ALI SE PARADIGME SPREMINJAJO?
Mojca Ravnik
S tem naslovom in s podnaslovom Zapiski o krizi etničnosti, je v Etnologu 2/2,
1992 izšel članek izpod peresa Hermanna Bausingerja. Ko sem članek prebrala, sem imela
izredno mešane občutke. Po eni strani sem se z njim strinjala, po drugi strani pa sploh ne,
hkrati pa sem čutua, da je na članek treba odgovoriti. Saj nas je avtor z naslovom v obliki
vprašanja takorekoč povabil, da se oglasimo.
Čim sem se lotila pisanja, sem spoznala, kako težko bom povedala, kaj nuslim, ne
da bi se zapletla v nesporazum. Hermann Bausinger je pisal na splošno, teoretično, iz
oddaljenosti, jaz sem ga brala konkretno, politično in v kontekstu. V razdalji med tema
ravnema se skriva nevarnost, da bi izpadlo, kot da Bausingerja nisem razumela, ker sem
politično obremenjena in nesposobna razmišljati na drugi ravni. Zato moram najprej
povedati, da Bausingerja delno razumem in mu dam prav, da pa sama nisem mogla brati
članka, ne da bi ga preverjala z našimi razmerami. Glede na naš »teren« pa misli iz članka
ne veljajo, oziroma jih je treba dopolniti.
Bausingerjev članek je kratek, a zgoščen. Tukaj ne morem drugače, kot da navajam
nekatere odlomke. Upam, da ga ne bom prikazala enostransko. Sicer pa bralci, ki članka
še niso prebrali, lahko to storijo zdaj.
Hermann Bausinger v svojem članku najprej govori o odnosu med državo in
folkloristi, oziroma etnologi. »Ker je bila kompleksna organiziranost države eden izmed
ključnih elementov modernizacije, bi lahko rekli, da je zanimanje za folkloro in folklorno
življenje vedno pomenilo razhajanje z državo.« (Etnolog 2/2, str. 233) To razmerje se je v
zgodovini zelo spreminjalo. Politika je manipulirala s folklorno tradicijo. Narodopisje je
enkrat sodelovalo pri izgradnji političnih ideologij, drugič je bilo v opoziciji. »Nekateri
ključni koncepti ljudstva in narodopisja so se razvili v opoziciji do obstoječih državnih
struktur. V zgodnji fazi tega razvoja je pomembno vlogo v oblikovanju in širjenju
narodopisruh študij odigrala ideja o 'Volksgeistu'. Pojem, ki ga je po vzoru francoskih
predhodnikov skoval Herder, se na splošno prevaja kot ljudski duh', vendar ta prevod
popohioma spregleda značilno distanco do vseh državnih konotacij. 'VoLksgeist' izvirno
pomeni duh naroda in označuje vizijo novega političnega reda, v katerem bi različni
narodi dosegh vsak svojo enotnost in se jasno ločili od drugih narodov. Dobro vemo,
kako močan vpliv je imel ta koncept na nacionalna gibanja v Srednji in Vzhodru Evropi -
aU, če govorimo manj idealistično: kako natančno je Herder v svoji teoriji predvideval
dejanski razvoj. Prav tako nam je dobro znano, da je ideja o 'Volksgeistu' postala izziv in
253
Mojca Ravnik
spodbuda za folkloriste: začeli so zbirati reči, ki so jih imeli za ljudske starine, zato da bi
riovi organski koncept podpirali s tradicijami, ki so se menda razvijale tisočletja. V
splošnem se nam zdi ta pogled danes zastarel.« (tudi tam, str. 234)
Bausinger je v nadaljevanju kritičen do tistih sestavin etničnosti, ki izhajajo iz
domnevne duhovne enotnosti, krvi aU zemlje in ki vodijo v egocentrizem, samopoveli-
čevanje in sovraštvo do drugih. Ugotavlja, da so etnologi in folkloristi na splošno »na
strani šibkejšega, zagovarjajo čim večjo avtonomijo in nasprotujejo izenačevahiim ukrepom
močnejšega, t.j.države. Zagovarjajo ali se vsaj implicitno zavzemajo za subjektivno
razsežnost kulture in skušajo vsaki skupnosti zagotoviti življenje v skladu z njeno
opredelitvijo. V zadnjih dveh desetletjih se je močno uveljavila beseda Eigen-Sinn,
napisana z vezajem, ki poudarja lastni smisel in voljo. Poznamo pa tudi besedo Eigerisinn
(brez vezaja), ki pomeni samovoljo ali trmasto vztrajanje pri lastnih namenih in merilih.
