

GOOD SPORTSPERSON – GOOD HUMAN BEING

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Abstract

“What is the nature of the good human being?” is a question asked time and again since Aristotle’s virtue ethics. In the human quest for flourishing as a good human being, according to MacIntyre, man has to fulfill two basic conditions: the ability of rational reasoning and the awareness of dependency on other people. The good cannot be achieved without the pursuit of and harmonizing with the good of the social and cultural environment only within which one can flourish.

A good human being is one who benefits her or himself and others. This is a matter not only of being good in any given role one has, for judgments we make about that role are always judgments about human flourishing as a whole.

When we apply this thesis to the field of sport we can say that a good sportsperson is the individual who satisfies the concept of the good human being. This can be realized when the role of the sportsperson is seen as only one of the roles the person has in life as a human being. Being a good sportsperson not only involves good skills, which does not necessarily show a good personality, but is also seen under a broader understanding of human flourishing *qua* good human being.

While focusing on the virtues and the rational dependency of man, the paper includes a consideration of the sportsperson as an individual, sport as an institution and society as the environment in which all participants, regardless of their role in sport, have to communicate and co-operate. This is the paradigm that allows the sportsperson to flourish as a good human being, and the social foundation for people to flourish in all their beauty and magnificence.

Key words: philosophy, ethics, good, society, sportsperson, well-being, relationships

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Izveleček

Racionalni evdajmonizem utemeljen z Aristotelovo Nikomahovo etiko vedno znova budi vprašanja po človekovi naravi dobrega. V želji, da bi človek uspeval v vsem svojem sijaju kot dobro človeško bitje mora po MacIntyre-jevi teoriji izpolnjevati dva temeljna pogoja; sposoben mora biti samostojnega kritičnega presojanja, hkrati pa se mora zavedati odvisnosti od drugih. Tako človek v iskanju dobrega vedno svoje dobro na nek način uskladi z dobrim družbenega oz. kulturnega okolja v katerem uspeva.

V športu to pomeni, da *dober športnik* ni samo tehnično ali taktično športno odličen, temveč je tudi moralno zrela osebnost. Tako svojo vlogo v športnem okolju utemelji znotraj širšega oz. vseobsegajočega lastnega življenjskega konteksta. Na ta način dobrega športnika opredeljujemo hkrati po njegovi športni vlogi in vlogi človeka, ki uspeva *kot dobro človeško bitje*. Tak športnik pa se vedno zaveda tudi svojega poslanstva in zgleda, ki ga daje mladim.

Z osredotočenostjo na vrline, samostojnost in hkratno soodvisnost človeka, v razpravi zajamemo športnika kot posameznika, šport kot inštitucijo in družbo v širšem pomenu. Tako pokažemo, da morajo vsi udeleženi, ne glede na vlogo v športu sodelovati in komunicirati, da uskladijo svoje *dobro* s širšim, splošnim dobrim. To je edini način, da športnik uspeva *kot dober človek* in to je hkrati tudi temelj, da družba nudi okolje v katerem človek sploh lahko uspeva v vsej svoji lepoti.

Ključne besede: filozofija, etika, dobro, družba, športnik, blaginja, odnosi

Modern man is strongly aware that overall ethical renaissance is unavoidable to survive. The post-modern thought that *anything goes* is driving us towards the opposite, yet we strive for the basic universal ethical principles to live by. More than metaphysical or theological ethical systems that postulate the existence of God, we nowadays trust in social conventions that, on the basis of agreement, constitute ethical norms and sanctions. This paradigm easily leads to moral cultural relativism, and as such the agreements fail or cannot effectively reach the private dimensions. And on the individual level, emphasis is placed on human moral consciousness and personal responsibility, requiring morally and rationally mature individuals.

Sport can be seen as a cultural category, reaching both the private and public spheres. In other words – sport is a matter of an individual and a society and for this fact it is a part of the big picture of humanity. Being conscious of oneself and others one has to accept some norms and find those highest moral values or duties which give direction to every action we take¹. By participating in sport one explores its own nature, body and mind, interferes with other individuals, society and nature, and in doing so one transforms the things and relations around oneself. By taking the responsibility of transformation, we have to take the responsibility for its consequences, too. It is very rarely (if not impossible) that the sportsperson is the only one involved in the transformation. As we are rational beings we have to be aware of the unintended consequences of our actions.

