The Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence, Ljubljana, Slovenja, Year II, No. 4, Februaiy 1992 a. Sir. b. Ves? ' a. You are under arrest. b. No. a. You are under arrest, Sir. b. No. a. I shai! shoot, Sir. b. No. a. I Shali shoot, Sir. b. No. a. I shall shoot, Sir. b. No. a. lhateyou. b. No. a. I shall crucify you. b. Not so. a. I shall poison b. Not so. a, I shall murder you. b. Not so. a. Think of the vvinter. b. Never. a. I am going to kili b. As I said, never. a. I shall shoot. b. You have already said that once. a. Now come along. , b. You can’t arrest me. a. Whynot? b. You can take me into custody, but no more. \ a. Then I shalf take you into custody. b. By ali means. b. allows himself to be taken into custody and led away. The stage grows dark. The audience feels duped and there are catcalls and whistles. The chorus cries: “Where’ s the author? Throw him out! Rubbish!” ( Kurt Schwitters, Anxiety Plays / A Dramatic Fragment ) CONTENTS EDITORIAL 1 Editor’s Self-Torture, Dominique Cochard 2 Apologies to Jan 0berg SLOVENIA: A NEW STATE? 3 Insignias, Zecdhino d'Oro 4 Economy, Janez Kopač 5 Politics, intervievv with Jože Pučnik 6 Metelkova, Sašo Gazdič YUGOSLAVIA: ANALYSIS 7 Peaoe Process, Josef Binter 11 Religion, Tonči Kuzmanič 13 VVomen, Vlasta Jalušič 16 VVomen in Serbia, Staša Zajovič 18 European Lebanon?, Srdjan Vrcan PEACE: INITIATIVES, COMMUNICATIONS AND VISIONS Initiatives 20 In Vojvodina, Belgrade, Ljubljana, Alpe-Adria region, Amsterdam Communications 24 Letter of Intention, Ljubljana/Zagreb 25 Electronic Communications and Anti-War Movements in Former Yu Visions 26 Pacifism and Patriotism, Nenad Zakošek 28 Non-violence and Patriotism, Marko Hren 30 Peace in People’s Hands, interview with Hovvard Clark BOSNIA: REPORTS 31 Fram aTraveller, the Press, and Sarajevo People REFUGEES: WHO CARES? 32 The Missing Persons in Croatia, Yasmina Kuzmanovic 33 Decisive Week in Slovenia, Dominique Cochard 34 International Volunteers' Report PERSPECTIVES 35 Vis Demilitarization, Tonči Kuzmanič 36 Conflict Resolution VVorkshop 37 War Media, Vlasta Jalušič and Sandra Bašič THE MAGAZINE IN THE MAGAZINE 38 M' zin The Intruder* No. 4, FEBRUARY 1992 Issued by: The Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence Address: Mestni trg 13 61000 Ljubljana, Yu - Slovenija Tel. +3861-210374 Fax. +3861-224666 EMAIL: MIROVNIKI@uni- lj.ac.mail.yu Edited by: Dominique Cochard Design: Darja Vuga Demilitary Publishing Password: Stop the War * TheMovementfor the Culture of Peace and Nonviolencevias issuing information abroad from 1984 and has been publishing news- letters in English language from 1985 on: during the years 85, 86, 87 titled Informa¬ tion Bulletin of the Peace Movement in Slovenia and during years 88, 89, 90 The Independent Voices from Slovenia. In 1991 the meaning of the word “independent” got occupied by the State policy. We had to changethetitleofourmagazine. Itisnovvthe secondyearof The Intruder. Itcan remain in the manifestation. with your help. Please keep in touch, send us a note, feedback letters, money, love! EDITORIAL : 4 51 401 EDITORS SELFTORTURE A story about killing An alternative maga¬ zine. But what alterna¬ tive ? Alternative type ofthinking ? Fourth issue of the Intruder: a viable pub- lication ? Anyway, once the question of survival overcome, it is possible to think more abstractly. Are we offering a wide range of possible observations and understanding ? Do we really have an ability to open new ques- tions ? The word Umberto Eco through his novel "The Name of the Rose" opened my horizon on the question: are things and events pre-exist- ing to words and concepts in the human mind, or, isthatthecontrary ? Doesdefini- tion generate a new component or charac- teristic of the subject ? lftheword''war" was not existing or simply, was not used, if this word wouldn’t have so many implications in my conscience (through symbols, tales, famiiy history, fic- tions....), would I make such a clear anal- ogy between the Gulf and Yugoslavia, between technological kiliings and human reciprocal violent destruction, betvveen post-moderm times and middle-ages? If I couldn't use the word “war" wouldn’t I put in paraleli: an average quietfrench man sud- denly killing an arab in the Street (This is called “racist crime”), a “good" father killing his neighbour in Croatia (“civil war”), Cai'n killing Abel (“fratricide”) ? The perception Did we ever wonder what leads a human being to kili another one ? Surely, we articulate rational explanations, stili condi- tioned by the XVIII century philosophy printing in our minds the clear distinction rational/emotional, objective/subjective, as the only way. Doing so, we set our minds at ease, persuade ourselves and others, but at the same time we loose an ability we ali possessed as children: the possibility of naive questioning and the faculty of doubt- ing. In the look of certain people this gualitv of naivetv represents for rpe an equi valent to the most provocative anarchy. For exam- ple: in the eveningof july 14th 1789, Louis XVI wrote in his diary that there was noth- ing significant to be recorded concerning this day. Such men surely represent aiive scandals. We prefer them dead. Couldn’t we admit that this might also be a reason for which he has been executed ? The observation We ali agree on the fact that producing weapons is generator of war in general, vvether economical or political reasons. But, we forget to watch the “weapon" as object. Why not, for example, giving a role, among other responsible factors, to the persua- sive power produced by a death’s instru¬ ment as such, the fascination coming from its technical or artistic perfection ? As well as we can’t help eating certain cakes, or make love with certain bodies, why would we be able to refuse, when facing certain weapons, an act they are initiating, just because of their existence ? One of the victims of this “instrumental persuasion" has been the american John C. Woods who was in charge of the execu- tion of people condemned at the Numberg trial in 1946; four years later, he killed himself when "testing" a new electric chair. Who would say that it was just a question of professional conscience ? A french pilot returning from the Gulf War described on TV the fascination he experi- enced vvhile bombing Irak: “it was like a christmas tree, one of the most magical moments of my life”. The categoriziation Who is right, who is wrong ?Black/white are the colours of obvious opposition the most employed implicitely. Couldn't we also think of ourselves in distinction be- tween red and vvhite ?. Both colours form a crew on the circus scene. The red down, with a big red noše, enormous shoes and coloured clothes: he is always grotesque, making laugh at the cost of himself, his sufferings (faliing down, receiving different disgusting stuff in the face...) being pre- condition to hisfunnv role. The vvhite down, dressed elegantly with white silk clothes: he is cultivating insolence, irony, double meanings, the one who makes people laugh at the cost of others (atthe cost of the red clown mainly), never hurt himself, keeping behaving in a distinguished way... In our needs of classification, we also could use this one. YPA, Tudjman, Miloševič, John C.VVoods, actors in gen¬ eral... would be on the red side, vvhile the EC, the UN, the french pilot..., ali sarcastic vvitnesses of their time who observe or vvin vvithout threatening their freedom or their own person vvould be on the vvhite one. According to the moral aspect, wouldn’t it be normal to support the red side, vvhich figures as the victim one ? Other possibilitiesto be explored Doors on intellectual stimulation and in- vestigation to be opened Silence better to be kept sometimes DominiqueCochard, February14th1992 photo Damjan K. The Intruder EDITO RIAL APOLOGIES TO JAN 0BERG In the last issue of The Intruder (n.3), we published an intervievv, supposed to give Jan 0berg’s opinion on conflicts in Yugoslavia. As it had been translated successively fromthreedifferentlanguages,wewere afraid not being totally faithful to the meaning, avvare that the exact vvords could never be reproduced.Therefore we warned the readers about this fact. As we were in the final rush before printing (lack of time, money, and peo- ple being our basic conditions of work), we committed one of the most enor- mous mistakes regarding our duty: deciding to publish the text even though there was no time left for Jan 0berg to check it. We apologize again to Jan 0berg and want to dissociate him from this text. The Editor The text published below is the exact reproduction of the partof Jan 0berg’s letter in vvhich he is expressing his disagreements about the content of “General selfishness and bad amateurism in politics”, Intruder 3, p.15: It is absolutely basic -and peace researchers knovv-that conflict-resolu- tion people stay systematical!y neutral vis-a-vis the contending parties. Char- acterizing people like the "intervievv” does with vvords such as "selfishness”, “amateurism”, “introvert", “vulgar”, is far from my personal and professional style and you find nothing like that in our report. A series of arguments, said to be mine, are taken out of context -at best- or misunderstood completely, at vvorst. Readers only have to compare with our report -in vvhich this article is not in any way a summary. For example, I have not talked about “national sovereignties brought so much misfortune". It is grotesque that I am guoted as saying that “I don’t figure out any serious possibility of so- lution" when the purpose of the TFF mission was to look into the possiblity of conflict-resolution and our report contains 75 proposals! VVhatever is called the biggest mistake of the EC has nothing to do vvith the arguments in our report and relating this to the hy- pothesis that there might be a military intervention is faked. The argument about the con- version of the YPA are taken out of context -demilitarization of ali other fighting units too and nevv alternative defence structures- and the concept of balance of povver is something I have actuallywrittencritically about for about 15 years and don’t believe in. Finally, it is also fun that you quote me for saying that “I am afraid that they (the UN) vvill reproduce the same mistakes as the EC". Our report vvas the first to argue for UN peace- keeping in a specified manner and as part of a larger conflict-resolution proc- ess in years to come. Jan 0berg THIS ISSUE OFTHE INTRUDER IS CO-SPONSORED BY Femmes pour la paix- Geneva (J. Bernstein) & Komitee fur Grundrechte und Demokratie (Klaus Vack-Andreas Buro) Other identified publications about Yugnsiavia: JUGOMEDIA (nevv) is issued by Service der Initiativen zur Unterstutzung der Friedensbevvegung in Jugoslavvien- c/o Martin-Niemoller-Haus, Pacellialle 61- 1000 BERLIN 33- GERMANY Language: German YUGOFAX, A Critical Briefing on The Conflict in Yugoslavia, is a joint project of “War report” and “Helsinki Citizens assembly”. Address: 7 Bury Plače- LONDON WC1A 2LA Language: English. Monthly, 10 issues up to now. THE KOSOVO WATCH is a publication of Kosovo-Helsinki-Committees. Informa- tions about human rights in Kosovo- Monthly Language: English ZAJEDNOis a publication of the inter-religious center in Sarajevo Pax Christi, c/o Marko Orsolic, Obala Vojvode Stepe 39, 71000 Sarajevo- Bosnia ARK’ZIN is a publication of the center for Anti-War Campaign in Zagreb- Gajeva 45/II, 41000 ZAGREB Language: Croatian- Monthly 2 The Intruder SLOVENIA / a New State? I DON’ T TRUST A STATE WHICH HAS SUCH SLOVENIJA 26.12.IW Symbols of a State have no direct in¬ fluence on the quality of life. Nev- ertheless, they are an incredible source of Informa¬ tion about the na- tion/state, particu- larly at the level of cultural and social consciousness. They give a common frame inside and have afunction of distinction outside. Moreo- ver, they represent a kind of self-analy- sis. Because they reflect the political real- ity, they change as often and radically as the States themselves . Europe of the 90ies is a real volcano of new and arising States. How interesting, in fact, this euphoria of searching symbols of political and eco- nomical independence ! The Slovenian čase Common historical coat of arms never existed, because, from the 16th cen¬ tu ry on, Slovenians were belonging to 8 different "countries". The first political unity in Sloveniaappeared in 1918, and not before (Banovina of Drave in The kingdom of Serbs-Croats-Slovens). At the same time appeared the first real national all-Sloven coat of arms. The white-blue-red is historically justif ied as national symbol by the fact that it is taking itsorigins in the beginning of the 19th century (Province of lliria), from the sample of colours represented on Kranj’s blazon (1463). During the second vvorld war, the tricolour was used by the white guards,while communist winners put a red star on it. After the second vvorld war, Slovenia (and Yu- goslavia) got its sign from the Soviet coat of arms, with a sheap of vvheat. Forthe independent Slovenia, ali this symbolic background brought quite big problems. The traditional tricolour, on one side, has too negative connotations, on another side it was exactly the same as the russian flag; also, it was not creating a clear distinc¬ tion with othertricolours, especially with INSIGNIAS By Zecchino d’Oro flags from the different republics of the former Yugoslavia. The republic of Slovenia flung its new flag, just few days before the day of inde¬ pendence (25th of June 1991), in- cluding new coat of arms vvhich substi- tutes the former red star. (Coats of arms could be used, but have nothing to do on flags. Furthermore, coats of arms of the 20th century are signs). The elements of the new sign are: blue colour, three six-rays stars from her- aldry of the count of Celje (it really associatesvviththe EC) and the Triglav (the highest mountain of Slovenia). Shock. The whole thing creates more the image of mass alpinism and collective syndrom of mo¬ menta ry historical-national ec- stasy, than the one of a totally 5 | □ _D a a tr C3 < REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA Yx>6 . c. new State on “the sunny side of the Alps”. Before becoming any- thing we placed ourselves in the position of archaic fellovv-travel- lers of a modern vvorld. The selection of the possible coats of arms happened in a more or less secret way for the public, and especially for professionals. The public competi- tion was obviously only meant for the democratic scenario, the se¬ lection in the hands of non-pro- fessional. It opened a spectrum of banalities vvhich culminated in the ejaculatio of the provisional money: Tolar-bons (vvhat a svveet dollar sound-like name!) On the Tolar-bons (vvhich have ali the same image) is the inevitable Triglav, but besides, is figuring Prince’s Stone, vvhich takes its justification in the dis- tant sloven history. The only prob¬ lem being that this stone is stili located in Austria! Is that an (un)conscious desire of belong¬ ing to Austria? Does it suggest: if not Big Slovenia, then Big Aus¬ tria! TheTolar-bon isquite as much as noth¬ ing. Itvvasintroduced by politicians, not by experts. It is the direct continuation of the Dinar: it is good to control and plan the economy, including the infla- tion! Realcatastrophe. Because of this, the visual image of the Tolar is not surprising at ali: it reflects the value of our goods and achievements. After ali, couldn’t we say that it is too well de- signed? Everything suddenly be- came provisional, expected to be ruined, already insipid vvhen stili at the State of project. We are expecting real, new banknotes to appear mid-92. But the everlasting question is: does it make any sense to design well a bad “product”? Butthese new Tolars will surely bring optimism to Slovens, won’t they? The vvhole story doesn’t exactly end up with this point. The Slovenian police- men made their own symbol themselves, to- tally divergent from the state’s ones. This is such a clear demonstration that guys possessing arms are always repre- senting astate in astate. l ili' Intruder 3 SLOVENIA / a New State? SLOVENIAN ECONOMY AFTER THE FIRST YEAR OF INDEPENDENCE Slovenian independencewas not meant to become an isolation. But it turned other way around. Commercial ex- change with other parts of Yugoslavia - vvhich involved a major part of partners for Slovenian economy - did almost disappear. NotbecauseSloveniavvouId wish to end the cooperation but because of disabled transport due to the war in Croatiaand becauseof inabilityofsouth- slav partners to pay for imported goods. They are not in position to pay even if they would want to keep the exchange going. The loss of Yugoslav market is and will remain the main char- acteristic of the first and most probably of few more years of the economy in independentSIovenia. It does not concern only the export but the import as well. The difficulties in supplying goods from former Yugoslav republics resulted in decrease of export of Slovenian producers to European and world market. The major innovation in slovenian economy was therefore introduction of “lohnarbeit" - comple- tion and after-treatment arrangements - with producers from the VVestern Europe and Northern America. Reduced market resulted in reduction of production, vvhich decreased in 1991 for 20% comparing to average pro¬ duction in 80-ies. Increase of un- employment has follovved now reaching 15%. This is a real shock for Slovenia vvhich did not face more than 2% unemployment for years. The second characteristic of the initial period of Slovenian inde- pendence is the incompetent State. A number of cognizances par- ticularly in the field of foreign trade, international monetary exchange, local monetary and exchange-rate policy Slovenia inherited from former Yugo- slavia. Besides, the new state bu- reaucracy lackexperiencewhichmakes its work even more stumbling. The former fact affects also the re-estab- lishment of relations with former Yu- goslav republics. These States with vvhich Slovenia until recently shared the state bureaucracy do - stili - not de facto representforeigncountries. Many agreements such as agreement con- cerning external payment, trade coop¬ eration and double-taxing arrangements must yet be signed. This is it in a nut- shell to illustrate the amount of vvork to be done in a short time - a morsel just too big for any of the new States. The incompetency of the state bureaucracy is complemented by grovving ambitions of the same. Forthefirsttimeslovenianbureaucracy founds itself completely independent dealingvviththebudget. Theresultof it is a budget-crisis due to inability of the parliament to agree on the 1992 budget. The proposed budget estimated 55% share of GNP for public Services. This can only be compared to those few originals as Netherlands, Svveden and Israel and is far beyond any comparison with those States of similar rate of income per capita (cca. 4.500 US$). Even Slovenian parliament - often enough chaotic to svvallovv up problematic proposals - had to refuse such intention. In addition slovenian economy will have to face the problem of abo- lition of state-property through the process of (re)privatization. The process - vvhich vvas recently in- terrupted duetofightsbetvveen political parties - vvould significantly increase the motivation of the management as vvell as of foreign Capital. The incompetent state bureauc- racy reflects also in non-pro- ductive jealous relation betvveen the ministry of finances and the central bank. The former is not subordinated to the govemment but to the parliament. This results in a schizophrenic situation when domestic currency (Tolar) is convertible and at the same time submitted to high inflation. Janez Kopač, Member of the Parlia¬ ment (Liberal Democratic Party). Translated by M.H. • 4 The Intruder SLOVENI A / a New State? WE SHOULDN’T BE TOO SENTIMENTAL ABOUT EX-YU G OSLA V STATUS IN SLOVENIA lnterview with Dr. Jože Pučnik The Intruder: How could you define a security com- plexin the new bom State of Slovenia ? J.P-. In the postvvar period two very rigid distinctionsvvereput forvvard in mostof the debates about peace and security in Slovenia, which in my opinion are merely based on the ideological and terminological delusion. Namely, in the discussions “peace” and “security” ap- peared as two different concepts with no conceptual inter-relations. I do not agree with such an approach. For me- peace and security represent only two faces of the same issue or concept. In order to develop a peacef ul society, we have to build up our own security in ali its aspects : from being able to defend ourselves on the national level to the development of the other forms of people’s security. Those, that are for peace (but we are ali for peace) should not oppose to the defence of a country and those, who are establishing the national security system should do that in order to achieve peace. It is nec- essary to overcome such ideo¬ logical distinctions vvithin the “peace and security” complex. We should explore it in its com- plexity and here I see also one of the possible aims of your Peace Institute. The Intruder: In the situation of a deep economic crisis, unemployment, social tensions, ethnic conflicts...the effectiveness of a national security system in Slovenia in my opinion depends more on the Siovenian citizens and their perception of the social, economic, ecological.. security, that is so radically threatened. From this aspect the military threats against the Siovenian State seem to be more and more unrealistic and appar- ent. Could you make a distinction be- tween the. military and other : social, economic, ecological...determinantsof our security ? J.P;After the withdrawal of the Jugo- slav army from the Siovenian soil, a direct military threat in spite of the war The former president of the Democratic coalition - DEMOS, which won the first anti-com- munist elections in 1990.The coalition fell apart in the be- ginning of 1992, just after the international recognition of Slovenia as a sovereign State. Dr. Pučnik is remaining on the political scene as a president of a Social-democratic party . By Dora Lešnik, Peace Institute in Croatia, was reduced to the point, where we should start to see the Siovenian national security in a differ¬ ent light. The military aspect of a secu- rity more and more belongs to the past. Our further attention should be given to the repressive appara- tuses of the State, which are be- coming more and more povverful and independent. Ithinkthatalsoon the issue of a national security there shouldn’ t be any holy cows and secret spaces. The only rule, that is follovved in a democratic society is the rule of a law. We have to establish strict mechanisms for controlling the struc- ture, ways of activities and financing of the repressive apparatusesof the State. In our hard economic situation we should provide