Zdi se mi, da se moramo vprašati, ali lüsmo pogosto spregledali tega drugega pomena. Z
drugimi besedami: ali ne bi kazalo zgoraj omenjenih konceptov prilagoditi strukturam
in zahtevam sodobne družbe ?« (tudi tam)
Bausinger opozarja na to, da »sedanji prizori korJliktov po vsem svetu, ki izvirajo
iz teh 'naravnih' skupnosti, kličejo k iskanju novih perspektiv.« (tudi tam, str.235)
Ugotavlja, da je v dinamičnih situacijah »etnična pripadnost pogosto le regresiven odziv
na različne izzive družbe ter bolj rafinirane potrebe in zahteve posameznikov.« (tudi
tam) V napetih časih in situacijah »so ljudje nagnjeni k temu, da sosedov ne sprejemajo
zgolj kot soljudi, ampak jih vidijo kot pripadnike druge etnične skupine, in sicer z izrazito
težnjo ločiti se in ograditi od njih.« Tako »se pogosto dogaja, da zaradi takih poskusov
narodne manjšine trpijo hudo prikrajšanje, izgon ali celo vojno.« »Pa tudi regionalizem
sam rü imxm za neupravičen skupinski egoizem. Zanimiva je ugotovitev politologov, da
so območja, ki se uprejo monopolističnim in odtujevalnim težnjam osrednje oblasti, le
redko revna in zanemarjena. Ponavadi gre za razmeroma uspešna in dobro razvita
območja. Ko neka država razpada, prvi težijo k neodvisnosti tiste regije ali deli države, ki
so najbolj razviti. Neodvisnost pa jim pogosto pomeiü konec soMamosti s sosednjimi
regijami.« (tudi tam)
Problematika je res zapletena in povsem možno je, da je od daleč, če nimaš podatkov
in ne poznaš razmer v posamezruh delih sveta, res videti, kot da gre povsod za isto
iracionalno sovraštvo, etnocentrizem, ksenofobijo, samopoveličevanje. Eden redkih
zahodnoevropskih izobražencev, ki se je potrudil podrobneje spoznati zgodovino in
politične razmere v deželah bivše Jugoslavije, je Alain FinkieLkraut, pri nas znan po tem,
da je že zgodaj obsodil napad na Slovenijo in na Hrvaško. Zanimivo, da se ravno nanj
sklicuje tudi Bausinger v edinem značilnem navedku: »Pred nekaj leti je Alain Finkielkraut
o 'Volksgeistu' govoru kot o najbolj eksplozivnem pojmu 19. in 20. stoletja. Po njegovem
mnenju se narodi s tem konceptom postavljajo na oltar in se izogibajo vrednostni razsodbi.
To, čemur Finkielkraut pravi 'občutek za univerzalno', se izgublja zaradi pravičniškega
vztrajanja na partikulamih normah.« (tudi tam, str. 232)
Francoski izobraženci so, tako kot njihova uradna državna politika, ki podpira
centralizem, vojno v bivši Jugoslaviji obravnavali kot iracionalne etnične spopade, Alain
Finkielkraut pa se temu ni uklorul.
Spomladi leta 1992, kmalu po posvetovanju evropskih izobražencev in politikov v
Palais ChaUlot v Parizu pod naslovom Plemena in Evropa, je nastopil na TV Ljubljana v
pogovoru z Jaroslavom Skrusnyjem. Pogovor so nato objavili v 125. številki Nove revije
254
Ali se paradigme spreminjajo?
in dodali še prevod Finkielkrautovega pogovora z redakcijo Politique internationale,
objavljenega v 55. številki te revije.(l) Bralcem, ki jih zadeva bolj zanima, svetiijem, da
preberejo te objave. Na na tem mestu sem izbrala samo nekaj odlomkov iz prevoda
pogovora s Politique internationale:
»Vprašanje: Vsem so znana vaša pogumna stališča v zvezi s konfliktom, ki že skoraj
leto dni razkraja Jugoslavijo. Kateri moralni, intelektualni in poUtični razlogi so vam
narekovali tako ognjevit angažma ? Odgovor: (...) Moj angažma korenini v dvojni
zgroženosti: v zgroženosti nad agresijo in v zgroženosti nad nebrižnostjo. Vpričo sprege
med neobčutljivostjo oblasti in intelektualcev sem se počutil zmedenega in osuplega.
