u sociološkim raspravama dominiraju teze o tome da je primarni zadatak socioloških teorijaprevladavati mikro-makro dualizme, te u tome povezivanju politika refleksivne modernizacije je naizgled optimistička verzija moći političkog subjekta kaosamosvrhe kolektivnog djelovanja. 














O identitetu se može govoriti i od najranijih oblika čovjekove društvenostikada je čovjek svoje kolektivno ja oblikovao u najranijim zajednicama najčešće putem religijske identifikacije u odnosu na drugi kolektiv. Većina sociologase slaže s tvrdnjom da su svi ljudski identiteti donekle društveni jer su vezaniuz značenja, a ona su uvijek rezultat sporazuma ili nesporazuma, i uvijek donekle zajednička. Pitanje identiteta jest povijesna, ali nadasve kulturnaspecifičnost zapadnog moderniteta u kojemu se očituju elementi društvene refleksivnosti. Među teoretičarima sociologije postoji niz različitih tumačenja 
A. SRšEN The Construction of Identity in Sociological Discourse 
pojma identitet kada se on promatra u postmodernom globalizacijskomkontekstu kao nešto imaginarno, ali ništa manje snažno uporište individualnogi kolektivnog doživljaja. U skladu s time javljaju se i različite interpretacije o 
134 	njegovoj ulozi u društvu. Postmoderni diskurs u svojim pristupima i modelimaidentitet promatra kao formu individualne i društvene egzistencije u kojoj je prepoznatljiv njegov prirodno-povijesni i esencijalistički koncept. Identitet zbogsvoje sadržajne arbitrarnosti ima tu moć da potiče na preispitivanje dubinskistrukturirane i tradicijom nataložene svijesti o individualnoj i kolektivnoj pripadnosti. Pojedincima daje spoznajni okvir za afirmaciju individualnosti, aširoj zajednici mobilizacijsko djelovanje u stvaranju kolektivnog subjektiviteta.Ovaj posljednji faktor ovisi o tome gledali li se društveno-kulturna ili politička dimenzija grupe. Kolektivno pamćenje, tradicija, vrijednosti, svi ti elementikoji se održavaju u svijesti pojedinca daju smisao kolektivnom subjektivitetu.Oni neprestano potiču potvrdu o pripadnosti grupi gdje je značenje grupnogidentiteta utemeljeno u simboličkom kodiranju granica. S druge strane, identitetistovremeno ima tu moć da relativizira javno-diskurzivne konjunkture s obziromda sudjeluje ne samo u rekonstrukcijskim, već i u različitim dekonstrukcijskimzahvatima postmodernističke zbilje. U tom kontekstu valja naglasiti kako je usuvremenim društvima identitet izrazito fragmentiran kao odraz refleksivnemodernizacije. Danas se suvremene kritike takva identiteta u javnim raspravamanajčešće odnose na rastući proces individualizacije gdje se oblikuju novimehanizmi osobnog identiteta. U toj promjeni identitet predstavlja odraz erozijetradicionalnih statusnih položaja i slabljenja društvene klase kao dominantneunutar društvene strukture. Takvim postmodernističkim konceptom identitetasociolozi se koriste u različitim, ali ipak, povezanim kontekstima. Postmodernidiskurs o identitetu upozorio je na krizu identiteta smatrajući da su njihovisocijalno-ekonomski i ideološki temelji, klasni i nacionalni, toliko dotrajali daviše ne mogu biti čvrsto uporište pojedinačne i zajedničke identifikacije. 


Anderson, B., 1990. Nacija: zamišljena zajednica; Razmatranje o porijeklu i širenju nacionalizma. Školska knjiga, Zagreb. 
Anderson, B., 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, 
2. izd., Verso, London. Arendt, H.,1991. Vita activa. August Cesarec, Zagreb. Balibar, É., 2003. Oblik nacija: povijest i ideologija, Tvrđa – časopis za teoriju i kulturu vizualne 
umjetnosti 1–2, 389–405. 
Bauman, Z., 2004. Identity, Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi. Polity Press, Cambridge 
Barth, F., 1997. Etničke grupe i njihove granice. U: Poutignat, Ph. & Streiff-Fenart, J. (ur.), Teo­
rije o etnicitetu. Biblioteka XX vek, Beograd. 
Beck, U. & Grande, E., 2006. Kozmopolitska Europa. Školska knjiga, Zagreb. 
Božić Blanuša Z., 2010. Nacija bez subjek(a)ta. Kakva je poststrukturalistička koncepcija
nacije? Filozofska iztraživanja 117–118, 311–321. 
A. SRšEN Konstrukcija identiteta u sociološkom diskursu 
Blumer, H., 1969. Symbolic Interactionism, Perspective and Method. Prentice-Hall, Englewo­od Cliffs. 
Brubaker, R ., 2001. Au-dela de l’identité. Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 139 (1), 66-85. 
Castells, M., 2000. Uspon umreženog društva. Golden marketing, Zagreb. 
Castells, M., 2002. Moć identiteta. Golden marketing, Zagreb. 
Calhoun, C., 1994. Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. U: Calhoun, C. (ur.), Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. Blackwell: Oxford, Cambridge. 
Cifrić, I., (2004) Orijentacijski identitet. Socijalnoekološke orijentacije kao obilježja identiteta.Socijalna ekologija 13 (3-4), 221-255. 
Cifrić, I. & Nikodem, K ., 2006. Socijalni identitet u Hrvatskoj. Koncept i dimenzije socijalnogidentiteta. Socijalna ekologija Zagreb 15 (3), 173-202. 
Cipek, T., 2000. Oblikovanje hrvatskog nacionalnog identiteta. Primordijalni identitetski kôdu ranoj hrvatskoj politickoj misli. U: Graovac, I., Fleck H.-G.(ur.), Dijalog povjesničara/ istoričara 4. Zaklada Friedrich Naumann, Zagreb, 59-73. 
Collins, R ., 2004. Interaction Ritual Chains. University Press, Princeton. 
Connerton, P., 2004. Kako se društva sjećaju. Izdanja Antibarbarus, Zagreb. 
Eisenstadt, S. N. & Giesen, B., 1995. The Construction of Collective Identity. Archives 
Europeennes de Sociologie 36, 72-102. 
Geertz, C., 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. Fontana, London. 
Giddens, A ., 1991. Modernity and Self Identity. Self and Society in the late Modern Age. Polity 
Press, Cambridge. 
Giddens, A ., 2005. Odbjegli svijet. Naklada Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb. 
Goffman, E., 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Anchor, Garden City, N.Y. 
Goffman, E., 1963. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Prentice-Hall, Englewo­
od Cliffs. 
Goffman, E., 1971. Relations in Public. Basic Books: New York. 
Kalanj, R ., 2003. Zov identiteta kao prijeporno znanstveno pitanje. Socijalna ekologija Zagreb 
12 (1-2), 47-68. 
Kalanj, R ., 2007. Dimenzije modernizacije i mjesto identiteta. Socijalna ekologija Zagreb 16 (2-3), 113-156. 
Kalanj, R ., 2008. Teorijsko suočavanje s izazovima identiteta. U: Cifrić, I. (ur.) Relacijski iden­titeti. Prilozi istraživanju identiteta hrvatskog društva. Hrvatsko sociološko društvo/Institutza društvena istraživanja/Zavod za sociologiju Odsjeka za sociologiju Filozofskog fakul­teta, Zagreb, 311-328. 
Kalanj, R ., 2010. Identitet i politika identiteta (Politički identitet). U: Budak, N. & Katunarić, V.(ur). Hrvatski nacionalni identitet u globalizirajućem svijetu. Centar za demokraciju i pravo Mirko Tripalo, Zagreb, 117-133. 
Katunarić, V., 2010. Hr vatska kulturna politika i izazovi globalizacije. U: Budak, N. & Katunarić,
V. (ur) Hrvatski nacionalni identitet u globalizirajućem svijetu. Centar za demokraciju i pravo Mirko Tripalo, Zagreb, 105-116. Mead, G. H., 1934. Mind, Self & Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Chicago Uni­versity of Chicago Press, Chicago. Mead, G. H., 2003. Um, osoba i društvo sa stajališta socijalnog biheviorista. Naklada Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb. 
Paić, Ž., 2005. Politika identiteta: kultura kao nova ideologija. Antibarbarus, Zagreb. Parekh, B., 2008. Nova politika identiteta. Politička kultura, Zagreb. 
135 

A. SRšEN The Construction of Identity in Sociological Discourse 
Reynolds, S., 1984. Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900-1300. Oxford: Claren­don Press. 
Reynolds, V., 1980. Sociobiology and the idea of primordial discrimination. Ethnic and Racial Studies 3 (3), 303-315.
136 
Ritzer, G., 1997. Suvremena sociologijska teorija. Nakladni zavod Globus, Zagreb. 
Sekulić, D., 2010. Pojam identiteta. U: Budak, N. & Katunarić, V. (ur) Hrvatski nacionalni iden­
titet u globalizirajućem svijetu. Centar za demokraciju i pravo Mirko Tripalo, Zagreb, 15-47. 
Shils, E., 1957. Primordial, personal, sacred and civil ties. British Journal of Sociolog y 7, 13–45. 
Smith, D. A., 2003. Nacionalizam i modernizam. Kritički pregled suvremenih teorija nacija i nacio­
nalizma. Politička misao, Zagreb. 
Sršen, A., 2013. Beyond Multiculturalism in Europe – Rethinking Equality in the Age of Inequalities. Book of Proceedings. The International Conference on Education, Culture and Identity.International University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo. 
Sršen, A . & Piskač, D., 2012. Hr vatski nacionalni identitet i Europska unija. Slavia Meridionalis. 
Studia Slavica et Balcanica 12, 159-171. 
Taylor, C., 2011. Izvori sebstva. Razvoj modernog identiteta. Naklada Breza, Zagreb. 
Tomić–Koludrović, I. & Knežević, S., 2004. Konstrukcija identiteta u mikro-makro kontekstu,
Acta Iader 1, 109-126. 
Van den Berghe, P., 1978. Race and ethnicity: a sociobiological perspective. Ethnic and Racial Studies 1 (4), 401-411. 
notes 





1 
Sa stajališta kulturalista upravo interakcija čovjeka s okolinom upućuje na gledišta Meada koji jejoš u 20-im godinama 20. stoljeća zaključio da je identitet uopćeni drugi (Usp.: Mead 2003). 
2 
Autorica H. Arendt situaciju kojom ljudski rod stvara uvjeta svoje egzistencija naziva conditio humana (Usp. Arendt 1991). 
3 
U analizi stupnjeva društvenog identiteta Harriet Bradley predlaže tri stupnja identiteta: pasivni,aktivni i politizirani. Pasivni identiteti su potencijalni identiteti koji proizlaze iz skupa odnosau koje su pojedinci uključeni (klasa, spol, etnicitet...). Pojedinci ih obično nisu svjesni i neodređuju se kroz njih, osim kada određene društvene okolnosti probude svijest o takvom načinuidentifikacije. Tada dolazi do aktivnih identiteta koji čine temelj djelovanja. No oni su nestalni,kratkotrajni. Ukoliko postanu trajni, odnosno ukoliko se pojedinci stalno određuju kroz njih,onda je riječ o politiziranim identitetima (Cifrić & Nikodem 2006). 
4 
Primordijalni tipovi simboličkog kodiranja oslanjaju se na naturaliziranje konstitutivnih granicajer su srodstvo, rod i etnicitet smješteni izvan mogućnosti komunikacije, definicije i konstrukcije,pa će i svaki pokušaj propitivanja tako postavljenih granica propasti, jer su te granice po definicijipostavljene iznad društvenog određivanja i promjene (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995, 72-102). 
5 
U današnjem društvenom kontekstu, institucije modernosti oblikuju nove mehanizme osobnogidentiteta, gdje Giddens upozorava da identitet zrcali promjene nastale globalnim načinimadruštvenog povezivanja. (Giddens 1991). 
6 
U knjizi P. Connertona “Kako se društva sjećaju” autor zanimajući se za pamćenje zamjećuje da senaše spoznaje o sadašnjosti umnogome zavise o našem znanju o prošlosti. U tom kontekstu našsadašnji svijet doživljavamo u kontekstu koji je uzročno povezan s prošlim događajima i stvarima(Connerton 2004). 
TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016, p.137–154 


V času druge svetovne vojne je bilo v Neodvisno državo Hrvaško izgnanih približno
10.000 Slovencev. Izgnani so bili predvsem v kraje, oddaljene od današnje slovensko­hrvaške meje. Izseljenci so se v krajih, ki so jih naselili, povezovali s tam že živečimiSlovenci. V prispevku bo prikazano, na kakšen način so se priseljeni Slovenci povezovalis Slovenci, ki so živeli v Osijeku v času med obema svetovnima vojnama, kakšenpomen je imelo kulturno-umetniško društvo, ustanovljeno leta 1938, in kako je postaloshajališče izgnancev. Poudarjena bo tudi vloga Ferda Delaka, umetnika, ki je bil s svojimdelovanjem aktivno vključen v narodnoosvobodilno delovanje – organiziral je združenodelovanje Slovencev v Osijeku in Slavoniji ter bil iniciator ustanovitve mestnih odborovOsvobodilne fronte na območju Osijeka. 
Ključne besede: izgnanci, Slovenci na Hrvaškem, Osijek, druga svetovna vojna. 

