


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With exclusion to the community

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With exclusion to the community

Abstract: Recent wave of mass popular dissent reminds us that it is necessary to understand social dynamics also from the perspective of social exclusion. Landauer (1900) inquired how to create alternative community with “the inclusion of the excluded as excluded” (Agamben, 1999). Antisystem movements are the driver of this process, but they suffer from an organisational problem. They refuse vertical structuration as their exclusion itself is the result of overstructured society. So they fail to perform together against the system which hampers their effectiveness in achieving radical goals from the inside. We hypothesise that movements need to resolve the problem by abandoning programmatic similarity as a common denominator of their structuration. It has been observed that movements are usually more radical in their programs than in their operation, or vice versa. Their action-program footprints are inconsistent, unless they link with movements with symmetrical opposite footprints. This strategy of structuration reconstructs their internal consistency in a heterogeneous way that does not imperil their diversity. Three coalitions are obtained: quasi-, semi- and orto-antisystemic. They complement each other in mobilisation and production of autonomous alternatives, and in capacity to defend the boundaries of autonomy. Resolution of the organisational problem is a precondition for the emergence of antisystem structure. Now the initial antisystem conflict between society and the state is decomposed into a conflict between competing structures (system’s vs. antisystem’s) and between competing agents (interest groups; Marx). Multiplication of previously binary relation between the society and the system changes exclusion mechanisms with emergence of new sociality. Here exclusion is not concerned with dark side of society any more, but establishes itself as a starting point for reasoning about alternative social strategies.

Keywords: social exclusion, incommensurability, antisystem, autonomy, mesoscopic method

1 System and antisystem

Emergence of the modern state as a democratic system after the French Revolution meant also surfacing of the irresolvable conflict between civil society as the autonomous domain of freedoms and the state as the systemic domain of order. This duality introduces a fundamental struggle of opposites (Goldman in Schumaker, 2010) in modern society between the antisystem and the system (Wallerstein, 2006), which is called antisystem conflict.

There is an evident irrevocable turn of civil society away from institutions of the state (Virno, 2004) as a consequence of collapsing coordination ability of the modern state and sinking legitimacy of its political representation (Vaneigem, 1997). Antisystemic character of civil society can be also documented with data. Global statistical survey of the United Nations in 2000 showed that two-thirds of people do not feel represented by their governments (Kreisler, 2001). Chomsky refers to another research, according to which the existing social and economic order is prevailingly characterized as unfair by 60 to 80 percent of respondents in surveyed countries (in Halpin, Summer, 2008). The adoption of the EU's overarching "Lisbon" development strategy (2005) was established on priorities that were objected by 64 percent of respondents, in Slovenia even by 82 per cent (Eurobarometer, February 2005, question 8b, p. 37). In a recent survey, 82 percent of Germans feel politically disempowered (Henning, 2007). In 2011, the world erupted in protests that have been taking place under the slogan "99 percent" (of the excluded).

Social exclusion is a dynamic process that "precludes full participation in the normatively prescribed activities of a given society and denies access to information, resources, sociability, recognition, and identity, eroding self-respect and reducing capabilities to achieve personal goals" (Silver, 2007). It often arises from individual and social characteristics, such as affluence, race, gender, ethnicity, social status, caste or religion, as well as political views, occupation, language, and place of residence. Social exclusion results from the condition that system grants membership rights only to those claimants who give up part of their personal and communal autonomy (Calhoun, 2003). Hence, social ties can only emerge through being torn down first (Holloway, 2004). It turns out that what is needed for constitutive power to emerge always produces social exclusion (Lorey, 2008). The basis for the internal structure of a democratic state is the "exclusion of members with their inclusion" (Wallerstein, 1989), or "inclusive exclusion" (Carbado, 2005). Here inclusion is about relative rather than absolute deprivation (Silver, 2007).

The exclusion mechanism is engraved into the political. The distinction between what a social construct includes and what it excludes is the base of political thinking (De Hoop Scheffer, 2007). The entire political history of the modern world – at least since the XVIII century – is the history of shifting boundaries between insiders and outsiders (Wallerstein, 1989). Each social construct is possible only by what is excluded from it (in Nash, 1994). So it is reasonable to apply exclusion as an alternative explanatory framework in social research.

The idea that exclusion can be the source of social cohesion is not new. German social theorist and anarchist Gustav Landauer has explained exclusion as a principle of the alternative community (1900; *Durch Absonderung zur Gemeinschaft*): “The state is a condition, a certain relationship among human beings, a mode of behaviour between men; we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by behaving differently toward one another”. An excluded in Landauer’s radical setting is a person in action who, above all, is not looking for recognition by the system but seeks to produce autonomy based on capacity to self-govern.

The concept of exclusion is applied in conventional sociology as a starting point for the study of society on its periphery. Such approach reveals the dark side of social processes, a passive view of victims and various forms of social degeneration. However, exclusion is not understood here as a nonsense or error. Derrida (1985) finds in any social construct the *différance* as an irreducible aspect of non-presence: the prime condition for constructing a comprehensive system, namely the exclusion of nonsense, is precisely what ensures that such a system remains incomplete. Social exclusion amid deep social disagreements is no longer something marginal, nonsense or error (Lye, 1996), but serves as a guide to critical reasoning.