money for the Ministry of De¬ fence and Internal Affairs intherelation to our economic abilities and to the estimated real military, external threats to the Siovenian security. Here I see a very strong connection of the military aspect of the national securitywith other determinants of it. I believe, that in a longer term Slovenia should be included in a European Security System and I would prefer having on our territory a demilitarized zone, Slovenia without an army. A security of such a small state can not be achieved through the military means but with the strong cooperation with other countries and on the basis of the international, in our čase, European Security Arrangements. The neces- sary conditions for the demilitari- zation of Slovenia are : recogni¬ tion of the state of Slovenia not only in the European framework but also in the United Nations, recognition of its borders and involvement of Slovenia in a col- lective European security. The Intruder: How to promote the idea of the demili¬ tarized Slovenia in the situation when the Ministry of Defence is efficientiy building up a Siovenian national army and has quite a strong support in the public opinion and in the parliament ? J.P: The Ministry of Defence should finally bring to the parliament the “right” issue, which is: the estimation of a real military danger against the Siovenian state, supported by the facts and fig- » Tlie Intruder 5 SLOVENIA / a New State? INCUBATOR OF NEW LIFE ures, which kind of weapons do we need for the defence, how many sol- diers, which buildings, equipment, how much money....? These things should be clear and public in or- der to be discussed by experts, politicians and ali interested people. A Slovenian army is not a holy cow , which shouldn’t be touched. The Intruder: One of the most important aspects of the poli tičal and social stability is the levelofthe legally assured human rights and their implementation in the society. Human individual and collective rights (for the Italian and Hungarian ethnic minorities) , which are vvritten in the Slovenian new constitution, are com- parable to the le vel, which is exercised in other European societies. But what about the legal status of other minori¬ ties - social, sexual, ethnic ( Non- Slovenes from other parts of a former Yugoslavia) ? It is true that in each society different marginal social groups exist and their identity; social, gender, sexual is not legally properly recognized. But the members of each such group are con- stitutionally protected as citizens and individuals. As far as the rights of Non- Slovenes are concerned we should differentiate betvveen those, that are the citizens of Slovenia and those, that do not have this status. People from the first group have the same rights as Slovenes and others are protected ac- cording to the special law for foreigners as foreign citizens, who are vvorking in Slovenia. We should not mix these two different statutes and we also should not be sentimental about this questions. If we, in the past , lived in the same country, it does not mean that “ex Jugoslavs” need to have a special status in Slovenia. What we should absolutely follovv is law. Theonly relevant criterion for us are the criterion of a constitu- tional State. We learned from the past that an artificial “brother- hood” that existed in Jugoslavia did not bring cooperation and un- derstanding among the former republics. Therefore, anotherap- proach is needed in order to provide justice and order. This will be also a proper ground for the real cooperation, based on the mutual in- terests, which should develop betvveen the newly formed States on the territory of a former Yugoslavia. Such a coop¬ eration is one of the aims of the Slovenian external policy. by Sašo Gazdič Military barracks are material parts of state’s body. They are its harder parts - skeleton. Some people are sure that the collapse of subjectivity is the final moment of life. But, can we be convinced that death of Yugoslav ideo- logical basis and, so, its subjectivity, means in the sametimethedeathof the body parts? Concerning the time we are living in it is not excluded their fractal lives will go on living, particularly if we know that al! diminuted images of Yugoslavian body have their ovvnskulls, as Slovenia has one in the command barracks on Metelkova Street. In the nature we are reckoning for incontestable proof of death the moment when material starts to organ- ize itself according to new genotype. The moment when, for example, flower begins to grow out of the corpse. If , contrarily, the organism just splits itself into more parts, as it happens in celi development, and if it follovvs the same genotype, then we are sure it lives on. Therefore, I would like to an- swerthequestion: lsthegenotypewhich will organize life in former military com¬ mand on Metelkova Street only continu- ity of old one or the new one 9 Criterion of arms I maintain that using the former military commandbuildmg as a vveapon means the continuity of changes as a development. In this čase we are stili on the road of modermty and the building wi11 be used against enemy. Although it s nearly clear that Slovenian army will not force, at least into most urban spaces (Metelkova Street is in the centre of Slovenian Capital Ljubljana), we can not reckon for essential changes if the police or administration of justice will move in. This Slovenian governmenfs intention shows only the wish to con- tinue the fight against States (inner) enemy - in this čase crime and crimi- nals. It vvould make a little difference if schools or culture vvould get it. But not necessarily if the purpose vvould stay the same, if they vvould be used just like an instrument for defending national identity. Theseasnails housestaysthe sea snails house even if the crab is living in it. And that could be also the trap for Metelkova Netvvork. If this building vvould, on the contrary, be in Service of connection (not separation), if it vvould become spacely, institutionally and spiritually open, if it vvould not, in a word, be used as a vveapon, then it vvould be possible to close it as a nevv nature. Which are in fact differences betvveen old genotype and this one vvhich Metelkova Netvvork intents to transplant on barracks fenotype? Invvards : First system exactly measu res out to the individual the plače in space, time and hierarchy, it de- scribes symbols and prohibits imagina- tion, vvhereas the second leaves ali of them open. First is extremely expen- sive, lavish andinvvard barren, vvhereas the second is cheap, profusion of un- foreseen contacts betvveen individuals produces abundance of material and symbolical goods. Outvvards : First system isclosed, its output are disciplinary and frustra- tionfor individuals. Thesecond is open, its material, symbolical and spiritual Products are destined for as wide public as possible. Old genotype radiates re- lations based on domination and, as vve can ensure ourselves just now, in ex- tremecases, puredestruction, vvhereas the nevv one aspires to coexistence vvith environment and produces also Creative atmosphere. Is Metelkova Netvvork a vveapon? Surely it is possible that nevv forms of life vvhich is breeding in Metelkova Netvvork incubator, vvill not be essentially different from the old one. The use of existing elements, from vvhich this incubator is built (and vvhich can not be created from nothing) is, undoubtly, risky. Even the fact that vve have used elements vvhich ought to give as much space for original initia- tive as possible is not a guarantee. Subcultural and civil fights tradition, as vvell as institutional trame are giving possibility for using them as arms. (It was, for example, impossible to regis¬ ter officially the netvvork vvithout para- graph m statute vvhere it stays: "Net¬ vvork is ensuring ali activities for na¬ tional security and constitutional regu- lation of Slovenia") Therefore, handling vvith this device must be very careful and subtle. Othervvise it can be con- verted in its own contrast. It is neces- sary to avoid temptation of being (too) combative tovvards the external system and, in other hand, of planning and arbitrating (too much) invvards. Refusal to aspiration of absolute foreseens and yielding to simultaneous reflections, valuations and solving problems are indispensable preliminary conditions. Only abdication of using vveap- ons is assurance for essentially differ¬ ent type of life betvveen the barracks vvalls, in tovvn and Slovenia as a vvhole. 6 The Intruder Yugoslavia / Analysis Conditions and Elements of a By Josef Binter, General Secretary of the European University Center for Peace Studies, Schlaining-Austria The cold war is over -and the world has not become more peaceful! After the euphoria of the moment, the day to day paralysis seems to be encroaching, mixed with feelings of powerlessness and resignation. Have peace re- search, peace movement and policies for peace failed? The endof the cold war and of the East- VVestconflict have been vievved by most peace researchers as an historic turn- ing point, bringing about both chances and challenges. Thus it should have been clear, that the cold war could be replaced by something "better”, but also by something “worse”: in short, peace through democracy -or violent conflicts due to nationalism. If the latter is hap- pening now within the transformation processesof East-and Central Europe, then this is happening quite often be- cause guite a lot of politicians cover up anddivertfromtheir incompetences and helplessness in re- gard to the current and upcoming eco- nomic, social and political problems by instigating na- tionalist ideolo- gies. For one of the es- sential forms of the (old) East-West conflict, ie. the “Western”aswellas the “Eastern" universalism . were both in the same way averse to na¬ tionalism . Thus, with the end of the East-West conflict -hopefully- the dan- gerof an all-European hegemonic con¬ flict has vvaned, but the once looming threat of a “big war” has turned into the sad reality of everyday violence “just next door". Especially where some atrocities that happened to our neigh- bours in Yugoslavia are concerned, the question comes up, how blind and de- structive rage could blow up to one extent, where it seems to have already far surpassed its original grounds (dis- crimination of nationalities, minority protections, etc)? It seems almost as if the same “acceleration of time" vvhich we have witnessed at the end of the last decade, has on one hand svvept away the top of peacelessstructures, while at the same time -due to its very pace- making it impossible to “fast enough” build up long-term institutions and mechanisms that are necessary for a civilized handling of conflicts. These institutions and mechanisms would be “corne rston es” of a peacecultu re. wh ere war as a social institution could be banned in the future just as it has been the čase with slavery and the feud in the past. What is here referred to as “peace’’- or “conflict culture", would as a matter of fact not aim at the avoidance and prevention of -many times necessary conflicts, but provide for an as much as possible non-violent handling of con¬ flicts and an early "prevention” (Burton) of such conflicts vvhich could escalate to violence and war. And that kind of conflicts are themselves quite often based on structural and cultural condi¬ tions of violence incompatible with “positive peace”, since they deny or hamper an essential potential for hu¬ man development. Obviously it has reappeared in Yugo- slavia what peace researchers at the times of the East-West conflict have described on the level of inter-system- atic confrontation: the emergence of “securitv dilemma” )which in this čase do not appear any more on the level of States and military blocks, but on the level of communities and ethnicities). Summarizing a recent paper of the Scandinavian peace researcher Hakan Wiberg, one could in short describe the Yugoslav crisis as follovvs: - One people tends to see itself as thestate-carrying one, but is actually only the biggest minority group in the State (Serbs) - Another people insists on ei- ther sharing the state-carrying role or opting out altogether (Croats) - Some relatively rich peoples want to live altogether (Slovens) - There are some underdevel- » Pablo Picasso, Peace, 1952, Vallauris The Intnider 7 Yugoslavia / Analysis oped Muslim parts (Kosovo) - Boundaries inside the federa- tion were largely drawn on the premise thattheexistence ofthefederationmade their exact iocation unimportant. - If the union is dissolved into its individual parts, that leaves sizable parts of the state-carrying people outside its own republic (more than 3 miilions Serbs, more than one third of them ali) - In some nationally mixed re- publics (Bosnia), the populations are intermingled that there is no practicable way of dividing them up in uni-national political units. Where the issue of secession and boundaries -the cause of the conflict- is concerned, there seem to be two con- trasting cases: 1) In Slovenia, only a few percent of Slovens live outside Slovenia and only a few percent of Sloven inhabitants are non-Slovens. Boundaries should hardiy become a problem, if secession is agreed. 2) In Croatia, by contrast, there is a sizable Serbian minority (600 000 people, 12 percent of the population in Croatia), a great part of vvhich forms a local majority in the part of Krajina. Here the issue of secession becomes almost inseparable from the issue of boundaries, leading to adeadlocksitu- ation. “The Croatian government insists both on an independent Croatia and on that being the present republic of Croatia (or even inclusion of croat-inhabited in Bosnia and in northern Serbia). It is impossible to yield on eitherdemand vvithout risking acoup d’etatfrom even more fervent nationalists. The local Serbian population in frontier areas in- sist on not becoming part of an inde¬ pendent Croatia, asking Serbs else- vvhere and the government of Serbiafor support. The Croatian government is in the fol- lovving dilemma: it cannot get Croatia out of Yugoslavia vvithout abandoning some predominantly Serbian areas; but it cannot abandon these areas vvithout risking its political life (or more)! On the other hand, the government of Serbia must support the local Serbs in Croatia to safeguard its (!) political life; if not, these Serbs are anyhow likely to resist to the bullet”. (1) The notion of“security dilemma’’during the cold vvar era vvas an expression for the objective or perceived incapacity of one State or military ailiance to have certainty of the “real" intentions of the other part, and thus always to have depart from a “worst-case’’-thinking. “Sečurity” in that context vvas perceived as “holding one’s own" by mobilizing proper povver-resources, vvhile striving fordelimitation and incapsulation, vvhich in turn had as consequences a ''pathological-autodvnamics" of fear (Senghaas), fear-projection, competi- tive arms-building and enemy fixation. So it seems as if in Yugoslavia the same kind of problematic auto-dynam- ics takes plače, only this time at an intersocietal and/or intra-state level. Maybe itvvould be possiblethereforeto apply certain praxeologies of peace research that vvere elaborated in an inter-statecontextcharacterised bythe East-West conflict -such as confidence building measures, “common security", unilateralism, gradualism, etc..? So far peace researchers have argued for an inter-systemic co-evolution and “common security”, now the far more complex task vvould be to lay theoreti- calandpracticalfoundationsfora“multi- national” co-evolution and “common security”. There might even stili be hope that the civil vvar in Yugoslavia vvould lead to a “dead end", because more and more soldiers vvould just leave the armies and national guards, or that a peace movement vvould form itself as “civil society from belovv” and by hun- dreds of activities for non-violent con¬ flict resolution enforce a change in thought, policy and action of the people in charge. Nevertheless it seems nec- essary, hovvever, to start thinking and acting also in a long-term perspective. Which theories, concepts and ex- periences of peace -and conflict research could be made applica- ble and constructive regarding the crisis in Yugoslavia, or on the other hand, what could we learn from this crisis for our goal of a more peaceful Europe? I vvill try here to sketch some basic principles. approaches and core ele- ments of such a peace process . 1. Approach the problem with- out presumption and simplification Taking into consideration the experi- ences so far, the complexitvof the crisis vvould call for a differentiated perspec¬ tive vvhich avoid any thinking in catego- ries of black and vvhite and also stays aloof of any attempt to achieve seem- ingly fast and clear “Solutions” vvith military means; a perspective, accord- ing to vvhich the “bad” is definable and tractable always and anywhere, and could easily be battled vvith the ad- eguate and reliable military means, is The Intruder surely not appropriate; for part of the problem is exactly the fact that in most cultures of the vvorld, recourse to mili- tary violence is an “accepted” option, vvhich in turn seems to block any Out¬ look for more constructive possibilities. Oursocietiesandculturesunfortunately take the riskfor a military security policy much more readily than the “risk” of peace-policy. This risk of a military se- curity policy has become obvious in Yugoslavia vvith a development that started vvith the establishment and ar- mament of “each own’s”, territorial mili- tary in Slovenia and Croatia and esca- lated vvith the occupations and inroads on the side of the “national people’s army”. At the moment it is exactly the danger of nationalism and militarism, as it is currently becoming most obvi¬ ous on the Serbian side, vvhich calls for a differentiated reaction that takes into consideration the complexity of the problem. 8 Yugoslavia / Analysis Teshigahare: The Sun Wheel YugosIavia / Analysis 2. Participation, Equality and Symmetry Without symmetry and fairness in re- gard to ali parties to the conflict, and their involvement and participation with egual rights. responsibilities and duties a peaceful solution will hardly develop. Therefore there may and cannot be “second-class" parties (ie. the Albani- ans in Kosovo, for instance). Svmme- trv . however, would also mean that each of the sides is ready to grant “their” minorities the same rights astheyclaim from the other side for “their” ethnicity or countrymen. 3. Primacy of inner-Yugoslav dialogue rather than “pacification” from outside The role of “third parties” should at first be focused on the promotion of an inter- Yuooslav dialogue as a priori founda- tion for a comprehensively accepted “peace-plan". As main actors in this process rather than the EC, institutions with a more comprehensive set-up such as the CSCE and the UN should become more active, since the Yugoslav crisis con- cerns notonly VVestern Europe. Yugo- slavia is already a member State of the CSCE and the UN, and it is to be expected that any future yet to be cre- ated mechanismsfor international con¬ flict resolution would be built vvithin the framevvork of these comprehensive in¬ stitutions. 4. Future orientation Even if realistically a peace-plan will have to depart from the fact, that “Yugo- slavia" as such does not exist anymore, any attempt at solving the issue will have to take into considerationthegiven realities of intermingled populations in a nationally mixed geographical area. Serbs, Croats, Macedonians and Bosnians will also in the future have each other as neighbours. Any approach to peace will have to lie in the future and not in the past. Such an orientation towards the future might, vvithout “suppressing the past” be ca- pable to accept and “endure” differ- ences, this attitude being the modus vivendi for “peaceful coexistence” . Out of many and various blueprints for a common future that kind of “meta-op- tion" might accrue, which vvithout con- stituting a menaceto any ofthe parts to the conflict best reflects common future interests beyond ali contradictions. 5. Needs-orientation Ethno-nationalist mobilizations . as they have emerged ie. also in Yugoslavia, mostly become immanent vvhen the “protection of possessions and posi- tions", and the rejection and defence against '1oreigninfiltration”and“coerced assimilation” are at stake.(2) Hovvever, this mechanism is in principle based and dependent on basic eco- nomic, political and cultural interests. The core of such a conflict is therefore competing strategies to regain and/or secure “life-chances” (ie. language, economic vvelfare, self-development, perspectives for identity formation and development). These basic needs . vvhich certainly set the criteria for any peace order, have been characterized asfollovvs by Johan Galtung in his broad notion of violence: survival needs, well- being needs, identity, meaning needs and freedom needs.(3) 6. Self-determination “without limits” in the framework of democracy If it holds true that there are no alterna- tives to “self-determination”, then it must in the long term come about vvithout “verticar and “horizontal” limits and vvithout creatino nevv “delimitations” : vvhich meansself-determination and its recognition as a right and duty not only forthe republics, but also forthe minori¬ ties living therein (eg. the Croatian gov- emment has to evenly grant to its Ser- bian minority, vvhat it demands “one level higher” forthe republicof Croatia in the framevvork of “Yugoslavia”). This vvould in turn imply that in the future “self-determination" should be vievved and determined both as an individual as vvell as a collective right on various levels vvhich in principle can only be realized in the framevvork of democ- racy. 7. Dis-”Etat-ize” national self-determination/de-territo- rialize “nationhood” One should as a matter of fact not overlook the fact that in Europe democ- racy has been realized above ali in the course ofthe establishment and consti- tution of nation-states. Less and less, hovvever, in ourtime- and space-trans- gressing industrial society, in the eraof international complexity and interde- pendence is nation-state “sovereignty” thinkable as a total and indivisible one. Attheend ofthe 20thcentury the nation- state has lost more and more of its “sovereign rights” to higher supra-na- tional and lovver communal entities. It also is less and less capable by itself to fulfill these already mentioned basic needs for security, vvelfare, freedom and identity, vvhich are also a crucial factor in many nationality conflicts. Apparently this objective development contradicts the subjective desires of certain nationalist movements, vvhere a “State of their ownalmostautomatically” vvould fulfill the needs and promises for “status-protection” and “identity-de- fence”. If it is to be prevented in the future, that “national" conflicts almost automatically convert into “territorial- military"ones, onecould have recourse to the theories and proposals of the Austro-marxists concerning the Dan- ube Monarchy. Expressed in short: “nationality" should not be strictly de- fined according to acertain territory, but should rather become operative more on a personal level (“cling" with consti- » The Intriulor 9 Vugoslavia / Analysis tutionally guaranteed rights to a re- spective person). According to eg. Karl Renner, a far-reaching “de-territoriali- zation” of “nation” should take plače vvhich could in turn be replaced by the establishmentof “nations” as“personal- associations” and collective legal sub- jects with quasi state-competences.