During WWII about 10,000 Slovenes were deported to the territory of the Independent Stateof Croatia, especially to localities remote from the present Slovene-Croatian border. In the placeswhere they were settled, deportees soon made contact with the Slovenes that had already livedthere. The present article highlights the nature of these contacts in Osijek in the interwar period,the importance of the cultural and artistic association that was founded in 1938, and how itevolved into the meeting place of the deportees. The paper also highlights the role of Ferdo Delak,an artist who actively participated in illegal actions, organized yje Slovene people and initiatedthe founding of town committees of the Liberation Front in the territory of Osijek. 
Keywords: deportees, Slovenes in Croatia, Osijek, WWII. 
Correspondence address: Barbara Riman, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja/Institute for Ethnic Studies, Erjavčeva 26, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail barbara.riman@guest.arnes.si. 
ISSN 0354-0286 Print/ISSN 1854-5181 Online  © Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja (Ljubljana), http://www.inv.si 
77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
b. RIMAN  The Activities of Slovenes in Osijek during World War II 
1. Uvod 





Prisotnost Slovencev na Hrvaškem opažamo že več stoletij. Razlogi za njihov prihod so različni. V zgodovini slovensko-hrvaških odnosov so bili ti prihodipredvsem prostovoljni in pogojeni z različnimi ekonomskimi ali družbenimi razlogi, medtem ko sta dve zgodovinski obdobji posebni. V teh dveh obdobjihso bile zabeležene prisilne migracije oziroma so prihode zaznamovali politično­vojni razlogi.1 Raznarodovalni ukrepi, pritiski okupatorjev in vojne razmere so povzročili velike premike tedanjega prebivalstva Slovenije, vendar jih je zaradipomanjkanja zanesljivih podatkov nemogoče natančneje določiti. Druga težavaje, da je bilo slovensko etnično ozemlje v času druge svetovne vojne razdeljeno med tri okupatorske države, kar je eden izmed dejavnikov, ki onemogočajoceloten vpogled v preselitve prebivalstva (Ferenc 2006, 576). Madžari so večtisoč Slovencev večinoma deportirali v koncentracijsko taborišče Sárvar. V tako imenovani Ljubljanski pokrajini pod italijansko oblastjo je bilo interniranih in vkoncentracijska taborišča poslanih približno 25.000–30.000 oseb oziroma 7–9 %prebivalstva (Repe 2010, 245). 
Po prvotnem načrtu naj bi bila z nemškega okupacijskega območja pregnana približno tretjina prebivalstva, natančneje 220.000–260.000 Slovencev, pregnanipa naj bi bili tudi koroški Slovenci, s čimer naj bi bilo dokončno rešeno tako imenovano “slovensko vprašanje” na sedanjem avstrijskem Koroškem (Repe2010, 245). Vendar niso bili izpolnjeni vsi načrti, ki so bili že od vsega začetkadokaj nerealni, zato je bilo v Srbijo, Neodvisno državo Hrvaško (NDH) in Nemčijo za vedno izgnanih približno 10 % okupiranega prebivalstva. Iz Posavjain Obsotelja je bilo izgnanih in preseljenih v Srbijo, NDH in Nemčijo 37.000ljudi. Z nemškega okupacijskega območja na Štajerskem in Gorenjskem je bilo že pred tem izgnanih 17.200 ljudi. Leta 1942 je nemška oblast iz Koroške izselila990 Slovencev. Od leta 1942 do leta 1944 je bilo v Nemčijo izgnanih še 8.000sorodnikov partizanov in ustreljenih talcev. Približno 17.000 prebivalcev pa je z nemškega okupacijskega območja zaradi nasilja in raznarodovalne politikezbežalo v Ljubljansko pokrajino (Ferenc 2006, 576). 2 
Izgnanci so bili v težkem položaju in so bili pogosto travmatizirani in vdepresiji. So pa v tem zapletnem položaju iskali način, kako bi se med sabo po­vezali. Povezavo so razvijali tudi s tistimi Slovenci, ki so se v določen kraj priseliliže pred drugo svetovno vojno. Pogosto so se priseljeni Slovenci vključevali v Osvobodilno fronto (OF) oziroma so na kakšen drug način sodelovali v ilegalniobliki združevanja.
V prispevku bodo predstavljena nova dognanja o omenjeni temi. Predstaviti želimo, na kakšen način so se priseljeni Slovenci povezali s Slovenci, ki so živeli vOsijeku v času med obema svetovnima vojnama, ter kako je kulturno-umetniškodruštvo, ki je delovalo v Osijeku leta 1938, v času med drugo svetovno vojno postalo shajališče izgnancev, deportirancev in staroselcev. Predvsem bo pou­
b. RIMAN Delovanje Slovencev v Osijeku med drugo svetovno vojno 
darjena tudi vloga Ferda Delaka, umetnika, ki je imel pomembno vlogo priorganizaciji Slovencev v Osijeku in drugih manjših krajih v Slavoniji med drugosvetovno vojno. S svojim delovanjem je zbiral Slovence na območju Osijeka in podpiral ustanavljanje mestnih odborov Osvobodilne fronte (MOOF).139 
V slovenskem in hrvaškem zgodovinopisju je opisano organizirano delovanje Slovencev na Hrvaškem v času druge svetovne vojne, s tem prispevkom pa bomoposkusili pridobiti celovitejšo sliko o omenjeni temi.
Iz gradiva na temo prikritega združevanja in organiziranja Slovencev v času druge svetovne vojne je razvidno, da se je o tem malo pisalo. Gradivo se navezujepredvsem na delovanje slovenskih društev v času pred drugo svetovno vojno, kiso potem prikrito nadaljevala z delovanjem tudi med drugo svetovno vojno. To je povezano z Zagrebom in živahnim delovanjem slovenskih društev v medvojnemčasu.3 Obravnavane so tudi druge teme, ki so se dojemale kot pomembnejšeali zanimivejše. Največ gradiva je o procesu tranzita in izseljevanja na območjeNDH, o položaju Slovencev v taboriščih ter nekaj malega o legalnih in ilegalnih organizacijah, ki so bile vključene v celotno vprašanje o problematiki Slovencevv NDH. 
Eden izmed prvih, ki je pisal o prisilnem preseljevanju Slovencev, je Tone Ferenc. Temi Slovencev v NDH je posvetil poglavje v knjigi Nacistična razna­rodovalna politika v Sloveniji v letih 1941–1945 (Ferenc 1968, 436–474). Vpoglavju Na Hrvaškem in v Bosni podaja natančne številke in potek izseljevanje Slovencev v NDH. Na podlagi njegovih ugotovitev so z raziskovanjem nadaljevalidrugi raziskovalci. 
Vera Kržišnik-Bukić v nekaterih svojih prispevkih omenja izseljence inorganizirane prevoze Slovencev v NDH ter tudi organiziranje in delovanje po­sameznikov med drugo svetovno vojno. V svojem prispevku omenja tudi MOOF(Kržišnik-Bukić 2006, 45–48). 
To temo so spotoma obravnavali tudi hrvaški zgodovinarji. Predvsem je o tempisala Marica Karakaš Obradov, ki omenja delovanje Rdečega križa Slovenije,delovanje državnih institucij NDH v povezavi s prihodom in organizacijo naselitve deportiranih Slovencev ter samo repatriacijo (Karakaš Obradov 2014,203–238, Karakaš Obradov 2012, 139–174). O tej temi piše tudi v prispevku, ki ima za prvotni cilj prikazati migracije srbskega prebivalstva na območju NDH(Karakaš Obradov 2011, 801–826). To je razumljivo, saj je ta tematika povezanaz usodo slovenskega naroda v času med drugo svetovno vojno. V povezavi s temoorganiziranega izseljevanja Srbov z območja NDH je pisal tudi Filip Škiljan, ki jeeno poglavje v tem prispevku, Kolonizacija Slovenaca na imanja iseljenih Srba,posvetil problematiki slovenskega vprašanja v NDH (Škiljan 2014, 278–299). Pomembna je tudi knjiga Slavka Alojza Kramarja, enega izmed pripadnikovslovenske skupnosti na Hrvaškem (Kramar, 2016).
Na tem mestu so omenjena samo nekatera dela, čeprav jih bomo v prispev­ku uporabili in citirali več. Razen tiskanih del bodo v prikazu problematike 
b. RIMAN  The Activities of Slovenes in Osijek during World War II 
združenega delovanja med Slovenci v Osijeku v času druge svetovne vojnepredstavljeni tudi podatki, pridobljeni iz arhivskega gradiva, ki se hrani v ArhivuRepublike Slovenije. Predvsem bodo uporabljeni podatki iz poročila Slovenskega 
140 mestnega odbora enotne narodnoosvobodilne fronte (SMOJNOF) v Osijekuiz leta 1945. Poročilo je sestavljeno iz poročil voditeljev pododborov MOOF v Osijeku.4 Zakaj se ni pisalo o prikritem delovanju? Zato ker obstaja relativno malopodatkov, ki jih je težko pridobiti. Treba bi bilo narediti obsežnejšo raziskavo,ki bi zajela neposredne akterje takšnega delovanja, in zbrati še njihove spomine. V prispevku nam ne bo uspelo prikazati celotnega gibanja in vseh aktivnosti,prav tako ne vključenosti različnih članov in njihove pomembnosti za omenjeno temo. Ta tema bo prikazana na primeru Osijeka in nekaterih manjših slavonskihkrajev ter je pomembna za zgodovino slovenstva na Hrvaškem. Tema je zanimiva,ker se o njej ni veliko pisalo, je pa hkrati tudi sporna. Cilj prispevka je prikazati temelje, na katerih so se Slovenci v Osijekuorganizirali, in njihove glavne naloge. Hkrati bomo poskusili prikazati glavneakterje, ki so sodelovali v taki obliki organiziranja odpora v Osijeku, in ob tem predstaviti delovanje Ferda Delaka, enega izmed teh glavnih akterjev. Ti temeljiso osnova kasneje nastalih organizacij, ki so imele pomembno vlogo za Slovencepo drugi svetovni vojni. Člani teh odborov so skrbeli za organizirano repatriacijo slovenskih izgnancev in vrnitev v Slovenijo. 
2. Deportiranci, izgnanci, pregnanci, preseljenci 





















O procesu in poteku preganjanja Slovencev na območje nekdanje NHD se je, kotje bilo že omenjeno, veliko pisalo, vendar je določena dogajanja treba ponovnoomeniti, ker so ključna za razumevanje kasnejših dogodkov.
Sestanki o reševanju vprašanj, kam s Slovenci z območja Štajerske in Go­renjske, so se začeli že na začetku maja 1941 (Karakaš Obradov 2012, 141–142), končali pa na konferenci 4. junija 1941. V Zagrebu se je Vlada NDH dogovorila 
o načrtu deportacije prebivalstva iz slovenskih krajev, po katerem naj bi se naobmočje NDH pripeljalo toliko Slovencev, kolikor Srbov se bo izselilo v Srbijo(Lisac 1956, 125–145). Glede na dogovorjeni načrt naj bi se na območje nek­danje NDH preselilo približno 260.000 Slovencev, vendar je bila kasneje taštevilka zmanjšana na 170.000, saj naj bi se toliko Srbov s tega območja izselilo vSrbijo (Karakaš Obradov 2011, 805). 
Določeni so bili trije valovi izseljevanja. V prvem valu, ki je trajal do 5. julija1941, je bila glede na sklepe konference načrtovana izselitev 5.000 Slovencev, večinoma profesorjev, učiteljev ter tudi drugih politično vplivnih in izpostavljenihposameznikov (Ferenc 2006, 578) v Srbijo ter slovenskih duhovnikov v NDH.5 Za drugi preselitveni val v NDH, ki je trajal od 10. julija do 30. avgusta 1941,je bila načrtovana izselitev približno 25.000 Slovencev iz Spodnje Štajerske, 