Vprašanje: Osuplega v kakšnem smislu? Odgovor: (...) Branil sem jih (Hrvate op .a.) še s
toliko večjim žarom prav zato, ker preživljajo dvojno muko: po eni stiani so žrtve agresije,
po drugi strani pa doživljajo, da jim resnico njihovega trpljenja celo zanikujejo aU
obrekujejo. Camus je nekoč dejal, da 'pomeni napak poimenovati stvari povečevati nesrečo
sveta'. Mi, zahodnjaki, s proslavljanjem in čaščenjem naših zmagovitih vrednot
povečujemo nesrečo Hrvaške(...). Vprašanje: Kako ločevati med dobrimi in slabimi
nacionalnimi dlji ? Obstaja kakšno merilo za razbor ? Odgovor: Merilo je nadvse preprosto:
demokracija. (...) Ali, z drugimi besedami, odločilna ločnica ne poteka med narodom in
demokracijo, ampak, kot je ugotovil veliki madžarski političru nüslec Istvan Bibo, med
demokratično obliko nacionalnega čustva in protidemokratičnim nacionalizmom. (...)
Vprašanje: Kako gledate na tezo, po kateri naj bi svoboden razmah nacionaUzmov ogrožal
evropski red ? Odgovor: 'Deviška Evropa se je zaročila z milim duhom svobode; drug k
drugemu prožita zaljubljene dlani in okušata slasti prvega poljuba,' je leta 1844 zapisal
Heine. Bo treba za vzpostavitev Evrope razdreti to zaroko aU bomo svobodo dopustih
samo tistim evropskim narodom, ki že od nekdaj uživajo njene sadove ? Vsekakor drži,
da obrekljiva nacionalnih gibanj v vzhodni Evropi nimajo občutka, da zagovarjajo red
na škodo narodov, ampak so prepričaru, da se borijo zoper etiiično regresijo ali, kakor
imajo navado reči, zoper obsedenost z identiteto. Gre za znaiü kHc: 'Primite tatu !'; vse te
obtožbe zgovorno pričajo o provincializmu velikih narodov, o njihovem vrojenem
egocentrizmu.(...) Pripadniki velikih narodov so svoje zgodovinsko znanje načrpaU
pretežno iz stripov. V skladu z njihovim pogledom na svet gre v primeru majhnih držav
z evropskega obrobja za nekakšne folklorne, rahlo smešne entitete, katerih eksistenca
nikakor ni nujna, saj nikoli rušo sodelovale pri urejanju resnih zadev. (...) Vprašanje: Mar
ni nenavadno, da naj bi nacionalizem teh majhnih držav pomenil klofuto napredku, zaporo
za prostost duha ? Odgovor: Zares, in še toKko bolj nenavadno ob dejstvu, da prva skrb
teh maUh narodov velja prizadevanjem, da bi si ub-H vstop v svet: pridobitev nacionahie
suverenosti je zanje pot k odprtosti in prostosti. V njihovem primeru je povsem razvidna
vez med nacionalizmom in imiverzalizmom, med 'poUs' in 'cosmopolis'.(...) Vprašanje:
Do kam pravzaprav seže tista zgodovinska in hkrati instinktivna soUdamost, ki ji pravimo
'evropska družina'? Odgovor: To je težko reči. AntitotaUtaristična inteligenca se tačas
prepušča nekakšru protimejniški gorečnosti: ne le, da trpajo v isti koš napadalca in
napadenega, napadeni velja celo za bolj krivega, zakaj on je bil tisti, ki je začel postavljati
meje. Za pristaše tovrstnega preseganja meja je tudi sama Evropa zgolj etapa, le vmesna
postaja.(...) Vprašanje: Padec komxmizma je demokracije oropal za naslednje čvrsto
oporišče: nič več nimajo opravka s sovražnikom. Je poslej mogoče živeti brez sovražnika?