We will try to show that there exists a paradigm that can embrace both individual and social dimensions and lead toward an environment enabling human beings to flourish *qua* good human beings. Our focus is on substantiation of virtue ethics, and on showing that the role of a sportsman is one of the roles human being has in living the life of *eudaimonia*². Therefore, we will not consider the internal moral norm systems of sport that have been dealt with by many contemporary works of sport ethics. However, if we succeed in substantiating the ideas of *eudaimonia* (both individual and social), then we

1 Not every action is morally significant, therefore, what is meant here is the world-outlook which every developed rational human being should have.

2 *Eudaimonia*: Greek word for the highest good; *kind of rational striving according to perfect virtue, that lasts through the entire life* (by Gantar in Aristoteles, *Nicomachean ethics*, 1994); final purpose or aim of the human being i.e. flourishing *qua* good human being.

can claim that the internal logic of sport is not independent of the social well-being and that it has to follow the virtues and aims of the society.

Besides the critical examination of concepts, it is important to examine arguments, to see if they are good or bad. For if we want to solve a problem, we have to know which are the good arguments. And at the end, is it not important that we know what we ought to know or what we ought to do (Hare, 2001)?

1. Virtue ethics and eudaimonia

“What is the nature of the good human being?” is a question asked time and again since Aristotle’s virtue ethics. *Eudaimonia* is his answer, and if we are true to ourselves we can only agree.

In the human quest for flourishing as a good human being, according to MacIntyre³ (1999), humans have to fulfil two basic conditions: the ability of rational reasoning and the awareness of dependency on other people. In the search for our final aim (*eudaimonia*) we need to develop an understanding of our initial animality that is an unavoidable part of our personality. Corporeality (bodiliness) as a necessary and unavoidable form of human life may provide us with basic impulses to live by the natural animal principles. However, MacIntyre’s point is that this is not sufficient in order to flourish as a good human being. Through rational reasoning⁴, which distinguishes us from being mere animals, we become aware of our mutual dependence as social beings. And if we continue the understanding of ourselves, we can follow MacIntyre’s thoughts and say that human beings develop from the totally dependent phase of frail infancy and childhood, through the adolescent rebellion, into responsible rational adult human being (or at least wishing to be). And from the magnificent adult phase of independent practical reasoner we return to more or less frail and sickly phase of elderly. Confessing this, we establish the importance of the early and late phase of human life, infancy and elderly. Apparently, according to psychologists, early phase is of high importance in forming the personality charac-

3 MacIntyre Alasdair; neo-aristotelian moral philosopher.

4 Rational reasoning is understood here as reasoning with expression in the form of language, while as animal science shows today human beings are not the only rational animals.

teristics for the rest of the life⁵. Also the morality as the highest personal and social disciplinization and human articulation has roots in childhood. While, speaking generally, bodily development is in the domain of genetic and environmental influence, intellectual development is more of a personal inquiry and cultural impact; moral development with the possession of virtues and lack of vices (regardless of any body or mind qualities) is that by which we judge human beings and give them the prefix “good”. With not much risk we can claim that the moral consciousness is the parameter of the human development. Tall or small, ugly or beautiful, smart or dumb, rich or poor, in order to flourish as a good human being, and to be recognized as such humans have to be morally successful. If this is really so, then we can demonstrate that the state of *eudaimonia* is relative to individual, or better said - it is an inner state of harmonized living, and can be reached, regardless of the non-moral values, by following the pattern of moral virtues that are more or less the same all over the world, and as such have become socially universal.

We will postulate rational reasoning as granted for adult human beings and will focus on awareness of dependency on other people, while, as seen later, it is a key issue for the praxis of sport.

2. Obvious dependency

Let us state that the possession of virtues and the lack of vices create a social environment in which everyone would like to live. In fact the atmosphere of such a society would stimulate the co-operation and positive relationships between individuals. As Bond remarks: “*We are social creatures by nature, living in mutual dependence, and we are better off as co-operating and contributing members of a community or communities, where friendliness, willing mutual support, and good feeling prevail, than we are as mere individuals, each isolated and in competition with others for the goods of the world,*” (Bond, 1996, p. 127). Good social relations are an essential part of the personal good (i.e. *eudaimonia*) of each and every individual member. Therefore it is in the interest of every responsible rational human being to ensure that such com-

⁵ When looking on the works of philosophers from this perspective, we can support the MacIntyre’s claim that there is not enough focus on the philosophy of the childhood or oldness.

munities, according to Bond⁶, “*come into being and be sustained.*”

Being rational we understand that in real life it is impossible to possess only virtues and have no vice. In fact, if this was possible we would lose or, more precisely, overcome the dialectic with which we recognize something to be virtue or vice. But this does not mean that we cannot strive for the best possible world we can create. In fact, from Aristotle on, this is our final aim; it is our personal and social good.