b. RIMAN Delovanje Slovencev v Osijeku med drugo svetovno vojno 
ki so se na to območje naselili po letu 1914 (Karakaš Obradov 2012, 143).Tretji val naj bi trajal od 15. septembra do 31. oktobra 1941, ko bi moralo bitina območje NDH izgnano obmejno prebivalstvo, približno 65.000 slovenskihkmetov iz Spodnje Štajerske in okoli 80.000 kmetov iz Koroške6 (Ferenc 2006,141 278, Karakaš Obradov 2012, 143). Vendar pa je tretji val izostal in je bilo zatoslovensko prebivalstvo namesto v NDH in Srbijo izseljeno v Nemčijo (Škiljan 2014, 279).
O končnem številu izseljencev, ki so bili naseljeni v NDH, lahko samo sklepamo. Na koncu je na Hrvaško in v Bosno prišlo okoli 10.000 slovenskihizgnancev (Ferenc 1993, 82).
Oblasti so se soočale s številnimi težavami pri izvedbi deportacij. Vlada NDH na začetku ni ustanovila posebnega organa, ki bi pomagal pri naseljevanjuslovenskih izgnancev (Ferenc 1968, 437). Tako je bil šele kasneje ustanovljenurad za priseljevanje in izseljevanje. 
Takoj po dogovoru je državno ravnateljstvo v svojih prvih okrožnicah zavsak okraj določilo po 2.500 deportirancev. Kmalu so se okrajne oblasti začelepritoževati nad tako velikim številom izgnanih Slovencev oziroma jih niti niso hoteli sprejeti. Razlogi so bili različni (Ferenc 1968, 438–439). Med drugim soomenjali, da Slovencev ni dobro naseliti ob meji, saj bodo na ta način ostali v stikus svojim domačim krajem, kar bo “onemogočilo hrvatiziranje tega elementa”(Škiljan 2014, 284). Omenjali so tudi, da so Slovenci “negotov in nezaupenelement” in da so “Slovenci kulturno superiorni Hrvatom in muslimanom in bi si jih kulturno podredili”, zato so svetovali: “Slovence naseljujte v kulturnomočnejše kraje, kjer se bodo prej asimilirali, naseljujte jih stran od meja.” (Ferenc1968, 439). 
Od 140 okrajev NDH jih je bilo približno 55 pripravljenih sprejeti vsajnekaj slovenskih pregnancev, pa še to pod pogojem, da lahko še hitreje izselijopreganjane Srbe (Ferenc 1968, 443). 
Vsi slovenski pregnanci naj bi bili zbrani v Zbirnem izseljenskem in na­selitvenem taborišču Slavonska Požega (Sabirni iseljenički i useljenički logorStara Požega) (Kramar 2016, 14).7 Tam so jih razdelili po posameznih okrajih,pri čemer so bili pozorni, da so družine ostale skupaj, pa tudi na poklice tehpregnancev, da so jih enakomerno razporedili. Težave pa so predstavljale politične usmeritve priseljencev, ki so bile pogosto tudi nasprotne politični usmeritviNDH. Tako je državno ravnateljstvo v NDH sklepalo, da so “taborišča kot zbirni kraji zelo primerna za politično propagando nam sovražno razpoloženihelementov. Takšna propaganda se lahko zlahka prenaša med naše ljudstvo prekopriseljencev, razposlanih po okrajih” (Ferenc 1968, 464). 
Na koncu je bilo odločeno, da bodo Slovenci razposlani na vsa območjaNHD, razen v okraje pasivnih predelov (Hercegovina, Lika in Dalmacija). Polegtega je bilo prepovedano naseljevanje v Zagrebu in obmejnem območju nasprotislovenske Štajerske (Ferenc 1968, 441). S tem so se strinjale tudi lokalne oblasti: 
b. RIMAN  The Activities of Slovenes in Osijek during World War II 
“Da bi se v Humu na Sotli lahko izvajal sistem vzgajanja prebivalstva v hrvaškemduhu, je potrebno, da na območju občine Hum na Sotli ne dobi dovoljenjaza bivanje noben Slovenec, bodisi da je kmet, delavec, trgovec ali duhovnik.”
142 (Ferenc 1968, 465).Čeprav so se oblasti NDH trudile, da izgnanci ne bi bili v stiku s svojimdomačim krajem, jim tega ni vedno uspelo preprečiti, o čemer pričajo številnaporočila lokalnih oblasti iz NDH (Ferenc 1968, 465–466).Iz taborišča v Slavonski Požegi so izseljence pošiljali v Bosno, Slavonijo inSrem. Zaradi nemirnih razmer v Bosni so kasneje Slovence preselili iz bosanskihv hrvaške kraje v Slavoniji (Ferenc 1968, 448–451). 



























Delovanje OF v Osijeku je povezano z elementi slovenstva, ki so bili prisotni vjavnem in kulturnem življenju že v času med obema svetovnima vojnama.
Zgodovina slovenstva in Slovencev v Osijeku ni raziskana, poznamo samoposamezne dele o obstoju Slovencev v Osijeku. Dejstvo je, da so Slovenci vOsijeku bili prisotni. Da je tako, potrjuje tudi slovensko društvo, ki je delovalov Osijeku med obema svetovnima vojnama. So pa na voljo tudi podatki, da so vOsijek odhajala delat dekleta in žene (Slovenec 1934, 3), ki so prevzemala vlogečistilk, guvernant, skrbnic za otroke in starejše, pravzaprav so sprejele katerokolidelo za zaslužek (Riman 2015, 125–134). Zabeležen je tudi odhod moških nadelo v Osijek, kjer so delali v industriji (Kržišnik-Bukić 2006, 41–44). V Osijekse je preselilo predvsem relativno veliko državnih uslužbencev (delavci naželeznicah, učitelji in drugi) (Kalan 1922, 271–274).8 
Prav ti priseljenci so med obema svetovnima vojnama ustanovili Slovenskoprosvetno in podporno društvo v Osijeku, ki je svoja pravila registriralo leta1938 (Riman 2014, 111). O delovanju tega društva se ne ve veliko, čepravsmo podatke iskali v hrvaških arhivih ter v dnevnem slovenskem in hrvaškem časopisju.9 
V vsakem primeru je obstoj tega društva pomemben, ker so njegovi članitakoj po prvih prihodih slovenskih izgnancev poleti 1941 začeli organiziratipomoč ter povezovati skupine in posameznike (Krajnc 1967, 7). Po podatkih,ki jih je zbral Tone Ferenc, naj bi se v Osijek preselilo vsaj 66 družin z 205 člani(Ferenc 1968, 450).10 
Kasneje je društvo preraslo v prikrito organizacijo, v kateri so delovali člani,ki jih lahko zasledimo kot aktivne člane MOOF v Osijeku. To so bili Julij Toporiš,Petelin, Hočevar, Kovačič, Kobal, Slavko Klančar, Gnus, Mušič in Ignac Krajnc(Glas Slavonije 1961b, 2, Krajnc 1967, 7). Žal za vse navedene posameznike vvirih ni bilo mogoče pridobiti tudi imen. Članom prej omenjenega slovenskegadruštva se ni uspelo povezati s slovensko OF v času, ko še ni bil ustanovljenmestni odbor, so pa sodelovali pri delovanju hrvaških antifašističnih organizacij (SMOJNOF 1945, 14). 
b. RIMAN Delovanje Slovencev v Osijeku med drugo svetovno vojno 
Za nekatere posameznike vseeno vemo, kakšne so bile njihove naloge. Tako jeSlavko Klančar, član Slovenskega prosvetnega in podpornega društva, bil izbran,da skuša pridobiti dovoljenje nekdanjega velikega župana Heferja za zbiranjepomoči za naše rojake. Dovoljenje je bilo od župana Heferja pridobljeno, ne pa143 tudi od tedanjega šefa policije Puratića (SMOJNOF 1945, 20). Razen zbiranjapomoči so izseljencem dostavljali še dnevnik Jutro, ki so ga prejemali brezplačno,poleg tega so poskusili vzpostaviti stik z društvom Slovenska kmečko-delavskasloga11 v Zagrebu. Ko je bilo leta 1943 tudi to prepovedano, so nadaljevali sprikritim delom ter zbirali podatke in izvajali propagando za OF (SMOJNOF1945, 21).
Na podlagi pisnih virov je mogoče sklepati, da so nekatere izmed njih, kerso oblasti NHD izvedele, da delujejo v OF, poslali v taborišče. To je na določennačin upočasnilo organiziranje in nadaljnje aktivnosti njihovega delovanja.
Pomembno je omeniti, da so se Slovenci vključevali tudi v narodnoosvobo­dilni boj v Slavoniji in da niso bili izključno v slovenskih organizacijah (Krajnc1967, 7).
V združenem delu slovenskih priseljencev v Slavonijo je posebno vlogo imelFerdo Delak,12 ki je bil aktivni član Komunistične partije že pred drugo svetovnovojno. Na začetku vojne je deloval v Narodnem gledališču v Zagrebu (Moravec& Predan 2001, 97), takoj po vzpostavitvi NDH pa je bil kot režiser odstranjeniz zagrebškega gledališča in poslan v Banjaluko. Pred odhodom mu je uspelodobiti dokument, s katerim je dokazoval, da je Hrvat iz Gorskega kotarja in članzaslužne družine Delak (SMOJNOF 1945, 1).
Delak v svojih spominih omenja, da mu je kot Hrvatu v Banjaluki uspelo iz taborišča rešiti Lojzeta Štandekerja13 in njegovo ženo ter ju zaposliti vbanjaluškem gledališču, kjer sta ostala do konca druge svetovne vojne.
Ferdo Delak je nadaljeval s povezavo med Zagrebom in ostalimi krajiHrvaške. Ko se je moral srečati z inženirjem Jožetom Kanklom, je za banjaluškogledališče zbolel. To je bilo oktobra 1942, ko mu je bilo naloženo, da organiziraustanovitev MOOF v Osijeku (SMOJNOF 1945, 2). Takrat so se začelepriprave na ustanavljanje OF v Slavoniji. MOOF je bil najprej ustanovljen vZagrebu, ker je bila tam močna organizacija Komunistične partije Jugoslavije znjenimi številnimi simpatizerji. Manj znano je, da so bili MOOF ustanovljenitudi v drugih krajih NDH. Močna organizacija je bila v Varaždinu, opazni so biličlani v Karlovcu (Kržišnik-Bukić 2006, 46), obstoj MOOF pa je zabeležen tudiv Slavoniji.
Ko je Ferdo Delak odšel iz Banjaluke, se ni več vrnil. Najprej je odšel vOsijek, kjer je bil zaznamovan kot komunist, zato tam ni mogel ostati. Pogodboje podpisal z gledališčem v Dubrovniku, vendar tudi tja ni odšel. Ostal je nabolniškem dopustu v Zagrebu in čakal na priložnost, da bi odšel v Slavonijo. Dabi preprečili prihod Ferda Delaka v Osijek, je od tam na ministrstvo prosveteodšla delegacija, ki so jo sestavljali Andjelko Štimac, Stjepan Dobrić in AnteŠoljak. Zahtevali so, da se Ferda Delaka ne pošlje v Osijek. Trdili so, da ne more 
b. RIMAN  The Activities of Slovenes in Osijek during World War II 
biti direktor drame, ker je bil v Kraljevini Jugoslaviji znan kot komunist in ker je vNovem Sadu iz predstav Bele bolezni ter Hlapec Jernej in njegova pravica naredilpolitično propagando, zaradi česar je bil odpuščen. Proti njegovemu prihodu je
144 bil tudi tedanji intendant osiješkega gledališča Ivan Štajcer (SMOJNOF 1945,10–11). Če se to vstavi v kontekst, da so bile v različnih kulturnih ustanovah v času med drugo svetovno vojno na vodilna mesta v različnih kulturnihinstitucijah postavljene izrazito režimske osebe ( Jelić-Butić 1977, 210), potemsta mogoče jasnejša tako situacija tega protesta kot dejstvo, da so na ministrstvu ta protest sprejeli in vsaj deloma onemogočili Ferdu Delaku odhod v Osijek.Kmalu se je situacija umirila in Ferdo Delak je prvič odšel v Osijek novembraleta 1942, vendar le na gostovanje, da bi videl, kakšna je tam situacija in ali seje negativno vzdušje, ki ga je bil deležen prvič, spremenilo. Ker se je situacija spremenila, je Delak na začetku leta 1943 odšel v Osijek in začel z ustanavljanjempodružnice zagrebškega MOOF. Tam je stopil v stik s Slavkom Klančarjem. Z intenzivnim delom mu je v Osijeku uspelo organizirati tudi pododbore. MOOF,ki je imel torej tudi pododbore, je bil v Osijeku ustanovljen na začetku leta 1943,njegovi člani pa so bili: Ferdo Delak, Karlo Kamuščič, Ignac Krajnc, Slavko Klančar in Franjo Blatnik. Mogoče so bili kateri izmed navedenih posameznikov,na primer Slavko Klančar, člani prej omenjenega slovenskega društva tudi predsvetovno vojno, vendar za to ni jasnih dokazov. Poleg MOOF v Osijeku je bil v novembru 1943 ustanovljen tudi zunanjiodbor MOOF v Đakovu, katerega zaupnik je bil Peter Mravljak, ki je k temu delupritegnil še dva Slovenca (SMOJNOF 1945, 32). Žal v arhivskem gradivu nistanavedeni njuni imeni. Nalogi tega MOOF sta bili razširjanje radijskih poročil ter zbiranje podatkov o Slovencih in njihovem delu v Đakovu ter o njihovi političniorientaciji. Poročila o delu je prepošiljal Ferdu Delaku (SMOJNOF 1945,31). Ustanovljeni so bili še zunanji odbori v Vinkovcih, Belišću in Vukovarju (SMOJNOF 1945, 4). 
4. MOOF v Osijeku 











