MONITORISH XXIII / 1 • 2021 Revija za humanisticne in družbene vede Journal for the Humanities and Social Sciences Izdaja: Alma Mater Europaea – Institutum Studiorum Humanitatis, Fakulteta za humanisticni študij, Ljubljana Published by: Alma Mater Europaea – Institutum Studiorum Humanitatis, Ljubljana School of the Humanities Monitor ISH Revija za humanisticne in družbene vede / Journal for the Humanities and Social Sciences ISSN 1580-688X, e-ISSN 1580-7118, številka vpisa v razvid medijev: 272 Glavni uredniki / Editors-in-Chief Lenart Škof, Barbara Gornik in Luka Trebežnik Uredniški odbor / Editorial Board Nadja Furlan Štante, Matej Hriberšek, Petra Kleindienst, Eva Klemencic Mirazchiyski, Sebastjan Kristovic, Aleš Maver, Svebor Secak, Tone Smolej, Rok Svetlic, Verica Trstenjak Mednarodni uredniški svet / International Advisory Board Rosi Braidotti (University Utrecht), Maria-Cecilia D'Ercole (Université de Paris I – Sorbonne, Pariz), Marie-Élizabeth Ducroux (EHESS, Pariz), Daša Duhacek (Centar za ženske studije, FPN, Beograd), François Lissarrague (EHESS, Centre Louis Gernet, Pariz), Lisa Parks(UC Santa Barbara), Miodrag Šuvakovic (Fakultet za medije i komunikaciju, Univerzitet Singidunum, Beograd). 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Kazalo / Contents UVOD / EDITORIAL Luka Trebežnik in Svebor Secak Deljenje smisla v letu 2021 SODOBNI PLES IN VIDEO / CONTEMPORARY DANCE AND VIDEO Svebor Secak 13-53 Transformation of an Archival Recording of a Neoclassical Ballet Hamlet Into a New Artistic Dance Video Hamlet Revisited / Transformacija arhivskega posnetka neoklasicisticnega baleta Hamlet v nov umetniški plesni video Hamlet Revisited Lidia Krisskaya 54-61 Juliet’s Run as Seen on Screen: Reinterpretation of the Past Through Camera Lenses / Julijin tek na zaslonu: Reinterpretacija preteklosti skozi kamerino leco Uroš Zavodnik 62-74 Ekspresija plesnega giba v filmskem velikem planu / The Expression of the Dance Movement in Close-up in Films Helena Valerija Krieger 75-107 Balet in ples 20. stoletja / Ballet and Dance of 20th Century HUMANISTIKA V DIGITALNI DOBI / HUMANITIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE Tanja Petrovic 110-134 AI and Empathy: The Possibility of Reciprocal Human-Robot Empathic Interaction (HRI) – Some Experiences from Socially Assistive Robots (SARs) in Elderly Care / Umetna inteligenca in empatija: možnosti reciprocne empaticne interakcije med clovekom in robotom - nekatere izkušnje z roboti za oskrbo starejših Melita Zajc 135-155 Film after the Cinema. Cinematographic Dispositive Transformed: Cultural Implications of the Online Distribution of Films / Film po kinu. Transformacija kinematografskega dispozitiva: kulturne implikacije spletne distribucije filmov Nadja Furlan Štante 156-179 Transhumanizem, posthumanizem – izziv (kršcanskemu) ekofeminizmu / Transhumanism, Posthumanism – The Challenge to (Christian) Ecofeminism Irena Avsenik Nabergoj 180-202 Temeljne vrline v Evropski duhovni zgodovini ter njihova vloga v sodobnem casu / Fundamental Virtues in European Spiritual History and their Role In Modern Times RECENZIJA / REVIEW Luka Trebežnik 205-208 Recenzija knjige Hotena nevednost UVOD Deljenje smisla v letu 2021 Pricujoca številka revije Monitor ISH v marsikaterem oziru izha­ja v zelo pomembnem trenutku in predstavlja mejnik, gre namrec za prvo številko pod novim uredništvom, ki je zavezano revijo, ki že sedaj sodi med najpomembnejše slovenske humanisticne in družboslovne publikacije, dvigniti še na višji nivo. V tem pogledu ta številka tudi oznanja upanje na prihajajoci preporod sodobne slovenske in mednarodne humanisticne ter družboslovne misli. V iztekajocem se letu revija Monitor ISH obeležuje triindvajseto leto rednega izhajanja. Ob tem je vec kot na mestu zahvala dolgoletni urednici, dr. Maji Suncic, ki je revijo s požrtvovalnim delom tudi v težkih obdobjih obdržala pri življenju. Pred novim uredništvom je pomembna naloga in obveza, da nadaljuje z njenim delom. V prelomnem letu 2021 se je poslovil eden najvecjih filozofov zad­njih petdesetih let, Jean-Luc Nancy, ki je sodeloval tudi pri doktor­skih programih ISH, njegovo delo in delo mnogih njegovih zdaj že vseh pokojnih sodobnikov je prežemal etos, ki je pred vec kot petindvajsetimi leti botroval ustanovitvi v slovenskem prostoru prepotrebne Fakultete za podiplomski humanisticni študij. Gre za strast raziskovanja in prevpraševanja samoumevnosti, multidisci­plinarno humanisticno misel, ki svoje dostojanstvo živi v komuni­kaciji in skupni zavezanosti nalogi mišljenja. Ustvarjanje smisla je po Nancyju skupna telesna dejavnost, ki je prvinska, radostna in ustvarjalna kot ples. Toda tu ne gre le za metaforo, pac pa za eno in isto dejavnost, »ko mislim, plešem«, je zapisal Nancy. V skladu s tem pricujoca številka prinaša tematski blok, pos-vecen sodobnemu plesu in tematizaciji prelomov, ki jih v to tradicionalno umetnost vnašajo vseobsegajoci procesi digitali­zacije. Štirje clanki tega tematskega bloka prikazujejo ples kot celosten cloveški izraz, kot utelešenje misli, ki seveda nikoli ne more in ne sme biti staticna, po svojem bistvu je gibajoca. Plesna teorija s postmoderno filozofsko mislijo dobi platformo za refle­ksijo novih praks in pojmovanj plesa. To na vec nivojih demon-strira Svebor Secak, ki je kot urednik tudi najbolj zaslužen za te­matski sklop o sodobnem plesu. V svojem razdelku razmišlja o novodobnih reapropriacijah klasicnih plesnih izvedb, za sodob­ni ples velja namrec kierkegaardovska doktrina, da le ponovitev lahko dejansko proizvede nekaj novega. To stori na podlagi ana­lize lastne koreografske prakse, ki predstavlja transformacijo ar­hivskega videoposnetka v postpostmoderni plesni video. Seca­kov prispevek ni le študija o prenosu klasicne baletne predstave Hamlet v postmoderni dance video Hamlet Revisited, pac pa izpostavlja pomemben preskok v sodobnih umetniških praksah, ki ga predstavlja tehnološka digitalizacija, istocasno pa v svoji študiji prikaže, da gre za konkretno manifestacijo-uprizoritev mestoma precej abstraktnih postmodernisticnih pojmov. Tudi drugi prispevek tega sklopa se posveca tehnološkim vidikom baletne uprizoritve Shakespearjevega dela, v njem nam Lidia Krisskaya ponuja premislek o kamerinem pogledu na Julijin slavni tek iz baleta Romeo in Julija. Kamera ponuja pogled na gibanje, ki je zapisano in s tem ohranjeno, ta zapis pa je moc preurejati in prepisovati. Umetniški gib tako postane material za snemalcevo in režiserjevo delo, z upocasnitvami, približeva­nji, rezi in montažo se baletna stvaritev razteza v prostoru in casu. Ta razmišljanja nadaljuje prispevek Uroša Zavodnika, ki govori o izraznosti cloveškega giba v filmskem velikem planu. Zavodnik prepricljivo dokazuje, da je filmski veliki plan izjemen medij za prenos izraza telesne govorice in da s svojo prilagodlji­vostjo pravzaprav služi kot nujno dopolnilo cloveški percepciji, ki bi brez njega prav gotovo spregledala podrobnosti izraza. Is­tocasno pa je filmski medij inscenacija resnicnosti, uprizoritev, ki proizvaja resnico za gledalca. Veliki plan je pravzaprav oboje, saj prinaša izjemno intimen pogled na gibajoce se telo, istoca­sno pa ravno s tem ustvarja ucinek nadresnicnosti. Prispevek Helene Valerije Krieger, ki zaokroža tematski blok prispevkov o sodobnem plesu in videoumetnosti se posveca razvoju baleta v dvajsetem stoletju ter njegovim shajanjem in razhajanjem s pre­ostalo moderno in postmoderno plesno prakso. Balet je klasicna umetniška izrazna oblika, ki je bila v preteklem stoletju nema­lokrat oznacena za zastarelo in preseženo, a je, kot prepricljivo pokaže avtorica, zelo pogosto služila kot navdih za druge plesne umetniške izraze, s tem pa se je ohranila in obogatila tudi sama. Izjemno zanimive prispevke prinaša tudi drugi sklop revije, ki je tematski razpršenosti navkljub posvecen tematizaciji sodobnih transformacij humanisticnega mišljenja, ki so jih v naš svet vnesli procesi digitalizacije. Prvi prispevek je delo Tanje Petrovic in govo­ri o tematiki, ki je že sedaj izjemno pomembna, njena relevantnost pa se bo brez dvoma zgolj še povecevala – gre za študijo o umetni inteligenci in custvih. Umetna inteligenca nas ne zanima le kot clovekov artefakt, ki kaže potencial za avtonomno delovanje, pac pa predvsem zato, ker predstavlja zelo pomemben element za štu­dijo o tem, kaj pomeni biti clovek, o kogniciji sami, o tem, kaj je razum in kaj so custva, kako se nanašati na znakovne podobe, ki jih prinaša okolica. Z drugega zornega kota se tej temi posveca tudi Melita Zajc, ki v svojem prispevku analizira spremembe, do kate­rih je zaradi tehnološkega razvoja zadnjih let prišlo pri dostopanju do filmskih vsebin. Film je umetnost, ki je v najvecji meri zaznamo­vala dvajseto stoletje, z novimi tehnološkimi inovacijami na podro-cju prenosa podatkov in vsebin pa se spreminja sam nacin njegove konzumpcije. To pa ni zanemarljiv proces, saj se s tem spreminja družba sama, gledalski subjekt pa pri tem pridobi povsem nove raz­sežnosti. Razmišljanje o tem prinaša tudi prispevek Nadje Furlan Štante, ki se posveca perecim vprašanjem sodobnosti, njen razmi­slek ponuja teološko ekofeministicno refleksijo o procesih v dobi neslutenih tehnoloških inovacij, ki posegajo v samo jedro tega, kar smo poprej razumeli kot cloveška narava. Tako imenovana tran­shumanisticna paradigma po avtoricini analizi sicer nastopa kot želja po izboljšanju cloveka, a ob tem prinaša grožnjo po izgubi clovecnosti kot take. Pred tem svari tudi prispevek Irene Avsenik Nabergoj, ki razgrne pojmovanje vrlin v zgodovinsko-duhovnem kontekstu od antike pa vse do sodobnosti. Ta sestavek prepricljivo demonstrira, da sodobna tehnološka miselnost ne more in ne sme zavreci moralnega znacaja, ki ga je evropski clovek, kot preplet gr-ških, hebrejskih in kršcanskih pojmovanj vrline, prejel iz bogate tradicije. Vrline so vrhovna cloveška umna znacilnost, ki pravza­prav prinaša edino možnost za sobivanje. Naj ta kratki uvod v izvrstna besedila sklenemo s še eno mislijo Jeana-Luca Nancyja, ki pravi, da biti v izolaciji ni možno, biti je na­mrec vselej že biti z (drugimi), to pa odpira tematiko priobcevanja in smisla kot skupnostnega akta: »Smisla ni, ce smisel ni deljiv, ce ni skupen, in sicer ne zato, ker bi obstajal neki pomen, poslednji ali prvi, ki bi bil vsem bivajocim skupen, temvec ker je smisel sam deljenje biti.« LUKA TREBEŽNIK IN SVEBOR SECAK, urednika CONTEMPORARY DANCE AND VIDEO / SODOBNI PLES IN VIDEO Monitor ISH (2021), XXIII/1, 13–53 Izvirni znanstveni clanek Original scientific article Svebor Secak1 Transformation of an Archival Recording of a Neoclassical Ballet Hamlet Into a New Artistic Dance Vid­eo Hamlet Revisited Abstract: This text is a distillation of the author’s exegesis that is an integral part of the PhD in Creative Practice project and is com­plementary to the dance video titled Hamlet Revisited. It shows the transformation of a video recording of the author’s own chore­ography of the ballet Hamlet into a contemporary post-postmod­ern dance video DVD Hamlet Revisited, answering the following research question: How to transform an archival recording of a neoclassical ballet performance into a new artistic dance videoby implementing postmodern philosophical concepts? The goal of the project is to elucidate the transformation of Hamlet to Hamlet Revisited, from a neoclassical choreographic approach to the recent postmodern approach that traverses into a transmod­ern dance video of an eclectic blend of styles and techniques in accordance with the paradigm of digimodernism. Key words: Dance Video, Ballet, Hamlet, Transmodernism, Digi-modernism 1 Associate Professor Svebor Secak (PhD) is dean of AMEU Dance acad­emy and national ballet principal of the Croatian national theatre in Za­greb. / Izr. prof. dr. Svebor Secak je dekan AMEU Akademije za ples in nacionalni prvak Hrvaškega nacionalnega gledališca v Zagrebu. E-pošta: svebor.secak@almamater.si. 13 Transformacija arhivskega posnetka neoklasicisticnega baleta Hamlet v nov umetniški plesni video Hamlet Revisited Izvlecek:To besedilo je rafiniranje avtorjeve eksegeze, ki je in-tegralni del doktorskega projekta Creative Practice, ki se dopol­njuje s plesnim videom z naslovom Hamlet Revisited. Besedilo prikazuje proces transformacije videoposnetka avtorjeve samo­stojne koreografije za balet Hamlet v sodobni post-postmoder­ni plesni DVD video Hamlet Revisited, pri cemer odgovarja na naslednje raziskovalno vprašanje: Kako z implementacijo post-modernih filozofskih konceptov preoblikovati arhivski posnetek neoklasicne baletne predstave v nov umetniški plesni video? Cilj projekta je razjasniti prehod od “Hamleta” do “Hamlet Revisited”, iz neoklasicnega koreografskega pristopa do sodobnega postmoder­nega pristopa, ki, skladno s paradigmo digimodernizma, prehaja v transmoderni plesni video eklekticne mešanice stilov in tehnik. 1 INTRODUCTION The post-postmodern paradigm of the 21st century has many names such as metamodernism (Vermeulen and van den Akker 2010, para. 15-16), transmodernism (Dussel cited in Cole 2007, 68-69) which is in accordance with the integral theory of Ken Wilbur (Visser 2003, xii) and digimodernism discussed in the book Digimodernism: How New Technologies Dismantle the Postmodern and Reconfigure Our Culture written by Alan Kirby (2009). Accordingly, the dance video emerges as a new artistic medium which is different from a documentary recording or a music film, resulting in a new form of art – edited dance that does not exist outside the medium of film and/or video.2 2 My article on post-postmodernism and dance video has been published In this text I present my PhD research3 which shows the transfor­ mation from a recording of a neoclassical ballet performance Ham­let into a post-postmodern artistic dance video Hamlet Revisited. 1.1 Purpose and goals I decided to turn to my own choreography of the ballet Hamlet which premiered at the Croatian National Theatre in Zagreb in 2004, in order to revise it with a goal to demonstrate the neoclas­sical and the contemporary postmodern approach, following the research question: How to transform an archival recording of a neoclassical ballet performance into a new artistic dance videoby implementing postmodern philosophical concepts? The main objective of my research was to present the neoclas­sical choreographic approach I used in my original choreography Hamlet, and the postmodern approach I wanted to research. I creat­ed an experimental dance video that is not just a documentary, but a separate work of art4. Its significance lies in establishing communi- in the Proceedings Book with Peer Review on Professional Contribu­tions on Dance at: https://dance-academy.almamater.si/wp-content/up-loads/2021/07/Proceedings-Book-of-the-Dance-Section-of-the-9th-Con­ference-All-About-People-1.pdf. 3This text is a distillation of the author’s exegesis that is an integral part of the PhD in Creative Practice project in the School of Arts at the Uni­versity of New England, New South Wales, Australia for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and has not been published elsewhere, but is stored in the repository of UNE and has open access: https://rune.une.edu.au/ web/bitstream/1959.11/18259/6/open/SOURCE04.pdf 4 I have experience in making experimental dance videos and my video titled The Fifth Instrument was shown at the Napolidanza International Festival of Video Dance in Italy in 2010. Furthermore, I have experience in shooting movies since I have participated in a TV series Good Inten­tions (2007) in the role of the Mystery Man getting an insight into the practical aspect of shooting films—different angles and shots: close up, medium and long shots; high, reverse and low angles; establishing and cation between neoclassical and postmodern approaches, resulting in a contemporary post-postmodern artistic work that elucidates the process in the artist’s mind during the creative practice. 1.2 Methods My initial methodology consisted of field research—I followed various contemporary ballet and dance performances created on the reper­toire of the CNT Ballet in Zagreb5 and web video excerpts spanning from early modern to recent postmodern works6—and desk research in which I became acquainted with recent contemporary theories and concepts relevant to my project. In the field of performance and dance analyses, besides Janet Adshead’s Dance Analysis (1988), the initial bibliography included Patrice Pavis’ Analysing Performance (2006) and Susan Leigh Foster’s Reading Dancing (1986). Foster claims that her Reading Dancing “charts ... progression from structuralist to post-structuralist theoretical positions... through a semiological analy­sis of choreographic conventions to a historical consideration of those conventions...” (1986, 234). In relation to the field of semiotics, Terence Hawkes’s Structuralism & Semiotics published in 1977 examines the foundational work about the topic including Ferdinand de Saussure, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, etc. Keir Elam’s book Semiotics of Theatre and Drama (2002)for which Hawkes is the general editor, tracking shots; aerial, dolly, handheld and zoom shots; swish pan shots; arc, head on and point of view shots and match cut shots as explained in an online tutorial (Sabourin n.d.:online). Many of these were used in recording and the postproduction of Hamlet Revisited. 5 Five Tangos (Hans van Manen); Suite, Suite, Suite (Marco Goecke); Her­man Schmerman (William Forsythe); Por Vos Muero (Nacho Duato); The Second Symphony (Uwe Scholtz), etc. 6 Youtube and other web sites provide a plenitude of video excerpts span­ning from works of Loie Fuller to recent works of Jérôme Bel, Anne Tere­sa de Keersmaeker, etc. continues with the Prague School and discusses semiotics in the field of theatre, while Pavis in his book Languages of the Stage (1993) fol­lows Michel Foucault and traces the semiological approach to theatre studies back to the Prague linguistic circle, as well as Charles Sanders Peirce and Saussure and discusses the difference between semiolo­gy and semiotics. In Understanding of the Theatre (2006) Marco De Marinis discusses the semiotics of reception. Furthermore, I decided to acquaint myself with the work of postmodern theoreticians from early Barthes in the 1960s onwards as gathered and analysed in Philip Auslander’s Theory for Performance Studies (2008), as well as with the Postdramatic Theatre (2006) by Hans Thies-Lehmann, Linda Hutch­eon’s A Poetics of Postmodernism (1988) as well as Performance Anal­ysis, edited by Colin Counsell and Laurie Wolf (2001). Particularly significant in the field of postmodern dance is Sally Banes’s Terpsich­ore in Sneakers (1987). Other important sources relating to the dance field for this exegesis are Selma Jeanne Cohen’s Dance as a Thea­tre Art (1992); Tim Scholl’s From Petipa to Balanchine (1994), Foster’s Choreography and Narrative (1996), Jane C. Desmond’s edited book Meaning in Motion (2006), Martha Bremser and Lorna Sanders’s 50 Contemporary Choreographers (2011), etc. My discussion on dance video is based on Erin Brannigan’s Dancefilm: Choreography and the Moving Image (2011) that also provides relevant video links and the intertextual approach to the interpretation of this project is based on Dancing Texts: Intertex­tuality in Interpretation (1999) edited by Janet Adshead-Lansdale as well as Graham Allen’s book Intertextuality (2011) where he, in a wider historical context, considers the fact that no text has its meaning alone; all texts have meaning in relation to other texts. My methodology for the creative practice component of my PhD consisted of creating an experimental dance video in which I used the recording of my original Hamlet performance and some other existing material that I juxtaposed against new material choreographed and recorded. In practice that means that for the creation of the Hamlet Revisited video, three dancers (Benjamin Duran, Ksenija Krutova and Pavla Mikolavcic) were shown the recording of my original Hamlet and then created their artistic response to it based on their reception and appreciation of it, without my interpretation or interference; then I watched their artistic response and used it on the basis of my recep­tion of their work, also without their oral/written explanation of their artistic intentions allowing space for postmodern features such as ale-atoric content, synchronicity, eclecticism, serendipity, etc. That way, we established communication on a receptive reader-response basis, thus blending the role of the spectator and the author. The dancers re­sponded differently to the task, based upon their diverse dancing back­grounds and life experiences. I blended in the newly recorded material and juxtaposed our different approaches, editing the content and struc­ture, that way transforming my original Hamlet into Hamlet Revisited based on my experience, but also on the experience of the performers who begin in the role of the audience observing video of the original ballet and transform into the role of the choreographer-performer. By blending the roles of the choreographer, performer and spectator, I hope I have created an original work of art whose significance lies in the relationship and communication between styles, old and new cho­reographic approaches, artists and audiences and the transformation of their traditional roles and relationships in accordance with Jacque­line Smith-Autard’s educational and artistic concept of appreciating, creating and performing (2002). In editing and collating the newly re­corded material I deliberately used some postmodern techniques such as fragmentation, repetition, self-reflexivity and simultaneity. I argue that by making a mixture of the old and the new material, classical and contemporary postmodern expression, the work resulted in a specific art piece which relates to the latest post-postmodern art theories. 2 RESULTS Dance video Hamlet Revisited lasts approximately 60 minutes. It includes about 30 minutes of new choreographies, blended with the earlier material. The quality of the video and execution of cho­reography were made possible through cooperation with my asso­ciates. I worked with professional video technicians and dancers in professional working conditions that enabled the feasibility of the project. In the written exegesis, I focused on the multimedia presentation of my ideas as a director and choreographer, includ­ing the creation, collation and editing of my work and the work of my co-authors on the DVD, from the discourse of a ballet artist and choreographer, not a professional filmmaker. It may be argued that my research proves that the postmod­ernists’ prescriptive way of creating a work (Banes 1994, 309) can be applied to the re-reading or re-interpreting and transforming recorded ballet works. Some of the key postmodern concepts and techniques used are: • intertextuality (Kristeva1969; Adshead-Lansdale 1999; Allen 2011): is implemented not just as a tool for the analysis but also for the creation of this multi-layered work that is conceived as the writerly text open to multiple interpretations that is con­nected to the concept of deconstruction7 • deconstruction (Derrida 1967; Wood and Bernasconi 1985; Lansdale 2010): reveals the underlying multiple layers of the performance and puts equal significance on the already said and the not yet said, emphasising its process-driven and open-ended feature 7 More in my paper “Intertextual dance analysis” published in the Pro­ceedings book on AMEU Dance Academy events 2018/2019, Alma Mater Press, 2020. • diffuse authorship (Barthes inAuslander 2008, 50): proves to be a concept that enhances the possibility of re-considering ex­isting monolithic or readerly texts (Barthes cited in Foster 1986, 259): my associates and I selected this approach on a reader-re­sponse basis, but other options are open for further exploration. It is connected with the concept of the rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari 1987), where there is not just one root or source, in this case text source, as well as the concept of carnival (Bakh-tin 1968) which accentuates the blurring of the boundaries be­tween the spectator and the performer • supplement (Derrida in Carlson 1985): refers to the additional choreographic and documentaristic video material. In a way I deconstructed the ballet Hamlet and re-built it, creating what Derrida calls supplement, resulting in an open-ended work of art, suitable for additional supplementation • deathoftheauthor (Barthes 1968): is used to question my role as the author, drawing on Derrida and Foucault, positioning myself as the editor of various intertexts emphasising the notion of the plu­rality of self (Foucault 1969) by postmodern techniques such as fragmentation, repetition and avoidance of a singular narrative (which I used to depict the fragmented consciousness of Hamlet as a character, but also of the author/spectator) and self-reflex­ivity by adding autobiographical elements, thus personalising William Shakespeare’s ontological themes in accordance with the postmodern condition of incredulity towards grand narratives • incredulitytowardsgrandnarratives (Lyotard 1984): empha-sises the importance of particulars as opposed to universals, in this case, by involving individual experience. • mirror: three aspects of the concept of the mirror were applied— theatre as a metaphorical mirror (Lacan 1977b), a real mirror as a set element and the video that can serve as a time-transcending mirror • psycho-schizoanalysis: from Freud`s psychoanalysis (1900) through Jung`s archetypes (1968), Hamlet Revisited arrived at the concept of schizoanalysis proposed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1983). I argue that the postmodern choreographers prefer the formal­istic mode of choreographing and deconstruct the topics they deal with and demand an adaptation, modernisation and even depar­ture from the literary text. However, in Hamlet Revisited, the ec­lectic combination of the old and new material and the constant oscillation of different discourses upon the same topic resulted in a transmodern integrationist recent work of art. This research has shown that some of the problems present in staged neoclassical ballets can more easily be solved through the medium of dance video. Techniques such as reverse-motion can be used to achieve travelling through time. Multiplication of im­ages, slow-motion, split screen and freeze-frame were used in an attempt to illuminate what is occurring in one’s mind, while over-layingX-rays presented the inside of a dancing body. Simultaneity was used to achieve communication between vari­ous styles and approaches. Additionally, computer technique such as imagescratchingwas used to emphasise that although it is a process driven work of art, it is not a documentary or an archival video; it is present only in the virtual world of the medium—that way somehow metaphorically imagined as a simulacrum (Baudrillard 1983; Aus-lander 2008) drawing on Foster (2006). It may be argued that this all corresponds with the digital age and the concept of digimodernism. 3 DISCUSSION The research follows the notion that there are no texts without intertexts (Hutcheon 1988, vi). However, there are works of art that are deliberately made up of intertextual components such as my Hamlet Revisited, according to Barthes’s readerly/writerly concept (cited in Foster 1986, 259). Such an analysis has shown that more traditional, neoclassical ballet performances such as Hamlet drew on the heritage of classical tradition and the ballet vocabulary developed to its peak by the end of the 19th centu­ry in Petipa’s ballets that was modified by modern influences in the works of cornerstone choreographers such as Mikhail Fokine and George Balanchine. Furthermore, I argue that the two artistic lines that emerged from Imperial St. Petersburg after the Rev­olution were connected by Sergei Prokofiev-Leonid Lavrovsky’s ballet Romeo and Juliet (1938) that incited a new interest in the West for grand narrative ballets which resulted in a plenitude of choreographers such as Kenneth Macmillan, John Cranko, John Neumeier and many others. I argue that narrative ballets based on canonical literature synergise theories of art as imitation, ex­pression and form (Copeland and Cohen 1983) that is also evi­dent in my Hamlet. Such ballets can be seen as a surrogation of its literary model (cited in Wharton 2005, 7). They keep more or less a simplified linear narrative libretto counting on the specta­tors’ past knowledge of the plot, illustrating that the transforma­tion of the spoken word into ballet is not the only goal of the cho­reographer (Worthen cited in Wharton 2005, 11) but exploring the ballet medium as well. I argue that physical aspects of the play, like dancing and fenc­ing as well as love scenes and expressions of emotions are suitable for ballet expression, as well as for depicting the main characters. Nevertheless, some of the inner thoughts can be too complex to express in the medium of ballet. Only in combination with other stage elements that can be used as a reference point for some of the unspoken text, as well as acting, pantomime or other choreo­graphic devices, may it be considered as a sign system containing visual, gestural, kinetic and spatial elements that to a certain extent in a semiotic sense may be paralleled with a verbal language. How­ever, there are situations when the choreographer/director has to be more inventive to be able to transfer more subtle concepts and information from the literary model, such as what has happened in the past or is planned to occur in the future, as well as discussions of a third person not present on the stage. This problem I tried to solve by a set element—the mirror. These issues are more easily addressed by the new generation of choreographers that implement video on the stage or transfer the ballet medium into the dance video as is the case of Hamlet Re­visited. I argue, drawing on Foster (1986, 92-93) that regarding cho­reographic syntax Hamlet worked on the principle of mimesis and pathos, while Hamlet Revisited includes parataxis: different inter-texts were put together in juxtaposition, some of which were put ran­domly to allow space for coincidence and serendipity (drawing on the work of experimental ballet choreographers such as MerceCun­ningham who merged ballet and modern dance and was the pre­decessor of the postmodernists); the others were blended together carefully trying to achieve communication between the old and the new approach to some of Shakespeare’s themes such as love, grief, remorse, lust, or, to put the new material as an artistic commentary of the old one, departing from Shakespeare and character depiction. Especially important text sources for conceiving Hamlet Revis­ited were the postmodernists from the 1980s that Banes (1994, 309) calls metaphoric and claims that since then postmodern is no longer a descriptive term, but a prescriptive one for the new generation of choreographers. This had impact on my work in which I tried to take advantage of this claim in transforming Hamlet into Hamlet Revis­ited. This stage of postmodernism Foster calls reflexive dance and is further subdivided by Hal Foster (cited in Foster 1986, 225) into reac­tionary and resistive forms which blend the roles of choreographer, dancer and viewer, just the way I imagined Hamlet Revisited. A paradigmatic example of a ballet choreographer who works according to postmodern philosophical concepts and whose work can be perceived as a significant intertextual source is William For-sythe, who deconstructs ballet vocabulary and syntax and uses con­cepts like intertextuality, fragmentation and diffuse authorship. He allows his dancers to improvise and give their contribution to the choreography, undermining the position of the author to a certain extent, but preserving the frame of the game he invented as he puts it: “I’m an initiator, and that’s delightful—he who invents the game but not necessarily the rules” (Forsythe quoted in Littler, 1991, C6). This is of utmost importance for the way I set up my collaboration with my associates—we were working on a reader-response basis. They conceived their new choreographic material inspired by my choreography, which I then used according to my comprehension of what they had done without verbal explanations, leaving the inter­pretive possibilities more open. By putting myself in the position of the super-spectator and at the same time undermining my position as the author, and then restoring it by including some autobiograph­ical elements, I have responded to what Hutcheon calls the poetics of postmodernism: she identifies a paradox within modernist inter­est in self-reflexivity and the postmodernist artistic approach to that urge, and she explains this as a challenge to the humanist assump­tion of a unified self and an integrated consciousness by both in­stalling coherent subjectivity and subverting it (1988). The intertextual approach is visible from the beginning of Hamlet Revisited where music, literal text and ballet bodies and vocabularies are presented as important text sources. Intertextu­ality is present in a way of referencing or quoting but even more of drawing on relevant intertextual fields, as well as juxtaposing different texts together. Besides various choreographic materials, autobiographical elements and various shootings that emphasise the process of the creation of the work, architectural frames serve as references to the historico-political intertextual field that was important for the evolvement of ballet art in Croatia, as well as for my personal artistic transformation. All of this was made possible only in the medium of dance vid­eo whose historical lineage also served as an important text source: so, drawing on the postmodern approach to video dance, I used computer manipulations drawing on contemporary work in the field. One of the pivotal ballet and dance choreographers whose work can serve as a reference is Philippe Decouflé who enhances the visual texture of film and merges disparate texts together8. In Hamlet Revisited I intentionally tried to establish this com­munication between the various texts by juxtaposing my neoclassi­cal choreography with the new contemporary choreographic mate­rial; at some places randomly put together in a paratactic way and at others meticulously blending different approaches to the same motif (love, remorse, grief, etc.) and also by fragmenting Tchaik­ovsky’s music score with newly composed music and adding di­verse references such as architectural in an attempt to recall the historico-political context. By collaborating with my co-authors, I blended our choreographies into one new artistic work, which is in accordance with Barthes’s idea on diffuse authorship, construct­ed through improvisation and experiment (Auslander 2008, 50) that corresponds to his concept of the death of the author (Barthes 1968). Although I use different choreographic pieces from various 8 I am not arguing that my work has any similarities to those of Decouflé or Forsythe, but that their usage of postmodern philosophical concepts was enlightening for my work. authors, I function as the super-spectator who combines them all into one unity and connects it to his private life and experience, using the theme of Hamlet for self-reflection. This explains my entire project in which I deal with this para­dox of modernist impulse on self-reflexivity and self-expression, and the postmodernist artistic approach to that urge,so the main achievement is not just the final work but illuminating the process of how that transformation occurred. By incorporating the work of other authors and, with a slightly auto-ironic detachment, by frag­menting the narrative through-line, I sought to problematise and undermine my position as the self-reflective author, at the same time, paradoxically by constructing a coherent artistic work, I re-es­tablished myself in that position. The autobiographical elements included in the video were meant to reveal how an artist’s life ex­perience can serve as an intertext in constructing or reinterpreting complex dramatic ballet roles such as Hamlet. They outgrew their initial function, evolving into personal ponderings about ontologi­cal themes where Hamlet serves as a point of departure. This is the way I imagined Hamlet Revisited where my function is, in places, more of an editor-creator than that of a traditional author-creator. In this collage of intertexts I am present as a danc­er performing the title role, choreographer of ballet Hamlet and the super-spectator and editor of the entire project. Foucault (1969, 112) claims that all discourses that encompass the author function possess this plurality of self9. 9 This corresponds to Mikhail Bakhtin’s idea that, according to Auslander (2008, 41), “the author’s function is that of a ringmaster who deploys var­ious voices without identifying entirely with any of them.” Bakhtin in his book Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1984, 51) searches for “a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices.” This ‘plurality of self’ is evident in Hamlet Revisited where my ‘self’ works on three levels; as a dancer/choreographer; as a mature artist/editor and as the author of the exegesis. Juan Carlos Hidalgo (1999, 211-213) calls this phenomenon the split ‘I’ and claims that it is present in the character of Hamlet, and in the review of Celesti-no Coronado’s experimental film Hamlet from 1976 finds this split subjectivity in the director as well as in the spectator who have difficulties in bridging the narrative gaps and finding a coherent self in the work, which is how I imagined Hamlet Revisited as well. This ‘plurality of self’ is apparent in my work—if the first self is the dancer and choreographer of the ballet Hamlet, the second self is the more mature artist who edits all previously mentioned inter-texts, including self-references into Hamlet Revisited and the third self, according to Foucault would be “the one that speaks to tell the work’s meaning, the obstacles encountered, the results obtained, and the remaining problems” (1969:112). Additionally, postmodern practice can be seen as either “neo-conservatively nostalgic/reactionary, or radically disruptive/ revolutionary” (Hutcheon 1988, xiii), a contradiction that is also apparent in my project. Hamlet Revisited preserves conservative neoclassical choreographic segments and my appearance as a younger artist. This is confronted with the new material which at places radically contrasts with the old material thus establishing a never-ending dialogue between the old and new artistic approach­es that is open to multiple interpretations. However, in accordance with Jean–François Lyotard’s (1984, xxiv) postmodern ‘increduli­ty towards grand narratives’ I depart from Shakespeare’s literary original, while using it as a starting point, and explore my artis­tic concerns, in a more abstract, formal way. In the new choreo­graphic material, there is no story or characters. The connection with Shakespeare’s Hamlet is the older choreographic material; for example the soliloquy of Hamlet To be or not to be read by Tom Bedlam juxtaposes the text with the movement to check how well it correlates with Shakespeare’s original words in accordance with James Calderwood (1983, 22) who mentions Hamlet’s words to the players when he urges them to: “... Suit the action to the word,/ the word to the action, ...” (3.2.17-18). The new material leans on the old, as a specific commentary and fantasy which offers numerous possibilities for new interpretations10. The more traditional ne­oclassical approach from which I drew my choreography was in places put in contrast with the formalistic choreography of Ksenija and Pavla, as disembodied distorted shadows.11 Abstract set move­ments were repeated in different contexts in order to chart their semiotic characteristics in various circumstances in an attempt to expand the repertoire of techniques which can be used when cho­reographing a story like Hamlet, exploring kinesic, proxemic and chronemic paralinguistic concepts. Finally, I offer analyses on two levels. I combine a semiot­ic structural analysis based on description, interpretation and self-evaluation with an intertextual analysis to complement self-explanatory elements with a more objective stance in the ex­amination of the project. The first level is a structuralist semiotic analysis in which both works, Hamlet and Hamlet Revisited are subjected to a traditional analysis that contains description. As Stanley Fish (1980, 353) puts it: “description can occur only with­ 10 Lyotard discusses that metanarratives are “being replaced by a prolif­eration of petits récits, ‘little stories’ or testimonies that draw attention to particulars as opposed to universals—that is, to local events, individual experience, heterodox ideas...” (quoted in Auslander 2008, 133). 11 This is in accordance with Maya Deren’s concept of depersonalisation – “a type of screen performance that subsumes the individual into the choreography of the film” (cited in Brannigan 2011, 101). in a stipulative understanding of what there is to be described”; explanations of my authorial intentions follow with a short self-evaluation. The second level takes into consideration Ads­head-Lansdale’s (1999, 7-8) claim that an alternative to envisag­ing description as being capable of resonating some prior reality is to consider the dance text as an open construction, containing the fluency and enigmatic quality of art and leaves the interpre­tive position open. Such an intertextual approach is woven like a thread throughout the exegesis to give a more objective stance to examine my project and possible constructions of meaning that can differ from my original intentions, moving from strict rela­tionships between signs to a multiplication of signifiers, combin­ing structural, semiotic and intertextual analyses12. 