(4) 8. Peacefui co-existence instead of “autistic escalation-dynamics” Another mechanism at the level of “In¬ ternational politics" that could serve as a model for peacefully dealing with conflicts would be the principles and experiencesof the CSCEprocess vvhich could be applied at the “intra-state” or regional level of Yugoslavia. For the dailygrowingsecurity dilemmascan be step-by-step decreased only through the creation of “reliabilities of expecta- tion" (2). and Confidence Building Measures based on armed control (this vvould in the first plače imply curtail- ment and control of the military appa- ratus of the conflict-parties. It vvould have beenvery desirable to prevent the conflict from turning into “autistic es- calation-dynamics” (Senghaas), vvhich becomes almost insolable from inside: this is a major part unfortunately al- ready seems to have happened in Vu¬ goslavia. This “autism” is characterized by incapsulation, fixation to enemy im- ages, cut off of communication, nar- rowing of intellectual horizons as vvell as irrational and fearful vvarding off of the “other”, vvhich supposedly might destroy one’s ovvn identity. 9. Transformation of “identity-conflicts” into con¬ flicts ofinterests What vvould be the main point in such a stage, vvould be to use the vvell-consid- ered support of athird party (UN, CSCE) to “empovver” the conflicting parties to liberate themselvesfrom the perceived fixation of non-soluble identity-conflicts and regress this again to the level of negotiable and reckonable conflicts of interest. to learn such a “constructive culture of dealing vvith conflicts'' vvould mean in the first plače to attempt to see the context , in vvhich certain problems find their expression, as one that is chanaeable and capable of change . so that basic conflicts of interest not im- mediately lead to “autistic blindness" and emotional self-reference charac- teristic for identity conflicts. 10. Peace Keeping as a first step towards “peace making” and “peace building” Of course, ali these ideas and propos- als havetvvo preconditions:the will and the possibilities to engage in long term, comprehensive, and fair negotiations, during vvhich as a matter of fact the fighting must stop. from today’s per- spective, if one vvants to secure that precondition, militarv "peace keeping' 1 might have to be taken into considera- tion as necessarv precondition but not as substitute for “peace making” and “peace building”. If at ali military measures should play a role, then they should be carried out rather in the framevvorkof Europeasavvhole (CSCE) and not from parts of Europe domi- nated by States vvith significant historic burdens regarding that area. Where the peace keeping measures of the United Nations are concerned, they are at the moment based on a legal "improvization” somevvhere betvveen Chapter 6 (Pacific Settlement of Dis- putes) and Chapter 7 (Action vvith Re- spect to Threats to the Peace...). There is no doubt about the necessity to use this instrument in a more flexible and broad manner also concerning the so- called “inta-state” conflicts, vvhich in the long run vvould make necessary to im- prove and extend the legal and political bases of this principle in the UN charter. 11. Towards a con-federation with “border-transformation” Realistically speaking there are no con- ditions existing right now that vvould enable the preservation of any kind of Yugoslav federal State. What seems possible stili is a lose con-federation model vvhere every part has its ovvn foreign-finance-and security policy based on non-offensive structures (the losest kind of con-federation vvould be the model of the Benelux-states). Based on and departing from a recognition of the status-quo, future border-changes might become a topič in the negotiation process, vvhile it is to be hoped and expected that these future “borders” along vvith ali European borders at that time vvill become much more open than they are now betvveen many States in the vvorld. While it stili seems neces- sarytoacknowledgethefactof “borders” so to speak as a “necessary evil", measures of practical politics tovvards a pan-European perspective should or vvill at the same time transcend them to an extent vvhere state-borders might have lost their character as “military borders” in favour of approaching the status of merely “administrative” bor¬ ders. 12. Hationalism and European Peace Order What can be concluded afterthe events of 1991 for the perspectives of a “Fu¬ ture European Peace Order”, vvhich should stili be on the agenda? One of the main principles of the CSCE, to both in principle respect territorial in- tegritv but also agree to the right ofself- determination (vvhich in this course mostly implies the change of given borders) seem atfirstsighttocontradict themselves; in any čase, both of these principles are only executable in a peacefui manner and in the frame of democracy as has last been mentioned in the 1990 Charter of Pariš, vvhich as a step further could be complemented vvith a special Charter for minorities (Group Rights) in Europe. In the špirit of these above mentioned principles a peacefui Europe should understand itself as being more than just the sum of territorial States : in such a Europe, vvhich does not totally abolish the traditional nation-state but rather “Stores” it vvithin supra-regional struc¬ tures, nevvformationsand political units such as eg. “autonomous territories”, “federations and associations of na- tionalities” vvhich vvould allovv for the justifiable national aspirations at hand, vvould have their political existence and relevance assured. NOTES (1) Hakan VVIBERG, “Divided Nations and Divided States”, VVorking Paper 11/1991, Center for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen. (2) Dieter SENGHAAS, Therapeutische Konfliktintervention in Europa, Juni 1990, Stiftung VVissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen (3) Johan GALTUNG, Cultural Violence, in Journal of Peace Re¬ search 3/1990, pp. 291-305 (4) Egbert JAHN, Die Bedeutung der osterreichischen sozialdemokratischen Nationalitatentheorie fur die gegenvvartige Natinalitatenproblematik in Europa, Manuskript, Mai 1991, Frankfurt am Main 10 The Intruder Yugoslavia / Analysis REUGIO|^NjyjHEJWAy^TLIGOSLAVjA By Tonči Kuzmanič, political scientist, faculty tor social Sciences, Ljubljana present war in Croatia has opened a lot of questions. Among other problems, there is an important one concern- ing the ideological question of the interpretation of the War. More ex- actly, the question of “the nature of the vvar" lasting in Croatia for several months. One of the relatively less present inter- pretations is actually based on the fol- lowing question: vvether or not this War could be understood in categories of “religious war", as War betvveen two, three or even more religious communi- ties ? Of course there is a lot of indica- tions and symptoms, especially at the level of the use of religious symbols, according to which it could be possible to claim that the War in Croatia is a “religious one": In the everyday pictures of the War given by the Belgrade or Zagreb televi- sion, one can daily observe soldiers from various armies or milices, ornamented with the rosaries, some- times even tanks, different types of military vehicles or cannons are deco- rated with similar religious symbols... Priests (not from the very beginning, but latter, especially when the War be- came “more serious”- during the battle for Vukovar), catholic and orthodox, used to give masses on thefrontlines or somewhere near the battlefields; they are blessing vveapons as well as sol¬ diers who are going to take part inf uture strifes against enemies.... Leading per- sons from both churches (including catholic archbishop and orthodox ar- chiepiscopal) from the very beginning took part in the War, first through differ¬ ent forms of speeches dedicated to “Christian love", later on, more or less through the symptomatic silence... Among the most important targets for Yugoslav People’s Army, for various semi-private “serbian armies", and milices from several “independent" serbian Krainas (States) in Croatia, used to be churches and other sacral ob- jects.... According to some estimations, approximately 160 churches in Croatia have been destroyed during the War in 1991. There are also symptoms shovving ele- ments of the so-called “imperial War” (occupation of territories)— And so on and so forth. Anyway, in this paper I would try to work out some elements for possible pro et contra argumentation conceming the question vvether or not this War could be interpreted as a “religious war" ? Oppression and self-oppression It is very important to notice that discourse and customary interpretations of so different religious situation, out- side as vvell as in former Yugoslavia, used to fall into specific and sympto- matic problems. generally speaking there are two important points regard- ing the religious situation in former Yu- goslavia: 1. exclusion of religion from ali segments of the so-called public life and by that also from the public dis¬ course and from the discourse about the public, and 2. reduction of complex religious situation at the Catholic-Mus- lim-Orthodox triad. Of course it is possible to ex- plain the first point vvith the quite large accepted and sometimes "useful”, but analytically extremely dangerous, ideological complex derived from the “communism” and vvith the grip of the so-called separation betvveen State and church. In other vvords vvith rathersim- plifying, more ideologic than scientific grasp regarding the communist repres- sion over the religious communities. Butthe second mentioned point, the specific “triad-discourse” empha- sizes the fact that at the level of dis¬ course Catholic, moslem and Orthodox religious communities used to work as a representation or better as a re¬ duction and even castration of extremely diversified religious situation. To put it differently, specific reduction vvorn us about the repressive potentialsand activitiescoming notonly from the communist State and party apparatus, but also from the three dominant religious communities themselves. Catholic-Moslem-Orthodox leading triad vvas dominant, in reality(empirically), as vvell as in differ¬ ent forms of ideological discourse be- fore communists and communism came in Balkans. it is possible to present the vvhole history of religious oppression in this part of Europe as an oppression among members of the dominant religious triad. next, and in my opinion the most important aspect of this problem is oppression vvhich came from the “Big Three” and vvhich vvas turned against other smaller religious communities. In this context the communist or better Yugo- slav system of self-management, as a sortofanti-religiousmovement-system, lasted just less than half a century, vvas just an episode in a very long history of quite hard religions strifes in Balkans. Mainly betvveen Catholic and Orthodox churches as institutionswithquitestrong interest connections vvith different in- stitutions, organisations outside of the state (Vatican, Moscovv...). It is not mere chance that Vatican as a State vvas among first States vvho recognized slovenian and croatian independence. Similarly it is not by accident that com- mencements of orthodox clergy and different other speakers(“Pamjat” or- ganisation, for example) too, from Moscovv are trying to explain us “jeop- ardizing" of Orthodoxes and Slavs in ex-Yugoslavia. Religion, Nation and State One of the central problems concerning Yugoslavia’s way of “decommunisation”, of the transition from communism to post-communism is concentrated at the point that almost through vvhole history (at least until 1929), it looks so that in the Balkans existed only one nation, vvith several tribal names vvithin One and not more Slavic nation. So, each single slavic nation or Yugoslavs (Yugo meaning south) were forced to keep their own hindered, thvvarted national identity through religious and not national conviction. The result vvas and stili is rather primitive sort of me- dieval, old-fashioned religious “con- sciousness”, through vvhich in a quite absurd manner, southslavic nations distinguish themselves regarding dif¬ ferent religious convictions. In other » The Intruder 11 Yugoslavia / Analysis words the function of the reli- gion is tvvofold: as a factor of preservation of national iden- tity (especially in serbian his- tory) (1), and secondly, as an element which, during the history, used to block au- tonomous national devel- opment, relatively inde- pendent f rom the religion (church). Just this situation is the reason why different na¬ tional movements/structures, vvhich has destroyed Yugo- slavia, are more or less reli- gious or in religion “soaked” movements/ structures. The impossibility of a “vvestern type” of nation build- ing processes (2) in the past is entirely easy to grasp, not solely in times of Venice, turkish and austro-hungarian empires, but also in the twen- tieth centurywhen One nation (serbian) ideology was pre- dominant (especially between 1929 and 1941) (3). Tito’s time development made impossi- ble the disconnection of those two elements or spheres and theirseparateexistence. In the eighties we witnessed specific kinds of implosion of civil society and at the end of the eighties we suddenly sought an explosion, or more exactly, revolution of the same civil society, vvhich over- threw the old system as a vvhole. due to those facts in post-communist Yugoslavia have appeared two struc- tural elements or even forms of oppressed soci- ety (stili inseparable!): nation and religion. And, if adding to this kind of structural situation the fact that different religious divisions in Yugosla- via were only partly the same as national divisions, and even less as republic/state borders (5), it is easier to explain to- day’s vvar and its religious im- plications. Two types of “abandoning” communism The situation was similarin Tito’s State, but Tito's Yugoslav nation was not a nation anymore in the sense of “the people” as such or community connected by blood, language, common market.... It vvas literally a “vvorking nation”. In conformity with more than terrible na¬ tional and religious strifes in Balkan history,Yugoslavcommunistshavetried to avoid similar events in the "new soci- ety” they have started to build. They also had in their hands relatively useful experiences from the Second VVorld War, but simultaneously they made other mistakes. in order to escape from religious and national collectivist type of conflict production, they have estab- lished a nevv one: social or socialist. Instead of opening a vvindovv tovvards the individualisation, they threvv out even those forms of individualisations vvhich arose in the partisan War circumstances vvhich by definition vvere full of indi- vidual actions and culture. The “socialist” problem at this stage vvas not concentrated at the point that many different peoples of Yugosla- via differ in their roles as political sub- jects, in their ethnic composition, that “the people’’, in the sense of demos or plebs and as political subjects have lost political influence and meaning in the Yugoslav constitutional system, vvhilethe nations and nationalities (na- Rene Maltete tional minorities) have become the main political subjects. Rather, individual, in- dividuality, as apolitical subject or be- ing vvas suppressed. “Political” existence assuch vvas not individual but collective, and first of ali in the meaning of sub-states (repub- lics) system inside of Yugoslavia as a “mega-state-system” and not in the way of "People" or ‘‘Nation’’. To be Sloven or Serb proletarian as a non-political being, a being reduced at the vvorking level (homo laborans) from vvhich vvhole corpus of rights have been derived. Precisely from this point ofvievv, it could bepossibleto observe, if notto explain, tvvo basic problems of the previous state. Firstly, there vvere a shortage of citizen- shipandtheabsenceof human rights(4). Secondly, a specific oppression of na¬ tional identity vvhich vvas -similarly as religion- pushed aside of public sphere or of sphere vvhich has replaced the political space (mono-party system as such). In other vvords, throughout the centuries, tvvo structural “spheres” of society, religion and nation, vvere op¬ pressed in a similar way. The not “nor¬ mal” (in the vvestern european sense) The decisive distinction betvveen tvvo different kinds of national movements in Yugo- slavia, among Slovens and Croats on one side and Serbs (Montenegro as vvell), is that these movements in Slovenia and Croatia vvere in the opposition, thus taking the form of anti-commu- nism. In Serbia and Montenegro, the national movement vvas imposed from above, from the communist leadership itself (Miloševič). Therefore, the anti- communist national movement in Ser¬ bia and Montenegro had little possibili- ties and less space for developing a strong, or even anti-communist posi- tion. In addition, one of the conse- quences of this interior national paralysis vvas the “production” of the extreme form of the anti-communist national movement in Serbia. Namely national assault on communism (as a non-democratic, totalitarian, dictator- ship...) vvas not enough, so national ideology has sought much deeper in history. Authors such as Čosič, Draškovič, Šešelj.... found it in the ex- istence of the Serbian medieval State and Church, in Serbian mythology, es- pecially in these periods of the history in vvhich the Serbian nation and Serbs vvere “victims” of other nations in Yugo- slavia (preferably of Albanians and Croats). the result vvas an extremely backvvard “nationalist ideology”. 12 The Int mder Yugoslavia / Analysis Searching tor and developing of the hindered, thvvarted national identity, they mainly talked of blood, church and medieval rulers (6), and victims. The outcome was that the formed post-so- cialist Serbian national consciousness remained vvithout “real answers” up to the present days, serbian questions and problems which resulted in a war against Croatia (first of ali, regarding the question of actual Serbian national- socialist leadership). In Croatia a simi- lar process went on, but in a more democraticform. democratic, of course, in the meaning of anti-communist na¬ tional block, which won the elections and established a strong right wing, populist national policy, symbolically and empirically, based on the majority rule principle. In both situations, churches and clergy played an impor- tant role in nation-building processes. The čase was similar in Slovenia, vvhere Christian democrats won elections and established the first post-communist government. The end of Yugoslavia Due to the absence of possibili- ties for “proper national identification” (lack of State identity) different ex-Yu- goslav nations replaced it with an identification based on religious beliefs . In that meaning religious adherence was and remains being a sort of “com- pensation for State identity" . The question wetherthe War in Croatiacould be interpreted as a religious one or not lead to a negative ansvver. This war surely contains in itself suitable strong religious elements, but not decisive for it. They are part of a larger entireness, firstly of the nation-building processes, secondly of the building of nation-state structures and finally they work as ele¬ ments of a larger entitywhichonly could be comprehended as a terrible war. Hovvever, afterthe war in Croatia itisobviousthatone logicalandhistorical circle in the growth of Yugoslavia is concluded. The Yugoslav state as a “common house” of different nations, national and culturalminorities, religious communities based on the cement of communist concept of “organic com- munity” becomes obsolete. Moreover, Yugoslavia became an obstacle for the possible (?) development of the parts from vvhich it is constituted. Strong centrifugal forces overthrovv any pos- sibility of “normal”, common living. Per- haps it would be possible in the future, but afterthis War, probably not before the XXI century. NOTES (1) Even more could be claimed in today's war situation when Montenegrians (and Macedonians) are trying to defend or, better, to develop theirovvn national identity, notthrough religion assuch, but with the help ofthe autochephality of Montenegrian (and Macedonian) Church regarding Serbian Orthodox Church. (2) Just this impossibility as such was, of course, constituting a part of “normal" or vvestern european type of nation- building processes. (3) Both, Austrohungarian and Serbian monarchies vvere religious States, and in both, there were dominant nations (Germans and Serbs). (4) Although Yugoslavia was not a proper example for this explanation, also in this country one could observe diminution and rejectionof human rights at the conceptual level, namely, as a “bourgeois” one. (5) In Yugoslavia, it is possible to observe two different problems. First there are different nations vvhich “be- long"to different religious communities. For example Slovens and Croats are catholic by faith, Serbs, Montenegrians and Macedonians are orthodox, Alba- nian, Muslims (in the meaning of nation) and Bosniachs are muslim by faith. But, Albanians as a nation are at the same time “members” of three different reli- gions: Islam, catholic and Orthodox. Besides, and that is the biggest problem, “members" of different nations -with Slovens as an exception- have not lived vvithin the borders of the same republic/ state of the former Yugoslavia. Nation- state building processes literally have destroyed previous social and “politi- cal” system based on the balances among nations, religious communities, different other minorities, and above ali, on the ground of communist party- state pressure. (6) The lack of the "modem” national ideology in the serbian nationalist movement results also in an extremely dangerous form of declaration of Holy War against Muslims (Albanians and Muslims from the Serbian Sandiak) and Catholic (firstly Croats). The PointZeroof Subjectivity The impact of disintegration on the position of women in Yugoslavia By Vlasta Jalušič Victor Brauner: La Fracture de