Ko je bil organiziran MOOF v Osijeku, je med njegove zadolžitve spadala pri­dobitev kopije transkriptov pogovorov, ki jih je tedanji konzul NDH v Ljubljani, odvetnik Ivanić, imel s predstavniki Slovencev o zedinjenju Slovenije in Hrvaške.14 Ivanić je bil doma v Osijeku in je hranil kopije transkriptov teh pogovorov. Ponekaterih virih naj bi MOOF to uspelo dobiti in je po Marici Lubejevi, tedanji članici osiješkega gledališča, ta material poslal glavnemu odboru v Zagreb (GlasSlavonije 1961a, 2).
Druga naloga, ki jo je MOOF imel, je bilo občasno emitiranje radijskih novic za člane. Novice so emitirali prek radijskih postaj zavezniških vojakov in tudi prekradijske postaje Slobodna Jugoslavija. Pomembno vlogo je imel osiješki novinar Mirko Trišler, ki je pisal za Hrvatski list.15 Trišler je bil v povezavi s Ferdom 

b. RIMAN Delovanje Slovencev v Osijeku med drugo svetovno vojno 
Delakom in je na ta način pogosto prejel informacije, ki so bile težko dostopne(Glas Slavonije 1961b, 2). Že naslednje leto je MOOF v Osijeku imel svojolastno radijsko postajo, za katero so skrbeli in prek katere so pošijali obvestila njegovi člani (Glas Slavonije 1961c, 2). Poleg tega je MOOF imel povezavo s VI.145 korpusom in člani narodnoosvobodilnega boja na terenu (Glas Slavonije 1961c, 2). 
Ob različnih aktivnostih, ki so jih izvajali člani MOOF, je Ferdo Delak delovalv smeri ustanavljanja organizacij, kot so Antifašistična fronta žena, Slovenskaantifašistična mladina in Slovenski pionirji. Organizacija za pionirje je zaživela šele, ko je bil Osijek osvobojen (SMOJNOF 1945, 5). V arhivskem gradivuje bil najden tudi popis članov slovenske antifašistične mladine. V odboru za Gornji Grad so bili: Dušan Grabnar, Vida Zupan in Bojana Vodlan, drugi članipa so še bili: Špelca Pezevšek, Ivanka Malin, Ljubica Bratuš, Milena Flakus inVinko Prelog. V odboru za Donji Grad so bili: Majda Dobrila, Vida Koblar, Jože Arh, Gojča Bradač, Janez Arh, Viktor Kunc in Marjan Keber. Člana v Tvrđi stabila: Leon Časl in Albert Gzelman, v Retfalu pa: Boris Gogina in Martin Kos(SMOJNOF 1945, 32). Iz poročila SMOJNOF o delu za organizaciji Slovenskaantifašistična mladina in Slovenski pionirji je razvidno, da je Štefica Grabnar “odtovariša Ferde Delaka /…/ dobila nalog, da prevzamem organizacijo Slovenskeantifašistične mladine in Slovenskih pionirjev” (SMOJNOF 1945, 32). 
Leta 1943 so z večjimi ali manjšimi težavami ustanovili tudi pododbore, kiso nosili naziv delovnega mesta ali institucije, v kateri so delovali člani MOOF v Osijeku: Donji Grad, Gornji Grad, Novi Grad, Retfala, Gledališče in Bolnišnica.Dejavnost teh članov bo prikazana po pododborih. Vse aktivnosti so bileosredotočene na prej omenjene naloge, ki jih je imel MOOF v Osijeku. 
V Donjem Gradu so na iniciativo Ferda Delaka ustanovili Pododbor MOOFOsijek – Donji Grad, v katerega so bili vključeni Slavko Klančar, Josip Gruden,ki ga je kasneje zamenjal Marjan Pahor, in že omenjeni Ignac Krajnc. Pododbor MOOF Osijek – Donji Grad je bil ustanovljen marca 1943. Delo se je v glavnemnavezovalo na širjenje radijskih poročil ter na agitacijo in organizirano delovanjev OF. Hkrati so razdeljevali propagandni material in vzdrževali mrežo med izseljenimi Slovenci. Ob pomoči drugih članov MOOF, predvsem Iva Skarpe,so zbrali podatke o premikanju vojakov in jih posredovali Ignacu Krajncu, ki jihje nato posredoval naprej (SMOJNOF 1945, 19). 
Člani so zbirali tudi podatke o drugih Slovencih, ki so živeli zunaj področjaPododbora MOOF Osijek – Donji Grad. Poleg že omenjenih članov so se v delovanje pododbora vključili posamezniki iz podjetij, ki so delovala na območjuDonjega Grada. Tako so se iz podjetja Schicht v delovanje Pododbora MOOFOsijek – Donji Grad vključili nekateri delavci, na primer Udovič in Mira Ferenc, pozneje tudi že omenjeni Ivo Skarpa in soproga inženirja Pirje.
Iz Kožare je bil v Pododboru MOOF Osijek – Donji Grad aktiven JožeSternad. Pavel Kozina in usnjarski mojster Strelec sta bila zaznamovana kot 
146 

b. RIMAN  The Activities of Slovenes in Osijek during World War II 
hitlerjanca (SMOJNOF 1945, 16), aktivna pri nemški narodni skupnosti, zatonista imela zaupanja članov Pododbora MOOF Osijek – Donji Grad (SMOJNOF 1945, 15). Člani odbora navajajo: 
Obadva sta bila trdno prepričana, da rešitev Evrope, Slovenije in civilizacije zavisi samo od sodelovanja z Nemčijo. To njihovo sodelovanje s to skupino se more posebno zameriti ing. Kozini, ki je mlajši človek in odgojen za časa bivše Jugoslavije, edina delna olajševalna okolnost za oba je samo to, da sta kljub vsemu pomagala s podporo našim rojakom ob raznih zbirkah, to pa seveda samo do tedaj, dokler se je še kdo obrnil na njo za to. (SMOJNOF 1945, 16). 
Tudi v Ljevaonici so delovali Slovenci. Pododbor MOOF Osijek – Donji Grad so vzpostavili brata Gruden in Gnusa. Za Antona Grudna so napisali, da je bilčlan Volksgruppe, vendar je bil na določen način v to primoran, ker je bil aktivenčlan slovenskega društva iz leta 1938, in da bi bil gotovo pregnan, če tega ne bi storil. Napisali so tudi, da “sploh pa je cela družina Gruden znana kot zavedena inpopolnoma zanesljiva in strogo antifašistično razpoložena” (SMOJNOF 1945,16). Za Gnusa so napisali, da je sodeloval v neznani skupini, da je bil aretiran, obsojen zaradi podpiranja partizanov in odveden proti Đakovu (SMOJNOF1945, 16). Poleg tega so v poročilu omenjali še fotografa Šoštariča, za kateregaso napisali, da se je zavedal svoje krivice in da je “odšel z nemškimi izseljenci leta 1944 v Nemčijo” (SMOJNOF 1945, 17).
Iz podatkov, ki so jih zbirali aktivni člani MOOF Osijek, pa je razvidno, da so svojo nalogo, da bi povečali število aktivnih v organizaciji, sprejeli zelo resno.Prav zato, da bi bili uspešni, so morali biti izjemno previdni pri tem, komu lahkozaupajo. Z druge strani pa zapisani podatki nekatere osebe, ki so bile tudi kasneje aktivne v hrvaškem ali slovenskem javnem življenju, v nekaterih situacijahpostavljajo v drugačno luč. Vsekakor je pomembno poudariti, da so verjetnoposamezniki, ki so pisali poročila, pogosto imeli subjektivno stališče. Ker zapisanih podatkov ni bilo mogoče primerjati z bolj objektivnimi viri, je treba tepripombe sprejeti z določenim zadržkom.
V poročilu so člani Pododbora MOOF Osijek – Donji Grad omenili še ne­katere Slovence, ki so delovali v Slovenskem taborišču na Vukovarski cesti: Debenjaka in Geelmana, ki sta odšla v partizane, ter Dimnika, ki je bil prostovoljničlan Kulturbunda in mu niso zaupali. Omenjen je tudi generalštabni polkovnikJurij Mušič (SMOJNOF 1945, 17–18). 
V Pododbor MOOF Osijek – Gornji Grad so bili vključeni Karlo Kamu­ščič,16 Anton Ogorelec17 in Ivan Buždon. MOOF je bil ustanovljen na predlog Ferda Delaka 14. junija 1943. Njegovi glavni nalogi sta bili pridobivanje zaupnih oseb in kontroliranje gornjegrajskih Slovencev, ki so bili pri SMOJNOF opisanikot nezanesljivi oziroma so bili v službi okupatorjev in ustašev. Tako so dobilinalogo, da nadzirajo dr. Marjana Ogrizka in Ivana Šoštariča (SMOJNOF 1945, 6). Poleg tega je bil Ivan Buždon poštar, ki je skrbel za pošto Pododbora 
b. RIMAN Delovanje Slovencev v Osijeku med drugo svetovno vojno 
MOOF Osijek – Gornji Grad in za pošto, ki bi prišla iz Oblastnega odbora vZagrebu. Posredoval je tudi informacije o Slovencih in slovenskih družinah, kijih niso poznali (SMOJNOF 1945, 6–7). Anton Ogorelec je bil v Laslovu in jebil zadolžen, da skrije posameznike, ki so bili kompromitirani, in jim pridobi147 nadaljnje zveze za pot v gozdove. Sestajali so se vsakih štirinajst dni. NalogaKarla Kamuščiča je bila pretipkati vse novice, ki jih je Ferdu Delaku posredovaltedanji novinar Hrvatskega lista Mirko Trišler.18 Nato so te novice širili naokoli kot “slovenske radijske novice” (SMOJNOF 1945, 9).
Člani Pododbora MOOF Osijek – Gornji Grad so med drugim dobili nalogo,da opazujejo in na določen način rešijo vprašanja gledaliških igralcev oziromada poizvedo za informacijami o Slovencih, ki so bili zaposleni v gledališču. Tonalogo so prepustili članom Pododbora MOOF Osijek – Gledališče. Njegovičlani so bili Miro Kopač,19 Olga Kocijančić in Karlo Kamuščič (SMOJNOF 1945, 9).
Pododbor MOOF Osijek – Gornji Grad je k delu poskusil pritegniti tudikaplana Jelena, ampak glede na poročilo je ta povedal, da ni komunist, vendarje “pripravljen pomagati S. M. O. J. N. O. F.-u posebno pri organizaciji vrnitve vdomovino” (SMOJNOF 1945, 9).
V Pododboru MOOF Osijek – Retfala sta bila aktivna Dragotin Vodlanin Časl. Posebnost tega odbora je bila v tem, da dolgo ni mogel dobiti nobenezveze. Tako se je ustanovil šele oktobra 1943. V odboru je deloval tudi Močnik,ki je sodeloval pri raznih vojaških podjetjih in se je izkazal kot zaveden sodelavecOF. Vodlan je zbiral podatke o Slovencih v Retfali (SMOJNOF 1945, 19) in muje skupaj s pomočjo Martina Kosa uspelo zbrati enainsedemdeset ljudi.20 Polegte mreže, ki jo je ustanovil Dragotin Vodlan, je izdelal tudi načrt mesta Osijek vmerilu 1 : 5700 in deloma Retfale z označbo utrdb (SMOJNOF 1945, 29).
Organizacija OF v Šečerani, Lanari in Novem gradu je bila zaupana MarjanuPahorju (Klančar 1945, 20), ki je v delovanje v Pododboru MOOF Osijek –Novi Grad vključil tudi Franja Bezjaka in Vekoslava Špangerja. Po podatkih sov njem sodelovali še: Sidonija Černigoj, Jakob Dobriha, Dimitrij Lapajne, IrmaBezjak in Milovan Godina, vsi zaposleni v tovarni Lana. Vekoslav Španger je imelnalogo, da zbira Slovence v Laneni industriji (SMOJNOF 1945, 30).
MOOF je imel svoje ljudi tudi v Narodnem gledališču v Osijeku, kjer je bilorganiziran Pododbor MOOF Osijek – Gledališče, katerega člani so bili MiroKopač, Olga Kocijančić in Karlo Kamuščič. Pododbor je bil ustanovljen avgusta1943, ko je v osiješko gledališče prišel Miro Kopač iz Sarajeva. Pododbor jebil ustanovljen zato, ker je v osiješkem gledališču delovalo veliko Slovencev.Iniciator njegove ustanovitve je bil Ferdo Delak, ki je osebno govoril z OlgoKocijančić in želel, da se k delu pritegne tudi Maksa Rogarja. Rogar je zavrnilsodelovanje, ker je imel informacijo, da “bodo polovili končno to slovenskogrupo, ki buni Slovence proti današnjem ustaškemu režimu, namesto da soHrvatom hvaležni, da jih tukaj rešijo” (SMOJNOF 1945, 10). Ker je bila OlgaKocijančić izjemno dobra prijateljica Maksa Rogarja, je pogosto niso klicali na 
b. RIMAN  The Activities of Slovenes in Osijek during World War II 
pomembnejše sestanke, saj so se bali, da mu slučajno ne bi izdala pomembnih
podatkov (SMOJNOF 1945, 10).Člani Pododbora MOOF Osijek – Gledališče so opazovali zaposlene v 
148 	osiješkem gledališču in tehtali, koga bodo še dodatno pritegnili k delovanju vMOOF. Nekateri zaposleni so bili nevtralni in jih niso povabili, pa ne zato, ker niso bili zvesti Slovenci, temveč zato, ker so imeli dovolj lastnih skrbi. Tako jebil eden izmed njih tudi že omenjeni Maks Rogar, ki so ga dojemali kot zeloneorientiranega Slovenca, ki je bil vesel, da je v Osijeku preživel ta štiri leta in da je bil zdrav. K delovanju niso povabili niti Pavle Udovič niti njenega brata.Tako o možu Pavle Udovič21 kot o njenem bratu Milanu Udoviču je MOOFpridobil slabe informacije, ki niso bile povezane z ustaši ali Nemci in niso želelitvegati. Podobno je bilo tudi z Borisom Gerbcem, ki je bil “kot Slovenec vedno zaveden, v pokret ga nismo vzeli, ker je preveč pil in lajal” (SMOJNOF 1945,12). Za Josipa Šuteja so napisali, da je “bil klerikalno nastrojen, slabih informacij 
o njem nimamo” (SMOJNOF 1945, 12). Elvira Levar ni prišla v poštev, kerso “jo stalno videli v nemški družbi” (SMOJNOF 1945, 12). V orkestru je bilše Slovenec Matko, vendar tudi njega niso povabili, čeprav o njem niso imeli nobenih slabih informacij (SMOJNOF 1945, 12). Pomembno vlogo je imela žeomenjena Marica Lubejeva,22 ki je skrivala material in prinašala pošto iz Zagreba(SMOJNOF 1945, 12). Slabe informacije so dobili o Maksu Furijanu,23 članu mariborskega gledališča, ki je nekaj časa deloval tudi v Skopju. Zanj so izvedeli, da se je po prihodu vpisal v Kulturbund in da je v Zagrebu organiziral nemškogledališče, s katerim je prišel tudi v Osijek. O njegovih aktivnostih so člani poslaliporočilo zagrebškemu MOOF (SMOJNOF 1945, 13). 
Pododbor MOOF Osijek – Bolnišnica je bil organiziran v Zakladnibolnišnici v Osijeku, kjer je delovala tudi skupina zdravnikov, ki so za potrebe OF zbirali zdravila in nabavljali lažno bolniško dokumentacijo ter na svojihoddelkih v bolnišnici skrivali kompromitirane posameznike. Nekaj časa je bil vtej bolnišnici tudi Ferdo Delak (Glas Slavonije 1961b, 2). 
Vsi opisani pododbori na območju Osijeka so imeli po deset članov, vseskupine pa so bile vključene v prikrito delovanje. 