3.1 Dance video The ballet vocabulary is an inexhaustible inspiration that can be combined with other dancing styles which means that in my quest for the transformation of an archival video recording into a post-postmodern dance video I integrated the old neoclassical with the new choreographic material. However, I was not expand­ing my choreographic vocabulary, because I used digital tech­nology and manipulation to achieve that effect. Deborah Jowitt (2011, 16) says that recent choreographers experiment with com-puter-generated imagery and techniques juxtaposing live danc­ers with virtual ones. Choreographers such as Wim Vandekeybus and Lloyd Newson engaged in the possibilities of cinema creat­ing dance films (Jowitt 2011, 15). Therefore, the medium of Hamlet 12 Intertextuality is employed in structuralist, post-structuralist, semiotic, deconstructive, post-colonial, Marxist, feminist and psychoanalytic theo­ries, and has been applied across a range of literary and cultural texts ac­cording to the preliminary statement in Allen’s Intertextuality (2000, i). Revisited is a dance video (also referred to as videodance, screen dance and cinedance). Brannigan (2011) follows the lineage from early modern dance and the first 19thcentury recordings to the present-day contempo­rary video dance but does not discuss the use of film or video as a component of stage productions. She makes a clear distinction between a dance film/video as documentary work and dance for camera that is choreographed and edited for the purpose of an ar­tistic dance film. As scholar Dave Allen (1993, 26) states: A clear distinction needs to be made here between those pro- grammes which seek to re-present existing dance on the screen in order to make the work more widely available ... and other works in which directors, choreographers, and dancers attempt to address themselves to the nature of the medium and create dance film video specifically to be screened. This distinction is especially of interest to my project, which deals with the transformation of an existing archival video into an artistic one. Dance video is a popular artistic field and there are numerous video and dance film festivals. Technology is increas­ingly entering the works of choreographers, not only in the sense of merely recording the choreography/performance or creating an autonomous work of art, but also in the sense of an analysis of movement, as in the interactive multimedia technology research of Forsythe where he translates choreography into new forms. In our post-digital age, also called the social media age, technology also enables each individual to create recordings using various re­cording devices at any moment in time. It may be argued that film, since its emergence that coincid­ed with the modern tendencies in art and the appearance of mod­ern dance, had great impact on ballet and dance art since the first works of Loďe Fuller, through the fact that many of the first Hollywood actors were accomplished dancers; over the influence of film on the new choreographers’ ideas since the beginning of the 20thcentury and the presence of dance in musicals and other films; over documentary recording of choreographies to the usage of video as a component of stage productions. However, for this discussion, the lineage from Fuller, Maya Deren to postmodernist Yvonne Rainer and Trisha Brown and other contemporary dance filmmakers such as Decouflé who is famous for his dance films and pop videos, has the main significance for a distinctive field of art called video dance, which led the filmmakers to experiment with various rendering techniques such as slow motion, multiple-expo­sure, repetition, reverse-motion, and digital postproduction tech­niques such as image scratching. These all serve to produce new forms of choreographic practice and new modes of cine-choreog­raphy. The rendering process surpasses reproduction, taking the choreographic elements to a new state or condition; the film itself becomes dance-like (Brannigan 2011, 127). Therefore, in the transformation of my archival recording of ballet Hamlet into an artistic dance video, it is appropriate to hy­bridise genres implementing various recording techniques and postproduction editing, as well as complementary postmodern theatrical techniques such as fragmentation, repetition, slow-mo­tion, freeze-frame, simultaneity, avoidance of a singular narrative, etc., utilising the postmodern philosophical and theoretical con­cepts in order to create this intertextual work. 3.2 From psychoanalysis to schizoanalysis Before creating Hamlet Revisited I became better acquainted with Freud’s theories as discussed in Hamlet and Oedipus (1976) by Er­nest Jones. For Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, the Oedipus complex, named after Sophocles’ play Oedipus the King, can be applied to Hamlet’s character. The Oedipus complex relates to the young child’s fascination with the parent of the opposite sex and jealousy of the parent of the same sex. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Freud wrote analyses of both Oedipus the King and Shakespeare’sHamlet. Freud explored the inaccessible mental processes which he considered as the working of the unconscious. For him, the unconscious content is forced out of the conscious­ness by repression. Hamlet is unable to take revenge on Claudius who murdered his father and has taken his father’s place with his mother. Claudius is the man who had shown Hamlet his repressed yearnings—he took his father’s place instead of Hamlet himself. Revenge is replaced by self-reproach, by conscious anxieties which reveal to Hamlet that he himself is no better than the perpetra­tor whom he should punish. Freud translated into consciousness what had to remain unconscious in the mind of the hero. Further­more, Freud (1900, 86) connects the subconscious and the theme of parent-child relationships to Shakespeare’s real life, claiming that Hamlet was written right after the death of Shakespeare’s father and connects the name of Shakespeare’s son Hamnet who died in childhood to the character of Hamlet. (This is especially interesting for my Hamlet Revisited where I not only explore the parent-child relationship, but also connect it with my private life for artistic purposes). Finally, if it may be argued that Freud’s Oedipal reading of Ham­let provides a viewpoint on the relationship with his mother, father and uncle, then Carl Jung’s concept of archetypes encompasses a greater variety of characters; while Freud explored the individual unconscious, Jung (1968) investigated the collective unconscious. I included his concepts of archetypes to emphasise that the tradi­tional artistic approach which tries to retell and interpret a story requires a deep understanding of characters and motivations. Be­sides the roles of the mother, father and child, all the main char­acters can also be linked to the idea of archetypes. The character of Hamlet searches for his self. It is an archetype that can be ex­plained as a combination of the unconscious and conscious of a person. This occurs through a process in which various aspects of personality are integrated which is noticeable in Hamlet’s ontolog­ical speeches. If it were a classical tragedy, Hamlet would probably be classified as the archetype of the hero who would revenge his father and defend his throne. However, Shakespeare’s Hamlet is much more complex than that and as a character he feels vulnera­ble in relation to other characters, so he feigns madness—choosing to put on a metaphorical mask that corresponds to the archetype of persona, a word derived from Latin that literally means mask. Ophelia’s character corresponds to Jung’s archetype of the in­nocent maiden. There are some other important archetypes, like the trickster connected to Claudius, shadow (the dark side of mind present in the deeds of Claudius, and others, but also in the ap­pearance of the Ghost), the wise old man (Polonius presents him­self as a wise old man). The archetype of anima that represents the subconscious idea of female in man (corresponding to animus in women) is arguably the part of Hamlet’s subconscious that finds the characters of Gertrude and Ophelia and their behaviour inad­equate for the archetypal models in his mind: “...—Frailty, thy name is woman—” (1.2.146), and can be linked to gender ambiguities in Hamlet. So, it may be argued that the main characters in Ham­let, although depicted in detail as having their own idiosyncrasies both in Shakespeare, and in my balletic version, can usefully be seen as archetypes. Freud’s and Jung’s Modernist thought and the concept of psychoanalysis were therefore useful for depicting the characters and their drives in the analysis of my Hamlet. Howev­er, in Hamlet Revisited I also use their psychoanalytical concepts as tools for interrogating the parent-child relationship relevant to Hamlet, combining it with postmodern lines of thought such as the schizoanalysis of Deleuze and Guattari (1983). Their concept of schizoanalysis rejects Freud’s psychoanalysis, the traditional transcendent structure of mother—father—child that is repressive and they reject the concept of that family triangle to avoid the re­pression and restraint of the psychoanalytic interpretative frame­work. For them (1983, 81) “It is not the purpose of schizoanalysis to resolve Oedipus, it does not intend to resolve it better than Oedipal psychoanalysis does. Its aim is to de-oedipalize the unconscious in order to reach the real problems.” Deleuze and Guattari (1987) use botanical terms to explain two different ways of thinking. One is rhizome, referring to a horizontal stem that sends out roots and shoots from multiple nodes and it is not possible to locate its source root, which I had in mind while cre­ating Hamlet Revisited as a collage of different intertextual texts. This thinking contrasts with the traditional arborescent tree-like thinking that develops from root to trunk to branch to leaf. Howev­er, in my work I tried to explore both ways of thinking, horizontal and vertical, so I used the traditional transcendent structure, moth-er—father—child, to search for the causes of present outcomes in childhood, in other words, in one’s roots. Therefore, through a se­ries of photographs I tried to refer to some of the main themes in Hamlet—love towards the mother, inability to take over the place of the father (to step in his shoes), an unsuccessful love relation­ship, expression through art, as well as a weapon in my hands with all the connotations it carries. Throughout the work I have used slight doses of irony and a touch of humour (especially in this frame with my childhood pic­tures) to avoid too much pathos and nostalgia. The undermining of autobiographical veracity is in accordance with the postmodern questioning of grandnarratives. Hence, what seems to be the auto­biographical part of the work is in fact something else. It is my ef­fort to illuminate the process in the artist’s head when dealing with narrative works, when selfidentification with the main character is almost inevitable, especially if you are also playing the role. 3.3 Body In the video material I played with images of the anatomy of the dancer to show what is under the surface of the body as a decon­structed instrument, juxtaposing it with images of literary texts, music and dance notation sheets that are not used literally, but as signs of the process in which dance is created. The human body is at the same time an instrument and the performer whose dance is defined by music and choreographic structures, but also by his/ her body predispositions and artistic talent. While André Levinson (quoted in Copeland and Cohen 1983, 110) saw dancers as machines for manufacturing beauty, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 2) conceive of human beings as desiring-machines: There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a pro­cess that produces the one within the other and couples the machines together. Producing-machines, desiring-machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all of species life: the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any mean­ing whatsoever. Auslander (2008, 87) further explains this concept: A desiring-machine is connected to a body without organs, ..., a term borrowed from avant-garde playwright and theatre con-ceptualist Antonin Artaud (1896-1948). This concept denies the idea that the person is to be found inside the body, composed of autonomous, self-sustaining, and organised internal forms. Instead, it suggests the notion that the person/body is inter­connected, exterior, open, multiple, fragmented, provisional, and interpenetrated by other entities. Correspondingly, Litza Bixler referring to Laurence Louppe’s discussion, drawing on Barthes and Foucault, describes the “muta­ble body in which meaning is culturally produced and not inherent within the biological form” (Louppe cited in Bixler 1999, 242). Fur­thermore, Barthes, following Freud and Jacques Lacan, has com­prehended the body as a sign for the structure of the unconscious; he has also, following the Russian formalist and structuralist tradi­tions, addressed the body as “a locus of mindful human articula­tions” (Foster 1986, 237). Therefore, I wanted to present a dancer’s body on one hand as a theatrical sign, instrument, machine, etc. and on the other, as a human being with all its idiosyncrasies, physicality, but also mind, emotions and talent. In Hamlet I represented male and fe­male dancing according to traditions and conventions of classical/ romantic ballet; in Hamlet Revisited I was more aware of gender ambiguities, and this is why I depicted Pavla’s body as an ‘instru­ment’. This does not mean that I wished to deprive her of female qualities, or of the male gaze of desire, as discussed by Ann Daly (2006, 117) who mentions that even today’s contemporary chore­ographers are not being subversive or transformative in ballet’s representation of Woman. Anna Kisselgoff, from the NY Times, argues that “it does matter whether the arabesque ...belongs to a man or a woman” (quoted in Daly 2006, 117). As Daly points out— for Kisselgoff, “the sacred authority of tradition is never to be des­ecrated...” (ibid.). Whether or not choreographers will “conceive a new language of desire” as Daly concludes drawing on Laura Mul­vey (ibid.), my intention was different. I wanted to point out that to­day’s professional dancer’s body, male or female, is not just a body trained in a particular dance technique; today’s eclectic repertoire demands a new type of body that Foster calls the ‘hired body’— it is a body trained to make a living in dancing. It is additionally shaped by activities such as sports, aerobics and various exercise programmes. The criteria for evaluating its training share physical education’s specialised and scientific orientation. This hired body should achieve a specific heart rate, a general level of strength and flexibility and a muscular tonus (Foster in Desmond 2006, 255). The language of biology and kinesiology is used to appraise the strength, flexibility and endurance of the body’s muscle groups. A dance screening process which monitors the above is recommend­ed by physiotherapist Mike Chisolm (2003, 9-10) for today’s pro­fessional dancer. Dancing bodies, professionally trained and cared for, can be perceived as a tool as well as text source in creating con­temporary choreographies which is why I made a reference to it at the beginning of my dance video. Furthermore, what is of utmost importance for my work is the notion following the hired body— the video dancing body. It is often constructed from the edited tapes of dance movement—its motion can be slowed, smeared or replicated and according to Foster (2006, 255) offers a ‘permanent’ record of the dance which can be viewed and reviewed indefinitely and can serve as an ‘unproblematic simulacrum’13 of live dance. 13 Jean Baudrillard’s (1983, 81) concept simulacrum is an image or rep­resentation of reality that has three main phases or orders—the first phase emerging in Baroque with artifice over realism, the second being the modern age of mass production with its realism and the third post­modern phase, where simulacrum has lost all relation to reality, produc­ing its own reality. In postmodernity the simulacrum has replaced the real, so that we live in a world of simulacra (Auslander 2008, 57). Additionally, at the end of this video clip, I repeated the image of me as Hamlet holding a skull in an attempt to make a parallel with her body’s anatomy, i.e. her skull that can be connected to Hamlet’s themes of death. The balletic interpretation of Hamlet’s character is definitely inspired by the old ballet classics. Such a romanticised version of Hamlet is suitable for ballet expression; in Hamlet I represented male and female dancing according to traditions and conventions of classical/romantic ballet inscribing gender difference as an aes­thetic virtue; male dancing is athletic and more powerful and sup­portive, while female dancing is a display of delicacy and fragility. Daly (2006, 112) claims that: Dance classicism is an ideology devoted to tradition, chival­ ry, and to hierarchy of all kinds—gender, performer’s rank, the distinction between types of roles, spectators’ placement, stage organization, the canon. Romanticism’s emphasis on personal expression also relies on the theatricalised dichotomy of femi­ nine and masculine temperaments. In Hamlet Revisited I selected Benjamin who is not a typical classical ballet dancer in accordance with the postmodern inclu­sive concept of different bodies.14 The unisex outfit of him and Ksenija diminishes gender binaries and utilises ambiguities present in Hamlet. It sounds innovative, but 14 Contemporary postmodernists push this to the extreme: DV8 Physical Theatre in Lloyd Newson’s film The Cost of Living (2004) includes a dou-ble-amputee person; Candoco Dance Company is inclusive of both disa­bled and non-disabled dancers; similarly, everyday behaviour has moved from, for instance pedestrian movement to the extremes in Jérôme Bel’s performance Jérôme Bel [1995] where one of the performers urinates on the stage. My intentions were far more moderate in application of con­cepts of inclusion or usage of ordinary movement. since we know that in Shakespeare’s time all the performers were male and that later on Sarah Bernhardt played the role of Hamlet15, as well as Bronislava Nijinska in her ballet production of 1934, it is evident that such an approach had its different predecessors throughout his­tory. Feminist critiques16 have dealt with female characters in Hamlet, but also with their experience of the character of Hamlet. Jean Betts (1994, ii) in the writer’s note to her play-script Ophelia Thinks Harder says: “I remembered studying Hamlet at school, and like most oth­er girls in my class, identifying with him and finding Ophelia alien; while at the same time being aware that even so, too often in my life I was judged not on how I measured up to Hamlet, but on how I com­pared to Ophelia.” Obviously, there is an element of gender ambiguity in Hamlet himself, which is evident throughout the text. For example, King Claudius addresses Hamlet’s mourning: “... tis unmanly grief” (1.2.94), implying that Hamlet acts like a woman or a child. Hamlet himself in 2.2.581-583 misogynistically calls himself a whore, a drab and a scullion and thus compares his behaviour to female behaviour. Furthermore, at 3.1.144-146 he says: “I have heard of your painting well enough. God/hath given you one face and you make yourselves an­other ...”. It can be observed that for him women can be perceived as artificial and fake. According to Robin Wharton (2005, 13) Vladimir Malakhov in his version of Hamlet (1990) uses the Shakespearean source to reveal and destabilise ballet’s conventions governing the construction of gender identity—his physical appearance, the femi­nine perfection of his line in the usually female pose together with 15 As well as many other actresses: Charlotte Charke (18th c.), Asta Niels­en (1920), Frances de la Tour (1979), Ruth Mitchell (1992), Angela Winkler (2000), Abke Haring (2014), Maxine Peake (2015). 16 For example—Lisa Jardine (1991), Janet Adelman (1992), Alison Findlay (1994), Kay Stanton (1994), Akiko Kusunoki (1995), Sharon Ouditt (1996), Debra Bergoffen (1998), Susan Lamb (2002). a sex-neutral costume, provide emphasis to Hamlet’s androgynous appearance (Wharton 2005, 16). Benjamin and Ksenija’s appearance deals with gender ambiguities in a more subtle way, unlike some cho­reographers who, like Mark Morris, intervene dramatically to defa­miliarise the representational conventions regulating gender issues by partnering men with men and women with women or by dressing men in tutus and pointe shoes to dance female roles (Burt cited in Wharton 2005, 10). This is another paradox of postmodernism where some of the authors such as Morris tried to change attitudes towards traditional gender roles with men and women sharing the same char­acteristics (Kisselgoff 1985, para. 5), while critics such as Wharton (2005, 8) suggest that on stage as in life, the body must be made to represent itself in every aspect, including gender. 3.4 The concept of mirror In Shakespeare’s original, the play within the play scene serves as a mirror of reality that provokes Claudius’s response and here, we perceive it on another level—in the actual mirror. Philip Armstrong (2003, 218) explains this concept of imitation according to which the purpose of playing is as explained by Ham­let’s words: “... to hold as twere the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.” (3.2.21-24). Armstrong contin­ues that many contemporary references repeat the ambivalence between the mirror as a passive reproduction of the image, and its more active role in constituting the beholder. Hamlet himself, for example will be described as “The glass of fashion and the mould of form / Th’observ’d of all observers, ...” (3.1.155-156). When Ham­let confronts his mother, he claims he will “... set you up a glass/ Where you may see the inmost part of you.” (3.4.18-19); actually, he is not showing her a mirror, but portraits of her two husbands, so she can realise how she was before and what she is now. Neverthe­less, according to psychoanalyst Lacan (1988, 169), what was the father becomes the super-ego that in Hamlet’s words reappears “... In my mind’s eye, Horatio.” (1.2.185). Richard Rorty in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980) discusses the eye of the mind as the cognitive model appearing in the Renaissance and deriving from Greek philosophy. Lacan in The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience (1977a) discusses the concept of the mirror stage that he perceives as an early stage in cognitive devel­opment of a child. However, it is also important for performance studies as discussed by Matthew Causey in The Screen Test of the Double (1999), where he uses the concept of split subjectivity, the subject’s awareness of itself looking at itself, to analyse postmod­ern performances. This is very interesting since Hamlet can be perceived as performance of identity. In words of Hidalgo (1999, 213) the individual I is a mere signifier - the grammatical eye sus­ceptible of adhering to different signifieds. Identity is never defi­nite, but always slippery and therefore provisional. Lacan (1977a, 2) defines identification as the “transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image.” But identifica­tion needs differentiation between projection and introjection. Intro-jection engages predominantly with the symbolic register according to Lacan (1988, 125). So, the stage mirror is not only important on the level of Hamlet’s mousetrap but is also significant to define some­one’s ego. Lacan (1977b, 31) uses the play Hamlet to discuss the rela­tionship between the ego and its ideal image in the mirror: The playwright situates the basis of aggressivity in this paroxysm of absorption in the imaginary register, formally expressed as a mir­ror relationship, a mirrored reaction. The one you fight is the one you admire the most. The ego ideal is also, … the one you have to kill. Armstrong (2003, 221) claims that “the moment of identifica­tion threatens always to replace the ego with its own image or rep­resentation”. In the view of James Calderwood (1983, 25), Hamlet defines himself not by what he is, but what he is not. He acts on Spinoza’s principle that “All determination is by negation.” Ham­let separates himself by words and actions mostly from Claudius, but also from Old Hamlet, Polonius, Ophelia, Laertes and Gertrude (ibid.). According to Armstrong (2003, 225), Hamlet, in eventually fighting his ego ideal, effects his own death. However, this can be perceived as a traditional approach and tradi­tional analysis. In the postmodern contemporary addition to my orig­inal choreography, as previously explained, my co-workers watch the performance from a theatre box and are filmed on the video, as are their artistic responses to the original choreography. Here, in a semi­otic sense we have three aspects of the concept of the mirror—theatre as a metaphorical mirror, a real mirror as a set element and the video that can serve as a time-transcending mirror (one can see himself/ herself how he/she looks in the moment and how he/she looked in the past). Furthermore, some of the new abstract choreographic material that uses the mirror as a prop is not firmly connected with the plot, so it corresponds with the postmodern and poststructuralist theatre concept which stimulates the audience to find their own meaning and inspiration while appreciating that abstract choreography.17 As images in the mirror disappear, we see Pavla behind a glass theatre door in which the panorama of Zagreb is reflected. (Zagreb 17 Brannigan (2011, 37) explains how already early dance films were fasci­nated with mirrors such as Dudley Murphy’s 1929 film Black and Tan with music of Duke Ellington, where the tap dancers performed on a mirrored floor simulating the effect of a hall of mirrors and a kaleidoscopic in-cam­era effect is used to achieve the disoriented gaze of a character in the mov­ie, similarly to what I did with the circling images around Pavla’s head. is the birth city of both Pavla and myself and in a way our artistic ‘kingdom’. Just like Hamlet, we both went abroad for studies and returned home to claim our position in the theatre, so the ambi­ence of Zagreb represents everything that supports but also ques­tions our artistic attempts.) Pavla opens the door and points her finger accusingly, alluding to the Ghost from the original story. The scene is blended into her abstract choreography with mir­rors. For the first time, we see her complete choreography Innocent and hear the original music to which it was created (Flesh Quar­tet). Her idiosyncratic choreography is performed harmoniously following elegant lines of movement and developing phrases. The camera as well as computer manipulations play with the fragmen­tation of the picture and mirror effects. So, instead of just docu­menting the choreography, it gives additional dimensions and qualities for the spectator to appreciate. She can represent both Hamlet and Ophelia exploring the subconscious and searching for their identities in the mirror, just like Narcissus who sought his reflection in water. Several clips of water and Pavla’s reflections in the water have been inserted—accordingly, the mirror can repre­sent the water in which Ophelia shall eventually drown. In another clip, Pavla is sitting in the audience with four images circling around her head. In each of the four images she performs her abstract movements in different locations in the theatre—in front of a large theatre window, in the Foyer, on the top of the thea­tre staircase and on a red sofa in front of a large Foyer mirror. The red sofa can suggest carnal lust; the Foyer court dances; the mirror Hamlet’s contemplations and reflections and the staircase can re­fer to the scales of Elsinore’s corridors, but also to the labyrinths in Hamlet’s mind. The shadow in front of the window can refer to the Ghost, but all understandings are open to the spectators. Pavla is dancing parts that can be linked to both Gertrude and Ophelia; however, my intention was not to depict characters as in the tradi­tional version, but to deal with themes such as love, grief, jealousy and remorse. As mentioned by Wharton (2005, 20) “Shakespeare functions ...as a kind of flexible cultural discourse—of power, desire, intrigue, etc.—rather than a set group of stable, printed texts.” All these complex allusions to sexuality, the subconscious, the search for identity, etc. are features intended to provoke powerful but different, individual responses, and are as always open for the spectator’s perception.18 3.5 Hamlet Revisited as supplementation/surrogation According to Wharton (2005, 7), after Joseph Roach, ballet can serve as a surrogation for dramatic performances, meaning that ballet can replace the play to a certain extent. As Roach said it is a process through which “culture reproduces and re-creates itself” (quoted in Wharton 2005, 11). Dramatisations of Shakespeare in ballet often depend upon the audience’s prior knowledge of Shakespeare to provide narrative coherence. Wharton (2005, 20) says that: textual interpretation results from a staged confrontation be­ tween the inherited kinesthetic vocabulary of the surrogate and the cultural meaning associated with its authoritative ‘source’ text. Rather than exploring themes or problems that are nec­ essarily already present in and a preoccupation of the source, these ballets instead seem at least equally invested in probing and critiquing the medium of ballet performance itself. 18 This is in accordance with Deren’s vertical film form concept account­ed for the different film structure in non-narrative films which she calls ‘poetic film’; rather than progressing horizontally with the logic of the narrative, vertical film sequences explore the quality of moments, ideas, images and movements (cited in Brannigan 2011, 101). Wharton says that turning to Shakespeare allows a choreogra­pher to take advantage of an audience’s presumed familiarity with the plot in order to introduce a previously unavailable level of nar­rative complexity. I would argue that I created Hamlet Revisited as an intertextual, open-ended, writerly work that is close to Marvin Carlson’s use of the Derridean concept of ‘supplementation’ that sets forth the idea that a supplementary text can always change the meaning of the original text and every further supplement can be supplemented. In his text Theatrical Performance: Illustration, Translation, Fulfill­ment, or Supplement? (1985) Carlson discusses various approaches to a theatrical performance, metaphorically described as illustra­tion of the text where plenitude is in the written text; fulfilment of the text where plenitude is in the performance and in a way fulfils the literary text; translation of the text where equivalent plenitude is on both sides and supplement of the text where the concept of supplement avoids the problems associated with privileging either performance or written text19. This is exactly what I did—I supplemented the archival recording of my choreography Hamlet with the new video material creating Hamlet Revisited, transform­ing the existing work according to postmodern concepts into an eclectic transmodern dance video. As Carlson (1985, 11) states “not all that this play has to say has been said, ... other different but 19 It may be postulated that works by traditional choreographers, from Jean-Georges Noverre to Macmillan and Cranko, can be considered as attempted ‘translations’ of literary text according to Walter Benjamin’s idea of the Task of the translator (1968). The translation of an artistic lit­erary work is not simply information, but “... something that a translator can reproduce only if he is also a poet” (1968, 70). This is applicable to the relationship between text and performance; a director or choreogra­pher requires an advanced artistic sensibility to ‘translate’ Shakespeare’s works into the medium of dance. equally rich experiences with it are always possible.” My function was as much that of an editor as of the traditional author and the plurality of texts I used resulted in the plurality of self in my role as the creator of Hamlet Revisited. On the other hand, Shakespeare’s role as the author of the literary source text was ambiguous and ambivalent—his literary model served as foundation for my works; while my original choreography tried to retell Shakespeare’s story, the new choreographic material almost rejects its importance us­ing it just as a starting point. However, their blend as the final work of art demands the spectator’s previous knowledge about Shake­speare as the author, his work, and its plot to be able to appreciate it in its entirety; otherwise, their experience would only be partial. Pavis (2006, 327) concludes that there are different theories for dif­ferent periods and claims that even poststructuralist theory after Barthes, Derrida, Foucault and other postmodern theoreticians such as Lacan is somewhat dated: now is a time for restoration of the text. Wharton (2005, 10) states that “the spectator often brings more to the performance than a rudimentary knowledge of the plot, citation of the text does more than simply impart narrative continuity to the action on stage.” So, at the end I am returning to Shakespeare, though not literally. Hence, to be able to follow and understand my new work, arguably we have to presume that the author is very much alive. Where? Well, to paraphrase the Bard himself: “In our mind’s eye, Horatio.” 4 CONCLUSION This research project was conceived as a case study of my spe­cific work (dance video as the creative practice component) and I hope that it contributed to the general knowledge in the field by elucidating the transformation of Hamlet to Hamlet Revisited pre­senting the neoclassical choreographic approach and the recent postmodern approach that crosses over into a transmodern dance video of an eclectic blend of styles in accordance with the para­digm of digimodernism. It included some of the most significant concepts and techniques used in solving problems of revisiting an archival recording of a ballet work and transforming it into a new dance video that can serve as prescription and scaffolding, or at least as a basis for other choreographers in re-thinking their past works of art; while many of these are used in current dance field in creating new choreographies or dance videos, the specific quality of this research is that it proves how old materials can be re-used and re-interpreted in the creation of a new artistic work. I answer the topic question by explaining how I transformed Hamlet to Hamlet Revisited offering an option how to do it, not excluding other possibilities. The research focuses on the concept of intertextuality as a tool for analytic purposes, but also on a man­ner of creating an open-ended complex work of art such as Hamlet Revisited that might be of interest to choreographers as well as theoreticians who wish to reconsider existing choreographic cre­ations. That way, the intertextual approach proves to be valid at least on two levels: the first is the possibility of a more objective analysis in combination with a semiotic structuralist approach and the second one is the creation of a new work where the author can function as the editor, aware and conscious of the interplay of dis­parate texts and their sources which co-act in the mind during the creative process. Finally, I am aware that in this dance video there are things that I have not addressed or verbalised. Correspondingly, the danc­er-choreographer Alexandre Munz20 (2015, para. 2) argues against 20 Alexandre Munz is the choreographer of the Video-Dance trilogy, Lu­mičre, Lola and Hydra, in collaboration with director Florence Freitag, filmmaker Johannes Plank and composer Fabian Russ (2015). a “deep-rooted bias privileging the power of the word over the power of corporeality” and against a “disavowal of the body as a thinking being able to express the inexplicable and the invisible, which is, in fact, precisely the realm of dance” (2015, para. 3). Further research can explore: • the ways of transforming prominent and established versions of ballet performances into a new work • how to establish a different cooperation between authors from the one presented in Hamlet Revisited • how to modify one’s own choreographic vocabulary and test the relationship of the old and the new vocabulary and syntax • the possibility of revisiting Hamlet Revisited after a certain time period and adding new ideas to this unrestricted work of art • possible relationships between works from different cultures through comparison and juxtaposition. 5 BIBLIOGRAPHY ADSHEAD, JANET. (ed) 1986. Choreography: Principles and Prac­tice. Report of the Fourth Study of Dance Conference 4-7 April 1986. Guilford: National Resource Centre for Dance, pp. 63-79. __ 1988. Dance Analysis: Theory and Practice. London: Dance Books Ltd. ADSHEAD-LANSDALE, JANET. (ED) 1999. Dancing Texts: Inter-textuality in Interpretation. London: Dance Books Ltd. 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N.D. “LÉONIDE MASSINE - The Impact of Leonide Massine on 20thCentury Ballet.” Retrieved 2 January, 2015 from http://massine-ballet.com/html/synopsis.php Monitor ISH (2021), XXIII/1, 54–61 Kratki znanstveni prispevekShort scientific contribution Lidia Krisskaya1 Juliet’s Run as Seen on Screen: Reinterpretation of the Past Through Camera Lenses Abstract: This article analyses Juliet’s famous run from the filmed ballet performance Romeo and Juliet’2 and looks at the camera as a subject in history. As the Angel of History3, the movie camera is an open-eyed witness, looking into the past while having its back turned to the future. But the camera is more than a witness - it is simultaneous­ly the executor of someone else’s will and the narrator of its own story. Keywords:Movie Camera, Film, Shakespeare’s, Romeo and Juliet, Ballet, Movement Julijin tek na zaslonu: Reinterpretacija preteklosti skozi kamerino leco Izvlecek: Clanek analizira slavni Julijin tek iz baletne predstave Romeo in Julija, pri tem pa kamero razume kot zgodovinski su­bjekt. Kot angel zgodovine filmska kamera nastopa kot prica odpr­tih oci, ki gleda v preteklost, s hrbtom pa je obrnjena v prihodnost. 