Long before it was Gödel (1930) who proved for the mathematical constructs that no formal truth is self-sufficient in its own context of reasoning, because it cannot be explained without the unexplained residual value; residual can usually be spotted and resolved, but only in a different formal system of claims (incompleteness theorem). Derrida (2002), analogously argues that at the core of every definition of truth is "difference, not the essence", that the essence and the truth are not what they claim to be, but only what is excluded from them. To see something as real is not a product of the search for truth but a result of blindness imposed by some particular strategy of dominant power.

There are incompatible perceptions of social exclusion. Movements contradict the system in a variety of ways: by refusal, revolt, disobedience, resistiveness, desertion, dissidence, dissent, with “counter-conduct” (Foucault, 1997). There are diverse ways in which members of civil society feel excluded and consequently also develop under different banners – as antiwar or antifascist, anticapitalist, antiglobalization, antiracist, antidevelopment, antiausterity, antielitistic, antimilitaristic, anticonsumer movements... These various types of exclusion emerge from the “structural unconscious” (Derrida, 1988) and result in a variety of antisystem movements as “the revenge of the remainder” (Barbagallo et al., 2011).

What they share is only their antisystemic "negative denomination" (Habermas, in Balibar, 2007). The method of negative definition or "*via negativa*" (Plotinus, *The Enneads*, IV 9,1) was applied to define absolute terms (love or freedom), to describe them by what they are not (Bookchin, 1995). Analogously, struggle for emancipation is always a fight against expansion of dominant power (Holloway, 2004). Therefore, there is only one antisystem horizon set by the model of the break (Diefenbach, 2007) and only one answer to the question “Why be

antisystemic but many answers to the question about how to operate in antisystem way (Klein, 2001, Rossiter).

Movements can achieve the antisystem objective only together. The question is how to organize dispersed and deeply divided antisystem efforts into a structure of a multitude (Blair et al., 2002). Bourdieu (2001) asks how to ensure the collective production of realistic community alternatives that are not subject to the demand of uniformity and could be enforced in their insurmountable diversity. The case is that antisystem movements face an organizational problem. They resist to structuration because they fear that it would organise them into uniformity of a hierarchy and plunge them into face-to-face confrontations. Also, majority of movements are not reflexive and cannot withstand criticism on their account. A typical example is the "Organisational debate" in the Situationist International, which was one of the levers of student demonstrations in May 1968 (Khayati, 1966). The debate took place between autumn 1968 and spring 1972. Any attempt to overcome programmatic and operational differences between participants immediately pointed to inconsistency between their programmatic self-determination on one side and actual practices of their operations and how they actually contribute to the antisystem struggles on the other (Dowling, 2005). The Debate immediately triggered an avalanche of mutual accusations for a range of program-action inconsistencies; this was followed by exclusion and exits of several members, which meant the end of International (Ford, 2004).

Our thesis is that to resolve the organizational problem, movements need to abandon classical idea of vertical structuration on the platform of their assumed programmatic similarity imposed as the lowest common denominator. Actually, the opposite has been observed. Movements usually exhibit more radical programs as they really operate against the system, or vice versa. Hence their action-program footprint is usually inconsistent. A given movement can recover its internal consistency only when interacting with another movement with the symmetrically opposite footprint. Internal consistency is achieved in cooperation with partly similar and partly dissimilar movements, so only in the heterogeneous way. Inconsistency is here a raw material of structuration.

When co-ordinated between each other, movements gradually build up an antisystem's structure that establishes itself as independent structural parallel to the system's structure. The formation of parallel structures is crucial. It enables the decomposition of initial antisystem conflict into the systemic antagonism between parallel structures and into the class agonism between social groups with alternative social visions. Importance of such deconstructive intervention has been justified already by Marx (in Eder, 1992). The conclusion is that organizing antisystems on the basis of their systemic exclusion is not only crucial for their own destiny. It is also a precondition for an alternative structuration of society as a whole through the permanent struggle for personal and communal autonomy, just like envisaged by Landauer.

2 The organizational problem

Contemporary antisystem movements have never been and have never aspired to become a fixed, comprehensive, self-contained, and internally consistent system of ideas, set of doctrines, or body of theory (Marshall, 2011). A social movement is a mixture of social protest and political action, which often leads to contradictions (Touraine, in Haferkamp, Smelser, 1992). This diversity poses an obstacle to their cooperative efforts to establish structural organization. Movements instinctively reject hierarchical structuration, as it always turns into domination of minority over majority. Impulse towards an unstructured form of operation is a reaction of antisystem movements to overstructured society. This impetus is in conflict with organisational imperative which follows from multiplicity of antisystem aspirations, from determination to achieve global impact and far-reaching social change. Unstructured movements remain unrepresentative, thus producing a democratic deficit when they act as defenders of public interests (Lovink, Hofmann, 2004). Unless movements develop their own independent vertical structure, official institutions remain uncontested bearers of legitimacy (Rossiter, 2006).