Obdobje med drugo svetovno vojno je bilo izjemno tragično in težko za vse,ki so bili neposredno ali posredno vključeni v vojno dogajanje. Ko spoznamo položaj Slovencev v času druge svetovne vojne na območju NDH, je možnosklepati, da je bil njihov položaj zelo težek. V tem vojnem viharju so se poskusiliznajti na različne načine. Prav to je razvidno iz prispevka. V njem so omenjeni Slovenci, ki so se v Slavonijo priselili v času med obema svetovnima vojnama,in tudi tisti, ki so bili s svojih domov pregnani. Nekateri so se odločili priključiti MOOF in se po svojih močeh boriti za cilje, ki so jih dojemali kot ustrezne. 
b. RIMAN Delovanje Slovencev v Osijeku med drugo svetovno vojno 
Nekateri posamezniki, ki so imeli priložnost, pa so se odločili dočakati konecvojne in se niso preveč izpostavljali.
Možno je sklepati, da je bil MOOF v Osijeku v času druge svetovne vojne dobro organiziran. Imel je pomembno vlogo, predvsem med slovenskimi149 priseljenci v Osijeku in okolici. Poleg obveščevalnih aktivnosti so bile zabeležene tudi aktivnosti, povezane s humanitarnim delom, na primer zbiranje pomoči zadeportirance. Člani MOOF v Osijeku so imeli razširjeno in dobro organiziranomrežo v različnih delih mesta ter tudi v pomembnejših institucijah (bolnišnica) in organizacijah, kjer so bili zabeleženi Slovenci. Poleg tega so ohranjali invzdrževali mrežo med pregnanci, ki so prispeli v Osijek in njegovo okolico.
Pri delovanju MOOF je vidna pomembna vloga Ferda Delaka v samem procesu organiziranja in tudi povezovanja MOOF v Osijeku z osrednjimcentrom MOOF v Zagrebu. Razvidno je, da je MOOF v Osijeku temeljil naosnovah, ki so jih zasnovali člani slovenskega društva iz leta 1938. Pomembno je tudi ponovno poudariti, da so člani tega društva na začetku druge svetovnevojne in po prihodu prvih pregnancev v Osijek in okolico začeli z organizacijoMOOF. Da je to slovensko društvo imelo pomembno vlogo v organiziranju in delovanju MOOF v Osijeku, potrjuje Slavko Klančar, ki je vidno ime v delovanjupododborov MOOF v Osijeku. 
Člani so s svojim aktivnim delovanjem dobili dober vpogled v situacijo medpregnanimi Slovenci in širili svoj delokrog.
Zaključimo lahko, da je treba narediti kontinuirano in celovito raziskavo, v katero bi bili zajeti različni kraji, v katere so bili deportirani Slovenci in v katerihso delovali MOOF. Verjetno se za številne še ne ve. Samo na ta način bi se lahkov celoti ocenila njihova vloga in uspeh pri izpolnjevanju nalog, na podlagi česar bi lahko uspešno podali sklepne misli o združenem delovanju Slovencev naHrvaškem med drugo svetovno vojno. 



Literatura in viri 









Belošević, K., 2012. Mirko Trišler (Trifun) – ne(poznati) magnet(izam) privlači humor i vege­tarijanstvo. Godišnjak Njemačke zajednice – DG Jahrbuch 19, 65–85. 
Bizjak, M., 2006. Orel, Štandeker i Rotar u Puli: moja tri izabranika u vremenu nakon Drugog svjetskog rata. Slovensko kulturno društvo Istra, Pulj. 
Ferenc, T., 1968. Nacistična raznarodovalna politika v Sloveniji v letih 1941–1945. Obzorja, Maribor. 
Ferenc, T., 1993. Množično izganjanje Slovencev med drugo svetovno vojno. V F. Šetinc (ur.),Izgnanci. Društvo izgnancev Slovenije, Ljubljana, 19-107. 
Ferenc, T., 2006. Razvoj prebivalstva: druga svetovna vojna na Slovenskem 1941–1945. V J. Fischer
idr. (ur.) Slovenska novejša zgodovina: od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja
Republike Slovenije: 1848–1992. Mladinska knjiga, Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, Ljubljana. 
Glas Slavonije (Osijek), 1961a. Otpor iza maske. 3. 12., 2. 
Glas Slavonije (Osijek), 1961b. Otpor iza maske. 5. 12., 2. 
77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
b. RIMAN  The Activities of Slovenes in Osijek during World War II 
Glas Slavonije (Osijek), 1961c. Otpor iza maske. 6. 12., 2. 
Grbešić, G., 2002. Prihvat prognanih slovenskih svećenika u Đakovačkoj i Srijemskoj biskupiji 1941.godine. Diacovensia 10, 131–150.
150 
Hećimović, B., Barbieri, M. & Neubauer, H., 2010. Slovenski umjetnici na hrvatskim pozornicama = Slovenski umetniki na hrvaških odrih. Slovenski dom, Vijeće slovenske nacionalne manjina grada Zagreba, Zagreb. 
Javornik, M. (ur.), 1989. Furijan, Maks. Enciklopedija Slovenije. Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana. 
Javornik, M.(ur.), 1990. Hrvatska. Enciklopedija Slovenije. Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana. 
Javornik, M. (ur.), 1992. Lubej, Marica. Enciklopedija Slovenije. Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana. 
Jelić-Butić, F., 1977. Ustaše i NDH. Sveučilišna naklada Liber, Školska knjiga, Zagreb. 
Josipovič, D. & Kržišnik-Bukić, V., 2010. Slovensko-hrvaški obmejni prostor: etnične vzporednice med 

popisi prebivalstva po letu 1991. Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana. Kalan, J., 1922. Slovenci med Hrvati in katoličani v Belgradu. Bogoljub 12, 271–274. Karakaš Obradov, M., 2011. Migracije srpskog stanovništva na području Nezavisne države Hrvatske
tijekom 1941. Časopis za suvremenu povijest 43, 801–826. Karakaš Obradov, M., 2012. Migracije Slovencev na hrvaško območje v drugi svetovni vojni(izseljevanje in izgnanstvo). Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino 2(52), 139–174. 
Karakaš Obradov, M., 2014. Novi mozaici nacija u “novim poredcima”: migracije stanovništva na
hrvatskom području tijekom drugog svjetskog rata i poraća. Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb. 
Kisić Kolanović, N., 1998. Mladen Lorković: ministar urotnik. Golden marketing, Hrvatski državni 

arhiv, Zagreb. Kolar, B., 2007. Duhovniki lavantinske (mariborske) škofije: izgnanci na Hrvaškem. V J. Krpeljević &
I. Žuljević (ur.) U služenju božjem narodu: zbornik radova u čast msgr. dr. Antuna Škvorčevića, prvogpožeškog biskupa prigodom 60. obljetnice života, 35. obljetnice svećeništva i 10. obljetnice biskupstva. Biskupski ordinarijat. Požega. 
Krajnc, I., 1967. Slovenci v Slavoniji. TV 15, 28. november, 7. Kramar, A., 2016. Slovenski izgnanci v Neodvisni državi Hrvaški. Vijeće slovenske nacionalne manjine Grada Zagreba, Zagreb. Kržišnik-Bukić, V., 1994–1995. Okvirni pogled poteka, vzrokov in pomena izseljevanja Slovencev naHrvaško. Razprave in gradivo 29/30, 85–93. Kržišnik-Bukić, V., 1995. O narodnostnem in kulturnem samoorganiziranju Slovencev na Hrvaškemv 20. stoletju. V V. Kržišnik-Bukić (ur.) Slovenci na Hrvaškem. Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana, 133–188. 
Kržišnik-Bukić, V., 2006. O Slovencih in slovenstvu na Hrvaškem od nekdaj do danes. V K. MundaHirnök & M. Ravnik (ur.) Slovenci na Hrvaškem. Slovensko etnološko društvo, Ljubljana, 15–87. Lisac, A. L. 1982. Kamuščič Karlo. V Primorski slovenski biografski leksikon. 8. sn.: Kacin-Križnar.
Goriška Mohorjeva družba, Gorica, 16. Lisac, A. L., 1956. Deportacija Srba iz Hrvatske 1941. godine. Historijski zbornik 1/4, 125–145. Matković, H., 2002. Povijest Nezavisne države Hrvatske. Naklada Pavičić, Zagreb. Mlakar, B., 1984. Ustaši in slovenska protirevolucija. Borec 5 (34), 361–371. Mlakar, B., 2012. Nekaj podatkov k razjasnitvi stikov med slovensko protirevolucionarnim vodstvom
in Zagrebom ob koncu druge svetovne vojne. Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino 1(52), 141–150. 
b. RIMAN Delovanje Slovencev v Osijeku med drugo svetovno vojno 
Moravec, D. & Predan, V., 2001. Sto slovenskih dramskih umetnikov. Prešernova družba, Ljubljana. 
Pelikan, E., 2010. Komemorativne prakse slovenskih emigrantov iz Julijske krajine v Dravskibanovini. Acta Histriae 3(18), 453–470. 
151
Repe, B., 2010. Izgon (Usoda slovenskih izgnancev med leti 1941–1945). V P. Štih & B. Balkovec(ur.) Migracije in slovenski prostor od antike do danes, Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, Ljubljana, 245–255. 
Riman, B., 2011. Doseljavanje slovenskog stanovništva s današnjeg prostora Republike Slovenije uPulu do 1918 godine. Razprave in gradivo 64, 68–85. 
Riman, B., 2014. Slovenska društva u Hrvatskoj između dva svjetska rata (1918. –1941.). Časopis zasuvremenu povijest 1(46), 101–130. 
Riman, B., 2015. Slovenske dekle na radu u Hravtskoj krajem 19. i početkom 20. stoljeća. V A.Dremel idr. (ur.) Uzduž i poprijeko. Centar za ženske studije, Zagreb, 125–134. 
Riman, B., 2016. 130 let slovenskega združevanja na Hrvaškem. V D. Grafenauer & K. MundaHirnök (ur.) Raznolikost v raziskovanju etničnosti: izbrani pogledi, 266–285. Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana. 
Slavčeva, M., 1936. Marica Brumen Lubejeva. Gledališki list Narodnega gledališča v Ljubljani 1936/37. Uprava Narodnega gledališča v Ljubljani, Ljubljana, 2. 
SMOJNOF, 1945. Arhiv Republike Slovenije (ARS), SI AS 1918, Ferdo Delak, Slovenski mestniodbor Jedinstvene narodno-osvobodilne fronte Osijek, 1–32. 
Stanonik, T. & Brenk, L., 2008. Osebnosti: veliki slovenski biografski leksikon. Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana. 
Škiljan, F., 2014. Organizirana prisilna izseljavanja Srba iz NDH. Srpsko narodno vijeće, Zagreb. 
Škvorčević, A., 2008. Gostoprimstvo Katoličke crkve prognanim slovenskim svećenicima u Požegi: (1941. –1945.). Biskupski ordinarijat, Požega. 
Vovko, A., 1979. Delovanje “Zveze jugoslovanskih emigrantov iz Julijske krajine” v letih 1933–1940.Zgodovinski časopis 1(33), 67–102. 
Zakonjšek, J., 2014. Prof. dr. Anton Ogrelec, 90-letnik. Delo, 3. julij, 15. 
Zorn, T., 1966. Poizkus izselitve koroških Slovencev med drugo svetovno vojno. Kronika: časopis za slovensko krajevno zgodovino 2(14), 73–82. 