1 Lidia Krisskaya is a masters student at the AMEU Dance academy. / Lidia Krisskaya je mag. študentka AMEU Akademije za ples, E-pošta: lidia.krisskaya@gmail.com. 2 The text is based on the following videos: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=hbc41CB1r5Y&t=3775s (1.02.15-1.03.00) https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=QlihOXSJTvY 3 Angelus Novus, a 1920 painting by Paul Klee, can be seen, for example here: https://www.imj.org.il/sites/default/files/collections/Klee%2C%20 Paul%2C%20Angelus%20Novus%2C%201920.jpg 54 Kamera pa je vec kot zgolj prica – istocasno je izvrševalec tuje volje in pripovedovalec lastne zgodbe. Kljucne besede: filmska kamera, film, Shakespearova Romeo in Julija, balet, gibanje My gaze is never vacant my eye pitchdark and full I know what I must announce and many other things as well “Greetings from Angelus” Gershom Scholem 1 CAMERA AS AN AGENT OF HISTORY Cinema has become a metaphor for capturing reality. Cinematic im­ages structure our memories of past events, and the movie camera is considered a unique means of delivering them to us. By interacting with the historical narrative, viewers acquire “memories” of events they did not experience and form their subjective perceptions. His­torical films, like documentaries, express the values of a particular time and frame history in the ways requested by society (Cole 2020). By expanding the boundaries of today and providing a glimpse into the past, they shape our historical consciousness and thus become part of our cultural memory of past events, blending our personal experience with collective conceptions of history (Landsberg 2004). The goal of many movies is not factual accuracy but the creation of a memorable impression that helps us visualize and memorize the historical events and their participants (Greiner 2021). Since the beginning of the movie’s era, we perceive history as the camera “chooses” to show us. Largely, the camera reflects the non-privatized public past, which is already in the mass conscious­ness (Landsberg 2003) – with directors, actors, scriptwriters, and cameramen acting on often unverbalized demands from the mass­es, who need to see the history. It should be noted that creative re­vision and alteration of history, an attempt to comprehend the past in the language of paintings, historical novels, or theater, repeated­ly challenged historiography before the advent of cinema, when, along with the emergence of new technological forms of spectacle, ideas about perception were transformed (Röttger 2017). Films play a central role in making history accessible to a broader audience and influence our understanding of historical events and their participants. Walter Benjamin, in his essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1969, 4), said that Abel Gance (French film director, actor, and producer, 1889­1981) once exclaimed enthusiastically: “Shakespeare, Rembrandt, Beethoven will make films . . . all legends, all mythologies and all myths, all founders of religion, and the very religions . . . await their exposed resurrection, and the heroes crowd each other at the gate.” Typically, historical films try to recreate the nuances of the era. Many movies have a dramatic canvas with central heroes easy to identify with – all of that enables them to leave a unique imprint in the spectators that brings about personal involvement with the past. Butthere are movies with no certainty about their relationship to history that also shape our opinions and perceptions of how things were and who acted which way, long or only recently ago. A ballet film based on Shakespeare’s play Romeo and Juliet is one of the excellent examples of how a seemingly non-histori­cal historical movie can create a personalized link with the past. Since we all know the storyline – a fiction since the moment of its inception by the author - it does not add much in terms of facts to our understanding of the depicted times. Still, through ingenious work of the cameraman and a brilliant interpretation by the lead actress, it compels the viewer to fantasize about the history and leaves us with an illusion of having had a glance at a beautiful bygone. Does this film claim to be historical? It certainly doesn’t. Instead, driven by our expectations, the camera reinforces and magnifies our desire to see the past as we have “pre-seen” it in our collective [un]consciousness. Romeo and Juliet is a Soviet ballet film. It was staged at the Mosfilm studio in 1954 by director Leo Arnshtam and choreogra­pher Leonid Lavrovsky based on the ballet of the same name by Sergei Prokofiev based on the tragedy of William Shakespeare. In 1955, the picture was awarded prizes at the VIII International Film Festival in Cannes for the best lyrical film and the cinematic inter­pretation of ballet and the outstanding skill of Galina Ulanova. For the sake of brevity, let us analyze a small excerpt from this film - Juliet’s famous run. 2 JULIET’S FAMOUS RUN Ballet has strong ties with the Great Mute since they both share the absence of the need for words, admiration for the expressiveness of the human body, a touch of decadence, the desire to rise above reality. Ballet is a language that does not require translation but is understandable to many. So, it is in this universal language that the camera tells its concise and aesthetic story. While aesthetic cinema is often rational, thoughtful, beautiful, somewhat cold, or even sterile, harmony balances the camera’s aesthetic space. The camera works with image interpretation; com­position relates to psychology and editing in the frame affects the viewer. We are so carried away by what is happening on the screen that we do not notice how our emotions are skillfully created. Ju­liet’s run is defined expressively - the camera detects the scene’s intensity, and lack of color takes on texture. Due to the light, the image looks three-dimensional: it breathes lyricism. Inspired by poetry, the running scene is exceptionally poetic. Exaggerated physical performance seen in the whole picture emphasizes the drama and emotional weight of the action. Visual styling makes the movie resonate. But while the larger story itself attracts the audience, the reason a running scene is compelling is that the character is framed, and the camera is operated to tell its own story. How exactly does it do it? The focus of this scene is on a movement. We perceive Ulanova moving with natural freedom, and the constant change in her ges­tures and steps enhances this perception. In this scene, dance is not just a technique for original artistic expression. We do not look at the movement from a polite distance; on the contrary - the camera reveals secrets to us, depriving the heroine of her personal space. The line between stage and hall blurs, throwing the spectator out of his/her comfortable chair in the stalls. The unusual angle forces the viewer to look from below into the radiant face of Juliet and look di­rectly into her heart. Doors tinted on canvas lead to the mysterious; the stage visually shrinks and then rapidly swings open. One cannot but pay tribute to the subtle sense of space that underlies all these metamorphoses. Although the techniques used by the operators are not exclusive, in contrast to the specifics of theatrical production, they become original, even innovative. While leaving a beautiful, al­beit cold look, the cinematic process does not spoil either the ballet or the performance in the film. The close-up, approaching excessive­ly close, does not lose sight of the dance and at the same time reveals what was previously hidden by shadows at the back of the stage. Restraint of feelings and words, pronounced with the help of fa­cial expressions and gestures, is a feature of the created atmosphere; this is a different world, the world of the stage. Rigid frameworks limit the artist’s ability to convey the idea of the work to the viewer. Still, they are pretty enough to demonstrate Juliet’s feelings, desire to succumb to love, deviate from the rules, and find out real life. Shakespeare’s text is much richer and more violent than what movie directors could stage on the set. But even if excessive re­straint did not allow actors to depict feelings so colorfully, all the same, what we observe is art. One glance at Juliet introduces the observer into a clouded mind, makes him plunge into the depths of the heroine’s soul, and understand how vital this love is. Each movement of this short scene is symbolic; there are no empty, mean­ingless movements. Theexquisite and very mannered image of the voiceless Eros is noticeable in the folds of her clothes. There is noth­ing superfluous in this scene; each element complements the other. The conceptual scenery emphasizes the insignificance of the world around the heroine. Architectural structures resemble illustrations and show that the significance of their presence here is not so great; the main thing is the events taking place against their background. The character is framed when the camera is allowed to tell its story. All other Juliets run as if behind the train. Ulanova - Juliet alone runs to her beloved Romeo. If we look at how she runs through frames, we will see her hand stretching forward, wrapped in a cloak in such a way that a piece of it – precisely the length of her arm - sways as she runs. When Juliet runs, she also sways her hand. The swaying gesture, picked up by Ulanova for this character and repeated throughout the run, shows the audience what Juliet is feeling. Juliet manages to run to the side, and again everything repeats in the opposite direction. We can disassemble frames to understand how this scene was filmed, but where it came from remains secret. The cloak is visible to everyone, but what does it hide - nobody knows. The prolonged running scene of Juliet in the black cloak is specially done for the cinema and lasts longer than in the theater. And it creates a more profound impression on the movie viewer than on the theater spectator. What are we looking for in the first place when judging a shot? Is it balance, leading lines, golden ratio, color, light, shapes? These are all essential ingredients in good images, but the first thing we notice is movement. Running Ulanova - Juliet moves like no other, delivering a masterclass on motions and a unique way to combine them. The movement in this scene is surprising and cinematic. Even when Juliet is silent, there is something about her appearance that attracts attention. Her face is shot from below and brightened - this is an emotional trigger that works in any film, and her run is cine­matic because the frame is full of it. And finally, there is the movement of the cut. When you follow the movement, you don’t see editing—the rhythm switches when the scene ends by completing something static and then cutting straight into motion. The camera move has a clear beginning, middle, end ending. The change in the direction characterizes the two runs filmed. As Juliet runs, the movement of the cloak cuts smoothly into the angle. With her hand outstretched and her contrasting cloak swaying behind her body, Juliet makes up a holistic image. Neatly distributed motion prevents the scene from looking flat, and there are no pointless camera angles. Viewers already know from previous experience of reading the play or watching different representations of the story what this scene is about, so here the camera tries to convey it not through di­alogue but precisely through the plasticity of the movement. And silence reinforces the subjectivity of the moment to make an in­tense scene even more potent, to show us, love, for example. 3 CONCLUSION In the case of the Romeo and Juliet ballet movie, the camera leaves us with such a strong memory that we unconsciously start to think about the historical time in which the protagonists supposedly lived as we have seen it on the screen. We map the emotions and the ways to ex­press them created by our contemporaries to the figures from distant times and have the mental comfort of assuming that our ancestors thought, moved, and felt the same way as we do. While it might be an il­lusion, this reinterpretation of the past given to us through the camera lenses nevertheless links us with history. Further, it feeds our desire to have a shared narrative of our movement through the sands of times. 4 BIBLIOGRAPHY BENJAMIN, WALTER. 2009. On the Concept of History. Cre­ateSpace Independent Publishing Platform. __1969. The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. Edited by Hannah Arendt. New York: Schocken Books. COLE, RICHARD. 2020. “Breaking the frame in historical fiction.” Rethinking History 24: 3-4. ENGELEN, LEEN. 2007. “Back to the Future, Ahead to the Past. Film and History: A Status Quaestionis.” Rethinking History 11: 555 – 563. GREINER, RASMUS. 2021. Cinematic Histospheres. Palgrave Macmillan. KLEE, PAUL. 1920. Angelus Novus. Jerusalem. LANDSBERG, ALISON. 2003. “Prosthetic memory The ethics and politics of memory in an age of mass culture.” In Memory and popu­lar film, by Paul Grainge. Manchester: Manchester University Press. __ 2004. Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Re­membrance in the Age of Mass Culture. New York. MACKENZIE, SCOTT. 2014. Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Cultures: A Critical Anthology. University of California Press. PAALMAN, FLORIS. 2021. “Film and History: Towards a General On­tology.” Research in Film and History (Universität Bremen) 3: 1-41. RÖTTGER, KATI. 2017. “Technologies of Spectacle and the Birth of the Modern World. A Proposal for an Interconnected Historio-graphic Approach to Spectacular Cultures.” TMG Journal for Me­dia History 20.2: 4-29. SCHOLEM, GERSHOM. 2018. Greetings from Angelus. Brooklyn: Archipelago Books. Monitor ISH (2021), XXIII/1, 62–74 Izvirni znanstveni clanek Original scientific article Uroš Zavodnik1 Ekspresija plesnega giba v filmskem velikem planu Izvlecek: Izrazna moc giba, s katerim plesalec poustvarja emo-tivno plesno kompozicijo pred filmsko kamero, na filmskem setu, praviloma preide v popolno ekspresijo v filmskem velikem planu, ko lahko še tako neznaten gib izpove naracijo, ki je bila kot celota koreografsko premišljena in oblikovana. V montaži se kadri sestavijo v ritem, ki ga plesalec narekuje skozi svoje ko­reografsko premišljene gibe. Filmski režiser, v navezi s plesal­cem in koreografom, lahko kadrira tudi skozi pogled igralca, ce žanrsko ni posebej zapisan plesnemu filmu. Kot igralca, lahko skozi veliki plan zacuti tudi plesalca, s tem pa omogoca interak­cijo med plesalcem in gledalcem, ki ga gib plesalca subverzivno nagovarja ter v vsej svoji ekspresiji v zatemnjeni kinodvorani posrka vase. Platno postane pribežališce obeh, ko in ce je ilu­zija popolna, saj je vendarle skrita v projekciji plesa svetlobe na praznem belem filmskem platnu zatemnjene kinodvorane, ki izrisuje gibajoce se podobe. Skozi veliki plan se mu približa, ga emotivno nagovarja, kot da bi gib skupaj kreirala in ga skupaj cutila na svojih telesih. Cas in prostor : kadarkoli in kjerkoli, ni omejitev, sodobna produkcijska tehnologija (VFX) domišljiji vec ne postavlja nobenih omejitev. Kljucne besede: film, plesni film, ples, plesalec, filmski veliki plan 1 Doc. dr. Uroš Zavodnik je zunanji sodelavec AMEU Akademije za ples. E-pošta: uros.zavodnik@gmail.com. / Uroš Zavodnik (PhD) is an external collaborator of AMEU Dance academy. 62 The Expression of the Dance Movement in Close-up in Films Abstract: The expression of movement, through which the dancer creates his composition, fulfilled with emotions, his dance perfor­mance in front of the film camera on a film set normally correlates into the perfect expression during a close-up. Here, in close-up, a tiny movement can expose the entire narration, which was well-thought-out and formed in terms of choreography. In the film montage, the shots are assembled into a rhythm that the dancer dictates through his choreographically thoughtful movements. The film director through interaction with the dancer and choreographer can create shots also through the viewpoint of an actor, even when he is not typically a director devoted to the dance film genre. Because he can feel an actor, he can also feel the dancer through the close-up. Dur­ing the process of his directing, he creates a special state of the art, which allows a kind of sophisticated interaction between the danc­er and spectator. As an actor, he can also feel the dancer through the close-up, thus enabling interaction between the dancer and the spectator, who is subversively addressed by the dancer’s movement and sucks in all his expression in the darkened cinema. The cinema screen becomes a refuge for both, when and if the illusion is perfect, as it is hidden in the projection of a dance of light on the blank white film screen of a darkened movie theater that depicts moving images. Through the close-up, he approaches, emotionally addressing him as if he were a part of it. The movement, the illusion could be cre­ated with his own body. Both the dancer and the spectator have the ability to feel the movement as if it is the creation of both. Time and space: whenever and everywhere, there is no limitation anymore; the VFX production technology can make any illusion real. Key words: film, dance film, dance, dancer, Close-up 1 UVOD Plesna umetnost je ena izmed umetnosti, ki jo film kot ‘sedma umetnost’ vkljucuje v procesu ustvarjanja filmske iluzije na filmskem setu, podobno kot upodabljajoce umetnosti, literatu­ro, arhitekturo, glasbo idr. Filmska umetnost je najmlajša med vsemi umetnostmi in je bila pogojena s tehnicno iznajdbo, kine-matografom oz. gibljivo sliko ter prvo uspešno izvedeno javno kinematografsko predstavo konec 19.stoletja, v letu 18952. Vse­kakor gre pri filmu za gibanje v nekem prostoru in casu, ki je postavljeno v kontekst naracije, zato je povsem razumljivo, da imata plesna in filmska umetnost že v izhodišcu svojega ustvar­jalnega naboja veliko skupnega. Skozi evolucijo kinematografi­je, saj je bilo potrebno najprej staticno filmsko kamero premak­niti, jo osvoboditi, razviti filmski jezik, ki je dandanes povsem samoumeven, že ce se osredotocimo zgolj in samo na casovne in prostorske elipse, ki se zgodijo na vizualni ravni in so gledal-cu razumljivi, sta se umetnosti napajali druga od druge. Hitro je namrec bilo jasno, saj gre za gibanje, da se lahko medsebojno oplajata in so se plesalci zato že zelo zgodaj znašli pred filmsko kamero3, ki je v svoj objektiv-okular ‘lovila’ gibajoce se podobe, 2 Am 28. Dezember 1895 fand die erste öffentliche Filmvorführung der Brüder Lumičre unter dem Namen Cinématographe Lumičre am Pari­ser Boulevard des Capucines, in Souterrain des Grand Café, statt, wo sie eine Varieté-Attraktion in der Tradition der Café-concerts war. (Zavodnik 2006, 13); Sadoul 1982 3 »There are of course numerous short dancefilms among the earliest moving pictures, made between 1894 and 1910, featuring solo dancers mainly from vaudeville and burlesque including Karina (1902, American Mutoscope and Biograph Co.), Betsey Ross Dance (1903, American Mu-toscope and Biograph Co.), and Little Lillian Toe Dancer (1903, American Mutoscope and Biograph Co.). Dance was also included in the earliest narrative feature films such as Ruth St. Denis’s work in Intolerance (1916, d. D.W.Griffiths).« (Brannigan 2011, 19) jih odtisnila na premikajoci se perforirani filmski trak, s katere­ga so se nato projicirale na prazno filmsko platno. Zapis giba­nja, ki je dandanes, skozi enormni produkcijsko-tehnološki ra­zvoj, ko se na filmu realnost prepleta z racunalniško animacijo, zbrisal sleherno mejo mogocega in lahko ustvarjalna vizija, tako filmskih ustvarjalcev, kot plesalcev, koreografov, seže v sfere še komaj dojemljivega, prešel v sfere vizualizacije še tako nemogo-cega v naši, cloveški podzavesti, se omejuje zgolj in samo še z domišljijo, ko in ce smo pripravljeni inscenirati v sferi cloveške domišljije ter smo produkcijsko (financno) neomejeni. Gibanje v casu in prostoru je vselej v fokusu insceniranja, ko filmski režiser skupaj s scenaristom, igralci ter produkcijsko-teh-nicno ekipo ustvarja domišljijski svet, v katerega gledalec vstopa in se mu podreja, z njim koketira skozi svojo podzavest, ki mu jo gibljive slike vzburjajo, koketirajo z njemu lastnimi obcutenji in iz­kušnjami v pogledu na platno. Gibanje je v esenci kinematograf­skega ustvarjanja, že v sami idejni zasnovi, ko kot režiser4 vizuali­ziraš, kar boš šele insceniral na filmskem setu, posnel v procesu produkcije ter oblikoval v konsistentno ritmicno filmsko formo v postprodukciji, torej montaži. Igralca-plesalca ali plesalca-igralca režiraš skozi gib oz. koreografijo ter izpovedno moc besede oz. pri­povedi, lahko bi rekli, da primarno predvsem skozi gib, saj je film v svoji izpovedni moci predvsem vizualni medij, ki pa je tudi v na­rativni vlogi5. Cetudi film povezujemo z resnicnostjo, le-to filmski ustvarjal­ci insceniramo, ko insceniramo mizansceno, postavljamo kamero, kadriramo. V tem procesu zlahka lahko presežemo okvire insceni­ 4 S pravico pišem v osebnem pogledu kot filmski ustvarjalec, režiser, sa­mozaposlen v kulturi pri Ministrstvu za kulturo; https://www.imdb.com/ name/nm3691186/; https://bsf.si/sl/ime/uros-zavodnik/ 5 „...film is a visual medium, it is also a narrative one [...].” (Winston 1973, 20) rane resnicnosti, realnosti, tudi skozi gib plesalca, ko le-ta v gibu pripoveduje, abstrahira, interpretira. Naenkrat prehajamo v neke druge domišljijske sfere, znotraj raznolikih casovnih in prostorskih dimenzij. Kdaj in kako, je v veliki meri tudi stvar gledalca, saj gre za svojsko subverzijo, ko se ugasne luc in se kinodvorana potopi v temo, platno pa zaživi v svetlobi6. V tej subverziji kinematograf­skega užitka je v dvorani lahko vsak pripet na nek svoj, sebi lasten doživljajski svet, cetudi gre za isto inscenacijo na filmskem platnu. Filmska umetnost je tesno povezana z igro emocij. Filmski re-žiser jih v procesu režije mizanscene inscenira skupaj z igralci, scenografi, kostumografi, direktorjem fotografije, osvetljevalci, rekviziterji, maskerji, tonskimi oblikovalci, komponisti oz. avtor­ji glasbe, ustvarjalci posebnih ucinkov in trikov (VFX), skratka z vso filmsko ekipo, ki jo zbere okoli sebe z enim in edinim ciljem, da z njimi skupaj poustvari vizijo filma, ki jo nosi v svoji kreativni zavesti. Ameriški režiser Samuel Fuller je v filmu Jeana-Luca Go-darda Pierrot le fou (Nori Pierrot) iz leta 19657 na vprašanje igralca v filmu, Jean-Paul Belmonda, kaj natancno je film, povedal slednje: »Film is like a battleground. Love, hate, action, violence, death. In 6 Die Macht des bewegten Bildes ist real, ebenso die Angst des Zuscha­uers davor und die Faszination, die von ihm ausgeht - die Subversion im Kino beginnt, wenn im Zuschauerraum das Licht ausgeht und die große viereckige Leinwand hell wird, es wird zum magischen Ort: psychologi­sche und umgebungsbedingte Faktoren schaffen eine Atmosphäre, die für Wunder und Suggestion aufgeschlossen macht (Vogel 1997, 9); ci­nematic technology by its very nature – the projection system at least as strongly as the filming equipment – manipulates the audience into unconscious identification not only with the characters but also with the process of screening-viewing (Fleishman 1992, 3). 7 »Pierrot le fou« (Nori Pierot, R: Jean-Luc Godard, 1965); sceno s Samu­el Fullerjem si je mogoce pogledati tudi na YouTube platformi ; primer: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZPXV_Tm6iIw one word emotions.«8. Gre torej za emocije, ki jih vsi nosimo v sebi in se nanje odzivamo vselej, ko smo preko njih nagovorjeni, torej tudi na filmu, kar se filmski ustvarjalci še kako zavedamo in se z njimi igramo. Znotraj filmskega kadra kot najbolj bazicne entitete filmske scene, sekvence, je slednje nujno prisotno, bolj smo v kom­poziciji slike v detajlu, velikem planu, hitreje je le-to cutiti. 2 FILMSKI KADER - VELIKI PLAN Filmski kader je praviloma nabit z izpovedno mocjo, izpovedjo, ki jo filmski ustvarjalci želimo posredovati svetu skozi filmsko umetnost – »the individual shot is the result of the combination of camera techniques and dramatic content; the content can be shaped into a composition, through which it gets aesthetic, emo­tional and dramatic effects« (primerjava Casty 1971, 56); »When thought is expressed in an artistic image, it means that an exact form has been found for it, the form that comes nearest to con­veying the author’s world, to making incarnate his longing for the ideal” (Tarkovsky 1987, 104); „Through composition we are telling the audience where to look, what to look at and in what order to look at it« (Brown 2002, 30). Ce v totalu opisujemo, gledalca vizualno seznanjamo z neko ekspo­zicijo, ki mu v nadaljevanju nudi potrebne informacije, s pomocjo katerih se orientira v nekem dolocenem casu in prostoru oz. v danih dimenzijah narativnega poteka izpovedi, ki mu je prica in zaradi ce-sar se total veckrat uporablja kot ‘establishing shot’, torej otvoritveni kader, ki v trajanju lahko tece, je posnet tudi kot ‘kader-sekvenca’, ga nasprotno v velikem planu lahko zelo neposredno soocimo z emocionalnim bojem protagonista, ki se odigrava v njem samem, na 8Uroš Zavodnik, »Plesni film – med resnicnostjo in domišljijo«, Zbornik prispevkov z dogodkov v organizaciji AMEU Akademije za ples v letih 2018 in 2019, (2020):141-146. kar smo spredaj nakazali skozi citat ameriškega režiserja Samuela Fullerja v filmu Jean-Luc Godardja. V velikem planu, ce je komponiran v kontekstu svoje izjemne izrazne moci, je zgostitev elementov, s katerimi se režiser igra v interakciji s protagonistom, hkrati tudi gledalcem, in ki jih poraz­poreja po filmu v skladu z dramaturgijo filma, filmske pripovedi, izjemna, saj gledamo, kar nam velikokrat ostaja prikrito, na neki zelo osebni, cutni ravni, ko smo tako zelo približani v pogledu do nekoga drugega, bodisi protagonista ali antagonista, naj ga upo­dablja igralec ali plesalec. Veliki italijanski režiser Sergio Leone je skozi tovrstne kadre zaslovel, ko je vso napetost, razpeto med protagoniste in antagoniste, zgostil v velikem planu, ki je mejil že skoraj na detajl, ko si gledal njegovo kompozicijo obraza-oci films-kega lika v širokem ‘cinematoskopskem’ formatu. Pomen filmskega velikega plana kot takega je dojela tudi ple­sna umetnost, kot slednje opisuje Erin Brannigan, ko se sklicuje na Deleuza – »In dancefilm, it is an understanding of the expressive capacity of the moving body engendered by a heritage of radical ex­ploration throughout twentieth-century theater dance that reveals, discovers, and draws attention to »all kinds of tiny local movements« all over the body through the close-up« (Brannigan 2011, 51). Ko in ce pogledamo plesne filme, ki koristijo ekspresijo velikega plana, že ko se recimo omejijo na krajšo ali daljšo ‘kader-sekvenco’, skozi kate­ro na primer eksponirajo zgolj in samo gibajoce se roke ali obraz v korelaciji s pretanjeno, dodelano koreografijo, postane jasno, da je veliki plan pomembno orodje plesne umetnosti, ko korelira s film-sko in jo koristi za svojo prezentacijo ter obratno. Gib v velikem planu, ekspresija gibanja celote ter posamicne mikro enote plesalca, se lahko pojmuje tudi sledece – That dancing involves a manipulation of our foundational, tonic stability has significance regarding filming the body in motion. If dance can challenge the centering habits of our corporeal ex­istence, the dancing body as a type of screen performance must suggest new models for expressive film images that take as their focus any number of bodily sites in close-up. What we find in this multiplicity of bodily sites are tiny muscle movements that consti­tute their own micro-dance – not expressing emotions or psycho­logical shifts, but pure movement relating only to the body and its “hidden little lives”. (Brannigan 2011, 52) Ce se predamo filmski umetnosti iz gledišca, da ne vkljucuje samo vizualne, temvec tudi narativne ekspresije, znotraj razvitega dramaturškega loka, ter iz gledišca ‘mikro-plesa’ telesa v velikem planu, lahko skozi tako in drugacno, sebi lastno interpretacijo, pre­cej zlahka preidemo tudi v emotivno izpovedno moc le-tega, še posebej ko plesni film žanrsko gledano prehaja v sfero igranega, kot na primer v psihološki drami oz. srhljivki »Crni Labod« režiser­ja Darrena Aronofskega9. 3 PLESNI FILM IN VELIKI PLAN Perspektiva velikega plana nam v plesnem filmu, ko in ce mu ko­notacijo gibanja telesa poskusimo ali želimo dolocimo še skozi perspektivo žanra, ponuja konotacije, ko sam gib oz. ‘mikro-ples’ telesa presega zgolj videno oz. reprezentirano v velikem planu. To se dogaja že v procesu samega insceniranja, enako kasneje, v pro-cesu recepcije videnega. Kaj želimo, tako na strani plesalca, kore­ografa, kot na strani režiserja, je stvar kompromisa, sicer bi kame­ro postavili in se prepustili voajerstvu, ko bi svoj pogled izenacili zgolj in samo s pogledom kamere. 9 Aronofsky, Darren (2010). Black Swan (igrani film). Produkcija: Fox Se­archlight Pictures z Cross Creek Pictures, Protozoa Pictures, Phoenix Pi­ctures, Dune Entertainment. Ce se primeroma soocimo s plesalcem, Sergejem Poluninom, v njegovi filmski plesni intervenciji oz. kratkem plesnem filmu Take Me to Church (2015)10, kaj lahko vidimo, gibanje, ples telesa, kore­ografiranega v prostoru in casu, pri cemer prostor opredeljuje ar­hitektura objekta, iz katerega v uvodnem kadru v pogledu kamere preidemo na plesalca, Polunina, hkrati pa le-to opredeljuje tudi svetloba, ki skozi meglico, ki jo je lahko ustvarila pristnost narave zunaj arhitekturno odprtega objekta, prodira v precej izcišcen pros-tor, v katerem prevladuje belina, cistoca, glasba pa diktira tempo, morda celo cas, ko in ce prisluhnemo liricni izpovedi, ki spremlja plesalca. Plesalec se približuje kameri, ki ga zgolj spremlja v planu, ki prehaja iz totala v ameriški ali bližnji plan, ne v veliki plan. Kljub temu cutimo celo njegov dih, ne zgolj gibanje njegovega koreogra­firanega telesa in mišic. Kaj pa emocije? Ples, sam plesalec, nam v izhodišcu, ko se v zakljucnem kadru ustavi in zremo v njegov obraz, pa le-ta ni v velikem planu, daje misliti, da je vse le imelo nek emo-cionalni naboj, ki je hkrati lasten njemu, pa tudi nam, gledalcem, ce v svoji podzavesti skozi liricni napev, ritem glasbe, ki diktira ritem koreografije, ter prostor, najdemo neko custveno interakcijo v svoji podzavesti, ki jo je performans plesalca nagovoril. Morda išcemo nekaj, kar vendarle ne obstaja in gre resnicno zgolj za performans, pa vendarle, ko gledamo istega plesalca-igralca v igranem avtobi­ografskem plesnem filmu Rudolfa Nurejeva z naslovom Beli Vran (2018)11, kjer Sergei Polunin igra Yuria Solovievea, še posebej pa ko v filmu spremljamo Olega Ivenka, ki igra Rudolfa Nurejeva, ko ga gledamo tudi v velikem planu, smo v neki povsem drugi konotaci­ji, še posebej, ker spremljamo dramaturško razvito avtobiografsko 10Sergei Polunin, Take Me to Church by Hozier, Directed by David LaCha­pelle; IMDb; YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c-tW0CkvdDI 11 Beli Vran; The White Crow (2018), režiser: Ralph Finnes; Sergei Polunin kot Yuri Soloviev zgodbo Rudolfa Nurejeva, znotraj katere se plesalca-igralca znaj­deta. V tem primeru gibi plesalca-igralca z nami koketirajo, konoti­rajo na povsem drugi ravni, saj smo dramaturško vpeti v zgodbo, celo vse od zgodnega otroštva glavnega protagonista. Vsak plan, še posebej veliki plani, nas soocajo z njegovim notranjim bojem, ki smo mu prica skozi naracijo. Cetudi bi si dovolili in trdili, da v plesnih insertih gre zgolj in samo za performans, kjerkoli v filmu se že to zgodi, slednje ne dojemamo na tej ravni. Vpeti smo v ‘bojišce emocij’, kot je film kot tak poimenoval Samuel Fuller. Torej smo v povsem drugi zgodbi istega plesalca-igralca, kot v njegovem performativnem filmu Take Me to Church. Vendarle, prav zato je filmska umetnost v povezavi s plesno umetnostjo tako nadvse in-spirativna, zapeljiva, ker nam nudi vse te interpretacije, že samo ce istega plesalca-igralca postavimo v nek drug kontekst in na njego­vo gibanje, performans njegovega telesa, opozorimo, ga gledalcu približamo skozi kadriranje, še posebej skozi veliki plan. Enako se z nami ter protagonisti filma na primer dogaja v psiho­loški srhljivki Darrena Aronofskega Black Swan (Crni Labod 2010). Kako bi podoživeli dramatizacijo prehoda med belim in crnim la-bodom, ce ne bi prav skozi velike plane vizualizirali transformacijo lika, balerine Nine Sayers, njen boj same s sabo v njeni notranjosti, ko iz njenega telesa zacno prodirati, v zakljucni sekvenci filma pa prav ‘vzcvetijo’ njene crne peruti, to, kar je tako v sebi, svoji not-ranjosti, kot v konfrontaciji z liki, s katerimi je bila konfrontirana tu in zdaj, v njenem resnicnem življenju, skozi dramaturški razvoj zgodbe najprej zanikala, potem pa dopustila, da le-to podoživi in postane to, kar je v uvodni sekvenci filma podoživljala v svojem snu, da je njen življenjski cilj prima-balerine. Ce smo si dovolili, da potujemo z likom Nine Sayers, ki jo je igralsko in plesno upodobila Natalie Portman, smo v zakljucni sekvenci morda celo na svojem telesu zacutili, da smo tudi sami v nekem drugacnem, vzhicenem, napetem stanju, ko v velikem planu vidimo njeno napeto kožo in peruti crnega laboda. Vsekakor je na nas, kako dalec dovolimo, da nas film oz. glavni protagonisti filma ‘posrkajo’ vase. Veliki plani so tisti, ko in ce morda že izstopimo, da nas povrnejo v igro med nami ter inscenirano domišljijo, insceniranim performansom na platnu. Prav zato je vloga režiserja, ko le-to insceniraš s filmsko ekipo na filmskem setu, tako zelo zapeljiva in edinstvena, potrditev gledal­cev v zatemnjeni kinodvorani, ko in ce gredo s tvojo inscenacijo, ji verjamejo, jo podoživljajo, pa ti nudi skoraj enako vzhicenje, kot samo ustvarjanje na filmskem setu, ko inscenirana scena, kot si si jo zamislil skupaj z ekipo, uspe v ponovitvah pred filmsko kamero. Hair (Lasje; Miloš Forman 1979), glasbeni muzikal, nudi svojske užitke prav v plesnih sekvencah, ki so pretanjeno skoreografirane. Vendarle, ker gre za muzikal, ki je žanrsko umešcen tudi v igrano celovecerno dramo, saj naracija jasno tece, je dramaturško izpiljena in se izjemno dopolnjuje skozi plesne inserte, ki so skozi liricna be-sedila jasni in dramaturško na mestu, naracijo peljejo v želeno smer, primeroma lahko vzamemo sceno doma pri Sheili (Beverly D’Ange­lo), ali odhod Bergerja (Treat Williams) v vojaški bazi pred koncem filma, njihovi obrazi in gibi, ko plešejo, izpovedujejo vec, kot ce bi bili samo v vlogi performerjev, plesalcev. To sicer prav tako cutimo v fil-mu Wima Wendersa Pina (2011), cetudi gre za dokumentarec o Pini Bausch, in sicer takoj, ko protagoniste filma srecamo v konotaciji njihove izpovedi o Pini Bausch, saj jih v naslednjem trenutku v njiho-vi izpovedni moci giba, gibanja telesa, dojemamo drugace, kot pred tem, ko in ce jih samo opazujemo v vlogi nam še neznanega plesal-ca. Slednje smo primeroma videli že v primeru Sergeja Pulonina. Veliki plan funkcionira podobno v plesnem filmu, kot v igra­nem ali dokumentarnem filmu, vselej mu dodatno vrednost v svoji izpovedi daje kontekst, znotraj katerega ga uporabimo in z njim komuniciramo, integriramo z gledalcem pred filmskim platnom. 4 ZAKLJUCEK Veliki plan je v kinematografiji nekaj svojskega, izjemnega, saj sko­zi tovrstno kadriranje cutimo, se soocamo, bodisi s protagonistom ali antagonistom filmske zgodbe. Hkrati je pomembno izrazno sredstvo tudi v plesnem filmu, pri cemer lahko gre zgolj za cuten­je gibanja telesa, brez emocionalnega naboja, ce tega nocemo in ga uporabimo zgolj v performativne namene. Gre za soocanje z ‘mikro-vesoljem’ gibanja, ki je prisotno in svojsko v vsakem delcku telesa posebej in ki posledicno sestavlja koreografsko dodelano ce­loto gibanja telesa v nekem prostoru in casu. Vendarle ponuja tudi integracijo emocionalnega aspekta, kar še posebej koristi filmska industrija, ko združuje igrani in plesni film. Na plesalcu-igralcu, ko­reografu in režiserju je, kaj si želijo, v katerem žanrskem kontekstu nameravajo izpostaviti ter uporabiti gibajoce se telo, ki je vselej, ce gledamo samega sebe, lahko razumljeno v custvenem konteks­tu, pa cetudi je predstavljeno, uporabljeno zgolj v performativnem kontekstu, kar je posledica velikanske subverzivne moci kine-matografije, ko se v kinodvorani ugasne luc in je gledalec, recipi­ent, naenkrat sam z gibajocim se telesom na filmskem platnu. 5 LITERATURA IN FILMI ARONOFSKY, DARREN. 2010. Black Swan (igrani film). Produkci­ja: Fox Searchlight Pictures z Cross Creek Pictures, Protozoa Pictu­res, Phoenix Pictures, Dune Entertainment. BRANNIGAN, ERIN. 2011. Dancefilm – Choreography and the Mo­ving Image. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. BROWN, BLAIN. 2002., Cinematography – Theory and Practi­ce: Image Making for Cinematographers, Directors, and Video-graphers. Amsterdam [u.a.]: Focal Press. CASTY, ALAN. 1971. The dramatic art of the film. New York, Evan­ston, and London: Harper & Row, Publishers. FINNES, RALPH. 2018. The White Crow (Beli Vran). Produkcija: British Broadcasting Corporations in Magnolia Mae Films. FORMAN, MILOŠ. 1979.Hair (Lasje). Produkcija: Metro Golden Mayer. FLEISHMAN, AVROM. 1992. Narrated Films – Storytelling Situati­ons in Cinema History. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. GODARD, JEAN-LUC. 1965. Pierrot le fou (igrani film). Produkcija: Films Georges de Beauregard, Rome Paris Films, Société Nouvelle de Cinématographie (SNC), Dino de Laurentiis Cinematografica. LACHAPELLE, DAVID. 2015. “Sergei Polunin: Take Me to Church”. SADOUL, GEORGES. 1982. Geschichte der Filmkunst, nach dem franzö­sischen Originalausgabe: Historie de l‘Art du Cinéma des origines ŕ nos jours aus dem Jahr 1955. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag. TARKOVSKY, ANDREY. 1987. Sculpting in Time, Reflections on the Cinema, translated from the Russian by Kitty Hunter-Blair. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. VOGEL, AMOS. 1997,Film als subversive Kunst : [Kino wider die Tabus – von Eisenstein bis Kubrick]. St. Andrä-Wördern: Hannibal Verlag. WENDERS, WIM. 2011. Pina. Dokumentarec. Produkcija: Neue Road Movies, Eurowide Film Production in Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF). WINSTON, DOUGLAS GARRETT. 1973. The screenplay as Litera­ture. London: The Tantivy Press. ZAVODNIK, UROŠ. 2006. Die Dekonstruktion der Filmregie, des Film-regisseurs als „Auteur“ im postmodernen Unterhaltungskino – Film-regie auf Anforderung – die Inszenierung eines interaktiven Spielfilms. Dissertation. Alpen Adria Universität Klagenfurt u. AGRFT Ljubljana. ZAVODNIK, UROŠ. 2020. Plesni film – med resnicnostjo in do-mišljijo. V Zbornik prispevkov z dogodkov v organizaciji AMEU Akademije za ples v letih 2018 in 2019, ur. Svebor Secak, 141-146. Maribor: Alma Mater Press. Monitor ISH (2021), XXIII/1, 75–107 Pregledni znanstveni clanek Scientific review article Helena Valerija Krieger1 Balet in ples 20. stoletja Izvlecek: V umetnosti 20. stoletja se je zgodil prelom z umetni­ško tradicijo in potreba po eksperimentiranju je botrovala nas­tajanju novih umetniških smeri kot oblik modernizma, ki niso imele istih programov, skupen jim je bil le antitradicionalizem. Ples in znotraj njega balet je dobival novo podobo, ki je soobli­kovala razvoj dveh vej plesne umetnosti: moderni balet in mo-derni ples. Skozi stoletje sta se ti dve formi odmikali in pribli­ževali ena od druge in v osemdesetih letih sooblikovali novo, postmoderno formo, ki je postala temelj sodobne plesno baletne umetnosti 21. stoletja. Namen besedila je pregled in osvetlitev plesno baletne transformacije in hibridizacije baletne klasike skozi zgodovinsko perspektivo od obdobja moderne do konca 20. stoletja, ki ga je zaznamoval postmodernizem. Uporabili smo kvalitativno deskriptivno vsebinsko analizo, s pomocjo katere smo preucili posamezne faze postopne transformacije ter vplive umetniških tokov, ki so posegali v odnos do telesa, giba, tradici­je, forme, reprezentacije in rojevanje novih plesnih slogov, ki so prispevali k hibridizaciji baletne klasike in razvoju postmoder­nega plesa. Kljucne besede: plesni modernizem, balet, postmodernizem v ple­su, baletno plesna transformacija, totaliteta, individualni slog 1Helena Valerija Krieger je doktorandka ISH AMEU in vodja baletne šole na Konservatoriju za glasbo in balet Maribor. E-pošta kriegerhelena@gmail.com. / Helena Valerija Krieger is a doctoral student at ISH AMEU and Head of the ballet school at the Maribor Conservatory of Music and Ballet. 75 Ballet and Dance of 20th Century Abstract: In the art of the 20thcentury, there was a break with the artistic tradition and the need for experimentation led to the emer­gence of new artistic directions as forms of modernism that did not have the same programs, the only thing they had in common was anti-traditionalism. Dance and within it ballet was given a new image, which co-shaped the development of two branches of dance art: modern ballet and modern dance. Over the centuries, these two forms have shifted and converged from each other and in the 1980s co-created a new, postmodern form that became the foundation of the 21st century contemporary dance and ballet art. The purpose of the paper is to review and illuminate the dance-ballet transfor­mation and hybridization of ballet classics through a historical perspective from the modern period to the end of the 20th century, marked by postmodernism. We used qualitative descriptive con­tent analysis to study individual phases of gradual transformation and the influences of artistic currents that interfered with the re­lationship to body, movement, tradition, form, representation and the birth of new dance styles that contributed to the hybridization of ballet classics and the development of postmodern dance. Key words:Dance Modernism, Ballet, Postmodernism in Dance, Ballet Dance Transformation, Totality, Individual Style 1 UVOD Avantgardna gibanja so ob koncu 19. stoletja umetniško miselnost obrnila od realizma ter mešcanske kulture in družbe skozi deka­dentni uporniški prehod v simbolizem, ki je na vseh podrocjih umetnosti pomenil preobrat iz realisticne zunanje opisnosti v clo­vekovo notranjost, neotipljivost, nedoumljivost in skrivnostnost. Osredotocenost se je zacela nanašati na umetnost sedanjosti, ne pa na njen odnos do preteklosti. Umetniška gibanja so odsevala duh znanstvenega raziskovanja, ki je omogocalo razumevanje in obvladovanje clovekovega okolja, industrializacije in tehnicnega napredka, ki so ga nekateri umetniki odobravali, drugi so bili do njega kriticni. V umetnosti 20. stoletja se je zgodil prelom z ume­tniško tradicijo in potreba po eksperimentiranju je botrovala nasta­janju novih umetniških smeri kot oblik modernizma, ki niso imele istih programov, skupen jim je bil le antitradicionalizem. Nova umetnost je podvomila tudi v tradicionalno sprejeta pravila in omejitve, ki so definirale klasicni balet. V tem obdobju, imenova­nem zlata doba baleta, je bila baletna umetnost na vrhuncu, baletno tehniko je opredeljevala dovršenost in virtuoznost na akademskem nivoju, repertoar je skozi simfonizirano strukturo predstav, ki je za­dostila paradigmi formalne popolnosti baletnega klasicizma prav tako dosegal svoj vrhunec. Avantgardni principi s sodbami o zasta­relosti, dolgocasnosti in predvidljivosti izvajanja baletne tehnike in baletnega repertoarja so vstopali v polje baleta z zahtevo po novih pristopih, nacinih razmišljanja in delovanja. V ospredje so postavlje­ni individuum, ekspresija, novi ritmi, linije in kompozicije. Revoluci­ja v baletu je sicer omogocila njegovo preoblikovanje in nadaljnji ra­zvoj, hkrati pa se je zacel eksistencni boj tradicionalne klasicisticne plesne forme, ki je trajal skozi dobršen del 20. stoletja. Ples in znotraj njega balet je dobival novo podobo, ki je sooblikovala razvoj dveh vej plesne umetnosti: moderni balet in moderni ples. Skozi stoletje sta se ti dve formi odmikali in približevali ena od druge in v osemdese­tih letih sooblikovali novo, postmoderno formo, ki je postala temelj sodobne plesno baletne umetnosti 21. stoletja. Namen naloge je bil pregled in osvetlitev plesno baletne transfor­macije in hibridizacije baletne klasike skozi zgodovinsko perspektivo od obdobja moderne do konca 20. stoletja. Uporabili smo kvalitativno deskriptivno vsebinsko analizo, s pomocjo katere smo preucili posa­mezne faze postopne transformacije ter vplive umetniških tokov, ki so posegali v odnos do telesa, giba, tradicije, forme, reprezentacije in rojevanje novih plesnih slogov, ki so prispevali k hibridizaciji baletne klasike in razvoju postmodernega plesa. Izpostavili smo kljucne ak­terje, ki so zaznamovali to obdobje: Ballet Russes, Michaela Fokina, Georgea Balanchina, Fredericka Ashtona in Mercea Cunninghama, Martho Graham, Williama Forysthea. Uporabili smo vire avtorjev Sal­ly Banes, Ramsay Burta, Aleša Erjavca, Roselee Goldberg, Joann Kea­liinohomoku, Michaela Kirbya, Alastaira Macaulaya, Graham McFee­ja, Judith Mackrell, Wolfganga Welsha idr. Skozi vsebinsko analizo smo želeli uvideti vpliv zgodovinske avan­tgarde, kot prve prelomnice v spremembi dojemanja in reprezentacije tradicionalne plesne forme ter posledice te revolucije, ki je vplivala na nadaljnji razvoj baletne umetnosti in modernega ter postmoder­nega plesa. Pri tem nas je zanimalo preseganje konvencij, tradicije in abstraktne reprezentacije, ki so v zgodovini zahtevale nenehne rede­finicije plesa, nanašajoce se na moralno in akademsko, brez podreja­nja formalizmu. Analiza nam je omogocila razumevanje teoreticno prakticnih zasnov udejanjanja plesno baletne umetnosti 21. stoletja, kar bomo uporabili kot eno izmed izhodišc nadaljnjega raziskovanja teme doktorske naloge, kjer želimo v konkretnem primeru koreograf­ske prakse sodobnega koreografa Edwarda Cluga identificirati njegov koreografski slog in ga umestiti v širši diskurzivni kontekst. Torej ob-javljeni prispevek predstavlja doktorsko delo v nastajanju. 