If we are to understand the all-embracing⁷ mutual dependency, we first need to recognize the basic characteristics of the three phases in human development as individual. This is a general distinction of developmental stages of individual that we use in this context to describe the common characteristics of different kinds of dependency.

2.1. Dependent infancy and childhood

Human beings are mammals incapable of surviving the early period of life on their own. The phase of infancy and childhood is recognized as an important socializing process that is necessary to survive in any given community. Within this we can count the basic instructions how to assure the safety of living, how to satisfy the biological needs and how to communicate with other members of the society in the form of language. The development of rational reasoning is also a necessary task in this period, while it is a foundation of successful co-operation and communication, which is necessary to assure the personal and social well-being.

In the phase of infancy and childhood, individuals are highly dependent on adults and elderly, and are more receivers than givers. In this relationship of receiver and giver, the mere economic rules are not appropriate. It is not simply about giving something and then expecting to, sooner or later, directly benefit from the input. This is a much more complex relationship. When the giver is aware of the role of the educator then (s)he gives in order to

⁶ Bond, E. J.: In his book *Ethics and Human Well-being* he expounded the view called communalism. In short it is explained by Bond (p. 221) as: “...no, we are not isolated and self-contained individuals (although we are separate), and yes, our attachments and our mutual dependency are genuine and real, a part of a human nature,” and the commitment through both aretaic and deontic morality to common good is justified.

⁷ This approach leads further on to ecological theories, and is worth keeping it in perspective while studying sport ethics.

benefit the receiver without further calculation. The aim is to help the new member of the society to develop in such a way, that they would contribute later in the phase of rational independency, by flourishing as a good human being, and that is the pay-off to society, for there is no *good society* without *good individuals*.

The individual in this phase has to learn about goods in general and in particular from other members of society to whom we first encounter as teachers. Each of us, in order to develop our abilities as independent reasoners, has to make the transition from accepting what we are taught by the earliest teachers to making our own independent judgments about goods, and justify them rationally (MacIntyre, 1999).

The role and function of a parent is important in this phase. It is to bring the child to that point at which it is educable by the various members of other kinds of teachers. So the child develops independency, and other members take part in educating and providing the goods and environment needed for their eudaimonia. Rule-following will often be the way of such education (MacIntyre, 1999).

2.2. Rational concealing independency

We, as adult rational reasoners, often forget the fact that we are highly dependent on others for our well-being. We are a part of the big picture of humanity that is partly constitutive of an even bigger picture of nature. If “body” is our personal nature, “nature” is our common body. We may call it a large network of relations, much of which we are not aware. We will use MacIntyre’s thoughts to describe this concealed dependency. Each member of the society is disabled in some way and degree and has its own peculiar talents and possibilities. *“Each therefore needs others to take note of her or his particular condition. And this is one of the points at which it is important to remember that there is a scale of disability on which we all find ourselves.”* (MacIntyre, 1999 p. 73).

In different periods of our life we are differently disabled. So, to overcome such disabilities we have to be able to think of possible futures we are expecting as taking judgments and actions in our life. The only way in doing this is to encounter cooperation and good relationships with other members of the society and to reach some degree of

shared understanding and interests. Within this, different sets of goods and consequentially different modes of well-being can be achieved, and it is up to individual rationality, which way of reaching eudaimonia one chooses. Common independent reason leads us to the virtues we should possess and vices we should avoid.

From the independent reasoner assuming the role of the educator⁸ we expected to develop some range of intellectual and moral virtues. Only then it is possible to adequately care for and educate others. The same virtues are used also to *“adequately protect ourselves and each other against neglect, defective sympathies, stupidity, acquisitiveness, and malice”* (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 98).