NDH – Neodvisna država Hrvaška MOOF – mestni odbor Osvobodilne fronte OF – Osvobodilna fronta SMOJNOF – Slovenski mestni odbor enotne narodnoosvobodilne fronte 

Vera Kržišnik-Bukić opredeljuje najpomembnejše razloge priseljevanja Slovencev na Hrvaško.
Navaja, da so se na Hrvaško v najširšem smislu priseljevali zaradi službe oziroma zaslužka, drugi
vzrok pa je bil odhod iz Kraljevine Italije po prvi svetovni vojni, pri čemer gre za politično-vojni
vzrok, saj so posamezniki bežali pred tedanjo politiko Kraljevine Italije. Med te politično-vojne
vzroke se štejejo že omenjene deportacije in preganjanje s strani Nemčije v času druge svetovne 

152 

77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
b. RIMAN  The Activities of Slovenes in Osijek during World War II 
vojne. Poleg tega je treba kot družinske in osebne vzroke omeniti še poroke in vzpostavljanjedrugih oblik zvez med Slovenci in prebivalci Hrvaške, študij in šolanje na Hrvaškem ter selitevSlovencev po upokojitvi v obmorske kraje na Hrvaškem (Kržišnik-Bukić 1994–1995, 92). Zaomenjene vzroke (razen politično-vojnih vzrokov) pa ne obstajajo natančne številke in je tovsekakor ena izmed tem, ki bi jo bilo treba dodano raziskati. Možno je trditi, da so bili procesiodseljevanja na Hrvaško intenzivni do šestdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja, ko je možno zasleditiobratne procese. Ostaja pa odprto vprašanje, koliko Slovencev se je po upokojitvi odločilo trajnopreseliti na Hrvaško. Slovenci so namreč v času turistične sezone še vedno najštevilnejši turisti naHrvaškem. 
2 	Drugo obdobje, ki je bilo obeleženo s političnimi migracijami, je obdobje med dvema svetovnimivojnama, ko so se prebivalci z območja Julijske krajine v Italiji odločili za beg oziroma odhod naobmočje Kraljevine Jugoslavije. Posledično so nastajala številna emigracijska društva na območjuKraljevine Jugoslavije, ki so imela za člane Slovence in Hrvate (Vovko 1979, 68–70, Riman 2014,108–109). Veliko emigrantov (70.000) iz Julijske krajine je bilo v Kraljevini Jugoslaviji povezanihv različna emigrantska društva, ki so spontano nastajala v vseh večjih krajih, še posebej v večjihurbanih centrih. Najdemo jih predvsem na območju Dravske banovine (Pelikan 2010, 457),mogoče pa jih je zaslediti tudi drugod na območju Kraljevine Jugoslavije (Riman 2014, 108–109).Društva so bila zbrana v Zvezo emigrantskih združenj v Jugoslaviji, ki se je kasneje preimenovala vZvezo jugoslovanskih emigrantov iz Julijske krajine. Glasilo zveze je postal tednik Istra, ki je izhajalod januarja 1932 do leta 1940. Objavljali so se članki v slovenščini in hrvaščini (Pelikan 2010,457). 
3 
Zgodovina slovenskega združevanja na Hrvaškem je zelo bogata in dolga. Prvo slovensko društvoje bilo zabeleženo že leta 1886 v Pulju (Riman 2011, 77). Od tedaj do danes je bilo na območjuHrvaške zabeleženih vsaj enainpetdeset slovenskih društev (Riman 2016, 267–277). Zgodovinain delovanje slovenskih društev na Hrvaškem je dokaj dobro raziskana tema in se je o njej relativnoveliko pisalo. Slovenska društva na Hrvaškem se omenjajo že v Enciklopediji Slovenije ( Javornik1990, 74). Prvo večje delo na to temo pa je napisala Vera Kržišnik-Bukić 1995, 133–188). Zaveč literature o slovenskih društvih na Hrvaškem glej Riman 2016, 266–285.  Kot pomembnoje treba omeniti, da je v času med obema svetovnima vojnama delovalo veliko število slovenskihdruštev in jih tako najdemo vse od Sušaka (danes vzhodni del Reke) do Splita in Osijeka. Samov Zagrebu je v tem času delovalo vsaj trinajst slovenskih društev, ki so bila različna oziroma sotemeljila na različnih smereh delovanja (Riman 2014, 101–130, Kržišnik-Bukić 1995, 133–188).Danes na Hrvaškem obstaja šestnajst slovenskih društev ( Josipovič & Kržišnik-Bukić 2010, 153–157, Riman 2016, 266–285). 
4 
Kot podpisani na poročilih pododborov MOOF v Osijeku so bili: Franjo Blatnik, Ivan Buždon,Ferdo Delak, Štefica Grabnar, Slavo (Slavimir) Klančar, Olga Kocijančić, Karlo Kamuščič, MiroKopač, Ignac Krajnc, Peter Mravljak, Jurij Mušič, Anton Ogorelec, Marjan Pahor in DragotinVodlan. Navedeni so po abecednem redu priimkov. 
5 
V prvem preselitvenem valu, ki je potekal na začetku julija, naj bi bilo pregnanih tudi 349slovenskih duhovnikov, ki so bili razporejeni po samostanih in župnijah v Slavonski Požegi,Đakovu in Zagorju. Zanje se je zavzemal predvsem škof Alojzije Stepinac (Grbešić 2002, 132).To tematiko sta omenjala tudi Škvorčević (2008) in Kolar (2007). 
6 
Za več o vprašanju Koroške in izselitve koroških Slovencev med drugo svetovno vojno glej Zorn1966, 73–82, Ferenc 1993, 71–73. 
7 
Taborišče je začelo delovati 9. julija 1941 v prostorih vojašnice v naselju Glis. Sprejelo je lahko
10.000 oseb. Z bodečo žico je bilo razdeljeno na dva dela, enega za Slovence in drugega za Srbe(Kramar 2016, 14). 
8 
Do zdaj se je nekaj pisalo o Slovencih, ki so se izselili v različne hrvaške kraje, vendar dosedanjeraziskave niso prinesle podrobnejših podatkov, iz katerih slovenskih krajev so se posameznikiodseljevali v Osijek in njegovo okolico. Ve se, da so v Osijek odhajali zaradi dela in da so bili tjapremeščeni. Poleg teh ekonomskih migrantov je možno trditi, da so se v Osijek odselili tudi 
b. RIMAN Delovanje Slovencev v Osijeku med drugo svetovno vojno 
pregnanci z območja Julijske krajine. Vsekakor je to še ena tema iz slovenske zgodovine, ki bi jo
bilo treba podrobneje raziskati. 

9 
Podatkov o delovanju tega društva je malo. Največ je o delovanju društva mogoče izvedeti izpravil, ki so shranjena v Državnem arhivu v Zagrebu. Iz teh pravil je možno razbrati nekatere člane,153 ki se kasneje, v času med drugo svetovno vojno, več ne omenjajo. Tako so bili aktivni Josip Rijavec,Franc Drofenik, Jože Sternad, Martin Zajšek, Jože Zaleznik, Karlo Kvas in Josip Koprivše (Riman2014, 111). 
10 	Tone Ferenc navaja tudi število pregnanih družin in njihovih članov za druge kraje v Slavoniji.Tako je bilo v Đakovo poslanih 161 oseb, v Grubišno polje 388 oseb, v Vinkovce 134 oseb, vNašice 189 oseb, v Novo Gradiško 128 oseb, v Pakrac 127 oseb, v Podravsko Slatino 96 oseb,v Slavonski Brod 192 oseb, v Virovitico 93 oseb, v Županjo 203 osebe, v Daruvar 103 osebe, vDonji Miholjac 102 osebi, v Valpovo 127 oseb in v Slavonsko Požego 147 oseb. Vse skupaj je bilopregnanih 763 družin in 2355 oseb (Ferenc 1968, 450). 
11 Slovenska kmečko-delavska sloga je bila ustanovljena takoj po vzpostavitvi NDH. Po dosedanjihpodatkih je to bilo edino legalno slovensko društvo na območju NDH. Pavle Horvat je kotpredsednik Slovenske kmečko-delavske sloge pomagal tedanjemu slovenskemu društvu Narodnidom, ki je bilo prepovedano, pri zbiranju pomoči za razseljene Slovence. Poleg tega je številneSlovence zaposlil v konzularnih predstavništvih NDH v Gradcu, Ljubljani, Beogradu in Trstu.Posredoval je tudi pri napotitvi Slovencev na delo v Tretji rajh in je tudi na ta način pomagal, dabi se izseljeni Slovenci lahko vrnili nazaj domov. Pri vrnitvi v domovino je v času od leta 1941do leta 1943 pomagal tudi duhovnikom. Deloval je dve leti. Že v obdobju vojne se je slutilo,da se dogajajo nezakonita dejanja in poneverbe denarja (Karakaš Obradov 2014, 207, KarakašObradov 2012, 148–149). 
12 Ferdo Delak (Gorica, 29. 6. 1905 – Ljubljana, 16. 1. 1968), gledališki režiser, organizator inpublicist. Študiral je na Filozofski fakulteti v Ljubljani in diplomiral na umetniški akademijiMozarteum v Salzburgu leta 1935. Do leta 1936 je deloval na gledališkem področju, predvsemv Ljubljani, nato pa dve desetletji v gledališčih zunaj Slovenije, v Beogradu, Novem Sadu,Skopju in Zagrebu. Med drugo svetovno vojno je bil v Banjaluki in Osijeku, kjer je sodelovalv narodnoosvobodilnem gibanju. Bil je predsednik Slovenskega mestnega odbora enotnenarodnoosvobodilne fronte Osijek. Po osvoboditvi je deloval v gledališčih v Trstu, Zagrebu, naReki, v Banjaluki in nato v Ljubljani, kjer je bil ravnatelj Mestnega gledališča Ljubljana (1957–1962), nakar je postal umetniški vodja mariborske Drame (1962–1963) (Moravec & Predan2001, 97). 
13 	Alojz (Lojze) Štandeker (Gačnik pri Jarenini, 8. 7. 1911 – Virovitica, 11. 12. 1983), režiser,dramatik, publicist. Kariero je začel graditi leta 1932 v Slovenskem ljudskem gledališču vMariboru, kjer je ostal do druge svetovne vojne, ko je bil deportiran v Banjaluko. Tam je deloval vbanjaluškem gledališču in istočasno sodeloval s partizanskim gibanjem. Po drugi svetovni vojni seje vrnil v Maribor, a se nato na poziv Ministrstva za prosveto in kulturno LR BiH vrnil v Narodnogledališče v Banjaluki. Od leta 1951 je bil v Pulju, leta 1971, ko je bilo gledališče v Pulju zaprto, paje odšel v Virovitico. Pokopan je v Mariboru (Bizjak 2006, 34). 
14 Podrobnejših informacij o tej ideji ni bilo mogoče najti in je možno samo domnevati, da je šlo zaidejo, ki jo je razvijal Pavle Horvat, predsednik Slovenske kmečko-delavske sloge v Zagrebu. Bilje namreč v zelo dobrih odnosih s tedanjim ministrom Mladenom Lorkovićem. Njegova idejaje bila, da se Bela krajina in pas do Zidanega Mosta s pomočjo oblasti NDH pripojita NDH,po kapitulaciji pa je zagovarjal idejo, da bi se NDH pripojila tudi Ljubljanska pokrajina. Pokapitulaciji Kraljevine Italije je poslal s svojimi sodelavci vodji NDH Anteju Paveliću prošnjo, vkateri so zahtevali, da se pri vodstvu Tretjega rajha zavzame za “združevanje celotnega slovenskegaozemlja” in ustanovitev “državne zveze” med NDH in Slovenijo, v kateri bi Slovenija obdržalasvoje slovensko ime, narodnost, jezik in grb (Karakaš Obradov 2012, 149). Dejstvo pa je, da se jedo sedaj v hrvaški literaturi o tej problematiki pisalo zelo sporadično in se ta ideja ne omenja ( Jelić­Butić 1977, Kisić Kolanović 1998, Matković 2002). Tej problematiki je obsežnejši članek posvetil 
154 