2 PLESNI MODERNIZEM 2.1 Dekonstrukcija estetskih konvencij in strukturiranje novih konceptov v plesu Avantgardna gibanja sovpadajo z zacetki akademskega razisko­vanja, ki so povzrocili velik preobrat v dojemanju umetnosti. Z negiranjem tradicije 19. stoletja, ki je temeljila na zgodovinski in domišljijski tematiki ter formalnosti umetniških uprizoritev, se je umetnost zacela napajati iz custev in obcutij in je umetnikom na vseh podrocjih ponudila veliko svobodo izražanja. Vzroki avant-gardnih gibanj so bile družbene in gospodarske spremembe kot posledica industrijske revolucije ter nezadovoljstva s politicnim sistemom, kar je vodilo k odporu in izkazovanju vse vecjega in-teresa za sodobno družbo, v umetnosti pa za novo umetniško mo-tiviko in tehnike. Razvilo se je nekoherentno realisticno gibanje, ki ga Mary Hollingsworth (1993, 418) razlaga kot izrecno sociali­sticno usmerjeno na eni strani in na drugi umetniško gibanje, ki je bilo manj zavezano politiki. Oba pola sta kljub razlicnim izho­dišcem zavracala zgodovinske in domišljijske teme ter poudarjala objektivno beleženje sodobnega življenja. Ti prvi avantgardni ek­sperimenti, ki so jih razvoj industrije, železniškega prometa, upo­rabe novih materialov ter posledicno znaten napredek v arhitek­turi, vse vecja družbena razslojenost in ekonomska moc potisnili v revolucionarno gibanje, so v zacetku 20. stoletja dobili znaten zagon. Odprle so se neskoncne možnosti individualnega izra­žanja in se postopoma razvile v razlicne umetniške smeri, ki so temeljile na postavljanju novih konceptov in konvencij ter trans-formacijo ustvarjalnih pristopov. Spremembe so pomenile veliko spodbudo in inovativnost je postala temeljni ustvarjalni princip. Zavržene so bile vrednote lepote, predstavljanja form in prostora. Umetniki so se vse bolj umikali v intelektualna, konceptualna ali custvena stanja in iskali navdih v avtonomiji umetnosti in umetni­škem eksperimentiranju. Industrijska civilizacija, tehnika, nasilje in vulgarnost so bili temeljni principi futurizma, dadaisti so s pro-vokativno umetnostjo in antiumetnostjo protestirali proti vojni in umetnosti, kubisti so novo vizijo sveta interpretirali skozi geome­tricne like, ekspresionisti so iskali esenco bivanja, nadrealizem se je kot vrh revolucionarnih gibanj umaknil v svet višje stvarnosti in nezavednih mehanizmov. Nove umetniške smeri so se razvijale in uresnicevale v slikarstvu, kiparstvu, glasbi, literaturi in arhitektu­ri. Kot novi podrocji sta v umetnost vstopili fotografija in film. V gledališki umetnosti in znotraj nje plesu se je avantgarda odražala kot preplet novih praks. Osnovna funkcija gledališca ni bila vec uprizarjanje temvec je gledališce postalo samo sebi namen. Odmik cetrte stene je postavil gledalca v dogajanje, scenografija in kostu­mografija sta se umaknili uprizoritveni dialoški atmosferi akterja in gledalca. Ideja avtonomnosti igralca in izraza njegovega telesa se je najbolj približala ekspresionizmu, kot novemu obcutku mo-dernosti. V plesni umetnosti se je kot plesni ekspresionizem razvil v Nemciji z Rudolfom von Labanom, Mary Wigman, Kurtom Jo-osom, Marie Rambert, idr. Umetniško prakso Emile-Jaquesa Dal-croza, ki je temeljila na trditvi, da mora glasbenik cutiti ritem v telesu in s telesom, ne pa z razumom in štetjem (Otrin 1998, 161), so prenesli v balet in jo zaceli uresnicevati. Pristaši Dalcrozove te­orije Sergej Djagilev, Michael Fokin, George Balanchine ter Vaclav Nižinski so postali tudi najpomembnejši akterji avantgardne trans-formacije klasicnega baleta. Ramsay Burt (1998, 20) je avantgardo oznacil kot obdobje ko­reografiranja motecega novega prostora modernosti, ki je v umet­nost vnašala »cudne« elemente distanciranja oziroma odtujitve in s tem postajala obicajna forma repertoarja. Bistvo estetike se je za-celo odražati na globljem nivoju. Liberalizacija tradicionalne forme je vzpostavljala popolnoma nove odnose v kulturi celotne družbe. Moderna dela so zavzela formo progresivne dekonstrukcije zasta­relih estetskih konvencij. Telo, osnovni element plesa, ki ga je tradicionalni koncept v uprizoritvah subjektiviziral s strmenjem k breztežnosti in nad­naravnosti, je postalo predmet težnosti, geometrije in se s tem transformiralo v negacijo tradicionalne forme, odstopilo je od trenutnega atributa. Material prevpraševanja in osnova za ume­tniško ustvarjanje je postalo vse, kar prej ni moglo biti, umetnost je zacela postajati avtonomna (Bucar 2018). Burt (1998, 22) še do-daja, da sta se balet in ples z implikacijo neodvisnosti odmikala od vrednot buržoazne družbe in kulturnega konservatizma devet­najstega stoletja. Z odrov Zahoda se je v veliki meri umaknila virtuoznost, kon­vencionalne strukture klasicnega baleta, uprizoritvene analogije baletov ni bilo vec. Gib je postajal sam sebi zadosten in njegova sporocilnost ni vec imela estetske vloge ugajati in biti lep, temvec je gib vedno bolj izhajal iz ustvarjalca, bodisi koreografa ali plesal-ca. Šlo je za njegovo razgradnjo, ki je v tej obliki nudil nove mož­nosti oblikovanja in neupoštevanje ustaljenih gibalnih elementov ter izražanje in konstrukcijo inovativnih gibalnih struktur, ki so dosegle novo formo. Roselee Goldberg (1979, 6) je tedanjo idejo manifesta predstave oznacila kot izražanje disidentstva z namero iskanja pomena vrednotenja umetniške izkušnje v vsakdanjem živ­ljenju. Cilj predstave ni bila všecnost širšega kroga obcinstva. Bilo je šokiranje, ki je vzbujalo prevpraševanje posameznikovih stališc o umetnosti v odnosu do kulture. Ideja umetniške deformacije, ki spodbuja skrajne manifestacije s simbolnimi gestami, ki zavracajo ustaljene norme so pravzaprav nacela avantgardizma. Prav zaradi nekonvencionalnosti, absurda in anarhicnosti se je lahko predsta­va referirala na literaturo, dramo, glasbo, arhitekturo, poezijo, film, fantazijo ali katerokoli kombinacijo navedenih polj umetnosti. Vsak umetnik je lahko oblikoval svojo definicijo procesa in izvedbe vseobsegajoce umetniške stvaritve. Nekoliko drugace se je revolucionarno avantgardno gibanje na podrocju baletne umetnosti odražalo v tedanji Carski Rusiji. Kljub politicnim spremembam z velikim pretresi in rojevanjem novih umetniških slogov (konstruktivizem, kubizem, supremati­zem, imaginizem …) je balet ostajal konservativen. Teatrski ples je ohranjal baletno tradicijo 19. stoletja, medtem ko so se izven teh okvirjev zacele razvijati ideje svobodnejših plesnih oblik. V Sankt Peterburgu so bili v Carskem baletu prvi poskusi izvedbe predstav v modernem, ekspresionisticnem plesnem slogu popolnoma zatr-ti, saj je politika, ki je financirala institucionalizirano umetnost, le to izrabljala za uresnicevanje svojih ciljev. Propagandna, politicno obarvana umetnost ni dovoljevala eksperimentiranja, obravna­vanja problematicnih tem in družbene kritike, zato so se nekate­ri umetniki odlocili za »izgnanstvo« na Zahod. Najpomembnejša kompanija ruskih emigrantov, ki so lastno vizijo modernih pristo­pov, temeljeco na klasicni baletni tehniki, uresnicevali v Parizu, je bila Ballet Russes. 2.2 Razvoj modernega baleta Na podrocju baletne umetnosti je bilo v zacetku 20. stoletja cu­titi nasicenost z družbeno sprejeto formo tedanjega kulturnega trenda. V novih pristopih v plesu je bil v ospredje postavljen po­sameznik z inovativnimi idejami, ki so bile delno ali popolnoma v nasprotju s tradicijo in konvencijami. Lepota in resnica sta bili iskani v novih linijah, ritmih in razmišljanjih o predelavah klasic­nih struktur v nove kompozicije, kar je povzrocilo pravo revolucijo, ki je zaznamovana kot zgodovinska prelomnica v razvoju baletne umetnosti. Ustvarila sta se idejna pola zagovornikov dveh estetik: novodobnega modernega plesa na eni strani ter tradicionalnega akademskega klasicnega plesa na drugi. Avantgardni principi soustvarjanja umetnosti, interdiscipli­narnost giba, kostuma, scenske uprizoritve, umetnikova zuna­nja podoba v vlogi konstrukta umetniškega dela, prehajanje mej nacionalnosti so postali temeljni ustvarjalni koncept kompanije Ballet Russes, ki je orala ledino modernemu baletu v evropskem prostoru. Njeni clani se niso strinjali z nadaljevanjem dela po klasicnem principu, vendar so kljub temu crpali iz tradicije ru­skega carskega baleta, jo nadgrajevali z modernimi elementi ter tako spreminjali dojemanje baleta. Kakorkoli se ta transforma­cija sliši tragicno, je nadaljnja uporaba baletne tehnike v novih oblikah plesno odrskega izražanja pomenila novo obdobje kla­sicnega baleta in za balet izjemno pomembno prelomnico ume­tniške samoohranitve. Kritik André Levinson (Macaulay 2016, 58) je leta 1914 o Djagi­levi kompaniji kot predstavnici novodobnega plesa zapisal: »Pot, ki so jo izbrali je samomor baleta na javni sceni. Ce ne bi bilo velike konservativne sile, kot je klasicna pedagogija naše baletne šole, je neizogibna pot baleta v popolno degeneracijo«. Kritik je izhajal iz takratne prakse v tedanji Rusiji, kjer je ideja baleta ostajala tradici­onalna, predstave Mariusa Petipaja so bile uspešne, baletne zvezde Kšesinskaja, Pavlova, Preobraženskaja in Gelcer so z virtuozno teh­niko navduševale publiko in utrjevale pozicijo klasicnega baleta v sferi visokih umetnosti. Zagovorniki baletne klasike so nihilistic­no prepricanje o obstoju, odvecnosti in nicvrednosti tradicionalne umetnosti obsojali ter opozarjali, da je s tem balet ogrožen in ob-sojen na propad. V mislih so imeli predvsem Djagileva (Macaulay 2016, 61), ki je razložil: Obtožujejo me, da gledam na klasicizem s prezirom. Neumnost! Klasicizem tako kot vse ostalo evolvira. Odlociti se moramo kaj razumemo kot klasicizem. Znanost našega teatrskega plesa je izjemno mlada. Medtem ko sta klasicno slikarstvo in kiparstvo nastajala skozi stoletja, je baletni klasicizem nastal šele v 18. stol. in se razvijal v 19. stol. v baletnem krilcu kot plesni unifor-mi prejšnjega stoletja. Klasicizem je akademska osnova moder-nega koreografa, ce pa želimo, da se razvije gledališka kreacija, ne moremo ostati na nivoju akademizma. Djagilev je v razmišljanju sugeriral, da je klasicizem le akadem-ska šola, ki je neobhodno potrebna profesionalnemu plesalcu kot oblika treninga, kar pogreša pri modernih plesalcih, vendar je vi-del napredek baletne umetnosti le v raziskovanju novih idejnih oblik. Tako je avantgarda zacela spreminjati pogled na ples in v zacetku formalno nesprejemljivo obliko izražanja giba spremeni-la v umetnost. Zacelo se je tudi razmišljati in teoretizirati o kon­ceptualizaciji avantgardnega plesa, saj ni temeljil ne na metodi ne na eksplicitni ideji plesno odrskega izražanja. Odrska dela so vecinoma temeljila na zgodbah, glasbenih motivih, kostumografiji in scenografiji ruske folklore ter grške in egipcanske kulture, kar sta publika in strokovna javnost sprva dojemali kot eksoticno in novo, kasneje so se porajala resna politicna vprašanja o negiranju lastne teatrske identitete in tradicije. V visoko umetniško formo je zacel vstopati etnološki princip, ki je manifestiral bazicno cloveško aktivnost, kar lahko razumemo tudi kot dadaisticno provociranje in konfrontacijo s takratno buržuazno publiko. Moderni ples ni temeljil na všecnih estetskih momentih in izraznosti ter akadem­skem principu uporabe klasicne baletne tehnike z uporabo pozicij en dehors, virtuoznosti izvajanja plesnih kombinacij, lahkotnosti gibanja, uporabe znacilnega baletnega kostuma, temvec je postal osnovni princip izhajanje iz sebe in lastnih obcutenj z uporabo gibalnega principa en dedans, težišcem usmerjenim navzdol, kar je popolnoma v neskladju z osnovnimi naceli baletne tehnike ter baletnega klasicizma. Odrsko izražanje je bilo realisticno, sprošce-no in spontano, nedefinirano in nekoreografirano, ce strnemo tra­dicionalno in formalno estetsko nesprejemljivo in vmesno je bilo zastaviti vprašanje, kje potegniti mejo in kaj še imenovati umet­nost. Martin (Martin v Kealiinohomoku 1983, 537-545) je poskušal odgovoriti z definicijo umetnosti kot estetske ekspresije. Želel je osvetliti, v koliki meri je balet dejansko povezan z etnologijo. Seve­da ga je opredelil kot doloceno formo teatrskega plesa, ki ima tra­dicijo, tehniko in doloceno estetiko, vendar po drugi strani naka­zal kako »etnicen« je balet zacenši s proskenijem, aplavzi, dolžino baletov, francosko terminologijo, kostumi, ljudski obicaji (poroke, krst, žalovanje, pogrebne slovesnosti, vile carovnice, živali, zlodej, monarhi, kmetje, sužnji, vladarji,…), skratka kulturno in versko de­dišcino. Razlika med plesom, baletom 19. in 20. stoletja nakazuje, da je v novodobnem plesu uprizoritev etnoloških prvin veliko bolj neposredna in konkretno vnesena v gib medtem, ko v klasicnih baletnih uprizoritvah 19. stoletja bolj prikrito, sofisticirano vnese­na v kontekst. Goldberg (1979, 8) o teh pomislekih ne dvomi in je poudarila, da so avantgardni umetniki kreirali dela, ki so odražala življenje kot subjekt, v katerega je asimilirana igra in ustvarjalni užitek, ki ga ne obremenjujejo tradicionalne omejitve, ki delajo umetnost objektivno in zakljucila, da je lahko na ta nacin ustvar­jalna forma karkoli. Graham McFee (1992, 69) je opredelil »novo stanje« destrukcija z oblikovanjem novih, drugacnih, nekonceptualnih form umetni­ških del. Judith Mackrell (2005, 37) je v tem kontekstu analizirala bistvene prvine in znacilnosti, ki jih je ponudil avantgardni ples: »Plesno telo se je nenadoma polastilo cele vrste razlicnih možnosti in podob. Ker ni vec stremelo k tradicionalnim idealom plemeni­tosti in gracilnosti, si je lahko privošcilo, da je oponašalo veliko širše palete znacajev, prepušcajoc surovemu custvu, da je preba­dalo njegovo popolno zunanjost in v zraku izrisovalo razlicne obli­ke.« Avtorica je v nadaljevanju opisala novodobni ples kot popolno nasprotje tradiciji in ustaljenim konvencijam, zato je nerazumljen, brez kakršnega koli obstojecega, teoreticnega ozadja, ki bi potr­jevalo njegovo modificirano formo, iz katere bi lahko potegnili formalne ali strukturalne paralele z obstojeco obliko umetnosti. McFee (1992, 70) je Mackrell pritrdil, da je v baletu prišlo do popol­ne negacije tradicije in konvencij. Z razmišljanjem Betty Redfern (1983, 16) lahko sklenemo, da je v avantgardni umetnosti šlo za vec kot menjavo sloga plesanja, saj so koreografi, plesalci, kritiki tedaj doživljali razcvet umetniške ustvarjalnosti, ki bi jo lahko primerjali z obdobjem renesanse iz 16. stoletja. Ples in ostale veje umetno­sti so bile odraz politicne, socialne in eticne atmosfere v družbi. Hollingsworth (1993, 443) je strnila odkritje radia, Freudovo tolma-cenje sanj, Einsteinovo relativnostno teorijo, Amundsenov prihod na južni tecaj, Marconijev izum brezžicne telegrafije, polet z mo-tornim letalom bratov Wright, kot nov raziskovalni duh, ki je dra­maticno povecal razumevanje in obvladovanje clovekovega okolja, kar je vplivalo tudi na dojemanje umetnosti. V plesu se je duh no-vega casa odražal v depersonalizaciji plesne figure, uporabi tehno­logije in geometricnega oblikovanja, delovanje kompanije Ballet Russes pa je postal središce modernega baleta 20. stoletja, vse do zakljucka njenega delovanja, leta 1929, kar je vplivalo na nadaljnji razvoj baletne umetnosti. V povojnem obdobju se je balet razmah-nil po celem svetu, za kar so zaslužni predvsem umetniki Ballet Russes, ki so po razpadu kompanije svoje delo nadaljevali v velikih svetovnih gledališcih. George Balanchine je deloval v New York City Ballet, Michael Fokin v American Ballet, Serge Lifar v Pariški operi, Ninette de Valois v Royal Ballet, drugi so gostovali kot ple­salci ali koreografi. Razkropljeni po celem svetu, vendar umešceni v velike in pomembne baletne institucije, so razvijali individualne sloge in iskali nove izrazne forme ter tako nadaljevali z baletno tra­dicijo. Kljub pomembnosti vseh navedenih je potrebno izpostaviti Fokina (1880 – 1942), ki mu teoretiki pripisujejo revitalizacijo baleta zgodnjega dvajsetega stoletja. Njegove koreografije so vsebovale kompleksna custva, odrsko gibanje je postalo bolj demokraticno in moški plesalec je prevzel osrednjo vlogo. Njegov baletni bese­dnjak je bil vecji, izognil se je baletni tehniki, ki je bila sama sebi namen, ples in pantomimo je združeval v dramaticno povezano celoto. Balete je skrcil v enodejanke, v katerih je razvil doloceno temo. V njegovih delih je prepoznati elemente simbolizma in na­turalizma skozi njegov individualisticni pristop, svobodomiselnost in intuicijo v uprizarjanju vsakdanjega življenja navadnih ljudi. S simbolisticno-naturalisticno estetiko je definiral moderno vlogo koreografa, ki kreira plesno delo in ima osebno identiteto. Vpliv metode igre Konstantina Stanislavskega, ki temelji na ekspozici­ji samoanalize, refleksije in utelešenja custev, se prav tako kaže v Fokinovih interpretacijah. Filozofija koreografiranja je temeljila na tem, da je za vsak balet poiskal dolocen nacin, formo gibanja, ki je ustrezala zgodovinskemu in geografskemu kontekstu, ples in ge­ste so podpirali akcijo in so vkljucevali celotno telo, ansambel se je aktivno vkljuceval v prizore in ni imel le dekorativne vloge. Ples, kostumi in scena so bili tesno povezani in skladno zasnovani. Stra-us (2016, 8) navaja, da je Fokin svoje delo oznacil kot nasprotovanje tradiciji in hibridizacija klasike. Razlicni pristopi h koreografiranju modernih baletov so zace­li razmejevati pripovedne balete od abstraktnih, ki so se samoza­dostno nanašali le na glasbo. Pojav abstrakcije v plesu sovpada s premiki v umetnosti nasploh, kjer se je dekorativnost vse bolj umikala funkcionalnosti. Zaradi izjemno slabe ekonomsko po­liticne situacije v Evropi, ki je nastala po 2. svetovni vojni, se je center umetniškega ustvarjanja preselil v Ameriko, kamor se je po razpadu kompanije Ballet Russes odpravil njen clan, George Ba­lanchine (1904 – 1983), kjer se je kot koreograf najprej spogledoval s cistim baletnim klasicizmom. V središce koreografije je postavil akademski slog plesanja ob predpostavki, da umetnost tvorita dva osrednja lika in sicer bog glasbe in plesna muza (Stravinski 1975, 143). Alastair Macaulay v delu Razmišljanja o plesnem klasicizmu (Macaulay 2016, 62) sugerira, da nerazumevanje Mauricea Petipa­ja vodi k nepopolnemu razumevanju Balanchina ter obratno, da Balanchinovo delo ponuja kljuc do razumevanja Petipaja. Znotraj koncepta plesnega klasicizma je zacel raziskovati abstraktni gib ter z novimi koreografskimi pristopi skozi izrazni gib, temeljec na klasicnem besedišcu iskal vsebino. Zvrst predstave je bila poime­novana abstraktni balet - model baletne predstave, v kateri plesal­ci raziskujejo nacine, kako se izraziti skozi abstraktne vloge, slog plesanja pa neoklasicizem. Predponi »neo« in terminu neoklasici­zem nekateri plesni strokovnjaki oporekajo. Andreja Jelicic (2013) predpono »neo« argumentira kot uporabljeno izven strokovnega konteksta, kot popolnoma neprimerno in kontaminirano z brezkri­terijsko uporabo, ki sugerira, da je vse dovoljeno, samo da so v ba­letu prepoznavni elementi klasicne forme. Erjavec (1992, 124) pa argumentira tezo Wolfganga Welsha, ki znacilnosti modernosti utemeljuje z poudarkom na posebnostih in posameznostih, ki so delne in ne vseobsegajoce in prav to izkljucuje neoklasicizem iz vodilne reprezentacije modernizma. Neoklasicizem, po njegovih besedah, ne izhaja iz temeljnega preoblikovanja vrednot in inte­resov. Kljub takšnim argumentom, ki imajo svojo težo, se v stroki ta termin pogosto uporablja. V tem kontekstu je potrebno omeniti tudi angleškega koreografa Frederica Ashtona, ki se ga opredeljuje bolj kot klasicista, vendar manj radikalnega, pa Johna Neumeierja, Johna Cranka,Kenneth MacMillana in drugih, ki so v svojih delih združevali tradicijo z modernostjo. 2.3 Razvoj modernega plesa Vzporedno s transformacijo baleta se je na prelomu stoletja zacel razvijati moderni ples kot oblika ekspresionisticnega naravnega gibanja, popolnoma odmaknjena od klasicne baletne tehnike v imenu svobodnega, osebnega in custvenega interpretiranja glasbe brez dramske osnove. Pionirji modernega plesa so bili Loie Fuller, Isadora Duncan, Ruth St. Denis, Ted Shawn, Rudolf Laban idr. Tem so sledile generacije plesalcev in koreografov, ki so v prvi polovici 20. stoletja utirali pot sodobnemu plesu v vseh njegovih slogovnih oblikah, pristopih in tehnikah. John Martin (Martin v Hrvatin 2001, 86 - 90) je okarakteriziral moderni ples ali plesni modernizem kot negacijo klasicnega in romanticnega plesa. Temeljne plesne prvine so tako postale gibanje kot dejanska substance plesa, kar je imeno-val absolutna umetnost, ki je neodvisna, samozadostna, je predmet raznovrstnosti in je gibanje v sebi in zase, metakineza, ki združuje telesno gibanje s psihicno namero. Za tem je v ospredje postavil stališce modernega plesa s približevanjem individualizmu ter od­mik od standardov, sistemov, kod in tradicionalnih oblik plesa ter dinamizem, ki iz plesa izkljucuje staticne prvine (dekorativne poze v klasicnem baletu) in v ples vnese pavze, ki jih postavlja na konec fraz ali plesnih sekvenc ter vnese moment mirovanja. Od dvajsetih let pa vse do petdesetih let 20. stoletja se je for-mirala in nadgrajevala moderna plesna tehnika, ki si je pot utirala od ekspresionisticno in simbolisticno navdahnjenih prvin, ki jih je v svojih koreografijah upodabljala ena vidnejših predstavnic mo-dernega plesa, Martha Graham (1894 – 1991), ter kasneje njihove abstrakcije in za tem negiranje predhodnega z eliminacijo ega, ko se je oblikoval hladen in neoseben slog. Zagotovo je na ples vplival tudi eksistencializem, ki je konec 40. letih vzpostavil pojem tvega­nja, kar sta v koreografskem smislu uporabila kot moment nakljucja ameriški koreograf Merce Cunningham (1919 – 2009) in skladatelj, glasbeni teoretik in filozof John Cage (1912 – 1992). Kljub temu, da v tem poglavju govorimo o modernem plesu, ostre locnice z bale-tom ne moremo potegniti. Martha Graham je bila tipicna predstav­nica modernega plesa, vendar je oblikovala svojo plesno tehniko, v kateri je urila plesalce ter svoje predstave imenovala balete, kar ne pritice plesnemu modernizmu. Prav tako so Cunninghamova dela vkljucevala specializiran in omejen tehnicni besednjak znotraj do-locenega konteksta, njegov slog je bil vertikalen in silovit, kar je tudi v nasprotju z definicijo modernega plesa. Upodabljal je moder-ni intelekt v formalnih koreografijah ter svoje predstave uprizarjal znotraj umetniških institucij. Prav zaradi teh plesnih znacilnosti se je oddaljil od modernega plesa in približal baletu. Cunningham je v sodelovanju s Cageom glasbo, scenografijo in ples postavil kot avto­nomne elemente odrske uprizoritve, s cemer je vzpostavil tudi nove definicije plesnega klasicizma. Po Macaulayu (2016, 63) je moderni ples do tedaj temeljil na osebnostih, ki so bile prevec krhki material, da bi se na njih gradila umetnost. Osebnost se je lahko povezovala s slogom, vendar ples potrebuje poleg tehnicnih kvalitet tudi moc, vitalnost, jasnost izražanja in ritmicno strukturo, kar je moralo biti modernemu plesu lastno in univerzalno. Avtor je tolmacil: »Balet poseduje tradicijo jasnosti svoje ritmicne strukture. Ta konkretna sredstva balet ne more posoditi, ker so njemu lastna. Funkcija, ki jo izpolnjuje, pa ni lastna temvec univerzalna«. Personalizacija baleta temelji na ritmicnem fraziranju in skupaj s kostumi, sceno in baletno tehniko dviguje to zvrst plesa na višji nivo. Cage (1961, 90, 91) je sugeriral, ce se klasicni gib, kostumi, scena umaknejo iz plesa, mora ples posedovati ritmicno jasnost in moc, da je lahko ples uspešen. Njegova glavna teza je bila: »Z jasnostjo ritmicne strukture je efekt cara dvojen. Kot »telo in duša« se car in jasnost dopolnjujeta, ceprav car deluje proti jasnosti ritmicne strukture. Jasnost je hladna in ma­tematicna, vendar bazicna in materialna. Car je topel in neizmerljiv, ljudski, v nasprotju jasnosti in obstaja kakor zrak«. Na jasnosti in caru sta Cage in Cunningham zgradila teorijo in prakso pristopa h koreografski kompoziciji. Odnos uporabe dvojnosti (dopolnjevanje in kontrast) obeh kvalitet je Cage primerjal s poezijo, kjer se pesnik poigrava z domiselnimi obcasnimi odstopanji od ustaljene glavnine. Tudi v baletu se v praksi uporablja rek: »Zamudi, da ne zamudiš!«, s cemer plesalec ustvari gibalno dinamiko, izraznost ali car ter hkrati zadosti jasnosti. Cage in Cunningham sta s svojo teorijo o jasni rit­micni strukturi, obarvani s carom, želela vplivati na sodobne plesne koreografske tokove, kjer se je kazalo pomanjkanje v izvirnosti, ki je sledila vzorcem tradicionalnih umetniških oblik. Ravnovesje cara in jasnosti se odraža v slogu plesa, v odnosu do glasbe skozi doloceno ritmicno strukturo, združeno v umetniško estetski obliki. Predpos­tavljala sta, da bi ta oblika lahko postala metoda za nadaljnje koreo­grafske kompozicije, kar je bil tudi cilj njunega raziskovanja. Cunninghamova praksa predstavlja most med plesnim moder-nizmom in postmodernim plesom, vendar ne kot temelj oziroma metoda, ki naj bi postala navdih bodocim generacijam koreogra­fov in plesalcem, temvec je prišlo do negacije njegovih nacel delo­vanja, torej zavracanja formalne koreografije, tehnike, vertikale in prostorske umešcenosti. Le avtonomnost elementov odrske upri­zoritve, ki sta jo vpeljala z Cageom v moderni ples, je klub negaci­ji preostalih prvin njegovega sloga postala ena od temeljnih tem postmodernizma v plesu. 3 PLESNI POSTMODERNIZEM 3.1 Vprašanje totalitete v plesu Ena izmed velikih tem filozofije devetnajstega in dvajsetega stoletja je bil tudi pojem totalitete, ki jo Ernest Ženko (2003, 15) jo je razložil kot izraz naše nezmožnosti, da bi v izkustvu zajeli celoto sveta in hkrati z mišljenjem strnili temeljno strukturo te celote, zato je pred­lagal, da jo razumemo kot konstruirani teoreticni model, ki pa de­jansko ni celota, temvec rezultat konstrukcije po parcialnem nacelu, ki tvori neko širšo enotnost. Avtor (166) je v svoji razpravi o totaliteti in umetnosti v ospredje postavil filozofe Jean-Francoisa Lyotarda, Fredrica Jamesona in Wolfganga Welsha, ki so s teoretskimi raz­pravami na podrocju kulture in umetnosti pomembno zaznamovali sodobno filozofijo postmoderne družbe in kulture. Ti pa niso zavze­mali enakih stališc o vprašanju omenjene problematike. Jameson se je zavzemal za holizem in ohranjanje totalitete v družbi ter obstoj velikih zgodb, medtem ko je je bil Lyotard gorec nasprotnik tega, kar je zagovarjal Jamerson, kar se kaže predvsem v zagovarjanju malih zgodb, navezanih na globalno in splošno krizo narativne funkcije. Jamerson je na to odgovoril s predlogom da ni potrebno ukiniti poj-ma velikih zgodb, temvec sprejeti, da le te ucinkujejo na drugacen nacin. Welshu (167) je bila bliže umetnost in je bil zagovornik odprte oblike totalitete, ki sledi dinamiki transverzalnega uma in ni enovita, temvec ohranja heterogenost in razlike med svojimi deli. To trditev je razširil v polje kulture in s tem zagotovil celovitejši pristop v od­nosu med razlicnimi kulturami s poudarkom na heterogenosti, saj je izhajal iz sodobne družbe, ki temelji na multikulturnosti in zaobsega mnoštvo razlicnih nacinov življenja in življenjskih slogov. Lyotard (2002, 60) je v tem kontekstu opredelil stanje postmodernizma kot nov napad na manifestacije totalitete, kjer ne gre toliko za teorijo kot za odnos. Welsh (1997, 9) je nadaljeval, da se razcep med moder-nostjo in postmodernostjo najjasneje kaže kot konflikt med malimi in velikimi zgodbami, ki zagotovo ni v prid slednjim in razumevanje postmodernosti pod vplivom Lyotarda sklenil: »Postmodernost se pricne tam, kjer se konca totaliteta«. V polju umetnost ugotavljamo, da je razlaga umetniških praks, ki je v zgodovini prav tako težila k iskanju totalnosti, opredeljene v kontekstih, omogocala razumevanje in umešcanje delovanja v logicne okvirje in omogocala obstoj velikih zgodb. Ob zavracanju vseh atributov preteklih umetniških praks je v postmodernizmu v ospredje vstopila avtopoetika, ki ima, po besedah Erjavca (2004, 25), drugacno odgovornost kot v preteklosti, namrec ni vec ideolo­gij, ki bi jim bila zavezana ali bi se s pomocjo njih utemeljevala. Po-drejena je lastnim pravilom v umetniškem svetu, v katerem obsta­ja. Še po drugi svetovni vojni so umetniki delovali v skupinah in smereh združenih v kulturnih imperijih, obstajala je neka obca nor-ma, ki si jo spoštoval ali pa nisi obstajal. Ko se je modernizem pre­vesil v postmodernizem, se je zgodilo prav obratno. Welsh(Welsh v Erjavec 2004, 24) je spremenjeno stanje ubesedil: »Postmoder-nost preci spoznanje, da se totaliteta porodi le tako, da se doloce­na partikularnost postavi v položaj absoluta, kar je nato neizbežno vezano na odpravo drugih partikularnosti«. Aleš Erjavec (2004, 25) Welshov aksiom razlaga, da s pojavom partikularnosti težnje po univerzalnosti v postmodernizmu ni vec, posledica takšnega sta­nja pa je, da je skupni imenovalec teh partikularnosti zelo majhen, kar otežuje tudi vzpostavljanje meril skupnega vrednotenja. Leta 1975 je Michael Kirby (1975, 3) zastavil koncept postmoder­nega plesa kot novega žanra: »Po teoriji postmodernega plesa kore­ograf pri svojem delu ne uporablja vizualnih standardov. Pogled je ponotranjen: gib ni vnaprej izbran zaradi svojih znacilnosti, temvec je posledica dolocenih odlocitev, ciljev, nacrtov, shem, pravil, kon­ceptov ali problemov. Vsak dejanski gib, ki nastane med predstavo, je sprejemljiv, ce je le zvest tem omejitvam in nadzoru teh nacel«. Nadalje je Kirby (1975, 4) razložil zavracanja muzikalnosti gibanja, pomena, karakterizacije, vzdušja ali atmosfere, sporocilnosti v plesu ali izražanje stališc. Plesalci ne igrajo vlog temvec prezentirajo sami sebe, uporabljajo kostume, ki so le formalni in funkcionalni in ne reprezentirajo nicesar. Tudi funkcija luci ima zgolj uporabno vred­nost in ne služi oblikovanju scenske atmosfere ali efektov. Pogosto je prostor dogajanja nekje na prostem, kjer se uporablja naravna svet­loba. Ob tem se je avtor spraševal ali se »postmoderni ples« sploh še referira na »ples«, saj je le ta zreduciran na naravni gib, vendar je zakljucil, da je poudarjeno dojemanje giba in s tem plesa na in-telektualnih gradnikih in ne na vrednostih sodbah. Pri tej razlagi pogrešamo avtorjevo natancnejšo kronološko opredelitev obdobja plesnega postmodernizma, na katerega se sklicuje, saj kot bomo v nadaljevanju osvetlili, gre za razlicna tematska in ciljno naravnana ustvarjalna obdobja plesnega postmodernizma. Katja Praznik (2010, 273) gleda iz širšega zornega kota in je sta­nje oznacila kot izgubo iluzije totalnosti in osredotocena na ples ugotavlja, da gre za razpad celovitosti umetniškega objekta, ko se raziskovanje in upiranje modernisticni ideji, ki temelji na znanju in spoznanju ter vprašanju resnice v postmodernizmu usmeri v prev­praševanje o temeljnih vprašanjih obstoja, kar pomeni, da se tudi ples slece do lastne obisti. Ob tem menimo, da izguba totalitete, ki v ospredje postavlja partikularnosti, le tem omogoca izražanje v njihovi popolnosti, upoštevajoc nacelo postmoderne pluralnosti poseganja v koreografsko, ekonomsko, teoretsko, estetsko, telesno, ideološko, kineticno in/ali politicno polje, kar odpira neskoncne možnosti umetniškega ustvarjanja. Preigravanja realnosti in fik­cije, intertekstualnost, možnosti samorefleksije, ironije ali parodi­je, prepletanje žanrov in visoke ter nizke kulture v ekscentricnost ali originalnost, postanejo možnosti izražanja, ki lahko definirajo posameznika in njegov slog. Postmoderni umetniki so tako dobili priložnost neomejenih možnosti uresnicevanja lastnih umetniških potencialov, ki so jih lahko kot prepoznan skupek individualnih re-ferenc, strnjenih v individualnem slogu, izstrelili v popularnost. V nadaljevanju želimo na kratko osvetliti tudi pojem sloga, ki sovpa­da z obravnavanim obdobjem. 3.2 O slogu Slog se nanaša na nacin klasifikacije, ki je bil v tradicionalnih umet­nostih znacilen za dolocena zgodovinska obdobja. Skupne slogov­ne lastnosti so se nanašale na materialno in nematerialno. Materi­alno ali oblikovno, lahko recemo tudi zunanje, se je dopolnjevalo z nematerialnim oziroma neodtujljivo povezanim z izrazom kultu­re, kar je Gell (1998, 194) razložil kot povezanost skupnih vrednot skupnosti s slogovnimi znacilnostmi izdelkov prek osnovnega shematskega transfera. Graham McFee (1992, 199) razmišlja neko­liko bolj ohlapno in je slog opredelil kot skupek dolocenih karak­teristik: delo mora izzvati umetniški interes v okviru dolocenega koncepta, ki ga umetnik presega ali drugace interpretira. V kolikor se vrednotenje umetniškega dela ne nanaša na preteklo umetni­ško prakso in teorijo, ne identificiramo kritiškega ali umetniškega kanona, ga ne moremo povezati z nobeno umetniško tradicijo. Ce karakteristike niso opredeljene, se delo tudi ne more vrednotiti. Pri tej razlagi pogrešamo vkljucenost definiranja znacilnosti so-dobnejših umetniških praks, ki jih njegova definicija karakteristik umetniškega sloga ne upošteva. Podrobneje je to opredelil Richard Wollheim. Argumentiranje pojma sloga, ki se lahko pojasnjuje s številnimi interpretacijami Wollheim (Wollheim v Lang 1987, 183 – 187) je v razpravi o estet­sko in umetnostnozgodovinskem kontekstu slikarskega sloga, ki se lahko nanaša tudi na ples, s slogovno analizo pojasnil locevanje ko­lektivnega in individualnega sloga. Kategorijo kolektivnega sloga je nadalje klasificiral na univerzalne realisticne in abstraktne sloge na eni strani ter na zgodovinske na drugi strani. Individualni slog, ki ga Wollheim poimenuje tudi generativni, s cemer oznacuje opis slogovnih znacilnosti umetniškega dela in ga ne razlaga v zgodo­vinskem kontekstu, kar je argumentiral z nezmožnostjo utemeljeva­nja slogovnih znacilnosti, ki se izražajo v delu posameznega ume­tnika. Upoštevati je potrebno tudi ali predvsem psihološki vidik, ki vzbuja pozornost v umetniški stvaritvi in je lasten le avtorju. Wollheim (Wollheim v Lang 1987, 188) je individualni slog ozna-cil kot osebnost v estetski obliki in predpogoj za estetski interes, slogovno analizo pa zahteval na skrajno abstraktni ravni in ne ta­ksonomski. Paradigmo »kolektivnega« je Gell (1998, 197), ki se na­naša na Wollheima, definiral kot omejevanje na parametre slogov­ne koherence in odsotnost umetniške identitete, ki jo nadomešca virtuoznost. Pri tem je opozoril na logicno dilemo med individu­alnim in kolektivnim. Posameznika definira prav skupnost, ki je njegovo nasprotje oziroma le ta izstopa iz nje z individualno izrazi­tostjo, zato je individualni slog odvisen od obstoja kolektivnega. V zadnjo trditev dvomi filozof Jean-Luc Nancy (Nancy v Sorcan idr. 2005, 245), kajti postmoderno stanje duha se je izreklo za odprto možnost v iskanju resnice in smisla in se odreklo enotni zapovedi o naravi sloga, kar pomeni, da je umetniški slog v sorazmerju s svojo opredelitvijo resnice in smisla. 3.3 Kronološka opredelitev postmodernega plesa in baleta Analiticno se je postmodernega plesa, predvsem v kronološkem smislu, lotila Sally Banes v razpravi o postmodernem plesu, ki jo je podala leta 1987 v njeni znameniti knjigi Terpsichore in Sneakers. V slovenskem prevodu je tekst uredil Emil Hrvatin, ki se ga bomo v vec­ji meri poslužili kot vira v tem poglavju, kjer želimo strniti izjemno pomembno razumevanje pristopov h koreografiji ter širše gledano k plesno gledališkim uprizoritvam skozi obdobje od zgodnjih šestde­setih let pa vse do osemdesetih let 20. stoletja. Pogosto literatura, ki obravnava to podrocje, ostrejše kronološke meje vecinoma zabrisuje, kar otežuje identifikacijo in umešcanje posameznih plesnih stvaritev ter njihovih avtorjev v casovni in slogovni okvir. Prav zato želimo v tem poglavju strnili opredelitev Banesove, ki lahko služi kot vzorcna matrica v raziskovanju postmodernih plesnih praks. V 60. letih prejšnjega stoletja se je vzporedno s klasicnim bale-tom na podrocju sodobnega plesa zacelo obdobje postmodernizma, minimalizma in fizicnega teatra. V veliki meri se je eksperimentiralo z gibom, odkrivale so se možnosti kombinacij, ki raziskujejo giba­nje, prostor, glasbo, svetlobo, sceno in kostume. Koncept plesnega postmodernizma je bila abstrakcija giba, raziskovanega izkljucno kot gibalne prvine, pristopa z namenom razširitve sodobnega ples­nega vokabularja in redefinicije plesa. Ples je vstopal v popkulturo, se mešal z glasbo, športom, literaturo, naravnim gibanjem, filmom, fotografijo, predavanji, skratka postal je kontekst in ne vec koncept. Banesova (Banes v Hrvatin 2001, 110 -115) je natancneje šestde­seta leta opredelila kot obdobje od 1960 do 1973, ko je bila nalo­ga zgodnjih postmodernih koreografov izcišcenje in izboljšanje modernega plesa, s poudarkom na njegovi družbeno umetniški funkciji. Argumenti so se nanašali na odmikanje modernega plesa navadnemu cloveku ter njegovo približevanje ezotericnosti in in-teligenci, kar je bilo enako oddaljeno od cloveka kot klasicni balet. Moderni ples je postal slog, nanašal se je na literaturo, dramaturgi­jo in gibalne pomene, v plesnih skupinah so se dodeljevale vloge po sistemu hierarhije in mladi koreografi so imeli malo možnosti za delovanje znotraj obstojecih institucij. Cilj zgodnjega plesnega postmodernizma je bilo polemiziranje v plesu, ki je temeljilo na naslednjih temah: raziskovanje plesnih površin, ki je plesno doga­janje preselilo iz institucij v vsakdanje prostore. Raba prostora, ki ni plesni podij je postala ustvarjalni izziv. Oziranje v preteklost so koreografi popolnoma izvzeli iz ustvarjalnega konteksta. S tem so negirali tehniko, virtuoznost, plesno, trenirano telo in upoštevanje teatrskih elementov umetniške uprizoritve. Funkcija rabe plesne­ga telesa je dobila družbeni pomen, kar pomeni, da je bilo spreje­mljivo le naravno telo brez kakršnih koli omejitev. Zadnja izmed pomembnejših tem je bila dojemanje plesa kot konteksta, s cemer je bil ples osiromašen gibalnih kvalitet in vsebine. Zgodnji plesni postmodernizem se je v letih po 1968 prevesil v analiticno fazo, vendar do leta 1973 govorimo o prehodnem obdobju, kjer so bile glavne teme politika, vpletenost obcinstva ter vstop nezahodnih plesnih tradicij v gibalno plesni besednjak. Sedemdeseta leta so bila zaznamovana kot obdobje nezado­voljstva in deziluzij, ki je prineslo ponovno prevpraševanje o ple­su in njegovem smislu. Vietnamska vojna, zavracanje elitizma, omejevanje svobošcin mladih in mejnih skupin, kapitalizem so zaceli izpostavljati politicne teme kot so participacija, demokraci­ja, ekologija, feminizem, homoseksualnosti, clovekove pravice. V plesna dela je zacel pogosteje vstopati princip nezahodnega ple­sa. Pomembna sprememba v plesnem dogodku je postala aktivna udeležba gledalca in koncept performansa. Nova ideja konceptu­alne umetnosti je bila razumevanje stvari v njihovi biti, brez razlag in brez višjih ciljev. Ustvarjalni impulz je postala funkcionalnost kot odraz upora proti modernim inovacijam, zato se tudi ni razi­skovalo, ni iskalo nicesar novega, cilj je bil zgolj obstajanje. Bane-sova (Banes v Hrvatin 2001, 115-118) razlaga, da so se pripadniki analiticnega postmodernizma zavezali novemu cilju, redefiniranju plesa, definiciji, ki zadeva strukturo in postavljanje giba v ospred­je, z možnostjo gledalcevega vpogleda vanjo s ciljem popolne de­mistifikacije gledališca. V ospredje je bil postavljen gib sam, brez ekspresivnih, iluzionisticnih ucinkov ali referenc. Pojavil se je re-duktiven, fakticen, objektiven in prizemljen slog plesanja. V istem obdobju se je vzporedno zacela razvijati tudi nova veja postmoder­nega plesa, ki je temeljila na raziskovanju duhovnih, religioznih, zdravilnih in družbene funkcije plesa drugih kultur, kar je vodilo k novim metafizicnim držam. V ples so ponovno vstopili ekspresija in gledališki elementi, ki so znacilni za moderni balet, vendar v kontekstu postmodernih procesov in tehnik, ki izhajajo iz zgoraj navedenih tem. Tako imenovani metaforicni postmoderni ples je vkljuceval kostume, osvetljavo, rekvizite, ekspresivne metafore in reprezentacije, zaradi cesar ga lahko opredelimo kot vejo avant-gardnega plesa, saj so omenjeni atributi znacilni tudi za historicni moderni ples. Kar pa ga dela postmodernega je radikalno juksta­pozicioniranje v polju koreografije, nova razmerja med gledalcem in izvajalcem, uporaba drugih medijev ter uporaba neinstitucional­nega prostora. Osemdeseta leta so v plesu ponovno izpostavila naracijo ples­nega dogodka, kar je bil radikalen preobrat, vrnitev k teatralizaciji plesa in s tem tudi k baletu. Tudi Banes (Banes v Hrvatin 2001, 118 – 128) navaja, da je prišlo do velikega slogovnega premika, zato se je zacelo govoriti o drugi generaciji plesnih postmodernistov. Avtorica pri referiranju na novo generacijo podvomi o ustreznos- ti uporabe termina »postmoderni ples« in izrazi svoje pomisleke: Morda bi morali ta termin uporabljati samo tedaj, kadar bi govo­rili o analiticnem plesu sedemdesetih let, enako kot nas najstrož­ja definicija modernega plesa omejuje na obdobje od dvajsetih do petdesetih let. Tedaj bi bilo mogoce odpadniške koreografe iz šestdesetih let oznaciti za predhodnike postmodernega ple­sa, tako kot Isadoro Duncan, Loie Fuller in Ruth St. Denis sem in tja imenujejo za predhodnice modernega plesa. In novemu plesu osemdesetih let bi lahko rekli »postmodernisticni«. Toda kot sem že pojasnila, se zavzemam za vkljucujoco rabo pojma »postmoderno«, takšno, ki se nanaša na odpadniški ples šestde­setih, analiticni in metaforicni ples sedemdesetih let in novi ples osemdesetih let, kajti vsi tokovi so povezani, zlasti zato, ker so se locili od glavnega toka v gledališkem plesu na nacine, ki niso preprosto kronološki (Banes v Hrvatin 2001, 118-119). Druga generacija postmodernistov je razgrnila vprašanja, zna-cilna za plesni modernizem, tako o slogu kot tudi o metodi. V preprostosti analiticnega postmodernega plesa, ki je bil ob koncu sedemdesetih let osiromašen do praznega formalizma in brezizraz­nosti, so videli brezizhodnost, zato so zaceli ukvarjati s pomenom v plesu in zavrgli osrednje vprašanje dotedanjih postmodernistov »Kaj je ples?