Emma Dowling (2005), a participant at the European Social Forum in London in 2004, described difficulties that accompanied Forum's attempts to vertically coordinate movements. At the Forum, the participants formed two opposite camps; "horizontal" and "verticals." The first group consisted of small local networks and movements that operated from the bottom up, and a group of weakly connected individuals. They pursued volunteerism and inclusive approaches, consensual decision making, non-hierarchical operation and ethical reflexivity. The second group consisted of representatives of trade union organizations, major international organisations and those who previously dealt with organizing mass demonstrations against the main systemic institutions of global capitalism. Verticals advocated professionalization of the Forum's operation. For them, antisystemic structuring is not only a functional means to achieve goals, but is important on its own as an antisystemic infrastructure (Breines, 1989). Verticalism has culminated at the seventh World Social Forum in Nairobi (Kenya, 2007), where a small group of professionals involved in the organizing committee managed the whole process and took their decisions independently. Majority of movements were involved in the process only as subcontractors (Rousset, 2009). Piven and Cloward (1977) argued that bureaucratic organizations created to advance these movements actually served to weaken them by demobilizing mass defiance (Halcli, in Browning et al., 2000) and channelling activists into old-style politics, which can only benefit the system. Rousset has described the same schism from the divide which took place at the World Social Forum 2009 (Belém, Brazil). Forum failed to create the conditions for the overlapping interaction at the macro level (Padovani, Tuzzi, 2004), which would emerge from multiple interactions between individual movements at the micro level (McLeish, 2003). At the concluding events of the Forum, participating movements from both groups even organized their operation on separate sessions.

At the European Social Forum, the exact opposite happened when Forum completely abandoned the structured operation (Vivas, Antentas, 2008). On the one hand, this enabled the Forum to overcome centralized operation. But on the other hand, it has fallen into crisis of perspectives, since it failed to impose self-sustaining organizational forms and clear intellectual vision.

Jo Freeman (1972) has rejected the possibility of unstructured antisystem operation. While studying feministic groups, Freeman realised that unstructured groups are very successful in mobilizing participants for the movements and inspiring people to talk about their lives, about what is important to them, what they miss most, what they would like to do, and how they want to be recognized. However, when groups are mobilized and want to start implementing their goals, they can no longer remain unstructured. The functioning of unstructured groups is not successful because action requires organization, uniform rules and restrictions on expression of differences (ibid.). To accomplish goals, organization is requisite (DeLeon, 1896).

The idea of unstructured processes is dogmatic. If a process is not structured, it cannot protect itself against subversion and efforts of stronger participants to prevail. Absence of structure results not only in absence of hierarchy but also in absence of formalisms which keeps minority of group managers, representatives and leaders responsible and accountable. Unstructured process is a fence behind which agents and brokers manipulate group by limiting information, forming hidden alliances, and by not sharing knowledge of operating rules and procedures of translation between micro and macro level. Each group, further says Freeman, regardless of their nature, duration and objectives, inevitably gets structured. That is precisely why we cannot have a free market. To talk about '*laissez - faire*' group is the same nonsense as talking about '*laissez – faire*' society (Freeman, 1972). In both cases this is a slogan in the service of establishing covert and informal hierarchies. Only two things are possible: a movement is either formally structured or its structure remains invisible.

Organizing antisystem movements requires to connect them vertically (above) and horizontally (McLeish, 2003). Movements can be distinguished horizontally in a classical way (cf. Holloway, 2004) as a reformist, revolutionary or autonomist. For the former, the systemic exclusion is only due to suboptimal systemic arrangements. It is antisystemic in the narrowest way – in defence of constitutional rights of members against those in power. Reformists appeal for nonconfrontational path of radical social change over long term by small steps without unacceptable sacrifice and unnecessary victims (Webber, 2006).

In contrast, the protagonists of revolutionary programs see the existing social order as fundamentally inadequate and demand its replacement by a radically different constitution – socially, nationally, religiously... Rosa Luxemburg (1900) rejected the idea that series of incremental reforms over time can radically change society. Chain of progressive reforms can quickly break and change the course of changes. Reforms are not always progressive; they are sometimes pursued by conservatives, as in the present wave of austerity reforms. Revolutionaries

claim that socially excluded must first demolish the walls of their exclusion, and then impose a whole new social structure (Huntington, 1968). However, the protagonists of revolutionary movements are criticized for being more committed to reproducing social antagonisms, which provide them with the central position in society, then to achieving antisystem objectives from their programs.

Tucker (in Chomsky, 1973) considered that the system is not a real structure, but only a concept that is respected by everybody. To destroy a concrete system does not require to physically demolish power structures, as revolutionaries would have it, but only to remove a uniform concept of society from the mind of its members and from social practices. Following Landauer (1910), the way how people relate to each other needs to be changed as a precondition for the elimination of hostile power structures. Proudhon kept telling that the abusive system could be abolished only at the point when people generally become confident in its antisocial and oppressive nature. And when antisocial practices of the system are abandoned, the system will be abolished (Reichert, 1967) and decomposed by itself.