77 / 2016 TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES 
b. RIMAN  The Activities of Slovenes in Osijek during World War II 
Boris Mlakar v reviji Borec (1984, 361–371), omenja pa jo tudi v prispevku Nekaj podatkov krazjasnitvi stikov med slovenskimi protirevolucionarnimi vodstvom in Zagrebom ob koncudruge svetovne vojne (2012, 141–150). 
15 Hrvatski list in Sarajevski novi list sta bila glavna časnika na območju NDH, čeprav so izhajali tudidrugi, ki so obstajali že pred drugo svetovno vojno ( Jelić-Butić 1977, 203). 
16 Karlo Kamuščič (Trst, 22. 10. 1914 – Maribor, 30. 1. 1968), operni pevec. Šolal se je na Glasbeniakademiji v Zagrebu (1935–1939) in nato debitiral v Mariboru. Kot operni solist je bil angažiranv Slovenskem narodnem gledališču v Mariboru od leta 1939 do leta 1941. Med drugo svetovnovojno je bil član opere in gledališča v Osijeku, po osvoboditvi pa se je vrnil v Maribor in tamdeloval do smrti (Lisac 1982, 16). 
17 Anton Ogorelec (Reka, 23. 5. 1924), slovenski inženir elektrotehnike, univerzitetni profesor.Diplomiral je leta 1950 in doktoriral leta 1957 na Tehniški fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani.Znan je kot znameniti slovenski elektroenergetik, oče relejne zaščite, avtomatizacije v elek­troenergetiki, prometu in industrijskih procesih (Zakonjšek 2014, 15). 
18 Mirko Trišler (Trischler) (Osijek, 6. ali 24. 7. 1919 – Zagreb, 5. 8. 1995), novinar, književnik.Končal je osnovno šolo in Trgovsko akademijo v Osijeku. Večji del svojega življenja je preživelv Zagrebu. V hrvaški zgodovini je znan predvsem kot humorist. V času druge svetovne vojne jedelal kot član uredništva in stenograf v osiješkem Hrvatskem listu, pri katerem je delal že od leta1938. Poleg tega je pisal tudi za Vrabca, Za vas in druge tedanje časopise. Do konca druge svetovnevojne je objavil več kot 140 novičarskih besedil (Belošević 2012, 66–67). 
19 Miro Kopač (Gorica, 8. 5. 1901–Ljubljana, 2. 12. 1961), dramski igralec. V Ljubljani so muzaupali samo manjše vloge, zato je odšel v Varaždin. Deloval je tudi v Osijeku, Trstu, na Cetinjuin v Beogradu. V Narodnem gledališču v Sarajevu je deloval trideset let. To je bilo hkrati njegovonajplodnejše obdobje, ko je doživljal posebne uspehe ob sodelovanju z Radom Pregarcem. Kotzrel karakterni igralec se je vrnil v Mestno gledališče v Ljubljani, kjer je igral zadnje desetletje(Stanonik & Brenk 2008, 722, Lisac 1982, 117) 
20 V poročilu je bilo imensko navedenih štirideset oseb, prav tako sodelovanje z redovnicami(SMOJNOF 1945, 30). 
21 Pavla Udovič-Smojver (Trst, 25. 1. 1904 – Reka, 14. 12. 1987). Iz Trsta se je leta 1920 preselilav Maribor, kjer je postala članica gledališča. Pela je v opernem zboru ter študirala solopetje indramatiko. V obdobju od leta 1936 do leta 1949 je delala v gledališču v Osijeku. Od leta 1949 doleta 1960 je delovala v gledališču na Reki. V svoji karieri je pela v šestdesetih operetah in operah(Stanonik & Brenk 2008, 1218, Hećimović, Barbieri & Neubauer 2010, 265). 
22 Marica Lubej (Borovnica/Braunitzen pri Šmohorju/Hermagor, 20. 3. 1902 – Maribor, 9. 2. 1983), operna pevka. Leta 1920 je postala članica opere v Mariboru. Po sedmih letih je odšla zapol leta v Beograd k Vesničevi zasebni opereti, nato pa v zagrebško gledališče in je tam delovalasedem sezon (Slavčeva 1936, 2). Med drugo svetovno vojno je bila angažirana v Osijeku, nakar seje vrnila v Maribor ( Javornik 1992, 332). Največji uspeh je doživela v opereti Mala Floramye IveTijardovića (Hećimović, Barbieri & Neubauer 2010, 173). 
23 Maks Furijan (Goričak, 19. 9. 1904 – Šmarje–Sap, 25. 7. 1993), gledališki in filmski igralec.Kot mizar je delal v mariborskih železniških delavnicah. Od 1921 je obiskoval dramasko šolo
M. Skrbinška, kasneje R . Pregarca. Od leta 1929 do leta 1936 je bil v Narodnem gledališču vMariboru, naslednjo sezono je igral v Osijeku, od leta 1937 do leta 1941 je bil v Skopju in od leta1941 do leta 1943 v Hrvaškem narodnem gledališču v Zagrebu. Od leta 1947 do upokojitve leta1962 je deloval v Drami SNG v Ljubljani ( Javornik 1989, 162). 
TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016 


The author read psychology and physiology at Oxford University, and took an MSc in the Psychology of Education at the London University Institute of Education. He also holds a degree in Psychology and a Diploma in Advanced Studies from the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. After teaching in international secondary schools, he directed two offices in the newly re-established government of Catalonia (Generalitat de Catalunya) — the Language Promotion Office (1980-1990) and the Institute of Catalan Sociolinguistics (1990-1999) — before becoming a lecturer in Sociolinguistics and Language Planning at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (2000-2014), including the position of Chair in Multilingualism, until his retirement. He chairs the Fundació Congrés de Cultura Catalana, and is a Member of the Board of Linguapax International. His main areas of research are minority language communities in Europe and status language planning. He coordinated a number of EU-co-funded or tendered projects and reports including Euromosaic (1994). 
Michael Strubell je študiral psihologijo in fiziologijo na Univerzi v Oxfordu ter magistriral iz pedagoške psihologije na Inštitutu za izobraževanje Univerze v Londonu. Ima tudi diplomo iz psihologije in diplomo iz višjih študij, ki jo je pridobil na Universitat Autonoma v Barceloni. Po poučevanju na več mednarodnih srednjih šolah je bil direktor dveh uradov novoustanovljene vlade v Kataloniji (Generalitat de Catalunya): Urada za promocijo jezika (1980–1990) in Inštituta za katalonsko sociolingvistiko (1990–1999). Kasneje je postal predavatelj za sociolingvistiko in jezikovno načrtovanje na Universitat Oberta v Kataloniji (2000–2014). Do upokojitve je vodil tudi Center za multilingvizem. Je direktor fundacije Fundacio Congres de Cultura Catalana in član upravnega odbora organizacije Linguapax International. Glavno področje njegovega raziskovanja so manjšinske jezikovne skupnosti v Evropi in jezikovno načrtovanje. Vodil je številne projekte in urejal poročila, ki jih je financirala EU, med njimi tudi projekt Euromosaic (1994). 

Dr. Michele Gazzola is post-doctoral research fellow at the REAL group (Research Group in Languages and Economics), Department of Education Studies, Humboldt-Universität, Berlin, where he is currently working on a research project on language policy, mobility and inclusion in the European Union (project "MIME"). He holds a PhD in Multilingual Communication Management (University of Geneva). His research interests include the economics of languages, language policy evaluation, public economics, policy analysis, multilingualism management, and language planning. He worked as a  post-doctoral research fellow at the Institute of Public Economics, Department of Economics, Humboldt-Universität, on a project on the evaluation of linguistic justice in the EU from 2011 to 2015, thanks to a fellowship from the Swiss National Science Foundation and to a Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship. 
TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016 
Michele Gazzola je podoktorski znanstveni sodelavec v skupini REAL (Raziskovalna skupina za jezike in ekonomijo) na Oddelku za izobraževalne študije Humboldtove univerze v Berlinu. Trenutno sodeluje v raziskovalnem projektu, ki proučuje jezikovno politiko, mobilnost invključevanje v Evropski uniji (projekt »MME«). Na ženevski univerzi v Švici je doktoriral iz menedžmenta večjezične komunikacije. Njegovo raziskovalno področje obsega jezikovno ekonomijo, evaluacijo jezikovne politike, javno ekonomijo, analizo politike, upravljanje večjezičnosti in jezikovno načrtovanje. Kot podoktorski znanstveni sodelavec ter dobitnikštipendije Švicarske nacionalne znanstvene fundacije in interevropske štipendije Marie Curie je bil od leta 2011 do leta 2015 zaposlen na Inštitutu za javno ekonomiko v okviru Humboldtove univerze v Berlinu, ukvarjal pa se je z evaluacijo jezikovne pravičnosti v Evropski uniji. 

Professor François Grin teaches economics and diversity management at the Faculty of Translation and Interpreting of the University of Geneva. He has previously held teaching and research appointments at the Université de Montréal and the University of Washington (Seattle). He has served as Deputy Director of the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) in Flensburg, Germany, and as Adjunct Director of the Education Research Unit (SRED) of the Geneva Department of Education. He has specialised in language economics, educational economics and policy evaluation in these areas. He is the author of numerous articles, books and book chapters, and has steered several large-scale research projects for research agencies and international organisations. He also advises national and regional governments on language policy issues. He is the Coordinator of the MIME project (Mobility and Inclusion in Multilingual Europe, 2014-2018) financed by the European Commission under the Framework Programme 7. 
Profesor Francois Grin poučuje ekonomiko in upravljanje raznolikosti na Fakulteti zaprevajalstvo in tolmačenje Univerze v Ženevi. V preteklosti je deloval kot predavatelj in raziskovalec na Univerzi v Montrealu in Univerzi Washington (Seattle). Bil je tudi pomočnik direktorja Evropskega centra za manjšinska vprašanja (ECMI) v Flensburgu v Nemčiji in delni vodja šolskega raziskovalnega oddelka v okviru ženevske univerze. Francois Grin je strokovnjak za ekonomiko jezikov in izobraževanja ter za evaluacijo politik na teh področjih. Je avtor številnih člankov, knjig in poglavij v knjigah, bil pa je tudi vodja številnih obsežnih raziskovalnih projektov za raziskovalne agencije in mednarodne organizacije. Je tudi svetovalec za vprašanja jezikovne politike državnim in pokrajinskim upravam ter koordinator projekta MIME (Mobilnost in vključenost v večjezični Evropi, 2014–2018), ki ga financira Evropska komisija znotraj Okvirnega programa 7. 

Johan Häggman has worked for 16 years in Brussels promoting regional and minority languages and developing the language policy of the European Union: first as project officer for the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, then as a policy advisor for 
TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016 
the Liberal group in the European Parliament, and during the last eight years for the European Commission as a member of cabinet of Leonard Orban, the Commissioner for Multilingualism, and as an Information and Communication officer and team coordinator, in charge of multilingualism studies and events. He graduated in PoliticalSciences (politices magister) from Abo Akademi University in Finland and the Escuela Diplomatica, Spain. He holds an MA (magíster universitario) in International Relations from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain.  He is currently a PhD student at Louvain-la-neuve university in Belgium and lectures at the Universitat de les Illes Balears. 
Johan Häggman je šestnajst let delal v Bruslju, kjer je promoviral regionalne in manjšinske jezike ter razvijal jezikovno politiko Evropske unije. Najprej je deloval kot projektni uradnik na Evropskem uradu za manj razširjene jezike, nato kot svetovalec politik liberalne skupine v Evropskem parlamentu, nazadnje pa še osem let v Evropski komisiji kot član kabineta komisarja za multilingvizem Leonarda Orbana, uradnik, zadolžen za informacije in komunikacijo, ter timski koordinator za multilingvizem. Diplomiral je iz politologije na Abo Akademi naFinskem in na Escuela Diplomatica v Španiji. Ima tudi magisterij iz mednarodnih odnosov, ki ga je zagovarjal na Universidad Complutense v Madridu. Trenutno dela doktorat na belgijski univerzi Louvain-la-neuve in predava na Universitat de las Iles Balears. 
Tom Moring 





Tom Moring (Dr.Pol.Sc., Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki, Finland) is Professor of Communication and Journalism. He also holds a position as Professor II at the Sámi University of Applied Science in Norway. He has worked as a journalist, as the Director of Radio Programmes, and as Chair of the Board of a newspaper publishing house. Between 1999 and 2001 he was Secretary General of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages. He was grant holder and one of two main authors of the final report of the project Support for Minority Languages in Europe (2003). Between 2001 and 2004 he was a member of the Committee of Experts of the Charter for Regional or Minority Languages of the Council of Europe. He has published widely on linguistic minorities and the media, and he has participated as grant holder in several projects funded by the EU. 
Dr. Tom Moring (Swedish School of Social Science, Univerza Helsinki, Finska) je profesor komunikologije in novinarstva. Zaposlen je kot Profesor II na Univerzi za uporabne študije na Norveškem. Delal je kot novinar, direktor radia in predsednik upravnega odbora časopisno­založniške hiše. Med letoma 1999 in 2001 je bil generalni sekretar Evropskega urada za manj razširjene jezike. Bil je dobitnik štipendije in eden izmed dveh glavnih avtorjev končnega poročila 
o projektu Podpora manjšinskim jezikom v Evropi (2003). Med letoma 2001 in 2004 je bil član ekspertnega odbora Listine za regionalne in manjšinske jezike pri Svetu Evrope. Veliko je pisal in objavljal o jezikovnih manjšinah in medijih ter sodeloval v številnih projektih, ki jih je financirala Evropska unija. 
TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016 

Maja Mezgec graduated at the Faculty of Education of the University of Trieste and received her Ph.D. at the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana. Since 2002 she has been a researcher at the Slovene Research Institute, Trieste (SLORI), and since 2008 she has been an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Education of the University of Primorska. Her major research interests focus on pedagogic issues, the education of adults, bi and multilingual education, in particular in minority environments. She worked on several research projects about education in minority situaions. 
Maja Mezgec je diplomirala na Pedagoški fakulteti Univerze v Trstu in doktorirala iz pedagogike na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani. Od leta 2002 sodeluje s Slovenskim raziskovalnim inštitutom (SLORI), od leta 2008 pa je zaposlena kot docentka za področje andragogike na Pedagoški fakulteti Univerze na Primorskem. Njeno znanstveno raziskovanje zajema pedagogiko, andragogiko, dvojezično in večjezično izobraževanje s posebnim poudarkom na manjšinski stvarnosti. Sodelovala je v več projektih s področja vzgoje in izobraževanja v manjšinskih in večetničnih okoljih. 