« S tem so vnovicno odprli vprašanje vsebine, ki je v plesne uprizoritve ponovno vkljucila gledališke prvine, tehnic­no virtuoznost, trajanje repertoarja, rabo drugih medijev, ponovno vzpostavitev odnosa med glasbo in plesom, dopustila vpliv mno­žicne kulture ter razširila plesni prostor. Ena od reprezentativnej­ših metod umešcanja pomena in vsebine v ples je bilo prilašcanje jezika in njemu podobnih sistemov. Govorica gluhonemih, govor­jen tekst, prstna abeceda so se povezovali s kretnjo kot ilustraci­jo, simbolom, odzivom ali kot abstraktni gibalni vzorec. Preporod pripovedi je temeljil na avtobiografskem žanru, kjer se v predstavi prepletata vsebina in osebni, intimni pristop, kar je lahko imelo tudi politicno konotacijo. Novi ples si je prizadeval za dekonteks­tualizirano in nekategorizirano, deloma abstraktno prezentiranje razpoloženja, custev, karakterja in situacij, ki ne ponuja dokoncnih interpretacij, kar je bilo v nasprotju z analiticnim postmodernim pristopom, ki zavraca ekspresijo in hkrati v nasprotju z reprezen­tativnimi pristopi, ki so bili znacilni za plesni modernizem. Naj­bolj ociten premik od predhodne generacije je bil v rabi glasbe, ki v plesu podpira izraznost in jo slednji lahko vizualizira. Zlitju glasbe in plesa se je vse od petdesetih let v ustvarjalnem procesu poskušalo izogniti in prav to je nova generacija izkoristila kot ra­dikalen avantgardni zgodovinski premik v plesu 20. stoletja, ki je sovpadal z avantgardo drugih polj umetnosti. Novo razmerje med glasbo in plesom je postmoderne koreografe navdihnilo, da so se zaceli tesneje povezovati z družabnimi plesi, pop glasbo in kulturo, celo zaceli so se zanimati za koreografiranje baletov. Ce se iz te perspektive ozremo nazaj, k modernemu baletu, lahko ugotovimo, da imajo njegove formalisticne vrednote vec skupnega s postmo­dernim plesom kot z modernim in obratno, ples druge generacije je uporabljal za tehnicno urjenje telesa klasicno baletno tehniko in ne individualnih modernih plesnih tehnik (Graham, Cunnin­gham), oziroma se je od tehnik celo distanciral, kar je bilo znacilno za prvo generacijo postmodernistov. Nova plesna perspektiva je z uporabo pluralisticnih gradiv mocno razširila koreografsko polje in odprla pot novim idejam in slogom. Tako je postmoderni ples v osemdesetih letih dobil nov kontekst. Ce pogledamo še v polje baleta, ugotovimo, da kljub temu, da se je balet v tem casu širil in populariziral na vecini kontinentov, vpliv postmodernega plesa ni ostal izven okvirjev nastajanja novih ba­letnih koreografij. Poleg klasicnega baletnega repertoarja so baletni ansambli zaceli eksperimentirali s sodobnim gibom in postopoma vkljucevali v repertoar tudi sodobne predstave, konceptualno teme­ljece na postmodernih imitativnih, ekspresivnih in formalisticnih pristopih, z akademsko treniranimi plesalci, kar je v sodobni ples vneslo nove kvalitete, baletnemu kanonu pa dalo novo podobo. Helena Wulff (1998, 45) je slogovno opredelila prepletanje sodob­ne tradicije z novimi principi plesa kot neoklasicni slog, vendar je opozorila tudi na druge definicije. Kot primer je navedla opredelitev Heidi Gilpin, ki je uporabljala termin postbaletni plesni slog. Postmodernist William Forsythe je s konceptom intertekstuali­zacije baletne koreografije v ustvarjalno polje vkomponiral podroc­ja glasbe, literature, filozofije, popularne kulture, geometrije, višje matematike in kognitivne znanosti. S tem je razširil možnosti prak-ticno teoreticne uporabe postmodernih konceptov, ki so dolocale smeri bodocim generacijam koreografov, kar je vplivalo na drugo revitalizacijo baleta (Spier 2011, 2). Bucar (2018) dodaja, da je balet rešil zgodovinskosti. Tehnika je po Forsythu postala ideja in kon­cept metoda. K dobremu pozicioniranju klasicnega baleta na Zahodu so po letu 1989 prispevale tudi masovne migracije ruskih baletnih umetnikov (plesalcev, pedagogov in koreografov), kamor so širili znanje dovršene klasicne baletne tehnike ter vrhunski repertoar baletne dedišcine. Teoretska znanja baletne tehnike in klasicnega repertoarja so v casu sovjetske izolacije ostajala v »baletnem in-kubatorju« nedotaknjena, dokumentirana, ohranjena in dovršena, zato se je lahko v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja, po padcu železne zavese, ideja zahodnega baletnega klasicizma z mocnim impulzom prenesenega znanja okrepila še iz Vzhoda. V sedanjosti transnacionalna mobilnost plesalcev, koreografov in pedagogov omogoca mešanje razlicnih slogov, metod, plesnih in gledaliških praks ter se v skladu z integralno teorijo sintetizira v nove koncepte s preseganjem totalitete nacionalnih kultur. Sodob­na družba je danes sama po sebi multikulturna in težko je iskati neki skupni imenovalec, za katerega se je v preteklosti zavzemal Johann Gottfried Herder (Herder v Ženko 2003, 164) v pojmovanju pojma kulture v smislu interkulturne zamejitve. Tako kot kulture danes niso homogene tvorbe, tudi umetnost sili v razlicne sfere, kar ji omogoca mešanje in prežemanje, presegajoc pojem tradicio­nalnosti in prav to rojeva nove postmoderne koncepte,kot so tran­smodernizem, metamodernizem in digimodernizem, v katerih se pojavlja nova umetniška forma Dance video, ki se razlikuje od do-tedanjega plesnega in dokumentarnega filma (Secak 2021). Ome­njeni postmoderni koncepti temeljijo na tradiciji in modernosti skozi nove umetniške perspektive. Balet v postmoderni zahodni družbi poznega 20. in v 21. stoletja ostaja umešcen med lepe in gledališke umetnosti, vendar tesno ob boku postmodernega plesa oziroma baleta, ki oba presegata meje nacionalnega in nanju vpli­va ucinek globalizacije in internacionalizacije. Koncept sodobnega postmodernizma sicer omogoca horizontalni soobstoj razlicnih plesnih zvrsti in gibalnih praks, vendar lahko trdimo, da imata kla­sicni balet in njegova hibridizirana razlicica zaradi dominance v institucionalizirani kulturi zaenkrat še prednostno pozicijo v polju plesnih umetnosti. 4 ZAKLJUCEK Institucionalizirano gledališko, plesno, umetniško obliko, name-njeno predvsem višjim slojem, so umetniška avantgardna gibanja na prelomu stoletja pahnila v nemilost in boj za lastno eksistenco. Propad buržoazije in novi umetniški tokovi so zahtevali dekon­strukcijo estetskih konvencij in strukturiranje novih konceptov v plesu, liberalizacijo plesnih form ter vzpostavitev novih odnosov v kulturi. Umik virtuoznosti in konvencionalnih struktur klasicnega baleta sta zamenjali plesna anarhija in umetniška svoboda defini­ranja procesa in izvedbe umetniških stvaritev kot kriticni odgovor na tradicijo, ki je družbo skozi ekonomsko krizo zaradi industria­lizacije, napredka tehnike ter poglabljanja družbeno ekonomskih razlik konec 19. stol pahnila v nemilost. Ballet Russes in pionirji modernega plesa so orali ledino ek­spresiji, ki je postala temeljni element modernega plesnega izraža­nja. Transnacionalni principi mešanja kultur so prav tako v novo­dobni ples vnesli drugacne gibalne kompozicije in s tem razširili kulturno umetniški kontekst, v katerem je gib dobil nove dimenzije in ustvarjeni so bili temelji za nadaljnje plesno raziskovanje. Trans-formirana produkta baleta sta postala moderni ples in moderni ba-let, temeljeca na abstrakciji, simboliki in naturalizmu, samoanalizi, refleksiji in utelešanju custev. V obdobju modernizma je v koreografiji prišlo do razmejitve med pripovednimi in abstraktnimi baleti. Klasicni balet je bil v tem obdobju zapostavljen, modernisti pa so v odmiku od libreta iskali smisel v izražanju skozi abstraktni gib. Poudarek je bil na zavracanju tradicionalne plesne forme ter odmikanju od vrednot buržoazne družbe in kulturnega konservativizma 19. stoletja. V ospredje sta bila postavljena osnovna elementa plesa, telo in gib, s katerima so se ukvarjali plesni teoretiki in praktiki v iskanju bistvenih prvin, novih stanj, konceptov in kontekstov. V prvih šestdesetih letih so nastale razlicne moderne plesne tehnike, vzporedno pa se je ohranjala klasicna baletna forma v prvotnem smislu in slogovni razlicici, imenovani neoklasicizem. Te forme so v zacetku 60. let 20. stoletja vstopile v obdobje postmoderniz-ma, ko je v ospredje stopil minimalizem in fizicni teater, cemur je sledila plesno gibna redukcija, s poudarkom na prikazovanju ustvarjalnega procesa, ki je postal koncni izdelek in smisel ples­nega ustvarjanja. Družbena klima se je odražala v popkulturi, ki je namensko poudarjala inovativnost v neinovativnosti, množicni reprodukciji in ustvarjanju zaradi ustvarjanja brez cilja. V plesu se je to stanje kazalo sprva v zavracanju uporabe vseh plesno te­atrskih atributov, kar pa je novodobni, avantgardni ples v osem­desetih letih ponovno privzel. Postmodernizem se v baletu ni od­ražal v tako radikalni obliki. V tem obdobju je zaznati ekspanzijo baleta po celem svetu, odpiranju šol klasicne baletne tehnike ter uprizarjanju narativnih in abstraktnih baletov ter formiranju ve­likih baletnih centrov. Zaradi spremenjenega odnosa do akadem­ske plesne forme na podrocju avantgardnega plesa je ponovno prišlo do vzpona in revitalizacije baleta. V plesu se je ponovno izpostavila naracija plesnega dogodka, kar je bil velik preobrat od abstraktnega dojemanja plesa in vrnitev k teatralizaciji plesa in s tem tudi k baletu. V teoriji se je nova ideja plesa opredelila kot postbaletni plesni slog, ki ga tvori preplet sodobnih plesnih tehnik s klasicno. Sodobni koreografi so v svojih koreografskih stvaritvah zaceli uporabljati baletni kanon, kar je ponovno oživilo baletno repertoarno tradicijo 19. stoletja. K utrditvi pozicije bale-ta so prispevale tudi migracije plesalcev, koreografov in pedago-gov, ki so po padcu železne zavese iz Vzhoda, zibelke klasicnega baleta, prinesle znanje in izkušnje. 90. leta so zaznamovana kot obdobje transnacionalne mobilno­sti umetnikov, mešanje in nadgrajevanje slogov, ki presegajo njiho­vo formalno omejevanje in definiranje, pristopov in konceptov. Te prakse so se v modificiranih oblikah nadaljevale tudi do konca 20. stoletja in v 21. stoletju, ko je digitalizacija posegla v uprizoritev v tehnicnem smislu, vendar sta telo in gib še vedno ostala osnovna izrazna elementa plesa. Kljub burnim umetniškim tokovom v prejšnjemu stoletju, ki vecinoma niso bili najbolj naklonjeni baletu kot tradicionalni ple­sni formi, sta se baletna tehnika in baletni repertoar, kot nosilca baletnega klasicizma ohranila. Njegova transformacija v sodobne umetniške forme, ki danes bogatijo klasicni baletni repertoar pa zagotovo omogocila njegovo ohranitev. Zakljucimo lahko, da akademsko dovršena klasicna baletna me-toda, izjemen klasicni repertoar, modernizacija in hibridizacija ba­leta ter moderni ples, ki se je razvil v prejšnjem stoletju in doživel vse svoje slogovne transformacije, skladno popularizirajo ples v institucionaliziranih in drugih okvirjih in s tem prispevajo k ohra­njajo prelepe veje umetnosti. 5 SEZNAM LITERATURE IN VIROV BURT, RAMSAY. 1998. Alien Bodies. London: Routledge. BUCAR, MATEJA. 2018. Zapiski s predavanja: Koreografija v ple­su. Maribor: Alma Mater. CAGE, JOHN.1961. Four statements on the dance. Silence: Lectu­res and Writings (pp.97-96). Middletown, CT: Wesleyan Universi­ty Press. ERJAVEC, ALEŠ. 1992. Filozofski vestnik. Vol. 13 No. 1 (1992): Lo-gika refleksije - logika argumentacije - transcendentalna logika. Postmodernizem in umetniške avantgarde. Ljubljana: Znanstveni center SAZU, Filozofski inštitut. ERJAVEC, ALEŠ. 2004. Ljubezen na zadnji pogled. Ljubljana: Za­ložba ZRC, Filozofski inštitut ZRC. GELL, ALFRED. 2007. Umetnost in delovanje. Antropološka teorija. Oxford: Oxford University Press. GOLDBERG, ROSELEE. 1979. Performance. Live Art 1909 to the Present. New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc. HOLLINGSWORTH, MARY, 1993. Umetnost v zgodovini cloveštva. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije. HRVATIN, EMIL. 2001. Teorije sodobnega plesa. Ljubljana: Maska. JELICIC, ANDREJA. 2013. Plesna scena. (15. veljace 2013). Dosto­pno na: https://www.plesnascena.hr/index.php?p=article&id=1547 (18. avgust 2021) KEALIINOHOMOKU, JOANN. 1970. »An Anthropologist Looks at Ballet as a Form of Ethnic Dance« v Copeland, R. & Cohen, M. (eds) (1983) What is Dance? Oxford: Oxford University Press. KIRBY, MICHAEL. 1975. Post-Modern Dance Issue: An Introduc­tion. Cambridge University Press. Dostopno na: https://www. jstor.org/stable/1144960?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3A85c­c56329922e1d691066d727a5a2c9e&seq=1#page_scan_tab_con­tents (16. avgust 2021) LANG, BAREL. 1987. The Concept of Style. Ithaca, New York: Cor­nell University Press. LYOTARD, JEAN FRANCOIS. 2002. Postmoderno stanje. Porocilo o vednosti. Ljubljana: Društvo za teoretsko psihoanalizo. MACAULAY, ALASTAIR. 2016. Razmišljanja o plesnom klasiciz-mu, Kretanja. 2015/16. MCFEE, GRAHAM. 1992. Understanding Dance. London in New York: Routledge. MACKRELL, JUDITH, 2005. Razumevanje plesa. Ljubljana: Založ­ba Forma 7. OTRIN, IKO. 1998. Razvoj plesa in baleta. Ljubljana: Debora. PRAZNIK, KATJA IN EDA CUFER. 2010. Kronotopografija plesa: Dve razpravi. Ljubljana: Emanat. REDFERN, BETTY. 1983. Dance, Art and Aesthetics. London: Dan­ ce Books. SECAK, SVEBOR, 2021. Dancefilm. In Proceedings book with Peer Review on Professional Contributions on Dance, ed. Svebor Secak, 8-13. Maribor: Alma Mater Press. SORCAN HRIBAR, VALENTINA IN LEV KREFT. Vstop v estetiko. 2005. Ljubljana: Filozofska fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani, Oddelek za filozofijo. SPIER, STEVEN. 2011. William Forsythe and the Practice of Chore­ography. New York: Routledge. STRAUS, RACHEL. 2016. Michael Fokine. New York: Routledge. STRAVINSKI, IGOR. 1975.Autobiography. London: Calder and Boyars. WELSH, WOLFGANG. 1997. Unsere postmoderne Moderne. Ber­lin: Akademie Verlag (Acta humaniora). WULFF, HELENA. 1998. Ballet Across Borders: Career and Culture in the World of Dancers. Oxford: Routledge. ŽENKO, ERNEST. 2003. Totaliteta in umetnost Lyotard, Jameson in Welsh. Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, ZRC SAZU. HUMANISTIKA V DIGITALNI DOBI / HUMANITIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE Monitor ISH (2021), XXIII/1, 110–134 Izvirni znanstveni clanek Original scientific article Tanja Petrovic1 AI and Empathy: The Possibility of Reciprocal Human-Robot Empathic Interaction (HRI) – Some Experiences from Socially Assistive Robots (SARs) in Elderly Care Abstract: Empathy is a vital part of human relationships. It re­mains a challenging concept with inconsistent measurement tools, yet widely accepted as an important factor for interpersonal inter­actions in healthcare. With robot development novel types of rela­tionship emerge. The key question is whether there is a possibility of the existence of empathic Human-Robot Interaction (HRI), as a reciprocal quality of human empathy vs. artificial empathy. Further­more, we aim to discover its specificities, with regard to a substan­tial eeriness in this domain. Socially Assistive Robots (SARs), designed for Aged-Care Set­tings, face an increased usage due to a pressing need for care for the elderly in a modern society. Because we as humans tend to regularly establish relationships and anthropomorphise objects, among them also robots, a wide range of challenges arise. Discuss­ing empathy in HRI requires a shift in human perspective, as only scarce traces of the concept are detected. While a key perspective on empathy is caring for the other person, empathy in HRI does have a conceptual potential. The paper challenges the anthropo­ 1Tanja Petrovic (MPhil) is a doctoral student of Humanities at AMEU – ISH. / Mag. Tanja Petrovic je doktorska študentka na študiju Humanis­tika, AMEU – ISH. E-pošta: tanjapet682@gmail.com. 110 centric attempt to define empathic and ethical benchmark for HRI, with a request to exclude our own negative personal and societal aspects from programing an algorithm, when dealing with human vulnerability and rights. Key Words: Empathy, HRI, Artificial Empathy, Socially Assistive Robots (SARs), Elderly Care, Artificial Carers, Ethics Umetna inteligenca in empatija: možnosti reciprocne empaticne interakcije med clovekom in robotom - neka­tere izkušnje z roboti za oskrbo starejših Izvlecek: Empatija je vitalen del medcloveških odnosov. Ceprav ostaja raziskovalni izziv zaradi nekonsistentnega merjenja in od­sotnosti skupne definicije, je široko sprejeta kot kljucen dejavnik medosebnih odnosov v zdravstvu. Z razvojem robotike so se po­javili novi tipi razmerij. Bistveno vprašanje je, ali obstajajo mož­nosti vznika empaticne interakcije med clovekom in robotom kot reciprocne kvalitete v pogojih, ko se srecata cloveška empatija in umetna empatija pri robotu, ob upoštevanju obcutka znatnega ne­lagodja cloveka pri interakciji z algoritmom. Roboti za oskrbo (SAR) starostnikov se hitro razvijajo zaradi ve­likih tovrstnih potreb v moderni družbi. Ker ljudje venomer tvorimo medosebne odnose in lepimo naše lastnosti na objekte, tudi robote, se pri tem zastavlja vec vprašanj. Raziskovanje empatije pri interak­ciji med clovekom in robotom zahteva clovekovo sposobnost spre­membe lastne perspektive, saj je možno najti le redke sledi resnicne­ga, celovitega empaticnega odnosa glede na medosebno interakcijo. Ker empatija vkljucuje skrb za drugega, menimo, da je v skrbi robota za starejšega drugega možno zaslediti njen konceptualni potencial. Nadalje v clanku problematiziramo antropocentricen poskus defini­ranja empaticnega in eticnega standarda za interakcijo med clove­kom in robotom, ter v tem oziru pozivamo k izkljucitvi številnih ne­gativnih osebnih in družbenih vidikov iz programiranja algoritma, ki se bo soocal s cloveško ranljivostjo in pravicami. Kljucne besede: empatija, interakcija med clovekom in robotom, umetna empatija, roboti za oskrbo, oskrba starejših, umetni skrbni­ki, etika »A computer would deserve to be called intelligent if it could de­ ceive a human into believing that it was human.« (Turing 2021) “One day ladies will take their computers for walks in the park and tell each other, „My little computer said such a funny thing this morning“.« (Turing 2021) Introduction Empathy is considered predominantly as a phenomenon of inter­personal, human to human connection. By origin, it stems from the Aesthetic tradition from the beginning of the 20th Century. The­odor Lipps, a German philosopher and aesthetician, fundamen­tally refers to it as a »projection of oneself into the object of per­ception.« (Encyclopedia Britannica 2021, Wispé 1987). Empathy as »feeling into« an artistic object in its initial stage, and notably into fictional characters in film and literature latter on, is however, still an important aspect nowadays. Nevertheless, a current perspective on empathy, particularly in Healthcare and behavioural sciences, installs it as an integral part of interpersonal relationships. Having in mind the possibility concerning a relationship of a human with an object, which is a robot, exposes the concept of empathy to a novel type of relation, switching from core intersubjectivity into other forms of connections, as well as it challenges an idea of its prospects and a possible role of empathy within. As a type of social emotion, it contributes to the feeling of inclu­sion into a certain social group (Asada 2015), which is among the fundamental human needs. With its important, evolutionary roots (de Waal 2008, Schultz 2019) it has got significant implications for the functioning of an individual in the society for centuries. Succes­sful human bonding is linked to a feeling of acceptance, warmth, affiliation and safety. Empathy can result in pro-social behaviour (Batson 1991). On the contrary, its shadow aspects evoke the pos­sibility of anti-social behaviour, which could result in an unhelpful or hostile attitude, a sensation of happiness seeing someone suffe­ring, e.g. »Schadenfreude« (Gonzalez-Liencresa et al. 2013). Failing to control an inflow of our own emotions (personal distress), we could turn our face away from the person in need, thus alleviating our own suffering in the first row (Coplan 2011, Kupfer 2018). A wide range of phenomena are related to empathy. Accord­ing to recent research findings we attempt to distinguish among them, although they are at least slightly interconnected and possibly occur during interactions interchangeably. Sympathy is a form of emotional contagion on a basic level with quicker, automatic, unconscious processes of sharing other‘s emotions, such as sadness, joy, love. It typically leads to a feeling of one­ness in the emotional situation, and to an immersion into the feeling or emotion of another person. On the contrary, empathy maintains clear self–other differentiation2 and is grounded on 2 De Waal explains self-other differentiation as the developmental pro­cess in light of ethology, animal studies (de Wall 2008). Self-other dis­crimination span increases from mere emotional contagion, through affective empathy, further with cognitive empathy and compassion. Dif­ference between I and you increases with diminished role of emotion and unconscious elements (lower level) in favour of cognitive and conscious (higher-level), on the scale. (Asada 2015, 43). affect-sharing (Decety in Meltzoff 2011, 68), but it also involves higher cognitive processes (Klimecki in Singer, 2013). Com­passion results from empathising with a positive outcome for the person in need. It is considered as an active principle in an attempt to alleviate the suffering of the others. In Healthcare, compassion is better valued than empathy.3 Due to the lack of a common definition framework for empathy, which is partly result of an interdisciplinary approach to the phe­nomenon from different scientific fields, empathy is rather defined as an umbrella term, and encompasses a wide range of other expe­riences, for instance: sharing feelings, beliefs, thoughts, and emo­tions of the others, caring for them, perspective-taking, immitation, mirroring, social bonding, and others (Coplan 2011). Empathy is embodied. A flagship of research is conducted on social cognition in the human brain. Empathy for pain (Singer et al. 2004), empathy for touch, as well as its sub-components, namely its cognitive and affective route, which are functioning as two distinct systems of empathy in the brain (Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2009), are part of re­cent findings in social neuroscience. Discovery of mirror neurons in some animals, initially in ventral premotor and parietal corti­ces of macaque monkey (Gallese et al. 1996), and subsequently in human brain, contributed fundamentally to the field of empathy and philosophical thought in the end of 20th Century.4 In focus of 3 In Healthcare, empathy sometimes does not have a positive connotation due to its shadow side and neutrality (empathy as gathering information about the other human, without taking action to help the person in need). 4 Discovery of Mirror Neuron System (MNS) at the beginning of 90s (a discovery of motor neurons that fire when we observe action of the other person as well as when we perform action by ourselves), had a significant influence on numerous disciplines, a cognitive science, philosophy, psy­chology, ethology, and also literature. (Fadigga in Rizzolati 2014). »The MNS seems closely related to motor mimicry because it recognizes an contemporary and future empathy research (Shamay-Tsoory in Lamm 2018) are psychopathologies, where empathy deficit can be expressed as a behavioural problem of biological and/or situation­al origin. However, measuring empathy, which is a fluent category is an ambiguous attempt. It depends on numerous scales, measuring individual differences, based on subjective assessments, yet often self- assessments. Most widely used are the Jefferson scale, with its subscales for Medical and Healthcare professions (Jefferson Scale 2021), the Davis‘ Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis 1980) and the Empathy Quotient (EQ) (Baron-Cohen in Wheel­wright 2004). Scales can be used alongside functional Magnetic Resonance for human brain imaging (fMRI). For the assessment of patient‘s satisfaction with received empathy from their practi­tioner, the wide spread measure is the Consultation and Relational Empathy Measure (CARE) (Mercer et al. 2004). Empathy basically enables a bridge into the inner world of the other person, and it can be approached from two different sides, as a process or as a result. Predominant theories of empathy come from the fields of Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (Schm­etkamp 2020), and include Mirror Neurons or Resonance Theory (Gallese 2001), the Theory Theory (Fodor 1987, Gopnik in Wellman 1994), Simulation Theory (de Vignemont in Jacob 2012, Goldman 2006, 2011; Stueber 2006), Direct Perception Theory (Zahavi 2011), Interaction Theory (Gallagher 2008, 2017) and Narrativity Theo­ry (Gallagher in Hutto 2008), or a combination of some of them. action performed by another and produces the same action, which is re­ferred to as motor resonance that could induce emotional contagion. Fur­thermore, this relates to self-other discrimination, action understanding, joint attention, imitation, and theory of mind.« (Asada 2015, 44). Mirror neurons are a basis for immitiation process (and learning). Additionally, from the neuroscientific perspective, a fundamental division of empathy into its cognitive and affective route in the brain has been discovered recently (Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2009).5 Nevertheless, there‘s no strict dichotomy of emotional vs. cogni­tive (Pessoa 2013), as different brain area are functionaly ovelap-ping (Thirioux et al. 2014, 288-289). In an attempt to apply an universal theory on empathy, ethol­ogists Frans de Waal and Stephanie Preston introduced a layered approach, starting from basic, core component, the so-called emo­tional contagion, up to the more external layers, involving higher cognitive processes in a similar structure to a Russian doll6 (Pres­ton in de Wall 2002). Frederique de Vignemont and Tania Singer, on the other hand, proposed a contextual, an appraisal approach, and emphasized isomorphism of emotion sharing (De Vignemont in Singer 2006). Isomorphism condition requires, that the empa­thizer and the target are in at least similar affective state, although there is still an ongoing debate whether this is a neccesary precon­dition for empathy or not (Goldman 2011, Coplan 2011). Artificial Empathy (AE) In pursuit to predict human inner state throughout observation of person‘s behaviour, posture, facial expressions and speech by the robot,7 we are talking about artificial empathy. It indicates a robot 5Shamay-Tsoory and colleagues found that »/…/patients with lessions in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) exhibits deficits in CE /cognitive empathy/ and theory of mind (ToM) while patients with lesions in the infe­rior frontal gyrus (IFG) show impaired EE /emotional empathy/ and emo­tional recognition.« (Asada 2015, 45) (Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2009). 6 Russian doll is worldwide known as »Matryoshka«. 7 Jeremy Howick distinguishes two types: care-bots and chat-bots (How­ick 2021, 457). Care-bots can even provide cognitive behavioural therapy for some psychiatric disorders. They are called artificial carers. trying to empathize with a human in an artificial, programed way. For instance, a care robot would try to grasp information on wheth­er its user, an older adult, is satisfied or shows negative emotions toward a machine. Computational challenges arise from a complex, yet not clear­ly defined nature of empathy.8 There are currently two main ap­proaches to the computational modelling of the phenomenon in artificial agents (Yalcin in DiPaola 2019, 4): • Categorical – based on two empathy mechanisms, i.e. low- and high-level, • Dimensional – based on empathy as multidimensional system. AE is developed within the field of affective9 and cognitive de­velopmental robotics (Asada 2015), following findings from social neuroscience and developmental psychology. Theoretical mod­els are implemented in artificial agents in two main ways, as a top-down approach (theory-driven), or as a bottom-up (data-driv­en), or a hybrid approach which is a mixture of both (Yalcin in DiPaola 2019, 14-17). Two theories on human empathy are of spe­cial interest to the robot developers of the top-down approach. One is the Russian doll evolutionary model of empathy (de Waal 2007), and the second one, de Vignemont and Singer‘s appraisal 8 Generally, we refer to it as a multifaceted nature of empathy. »/…/ the manifold facets of empathy are explored in neuroscience from simple emotional contagion to higher cognitive perspective-taking, and a dis­tinct neural network of empathy comprises both phylogenetically older limbic structures and neocortical brain areas. These suggest that emo­tional contagion is mainly based on phylogenetically older limbic struc­tures, while higher cognitive perspective-taking is based on neocortical brain areas.« (Asada 2015, 42). Empathy encompasses both emotional and cognitive aspects, which is a great challenge for computing. 9 »Affective computing research has focused on emotion recognition.« (Yalcin in DiPaola 2019, 11). model (de Vignemont in Singer 2006) (Yalcin in Di Paola 2019). Bottom-up models on the other hand, try to build an extensive database of human empathic elements, such as variations of fa­cial expressions, recordings of group interactions, classification of empathic behaviour etc. A robot, equipped with information in form of data imput could respond toward human in a (partly) empathic way. As these attempts are still in their initial phase, current models often fail to encompass a broad spectrum of hu­man empathic behaviour. Most AI research addresses empathy as a binary category, either as an empathic or as a non-empathic behaviour, but fail to represent it in a broader spectrum (Yalcin in DiPaola 2019, 2) with possible oscillations, which are a result of numerous factors (Singer in Lamm 2009). As an umbrella term, empathy encircles a wide range of ele­ments, also negative ones. For computational purposes it is, howe­ver, important to clarify the definition of empathy, and to exclude its negative aspects in order to achieve an appropriate empathic outcome. A wide definition of empathy includes negative aspects (envy, »Schadenfreude«). A narrow definition »/.../is simply the ability to form an embodied representation of another‘s emotional state while simultaneously being aware of the causal mechanism that included emotional state.« (Asada 2015, 42). The underlying principle is self-other distinction, when the empathizer is always aware of his own body with an interoceptive awareness, and the ability to represent the other‘s inner world in his mind at the same time (Asada 2015, 45). Technology builds artificial empathy, obviously lacking funda­mental human characteristic, i.e. consciousness. Empathy without the latter, is defective or incomplete at least in an abstract, philo­sophical level.10 Self-other distinction, a cornerstone for empathy,11 and its differentiation from sympathy and compassion, is futile or even non-existent without self-consciousness. From this perspec­tive, we cannot talk about empathy in algorithm at all.12 Jeremy Howick, however suggests to take more pragmatic approach, by applying an Empathy Turing Test for Care- and Chat-robots (How­ick 2021, 458). The version of the original Touring Test, which tests human communication with a robot,13 specifically for empathy purpose would have to alter the Test‘s central questioning into whether a human user could distinguish between empathy re­ceived from an artificial carer vs. human carer. Slightly modified CARE measure might be an appropriate tool. Proposed perspec­tive by Howick indicates, that we alternatively concentrate on the favourable empathic result, felt by a human user, i.e. a better inner state and well-being of the user when empathising either with a robot or with a human carer. If an older adult feels content and is 10 Empathy is distinguished from sympathy in terms of self-other differ­entiation. »Unlike emotional contagion that does not require reasoning about the cause of aroused emotions in others, both EE /emotional em­pathy/ and CE /cognitive empathy/ require distinction between one‘s own and other‘s mental states and forms of representation of one‘s own embodied emotions« (Asada 2015, 42). 11 Self-other awareness and sense of agency are fundamental to empathy. Agency is ability to recognize yourself as an independent agent of ac­tions and emotions. (Decety in Meltzoff 2011, 73). 12 Another argument for impossibility or at least difficulty of empathizing with robots comes from Phenomenology. In order to experience others‘ phenomenal experiences through direct, intersubjective interation, we must have face-to-face, intercorporeal encounters. Robots do not feel an­ything, have no emotions, no subjective experience. »That said, from a phenomenological perspective, it seems difficult to empathize with ro­bots.« (Schmetkamp 2020, 888). 13 The goal of Turing Test is to find out, through a series of questions, if we communicate with a human or a robot. (Oppy in Dowe 2021). able to empathize with an artificial carer, central aim of empathy is thus achieved. But not all robots are programed to be empathic. Nevertheless, numerous deficiencies still persist in this notion, in­cluding ethical obstacles, such as deception about the true nature of the machine, personal data and human rights protection etc. In an attempt to empathize with robots,14 humans should, how­ever, be able to take their perspective, and »put ourselves into their shoes«. Thus, to experience what it is like to be a robot, with a plas­tic-metallic body and a programmed mind.15 »We might simulate what we would do if we were in their situation and then project our experience on them. Or, in direct encounters, we might be able to interactively perceive their actions.« (Schmetkamp 2020, 887). Robots have a computational mind and seemingly lack emotions. But taking into account interconnection of emotional and cogni­tive aspect in human, in our functioning in a complex social en­vironment, as proposed by de Soussa (de Soussa 1987) and Mar­tha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 2001) they might also have some sort of artificial emotional elements. Robots do not possess ability of self-awareness, but are able to detect, monitor and asses their en­vironment, and share it with a human in a daily interaction. Fur­thermore, a machine does not have its own »personal narrative«,16 14 »But what kind of empathy is at stake here? Do we mirror robot›s expec­tations? Do we interpret and predict their behaviour? Or do we empathize in a more phenomenological, interactive way?« (Schmetkamp 2020, 885). 15 With a similar dilema, of the one expressed by Nagel in famous anti-re­ductionistic question »What is it like to be a bat?« (Nagel 1974) (Schm­etkamp 2020, 890). 16Concept of narrative is important in empathy. In philosophy, the other is given by a narrative and it is important for understanding other minds. Daniel D. Hutto proposed a Narrative Practice Hypothesis (Hutto 2008). Personal narrative, a story of the patient (his illness) is part of empathic interaction in Healthcare. since its personal story is a story of a creation by its developer. On the other hand, it possesses a shared history of interaction with a human which increases over time. Understanding a robot in an empathic way, means simply being sensitive to what happens to it. A study on empathy for pain in case of a robot (Cross et al. 2018) tested the possibility of empathic and emotional responding of human when robot »experiences pain or pleasure«. The study did not show any evidence for human empathic responses in short-term interaction with a robot, but raised a question on what might happen in longer term. For the moment, we cannot speak of a full range of human empathic behaviour toward a robot, as we know it from our intersubjective experience, but rather about its elements, certainly in a different perspective. Additionally, results of other studies confirm that when testing attitude toward robot‘s abuse, torture, or damage caused by human, or when robots »seems suffering«, many people do intuitively em­pathize with them, but less than with a human in a similar situation (Suzuki et al. 2015, Rosenthal et al. 2013, Darling 2015). We also tend to treat robots differently than other household machines (Coeck­elbergh 2018). Ethical approach to treating robots might include extended Kantian animal ethics (if we mistreat animals/robots we are not humane, good persons) and virtue ethics (mistreatment of a robot is not a virtue, but vice). We refer to a robot as if it was a hu­man, a quasi other (Coeckelbergh 2018, 144-147). Discussing the ro­bot ethics, Mark Coeckelbergh proposes socio-relational approach, in which object and subject are not separate entities, but rather »mu­tually interdependent and mutually constituting« (Coeckelbergh 2018, 149). Interestingly, interactions of a subject with an object re­veal many characteristics about the subject. Through relationship with a robot we show and discover our own human side. In case of a pet robot (cat, dog), people start to care about it, thus showing their human caring abilities and attachment capacities. Important factor for making a caring »narrative«, is an appropriate language formu­lation in which we express our empathy (Coeckelbergh 2018, 151).17 Empathy and Socially Assistive Robots (SARs) in Aged-care Artificial Intelligence (AI)18 shows significant developmental poten­tial in medicine and patient-centred Healthcare.19 By finding patterns in large data bases at a record speed, it significantly contributes to setting or confirming the correct diagnosis and can provide an invalu­able assistence to a technically skilled doctor in this process.20 Or, it is present as a sophisticated tool in the field of surgery and others. The technology is not replacing human, at least not in the moment, but it does complement certain human tasks. Some researchers claim that AI potentially increases doctor‘s empathic capacity with probably more time available for the patient (Ostherr 2020). With new technol­ogies novel types of care and relationship might appear.21 17 »Searle (Searle 1995) argued that we give social meaning to objects by using language, in particular by so-called »status functions« (Coeckel­bergh 2018, 152). 18 AI is defined as a mathematical algorithm, processed by computers that »have an ability to learn« from data, mostly in form of deep learn­ing and machine learning. There is no single product called AI, and this naming reffers to a range of algorithms with human-like capabilities in computing (Zweig et al. 2018, Ostherr 2020). 19 Promisses of AI are greater efficiency, effectiveness and more person­alized medicine. By technical improvements, more time is expected to be available for a trust relationship with patient, and to more humane care, empathic and compassionate (Kerasidou 2019, Ostherr 2020). 20 AI might find better rational sollutions than doctor. If this is true would patients still trust the doctor‘s opinion and adhere to proposed treat­ment? (Kerasidou 2019). 21 AI is expected to replace trust to doctor with certainty about care, lead­ing from trust relationship to assistive partnership (Bauchat et al. 2016) in the Healthcare (Kerasidou 2019). In providing care to elderly, artificial intelligence has been ex­panding in the field of social robotics, and specifically in develop­ing socially assistive robots (SARs). SARs provide assistance to elderly people through social interaction. Robot development has been recently accelerated due to growing discrepancy between the pressing need for care and the lack of formal and informal carers resources, their daily work load full of routine tasks, overall over-bur­den and a plead for more quality free time. One of the positive sides of the algorithm is meeting expectation of the care market to ensure more free time for carers, in favour of more time for important tasks, and to provide extra time for closer communication among people (Ostherr 2020). Discussions on consequences of using SARs, a part­ly autonomuos machines with social characteristics,22 are part and parcel of research interest, focused on carers, developers, and other stakeholders in the care market. Moreover, the end user‘s needs and opinion, should be taken into the account as well, especially in case of elderly people with their specific needs and requirements. Researchers from KU Leuven – University of Leuven, Centre for Biomedical Ethics and Law, conducted several studies on exis­ting pool of research, on how care robots can be used in residential Aged-care settings, with aim to give voice to older adults, who must be heard and respected from the ethical and legal point of view, and particularly in terms of ensuring human rights. Results of their meta-studies (Vandemeulebroucke et al. 2018a, 2018b) and a focus group study (Vandemeulebroucke et al. 2019) revealed, among other facts, that multi-functional robots are less favoured than specialized 22 Focus of this paper is on HRI, in case of SAR in residential settings, because this type robots and HRI reveal crucial elements for empathy re­search in the context of care and dealing with human vulnerability. Cer­tainly, interactions with other robots and in other circumstances could bring different views on empathy. one, and that older people want a technically reliable machine with female voice, whom they can control (retained sense of agency),23 and who have »good manners«. This means that a robot should ask permission before entering a bathroom for instance, hence it does not harm user‘s feelings and their sense of intimacy (Vandemeu­lebroucke et al. 2018a, 162). SAR should be autonomuous, but at the same time under control of human. »The user-SAR relationship was regarded as a boss-employee relationship, with the user – the older adult – being the boss.« (Vandemeulebroucke et al. 2018a, 160). Anthropomorphisation of a robot, reflects our natural tendency to attribute human-like features to objects (Schmetkamp 2020, Vande­meulebroucke et al. 2018a, 162), but can lead also to over-emotiona­lizing, i.e. sentimentalizing care robots (Vandemeulebroucke et al. 2018b, 23). A robot that resembles a human in its appearance and shows certain elements of human communication and social skills is more likely to be accepted (Schmetcamp 2020). On the other hand, there are several ethical concerns, among which are fear of decep­tion (uncanny valley problem),24 extensive emotional attachment to a robot, reduced respect for person‘s authority, dignity and vulnera­bility, lack of spontaneity, speech problems, manipulation, stigma, surveillance, and others (Vandemeulebroucke et al. 2018a, 161; Van-demeulebroucke et al. 2018b). Interestingly, what the user‘s of SAR mostly missed, was a human touch. Relying on study of Tineke A. Abma et al. (Abma et al. 2010), researchers from KU Leuven, Tijs Vandemeulebroucke, professor Chris Gastmans and others empha­zised that in building of a robot, there should always be a »democra­ 23 Trust to machine is dependent on feeling of (technical) safety and sense of agency. (Vandemeulebroucke et al. 2018a, 158-161). 24 The uncanny valley theory was introduced by Japanese engineer Ma-sahiro Mori and indicates feeling of eeriness when confronting reality with some technical imperfections (Stein in Ohler 2017). tic space« for an open, inclusive interaction among all stakeholders involved in Aged-care, thus overcoming barriers and sharing com­mon vocabulary (Vandemeulebroucke et al. 2018, 164). If we want to empathize with robots, we are confronted with a question of reciprocity as a important constitutive element of our relations. Caring for older people with cognitive decline and oth­er health deteriorations, generates increasingly asymmetric rela­tionship situations, which could contribute to extreme pressure on a human to human relationship. For example, a person with de­mentia enters into interaction with their carer as a progressively weaker partner, since their active contribution to the quality of re­lationship diminishes rapidly, while their demand for care grows. Similarly, a human connection with a machine is subject to asym­metry per definitionem, but in a different way. Machines do not have any subjective experience, emotions, beliefs, moral reason­ing, consciousness, and empathy, in a way we would expect it from a human being. In terms of artificial empathy development, a ro­bot‘s capacity to express emotions to interact in an socially pleas­ant way, is important for reciprocal empathic understanding, espe­cially in the Healthcare where such features are highly needed.25 Caring for someone is an empathic and compassionate act. It is an expression of love, devotion and connection between the care receiver and the caregiver. In formal care, caring is a professional duty, that should not lack empathic dimension. Amy Coplan defines empathy also as »caring about someone else« (Coplan 2011, 4). »Ca­ring about« and »caring for« are »/…/ two fundamental, interrela­ 25 Opponents such as Bert Baumgartner and Astrid Weiss, claim that emotions are not directly relevant in HRI (Baumgartner in Weiss 2014 ). They argue that also human carers could have a negative, unprofessional behaviour towards care receiver, such as intolerance, negligence, inap­propriate expressions etc. ted dimensions of care, reciprocal one and a technical-instrumental one.