Odgovor: Sam bi vprašanje zastavil drugače. Demokracija ima še vedno opraviti s
sovražniki, težava je v tem, da jih ne znamo več prepoznati. Kadar zdaj v post-
imperiaHstični in posti:otaUtami Evropi izbruhne konflikt, ga, namesto da bi mu ponižno
255
Mojca Ravnik
skušali odkriti pomen in razumeti zastavke, ki so v igri, pri priči 'psihologiziramo',
'tribaliziramo', v njem odkrivamo zgolj sovraštvo; in to sovraštvo potem brez odmerka
pripišemo obema spopadajočima se stranema. Bolj ko je agresija kruta in krvava, bolj se
nam zdi barbarska tudi sama žrtev. (...)« (Nova revija 125, str. 972-978)
Najraje bi tu prepisala kar vse Finkielkrautove izjave, ker se tako zelo vklapljajo v
našo razpravo, pa še Bausinger sam ga je vanjo uvedel. Mislim, da Finkielkraut lepo
prikaže, da se nmogi ljudje v Zahodni Evropi, ki rümajo znanja in ki so izgubili orientacijo,
oprijemljejo nekih ideoloških šablon, ki jim popolnoma zamegljujejo pogled. Njegova
misel, ki jo navaja Bausinger, o »VoUcsgeistu« in o tem, kako se »občutek za umiverzalno
izgublja zaradi pravičniškega vztrajanja na partikulamih normah«, zato ruč manj ne drži.
Bausinger se najbrž sam sploh ru zavedal, da je napisal izrazito poUtičen članek.
Separatizem, regionalizem, avtonomija, nacionalizem, o katerih govori kar na splošno,
na splošno sploh ne obstajajo; to so politične kategorije in se pojavljajo v konkretnih
družbenih in zgodovinskih kontekstih. Za pisanje o politiki pa je treba poznati politiko.
V našem primeru bi to bili notranje političru odnosi v bivši federalni državi vsaj deset let
nazaj. Tu ne mislim razpravljati o vzrokih krize v bivši Jugoslaviji; omenim naj le
dolgotrajno blokado predsedstva, onemogočanje predlogov za rešitev krize s
konfederacijo, politične pritiske in vojaške grožnje s strani centralistične oblasti.
Separatizem, nacionalizem, nesoUdamost z nerazvitimi, vse to še odmeva po naših
ušesih, saj je bilo vse to očitano »separatistični«, »nacionalističru«, »egoistični« Sloverüji s
straru centralistične jugoslovanske politike in armade, pa tudi mednarodne diplomacije,
kije centralistično nasilje podpirala.
Zdi se mi, da Bausinger razpolaga s popačeno podobo o spopadih po svetu. Želim
mu sporočiti, da glede naših razmer nima prav, verjamem pa, da se sam rü želel opredeliti
do nobene konkretne politične situacije.
Žal pa mnogi drugi zahodnoevropski izobraženci, ki rümajo pojma o zgodovini in
politiki, zelo poenostavljeno interpretirajo in sodijo o zapletenih situacijah, ki jih ne
razumejo. Čeprav stvari ne poznajo, nočejo zgubiti avtoritete v svetu; ker so svetovljani,
obsojajo nacionalizem; ker se nočejo pohtično opredeliti, se držijo interpretacij, kot da
gre povsod za etnične spopade, državljanske vojne, plemenske strasti...V skladu s staro
resrüco, da je pravica na strani močnejšega, so »imiverzaUstičru« izobraženci neizprosru
predvsem do tako imenovanih »separatistov« in po pravilu ne napadajo nacionalizma
»centralistov«, oboroženih s tanki in bombniki, ki rušijo in ubijajo pod geslom boja proti
separatizmu, za ohranjanje države. Domišljajo si, da so njihove »nepolitične«, intelektualne
razprave zunaj politike. Ne zavedajo se, da strežejo političnemu nasilju. Tisti, ki je vojno
začel, ki ima še polne zaloge orožja, vedno laže izvršuje svoje cilje tudi z njihovo pomočjo.
Proti koncu člaru^a Hermann Bausinger pravi: »Sprejemljivo in celo zaželeno je, da
folkloristi in etnologi skrbijo za bolj tradicionalne ktiltume običaje in predmete, vendar
bi se morali izogniti pasti, da nanje gledajo kot na povsem avtonomne pojave, ki jih je
elitna in množična kultura pustila nedotaknjene. In nikoli ne bi smeli poskušati kulturnih
pogojev razširiti na politične načrte ne da bi obravnavali vse možne različice. Po mojem
bi morali kulturna in politična identiteta ostati povsem ločeni. Gojenje in spodbujanje
kulturne dediščine ni nujno povezano z dediščino neke obstoječe politične skupnosti.