Matejka Grgič studied philosophy and Slovenian language at the University of Trieste. She graduated in semiotics (1997); afterwards, she obtained her M.A. (2001) and Ph.D. (2005) at the University of Ljubljana. She has been a researcher, assistant, lecturer and assistant professor. Since 2000 she has been working with several universities in Italy and Slovenia as adjunct professor. In 2014 she obtained the Italian qualification “associate professor”. During 2008-2016 she was the Scientific director of the Slovenian Educational Consortium (Slov.I.K.) in Italy. Her research includes pragmatics, the philosophy of language, epistemology, and the history of linguistics and semiotics. Since 2010 she has focused on language and linguistic ideologies in the Slovenian-Italian contact area. She is also a translator, interpreter, and editor. 
Matejka Grgič je študirala filozofijo in slovenščino na Univerzi v Trstu, kjer je diplomirala iz semiotike (1997). Magistrirala (2001) in doktorirala (2005) je na Univerzi v Ljubljani. Bila je mlada raziskovalka, asistentka, lektorica in docentka. Od leta 2000 sodeluje z različnimi univerzami v Italiji in Sloveniji. V Italiji je habilitirana izredna profesorica za področje slavistike. Od leta 2008 do leta 2016 je bila znanstvena direktorica Slovenskega izobraževalnega konzorcija 
– Slov.I.K . Ukvarja se z različnimi področji jezikoslovja, na primer s pragmatiko, filozofijo jezika, epistemologijo in zgodovino jezikoslovnih ved ter semiotiko. Od leta 2010 se posveča predvsem raziskovanju jezikovnih ideologij in pojavov slovensko-italijanskega jezikovnega stikanja. Je tudi prevajalka, tolmačka, avtorica radijskih oddaj in strokovnih prispevkov. 
TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016 

Špela Gale completed her B.Sc. in Geography at the University of Ljubljana in 2005, and her M.Sc. in Contact Geography at the University of Primorska in 2016. Her expertise relates to the backgrounds, development and current features of language policies in different Celtic environments, especially the Welsh and Scottish Gaelic ones; changes within the Slovene minority area in Italy due to the process of European integration; and cross-border cooperation dynamics between Slovenia in Italy. She works as a Senior Counsellor at the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, with more than 10 years of experience in official statistics, especially in forestry and agricultural statistics and ESS decision-making processes in the EU. 
Špela Gale je leta 2005 diplomirala iz geografije na Univerzi v Ljubljani in nato leta 2016 magistrirala iz geografije stičnih prostorov na Univerzi na Primorskem. Je strokovnjakinja za zgodovino, razvoj in vprašanja jezikovnih politik različnih keltsko govorečih območij, šeposebej Walesa in Škotske, ter tudi za slovensko manjšino v Italiji, za spremembe, ki jih je ta doživela zaradi evropskih integracijskih procesov, in za čezmejno sodelovanje Slovenije in Italije. Zaposlena je kot višja svetovalka na Zavodu za statistiko RS in ima več kot deset let izkušenj z uradno statistiko, še posebej na področju gozdarstva in kmetijstva ter procesov odločanja v Evropskem socialnem skladu. 

Andreja Sršen is a Senior Research and Teaching Assistant at the Center for Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb. She graduated in 1999 in Croatian Studies as Croatologist and Sociologist. She acquired an M.Sc. in political science,  has directed International Relations in 2004 at the Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb University, and  in 2012 defended  her Ph.D. dissertation, Croatian National Identity in the Process of European Integration, in the interdisciplinary field of Politics and Croatian Studies at Zagreb University. She became Associate Assistant in field of Sociology in Croatian Studies in Zagreb. Nowadays she teaches undergraduate and graduate courses on Contemporary Sociological Theory, Sociological Theory, the Sociology of Croatian Society and the Sociology of Identity. She has published several articles related to national and european identity analysis. 
Andreja Sršen je višja raziskovalna in pedagoška sodelavka na Centru za hrvaške študije Univerze v Zagrebu. Leta 1999 je diplomirala iz hrvaških študij in si pridobila naziva kroatologinje in sociologinje. Naziv magistra znanosti iz socialnih ved, politologije in mednarodnih odnosov je pridobila leta 2004 na Fakulteti za politične vede Univerze v Zagrebu, doktorsko disertacijo z naslovom Hrvaška narodna identiteta v procesu evropske integracije iz interdisciplinarnega področja znanosti in kroatologije na Centru za hrvaške študije Univerze v Zagrebu pa je zagovarjala leta 2012. Trenutno na dodiplomski in podiplomski stopnji poučuje predmete, kot so sodobna sociološka teorija, sociologija hrvaške družbe in sociologija identitete. Objavila je več člankov s področja narodne in evropske identitetne analize. 
TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016 








Barbara Riman was born in Rijeka and graduated in the Faculty of Arts of the University of Rijeka in 2005. Since 2006 she has worked as a junior researcher at the Institute for Ethnic Studies. In 2011 she received her Ph.D. (thesis: Slovenes in Gorski kotar, Istria and the Kvarner Gulf from 1918 to 1991). In 2014 she was appointed lecturer. Since 2011-12 she has been teaching the optional subject “National minorities: approach to research” at the Faculty of Arts in Rijeka. In 2013-14 and 2015-16 she has also been teaching as an optional subject “Slovene-Croatian cultural and historical ties.” She has co-authored a number of books and published several academic papers, and attended various scientific and expert meetings at home and abroad. Her professional interests focus on the history of minorities in Croatia, with special emphasis on the Slovene community. 
Barbara Riman se je rodila na Reki. Diplomirala je na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze na Reki leta 2005. Od leta 2006 je bila zaposlena na Inštitutu za narodnostna vprašanja kot mlada raziskovalka in potem kot raziskovalka. Leta 2011 je doktorirala na temo Slovenci v Gorskem kotarju, Istri in na Kvarnerju od leta 1918. do leta 1991. Leta 2014 je pridobila naziv docentke. Od šolskega leta 2011/2012 na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze na Reki poučuje izbirni predmet Narodne manjšine: pristop k raziskovanju, v šolskem letu 2013/2014 ter 2015/2016 je izvajala tudi izbirni predmet Slovensko-hrvaške kulturne in zgodovinske vezi. S soavtorji je objavila nekaj knjig , več znanstvenih prispevkov, udeležuje pa se številnih domačih in mednarodnih znanstvenih in strokovnih srečanj. Njeni raziskovalni interesi so povezani z zgodovino manjšin na Hrvaškem s posebnim poudarkom na slovenski skupnosti. 
TREATISES AND DOCUMENTS JOURNAL OF ETHNIC STUDIES RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016 

We highly appreciate the help of all the experts who reviewed the articles submitted 
for publication in Treatises and Documents, Journal of ethnic studies, in 2016. Zahvaljujemo se strokovnjakom, ki so v letu 2016 recenzirali prispevke za 
revijo Razprave in gradivo, Revija za narodnostna vprašanja. 
Doc. dr. Andreja Barle Lakota, Ministrstvo za izobraževanje, znanost in šport RS, Ljubljana 
Doc. dr. Marinko Banjac, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani 
Dr. Veronika Bajt,  Mirovni inštitut, Ljubljana
Izr. prof. dr. Marjan Šimenc, Univerza v Ljubljani 
Dr. Eva Klemenčič, Pedagoški inštitut, Ljubljana 
Dr. Drino Galičić, Centre for Southeast European Studies, Univerza v Gradcu 
Dr. Mitja Sardoč, Pedagoški inštitut, Ljubljana 
Dr. habil. Nóra Schleicher, egyetemi docens, Budapesti Metropolitan Egyetem, Budimpešta 
Dr. Janez Pirc, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana
Dr. Neža Kogovšek Šalamon, Mirovni inštitut, Ljubljana 
Red. prof. dr. Sonja Novak Lukanovič, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana; Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani 
Doc. dr. Barbara Riman, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana; Filozofski fakultet u Rijeci 
Dr. Vera Kržišnik Bukić, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana
Red. prof. dr. Mitja Žagar, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana; Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani 
Red. prof. dr. Miran Komac, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana; Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani 
Dr. Romana Bešter, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 
Dr. Mojca Medvešek, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 
Dr. Suzanna Pertot, Trst 
Red. prof. dr. Milan Bufon, Znanstveno raziskovalno središče, Koper 
Dr. Lana Zdravkovič, Mirovni inštitut, Ljubljana 
Bojan Brezigar, Trst 
Dr. Vera Klopčič, Inštituta za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 
Red. prof. dr. Matjaž Klemenčič, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Mariboru 
Janez Stergar, prof. zgod., Inštituta za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 
Doc. dr. Mojca Pajnik,  Mirovni inštitut, Ljubljana; Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani 
Dr. Damir Josipovič, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 
Dr. Sofija Zver, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 

General — 
The editorial board of Treatises and Documents, The Journal of Ethnic Studies welcomes the submission of scholarly articles in the field of ethnic and minority studies, especially on racial and ethnic relations, ethnic identity, nationalism, xenophobia, the protection of (ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, and other) minorities, migration, multiculturalism and related subjects. The journal is particularly interested in discussions regarding ethnic and minority issues in the so- called Alpine-Adriatic-Panonnian area and all comparative studies, which include – only partially or as a whole - this geographic area. This area comprises the Alpine arc, the hinterland of the eastern Adriatic and Panonnian Basin. More technically, this area includes the following countries: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Germany (especially the southern part), Hungary, Kosovo, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Also Macedonia and Bulgaria may be interesting cases. 
Two issues of the journal are published every year, usually in June and December. 
Articles that are submitted must be original, unpublished material and should not be simultaneously under consideration - either in whole or in part - for publication elsewhere. 
The journal encourages the submission of articles in English, since this enables authors to present their ideas and work to a broader public. However, articles in other languages – with a special emphasis on the Slovenian language – are also welcome. The abstracts of the articles are always published in the language of the article and in English. 
Authors who do not have native or equivalent proficiency in English must prior to submission have the article read by someone with this proficiency. This step ensures that the academic content of your paper is fully understood by journal editors and reviewers. Articles which do not meet these requirements will most likely not be considered for publication. 
Manuscripts should be submitted in electronic form and must include: 
•	 
the submitted article, with the title in the language of the article and in English; 

•	 
an abstract of the article in the language of the article and in English; this should include a brief 


presentation of the issues discussed, the methodology used, the main findings and the conclusions; 
•	 3–7 key words in the language of the article and in English. 
The length of the title, the abstract and the key words in one language should not exceed 1,100 characters (including spaces). More detailed information about the form of submitted manuscripts is presented in the prescribed template, available at the journal’s website (http://www.inv.si). 
In a separate document please submit: the title of the article, the author(s) name and a brief biographical note on each author with full contact information (for publication in the journal). Please refer to the template (at the journal’s website) for further detailed information. 
All submitted manuscripts are subjected to peer-review procedure by at least two reviewers. The review procedure is double blind. Authors may be asked to revise their articles bearing in mind suggestions made by the editors or reviewers. The final decision on publication rests with the editorial board. 
Manuscripts should be sent by e-mail, in Word (.doc), to editor-in-chief: editorTD@guest.arnes.si. 

— The preferred length for articles is between 30,000 and 45,000 characters, including spaces (between approx. 4,500 and 6,500 words). Longer articles may be accepted at the discretion of the editorial board. A limited number of endnotes are permitted, if they are used for explanatory purposes only. They should be indicated serially within the article. 
Authors should take into careful consideration also the style and format requirements of the journal, which are presented in the template (available at http://www.inv.si) in more detail. Particular attention should be paid to the formatting of references, single spacing throughout and the inclusion of keywords and abstracts. Articles that do not meet these requirements will be returned for modification before being read and reviewed. 

—TheHarvard author-date system of referencing must be used for bibliographical references in the text and in the alphabetical list of references at the end of the article. Authors should ensure that all and only those references cited in the text appear in the list of references. General bibliographies should not be provided. Authors must also follow the requirements regarding referencing style and format as presented in the table of examples, available at the journal’s website (http://www.inv.si).