« (Vandemeulebroucke et al. 2018b, 22). Care relationship would be disrupted, if SAR would replace human carer, and as such a rela­tionship cannot be reciprocal, but unidirectional and focused solely on technical aspects. In care, values such as empathy, compassion, respect for dignity etc., are reciprocal in nature. Several authors,26 referred to by Vandemeulebroucke et al., however, reject an idea of reciprocal HRI (Vandemeulebroucke et al. 2018b, 22). Conclusion In the future, robots will be increasingly sophisticated, autono­mous artificial agents with additional social skills, thus being more able to weave a net of relations with human, hopefully with an em­pathic supplement. This might not be in a classical form, as we understand it today from our interpersonal interaction. From a di­fferent angle, though, having extended our tolerance for empathy definition framework, we can speak of reciprocal empathizing with robot as a concept, and about their possibility of expressing some elements of »deep« empathy toward a human, in a very limited way. Possibly, alongside with augmented artificial consciousness and other necessary future technological advancements, that wo­uld certainly have to meet several ethical and legal requirements. Although some traces of empathy can be detected in HRI, we can­not speak of a true reciprocal empathic relationship between older adult and a robot (SAR) within contemporary reality in Aged-care. In this context, »deep« empathy is currently somewhat »shallow«. Alan Turing allegedly said, that machines think differently, and for a human to recognize this ability and call it intelligent, is a chal­lenging task (Turing 2021). Analogous, this might be true for artifi­ 26 Coeckelbergh, Parks, Vallor, Vanlaere in Van Ooteghem. cial empathy, as an emergent quality of a machine. Relationship with an algorithm reflects human features and bond-making capacities, in the first place. It is our mirror. As such, it might also reflect our own shadow side, our aggression, intolerance, hatreds, greed, rac­ism, sexual assault ... and also negative aspects of empathy. Should our society, that caused a destruction of an ingenious mind of one of its greatest allies during the WWII, saving thousands of lives, Alan Turing, just because of his different sexual orientation, be entrusted to be set as an ethical and empathic benchmark for a robot develop­ment, without a thorough critical reflection? 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Simulta­neously, the streaming of films witnessed unprecedented growth and the fears that the cinema as we knew it might come to an end abound­ed. Yet the death of cinema has been predicted before, most notably with the introduction of television in the 1950s and the advent of video cassettes in the 1980s. The question is, does the recent digital transformation differ from these events? There exists an impressive theoretical tradition in studying the implications of digital technolo­gies for the film medium and this article turns to this tradition for the answer. The focus is on the concept of “the cinematographic dispos­itive” (“le dispositif cinematographique” in French) as the situation in which films are being watched, connecting the apparatus of dis­tribution and projection on the one hand, and the viewer as the con­crete, idiosyncratic, individual person watching the film on the other. As such, it proves to be a particularly suitable concept for the study of the recent transformation and its implications for film medium as well as for culture and society at large. 1 Melita Zajc (PhD) is an associate prof. at AMEU – ISH. E-pošta: mel-ita.zajc@gmail.com. / Dr. Melita Zajc deluje kot izredna profesorica na AMEU – ISH. 135 Key words: Film, Cinema, Streaming Platforms, Cinematographic Dispositive, Prosumers Film po kinu. Transformacija kinematografskega dis-pozitiva: kulturne implikacije spletne distribucije filmov Izvlecek: Digitalno preobrazbo, ki je potekala na vseh podrocjih cloveš­kega življenja, je pandemija koronavirusa še pospešila. Da bi obvladale virus, so vlade širom sveta zapirale kinematografe. Hkrati pa je distribu­cija filmov na spletu doživela strmo rast in to je povecalo strahove, da je filma, kot smo ga poznali dotlej, nepreklicno konec. Vendar pa so smrt filma napovedovali že prej, predvsem ob uvedbi televizije v petdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja in ob pojavu video kaset v osemdesetih. Vpra­šanje je, ali se nedavna digitalna preobrazba razlikuje od teh dogodkov? Obstaja impresivna teoretska tradicija preucevanja implikacij digitalnih tehnologij za filmski medij in ta clanek se je pri iskanju odgovora obrnil na to tradicijo. Poudarek je na konceptu »kinematografskega dispozi­tiva« (v francošcini »le dispositif cinematographique«) kot situacije, v kateri filme gledamo, in ki poveže aparat distribucije in projekcije na eni strani ter gledalca kot konkretno, idiosinkraticno, individualno osebo, ki gleda film na drugi strani. Kot tak se izkaže za posebej primeren kon­cept za preucevanje nedavne preobrazbe in njenih posledic za filmski medij pa tudi za kulturo in družbo nasploh. Kljucne besede: film, kino, platforme, kinematografski dispozitiv, protrošnja Introduction The film is changing constantly. From silent films to the sound, black-and-white to color to computer-generated imagery and spec­tacular special effects, from cinema to TV and video, to IMAX and 3D and virtual reality. Yet it seems that at present we are witness­ing a much more thorough change. In the heart of this change is the Covid 19 pandemics which accelerated processes that predat­ed it and is now altering the production, distribution and viewing of films (Delaney and Greenberg 2020). As governments were try­ing to keep the virus in check, cinemas were forced to shut down all over the world. But, while the cinemas, from the biggest mov­ie theatre chains to the small European cinemas, reported huge revenue losses and feared they will be forced to close down, the streaming of films witnessed unprecedented growth. Many film production companies began to entirely avoid cinemas and direct­ly premiered their films on the streaming platforms. The majority of film festivals moved online and the first audience response was enthusiastic: the hybrid edition of the 2021 Sundance Film Festival reached more than half a million viewers, the largest-ever audience in the festival’s history (Lindahl 2021). The major streaming plat­forms that already dominated the digital media landscape before, such as Netflix and Amazon, were taking over the revenues of clas­sical cinemas. Experts (Harriman 2020) predicted that “we’re wit­nessing what may be the irreversible turn from cinema being a the­atrical mode to becoming a predominantly streaming medium”. This article presents the first step towards a comprehensive study of the transformations of the film in these “post-cinema” con­ditions, that is, in the conditions when the cinema is ceasing to be the prevalent form of film watching and online streaming prevails. This change affects a set of intertwined elements, from the film it­self with its narratives, characters, formats and languages, to the film viewers and modes of film watching, from different devices and screens (computer, mobile, ...) to the possibilities of interaction with the contents and among the viewers, including film reviews and oth­er modes of evaluation and rating. I believe that to apprehend such a large variety of practical features, a conceptual approach might be of use and in this article, I will propose a framework of such ap­proach. I will start with the analysis of the main theoretical tradi­tions of investigating the technological aspect of the film media, in particular of transformations brought about by digital cinema. In the second part, I will focus on the theory of the cinematographic dispositive. I aim to show that dispositive might provide the con­ceptual framework for the empirical research and at the same time facilitate the confirmation of the hypothesis of my research work, that is, that the weakening of the cinematographic dispositive in the contemporary mediascape, along with other related processes, indicate much broader transformations of contemporary societies. Methods and the hypothesis There exist several approaches and conceptions of cinema’s dig­ital transformation. Particularly valuable for this research are the views that technological changes have implications for the film itself, its contents and formats, as well as for the audienc­es. Technological changes might also, potentially, bring about broader social and cultural shifts, which is the basic premise of the concept of the dispositive. I previously applied this concept in the exploration of “prosumption” in social media (Zajc 2013) and of the “monetisation” of user generated content (Zajc 2015). The concept of social media dispositive is particularly useful for exploring the migration of the film to the internet and the dis­tribution of the film on social media platforms. To explain this, it is important to note that this concept is an elaboration of the concept of the cinematographic dispositive (“le dispositif cine-matographique”) developed by French film theorist Jean Louis Baudry (1986a, 1986b). He conceptualised the fact that technol­ogy is an intrinsic element of the film itself and also assumed that the filmic mechanism is connected to the processes of the construction of subjectivity, necessary for any (modern) society because it is based on the structure of central perspective. The central perspective was introduced as the main model for visual representation during the European Renaissance. It was instru­mental for the introduction of the modern subject as an individual responsible for one’s actions and thus, subsequently, for the modern capitalist, liberalist and neoliberalist Europe. Therefore, I would like to propose the hypothesis that the actual weakening of cinematic dispositive, along with other related contemporary processes, might indicate a potential for modifications of this modern notion of sub­jectivity, and, potentially, a transformation towards a society based not on isolated individuals but on connected and mutually depend­ent singularities and collectivities. Such expectations of course need to be further explored and verified by empirical research in various fields, by explorations of contemporary films, their languages and narratives on the one hand, and the ethnographic (observation and interview based) research among the creators and viewers of these films, the users of various platforms in diverse parts of Europe and the world on the other. This empirical part of the research will need to be performed in the next steps, below I would like to present theoretical foundations and conceptual reflections, based on the critical compar­ative analysis of existing scholarly work in the field. Research One year into the Covid19 pandemics, as cinema halls all over the world remained closed and the audiences were watching films on-line, director Martin Scorsese expressed concerns about the future of cinema as the streaming platforms have come to overtake the moviegoing experience. This “has created a situation in which everything is presented to the viewer on a level playing field” (Scorsese 2021). The celebrated director is himself making films for the popular streaming platforms: after in 2019 The Irishman was successfully released on Netflix, he is now pre-producing Kill­ers of the Flower Moon (Bramesco 2021) that will be produced and distributed by Apple. He does not deny that for filmmakers this might even be an advantage, however, he asks, if “further viewing is ‘suggested’ by algorithms based on what you’ve already seen, and the suggestions are based only on subject matter or genre, then what does that do to the art of cinema?” (Scorsese ibid.) Early theories of the digital cinema Scorsese’s essay marks very well the actual moment in a long his­tory of cinema’s digital transformation. The relations between the content and form have always been in the very centre of the critical reflections of this history. Early theorists of digital cinema, facing the use of digital technologies for the costly production of special effects, were mostly worried because the form, designated at that time by the term ‘spectacle’, was dominating over the cinematic narrative, that is, over the content. As early as 1986 Thomas El-saesser observed that “the success, of SF as a genre, or of direc­tors like Steven Spielberg whose narratives are simply anthology pieces from basic movie plots, suggest that narrative has to some extent been an excuse for the pyrotechnics of I L&M” (quoted in McQuire 2000, 42). The concerns over the demise of content in cinema further grew in the following decade as the use of the com­puter generated special effects in the Hollywood film industry con­tributed to the rise of blockbusters. Yet, as McQuire pointed out in 2000, special effects were essential to blockbuster exploitation strategies but they were also part of “the cinema’s efforts to demar­cate its ‘experience’ from that of domestic entertainment technol­ogies” (43). By that time, already, it became obvious that digital technologies constitute “a profound revolution in cinema, primari­ly because of their capacity to cut across all sectors of the industry simultaneously, affecting film production, narrative conventions and audience experience” (43-44). McQuire’s conclusion that “The repetition of awe and astonishment repeatedly evoked by ’im­possible’ images as the currency of today’s ‘cutting edge’ cinema undoubtedly functions to prepare us for the uncertain pleasures of living in a world we suspect we will soon no longer recognise“ (56-57) proved particularly visionary. Such was also his analysis of the dialectical relationship between the spectacle and the narra­tive in the cinema. Contrary to prevalently critical approaches, he believed that the spectacle might have a ’progressive’ function in contemporary cinema, for example, as Paul Young claimed, “con­temporary ’spectacle’ cinema constitutes an emergent challenge to ’Hollywood’s institutional identity’“ (in McQuire, 2000, 55). Post-millennial theories of the digital cinema (post-cinema) Such claims should be of no surprise. Ever since the early years of film media, film theorists focussed on its form in the search for its’ specificity. Technology was a key to acknowledging the film as a distinct art form. In the 1920s, avant-garde filmmakers were advo­cating for media specific cinematic qualities against classical nar­rative cinema because it was associated primarily with literary and theatrical scenarios. Similar concerns emerged with debates over auteur theory in the 1950s in France, where the literary qualities of the script were opposed to the ’properly cinematic’ qualities of mise-en-scene. A more analytical theoretical approach connected the specificities of cinema to the use of camera and central per­spective as modes of (realist) visual representation. Theorists who developed this approach (Comolli 1986, Baudry 1986a, 1986b) in the context of the prevalent philosophical current of combining Althusserian neo-marxism, semiology and psychoanalysis, were mostly associated with the French film magazine Cahiérs du Cin­ema. Today, on the contrary, we associate this view with the film theorist Christian Metz and his book Imaginary Signifier (1982). The reason for this is that Metz’s view that the classical narra­tive cinema was a rather narrow form that failed to fully utilise the affordances of the film media, was the starting point for several key conceptualisations of digital cinema in the 21st Century. Lev Mano-vich, for example, directly quoted Metz that “most films shot today, good or bad, original or not, ‘commercial’ or not, have as a common characteristic that they tell a story,” and thus “all belong to one and the same genre” or, better, “super genre” (Metz in Manovich 2016, 21). Besides, adds Manovich, fictional films are all “live-action films” and largely “consist of unmodified photographic recordings of real events which took place in real physical space” thus, he concludes, “cinema is the art of the index; it is an attempt to make art out of a footprint“ (Manovich 2016, 21). Digital technologies, claimed Mano-vich, radically changed this. It is now possible to generate photoreal­istic scenes in a computer using 3-D computer animation; to modify individual frames or whole scenes with the help of a digital paint program; to cut, bend, stretch and stitch digitised film images into something which has perfect photographic credibility, although it was never actually filmed. Cinema “can no longer be clearly distin­guished from animation. It is no longer an indexical media technol­ogy but, rather, a sub-genre of painting” (22). Steve Shaviro similarly associated digital cinema with “the new possibilities of expression” (2016, 53) that might take the film be­yond the narrow confines of classical narrative cinema. His concept of post-continuity relates to the continuity as another important feature of this ‘super genre’, namely the requirement that “space is a fixed and rigid container, which remains the same no matter what goes on in the narrative; and time flows linearly, and at a uniform rate, even when the film’s chronology is scrambled by flashbacks” (60). In the 21st century the “continuity itself has been fractured, de­valued, fragmented, and reduced to incoherence” (56). The integra­tion of graphics, sound effects and mixtures of footage emulating video games, the promiscuous mixtures of different styles of foot­age that we find in such films as Oliver Stone’s Natural Born Killers and Brian De Palma’s Redacted do not altogether dispense with the concerns of classical continuity, they are simply “no longer centred upon” it (60). Post-continuity aesthetics claims Shaviro, is expres­sive both of technological changes, such as the rise of digital and Internet-based media and also “of more general social, economic, and political conditions (i.e. globalised neoliberal capitalism, and the intensified financialization associated with it)” (ibid.). Even more than the new aesthetical and formal strategies, there were the radically new conditions of viewing and new ways in which films address their spectators (Denson and Leyda 2016, 4) that defined the transformations of cinema in the new millennium. Emblematic of this transformation was the Matrix franchise. Film The Matrix, the first in the feature film trilogy, directed by The Wa­chowskis and released in 1999 was accompanied by a whole set of various products and this caused a series of interpretations and new conceptualisations, most notable are “transmedia storytelling” (Jen­kins 2006) and “cinema of interactions” (Grusin 2016). The Matrix franchise was composed of the IMAX Reloaded, the Animatrix DVD and its related web versions, the Enter the Matrix video game (for Xbox, Nintendo GameCube, PlayStation 2, and Windows PC), and a multiplayer online game, a film trilogy and a series of short films. For Grusin, the “cinema of interactions,” a hybrid medium, indicates “a change that is distributed across practices of production, screening, exhibition, distribution, interaction, use, and spectatorship” (ibid.) but the latter is far the most significant. The experience of the film in the cinema becomes “part of a more distributed aesthetic or cin­ematic experience” as “a film does not end after its closing credits, but rather continues beyond the theatre to the DVD, the video game, the soundtrack, the websites, and so forth” (2016, 71-72). Grusin cel­ebrated the rise of “an interactive spectator in a domestic or other social space rather than an immobilised spectator in the darkened dream-space of apparatus or gaze theory” (70). However, he also ob­served that the purpose of the Matrix franchise was an “attempt to acquire for the Matrix a cinema audience that extends across any number of different media times and places” (72). The ‘cinema of interactions’ is thus in the first place a marketing vehicle. Prosumption and the dispositive of social media Similar was the conclusion of Hallinan and Reynolds (2019) who analysed the adoption of digital technologies by the largest the­atrical chain in the United States, AMC. The use of media such as credit cards, computerised point-of-sale systems and loyalty pro­grams, the tactics like augmented reality (AR) integration, apps that deliver personalised advertising to moviegoers and other dig­ital overlays within the physical space of movie theatres convert these places into “platforms” while, simultaneously, turn cinema audience into “digitised media users” (2019, 6). These strategies “convert moviegoing preferences and habits into digital informa­tion that can be operationalised to advertise future films and com­municate the value of the theatrical experience” (ibid). Evoking the critical writings of communication theorist Christian Fuchs and his notion of audience commodification, the authors concluded that the digitisation of the cinema audience is “simultaneously the commodification of the audience” (2019, 15). Hallinan and Reynolds’s study is particularly important because it revealed that, to some degree, cinema audiences have been exposed to the same processes as social media users. And that this began even before, due to the Covid19 pandemics, the distribution of films migrated online. The physical closure of the cinemas during the pan­demic enforced these processes. Due to the decentralised structure of the Internet that allows many-to-many communication, social media users engage in permanent creative activity. This further ex­poses them to commodification because, by creating user generated content they perform what Fuchs defined as “free labour” (2012, 706) and also because their online activities are constantly monitored by social media operators and advertisers, turned into data, stored and used to train algorithms and generate targeted advertising. Performing these activities, social media users act as “pro-sumers,” which is a term introduced by Alvin Toffler in the early 1980s to describe the “progressive blurring of the line that sepa­rates producer from consumer” (Toffler in Fuchs 2012, 711). Ritzer demonstrated that there has always existed a continuum between production and consumption and the reason why we have become “a prosumer society” (Ritzer 2010, 10) is that, with digital technol­ogies, the material obstacles that separate production and con­sumption have virtually disappeared. While Toffler was mostly op­timistic and wrote about the arrival of a new form of economic and political democracy, today theorists mostly agree with Fuchs that prosumption is enabling corporations to reduce their costs and that jobs are destroyed while consumers who work for free are ex­tremely exploited (2012, ibid.). Ritzer and Miles warned that digital technologies speed up “processes of rationalisation while intensi­fying levels of consumption” and that prosumption itself is part of a broader change towards a “more highly controlled, bureaucratic and dehumanising society” (2018, 4). The concept of prosumption describes the important changes of media structures and practices (Fuchs 2012, 711) in which the positions of the media owners, as well as those of active and crea­tive media users, have been transformed. Building on Ritzer’s defi­nition of prosumption, I previously introduced the “social media dispositive” (2013, 2015), a concept that enables “a more detailed analysis of the functioning of social media within contemporary power relations, and also a more detailed insight into those pro­cesses within the dispositive of social media, where the possibili­ties of resistance may reside” (Zajc 2013, 17). This concept is based on a detailed study of the cinema viewing experience inside the cinema and is therefore particularly suitable to explore the migra­tion of film media online. The cinematographic dispositive The concept of social media dispositive is based on the notion of the cinematographic dispositive (le dispositif cinematographique) that originated in the same context as the endeavours to transcend the constraints of the classical narrative cinema (Manovich 2016, Shaviro 2016). The focal target of the criticism and the starting point of the search for innovative cinematic forms in the film the­ory of the 1960s was the realistic visual representation, based on the mechanism of central perspective. In this unique moment of convergence between form and content, aesthetics converged with politics: it was this exact model of cinematic representation that was considered emblematic for the modern subject and for the de­fects of modern capitalist societies. A note on the origins of the central perspective might better explain this. The central perspective became the main model of visual representation during the Renaissance. It was thought (Bri­tannica) to have been devised about 1415 by Italian Renaissance architect Filippo Brunelleschi and later documented by architect and writer Leon Battista Alberti in Della Pittura, published in 1435 but much earlier Arab sources still have to be considered. What is clear, however, is that until this day, it is considered the model of the visual representation that is the most realistic, the “closest to life”. Its other names, linear, monocular, scientific i.a. well describe its main features - it is a system of creating an impression of depth on a flat surface, in such a way that, in a painting or drawing using this system, all parallel lines (orthogonals) converge in a single vanishing point on the composition’s horizon line. So as to appear farther from the viewer, objects in the compositions are rendered increasingly smaller as they near the vanishing point. The lines converging in the vanishing point on the drawing create an im­aginary cone, symmetrical to the cone that would be created if we imagine rays of light traveling from the painting and converging in the eye (monocular) of the viewer, thus confirming the viewer’s position at the center and origin of the image. The central perspective is considered instrumental for the in­troduction of the modern episteme and its’ central notion of the subject as an individual responsible for one’s actions. As such, the central perspective is also considered crucial for the develop­ment of modern capitalist, liberalist and neo-liberalist Europe. The fact is that this perspective has, until now, remained embedded in photographic and cinematographic cameras but also in the grids underlying the contemporary computer modelling and digital ani­mations including the latest technologies from virtual reality (VR) to virtual production (VP). At the same time, however, the central perspective, together with the conventions about the narrative and contingency, enforced the kind of cinematic realism that the boldest uses of digital technologies in cinema aimed to subvert (Manovich 2016, McQuire 2000, Shaviro 2016). More important­ly, the focus on the perspective in film theory connected the cin­ematographic camera with the film projector. It shifted the atten­tion from film production to the viewing experience and was the starting point for the conceptual exploration of the act of viewing through the concept of dispositive. It was the French film writer Jean-Louis Baudry who developed the idea of the cinematographic dispositive (le dispositif cine-matographique) in the most complex and comprehensive way. He wrote two essays: “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematograph­ic Apparatus (“l’appareil de base” in original),” published in the journal Cinéthique in 1970 (Baudry 1986a) and “The Apparatus (“le dispositif” in original): Metapsychological Approaches to the Im­pression of Reality in the Cinema” published in 1975 in the journal Communications. Both were translated into English and reprinted in the epic film theory reader Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology, edit­ed by Philip Rosen and published in 1986 by Columbia University Press. Unlike the English translation that uses the term “the ap­paratus” for both terms, “l’appareil de base” and “le dispositif”, I retain that the distinction is crucial for a proper understanding of Baudry’s theory and thus propose to translate “le dispositif” as “the dispositive” and maintain the distinction. Writing about the media, Baudry observed “that instrumenta­tion plays a more and more important role in them and that their distribution is more and more extensive.” Therefore “it is strange (…) that emphasis has been placed almost exclusively on their in­fluence, on the effects that they have as finished products, their content, the field of the signified if you like; the technical bases on which these effects depend and the specific characteristics of these bases have, however, been ignored” (Baudry 1986a, 287). Oth­er film theorists at that time investigated the role of technology in cinema by focusing on the representational system, that is, on the central perspective and the movie camera, while Jean-Louis Baudry refused to separate the camera from the rest of the cine­matic machinery. He analysed the act of viewing itself and in par­ticular the processes of “primary identification” and the “impres­sion of reality” within the film viewing experience. Baudry’s concept of “primary identification” refers to one of the very basics of visual media, that is, the cinema audience can only identify with the fictional persons on the screen if they previously rec-ognised these representations as meaningful. This, claimed Baudry, is only possible if they identified with the mechanism of representa­tion. The recognition of the cinematic representations is a result of what Baudry named the “impression of reality” in cinema and Metz the “reality effect” (in Manovich 2016, 32). According to Baudry, the “impression of reality” in cinema does not primarily depend on what is shown on the screen, because “the spectator identifies less with what is represented, the spectacle itself, than with what stages the spectacle, makes it seen, obliging him to see what it sees “ (Baudry 1986a, 295). For viewers to identify with the characters on the screen (secondary identification), they have to identify with the mecha­nism of representation (primary identification). In his second essay, Baudry concentrated on the cinema viewing experience and com­pared the cinema with Plato’s cave and with a dream, two situations that require a specific position of the human body: in Plato’s cave the hypothetical human person has been chained since birth; in a dream, a person sleeps and is immobile. Cinema is not Plato’s cave, nor is it a dream, but both these situations provide simulations of reality by constructing the place for the subject. The same happens within the cinema hall: the “impression of reality” in the cinema does not depend on what is being represented in the film. The cinema does not simulate reality, it simulates the conditions of the subject. “[T]he entire cinematographic dispositive is activated in order to provoke this simulation: it is indeed a simulation of a condition of the subject, a position of the subject, a subject and not reality”(1986b, 316). To specify the processes that take place in the act of cinema viewing, Baudry emphasised the need to “distinguish the basic cine­matographic apparatus (‘l’appareil de base’), which concerns the en­semble of the equipment and operations necessary to the production of a film and its projection, from the dispositive (‘le dispositif’) (…), which solely concerns projection and which includes the subject to whom the projection is addressed” (ibid., 317). Within the dispositive, the subject not only is simulated but also is included: not only is it a simulated point of view which one must take in order to recognise the representations, to “take them as reality,” but also it is the actual spec­tator as a condition of the flow, of the duration of these representa­tions, the one who guarantees that in the cinema the imaginary life of the protagonists, their emotions, their adventures, last by someone. Constituted is an imaginary subject position, a simulated point of view which one must take in order to recognise representations and which all spectators share. Included is the individual, the concrete, living person, and every single cinema-goer to whom the dispositive assigns a distinct place within the setting. The dispositive, as a sin­gle concept, enables the distinction that is constitutive for the social aspect of any technology, that is, the distinction between the subject position that the dominant use of media technology prescribes to any user and the creative practices of individual users with their his­tories, memories, expectations and desires, which can generate alter­native and oppositional uses (Zajc 2013, 11). Discussion: film and its’ audiences outside the cinema The dispositive, with its focus on the actual situation of film viewing, puts the present migration of film from the cinema hall to other dis­tribution platforms into a novel perspective. First of all, it enables a more precise comparison between the viewing of the film in the cin­ema and in other situations. Roland Barthes complained that watch­ing films on TV has no fascination as darkness and anonymity are gone (1986, 346). For watching the film in the cinema, a detailed pro­cedure is put in place, from buying the ticket that prescribes to the viewer the exact place within the cinema hall, darkness, silence, the look directed into one direction during the whole projection. As we are watching films online, all these physical constraints are gone. Yet the use of social media is regulated as well and several techniques might be seen as a direct substitute for the control of the viewer’s body in the cinema, from the single-use devices such as tablets and smartphones and their authentication technologies (fingerprint, face recognition,…) to the personal data one needs to provide in exchange for an individual account that conditions the use of any social media from the start. Just like the cinema going experience, the surveillance of social media users is individualised too. But besides the audience commodification and surveillance, the new modes of film viewing also open up new spaces for creativity and innovative, alternative filmmaking practices. For example, film viewing online is much more easily accessible and this means that new, more numerous audiences are available for several artists who started making films due to the new more accessible production technologies. This opens up new possibilities for the nonlinear and nonrealist cinematic forms that are exhibited on a television or a computer screen, rather than in a movie theatre (Manovich 2016, 32) to multiply in the future. This new, decentralised film viewing experience is happening along with other cultural and social practices that, similarly, demon­strate a radical decentering of the previously given central position of a subject as white, male, middle class human, defining all others as dif­ferent and thus, inferior. Movements such as feminism, anti-colonial­ism and environmental activism all testify to social and cultural trans­formations that are very similar to the recent multiplication of film viewing experience. We still need to investigate these processes in detail. Yet the concept of dispositive proves to be the right tool to con-ceptualise the basics of this new diversity where varied genres, races, human and other live beings jointly coexist, simultaneously sharing the position of centrality and keeping their particular idiosyncrasy. Conclusion The Covid19 pandemics accelerated the processes of digital trans­formation. The closure of cinemas advanced the migration of film distribution online and brought about a radical change in film view­ing and film medium itself. We know by now that this change is accompanied by profound changes in societies and culture at large. 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Monitor ISH (2021), XXIII/1, 156–179 Izvirni znanstveni clanek Original scientific article Nadja Furlan Štante1 Transhumanizem, posthumanizem – izziv (kršcanskemu) ekofeminizmu Izvlecek: Clanek primerja (kršcansko) ekofeministicno etiko od­nosnosti – medsebojno povezanost vseh naravnih bitij (cloveških in necloveških) v mreži življenja (medsebojno povezana subjek­tivnost) – s transhumanisticno etiko clovekovega izboljšanja (na-predka) in tehnološke singularnosti. Poleg tega je izpostavljena kritika transhumanizma in njegove (možne) zlorabe tehnološke moci – nad clovekom in naravo –, saj bi »nova« superinteligenca lahko sicer poganjala pospešen tehnološki napredek, a bi pri tem mocno ogrozila ekofeministicni ekocentricni egalitarizem, saj bi se pomikala k posthumanizmu kot koncnemu cilju. Kljucne besede: kršcanski ekofeminizem, transhumanizem, posthumanizem, izboljšanje cloveka, narava, tehnologija. Transhumanism, Posthumanism – The Challenge to (Christian) Ecofeminism Abstract: This article compares the (Christian) ecofeminist ethic of relationality - the interconnectedness of all beings (human and natural non-human) in the web of life (interconnected subjectivity) - with the transhumanist ethic of human enhancement and techno­logical singularity. Moreover, a critique of transhumanism and its 1 Dr. Nadja Furlan Štante deluje kot znanstvena svetnica na Inštitutu za filozofske študije Znanstveno raziskovalnega centra Koper. E-pošta: nadja.furlan@zrs-kp.si. / Nadja Furlan Štante (PhD) works as a principal Research Associate at the Institute for Philosophical Studies of Science and resarch centre Koper. 