A violent assault on power is not needed to destruct a particular system of exclusion (Holloway, 2004). Problematic is the very existence of the concept of power – when one accepts its logic, the battle for freedom is lost in advance. What needs to be done in the antisystem process is to create a world without masters and slaves (Vaneigem, 1965). Thus, the essential question is not who or how should exercise power, but how to create social relationships that are not based on relations of domination (ibid.). Antisystem movements that strive most for these goals are autonomist movements, representing the third main antisystem program. Engels wrote that autonomists have managed to put the revolutionary order of things upside down, when they eliminated the state at the beginning of revolution, not at the end of gradual transition following the takeover of power (Chomsky, 1973).

Demands for autonomy derive from inalienable freedom of individuals and their communities to self-governing (Camatte, 2003). One cannot be authentic unless he/she has competencies to chose and enforce his or her lifestyle in not necessarily favourable circumstances of everyday life. Their autonomy does not lead them to ignore market and state altogether, they only refuse all imposed rules that are not confirmed by them *ex-ante*.

Autonomists agree with the revolutionaries that the system cannot be repaired, even less changed, by a series of reforms. However, they also agree with the reformers that it is not necessary to discard old altogether to produce a radical social change. Unlike reforms or revolutions, autonomy cannot be fulfilled on request, nor can it be granted or conquered. It can be achieved through practice and can emerge only from the inside, e.g. by taking global responsibility in local interactions (Radej et al., 2013). Post-leftist anarchist Hakim Bey (1991) wrote that only the autonomous can plan autonomy, organize it, create it. Indeed, those who do not use the available freedom will undermine others (Kant, in Howell, 2012). This brought

Lévinas (1969) to perceive autonomy as selfish and narrow-minded, concerned only with the conditions for its own realization. Consequently, aspiration for autonomy itself cannot provide diverse antisystem movements with the platform for their complex structuration.

So we have horizontally three antisystem programs which cannot by themselves enhance structuration of antisystem movements. Just the contrary, programmatic differences are the main axis along which movements remain separated. Resolution of antisystem's organisational problem evidently requires entirely different approach.

3 Inconsistency as a denominator

Three main antisystem programs are incommensurable and share no common denominator in programmatic sense. So it is necessary to abandon any attempt to link movements on the base of their programmatic similarity. The relationship movements have with the system is important for their structuration only in principal matters concerning their excludedness. This offers very limited guidance for everyday interactions between the movements, which represent the vast majority of contributions to the antisystem's structuration. This suggests that the possibility for antisystem's structuration should be researched not only on programmatic but also on operational level.

Introduction of the operational aspect into the study of organisational problem is the point where this dispute becomes interesting. For most movements there is observable internal inconsistency between their program claims and actual effects of operation: their programs are more radical in antisystemic terms than their operational contributions, or vice versa. This discrepancy is not the result of error, but reveals the nature of the phenomenon. Social reality is not solely programmatic but also pragmatic. There is no reality without action (Sartre, 1995). Program cannot be implemented immediately as a spell, but requires organized efforts and focused performance (see Tilly, 1978). Herbert Simon (1961, 1969) says that we must distinguish between how we perceive the world and how we impact it. Principal issues of programmatic nature refer to our primary concerns, which are set in abstract conceptual terms. On the other hand, capacity for action is always limited by possibilities and contextual factors that allow only for a limited set of operational options (Sternfeld, 2007) which enable only partial implementation of program's demands. This is why the programs, with which a movement presents itself to other movements and the results of its actual operation, after which it is recognized by other movements, seldom really add up. This inconsistency is a source of continuous friction and distrust, and ultimately contributes to divisions between movements. The impression is that antisystem movements are not capable of managing their mutual differences even though social diversity is a goal to which they passionately aspire.

Bookchin (1995) elaborated the typical "program-action duality" of movements. Rosa Luxemburg presented it as dialectic between action and on-going innovations of organizational forms of a movement (Bonefeld, 2004). Derrida (1978) also saw dialectic between genesis or

spontaneous emergence of movements and their structuring in the static configuration. Graeber (2004a) subsequently distinguishes between a movement's input side as implied by its program declaration and output side, related to its actual performance in practice. Input-output formalization of antisystem movements introduces the program-action matrix, suitable for further exploration of organizational problem.

Matrix schematization of organizational problem is consistent with the preference of movements to organise in networks. Network does not have defined limits, but rather overlaps with other networks, and expands or contracts as groups interact or part ways (Gerlach, in Gordon, 2008). Network connection is non-binding and weak enough to meet movements' preference for unstructuredness. But it also has significant drawbacks. Above all, it is incapable of collective action. The network is one-eyed (Ankersmit, 2005), because it cannot see the other's point of view. Network links are bilateral, and in this respect, private, while public affairs are multilateral (Strydom, 1999). Rossiter (2006) has proposed to crystallize untapped cooperative potential of antisystem networks so as to impose artificial restrictions on them to control their vagueness and instability. As long as a network is entirely open and with no rules, all options are open to it, and when faced with them, the network shatters in indecisiveness. This is typical situation for systems which organize abundance, such as information. In these cases underlying systems suffer from "scarcity of scarcity" (Curzon Price, 2007a, b). To restrain antisystem networks, Rossiter proposes a concept of "organized networks".