Obstoj posebrüh kulturnih tradicij pa ne pomerü nujno pravice in dolžnosti, da se zaradi
njih zahteva vzpostavitev posebne pohtične skupnosti. To je le logično dopolnilo
pričakovanj, da bo vsaka država priznala in spoštovala različne kulturne manifestacije in
256
Ali se paradigme spreminjajo?
tradicije znotraj svojih meja.« (Etnolog 2/2, str. 236)
Vendar je tudi načelo, da ni treba, da se državne meje ujemajo z etničnimi, dvorezen
meč. Uporabi se lahko kot geslo nasihie centralistične moči, lahko pa na njem gradimo
mimo sožitje.
Glede razumevanja državnih in etiučnih ozemelj so Slovenci gotovo eden najbolj
prosvetljenih narodov v Evropi. Njihovo etnično ozemlje je v štirih državah in je idealen
teren za raziskovalce, ki bi morebiti zeleh preučiti, ah demokratične države v Zahodrü
Evropi res omogočajo avtohtorüm manjšhiam uporabo materinega jezika v javnem
življenju in šolstvu in druge temeljne ustanove kulturne samobitnosti.
Hermarm Bausinger je opravil hvalevredno dejanje s tem, da je v etnoloških krogih
odprl ta vprašanja. Vendar menim, da pripisuje etnološkim in folklorističnim paradigmam
prevelik vphv. Pohtično nasilje lahko zlorabi vsako ideološko razpravo, ne glede na to,
ali odobrava nacionalizem, urüverzahzem, separatizem, integracioriizem, regionalizem,
centralizem. Ediiü veljavrü kriterij je uporaba orožja. Izobraženci, ki tega nočejo videti in
obsoditi, z ideološkimi interpretacijami o nacionalizmih in separatizmih zamegljujejo
jasna poHtična dejstva in s tem posredno pomagajo nasilju.
OPOMBA:
Glej:
- Entretien avec Alain Finkielkraut. Politique internationale 55,1992, str.49-63
- Evropa med Homerjem in Harlekinom. Pogovor z Alainom Finkielkrautom. (Pogovor je vodil in za
natis pripravil Jaroslav Skrusny. Nova revija 125,1992, str. 963-971
- Prebujanje majhnih narodov. Odlomki iz pogovora Alaina Finkielkrauta z redakcijo revije Politique
internationale, ki je bil objavljen v št. 55, spomladi 1992. Nova revija 125,1992, str. 972-978 (Izbral in prevedel
Jaroslav Skrusny)
CHANGE OF PARADIGMS?
258
Mojca Ravnik
Etnologi/2 (1992) published an article by Hermann Bausinger with the above title
and subtitled "Comments on the crisis of ethnicity".
The article left me with mixed feelings. On the one hand I agreed with the author,
but on the other hand not at all. And I also felt I had to react. After all, the interrogative
form of the title so to say invites us to respond.
As soon as I had started writing, I became aware how hard it wovild be to make
myself clear without provoking misimderstandings. Bausinger's article remains on a
general, theoretical level and is written from a distance. But I had read it on a concrete,
political level, and within a specific context. The risk (to be nusunderstood) lies in the
distance between these two levels. It might indeed appear that I did not understand
Bavisinger correctly because of my being politically predisposed and incapable of reflecting
on a different (i.e. Bausinger's) level. That is why I would like to emphasize first of all
that I do - at least partly - understand Bausinger and agree with him. I could not, however,
read his article without referring to our specific circumstances. And when we read it in
the light of our "setting", the notions it presents do not apply, resp. need to be
complemented.
Bausinger's article is short and terse. In my response I can quote only some passages
and hope not to represent his ideas partially. After all, those who have not read it yet,
may do so now.
The article oper^ with Bausinger's reflections on the relationship between the state
and folklorists, resp. ethnologists. "... as the elaborated organisation of the state has been
one of the crucial elements of modernization one might even say that the interest in
folklore and folk-life has always implied a departure from state" (Etnologi/2, p. 229). In
the course of history this relationship often changed corisiderably. Folklore traditions
were often politically manipulated; at times folklore(-ists) collaborated in constructing
ideological concepts, at times they opposed them. "Several key concepts of folk and folklore
have been developed in opposition to existing stately structures. In their early stage the
idea of "Volksgeist"played an importantpart in the construction and extension of folklore
studies. The term was coined, following Erench forerunners, by Herder In general, it is
tianslated as "nationalspirit", but this translation misses the characteristic distance from
all stately conHgurations. 'Volksgeist" meant the spirit of the people and was aiming at
the vision of a newpohtical order in which differentpeople would get to their unity and
Change of paradigms?