156 (possible) abuse of technological power - over humanity and nature - is elaborated, as the “new” superintelligence could drive accelerat­ed technological progress and leave ecofeminist ecocentric egalitar­ianism behind, while moving towards posthumanism as a goal. Key words:Christian Ecofeminism, Transhumanism, Posthuman-ism, Human Enhancement, Nature, Technology. Uvod Realnost ekološke krize na eni ter kvantni preskok v tehnološki rasti in razvoju na drugi strani pušcata mocan pecat na sodobnega cloveka, ki je soustvarjalec/ka obojega in je posledicno s strani obo­jega tudi sooblikovan/a. Podobno kot je neolitska revolucija mocno vplivala na psihofizicni razvoj cloveka, na medosebne in medvrstne odnose ter v odnosu do naravnih, necloveških bitij, tudi tehnološka revolucija posledicno prinaša mocne spremembe v cloveku. Tehnološke aplikacije niso vec nekaj, kar bi le posredno vplivalo na delovanje in razvoj živih bitij, tudi cloveka, temvec s seboj prina­šajo tudi možnost neposrednih posegov v osnovne biološke grad-nike - genome, in vedno tesnejšo povezavo s cloveško tehnologijo. Ceprav clovek že dolgo »soobiva« s tehnologijo, slednja nanj vpliva na razlicne nacine. Tehnološke aplikacije postajajo vse bolj aktivne, tako da informacije ne le shranjujejo, ampak jih tudi zbirajo in obdelujejo. Tako niso vec nekaj, kar bi ostalo zunaj cloveka, tem­vec tehnološki razvoj pospešuje vedno tesnejše sodelovanje ali celo povezovanje cloveka in tehnologije ter celovitejšo fuzijo bioloških in mehanskih elementov. Številni tehnološki procesi, kot so informati­zacija, avtomatizacija in robotika, omogocajo tehnološko prevzema­nje in izvajanje vešcin, ki so bile nekoc izkljucno v domeni cloveka in hkrati bistveno širijo nabor zmogljivosti cloveške vrste. Vse vec velikih zasebnih tehnoloških podjetij in investitorjev vlaga v razlicne visokotehnološke projekte, ki so bili do nedavnega znan­stvena fantastika, kot so odprava degenerativnega staranja, inženi-ring mikroorganizmov za proizvodnjo dizelskega goriva in v razvoj umetne inteligence. Seveda ima vsaka vecja sprememba ali novost tako pozitivne kot negativne posledice za obstojece stanje, njena raz­poreditev pa je pogosto povezana s socialno-ekonomskim statusom posameznikov/ic in skupin ter z vrednotenjem naravnih in drugih živih bitij. Pospeševanje tehnoloških inovacij vodi tudi do hitrejših družbeno-kulturnih sprememb, ki prinašajo nove trende in dojemanja sveta, hkrati pa odpravljajo dolocene ustaljene prakse (Pustovrh 2016). V tem kontekstu narašca priljubljenost transhumanizma na eni in potreba po eko-feministicni paradigmi na drugi strani. Ceprav se obe paradigmi na prvi pogled zdita povsem razlicni in nezdru­žljivi, bi lahko izpostavili nekaj skupnega. Joel Thompson pravi, da nam transhumanizem obljublja svobodo pred biološkimi omejitva-mi, ki so lastne naši naravi. Njegov cilj je povecati fizicne, custvene in kognitivne sposobnosti, s cimer odpira nove možnosti in obzor­ja izkušenj. Trdi tudi, da so številne transhumanisticne težnje po­dobne tistim v domeni religije (Thompson 2017, 180). Clanek iz tega torišca ponudi primerjalno analizo kršcanske eko-feministicne etike in transhumanisticne etike ter poda kriti­ko transhumanizma iz (kršcansko) eko-feministicne perspektive. Glavno vprašanje je: ali je mogoce kršcanski eko-feminizem in transhumanizem misliti skupaj, ce je tako, zakaj bi to poceli? Kršcanska eko-feministicna etika – konceptualni oris Naj konceptualni oris kršcanske eko-feministicne etike zacnem z bese­dami Heather Eaton, ene izmed pionirk kršcanskega eko-feminizma, ki pravi, da prizadevanje za enakost spolov ni le družbeno-politicno giba­nje in eticna preobrazba. Feminizem skupaj s projekti spolne raznoli­kosti, po njenem mnenju, predstavlja zgodovinsko revolucijo zavesti in verjetno najvecji premik zavesti od neolitske revolucije. (Eaton 2017, 331) V okoljskem diskurzu se ekofeminizem (zacetnica sekularne­ga ekofeminizma - Francois d’Eaubonne leta 1974) uvršca med tako imenovane radikalne (revolucionarne) zelene teorije, ob bok globoki ekologiji in socialni ekologiji. Tako kot vse druge radikalne zelene te­orije se tudi ekofeminizem zavzema za temeljne družbene, politicne in ekonomske spremembe, za spremembe znotraj celotne miselne paradigme. Ekofeministke zato obicajno poudarjajo moralno kritiko sodobnih industrijskih družb ter izkorišcevalski znacaj neoliberalne­ga kapitalizma in potrošniške družbe. Ekofeminizmi zahtevajo globlje vrednote, kar posledicno pomeni korenite družbene, politicne in go-spodarske spremembe. V nasprotju z mehkejšimi pristopi k okoljskim problemom, ki zagovarjajo »upravljavske in tehnološke« rešitve in se osredotocajo le na obravnavo simptomov okoljske krize in poskuša­jo ublažiti posledice pretiranega poseganja v naravo, ekofeminizem obravnava okoljsko oziroma ekološko krizo kot posledico. neeticnega in neprimernega odnosa, ki ga imamo ljudje do narave in okolja, od­nosa, ki je deloma posledica ucinkov paradigme hierarhicnih kartezi­janskih binaristicnih dualizmov ... (Furlan Štante 2014, 9 - 11) Kršcanski ekofeminizem je oblika religijske oziroma teološke okoljske feministicne etike, ki ostaja znotraj kršcanske misli. Po eni strani kršcanski ekofeminizem povezuje zatiranje žensk, živali in narave kot simbolno, strukturno in politicno podobno, ker sta (bili) ženska in narava izkorišceni, zlorabljani. Ceprav ekofeministke niso monolitno gibanje, so enotne v prepricanju, da obstajajo po­membne povezave med izkorišcanjem žensk in narave. Transhumanisticna etika – konceptualni oris Transhumanizem in posthumanizem sta sorodni filozofski gibanji, ki sta tesno povezani s tehnološkim razvojem in posledicnimi novi-mi možnostmi, ki jih ponuja tehnološki razvoj prihodnosti. Posthu­manizem trdi, da obstaja naslednja stopnja cloveške evolucije, na kateri bodo ljudje postali postcloveški zaradi calovekove interakci­je s tehnologijo in povezave z njo. Transhumanizem po drugi strani spodbuja vrednote, ki prispevajo k tej spremembi. Transhumani­zem ima za cilj posthumanizem in oba v veliki meri temeljita na potencialu, ki ga ponuja tehnologija. Na nek nacin transhumani­zem zagotavlja razmišljanje in metodo za premik k posthumaniz-mu. Transhumanizem vodi v posthumanizem. (Shatzer 2019, 12) Imata skupen vrednostni sistem in v tem prispevku se sklicujem predvsem na transhumanizem, obcasno pa zaradi omenjene pove­zave med njima tudi na posthumanizem. Dorcas Cheng-Tozun opredeljuje transhumanizem kot »vero v tehnologijo, da se z njeno pomocjo mocno okrepijo sposobnosti lju­di«. (Cheng-Tozun 2016) “Naceloma zavraca nadnaravno, ceprav je, kot ugotavlja Jacob Shatzer, tudi v okviru transhumanizma zaznati sledi transcendence. (Shatzer 2019, 22) Lahko bi rekli, da se »tran-shumanizem v svojih skrajnih oblikah predstavlja kot nadomestek vsega, kar clovek išce v razlicnih oblikah religioznosti«. (Stegu 2019, 683) Namesto transcendence transhumanizem poudarja, da odkri­vamo pomen in etiko prek razuma, napredka in vrednosti samega obstoja. Transhumanizem torej v prvi vrsti poudarja vecni napredek. Transhumanisti vedno želijo vec: vec inteligence, vec življenja, vec izkušenj. Ta želja se pojavi na individualni ravni preko principa sa­mopreobrazbe, kar pomeni potrjevanje nenehnega eticnega, intelek­tualnega in fizicnega samoizboljševanja s kriticnim in ustvarjalnim razmišljanjem, nenehnim ucenjem, osebno odgovornostjo, proaktiv­nostjo in eksperimentiranjem. (More 2013, 5) Mnogi transhumanisticni vizionarji so se osredotocili predvsem na tehnologijo. Pomemben cilj je (bil) razvoj vecje cloveške inteli­gence in napovedi o prihodu superinteligentne umetne inteligence. Ta superinteligenca bi lahko spodbudila pospeševanje tehnološke­ga napredka in prehitela, nadgradila in celo nadomestila ljudi. Znan­stveniki to idejo imenujejo singularnost. Vendar singularnost ni ab-solutno kljucna za vse oblike transhumanizma. (Shatzer 2019, 47) Transhumanizem problematizira sedanje razumevanje cloveka ne nujno skozi njegovo preteklo in sedanjo dedišcino, temvec skozi možnosti, ki so vpisane v njegove možne biološke in tehnološke da­nosti in evolucijo. Cloveško izboljšanje je kljucni pojem transhuma­nisticne refleksije. Glavni kljuci za dostop do takšnega cilja so v zna­nosti in tehnologiji in so opredeljeni v vseh svojih spremenljivkah kot obstojeci, nastajajoci in špekulativni okviri – od regenerativne medicine do nanotehnologije, radikalnega podaljševanja življenja, nalaganja uma in krionike (praksa ali tehnika globokega zamrzova­nja teles pravkar umrlih ljudi, v upanju, da bi znanstveni napredek lahko omogocil njihovo oživitev v prihodnosti). V transhumanizmu sobivajo razlicni tokovi in smeri le-tega, kot so: libertarijanski tran­shumanizem, demokraticni transhumanizem in ekstropizem. Znanost in tehnologija sta glavni sredstvi in skupni povezoval­ni clen vseh navedenih smeri transhumanizma, vendar z razlicnimi poudarki. Libertarni transhumanizem zagovarja prosti trg kot naj­boljšega poroka pravice do clovekovega izboljšanja. Demokraticni transhumanizem zahteva enak dostop do tehnoloških izboljšav, ki bi sicer lahko bile omejene na dolocene družbenopoliticne razrede in povezane z ekonomsko mocjo, posledicno pa bi kodirale rasno in spolno politiko. Nacela ekstropianizma je njegov ustanovitelj Max More zacrtal kot: vecni napredek, samopreobrazba, prakticni opti­mizem, inteligentna tehnologija, odprta družba (informacije in de­mokracija), samousmerjanje in racionalno razmišljanje. Poudarek na pojmih, kot so racionalnost, napredek in optimizem, je v skla­du z dejstvom, da transhumanizem, filozofsko gledano, korenini v razsvetljenstvu in zato ne opusti racionalnega humanizma. V tem okviru, lahko transhumanizem opredelimo kot »ultrahumanizem«. Vendar je le-to lahko precej zavajajoce oziroma sporno. Saj tran­shumanisticno vztrajnje pri priznavanju znanosti in tehnologije kot glavne prednosti preoblikovanja cloveka tvega tehnoredukcio­nizem in tehnocentrizem: tehnologija postane hierarhicni projekt, ki temelji na racionalnem razmišljanju, usmerjenem v napredek. Zgodovinska in ontološka razsežnost tehnologije je kljucno vprašanje, ko gre za pravilno razumevanje postcloveške/posthu-mane agende; vendar posthumanizem tehnologije ne spreminja v svoj glavni fokus, kar bi njegov lastni teoreticni poskus reducira-lo na obliko esencializma in tehnoredukcionizma. Tehnologija ni niti “drugo”, cesar se je treba bati in se ji upirati, niti ne ohranja skoraj božanskih lastnosti, ki ji jih pripisujejo nekateri transhuma­nisti (na primer z naslavljanjem tehnologije kot zunanjega vira ki bi cloveštvu lahko zagotovila mesto v post-biološki prihodnosti). Skupne tocke, napetosti/razlike Medtem ko poskušamo potegniti nekaj skupnih tock in hkrati opozoriti na podrocja napetosti in razlik med kršcansko ekofemi­nisticno etiko in transhumanisticno etiko, moramo upoštevati nju-no kompleksno notranjo raznolikost: saj niti kršcanski ekofemini­zem niti transhumanizem nista monolitna pojava. Oba vsebujeta vrsto razlicnih tokov, oblik, smeri in je zato nedosledno govoriti o katerem koli izmed njih v posploševalni ednini, brez zavedanja in upoštevanja omenjene pestre notranje raznolikosti obeh. V tem okviru bomo poskusili izlušciti nekaj njunih kljucnih skupnih tock in hkrati opozoriti na tocke napetosti in razlikovanja. Interdisciplinarnost Interdisciplinarnost je vsekakor ena izmed ocitnejših skupnih tock (kršcanskega) ekofeminizma in transhumanizma. Heather Eaton interdisciplinarno naravnanost ekofeminizmov primerja s »presecišcem, križišcem vecih poti«, saj po njenem mne­nju ljudje v ekofeminizem vstopajo iz razlicnih smeri, podrocji, ved in delovanj in le-te posledicno oplajajo z ekofeministicno etiko. (Eaton 2005, 12) A ne glede na pestro raznolikost posameznih vrst in oblik ekofeminizma, ki izhaja iz številnih disciplin in pristo­pov (od humanistike, družboslovja, naravoslovja, okoljskih študij in tehnologije do politicnega aktivizma ...), je vsem skupno zave­danje, da je nemogoce rešiti ekološko vprašanje, ne da bi hkrati vkljucili feministicno vprašanje in obratno. Skupni element femi­nizma in ekologije je torej boj za osvoboditev izpod spon kulturne­ga in gospodarskega zatiranja in izkorišcanja v smeri izboljšanja cloveškega in ekološkega stanja. Povezava med zlorabo naravnega sveta in zatiranjem žensk je torej kljucna in skupna tocka vseh vrst ekofeminizma, ki si prizadeva za izboljšanje cloveškega stanja Nick Bostrom pravi, da transhumanizem spodbuja interdiscipli­narni pristop k razumevanju in vrednotenju priložnosti za izbolj­šanje clovekovega stanja in cloveškega organizma, ki se odpira z napredkom tehnologije. Pozornost je namenjena tako trenutnim tehnologijam, kot sta genski inženiring in informacijska tehnolo­gija, kot tudi pricakovanim prihodnjim, kot sta molekularna nano­tehnologija in umetna inteligenca. Interdisciplinarnost v transhu­manizmu je usmerjena na optimisticno prepricanje v izboljšanje cloveškega stanja s tehnologijo v vseh njenih oblikah. Zagovorniki transhumanizma iz razlicnih podrocji, ved in disciplin verjamejo v temeljno izboljšanje clovekovega stanja s pomocjo uporabnega razuma in telesnega sprejemanja novih tehnologij. (Bostrom 2005) Obema je torej skupna interdisciplinarnost, kot ucinkovito orodje za doseganje koncnih ciljev, ki pa se pri obeh precej raz­likujeta, kot bomo podrobneje videli v nadaljevanju. Medtem, ko si oba, tako ekofeminizem kot transhumanizem prizadevata za iz­boljšanje clovekovega stanja, pa se izrazito razlikujeta v metodah, orodjih in poteh, do željenega cilja. Anti-dualizem in novi metanarativi Kršcanski ekofeminizem iz perspektive teologije osvoboditve, natancneje s feministicnega somatskega in ekološkega vidika, poda kritiko osnovnih binaristicnih dualizmov, katerih izvor pri­pisuje apokalipticno-platonski zapušcini klasicnega kršcanstva. Ti vkljucujejo odtujenost uma od telesa; subjektivnega jaza iz objektivnega sveta; subjektivni umik in odtujenost posameznika od širše cloveške in družbene mreže; prevlado duha nad naravo. V tem kontekstu je clovekov imperialisticni odnos do živali, rastlin, okolja in narave pod vplivom kartezijanske dualisticne paradigme okrepil hierarhicno binaristicno znacajnost, katere odraz je nadvla­da substancialnega (clovek: gospodar) nad tako oznacenim nesub­stancialnim (narava, živali, rastline: popredmeteni brez intrinzicne vrednosti …). Enako se je okrepila tudi paradigma locenosti posa­meznika od celote, cloveka od narave. Model cloveka v vlogi nad­rejenega gospodarja, ki je naravo docela popredmetil in kot »krona stvarstva« naravo poseduje, brezobzirno izkorišca naravne vire, jih pustoši in mehanicisticno zlorablja, je postal vzorcni model odnosa med clovekom in naravo. S tem, ko naravi odvzamemo intrinzicno vrednost, je odnos clovek-narava mehanicisticno in popredmeteno razvrednoten. (Furlan Štante 2015, 211) Kršcanska tradicija je (z ekofeministicnega vidika) prispevala vec problematicnih podob in simbolov, ki so se utrdili in preživeli v obliki stereotipov in predsodkov ter se ukoreninili v zapušcini zahodne filozofsko-religiozne misli. Vse vrste teološkega ekofemi­nizma si prizadevajo za dekonstrukcijo patriarhalne paradigme iz­korišcanja, nadvlade, metodologije in mišljenja. Poskušajo dekon­struirati celotno paradigmo prevlade moškega nad žensko, duha nad telesom, nebes nad zemljo, transcendentnega nad imanen­tnim, moškega Boga, ki je odtujen in vlada vsemu stvarstvu, in vse to nadomestiti z novimi alternativami oz. novimi metapripovedmi. Z vidika transhumanizma je tehnologija vec kot funkcionalno orodje za pridobivanje (energije; bolj sofisticirane tehnologije ali celo nesmrtnosti), v posthumanisticno razpravo pride s posredovanjem feminizma, zlasti s kiborgom Donne Haraway in njene dekonstrukcije strogih binaristicnih dualizmov in in meja, kot je npr. med clovekom in živalmi, biološkimi organizmi in stroji, fizicnim in nefizicnim; in koncno meja med tehnologijo in jazom. (Ferrando 2013, 28) Kiborg Donne Haraway je, kot utemeljuje Valerija Vendramin, »kiberneticni organizem, križanec med strojem in organizmom, bitje družbene stvarnosti in hkrati fiktivno bitje. Nikoli ne gre za ali – ali, ampak je vedno oboje. Kiborg je ironicni politicni mit in hkra-ti tudi tocka, kjer je vedno na delu neka dvoumnost med dobesed­nim in figurativnim. Kiborga je sicer transhumanisticno gibanje, ki bi s pomocjo tehnologije rado premagalo naše biološke omejitve, posvojilo oziroma si ga prisvojilo.« (Vendramin 2020) A glavni na-men te figuracije prav gotovo ni vpogled v sintezo cloveka in stro­ja kot danes aktualnega transhumanisticnega pojava – kiborg je v prvi vrsti metafora. In prav metafora je pogosto najboljše sredstvo za konceptualni prehod, spremembo ali premik k drugi perspek­tivi. Tovrsten program razume nesorazmerja teh dvojnosti ter jih poskuša premisliti in razgraditi oziroma opozoriti na njihovo vred­nostno lestvico. Manifest Donne Haraway odpira nove perspektive na sodobna razmerja med živalmi, tehnologijo in ljudmi. Prebojna knjiga Donne Haraway Opice, kiborgi in ženske, v kateri je kasne­je izšel tudi Manifest, je mišljena kot svarilna pripoved o evoluciji teles, politike in zgodb – in sem sodijo zgodbe o naravi, opicah, kiborgih, spolu in epistemologijah, hkrati pa knjiga tudi utemeljuje pravico do ustvarjanja drugacnih, manj sovražnih zgodb o naravi in družbi. (Vendramin 2020) V okviru transhumanizma konkretneje posthumanizma je an-tidualizem izhodišce za rekonceptualizacijo materije. Dualizem pride v ospredje kot strukturno nacelo transcendentalnih in huma­nisticnih tradicij, ki jih želita transhumanizem in posthumanizem spremeniti. (Dolphijn in van der Tuin 2012, 156) Posthumanizem kot filozofsko kotlišce omogoca razmišljanje onkraj dualisticnih, hierar­hicnih konceptov v smeri razširitve fokusa na necloveško podrocje v postdualisticnih, posthierarhicnih nacinih, s cimer se omogoc misli-ti post-cloveško, post-humano prihodnost, kar posledicno radikalno razširi meje cloveške domišljije. Posthumanisticno razmišljanje in raziskovanje zahtevata, premišljanje onkraj antropocentricne misel­nosti, onkraj dualizmov, preizpraševanje samoumevnega (nevidne­ga ali pozabljenega), transformacijo univerzalisticnega mišljenja (da smo vsi enaki) in zavracanje hierarhije moci. V središce stopi obravnava postcloveških subjektov, subjektivitet, ki so v nenehnem nastajanju, so-postajanju (proti temu, kar bi lahko bilo; virtualno), namesto fiksnih identitet. (Francesca Ferrnando 2013, 31) V tem kontekstu se posthumanizem sreca z novim materia­lizmom Rosi Braidotti, ki transformacijo dualizmov izpostavi kot glavni focus razvoja alternativ onkraj binaristicnih opozicij, pri ce-mer analizira inherentne paradokse, ki jih ustvarja dualizem. »Novi materializem sestavlja filozofijo razlike ali imanence z delovanjem ali ‘prehodom’ dualizmov, ki tvorijo hrbtenico modernisticne misli« (Dolphijn in van der Tuin 2012, 86). Pravzaprav Braidotti svojo nomadsko misel artikulira kot materialisticni pristop k filozofiji, ki temelji na monisticni viziji materije v nasprotju z dihotomnimi in dualisticnimi nacini mišljenja (Braidotti 2011, 3). Njena nomadska misel je fizicna, materialna, pa tudi spekulativna in etericna: zato želi zgraditi teorijo, ki omogoca pozitiven prikaz razlike, postaja-nje-nomad, ki ruši glavne binaristicne dualizme (Braidotti 2011, 3). Propad binarizmov bo, kot pravi razveljavil dualisticni nacin in prerazporedil razmerja moci med obema stranema dihotomije (Braidotti 2011, 42). Medtem ko se ekofeminizem osredinja na dekonstrukcijo bi­ naristicnih dualizmov, transhumanizem razume dualizem skoraj kot pojem preteklosti, ki jo je treba pustiti za seboj. Za oba pa so dualizmi in njihova dekonstrukcija pomemben del njune kriticne konceptualizacije sveta. Izboljšanje cloveka V jedru kršcanske ekofeministicne misli leži ideal metanoje (Rosemary Radford Ruether 1992, Eaton …, Gebara 1999) – spre­membe zavesti v clovekovem odnosu do in z naravo. Izboljša­nje cloveka je razumljeno v smislu clovekove osebne rasti preko odgovorne odlocitve, notranje spremembe, preobrazbe posame­znika/ce, v smeri ekološke senzibilizacije in pripoznanja intrin­zicne vrednosti narave in ekološke pismenosti. Gre torej za spremembo nacina življenja, ki je posledica zavestne odlocitve ali duhovnega spreobrnjenja, torej popolna sprememba razuma in srca, ki zavraca vse nadvlade izkorišcanja in hierarhicnih bi-narizmov. Le-ta posledicno vodi do paradigme, manj je vec (v smislu potrošništva) in odgovornega skrbstva naravnih resur­sov. Za ekofeministicno paradigmo da je transformacija nega­tivnih stereotipov, ki obnavljajo nadvlado v nove metanarative, ki potrjujejo ekocentricni egalitarizem, naslednji korak evolu­cije cloveških in medvrstnih odnosov v mreži življenja. Tako je tudi izboljšanje cloveka Transhumanisti gledajo na cloveško naravo kot na delo v nas­tajanju, kot na pol pripravljen zacetek, ki se ga lahko naucimo preoblikovati na želene nacine. Sedanje cloveštvo ni nujno, da je koncna tocka evolucije. Transhumanisti upajo, da nam bo z od­govorno uporabo znanosti, tehnologije in drugih racionalnih sredstev scasoma uspelo postati post-clovek, bitje z veliko vecjimi zmožnostmi, kot jih imajo sedanji ljudje. Transhumanizem torej poudarja vecni napredek. Transhuma­nisti vedno želijo vec: vec inteligence, vec življenja, vec izkušenj. Ta želja se pojavi na individualni ravni prek drugega principa, sa­mopreobrazbe, kar pomeni »potrjevanje nenehnega eticnega, inte­lektualnega in fizicnega samoizboljševanja s kriticnim in ustvar­jalnim razmišljanjem, nenehnim ucenjem, osebna odgovornostjo, proaktivnostjo in eksperimentiranjem. Možnosti clovekovega izboljšanja vkljucuje radikalno podaljša­nje cloveškega zdravja, izkoreninjenje bolezni, odpravo nepotreb­nega trpljenja in povecanje cloveških intelektualnih, fizicnih in custvenih zmogljivosti. Druge transhumanisticne teme vkljucuje­jo kolonizacijo vesolja in možnost ustvarjanja superinteligentnih strojev, skupaj z drugim potencialnim razvojem, ki bi lahko globo­ko spremenil cloveško stanje. Clovekovo izboljšanje je tako tesno vezano na tehnološki razvoj, ki ni omejen na pripomocke in me-dicino, ampak zajema tudi ekonomske, družbene, institucionalne zasnove, kulturni razvoj ter psihološke vešcine in tehnike. Esencializem/antiesencializem Ekofeminizem ni brez kritik, tako s strani razlicnih smeri ekofe­minizma kot drugih. Nekatere najbolj gorece kritike dvomijo o tesnejši povezavi med žensko in naravo, ki je postavljena v samo jedro ekofeminizma. Zaradi mocne povezave med žensko in naravo, ki se je uveljavila in razvila v nekaterih ekofeministic­nih okvirih, se razlicne feministke distancirajo od ekofeminiz-ma in namigujejo, da je esencialisticne narave. Napetost znotraj ekofeminizma glede esencializma je mocna: predpostavka kul­turih ekofeministk o ženskem bistvu, ki naj bi bilo bližje naravi, je v nasprotju s kritiko esencializma kot izkljucujocega elemen­ta, ki zatira tako ženske kot naravo, ki izhaja iz patriarhata, kapi­talizma in imperializma. To napetost je mogoce razložiti z dejstvom, da v ekofeminiz-mu sobivajo številni smeri, ki segajo od duhovnega ekofeminizma, marksisticnega ekofeminizma, kiborškega ekofeminizma, Ekofeminizem kriticno analizira vzporednice med zatiranjem narave in zatiranjem žensk, da bi poudaril idejo, da je treba obo­je kriticno razumeti, da bi pravilno prepoznali, kako in v cem sta povezani. Te vzporednice vkljucujejo, vendar niso omejene na, ra­zumevanje žensk in narave kot lastnine, razumevanje moških kot kustosov kulture in žensk kot kustosinj narave ter kako moški pre­vladujejo nad ženskami in ljudje prevladujejo nad naravo. Anne Primavesi jasno povzema pasti in nevarnosti univerzalizacije od­nosa med ženskami, naravo in kulturo: Meja med naravo in kulturo je še vedno mesto napetosti znot-raj ekofeminizma. Po eni strani so tisti, ki zavracajo vsakršno esencialisticno predstavo o odnosu med ženskami in naravo, saj v tem vidijo dogovarjanje s patriarhalnim konstruktom, po katerem se ženske identificirajo z naravo, da bi jih izkljucili iz kulture. Po drugi strani pa nekateri to vidijo kot odnos, ki ga je treba spodbujati, ki lahko služi kot katalizator za novo zavest, ki je sposobna zaustaviti destruktivne prakse, ki ogrožajo dobro pocutje življenja na planetu. (Primavesi 1996, 45-46) Dominacija in izkorišcanje narave in žensk s strani (zahodne) industrijske civilizacije se vzajemno krepita in stereotip vzporedni­ce ženske/narave le-to še pospešuje in je mocno usidran v kolek­tivnem spominu naše kulture. Nekateri ekofeminizmi (vcasih ime­novani tudi duhovni ekofeminizmi) trdijo, da je v ideologiji, da so ženske »bližje naravi« nekaj resnice. Pri tem kriticno opozarjajo, da je to bližino izkrivljal patriarhat, da bi uzakonjal moško nadvlado nad ženskami in naravo kot manjvrednima kategorijama. To izkriv­ljanje je po njihovem mnenju zakoreninjeno v bistveni resnici, da so ženske zaradi svoje rojevalne funkcije bolj uglašene z ritmom narave, bolj v stiku s svojim telesom. Ženske morajo zato zahteva-ti to sorodnost z naravo in prevzeti vodilno vlogo pri ustvarjanju nove zemeljske duhovnosti in prakse skrbi za zemljo pod lastnimi pogoji, ne pa kot nasprotno stališce. Novi materialisti želijo radikalno izpodbijati in redefinirati naravo, saj »ne more biti vec skladišce nespremenljivih resnic ali dolocujocih substanc, ampak je sama aktivna, transformirajoca, oznacujoca, materialna sila« (Casselot 2016, 90). Z vztrajanjem pri delovanju materije, njene interakcije s telesi, bodo novi materialisti preoblikovali naravo kot vrsto razlicnih materialnih sil in tokov, ki so v interakciji z utelešenimi bitji v svetu. Novi materialisti tako dekulturalizirajo kulture z napredovanjem novih konceptualizacij narave, ne da bi ji dali deterministicno vlogo. Rosi Braidotti opozarja na ociten antiecencializem saj pravi, da v posthumanizmu referenti drugacnosti niso vec tako preprosti, ker ne sovpadajo vedno s specificnimi utelešenimi znacilnostmi, niso vec preprosti »mejni oznacevalci«. (Braidotti 2013, 40) Brai­dotti meni, da so ti referenti vcasih lahko koristni za politicno organiziranje, v idealnem primeru pa bi se morali odmakniti od njih zaradi notranjega tveganja esencializma. Predmeti niso nikoli doloceni in fiksni; namesto tega je subjekt, na primer ‘ženska’, je vedno vecplasten, kompleksen fenomen, ki ga sestavljajo razlicne spremenljivke; v tem kontekstu je v posthumanizmu zaslediti izra­ziti antiesencializem. Narava Za ekofeministke je zavedanje soodvisnosti in medsebojne pove­zanosti vseh cloveških in naravnih necloveških bitij, narave, okolja itd. kljucna in postavlja ekocentricni egalitarizem kot temeljno in izhodišcno tocko etike medosebnih odnosov (v smislu medseboj­no povezanih ekosistemov). Za Karen J. Warren je ekofeministicna kritika patriarhata vsebovana v nacelih ekologije: Vse je medseboj-no povezano z vsem drugim; vsi deli ekosistema imajo enako vred­nost. Za ekofeminizem je totrej etika medsebojne soodvisnosti, ki je dosežena po poti metanoje – individualne samospremembe srca in razuma kljucen izraz pripoznavanja intrinzicne vrednosti nara­ve. Iz tega eticnega nacela posledicno izhaja temeljna clovekova odgovornost do narave v smislu cloveškega ekološkega skrbstva ohranjanja narave. Pri tem je pomemben eticni imperative socutne­ga, ekološkega skrbstva narave. Ljudje bi morali biti božji skrbniki narave, ki bi preprecevali njeno zlorabo in unicevanje. Pravzaprav tudi beseda, ki oznacuje prvega cloveka – Adam (hebr. ADAMAH) pomeni prst in nakazuje snov iz katere je (po zgodbi o stvarjenju) narejen clovek. Prav tako naj bi clovek s sesalci delil enako toplo kri, kar naj bi bil razlog zakaj naj bi bilo cloveku po zgodbi stvarjenja, prepovedano jesti meso. Vse-to predpostavlja globoko medsebojno povezanost cloveka z zemljo oziroma naravo in z ne-cloveškimi bit-ji. Razumevanje ženske (in clovekove) identitete je v kontekstu te­ološkega eko-feminizma tako osredotoceno vzdolž eticnega princi-pa temeljne medsebojne povezanosti vseh enakovrednih cloveških bitij in narave v mreži življenja. (Furlan Štante 2012, 115) Mercedes Canas to temeljno medsebojno soodvisnost in povezanost opiše s sledecimi besedami: »Življenje na Zemlji je medsebojno soodvisno povezana mreža in nobena hierarhicna nadvlada cloveka nad na­ravo, nobena vrsta dominacije v tem kontekstu ne najde prostora. Zdrav, harmonicen ekosistem, ki vkljucuje tako cloveške kot tudi ne-cloveške prebivalce, mora vzdrževati in ohranjati svojo pestro, enakovredno raznolikost.« (Canas 1996, 27) Namesto patrairhalnega androcentrizma in matriarhalnega utopizma je v osrednji položaj postavljen kozmicni ekološki egali­tarizem. Za razliko od androcentricne patriarhalne teologije, ki po­sledicno širi odnose dominacije in izkljucevanja, je ekofeministicna teologija, ki se osredotoca na kozmicni organski egalitarizem, teolo­gija intrinzicnega pripoznavanja cloveškega in naravnega drugega. Kot taka poziva vse institucionalizirane religije in duhovne prakse, naj diskriminatorne paradigme zamenjajo z izgubljenimi podobami in simboli, na primer: umevanja univerzuma in narave kot Božjega telesa (Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sally McFague), ki je bila znacil­na metafora (sicer v raznolikih oblikah) ter središcna podoba senzi­bilnosti zahodnega (mediteranskega) sveta. Zamenjal jo je namrec mehanicisticni model pogleda na svet v sedemnajstem stoletju (Ca­rol Merchant in Vandana Shiva). (Furlan Štante 2012, 108) Medtem, ko ekofeminizem poudarja moc sodelovanja razlicnih ekosistemov biotskega obcestva (ob tem clovek nosi najvecjo od­govornost, a ne v smislu negativnega stereotipa krone stvarstva, ampak poudarja imperativ odgovornega skrbstva in življenja z nara­vo), transhumanizem naravo razume kot tiststo, ki jo mora prema­gati, obvladati – torej deluje po principu moci nad. Rod Dreher na­mrec ugotavlja, da bi bile izjave o solidarnosti, soglasju in skupnih vrednotah v transhumanizmu, na koncu žrtvovane na oltarju izbire posameznika. Saj naj bi tehnološki clovek štel za napredek vse, kar širi njegove izbire in mu dajevec moci nad naravo. (Dreher 2017, 223) Transhumanizem namrec poziva, k locitvi ljudi od narave, saj izhaja iz predpostavke, da je najucinkovitejši nacin za prenehanje trpljenja, v tem, da se je znebimo biološkega substrata, ki povzro-ca trpljenja ali hibo in zato v njem vidi le breme. Ves pomen in vsi cilji so v transhumanizmu položeni v roke tehno-znanstve­ne utopije, ki se opira na neomejeno cloveško plasticnost in brez kakršne koli utemeljitve zavraca možnost nepopravljivega in koncnega. Narava je razumljena kot nepredvidljiva in nepopolna in prav zato jo je potrebno obvladati, podjarmiti oziroma ji gospo­dovati oziroma jo izpopolniti. V posthumanisticnih ekokriticnih analizah se soocamo s tem, kako je clovek potopljen v necloveške zanke in kako literatura, bio-logija, kemija, tehnologija, estetika in politika postanejo nelocljive od materialnih mrež in tvorijo naravni kulturni (Donna Haraway) prostor kot preplet znanosti in književnosti. Delo Donne Haraway Opice, kiborgi in ženske: reinvencija narave, je bila deloma tudi pro-vokacija, namenjena tistim (eko)feministkam, ki so ženske videle bolj v sozvocju z naravo in v nasprotju s tehnologijo (Hayles 2006), morda celo v smislu krilatice »nazaj k naravi«. Posthumana ekokritika se ukvarja tudi z družbenimi, poli-ticnimi in eticnimi posledicami hibridnih življenjskih oblik in opozarja na ambivalentne eticne vložke nekaterih novih dogod­kov; na primer nacrtovanje novega življenja z anorganskimi ali sinteticnimi snovmi, kot že poskušajo današnje nanotehnologije (Oppermann 2016). Tehnologija Ekofeminizem je pretežno dvomljiv v razmerju do tehnologije in trdi, da nas le-ta dodatno locuje od naravnih nacinov spoznavanja in interakcije z naravo, Neekatere ekofeministicne paradigme kljub kritiki antropocen­trizma ostajajo v njegovem paradigmatskem objemu (Plumwood, Merchant, Warren), medtem ko posthumanizem pretežno orien­tira v anti-antropocentricnosti razumevanja sveta. V zvezi s tem je vprašanje pripoznanja intrinzicne vrednosti kljucnega pomena za dosledno razlikovanje pozicij in paradigem. Medtem, ko vecina teoloških ekofeminizmov pripoznava intrinzicno vrednost živim necloveškim, naravnim bitjem (živalnim, naravi), posthumanizem in transhumanizem aktivno dejavnost pripoznava tudi anorgan-skim, inertnim snovem in posledicno tudi s strani cloveka ustvar­jenim, nenaravnim predmetom (Bennett 2010, 55). Nekatera ekofeministicna protitehnološka stališca kriticno razu­mejo tehnologijo kot mocno seksisticno orodje, ki ženske in naravo zatirajo in jima poskušajo nadvladati tako, da jih objektivizirajo in izkorišcajo na podobne nacine. Druge ekofeministke pa opozarjajo na možnost razumevanja tehnologije kot nevtralnega orodja, ki bi bilo lahko ob ustrezni kriticni analizi tudi emancipatorno uporabno. V tem kontekstu lahko v smeri premika k novemu materia­lizmu razumemo misel Donne Haraway: “Raje bi bila kiborg kot boginja”, v smislu, da bi morali tehnologijo integrirati v naš kon­cept subjektivnosti, ker se je ne moremo znebiti, ne da bi se zne­bili sebe. Novi materializem se v tej smeri zanima za interakcije snovi in tehnologije, predvsem pa, kako le-ta spreminja in vpliva na naše dojemanje in delovanje. Novi materializem ima za razliko od ekofeminizma bolj odprto stališce do tehnologije, saj teoretizi­ra postcloveško in transcloveško ter presega tradicionalne teorije cloveškega subjekta. Posthumanizem ugotavlja, kako inteligentna tehnologija in ljudje postajajo vse bolj prepleteni, medtem ko je transhumanizem »projekt spreminjanja cloveške vrste s kakršno koli nastajajoco znanostjo« (Casselot 2016, 87). Rosi Braidotti meni, da so »meje med kategorijami naravnega in kulturnega premak­njene in v veliki meri zabrisane zaradi ucinkov znanstvenega in tehnološkega napredka« (Braidotti 2013, 3). Z vidika transhumanizma, prehod s humanizma v posthuma­nizem zahteva integracijo in ne omalovaževanje tehnologije: po­membno je priznati, da je tehnologija že del naše identitete in našega vsakdanjega življenja ter da nenehno vpliva in spreminja naše iden­titete. Pri tem je potrebna velika, kriticna previdnost zasledovanja morebitnih negativnih vplivov tehnologije, ki lahko v marsikaterem segmentu povzroci sistematicna zatiranja. Saj (je) tehnologija kot takšna (za enkrat še v domeni cloveka in) lahko postane ucinkovito orodje zatiranja in neenakosti cloveške vrste in narave. Zakljucek V tem prispevku sem preko kratke analize razhajanj in sticnih tock poskusila izpostaviti, da je združevanje kršcanske eko-feministicne etike in transhumanisticne etike nujen projekt, saj lahko kršcan-ski ekofeminizem ponudi kriticne vpoglede v transhumanizem in posthumanizem, zlasti ko gre za analizo zatiranja ucinkov in zati­ralskih struktur transhumanizma, posthumanizma oziroma tehno­logije na ljudi, naravo. (Teološki) ekofeminizem in transhzumani­zem imata skupen interes za preseganje binaristicnih dualizmov in interdisciplinarnost. Razhajata pa se glede konceptualizacije esencializma, narave in tehnologije ter eticnih in koncnih ciljev in oblik clovekovega izboljšanja ter seveda metod. Izraelski kriticni zgodovinar in pisatelj Yuval Noah Harari, v knjigi Homo deus – kratka zgodovina prihodnosti predvideva, da se bo clovek prihodnosti moral soociti s svojo odvecnostjo, saj nje-govo/no vlogo prevzemajo roboti in algoritmi, in ga zatorej caka lastno preoblikovanje v samega boga. Izpostavi, da se bo homo sa­piens verjetno nadgrajeval korak za korakom in se pri tem združil z roboti in racunalniki, dokler se naši potomci ne ozrejo nazaj in ne ugotovijo, da niso vec taka žival, ki je pisala Sveto pismo, gradila Veliki kitajski zid in se smejala komedijam Charlieja Chaplina. To se ne bo zgodilo v enem dnevu ali letu. Dejansko se to dogaja že zdaj, z neštetimi vsakdanjimi dejanji. Vsak dan se na milijone ljudi odloci, da podelijo pametnim telefonom nekoliko vec nadzora nad svojim življenjem ali poskusijo novi in ucinkovitejšim antidepre­siv. V iskanju zdravja, srece in moci bodo ljudje postopoma spre­minjali najprej eno svojo lastnost, nato drugo in še eno, dokler ne bodo vec ljudje. (Harari 2017, 49) Pri tem je teološki ekofeminizem, ki opozarja na notranjo eko­loško preobrazbo, ki posledicno pomeni dvig osebnostne rasti in bolj zdrav odnos do samega sebe, do socloveka in narave (narav­nih necloveških bitij) ter trezen odnos do tehnologije, ki mora biti vedno v službi cloveka in narave. Paradigmatski premik, ki pou­darja odgovorno sožitje sobivanja razlicnih ekosistemov, odgovor-no clovekovo “upravljanje” z naravnimi viri ter kriticno uporabo tehnologije v namen ohranjanja ravnovesja med naravnimi ekosi­stemi. Poudarja pomen intrinzicne vrednosti narave in clovekove biti, ki je v transhumanizmu in posthumanizmu zabrisana v fuziji narave, stroja in cloveka. Tehnološko preoblikovanje cloveka, narave in družbe je pro­cess, ki je že tu med nami in se dogaja tukaj in sedaj, nam na oceh – tako ociten, da je v tej svoji ocitnosti paradoksalno povsem prikrit. Prav to je nevarnost, da sodobni clovek v fuziji komoditet pozabi na pomen svoje clovecnosti, humanosti, ki bi ga v esenci morala izpopolnjevati v smeri eticnega socutja. Ekofeminizem je v casu pospešene digitalne kulture svetilnik temeljne socutne humanosti in clovecnosti v polnem pomenu besede, ki pojem humanost razu-me onkraj hierarhicnih binaristicnih androcentrizmov. Sodobnemu svetu tako transhumanizem kot teološki ekofemi­nizem ponujata vizije boljšega sveta. Prvi, ki sledi veri v cloveški razum in znanstveni napredek, trdi, da bo razvoj ustrezne tehno­logije vodil v svet z manj trpljenja in vec svobode za posamezni­ke/ce in skupnosti, da dosežejo svoj potencial. Drugi pogled pa meni, da sprememba srca in razuma v smeri empaticne odgovor­nosti do samega sebe, do drugega in narave predstavlja nujen korak za ohranitev cloveške in drugih naravnih vrst. Le-ta zago­tavlja osnovo za družbeno preobrazbo, ki je deloma dosežena z razvojem novih skupnosti sobivanja in vedenja, oblikovanega z Božjo nenehno ustvarjalno navzocnostjo v svetu. Pri tem je pot-rebno zavedanje, izpostavljeno s strani Karin Michelle Barad, ki v zvezi z novimi konfiguracijami sveta v posthumanisticni per-spektivi pravi: Ceprav robotske tehnologije, genetski inženiring, kibernetski mehanizmi, in biotehnološki razvoj kažejo na hiter napredek onkraj alarmantnih in spekulativnih nacinov k bolj konkretne-mu zanikanju cloveškega nadzora, ne gre za temeljno vprašanje posthumanizma v smeri nadomestitve cloveka in vzpostavitve robotske kulture, ampak v smeri priznavanja cloveka kot sood­visnega dela materialnih konfiguracij sveta »v svojem raznoli­kem postajanju« (Barad 2007, 185). In prav v tem raznolikem postajanju je kriticna (kršcanska) ekofeministicna refleksija izjemnega pomena, da opozarja na po-men ohranjanja strukture cloveškega obstoja, obstoja naravnih vrst in intrinzicne vrednosti naravnih živih bitij. Bibliografija BARAD, KAREN. 2007. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quan­tum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning.Dur-ham&London: Duke University Press. BENNETT, JANE. 2010 Vibrant Matter : a Political Ecology of Things, Durham and London: Duke University Press. BRAIDOTTI, ROSI. 2011. Nomadic Theory: The Portable Rosi Brai­dotti, New York: Columbia University Press. BRAIDOTTI, ROSI. 2013. The Posthuman, Cambridge: Polity Press. BOSTROM, NICK. 2005. Transhumanist Values. Dostopno na: https://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/values.html (20.9.2020) CANAS, MARCEDES. 1996. In Us Life Grows. V: Women Healing Earth. New York: Maryknoll, 24-28. CASSELTON, MARIE-ANNE. 2016. Ecofeminist Echos in New Materialism?. PhoenEx 1: 73-96. 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Relations Beyond Anthropocentrism 4(4.1): 23 – 37. SHATZER, JACOB. 2019. Transhumanism and the Image of God. Illinois: IVP Academic. STEGU, TADEJ. 2019.Transhumanizem in kršcanska antropologi­ja. Bogoslovni vestnik 79(3): 683 – 692. THOMPSON, JOEL. 2017. Transhumanism: How Far Is Too Far?. The New Bioethics 23(2): 165-182. VENDRAMIN, VALERIJA. 2020. Umetnost pripovedovanja znan­stvenih zgodb: ob 35-letnici »Kiborškega manifesta«. Alternator 55. Dostopno na: https://www.alternator.science/sl/daljse/umet­nost-pripovedovanja-znanstvenih-zgodb-ob-35-letnici-kiborske­ga-manifesta/(10.9.2021) Monitor ISH (2021), XXIII/1, 180–202 Izvirni znanstveni clanek Original scientific article Irena Avsenik Nabergoj1 Temeljne vrline v Evropski duhovni zgodovini ter njihova vloga v sodobnem casu Izvlecek: Vrednote in vrline imajo osrednjo vlogo v clovekovem življenju, saj vsebujejo naše mišljenje o tem, kaj je dobro in prav in za kaj si je vredno prizadevati. Brez temeljnih vrednot in vrlin ni mogoce razumeti religioznega sveta, v katerem v ospredje sto-pa odnos bogov/Boga do ljudi, odnos ljudi do bogov/Boga in od-nos med ljudmi. Raziskave judovsko-kršcanskih virov in tradicije z vidika vrednot in vrlin so še v zacetni fazi in obravnavani so le nekateri delni vidiki. Raziskovalci s podrocja teologije so se pomenu vrednot in vrlin zaceli bolj posvecati šele v 20. stoletju. Novi izzivi globalizacije in digitalizacije v današnji dobi zahteva­jo iskanje odgovorov na razlicne dileme v dialogu med osebami, religijami in kulturami. Prispevek bo skušal odgovoriti vpraša­nja: Katere vrline so temeljne v judovsko-kršcanskih virih in tra­dicijah? Katere od njih so skupne vrednote in univerzalne norme? Natancno primerjalno raziskovanje starejših virov ter poznejše religiozne in svetne literature lahko zanesljivo pokaže tocke po­dobnosti in razlik med anticnimi civilizacijami in kako so te civi­lizacije vplivale na razvoj evropske religiozne in svetne kulture. Kljucne besede: vrednote, vrline, kreposti in pregrehe, Sveto pis-mo, patristika, filozofija in teologija, sedanja doba 1 Dr. Irena Avsenik Nabergoj deluje kot znanstvena svetnica na Znan­stveno raziskovalnem centru SAZU. E-pošta: irena.avsenik-nabergoj@ zrc-sazu.si. / Irena Avsenik Nabergoj (PhD) is a senior research fellow at Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts 180 Fundamental Virtues in European Spiritual History and Their Role in Modern Times Abstract:Values and virtues play a central role in a person’s life as they contain our thinking about what is good and right and what is worth striving for. Without fundamental values and vir­tues, it is not possible to understand a religious world in which the relationship of gods / God to people, the relationship of people to gods / God and the relationship between people come to the fore. Research on Judeo-Christian sources and traditions in terms of values and virtues is still in its infancy and only some partial aspects are addressed. Researchers in the field of theology did not begin to pay more attention to the importance of values and virtues until the 20th century. The new challenges of globalization and digitalization in today’s age require find­ing answers to various dilemmas in the dialogue between indi­viduals, religions and cultures. The paper will try to answer the questions: What virtues are fundamental in Judeo-Christian sources and traditions? Which of them are common values and universal norms? A careful comparative study of older sourc­es and later religious and secular literature can reliably show points of similarity and difference between ancient civilizations and how these civilizations influenced the developmentofEuro­pean religious and secular culture. Key words: Values, Virtues, Virtues and Vices, The Bible, Patris­tics, Philosophy and Theology, the Current Era Uvod Ljudje smo ustvarjeni tako, da smo bivanjsko naravnani drug na drugega. Le ob dobrih osebnih stikih se lahko razvijamo v celostno in harmonicno osebnost ter živimo polnejše in srecnejše življen­je. V nenehnem iskanju takšnega življenja nam pomaga moralno znanje, ki nas uci moralnega ravnanja, usklajenega z vrednotami in vrlinami. Vrednote odražajo tisto, kar je v kulturi sprejemljivo, vrline pa posamezne cloveške znacilnosti. Vrlina ali krepost je zna-cilnost cloveka, ki se zavzema za individualno moralno odlicnost in kolektivno blaginjo. To so prirojene dobre lastnosti ali morala ljudi, a ne opredeljujejo kolektivne kulture. Vrednote so koristno, zaželeno vedenje, vrline pa so merilo odlicnosti ali dobrote in so za posameznike morda pomembnejše zaradi svoje osebne narave. Vrednota spoštovanja (respect) tako npr. vkljucuje vrsto vrlin: potr­pljenje, toleranco, vljudnost, nepretencioznost, prijaznost, vkljuce­vanje in upoštevanje drugih idr. V svetu storilnostne in ekonomske naravnanosti, v katerem smo pogosto price nehumanosti in nestrpnosti in v katerem množicna digitalizacija izpodriva fizicne osebne stike med ljudmi, je moral-na vzgoja izjemno pomembna. Pozorni smo na vec vrst etike – na prakticno in uporabno etiko, ki obravnava posamezna prakticna vprašanja, kot na primer vprašanja pravicnosti, vojne in miru, he-donizma proti eudajmonizmu, vprašanja locitve, evtanazije, splava idr.; normativno etiko, ki preucuje nacela ravnanja – sem sodijo uti­litarizem, etika dolžnosti, etika vrline, aksiologija; in metaetiko, ki jo zanima obstoj in objektivnost dobrega in slabega ter se ukvarja z vprašanji, kako se spoznajo moralne resnice, ter z naravo moral-ne motivacije. Najmanj tocno dolocena sfera etike je metaetika, ki s pogledom od zgoraj raziskuje izvor in pomen eticnih pojmov. Sprašuje se, ali so moralnost in vrednote nekaj vecnega, kar izvira neodvisno od ljudi, ali pa so plod cloveškega dogovora. 1.Razmišljanja o vrednotah in vrlinah v svetu grške antike Prva razmišljanja o eticnih vprašanjih, o visokih življenjskih vred­notah, o vrlem in srecnem življenju ter o njegovem nasprotju naj-demo v stari Grciji. Kot samostojna disciplina se je etika razvila šele z Aristotelom, toda zametke razmišljanja o eticnih vprašanjih v starogrškem svetu najdemo že v anonimnih rekih in pregovorih, ki sestavljajo »zakladnico stoletne ljudske modrosti in življenjskih izkušenj neštetih generacij« (Gantar v: Aristoteles 2016, 5). Mno-go takšnih razmišljanj vsebujejo »najlepše pesniške mojstrovine – Homerjeva Iliada in Odiseja in Heziodova didakticna pesnitev o Delih in dnevih, pesmi in fragmenti elegikov, jambografov in drugih liricnih pesnikov, Sofoklove, Ajshilove in Evripidove trage­dije itd. Seveda pri tem ne gre za teoreticna in sistematicna raz­pravljanja, temvec za aforisticno zaostrene in duhovito poantirane sentence in refleksije ali za prakticne nasvete in navodila, kako ravnati v razlicnih življenjskih situacijah.