la subjectivite, 1951 “Nobody cares about anything in the čase of vvomen in Serbia", told me a friend of mine, woman vvriter, whom I asked to explain me a little bit more about the actual situation. “Even not in the sense of trying to eiiminate wom- en’s formal rights, because they are lost at any čase.” When asking myself how to grasp the so-called “position of vvomen in Yugo- slavia” few years ago, I vvould be con- fronted vvith one, probably not unusual difficulty: namely, it is impossible to vvrite about “vvomen in Yugoslavia” as a unique “field". I vvould probably start vvith describing of broader historical, political, cultural, economical and other differences vvhich resisted the 45 years unifying socialist system and were ac- tually growing bigger and bigger. I vvould speak about six republics and two au- tonomous provinces, about big differ¬ ences, not only betvveen men and vvomen, but also among vvomen from different republics, regions, nationali- ties, religions, not solely about vvage differences betvveen men and vvomen, but also about the gap betvveen vvomen from Southern and northern parts of Yugoslavia..., about the 23.3% of illit- erate vvomen in Kosovo (ex-autono- mous province vvith the Albanian ma- jority population, vvhere Serbian regime destroyed ali legal Albanian institutions) » The Intrudcr 13 Vugosiavia / Analysis and 0.9% in republic of Slovenia, etc... Anyway, I have much bigger troubles now. Infact, atthetime I am writing this paper there is no more Yugoslavia as a common State of six republics and two autonomous provinces. There is a war going on in the republic of Croatia. Some parts of former Yugoslavia are proclaiming themselves independent States, some of them are trying to pre¬ sen/e “the rest” of it as something they want to call Yugoslavia in any čase. There are deep strifes about the ques- tion of how the people shouid live (separated or together) in this area in the future. Yet there vvould probably be many vvomen from some parts of the former Yugoslav territory, claiming that my opinion is not adequate and that there stili exists something like Yugo- slavia. In other words, somebody living in the republic of Slovenia shouid not have the right to vvrite about “Yugosla- via”. Therefore I can not describe broadly the “position of vvomen”, but only write about the last “common point” of Yugoslavia: the disintegration and its existing and possible future effects on women’s lives and rights. I cannot offeranycertain newstatistics,because at this mom ent, nobody works on statis- tics concerning the position of vvomen. my starting point issomewherebetween past and future, vvhere everything is difficult to define, vvhere nothing is cer- tain, excepttheuncertaintyof thefuture developments. If at the beginning of eighties, it seemed that the main difficulty for vvomen in different parts of Yugoslavia vvould be the so-called “transition" from the so¬ cialist system and State or self-managing economy to the market system, vvhich vvomen inallex-socialistcountrieswere facing at this time, now it is clear that it vvas not the main problem. Namely the situation is much vvorse than expected. I vvould not like to spend too much time by describing rather well knovvn facts concerning a quite good legal position of vvomen in former Yugoslavia (after the Second VVorld War): connected to special ideological premisesofthe role of “vvomen in socialism” and not to the concept of women’s politics, of course. The very common assumption, both in the everyday’s experience in the so¬ cialist system and in the “political- theoretical” (official) explanation of the so-called “position of vvomen” in the society vvas the follovving: there is a vvomen question, vvhich is actually not a “separated” one, but only a part of a broader “social question”. The vvomen in our country enjoy equality, at least formal equality, there are only some corrections at the level of actual posi¬ tion of vvomen necessary (social meas- ures) and perhaps at the level of con- sciousness, and vve vvould solve the vvomen question. Hovvever, this position of socialist “State feminism", vvhich, it is true, has grovvn out of some kind of movement and vvas the core of the ex-allembracing social¬ ist women’s semi-autonomous organi- sation (Anti-fascist League of Women from the Second VVorld War), abol- ished in 1953, having succeeded in forming a relatively equalising system forwomen,aboveallasasocialequality: the main achievements vvere in such areas as employment, social čare, public čare for children, parental leave, reproductive rights. Only for illustration, the areaof reproductive rights has been founded in the constitution of 1974 in a paragraph about the “human right to decide over the birth of one’s ovvn children”(1). In different republics, the declared rights vvere realised to differ¬ ent extents, not vvithout the influence of religious differences, differences of tradition and the level ofdevelopment.... Though vve know that the data of the 'average amount of employed people in Yugoslavia being vvomen vvas 39%, the concrete data vvas: in the republic of Slovenia 46%, in Croatia 42%, in other republics betvveen 35 and 37% and in Kosovo 22%, then it must be clear that vve have had the differences vvhich can be compared with the vvorld North-South differences. So, even before, no average sta- tistical data could explain the position of “Yugoslav” vvomen (the paradox vvith this name is also that Albanian vvomen are not “south Slavic”). The very special issue vvas the question of the political repre- sentation of vvomen, vvhich vvas - compared to the employment- very lovv on the higher posts. because of the special characteristics of the so-called self-managementsystem,thedecision- making net has been rather non-trans- parent, and the number of vvomen del- egates in the so-called "delegate sys- tem” vvas at the beginning of eighties 26%, but vvas not the right indicatorfor their political activity and influence. The mentioned “state feminism” per- sisted in some form vvith a perceptible influence at the decision-making level until the beginning of early eighties. Then it has lost its influence and legiti- macy. Loosing its influence vvas a consequence of changing the vvhole system and grovving economical diffi- culties on the one side, of starting process of disintegration of the vvhole state and society on the other. The legitimisation of the special social poli¬ tics, connected to the presupposed special women's role in socialism has been “useless” for the period vvhen a nevv concept of market system vvas introduced. Besides, ali changes vvere very closely connected to the grovving nationalism, vvhich shovved hovvfragile women’s rights and formal equality can be, if there is no longer tradition of women’s movement, independent women’s political forms and no public women’s political conscientiousness about the meaning of these rights. The dominant “nevv democratic” discourse about vvomen started to claim the 40 years “forced emancipation of vvomen”, vvhich has presumably destroyed and terribly socialised the family. On the other hand, a very strong ideology of progress and praise of “democracy and human rights” vvas and stili is atvvork. In spite of this, there is no question- ing of the term “democracy”, vvhich is as a majority rule used as a covering for every possible action or argumentation (includ- ing the war). There emerges a para- doxical situation, vvhere one might vvork out the argument for both abolishing and restore certain human rights. Nearly 40 years of absence of an or- ganised women’s netvvork have had tragicalconsequencesonthe legal and empirical position of vvomen after the first post-socialist elections in different republics. The old socialist legislative came first of ali from “above" and vvas not the result of long-lasting political battle from “belovv". It seemed as if the good father or mother state (in most of the languages in Vugo¬ siavia, the state has a female gender) brought a present, “so¬ cial” legislative to vvomen, vvith¬ out numerous vvomen participat- ing actively in struggles for it. The political issue vvas reinterpreted as the question of the “social” and covered by the “imposing” social Solutions vvithout raising the questions of women’s posi¬ tion as a political one. And, in spite of a certain numberof independent women’s position and feminist groups existing from the middle of seventies, there vvas mainiy no povverful basis to influence the changing old and (if at ali) the form¬ ing of the nevv lavvs, vvhen the povver changed. Namely, Yugoslavia had in this sense an advantage compared to the other socialist States: open borders, vvhich allovved an early impact of vvest- ern women's movements. Several groups appeared at the beginning of 14 Tlie Iutruder photo DVuga Yugoslavia / Analysis eighties, moslly in centres as Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana, among them rape crisis centers and academical groups.(2) Onward, in the last few years the f inan- cial and social position of the majority changed in vvorse and strong militarisation took plače. In the middle of the eighties we could see the pic- tures of women from Macedonia fight- ing for bread at one shop’s entrance. We can hardly imagine the Kosovo situation in 1991 vvhere no schools in Albanian language exist anymore (and vvhere even before, until the beginning of eighties, oniy 46% of girls finished the primary school), vvhere health čare has lost professional point of view, vvhere vvomengivebirthtotheirchildren eithervvithoutprofessional medical help or have to pay high amounts of hard currency. Meanvvhile, one can observe pictures of vvomen (in Croatia), joining military volunteers, on another hand morethan one million refugees ali over Yugoslavia and out of it, partly desert- ers, but mostly vvomen and children. And again, in Sloveniafor example, you could see pictures of vvomen organis- ing charity work. The loss of autonomy in Kosovo and Vojvodina, the independence of some republics, the disinte- gration in some of them and in the rest of Yugoslavia brought not solely economical and social consequences, but above ali, the loss of fundamental human rights. After abolition of the federal constitu- tion in different republics some kind of lavvless situation appeared. After more or lessdemocratic elections in the single republics, vvhere national or nationalist parties won the majority, only very few vvomen got into republics’ parliaments (under socialist conditions ali over Yu- goslavia there vvere from 10 to 25% vvomen in various assemblies): in Slovenia 11%, in Croatia 4% and else- vvhereless. In most of the republics, the reproductive rights vvere left out of the constitutions. Especially in Croatia, a very strong anti-abortion campaign, vvhich took plače before the war began, had as effect the abolition of the indi- vidual right to decide over the birth, by leaving it out of the constitution and introducing the right of physicians to "conscientious objection” as a constitu- tional right. (3) In Slovenia, the repro- duction rights vvere left in the new con¬ stitution as a "freedom", but only after long campaigning and a large demon- strationof manywomen’sgroups. (4) In Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is no dis- cussion about the position of vvomen at ali: but simultaneously, it is obvious that, especially in war circumstances, they took over the main burden of re- production of life. It is quite clear that the new nation- states do f unction so to speak "over the female body”. A nevv nation-state needs its national body and vvomen to repro- duce it. It devises vvomen in “ours” and “theirs”. This ideology operates now in its most rough form. We are not only faced with the large changes and turn over of the different spheres of political, social, group or individual lives and rights, but also with something vvhich could be called “bringing the society back to the State of nature” in order to be able to build up a completely ‘‘nevv" system. And that is the main character- istic of revolution, especially of those ones, vvhich are connected to violence. In the čase of former Yugoslavia vve are confronted vvith vvar, in vvhich vve are, volens nolens, both actors and observ- ers. Again, once more in the his- tory, vve are vvitnessing violent disintegration of State, political mechanisms, of what is called social structure and its connec- tions. This inevitably involves changes and suffering in the real lives of individuals, individual vvomen as well as the redifinition or rebuilding of the “category” vvhich is called vvoman. This redifinition is going on at ali levels of acting, judging and speaking. And the common ques- tion I see as a problem for vvomen in former States or rests of this State, re- gardless to the specific positions and differences is, hovv to come to terms vvith the situation, vvhere vvomen in few years changed from the šemi or quasi “social” subject (vvomen vvorkers) to the “natural ferment” of re- production of life. Namely, in a society vvhere only ques- tions of survival appear, there is no real space to make poli- tics. NOTES (1) In the republic of Slovenia, for example, this right did not only include abortion rights (on demand until the 10th vveek of pregnancy) but, first of ali, the social, health and other facilities to enable to give birth to desiredchildren. This included the vvhole net of women’s health centers, accessible (free) contraception, abortion on demand, payed out of the health insurance. Not to speak about the health čare for mothers and chil¬ dren, and other social facilities. (2) And at the beginning of the vvar in Croatia, in September 1991, women’s groups from the vvhole territory of Yugoslavia vvere the first peace initiators at the level of the so- called “civil society". (3) Recently, tvvo vvomen journalists went to the central women's dinic in Zagreb pre- tending they want to make an abortion and vvere told that this clinic does not make such interventions any more. (4) You can read in details about the recent situation in Slovenia in this regard in Intruder 3 “The reappearance of civil society ?”, by Marija Melodič. The Intruder 15 Yugoslavia / Analysis WQMEN IN SERBIA Staša Zajovič revolution” — the perceived threat posed by the Albanian vvomen of Kosova province, who have the highest fecondity rate in Europe. Serbian repression in Kosova has as one of its objectives a reversal of this demographicgap. This has been seen in increasingly militarist (or “national security”) terms. The structures of mili- tarised povver now insist that the birth- rate mustgrowsothatthe nation mightdefend itself in military conflict with other people. And women are to be blamed for any shortfall in this sacred mission: “I call upon ali Serbian vvomen to give birth to one more son in order to carry out their national debt” stated one politician. Another, Rada Trajkovic of the Association of Kosovo Serbs, was even more explicit in vievving mothers’ sons as cannon fodder: “For each soldier fallen in the war against Slovenia [June 1991] Serbian vvomen mustgive birth to 100 more sons”. Political pimps Before the massive wave of mobilisa- tion for civil war, there were vvarnings in some parts of the country — such as Montenegro, knovvn for its martial tradi- tions —that men should be prepared to give up their lives for the f atherland and that anything less vvould be a blow to their masculine dignity. Men were ex- pected to follovv national tradition, whereby “in war not one Montenegrin man can be protected by a vvoman.” The militarisation of former Yugoslavia has meant the imposition of military values, symbols, and militaristic lan- guage; a cult of necrophilia (expressed in slogans such as "the frontiers of Serbia are vvhere Serbs are buried”); andtheacceptanceof political and moral totalitarianism. Along with these ideo- logical shifts has come a rigid separa- tion of masculine andfeminine roles — in short, vvoman as mother and man as vvarrior — and the political marginalisation of vvomen. Belgrade feminist STAŠA ZAJOVIC com- ments on how language, ideology, and povver have been used to control vvomen and reinforce nationalist mythology. Throughoutthe postvvar period, concern overwomen’s social condition in Serbia and Yugoslavia has been reducedtoan obsession with keeping upthevvorking- class birthrate. As nationalism replaced class struggle as the basis of political discourse in Serbia, this obsession with reproduction was transferred to the nation. With the 1987 “anti-bureaucratic revolution” [led by Slobodan Miloševič] a strange sort of sisterhood began to show itself on the streets. Huge crovvds throughout the country shouted “we want arms” — in a sort of collective trance, United in hate and the desire for vengeance for Serbia’s “offended nation- hood”. In tandem with the cult of blood and soil, the new Serbian nationalists also summonedtolifethesymbolicmediaevil figure of _mother Yugovich_ — the long-suffering, brave, stoic mother of nine, offering herchildren uptodeath in the defense of the fatherland. Maternity is now to be seen as an obligation, not as afreeoption for vvomen; the sexuality of vvomen has to be controlled and reduced to procreation. Kosovo: the demographic counter-revolutio n Serbia’s demographic slump has been described as “one of the greatest trag- ediesof the Serbian people” in particular in light of the “demographic counter- The manipulation of vvomen by the military establishment began some time ago; but the clearest examples are found in the ral- lies held by the “Women’s Movement for Yugoslavia” (linked to the pro-mili- tary parties, and formed in 1990. In February 1991 the vvomen of this movement publicly lent their support to the JNA, saying that they considered it the only force capable of saving the country. The vvomen have been used; the military hierarchy carries out the function of “political pimp”, putting vvomen on the Street to give their ap- proval to ends vvhich are contrary to women’s ovvn interests. This text is also published in PEACE NEWS, March 1992 One parliamentarian stated that “we in Montenegro believe that a man who is fighting at the front and allovvs himself to be hauled back home by a vvoman should commit suicide at once.” This perception that vvomen were prevent- ing men fromfulfilling their national duty was reinforced in radiobroadcastsfrom the Dubrovnik front, in vvhich a high proportion of Montenegrins were in- volved. Soldiers vvould send greetings to their fathers, brothers, and male friends, but not to their vvives or girl- friends. 16 Tlie Intruder Yugoslavia / Analysis Reiecting manipulation Happily, the number of men who wish to free themselves from this macho war culture is growing, and more are not ashamed of being protected by their mothers, wives, andsisters. Acommit- teeofwomen wasformed in Montenegro in October 1991; “We raise the voice of protest against the private war vvhich those in charge are making from their offices. They have senttheirsonsoutof the country and on to the tennis courts, whileoursonscarryon being carried by force to the front and to their graves. We demand that these demented leaders, politicians, and membersof the military resign immediately in orderto save this country.” ber ''occupy the administrative jobs, communication Services, health, Stores. We are simply replacing the boys who have gone into combat. But we too have passed the military entrance exam and we can help the boys at any mo¬ ment.” A small number of Croatian and Ser- bian women fighters _have_ gone to the front and have been rapidly con- verted into mythicalfigures, confirming whatpatriarchalhistoryteachesus: that women enter history only when they have taken on masculine roles. The media celebrate these women as hero- ines when they kili the enemy; when women fighters from the other side are captured they are denounced as “mon- strous women” and the like. The mothers’ movement With the end of the war in Slovenia in early July 1991, human rights — above ali, the right to life — lay in ruins throughout Yugoslavia. In such asitua- tion, women burst on to the political scene, demanding the right to live. On 2 July, a parliamentary session in Bel- grade was interrupted by several hun- dred parents, mostly conscripts’ moth¬ ers. This was the first civil society ini- tiative against the war in the federal Capital, and the first to protest against the ab use of wom en 's rep rod uctive work by the State, nation, army, and party. “Men are the controliers of the war and of our sons. We do not give them per- mission to push our sons forvvard to kili one another." Women as soldiers Thefirstfemalebattalionofthewarwas established in Glina, a Serbian-majority town in Croatia annexed to the Serbian autono- mous region in De¬ cember 1991. Mem- bers took the oath “we will fight against ali of the Serbs' enemies underthe protection of God" and heard male officers declare senti- ments like “if our moth¬ ers should not have been heroines, they vvould not have given birth to such valiant children." Patriotic women also fight on the “home front”, of course. In Belgrade, vvomen knit socks and gathervvin- terclothing to keepthe boysatthefrontwarm. The pro-government media fawn on every evidence of maternal mobilisation, at the same time ridiculing the work of women in the anti-war committees and centres. An increase in the numbers of vvomen in the army is no indicator of sexual equality, least of ali vvhere there has been no corresponding democratisa- tion of society. There are vvomen in ali the militias and national armies now active in former Yugoslavia, appropri- ating the most brutal patriarchai values. VVomen members of the Serbian mili¬ tias in Croatia do not occupy important positions in the military hierarchy. The frontline is for the men; the_knidze_or femalemilitia, inthevvordsof onemem- We feel it is clear that the majority of vvomen are on the side of peace. They are convinced that they can offer the historical female alternative; nonvio- lence in plače of violence, life in plače of death, vitality in plače of destruction. Stana Pavic, an elderly refugee from a Serbian village in Croatia, told me that “vve vvomen ... should have united like them [the military] — vve could have made a peace accord in no time at ali.” As a result, the very role — reproduc- tion — vvhich marginalises vvomen in their private lives has had the effect of converting them into active participants in the political life of the nation. So the patriarchai divide betvveen the personal and the political is vveakened; the per¬ sonal has become the political in this war. The mothers’ movement has contained ali the ingredients for a mili- tarisfs nightmare. On the other hand, the mothers’ move¬ ment has been subjecttodifferenttypes of manipula- tion by political structures. A part of the mothers’ movement has been used—both in Serbiaand