to clear demarcation against other people. It is well knovm how inuuential this idea was
for the national stingglesin Central and Eastern Europe - or to put it in a less idealistic
way: how precisely Herder anticipated ti:ie real development in tius theory. And itis also
well known tiiattiiisidea of'Volksgeist'became a challenge and an incentive for folklorists:
they started to collect what tiiey looked at as popular antiquities in order to support the
new organic concept by traditions allegedly having evolved over the millennia. By and
large, this seems to be an outdated view, "(ibid., p. 230).
Bausinger then criticizes those elements of ethnicity which stem from an alleged
spmtual unity, blood or place, and lead to egocentricity, self-conceit and xenophobia.
Ethnologists and folklorists, says Bausinger, in general "standby the side of the weaker
groups; they plead for as much autonomy as possible and they oppose the levelling out
measures of the powerful - the representatives of the state. They speak up or at least
implidtiy stand for the subjective dimension of culture, and they try to guarantee every
group a life in accordance with its own principles; the word Eigen-Sinn has gainedground
during ti:}e last two decades - written with a hyphen and thus indicating a sense and will
of its own. Butane can write that word Eigensinn without a hyphen, and in this case it
means stubbornness, a narrow-minded insisting on one's own intentions and measures.
And it seems to me that the question should be raised whether this other side of the coin
has not been ignored too often. Or to put it in another way: Should the concepts mentioned
above not be adapted to tiie structures and needs of modem society!" (ibid., p. 230)
Bausinger then warns us that "the scenery of world-wide conflicts originating in
those "natural"configurations, calls for new perspectives, (ibid., p. 231), continuing that
in dynamic situations "ethnic identity is often only a regressive answer to the differ-
entiated challenges of society and the more refined needs and wants of the individuals. "
(ibid., p .231). In stages and situations of high tension " there is an inclination not to accept
people just as human beings and neighbours but to look at them as members of an other
ethnic group with a dear tendency to fencing off and demarcation". And "quite often
exactly by this attempt minority groups are exposed to gra ve deprivations if not deporta-
tion or war Not even regionalism is immune to unjustified group egoisms. Interesting
enough, political sdentists have found out that it are rarely very poor and neglected
areas which stand up against the monopolizing and alienating tendencies of the central
power but often relativelyprosperous and well developed regions. In states falling apart
the most well-to-do regions or sub-states are generally the first striving for independence
- which sometimes means also independence ftom solidarity with neighbouring regions ".
(ibid., p. 231)
The issues Bausinger mentions are certainly complex and it is quite possible that to
those who are far away and do not have (sufficient) information or knowledge about the
conditions in individual parts of the world, it actually appears that the same irrational
hatred, ethnocentricity, xenophobia and self-conceit rage everywhere. Among West-
European intellectuals, Alain Finkielkraut is one of those very few who actually imdertook
to understand in detail the history and pohtical conditions in the coimtries which were
part of the former Yugoslavia. Finkielkraut is well known in our coxmtry for his early
condemnation of the aggression on Slovenia and Croatia. It is quite interesting to see that
Bausinger's one and only particular quotation refers to Finkielkraut: "A few years ago
Alain Finkielkraut called the idea of 'Volksgeist" the most dangerous explosive of the
19th andŽOtii centimes. He took the view tijatby this idea people idolize tiiemselves and
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Mojca Ravnik
avoid the court of values; what Fiiudelkraut calls 'the feeling for the universal' gets
withered by the self-righteous sticking toparticularized norms, (ibid., p. 231). Most French
intellectuals looked upon the war in the former Yugoslavia as on irrational ethnic clashes,
all along the lines of the official policy of their (centralism-supporting) government. Alain
Finkielkraut, however, did not comply with this general tendency.
In the spring of 1992, shortly after European intellectuals and politicians had held
a conference in Palais ChaiUot (Paris) under the title "Tribes and Europe", Finkielkraut
was interviewed on TV Ljubljana by Jaroslav Skrusny. The interview was later published
in the 125th issue of Nova Revija, supplemented with Finkielkraut's interview given to
the editors of Politique internationale (published in its 55th issue). Readers who have a
deeper interest in the matter are referred to this publication.