Imposition of restrictions on networks introduces "undemocratic element of democracy" (Balibar, 2007) into antisystem movements. It is formalism and restriction, like rules and borders, in a democracy "which links *demos* to *krátos*" (from lat. "*kratein*", to rule; Rossiter, 2006). For postmodern authors *krátos* is contradictory in an antisystemic context because rules are the basis for oppression of freedom. However, they have in mind the systemic *krátos*, not the antisystemic *krátos*, which is not established on the domination of one, but on the autonomy of many. Its form is not a mirror image of the power relations (Holloway, 2004), but the frame for self-management. In our particular case, artificial limits are imposed with the demand that every movement should locate itself in the antisystem matrix (as an example of organized network) and in this way define its program-action footprint. This not only presents movements to each other in a uniform way but also displays their internal inconsistency and so reveals their cooperative potential.

Rows in antisystem matrix (below) present three program horizons, while columns present the same three horizons from the standpoint of movements' operational effects. Each cross-sectional field of the matrix locates the different input-output footprint. The idea of researching movements in a cross-sectional perspective is consistent with the nature of exclusion, which is, according to intersectional theory, also cross-sectional (Knudsen, 2006). It claims that mechanisms of exclusion on the basis of gender, race, class and ethnicity are not to be dealt with separately, because they are overlapping and each of them works at the intersection with all the

others – one does not have only sex, but at the same time also has class and ethnic identity. The aggregate consequences of exclusion by gender and race are larger than would be found in sum of separate effects because exclusion factors work together (Weldon, 2005) and support each other. Beside the hidden hand of social cohesion through market, there is also at work a hidden hand of social disintegration (so the concept of hidden hand is the most unhelpful approach to explanation for processes of social dis/integration; see Radej, Golobič, 2013).

Only for three basic antisystem horizons, reformist, revolutionary and autonomous, there is no internal gap between their program demands and effects of operation in practice. Due to this homogeneity they are located on the negative diagonal of a square matrix (dragged from the top left field to the bottom right, indicated by 1-1, 2-2, 3-3). This gives these movements a sense of inner consistency and thus self-sufficiency. They see other movements with inconsistent footprints, located on non-diagonal fields, as immature and possessing no original antisystem potential.

Movements located below negative diagonal are more radical in their programs and diagnose the system more critically, than they effectively contribute with their operation to the achievement of antisystemic objectives. The opposite holds for movements located above a negative diagonal. Between the diagonal and non-diagonally arranged movements there is a tension which can only be resolved undemocratically – so that the inconsistent is subjected to the consistent and so that diversity is traded for unity. As this would contradict the antisystem character of movements, it cannot be expected to happen on a large scale. Hence, only non-diagonally located movements can be expected to cooperate and emerge antisystem structuration that does not demand unification between them.

Program-action matrix of antisystem movements

Operation Program	1 As Reformists	2 As Revolutionaries	3 As Autonomists
1 Reformist	1-1 Reformists as reformists	1-2 Reformists as revolutionaries	1-3 Reformists as autonomists
2 Revolutionary	2-1 Revolutionaries as reformists	2-2 Revolutionaries as revolutionaries	2-3 Revolutionaries as autonomists
3 Autonomist	3-1 Autonomists as reformists	3-2 Autonomists as revolutionaries	3-3 Autonomists as autonomists

First we need to remove the possibility of misunderstanding, because we might have provoked it ourselves. Movements in the field 1-1 declare reform program and also consistently achieve only minor changes of the system. So they do not really contain anything radically antisystemic. They can establish favourable conditions for a break with the present – but they never achieve it. Besides, it is clear that some reformist movements achieve effects that actually contribute to radical changes (in fields 1-2, 1-3), as well as the opposite, when reformist impacts are produced by movements with radical programs (2-1, 3-1).

Nondiagonally placed movements are not fully compatible, because characteristics that connect them always go hand in hand with some other characteristics that separate them. Therefore, their similarity is only weak, and can be realized only in agonistic way. The oppositions between the diagonally located movements, however, are entirely different than those between the nondiagonal ones. The former are expressed in categorical terms, while the latter are not due to their inconsistent internal footprint. Nondiagonal movements can achieve internal consistency only collaboratively, in interaction with some other movements with heterogeneous footprint. Their internal consistency can be reconstructed through their hybridity in mesoscopic logic. This confirms that only "inconsistent" movements contain potential for antisystem vertical structuration.

Present approach to antisystem structuration needs to be reversed. The result is no longer unity based on the common denominator of their programs, but on the symmetry of their internal program-action inconsistencies. Therefore, it is necessary to look more closely at the logic and consequences of antisystem's structuration on heterogeneous basis. Homogeneous categories are not seen any more as consistent in their own framework of elaboration, even less beyond it. Central importance of inconsistency is thus not conceptualised here because we resignate from the aspiration for holistic meanings, but it denotes a shift in paradigm, as will be shown, from binary to triadic setting of our initial concerns.