« Aristotel je »nacrtno zasledoval raztresene drobce vecstoletne grške življenjske modrosti, jih kriticno pretresal, hierarhicno strukturiral in osmišljal ter sistematicno podrejal dolocenim miselnim kategorijam in kriterijem« (Gantar v: Aristoteles 2016, 5–6). Globok moralni konflikt je v osrcju mojstrovin najvecjih grških tragikov, Ajshila, Sofokla in Evripida. Osrednji konflikt, ki je v temelj­ni zasnovi njihovih dramskih umetnin, »se ne razrešuje s teoreticnim razpravljanjem, marvec je utelešen v tragicnih usodah nastopajocih junakov« (Gantar v: Aristoteles 2016, 11–12). Ti in podobni primeri iz starogrške poezije in dramatike ne ponujajo vpogleda v etiko kot neko zaokroženo in sistematicno znanstveno disciplino, temvec vse ostaja bolj na ravni prakticnih napotkov, kako se odzivati na razlic­ne življenjske situacije. Gre torej za nekakšno predfilozofsko etiko, prakticno filozofijo oziroma za življenjsko modrost, ki pa je pomemb­na za razumevanje razmaha etike kot filozofske discipline. V starogrški morali so osnovni temelj za moralno ravnanje vrli­ne, teorija vrlin pa s Platonovim delom Država in z Aristotelovo Nikomahovo etiko sestavlja najstarejšo normativno tradicijo v zgo­dovini zahodne filozofije. V prvi vrsti ji gre za razvijanje dobrih navad in znacajskih potez, ne pa toliko za ucenje pravil, ki naj jim sledimo, da bi bili moralni. Sokrat je kot prvi filozofsko zanimanje preusmeril od opazovan­ja kozmosa k preucevanju cloveške družbe, njenih moralnih vpra­šanj in dilem (Gantar v: Aristoteles 2016, 12), toda eticna vprašanja so vznemirjala tudi že številne mislece pred njim, predvsem sofis­te, npr. Protagora. Za Sokrata je bil osnovni eticno moralni princip delovanja tisto delovanje, ki je skladno z vrlino (areté). Vrlina je zanj vednost o tem, kaj je prav in kaj ne, in je povezana z dosegan­jem dobrega. Sokrat meni, da je koncni rezultat teženja k dobremu, k clovekovim vrlinam, osebna sreca ali blaženost (eudaimonía), kontinuirano delanje dobrega pa cloveku prinaša sreco. Sokrat verjame, da samo spoznanje cloveku zadostuje, da dela dobro, kar pomeni, da nam znanost zagotavlja dostop do srece. Izrecno meni, da nihce ne dela slabega hoté in da zlo vselej izvira le iz nejasnih predstav, ki jih povzroci nevednost. Ob pojmu absolutno veljavnih eticnih kriterijev je odprto vprašanje, »v kolikšni meri je kriterij eticnega absolutuma v resnici opredelil že sam Sokrat, v kolikšni meri pa je njegov ucenec Platon (427–347), ki velja kot najpomemb­nejši vir za poznavanje Sokratovega življenja in nauka, v svojih dia­logih Sokratu na usta položil svoje lastne misli in ideje« (Gantar v: Aristoteles 2016, 13). Po Platonu si moramo prizadevati za štiri kardinalne vrline: pravicnost, pogum, modrost in zmernost; izogibati pa se mora-mo slabim znacajskim potezam, kot so strahopetnost, necutnost, nepravicnost, nespametnost. Vrlina je po Platonu izraz dispozi­cije, ki napotuje k dobremu življenju. Platon kot metafizicni etik meni, da so vrednote del neke stvarnosti, ki je onstran cloveške, subjektivne zaznave ali konvencije; so vecne in univerzalne, saj veljajo za vsa razumna bitja na svetu. Do vrednot po Platonu pri-demo s pomocjo uma. Aristotel se je s Platonovo filozofijo seznanil, ko je osemnajstle-ten prišel iz rodne Stagire v Makedoniji v Atene na študij na tam-kajšnji Akademiji. Kljub nedvomnemu vplivu, ki ga je Platon imel nanj, ga Platonova filozofija ni mogla prepricati toliko, da bi ji sle­dil vse življenje. Še posebej sporen se mu je zdel »nauk o idejah, ki so – po Platonu – edine resnicno bivajoce, medtem ko je ves vidni, cutom zaznavni svet samo varljiv in nepopoln posnetek, samo sen-ca vecno bivajocih idej« (Gantar v: Aristoteles 2016, 18). Namesto tega je Aristotel menil, da naše spoznanje »ne izvira iz spominjanja idej, ki naj bi jih duša gledala pred rojstvom, ko še ni bila vklenje­na v telo, ampak da temelji predvsem na vsakdanjem opazovanju in izkustvu« (Gantar v: Aristoteles 2016, 19). Po Aristotelu je smo­ter etike »opredeliti in uveljaviti najvišje dobro, h kateremu teži tako vsak clovek kot posameznik kakor tudi družba kot skupnost teh posameznikov; to najvišje dobro pa je srecnost (eudaimonía)« (Gantar v: Aristoteles 2016, 20). Pri Aristotelu areté pomaga k uresnicitvi prave narave necesa ali nekoga, pri tem pa se vselej vzpostavlja s pomocjo razuma in presoje, po pravilu srednje mere med dvema skrajnostma. Vrlina se torej pusti voditi razumu in zadržuje strasti. Aristotel je kriticen do Sokratovega pojma vrline, saj po njegovem mišljenju sama vednost še ne prinaša vrlosti. Obenem pa meni, da so vrline tiste znacaj­ske odlike, ki nam omogocajo, da smo dobra cloveška bitja, ki žive skladno s svojo cloveško naravo. Številni klasicni misleci, na pri­mer Platon, Aristotel, stoiki in Tomaž Akvinski menijo, da življenje, ki je skladno z vrlinami, omogoca sreco tako njihovim lastnikom kot tudi skupnosti. Srecnosti torej ne prinaša uživaško življenje, temvec življenje, ki je usklajeno z vrlino ali krepostjo. Drugace pa mislijo številni sodobni filozofi, ki menijo, da delovanje, skladno z vrlino, še ni samo po sebi zadostno za clovekovo sreco ali dobrobit. Aristotel v na zacetku prve knjige Nikomahove etike opredeli po-men dobrega: Vsaka umetnost in vsako raziskovanje, kakor tudi vsako de­ janje in odlocanje, teži – po splošnem naziranju – k nekemu dobru; od tod tudi lepa oznaka, po kateri je dobro smoter, h kateremu vse teži. Vendar je med smotrom in smotrom razlika: vcasih je smoter že udejstvovanje samo po sebi, vcasih pa so to dela, ki so plod udejstvovanja (Aristoteles 1094a, 2016, 47; prev. Gantar). Aristotelova Nikomahova etika opredeli vrline kot stalne dis-pozicije, ki nagibajo cloveka, da ravna skladno z dobrim. Take na­ravnanosti se pridobi s prakso dobrega ravnanja pod vodstvom mentorjev in vkljucujejo iskreno željo po dobrem, ne le pravilnega ravnanja, kljub nasprotnim željam. Vrline so dveh razlicnih vrst: in-telektualne navade spretnega razmišljanja (v reševanju problemov, v odzivanju na druge ljudi, v ustvarjanju stvari) in znacajske nava­de, ki nagibajo cloveka ne le, da naredi pravo stvar, temvec tudi, da se pravilno obnaša. Phronesis, intelektualna vrlina, ki izpopolnjuje prakticno razmišljanje o dobrem, je osrednja v tem pogledu (gr. phronesis; lat. prudentia – slov. preudarnost). S pravo vajo praktic­nega razmišljanja in ob pomoci drugih vrlin je preudarna oseba sposobna prepoznati, katere dobrine je vredno zasledovati, kakor tudi, kaj bi lahko pomenilo delovati znacajsko odlicno v doloceni situaciji. Phronesis lahko razlikujemo od zgolj pametnosti, ker pa-metni clovek lahko najde sredstva za dosego cilja, vendar ne uspe spoznati, kateri cilji so vredni. 2. Pristopi k obravnavi vrednot in vrlin Izjemno bogat vir, ki vsebuje mnoštvo primerov osebnega in druž­benega uresnicevanja vrednot ter zgledov vrlih ženskih in moš­kih likov, prav tako pa tudi njihovih nasprotij, je Sveto pismo, ki je razširjeno po vsem svetu in cloveka osebno nagovarja prek svojih dialoško naravnanih besedil. V 20. stoletju je ruski filozof jezika in literarni kritik Mihail M. Bahtin (1895-1975) opozoril na temeljno dialoško osnovo vsake clovekove komunikacije, v zadnjih desetle­tjih pa so številni literarni kritiki in biblicisti na Zahodu prav v nje­govi teoriji govornih žanrov našli kljuc za vrednotenje osebnostno naravnane dialoške narave svetopisemskih besedil. Celotno Sveto pismo temelji na principu dialoga v obliki nenehnega pogovora med clovekom in Bogom, prav tako svetopisemska besedila vse­bujejo mnoštvo dialogov med svetopisemskimi osebami, pa tudi bogastvo notranjega pogovora ali monologa, v katerem odkrivamo clovekov odnos do vrednot in njegovo prizadevanje za vrline. Zanima nas, katere so osrednje vrednote v Svetem pismu in v katerih svetopisemskih knjigah so zastopane. Kateri so najbolj zna­ni primeri vrlega ravnanja ženskih in moških likov? Kakšen vpliv so imele svetopisemske zgodbe, prilike, parabole in druge literar­ne oblike s svojim osredotocanjem na razlicne vrednote in vrline na slovensko in evropsko literaturo, likovno in druge umetnosti? Kako nagovarjajo današnjega cloveka? Velik nabor novejše strokovne literature kaže, da strokovnjaki v analizi svetopisemskih besedil in drugih judovsko-kršcanskih vi-rov veliko pogosteje kot o vrednotah (values) govorijo o vrlinah ali krepostih (virtues), vcasih tudi v povezavi z njihovim nasprotjem – slabostmi ali pregrehami (virtues and vices). Termin vrednote (values) je veliko pogosteje povezan s strokovnimi obravnavami na podrocju filozofije oz. filozofske etike (Lovin 2011 idr.), le redke pa so objave s podrocja biblicistike (Bruin 2015 idr.) in drugih vej teologije. Te so pogosto povezane s pastoralo in prakticno teologi­jo (McKenzie 2018; Henson 2020 idr.). Zelo verjetno je, da je razlog takšnega stanja bolj osebno dojemanje vrlin kot clovekovih oseb­nih pozitivnih lastnosti z visoko moralno vrednostjo. Dojemanje vrlin se precej razlikuje od dojemanja vrednot kot nacel ali stan­dardov, ki v neki družbi veljajo za pomembna ali zaželena, uresni-cevanje eticnih in moralnih norm ter splošnih pravil obnašanja pa kot nujno za normalno življenje tako posameznika kot tudi celot­ne družbe. V kontekst zgledov svetopisemskih vrednot in vrlin v judovsko-kršcanskih virih in tradiciji sodijo dela, ki obravnavajo svetniške moške in ženske like (McNeill 2020 idr.). Omeniti velja tudi interdisciplinarne pristope, ki kažejo na pomen svetopisem­skih vrednot za najrazlicnejša podrocja znanosti, umetnosti in družbe, npr. za ekonomijo (Bruni in Róna 2019).2 Nekateri raziskovalci povezujejo vec podrocij: filozofijo, zlasti njeno podrocje etike, filozofije religije in filozofije odnosa med vero in znanostjo; biblicno ali relacijsko teologijo (Holtzen 2019); filo­zofijo, teologijo in psihologijo (Miller 2015). Številna novejša dela raziskujejo odmev svetopisemskih vrednot in vrlin v pridigah, kate­kizmih in umetniških delih v literaturi, likovni umetnosti, glasbi in drugih umetnostih, pri cemer izpostavljajo kljucno vprašanje o tem, kako brati in interpretirati tovrstna besedila (Fulton in Poole 2018). 2 Svet vrednot je v filozofsko-ekonomski obravnavi postavljen v kontekst sekularne kulture, ki vkljucuje postmodernizem, postmodernost, ateistic­ni eksistencializem, pragmatizem in poststrukturalizem ter verjame, da ne obstajajo objektivne resnice in da lahko vsak posameznik izbere svoje cilje in vrednote (Leightner 2021). V nasprotju s tem stališcem, ki je ozna-ceno kot pomanjkljivo, zagovarja clovekovo »inherentno« ali objektivno vrednost, ki ni odvisna od situacije; sprejetje ciljev, ki so vecji od posame­znika in njegovih egocentricnih želja; obsojanje zla in iskanje odgovora na problem trpljenja in zla v abrahamskih religijah (judovstvo, kršcan­stvo, islam), pa tudi v budizmu in hinduizmu. Kršcanska umetnost ni bila nikoli namenjena zgolj estetskemu uživanju, ampak je bila vselej dojeta v povezavi z izražanjem najpo­membnejših znacilnosti in vrednot kršcanske vere, na ta nacin pa so tovrstna dela imela tudi eticen vpliv v spodbujanju kršcanskih vrlin, kot so npr. odpušcanje, potrpljenje in radodarnost. Duhovna umetnost je ponujala odgovore tudi na moralna vprašanja, kot so rasizem, zapori, nasilje, revšcina, okoljevarstvo ter skozi zgodovino vplivala na kršcanske prakse, kot so molitev, delo, preucevanje Sve­tega pisma in bogoslužje (Hornik 2018). 3. Vrline v Svetem pismu V Stari zavezi ni nobene hebrejske besede, ki bi jo lahko prevedli z besedo »vrednota« ali »krepost«. Vendar v Stari zavezi najdemo mesta, na katerih tradicija vrlin osvetljuje nauke besedil. Poleg tega lahko v Stari zavezi najdemo tudi nekatere popravke k tra­diciji vrlin. Številne pripovedi v Stari zavezi ponujajo primere po­mena vrlin za življenje. Zelo opazna je tradicija vrlin v psalmih in modrostni literaturi, zlasti v knjigi Pregovorov. Odlomki, kot je npr. Prg 2,1-11, poudarjajo pomen vzgoje k modrosti, razumnosti, razso­dnosti, poštenosti, iskrenosti, pravicnosti in preudarnosti, ki vodijo k spoznanju Boga, izvira modrosti – »Kajti Gospod daje modrost, / iz njegovih ust prihajata spoznanje in razumnost. / Iskrenim pripravlja uspeh, / šcit je tem, ki hodijo v popolnosti.« (Prg 2,6-7) Pridobivanje modrosti prek razumevanja »razumnih izrekov« ter sprejemanja vzgoje k dojemljivosti, pravicnosti, razsodnosti, poš­tenosti, previdnosti in preudarnosti knjiga Pregovorov povezuje s »strahom pred Gospodom« (Prg 1,7). Zelo odmeven je odlomek iz zadnjega poglavja knjige Pregovo­rov (Prg 31), ki hvali vrlo ženo, katere vrednost je »dalec nad biseri« (Prg 31,10). Ta žena svojemu možu izkazuje »dobroto in ne hudega / vse dni svojega življenja«. Odlikujejo jo delavnost, skrbnost, cu­jecnost, pravicnost, modrost, skrb za uboge in pomoci potrebne, neustrašna skrb za družino, pa tudi cut za gospodarjenje: »Ogleda si njivo in jo kupi, / z zaslužkom svojih rok zasadi vinograd« (Prg 31,16); »Cuti, kdaj je kupcija zanjo ugodna« (Prg 31,18); »Veliko hce­rá si je pridobilo imetje, / ti prekašaš vse« (Prg 31,29). Portret vrle žene, ki s svojimi vrlinami pomaga svojemu možu in vsej družini, je opisan z besedami: »Moc in cast sta njeno oblacilo, / smeji se prihodnjemu dnevu. / Svoja usta odpira modro, dober pouk je na njenem jeziku« (Prg 31,25-26). Lepota te žene je v njenem »strahu pred Gospodom«: »Milina je varljiva in lepota je prazna, / žena, ki se boji Gospoda, pa je vredna hvale.« (Prg 31,30) V zgodovini interpretacije so ta odlomek pogosto uporabljali kot zgled svetopisemskih vrlin za vzgojo hcera, ki naj bi bila po­dobna starodavni vzgoji hcera v princese in poznejše kraljice. Sle­denje osmim vrlinam v Prg 31 pa ni bilo pomembno le za vzgojo mladenk (Croyle 2014), temvec je ponujalo tudi zgled lastnosti kre­postne odrasle ženske (Harrison 2014). Sveto pismo daje kršcanskim uciteljem in pridigarjem zglede za pot krepostnega življenja (Goza 2020), pri cemer je v ponazarjanju vrlin še posebej pogosto sklicevanje na knjigo Pregovorov, na Joba ter Pridigarja in na lik Kristusa v evangelijih (McKenzie 2018; Kee­fer 2021). Vecina navodil v Pregovorih izpolnjuje merila moralne in teološke vrline v njenem družbenem, zgodovinskem in teološkem kontekstu, kot je dolocena v Aristotelovi Nikomahovi etiki in delih svetega Tomaža Akvinskega (Keefer 2021). Prerok Mihej, ki v svojih pridigah brani stiskane ter obsoja mali­ke in nepoštenost, zgošceno pove, kakšno ravnanje in katere vrline Bog pricakuje od njega – ne žgalnih daritev, ne tisocev ovnov in ne darovanja prvorojenca v zameno za clovekove pregrehe, temvec »nic drugega, kakor da pravicno ravnaš, ljubiš dobroto / in hodiš ponižno s svojim Bogom« (Mih 6,8). Krona vseh kreposti v Svetem pismu Stare in Nove zaveze je ljubezen do Boga in cloveka. Zato je še posebej dragocena starozavezna knjiga Visoka pesem, ki v dialoški obliki povelicuje ljubezen, ki si jo podarjata zarocenka in zarocenec. Visoka pesem je tako cista v izražanju ljubezni, da je v judovstvu in kršcanstvu dobila status simbola ljubezni med Bo-gom in Cerkvijo oziroma sinagogo (pri Judih). V Novi zavezi so vrline obravnavane tako pogosto, da da lahko govorimo celo o seznamih vrlin in pregreh. Sezname vrlin zasledi-mo v teh odlomkih: 2 Kor 6,6-7a; Gal 5,22-23; Ef 4,23. 31; 5,2. 9; Fil 4,8; Kol 3,12; 1 Tim 3,2-4. 8-10. 11-12; 4,12; 6,11. 18; 2 Tim 2,22-25; 3,10; Tit 1,8; 2,1-10; Heb 7,26; 1 Pet 3,8; 2 Pt 1,5-7 (prim. Mt 5,3-11; 1 Kor 13,4­7; Jak 3,17). Odlomek Gal 5,22-23, ki govori o sadovih Duha in delih mesa, med sadovi Duha npr. navaja te vrline: »Sad Duha pa je: lju­bezen, veselje, mir, potrpežljivost, blágost, dobrotljivost, zvestoba, / krotkost, samoobvladanje. Zoper te stvari ni postave.« Odmevni so tudi blagri, ki jih je Jezus govoril svojim ucencem v Govoru na gori (Mt 5,3-12; prim. Lk 6,20-23). V njih Jezus blagruje uboge; krot­ke; lažne in žejne pravicnosti; usmiljene; ciste v srcu; tiste, ki delajo za mir; in tiste, ki so zaradi pravicnosti preganjani in zaradi Njega zasramovani, ter jim pravi: »Veselite in radujte se, kajti vaše placilo v nebesih je veliko. Tako so namrec preganjali že preroke, ki so bili pred vami.« (Mt 5,12) Na drugi strani se v Novi zavezi kot nasprotje vrlinam pojav­ljajo številni seznami pregreh: Mt 15,19; Mr 7,21-22; Lk 18,11; Rim 1,29-31; 13,13; 1 Kor 5,10-11; 6,9-10; 2 Kor 12,20-21; Gal 5,19-21; Ef 4,31; 5,3-5; Kol 3,5-10; 1 Tim 1,9-10; 6,4-5; 2 Tim 3,2-4; Tit 1,7; 3,3; 1 Pet 2,1; 4,3. 15; Raz 9,21; 21,8; 22,15 ( prim. Lk 18,11). V Kol 3,5-10 na primer beremo o slabostih, ki jih mora clovek odvreci, saj mora, ce hoce vstati s Kristusom, iskati to, »kar je zgo-raj, kjer je Kristus, sedec na Božji desnici«, in ne tistega, »kar je na zemlji«. Med slabostmi, ki »težijo k zemlji«, so »necistovanje, necis­tost, strastnost, hudobno poželenje in sla po cim vecjem imetju, ki je toliko kot malikovanje, […], jeza, vzkipljivost, hudobnost, obre­kovanje, nesramno govorjenje«. V nadaljevanju so kot nasprotje poudarjene vrline, ki naj jih goji clovek kot »Božji izvoljenec. Med njimi so »cim globlje usmiljenje, dobrotljivost, ponižnost, krotkost, potrpežljivost«, odpušcanje, »[n]ad vsem tem pa naj bo ljubezen, ki je vez popolnosti« (Kol 3,12-17). Eticni seznami vrlin in pregreh opravljajo razlicne retoricne funkcije v novozaveznih spisih. Nekateri seznami pregreh poudar­jajo pokvarjenost cloveštva na splošno (Mt 15,19; Mr 7,21-22; Rim 1,29-31; 1 Tim 1,9-10), drugi pa poudarjajo ali vzpostavljajo eticne meje med dedici Božjega kraljestva in »nemoralnimi tega sveta«, kot pravi Pavel v 1 Kor 5,10-11 (prim. Rim 13,13; 1 Kor 6,9-10; Ef 5,3-5; Kol 3,5-9; 1 Pt 4,3.15). Številni eticni seznami spodbujajo krepostno vedenje tako, da bralce spodbujajo k izkazovanju dolocenih splo­šnih lastnosti (Fil 4,8; 1 Pt 2,1; 3,8) ali pa vernike opominjajo na zna-cilnosti njihovega starega življenja v nasprotju z novim obstojem, ki ga imajo v Kristusu (2 Kor 12,20-21; Gal 5,19-23; Ef 4,31; Kol 3,12; Tit 3,3; 2 Pt 1,5-7). V Kol 3,12b beremo poziv: »Kot Božji izvoljenci, sveti in ljublje­ni, si torej oblecite cim globlje usmiljenje, dobrotljivost, ponižnost, krotkost, potrpežljivost.« Gre za novo identiteto, ki so jo sveti, ki jih je izbral Bog, prejeli v Kristusu. V Kol 3,11-12 beremo: »Kjer je to, ni vec ne Grka ne Juda, ne obrezanega ne neobrezanega, ne barbara ne Skita, ne sužnja ne svobodnega, ampak vse in v vseh je Kristus.« V »pastoralnih« poslanicah, ki vsebujejo najvecjo zgošcenost eticnih seznamov v Novi zavezi, je seznam vrlin in pregreh osredo-tocen na prepoznavanje lastnosti, primernih za cerkvene voditelje (1 Tim 3,1-12; 4,12; 6,11.18-19; 2 Tim 2,22-25; 3,10; Tit 1,7; 2,2-10 [prim. 2 Kor 6,6-7a]). 1 Tim 4,12 o tem zgošceno pravi: »Bodi pa vernim zgled v besedi, vedęnju, ljubezni, veri in cistosti«. Obenem Nova zaveza kot nemoralne obsoja lažne ucitelje, ki jim nasprotujejo Pa­vlova pisma (1 Tim 6,3-5; 2 Tim 3,2-4 [prim. Raz 9,21; 21,8; 22,15]). V pismih Nove zaveze najdemo vec seznamov, ki so znacilni za življenje kristjanov. Štirje od teh seznamov izpostavljajo teološke vrline vere, upanja in ljubezni (1 Kor 13,13; Kol 1,4-5; 1 Tes 1,3; 5,8). Zelo odmeven je cudovit odlomek o ljubezni v 1 Kor 14, ki se konca s slavospevom ljubezni kot najvišje od vrlin: »Za zdaj pa ostanejo vera, upanje, ljubezen, to troje. In najvecja od teh je ljubezen.« (1 Kor 13,13) Drugi seznami zajemajo še širši seznam vrlin (2 Kor 6,6; Gal 5,22-23; Ef 4,23.32; 5,9; Fil 4,8; Kol 3,12; 1 Tim 4,12; 6,11; 2 Tim 2,22; 3,10; Jak 3,17). Fil 4,8 na primer priporoca: »Sicer pa, bratje, vse, kar je resnicno, kar je vzvišeno, kar je pravicno, kar je cisto, kar je ljube­znivo, kar je castno, kar je kolickaj krepostno in hvalevredno, vse to imejte v mislih.« Jakobovo pismo pa postavi pred cloveka podobo resnicne modrosti, ki prihaja »od zgoraj«, njeno nasprotje in njene sadove ter sklene: »Kjer sta namrec nevošcljivost in prepirljivost, tam je nered in vsakršno zlo. / Modrost pa, ki je od zgoraj, je najprej cista, nato miroljubna, prizanesljiva, dovzetna, polna usmiljenja in dobrih sadov, brez razlocevanja in hinavšcine. / In sad pravicnosti se seje v miru tistim, ki delajo za mir.« (Jak 3,16-17) V navedenih odlomkih ni nobenega namiga, da obstaja izcrpen seznam, ki bi oznaceval celotno kršcansko življenje. »Sezname vrlin« navadno spremljajo »seznami pregreh« oz. slabosti. Skupaj ti sezna-mi potrjujejo clovekovo rast v dobrem, ne kot pot, da postane kre­posten v sebi in neodvisen od Boga, temvec kot pot do popolnejše zvestobe v pricevanju o Božjem odrešitvenem delu, ki mu omogoca, da sodeluje v rasti in je clan Božjega ljudstva. Celotno Sveto pismo, osvetljeno z vpogledi v tradicijo vrlin, cloveka uci o nujnosti eshato­loške vizije (telos) za njegovo rast v zvestobi. S tem ga poziva tudi k vrlinam, kot sta potrpežljivost v cakanju na popolno odrešitev in po­nižnost ob zavesti, da je odrešenje mogoce doseci le po Božji milosti. 4. Pomen etike vrlin v evropski duhovni zgodovini ter njihova vloga v današnjem casu Skozi celotno zgodovino so razlicni temeljni viri evropske civiliza­cije poudarjali razvoj clovekove moralne odlicnosti v smislu zna-cajskih lastnosti, imenovanih vrline. Vrline so veljale kot priucene naravnanosti, ki vkljucujejo tako custveno željo po dobrem kot tudi spretnost razlikovanja med dobrim in slabim ter ustreznega ravna­nja. Priucene so bile skozi prakso v okviru tradicije ter usmerjene v posebno pojmovanje dobrega v tej tradiciji. Najbolj temeljito raz­lago »vrline« je prinesla zlata doba Aten v 4. st. pr. Kr. Phronesis je, tako kot vse vrline, usmerjen k »dobremu« in zahteva kultiviranje. Aristotel imenuje koncni telos ali konec, h kateremu so vse vrli­ne usmerjene, evdaimonija, obicajno prevedeno kot »cloveški raz­cvet« oz. »sreca«. Aristotel in pred njim Platon sta zagovarjala tiste posebne vrline, ki so potrebne za življenje v grški mestni državi, polis, v casu, ko se je zdelo, da starejši seznam junaških vrlin raz­pada z izginjanjem klanskega življenja. Aristotelov ucitelj Platon je identificiral štiri osrednje oz. kardinalne vrline: pogum, zmernost, pravicnost in preudarnost. Kristjani so si sposodili jezik vrline, vendar nadomestili radikalno vizijo dobre družbe (Lk 4,18-19). V kršcanstvu je etika vrlin poudarjala razvoj navad, praks in modros-ti, potrebnih za doseganje »dobrega« po zgledu Kristusa. Svetopisemski avtorji domnevajo, da je moralno življenje stvar ra­zvoja in rasti. V zgodnjem kršcanstvu so menili, da Sveto pismo lahko ustrezno bere le clovek dobrega znacaja, ki je oblikovan v Kristusovem telesu; le on lahko pravilno dojame, kaj je resnicno in dobro. Osrednji del kršcanskih porocil o vrlini je ljubezen in želja po Bogu. Zgodnji kristjani so zavrnili helenisticne predpostavke o telosu cloveškega življenja in vztrajali, da clovekov namen in koncno dobro najdemo v Kristusu. Cloveško dobro naj bi našli in ecclesia, to je v skupnosti ver­nikov, ki so Kristusovo telo, kajti tja je Kristus poslal svojega Duha. Zgodnjekršcanska Cerkev je poudarila drugacne vrline od svo­jih klasicnih predhodnikov: potrpežljivost, ponižnost, poslušnost in še posebej ljubezen, podobno Kristusovi. Vzor poguma je bil mucenec, ne pa junaški bojevnik; model pravicnosti pa je bila skrb za ljudi na obrobju, ne pa ohranjanje razrednega razlikovanja. Zgo­dnjekršcanski avtorji so te vrline razumeli kot stranski produkt tako milosti kot tudi prakse ucenja. Tako kot Aristotel, so tudi zgo­dnji kristjani razumeli, da so vrline obicajne nagnjenosti, ki vklju-cujejo zaznavanje dobrega in željo po njem, kar so kristjani koncno našli v Bogu. Zgodnja cerkev se je mocno opirala na koncept kršcanstva kot »poti«, locene od drugih oblik družbenega življenja, zaradi njene usmerjenosti k Božjemu kraljestvu kot pravemu telosu clovekove­ga življenja. Od novih kristjanov se je pricakovalo, da bodo porabili celotno leto (v nekaterih primerih celo tri leta) v pripravi na krst. Naucili so se nacel vere, vendar se je tudi pricakovalo, da se bodo zaceli razvijati po Kristusovi podobi; greh, storjen po krstu, je bil razumljen kot posebej hud. Zelo pomembni sta bili preusmerjanje želja in kultiviranje vrlin. V ta namen so prakse bogoslužja obliko-vale kristjana v ljubezni do Boga in v navadah zvestega ucenstva. V 4. stoletju je Avguštin izrecno trdil, da je ljubezen do Boga re­snicni telos cloveškega življenja – vsa naša dejanja so usmerjena k temu. Obenem je menil, da se ljudje motimo – naše želje so postale neurejene in zadovoljimo se z manjšimi dobrinami. Za Avguština je vrlina skladnost naših želja z Božjo ljubeznijo, ljubezen pa je ob-lika vseh vrlin, vkljucno s kardinalnimi, ki jih je identificiral Platon. Najpomembnejše sistematicno porocilo o kršcanski etiki vrlin je Summa theologiaeTomaža Akvinskega. Sklicujoc se na Pavla je Akvinski prepoznal modrost in teološke vrline, to je vero, upanje in ljubezen ali »dobrodelnost« kot darove milosti in trdil, da ljubezen v darovanjskem smislu (caritas) oblikuje in usmerja druge vrline proti Bogu kot našemu pravemu cilju. Za Tomaža, tako kot za sto­letja kršcanstva pred njim, so bile vrline pridobljena nagnjenja, ki vkljucujejo željo po dobrem. Vendar pa je Akvinski razlikoval med vsajenimi, to je v cloveka položenimi, in pridobljenimi vrlinami. Pridobljene vrline so usmerjene v naravne cilje in se jih clovek navadi z delovanjem v skladu z dobrim, medtem ko so »vsajene« vrline usmerjene v naš nadnaravni cilj, vecno združitev z Bogom. Ceprav »vsajene« vrline, ki so pristno navzoce v cloveku, zahte­vajo kultiviranje z molitvijo in cašcenjem, dobijo svoj zacetek kot neposredno dodeljen božanski dar. Tomaž Akvinski trdi, da so te­ološke vrline vere, upanja in ljubezni vsajene v cloveka, prakticno modrost (prudentio) pa je mogoce pridobiti s prakso, kot božji dar ali neko kombinacijo obeh. Tako je dovzetnost za milost skozi pra­kse molitve in cašcenja kljucnega pomena za srednjeveško moral-no teologijo. Moralno življenje poleg gojenja vrlin kot pridobljenih navad zahteva vsaditev milosti, ki usmerja druge vrline z dodelit­vijo božje ljubezni, ki je telos vseh drugih vrlin. Razsvetljenski filozofi iz osemnajstega stoletja so iskali doloce­ne temelje za znanje v objektivnih »resnicah«, dostopnih avtono­mnemu posamezniku in locenih od tradicionalnega poucevanja in splošnih praks. V tem okolju so etiko vrlin nadomestili razlicni sis-temi teoreticnega sklepanja, ki so zahtevali objektivni, univerzalni temelj za moralo. Pozneje so se na Zahodu nagibali k temu, da so videli moralnost kot zadevo subjektivne izbire med vrsto možnih vrednot in prepricanj, kljub nenehnim poskusom filozofov (Locke, Kant, Mill, Rawls itd.), da bi napisali univerzalno, prepricljivo poro-cilo o etiki. Alasdair MacIntyre v svoji knjigi After Virtue(2007) dokazu­je, da to stanje stvari preprecuje vsakršno racionalno reševanje moralnih sporov; razprave o moralni dolžnosti se zmanjšajo na poskuse prepricevanja. MacIntyre trdi, da sodobni misli manjka vsakršen skupni dogovor o namenu ali telosu cloveškega življe­nja, kar pa bi zagotovilo skupni pomen izrazov, kot so pravicnost, obveznost in dobro. Poziva k vrnitvi k etiki vrlin kot poti naprej pri obnovi teh konceptov. Nekateri sodobni kršcanski etiki vrlin uporabljajo pristop vrlin z manj poudarka na kršcanski posebnosti. Jean Porter na primer uporablja tomisticno pisanje o prakticnem razumu v poskusu zdru­ževanja etike vrlin z deontološko etiko (Porter 1995). Drugim je všec vrlina kot dopolnilo utilitarni ali deontološki etiki odlocanja, pri cemer trdijo na primer, da je vrlina pomembna za kompetentno presojo teh teorij ali poudarjanje posameznih vrlin, kot je »skrb za druge«, ki se zdijo podcenjene od drugih pristopov. V nasprotju s temi poskusi pomiritve vrline s filozofskimi teorijami Hauerwas poudarja pomen utelešenih tradicij za razvoj vrline. Trdi, da kristja­ni razvijajo dispozicije za vrline skozi skupnostne prakse in zgod-be. Branje Svetega pisma je takšna skupna praksa, ki se je naucimo v cerkvi, in ni le zasebna pobožnost. Zahteva vrlino, a tudi prispeva h gojenju vrline in moralni viziji. Vrlino se pridobi z nenehnim po­snemanjem tistih, ki so obvladali prakso gojenja vrlin. (Hauerwas in Pinches 1997) V etiki kršcanskega ucenstva je gospodar Kristus, vendar se tudi ucenci naucijo prepoznavati odlicnost prakse z opazovanjem in posnemanjem tistih, ki so zrelejši v veri (1 Kor 4,16; 11,1; Fil 3,17; 1 Tes 1,6; 2,14; 2 Tes 3,7, 9; Heb 6,12; 13,7). Za sledenje Kristusu ni dovolj preprosto posnemati dolocenih dejanj, ampak si tudi priza­devati za celotno življenje modrosti in moralnih vrlin. Bogoslužje, branje Svetega pisma, molitev, hranjenje lacnih in podobno so po­sebne prakse, ki so osrednjega pomena za široko nalogo oblikova­nja skupnosti ali za ustvarjanje ucencev. S temi praksami se zvesti ucenci navadijo na kreposti, se naucijo želeti si, kar je dobro, in tako oblikujejo modre, preudarne sodbe o moralnem dejanju. Sklep Kot smo pokazali v tem prispevku, je zamisel o vrlinah v intelektual­nem razmišljanju navzoca že vec kot dva tisoc let. Ko so se razvijale nove religije, so vrednote crpale iz starejših religij. Kršcanstvo je na primer crpalo iz hebrejske religije, islam iz judovstva in kršcanstva. Te vrednote so bile nelocljivo povezane s kozmicnim, filozofskim in teološkim okvirom religije ter z družbo, v kateri je religija uspe­vala. Abrahamske religije judovstva in islama se osredotocajo na vrednote ljubece prijaznosti, ucenja in modrosti, cašcenja Boga, spo­minjanja, kesanja in odpušcanja, pravicnosti, cistosti in poštenosti. Osrednjega pomena za izraelsko ljudstvo je bila zamisel o posluš­nosti Božji zapovedi, zlasti desetim zapovedim kot Božji postavi. Ko so se razvijale kršcanske teologije, je tisto, kar so Judje imenovali najvišje zapovedi, postalo osnova za kršcansko moralo. Ljubezen do Boga in bližnjega, kakor je bila razložena in izoblikovana z Jezuso-vim življenjem, je postala standard za ocenjevanje verovanj in obna­šanj tistih znotraj in zunaj Kršcanske cerkve. Pismo apostola Pavla Rimljanom je znova interpretiralo zakone Stare zaveze, da bi poka­zalo pomen Jezusove smrti v prisvajanju Božje milosti. V njegovih pismih je bil poudarjen tudi stoicizem, izposojen od Grkov, ki je bil vkljucen v kršcanska razumevanja moralnega vedenja. Skozi stoletja so se te teme osredotocale na oboje, kršcanska teološka razumevan­ja dobrega ter kršcanske ocene drugih religij in njihovih eticnih sis-temov. Kršcanska porocila o vrednotah in vrednostnih sodbah je v dvajsetem stoletju dopolnil, izzval in obogatil ekumenski dogovor z drugimi živecimi verskimi tradicijami. V zadnjih desetletjih so kršcanski etiki obudili tradicijo vrlin, ki so bile prisotne že v zgodnji Cerkvi, osrednje v srednjeveški Cerkvi in nekoliko zapostavljene v casu protestantske reformacije in moderne dobe. V študijah Svetega pisma ima obujanje etike vrlin nekaj vpli­va, vendar je še vedno v zgodnji fazi. Nekateri kršcanski izvedenci v etiki, ki vodijo obnovo tradicije vrlin, Sveto pismo berejo bolj pozor-no, kar obeta nadaljnje medsebojno oplajanje med kršcansko etiko in biblicnimi študijami. Tradicija vrlin si znova zamišlja »kršcansko etiko«, ki naj bi se ukvarjala z našim celotnim nacinom življenja kot sodelovanjem v evangeliju in pricevanjem o njem. Obujanje tradicije vrlin je v filozofiji dajalo zagon predvsem delo Alasdaira MacIntyrea. Njegovo vplivno delo After Virtue (2007) deluje v aristotelski tradiciji vrlin. V svoji knjigi Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) se MacIntyre vrne v kršcansko vero in vrlino najde v tomisticni tradiciji. Nedavni teološki razvoj v tradi­ciji vrlin iz MacIntyrea crpa številna spoznanja, ki osvetljujejo delo teološke etike in poucevanje Svetega pisma. Osrednji za tradicijo vrlin je njen teleološki znacaj. V tradiciji vrlin telos opredeljuje na-men ali cilj, za katerega smo ustvarjeni. Platon, Aristotel, Avguštin in Tomaž Akvinski govorijo razlicno, vendar se sredi teh razlicnih pripovedi vsi strinjajo, da nam je telos podarjen in da daje obliko in pomen našemu življenju; v tradiciji vrlin nam telos daje vizijo o tem, kdo naj bi mi bili. Ob raziskovanju osebnih in družbenih vrednot in vrlin v judov­sko-kršcanskih virih in tradiciji ter njihovega vpliva na nove reli­gije ter kulture po vsem svetu se pokaže dialoška narava Svetega pisma. Celotno Sveto pismo temelji na principu dialoga v obliki nenehnega pogovora med clovekom in Bogom, prav tako sveto­pisemska besedila vsebujejo mnoštvo dialogov med svetopisem­skimi osebami, pa tudi bogastvo notranjega pogovora ali mono-loga. Ceprav je v Svetem pismu zelo malo odlomkov, v katerih je »krepost« ustrezen prevod iz hebrejšcine ali gršcine, pa je veliko svetopisemskih odlomkov, ki nas pozivajo k oblikovanju trajnih znacajskih lastnosti skozi prakse, usmerjene v telos, ki sodeluje pri Božjem odrešenjskem delu, kakor ga prepoznava evangeljska pri­poved, ki oblikuje ljudi. Kot smo pokazali v tem prispevku, je zamisel o vrlinah v in-telektualnem razmišljanju navzoca že vec kot dva tisoc let. Postavlja pa se vprašanje: Ali se bo njihova pomembna vloga ohranila tudi v prihodnosti? Katere so osrednje vrline v današ­njem casu in kakšna bo vloga vrlin glede na obdobje velikih tehnoloških inovacij z razvojem robotike, umetne inteligence, interneta idr.? Filozofi, psihologi, sociologi in pedagogi vse po­gosteje pozivajo k osredotocanju na vrline, da bi se soocili z nekaterimi najbolj žgocimi eticnimi izzivi, ki jih nastajajoce te­hnologije predstavljajo za posameznike in družbe. Med velikimi vprašanji, ki se pojavljajo v sodobnem casu, so: Kakšne vrline in slabosti prinaša digitalizacija? Kakšen je vpliv družabnih me-dijev na prijateljstva in medcloveške odnose? Ali digitalne te­hnologije razosebljajo družbo? Ali bi morali dovoliti, da tehno­logija prevzame moralno odlocanje? Kako verjetno je, da se bo v prihodnjih družbah ohranilo skupno razumevanje vrlin? Kako lahko zagotovimo, da bodo prihodnje tehnologije oblikovane za spodbujanje in krepitev vrlin? Kakšna naj bo vloga vzgojiteljev, da v prihodnosti ohranijo ideale dobrega znacaja in cloveškega razcveta? Ta clanek, ki obeta nadaljevanje, želi s kratko uvodno osvetlitvijo osrednjih vrednot evropske civilizacije skozi dva tisoc let, predvsem vrednot in vrlin Svetega pisma Stare in Nove zaveze, prispevati enega prvih poskusov v nadaljnjem iskanju mostov med prakticno modrostjo in tehnološkimi inovacijami moderne dobe. Reference ARISTOTELES. 2016. Nikomahova etika. Prevedel, uvodno besedo, opombe in terminološki slovarcek napisal Kajetan Gantar. Ljublja­na: Slovenska matica. BRUIN, TOM DE. 2015. The Great Controversy: The Individual‘s Struggle between Good and Evil in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs and in Their Jewish and Christian Contexts. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. BRUNI, LUIGINO IN PETER RÓNA. 2019. The Economy of Salva­tion: Ethical and Anthropological Foundations of Market Relations in the First Two Books of the Bible. Cham, Švica: Sprinter. CROYLE, JOHN. 2014. Raising a Princess: 8 Essential Virtues to Teach Your Daughter. Nashville, TN: B & H Publishing Group. FULTON, THOMAS IN KRISTEN POOLE. 2018. The Bible on the Shakespearean Stage: Cultures of Interpretation in Reformation England. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. GANTAR, KAJETAN. 2016. Aristoteles in njegova etika. Spremna beseda. V: Aristoteles: Nikomahova etika. Prevedel Kajetan Gantar. Ljubljana: Slovenska matica. 5–42. GOZA, DAVID. 2020. Seeking Virtue: Through History and Scrip­ture. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock. HARRISON, ERIN. 2014. Living Virtuously: A Wife's Complete Gu­ide to Keeping Her Heart and Home. Pleasentville, TN: Homestea­ding Productions. HAUERWAS, STANLEY IN CHARLES PINCHES. 1997. Christi­ans among the Virtues: Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics. University of Notre Dame Press. HENSON, JOSHUA D. 2020. Modern Metaphors of Christian Lie-dership: Exploring Christian Leadership in a Contemporary Orga­nizational Context. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. HOLTZEN, WILLIAM CURTIS. 2019. The God Who Trusts: A Re­lational Theology of Divine Faith, Hope, and Love. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic. HORNIK, HEIDI J. 2018. The Art of Christian Reflection. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press. KEEFER, ARTHUR JAN. 2021. The Book of Proverbs and Virtue Et­ hics: Integrating the Biblical and Philosophical Traditions. LEIGHTNER, JONATHAN E. 2021. See No Evil: Secularization versus Sacred Scriptures. New York: Nova Science Publishers. LOVIN, ROBIN W. 2011. An Introduction to Christian Ethics: Goals, Duties, and Virtues. Nashville: Abingdon Press MACINTYRE, ALASDAIR.1988. Whose Justice? Which Rationali­ty? Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. MACINTYRE, ALASDIAR. 2007. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. MCKENZIE, ALYCE M. 2018. Wise up!: Four Biblical Virtues for Navigating Life. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books. MCNEILL, JOHN ET AL. 2020. Romanesque Saints, Shrines and Pilgrimage. Abingdon, Oxon / New York, NY: Routledge. MILLER, CHRISTIAN B. ET AL. 2015. Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology. Oxford / New York, NY: Oxford University Press. PORTER, JEAN. 1995. Moral Action and Christian Ethics. Cambrid­ge: Cambridge University Press. RECENZIJA Recenzija knjige Hotena nevednost (TOMAŽ GRUŠOVNIK, Slo­venska matica, 2020, 275 strani) Knjiga Hotena nevednost dok­torja Tomaža Grušovnika, ki je konec leta 2020 izšla pri Slo­venski matici, je izjemno aktu­alno filozofsko delo, ki v dobi vsesplošne razširjenosti razno­likih obcil, brezmejnega dosto-pa do informacij in razbohote­ne vednosti v ospredje našega zanimanja prinaša vecplasten fenomen izogibanja resnici. Avtor nam že v uvodnem poglavju predstavi ves domet vprašanja, ki nastopa pod na­slovno sintagmo: gre za eksisten­cialno nevednost, ki bi jo lahko upraviceno dojeli kot znacilno držo sodobnika vprico perecih svetovnonazorskih problemov in zagat. Vednost je namrec v veliki meri napoti uživanju in brezskrb­ni eksistenci, zavezuje k dejanju in odgovornosti. Nevednost tako nastopa kot refleks, ki se sproži ob slutnji vsakega dejstva, ki bi utegnil od nas zahtevati odgovor­nost. Nevednost, za katero se v svoji analizi zanima avtor, pa ni v nedvoumno jasnem konsekvent­nem razmerju z vednostjo. Ne-vednost namrec ni potencial, ki se aktualizira v vednosti, pac pa je odnos med njima precej bolj za­pleten in vecplasten. Nevednost iz knjige tako ni nujno casovno predhodna vednosti, pogosteje je ravno obratno. Dejstvo, da si ne­kaj želimo nevedeti, pomeni, da moramo to že vnaprej anticipira-ti in torej vsaj slutiti. V tem oziru je hotena nevednost v prvi vrsti eticen problem, saj vodi v ele­ganten izogib eticnim precepom, in je torej po svoji naravi neetic­na (je torej nevednost, ki ne od­vezuje krivde). Primeri za takšno izogibanje se pravzaprav ponu­jajo kar sami in predstavljajo kl-jucna navzkrižja sodobne eticne eksistence, segajo od nehumanih delovnih razmer v manj razvitih državah, ki botrujejo k vedno bolj dostopnim blagovnim artiklom na razvitem Zahodu, totalnega spregleda trpljenja živalskih bitij v prehrambni industriji in vse do zanikanja okolijskih vplivov, ki jih prinaša clovekovo vedenje idr. Knjigo bi torej zlahka umes­tili na podrocje etike, saj z njo avtor pricne in konca, kljub temu pa ne vztraja zgolj na etiški, mor­da najocitnejši ravni tega prob-lema. V želji ponuditi celovito analizo spoznavnoteoretske vlo­ge, ki jo igra hotena nevednost, se poda v zgodovino filozofske misli. Prvo veliko poglavje je v ta namen zasnovano kot zgodovin­skofilozofska analiza fenomena hotene nevednosti. V njem se razkrije, da se ta fenomen pod razlicnimi vidiki in imeni nahaja v samem jedru zanimanja filozo­fije – ta je namrec strukturirana kot resnicoljubnost, vsakršna želja po nevednosti pa nastopa kot njena negacija. Avtor v tem segmentu izkaže izredno pozna­vanje filozofske tradicije in zelo podrobno branje filozofskih kla­sikov. Ce sledimo njegovemu branju, bi lahko rekli, da vsakega filozofa v bistvenem zaznamuje prav odziv na vprašanje odnosa do vednosti in preprek, ki ga ne­girajo. Zato je vec kot dobrodoš-lo, da knjiga ponuja analizo celo­vite verige odzivov, ki segajo od zacetkov filozofske discipline v grških mestnih državicah pa do kršcanskega srednjega veka in novoveških avtorjev. V tem oziru knjiga predstavlja dober pregled zgodovine filozofije (ki ne zane­marja niti relevantnih elementov neevropskih filozofskih in reli­gijskih misli). Avtor pa zgodovinskokriticni razmislek nadgradi v sledecem poglavju, kjer ponudi psihološke in kognitivnoznanstvene pristo­pe k fenomenu. V tem poglavju obravnava konkretne razlicice hotene nevednosti in zlasti me-hanizme, ki subjektu omogocajo samozašcitno nevednost. K bi-stvu hotene nevednosti namrec sodi, da je njena hotenost na nek nacin zakrinkana. Zato je vec kot smotrno, da v tem poglavju avtor vpeljuje tudi sodobna dognanja s podrocja psihologije. Tako so nam predstavljene nekatere so-dobne vedenjske teorije, ki pri nas še niso bile interpretirane, njihova miselna nadgradnja, ki jo prinaša knjiga, pa predstavlja dobrodošel prispevek tudi k mednarodnim razpravam s tega podrocja. Delo zakljucuje tretji vecji sklop, ki se znova vraca k etiki hotene nevednosti, njenim pogojem in mejam. Tu morda najdemo kljucne poudarke knji­ge, kjer se avtor spretno navezuje na svoje poprejšnje raziskovalno delo s podrocja okolijske etike in etike živali ter ga v marsicem nadgrajuje. Knjiga tako ponuja dodelan pristop h kljucnim vpra­šanjem filozofske etike. Pristop, ki ga prinaša Hotena nevednost, ima seveda doloce­ne omejitve in pomanjkljivosti. V veliki meri se izogiba vpraša­njem po statusu resnice in njeni vrednosti, vprašanjem, kaj je res-nica, kako se nam daje ter ce je sploh dosegljiva. Resnica, kot je postulirana v Hoteni nevednosti, mestoma deluje prevec nepro­blematicno, skoraj nedvoumno jasno in tako dosegljivo. Toda v resnici se prav lahko nahaja ne­resnica in obratno, tako lahko pravzaprav obstajata hkrati. V tem kontekstu so seveda v veliki meri zanemarjeni postmoderni filozofski uvidi, ki opozarjajo rav-no na težave z resnico kot pre­zenco, dojemljivo in posedljivo. V tem oziru je pravzaprav lahko tudi hotena vednost dojeta kot precej problematicna, želi na­mrec posedovati neposedljivo, s tem pa hromi življenje samo. Temu drobnemu zadržku nav­kljub pa moramo poudariti, da knjiga Hotena nevednost v slo­venski intelektualni prostor pri­naša sodobno filozofsko misel, ki na inovativen nacin premišlja starodavna vprašanja in ponuja nove inovativne odgovore nan­je. Seveda pa ne prinaša zadnje besede glede analiziranega ob­cecloveškega mehanizma (ce je kaj takšnega sploh mogoce), av-tor se namrec vselej trudi svojim argumentom poiskati prepriclji­ve protiargumente, ki osrednjo temo držijo odprto in zanimivo. Kot takšno je doticno delo odlic­na izhodišcna tocka za prihaja­joce razprave. Hkrati s tem pa delo s svojim koherentnim filo­zofskim pristopom in pogloblje­nostjo osnovne teze predstavlja izjemen prispevek k slovenski humanisticni stroki. V slovensko akademsko okolje vpeljuje dolo-ceno znanstveno senzibilnost, ki predstavlja obogatitev domace filozofske produkcije, v zavze­manju za izgradnjo slovenske terminologije pa uvaja marsika­teri nov izraz. Knjiga je v svojem spoju raznolikih pristopov k za­nimivi osrednji temi inovativno znanstveno delo, napisana je na visokem filozofskem nivoju, hkrati pa s temo, ki bo zanimi­va širokemu krogu bralcev, in razumljivo argumentacijo pred­stavlja privlacno vstopno tocko v filozofsko znanstveno misel. Luka Trebežnik