2.3. Dependent elderly

Not only then is the first phase of human existence obviously dependent. Through the aging process, we become again more or less dependent on others in old age. We cannot provide the environment we need to flourish without help from others. Physical and intellectual functions are in decline. In fact, most old people die from disease, and are in need of social and medical care.

What matters is not only that they need help. It is also expected from them who are no longer children or disabled by age, to recognize in the old what they are moving towards. And these recognitions need not be a source of fear. As MacIntyre (1999, p. 146) elaborates *“For such recognitions are a condition of adequate awareness of both the common needs and the common goods that are served by networks of giving and receiving and by the virtues, both of independence and of acknowledge dependence. Yet that awareness cannot itself be achieved without those same virtues.”*

It may be that in the old age, we are more receivers than givers, living the “payback” time of contributing to social eudaimonia through the virtues expressed before. We are then receiving environmental feedback that contributes personal eudaimonia even when sickly or in any other way disabled by age. The energy that

⁸ We can say that every member of the society is in some way the educator of others. Therefore, everyone should possess moral and intellectual virtues. But for those taking the role of primary educators (parents, teachers etc.) it should be self-understood that they are highly aware of those virtues and the importance of the role they have.

was uncalculately given to contribute to common goods was not wasted or lost. It was transformed in some way, and by the law of “what goes around comes around”⁹ we are sooner or later, through the complex nets of relations, again at the end of the receivers.

There is one more thing that should be given a thought. The old people should through their experiences and rationality develop a thinking pattern – a kind of wisdom – and possess specific knowledge or a *life doctrine* of what is important to maintain or to set the life of eudaimonia (personal and social). In this respect they are still givers and are contributing the important share of common well-being.

2.4. Acknowledge dependency

The stages through which we must go in learning to become practical independent reasoners and the recognition of distinction between structures that contribute and/or inhibit our individual and communal life give us reason to acknowledge our dependency. We therefore recognize that the good for each cannot be achieved without the pursuit and harmonization of the good of the social and cultural environment.

To conclude the part of acknowledged obvious dependency, we will again refer to MacIntyre (1999) and his explanation of just generosity. This virtue requires us to be uncalculating in this sense that we can rely on no strict proportionality of giving and receiving. There is no rule that assures that we will benefit or receive from those whom we give.

3. Playing and having different roles in sport and eudaimonia

Each sport practice is defined by prescribed rules, and competitive sport has especially emphasized this. The resultant institutionalization and standardization of modern sport has lent itself to theories of the autonomy of sport. However, we should see sport also as situated in the wider network of values in a given society.

The very essence of sport – *agens movens* – is in a certain way physically active human being, and as such, sport is just one amongst other human activities. In this respect sport becomes one practice among many, and to be a sportsman is just one of the short-term roles a person can choose. To judge the good life we refer to individual and social eudaimonia, and that is the main aim of this work. Therefore we will explain the roles that a person can play in sport in the context of virtue ethics. We suggest that playing any role in sport is merely a part of playing the main role of life – one and only one. And we judge the well-being of a person by all the roles played as one.

3.1. Soft de-autonomization of sport

We suggest that sole reliance on the concept of autonomy regarding ethics is misleading, and lends sport false character. We argue that on this philosophy (better – ideology) sport comes into conflict with its own inherent morality. As an alternative we offer a soft de-autonomization¹⁰ of the sports world.

The autonomy of sport is manifested in many ways. It is obvious and logical that competitive sport became highly institutionalized and standardized activity. As rule governed, sport is in some way the world of its own. When one enters the competitive sport, one also enters the “game” of rules. These are not only the rules of particular sport these are the rules of *sporting life*. When the work-out is over, the sporting life continues. The rest is not simply a rest; it is a part of the training process. The food is not just food; it is a part of energizing process. The social activities are part of image management process etc. Dedicated sportsperson can easily live the life of sport only. The values of sport become de facto the values of life, moral and non-moral.

As W. Morgan (Breivik, 2000) suggests: “*Studies of the political and social reality of elite sport suggest that sport is not autonomous institution and therefore not a healthy organism. Sport is rather, especially at elite level invaded and exploited by other social institutions like market, business, media, and also education and politics.*”

9 Mutual reciprocity.

10 With the notion *soft de-autonomization* we support the autonomy of sport as autotelic activity, but not solely as such.