4 Antisystemic correlates

If a given movement with inconsistent program-action footprint aspires to reach internal consistency, it needs to enter into cooperative effort with a movement with exactly opposite footprint. Symmetrically located movements relative to the negative diagonal have the best collaborative potential, because they are inversely similar (or equivalently – symmetrically dissimilar). Through their correlative interaction antisystem matrix produces three overlapping correlates (cf. Teivainen, 2002 in Reese, Vaneigem, 1965), which set three routes of antisystem structuration: a participatory, communitarian and militant.

Symmetrically dissimilar are movements in the fields of 1-2 and 2-1, both of which enhance their antisystem effectiveness in close collaboration with the system and also draw on systemic resources for financing their operation, like nongovernmental organizations or they rely on the systemic mechanisms of participatory democracy, such as economic-social partnership between the state, owners of the industrial capital and trade unions. In joint projects movements 2-1 can settle their action deficit, while 1-2 do the opposite when radicalizing their program demands. A practical example of participatory correlate is a coalition between local non-governmental organizations (1-2) and the transnational non-governmental organizations such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International (2-1). Another example is linking between national and transnational trade unions. A systematic review of links between domestic and transnational movements is presented by Grimes (2011). In the correlate, two movements catalyze their antisystem capacities: local

organization obtains denationalized legitimacy in the international arena (Rossiter, 2006), which is then capitalised at home with a higher impact on the systemic institutions. On the other hand, an international movement obtains a seal of legitimacy on the international stage for its localized operation. From the aspect of structuration it is crucial to observe that cross-sectional coalition connects movements in a way which restores consistency between their programmatic and their operational side, without demanding from movements to sacrifice their diversity for unity.

The second, communitarian correlate emerges from the interaction between inversely similar movements anchored in the fields 1-3 and 3-1. The system serves – exactly in the same way as in the previous instance – as the starting point for their antisystemic efforts. But autonomy is not authentic if its performance mainly benefits the system (3-1) or is granted by the system (1-3). Only when these two movements connect, they can produce antisystem effects in the form of alternative public goods in an autonomous and self-sustaining way. An example is the production of eco-food. Eco-farmers have been seeking for the separation of eco-food production (antisystem) from non-organic production (systemic) for decades. With the introduction of strict ecoregulation in agriculture, their demands are basically fulfilled. However, their radical antisystemic impact is mostly absent. This is so because ecofarmers do not bother if their crops end up on supermarket shelves only as a complement to the non-organic food. Antisystem character of eco-food will be maximized only when their main clients are found in antisystem community. Eco product would need to be also traded in the antisystem way, distributed in the antisystem way, such as sharing, and even consumed in the antisystem way – such as when basic needs are met in a healthy way. This would be needed to secure that antisystem content is accumulated in every stage of circulation of its products, so that its impacts cannot be assimilated to strengthen the system again and again. From the antisystemic point of view, ecofarmers should connect their production with the fair trade method or swap the product in the local exchange scheme provided by movements in 1-3. The local exchange schemes also cannot become radical in antisystemic way until goods they exchange are not of antisystemic origin, such as second-hand goods which experientially prevail in local exchange systems.

Link between 3-1 and 1-3 is a precondition for the possibility that communitarians produce prefigurative effects. These increase independence of communities from the system and its dysfunctional services. Bakunin imposed that movements must create "not only the ideas but also the facts of the future" (in Maeckelbergh, 2012). The prime aim of prefigurative operation is to reconstruct the correspondence between vision and praxis (Gordon, 2008) through collaborative praxis, where 'creation is resistance, resistance is creation'" (Deleuze in Blair et al., 2002). Despite their radical contributions, communitarians do not abolish the system as such, but only complement it and so make it unnecessary in increasing number of vital areas of everyday life.

The third main coalition of antisystem movements is the militant one, connecting movements in 2-3 and 3-2. Their main purpose is neither to improve the system (a participatory correlate) nor to complement it (a communitarian correlate), but to refuse it for the sake of protection of

autonomy, in response to structural colonisation of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*, Husserl, 1970). As long as operating separately, both groups are disadvantaged by their internal inconsistency. Movements in 2-3 cannot achieve autonomy only through autonomous approaches, but need to resort to revolutionary struggles to defend their islands of autonomy, collective memory and acquired social identity (Harvey, 1996), surrounded by violent system seas – such as the Mexican *Zapatistas*, Indians from Chiapas and other rural or location-based movements such as Argentinean *Piqueteros* or *Cocaleros* from Colombia. Being territorial, these movements are often cut off from the wider antisystem background and thus at risk to take localistic view. For instance, they might suppose traditional understanding of gender relations or "militant particularism" (Raymond Williams, in Harvey, 1995), in which antisystem efforts retreat into conservative models of community relations (Harvey, 1996).

On the other hand, movements in the 3-2, such as Negri's urban multitude, do not possess a clear action or spatial focus because of their global orientation and mobility. It is not unusual that global injustice attracts more attention than injustices that occur locally. In cooperation with movements in 2-3, they can experience localised autonomous practice, for example traditional consensual method of coordination (Graeber, 2004b), and ways of governing common everyday life on the autonomous basis. On the other hand, cooperation is also fruitful for movements in 2-3, because it extends their perspective on the struggles that are taking place in the global antisystem archipelago.