Croatia —for patriotic propaganda. It is easy to exploit the sentimentsof mothers vvhose sons’ lives are in danger. The soldiers’ mothers at times feel confused, inter- nalising the struggle betvveen the “pa- triotic”sentimentwhichunderliesofficial propaganda and the desire to save their own sons. Yugoslav vvomen have been linked to- getherinafeministnetvvorksince 1987; they have managed to maintain soli- darity and plan jointactivitieseversince, rejecting the conditions that support policies of divide and rule. Over the past four months normal communica¬ tion has been almost impossible, with the cutting of telephone lines, post, and transport betvveen the republics. In spite of such practical obstacles, feminists — Serbians, Albanians, Croatians, Slovenians, Hungarians, and Montenegrins—are united inorganising against the war. Jointandsimultaneous protests, such as the weekly “Women in Black” demonstrations, are a product of this unity of purpose. Translated to Spanish by the author; translated from Spanish by Juley Howard # The Intruder 17 Yugoslavia / Analysis Ak CEU R^DPELAJNI E»E»B^\NIONI ^flLAJKklNGl OR A rKpuIOČA OF PAKISTAN / INDIA DRAMA The text reproduced here is a part of a longerarticle, which is going to be pub- lishedmid-aprilin the book which work- ing title is: "Yugoslavia: disintegration anaiysing”, advertised in this issue of Intruder. There is no doubt that some highly optimisticdreams aboutthe tran- sition from a communist society to a post-communist one have been lately dreamed off. And particularly in the čase of Yugoslavia vvhich not so long ago seemed to be the first one to make such a transition in the most easy and quick way. Primarly as a transition from old collectivism, already eroded, to a CITY CENTRE OF BEYROUTH. "The Lebanese are today very far from ali the mirages vvhich have led them to the war” new individualism already grovving up as well as a transition from vveakened and vveakening authoritarianism to new democraticanti-authoritarianism.orthe first one to make a rather easy transi¬ tion from a not rigid state controlled economy, generating a society of scar- city, to afree market economy produc- ing by a short cut a society of prosperity and affluence just behind the corner. There is no doubt more particularly that an over-optimistic dream of solution of By Srdjan Vrcan Ph D of sociology, Split Yugoslav crisis along the lines of the so-called Scandinavian model has been recently dreamed off. The reče nt tu m of events has made the Scandinavian solution highly improbable, and that for some major reasons. First, owing to the fact that the existing hostility and hatred along na- tional and ethnic lines have already attained such an extend and intensity that a peaceful and mutually agreed and freely consented to a solution along the Scandinavian model has become an illusion. Imposed and inforced solu¬ tion comes to be the only feasible one, but it remains very precarious, project- ing the existing conflicts in future and generating new future conflicts. Sec- ond, owing to specif ic position of Bosnia- Herzegovina. It seems very clear that any partition of Bosnia- Herzegovina would be as difficult as a partition of a leopard’s skin andcertainlywouldcreatemoreconflicts and lead to vvidespread hostility than eliminate and resolve them. At the same time an independent re- public of Bosnia-Herzegovina would hardly be a durable peaceful solution if the area would be characterized by perpetuation of exacerbated conflicts between Croatia and Serbia and if Ser- bians and Croatians would mutu- ally act as arch-enemies, not being able to live peacefully in any kind of common association or good neighbourhood. It is highly improbable that a political philosophy vvould be efficiently functioning by con- sensusin Bosniaand Herzegovina, as- suming that Muslims, Serbians and Croatians may live peacefully side by side in a Bosnian State as equal and free citizens, while the whole ex-Yugo- slav area is being politically reorgan- ized upon the contrary political philoso- phy of the formula “One nation, One state, onefaith, one language, oneflag, one national political philosophy, one national television and broadcasting netvvork, raised to a cathedral of the national špirit, one national truth, one true national political party, one leader or father of the nation, etc’’, and as- suming that there is no possibility of living together in a democratic, peaceful and equal way in any kind of political community or any kind of association of Croatians and Serbians. Consequently, the explosive charge of inter-ethnic relations in bosnia and herzegovina is not going to be dis- mantled or substancially reduced in the near future. It seems more realistic to fear that the eventual solution of the Yu- goslav crisis by partition vvould follovv at least partially another well-known model with contrary connotations, i.e the model exhibited on the Indian sub-continent in dismantling the british Dominion of India. (1) It is the model vvhich led to the creation of two new independent states of Pakistan and India, both ob- taining quick universal interna- tional recognition as independ¬ ent states, both entering the UNO and both becoming members of the British Commonvvealth. Un- fortunately, ali this did not pre- vent the two new independent states to wage at least two major wars in the meantime with hun- dreds of thousands of deads and vvounded, with a mass of people f leeing from a side of the border to another, many of them being driven by force from their native homes, with occa- sional massacres of civilians on reli- gious and ethnic basis, and finally, with the new state line, dividing the new 18 The Intruder Yugoslavia / Analysis States, turned practically into afront line on some sections of which guns have never been silent since partition and with specif ic regions becoming areas of permanent interstate crisis and of per- petuating armed clashes and conflicts. Consequently, it is more promis- ing in order to anticipate prob- able consequences of a solution of the YugosIav crisis by partition to take into account develop- ments in the Indian sub-conti- nent than developments on Scandinavian peninsula more than a century ago. It seems very realistic to predict that a solution along the Indian model could be applied, but it would result in recourse to arms and in perpetuation of h osti I ity and conflictuality with almost permanent vvalking on the very brink of war for the years to come. There is another historical ex- perience vvhich ought to be taken into consideration. It is the Lebanese ex- perience. Let us underline only some crucially relevant points in that expe- rience. First, the Lebanese experience demonstrates that “a State of things vvhich persists has a tendency by generalizing to establish itself it may become a way of life and even to organize itself in a social system”. (2) It is evident that the same is valid for a prolonged motion in direction of a war, orforprotracting march uponthe very brinkof war or preparing for a war have their own logic and it turns the war, being prepared orbeing vvaged, into a functioning social system or a way of life, covering tendentially the vvhole of the society. Therefore, playing a political game with war and peace is not an inno- cent political game vvhich may be abandoned at any chosen moment with anyconsequence. Second, the Lebanese expe- rience, vvhich is the longest modern experience with a civil vvar in an ethni- cally and religiously mixed area, indi- cates that the preparation to vvage a vvarand/orvvalking a longtime uponthe very brink of a major vvar, the end of vvar and establishing durable peace be- comes a very complicated and difficult affair. In substance, peace undersuch circumstances is not simply the end of vvar and least of ali the end of shooting and of open hostility. Ahmed Beydoun concludes that “elevating itself to the d ig n ity of a social system, vvar becom es less and less comparable to different ruins it has produced or to anomalies it has imposed upon thousands. A con- seguence of this transformation is the fact that peace could not be anymore a pure end of vvar. It has to be no less and more but replacing complex and pro- gressing of a system by another one”. ( 3 ) Third, the Lebanese experience shovvs that it is vvrong to expect that “peace, vvhatever its formula may be, vvould bring immunity against a return to vvar. This is evidently a nonsense: the system of vvar should be patiently dismantled since it is nothing else but a way of the actual organization of the Lebanese society. Another system ought to replace it.” (4) Therefore, it is not rational and promising to expect that “establishing peace is to be a mat- ter of belligerants”. Moreover, A. Beydoun vvarns that it is erronous to suppose that “belligerant forces are those vvhich should supervise the instauration of a nevv system”. (5) Finally, the Lebanese ex- perience shovvs that political analysing the Lebanese situation, con¬ cludes instructively: “the Lebanese are today very far from ali the mirages vvhich have led them to the vvar. They are far from the national dignity and sovereignty of the state. They are distant also from an equal participation of ali in government and from justice in prosperity. They are far from enjoying an authentic “citizen- ship” in context of a democratic regime of freedom of their “ret- rograde” traditions. They have even lost a large part of their old liberties.” Qnly a freely agreed and consented solution by ali parties involved vvould offer a perspective for a durable peace and stable pacification and normaliza- tion of social life as well as for genuine democratic developments in the area, but such a solution is very unrealisticto strategies oriented to vvage a civil vvar or to prepare for such vvars and in fact making the vvar a way of organization of social life, are at the same time doomed to be self-fulfilling and self-defeating. Namely, preparation for a civil vvar in an ethnic and religious mixed territory usuallyendswithenhacingthechances of vvar and leads to actual vvar conflict, and it does not in long run reduce or eliminate the danger of vvar or armed conflicts. Atthesametime, such political strategies easily leads to a State of things vvhich is to a high degree con- trary to initial expectations. A. Beydoun, Osijek, CRO, 1991 expect under current circumstances. An imposed and enforced solution - vvhich seems more likely- upon any party in conflict vvould not eliminate the remain essentially unstable and pre- carious with a nevv round of recourses to arms being prepared behind the curtain. August 1991 NOTES (1) The author of these lines formulated such ideas in September 1990 in a public debate on the book "Cetvrta Yugoslavia” (Fourth Yugoslavia), vvritten by Slaven Letica, later reported by the weekly “Nedjeljna Dalmacija”. (2) Beydoun, Ahmad, op. cit., p 604 (3) Idem, p 588 (4) & (5) Idem, p 602 • The Intruder 19 PEACE / Initiatives STATEMENT AGAINST CONSCRIPTION IN VOJVODINA These statements come from Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina, via the Hungarian Human Rights Office in New York We consider it the height of hypocrisy, cynicism and anti-democra- ticbehaviour that, in the middle of a lasting ceasefire, when the arrival of peacekeepingforces isonly a matterof days and members of the rump presi- dency, along vviththe President, Prime Minister and other leaders of the Re- public of Serbia, as well as the high command of the one-time Yugoslav People's Army, are ali talking inces- santly about peace and ending the war, the conscription in Vojvodina has Jn- tensified_ and thousands are being taken to the front_. The Serbian mobilisation effort contin- ues to be directed primarily against Vojvodina and within it, the areas in- habited by opposition groups — and therefore aff ect the com munities where minorities live. It is ourfirm belief that the Serbian Party in power and the one-time Yugoslav People's Army are manipulating the mobilisation device as a form of punish- ment and brutal retaliation against the opposition and the minority. The nevvest measures are evidence of this intent, as a result of which further hundreds and thousands of Hungarians from Vojvodina are being forced to take ref- uge abroad or go into hiding at home, follovving in the wake of the more than 25,000 who have already fled their an- cestral homeland. Since the beginning of the war, the Hungarian community of Vojvodina has consistently made its position clear: it has no desire to take part in this dirty, fratricidal slaughter and it deems un- lawful the mobilisation orders issued by the rump presidency. Its representa- tive organisation, the Democratic Alli- ance of Hungarians in Vojvodina (VMDK)—which,intermsofthenumber of seats it holds in Parliament, is the second largest opposition party in Ser¬ bia — has taken this position publicly on numerousoccasions, both domesti- cally and in front of the international community. In the špirit of Helsinki, we declare: there is at present no political problem in Europe which could only be resolved through warfare. It is outrageous, therefore, that despite theabove, the Hungarians of Vojvodina — who wish no part of this internecine vvarfare and who have urged peaceful negotiations from the very outset — are being drafted in disproportionately high num- bers. The latest large-scale mobilisation campaign is having a particularly ad- verse effect on the representative or¬ gan of the Hungarian minority, the VMDK. Previously, draft notices had already been received by one quarter of the organisation’s central leadership, several leaders of the vvestern-Bacska (Bac) regionalchapterandothers. This time notices were sent to two Vice- Presidents of the regional chapter in Szabadka (Subotica) and the Vice- President of the Ada chapter among others. In our judgementthe authorities, main- taining the false pretence of upholding democratic principles, are trying to ob- struct the activities of our organisation not by outlavving it but by resorting to this devious tactic. The same purpose seems evident from the recent sharp increase in the number of wholly un- founded slanderous attacks, unvvar- ranted belligerence and threats against the VMDK and its leaders by the Party in power and its fellovv travellers. It is outrageous that while leaders of the VMDK chapter in Szabadka (Subotica), for example, have been drafted — people who from the beginning advo- cated peace, urged peaceful negotia¬ tions in the midst of war and wholly opposedtakingany part in the fratricidal killing — at the same time, to our knovvledge, no one has been called up for military Service from the inner lead¬ ership of the Party in power and its satellites (KSZ-MJ, Bunyevac-Bokac Party and Serbian Radical Party) — people who swear by vvarfare, launch vicious slander campaigns against the peace movement and boast loudly of their patriotism. Through this statement vve wish to inform the domestic and international community of the discrimination being exercised against the VMDK and its leaders, of the present and likely con- sequences of the forced conscriptions, and of the persecution campaign being vvaged against us. Vajadasagi Magyarok Demokratikus Kozossege (VMDK) — Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina, Ada, 28 January 1992. SERBIAN AUTHORITIES ARREST BELA CSORBA Bela Csorba a Hungarian writer in Vojvodina and member of the VMDK’s 12- person govern- ing body (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina), was arrested on 7 February for avoiding the draft. 20 Tire Intruder Detail of the gravure of Jacgues de Gheyn: Mars Asleep, 1630 PEACE / Initiatives Statement bv the VMDK: The Hungariancommunityof Vojvodina, other peace-loving citizens, and espe- cially VMDK members were shocked and outraged to learn that on 7 Febru¬ ar/, on a public Street in the town of Temerin, police arrested Bela Csorba. Mr Csorba, a member of the VMDK's governing body and President of the organisation’s Temerin Districtchapter, is a noted peace activist and public personality, who serves as responsible editor of _Hirmondo_ [Courier], the newsletter of the VMDK. Bela Csorba had been forced to go into hiding during the past vveeks after re- fusing to comply with a military draft order. Under difficult circumstances and exciting considerable effort, he was nevertheless able to continue carrying out his most important organisational and editorial duties. His arrest is clearly part of the predeter- mined military operation by which the Serbian authorities are seeking to de- stroy the VMDK, by incapacitating the organisation’s leaders with the aim of intimidating, breaking and decapitating the consid¬ erable political oppositional povver rep- resented by the Hungarian community living here. The VMDK — with its resolutepeace-seekingpositions, long- term perspective and firm commitment to democratic principles — has long been a thom in the side of the xeno- phobic tyrants seeking the disintegra- tion of the country. Aware of our defencelessness — that we are at the mercy of circumstances andthattomorrownewvictimsarelikely to be dragged away from our midst — we protest in the strongest possible terms the shameful political repression of the Hungarian community and the arrest and incarceration of those brave peace activists who dared raise their voices against the war. We demand the release of Bela Csorba! We appeal to ali decent, demo- cratic-minded individuals and political organisations to protest the arrest and dragging away of Bela Csorba! Ada, 7 February 1992 Translated by the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, PO Box J, Gracie Station, New York, NY 10028 (tel: +1 212 289 5488, fax: +1 212 996 6268). Posted on GreenNet by War Resisters’ International (gn:warresisters) AMNESTY ACT ArtiCle 1 Ali persons who, prior to the day on which this act goes into effect, have committed the offense of refusing to answer the summons and avoiding mili- tary Service as defined under Article 214 of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia or the criminal offense of unauthorized absence or desertion from the armed forces as defined under Article 217 of this Code, shall be freed from criminal pros- ecution and punishment (hereinafter Amnesty) Recruits, soldiers and reservists, in- cluding many reserve officers, have refused to participate in an undeclared civil war, which was never implied in their oath to defend the country. A replacement for declaration of war was found in a poorly articulated act by the four members of the Presidency of the S.F.R.Y, which was denied recog- nition by the international community and did not enjoy any respect at home, either. The semi-secret mobilizations which had been ordered on the basis of such semi-legitimate act were gener¬ ali/ disputed and rejected, partly be- cause they implied discrimination against citizens of former Yugoslavia of different nationalities. Tens, and perhaps hundreds of thou- sands of mostly young men have fled abroad where they live under difficult conditions, separated from their rela- tives and their country. Many are in hiding atfriends’ and relatives’ homes as illegals, loosing their jobs, interrupt- ing studies and living in constant fear. VVhich country can afford to deprive itself of the talents and Creative contri- bution of an entire generation of youth? It is not enough that many of their peers wenttowar, voluntarily or under duress, and suffered greatlytherein? Both those groups have been severely damaged. We would greatly appreciate your support in our effort to provide Amnesty for those who are hiding or who have been charged with refusing to be mobilized into the armed forces or who have de- serted from the battlefield. We ask you to vvrite to the following authorities: -ThePresidencyoftheS.F.R.Y,Bulevar Lenjina2, 11070 BEOGRAD -The President of the Republic ofSerbia, Mr Slobodan Miloševič, Maršala Tita 14, 11000 BEOGRAD - The Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, Maršala Tita 14, BEOGRAD By the coordinator of the action, Vesna Pešič Center for Anti-War Action, Prote Mateje 6, 11000 Beograd The Intrudcr 21 PEACE / Initiatives CROATS AND SERBS UNITE FOR PEACE AGAINST THE WAR IN CROATIA AND THE SPREAD OF VIOLENCE TO THE TERRITORIES OF FORMER VUGOSLAVIA Mi Za Mir (We For Peace) was estab- lished in Amsterdam on 13 october 1991. it isan association made up largely of young Croats and Serbs who have come to the Netherlands, refusing to take part in the present war in Croatia. Its members are generally highly edu- cated and are therefore able to take a widerviewofthecurrentsituation.They are thus in position to observe develop- ments intheformerYugoslavterritories with a certain detachment and objec- tivity. Mi Za Mir also has a number of active Dutch members. Those who have come to the Nether¬ lands from abroad have no intention ot settlinginthecountry permanently:their stay depends on the duration of the war. They are therefore not seeking political asylum. for as long as they are here, hovvever, they hope to remain together as a group so that they can continue to help one another in finding shelter, employment and food, and provide other forms of moral and ma¬ terial support. By fostering dialogue, the association hopes to help overcome hatred, which is invariably the worst possible basis for any kind of solution. Mi Za Mir aims to demonstrate that dialogue between Serbs and Croats is possible, and that the two sides can join forces in pursuit peace. This dialogue reflects their determina- tion to find a way for Croats and serbs to live side by side in peace and har- mony. Any violent solution to the present situation will simply sow the seeds for furtherviolence inthefuture. Peace,on the other hand, stems for the recogni- tion of one another’s rights and the desire to live and work together in trust. Besides promoting such dialogue vvithin its own ranks, Mi Za Mir hopes to es- tablish links with the peace movements in the former territories of Yugoslavia and counterpart movements in other countries. The association will make every effort to safeguard its aims and ensure that it is not used to further political ends. Activities A number of working parties are re- sponsible for a range of activities de- signed to promote the peace process, and to assist those who have fled the region and ensure that they are able to live in dignity while in the Netherlands. - A liaison group maintains links with the peace movement in the former territories of Yugoslavia, and helps to publicise Mi Za Mir - The press committee is re- sponsible for publicity in the Nether¬ lands. -Thewomen'sgroupaddresses the problemsfaced by women refugees - The art's committee organises cultural activities - The legal rights group is at- tempting to establish the formal status of those seeking temporary refuge in the Netherlands - The survival group has