Here are some passages from the interview: *
"Question : Everybody knows about your courageous standpoints regard theconflict
which, for almost a year now, is tearing up Yugoslavia. Which are themoral, intellectual
and political reasons behind your passionate commitment?
Answer: (...) My commitment was provoked by a double disgrace: the disgrace of
the aggression and that of the indifference towards it Confronted with the combined
insensibility of both our authorities and intellectuals Ifelt confused and amazed.
Question: Amazed in what sense?
Answer: (...) I defended them (the Croatians) with even more passion because
they were undergoing a double torment: on the one hand they were the victims of the
aggression and, on the other hand, the truth about their suffering was either rejected or
denigrated. Camus once said that 'to call things by their wrong names means to increase
the misfortunes of the world.' The victory our West-European values have won has
increased Croatia's suffering. (...)
Question: How can we discrimmate between good and bad nationalist causes? Is
there a criterion to sort them out?
Answer: The criterion is a simple one: democracy. (...)Qr,in other words, the real
opposites are not nation and democracy but, as the great Hungarian political thinker
Istvan Bibo saw it, between democratic forms of national feeling and antidemocratic
nationalism. (...)
Question: What is your opinion on the thesis that the free expression ofnati'onalisms
threatens the European order?
Answer: In 1844Heine wrote: "Virgin Europe has become engaged to the guardian
angel of freedom; their loving arms are around each other and they are relishing their
first kiss. " Mil it be necessary - in order to establish Europe - to break this engagement
and let freedom be the privilege of those European nations whohavebeen enjoying it for
a very long time? It is true that those who denounce the national movements in East
Europe do not have the feeling that they are upholding the established order against the
peoples. They are convinced that they are ßghting ethnic regression or, as they often put
it, the twitches of an identity. In the case in hand, this comes down to accusing the accuser,:
and this accusation is eloquent of the provincialism of big nations and their innate
egocentridty. (...) The citizens of big nations receive, as far as history is concerned, an
education in the way of a comic strip. In their view of the world these littie counbies on
*   Translator's note: - The passages from PolitiqueIntemationalesie translated from the French original.
260
Change of paradigms?
Europe's periphery are foUdorist, slightly ridiculous entities. They need not exist since
serious matters have always been arranged without them. (...)
Question: Is it not a strange notion that the nationalism of these little countries
presents an affront to progress, to the idea of freedom of the mind?
Answer: The notion is all the more bizarre because, actually, the first thing these
little countries worry about is to enter the world: to them acquiring national sovereignty
is part of the road to freedom of the mind. There is an evident connection linking
nationalism and universahsm, "polls"and "cosmopolis"(..)
Question: How far goes the historical as well as instinctive solidarity of what we
like to call "the European family"?
Answer: That is hard to say. Nowadays, a kind of "frontier"syndrome has taken
hold of anti-totalitarian intellectuals: not only do they equate the aggressor and his victim,
but those under attack are even held to more responsible because it were they who wanted
to draw frontiers. To the adherents of such transcendence of frontiers Europe is just a
stage, a intermediate station. (...)
Question: The fall ofcomm unism has berea ved democracy of another stionghold:
there is no enemy lea. Will it be possible to live without enemies in the future?
Answer: I would like to paraphrase your question. Democracy is not out of the
wood yet. The problem is that we no longer know how to identify its enemies. Whenever
a conflict breaks out m present-day post-imperialist and post-totalitarian Europe we
immediately have a go at "tribal psychology" instead of being modest and hying to
understand its real meaning and origin. All we see is hatred, hated we then ascribe to all
parties involved without exception. The more cruel and bloody the aggression is, the
more barbarian the victim, too, appears to us. (..) (Nova Revija 125,1992, p. 963-971.
Because Finkielkraut's reflections are so much part of our discussion, and because
Bausinger himself introduced him to the subject, I regret I cannot quote both interviews
at fuU length. In my opinion, Finkielkraut shows very clearly, that many people in Western
Europe, lacking the necessary knowledge and disorientated, prefer to cling to ideological
stereotypes which obscure their view completely. This means, however, that Finkielkraut's
notion, quoted by Bausinger, about "Volksgeist" and about how "the feeling for the
tmiversal withers because of self-righteous sticking to particularized norms" is all the
more true.
Bausinger probably is not aware that he wrote a distinctly political article.