Antisystem militancy is not dictated by the violent nature of movements. It is only the answer to the structural violence of the system against the society (Emma Goldman, in Reichert). Opposite to the repressive nature of the system, there is "*ius resistentiae*", the right to resist (Gordon, 2008) everything that threatens the primacy of the individual and community before the system (Virno, 2004). Militancy has positive motivation of defending intrinsic values. It does not induce uncontrolled outbreaks of violence characteristic of the revolutionary path. The Italian anarchocommunist Errico Malatesta (1853-1932) wrote after the October Revolution that if the gallows on the main square were precondition for victory, he would have preferred that the revolution fails (1924, in Vernon, 1993). Violence against the defeated and the sacrifice of the innocent for radical goals of the new society is not radical and it cannot contribute to the original antisystem goals. Antisystem movements consistently refuse all forms of violence which are not induced by the implementation of antisystem goals, for example religious violence, fundamentalism, racism, sexism and organized crime (Grubačić, 2003, cf. Teivainen, 2002, Reese).

Exclusion of anti-social violence from antisystem matrix is not the only aspect of antisystemic practices of exclusion. Exclusion also occurs in the case of those critics of the system who reject all forms and even the possibility of antisystem structuration and in this way deny the prospects of an alternative society. Such defeatism has been supported by radical postmodern philosophy of the individual. It only sees fragmentation and disconnectedness. Its relativism is stretched to

the point that it degrades the importance of community and even resists any idea of collective spirit and qualitative differences (Zerzan, 2004). For Foucault, postmodern relativism collapses into "irreducible pluralism of interpretations" (1979). Individuals are isolated from social reality and are more oriented toward themselves than toward social change (Bookchin, 1995). "Never in any previous civilization have the great metaphysical preoccupations, the fundamental questions of being and the meaning of life, seemed so utterly remote and pointless" (Jameson in Zerzan, 2004). Here we find no resistance to power; on the contrary, we are faced with the glorification of powerlessness, in which autonomy becomes a myth (Kirinić, 2003).

Radical relativism does not contain anything radical in antisystem terms. A fully developed individual can only emerge in fully developed society. In the interpretation of social facts, one should avoid both the generalisation as well as relativism. Giddens (1989) disagrees with relativistic attempts to rule out holistic thinking. The principle of relativity must be defended against relativism: we are not allowed to derive relativistic conclusions from our limited knowledge of reality. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers explain (1982, 1978) that relativity is based solely on restrictions that apply to the elementary level, i.e. only on physical observer. It is not general, so we should not dismiss the possibility of a holistic truth.

Asocial relativists are also expelled from the antisystem matrix because they subvert the project of alternative society. Although antisystem movements are a product of social exclusion, they themselves impose strict exclusionary demands to their single-minded antisystem counterparts (Balibar, 2007). These are therefore excluded both from the system and from the antisystem. The result of the second exclusion is a double excludedness which forms the "antiantisystem"¹ of all asocial varieties of opponents to the system. This suggests two things. Movements do not abolish exclusion but only impose their own rules to produce a different form of social relations. And secondly, schematically speaking, antisystem as a category can no longer be seen as the opposite of the system and antagonistic to it, but instead as an intermediate or mesoscopic category situated within triadic structure.

Before turning to discussion of the significance of this finding, we shall first finalize the explanation of antisystem structuration logic. We find that antisystem movements establish the most effective interactions when they balance their inconsistent program-action footprints. Even in such ideally structured interactions, no single antisystem coalition can accomplish its antisystem goal on its own. Participatory correlate is only quasi-antisystemic as its contributions depend on the system resources. Communitarian coalition is effective only as semi-antisystemic. Contrary to the previous coalition, it relies on its own capabilities. However, it does not transform the system, but establishes itself as a parallel provider of services and so only makes

¹ Similar terminological acrobatics is sensible for situations when a research topic is set in the mainstream binary framework (system – antisystem) but research itself is accomplished in the mesoscopic way (system – antisystem – antiantisystem).

the system unnecessary. Militant antisystem coalition achieves only orto-antisystem effects. This coalition is the only one which aspires for a radical alternative to the system, but they rarely produce full autonomy with autonomous means. It has a relatively low mobilization potential and is difficult to maintain and restore.

The highest level of the vertical structuration of antisystem movements is achieved by meta-overlaps – correlating coalitions. Participatory correlate is "mesomobilisational" (Gerhards, Rucht, 1992) that provides a broad support to an antisystem movement as a whole. Community correlate constructs sustainable basis of self-sustaining autonomous community. Militant correlate protects achievements and defends communal boundaries. This is not to claim that the holistic strategy is impossible for antisystem movements, but only that different holistic concepts coexist and produce antisystem effect only through mutual efforts.

A result of meso-level approach to the structuration of movements is the emergence of vertical antisystem structure at three basic levels: individual movement – antisystem coalitions – meta-overlaps between three coalitions (in our schematic example). The highest level of connectedness is not a formal structure but a reflexive feedback loop. Reflexivity is crucial for antisystem movements that develop autonomy which relates only to itself (Vaneigem, 1997). Reflexivity is needed to enhance their overall antisystemic consistency. It is a deconstructive mechanism that is never synthesizing (like dialectics) but "always reaching back" (Lye, 1996) to remind the movements of the complex (horizontal and vertical incommensurability) nature of the antisystem structuration process.