been set up to vvelcome and assist those who have fled the region In addition, the association is organis- ing a course in non-violent methods of resolving conflicts. it is also planning to conduct various sociological and other surveys. Since its inception, Mi Za Mir has re- ceived the support of a number of both Dutch and international organisations. They include the follovving: -Theworking group for vvomen, peace economics and vvelfare - The association of Conscien- tious objectors (VD) - The International Fellovvship of Reconciliation (IFOR) - Women against nuclear arms - VVomen for Peace - The Helsinki Citizens Assem- bly (HCA) - The Interdenominational Peace council (IKV) - Pax Christi - The Tilburg-Dubrovnik Soli- darity Committee - The Netherlands Association for medical War Studies (NVMP) - War Resisters International (WRI) A number of Dutch lawyers have kindly been providing both advice and support. the association is also able to offer the Services of a social vvorker. Target group most of those who form the associa- tion's target group are opposed to seeking refugee status forthe follovving reasons: - They regard their stay in the Netherlands as a temporary measure in anticipation of an end to the war - They wish to stay together as a group in order to support one another and to join forces as part of the peace movement - They hope to avoid branded as refugees in the eyes of their compatri- ots for fear of reprisals on returning to their homeland - They are not seeking any benefit from the Dutch social security system They are entirely dependent on third parties for their basic needs. Mi za mir vvorks closely with Dutch organization of conscietious objectors and also use their office; contact address: Mi Za Mir P.O Box 4920 1009 AX Amsterdam NETHERLANDS TEL 020-6229954 FAX 020-6652422 January 27., Mi za mir has organized a multimedia performance in Paradiso, well knovvn alternative center of Am¬ sterdam. Speakers from Slovenian, Croatian and Serbian peace move¬ ments were invited and some local ra¬ dio stations of Amsterdam provided On¬ line connection with studios of local radio stations from Zadar, Sarajevo, Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana vvhere more activists were available for dis- cussion. Marko Hren reported after his visit to Amsterdam: “Mi za mir is currentlyhighly energized. They are just moving into their newly squated house, construct- ing their club, bar and dormatories. They are incredible example of creativity and positive vibration - probably a very unique čase concerning refugees from former-Yugoslavia. Dutch CO move¬ ment played a big role helping Mi za mir to get organized." To avoid spreading only supreme feed back on the group we have to note that they promised an article and photos for this issue of The Intruder. They did not send it yet - probably too busy.” • 22 11h‘ Intruder PEACE / Initiatives Cross-cultural Education Against Nationalism (Short version; a more detailed version is available in german) By Bettina Gruber and Werner Wintersteiner, Alpe-Adria-Alternativ, Villach-Austria 1. A few weeks ago, in January, Austrian police succeeded to raid up a group of neo-nazies, ali well-known peo- ple for many years. They found tracts and propaganda -leaflets trying to prove that the holocaust against the Jevvish never had happened, but also many vveapons for terrorist attempts against Austrian politicians. Up from this mo¬ ment, a violent debate about neo-nazism started in our country. but it seems to be lead in a vvrong way from the beginning. The leader of the Liberal Party, Jorg Haider, is trying to play down the affair declaring that it was only few “crazy” people who are not to be taken seriously. The governmental parties, Socialistsand Christian Democrats, on the other hand, underlined that the racist behaviour of Mr Haider’s party, shown for ex- ample in the propaganda against the immigrants during the elec- toral campaign in Vienna last automn or his position tovvards the Sloven minority in Carinzia, is one of the very origins and the ideological base of nazi’s extrem- ists. Both parties, of course, didn’t mention their own contribution to the climate in Austria. And if it is true that nationalism is not spread equally in every parties, it is also a fact that it was the govemment vvhich put the army on the border to stop illegal immigration and there were socialist mayors who ref used for the immigrants to stay in their com- munity. Fearing the increasing influence of Haider, the governmental parties started themselves a more or less racist debate, especially during election cam- paigns. 2. Like in ali European countries, East and West, we observe also a wave of nationalism, xenophobia and racism in Austria, “a cry of hopelessness, of rage and hatred” (Claude Julien). Democrats seem to be helpless facing this situation. What are the reasons for the surprising strength of this movement that maybe has found its most awful expression in the Yugoslav crisis (the only real existing common Yu- goslav phenomenon that stili ex- ists) ? Far from pretending that we can give an exhaustive ansvverto thisques- tion we like to turn the attention to the follovving points: - Being afraid of the stranger is, as Julia Kristeva pointed out, the fear of the dark side in ourselves. the influence of nationalism and racism is due to a certain mental structure, 'the authoritar- ian personaiity”, developed by Erich Fromm, Theodor Adorno and others. The society's “structural violence" in policy, culture and education, is reproducing this mentality every day. Under certain circumstances, this capacity might be “actualised” -for example when a demagogic leader of an opposition party exploits the failures of the leading demo- cratic parties. - The actual raise of migra- tion seems to threat some social classes fearing to loose their so¬ cial status. Of course, rich countries like ours shouldnt have any problem to solve the problems of both, natives and foreigners, for example to find a fiat at a fair priče, to get a job with a fair income and so on. But unfortunately, the classical mechanism of trans- forming social problems into na- tional problems stili works. And it works in a very successful way. For intellectuals who are not personally con- cern with these problems, it is easy to speak about a multicultural society and to enjoy alargerofferof food, animation, intellectualdebates.Aslongastheydon't considerthe real questionsof the man in the Street, their good looking ideas will not be accepted. - But it is not only the loss of material security, it is more a general instability of values, a lack of institutions that twenty years ago could help to sup- port changes of life but that can’t do it anymore: families, churches, parties, associations. In today’s Austria, af- ter the end of the cold war, the vvhole identity of the Second Re- public is in question. Austria’s pic- ture of itself has only been inter- preted in a negative way as neutral betvveen the two military blocks. But now, after the breakdovvn ? Espe- cially young people are very aware of ali these problems. and they can react in very different ways, as the examples of young pacifists on the one hand, and young skinheads or neo-nazies on the other hand prove. It depends on theirpersonality and their experiences to vvhich side they incline, and sometimes the two extreme positions are very close to each other. 3. In our region, the so-called Alpe-Adria region (the triangle betvveen Slovenia, the north-vvestern part of ltaly and Carinthia-Styria in Austria) these new problems appear mixed with the old problem of national tensions, more precisely: with the difficult rela- tionship betvveen minority and majority in each country. Our region indeed has always been a melting pot of Roman, Slav and German populations, languages and cultures. Unfortunately, we don’t have only the tradition of a good neighbourhood, but also of nationalist violence, persecution and war. Some prejudices are stili existing, and national minorities have never reached ali the rights they are entitled to in any country of our region - and this inspite of many attempts to establish good and intensive relations betvveen the peoples. After the end of the cold vvar and ali the changes happened in Slovenia and Croatia, on the eve of European Union, we are now on a decisive point: if we succeed in overcom- ing the old and new prejudices in one effort, our region could be- come a model of interethnic coop- eration in a “Europe of regions”. 4. To reach this aim and to pre- vent the expansion of nationalism, vve should also consider the field of educa¬ tion. Of course, education cannot repair the failures of policy as it often seems to be expected, and there is no excuse for political omissions. But even if vve admit that there have been too many illusions on the influence of enlightening and edu¬ cation, the importance ofthis sectorcan- not be denied. In any čase there are things not to be forgotten: school system can also be considered as a part of a system of structural violence both against teachers and pupils. This aspect of the school system should be reflected in any peda- gogical process, and teachers should try to democratize as much as possible ali their lessons. If intercultural education doesn't pay attention to this point, it hardly can contribute to an emancipating edu¬ cation and diminish prejudices and ha¬ tred. Intercultural education has become an importantprincipleofany education rather than a nevv pedagogicai branch. In our opinion, inter-cultural education is too often limited on relations betvveen minority and majority, or preoccupations vvith immigrants. The various possibilities of con- tacts acrossthe neighbouring bor- ders are far from being explored. Forthis reason, our oraanisation started a studv of intercultural school contacts in the Alpe-Adria region. The Iutruder* 23 PEACE / Communications Peace Action in Ljubljana LETTER OFINTENTION To social movements worldwide From AntiWar Campaign Zagreb/ Croatia and Coordination of Peace Initiatives Ljubljana/Slovenia The candels action has stopped on 20th. January 1992. During the candles action in Ljubljana a number of signa- tures were collected in support to the campaign of Serbian anti war groups collectingsignaturesforthe referendum against involvementof serbian recruits in war in Croatia. Peace Caffe in Ljubljana is going on each wednesday evening. Ac- tivists from various social groups come and meet in one of the most beautiful Caffe - Galeries in the center of Ljubljana. During January and February 1992 the follovving topics were dis- cussed: -peace activities in various republics of former Yugoslavia; Hovvard Clark from War Resisters International reported from his 3-weeks tour around former Yugoslavia (see his report in Peace News /January 1992/ published in London. More than 50 local activists were present. -voluntary workwith refugees in Slovenia. Volunteers vvorking in refugee camps reported on their activities, particularily on an international vvorking camp held in one of the two refugee centers in Ljubljana during Christmas and New Year ( Further activities vvere announced, particularily a vvork camp for refugee children planned for May 1992.) -a discussion about Slovenian identity crisis was moderated by Božidar Slapšak -education for primary school refugees was discussed vvith local au- thorities of SLovenia -involvement of vvomen groups was discussed and a number of vvomen peace groups participated in the dis¬ cussion. It was agreed that the next issue of The Intruder will include a special dossier on involvement of vvomens' groups in former Yuqoslavia during the war. -activities of Croatian peace movements vvere discussed and Zoran Ostrič from AntiVVar Campaign from Zagreb vvas moderating the session, presenting also his observations from his 2-weeks travel around former Yu- goslavia at the begining of February 1992. The two follovving Peace Caffee ses- sions will present: conscientious ob- jection in Slovenia and activities of Sarajevo peace groups. Evaluation Yugoslavia vvas a focus of European public during the last six months. We are impressed on the level of response- ability of civil society and vve deeply appreciate the consideration and sup¬ port vvhich involved a large spectrum of groups and individualsfrom ali overthe vvorld. We think it is time for a short reflexion and evaluation of six months cooperation in the region of extremely hard conditions and trauma. We have faced difficulties in Communications and specially the difficulties deriving from the fact that international community could hardly adopt to the fact that re- alitiesinyugoslaviahavetobeobserved as different from each other and that they can not be aproached vvith simplifications and generalizations. Together vvith these difficulties vve gained a lot of experiences. The crisis in Yugoslavia vvas a good test for ali of us. Good Will There isnodoubtthatincredibleamount of good will to contribute positive energy in the time of crisis vvas shovvn by social groups in Europe and vvider. Several groups did vvork for dissemination of information, several researchers, jour- nalists and activists came for a visit to study, learn and report back home, vve have performed quite some trainings for our activists and a number of speakers tours vvere organized for us ali over Europe. Many people have been fund rising or contributing funds for these projects, some technical ecquipment has been transported for our movements into the region. Good Intentions and sometimes bad results Evaluating international activity in the region (SlloveniaandCroatia)vvecame to a conclusion that vve can divide inter¬ national presence into tvvo categories: 1. people vvho come for too short period of time for what they expect to get 2. people vvho are vvilling to dedicate enough time to learn, help or under- stand Time dedicated to the visits has praven a crucial factor for the success of the visits. We discovered, that vve vvere hapy and felt fullfilled after the visits of people (journalists,trainers, volunteers) vvho stayed vvith us enough time vvhich enabled us to listen to each other, un- derstand experiences of vvar, perceive the analysis of the conflict and accept the political proposals vve have. There vvas never a problem vvith such visits. They ali proved constructive, vve devel- oped nevv friendships and long term projects. On the other hand there vvere some cases of “instant” visits vvhere visitors expected much from us (in organiza- tionalterms),butofferedvery lovvdegree of readiness for listening or had almost notime to listen. This particularily applies to “peace caravanes” vvhen a large number of people travelled through former Yugoslavia having very short stops in major cities - vvhich gave us a lotof vvork but very little results. In some cases vve strongly felt a notion of peace turism or peace safari amongst visitors. This kind of actions vvere usually not planned in cooperation vvith localgroups but exclusively from abroad and vve vvere put in a position to “host” them. To emphasise our intentions and priori- ties for the future and to decrease the missinvestements of time and energy vve suggest the follovving principles for the activities in the regions of crisis: 1. projects should be carefully planed and prepared in cooperation vvith local groups 2. enough time should be assigned for desired goals to be fulfilled 3. the numberof people comming should be corresponding the aims of the mis- sion, each one in a team should have 24 The Intruder PEACE / Communications his or her plače and role in the mission. (i.e. for the purpose of facts-finding & Information small groups are desired to arrivefor longer period rather big groups for short period of time). 4. atleastsomepreparatoryworkshould be done before people actually come to the region, or preparatory meetings shouldbeplannedfortheveryfirstdays of arrival to the region. Intentions and priorities We are aware of the fact that long term work after major hostilities will end will be needed in the region, specially to promote reconciliation and trust build- ing and to work with traumatised people who suffered repression or war treat- ment (more than 1/2 million people were displaced until now the number of victims is estimated to be around 50.000 and great majority of people in our regions are or were suffering from the psychological trauma of war because of political and military threaths). Our aim is to buiid infrastructure for long term work and to educate a number of people who will dedicate themselves to work in the field of popular education for peace and reconstruction. To fulfill this goals we ask you to coop- erate with us on the following points: 1. disseminate Information concerning our work, analysis and visions, organiz- ing speakers tours in your regions, translating our material, distributing our papers in English etc. 2. help us buiid infrastructures, offices, vvorking camps etc. 3. perform trainings and education for our activists and for affected people directly (nonviolence, group work, conflict resoulution, local organizing, de-traumatization....) 4. voluntary work / we need experi- enced people to work with us on long term: international Communications, editing, education, work with refugees etc. 5. humanitarian aid /collecting and distributing/. Ljubljana, Zagreb, January 1992 Konrad Klapheck The Movement for The Culture of Peace and Non¬ violence in Ljubljana has ini- tiated in August 1991 a proposal to establish elec- tronic communi- cation betvveen peace groups emerging in Yu- goslavia. The ideapresented at several interna¬ tional meetings wasthentakenby German peace groups and Erič Bachmangotfully involved in fundrising and technical prepa- rations. During Christmas he travelled around former Yugosla- via and provided sevaral groups vvithmodemsand technical infor- mation. Here is a short report on the Email peace- Services The main idea was to connect existinq Bulletin Board Svstems in former Yu- goslav republics (ABM-BBS in Ljubljana, Sezam in Belgrade, Rhinocerus in Novi Sad, MIPS in Zagreb, Peace News in Belgrade, etc.), and through these BBS Services pro- vide a permanent link betvveen existinq peace centres (Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence, Ljubljana, Anti War Committee, Zagreb, Center for Anti War Action Novi Sad and Bel¬ grade, Centerfor Peace, Sarajevo etc.). ANI kind of local users could then use local BBS systems and access peace conferences for public use. Further more, a central node (ABM BBS in Ljubljana ) would provide a link to AdriaNet and to APC through GreenNet. Basis AdriaNet is the biggest existing net of BBS nets from former Yugoslavia with ABM-BBS being its strongest develop- ing center. AdriaNet serves several thousand users. It is connected to FidoNet (international BBS network) and DecNet (national academic com- munity netvvork of VAX users). The operators of ABM-BBS are commited to peace movement and will- Electronic Communications & Anti War movements in former Yugoslavia Report ing to serve to its communication needs. (See the letter by Boris Horvat, manager ofthe ABM-BBS). Therearetehnical possibilitiesalsoin othermajortovvns -i.e. Belgrade, Novi Sad, Zagreb, Sarajevo, Skopje, Split). Erič Bachman visited some of those centres during his mission from 26. December to 4. January. Hisgoal vvasto make connec- tions with the local BBS systems and to establish basic electronic connections betvveen BBS and peace groups. What follovvs is a report of the first phase of the work done by Erič in Ljubljana, suggestions and budget for the second phase and prospectivesfor the third one. I. phase - report A high speed modem was installed in ABM-BBS center in Ljubljana and con- nection with GreenNet was established. ABM-BBS has established a public peace conference “PeaceNews“which is already transmitted regularily to AdriaNet members. There are also special conferences like “HelpCroatia”, “HelpSerbia”and“HelpSlovenia"which are dedicated to the particular prob- lems of these areas. During the visit of Erič B. a (limited access) conference “PeaceGroups" for the peace groups was established. Four lines are currently available by ABM-BBS. Three more are planed - peace movement in Ljubljana has sig- nificant support of the local PTT com- pany. A low speed modem was installed in the Centerforthe Culture of Peace and Nonviolence in Ljubljana and the com¬ munication vvith ABM-BBS established. Modems and softvvare were supplied by Bund fur Soziale Verteidigung (Erič » 'II it- Intriider 25 PEACE / Visions PACIFISM By Nenad Zakošek, Zagreb How I understand the Peace Enaaaement in Croatia todav Bachman). Viv Kendon (APC - Green Net) has enabledthecontacttoAPCthroughthe GreenNet. Significant support was of- fered f rom various sys-ops of mail boxes in Germany. Special thanks to Bionic. Budget of the First Phase was 8950 DEM II. phase total budget esti- mated 13.000 DEM To operate the established links, the following installations are most urgent: 0. Harddisc&controllerforthe mail box (1 GB) 1. Connection to APC throuah Green Net 2. Connection betvveen BBS systems in different republics 3. Visit and instalation two weeks and travel -Erič Bachman III. phase - dreams -APC charges -high speed modem for Zagreb and for Belgrade BBS -establishing direct linkto Inter¬ national Computer netvvorks (X.25 or DATEX-P). Peace group in Ljubljana will try to get partial sponsorship of local PTT company. The cost of con¬ nection is 15.000 DEM. This report and budget proposal for the next phase of the project was drafted during New Year Hollidays. In the meanwhile, the Center for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence in Ljubljana has established its Email addressthat can be accessed from any other Email netvvork EMAIL: MIROVNIKI@uni- lj.ac.mail.yu You can access PeaceGroups Con- ference dialing directly to ABMBBS in Ljubljana and leaving a message for SYSOP: Dial: +38-61-218663, +38-61-154270 or+38-61- 154156. AT the moment peace groups outside Ljubljana did not get used to use their equipment but we hope they will do it soon. For more details, please get in touch on the above addresses. Financial support for the upgrade of peace-email-service in yugoslavia should be directed to Bund fur Soziale Verteidigung, Germany (ring Erič Bachman +49-5221-65485) for more information. By Marko Hren Since I met Christian, a radical pacifist from Berlin and now a good friend of mine, at the beginning of eighties, I became aware of the complexity of the peace issue.Throughthedialoguewith him, I realized that many apparently self-evident arguments which justify or advocate the solution of conflicts by means of violence are questionable. It was of special significance to me when I recognized that, on the basis conse- quent ethical argumentation, we can justify a right of an individual, who consciously accepts