It is easily to see that sport is *the world of its own*. But to regard sport as only autotelic activity is misleading. There is always also a motive from outside that inspires us to enter the world of sport. And what can that motive be?

Since we are rational beings, our final aim, according to Plato is to reach *the idea* of highest Good or as Aristotle would say, to live the life of eudaimonia. Let us assume that this can always serve as a motive (conscious or otherwise). When we apply this thesis to the field of sport, we can say that a good sportsperson is the individual who satisfies the concept of the good human being. This can be realized when the role of the sportsman is seen as only one of the roles the person has in life as a human being. And that, we think, is the core of the thesis, why sport cannot be justified only through its autonomy. Neither do we wish to justify sport as an instrument for external values (to sport) such as health, morality etc. which are questionable arguments. We wish to offer an argument that is based on individual that is striving towards long-lasting overall well-being (i.e. eudaimonia), for there is no argument we can think of that a rational dependent human being can deny this.

3.2. Dependent young sportsperson

Since we referred to dependent infancy and childhood earlier, we will now focus on young sportsperson. It would have been interesting to explore how and when the child's play becomes sport, but for this occasion let us agree that the young sportsperson is the one who is involved either in school physical education or in any other sport institution as an active participant.

In this stage the others play important part in enabling us to move from a high level of dependency to that of the independent sportsperson. To the roles of those, we will refer as teachers and as institutions later on. Let us focus now on the role of youngsters.

To transfer into independent human beings, we have to learn how to stand back in some measure from our present desires. Since sport is rule-governed activity one has to learn to reach the end only within the permitted means. We can say therefore that the rules force us to act in accordance with them and that our ends can be reached only in rule-abiding way. That requires the ability of

rational reasoning while striving to fulfil our needs and desires. This is only possible, if one develops the ability to stand back, and consider through the awareness of possible consequences what is the best way to reach the desired end. So, in order to win in sport we have to choose the way of winning. And that is the moral decision that we have to learn and cope with rationally in our early years.

Reasoning with others is the second part of transformation towards independency. In order to become independent we have to, paradoxically, recognize our dependency. What do we mean by that? There is no sport without others and therefore one also needs to observe the social community. It is not hard to recognize the importance of respect given to others involved in sport. While this is a freely chosen activity, one can also freely choose not to engage in sport, or to engage only so far as one feels good. The decision will certainly be based on the desire to contribute one's eudaimonia and if one cannot achieve that within the sporting community, the decision will be not to participate. And if there are no participants, no sports game is possible. The young sportsperson needs to develop knowledge or feeling to what extend his eudaimonia is limited and compatible with other players' eudaimonia. Regarding this the virtues of temperateness and empathy comes forth. Also the recognition of flourishing social environment as fundamental for individual well-being is crucial. Therefore the respect for the game itself, as Butcher and Schneider (2001) suggest, is important. Aiming towards the good game can be understood as harmonizing one's desire through rational reasoning considering possible futures and others desires, and at the same time taking respect towards internal values of the activity itself.

Thirdly, for the young sportsman to flourish it is important to trust other participants on the field as well as to those out of the field (i.e. coach, referee or judge, parents, organizers etc.). Regarding trust, honesty, justice and responsibility are the virtues in question. Institutionalized competitive sport is a continuous process that requires proper training and attitude in order to achieve good game. Responsibility is what youngsters learn when the success of a team is dependent on each individual. Commitment to practice is what is expected from the one that enables it (coaches, club etc.). Therefore responsibility to others is also in question. Honesty and justice are fundamental for every

social community to flourish. While virtues in question are not in focus here, we will leave this open to some other discourse.

In conclusion, in the stage of dependency the young sportsman needs to recognize the mutual dependency of his and others' well-being. Respect has to be shown to be one of internal goods of the game. Trust, temperateness and responsibility are the virtues (amongst others) one need to develop while striving towards individual and social well-being.

3.3. Rational independent adult sportsman

Being a rational independent adult sportsman that has gone through the described stage of young dependency is only half way towards the aim – that is to flourish *qua good human being*. Why only half way, we ask ourselves? If we are to know how the individual is to flourish, we need to recognize the virtues one ought to possess. Even more, we need to know how and in what way others are to live and flourish. What are then the virtues of adults, adult sportsmen?