By establishing a vertical structure, the initial desire to resolve the organizational problem of antisystem movements is at last schematically accomplished. Now we need to elaborate consequences, in particular to see how antisystem structuration affects the transformation of social relations, due to rearranged relationship of exclusion.

5 Society in the middle

We started with the conventional sociology claiming that society operates both in unstructured and in structured ways, and that they are locked in an antagonistic relationship. Between them and, consequently, between forces of order and freedom there is an irresolvable antisystem conflict. This should be the natural order of things between society and the system.

If observed organically, society as a category is not opposite to the system, and its spontaneity and aspiration for autonomy are not antagonistic to any form of structuration. For each society, structural support is necessary as it enables its members to escape from ephemeral relations and focus on fundamental collective values and aspirations. On the other hand, society needs to remain independent from any specific structure.

In mesoscopic frame, forces of systemic order are not uniform, but are split in two parts. This becomes evident with the emergence of the antisystem structure. Now the system's structure is

not seen any more as opposite to the unstructured society but as antagonistic to the antisystem's structure. With the emergence of antisystem structure, antisystemic conflict is transformed into systemic conflict between two competitive structures of the same society which is placed as the third (actually the first) element between them.

Such a transformation deantagonizes intrinsic and irresolvable conflicts in a society so that its members can finally perceive the true nature of social contradictions in a way that is not (so much) distorted. Confrontations between members of society, such as interest groups, are no longer structurally hostile or antagonistic, but become agonistic (Foucault, 1982, in Gordon), in this way making use of the conflict instead of trying to eliminate them. "Agonism is a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle: less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyses both sides than a permanent provocation" (Donzelot in Burchel, 1991). At this point antagonized social relations die out and with them also disappears political orthodoxy (Noys, 2011) of the binary social world. However, this cannot purge political radicalism. What is radical here is that a society is now seen in meso perspective as plural and located between its poles in two senses: first, between two antagonistic forms of asociality, between the system and antiantisystem, and then also between antagonistic structural arrangements, systemic and antisystemic.

The society then, schematically speaking, lies between two parallel structural regimes, and oscillates between them. When the systemic forces of exclusion become too suppressive, parts of society simply swing toward antisystemic structure, because it enhances their need for autonomy. And the opposite happens when parts of society need more unity in collective matters of central importance.

In such a triadic setting, society derives its autonomy against the system from the possibility of choice between competing structuration offers. Legitimacy of structural arrangements, from which parts of society retreat, is consequently diminished. This shrinks its future social opportunities (see a concrete example of the impact of energy policy on the territorial cohesion in Slovenia, Radej, Golobič, 2013). The strategy of antisystemic retreat is therefore not defensive, but is the result of an aspiration for autonomy. The movements no longer need to use the old method of direct confrontation with the system, but instead subject the institutions to scorn and ridicule to isolate them and force them to deal with themselves (Camatte, 1973). Rigid structures of power can be forced to change from the inside because of underpressure created by withdrawal of members from dysfunctional structures and by the substitution of their services with antisystemic ones. In the case of antisystem alternatives, these substitutions become feasible with deconstructivist innovations, as in the case of deconstruction of antisystem conflict to the system conflict and the resulting deantagonization of social relations.

Marx differentiated conflicts between structures, which are systemic, from conflicts among agents (Eder, 1992), which are social. Conflicts among agents are called class conflicts and are

the intrinsic form of social confrontation between protagonists of competing visions of social good. Mesoscopic class conflict is different from the classical one. It is no longer economically motivated, but based on differences in values and lifestyles (Eder, 1992). In meso logic, class conflicts can no longer act destructively and threaten social stability. On the contrary, high intensity of class struggle is an indication of the high level of cooperation in a society coping with its profound contradictions and exhibiting its strong reflexive and learning capacity.

We started with antisystem conflict, while we conclude with a distinction between the system and the class conflict. What have we achieved with all this? To illustrate the achievement it might be convenient to sum up with the help of *sancta simplicitas* of classical liberals, who thought that the relationship between autonomy and order, that is, between unstructured and structured society, can be regarded as the relation between good and bad, the beauty and the beast. With our mesoscopic framing we therefore claim that to abolish presently dominant binary concepts of society one needs first to deconstruct the dominant conflict between good and bad (“the antisystem conflict”), and then to arrange the result of this deconstruction into the structural conflict between bad and bad (“the system conflict”) and into the social conflict between good and good (“the class conflict”).

This finally suggests that the resolution of antisystem contradiction – with the introduction of a more advanced mesoscopic algorithm of social exclusion – is not only important in itself, for resolution of the organisational problem of antisystem movements. It is also important because it produces effects that act as the sufficient precondition for a modified conceptualisation and transformation of social relations as a whole. This is not to say that the old system becomes irrelevant and can be ignored. It continues to exist even after mesoscopic transformation of society, but now it becomes obvious that the resolution of its system crisis is not a decisive element of the social change.

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