his obligation as a Citizen (i.e. the obligationsderiving from his membership vvithin a political com- munity, a state), to refuse the military “patriotic Service” -as long as he fulfills an adequateciviliansubstitution for this obligation, in order to prevent the vio- lation of the principal of equal civil rights. Thus the right of a state to impose certain obligations upon its citizens is rendered only relative status and is limited by the individual choice based on conscience (bythe way, it should be mentioned that during the eighties this understanding gained the official sup¬ port of the United Nations). This clearly demonstratesthatfundamental human rig hts put a lim it to ‘‘patriotic obligations”. But what I never could accept in this dialogue was the attempt to postulate an absolute ethical value of peace and out of this to derive an unconditioned refusal of any violence. It always seemed to me that peace as an ethical value must be judged in combination with at least one other value, individual and collective freedom. I understand that we should try to avoid violence, but not if the priče should be the loss of our freedom. This problem becomes even more drastic if we are confronted with the violence of totalitarian regimes. Methods of civil disobedience and civilian resistance may be suc- cessful against the violence of a liberal-democratic state vvhich respects the rule of lavv, but not against a totalitarian aggressor or authority vvhose violence arises from a completely circular, autis- tic ideology (i.e. an ideology vvhich is totally deaf for arguments of other ideological and ethical positions). In other vvords, it was possible for Gandhi’s Indian national move- ment to attain its goal through non-violent means against the British colonial authorities vvhose inner structure remained basi- cally liberal, but Czechs were completely helpless with their non-violent civil disobedience against the fascist occupants in 1938 and against the communist occupants in 1968. Ali these basic dilemmas also appear in special form in the čase of the war in Croatia. It’s beyond doubt that the pri- mary cause of violence (not only in Croatia but in the whole Yugoslav area) is the two-headed totalitarian Moloch: the national-communist regime of Slobodan Miloševič, supported by the authentic and aggressive Serbian na¬ tional movement on the one hand, and the stalinist military junta vvhich mobi- lized incredible destructive potentials (accumulated during many years) on the other. The fatal mixture of these tvvo totalitarianisms (the Serbian national- communist and the Yugoslav-stalinism) also produces a double threat against freedom: in the first plače by violating elementary liberal rightsofthe individual (evidence for this is above ali the poor state of human liberties and right s in Serbia itself), but also by oppressing collective liberties of ali non-Serbian nations in Yugoslavia, vvhich was brought to the extreme in the war not only against the Croatian republic but also against the Croats (having in mind 26 The Intmder PEACE / Visions PATRIOTISM several cases of arbitrary massacres against Croatian civilians, especially in rural areas under Serbian occupation). In this situation it is the right of individu- als and of the collective to protectthem- selves againstthe totalitarian theat also by violent means. Becauseofthis itcan be said that Croatian State is fighting in a justified defensive war. But if it is so, then what can be the meaning of the peace engagement in Croatiatoday ? I am convinced that it is not only legitimate but also very neces- sary, from the aspect of pacifist as well as libertarian values. a defensive war can be easily turned into an instrument of particular political interests and into a pretext for limitation or derogation of individual liberties. The main purpose of peace engagement in Croatia I see above ali in the attempt to prevent this development and thus help to end the war as soon as possible. The situation of war in Croatia is par- ticularly aggravated by the fact that simultaneously a new political com- munity -the new Croatian State- is emerging. This fact obviously increases Cover of Ark' zin No. 2 - 3 the danger of political instrumentalization of the war and vio- lation of individual rights and liberties. The present ruling political party in Croatia, the media under its control and a part of the intolerant public opinion are trying to mobilize undifferentiated patriotism. Inthismanipulativewaythey attempt to identify the particular party rule with the political community of ali citizens, i.e: the State as a whole. The overvvhelming accent on achiev- ing the independence of the Croatian State is constantly being used for derogation of civil and political liberties. Both political manipulations are extremely dangerous, not only for Croatia as a political community but also for the effectivity of its defence againstextemal aggressor. Itmust be clear that in contemporary Europe, Croatia will not be able to constitute itself as a State, nor will it achieve its internal and external security, if it won’t protect the free space for civil and po¬ litical liberties of its citizens. Therefore I think that peace en¬ gagement in Croatia, above ali, means struggling: - against the militaristic illusion that the war can be finished through a glorious victory of Croatian army - against pogrom-like inventing of enemies and undifferentiated “patri- otic” mobilization. - for full political and ideological pluralism vvithin boundaries of consti- tutional order (which means that no individuals can be stygmatized only because they don’t satisfy some arbi- trary measure of “patriotic špirit”. - for individual right of choice vvhich is different from the position of the present authority (i.e. the ruling party), including the right to refuse military Service in accordance with constitutional and legal procedure (this right must be guaranteed especially in the war, of course under condition that the individual fulfills a different kind of obligation towards the community) - against the illusion of Croatian national egoism that the Croatian question can be definitely solved with- out a peaceful and democratic solution of the position of ali other national com- munities in the Yugoslav area. VVithout a liberal and democratic Croatia (and this is vvhere Croatia really has the key position in the Yugoslav area) there will be no breakdovvn of Serbian totalitar¬ ian illusions nor any peace in the area. To struggle for peace in Croatia means to help the at- tainment of this aim. (lirst published in Croatian in Ark' zin) • The Intruder 27 PEACE / Visions NONVIOLENCE AND PATRIOTISM By Marko Hren Nenad Zakošek, a member of Anti VVarCampaignfromZagrebhad start ed a discussion about patriotism and paci- fism in his essay published in ArkZin no. 3., a publication of Anti War Cam- paign in Croatian language. The In- truder is republishing the whole text and here follovvs a reflection by Marko Hrenf rom The Centerforthe Culture of Peace and Nonviolence in Ljubljana. Two questions seems to be (re)open in the essay of Nenad Zakošek. One is concerning the legitimacy of armed resistance and the other is concerning the “patriotic" mobilization. Legitimacv of armed resistance The dillemmaconcerning the eff iciency of nonviolent struggle against totalitar- ian regimes - arguing that Gandhian strategy was applicable due to liberal- democratic nature of British authorities - was presented very often in Slovenia after the June 1991 events. Nenad Zakošek clearly States that: “In this situation (i.e. war in Croatia) it is the right of individuals and ofthe collective to protect themseives against the to- talitarian threat also by vioient means. Because of this it can be said that Croatian state is fighting in a justified defensive war." The “right to protect... against ... with vioient means” will be not put under guestion here. What I want to discuss is the choice certain society has concerning the means of their struggle. When Slovenian civil society was struggling for human rights in the late 80-ies it consciously decided that the struggle will be nonviolent. There was a strategyand means were carefullycho- sen and reflected. The basic mean was public work and dialoguevvith allparties involved.Themovementconfrontedthe very same totalitarian regime, vvhich was at that time already producing vis- ible threats. Those threats were origi- nating from federal military bureauc- racy and were directed against de- mocratization forces in Slovenia. The priče that the movement was vvilling to pay was equal to the goal that the movement wanted to achieve - human rights and democracy. If the movement would lose the level of both human rights and democracy vvould be reduced. And the movement had won. The en- ergy of the movement was then taken by forces which had as a goal to create an independent (not to be confused with “separate”) State. These forces were struggling for a form of State and not for the quality alone. The priče they were vvilling to pay vvas more and more unlimited and accordingly also the means to achieve the goal became unlimited. The efficiency of nonviolent struggle can not be approached vvithout ref lecting the goals of the movement (campaign, struggle etc.) and the priče it declares to be vvilling to pay. It is important to say, that human rights and democracy movement vvas only vvilling the very freedoms of people involved, vvhile nation-state-building movement vvas vvilling to riskthe lifes of everybody. The movement for HR further mobilized people according to their free will vvhile the later is mobilizing people according to a law of “national duty” and according to the principle of patriotism. Gandhi spoke about convertibility of means and ends and further, about nonviolent means and nonviolent ends. When the ends becomeexclusive (prioritising one nation for example) also the means degenerate. Itcannotbethereforesimplyconcluded, that Gandhian strategy could not be efficient in the cases of Slovenia after elections or Croatia during 1991. (Such conclussion vvas made by slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek in July 1991 further concluding that Serbs are not British Genlemen). The alliance of Miloševič (serbian president) and Jovič (military general and federal presidency leader) can of course not be compared with British government and any of its Viceroys who had to deal with Gandhi, asvvellasthepathofTudjman (croatian president) can not be compared with Gandhi's rich philosophical and practi- cal references to nonviolence (Tolstoj, links to British conscientious objection movement, experience in South Africa etc.). Gene Sharp - vvhile analyzing Gandhi as a Political Strategist - com- ments on the dillema of “British gen- tlemen” as follovvs: “Ifthe British exer- cised restrain in dealing with the non¬ violent rebellion, this may be related more to the peculiarproblems posed by a non vioient resistance movement and to the kindof forces vvhich the nonviolent action set in motion, than to the oppo- nent being ‘British’. The same people shovved little restraint in dealing with the Mau Mau in Kenya, or in the satura- tion bombings of German cities.” Fur- thermore, history remembers British treatment of Indians with quite a refer¬ ence to brutality used. Gandhi himself provides a good linkto the dillemma discussed in the essay of Nenad. Gene Sharp writes:“ln late 1938 and early 1939 Gandhi appealed to Jews in Germany to resist the Nazi persecutions by nonviolent resistance. From Octoberto December 1938 - after the Munich Agreement (30 September) and before the full German occupation of Czechoslovakia (late March 1939) - Gandhi appealed to the Czechs and Slovaks to resist with his technique of struggle”. Gandhi vvrote: “if they (Czechs) had knovvn the use of non¬ violence as avveaponforthe defence of national honour,they vvould havefaced the vvhole might of Germany with that of ltaly throvvn in.’’, and further “If the Na- zis come to India, the Congress will give them the same fight that it has given Great Britain. I do not underrate the povver of satyagraha...” Patriotic mobilization and nationalisms The patriotic mobilization is dangerous as much as it is framing cosmopolitan thinking into nation-state identification. The defence concept of Gandhi vvas understood as "defence of national honour" and vvas based on a complex philosophy of nonviolence behind. The defence of honour vvith nonviolent 28 The Intrudcr PEACE / Visions meansislimited to struggleforones own identity. It is self-promotive. Thedefence which includes violent means is always projected to a struggle against another identity. It is mutual-destructive and perpetuates the presence of xenopho- bia and ethno-centrism. Nonviolence requests strong individual will and is therefore based on individual. Armed resistance requests strong subordinative system and is denying individual. Armed resistance is in long run contraproductive simply because it provides ground for militarization. A pacifist who founds him/herself in a climate of patriotic mobilization is therefore confronted with a basic task - to remain individual. As individual I supported and was fully involved in Slovenian struggle for human rights and for national identity. I was involved to contribute the vibration of nonviolence and peace politics and besides, I was convinced that struggle for collective rights (cultural, minorities, national, re- gional etc.) are a legitimate process in liberation of peoples, even-though my- self personally would declare as cos- mopolitan and would never feel no other(regional, racial, cultural, religious, national or whatever) identity but the one of human being and religious seeker. This attitude produces another schizophrenic contradiction: cosmo- politan personality can be caught in a corner between justification of libera¬ tion struggle and patriotic mobilization. T ravelling abroad comming from “a new nation-state” we found ourselves often confronted by two types of reactions: -those who expres congratulations for independence of Slovenia (and some of them even for the “war" victory) -those who blame for Slovenian se- cession (sometimes expressing it with cynical statement “now you have got your own State”). Both presume that people comming from mentioned regions have some patriotic feelings. The latter even pre¬ sume that everybody is a nationalist simply because he or she comesfrom a region vvhich just struggled for its national liberation. I argue with both. Everybody is of course responsible for what happened, but I do not feel re¬ sponsible as Slovenian - I only feel a fundamentalresponsibility as a human being who is involved locally as well as globally. The argument with the former starts with assumption that there is really nothing to be congratulated for. The war is one big disaster and failure of ali of us - nationally and internationally. The result of mal-processing the tran- sition period is bad and no-one can be proud of that. The creation of some kind of patriotic pride because of independ¬ ence is morbid. Yugoslavia dissolved and Slovenia became independent because of the failure of ali diplomacies (Slovenian, yugoslav and intemational) and not because of Slovenian diplomacy being successful. The war is afailure of a nation and can not be converted into pride. We could have been proud if we vvould have avoided the war, violent nationalisms, separations and devastations. The use of violent means isproducing long term multipliereffects. I never dreamt of Slovenian state, my blood has quite some anarchist colour and my soul is gipsy. Slovenian state does not mean anything else to me but -as ali States do - an obstacle: new borders, new limitations, new frustra- tions of my friends travelling from abroad, new frustrations of my closest friends at home who have to wait and plea to obtain Slovenian citizenship. I vvould be proud of the region, of the culture and of the state, only when it vvould be modest, open, demilitarised and friendly. But it is not the čase really . It includes quite some elitist, xenopho- bic, militarisedandfrustratedelements. More than ever since I remember. The argument vvith the latter produces a defence of “Slovenian thing”. The conflict was not due to Slovenian na- tionalism or at least can not be as- signed to slovenian nationalism prima¬ rij. We should not under-estimate the fact that the core problem of societies caught in Yugoslav pot vvas the exist- ence of ideological military aparatus vvhich depended entirely on Old Yugoslavias' ideological doctrine. The problem of Yugoslavia vvas the one of militarised state and militarised society. Projecting the problem to ethnical and national questions alone is blinding as vvellthe understandingofthe militaristic doctrine being now incarnated in na¬ tional States - vvhich inherited militarism simply copying it into their new political realm. Since the issue of militarism of Yugoslavstate is usually nottakenasa major source of the conflict it is also easy to understand that people - to vvhich this paragraph refers - do not understand the antimilitaristic argu- ments. It istoobject(re)militarizationof Slovenia and it istodefend elements of peace politics vvhich (quite a number of them) vvere exercised during the tran- sition period and during the vvar being later systematically denied by federal authorities (rememberthat Slovenia has offered the contract of confederation or a contract for the union of souvereign States to ali former Yugoslav republics even stili in May 1991), and it is to defendthe right of people in Slovenia to decide on what form of relations they vvill create vvith their neighboring socie¬ ties. I’m again and again shocked vvith thiscategory of intemational observers vvho are so blindly rejecting any positive aspect of national struggle. Sometimes they appear to be more xenophobic than “ordinary” nationalist. National identity is a reality. If some people do not have this identity it is fine. Many of us do not hang on it either. But people have right to identify vvith their nation and have right to be patriots. Finally, those vvho condemn so much the independence of Slovenia are often expressing quite violent pro-Yugoslav (patriotic) feelings. Any addiction vvith States is illusion. The question of good or bad nationalisms does not play much importance but it isto be avvare of the fact that nationalism is a strong Identi¬ fication vvhich has to be approached vvith full sensibility and attention. Glori- fying or discrediting it are both equally contraproductive. Patriotic mobilization did not only affect people locally but also intemational community. Most of people home and abroad are taking sides -for one (Yugoslav) or another (small state) patriotism. And I under¬ stand more and more the good old slogan “state is shit". Ram vvould say: “I vvant to get a little bit outside”. Photo from the film Gandhi of Richard Attenborough The Intruder 29 PEACE / Visions THE WAY TO STOP THE WAR IS IN PEOPLE‘S HANDS interview with Hovvard Clark, coordinator of WRI Office in London by Antiša Korljan Hovvard came to former Yugoslavia with one and only aim: to meet different peace groups and initiatives in this part ofthe vvorld through impartial eyes. We bring you some ofhis impressions... Hovvard. first of ali. what are vour impressions on the situation here, considering vou were on both sides, Serbian and Croatian, as well in other republics of former Yuqoslavia? H. C. : Well, I arrived, together with a Hungarian, an Austrian and a German WRI members, in former Yugoslavia in Novi\ Sad, Vojvodinal on the tvventieth of december 1991 and I visited peace groups in various places. I spent quite some time in Belgrade, I visited Pančevo2,1 wenttoSarajevo3, Priština, vvhere ! met Kosovo Albanians4 and I was also in Ljubljana and Zagreb. After this tour I can say that the situation is completely different in each republic or autonomous province. In Novi Sad I met Nenad Čanak, a leader of the League of Social Democrats in Vojvodina. He vvas arrested after his involvment in peace rallies in tovvns vvith Hungarian majority and later sent to the front. This event really gave me some directions to understand the situation in Serbia. There is also a problem of national composition of troups of federal army. Namely, it seems that about 80 percent of those con- scripted to take part in federal army, are from Vojvodina. According to Nenad' s story, there is also enormousamountof alcoholism among these soldiers and this a problem that society vvill have to čope vvith very soon. In the lasttvvoorthree months in Serbia qrew an initiative for a plebiscite, on vvhich citizens vvould decide vvhether to send Serbstovvaroutofthe republicor not. One hundredthousandssignatures are needed and the State vvould be forced to issue the vvritsforthe plebiscite. H. C. : I think that this is a remarkable action.Thefactthatpeoplehave togive their identity number when signing the petition means that they really have to make a great psychological step. Namely, most of the people of former Yugoslavia have never had to stand up for their beliefs. Now, for the first time in their livesthey are making adeclaration of opposition to their government and I think that the fact they already got tvvo thirds of required signatures is a re¬ markable achievement. Hovv do vou feel about peace groups and movements in Serbia? H. C.: I wasquite encouraged bythem. You have to knovv that the climate in Serbia is very hostile, you can actually feel the špirit of militant nationalism, but inspite of that almost every night there is some protest event. What is more important, the idea of pacifism is spreading to other tovvns in the middle of the land like Požarevac, vvhich is Slobodan Miloševiči hometovvn. or Kragujevac, vvhat is really significant, this spreading. Assuming that the war vvill continue and that people vvill get a clear picture of casualtiesthat war has caused, these initiatives vvill start to organize themselves and there vvill be very strong antivvar campaign there. You used the form " vvhen it happens “. Does that mean that in present Serbia there is no organized peace movemen t? H. C. : The anti-war movement is stili somevvhat marginal in the Serbian society. The peace groups are very active, but resistanceto military Service is largely taking the form of more or less spontaneous acts of re- sistance. There are lot of people Corn¬ ing back from the front and refusing to soldier on; there are people who refuse to go there forthe first time and so have to hide from Military Police. But this resistance is not really organised yet. The social and economical cost of the war in Serbia mean there is tremendous potential for revolt, but it is not clear vvether this discontent vvill be manipulatedto strengthen Serbian nationalism or altematively become a base for anti-war action. The people of Serbia are not used to organising things. In the pastthey vvere used to being organised and manipu- lated by others. After vour tour, vvhat vvill WRI do on organizing peace groups? As vou cer- tainlv noticed, the off icial polit ics as well as public opinion in Serbia are verv militant and, as vou put it. verv hostile. H. C. :The firstthing lwas sayingonthe trip and vvill say repeatedly is that peo¬ ple have to realize that the way to stop the vvar lies in their hands. No action can be taken from the outside vvithout their cooperation, so it is really up to them to make a political step they vvere not used to do. If there could be events about the vvar like last march5 it could be very helpful. So the first message to them is: “ Don't look for deus ex machina from the UN or EC, look to yourselves! " The practical project that WRI vvill take up now is to get somebody from the United States, probably a Vietnam veteran, vvho has become an antivvar activist, to come and tour Serbia, Vojvodina and also Croatia. You have to knovv that United States lost 58000 men in battles in Vietnam, butsince then over 60000 veterans have com- mitted suicide in the USA. The vvar had an enormous cost, not just eco- nomically, but also psychologically and socially. And that is vvhat Serbia isfacing novv and I think they are not ready to handle it. So vve think that bringing somebody to teli people : “ Look, vve had our vvar. It did not just traumatized us, the vvar vvas vvrong and vve are going to oppose it for the rest of our lives “ could be very helpful. And this mes¬ sage, I think, vvill bevery important and vvill have real echo there. One the last guestion, vvhat are vour impressions on relations betvveen the State and these representatives of civil societv.? H. C. : Civil society is such anevv phe- nomenon here that the rulers have no respect for it yet. They are also not avvare of its potential povver either and I think this is a lesson that the rulers of Serbia or vvhatever emerges out of it vvill have to learn. Civil society can actually restrain them in their behaviour, but civil society has also to learn that it does not have just povver to do that, but also responsibility to do that. 1 ex autonomous province, vvhich is novv included into republic of Serbia. About 30 nationalities live there, Hungarians are in majority. 