First, we suggest, is the recognition of the sports world as part of *the World*. By that we mean soft de-autonomization of sport. The very essence of sport – *agens movens* – is in a certain way physically active human being, and as such sport is just one amongst other human activities. In this respect sport becomes one practice among many, and to be a sportsman is just one of the short-term roles or activities a person can choose. With soft de-autonomization we argue that doing sport is not taking a break from the life itself. It's not *only* a game. It is a game and we play it. And it is the way we play it that shows our virtues as practical reasoners. If we are able to play by the true ethos of the game, then a good game is likely to occur, and that should be our goal – to contribute to a good game, unless of course some other external motives are left to be satisfied, as it is with the elite sport. Then we cannot talk about the soft de-autonomization of sport but rather of instrumentalization and commercialization.

Secondly, acknowledgement of dependence is the key to independence. The sportsman has to realize that the environment in which sport exists is a product of social interactions combined with political and economical interests. Sport as a social

phenomenon and competitive activity postulates the presence of others. All sports games are possible only with agreement of two or more people. We depend on others. We make friendships and high fives with people we do not know anything about before playing sport games with or against them. Their will to play is what is important to us. We depend on sport facilities that one has to build in order to satisfy the standardization of the sports world. We need the requisites that we are not able to produce ourselves. If we are involved in sport competition or league system then the institutions are working in our way. We could also argue that much of a professional sport activity is dependent on media support and so on. The acknowledged social or communal dependency brings mutual recognition of it.

Thirdly, we emphasize that one ought to be able to step back from its result achieving desires. Maximalization of all required skills and abilities is not possible without the minimalization of some "less" important things. Since sport is mostly concerned with physical abilities, proper school education is often on the second list. In this respect the awareness of *possible futures* steps forward. Physical abilities (body itself) are too fragile to build a career solely on this foundation, but they who succeed are giving us dreams and hope. Being unable to distinguish between reality and fantasy, between real expectations and utopia is a failure. In media we mostly see the few that are successful and nothing about the "fallen heroes" left alone, lost on their way towards eudaimonia. We should recognize that their failure is also the failure of a community. The clear sign of failure in elite sport, even in the cases of successful careers, are the programmes of re-socialization, reintegration etc. Reintegrate who? Re-socialize who? Re-humanize. Is it that the true nature of elite sport is ethically contestable? Maybe this is the symptom of post-modern "anything goes" disease? Who is left, after Nietzsche's death of the God, to tell us what to do and what is good? It is rational dependent human being.

To conclude, we will borrow the words of Bond (1996, p. 159) that points out the importance of communal well-being: "*If people (sportsman) were to act strictly as individuals, each one pursuing his or her own personal interests exclusively, forgetting ... social virtues ..., the result would be unhappy social atmosphere, full of adversarial competition,*

which in the long run is of no benefit to anyone.” As he adds that this is largely the today’s situation, we ought to recognize the potentials that sport competitions have in contributing to such atmosphere.

3.4. The sport teacher

When we speak about teachers, we mean all those in sport that are involved in some kind of knowledge or skill transfer onto others. This may be the academically educated professionals, an elite sportsman as a role model, parents and coaches or a simple guy in the neighbourhood giving kids some instructions etc. As it is described through stages of becoming independent adult human being and flourish as a good human being in general, so it is with sport. To paraphrase MacIntyre (1999, p. 77): others play an important part in enabling us to move from sport infancy to that of the independent sport practitioner. The child learns through its experiences in order to satisfy its desires – it must please adults. If the child is to become an independent sport practitioner, *“the adults have to teach it that they are pleased not because it acts as they expect but by acting so the child achieves what is good and best, whether this pleases them or not.”* (MacIntyre, 1999 p. 84) Is it not this what we as physical education teachers are preaching to the kids? And is this not exactly what is sometimes lost in the institutionalized competition based sport? Here we could go on with the reflection on Kant’s categorical imperative that the persons should never be treated as mere means to the end, but let this be the issue for another discourse.

According to MacIntyre (1999, p. 89) *“all teaching requires some degree of care for the student qua student as well as for the subject matter of the teaching”*. Therefore the distinction between external and internal values of sport is important. *Fair Play as Respect for the Game* (Butcher & Schneider, 2001) is a great justification of internal values of sport, and since sport itself is a competitive practice, we must do what we can to preserve the pursuit of internal goods and the virtues that go with them.