Separatism, regionalism, autonomy and nationalism are mentioned in general, but these
do not exist in general forms; they are political categories and arise in concrete social and
historical contexts. In order to write about politics one should know about it. As far as
our country is concerned, one should know the internal political relations in the former
federal state for at least some ten years back. I do not intend, to discuss here the causes
for the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, but allow me to mention the following facts: the
centralist authorities wilfully and persistently blocked the presidency, they throttled every
proposal to solve the crisis with a confederal system, exerted political pressures and never
stopped threatening with military intervention.
Separatism, nationalism, lack of solidarity with less developed areas, all these
reproaches are stiU ringing in our ears. We have heard them from both the centralist
Yugoslav authorities and army as from international diplomacy which supported the
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Mojca Ravnik
262
centralists' violence. It seems to me that Bausinger's view of the world's confUcts is a
distorted one. And I would üke him to know that he errs as far as our condition is
concerned. I do beUeve, however, that it was not his intention to take side in any specific
and concrete pohtical situation.
Ur\fortimately, many other West-European intellectuals who have no idea about
our history and poUtics, stick to highly simplified interpretations and judgments of very
complex situations they do not really imderstand. Although they are poorly informed
about the specific items at stake, they are afraid of losing face or theh authority as opinion-
makers. Being cosmopoUtans, nationalism is something they feel they have to denoimce;
and because they to not want to take a pohtical position, they chng to interpretations
seeing ethnical clashes, civil wars, tribal passions everywhere.... In accordance with the
old truth that nüght is above right, these "universahst" intellectuals are inexorable towards
so-called "separatists" but, as a rule, do not oppose the nationaUsm of the "centraUsts"
armed with tanks and bombers, sowing death and destruction under the banner of fighting
separatism and preserving the country's integrity. They fancy their "unpolitical",
intellectual discussions to be beyond politics and are not aware that they indirectly enhance
pohtical violence. Those who started the war and still possess plenty of arms, find it even
easier to accomplish their goals thanks to such reflections.
Towards the end of his article Hermann Bausinger writes: "It is acceptable and
even desirable that folklorists and ethnologists take care of the more traditional ways
and items of culture, but they should a void the trap to look at them as totally autonomous
and untouched by elite or mass culture and they should never try to extrapolate cultural
conditions to political designs without any discussion of intervening variables. In my
opinion cultural identity and political identity should be decidedly uncoupled. Saving
or fostering cultural heritage does not necessarily refer to the heritage of an existing
political unit, and the existence of special cultural traditions is neither a licence nor an
obligation to demand the establishment of a political unit around these traditions. This is
the logical complement of the expectation that every state will acknowledge and respect
different cultural manifestations and traditions within its boundaries. "{Etnolog 2/2, p.
232).
However, the principle that state frontiers need not necessarily match ethnic imits
cuts both ways. It can be the war-cry of a violent centralist power or the basis of peaceful
coexistence. In terms of imderstanding state frontiers and ethnic territories the Slovenes
certainly rank among the most enhghtened peoples in Europe. Their ethnic territory is
divided over four separate states and is perfectly suited for research. I dare suggest that
researchers examine whetiier the democratic states of West-Europe actually facihtate to
their autochthonous minorities the use of tiieir mother tongue in pubhc life, education
and other basic institutions which are part of an intrinsic, autonomous culture.
Hermaim Bausinger's merit is that he has tackled these question in ethnologic circles.
I think, however, that he over-estimates the influence of ethnologic and folklorist
paradigms. Pohtical violence is hable to abuse whatsoever ideological discussion, whether
it approves of nationalism, imiversahsm, separatism, integrationism, regionalism or
centralism. The orüy vahd criterion remains the use of armed force. Intellectuals who do
not want to accept this criterion, who refuse to denoimce the use of violence, ignore the
fact that iheii ideological interpretations of nationalisn\s and separatisms obscure obvious
pohtical facts and, indirectly, sanction violence.
Change of paradigms?
SOURCES
- Entretien avec Alain Finkielkraut. Politique internationale, 55, Spring 1992, pp. 49-63, Paris.
- Evropa med Homerjem in Harlekinom. Pogovor z Alainom Finkielkrautom. (Pogovor je vodil in
za natis pripravil Jaroslav Skrusny) (^'Europe between Homer and Harlequin. Interview
with Alain FinkieMa-aut, edited by Jaroslav Skrušnf) Nova revija 125,1992, pp. 963-971,
Ljubljana.
263