2 asmall town near Belgrade 3 Capital of republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 4 Kosovo is also an ex autonomous province, novv included into Serbia. Albanians make a great ma- jority there. 5 Serbian opposition made a demonstration in the center of Belgrade because they vvanted demo- cratic and impartial media. Army troups interfered and one person got killed 30 ’ I lie Intrudcr BOSNIA / Reports SNAPSHOTS OF LIVES APART Reporters notebook By Marisa Crevatin, in Sarajevo Living together. Visiting Bosnia- Herzegovina, the reporter faces the eternal dilemma of vvether reality is bettercomprehended by anoutsideror an insider. The question is especially fraught here. Five days in this region - this “beautiful country, intriguing and not at ali ordinary", as Ivo Andric put it - I decide to bet on the insiders. from my perspective, that the living together of these people who represent the three largest Yugoslav nations of Serbs, Croats and Muslims, has vanished, gone as if it never existed. Could an insider find where it has dis- appeared to? “Disappeared” -people an- swer with resignation, vvhat- evertheirnationality. Detailed discussions convey the dif- ferences betvveen them. but there remain similarities: they ali hope that, when the night- mare is over, life will resume its familiar course, and they will rediscover this living to¬ gether. Herzegovina. The area of this region is not vast, but its history is. The divide here is betvveen Christians: Catholic/ Orthodox, VVestern/Eastern. I n the post- war period, people in vvestern herzegovina, mostly Croats, emigrated to vvestern European countries, espe- cially germany. Those in Eastern herzegovina stayed at home. Now they are tvvo vvorlds. In the West, vve are told to go East to see the Chetniks. From federal army and Serbian sources vve hear about the “concentration of the Ustashe’s para- military forces” in the VVest. On a sunny sunday, driving through the Neretva River valley, vve see nothing unusual, not even armed guards betvveen Croat and Serb villages. We pass through vineyards, home of the famous Zilavka and Blatina. VVilltherebeavintage next year? The army. Yugoslav People’s Army, Serbo-Communist Army -different names for one military force. In one version it is the legitimate protector of unarmed people facing genocide. In another, it is an occupying force. Army troops have begun to vvithdravv from Croatiatovvard B-H. Some say the peo- ple'sarmy hastostaysomewhere. Oth- ers say it is just transplanting its occu- pation. In Mostar, reservists from Serbia and Montenegrovverebroughtin morethan tvvo months ago. A young vvoman tells us of uncontrolled shootings, provoca- tions, harassments. We don't hear the opposite vievv. But the Army’s asser- tions reveal deep tensions betvveen it and the local citizenry. Political parties. Three parties -SDA, SDS, and HDZ- share the povver. Do they share the people? “Bosnia- Herzegovina is an indivisible, sover- eign State to its citizens," says, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the republic and head of the Muslim Party of Demo- cratic Action (SDA). Radovan Karadzic, leaderof the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), says, "The peoplesof the Bosnia and Herzegovina don’t have to live to¬ gether. They can live in parallel, just one (group) next to another. The plebi- _ Sarajevo _ scite of Serbian people has shovvn its vvill to stay in Yugoslavia and does not accept a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina". Stjepan Kljujic of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) says, “Unfortunately, Serbs and Croats have to live together”. Europe. Lots of talks. People ask, Why isn’t Europe more grateful? “Doesn't Europe see that vve defend it against the Bolsheviks?” says one. “When they arrive at Trieste it vvill be too late”, others make the same argument, but vvarn against religious fundamen- talists. The most reasonable people just vvonder, “When vvill the blue hel- mets arrive?” The media. Wel! knovvn Belgrade vvriter Philip David once said, "Every bullet shot on the battlefield vvas pre- ceded by a vvord shot in the media”. There is not yet real war in B-H in part because there is no media vvar here. The press does its best to steer clear of the vvar-mongering typical in Belgrade or Zagreb. President Izetbegovic says the media's success in retaining Pro¬ fessional standards vvill help B-H avoid bloodshed. Who vvantsto disagree with him? It is a hopeful consolation amid bad nevvs. Making a Living. Geography is athing of great importance in B-H. Almost eve- ryone displays his charts, making out old lands, new borders. Every nation has its ovvn colour, shovving that the forests belong to one nation, ores to another, and to a third -God knovvs vvhat. But if the resources are divided, vvhat are the people going to do for a living? Decmber 1991, first published in Yugofax. • Out of Press Review THE VVEAPONS MARKET The extension of the vvar in Croatia vvasfelt in a much stronger way in Bosnia- Herzegovina than in any other republic. The popula- tion knovvs that they can be- come a target at any time. The vveapons' market is in great extension on ali the Yugoslav territory, and Sarajevo is one of its cen- tres. In the Stup’s quarter, in front of the cafe Evropa, it is possible to buy guns for a range of prices, from 1000 and 2000 DEM. (Le Monde Diplomatique, February 1992). The supply of vveapons is achieved through national ways. The Federal Army, massively present on the terri- tory, is providing the Serbian popula- tion; Croats are helped by the diaspora, and indirectly by Germany, Austria and Hungary; Muslims are helped by Tur- key, Iran and Lybia, through the axe Istanbul- Novi Pazar(Sandžak)- Sarajevo. According to certain informations, lotof Bosnians personalities (managers, parliament and presidency's members) vvould beinvolved in this market, vvether nationality they have.(Vreme, 16th of December 1991) An armed confrontation betvveen the three ethnies in this republic vvould quickly take the aspect of a religious vvar. It seems that protagonists and the international community is shaking when thinking of this possibility. Never- theless, the 10000 BlueHelmetsdueto come to ex-Yugoslavia are not sup- posed to intervene in Bosnia- Herzegovina I Tlie Intruder 31 Refugees / Who Cares? B o s n i a II W hy 11 she asked Commentaries from people in Sarajevo Mirko Škerbič Ph.D. Professor of Electronical Enaineering. Universitv of Sarajevo Because for years, values have been destroyed, and the system of standard world values has not been supported- first of ali with regard to the work. The perfectly conceived system of self- management in practice created false values, so that nonobligated-negative parties have brought us to our present situation. Aida Softič Gvnecologist Because we are artificially restricted in our social and intellectual development, and because we are constrained within narrow limits vvhich are preventing us from self-development, and obtaining the ability to overcome the Identifica¬ tion of ourselves through national and nationalistic feelings. So, the conse- quencesforthechildren, family and the wholesociety are horrible, andtheproof of this is evident in our country. Indira Haračič Clinical psvchologist Although we have spoken a lot about unity, it is obvious that it does not exist strongly enough to conf ront ali the povv- ers of evil and hatred. It is obvious that we have not overcome the “Balkan” syndrom, and the past is stili dominant in our lives. Predrag Finci Ph.D. Professor at the Facultv of Philosophv Freedom is possible only as real free- dom; life is realiy possible and it is life only as free life. The question about the right to life and the question about the right to freedom are questions about the same thing. THOSE WHO ARE VISIBLE, AND THOSE WHO, FOR THE MOMENT, ARE NOT Report from Zagreb, by Yasmina Kuzmanovic Missing persons Ljubica Oleski is looking for her 19 years old brother Željko, who dissappeared during the compulsory army service in Serbia. She last heard from him in August. Rade Brakus is looking for hismother, from the Croatian town of Drnis, vvhich was occupied by the Federal Army in September. Marija Papac is stili looking for herfather Nikola, a native of Vukovar, missing since Au¬ gust. Since the first blood was dravvn last Easter, the war in Croatia has claimed many thousands of casualties. Zdravko Tomac, the Vice-President of the Croatian government, recently es- timated the figures to be in excess of ten thousands. Thoughout these months of war, there have also been isolated reports of Croatian soldiers and civilians being taken as Serbian prisoners, or simply left behind in the occupied territories, but nobody ex- pected the number of missing people to be so high. “At this moment we estimate that there are more than 30,000 people missing in Croatia, based on the re- quests for tracing that their relatives have put to the Croatian Red Cross", says Dubravka Horvat, chief of the Red Cross tracing agency in Croatia. The Croatian agency is part of the Central Tracing Agency vvithin the International Committee of the Red Cross in Ge¬ ne va. Ali our local chapters have been literally buried by citizens searching for missing members of their families, and we stili don’t have complete reports from Slavonija, let alone Vukovar”, says Miss Horvat. At this moment the number of refugees in Croatia has reached 700,000. That means we are talking about over half a million people who are on the move." What lies behind the staggering number of people who have been reported missing? “Some of them are Croatian soldiers missing in action, some are Croatian citizens lost during their regu- lar service in the Federal Army, but the majority of missing are civilians”, ac- cordingto BosiljkoMisetic, the Croatian minister of justice. “You read about them in nevvspapers after each wave of enemy aggression. A report usually goes: it is suspected that a number of inhabitants of so-and-so village have remained in the enemy area, and their fate is unknovvn." Of course, nobody knovvs exactly what has happened to the missing people. “We speculate that the majority of them are held as hostages in the areas temporarily out of reach of the Croatian authorities", says Miisetic, “vvhich means 32 The Intruder Henry Chartier - Bresson Refugees / Who Cares? that they are captive in one of the Ser- bian or Army prisoners camps on Croatian territory, like Knin, Manjaca, or Samarica, or that they have been taken to camps in Vojvodina”. Ac- cording to Misetic, many of the missing have been killed: 'I just talked to a refugee from Glina; he told me that they are not able to identify and bury the bodiesof Croatian men, women and children, vvhich they find near the occupied villages.” “The vvorst thing about missing people is the uncer- tainty”, says Ivan Gradisar of the Zagreb Red Cross chapter. A vvoman who has searched for her son forthree months, who was reported missing in action, said: “I would rather know he is dead, than not know what has happened to him". She was one of the lucky ones, for last week her son arrived in a group who had been exchanged for Serbian prisoners of war. For a nation of 4.5 millions, the number of 30,000 missing people in only five months of war is very high. “We fear that this figure is just a con- servative estimate", says Ivan Gradisar, “individuals and whole families can actually be missing, but if nobody starts atracing procedure with the Red Cross, thenthey will not be registered assuch." As with so many things, the real number of missing people will only be clear after the war is truly over, with the help of cen- sus and voting registrations. The displaced According to Croatia's Office for refugees, about 650,000 people have fled from their homes in Croatia. Out of this number, 322,745 refugees have found shelter in Croatia, and 1,060 per- sons have fled from Serbia to Croatia. Most of those refugees are Croats, but there are also Serbs and Hungarians. 141,000 people have fled to serbia, about 95,000 to Bosnia- Hercegovina, and at least 22,000 to Slovenia. Hungary has provided shel¬ ter for 45,000, Austria for 50,000, and Germany for 5,000 refugees. These figures arethose reported by the United Nations High Commisioner for Refu¬ gees. “They shot at us”, said an eleven year old boy from Jukinci, a village near Glina in eastern Croatia, describing the events from last September. “At night, when the shooting had ceased, my mother led us out of the house. My sister, mother, uncle and me started to run, followed by several other people from the village. I was terribly afraid. We walked for about 20 kms through the woods. The next evening in the village of Pokupscko, Croatian police picked us up and helped us to Zagreb. A family from the town of Vinkovci nearthe Serbian border had to leave their home afterthefallof Vukovar. “We left our house after the last army attackvvith mortars”,said Danijela Krivic, a 30 year old economist. “We could'nt take it any longer. We have a nine months old baby. The Serbian village of Mirkovci, the base of Serbian terrorists, is very near, and for days there was constant fire. My kid was crying ali the time." Danijela is now staying with relatives in Zagreb, but neithershe nor her husband know when they will be able to return home. Independent or not, Croatia is stili atwar. Most of the now desolate territories are occupied by the Serb-led federal army, and many Croatian villages have been levelled to the ground. The Croatian government has a strict policy on this issue; territories have to be reclaimed and refugees returned to their homes. But nobody knows how or when this can happen. This article has first been published in Yugofax-3 February 1992 f CROSS THE FINGERS, EVERVTHING IS GOING TO BE ALRIGHT... One decisive week in Slovenia: 7th of Februarv - 14th of Februarv. By Dominique Cochard A kind of Storm devastated the refu¬ gees’ centers of Ljubljana during the last few days. As many people decided to go back to Croatia in January, it was expected that ali the refugees who de¬ cided to stay in Ljubljana (not believing in a stable peace in Croatia) would be gathered in the same camp. Against ali our expectations, the government de¬ cided last fridayfor Vič, whereas Šmartinska was the biggest, nicest and most organised center. On mondaythe official voice announced that ,finally, no refugee willstay in Ljubljana:theyshould be send to Karavanke (at the austrian border) where they would share some barracks with workers. On tuesday decision was made that the destination should be Bagnola. Goga Flaker, coordinator of the volun- tary work in the camps up to now, went to the Šmartinska's center on wednesday, date of departure for Bagnola. She reported: Going there, I was expecting a lot of animation. People packing, about to leave, usually generate a lot of noise, movement... and anyway children are always around.... As soon as I entered the building, I have been shocked by the silence, as if there was nobody left. I went to the meeting room for volun- teers, and I found them crying. I had to retain myself not to be caught by the emotional intensity, not to cry myself. I understood how much these young people have got involved with the refugees, how personally committed theywere.Then, the bussesfor bagnola arrived. The people came down very quietly, in extreme silence. Resigned. Nobody said a single word, except one small boy, just before entering the bus, who glanced at Nataša (one of the volun- teers) and added: “cross the fingers, everything is going to be alright...” Finally, at the end of this weej- 39 The Magazine in the Magazine SLOVENIAN ATHENS: the big exhibition on iwell-known subject of “the man with the seeds”, happened in 1991 in Modem Gallery in Ljubljana in cooperation with many Slovenian and Yugoslav artists Ferus Mustafov; macedonian musician was the big suprise and the star of Ljubljanas' audience at DRUGA GODBA (=another mušic) in spring 1991; DRUGA GODBA is probably the best musicfestival in Slovenia. (photo M. Mrčun) Alan Hranitelj is knovvn as one of most interestning young fashion designers in Slovenia (photo Jasna Rajh) 40 The Intruder A SPECIAL ISSUE OF INTRUDER SHOULD BE PUBUSHED IN MAY WITH THE FOLLOWING FOCUS Subculture in Slovenia, from 80ies to 90ies Women in Yugoslavia A NEW PUBLICATION PEACE INSTITUTE LJUBLJANA / SCHLAINING Are issuing VUGOSLAVIA: DISINTEGRATION ANALYSING (working title) f available mid-april * Result of 3 scientific seminars on Non-Violent Conflict Resolution in Yugoslavia 'Among other contributors, J.Galtung (Sweden), D.Atwood (USA), H.Tromp (Netherlands), Ž.Puhovski (Croatia), V Pešič (Serbia), T Kuzmanič (Slovenia), M.Filipovič (Bosnia), J. Binter (Austria)... * Yugoslav history, ethnic/religious/cultural conflicts analys- ing, new nation/states, post-stalinism, war in croatia, Peace politics, Conflict resolution, perspectives ... * 250 pages (paperback) tovvards understanding of a tragic and contemporary subject For 10 pounds (or equivalerrt in any other hard currency) Give yourself a present and offer it to others! Available from: Peace Institute- Mestni trg 13 61000 LJUBLJANA-SLOVENIA Tel. 3861-210 374 Return slip enclosed S Union of Peace Initiatives from Slovenia oordinacija mirovnih iniciativ iz Slovepijb) Marko Hren, Mestni trg 13, YU-61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia; tel., fax. 061- ?24666, 210374 Milan Khep, Jurčičev trg 2, fax.,061-314169 YU- 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, Tel. 2Ž3864, 211136 Sonja Lokar, Tomšičeva 5, YU- 61000 Ljubljana, .Slovenia tel. 061- 161140, fax. 215855 Angelca Murko Pleš/Komenskega 7, j . VU-61000 LjubljanarSlo., tel. 324189, fax' 3291.96 * Mateja Kožuh, Tel. 061-324059, fax. 323955 ; , Eva Strmljan, Aškerčeva 9, YU-61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, j Tel. 061- 217113, Fax. 061-153304 Associatidn for Preventive and Voluntary Work Linhartova 13,YU-Ljubljana, Fax. 061- 129141 /234 Center za kuituro miru in nenasilja /Movement for the Culture of * Peacb & Nonviolence Medškofijski odbor študentov /InterBishops Conference of Students Ženska frakcija SDP /VVomfens’fraction SDP Most S Committee of Anti-War Campaign Zagreb dbor anti-ratne kampanje Zagreb) i Zelena Akcija /Green Action ■Društvo za unapredjenje kvalitete života /Assotiatior) for'lmprovement of ■ >■ the Quality of Life, Demokratski forum Rijeka /Demokrati^ Forum Rijeka Zoran Oštrič.Gajeva 45, P.P. 876 YU- 41000 Zagreb, Croatia tel.+ 3841 431 658, fax 425,552 " Draženka Dobrič, 041-677574 / privat Vesna Jankovič -c/o ArcZin 041- 214507 Zlatko Pejič, Iliča 72/I P.P. 117, Yu-41000 Zagreb, Croatia * Tel. 041-426352, fax. 041-428771 f Šura Dumanič, tel. fax. 051-713291, Rijeka, Croatia £ Center for Peace Sarajevo (Centar za mir Sarajevo) Društvo Slobodne misli /Assotiation of Free Thoughf Centar za ljudska prava i mir /Center for Human Rights andvPeace Udruženje prijatelja djece i mira /Union of Friends of Children & Peace Ibrahim Spahič, Dobrovoljačka 11, Yu- 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia & Hercegovina tel. 071-214884, fax. 071-216238, privat 071-38247 Nermin Butkovič, sameaddress ■ privat 071-652806 Zdravko Grebe Miodrag Živanovič, Banja Luka tel. 078-12754, fax 071-12766, privat 071-55613 Duško'TomičMedjaši kod Bjeljine, Tel. 071-646937, 076-53176 0 Center for Anti-War Action Novi Sad (Centar za antiratnu akciju Novi Sad) I i Pokret za mir Pančevo Slavenka Ljubič, Maksima Gorkog 10 Yu-21000 Novi Sad, Vojvodina ' ' tei. 021-278887 privat 021-619019 i , Svetlana Berisavljevič, Stevana Mokranjca 24 Yu-21000 Novi Sad, Vojvodina, tel. 021- 319204 privat Bulevar maršala Tita 20, Yu-21000 Novi Sad, Vojvodina, Tel., fax. 021- 57797 .Sašo Marinkovič, Br. Jouanica 629, Yu-26 000 Pančevo, fax 013 41 735 Biljana Regodič.Vojvodanška 53, tei. 512,641 S Center for Anti-War Action Beograd entar za antiratnu akciju Beograd) Ženska Stranka AA/omens’ Party 1 J3ama / citizens Action for Peace Stojan Cerovič, cnair, fax: 011-342646 c/o Vesna Pešio, Prote Mateje 6, Yu-11000 Beograd, Serbia tel. 011-431298, fax 681989 Svetozara Markoviča 4, 011-334706 Lina Vučkovič, privat 011-334706 Milan ŽivohičjDorp omladine, Makedonska 22, YU-11000, BG S Citizens Committee for Peace Titograd radjanski odbor za mir Titograd) I* League for Democracy Skopje (tiga za demokratiju Skopje) Hercegovačka 15, YU- 81000 Titograd, Montenegro te!., fax. 081-41914 ' ' * Miodrag Vlahovič, tel. 081-11789 RadeBojovič, tel. 081-612049 Djordji Marjanovič, 091-518589 i