Virtues of the *teachers* are, of course, at least the virtues that ought to be taught to enable the good sport. The one we should emphasize here: trust. McNamee (1998, p.150) is arguing that *“what is presumed is that the coach always acts in the*

interest of the performer, and, indeed, of the sport”. Based on this, parents trust coaches and children follow the instructions they are given. With no trust there is no co-operation, there is no fundamental element of flourishing society. Teachers must be aware of the power they have. They play a great role (other members of the society are not to be excluded here) in enabling such circumstances that children can develop and flourish in their full magnificence. They, especially, are the ones that should not be calculating in giving, while children should not feel like they owe¹¹ us something. The relation of giving and receiving between a teacher and a child should be unconditional, and the role of institutions is to satisfy the needs of the teacher, and so create the environment in which individuals, regardless of their role, as well as society can flourish.

We will conclude this part with the thought, (Bond, 1996 p. 127) which we think is a neat description of a wisdom that the teacher should possess, and what the children should take for granted as it is in our nature: *“we cannot achieve eudaimonia, the fulfilment of our own individual natures, all on our own, but only as participating members of a good community. It is therefore in the interest of anyone and everyone to ensure that such a community, with its good social relations, so necessary for happiness, come into being and be sustained.”*

4. The role of sport institutions

To become an effective (good) practical reasoner one cannot achieve this without being in some measure a political reasoner. As MacIntyre (1999) claims, to reason together about the common good is to reason politically. When he tries to describe the form of political society that is necessary for a human flourishing, he suggests that in such society it is taken for granted that every member is in some way or degree disabled and dependent on others. And how the needs of those are met is not a special interest, but rather the interest of the whole political society.

11 If they owe us something, it is their will to develop into a rational human being that acknowledges its dependency on others, and to contribute to social eudaimonia by focusing also on their own well-being.

Because of the family's lack of self-sufficiency¹² and the inability of the state to provide a political framework informed by the just generosity necessary to achieve the common goods of network of giving and achieving, MacIntyre (1999) is emphasizing the importance of the associations and relationships that are intermediate between nation – state and nuclear family. This framework will serve us as a basis for sporting society. In this respect we will refer to sports clubs and other forms of associating interests in sport as intermediate institutions that are playing an important role in reaching the common good.

Sport institutions are formed through the network of receiving and giving. It is a form that enables individual to recognize the importance of one's good as constitutive element of common good. Ability to reason practically about the common good is indispensable. We *"treat someone else as someone for whom we have a regard because of what, one way or another, they contribute to our shared education in becoming rational givers and receivers ..."* (MacIntyre, 1999 p. 141).

Sport institutions play a great role in the social life of many people. The discussion of moral and political significance of institutions is necessary, and is compulsory in studying MacIntyre. But for the purpose of this paper we are just giving the orientation and concept he is offering.

5. Conclusions

The substantiation of morality is successful only then, when one feels the duty to act in proper way. This is only possible, if we succeed to uncover that the human being is a part of unavoidable continuous process or relation, from which there is no way out. Only two choices are left: either one acts according to the duty, or one becomes guilty (Stres, 1999).

We tried to show, following MacIntyre's theory of mutual dependency of human beings, and the duties that arise from the acknowledge dependency¹³, that human being cannot flourish as a

good human being regardless of the circumstances and the surrounding environment conditions. We need to possess moral virtues that are necessary to communicate and co-operate with others. To reach the eudaimonia, social and individual, we have to recognize that without one there is none. If the morality is the maturity parameter of "rational animal", then we have no choice in being moral or not. There is no escape from our human nature, no escape from one's consciousness. Can we at least choose the level of being moral? Does this make sense, since our final aim is eudaimonia? Can we be moral only in some roles that we are given in society, or do we have to be the best we can in every act we do? Is this in our nature? If we talk about virtues, we postulate vices. Does the maximization of one not lead to declination of other until it reaches the unavoidable turning point, and we are better off always trying to keep the balance somewhere in between? Is it not so in sport, too?

And finally, what is beyond morality, and how to get there?

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12 MacIntyre: *Dependent Rational Animals*. (p. 134): "Virtues of acknowledged dependence cannot be achieved within the family, at least so far as the family is conceived of as a distinct and separate social unit."

13 Especially in the stage of rational concealing dependency.